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Opposition to Atlanticism in US Politics
David Dunn (United Kingdom)
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  1. The Rise of "Neo-Isolationism"
  2. The widening of the foreign policy debate to include more radical policy positions was most evident in the 1992 presidential race. The election campaign demonstrated that there were both candidates and constituencies who were willing to support a more fundamental restructuring of America's overseas commitments and world role. Nor were these views limited to one political party or perspective. Instead, radical, populist and isolationist sentiments could be found on the radical left, amongst former Presidential candidates Jerry Brown, Jesse Jackson and Douglas Wilder and amongst Democrats in Congress such as Pat Schroeder, Richard Gephardt and David Bonior.

    On the Republican right the "neo-isolationist" tendency is supported most publicly by former Reagan Administration speech writer and Presidential candidate Pat Buchanan and by such think tanks as the CATO Institute. Independent Presidential candidate Ross Perot was also a vocal advocate of a radically retrenched US foreign policy, especially towards Europe. Evidence for the continued support for these radical foreign policy ideas was provided by the 1994 mid-term elections to the 104th Congress which returned members who shared some of these unorthodox views.


    While much has been written about the growth of "neo-isolationism" it is all too easy to generalise about the radical foreign policy views which are now being articulated in this debate. (34) Indeed, one of the few things that most of these foreign policy radicals agree on is a dislike of the label "isolationist." This is the case, as Peter Rodman explains because "isolationism is still a pejorative term in the American debate. One is put on the defensive if one is accused of being an isolationist..." (35)

    Indeed each individual or grouping is both eager and willing to find some feature of their own beliefs differentiating them from those of the isolationists of the pre-cold war age. (36) For this reason some observers prefer to label this current of thinking with the more neutral term "Anti-Internationalism". (37)

    It is also not difficult to find differences between the most radical advocates of foreign policy retrenchment and the isolationists of old, since most accept in some form or other the implications of America's place in the changed international environment of the 1990s. While not all radicals are isolationists, however, it suits those who oppose their views to characterise them as such. Thus the Clinton administration has been at pains to warn of the dangers of the "isolationist backlash, which is present in both parties". (38)

    At least part of the rhetorical concern for the resurgence of isolationism, therefore, is designed to rally support behind the accuser's version of internationalism as it is to warn against a coherent challenge from the radical disengagers. This form of linguistic censure, which is also present among internationalist Republicans, is not itself without its critics who recognise that the effect of this characterisation of foreign policy as "either full-blown internationalism or know-nothing isolationism, without any middle ground, is to choke off fresh... thinking." (39) Nor indeed are the reforming foreign policies of the Clinton administration immune from partisan critics who wish to present its brand of internationalism in some sense "isolationist". (40)

    Among the advocates of a radically retrenched foreign policy are many cross cutting political cleavages. The foreign policy radicals come neither exclusively from the right wing or the left nor indeed are their views even consistent with such concepts. Gore Vidal for example accepts the twin labels of "left-wing isolationist" and "Palaeolithic conservative". (41) Similarly Pat Buchanan's denouncement of "vulture capitalism" and description of free trade as a "very brutal force" are ideas more traditionally associated with the left than with the Republican party which he has twice sought to lead. Nor are they solely Democrats, Republicans or independents. (42)

    Differences are also apparent on more substantive questions. Not all foreign policy radicals are exclusively protectionist on the question of trade or united in a desire to cut the defense budget. Differences are also apparent over time as is evident with Pat Buchanan who waxed lyrical on the merits of the US invasion of Grenada and support for the Nicaraguan contras while a Reagan administration spokesmen but who is now opposed to all such interventions. (43)

    Even when foreign policy radicals agree on a foreign policy position, such as Jerry Brown and Pat Buchanan's common opposition to both free trade and foreign aide, other differences in their political views place them far apart. Brown's position on environmentalism, for example, is almost as unpopular with Buchanan as are the latter's views on abortion with the former. Similarly, even when foreign policy radicals identify with a particular slogan or concept, such as "America First" this does not signify a unity of purpose. As Kauffman explains in relation to the supporters of America First,

    No formal platform exists, nor is one likely to: this is far too versicolored and contentiously American a lot to swear collective allegiance to a single document. There are, across this broad band, differences in emphasis, focus, and sometimes policy. (44)

    While neither inclusive nor definitive, it is possible to identify and differentiate some of the perspectives motivating the foreign policy radicals to support the policy positions which they hold.

