THEMATIC BIBLIOGRAPHIES
No. 9/2004

THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT :
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
LE CONFLIT ISRAÉLO-ARABE :
PERSPECTIVE HISTORIQUE

Bibliographies Thématiques
No. 9/2004
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Adresse électronique: library@hq.nato.int
Site web (Internet): http://www.nato.int/structur/library/library-f.htm

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En tant que membre du personnel de l'OTAN vous pouvez emprunter des livres (Type: M) pour une période d’un mois et des revues pour une semaine. Les livres de référence (Type: REF) sont à consulter sur place. Les personnes n'appartenant pas à l'OTAN peuvent s'adresser à leur bibliothèque locale et emprunter des ouvrages via le système de prêt inter-bibliothèques.

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Vous pouvez également les consulter sur le site web de la Bibliothèque à http://www.nato.int/structur/library/library-f.htm
2003

327 /01196
Balancing Act : US Foreign Policy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict -
Aldershot, UK : Ashgate.
viii, 148 p.; 23 cm.
(US Foreign Policy and Conflict in the Islamic World)
ISBN: 0754635910
Author(s):
1. Shannon, Vaughn P.
Subject(s):
1. MIDDLE EAST--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
2. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--MIDDLE EAST
3. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
Notes:
'The author argues that US foreign policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict has been determined at three levels of analysis: that of systemic strategic context, that of domestic politics, and that of individual decision-makers. In this book he explores the role of each level of influence, as well as the implications for the posture which the US has chosen.
Reflecting changing circumstances, the volume examines the Cold War, the Gulf War and the new 'War on Terror' and how they have placed differing pressures on US policymakers as they strive to maintain the ultimate strategic goal of preserving regional oil from becoming dominated by hostile forces.'
ID number: 80019347
Year: 2003

441 /00110
The European Union and the Crisis in the Middle East - Paris : European Union Institute for Security Studies.
94 p.; 24 cm.
(Chaillot Papers ; 62)
Subject(s):
1. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT--1993---PEACE--EU
2. EU--MIDDLE EAST
Added entry(s):
1. Ortega, Martin, ed.
2. European Union Institute for Security Studies (FR)
Notes:
'In this paper, five European authors put forward their views on the role played by the European Union in attempts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the beginning of the intifada in September 2000. Among the positive aspects of the Union's actions, it should first be emphasised that it has defined a clear position based on the peaceful coexistence of two states within stable borders and respect for international legislation. That position, as well as a vigorous condemnation of violence, has been expressed in successive European Council statements. Second, the existence of the High Representative and a Special Envoy on the Middle East has made it possible for the Union to participate directly in various negotiating...'

* This list contains material received as of October 21st, 2004 – Cette liste est arrêtée au 21 octobre 2004
frameworks, including the Quartet, which has prepared a 'road map' for peace. The Union has also continued to maintain economic relations with both parties in order to avoid aggravation of the negative consequences of the conflict. Despite these positive aspects, however, the Union should play an even greater role, because both the principles and values that it upholds and its interests, like those of its member states, are endangered by the continuation of the conflict. As a result, the Union should work together with the United States, which is the principal mediator, in implementing the 'road map', and it should be prepared to use all instruments at its disposal to demand that the two parties renounce violence in favour of negotiation.'

ID number: 80018775
Year: 2003

Author(s):
1. Gresh, Alain

Subject(s):
1. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
2. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT--1993---PEACE

Notes:
Bibliography: 199-201.

'This book is not an expression of indignation, but also of a volition to comprehend, to better understand. In several months, all the peace aspirations in the Near East, born of the historical agreement between Yasser Arafat and Itzhak Rabin in 1993, have collapsed. The second Intifada has expressed the limits of the agreements signed. In France, this revolt has sparked many solidarity movements, from the Jews to the Arabs. Should we resign to these consequences? Is there a laic discourse capable of transcending these divisions? The confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians has a long history: from the birth of Zionism to the 1948 war and the creation of Israel, from Palestinian resistance to their transformation into refugees and the creation of the OLP, from the 1967 war to the Oslo Peace Accords. Countless episodes that need to be grasped as a whole. But these indispensable reminders are not enough. They must be placed in an analytical framework that gives them a universal meaning. Why should the experience of ex-Yugoslavia or South Africa not apply to Palestine-Israel? Would the Holy Land lead us to lose the north? Let us accept to use the compass of reason to better understand this difficult Orient, to use the compass of the humane.'

ID number: 80017892
Year: 2001

The Middle East = Le Moyen-Orient - Geneva: UNIDIR. 99 + 109 p.; 30 cm. (Disarmament Forum 2/01 = Forum du Desarmement 2/01)

Subject(s):
1. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--MIDDLE EAST
2. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT--1993---PEACE
3. WEAPONS PROLIFERATION--MIDDLE EAST

Added entry(s):
1. Vignard, Kerstin, ed.
2. Compagnion, Valerie, ed.
3. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

Notes:
'The stalemate in the Middle East Peace Process has taken a drastic turn for the worse in the past months. With violence exploding, hopes for positive steps towards a Palestinian-Israeli accord in the near future are all but extinguished. How will this deteriorating situation effect the rest of the Middle East? What are the near to mid-term prospects for the region? What's happening with ACRS and what, if anything, are its possibilities? Topics such as the international community's wavering equivocations on how to deal with Iraq, recent elections throughout the region and their implications, and the indisputable strategic importance of the Middle East demand a new examination through a regional security and disarmament lens. This issue offers a deeper exploration of how and why the Middle East constitutes such an important challenge to arms control and disarmament.'
2000

628  /00072
xx, 297 p. : ill.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 0333699645
Author(s):
1. Rouyer, Alwyn R.
Subject(s):
1. WATER-SUPPLY--POLITICAL ASPECTS--ISRAEL
2. WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT--POLITICAL ASPECTS--ISRAEL
3. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
Notes:
Includes index.
'The author presents a comprehensive and objective examination of the water issue in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The book examines the historical, environmental, economic and legal dimensions of the water issue between Israel and the Palestinians but demonstrates that the dispute is essentially political in nature and can be solved only through political accommodations. The book examines the Palestinian-Israeli water conflict and water negotiations in the peace process from a variety of disciplines and includes informations gathered from over 60 interviews with leading and knowledgeable Israeli and Palestinian authority government officials. The water dispute between the Israeli and the Palestinians seldom grabs newspaper headlines like the issues of Jerusalem or Jewish settlements, but no permanent peace accord can be achieved between these two people without agreement over the allocation of shared water resources.'

ID number: 80016253
Year: 2000

1998

327  /00984
The Transatlantic Allies and the Changing Middle East - Oxford, UK : Oxford University Press.
96 p. : ill.; 24 cm.
(Adelphi papers, 0567-932X ; 322)
ISBN: 0199223777
Author(s):
1. Gordon, Philip H., 1962-
Subject(s):
1. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--MIDDLE EAST
2. MIDDLE EAST--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
3. EUROPE--FOREIGN RELATIONS--MIDDLE EAST
4. MIDDLE EAST--FOREIGN RELATIONS--EUROPE
5. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT--1993---PEACE
Added entry(s):
1. International Institute for Strategic Studies (GB)
Notes:
'Since the mid-1990s, US and European attitudes, strategies and policies towards the Middle East have diverged. In the Middle East peace process, Europeans have grown frustrated with the lack of progress and Washington's near-monopoly on diplomatic action, and have begun to demand a greater role. On Iraq, the US insists on Saddam Hussein's military and economic containment, while some Europeans have started to press for a more rapid reintegration of Iraq into the international community and are reluctant to use or threaten force. The issue of how to deal with Iran has been most divisive, with the US threatening to impose economic sanctions on its European allies.'
to coerce them into following Washington’s harder line. This paper examines the reasons for these potentially damaging differences, assesses the prospects for improving transatlantic cooperation in the region, and suggests approaches that may help to bring this about.

ID number: 80015341
Year: 1998

1997

327 /00963
iv, 40 p.; 23 cm.
Author(s):
1. Cobban, Helena
Subject(s):
1. ISRAEL--FOREIGN RELATIONS--SYRIA
2. SYRIA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--ISRAEL
3. MIDDLE EAST PEACE CONFERENCE, 1991
4. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT--1991---PEACE
Added entry(s):
1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
Notes:
‘One of the more dismaying aspects of the current peace process has been the failure of Syria and Israel to make a deal. According to the author, these two long-standing foes came very close to composing their decades-old quarrel. The Syrian and Israeli leaders persevered to overcome extraordinary obstacles, but in the end failed. A terrible setback, because so much hard negotiating work had been done up to the very last moment when the whole carefully constructed edifice of peace drifted away.

ID number: 80014262
Year: 1997

327.5 /00362
vi, 93 p.: ill.; 23 cm.
Subject(s):
1. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT--1993---PEACE
2. JEWISH-ARAB RELATIONS
Added entry(s):
1. Pelletiere, Stephen C., ed.
2. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
Notes:
‘The three essays presented here take stock of several key aspects of what can now be considered the first phase of the Mideast Peace Process (i.e., that period from the 1991 Madrid Conference to the 1996 Israeli election). In the first essay, Alfred B. Prados examines the Jordanian-Israeli peace agreement, which vies with the Israeli-Palestinian accords as the most positive development of the first phase. Prados outlines the history and terms of this landmark agreement. Next, LtCol Stephen H. Gotowicki assesses in detail the issue of deploying US troops on the Golan Heights. Recent Israeli and Syrian statements seem to have doomed any near term Golan arrangement (and hence an Israeli-Syrian settlement). However, should the peace process with Syria suddenly resume, expectations of the United States could be even greater, and a US Army peacekeeping mission would become the topic of intense debate in Washington. Finally, Dr. Pelletiere’s study of Operation Grapes of Wrath looks at possible Israeli and Syrian motives underlying the violent exchanges in April 1996 in southern Lebanon. His analysis does not augur well for what lies ahead on the peace front. US policymakers must move
quickly to exploit - or at least try to control - developments in the Syria-Lebanon tangle of relations.'

ID number: 80013716
Year: 1997

327.5 /00364

Author(s):
1. Telhami, Shibley
2. Velte, Lawrence R.

Notes:
'As of mid-1997, the fate of the Arab-Israeli peace process is dangerously uncertain. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's decision to begin work on a new Jewish settlement in Jerusalem has so enraged Palestinians that they have effectively walked out of the negotiations. President Clinton has called on his special envoy, Dennis Ross, to exert every effort to get the Palestinians to return. Meanwhile, elements opposed to the peace process from within the Israeli political establishment have pressured the Prime Minister to halt or even reverse the steps taken to date. Given these current setbacks, it is worthwhile to review what hangs in the balance for US interests in the Middle East. How important is success in the peace process? What are the implications should the peace talks fail? The two papers presented here examine the likely effects of breakdown, or breakthrough, on America's broader regional interests, extending in particular to the Persian Gulf. As US policies with respect to the Gulf and the Arab-Israeli peace process come under increasing stress, the authors elaborate linkages between them. They also make clear that the outcomes will have profound implications for US security commitments and, potentially, future missions and deployments.'

