Conference: NATO Enlargement: The National Debates over Ratification 7 Oct. '97

The Logic of Dual Enlargement by Simon SERFATY

Among the many issues facing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), few, if any, are as historically poignant as the dual enlargement of these two Western institutions to the East. After 1945, the insanity of two world wars in slightly more than one generation created firm resolve in the United States and among the European states to make another military conflict in Europe unthinkable. To this effect, decisions involving the organization of a transatlantic security community with the United States and a European economic community with Germany were complementary. Under the protective umbrella of NATO guarantees that confirmed America's return to Europe, an ever more integrated civil space began to take form on the western part of the continent-a civil space whose expansion to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is now viewed as Europe's own manifest destiny. Such expansion was decided in June 1993, when the European Council summit meeting at Copenhagen agreed that countries associated with the EU through "Europe Agreements" were all eligible for full EU membership. (1) Four years later, half of the 10 initial CEE applicants, together with Cyprus, are about to begin negotiations whose final schedule remains ambiguous: while France's President Jacques Chirac, continues to target the year 2000 first evoked by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, EU officials like Commissioner Hans van den Broek speak of the years 2002-2003 as target dates that many observers still dismiss as unrealistic. Irrespective of its timetable, the enlarge-ment of the European Union raises many political and economic questions whose resolution imposes a major rethinking of the EU integrative effort irrespective of the enlargement of NATO. EU enlargement will not come cheap, and an overhaul of EU policies in many areas of primary concern to most CEE states, including the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and structural subsidies, is, therefore, indispensible. Enlargement is likely to involve many new members, and some anticipatory redesign of the EU structures is necessary, including changes in voting procedures at the European Council, as wel as the organization of the Commission and the role of Parliament. Because enlargement will not be open-ended the EU must conduct its negotiations all the more cautiously as the consequences of non-membership in the EU are probably more immediate and more real than non-membership in NATO. As every stage of enlargement remains dependent on the acceptance of specific terms and conditions by every EU member, the national debates within each member state is no less significant than the European debate. In other words, it is the specific interests of each member state, and the perceptions of these interests by all its partners, that will condition and ultimately produce the compromises and trade offs over the terms, conditions, and timing of enlargement. NATO enlargement is different-more demanding in some ways and less complex in others. It became the lead issue of the post-cold war order in Europe as an afterthought -after, that is, the EU had displayed its post-Maastricht institutional disarray and its post-Bosnia political impotence. Admittedly, there-fore, the NATO decision to enlarge, in December 1995, came more cautiously than the EU decision, in June 1993. But irrespective of will and circumstances, the dynamics of each institution was bound to make enlarge-ment much slower and much more tentative for the EU than for NATO: Because NATO is so responsive to the leadership of the one member state without which it cannot endure while the EU is effectively dependent on a consensus of all members without which it cannot proceed; because the financial costs of enlargement cannot be as easily fudged, deferred, or shared for the EU as for NATO; and because the Washington Treaty, which was drafted in a simple language, is flexible and relatively undemanding whereas the Rome Treaties, written as an infinitely more complex and demanding document, define a discipline that has becomes increasingly demanding for current members let alone new ones. (2) Nor is this all. The different processes-directions and speeds-of enlargement have also had to respond to such considerations as: NATO's need to take into account the interests and sensitivities of non-members (especially but not only Russia), whereas the EU has had to accomodate the preferences and apprehensions of its own members-a much more difficult task that can be blocked by any EU member at any step of the process; a public indifference to the necessity of NATO enlargement (which does not entail, however, any hostility toward NATO), as compared to a growing public hostility to the EU (which does not suggest, nonetheless, indifference toward EU enlargement);(3) and for both NATO and the EU, the requirements of separate ratification debates likely to be determined on grounds of national interests ranked in terms of national priorities.

Major Issues Since the 1957 Rome Treaties, four waves of enlargement have increased the size of the European community from its original six members to its current 15 members. Revisions in the rules of institutional governance were, therefore, indispensible irrespective of any further expansion in EU membership. In addition, post-Maastricht prospects of enlargement also seemed to demand that the 15 EU members come to an early decisions over the next steps needed to consolidate and even deepen the acquis that would have to be offered to the new members. Thus, the IGC was from the start a central feature of the decision to enlarge the EU. In other words, since the decision to expand had already been taken, EU members were to negotiate the needed treaty revisions with an understanding that the Union's membership would soon expand to 20 or more states. Because this IGC would explicitly have to be concluded before negotiations on enlargement could be initiated, the IGC was widely expected to settle many of the institutional issues placed on its agenda: institutional/ procedural reforms such as voting in the European Council and distribution of Council votes (increase qualified majority voting, adopt super-qualified or population-weighted majority voting, and change the presidency system), powers of the European Parliament (increase or decrease its powers, and/or reinforce the role of national legislatures), and composition of the European Commission (reduce commissioners to one or less per member state, and change their nominations/ dismissals as well as the choice of the Commission president); development of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP)-with increased majority voting, a single voice, and the integration of the Western European Union (WEU) into the EU-in order to give Europe a regional military autonomy and global political influence commensurate with its economic weight and historic tradition; and closer member state cooperation in the vital societal areas of justice and home affairs. The expectations raised by IGC for the resolution of many of these questions were not met. As the 15 member states prepared for the last round of IGC negotiations in the spring of 1997, the newly fragile German government of Helmut Kohl found it difficult to accomodate the new and newly skeptical French govern-ment led by Lionel Jospin. The trade-offs that had characterized previous such encounters could no longer be achieved with any semblance of