Conference: NATO Enlargement: The National Debates over Ratification 7 Oct. '97

Germany and the Enlargement of NATO by Karl-Heinz KAMP and Peter R. WEILEMANN

The enlargement of NATO to new members in Central and Eastern Europe has been on Germany's foreign and national security agenda since the spring of 1993. The accession of Poland and the Czech Republic especially will affect Germany most directly: for the first time in history, the Federal Republic will have alliance partners on its Eastern borders. Since the end of the Cold War, Germany has also actively sought to engage Central and Eastern European states in European structures: bilateral treaties signed with former members of the Warsaw Pact in the early 1990s commit the German govern-ment to support EU membership for the countries involved. These aims are consistent with a foreign and security policy which, since Germany's unification, has been designed to deepen the traditional Westbindung (Western integration) and simultaneously widen the Euro-Atlantic structures to the East. These basic aims enjoy broad support in decision making circles and the general public as well. Admittedly, foreign and security policy has a very low priority in the public agenda, and must be formulated in a domestic political and economic context that is difficult and remains in flux seven years after unification. First, lingering questions of internal unity draw most of the public attention, at home as well as abroad. The problem seems to be exaggerated relative to the political coherence found in other countries and in the light of the proper criteria to be applied to measure the German consensus: there is, after all, very wide acceptance of the constitutional order and of the idea of social market economy, as well as broad support for, and identification with Westbindung. Indeed, in this latter context, acceptance in the former East Germany of the EU and, especially, of NATO membership now stands at the same level as in the former Federal Republic. However, the consequences of unifica-tion for the political party system and, together with globalization, for the economy are far-reaching. While the German currency is still strong, inflation low and corporate profits high, unemployment figures are soaring and the government finds it difficult to reduce the budget deficit to make it compatible with the 3% ceiling required for the European Monetary Union (EMU). Since economic growth is expected to remain under 3%, the critical level over which new jobs can be created, and with large transfers to the Neue Lnder (now amounting to DM 150 Billion per year) needed for the foreseeable future, the German government will have to continue an unpopular austerity policy. In addition, to cope with the impact of globalization and an aging society, the social security system must be urgently reformed. Some reforms of the health insurance system could be carried out despite strong opposition and reforms of the pensions systems are under debate, but an equally needed tax reform, a high priority on the Government agenda to stimulate the economy, is bogged down in the political process. Formally, tax laws must pass the German Bundesrat, the representative body of German State (Laender) Governments, which is currently dominated by a majority belonging to the opposition parties. With an eye to the election of September 1998, the Social Democrats as well as the Greens are reluctant to cooperate with the Kohl government to come out of that impasse. In addition, the governments position is weakened by differences among the coalition partners: Christian Democrats, the Christian Socialist Union (CSU), and the Free Democrats. These differences reflect deep changes of the German party system in which the smaller coalition partners have been the main victims of unification. The eroding weight of the CSU, which competes only in Bavaria, invites populists attacks on Kohl and his European policy (especially EMU) in order to keep its abolute majority in Bavaria. The Free Democrats, whose influence and represent-ation are resented by the CSU, fared very badly in the 1994 national elections, especially in the Neue Laender where they averaged only four percentage points of the vote and lost their representation in almost all State parliaments. In the West, the Free Democrats have been replaced by the Greens as the third strongest party. Left of the Greens, the PDS, which succeded the old communist party, managed to get about 20 percent of the votes in East Germany and, because of some specifics of the German electoral law, managed to enter the Bundestag despite a nation-wide vote below 5 percent. Although the specter of a SPD-Green-PDS national coalition seems unlikely, public opinion polls gave a red-green coalition almost 50% of the votes in the summer 1997, not including the still large number of undecided. The Kohl government, which has been in power for more than 15 years, now commands a narrow majority in Parliament and will face a stormy political year before the next elections, in anticipation of which it will certainly seek to capitalize on a foreign policy record, including NATO and EU enlargement.