ID number: 80014223
Year: 1997

1996

327.5 /00359

Notes:
Bibliography: p. 100-104.
ID number: 80013220
Year: 1996
xii, 436 p. : ill.; 24 cm.
ISBN: 1860670091
Author(s):
  1. Joffe, Lawrence
Subject(s):
  1. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT--1993---PEACE
  2. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
  3. MIDDLE EAST--BIOGRAPHY
Notes:
  Includes index.
  'This book includes sections on the historical background; an
overview of the process, including agreements reached so far,
timetables and a chronology of the Arab-Israeli dispute;
detailed profiles of the main figures involved in the main
peace process; a listing of profiles within country headings.'
ID number: 80013387
Year: 1996

An Historical Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict - London :
Aldwych Press.
xv, 655 p.; 24 cm.
ISBN: 0861721012
Subject(s):
  1. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT--DICTIONARIES
  2. JEWISH-ARAB RELATIONS--DICTIONARIES
Added entry(s):
  1. Reich, Bernard, ed.
Notes:
  Includes index.
  'This first encyclopedia about the Arab-Israeli conflict by a team
of experts gives detailed and comprehensive coverage of the
important political, military, and diplomatic events, places,
people, groups, agreements, treaties, and issues that have
marked this controversial and complex regional and
international conflict. A team of authorities with varying
backgrounds, interests, disciplines and perspectives gives
special attention to the period since the adoption of the
Palestine partition plan in November 1947, the first
Arab-Israeli War up to the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles
and subsequent agreements, as well as the Israel-Jordan Peace
Treaty and implementation process. Hundreds of entries arranged
alphabetically provide hard-to-find information and point to
sources for further reading and research. Extensive
cross-references, a chronology of important events, a
bibliographical essay, and a general index further enhance this
basic research tool.'
ID number: 80014684
Year: 1996
vi, 109 p.; 21 cm.
(Research Paper ; 37)
ISBN: 9290451076
Subject(s):
1. MIDDLE EAST--NATIONAL SECURITY
2. MIDDLE EAST--FOREIGN RELATIONS
3. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
Added entry(s):
1. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
ID number: 80012569
Year: 1995

v, 46 p. : ill.; 23 cm.
Author(s):
1. Pelletiere, Stephen C.
Subject(s):
1. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
2. SYRIA--MILITARY RELATIONS--ISRAEL
3. SYRIA--MILITARY RELATIONS--LEBANON
4. ISRAEL--MILITARY RELATIONS--SYRIA
5. LEBANON--MILITARY RELATIONS--SYRIA
Added entry(s):
1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
Notes:
'The author examines the current status of peace negotiations between Syria and Israel, and concludes that Syria's position is more formidable than is generally believed. The study explains why this is so and offers recommendations concerning U.S. policymakers' approach to this situation.'
ID number: 80011479
Year: 1995

iv, 96 p.; 22 cm.
(Whitehall Paper ; 33)
ISBN: 0855161159
Author(s):
1. Groth, Allon
Subject(s):
1. DECISION MAKING--PLO
2. JEWISH-ARAB RELATIONS
Added entry(s):
1. Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (GB)
Notes:
'Bibliography: p. 91-96.
'The first chapter of this paper provides an overview of PLO decision-making between 1967-1991. The second and third chapters, based mainly on publicly available primary sources, give a more detailed account of PLO decision-making procedures behind the Washington and Oslo negotiations. The fourth chapter is devoted to an analysis of the trends emerging from the three previous chapters. Finally, the epilogue looks at the implications for the future of the PLO in the light of the agreement reached in September 1995 initiating the interim phase of the Oslo DOP.'
327.5 /00349
Fredesprocessen i Mellemosten - Kobenhavn : Sikkerheds- og
Nedrustningspolitiske Udvalg.
67 p.; 22 cm.
ISBN: 8760144327
Author(s):
  1. Hansen, Birthe
Subject(s):
  1. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
  2. JEWISH-ARAB RELATIONS
ID number: 80010738
Year: 1994

327.5 /00351
The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement : A Documentary Record -
Washington : Institute for Palestine Studies.
306 p.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 0887282571
Subject(s):
  1. JEWISH-ARAB RELATIONS
  2. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
Added entry(s):
  1. Institute for Palestine Studies (US)
Notes:
'This new revised edition is updated to include the post-September
1993 documents relating to the ongoing peace process. Over 100
pages of appendices feature essential background documents and speeches,
including the original UN partition plan of 1947, relevant UN
Security Council resolutions, the Camp David Accords, King Hussein's
disengagement from the West Bank speech and the PNC 'Declaration
of Independence' of 1988.'
ID number: 80010978
Edition: Rev. 2nd ed.
Year: 1994

323 /00561
Hamas and Hizbollah : The Radical Challenge to Israel in the Occupied
v, 63 p. : ill.; 23 cm.
Author(s):
  1. Pelletiere, Stephen C.
Subject(s):
  1. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
  2. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM--ISRAEL
  3. ISRAEL--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
Added entry(s):
  1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
Notes:
'In this study, the author argues that these two religious
organizations are more dangerous to US interests than heretofore
has been thought. They are not mere terrorist groups, but part of a
universal movement that has succeeded in mobilizing elements
previously suppressed throughout the Middle East, and is
attempting to radicalize the whole Arab world. This study seeks to alert US
policymakers and military leaders to the larger potential danger
posed by Hamas and Hizbollah.'
ID number: 80011008
Year: 1994
xxvii, 906 p. : ill.; 25 cm.
ISBN: 0253358485
Author(s):
1. Tessler, Mark A.
Subject(s):
1. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
2. JEWISH-ARAB RELATIONS
Notes:
ID number: 80010302
Year: 1994

1992

Moyen-Orient : les dossiers de la paix - Bruxelles : GRIP.
127 p. : ill.; 21 cm.
(Dossiers du GRIP ; 175-176)
Author(s):
1. Fenaux, Pascal
Subject(s):
1. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
Added entry(s):
1. Institut Europeen de Recherche et d'Information sur la Paix et la Securite (BE)
Notes:
'Cet ouvrage tente de presenter les principales contradictions israelo-arabes et surtout israelo-palestiniennes. Au-dela des classiques enjeux frontaliers, militaires, economiques et ideologiques, une dimension fondamentale est longuement detaillee : la dimension demographique, sans laquelle il est vain d'analyser les strategies des protagonistes. Enfin, cet ouvrage se conclut sur la pierre angulaire du processus de paix, a savoir les projets d'autonomie transitoire pour les territoires palestiniens occupez.'
ID number: 80008680
Year: 1992

102 p.; 22 cm.
(Chatham House Papers)
ISBN: 0876091265
Author(s):
1. Golan, Galia
Subject(s):
1. MIDDLE EAST--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USSR
2. USSR--FOREIGN RELATIONS--MIDDLE EAST
3. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
4. PERSIAN GULF WAR, 1991--USSR
Added entry(s):
1. Royal Institute of International Affairs (GB)
2. Council on Foreign Relations (US)
Notes:
'The author sheds here new light on a crucial period in Soviet and Middle Eastern history, which marked a fundamental ideological break with the past. Golan analyzes the link between domestic pressures and the development of Moscow's Middle East policy, highlighting the influence of Muslim interest groups and entrenched hard-line factions in the government and military. She asserts that the Gulf war tested Gorbachev's ability to withstand these pressures. Golan goes on to examine the ideological and tactical reasons behind a number of
Moscow's key decisions and concludes by exploring how the complex
political, cultural and economic forces that influenced these
decisions might affect the emerging foreign policy of the newly
independent republics.'

ID number: 80008228
Year: 1992

327.5 /00343
The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict : A Documentary Record - Cambridge, UK :
Cambridge University Press.
xviii, 549 p.; 24 cm.
ISBN: 0521375614
Subject(s):
1. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT--SOURCES
2. JEWISH-ARAB RELATIONS--SOURCES
Added entry(s):
1. Lukacs, Yehuda, ed.
2. International Center for Peace in the Middle East (IL)
Notes:
Rev. and expanded ed. of: Documents on the Israeli-Palestinian
ID number: 80008118
Year: 1992

1991

327.5 /00339
The Superpowers and the Syrian-Israeli Conflict : Beyond Crisis
xxii, 182 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
(The Washington papers, 0278-937X ; 149)
ISBN: 0275939448
Author(s):
1. Cobban, Helena
Subject(s):
1. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
2. ISRAEL--MILITARY RELATIONS--SYRIA
3. SYRIA--MILITARY RELATIONS--ISRAEL
Added entry(s):
1. Georgetown University. Center for Strategic and International
Studies (US)
Notes:
Includes index.
'This study analyzes strategic developments in the Israeli-Syrian
region of the Middle East during the years 1978-1989 and the
involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union in those
developments'.
ID number: 80006918
Year: 1991

1990

327.5 /00332
v, 42 p. ; 23 cm.
(Triangle Papers ; 38)
ISBN: 093050366X
Author(s):
1. FitzGerald, Garret, 1926-
Subject(s):
1. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
Added entry(s):
1. Trilateral Commission
ID number: 80005254
Year: 1990
327.5 /00331
Israel on the Brink of Decision: Division, Unity and Crosscurrents in the Israeli Body Politic - London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism.
29 p.; 25 cm.
(Choice of Studies, 0069-0792 ; 231)
Author(s):
1. Hollis, Rosemary
Subject(s):
1. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
2. JEWISH-ARAB RELATIONS
Added entry(s):
1. Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism (GB)
ID number: 80004717
Year: 1990

1988

327.5 /00337
xx, 402 p.; 24 cm.
ISBN: 0714632813
Author(s):
1. Shemesh, Moshe
Subject(s):
1. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
2. ARAB COUNTRIES--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
3. PALESTINE--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
Notes:
'Published in cooperation with the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem'
Bibliography: p. 373-388. Includes index.
ID number: 80006500
Year: 1988

1987

327.5 /00295
xxxv, 345 p. : maps ; 23 cm.
ISBN: 0566008181
Author(s):
1. Gainsborough, J. Russell, 1943-
Subject(s):
1. ISRAEL-ARAB WAR, 1948-1949
2. ISRAEL-ARAB BORDER CONFLICTS, 1949-
3. WAR (INTERNATIONAL LAW)
4. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
Notes:
Includes index.
Bibliography: p. 319-334.
ID number: 70001767
Year: 1987
1986

327.5 /00278
Les conflits dans les zones de crise : le Proche-Orient et le Liban :
essai de polemologie, de geopolitique et de sociologie - Cousset, CHE
: Delval.
260 p.
ISBN: 2881470122
Author(s):
1. Sayegh, Raymond
Subject(s):
1. LEBANON--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
2. JEWISH-ARAB RELATIONS
Notes:
ID number: 70001753
Year: 1986

1985

327.5 /00297
Francaise.
141 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
(Notes et etudes documentaires, 0029-4004 ; 4791)
Subject(s):
1. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
2. JEWISH-ARAB RELATIONS
Added entry(s):
1. Institut Francais de Polemologie (FR)
Notes:
Includes bibliographical references.
ID number: 70001769
Year: 1985

327.5 /00297
Francaise.
142 p. : ill.; 24 cm.
(Notes et etudes documentaires, 0029-4004 ; 4792)
Subject(s):
1. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
2. JEWISH-ARAB RELATIONS
Added entry(s):
1. Institut Francais de Polemologie (FR)
Notes:
Includes bibliographical references.
ID number: 80004437
Year: 1985
x, 601 p. : ill., maps, facsim
ISBN: 0718125282

Author(s):
1. Peters, Joan, 1938-

Subject(s):
1. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
2. JEWISH-ARAB RELATIONS

Notes:
Includes index.
ID number: 70001750
Year: 1985

1982

19 p. ; 25 cm.
(Conflict studies, 0069-8792 ; 141)

Author(s):
1. Lerman, Eran

Subject(s):
1. JEWISH-ARAB RELATIONS
2. PALESTINIAN ARABS--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
3. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Notes:
Includes bibliographical references.
ID number: 70001715
Year: 1982

1981

59 p. : 7 maps ; 25 cm.
(Adelphi papers, 0567-932X ; 163)
ISBN: 0860790452

Author(s):
1. Plascov, Avi

Subject(s):
1. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
2. PALESTINE--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

Notes:
Includes bibliographical references.
ID number: 70001705
Year: 1981

355.4 /00396

Crisis management and the super-powers in the Middle East - Farnborough, UK : Gower.
vi, 183 p. ; 23 cm.
(The Adelphi library ; 5)
ISBN: 0916672735

Subject(s):
1. MIDDLE EAST--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
2. JEWISH-ARAB RELATIONS

Added entry(s):
1. Treverton, Gregory F., ed.
2. International Institute for Strategic Studies (GB)

Notes:
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Author(s): 1. Mroz, John Edwin
Subject(s): 1. JEWISH-ARAB RELATIONS--PUBLIC OPINION
2. PUBLIC OPINION--ARAB COUNTRIES
3. PUBLIC OPINION--ISRAEL
Added entry(s): 1. International Peace Academy (US)
ID number: 80003260 Year: 1981

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1. Kemp, Geoffrey
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Notes:
'The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the factors in
the Arab-Israeli conflict that have direct bearing on the relationship
between strategy, politics and arms levels in the area. The
transfer of arms to the Middle East is not a new phenomenon, but the June
war of 1967 gave further impetus to the flow of weapons to Israel and
the Arab countries that began in earnest in 1948, and has become
progressively more intense in terms of quantity and quality. It is
particularly important to understand the qualitative as well as
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1. Cooke, Hedley Vicars, 1906-
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- Golan, Galia
  Plans for Israeli-Palestinian Peace: From Beirut to Geneva.
  http://www.swetswise.com
  This article examines what the international community has offered as a basis for Israeli-Palestinian peace, what the Arab world has suggested, what the local participants themselves are proposing, and the potential for actually realizing any of these plans.