substantive reality, either between France and Germany or between them and their partners: no change in the allocation of commissioners, or in the rules of majority voting, or with regard to the role of the European Parliament; no significant decision either with regard to CFSP, about which an hypothetical Mr. Europe remained unknown even after he was named since he could claim neither the authority of his personal saliency nor that of his national sponsors. In sum, the IGC that was expected to launch EU enlargement to the East proved to be mainly a non-event. Its main contribution was to end, as was shown with a subsequent announcement that negotiations with five CEE countries (the same three countries picked by NATO plus Estonia and Slovenia) and with Cyprus could now begin; but its main legacy was also the certain need for a new IGC-at some point in or after the year 2000, when the decisions which the 15 members failed to make in 1997 in anticipation of EU enlargement will have to be considered anew and for the same main reason. The debate over budget reform is also of immediate relevance to future decisions about enlargement. With over three-quarters of the EU budget earmarked for CAP and regional development policy, the EU budget is especially significant to member states that have large agricultural sectors and/or significant regional needs-a status held by most CEE applicants and future members. Not surprisingly, net contributors to the EU budget-Britain, France, Germany, Benelux, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland-neither want to increase their outlays in Brussels under conditions of stringent fiscal austerity at home, nor wish to share the subsidies which some of them receive from the Commission, or endure additional competition from CEE farmers who produce plenty and sell cheap. No more surprising, and even more urgent, are widespread concerns among EU members over the impact of enlargement on the EU regional development policy: to satisfy the new members' needs (higher than those of current members) would require either more Structural Funds (likely to be unavailable) or a reform that changes criteria of eligibility for aid or/and limits the amount of aid that any one member can receive (likely to be unacceptable). In fact, without changes in these criteria, the average per capita income within a wider EU might be changed to such an extent as to leave Greece as the only current member state eligible for aid. These are only a few examples of the relationship between EU enlargement and EU reform. The nuances of each national position, compromises among these positions, and the bargains they produce, as well as their actual impact on expansion (not only generally but from one applicant to the next), deserve close attention as they constantly evolve depending on economic and political conditions in each member states-from one election to the next (Britain and France in 1997, Germany and Italy in 1998) or even from one decision to the next, whether over economic and monetary union (EMU) or while awaiting the resolution of some new U.S.-EU dispute over issues of trade or money. To wit, will Britain's Labour govern-ment hold out as a minority of one and block all institutional reform, or will it find in the EU deadlock an opportunity to regain its long-lost influence on EU matters? Will France's third experiment in political cohabitation undermine further its bilateral relations with Germany and encourage improvement in its relations with Britain? Might a coalition of the three larger states impose its will over the European Council and the Commission at the expense of the smaller EU members and in spite of their differences over CFSP (France and Germany without Britain) and the European Parliament (Britain and France without Germany)? How would the current alignment of political forces in Italy react to, or be affected by, the novelty of exclusion-say, from EMU, but how, too, would the more recent members from southern Europe (including Spain and Portugal)? Can either the Nordic states or Germany, as well as Italy and France, find solace in the EU for states like Estonia and Slovenia, whose NATO membership they had sponsored respectively? Can Italy and Britain combine with Denmark and others in the Council to deny the Commission's recommendation over EMU? Will the larger and richer states insist on curbing EU budget spending? If so, what will be the tit-for-tat concessions sought by the smaller and poorer states? How can the Single Market be completed without intensive development of underdeveloped areas that will come with enlargement to the East? These questions, and the policy dilemmas they raise, will not become any easier with time, and failure to address and resolve them will not make enlargement easier either.

Fragile States, Fragile State of the Union In this context, conditions for EU reform and EU enlargement do not appear propitious, whether from the standpoint of Europe as a more-or-less coherent Union of states or from that of Europe as a more or less recognizable mosaic of nation-states. Everywhere now, the countries of Europe bemoan their condition as democracies whose representatives find it difficult to represent their constituencies because of a technocratic European leadership in Brussels that is said to be lacking democratic legitimacy; as national groups that are asked to become something "more" or, worse yet, something "else" than whom or what they have always been, at the expense of a national legitimacy rooted in history; and as citizens whose identity is said to be blurred by distinguishable minorities that have come in large but increasingly unwanted numbers from the lost empires of an increasingly distant past. (4) Some of Europe's resulting political volatility has to do with the end of the cold war, which has removed the convictions that helped protect each country and its people from the threat abroad or the enemy within. Some of this volatility also has to do with the economic rigor and political discipline imposed on each state in the name of Europe: absent the heroic opportunity to die for one's country, starving for one's neighbors is not a fulfilling alternative. Finally, some of this volatility may also be linked to a more fundamental national rebellion against an ideological convergence and social cohesion sought at the expense of some heroic myths about who "we" used to be and "what" we used to do. In any case, as every nation-state in Europe seems to rebel against further losses of its sovereignty to, and pain from, the EU, trade-offs needed for the completion of an ever wider Union are increasingly difficult to negotiate and enforce. (5) The June elections in France provided a dramatic confirmation of this general trend in Europe-the end, that is, of the permissive consensus that had surrounded government decisions about Europe over the past 40 years. To be sure, "Europe" was only one issue among others-which also included the many unfulfilled promises of the 1995 presidential election-but it was nonetheless a decisive issue that conditioned the nation's mood from one group of citizens to another and helped define alignments from one group to the next. With the defeat of the idea of Europe are defeated those who had associated their political fate with that of more, not less, Europe-not only in France, with Chirac and his conservative majority, but also in Germany, where Helmut Kohl stands aloof and astray, and in Italy, where the Olive coalition of prime minister Romano Prodi is abandoned by his left without gaining support on a right whose strong and