Conference: NATO Enlargement: The National Debates over Ratification 7 Oct. '97

The Debate in the U.S. Senate on NATO Enlargement by Stephen A. CAMBONE

The Constitution of the United States requires that treaties, and amendments to them, be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent. Ratification of a treaty or amendment requires a majority of two-thirds, or sixty-seven votes. Ratification takes place via adoption of "articles of ratification." These articles may have attached to them "conditions," "reservations" and "declarations" by which the Senate modifies and interprets the treaty. Historically, these have resulted in a need for a president to re-negotiate a treaty before it could be ratified by the Senate. Once a treaty is ratified, it becomes the law of the land-that is, it governs the day-to-day actions of the president as he "faithfully executes" the laws of the nation. Hence, any conditions or reservations are binding on the executive in the implementation of the treaty. In addition, the record of the debate in the Senate on the treaty becomes, for the purposes of interpreting the meaning of a clause of the treaty or for U.S. obligations under the treaty or for assessing compliance with the treaty, a virtual part of the treaty as it affects the United States. As a result, treaty ratification by the U.S. Senate is a major undertaking. For issues of supreme national importance, debate on a treaty and its ratification can take on all the trappings of a major political event and can affect, as did the debate over the Treaty of Versailles following World War I and that on the Washington Treaty in 1948-1949, the course of U.S. foreign and defense policy for decades. Thus, the enlargement of NATO, and the need to do so by means of ratifying an amendment to the Washington Treaty, is a matter of supreme national importance. NATO, and the attendant commitment of the US to take "such action as it deems necessary," to "assist" an ally in the event of an armed attack on it is taken seriously by Americans. The forward deployment of U.S. forces in Europe, the central role played by the United States in the planning and execution of alliance military plans, and the national interests of the United States all point to the inescapable conclusion that, while America is not obliged to come automatically to the aid of an ally whose territory is attacked or interest is threatened, Article V has been, and continues to be, seen as a U.S. guarantee to its allies that it would stand beside them in the event of such circumstances. The Senate will take up the amendment of the Washington Treaty to admit new members to the alliance with this solemn obligation in mind. Nothing said by the president to date suggests that the United States has agreed to enlarge the alliance with any other thought in mind. Indeed, to the contrary, the president (as have Members of the Senate) has gone out of his way to reiterate that the foundation of the alliance remains Article V of the Washington Treaty and that the United States has not altered its original understanding of the commitment it made in 1949. The debate in the Senate must be understood against this background. The concerns expressed in the Senate on the issues to be developed below-the cost associated with enlargement; the commitment of our allies to the process; the impact of the parallel European Union enlargement on that of the alliance; the role Russia is to assume in the new European security architecture; and the subsequent enlargement of the alliance-trace their origin in each case to the "guarantee" to defend America's allies. If the Senate expresses any conditions, reservations, or declarations as part of the articles of ratification it will be with the intent of assuring that the American commitment to the alliance, in peace, crisis and war is discharged in a manner that protects and promotes the vital interests of the United States.

Critical Issues The debate on NATO enlargement is still in its early stages in the United States and is only beginning to gain the concentrated attention of Members of the U.S. Senate. However, in the period 1994 through 1996, the Congress as a whole has voted three bills with overwhelming majorities designed to express support for NATO enlargement, to encourage the president to press the matter urgently, to voice support for certain candidates and to make funds available to those candidates to assist them in preparing for accession. In addition, following the president's visit to Central Europe, the Congress funded the "Warsaw Initiative" in the amount of $100 million. In early 1997, the Majority Leader of the Senate established a Senate observer group to monitor the development of the accession process, to givee unofficial advisory opinions to the executive on the matter, and to sponsor the resulting amendments on the floor of the Senate. Members of this group accompanied the president to Paris for the signing of the Founding Act, as well as to Madrid for the historic summit that identified the three states invited to enter into accession talks. In addi-tion, the president appointed a special advisor to assist him and the Secretary of State in keeping the Senate and House fully informed of developments. And, consistent with the authorization and appropriations process, the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have testified before Congress and have been in private communication with Members on the military aspects of enlargement. Even now that the Madrid Summit has been held with the results that had been widely anticipated, the Senate debate is unlikely to begin in earnest until fall, after the summer recess and the yearly budget battle. In the meanwhile, however, key Members of the Senate are beginning to articulate the positions that will guide their debate on the Senate floor. The following set of key issues represents the current thinking of key members on NATO enlargement. While the specific rendering of the issues may change over time as the debate matures, and new issues are likely to arise, together they do seem to reflect the full range of concerns that have been expressed by "experts" and Members alike over the last several months.