- Hollis, Rosemary
  The Israeli-Palestinian Road Block: Can Europeans Make a Difference?
  http://www.swetswise.com
  Europe needs a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for the sake of its own social harmony, and could reconfigure the calculations of the parties by inviting Israel to integrate into Europe's social, economic and security space in return for withdrawal from the West Bank, Gaza and Arab East Jerusalem. The idea would be to capitalize on the drive for separation that prevails in Israel and abandon an unrealistic policy that requires the Arabs to integrate Israel in the region. It is also time for Europe to face up to its own role in the problem and the solution, and demonstrate that anti-Semitism does not influence its policy.

- Lasensky, Scott
  Paying for Peace: The Oslo Process and the Limits of American Foreign Aid.
  American foreign aid has been essential for both cementing and sustaining efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict since the 1970s. During the Oslo process, aid was designed primarily to build public constituencies to support the negotiations. However, aid quickly became a bandage for a deteriorating Palestinian economy weighed down by corruption, damaged by violence, and stifled by Israeli closures. Rather than serve its original purpose, aid became a crutch for an unsteady process that collapsed following the 2000 Camp David summit. Unlike in other Arab-Israeli negotiations, where aid has been more effective, the Oslo process highlights the limits of foreign aid as an instrument of statecraft.

- Makovsky, David
  How to Build a Fence.
  Israelis and Palestinians must be separated for the Middle East to achieve some semblance of peace. At this point, that will take a fence. The good news is that Israel is already building a sensible barrier. The bad news is that the Sharon government may construct it in a way that spurs future conflict rather than ends it. The United States thus needs to step in to make sure that the right kind of fence gets built, in the right place - or else both sides will face more fighting in the future.

** This list contains material received as of October 21st, 2004 – Cette liste est arrêtée au 21 octobre 2004
Nabulsi, Karma
The Peace Process and the Palestinians: A Road Map to Mars.
http://www.swetswise.com
This article provides an analytical framework in which to understand the new approach to the Israel-Palestine conflict that has been developing over the last two years. It discusses this new agenda: how it operates, and what arenas it operates in. It looks at the ways this new approach is being implemented through various processes and common understandings by the officials, experts, diplomats, and academics who make up the international community involved in the Middle East Peace Process.

Neugart, Felix
Time Is Running Out.
It would be a grave error to be complacent about the end of the Oslo process and the start of the intifada. Israeli politics has become much more volatile and fragmented. More and more Palestinians feel they have less and less to lose. Trust has evaporated. The only last chance to escape the self-perpetuating spiral of violence is to link the end of hostilities with substantial political progress. The concepts are clear in the existing 'road map'. What is needed now is the commitment to implement them.

Ottolenghi, Emanuele
Why Palestinians and Israelis Are Not Ready For Peace.
http://www.swetswise.com
The failure of the Oslo process and the surge of violence since September 2000 have highlighted the unbridgeable gap that separates Israelis and Palestinians. After 11 September 2001, Western policies in the region have been faced with two choices. A 'Palestine-first' option would emphasise the centrality of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute to the region and seek to solve it, in the expectation that a solution will make it easier to cure the other ills of the greater Middle East. Yet the correlation between Palestine and these other problems is tenuous at best. The Bush administration correctly has chosen a second strategy: putting Palestine last. A solution to other regional problems might well prepare the ground for an eventual resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute. Until conditions change, the best strategy is to significantly lower expectations, substituting conflict management for conflict resolution.

Allin, Dana H. and Simon, Steven
The Moral Psychology of US Support for Israel.
http://www.swetswise.com
In their common sponsorship, along with Russia and the United Nations, of the so-called 'Road Map' to peace, Washington and Brussels have jointly denounced Palestinian terrorism, described the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza as legally and morally unsustainable, and lent explicit and official support to the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state. So much agreement is astonishing in light of the radically different positions taken by the US and its European allies from the 1960s until the 1990s. Still, the United States remains practically alone in its historically and emotionally charged support for Israel. This can motivate and justify robust engagement in the peace process. But moving it forward will require a degree of US engagement that will be daunting, given the dire security situation in Israel-Palestine and the constellation of political and emotional factors at play in the United States.
The recent war in Iraq will have long-range strategic ramifications on the Middle East. Following the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime the Bush administration introduced the so-called road map, which seeks to make peace between Israel and the Palestinians. These political developments underscore the connection between the geo-politics of the Persian Gulf and the Arab-Israeli conflict. This study examines the Gulf monarchies' policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. Particular attention is given to the Saudi leading role in the Arab oil embargo in 1973 and the Saudi peace plans of 1981 and 2002. Finally, the study discusses the limited diplomatic relations between Israel and two Gulf monarchies (Oman and Qatar).

The best hope for Israeli-Palestinian peace lies in the 'Road Map', a peace plan put forward by the so-called Quartet, which is composed of the United States, the United Nations, the European Union and Russia. The Road Map calls for a commitment to a two-state solution, not only from the parties to the conflict but also from international actors. The key to the success or failure of the new plan lies in the degree of third-party involvement in advancing the implementation of the agreement and in monitoring and verifying it. In practical terms, the success of this endeavour will depend on constructive and bold US policy. US policy in forcing regime-change in Iraq was risky; a reversion now to risk-averse realism with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would be fatal to the prospects of resolving it.

The hope generated by the Oslo Accords and the political capital spent to preserve its ideological and political trajectory have been replaced by cynicism, suicide bombings, and despair. How did Oslo collapse so rapidly and what are the security implications for Israel of this event? This essay addresses these issues in three parts. First, it examines the Oslo Accord and the events that have led to its rapid demise. Second, it argues that the Bush administration policy vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be best explained within the context of the 'war against terror' and that this antiterror campaign has contributed to delinking the peace process from the PLA leadership. Third, it examines Israel's internal and external security dilemmas and what strategic options it might pursue in a post-Arafat environment. The essay concludes by endorsing a unilateral Israeli evacuation from the West Bank and Gaza after the construction of a border security fence. Such a policy represents the least bad alternative in a security environment increasingly dominated by Islamic extremism and suicide bombings.

The meeting in early June in Aqaba, where King Abdallah II of Jordan and President Bush met with prime ministers Ariel Sharon and Mahmoud Abbas, sparked considerable hope. The meeting resulted in especially strong public commitments, as Ariel Sharon recognized the Palestinians' right to a state, while his Palestinian counterpart condemned the intifada. Above
all, the meeting marked the official relaunch of the diplomatic process based on the road map drafted by the Quartet (United States, European Union, UN and Russia). Today, little remains to show for all this diplomatic agitation. On the ground, assassinations and terrorist attacks answer one another with clockwork regularity. Israelis and Palestinians again accuse each other of having broken promises. And the road map is moribund without even the first steps of application. To get out of this impasse the only solution is the creation of an international authority to oversee Gaza and the West Bank.

- Doran, Michael Scott
Palestine, Iraq, and American Strategy.
Many critics argue that the Bush administration should put off a showdown with Saddam Hussein and focus instead on achieving a breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But they fail to understand that although Palestine is central to the symbolism of Arab politics, it is actually marginal to its substance. Now, as in 1991, if a road to a calmer situation in Palestine does in fact exist, it runs through Baghdad.

- Eshel, David
Ein Fahrplan nach Nirgendwo.
EUROPAISCHE SICHERHEIT, 52. Jg., Nr. 9, September 2003, S. 11-14.

- Giniewski, Paul
La 'feuille de route' du Quartet : passeport pour la paix ou pour la guerre ?
Un nouveau plan de paix, destine a mettre fin a la 'deuxieme intifada', et plus ambitieusement encore a liquider le conflit israelo-arabe, occupe les devants de la scene internationale. Que proposent les puissances ? Quelle est la nouveaute du projet ? Quelles sont ses chances de succes ?

- Haas, Harald
Plaschke, Andrea
OSTERREICHISCHE MILITARISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT, 41. Jg., Heft 1, Januar - Februar 2003, S. 31-40.
The authors suggest a psycho-political approach to the Middle East conflict, focusing on the traumatic defeats that the Palestinians and the Israelis experienced. Both people are suffering from their respective national traumata which, by being continuously re-staged, contribute to a cycle of violence that is handed down from generation to generation. A way out of this dilemma can only be achieved by pertinent mediation, as the 'Harvard Negotiation Projects' suggests it. Instead of fighting over positions, which are often just a cover-up for underlying problems, points of dispute should be decided on the basis of their importance and relevant content. The mediator, a neutral third party with equidistance to the conflict parties, should guide the process like a manager or film producer and lay down the rules for interacting. However, such a person is nowhere in sight in the Middle East, at the moment. Only under the protection of international peace troops could Israelis and Palestinians start the laborious process of coming to terms with their traumatic pasts. And after that, a mediator could be sought, who might then substantially contribute to a solution by mediating a settlement.
The Bush administration's plan for Middle East peace is a road map to nowhere. A more ambitious approach will be necessary to parlay the bounce from a successful Iraq war into serious Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. The time has come to consider the notion of a trusteeship for Palestine.

To succeed, the roadmap to peace will need many things, not least of which is Israeli and Palestinian participation in it.

To the despair of the international community, President Bush has departed from a commitment pursued by the past six US presidents, leaving slim prospect in the wake of this year's war in Iraq for any kind of Israeli-Palestinian peace.
- Zelnick, Bob
The Unnecessary Intifada.
The author reports on key developments in Israel, where the second intifada is steadily being brought under control – an important preliminary to US-Israeli common strategy in the effort against Iraq. The Israeli moves into the West Bank have dealt a crippling blow to the Palestinian Authority, and America's dismissal of Arafat as a negotiating partner lays the basis for intimate cooperation with Israel or a policy of democratic enlargement in the area.

2002

- Benn, Aluf
The Last of the Patriarchs.
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon faces disaster on two fronts: ongoing unrest from the Palestinians on one side and a disintegrating domestic coalition on the other. Seemingly paralyzed, Sharon has not responded well to either. So far, Israelis have remained mostly loyal to the former general, and Washington has stayed largely supportive. Both those situations could change, however, unless Sharon comes up with a plan. He may already have one in mind, but not one anyone else is hoping for.

- Bojko, Krzysztof
US Policy Towards the Middle East Conflict in the Light of Saudi, Egyptian and Jordanian Peace Initiatives.