assertive leaders are comforted by the perspective of a constitutional reform that will place a premium on assertiveness and strength. In addition, bilateral relations between the three main EU countries, as well as between each of them and the United States, are also increasingly fluid. Thus, the Franco-German partnership which has helped "define" Europe for the past four decades rests on more fragile grounds than at any time since Charles de Gaulle first met with Konrad Adenauer in September 1958 and, subsequently, the two men celebrated their countries' reconciliation with a Treaty of Friendship they signed in January 1963. In June 1997, the failure of the European Council Summit in Amsterdam followed naturally the failure of the bilateral summit held in Poitiers, France, a few days earlier, when France and Germany could not even agree on a bland and general statement dealing with the Middle East. (6) Such tensions in Franco-German relations have little to do with the ghosts that may still haunt either country's memories. Rather, they have to do with the growing political difficulties faced by France to keep up with the pace of Germany's economic leadership and share its objectives, as well as with Germany's impatience with a French inability to keep up with the pace and discipline of its own projects: within the European Monetary System (EMS) and, more recently, over the Maastricht criteria for EMU; in the European Parliament, and over the broader extension of majority voting in the European Council; during successive rounds of trade negotiations and, repeatedly, over the political costs of reforming CAP; for the accomodation of French privileged ties with its former colonies in the South, and now over the modalities of accomodating these interests with the imperative of enlargement to the East. Indeed, a review of the Anglo-French-German positions after the Amsterdam summit and the recent significant political changes in each country (including the Labour triumph in Britain, the sudden socialist return to power in France, and the erosion of Kohl's strength in Germany) (7) confirms that agreements trois remain rare but that French disagreements with a maximalist Germany are getting wider over more and more significant issues while bilateral differences with a minimalist Great Britain appear to become smaller on many of those same issues. That closer Anglo-French relations, made even more attractive by the nominal convergence of Blair's and Jospin's socialist majorities, would emerge in the context of improved Anglo-American relations (also made possible by the instant closeness between Tony Blair and Bill Clinton) is even more significant because of a French rapprochement with the United States accelerated after Chirac became president (but compromised somewhat by his recent political weakness). In any case, the first Labour prime minister since 1979 can now provide a natural link across the Atlantic but also across the Channel, a link that has been missing since the 1956 Suez crisis ended the Anglo-French special partnership, the 1957 Rome Treaties blurred Britain's relations with Europe, and the 1958 Gaullist call for a NATO directoire asserted France's mistrust of Britain as its spokesman across the Atlantic. (8)

EU and NATO Enlargement Both NATO and the EU are the flagships of U.S. policies in Europe (although, admittedly, only one of these institutions is U.S.-led). Since the end of World War II, these policies have been shaped by interests-economic, political, and security. These interests, which were hardly born out of the Cold War but grew during the Cold War, are known. Suffice it to assert emphatically that the totality of these interests is not matched anywhere else outside the Western Hemisphere: the transatlantic relationship is a complete relationship, and what the states of Europe do and fail to do, whether as nation-states or as member states of a uniting and increasingly strong European Union, has direct, and often vital, consequences on the United States. Whatever risks to U.S. leader-ship and influence may be raised by a united Europe, with an army and a currency of its own, are prospective and hypothetical; the risks to U.S. interests and ideals raised by a weak and divided Europe are immediate and tangible. EU enlargement is not a U.S. responsibility. Although the United States is a power in Europe-arguably the only active Great Power on the continent-it is not a European power. (9) Nonetheless, EU enlarge-ment is a very important U.S. interest because of what it means for the economic and geo-political interests of the United States- virtually a non-member member state within the EU-but also, by implication, because of what it means for stability and affluence in Europe. Thus, although decisions affecting the enlargement of either Western institution can be separated the two processes of enlargement remain inseparable. Moving at different speeds and in different directions, and responding to different needs and different priorities, they are not only compatible but also complementary (even though some European states, especially France, may still be tempted by the vision of a more powerful and broader Europe as a substitute for NATO). As they proceed toward convergence at some time and some point in the future, EU (and NATO) enlargement to the East completes NATO (and EU) enlargement: because each of these two institutions (NATO and the EU) provides a dimension (security and economic) which the other (the EU and NATO) lacks, because membership in either (gained on its own right) can help compensate for non-membership in the other (denied for reasons of its own), or even because the transparency of EU and NATO enlargement can influence national debates over ratification of NATO and EU enlargement. (10) In the United States, the EU has been usually second in importance to NATO. Whenever the EU moves center stage it is often viewed as a potential competitor for regional leadership and an actual rival on global trade issues. In short, U.S. perceptions of the EU are often ambivalent because U.S.-EU relations are often adversarial. Examples of discord abound. In recent years, such discord has become ever more sensitive to domestic pressures that make its resolution ever more difficult. Early in the Clinton administration, after the Maastricht treaty had been signed and the single market launched, many in the United States assumed that "Europe's time" was about to come-for the better or for the worse. This assumption remained unmet. Soon, therefore, the debate over Europe and its future gave way to a discourse over NATO and its future. As the EU with the 1993 Copenhagen Summit and the 1997 IGC, NATO's initial decisions about enlargement were executive agreements negotiated and signed by heads of state or government: to reassert NATO cohesion at 16, still awaiting a final decision from France, hope-fully long before but certainly no later than the "new" Washington Treaty in April 1999; to organize relations with Russia (and also the Ukraine) before and beyond the first wave of enlargement; to upgrade the NATO "partners" into non-member members of the Alliance, with appropriate measures of consultation before decisions are made (and active contributions as these decisions are enforced); and to initiate access talks with new members whose identity was be revealed at 16 even though only one NATO member was truly empored to name them, and only one NATO-member was virtually allowed to veto any of them. For the most part, these decisions came, at least implicitly, long before the Madrid Summit was arranged, let