Prospects For Ratification German ratification will be influenced by the interaction of the NATO calendar, the EU calendar, and, of course, the country's own political calendar. With respect to NATO, German decisionmakers share the view that now that the three candidates for membership have been announced, treaties or protocols can be signed in December 1997 and the ratification process concluded in all 16 member states by April 1999, the alliance's 50th anniversary. During the same period, the European calendar will be very demanding and might affect NATO enlargement in many ways. The InterGovernmental Conference (IGC) on the revision of the Maastricht Treaty was concluded at the Amsterdam meeting of the European Council one month before the Madrid Summit. The agreements reached by the IGC, including minor institutional reforms of the EU which are unlikely to improve its capacity to act as an international political actor, will have to be ratified by the national parliaments, too. Although the IGC decisions fall far behind the original expectations of the German government, the revised treaty is likely to be voted by the Bundestag by December, thus making it possible to start enlargement negotiations with potential new EU members by February 1998. Final decisions over how and with whom to proceed with these negotiations are yet to be made, but the Commission report of mid-July 1997 naming six countries as the most likely candidates-Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and Slovenia, besides Cyprus-was well received by government officials and parliamentarians alike. Meanwhile, EMU remains Europe's overwhelming issue, with implementation of the decision to launch the euro scheduled to come into effect by January 1999, after a preliminary announcement by the European Council, in March 1998, of the starting EMU group, based on the actual fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria of economic convergence. In 1999, the EU must also agree on a new five-year budget that requires delicate nego-tiations on the structure of revenues as well as on the future of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the structural policies (i.e. regional funds). These reforms will have a significant impact on the EU's ability to finance its enlargement. That the presidency of the European Union in 1999 will be assumed by Germany, after six-months presidencies by Luxembourg in 1997 and Great Britain and Austria in 1998, gives added significance to the German political agenda, dominated in 1998 by the federal elections scheduled for September 27. In addition, state elections are also scheduled in four 'Bundeslaender' (Niedersachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, and Bayern). Traditionally, German elections have been dominated by domestic issues, and except for 1972 (Ostpolitik) and 1990 (unification) foreign and national security policy issues have played a secondary role. In 1998, the overriding campaign issue will be the future of the welfare-state in an age of globalization. With the Bundestag expected to vote resolution on the euro as early as March 1998, the EMU debate will be kept out of the campaign so long as Germany meets the criteria and the schedule for monetary union is respected. Such other issues as human rights or Iran may well come up, but none is likely to generate a great foreign policy debate. Against this background, German ratification of NATO enlargement is likely to give rise to little argument and be concluded by the early summer 1998, before parliament goes into recess and the heated phase of the national election campaign begins. Despite some criticism, the Madrid summit, as well as the earlier NATO-Russia Founding Act and the similar agreement between NATO and Ukraine, also paved the way for a smooth ratification process. Surprisingly, Parliament criticized the govern-ment's unwillingness to ask unequivocally for more than three new members and was instead the only NATO government willing to agree to any decision. Parliamentary resolutions voted shortly before Madrid had all major parties favorable to the inclusion of Romania and/or Slovenia. Nonetheless, Kohl's role as a mediator at the NATO summit, and his insistence on having other potential candidates, including the Baltic countries, explicitly named in the final communiqu, took off the heat in the ensuing debate in Parliament. The NATO-Russia Founding Act signed in Paris was also welcomed, notwithstanding some criticism that with the Council started to begin much earlier than active membership of the new candidates, Mocow will have a marked advantage over Warsaw, Prague or Budapest. A credible and substantial post-enlargement strategy for later candidates, however, remains critical to a swift ratification process, even though the criteria for a such a strategy have not been precisely formulated, as will be seen below. Ever since Defense Minister Rhe surprisingly proposed the enlargement of NATO to the East, there has been little open criticism or strong public opposition against the idea itself. Chancellor Kohl, as well as Foreign Minister Kinkel and the Auswrtiges Amt, have been more concerned over the timetable and over the ramifications of enlargement on Germany's relations with Russia. Not only the coalition parties but also the Social Democratic Party (notwithstanding a dissenting minority of old pacifists) and their respective parliamentary groups in the Bundestag support enlargement too. With a strong anti-NATO record, the Green party is deeply split on the issue between "Fundamentalists" and "Realists" who see an enlarged Alliance as the lesser evil, while the PDS (which replaced the former communist SED) is opposed. If there is no loud opposition by major political forces there remains some grumbling in the traditional classe politique, where two currents are discernible. On the one hand, the friends of the old NATO fear for the future of the alliance and are especially afraid that the Western powers will make too much concession towards Russia-a fear sometimes shared by strong proponents of enlargement. On the other hand, skeptics who fear that NATO enlargement to the East could spoil the political and economic transformation