Financial Cost The issue of financial cost has two elements. The first is the absolute cost of enlargement. The second is on what the money is to be spent, by whom, and for what reason. Absolute Cost: No agreed figure on NATO enlargement exists as of the summer 1997. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has projected as much as $120 billion. The RAND Corporation, in a study for the Department of Defense, estimated costs in a range of $40 to 60 billion. The estimate provided by the Office of the Secretary Defense (OSD), in a report endorsed by the government as a whole, stood between $28 and 35 billion. All projections are over about 10 years. OSD assumed the U.S. share of the costs to be approximately $1.5 to 2.0 billion over that entire period. Few experts believe that the absolute costs will approach the CBO figures. Many remain skeptical still of the OSD figures, but they are more inclined to believe the final costs will be closer to OSD's figures than to CBO's. For now, RAND's figures seem to have more credibility and may represent the "comfort zone" of Members. RAND experts themselves often point to the compatibility of their figures and thos provided by OSD, as they argue that any difference only stems from different assumptions rather than from different accounting. The issue with respect to absolute costs will be whether and how they can be justified in the context of the balanced budget commitments of the Congress. If, for purposes of discussion, the cost to the United States rises to about $500 million per year, Members will need ample reason for authorizing and appropriating such sums on what amounts to a "zero-sum" basis. That is, given that the balanced budget promised for 2002-agreed with substantial difficulty-is predicated on a low inflation rate and a growing economy to fund existing programs, new expenditures like those occasioned by NATO enlargement will be taken from some already agreed program. The most immediate candidates, of course, are within the defense budget. But that budget is fixed, too, within the balanced budget framework, to rise in value only to offset the baseline inflation rate. As it turns out, the inflation rate for defense is running nearly a full percentage point ahead of the economy as a whole. The Chiefs of Staff have testified that the current defense budget is now $20 to 40 billion per year underfunded in its procurement accounts (and potentially twice that in its O&S accounts), and members under-stand that it is not going easy to absorb an additional burden of $500 million per year within such a budget. In the ratification debate this is likely to be posed in an abstract way, as a matter of future concern. But it will become quite concrete if Members realize they will either have to forego cherished programs within the DOD budget to fund enlargement or add money to the DOD account, subtracting it from the already diminished "discretionary" account. In the end no Member will "cry poor" to such an extent that he could persuasively argue that the United States could not afford enlargement. But Members are likely to be able to argue that as a result of the burden to be borne by the American taxpayer, NATO allies must be expected to bear a substantial fraction of the cost. This leads directly to the next issue, the commitment of allies to enlargement. Before turning to it, however, it is necessary to address the second element of the cost issue. What is the money to be spent on? What separated the CBO report from the RAND and OSD reports was the assumption about threats. In addressing the question of costs, Members will delve into the nature of the threat, the relative state of modernization of allied forces and new members' forces, and the missions that are to be performed. Concerns about threats and missions are not now apparent. Of greater concern seems to the apparently large and growing gap between the technical capabilities of U.S. forces and those of current and prospective members. Between the latter two, increasing concern is heard about the lagging state of current members' forces. While the drop in U.S. and allied defense spending since the Cold War has been relatively similar, and aggregate NATO-wide spending in absolute terms and as a percentage of GDP is not badly unbalanced relative to the United States, spending among allies is done on a national basis. Members understand that the resulting distribution has meant that the largest allies-France, Germany, and the United Kingdom-have had to reduce their forces and concentrate modernization on the even smaller (rapid) reaction portion of their respective forces to the detriment of overall modernization. The lagging modernization of allies, and the relatively small contribution they can make to a modern battle force is reinforced when it is realized that U.S. forces themselves could no longer mount an expeditionary force equal to that of the Gulf War. Members have been persuaded this outcome is acceptable due to the introduction of new equipment drawn from the military-technical revolution (MTR) and the adoption of joint doctrine based on concepts emanating from the revolution in military affairs (RMA). The activity surround-ing the Quadrennial Defense Review has created the impression that the United States has now, or soon will have, a 21st century force. With this expectation in mind, a cursory look by Members at allied forces is likely to bring disappointment with their capability and prospects for "interoperability." This might not be an issue but for the adoption by the alliance of a new defense doctrine to project forces into troubled areas that was seemingly derived from concepts related to the MTR and RMA. The Members are acutely aware that the current allies possess little capability to execute such a doctrine without the massive support of the United States. Hence, the worry about cost may in the end prove to be a worry about the ability of the alliance as a whole to meet its commitments to new members. It is expected and accepted that their capability will lag those of current members. What is soon to be learned, and is unlikely to be well accepted, is that current allies may not be adequately equipped and organized to complement U.S. forces and that the new NATO doctrine is more a concept to guide future defense planning than a base for realistic operational planning. In this regard, Members may seek assurances that allies have made the requisite commitments to upgrade their forces and make them compatible with those of the United States. Concern is also expressed about the implications of the pending negotiations to update the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. Members worry that the ceilings to be agreed in the CFE talks-which will not reach their conclusion until well after NATO enlargement is ratified-will so reduce new members' potential as to make them incapable of a serious contribution to alliance security. The tension in their position is not lost on Members; they want both a reasonable cost for enlargement aimed at the sensible modern-ization of forces across the alliance and some assurance that the new allies will be able to make a substantial contribution to allied capabilities. In their view, this combination will provide the alliance with a credible defense and deterrence capacity.