alone held-and at a time that could itself be surmised to have been long before it was announced, let alone confirmed. (11) That the final outcome of the decision over NATO enlargement (who and when) was never in doubt, unlike the final outcomes of the IGC negotiations viewed as a parallel prelude to EU enlargement (when and who), had to do with the institutional dynamics of NATO. The decision to proceed would have been made irrespective of Russia's response to the NATO offer for a separate agreement; it proceeded irrespective of France's decision to return in an organization it should not have left in the first place; and, as was shown in Madrid, European preferences for more new members did not affect decisively the debate and its conclusion. To be sure, the process of NATO enlargement would have been smoother, and the upcoming U.S. debate over the articles of ratification easier, had consultation with the main allies and deliberation with the generalt public been more candid and come to closure earlier than proved to be the case. But failings in both of these areas could not stand in the way of the decisions in Madrid because in the end NATO is a (1+15) organization whereby the American one matters somewhat more than its 15 partners, as opposed to its European counter-part as an institution within which any one member can frustrate the will of the community to which it belongs. What is at issue now is not only the outcome of the ratification debates in each current NATO member (and the projected new members), but also the form that debate might take, especially in the U.S. Senate which will predictably have an effect on parallel debates in some of the NATO allies (in France for example, but also in Germany) and even lasting consequences in Europe (should the terms and the size of the final vote raise new doubts over the short-term reliability and long-term credibility of the U.S. commitment). (12) That such would be the case has less to do with NATO (about which calls for dissolution are no longer heard) than with the role of the United States in Europe, as Americans accept it, as well as of the role of European countries (and the EU), as Europeans may wish it to be. In other words, the upcoming debate in the United States Senate will be less about NATO than about Europe, and less about NATO enlargement than about the U.S. role in Europe. Accordingly, contentious trans-atlantic and intra-European questions that creep up during the ratification debates may prove all the more significant as the calendar for NATO enlargement is unusually rigid and the EU agenda extraordinarily demanding. The NATO calendar responds to an unusual number of known and arbitrary deadlines set mainly by President Clinton: to enter history through the backdoor of fiftieth anniversaries (the 1947 Marshall Plan and the 1949 Washington Treaty); to leave it by ending past commitments (the projected June 1, 1998 exit from Bosnia, for example); and to live it through its pre-set agenda of bi- and multi-lateral meetings (including the bi-yearly calendar of NATO interministerial meetings and EU and U.S.-EU Summits). The importance of this calendar cannot be overstated: each deadline forces new decisions and each decision is cause for new deadlines, but failure to enforce any decision endangers the next deadline and may force a reappraisal of earlier decisions. For all purposes, the enlargement debate should have ended after release of the NATO study in September 1995 and the sub-sequent formal decision to adopt that report at the NATO meeting of December 1995-a study and a decision, at 16, designed to answer the whether and why of enlargement. Whatever the causes for delay, the Madrid Summit started the next phase of the debate, which has to do with ratification of decisions that have already been made, at about the time when the end of IGC also helped start the next EU phase, which includes vital decisions over EMU in the commitment to enlarge to at least five CEE countries, which are decisions that have note been made yet. In both instances, too, target dates in 1999 are comparable -January 1 for the new Euro and April 4 for the new NATO. Prior to NATO's blind date with its own past, issues that could cause significant delays for the NATO process-with consequences on the EU process-include: a botched withdrawal of U.S. forces in Bosnia in June or at any other date, because of, or prior to the long-standing pledge to arrest and punish the war criminals-which would be the first ever withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Europe before the war has been ended and won. There should be no mis-understanding in Europe about the imperative of contributing fairly to whatever force is devised to replace SFOR; Turkey's objections to NATO ratification, either because of continued opposition by leading European states to Turkey's EU membership, or because of a perceived lack of Western support in the Aegean, or because of rising Islamic anger over issues in Bosnia, the Gulf, and/or the Middle East; ill-defined drama in Moscow, resulting from, or leading to, a new political leadership and a reappraisal of post-cold war policies and attitudes; and, similarly, ill-defined dramas between Russia and any one of the former Soviet republics, because or in spite of Russian intentions and ambitions; new U.S.-EU trade disputes now that there is agreement over the Boeing-McDonnell merger (arguably the most serious transatlantic trade conflict since the 1957 Rome Treaties), or further congressional legislation with extra-territorial reach, la Helms-Burton. a war in the Middle East, which would confirm Europe's sense of a U.S. failure in the Middle East, or new U.S. military action in the Gulf, which the states of Europe would deem to be irresponsible even as repraisals for Iran's a demonstrable role in the 1996 terrorist attack against U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia. Thus, the next two years of national and transatlantic debates over NATO enlarge-ment, from 16 to 19 members, and the consequences of these debates over EU enlargement, can follow three main directions -ratification, postponement, and derailment: NATO enlarged, America triumphant cohesion at 16 renewed with broad reforms side agreements concluded, Russia/Ukraine next phase of enlargement kept open easy ratification by all 16 and new 3 new treaty signed on April 4, 1999 EU enlargement without alibi for new delays NATO enlarged. Agreements with France and others on NATO reforms in 1998, a subdued Russia seemingly content with its bi-multilateral Founding framework of relations with the West, an orderly continuation of the post-Dayton process in Bosnia, no new areas of U.S.