- Carpentier, Chantal
Conflit israelo-palestinien : l'ONU se discredite-t-elle ?
DEFENSE NATIONALE, 58eme annee, no. 8 - 9, aout - septembre 2002, p. 77-88.
Au printemps 2002, alors que la deuxieme Intifada fait de nombreuses victimes dans la population civile parce qu'aux attentats palestiniens repondent des operations militaires israeliennes, les Etats-Unis autorisent le Conseil de securite de l'ONU a s'ingerer dans une affaire echappant jusque-la a sa competence, en raison de la constance du veto americain. En fait, l'ingerence du Conseil de securite est en trompe-l'oeil parce que les autorites de Washington ont propose un troc aux autres membres du Conseil de securite : elles acceptent la competence du Conseil sur la seule base du chapitre VI et en contrepartie, certaines regles de droit international trop favorables au peuple palestinien sont substantiellement revisees.

- Chartouni-Dubarry, May
L'apres-Oslo : paix avortee ou guerre annoncee ?
Les aleas du processus de paix israelo-palestinien ont maintenant fait place a une guerre non conventionnelle bien reelle : ce revirement s'explique par une radicalisation politique d'Israel (nationalisme de Sharon et lutte contre le terrorisme encore legitimee par le 11 septembre) et par la perte de credit international d'Arafat (attentats-suicides et delitement de l'Autorite palestinienne). Celui-ci doit encore, pour repondre aux nouvelles exigences americaines, se couper d'une opinion publique convaincque que la guerre d'usure est le seul recours contre l'occupation, et engager une democratisation du regime palestinien, condition posee comme prealable sine qua non a la reprise des negociations de paix. Au-dela de cet enlisement meurtrier du conflit, l'impasse actuelle menace en fait la stabilite a venir de toute la region et ne laisse pour l'instant entrevoir aucune amelioration.
- Chartouni-Dubarry, May
The Middle East Debacle : A Prospective Analysis.
The author explores the most plausible medium-term scenarios of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Moving from the observation that we have already entered a post-Arafat era, she argues that, with the failure of the Oslo accord, the escalation of the armed confrontation and the abyss that has opened between the two parties, there is a growing risk of Lebanonisation not only of Palestine, but of the entire conflict area which could have wider regional implications.

- Goguenheim, Francois
L'an prochain a Jerusalem.
DEFENSE NATIONALE, 58eme annee, no. 8 - 9, aout - septembre 2002, p. 64-76.
Prix Nobel de la paix, Yasser Arafat cultive l'image du guide charismatique du peuple palestinien dans sa quete historique, mais n'a pas renonce aux oripeaux du revolutionnaire. Ainsi, l'echec des negociations de Taba et de declenchement de la deuxieme Intifada ont sonne le glas des espoirs suscites a Oslo. La politique de Y. Arafat s'apparente a une fuite en avant, mais le chaos engendre par ses choix strategiques obeissent a une rationalite coerente, visant a legitimer par le feu la creation du futur Etat palestinien. Enrayer la dynamique de l'affrontement passe par la comprehension des reelles intentions du leader palestinien. La question de son avenir politique est alors posee.

- Green, Jerrold D.
La politique americaine et le conflit israelo-palestinien.
Les efforts de Bill Clinton pour trouver une solution au conflit israelo-palestinien se soldent finalement par l'echec de la reunion de Camp David, en juillet 2000, Israelis et Palestiniens n'arrivant pas a s'entendre, notamment sur Jerusalem. L'Intifada Al-Aqsa, qui suit la visite d'Ariel Sharon sur les lieux saints musulmans et juifs (esplanade des Mosques / mont du Temple), et la repression qui s'ensuit suscitent de nombreux appels a l'engagement americain de la part de la communaut internationale. Mais George W. Bush, echaude par les deboires de ses predecesseurs, reste prudent a l'egard du conflit. Et il faut attendre le 11 septembre pour que l'Administration reaffirme sa presence dans la region. Depuis lors, la politique americaine reste difficile a suivre. Entre le soutien a l'option repressive de Sharon, qui domine malgre tout la periode, et l'appui aux regimes arabes 'moderes', dont Bush a besoin pour diverses raisons, les Etats-Unis semblent quelque peu naviguer a vue. Et seule la volonte des Israeliens et des Palestiniens de trouver une issue au conflit permettra a la region de sortir de l'impasse.

- Hadas, Samuel
Cuando dos guerras se superponen.
La critica situacion en que se encuentra Oriente Proximo lleva a la necessidad de un compromiso impuesto desde fuera. El primer ministro israeli, Ariel Sharon, y el presidente de la ANP, Yassir Arafat, illustrent la imposibilidad de un acuerdo entre israelis y palestinos.
This article examines Israel-Jewish attitudes toward the Oslo process, as it has been unfolding in the years 1994-2001. The authors found that despite the turbulence and frequent crises associated with it, the aggregated attitudes toward the Oslo process have been remarkably stable during most of this period. The authors explain this stability by the persistent division of Israeli society into two entrenched publics—pro Oslo and anti Oslo—each of which displays distinct sociopolitical and demographic attributes. However, the authors have also found that, along with its bifurcated structure, Israeli-Jewish public opinion consists of yet another, unifying layer. The latter was manifested in the largely consensual reactions to critical threat posed by the Palestinians to Israel's security and its continuation as a Jewish state. The authors discuss these results in the context of recent debate about the relevance of public opinion to foreign policymaking in general, and consider their bearing on Israeli policies regarding the Oslo process in particular.'

- Kinkel, Klaus
An 'OSCE' for the Mideast.
The Europeans should dare to be proactive in the Mideast as well. Even if this looks like the worst possible time, shouldn't Europe try to broker confidence-building there in economic and other areas? After all, it was this kind of softening up by OSCE contacts that over two decades broke down the iron curtain in Europe.

- Lister, John
'Middle' Politics : Looking Again at the Peace Process.
http://www.swetswise.com

- Maarouf, Nabil
Guerra en Palestina.
La evolucion de Oriente durante el ultimo ano y medio ha supuesto una marcha atras respecto a los principios acordados en la conferencia de Madrid en 1991. Para los Palestinos es necesario un mayor activismo de la comunidad internacional.

- Ottolenghi, Emanuele
Dangerous Instability.
The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians has escalated to unprecedented proportions, leaving a trail of death and destruction, and fueling wider tensions. The fighting may become just one front of a much broader regional conflagration. This at a time when regime stability in the area is in question, Iranian and Iraqi interference is gearing up and Washington is pushing hard for its plan to topple Saddam Hussein.
- Ounaies, Abderraouf
Le monde islamique et les Etats-Unis.
La polarisation dramatique entre le monde islamique et les Etats-Unis au lendemain de l'attaque du 11 septembre constitue désormais un axe de la scene internationale. La these des Etats-Unis qui reduit l'attaque au seul phenomene du terrorisme et qui fait croire que l'Amerique est visee pour sa liberte, sa democratie et sa civilisation n'est pas satisfaisante. Les rapports des Etats-Unis avec le monde islamique sont mines par une crise interne de la classe politique americaine centree sur la question palestinienne et qui la met en contradiction avec sa propre culture et avec le consensus mondial.

- Reich, Bernard
Israel's Quest for Peace.
http://www.swetswise.com
Since its independence in May 1948, Israel has focused on a quest for peace in the region in which it is located. At various times that effort has been seen as successful, but more often it has resulted in failure. What is clear is that, at the outset of the twenty-first century, Israel is not at peace with all of its neighbors, having signed and implemented but two peace treaties (with Egypt in 1979 and with Jordan in 1994). Despite the initial promise of the Oslo process, Israel remains the target of unremitting hostility, terrorism, and violence, and is shunned by most of the Arab states. Where does Israel's quest stand today, and what are its perspectives on the peace process ?

- Rogan, Eugene
Levelling the Playing Field.
Israel is a nation that needs to be saved from itself. Its war against the Palestinians has brought not only unspeakable horrors to Palestinian civilians but death and destruction to Israeli citizens as well. The damage to the institutions of the Palestinian Authority and the isolation of its president, Yasser Arafat, have strengthened militancy and radicalised Palestinian public opinion. Israel has never been more isolated, with even reliable American support beginning to wear thin. And still the leadership resorts to military force when force offers no solutions. The international community urgently needs to level the playing field in the cause of peace.

- Ross, Dennis B.
Yasir Arafat.
As the Israeli-Palestinian conflict enters a tenuous new phase of negotiations, understanding Arafat's true motives will be essential to reaching a lasting peace agreement. Who better to decipher them than the man who negotiated with him for the last decade ?

- Roy, Sara
http://www.currenthistory.com
The ongoing crisis among Israelis and Palestinians is not primarily the result of a failed summit, poor implementation, or Netanyahu's intransigence: it is instead the result of a 'peace' process that by design altered the political, economic, and physical landscape of the Palestinian territories in a manner that intensified rather than mitigated Palestinian dispossession, deprivation, and oppression, and so precluded a fair and workable settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
- Samih Khalidi, Ahmad
Le conflit israélo-palestinien : retour vers le futur.
A l'été 2000, de grands espoirs avaient été fondés pour le règlement du conflit israélo-palestinien sur les déclarations d'ouverture d'Ehud Barak et sur l'orchestration des pourparlers par les États-Unis : Camp David représentait la possibilité d'un compromis dans la continuité des accords précédents (Oslo). Mais le refus par Yasser Arafat des offres ambigues de la partie israélienne eut pour effet de le délégitimer en tant que partenaire pour la paix, tandis qu'une ultime provocation (la visite d'Ariel Sharon sur l'esplanade des Mosquées/mont du Temple) exacerbait la dimension religieuse du conflit et déclenchait la deuxième intifada, encore plus meurtrière que la première. Depuis, la poursuite de la colonisation des Territoires occupés et la radicalisation des deux camps font que le processus de paix est aujourd'hui pris en otage : si Israël et les États-Unis semblent considérer que la reconnaissance d'un État palestinien passe par le départ d'Arafat et la démocratisation de l'Autorité palestinienne, la politique de Sharon pourrait avoir ramené le conflit à ce qu'il était en 1948 : une guerre existentielle pour la terre de Palestine.

- Sayigh, Yezid
The Palestinian Strategic Impasse.
http://www.swetswise.com
The Palestinians face bleak strategic prospects. There is a substantial price to pay for the political misjudgements of the past two years by their leadership. Palestinian statehood has been placed in serious doubt, raising the spectre of new, and increasingly violent and disintegrative, trajectories in the Palestinian-Israeli relationship. This narrows the range of future prospects down to two. Firstly, the conflict will continue until the international community ultimately confronts Sharon (or any like-minded successor) over the nature of the territorial dispensation in the West Bank and East Jerusalem that must be reached if durable Palestinian-Israeli peace is to be attained. Secondly, the conflict will continue until the levels of pain and fatigue in both societies bring about a shift in domestic political balances and force national leaderships to agree to the sort of peace deal for which there already is majority support. The cruel irony is that this was attainable in 2000. If the opportunity is missed once more, then the essence of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict will change over the coming decade, from a struggle over the terms of partition to one over the national identity and political nature of Israel.

- Schattner, Marius
De la paix manquée d'Oslo à la marche vers l'abîme.
Au lieu d'une paix promise, Israéliens et Palestiniens sont aujourd'hui prisonniers d'un engrenage de violences, alimenté par la haine, le désespoir et, dans une certaine mesure, le fanatisme religieux. La régression est totale. Faute de perspective, le sentiment dominant est que le processus de paix est mort en juillet 2000 à Camp David, quand les deux parties se sont confrontées pour la première fois aux problèmes de fond. On peut argumenter sur les causes de cet échec, sur ce qui s'est vraiment passé à Camp David : la paix était-elle vraiment 'a portée de main' ? Mais, par-delà ces interrogations, se pose la question de l'interprétation, c'est-à-dire des leçons tirées pour les deux camps de cet échec, et particulièrement pour Israël ou la perception la plus radicale s'est imposée.
After coming so close to a solution, Palestinians and Israelis seem only capable of blaming each other for the collapse of the peace process while the violence spirals out of control. The Arabs have stepped in with a Saudi proposal, giving reassurance to Israel that normal relations will begin once peace is achieved. The Americans are keen to organise an international conference. Despair is mixed with deja vu, not least among thousands of Palestinian refugees, as all of this has been tried before. What chance is there for it to work this time? Could it be just a question of mechanisms?