Allied Commitment As in the case of cost, the issue of commitment seems to consist of two elements. The first is commitment to the process of NATO enlargement itself. The second is whether the politics of the European Union (EU), to include both the enlargement of the EU and its attempt at European Monetary Union (EMU), will so divert and preoccupy allied political leaders and national wealth that little of either will be left for NATO enlargement. NATO Enlargement: Members know that the enlargement of NATO is a product of U.S. insistence; indeed many of them will claim to have helped motivate the administration to set 1999 as the date when enlargement is to occur. They are less well aware of the reasons for, but nonetheless cognizant of, the less than enthusiastic attitude of allies to enlargement. Excepting Germany, the reaction of most allied delegations visiting Washington over the last 18 to 24 months has been reluctant acceptance. As a result, Members will be particularly attentive, and may even be likely to misinterpret, actions and signals from other allies with respect to enlargement. The expression of concern by allies on many of the same issues of concern to Members can easily be viewed as a lack of commitment to enlargement or an effort to place the burden on the United States, now and into the future. There is little that can be done in this regard by allies, other than to be sensitive to the possibility that Members will construe allied remarks in a fashion that best serves a Member's own predilections. The debate, in other words, will not merely center on the merits of NATO enlargement but on the value of Europe's contributions. One way of reducing the sensitivity of Members on this issue would be a set of resolutions by allied legislatures on the model of the recent resolution of Representative Benjamin Gilman, chairman of the House International Relations committee, expressing broad support for enlargement and pledging the best efforts of the nation to see that it succeeds, among other items. Because of the procedures surrounding its ratification debates, Great Britain is well placed to take the lead for such an initiative in the context of the questions placed to prime minister Blair, for example. Another possible European alternative could be a debate like that which occurred in 1996 in the Storting on the government's foreign policy objectives. Some such expression might help easing senatorial minds at limited cost to the allies. EU Competition? Whatever expression of commitment might be forth-coming, it needs to reflect an ally's under-standing that NATO enlargement and EU enlargement are not in competition with each other but are instead complementary and parallel efforts. In other words, decisions taken by the EU and NATO come together, and neither institution can ignore the other as it appraises the capacity and aspirations of other states that have indicated unequivocally their interest to join. As Members take greater interest in NATO, they will also take greater interest in the broader European political scene. At the moment that broader scene is hardly an ordered one. Labour's victory in the United Kingdom, the left's unexpected and potentially far-reaching election in France and the difficulties of the German government, which have all have a greater or lesser relation to EU affairs, could be seen by Members as an indication of either an underlying instability in the European project and/or as a major distraction to the work of NATO enlargement. Efforts ought to be undertaken, perhaps via European representatives in the North Atlantic Assembly, to provide a rendering of EU politics and events that demonstrates that they are not likely to have a deleterious effect on NATO enlargement in the shorter term. At the same time, care will need to be taken not to minimize the difficulties faced by the EU. Senators know that politicians and governments need to balance competing interests and can do so. They also have an uncanny ability (or urge when they lack the ability) to assess the viability of a scheme without knowing much of its details. Therefore, a frank admission of the issues the EU is seeking to address and why leaders in Europe believe they can be addressed successfully or why they are irrelevant to NATO enlargement would be useful. As seen most recently in the euphoric aftermath of the Maastricht treaty, European leaders have a tendency to promise too much too soon, and Americans who take such promises seriously are too often exposed to the difficult aftermath that usually follows.