-EU discord, and a general sense of satisfaction with the trends in and beyond Europe ease ratification in the Senate and, by extension, all European parliamentary bodies, thereby leading to a new NATO treaty in April 1999, after which date a new phase of NATO enlargement can erupt with fewer of the risks faced in the current context: with or without a pause, to the neutrals or to the East, without but not against Russia, at a cost but within reason and with some equity. As the NATO schedule reassures the countries of Europe, it helps ease the time pressures on EU enlargement too. NATO stalled, Russia combative ratification delayed agreement with Russia questioned no cohesion at 16 U.S. withdrawal from Bosnia tensions in the Gulf/Middle East EU uncertainties NATO stalled. Russia wages battle against ratification and the next round of enlargement, thus causing more tensions in the United States and with the NATO allies over the risks of NATO encroachment in former Soviet territory and over traditional Russian interests. France's return in NATO is cancelled or post-poned (pending a new presidential election), and weak political leadership in other NATO states (including Germany and Italy, pending new national elections) or political maneuvers in Washington (including those managed out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with articles of ratification that amount to a unilateral reformulation of the agreements negotiated within NATO at 16) stall or distort the ratification process in the United States and/or some of the other members (and even applicants). Europe's ambivalence is increased by the U.S. withdrawal from Bosnia, the fear (or consequences) of U.S. policies in the Gulf and the Middle East, and, on the whole, the unilateralist tone of its policies everywhere. Alignments with or against the United States complicate intra-European relations, with consequences for EU cohesion and decisions on all issues, including enlargement. No enlargement, NATO derailed Ratification blocked Russian provocations in/beyond Europe confused western leadership new war in the Middle East open hostilities in Bosnia EU hard core favoured over enlargement Enlargement derailed. Crises in and beyond Europe raise questions about the effectiveness and relevance of NATO, and the risks and costs of enlargement: war in Bosnia after a partial or full pullout of U.S. troops, tensions or worse in the Middle East and the Gulf, a political collapse in, say, Algeria or the Congo and a spillover in neighboring states paint a picture of U.S. policies as reflexive, hazardous, and self-serving. Instabilities in Russia widen trans-atlantic and intra-European divisions as vulnerable leaders cater to domestic pressures for disengagement from established alliances and even institutions. The Senate's half-hearted endorsement of NATO enlargement (with a close vote and/or too many revisions and new conditions), or postponement of the vote ( la Salt-II), creates enough disarray and uncertainties among European members of NATO to stall or disrupt the debate over EU enlargement. While the U.S. role in Europe is debated in the context of NATO enlargement, the countries of Europe debate the fate of the EU in the context of EMU-the issue that hijacked Europe's debate about the post-cold war future of the EU while the public debate in America was hijacked by the issue of NATO enlargement. As already noticed, the calendar for launching the new euro and the new NATO overlap within a narrow 12-week time frame early in 1999. Postponement of EMU, whether or not tantamount to failure, would have consequences on the EU and its members that could affect the attitudes of individual EU states not only toward the EU but also toward NATO and, arguably, toward the enlargement of either institution (or both). Conversely, failure of NATO enlargement because of non-ratification by the U.S. Senate, would impact on the EU: either in the sense of a smaller hard core of EU members intent on exploring a new partnership with Russia while accepting new distance from the United States. Launching the euro, however, will not end the debate over EMU (any more than a first round of NATO enlargement will end the debate over NATO enlargement). As was the case when the European Monetary System (EMS) was launched after 1979, the EMU debate will continue in the streets and in the marketplace after 1999, when national currencies will be eliminated during a three-year period of transition. Thus, the EU debate over enlargement will unfold in the difficult political context created by the national debates over EMU whose prospects can also be seen most fundamentally as triumphant, astray, or derailed: Emu triumphant, Europe relaunched strict adherence to the Maastricht criteria structural issues adressed, unemployment reduced EU institutional reforms launched CFSP on the way with NATO adapted/ enlarged EU enlargement talks launched EMU triumphant. A core group of Emu states is named out of a strict application of the Maastricht criteria of convergence-with the participation of Mediterranean states (including Italy) delayed, a strong euro, and an assertive European Central Bank. After IGC, and with Blair's Britain, renewed EU cohesion permits substantive action on CFSP. Indeed, presented as the centerpiece of Europe's CF[S]P, enlargement negotiations unfold in the context of the evolving enlargement of NATO. Emu, meanwhile, shows enough results quickly (more like the Common Market than like the EMS) to reinforce a new economic dynamism among its members, already apparent in 1998, and, accordingly, strengthen existing majorities for 1999. Mal-euro in a sick Europe loose application of Maastricht criteria monetary turbulence and economic/political crisis pain of membership and demanding core euro questioned, reshuffling of emu members all aspects of "Europe" deferred to emu EU enlargement deferred Mal-euro. Launching Emu with a larger core group (including Italy) is a necessity accepted by Kohl, in spite of the Bundesbank and under pressure from a weaker France. A larger Emu causes pressures on the euro- turbulence in the market and challenges in the streets, which repeat the early instabilities of the EMS (1979-83) without the unusually stable political majorities available then under conditions of relative prosperity in the member states and cohesion in the union. Such a weak and unstable euro erodes further the public willingness to endure the continued pain of EMU discipline pending tangible evidence of its effect on growth and jobs. Rising public skepticism about the EU stalls new decisions about the future of the European institutions, including final decisions over the terms and schedule of enlargement. Tighter monetary policies in Europe, in response to the weakness of the euro, combined with a loose fiscal policy drives the euro up, causing further public discontent and, hence, political instabilities. No Emu, no relance elsewhere decision to postpone creates new turbulence new political majorities in the EU hard core not only emu but the idea of union is questioned the igc is ignored, and no new igc is planned slow relance around cfsp and political issues divisive EU partnerships in nato context enlargement, too, is postponed indefinitely Emu derailed. Conditions in France and in Germany (criteria unmet, calls for referendum, majority changes) force the postponement of Emu in early to mid-1998 or of the euro in late 1998/early 1999-decision that creates further turbulence in the marketplace and in several leading EU members. With IGC having failed to provide an alternative point of relance (over CFSP or other high-visibility issues), the EU is astray, and enlargement seems to be stalled indefinitely. Alternative plans for a new IGC prior to the launching of the single currency in the year 2002 fail, as Tony Blair, himself closer to a new election, is reluctant to glue a Franco-German partnership that is questioned in the aftermath of an increasingly possible defeat of Kohl in September 1998 and confirmed prospects of a new presidential election in France in April 1999. EU disarray impacts on NATO cohesion, not only in the area of NATO reform but also over the conditions and timing of the next round of enlargement as non-NATO states threatened with remaining out of the EU insist on a faster calendar for NATO membership-to the dissatisfaction of Russia that redoubles its own pressures over western institutions that seem open to new opportunities for a more forceful Russian role in Europe.