Yasir Arafat has been neither an orchestrator nor a spectator of the second intifada; he has been its target. A young guard of Palestinian nationalists, angry at both Israel and the corrupt Palestinian Authority, lies behind the violence. Arafat must reform his government and secure a credible peace process - before it's too late.

In a challenge to much of the conventional wisdom, the author writes that observers in the United States and Israel have unduly laid blame for the decades-old Israeli-Syrian conflict on the leadership in Damascus. Although both Israel and Syria have been 'inflexible, ideological, and prone to maximal demands', Slater says, Israel bears greater responsibility for the lack of a comprehensive Israeli-Syrian settlement. Slater begins with an overview of the conventional wisdom and then assesses challenges to it by Israel's 'new history movement'. He then traces the 'lost opportunities for peace' between the Israelis and the Syrians since 1948. Slater concludes that the key stumbling block remains Israel's unwillingness to withdraw to its pre-June 1967 borders.

Le deuxieme soulèvement palestinien, qui a commencé le 29 septembre 2000, vient à la suite de l'échec des négociations israélo-palestiniennes de Camp David et au lendemain de la visite d'Ariel Sharon à l'esplanade des mosquées', lieu dont la souveraineté est contestée entre les deux parties. Les deux camps se rejettent mutuellement la responsabilité du déclenchement et de la poursuite des violences. Risposées militaires massives de la part d'Israel, actions de tireurs isolés et attentats-suicides du cote palestinien : les conséquences sont désastreuses (plus de 2.400 morts, destruction de l'economie des territoires palestiniens, exacerbation des opinions publiques des deux cotes). Une sortie de crise ne pourrait intervenir sans une implication forte de la communauté internationale, en particulier des Etats-Unis. Des plans de paix sont bien proposés de part et d'autre, mais la restauration de la confiance ne pourra sans doute etre que longue et ardue.
President Bush has already recognized the path that must eventually be followed. His vision of two states, one Israeli and one Palestinian, living side by side, despite all the obvious problems, provides the only workable framework for peace. Movement down that path can begin today, looking beyond Mr. Arafat, but not waiting for his actual departure.

The Bush 'Vision' for Palestine: Realistic or Apocalyptic?

La paix au Proche-Orient: agonie d'un processus.

Des voix s'élevaient évoquant la fin d'un 'processus' maintenu jusqu'alors tant bien que mal, tandis que d'autres soulignaient le besoin de trouver de nouveaux mécanismes plus adéquats. Des conditions avaient été émises de part et d'autre pour la reprise des négociations gelées tandis que la violence faisait rage en Terre sainte. Comment peut-on expliquer les hesitations à voir les choses comme elles se présentaient ? Le 'processus' tel qu'il était conçu au départ pouvait-il conduire à une paix juste et durable entre Israéliens et palestiniens ? Comment les choses en étaient-elles arrivées jusqu'à la ? Quelles sont les perspectives avec la démission du Premier ministre israélien, Ehoud Barak, et l'organisation d'élections législatives anticipées en Israël ?

Middle East: Is Peace a Dream?

This article contends that partition does not deserve the bad reputation it has developed, and should be considered a plausible solution to some ethnic civil wars. The author illustrates his argument by examining the war between Arabs and Jews that occurred after the United Nations voted in 1947 to partition Palestine.
- Hedges, Chris
The new Palestinian Revolt.
Last autumn’s fresh outbreak of violence between Palestinians and
Israelis has shaken as assumption that has reigned since the 1993 Oslo
peace accords: that negotiations and interim agreements can lay the
roadwork for a lasting peace. Now Oslo’s delegitimization has swayed
public opinion in Israel and the occupied territories away from
compromise and toward more radical solutions.

- Hertzberg, Arthur
A Small Peace for the Middle East.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol. 80, no. 1, January - February 2001, p. 139-147.
At the heart of the conflict in the Middle East stand two irreconcilable
ideologies: Zionism and the Palestinian dream of a homeland. Adherents
on either side cannot accept the demands of the other, so perfect peace
remains a fantasy. But another solution exists: to abandon grand plans
and muddle forward. Piecemeal solutions can succeed where ambitious
strategies have failed. Indeed they are now the only option.

- Lapidoth, Ruth
Der Status von Jerusalem: ein Kompromiss ist vielleicht möglich.
Widersprüchliche Interessen, tiefe Gefühle und die holle Symbolik
Jerusalems stehen einer Einigung zwischen Israelis und Palestinensern
über den Status der Stadt im Wege. Trotz der scheinbar unüberwindlichen
Interessengegensätze ist nach Ansicht der Autorin ein Kompromiss möglich,
wenne Beteiligten ihn wirklich wollen.

- Leveau, Remy
Moisi, Dominique
Les violences de la paix.
POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 66e année, no. 1, janvier - mars 2001, p. 2-12.
Depuis la reprise des violences, en octobre 2000, le processus de paix
entre Israelis et Palestiniens va d'échec en échec. Malgré les efforts
de Clinton et l'énergie déployée a Camp David en juillet dernier, pour
formuler un compromis acceptable par les deux parties, les pressions de
la rue et des opinions publiques ont finalement eu raison des efforts de
compréhension et de négociation produits courageusement par les élites
israéliennes et palestiniennes. Et alors qu’a l'automne 2000, on n'avait
jamais semblé si près d’un règlement pacifique du conflit, la seule
perspective a court terme est aujourd'hui celle d'un ralentissement de
l'escalade des violences.

- Makovsky, David
Middle East Peace Through Partition.
After all the recent bloodshed in the Middle East, many have pronounced
the Oslo peace process dead. But Oslo’s core principle— that peace
requires an end to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza—
remains as sound as ever. Friendly cooperation between the two sides
appears a long way off; even final-status talks may be premature. But in
the interim, there is one step Israel can and must take: withdrawal from
the territories, whether the Palestinians are ready or not.
The administration taking office this month will face its first foreign policy crisis in the Middle East. As a second intifada takes root and as Israelis decide whether to elect a new, anti-Oslo government, what is left of the nearly decade-long peace process for the Bush administration to build on?

Pundak, Ron
From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?
http://www.swetswise.com

There are three possible explanations for the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process that started in Oslo in 1993. One could argue that peace between Israelis and Palestinians is simply impossible, or that the two sides were simply not ready to make the necessary painful concessions. But the evidence points to a third explanation. There was, in fact, an opportunity for peace, but it was squandered through miscalculations and mismanagement of the entire process. The Palestinian leadership shares considerable blame for the crisis. Yet the story of the August 2000 Camp David summit that is often told in Israel and the US — of a near-perfect Israeli offer which Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat lacked the courage to grasp — is too simple. Above all, it is a story that tends to obscure the excruciating difficulties and frustrations of the Palestinian side, which were too often the unnecessary products of flawed Israeli policies.

Robinson, Glenn E.
Israel and the Palestinians: the Bitter Fruits of Hegemonic Peace.
http://www.currenthistory.com

Is Yasir Arafat the master puppeteer overseeing the Palestinians revolt that erupted in September? Or is a more complex interplay of forces at work that could result in a realignment of political power within the Palestinian community — a realignment Arafat can neither orchestrate nor dictate?

Sayigh, Yezid
Arafat and the Anatomy of a Revolt.
http://www.swetswise.com

In October 2000, at the onset of the latest intifada, key political and security officials on both Palestinians and the Israeli side still considered an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal to be politically realisable. Some of the substance of a mutually acceptable deal finally emerged at the bilateral talks held in the Red Sea resort of Taba in late January 2001, but by then it was too late to alter the course of events. The present situation of low-intensity conflict will almost certainly persist for the rest of 2001, and in all likelihood for at least another year beyond that. Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat bears much of the responsibility for this precarious state of affairs, though not for the reasons cited by official Israeli sources. Contrary to the Israeli account, his behaviour since the start of the intifada has reflected not the existence of a prior strategy based on the use of force, but the absence of any strategy. His political management has been marked by a high degree of improvisation and short-termism, confirming the absence of an original strategy and of a clear purpose.
- Shikaki, Khalil
   Der Friedensprozess aus palastinensischer Sicht : Hoffnungslosigkeit
   ist nicht das Gebot der Stunde.
   Der Osloer Friedensprozess ist am Ende. Um dennoch auf den Weg zum
   Frieden zurückzukehren, müssen beide Seiten ein Stabilitätspaket
   schnüren, das das Bedrohungsgefühl reduziert, das Vertrauen in den
   Prozess wiederherstellt und die Überwachung der Vereinbarungen
   sicherstellt.

- Slater, Jerome
   What Went Wrong ? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace
   Process.
   With the election of Ariel Sharon and the Palestinian turn from
   revolution to terrorism, the Israeli-Palestinian 'peace process', which
   managed to go on for over ten years without producing peace, has
degenerated into major violence. It is critically important that the
reasons for this catastrophe be properly analyzed, for sooner or later
there will be a resumption of negotiations, and the lessons of this
failure must be understood. Contrary to the prevailing view, Israel
rather than the Palestinians bears the greater share of the
responsibility, not only for the latest breakdown of the peace process
but for the entire course of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since 1948.
And US economic and military assistance, along with America's nearly
unconditional political and diplomatic support of Israel, has enabled
Israel to disregard the legitimate interests and demands for moral
justice of the Palestinians, as well as the potential constraints of
regional power and international opinion. Well-intentioned but unwise US
support of Israel in its conflict with the Palestinians has also enabled
Israel to disregard its own best interests.

- Soetendorp, Ben
   Is het Israelisch-Palestijnse conflict onoplosbaar ?
   INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, jg. 55, nr. 11, november 2001, p. 541-545.
The author of this article deals with the stalemate in the efforts to
resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The failure to reach a final
settlement of this conflict in Camp David a year ago, which was followed
by the Palestinian revolt against Israel and Israeli attempts to suppress
this second Intifada offer little prospect for a way out of the current
deadlock. The chances are great that because of the war in Afghanistan,
President Bush will feel obliged to impose some kind of settlement on the
Israelis and the Palestinians to appease the Arab members of the American
coalition against Bin Laden. However, the lesson of the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process so far has been that any attempt of the
international community to interfere in the bilateral negotiations is
fruitless. Success simply depends on the readiness of the two parties to
distance themselves from fixed positions, on the Israeli side, from the
dreams about a Greater Israel, and on the Palestinian side from the
dreams about refugees returning to their homes in former Palestine. Only
then will both parties be able to walk the extra mile to complete the
Oslo peace process.

- Talal, El Hassan bin
   Der Nahe Osten in der Krise : eine Zukunftsperspektive fur neue
   Partnerschaften.
   Während die Superhighways beim E-Commerce knistern, versinkt der Nahe
   Osten in rücksichtsloser Gewalt. Nur durch bindende Vereinbarungen
zwischen den Parteien über die Schaffung wirtschaftlicher Geflechte kann,
so der Autor, das Risiko von Konflikten reduziert und Wohlstand in der
Region geschaffen werden.
Camp David II, intended to be Clinton's triumphal addition to President Jimmy Carter's Camp David peace achievement, now appears to be headed for a historical reckoning similar to Carter's ill-fated attempt to rescue American embassy hostages in Tehran. It may also have sparked a new phase in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one driven by ethnoreligious rather than nationalist passions.