    Libertarians

    On the radical right, this grouping is primarily represented by the CATO Institute, whose principle spokesmen and prolific writer on international relations is Ted Galen Carpenter. One of the more radical groupings, this current of thinking comes closest to the popular conception of isolationism in their foreign policy prescriptions with the exception of their support for free trade. This group advocates an end to America's alliance commitments in Asia and Europe and a halving of the defence budget. They support a very narrow definition of the national interest which they think America's foreign policy must serve. For them, as Carpenter, explains, "A vital interest ought to have a direct, immediate, and substantial connection with America's physical survival, political independence, or domestic liberty...[and] for which the nation must be willing to fight a major war, if necessary." (45)

    Indeed, for Carpenter this definition would not have included the Persian Gulf War. (46) Nor would the libertarians support the Clinton administration's policies designed to counter nuclear proliferation, since they argue that these tasks are unnecessary, expensive, probably counterproductive and likely to embroil the United States in other peoples concerns to its own cost. Thus Doug Bandow of the CATO Institute argues that "With the growing ability of even small political movements and countries to kill US citizens and to threaten mass destruction, the risks of foreign entanglements increase... In coming years, the United States could conceivably lose one or more large cities to demented or irrational retaliation for American intervention." (47)

    For the libertarians, US interests world wide can best be served by a minimalist foreign policy which limits both costs and risks to the United States by avoiding foreign entanglements. It is a position which makes much of the changed international environment at the end of the cold war. The United States, Carpenter argues, ought to take advantage of the fact that "For the first time in 50 years, there is no powerful threat to US security" and should therefore act upon this by retrenching its foreign policy role in the realisation that in the "post-Cold War world...most of the conflicts and quarrels will be irrelevant to America's own security interests." (48) This group remains a minority perspective with little support among elected officials.

    Palaeo-conservativism

    This grouping is best characterised by the views of Patrick Buchanan and Ross Perot, although Gore Vidal also claims this label. Populist, nativist and nationalist in many of its reflexes, this grouping embraces the slogan and much of the heritage of the America First Committee of the 1920s. This approach advocates a transfer of resources from international commitments to domestic concerns. "Why" Buchanan writes "26 years after World War II, are we defending Germany and Japan while they steal our markets?" (49)

    Buchanan and his supporters advocate the abrogation of the Mutual Security Treaty with Japan and the withdrawal of all US troops and nuclear weapons from Europe and handing over of NATO to the Europeans. In addition, like Perot, he demands that where America still contributes to the security of its allies, they should pay for the privilege. The Palaeo-conservatives are also opposed to US support for international organisations like the IMF, World Bank, and the United Nations, which they believe to be a threat to American sovereignty and a means to use American money in the interests of ungrateful foreigners. On trade they are protectionist and particularly vocal against the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The house magazine of the palaeo-conservatives is Chronicles, published by the Rockford Institute in Illinois and edited by Thomas Fleming. (50)

    While advocating policies which demonstrate a desire to retrench from America's international commitments, the palaeo-conservative position, as advocated by Buchanan, also contains curious contradictions such as Buchanan's claim that the US is "uniquely situated to lead the world...The twenty-first century will also be the American century." Thus as Owen Harries explains, "we are left with the confusing image of a United States that simultaneously stands apart and leads." (51)

    While Buchanan gained twenty five percent of the Republican vote in the 1996 New Hampshire presidential primaries and Ross Perot gained nineteen percent in the 1992 Presidential election, this perspective remains a sizable but minority perspective. Ross Perot failed to gain the endorsement of a single member of Congress and Patrick Buchanan is seen as more of a hinderance than an asset by the Republican Party establishment. (52) Presidential nominee Robert Dole even went so far as to brand Buchanan an "extremist".