EU Enlargement An account of issues facing the EU must also address the nagging irritation that the EU is not moving with greater dispatch on its own enlargement. In coming months, such irritation could easily become worse. At their Amsterdam summit meeting of June 1997, which concluded an Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) started more than one year earlier, the EU countries hardly gave confidence to those who believe that for NATO and EU enlargements to be complementary and parallel, a EU enlargement must be pursued with vigor. Especially to a Republican Senate, the EU and its enlargement process appears overly bureaucratic and incapable of reforming itself. As a result Members could come to discount protests that EU matters do not distract allied leaders or that a parallel enlargement will occur. As important as complementarity may be, it is the pace and timing of parallel enlargement that is going to occupy the attention of Members. Already the three prospective new NATO states- Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary-have expressed the belief that it will be at least 2002-2003 before they are ready to accede to the EU. Experience with the EU suggests that the actual date could be even later. Indeed, it is not uncommon to hear Europeans visiting Washington to express their private opinion that it could be as much as ten years before new members are brought into the EU. Given that the accession talks are not scheduled to begin before 1998, that would bring the date for new accession much too far into the future. Worse yet, if Members come to believe that the EMU process is even more difficult than they had thought (to the extent they had thought of it), they may conclude that parallel enlargement will take longer than 10 years. Whatever their views on EU enlarge-ment, it is the case that a fairly large body of opinion exists among Members (and the informed American public) that as a matter of good faith in constructing the new Europe the EU must expand soon. Insistent voices can already be heard that the EU has no reason not to bring one or more of the Baltic states into the EU within a few years. The same is often said of Slovenia. Turning about the arguments recently made by allies about Slovenia and Romania and NATO enlargement, some Members will argue that Estonia and Slovenia clearly meet EU criteria now and should be admitted without delay. This argument is meant to encourage a new form of burdensharing in which the US and the EU (or at least its member states) work together to extend both "hard" and "soft" security to Central Europe. It is also clearly seen as a way of offsetting the potential problems that could arise as a result of offering invitations to join NATO to only three states. In this last respect it is doubtful Members have thought through the broader implications of the EU as a source of (some) "hard" and (a good deal of) "soft" security in Central Europe. What cannot be doubted is that with NATO enlargement, and the attendant increase in US responsibility in Central Europe, Members believe the EU must do more. The more attentive among them may come to the conclusion that the United States now has or should have a "voice if not a vote" in EU matters and they may be willing to use it. Again, there is little to be done in a practical sense on this issue between now and the time of the Senate vote on NATO enlargement. One measure that might be of use is for EU spokesmen to avoid stressing the difficulties that must be overcome for the EU to expand and to stress instead the progress that has been made in setting the stage. The associate status of prospective members, the efforts they are making to conform their economies, and their overall determination to make whatever adjustments are needed to prepare for the exacting EU discipline (the acquis communautaire), should be represented to Members and to the "elite" community more generally.

Russia Senatorial concern about Russia spans many issues. Few Members are hostile toward Russia. Many, however, are uncertain about its future in political and economic terms and therefore uncertain about the attitude it will develop toward the West and the United States in particular. This uncertainty is not a function of NATO enlargement for most. While some warn that enlargement will directly undermine domestic reform in and good relations with Russia, others believe that while measures to bring Russia into a working, even if not overly cordial, relationship with the West are to be applauded, care needs to be taken not to give Russia both a voice and a veto in NATO affairs. As a result there is a modest number of Members who think the recently-signed Founding Act was not a good idea. Their number is increased considerably by those who accept that the Act (or something like it) was inevitable and in principle not objectionable but worry about how it will be implemented. Members understand how committees operate and they may view the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) as a vehicle for a Russian veto. The council will be chaired jointly by a Russian member, the NATO Secretary General, and one rotating NATO member. This arrangement has led some to suggest that Russia, with its permanent position as a chair, will retain a larger share of the chairman-ship's power relative to the United States. In addition, NATO has committed to consulting within the council on all common security concerns. How far these extend is unknown. In addition, the size and organization of the Council's secretariat has not been defined. Both of these ambiguities are cause for concern. The longer the issue of the PJC is left unsettled, the more unsettling it will be on the ratification debate. The alliance can move quickly to put concerns to rest by taking decisions to limit the Council's field of regard, so to speak, and its bureaucratic and institutional clout by limiting the size of its secretariat to that appropriate to a consulting and not a decision making body. Furthermore, it might be prudent for the NAC to take unilaterally a number of decisions soon on issues that might be argued to be the subject the PJC. One example might be the movement of a brigade-sized force, perhaps under PFP auspices, into Poland for exercises. There need not be a large number of such decisions/actions, nor do they need to be taken or executed in a provocative manner. But they should be of kind that sets the outer limits of the PJC's area of regard and reinforces the NATO pledge that it can and will act on its own interests independently of the PJC.