On Friday, September 29, 2000 as they were leaving the Al-Aqsa Mosque, a few dozen Palestinians violently demonstrated their anger after the visit the previous day of Likud leader Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount and the Al-Aqsa. The brutal response of the Israeli police - resulting in several deaths and more than two hundred wounded - provoked riots in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and even in Arab areas within Israel. This marked the beginning of the second Intifada. After several weeks of conflict, it became clear that Ariel Sharon's visit was merely the spark which ignited the conflict. Two months previously, the failure of Camp David served only to emphasize the serious differences dividing Israeli and Palestinian negotiators. And the fact that the highly sensitive subjects under discussion included the status of Jerusalem doesn't explain everything - far from it! This crisis of confidence which has degenerated into a show of force is primarily due to the gradual breakdown of the peace process since the assassination of Yitzak Rabin.

The paroxysm of violence that erupted in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza at the end of September came less than three months after Prime Minister Ehud Barak hard reduced the gap in Israeli and Palestinian negotiating positions to the narrowest point ever - and lost his governing majority. This chain of events illustrates the policy dilemma that has plagued Barak since his first day in office. Reduced to its bare essence, the dilemma stems from the simultaneous fragmentation of the Israeli political system along multiple axes, making it extremely difficult to assemble a majority coalition for decisive action along any single one of them. The rationalisation of Israeli politics is necessary to move the peace process forward, but a domestically marketable peace agreement may be necessary to rationalise Israeli politics. An Israeli prime minister's ability to break this vicious circle will determine not only his own political fate but perhaps the very viability of Israeli democracy in its present form.
The violent collapse of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations revealed how exclusive and narrowly focused the US-brokered process had become. The fall-out across the Middle East shows how much America's standing and leverage in the region has come to depend on its ability to deliver on this core issue. In short, the whole multi-faceted crisis provides food for thought on the extent and limits of US influence in the region.

In this essay, the author argues for a realistic assessment of the Arab-Israeli Peace Process. First, the reasons for the entrenchment of Israel in the Middle East and for the shift towards its greater acceptance as a regular international player in regional politics are reviewed. The second part of the essay clarifies the often forgotten limitations of the peace process, which the strategic and cultural realities of the Middle East impose on Arab states' relations with Israel. The last section offers advice against impatience and diplomatic hyperactivity.

The author reports on a study of Arab attitudes towards Israel, Israelis and the Middle East peace negotiations, based on an opinion survey of Syrians, Lebanese, Jordanians and Palestinians representing diverse socio-economic levels and different degrees of Islamic religious conviction. The results are analyzed on a multivariate basis and presented together with the author's comments.

The author observes the peace process in the Middle East. Or rather what is left of it. The hardest nut to crack will be a solution on the sovereignty of the Holy Places in Jerusalem. Stability in the region may rest on a square kilometer of concentrated holiness in the Old City. The key to a solution may be found in the world status quo. In a sense, the division of Jerusalem is already a fact, the author argues. Sovereignty may be 'given' to God; supervision of upholding His rules in the Old City may be delegated to a High Clerical College. In that way the question of sovereignty may be solved, without the internationalization the Israelis oppose.
Dix ans après l'effondrement de l'URSS, le renouvellement des générations et l'arrivée de nouveaux leaders politiques dans certains États arabes contribuent, semble-t-il, à accélérer les mutations inévitables liées au phénomène de mondialisation. Dans ce contexte, le processus de paix israélo-arabe semble porter en germe les éléments d'un véritable changement des systèmes et des représentations. En effet, il apparaît désormais nécessaire de dépasser une culture de guerre, qui détermine encore de nombreux comportements, pour une véritable culture de paix. À ce sujet, le processus de paix est d'une importance capitale dans la mesure où il permet de relever le conflit israélo-arabe à l'arrière-plan des préoccupations au profit de l'émergence de nouveaux centres d'intérêts et de nouveaux acteurs.

Nilsen, Fritz

Perthes, Volker
The Advantages of Complementarity: US and European Policies toward the Middle East Peace process.

This article deals first with the argument that has developed since the start of the Madrid peace process about Europe's role in the peace process. Second, it examines the interests and diverging priorities of Europe and the US in the region. A look is then taken at the structural factors that account for different US and European approaches. This is followed by a brief discussion of the specific relationship between the 'Madrid' and the 'Barcelona' processes. Finally, the possibilities of translating the comparative advantages of US and European Middle East policies into practical cooperation are explored.

Quandt, William B.
Clinton le facilitateur.

Aucun président américain n'a jamais pris ses fonctions dans un contexte aussi favorable pour faire avancer la paix entre Israël et ses voisins arabes que Bill Clinton. Néanmoins, au moment où il prenait ses fonctions, le président américain paraissait relativement inexpérimenté en matière de politique étrangère et son approche sur le Moyen-Orient demeurait un mystère. Au terme de sa présidence, quel bilan peut-on tirer de la politique de Bill Clinton au Moyen-Orient ? Celui-ci reste mitigé; en effet, si Clinton et son équipe ont consacré un temps et une énergie considérable pour faire avancer la paix, on ne peut s'empêcher de penser, eu égard aux conditions initiales fort prometteuses, qu'ils auraient pu faire davantage, notamment lors du premier mandat...

Satloff, Robert
PERCEPTIONS, vol. 5, no. 1, March - May 2000, p. 82-91.
Dramatic as it was, the bloodshed of autumn 2000 could not obscure the fact that little had changed in the basic political parameters of the Palestinian-Israeli relationship. On one side, any Israeli government, no matter what its ideological persuasion, still has to deal with the Palestinians as a separate national reality and political entity. On the other side, whether or not the Palestinian Authority issues a unilateral declaration of independence, it will still remain unable to reach key national objectives except through a negotiated settlement with Israel. But a Palestinian state will emerge, and may pose an unsettling and potentially destabilising political reality for the two neighbours, Israel and Jordan, with whom it shares intricate ties of geography and demography. Governments in both Israel and Jordan do have policy instruments and resources that should enable them – given a reasonable level of political foresight – to head off worst-case scenarios of inter-communal conflict.

With the recent Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon and the death of President Assad of Syria, the peace process finds itself once more at the crossroads. Israeli-Syrian negotiations, which have largely focused on the delicate question of Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, are currently making no progress. Attended by Bill Clinton in person, the summit in Geneva in late March 2000 proved to be yet another failure, with the late President Assad categorically refusing to withdraw Syrian sovereignty claims over the northeast bank of the Sea of Galilee. Everything will depend on the situation in South Lebanon in the months to come. If the Hezbollah, encouraged by Damascus, renews its bloody raids on the other side of the border, Israel may try to persuade Syria through air strikes against key Lebanese targets, along the lines of the NATO strikes against Serbia.

Optimism abounded when Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak was elected. As the clock ticks down, those who believe that the Middle East peace process is irreversible must admit that true peace will not come soon.

El memorandum de Wye supone un notable paso adelante en la aplicacion de los acuerdos de Oslo, pero sujeto a la inestabilidad de la politica interior israeli y palestina.
Despite Barak’s crushing victory over Netanyahu in the May 1999 Israeli elections, radical steps are needed to fulfil new political expectations. Israelis are encouraged by possibilities of progress in negotiations with the Palestinians and peace with Syria (including withdrawal from Lebanon). The Palestinians are again hopeful, after near despair. Jordan, with Abdullah on the throne after the death of his redoubtable and durable father Hussein, is cautiously developing links with its neighbours, Syria in particular. Syrian-Israeli relations deteriorated while Netanyahu was in power. The challenge now is to get fruitful talks back on track and exploit the new opportunities. Three possible steps forward: the USA and Europe should encourage Israel to take more courageous steps for peace; the Arab states should introduce more open government; and Iraq should be brought back into the Middle East mainstream.

For about two decades after the 1948 war, Israel successfully fought against Arab belligerency and, in the 1967 war, it occupied new Arab territories. But while concluding a peace agreement with Egypt (1979) and conducting de facto peaceful relations with Jordan (since 1970), Israel continued its bitter conflicts with Syria and the Palestinians, highlighted in the 1982 Lebanese war. Only under Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s leadership (1992-95) did major breakthroughs occur for the first time between Israel, the Palestinians and Syria. But these remarkable developments were halted during Binyamin Netanyahu’s term as prime minister (1996-99), leaving Israel with the crucial challenges to achieve full peace and reconciliation with these two Arab nations.

Israel is about to choose a new parliament and prime minister. The process is likely to be lengthy with difficult coalition talks and a second round of voting to select the next directly elected prime minister. The new government will take office almost six years after the Oslo peace process began. What sort of a peace can now be produced?

Is there a significant connection between the Arab-Israel dispute and developments in the Gulf? Each of these major areas of interest in the Middle East has its own dynamic and even its own band of specialists. Although most observers would acknowledge some degree of interaction between the spheres, there has been virtually no systematic examination of the influence of one on the other. Yet, even a cursory examination of recent history reveals an intriguing record of mutual influence.
Over the past 25 years, the negotiating assumptions of Arabs and Israelis have changed in a manner consequential for their negotiating tactics and strategies. This article examines how Arabs and Israelis have perceived the role of the United States in Arab-Israeli negotiations, and how each party viewed the role of the domestic politics of the other in these negotiations. Specifically, it relates the conduct of the negotiations to the ability of each party to understand and adjust to change in domestic politics.

The author examines Israel's general attitude towards the EU and its reservations about a more prominent political role in the region, concluding with a set of policy suggestions for a more active and effective EU involvement in the peace process.

The NACD talks, like all other problem-solving talks between Israel and the Arabs, are stymied by misunderstandings arising from: a) cultural differences between the Arabs and Israelis; b) negative stereotypes attaching to either party; and c) an overall culture-based opposition to the NACD process itself. However, cultural values are not static. Western values are penetrating into the Middle East. This may, in time, create cultural norms that will promote the strategic dialogue. Of more immediate significance is the fact that Arab and Israeli political leaders, the effective decision-makers, are in constant contact with and consequently influenced by Western values. They are absorbing a kind of common, global culture which is bound to facilitate problem-solving negotiations. Therein lies our hope for progress towards peace in the Middle East.

Israel was not in a party mood for its recent fiftieth birthday celebrations. It is true that the Israelis have come a long way over the last half-century: the Zionist movement has evolved into an efficient, modern state that is the only real democracy in the Middle East. But over and above the celebrations, the recent anniversary gave the young country an opportunity to examine its history and identity. Benyamin Netanyahu's election revealed the profound division between the two main ideological camps in Israel. On the one side, the nationalists see the peace process as a dangerous threat to the Jewish identity of Israel, while on the other side, there are the moderates who are more attuned to Western ways and are ready to talk to the Palestinians. Whether the peace process shudders to a halt or gains further ground, Israel's divisions will remain. The current government's negative stance will only delay the moment when hard decisions will have to be made on crucial issues such as the relationship between lay and religious authorities and the status of Palestinian Arabs in Israel. And yet the day of reckoning cannot be put off forever.
Five years ago, in September 1993, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel signed the Oslo Accord on the White House lawn and set in motion a historic process of mutual recognition and interaction, detailed multi-sectoral negotiations, Israeli redeployments and withdrawals from occupied territory, expanding public contacts between Israel and Arab states, and the gradual advent of Palestinian self-government. This process has continued to this day, broadly as envisaged in the original accord, though with recurring hesitations and interruptions, increasingly bitter and frequent accusations of bad faith by both sides, and occasional outbreaks of political or physical violence that sometimes threaten to bring the process to a complete stop. What have we learned about effective peace-making during these five years? What lessons can we draw upon to ensure that the flaws of the past half decade are minimized, and that peace, security, and justice can be achieved equally and for all in the Middle East?

The author analyzes here the interaction between the Barcelona process and Arab-Israeli multilateral talks, underlining their complementarity, but also the need for greater coordination and transparency between the two undertakings on the basis, in particular, of closer cooperation between Europe and the United States.