Dual Enlargement Decisions by and about the EU, and decisions by and about NATO, come together. Neither institution can ignore the interests and aspirations of countries that have been responding to the criteria for membership defined by both institutions. That NATO will expand before the EU is no longer in doubt. The first round of NATO enlargement (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) will be completed by April 1999, and all five new members from the East singled out in July 1997 (the NATO three, plus Estonia and Slovenia) are unlikely to enter the EU before January 1, 2003 at the earliest (after completion of the EMU debate). Only a failure of U.S. will over NATO ratification-comparable to the U.S. failure over the League of Nations-would allow the EU to enlarge first. The consequences of such failure would extend much beyond NATO enlargement, however, and threaten a derailment of NATO altogether, with potentially disastrous consequences on U.S. interests in Europe. Thus, the timetables of dual enlargement are beginning to emerge-based on NATO as the "dynamic whip" of Europe's move to the East. The completion of accession talks for NATO's three new members in December 1997, ratification debates in the U.S. Senate and other relevant national legislatures throughout 1998, and the signing of a new treaty in April 1999 can all be expected as scheduled, notwithstanding the various risks of derailment already suggested. References to further expansion after 1999 are not binding, however, even though, admittedly, Romania and the Baltic states (and even Slovakia) will view the Madrid decision for an open process as a firm NATO commitment that would reward their patience and alleviate their fears at the opening of the new century. In Europe, it is EMU rather than enlargement that will continue to absorb the attention of the EU states until 1999 at least, and probably beyond. That the June 1 elections in France have significantly damaged the prospects for EMU is beyond doubt. (13) There are limits to the flexibility that the German chancelor will be able to impose on the Bundesbank, his opposition, and even his own party in the spring of 1998, without paying the ultimate political price of electoral defeat in late September 1998. (14) Yet commitments to EMU have gone too far to abort a decision to launch in April 1998 (announcement of the core group) and January 1999 (start of the euro). At worst, monetary turbulence in the market place and political disorders in the streets, before and after both decisions, may force a reappraisal of the lengthy transition to a single currency, however difficult such a reappraisal may be. This period of turbulence could be shortened either by moving forward the date of July 1, 2002, or, alternatively, by stopping the clock on January 1, 1999 in order to give the members of a broadly-defined core group the time to improve their performance with regard to the convergence criteria set at Maastricht. In truth, whether the EMU states will be able to endure such turbulence cannot be predicted. Suffice it to recall that the initial launch of the EMS was also the source of much turbulence that was overcome after a general political overhaul throughout Europe brought to power strong and lasting political majorities from Margaret Thatcher in 1979 through Franois Mitterrand and Felipe Gonzalez in 1981 and up to Helmut Kohl in 1983. These strong governments do not exist today, and irrespective of available substitute majorities the public mood appears to make such stability unlikely in the future. Even under the shadow of EMU, the commitment to EU enlargement has also gone too far to be abandoned. Yet, delays in enforcing this commitment can be feared in the context of the economic and political agendas faced by the EU (including the probability of a new IGC at the turn of the century) and within several EU member states (including the 1998 elections in Germany and, possibly, Italy, and France in 1999). Nonetheless, a retail EU enlargement (1+4+1+x+y+z+...) could reduce the current time pressures if the quick admission of one state prior to the others was to be viewed as a down payment made by the EU as the irrefutable proof of its commitment to enlargement. Because of the potential consequences of an early admission of Estonia on its neighbors in the Baltic if there is too long a gap between the first and the other two, the least costly (financially and politically) candidate for fast-track admission appears to be Slovenia rather than Estonia. Assuming EU enlargement from 15 to 21 states on January 1, 2003, the desirable synchronization of NATO and EU enlarge-ment could occur only in the out years. After NATO membership has grown from 16 to 19, on April 4, 1999, calls to await the completion of EU enlargement will justify delays in further eastern enlargement of NATO (in spite of Romania whose claim for NATO prepared-ness will suffer accordingly while its hope for EU membership would remain stalled). (TABLE .PDF/10Kb) In any case, after 1999 it may be best for NATO to target EU states that are not NATO members yet (including Austria, Sweden, Finland, and even Ireland) as the most desirable new NATO members which, for the most part, will not raise new objections in Moscow. A progressive overlap of NATO and EU membership would help reform NATO, before and beyond April 1999, and might even help with the "progressive but full" integration of WEU in the EU in the context of the next IGC, in or around the year 2001: the "s" of CFSP would represent the most visible and most readily availabl vehicle for a European relance in the context of the uncertainties that might continue to surround EMU in coming years. Calls for membership overlap based on decisions made separately by both institutions would also help justify a pause before the next round of NATO enlargement without denying the commitment made in Madrid. (15) After that, EU expansion to 21 members would prepare the next round of NATO enlargement eastward, including the new EU states that are not yet members of NATO (Estonia and Slovenia), Romania and the other Baltic states (Latvia and Lithuania), and some of the former Warsaw Pact states that were left out of the initial NATO (and EU) decisions (Slovakia and Bulgaria). By that time, 2005 or so, some of the questions surrounding Russia and its future are likely to have been answered sufficiently to moderate or even end any more debate on the desirability or risks of an enlargement of NATO farther east and to former Soviet republics outside the Baltics (including the Ukraine). How these questions are answered will in turn determine how much longer the logic of dual enlarge-ment can be sustained and how much farther the enlargement of either institution must be extended. Limits are likely to be especially strict for the EU, whose aspirations as a budding political community suggest that at some point soon more enlargement will become neither manageable nor desirable.