in Russia are joined by old NATO foes who still believe in a collective European defense system, disarmament and the OSCE. In both groups, some influential and prominent voices in Parliament, as well as in the administration and among academics, are especially notable, including former foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the foreign policy spokesman of the CDU/CSU Karl Lamers, and Gnther Verheugen, a leading SPD foreign policy expert. But, to repeat, the government officially supports NATO enlarge-ment and, in the end, the skeptics in the traditional parties will vote for it. The few public opinion polls taken on that issue show, that 76% of the political elite favor NATO membership for Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, with especially strong support from the military, the churches, industry, and political leadership. The public in general is less enthusiastic, but 58% are nevertheless in favor of enlargement, a level that is especially high considering that it was measured at a time when more than two thirds of the population was taking seriously Boris Yeltsin's warning that NATO enlargement could lead to a new war in Europe. Under these circumstances, a vote on ratification before the election is held is clearly in Kohl's interest and it is more than likely. While the inclusion of Central and Eastern European states in NATO is not an unavoidable consequence of Germany's post-unification policy, non-ratification by the Parliament would be a complete reversal of German foreign policy most generally and its Ostpolitik more specifically. NATO enlarge-ment serves Germany's political, strategic, and moral interests. For the first time in the 20th century Germany is not in conflict with any of its neighbors, and can instead deepen or launch friendly relationships with all of them. Reconciliation with its Eastern neighbors will complement what the Bonn Republic successfully achieved in the West during the first 40 years of its existence. NATO member-ship for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic also contributes to the stability of these countries' political and economic transformation: not only will it improve international conditions for such transforma-tion, it will also prevent a renationalization of their defense policies. As a supplement to NATO's Parnership for Peace (PfP) program, Germany established close ties of military cooperation with its Eastern neighbors on a bilateral and in some cases trilateral basis including military personnel exchange programs, military training and education programs, in addition to arms transfer arrangements. The 1996 defense budget allocates about 11 million DM for such undertakings. NATO membership for Poland, the Czech Republic or Hungary will also improve bilateral relations with countries that all view Germany as their most important economic if not political partner. They all have high expectations of Germany, but also live with historic memories of German dominance in Eastern and Central Europe. For this reason, the Federal Republic tried to enlist its Western partners into a multilateral Ostpolitik from the moment cracks appeared in the Eastern block in the mid-1980s. Reconciliation with Poland is an indicator of the Germany's ability to cope with its history. The German Armed forces can now carry out bilateral and trilateral (with Danish or French forces) maneuvers on Polish soil. In addition, minorities are no longer a burden but an untapped source for closer bilateral cooperation even though they do not play a significant role over such questions (unlike what seems to be the case in the United States). Relations with the Czech Republic are more shaky, despite signs of improvement that have been especially apparent since the earlier part of 1997 with a marked assist from the presidents of the two countries. As shown during the prolonged negotiation over, and the bitter subsequent debate about, the Czech-German declaration, the shadow of history is still a factor. Yet despite the acrimonious tone of their opposition, the Sudetendeutschen (Germans expelled after the war out of Chechoslovakia) never sought to link NATO or EU membership with Prague's accomoda-tion of their demands. Distinctive Czech views on the market economy, the role of churches, and especially the future of European integration do not help very much in that respect. In the case of Hungary, history is more an asset than a worry. The highly constructive role played by the Hungarian government at the beginning of the Eastern European revolution of 1989 is still remembered and creates a deep moral obligation towards the country that dared open the iron curtain and permit thousands of Germans to enter the West, thus precipitating the fall of the former German Republic. The German minority in Hungary is no longer an issue. Most generally, the relationship can be described as close and free of tensions irrespective of who is in power, a principle that has ruled the evolution of Germany's relations with France and now conditions its relations with Eastern countries -with the help of political foundations that contribute to the development of common positions between Germany and its eastern neighbors.

Alternative Outcomes Is there a chance that the most likely outcome described above might not come true? Theoretically three factors could influence negatively the ratification and accession process: dramatic changes at home, extraordinary developments with some NATO partners or with one of the candidates for membership, and a deterioration of the international environment, especially with regard to Russia. Democracy in postwar Germany is not known for its volatility and instability. Although a change of government in October 1998 cannot be excluded, a fall of the Kohl government before that date can certainly be ruled out. Even if for some technical reason ratification was to be postponed until the election is held, a hypothetical Red-Green coalition government would not derail the process because the forces within the Green Party that are most eager to assume power are also those in favor of enlargement. Difficulties can only be conceived in the highly unlikely case of a Red-Green minority