Yasir Arafat and his loyalists have been the backbone of Palestinian support for the Oslo peace process, but Arafat will not live forever. Already, the corruption and repressive practices of his Palestinian Authority have sapped support for Oslo. His foes will not remain on the sidelines. Palestinian society's traditionalism makes the fundamentalists of Hamas the only credible alternative to Arafat's center, and they feed off frustration over Israeli intransigence. If the diplomatic deadlock, graft, and illiberalism continue after Arafat, Hamas could well take over.

After eighteen months of paralysis in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, the signing of the Wye Memorandum in Washington on 23 October injects hope among Palestinians and brings expectations of future progress. Such hopes and expectations may however be short lived.
Chirac's 'new Arab policy' is aimed at reversing France's marginalization as a political player in the Middle East and reasserting its role as an active and influential player in the region. Yet Chirac's ambitious agenda may be difficult to implement in view of the fact that the United States is determined to maintain its predominant position in the region. Although the United States continues to dominate the Arab-Israeli peace process, France's strategy of pursuing an active foreign policy has been strengthened by support from the United Nations and the European Union.

1997

- Awwad, Emad
Bill Clinton et le conflit au Proche-Orient.

- Awwad, Emad
Paix menacee au Proche-Orient.
DEFENSE NATIONALE, 53eme annee, janvier 1997, p. 91-104.

Le retour du Likoud au pouvoir en Israel, avec la nomination de M. Netanyahu comme Premier Ministre, ne peut qu'inquieter et faire craindre que le processus de paix au Proche-Orient ne se bloque, avec meme le risque d'un nouveau conflit israelo-arabe.

- Boltanski, Christophe
L'horloge d'Oslo est arretee...
'Thorn field' is the code name Tsahal has given to a plan to recover by force the autonomous areas ceded to the Palestinian authorities as part of the Oslo accords. If any such TV film scenario were to get off the ground it would of course sound the death knell for the Middle East peace process. And yet only a few months ago, the same peace process was being touted as irreversible. So why has the ground shifted so much since then? Tel Aviv points to the bomb attacks organized by Hamas and accuses Yasir Arafat of being soft on terrorism. And yet the peace process was in doubt well before the recent round of Hamas-inspired violence. It goes right back to the fact that hard on the heels of his election victory, the new conservative Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu relaunched colonization programs not only for the West Bank and Gaza, but also for Jerusalem itself. With a number of highly provocative 'fait accompli' actions, such as the opening of a tunnel near Jerusalem's Muslim holy sites and the construction of new homes for Jews in East Jerusalem, Netanyahu has succeeded in removing the two cornerstones of the peace process: hope and trust.

- Gallet, Bertrand
'Le nouveau Moyen-Orient' : une idee neuve deja morte ?
RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES ET STRATEGIQUES, no. 26, ete 1997, p. 52-58.
Shimon Peres avait promis un 'nouveau Moyen-Orient' garantissant la securite et la cooperation entre les Etats de la region. L'attitude actuelle du gouvernement de Benyamin Netanyahou apparait comme une rupture qui contredit totalement ces discours optimistes. En fait, le processus de paix des accords d'Oslo etait deja fragile et profondement desequilibre : les Palestiniens sont manifestement en position de faiblesse. Les colonies se sont repandues, notamment a Jerusalem. La priorite pour Israel est la normalisation des relations avec les Etats musulmans, grace a l'influence des Etats-Unis, en excluant la question palestinienne. Si des succes ont ete enregistres avec la Jordanie et la Turquie, le desenchantement l'emporte et la Syrie resistait toujours a ce nouvel ordre du Moyen-Orient. Pour relancer la dynamique de cette idee
Dissatisfaction at the pace or direction of the Israeli-Arab peace process is not a new phenomenon. Nor is it linked solely to the deadlock of recent months. Ever since the Madrid Conference convened in 1991, Arabs and Israelis have been as much divided among themselves as between each other whether the process was moving along the right course and whether it was moving too quickly or too slowly. In the absence of any better idea, the two state solution — Israel and Palestine — remains the best and most likely outcome.

The debate about a Palestinian state has been settled. An embryonic state already exists, and a more fully formed state will necessarily be part of any peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. What remains to be decided are its form and content. Israel should be as generous as possible in its attitude to the territorial and functional components of Palestinian statehood, but it needs to incorporate the major settlement blocs in the West Bank, retain military control of the Jordan Valley and insist on some restrictions on Palestinian sovereignty. The alternatives to this approach are few and far less promising.

The Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group (ACRS) is one of five groups of the multilateral track of the Middle East peace process. Due to a variety of circumstances described in this article, it has gone into abeyance. It is the only one of the groups in this situation, though the others have also slowed down. Though it has experienced a significant set-back, ACRS is not dead. ACRS was the first regional attempt to address security and arms control questions in the Middle East. No matter what its ultimate fate may be, what happened in ACRS serves as an indicator of possible events when the next attempt is made to raise these issues at the official level.

The policy of the present Israeli government has made the option of a Palestinian state less workable and less likely. As an alternative, a single democratic state including Israelis and Palestinians might seem utopian, but it is a route to a stable region.

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Under Israeli occupation, Palestinians have been denied involvement in the management and development of water resources and have been severely restricted in water consumption for both agricultural and household use. Palestinians charge that Israel is stealing their water while preventing them from using their fair share of this resource. Israelis counter that they have prior claim to the water and that any further development by the Palestinians would damage the aquifer. The Taba Agreement of September 1995 made progress towards resolving this dispute, but only limited implementation has occurred and negotiations of an equitable water-sharing formula have been left to the final-status talks. The issue can only be settled with an agreement based on the principle of equal individual minimum requirements for Palestinians and Israelis alike.

Salame, Ghassan
Zwischen Hoffnung und Tragik : Perspektiven fur den Nahost-Friedensprozess.

Sayed, Abdulhay
For more than two decades a serious security concern for Arabs in general and Syrians in particular has been the gradually confirmed suspicion that Israel not only has the technical capability to manufacture nuclear weapons but is stockpiling large quantities of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons capable of inflicting immeasurable damage on targets throughout the Middle East.

Soetendorp, R. B.
Vrede in het Midden-Oosten : een onomkeerbaar proces ?
INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, jg. 51, nr. 1, januari 1997, p. 3-6.
The author surveys here the Middle East peace process. While a year ago the prospects for peace looked very promising, at present, with the uncompromising attitude of the new Israeli government of prime minister Netanyahu in negotiations with the Palestinians as well as the stalemate in negotiations with Syria on the future of the Golan Heights, peace in the Middle East seems further away than ever. Convinced of Israel's military superiority Netanyahu is only willing to continue the peace process on his own terms. The creation of an autonomous Palestinian state is as yet not on his agenda. The author advocates the resumption of the quiet diplomacy 'Norwegian style' in order to overcome the present deadlock in negotiations.

Tutunji, Jenab
Khaldi, Kamal
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, vol. 73, no. 1, January 1997, p. 31-58.
The creation of an independent state will not satisfy the Palestinian people's dream of freedom, equality and political normalcy, and is a remote probability at best. The Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza face a choice between living in a bantustan or transforming limited autonomy into a component of a binational state in which the Jewish and
Palestinian ethno-national communities will be able to coexist while each preserves its own cultural identity. The Palestinians need to reorient their struggle accordingly. This rational choice for Palestinians is also the moral choice for Israelis and Palestinians alike because it transcends particularism and the confines of narrow nationalism through the redemptive power of coexistence and the embrace of universal human values without surrendering one's heritage.

- Weyden, Patrick Vander
De Oslo-akkoorden en de Palestijnse frustratie.
INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, jg. 51, nr. 1, januari 1997, p. 12-16.
The author looks at Israel's ambiguous role in the peace process. It wants peace with the Palestinians, but at minimal political and economic costs. An analysis of the Oslo Agreements and of the negotiations on the interim-phase shows a lack of willingness on the part of the Israelis to accept an autonomous Palestinian state. For Israel, the author argues, the peace process is a process of controlling and restructuring. The Palestinian people will be the victims of this process. Without sustained pressure on Israel from the international community, in particular the United States, to resume negotiations with the Palestinians on a 'two-state-solution' a fair peace in the Middle East is unattainable.

1996

- Alpher, Joseph
Divided over the Fate of Israel.

- Awwad, Emad
Palestine : elections et perspectives.

- Giniewski, Paul
Israel : Etat juif ou 'juif des Etats' ?
The events which have shaken the Middle East over the past few months are posing a real threat to the Arab-Israeli peace process. Some observers are even stating to wonder whether the Palestinians and their Arab allies really have abandoned their plans to destroy the Jewish state after all. One thing is certain, and that is that any kind of peace, however promising it might seem on paper, will have to be militarily enforced. Most Israelis believe that even if the program for reconciliation and regional cooperation proposed by Shimon Peres were carried out, the physical threat to their country would remain. Their sacrifices for the cause of peace might only be whetting their opponents' appetite for more concessions. And in times of crisis, the international community's verbal assurances of support have been shown to be without substance. In spite of those few historic handshakes, Paul Giniewski says that reconciliation between Israel and the Arab world is not in the cards for any time soon.

- Kass, Ilana
O'Neill, Bard E.
Rejectionism, Reversibility and Realism : The Middle East Peace Process in Perspective.
Is there a linkage between the murder of 29 Palestinian worshipers at prayer in Hebron, the spate of suicide bombings in Israel's heartland, the assassination of prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and the 1996 Israeli election results ? If so, what are the implications for regional stability ? In seeking answers to these questions, this article challenges the popular assumption that the Middle East peace process is irreversible. It calls attention to the very real, if largely unrecognized, dangers posed by Israeli and Palestinian rejectionists:
that is, those who oppose territorial compromise on ideological or religious grounds. The article concludes with a set of policy recommendations designed to mitigate the threat and, thus, promote enduring US interests in regional peace and stability.

- Kimche, David
  The Arab-Israeli Peace Process.
  The Arab-Israeli peace process has passed the point of no return. There will be no going back to the status quo ante, to the old days of tension and war, irrespective of whether there is a Labour or Likud government in Israel. Israeli forces can not move back into Gaza, nor to the West Bank towns that have been taken over by the Palestinians, nor can talks with the PLO leadership be frozen completely. However, there are still many obstacles to circumvent, many crises to overcome. The future of the Middle East lies largely in improved economy, better living conditions, a higher level of education and a greater awareness of the problems that could be tackled on a regional basis. The economy of the Middle East is in dire straits, and something drastic will have to be done to change the situation. There is, at present, a tug-of-war developing between a Mediterranean regionalism, favoured and encouraged by Europe, and a Middle Eastern regionalism, sponsored by the USA. In both these eforts, Egypt could and should be a leading factor.

- Lehmann, Pedi
  Land for Peace : On the Inner-Israeli Controversy over Peace in the Middle East.
  The peace process initiated in the Middle East under American mediation has aroused great expectations in many parts of the world, combined with impatience regarding its further progress. From the perspective of the parties concerned, however, negotiations raise questions affecting complex, and often existential problems. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that formidable obstacles exist which cannot be cleared away through fast and simple decisions. The author outlines how developments are perceived by Israeli public opinion and discusses the degree to which this influences activities at an official level.

- Levallois, Agnes
  Les Palestiniens pris au piege.
  It is now becoming clear that the Oslo accords, signed in September 1993 by Yasser Arafat and Yitzak Rabin, are fundamentally flawed. Israel's new government has a vision of the peace process that is quite different to that of its predecessors. The Palestinians, desperate to keep the peace process alive, and anxious not to be seen as responsible for its failure, have agreed to every conceivable concession - and now feel betrayed and swindled. The problem is that the actual wording of the accords is so ambiguous that it can be interpreted in any number of ways. Exactly what or how long the 'interim period' should be is nowhere clearly defined. The question of the final outcome of discussions is never really tackled. Nowhere does it say explicitly that the Palestinian and Israeli states will coexist. This leaves the field wide open to opponents of the peace process on both sides. The irony is that the real winners may well end up being the Islamic fundamentalist groups.