Stay The Course As nation-states learn to live as member states of those institutions to which they belong or which they wish to join, and as institutions continue to accomodate the resilience of nation-states on which they continue to depend for legitimacy, both NATO and the EU face a heavy agenda: widen in order to deepen, deepen in order to widen, and reform in order to do both. None of the specific tasks associated with any of these general goals is truly new. The EU and NATO have both been widening, deepening, and reforming ever since the Washington and Rome treaties were signed in 1949 and 1957 respectively. So it was during the cold war, and so it remains now. This dual institutional process has to do with nothing less than the reorganization of the political, economic, and security space in Europe and across the Atlantic, not only after the cold war but also after the two world wars of the twentieth century and the many European wars before that. Decisions for the enlargement of NATO and the EU to the East are, therefore, about the final fulfillment of the visions that emerged on both sides of the Atlantic 50 years ago-Europe's vision of America returning "home" and America's vision of Europe fashioning a common home for its weary states. These decisions face numerous critics on each account. In the United States, many find Europe tiresome and a hopeless consumer of American time and assets. The EU is dismissed as a failure and its members as a thing of the past-including a population that is no longer compatible with the prevailing demographic trends in the United States. In short, America's future is said to be elsewhere, in Asia mostly but also, to an extent, throughout the Western Hemisphere. In Europe, meanwhile, many find the U.S. leadership intrusive, hazardous, deceptive, and unreliable: intrusive because of its penchant for an hegemonial lendership especially in evidence since the end of the cold war and the Gulf war; hazardous because the price of its failures must too often be borne by the allies in Europe (and elsewhere); deceptive because of a tendency (hardly limited to the United States) to rely on ideals to hide its self-interests; and unreliable because of its dependence on internal patterns of political and constitutional behavior that are neither understable nor acceptable in Europe. Finally, within Europe a Union that was welcomed during the cold war as a shield against U.S. power and an alternative to a conflictual history is now questioned for being too unwieldy, illegitimate, and painful: unwieldy because of a bureaucracy that erodes the sovereignty and the identity of its members, illegitimate because this bureaucracy lacks democratic credentials and transparency, and painful because its action is now viewed as a consumer of affluence and a producer of hardship. Such doubts over the decisions that loom ahead reflect too much ambivalence over the accomplishments that lie behind. By the standards of history no less than by the standards of self-interest, U.S. policies toward Europe have been extraordinarily successul: they have served the nation well, and they have served the nations of Europe well too. By these same standards, of history and self-interest, the construction of Europe has served its members well too, and it has also served well the interests of the United States. Enlarging NATO and enlarging the EU are not without risks and costs, some political and others military, some financial and others societal. Yet, far worse would be the costs of non-enlargement-due to a refusal to ratify a decision after the decision has been made, or to enforce a decision after the decision has been announced. National confusion in the United States over NATO enlargement and to an extent NATO itself, and in Europe over the future of the EU and to an extent the EU as well, does not result from the fact that there is no case to be made. Rather, such confusion results from the fact that the case based on interests and aternative has simply not been made, thereby enabling the critics to be heard irrespective of the case they make. To repeat once more, the case to be made in the United States is about the interest of the United States in attending to the completion of a common Euro-Atlantic space whose significance is too vital be left to the inflated expectations of some nation-states or to the premature aspirations of institutions that are still in the making. As to Europe, the case will begin to be made as soon as pandering majorities stop pretending that every difficult step taken by the government they support responds to the dispassionate whims of Brussels rather than to the harsh realities uncovered in each national capital. In sum, in every EU member state that is also a member of NATO, as well as for all NATO members that do not belong to the EU, there is no alternative to the ratification of the decisions made since the IGC Summit in Amsterdam and at the NATO Summit in Madrid. The cost of action may seem high but the cost of inaction would be much higher. End Notes Accession, it was agreed in Copenhagen, would occur "as soon as an associated country is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required." See John Van Oudenaren, "Poland's Accession to the European Union: Outlook and Options" (CSIS Occasional Papers in European Studies, OR-96/14, August 1996), p. 10. Stanley Sloan, "NATO: What is it," CRS Report for Congress, 97-708F (July 17, 1997), p. 2. In 1993-96, surveys consistently confirmed a public endorsement of NATO-83% in Britain, 81% in Germany, and 76% in France (in 1996). Support for NATO has also been quite strong in the United States, amounting to 75% according to surveys conducted in early 1997, although it varies from one survey to the next. Perceptions in Europe that a European defense force can replace NATO have been limited to a small fraction of Europeans- 9% in Germany, 16% in Italy, and 18% in Britain and France. The New