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PART I : BOOKS PREMIERE PARTIE : LIVRES*

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323
       /00739
  How Did This Happen ? : Terrorism and the New War - New York :
      PublicAffairs.
      xiv, 324 p.; 21 cm.
      ISBN/ISSN: 1586481304
      Subject(s):
         1. SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2001
         2. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-
         3. TERRORISM--USA
      Added entry(s):
         1. Hoge, James F., ed.
         2. Rose, Gideon, ed.
      Notes:
         'In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, one
            question has been on everyone's mind : 'How this did happen ?'
            This book seeks to answer this question in all its critical
            aspects - the motives and actions of the terrorists, the status
            of the US military, the context of the Middle East,
            bioterrorism, airport security, diplomatic pressures - and to
            provide readers with perspective, information, and sound
            interpretation. The editors of 'Foreign Affairs' have brought
            together noted experts whose insights make the events of that
            terrible day more understandable, even as we steel ourselves
            for the conflicts ahead.'
      Edition: 1st ed.
      Year: 2001
      /00703
323
   Usama bin Laden's al-Qaida : Profile of a Terrorist Network - Ardsley,
      NY: Transnational Publishers.
      var. pag. : ill.; 23 cm.
      ISBN/ISSN: 1571052194
      Author(s):
         1. Alexander, Yonah
         2. Swetnam, Michael S.
      Subject(s):
         1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
         2. TERRORISM--AFGHANISTAN
         3. BIN LADEN, OSAMA, 1957-
         4. TERRORISTS
      Notes:
         Bibliography: p. 53-59.
         'The purpose of this publication is not to glorify bin Laden nor
            his group. Rather, it is designed to provide an easily
            accessible reference for academics, policy makers, the press,
            and other interested individuals. The study exposes much of
            al-Qaida's mystique and thereby places it in a perspective as
            one of the many challenges facing the international community
            in the twenty-first century.'
      ID number: 80017624
      Year: 2001
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^{*} This list contains material received as of August 26th, 2002 - Cette liste est arrêtée au 26 août 2002.

355.2 /00247 Facing the Hydra: Maintaining Strategic Balance while Pursuing a Global War against Terrorism - Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College. vi, 23 p.; 23 cm. ISBN/ISSN: 1584870915 Author(s): 1. Crane, Conrad C. Subject(s): 1. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-2. USA--MILITARY POLICY 3. USA--ARMED FORCES Added entry(s): 1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US) Notes: 'As the global war on terrorism continues, members of Congress and media pundits are starting to say that American military forces are being stretched to thin by far-flung commitments. While Bush administration officials dispute this, they have expressed desires to reduce peacekeeping commitments and reexamine the number of overseas stations and deployments. The author analyzes the impact of the war on terrorism and the requirements of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review on the many essential missions conducted by the US Armed Forces. Focusing primarily on the Army, he highlights the requirements associated with combat operations against terrorists, accelerating transformation and the new emphasis on homeland security and force protection. At the same time, he points out that the Army and the other Services must remain involved worldwide in day-to-day assurance, dissuasion, and deterrence activities; execution of peace operations and other smaller-scale contingencies; and remaining ready for other major combat operations. Dr. Crane asserts that these obligations require the Army to reshape and expand its force structure. Failure to do so places critical missions at risk around the world, and could lead to replacement of operational 'victory' in the war on terrorism with strategic failure as regional instability increases.' ID number: 80017994 Year: 2002 Robust Response to 9/11 Is Needed but Poking the Hornets' Nest Is Ill-Advised - Washington : Cato Institute. 6 p.; 30 cm. (Cato Foreign Policy Briefing; 69) Author(s): 1. Eland, Ivan Subject(s): 1. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-2. TERRORISM--USA Added entry(s): 1. Cato Institute (US) Notes: <http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb69.pdf> accessed 04/02/02. 'To date, the Bush administration has responded well to the terrorist attacks of September 11. However, the recent imposition of stringent financial sanctions against terrorist groups not affiliated with bin Laden's network and most likely not involved in the September 11 attacks should raise a warning flag. It is vital to show that the heinous attack on US soil will not go unanswered and to eliminate the threat from al Qaeda and affiliated groups, but it is foolhardy to draw a bigger bull's-eye on the United States by taking up the fight