    Economic Nationalists

    More a political impulse than a a coherent grouping, economic nationalism has always been a feature of the American political debate and has been on the increase since the recessions of the 1980s. This grouping combines some of the America First impulses of the palaeo-conservatives with left wing concerns of organised labour fearful of the loss of jobs to overseas competitors. Primarily protectionist in its focus, this grouping is also fiercely hostile to US foreign aid playing on public opinion which perceives this expenditure to be a far higher proportion of the federal budget than it actually is. (53)

    Articulators of economic nationalist sentiments include Perot and Buchanan on the right, and former Governor Jerry Brown, Congressmen Richard Gephart, Senator Tom Harkin and Virginia Govener Douglas Wilder on the left. This group has made a significant impact in the American political debate over the issue of the need to focus on the domestic rather than the international agenda. Part of this argument involves the idea, which has gained wide support, that it is time that America sheds its disproportionate share of international responsibilities.

    Anti Imperialists

    This grouping was defined by their opposition to the Vietnam war and has retained a constant presence in the political debate since, opposing operations such as the Reagan administration's military action against Grenada, Lebanon, Libya and its support for the Nicaraguan contras and the Bush administration's operations in Panama, the Persian Gulf and Somalia. Left wing in its perspective, this group believes that America's foreign policy is anti-democratic abroad and ruinous at home of both the domestic economy and the democratic fabric of the state. Their positions include withdrawal of US military presence from abroad and radical cuts in the defence budget, but not of the aid budget. Because American foreign policy was dominated by security concerns for most of the cold war, opposition to military commitments which no longer seem vital can be translated into reluctance to be engaged internationally more generally.

    Advocates of this position include Congresswoman Pat Schroeder, former Presidential candidate Jesse Jackson, and academics Gore Vidal and Noam Chomsky. This grouping remains a minority perspective, especially among elected officials.

    Narrow Realists

    This grouping combines supporters from both ends of the political spectrum united in their opposition to what they see as an overly expansive foreign policy. This group includes those who supported containment during the cold war but who now argue for a more narrow definition of the national interest. In this grouping is former Reagan administration official Jeane Kirkpatrick, who argues that "The time when Americans should bear such unusual burdens is past. With a return to 'normal' times, we can again become a normal nation". (54)

    The argument is based on the idea that, in the post-Cold War environment, there is no need for such an elaborate and extensive foreign policy as was pursued for the past fifty years, and that now "the United States is free to focus again on its own national interests without endangering the civilisation of which it's a part". (55)

    Indeed Kirkpatrick derides an America foreign policy that she describes as "'disinterested globalism' which looks to the world and asks what needs to be done - with little explicit concern for the national interest." (56) This grows deeply critical of Wilsonian internationalist policies which aim to promote democratic enlargement, human rights and, in Europe, support the expansion of NATO.

    On defence policy, while most are in favour of ballistic missile defence for the United States itself, opinion on the size of the defence budget is split. While Kirkpatrick argues for substantially larger budgets than proposed by the Clinton administration to avoid "hollow forces" most narrow realists argue exactly the opposite case. (57) Alan Tonelson of the Economic Strategy Institute and Ronald Steel of the University of Southern California are two of the most prolific advocates of redirecting resources away from defence to the domestic agenda, arguing that cold war-scale budgets are no longer affordable or supported by the public.

    At the extreme this perspective advocates a minimalist foreign policy where "Once national survival and independence are assured, all the major objectives of US foreign policy must be subjected to a rigorous cost-risk analysis... Americans should start thinking of foreign policy in terms of avoiding problems, reducing vulnerabilities and costs, maximising options, buying time, and muddling through - objectives that may be uninspiring but that are well suited to a strong, wealthy, geographically isolated country." (58)

    Part of this cost-risk analysis is to see all international contact as a zero-sum game. Thus, for Ronald Steel, the United States "must act unsentimentally upon our wider interests. It means thinking of Europe not as a dependent, or even any longer as an ally, but as a trading partner, an economic competitor, and in some cases as a rival." (59) This thinking also extends to protectionism in trade policy.


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