government that would depend on the tacit or explicit consent of the PDS. Postponement of the ratification vote to the next legislature could also happen if the political calendar had to be changed because of some extraordinary events. One could imagine, for example, that a further deterioration of the economic situation combined with the more than four million unemployed might lead to severe strikes and domestic turmoil that absorb political attention at the expense of the NATO debate. Another possibility would have additional cuts in the social welfare system or pressure on the federal budget in general put under new scrutiny defense spending which is currently scheduled to increase slightly to about DM 47 billion in 1998. Since all laws passed by the Bundestag must address the question of costs, the financial implications of NATO enlargement could become an issue. The Defense ministry, however, estimates that these costs will be modest, especially after the NATO-Russia Founding Act and with no apparent need for a rapid modernization of the Armed Forces of the new members, who will have to finance the main bulk of their needs on their own anyway. Bonn's shares of the NATO military budget (18.1 % or DM 150 million) and the NATO Security Investment Programs (24.5 % or DM 300 million) are, therefore, also expected to increase only slightly. In addition, making enlargement depending on cost estimates would reverse the opinion that NATO membership for Eastern European countries is a wise investment for the future because it will certainly be much cheaper than to attend to a break down of order in Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, the financial cost of a parallel EU enlargement will be much more politicized and may play into the NATO debate. Developments in the EU might also cloud the prospect for swift ratification. However unlikely a stalemate or even a collapse of the European single currency may be, either could shift the priorities of both the government and parliament. The NATO issue might even become part of a bargain in European policy. In addition, although Germany opposes any direct link between NATO and EU enlargement, especially with respect to taking in new EU members that are not in the first wave of NATO enlargement, both developments are still conceived as parallel processes. Under these conditions, a postponement of EU enlargement due to a crisis within the EU might affect negatively Germany's ratification (with the opposite effect, however, equally plausible). A reversal in U.S. policy toward NATO enlargement would have a major impact, but changes among Germany's EU partners would have only minor consequences. The landslide victory of the French Socialists exposed some pollution in Franco-German relations and highlights conceptual as well as structural differences between these two countries, especially on economics and NATO-related issues. The French insistence on including Romania and Slovenia in the first round of NATO enlargement influenced the German role in Madrid. But while the French government was ready to accept isolation, Bonn was not willing to join Paris against Washington and risk compromising the entire process of enlargement. Neither the Bundestag nor the government is likely to be influenced by change of governments or shifts in opinions in other EU states. This might not hold true for political changes in the Eastern European candidates, however. While the next election in the Czech Republic is scheduled for the year 2000, Poland (October 1997) and Hungary (spring 1998) will go to the polls before ratification. In Poland, stronger anti-European or nationalistic forces like the Farmers Party, combined with such a weak performance of the major parties as to leave a new government dependent on the splinter groups, would encourage a postponement of ratification until the situation has cleared. A similar theoretical possibility exists in Hungary, where a triumph of the national populist forces and related revisionist policies could cause unrest in neighboring countries with large Hungarian minorities. But neither case is likely. Finally, the international climate can turn sour, especially with changes in Russian domestic and foreign policy. What impact such changes would have on German readiness to ratify NATO enlargement is difficult to ascertain. But it can be expected that the more subtle the Russian government moves to influence the public the more successful it might be. A strategy of intimidation by Moscow would be certainly counter-productive. But if the Russian leadership can point to the fact that its interests are not sufficiently respected, or if it demonstrates its residual veto power by spoiling the Bosnian peace process for example, or if it can gain China's support by deeds and not only in words (as has been the case to-date), those opposition forces that are afraid that Russia will be lost for an all European order by NATO enlargement might be encouraged further.

Enlargement After Madrid Given the political developments outlined above, the enlargement of NATO to the three Central and Eastern European countries named in Madrid in July 1997 will find support throughout the entire German political spectrum. Accordingly, the pressing issue seems no longer about enlargement propoer but bout its consequences, especially on Russia and countries that were been left out in Madrid. Open Enlargement and Russia Russia has been the key consideration in all debates on NATO's enlargement. Notwithstanding that the range of potential Russian countermeasures against enlargement truly affecting NATO's security interests was and still is quite limited, NATO remains deeply committed to a stable and constructive relationship with Russia. The future corner-stone of such a relationship will be the NATO-Russia Founding Act that was signed in Paris in May 1997. This agreement provides Russia with a significant voice within the emerging new European security order by, among other measures, creating a permanent joint council for NATO-Russia meetings. Notwithstanding this newly found understanding with Russia, NATO faces a fundamental dilemma. On the one hand, it is committed to an open enlargement process according to