Open Process The President's June 11 statement limiting the number of countries the United States favored inviting in Madrid to three underscored the administration's commitment to keep the alliance open to new members. Most Members are equally committed, too, as confirmed at the Madrid Summit. The reasons are complex, often overlapping and at times contradictory, but unmistakably in favor of an open process. A desire to see the Baltic states in NATO drives many Members. They believe the Baltic states are "owed" something by the West. Others have a particular interest in one nation or another, for example Slovenia, driven by personal experiences or by a notion that membership would be good for the region in which they reside. Others believe (in addition) that a process left open is a process that Russia does not control and therefore one that safeguards NATO's political freedom of action. Still others see NATO as a continuously enlarging and evolving organization that will guide the final integration of Europe. There are voices, however, that worry about alliance cohesion. These voices argue that while Slovenia and Romania may be likely future candidates, enlargement cannot accommodate all those who seek future membership. The case for leaving Slovenia and Romania to a second tranche was shared, and indeed promoted, by Members who looked with interest to the allies' reaction to the U.S. decision to seek only three new alliance members. The extent to which allies accept this argument after Madrid will be telling for Members with respect to allies' acceptance of U.S. leadership on the issue and as an indicator of their commitment to the process.

Preliminary Conclusions In the days preceding Madrid there was a broad commitment to NATO enlargement in the U.S. Senate. That commitment is still evident, but it is far broader than it is deep. As a result, opinion on how enlarge-ment should be accomplished, the role of the United States, of its current allies and of the new members, is still waiting to be formed. In coming month, there are many issues that might influence the shaping of that opinion and the understanding of that role, including, perhaps most urgently, the next phase of the conflict in Bosnia (especially if a NATO attempt to arrest war criminals were to result in U.S. and allies casualties). Nonetheless, the likely course of development is that enlargement per se will never come truly into doubt. As notions about NATO, the EU and their respective enlargement take hold and the issues outlined above are aired, Members will be all too aware of the consequences of non-ratification even as they begin to form their conditions, reservations and declarations to accompany the articles of ratification. If the Members are satisfied with the responses to their questions from the White House, Brussels and from their own correspondents in Europe, then the number and severity of amendments to the articles will be restrained. But if the Members lack confidence, it is not at all impossible to see their endorsement of ratification formulated with amendments that might, for example: restrict the contribution of US funding for enlargement to some amount figured as a yearly sum or a percentage of a sum, with the upper limit of that contribution defined; require the President to certify that enlargement spending is being directed in new member states to a specific and limited number of areas designed to make forces in these states progressively more complementary to U.S. forces; insist that nothing be agreed in a CFE context that undermines the ability of allies- current and future (meaning not only the three to be admitted at Madrid but future candidates already identified by Congress)-to contribute to the defense missions of the alliance; urge the President to press the EU to accept new members as quickly as possible; circumscribe the field of regard or participation of the US in the PJC. This could be advisory (declaration) or binding (reserva-tion or condition) depending on how the Founding Act is implemented and reactions among allies, new invitees and in Russia; require that the process remain open after an effort to impose some sort of a pause has been defeated. It would not be surprising if in addition an effort were made to set a date for subsequent enlargement and/or name actual or prospective candidates. These are meant as an illustrative set of amendments, based on the foregoing discussion. It must be stressed that no thought has been given by the Members yet to the articles of ratification. But it is sure that staff is turning to the issue now that Madrid is behind us and as their Members return from the summer recess. That suggests it would be prudent for NATO to undertake a substantial effort to engage critical staff so that they are not left without insight and information that only Brussels can provide. Stephen CAMBONE has been a Senior Fellow in Political-Military Studies at CSIS since 1993. Previously, he served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as director of the strategic defense policy office. Dr. Cambone has published widely and often on political-military issues in and beyond Europe.