nations.' ID number: 80017800

against numerous other terrorist groups on behalf of other

Year: 2001

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323
      /00712
   Issues for Europe - Post-11 September - Brussels : Centre for European
      Policy Studies.
      7 p.; 30 cm.
      (CEPS Policy Brief; 8)
      Author(s):
         1. Emerson, Michael
         2. Gros, Daniel, 1955-
      Subject(s):
         1. SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2001
         2. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
      Added entry(s):
         1. Centre for European Policy Studies (BE)
      Notes:
         <http://www.ceps.be/Pubs/2001/N8-Eu11September.pdf> accessed
            17/12/01.
         'Ten days after 11 September, the policy agenda becomes a huge set
            of interlocking issues - political, strategic, economic. The
            present note makes a first survey of these issues, and
            expresses opinions on some of them. However the main purpose is
            to establish a template or framework to help monitor and
            evaluate the evolution of the world's response to this massive
            event.'
      ID number: 80017686
      Year: 2001
       /00740
323
   Inside Al Qae'da - London : Hurst.
      xiii, 176 p. : ill.; 23 cm.
      ISBN/ISSN: 185065672X
      Author(s):
         1. Gunaratna, Rohan
      Subject(s):
         1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
         2. TERRORISM--AFGHANISTAN
         3. BIN LADEN, OSAMA, 1957-
      Notes:
         Includes index.
         'The definitive work on Al Qaeda, this book is based on five years
            of research, including extensive interviews with its members;
            field research in Al Qaeda-supported conflict zones around the
            globe; and monitoring Al Qaeda's infiltration of diaspora and
            migrant communities in North America and in Europe. This book
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'The definitive work on Al Qaeda, this book is based on five years of research, including extensive interviews with its members; field research in Al Qaeda-supported conflict zones around the globe; and monitoring Al Qaeda's infiltration of diaspora and migrant communities in North America and in Europe. This book sheds light on Al Qaeda's financial infrastructure and how the organisation trains combat soldiers and vanguard fighters for multiple guerrilla, terrorist and semiconventional campaigns in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. In addition, the author investigates the clandestine Al Qaeda operational network in the West. Finally, the author shows that for Al Qaeda to be destroyed or seriously weakened there needs to be a multipronged, multiagency, and multidimensional response by the international community.'

ID number: 80018003

Year: 2002

323 /00704

Au nom d'Oussama Ben Laden : dossier secret sur le terroriste le plus recherche du monde - Paris : Picollec.

399 p. : ill.; 21 cm. ISBN/ISSN: 2864771837

Author(s):

1. Jacquard, Roland

Subject(s):

- 1. BIN LADEN, OSAMA, 1957-
- 2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
- 3. TERRORISM--AFGHANISTAN
- 4. TERRORISTS

Notes:

Includes index.

'Le 11 septembre 2001, le monde entier est assomme : New York et Washington sont en feu. Ces actions d'eclat sont attribuees par les services secrets a Oussama Ben Laden, jusqu'alors bien peu connu du public. L'auteur ouvre ses dossiers et nous dit qui est ce milliardaire arabe. Quels sont ses objectifs ? Qui sont ses militants ? Ses kamikazes ? Ses terroristes qui constituent sa fraternite, veritable nebuleuse qui agit de l'Algerie aux Philippines ? Quel est son financement ? Qui sont ses taupes, ses relais en France, a Londres, en Allemagne ou en Amerique du Nord ? Quelles sont leurs operations du World Trade Center aux ambassades americaines en Afrique orientale, de l'assassinat de touristes a Louxor ou de marines en Arabie Seoudite a l'explosion d'un destroyer a Aden ? Quelles sont les menaces en France et en Europe occidentale ? Doit-on craindre les effets mortels des armes nouvelles (bacteriologiques, chimiques ou nucleaires) ? Avec des faits, des noms, des documents, des precisions, l'auteur y repond.'

ID number: 80017629

Year: 2001

323 /00709

The World Has Not Changed - Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center.

5 p.; 30 cm.

(Briefing Papers ; vol. 3, issue 9-10, September-October 2001) Author(s):

1. Malashenko, Aleksei

Subject(s):

- 1. SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2001
- 2. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
- 3. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

Added entry(s):

1. Carnegie Moscow Center (SU)

Notes:

<http://pubs.carnegie.ru/english/briefings/2001/issue01-09-10.asp>
accessed 10/12/01.

'It seems as though the idea that 'as of September 11, we live in a different world' has taken root, once and for all. In general, one doesn't argue with axioms, but this newest maxime requires some adjustment and elaboration. Unexpected cataclysms do not, after all, put an end to old, routine political and geopolitical processes. The time has come to catch our breath and talk a bit - not about what has changed, but, rather, about what has remained the same, and has been given a new impetus toward growth.'

*323 /00709

ID number: 80017667

Year: 2001

327 /01074

The Anti-Terrorism Coalition : Don't Pay an Excessive Price - Washington : Cato Institute.

7 p.; 30 cm.

(Cato Foreign Policy Briefing; 68)

Author(s):

1. Pena, Charles V.

Subject(s):

- 1. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-
- 2. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS

Added entry(s):

1. Cato Institute (US)

Notes:

http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb68.pdf> accessed 04/02/02.