which the accession of new members after 1999 remains open to any applicant country provided that certain criteria are met. Thus, the German Chancellor finds it "quite natural" that Romania's and Slovenia's applications will be "examined" with utmost sympathy for the second round. The Baltic states, too, are explicitly mentioned in the Madrid communiqu as potential candidates. In principle, only Russia is likely to be excluded from membership, and defense minister Rhe is only echoing the view of the majority of his NATO allies when he states that "Russia is too large to be integrated" (a statement which also excludes Russian membership in the EU). On the other hand, however, open membership almost necessarily implies a step-by-step expansion of NATO toward Russian territory-a slow but steady expansion that must inevitably raise apprehen-sions in Moscow. Even moderate Russian voices that seem to have grudgingly accepted the inclusion of three to five former members of the Warsaw Pact into NATO are most likely to regard NATO's entry into the geopolitical space of the former Soviet Union as simply unacceptable. To circumvent this obvious predicament,.American observers have suggested guarantees of a five to 10 year-pause before the next round of enlargement (a deal that could be made tacitly or explicitly in the framework of the NATO-Russia Council). In their view, such a significant reduction of the speed of enlargement might bring several advantages. First and foremost, NATO would respect the principle of openness while simultaneously responding to Russian fears of encirclement. In addition, NATO could moderate the pressures of other countries to join NATO, thereby preserving its own ability to choose from its own candidates. From a German perspective, the disadvantages of such an approach are all too obvious. Countries that were disregarded by NATO in Madrid would fear that such a delay might lead to an indefinite postponement. Consequently, this would forestall any realistic perspective to be included in a Euro-Atlantic security framework-something which all of the leftover-countries are seeking desperately. Moreover, what would happen if countries like Sweden, Finland or Austria were suddenly to express their desire to join NATO? Even Russia would have few objections to NATO membership for countries that used to belong neither to the Warsaw Pact nor to the Soviet Union and were well entrenched in the West for decades. But in spite of the fact that most NATO allies would welcome the inclusion of these states, their bid would have to be turned down because of a 10-years-moratorium with Russia. Another problem could emerge if a new revisionist leadership in Moscow were to use the 10-year pause to raise anti-Western resentment to prevent further enlarge-ment-presumably along the lines of the Soviet anti-nuclear propaganda during the INF debate in the early 1980s. In sum, any open guarantee of non-enlargement for a given period, however short, would necessarily cause severe damage to the credibility of NATO as a democratic and open alliance. The German classe politique has not specifically debated such a break, however, and some different perceptions of key decision makers may be identified. Thus, Ruhe excludes this option completely: as one of the founding fathers of enlargement as a means to export stability to the East, he is necessarily committed to the process approach. The Chancellor and foreign minister Kinkel have always been less forceful on enlargement, and Kohl himself has stated time and again, with particular reference to the Baltic states, that the security interest of Russia has to be taken into account. This explains the forceful German commitment to a NATO agreement that would bridge the existing differences with Russia in ways that do not reduce the applicants to second class membership while remaining attractive to the Russians. Leaving aside the contrary approaches of Russia and NATO toward further enlarge-ment, there are four main considerations that help explain why some kind of pause still seems likely. First, with the invitation to three new members extended at the Madrid summit the next two years face a demanding agenda that includes accession negotiations, ratifica-tion debates, and specific decisions for making membership work. Second, NATO's general agenda also includes the pressing issues of the new command structure and the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), issues that have proven especially difficult to resolve. Third, in light of the sometimes harsh NATO debate on enlargement over the last few years, opening another debate on additional new members will be resisted. Despite his initial commitment to keeping the process open, Kohl has cautioned against assuming that a review of the enlargement question will necessarily take place in 1999. In other words, the Madrid compromise on the future of enlargement is a soft commitment that does not preclude further delay should the Alliance lack consensus on that issue, especially as, finally, Russia remains firmly opposed to the expansion of NATO to the former Soviet republics, especially the Baltic states. With this opposition stated repeatedly-when signing the agreement with Russia and immediately after the Madrid accord-Russia can be expected to continue to exert its influence to avoid that Madrid be viewed as a carte blanche for further enlargement. To speculate on the likelihood of a pause is not merely of academic interest: any such pause would have significant consequences for countries that did not receive an invitation at the Madrid summit. If NATO's pledge to take new members is a gesture but not a guarantee, any NATO offer to increase the security of the non-member countries cannot be seen as short-term compensation of disappointed expectations pending the next round of enlargement in the near future. Instead, NATO must develop a concept that would make it possible to couple non-members to Western security arrange-ments, even without a guarantee of immediate membership. In other words, NATO must design a comprehensive post-enlargement strategy that will be strong enough to transfer stability whether or not a rapid accession to NATO is likely to happen.