- Marcus, Jonathan
Dr. Sha'ath outlines the problems confronted on the road to peace, discussing the practical and political difficulties, the challenges posed by Islamic opposition and the shape of Palestinian self-determination. He concludes with optimism on the prospects for Palestinian democracy and the hope that achievements so far will provide inspiration for all those involved to work towards the common goal of a just and lasting peace.

Steinberg, Gerald M.  
This article focuses on the accomplishments of the Arab-Israeli peace process in increasing regional stability, and the continued threats and conflicts, with a particular emphasis on the role of the security dilemma and possible responses.

1995

Frieden im Nahen Osten.  

Alpher, Joseph  
Israel : The Challenges of Peace.  

Awad, Emad  
Jerusalem et le reglement de la question palestinienne.  

Awad, Emad  
La paix israelo-jordaniennne et le conflit au Proche-Orient.  

Beres, Louis Rene  
The 'Peace Process' and Israel's Nuclear Strategy.  

Donkers, Henk  
Water als factor in het Israelisch-Arabisch conflict.  

El-Doufani, Mohamed M.  
The Middle East I : The PLO-Israeli Accord : An Arab Critique.  

Evron, Yair  
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the Arab-Israeli Context.  
The present paper focuses first on the historical evolvement and application of CSBM in the Middle East, and the distinction between them and CSBM in Europe; second, on future CSBM that might be introduced as part of the expected peace agreements.
- Fellowes, Peregrine
  The Middle East II: A proposal for Jerusalem.

- Jarbawi, Ali
  The Triangle of Conflict.
  FOREIGN POLICY, no. 100, Fall 1995, p. 92-108.

- Lederman, Jim
  Economics of the Arab-Israeli Peace Process.

- Maskoud, Clovis
  Peace Process or Puppet Show?
  FOREIGN POLICY, no. 100, Fall 1995, p. 117-124.

- Perlmutter, Amos
  The Israel-PLO Accord Is Dead.

- Perthes, Volker
  Integration oder Trennung?: die Logiken des nahostlichen Friedensprozesses.
  Der Friedensprozess im Nahen Osten weist eine Reihe unterschiedlicher und widersprüchlicher Logiken auf. Nicht nur die regionalen Konfliktparteien untereinander, sondern auch die internationalen Akteure haben hier unterschiedliche Vorstellungen. Es wäre falsch zu glauben, die handelnden Eliten im Nahen Osten wolle vor allem, dass der Westen bei ihnen Frieden stifte.

- Pommier, Sophie
  Jerusalem: le mur des negociations.
  As the deadline of May 1996 approaches, the date fixed for the start of discussions on the three issues set aside by the joint declaration of principles negotiated in Oslo, a review of Jerusalem's history might help clarify certain aspects. One of the most significant points is that the Holy City has not always represented a critical political stake. Through the ages, the importance assigned to Jerusalem intensified during periods of tension and clashes. Its role at the heart of the Jewish, Muslim and Christian identities nevertheless remains unique, hence the difficulty in drawing up a plan likely to win unanimous support. The ambiguity which made it possible to initiate the peace process in October 1991 has thus revealed its limitations. At that time, it was important to mask over the most irreconcilable differences to allow the parties involved to sit down at the same negotiating table. Today, however, two fundamentally opposed approaches are set to confront each other. Israel repeatedly reaffirms its sovereignty over the city, while the Palestinians intend to see their flag fly over the Arab quarters of Jerusalem.

- Satloff, Robert
  The Path to Peace.
Several types of United Nations' (UN) and non-UN peace-keeping operations (PKOs) are likely to play a significant role in the Arab-Israeli sector, with the probable resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the next few years. In order to ascertain the nature of these future PKOs, this paper assesses the prospects for five alternative scenarios. It concludes that these PKOs are not likely to be homogeneous in nature, with three types of PKOs apt to play such a role: UN-commanded PKOs, non-UN, US-led multinational PKOs, and joint Arab-Israeli security arrangements.

1994

- Alpher, Joseph
Israel : Security After Oslo.
Israel has embarked on a complex process of dialogue with its Arab neighbours, of which the highly visible launching of a peace process with the Palestinians is just one element. In this article Joseph Alpher shows why, for Israel and for Israel alone, security considerations are paramount in its consideration and conduct of relations both with other states and with the currently stateless in the region, and discusses in detail the security aspects of existing and potential arrangements between the State of Israel and its neighbours.

- Aly, Abdel Monem Said
The Road to Oslo and Beyond : Prospects for an Arab-Israeli Peace.

- Awwad, Emad
L'accord Israel-OLP et le processus de paix.

- Awwad, Emad
Les soucis de Yasser Arafat face aux multiples defis.

- Beilin, Yossi
Peace as a Major Component in Middle Eastern Regional Security.
RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 139, no. 4, August 1994, p. 6-8.

- Dieckhoff, Alain
Israeliens et Palestiniens : les defis de la paix.
PROBLEMES POLITIQUES ET SOCIAUX, no. 738-739, 18 novembre 1994, numero entier.
La reconnaissance mutuelle d'Israel et de l'OLP et la signature d'une Declaration de principes, en septembre 1993, s'inscrivent dans une double evolution des deux parties vers le pragmatisme. En depot de graves difficultes, le processus initial se poursuit : une Police palestinienne a ete mise en place et des pouvoirs civils transferences a l'Autorite palestinienne. Toutefois, les divergences internes a chaque camp constituent toujours un danger et nombre de problemes restent en suspens (statut definitif des territoires, implantations juives, refugies, statut de jerusalem, trace des frontieres). Une solution definitive exigerait un reglement equitable de ces questions, ainsi qu'un accord global avec les pays arabes voisins : apres la signature du traité de paix israelo-jordanien, la Syrie devrait, a terme, suivre le mouvement. Aujourd'hui, si la paix est encore precaire, la guerre est devenue improbable.
- Eshel, David
  Frieden im Nahen Osten : Traum oder Wirklichkeit ?

- Gazit, Shlomo
  The Declaration of Principles between Israel and the PLO : The Security Issues.

- Heller, Mark A.
  The Israeli-Palestinian Accord : An Israeli View.

- Hoch, Martin
  Peace in the Near East After the Gaza-Jericho Accord.

- Khalidi, Rashid
  A Palestinian View of the Accord with Israel.

- Muslih, Muhammad
  Dateline Damascus : Assad Is Ready.
  FOREIGN POLICY, no. 96, Fall 1994, p. 145-163.

- Muslih, Muhammad

- Pommier, Sophie
  Jordanie : sur le fil de la paix.

- Roy, Sara

- Roy, Sara
  Separation or Integration : Closure and the Economic Future of the Gaza Strip Revisited.

- Steinberg, Gerald M.
  Israel Security and the Peace Process.

- Tibi, Bassam
  Drie Hindernisse fur den Fridensprozess im Nahen Osten : die judischen Siedler, Hamas und die wirtschaftlichen Engpasse.

- Tlemcani, Rachid
  Islam : violence et democratie au Proche-Orient : les islamistes palestiniens face aux defis de l'accord 'Gaza-Jericho'.
Maintaining the separate national identities of both Israel and any future Palestinian "entity" that might be established in the West Bank and Gaza is critical to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These national identities, however, are affected in diametrically opposite ways by current and future demographic factors and by the interdispersement of Israeli and Palestinian populations.

1993

- Awwad, Emad

L'Administration Bush et le conflit israelo-arabe.
DEFENSE NATIONALE, 49e annee, no. 3, mars 1993, p. 103-121.

- Ben-Meir, Alon

Israelis and Palestinians : Harsh Demographic Reality and Peace.
Maintaining the separate national identities of both Israel and any future Palestinian "entity" that might be established in the West Bank and Gaza is critical to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These national identities, however, are affected in diametrically opposite ways by current and future demographic factors and by the interdispersement of Israeli and Palestinian populations.

- Bonnefous, Marc

Politique et diplomatie.
DEFENSE NATIONALE, 49e annee, decembre 1993, p. 105-112.

- Brandes, Jorg-Dieter

Bilanz der Nahost-Verhandlungen.
EUROPAISCHE SICHERHEIT, 42. Jg., Nr. 11, November 1993, S. 563-566.

- Dieckhoff, Alain

Israel-OLP : le tortueux chemin vers la paix.

- Gaymard, Herve


- Gold, Dore


- Hoch, Martin


- Lustick, Ian S.

Zankapfel Jerusalem : Pladoyer fur einen neuen Status.

- Taheri, Amir

Israel-OLP : la promesse de l'aube.
POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, no. 61, automne 1993, p. 67-80.
The end of the Gulf War has reinforced the belief among experts and government officials that Arab and Islamic politics are entering a more moderate, modern phase. But the belief that Arab and Islamic politics has become more pragmatic and moderate is wishful thinking, confusing adaptation to the realities of power with fundamental change. Both secular-Arab nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism are motivated by a profound antipathy to the West. Attempts by the U.S. to force Israel to make concessions will be counterproductive, since nothing short of the disappearance of Israel will satisfy Arab nationalists and Islamic fundamentalists. Ironically, therefore, the key to a stable peace in the region is a strong Israel.

1992

- Arabes et Israélis : la bataille de la paix (8 articles).
  POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 57e année, no. 4, hiver 1992, p. 763-855.

- Bannerman, M. Graeme
  Arabs and Israelis : Slow Walk Toward Peace.

- Defarges, Philippe Moreau
  Le conflit israélo-arabe : la paix sera révolutionnaire ou ne se fera pas.

- Gazit, Shlomo
  To Share the Same Child : The Arab-Israeli Conflict : Guidelines for a Solution.

- Soetendorp, Ben
  De nieuwe veiligheidsorde in het Midden-Oosten.
  INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, jg. 46, nr. 9, september 1992, p. 506-510.

- Zak, Moshe
  Madrid and After.

1991

- La Conferencia de Pax sobre Oriente Proximo : Palacio Real de Madrid,
  30 de octubre - 3 de noviembre de 1991.

- Awwad, Emad
  L'invasion du Koweit et le probleme palestinien.

- Giniewski, Paul
  Les pièges de la paix.

- Guerin, Michel
  Peace in Doubt.
To illustrate the merits of neutralization in the Arab-Israeli context, this article analyses the essence of this concept and the factors which bear upon its political feasibility. It also delineates the proposed neutralization package and indicates the regional and global advantages resulting from its implementation.

- **Karsh, Efraim**
  Neutralization: The Key to an Arab-Israeli Peace.

- **Riva, Alvaro de la**
  El conflicto arabe-israeli tras la guerra.

- **Segal, Jerome M.**
  Another Change for Peace?

- **Taheri, Amir**
  Madrid: la conference de l'espoir.

- **Vidal, Dominique**
  Une terre a partager.

1990

- **Britton, Stuart**
  Competition or Collaboration?: The Soviet Union, Detente, and the October 1973 War.
  The ambiguities of Soviet behavior prior to and during the 1973 October War have since generated controversy on the question of whether the Soviet Union was essentially competitive or collaborative toward the United States during the Middle East crisis.

- **Cordesman, Anthony H.**
  Regional Balance Unaffected by Costly Arab-Israeli Arms Race.

- **Hadar, Leon T.**
  Reforming Israel: Before It's Too Late.

- **Hottinger, Arnold**
  Machtverschiebungen in der arabischen Welt: Konfrontations- oder Friedenspolitik gegenüber Israel?

1989

- **Awwad, Emad**
  L'Union Sovietique et le conflit israelo-arabe.
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