European Security Architecture: Volume II, USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction (September 1996). Also, Steven Kull, Americans on Expanding NATO: A Study of US Public Attitudes, Program on International Policy Attitudes, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, February 13, 1997. In 1997, however, the mood in Europe turned sour, and public support (measured as expectations of gains) dwindled to 42% in Britain, and 38% in Germany, for example. While the NATO agreement with Russia that was signed shortly before the Madrid summit had a soothing effect on the public, Europe's sensitivity to Russian behavior suggests that the ratification debates and future NATO enlargement, especially in the direction of former Soviet republics, could be directly influenced by Moscow. Opinion Analysis, USIA, Office of Research and Media Reaction, M-27-97 (February 7, 1997). After Madrid, Boris Yeltsin lost no time, therefore, in stating his "categorical" opposition to Baltic membership in NATO (Reuters, July 13, 1997). For example compare my Taking Europe Seriously (New York, 1992) and Stay the Course (Washington Papers, 1997): the analysis remains broadly similar but the tone has surely changed. David Pryce-Jones views the current state of the European Union as a "disaster in the making" (Commentary, June 1997, pp. 32-37). For Tony Judt, it is now "a grand illusion" (New York Review of Books, July 11, 1996, pp. 6-9. "The Amsterdam meeting was the most unsuccessful European summit for many years," wrote Ian Davidson, "Fault lines appear," Financial Times (July 1997). See also Jack Lang, a possible prime minister under a President Jospin, "Je ne voterai pas le trait d'Amsterdam," Le Monde (August 19, 1997). That Amsterdam would have followed the most unsuccessful Franco-German summit in even more years is an explanation that adds further to the concerns over what comes next. As new Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine said of Franco-German relations (about which he brought the perspective of his years spent with President Mitterrand), "It's less automatic to find convergence ... it's a bit more laborious." Reuters News Service, June 18, 1997. "Who Wants What? The IGC State of Play," Challenge/Europe (March/April 1997). Simon Serfaty, "Half Before Europe, Half Past NATO," The Washington Quarterly (March 1995) and "Europe Beyond Bosnia," The Washington Quarterly (June 1996) Richard Holbrooke, "The United States as a European Power," Foreign Affairs (March/April 1995). So it is with the financial costs of NATO enlargement, for example. As argued convincingly by various specialists at Rand, these costs "are likely to be modest" because enlargement is "not threat-driven" and "will not require a major military build-up of new forces." Ronald D. Asmus, Richard Kugler, and Steve Larrabee, "What Will NATO Enlargement Cost," Survival (Autumn 1996), p. 7. In any case, the essence of the debate is not how much will be spent, but how it will be spent - by whom and to whose benefit. Philip Gordon, "Will Anyone Really Pay to Enlarge NATO - and If So, Who?" International Herald Tribune, April 30, 1997. U.S. calls for a disproportionate European share of the costs may not only cause resentment in Europe: it may also exacerbate a debate on the costs of EU enlargement, first as a response to the U.S. calls for burden sharing, and next because of a real concerns over the nature and scope of these costs. Even before enlargement entered the public debate, senior members of the Clinton administra-tion were pointing to the states of Central Europe as the main, and possibly the only, candidates. The one true development during the two years before the Madrid summit is the fall of Slovakia from the early ranks of leading contenders. No other country was truly in contention in 1997: it was deceptive to pretend otherwise for so long. Sean Kay and Hans Binnendijk, "After the Madrid Summit: Parliamentary Ratification of NATO Enlargement," Strategic Forum, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, No. 107 (March 1997). For the French government to reduce the budget deficit from 4.2% in 1996 to 3.5% in 1997 will still satisfy the Maastricht emphasis on trends. But improving on that performance in 1998 will not be easy. Pierre-Antoine Delhommais et H. de Bresson, "Les risques que la France fait courir l'euro," Le Monde, July 3, 1997. Also, Alain Lamassoure, "L'alibi de l'audit," Le Monde, July 4, 1997. Earlier estimated had placed the deficit as high as 3.8% in 1997 and 4.5% in 1998. Laurent Mauduit, Le Monde, April 18, 1997. In Germany, the debate has already started, 12 months before the September 1998 election. Within his own party, Kohl is pressured to make pledges he cannot keep, like enforcing a 3.0 deficit target for Germany and all EMU participants. From the SPD, party leader Oskar Lafontaine dismisses the 3.0 criterion as "economic nonsense" and warnings against the economic, social, and political damage caused in the name of these criteria come from leading SPD candidate Gerhard Schroeder, who suggests that it mat be better to delay the single currency (a suggestion which the head of the Bundesbank does not rule out). Upon his return from Madrid, French president Jacques Chirac lost no time to return to affirm that Romania and Slovenia will be invited to join in 1999. He also provided unsollicited "assurances" that three or four new members will join the EU in 2000 or 2001. President Clinton is more cautious: "when they are ready and the time is right," which suggests that they might be ready at a time that is not right-and, alternatively, that the time might be right before they are ready. Criteria of timeliness were spelled out in the final Madrid communiqu, as "serv[ing] the overall political and strategic interest of the alliance" and "overall European security and stability." The former can be achieved without the latter and, to an extent, vice-versa.