Post-Enlargement Strategy Various political, military, and economic measures have been suggested for countries that have been left out of the NATO enlargement process. Most prominently, it has been suggested that they be given quick membership in the EU. According to its proponents, such a strategy would offer several advantages. First and foremost, EU membership, albeit not linked to a formal security guarantee, would undoubtedly have a security effect since even a revisionist Russia would not be likely to dare wage war against a EU member. That security effect would grow steadily with every new step toward an effective and credible CFSP. In Germany notably, Rhe has explicitly raised the EU option for the Baltic states, thereby taking account of the difficult issues surrounding Russia's relations with its Northwestern neighbors (including Russian minorities, border disputes, and access to Kaliningrad, to name only a few such issues). By comparison, taking these countries into the EU would soothe Russian apprehensions as NATO would not enter former Soviet territory. This is all the more true as Russia seems to have few objections to EU enlargement in general. At a closer glance, however, the EU option is much more complex than it was initially assumed. Not only do most candidates still have to meet the criteria for membership, the EU itself does not seem prepared for rapid enlargement. The June 1997 summit in Amsterdam cleared the way for a first wave of new members but the significant reforms needed to make the decision-making processes work with an even larger number of members are still missing. Another InterGovernmental Conference (IGC) will be necessary, therefore, by the year 2000. Iissues of cost-sharing, too, are equally difficult and so is the redistribution of economic benefits. Southern members, for instance, are not prepared to accept that EU financial transfers to them be reduced to accomodate their new partners in the East: they will only agree to EU enlargement if the present level of subsidies they receive can be maintained. On the other hand, the richer EU states, which are faced with severe fiscal difficulties, are no longer willing and able to increase their contributions to the common EU budget. This holds particularly true for Germany: as the biggest net contributor to the EU budget, it suffers from a strained economy and exceptionally high unemployment rates while bearing the brunt of the unification costs. The German Government, therefore, has a strong interest to reduce its net budget contributions to the EU budget. The Commission's optimistic estimate that enlarge-ment costs, reportedly amounting to DM 150 billion between 2000 and 2006, can be financed without changing the present limits on the EU budget (1.27 % of GNP) is not shared widely. Substantial reforms in Structural Funds and CAP will also be required, with German farmers already fearful of a 20 to 30% loss in income. Still, most Eastern applicants for EU membership are not yet ready to enter the single market. In its July 1997 report on enlargement, the Commission named only five states, including the three NATO candidates as well as Estonia and Slovenia, that are ready to begin negotiations by 1998. Their accession, however, will not take place before the year 2003. Even then, longer transition periods for critical economic sectors are to be expected. An additional political problem for EU enlargement has to do with Cyprus, the sixth EU candidate, in the context of Turkey's own interest in EU membership, an issue of special concern to Germany. In light of these difficulties, it should be all too obvious that EU enlargement will require difficult negotiations based on other criteria than a failure to gain NATO member-ship. Indeed, EU membership cannot be regarded as a by-product of NATO enlarge-ment, and the catchy argument of avoiding the shock of double rejection is nothing more than a bumper-sticker approach that ignores that accession to the EU will be determined primarily by economic factors. Associate NATO-Membership Another option for a post enlargement strategy, which has been supported by some members of Parliament in Bonn, is a formal affiliation that would remain short of full membership. The precedent for such a procedure would be the accession of Turkey and Greek into NATO in 1952. The EU has signed association agree-ments with a large number of countries, and the WEU has a full range of possible affiliations that stem from its close relationship with NATO. Next to full WEU membership, which is characterized by the three core elements of mutual defense obligation, close cooperation with NATO, and support of a European defense identity, are "associate members" like Iceland, Norway, and Turkey who are broadly involved in WEU activities but do not have the right to vote and cannot claim the Article 5 security guarantee granted by the Brussels Treaty to the full members. Next to the associate membership there are "associate partnership"-a status that has been granted to the Central and Eastern European countries and provide for close but less involvement with WEU actions than associate membership. Finally beyond associate member-ship and partnership, "observers" like Denmark or Austria receive regular information on WEU activities and, on occasion, can also be involved in specific actions. Following these examples, NATO could create associate or observer status to demonstrate the close relations of leftover countries with the alliance. In addition to the type of cooperation that already exists through PfP, or with the CJTF concept, the formal status of "associate member" or "observer" would be awarded to a limited number of countries. Unlike the PfP principle of self-differentiation, this would mean a clear NATO choice which would reflect its assessment of these countries relevance and thus provide them with a credible perspective on their ability to join NATO in the second or third round. On the debit side, however, the idea of association lacks the critical ingredient of the Article 5 security guarantee provided by NATO treaty or the WEU treaty. Examples of association within the WEU miss one crucial point: all three associate members of WEU are also full NATO members and can, therefore, easily replace the missing defense obligation of WEU with the security guarantee of NATO. Associated Central and Eastern European countries, however, would not have such a fallback position. A limited affiliation to NATO only emphasizing a formal status without the Article 5 commitment would be of restrained value, at least in security terms, since there is no such a thing as an "associate" security guarantee. Hence, status alone without practical involvement into NATO might prove to be a placebo for countries looking for security. Military and political cooperation To place firmly the leftover countries in a stable transatlantic framework, the most promising approach remains the PfP and its proven procedures of military and political cooperation. Initially designed to postpone the pressing requests of Central and Eastern European countries for NATO membership, PfP has now provides the Central and Eastern European countries with a tailored menu of options for engagement according to the preferences of each partner. Notwithstanding the fact that PfP had a strong military bias in its early stages, it has evolved significantly and now seems to be the natural linchpin of any successful post-enlargement strategy. In its present form, however, PfP seems to be poorly equipped to cope with the requirements of the post-enlargement era. Given that PfP will lose three of its most active and engaged members after they gain full NATO membership, it might become a gathering of disappointed candidates for membership and moderately committed countries. Such lacking enthusiasm of PfP members could in turn lead to a diminished interest on the side of NATO which would almost necessarily result in an erosion of PfP's political quality. To counter such tendencies PfP needs to evolve politically. NATO had set up a "Senior Level Group" to cope with the demanding task of developing further the PfP concept. Now, to assert the seriousness of PfP the partners could be increasingly included into the large number of NATO committees. In addition, a political counterpart to the already existing Military Coordination Cell could be created as a kind of International Partnership Staff that would be based in Brussels and would almost automatically increase the partners' political influence on the NATO decision-making processes. In particular, such an arrangement would avoid situations like the IFOR-mission in Bosnia, where 13 PfP countries contributed about 5,200 soldiers to the peace-enforcement operation without having any influence on the political consultations that surrounded IFOR. Although deeply committed to all ideas that permit an evolution and reinforcement of PfP mechanisms, Germany has not addressed convincingly their budgetary implications just as it has failed to debate satisfactorily the financial costs of NATO enlargement. Germany's current economic condition and the rigid EMU criteria hardly leave any leeway for major financial contributions to either. Some questions are also justified with regard to the European-American Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) to which NATO countries agreed at the Ministerial meeting in Sintra, Portugal, on May 30, 1997. Guided by the desire to soothe the disappointment of the unsuccessful applicants for membership by creating a whole range of different offers, the Clinton administration suggested, in the fall 1996, the creation of a new forum that would combine the activities of NATO's aging Cooperation Council (NACC) and the PfP program. However, Germany and the European NATO members insisted that the concrete tasks and purposes of such a new forum be clarified. Even now, a need for clarification remains. First, the specific relationship between EAPC and the enhanced PfP remains unclear, as does the impact of EAPC on OSCE, which basically covers the same ground. Another question has to do with the impact of a proliferation of decision-making bodies on NATO's decision making. How will the three fora-the "old" NATO Council, the NATO-Russia Council, and the EAPC-interact, and how will coordination and consensus be feasible remains to be seen. Nevertheless, critics might object that even an increased cooperation with the left-over countries, whether political or military, would not equal the Article 5 security guarantee of the NATO treaty. Hence, cooperation alone would only serve as a consolation prize at best, but it would not lead necessarily to a measurable security benefit. This argument, albeit popular, tends to ignore some historical precedents where military cooperation translated into reassurance and even deterrence. The most obvious example is that of Sweden's relations with NATO during the Cold War. Even though Sweden always emphasized its strict political neutrality, Swedish governments closely cooperated with NATO up to a level known only by a very small number of key decision makers. The political value of such military cooperation-including the establishment of communication links between Sweden and the US forces in Europe, the accommodation of military air-traffic control, or the construction or airfields on Swedish territory-stemmed from the fact that such cooperation could be taken for granted and that, in spite of all secrecy surrounding it, Moscow had at least some rudimentary knowledge of its terms. As a consequence, no Soviet military planner seriously thinking of the costs and benefits of a military aggression could view Sweden in isolation but had, instead, to take into account the possible involvement of NATO even though Sweden was not formally under the protection of NATO's Article 5. Of course, it is not possible to transfer historical experiences to the post Cold War era, and the argument is not to establish secret arrangements of cooperation with non-NATO countries as implicit security guarantees. But there is no doubt that the case of Sweden proves the close connection between military cooperation and political reinsurance. Transferred to the situation of post-enlargement requirements this suggests that a credible security transfer is possible even without formal alliance membership. This, however, requires intense cooperation leading to a level of compatibility and interoperability to clearly document the realiability of the security umbrella vis--vis any potential aggressor. Unfortunately this idea has not received sufficient attention during the harsh battles on enlargement, but it could prove its value in the period following the first round of accession. If NATO manages to explain convincingly that membership is not the only source for security, then future debates over the enlargement process may be much more relaxed, and the expectations of the leftover-countries with regard to 1999 may also be moderated.

Germany And New NATO Role The emphasis placed on enlargement in recent years has put the pressing questions of NATO's future tasks and purposes on the backburner of the alliance agenda. Some observers have gone so far as to present enlargement itself as a major future task of the Atlantic Alliance. This, however, left the basic question unanswered: against whom or what will an alliance of 20 or more members be directed in future? Suggestions that "the future enemy of NATO will be instability and insecurity" or that "the Alliance is not directed against something, but instead designed to promote peace and freedom" may find public support but they do not carry that far. This debate has not yet entered the decision making circles in Bonn and is evoked only in the German strategic community. The unpredictability and difficulty of the debate over NATO's future role is complicated by at least three major difficulties. First and foremost, there is a fundamental dilemma with regard to the basic interests of all major players involved. The Central and Eastern European countries are looking for security from Russia together with NATO. NATO, however, is looking for security for the Central and Eastern European countries together with Russia. Russia itself is looking for influence on NATO and on the Central and Eastern European countries to fortify its position as a large power which cannot be neglected. As a result, NATO attempts to come to a constructive relationship with Russia must lead nearly automatically to suspicion and mistrust on the side of the membership applicants: references to "a new Yalta" have already accompanied the media coverage of recent NATO meetings with high ranking Russian officials. Others note that as a result of the Founding Act there is a nuclear weapons free zone in (Eastern) Central Europe-anathema in Western Security thinking so far. The way and style the new NATO-Russia understandings will be handled and implemented are, therefore, of utmost importance. The second fundamental problem is that ideas and concepts on NATO's future differ significantly even within the Alliance. Germany, as mentioned above, places great emphasis on supporting stability in regions beyond its Eastern borders, whereas France is evidently biased to the Mediterranean. As the only remaining superpower, the United States tends to define its foreign policy blueprints in global categories: Senator Richard Lugar's catchphrase of a "NATO out of area or out of business" underscores that approach. Prominent members of the American "strategic community" even go as far as to state that if NATO does not move toward a global role, particularly in stabilizing the Persian Gulf, its decline will only be a matter of a few years. Finally, the third uncertainty in NATO's further development is the situation in Russia. Insecurity and unpredictability in that respect imply that NATO will remain torn between shaping a strategic partnership with Russia on the one hand and keeping up military reinsurance against any fundamental reversal of Russian policy on the other. In light of these different and sometimes mutually excluding approaches of all the players involved, there can be found no consensus on NATO's future role and missions, and only two main components of the alliance's future configuration can be suggested. First, and quite obviously, the core function of NATO is to protect the territorial integrity and the vital interests of its members from externals threats. The difficulty, however, is that these traditional tasks will no longer be geographically limited to the European realm. Instead, progress in military technology, advances in missile developments, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction provide more and more countries with the option of power projection over long distances. This implies the unpleasant reality that the regionalization of military conflict becomes increasingly difficult, which in turn means that NATO will be more and more confronted with fundamental threats from distant areas. This uncomforting trend is aggravated further by the fact that some of the future risks and challenges are unlikely to be handled by traditional military means. With regard to its adaptation to these new realities NATO seems still to be just in the initial phase of a lengthy process. The second remaining core function of NATO is to provide the most successful framework for firmly embedding the United States in Europe as the precondition for enduring European stability. Here, the prime challenge will be to keep the transatlantic link viable even without an alliance-wide menace posed by a hostile superpower. To cope with that problem almost necessarily requires a stronger engagement of the European allies within the transatlantic partnership. It is worth noting, however, that European efforts to develop an independent ability to act must not be guided by what Europe might be able to accomplish without the United States. Rather, the real question is what Europe will have to do to remain a rewarding and efficient partner for the United States: in that respect, the overused notion of "burden sharing" deserves a fresh look. Fortunately, the accumulation of summits and important events in 1996 and 1997 contributed significantly to lift the fog that had shrouded the European security landscape for many years. Two key results need to be emphasized. First, notwithstanding its rhetoric the EU will have no true CFSP for years to come. NATO, therefore, will be the prime security institution neither challenged by any concept of collective security (OSCE) nor by an imaginary European pillar. Second, NATO itself is being transformed from a formerly defensive alliance with a mutual defense obligation into the core of the Euro-Atlantic security order equipped with an intervention capability. This has a tremendous impact on NATO in various respects. For instance, U.S. influence in NATO is most likely to grow in a sense that the new members of NATO are likely to share pro-American views within NATO. The U.S. bias will also receive further underpinning because of the European agreement on the CJTF concept, which gives the United States a veto over any NATO/ European military operation beyond Article 5 contingencies. Another consequence will be that NATO's basic documents like the 1991 "Strategic Concept" need to be reassessed, a requirement NATO has already explicitly admitted in the NATO-Russia Agreement. The Madrid-Summit and its related developments will also have significant repercussions on individual NATO members like Germany in a sense that they have to evaluate critically whether the number and structures of their armed forces are still suitable to cope successfully with future risks and challenges. At present, Germany is still endorsing the principle of conscription which guarantees a capability up to 680,000 men in times of crisis. Neither the defense minister nor the chancellor are ready to discuss or even to reconsider conscription in spite of the obvious difficulty to imagine any realistic military contingency that requires such larged armed forces. Meanwhile, however, it proves to be increasingly difficult to suppress a wider debate on how to adapt the Bundeswehr to new realities, particularly since the German federal president, Roman Herzog, has publicly declared that conscription is justified only if it can be backed by a convincing strategic rationale. Hence, it is likely that in 1998 at the latest Germany will face a discussion on how to draw the lessons for the armed forces from the recent changes outlined above. This debate will not be confined to the implications for the Bundeswehr alone but might also take on the question of NATO as a global player-a debate which also seems to glow slowly but steadily in the United States. Karl-Heinz KAMP is Chief of the Foreign and Security Division of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Peter R. WEILEMANN is Deputy Director of Political Research, also at the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.