'To prosecute the war on terrorism, President Bush has assembled a diverse coalition of countries for political, diplomatic, and military support. Some of those countries are long-standing friends and allies of the United States. Others have new or changing relationships with the United States. Although there may be a price for their support, America should not pay an excessive price - one that could be detrimental to longer-term ${\tt US}$ national security interests. And though it may be necessary to provide a certain amount of immediate aid (directly or indirectly) as a quid pro quo for the support of other nations in the US war on terorrism, the United States needs to avoid longer-term entanglements, open-ended commitments, and the potential for an extreme anti-American backlash. If the United Staes has the same kind of tunnel vision about terrorism that it had about the fight against communism during the Cold War, it could be blindsided by disastrous unintended consequences. In its zeal to go after the terrorists responsible for the attacks of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the US government must understand that alliances of convenience (especially with countries of which it was legitimately critical before September 11) may be necessary, but they come with the potential for great risk. Ultimately - and paradoxically - the United States could end up doing more to breed terrorism than to prevent it.'

ID number: 80017798

Year: 2001

323 /00745

Terrorism and US Foreign Policy - Washington : Brookings Institution

xii, 272 p.; 24 cm.

ISBN/ISSN: 0815700040

Author(s):

1. Pillar, Paul R.

Subject(s):

- 1. TERRORISM
- 2. TERRORISM--USA
- 3. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS

Notes:

Includes index.

'In a recent poll conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, respondents were asked what they considered the most critical threats to US vital interests. International terrorism was cited as the most pressing danger to America's security. Americans take the threat of terrorism very seriously. But is the US government's approach to combating terrorism the right one ? In this important and provocative new book, Paul R. Pilar argues that, while the US government has done welll in its efforts at preventing terrorist attacks and bringing terrorists to justice, too little thought has been given to the integration of counterterrorism into a broader US foreign policy. Pillar reminds us that the vast majority of terrorist

attacks and activities occur overseas and that counterterrorism should be at the forefront of the policy making process. Pillar emphasizes that combating terrorism may be better served by 'more finesse and, if not less fight, then fighting in a carefully calculated and selective way'. To do this, he argues, it is essential, that the US cooperate more fully with other governments in fighting terrorism, evaluate terrorist threats individually, and abandon counterterrorism measures that do not produce positive results.'

ID number: 80018080

Year: 2001

PART II : JOURNAL ARTICLES DEUXIEME PARTIE : ARTICLES DE REVUES**

- 11 de septiembre y despues : enemigo difuso : no es el islam; ni Afganistan. POLITICA EXTERIOR, vol. 15, no. 84, noviembre - diciembre 2001, Whole Issue.
- After September 11.
 BROOKINGS REVIEW, vol. 20, no. 3, Summer 2002, Whole Issue.
 http://www.brook.edu/press/REVIEWsummer2002/
- Terrorism : Threat Assessment, Countermeasures and Policy.
 US FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA, vol. 6, no. 3, November 2001, Whole Issue.
 http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1101/ijpe/ijpe1101.pdf
- US Terror Attacks (5 Articles).
 WORLD TODAY, vol. 57, no. 10, October 2001, p. 4-13.
- Alexander, Michael A Global Civil War. RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 146, no. 6, December 2001, p. 12-15.
- Andreani, Gilles
 Apres l' evenement.
 COMMENTAIRE, vol. 24, no. 96, hiver 2001 2002, p. 775-783.
- Antonenko, Oksana
 Putin's Gamble.
 SURVIVAL, vol. 43, no. 4, Winter 2001, p. 49-59.
 http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod

For the first time since the Second World War, Russia, the United States and Europe are working together to address what all of them view as vital security interests. Russia is important not only for the war against Taliban and al-Qaeda, but also for longer-term goals such as targeting terrorist money flows, identifying and eliminating al-Qaeda cells throughout the world, addressing the proliferation of weapons-of-mass destruction (WMD) materials and technologies and finding effective responses to bio-terrorist threats. Russia President Vladimir Putin took a major gamble after 11 September, setting aside outstanding disagreements and offering full Russian support to the US-led coalition against terror. It is now up to the NATO allies to respond with similar imagination to accommodate Russia's legitimate strategic concerns and bring Moscow into the global economy. If this chance is missed, the next ten years are likely to resemble the 1990s as a decade of lost opportunities in Russian-Western relations.

- Armacost, Michael H.
La politica exterior de EE UU despues del 11-S.
POLITICA EXTERIOR, vol. 15, no. 86, marzo - abril 2002, p. 73-84.
La necesidad de combatir el terrorismo ha producido un giro en la diplomacia norte-americana. Sus intereses geopoliticos han cambiado una vez concluida la guerra en Afganistan.

^{**} This list contains material received as of August 26th, 2002 – Cette liste est arrêtée au 26 août 2002.

- Baranovsky, Vladimir 11 septembre : une vision russe. POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 67e annee, no. 1, janvier - mars 2002, p. 9-20. Les attentats du 11 septembre a New York et Washington vont se traduire, vus de Moscou, par une evolution significative de la politique etrangere des Etats-Unis, par une redefinition des relations internationales et par le renouveau de la position de la Russie. Les Etats-Unis pourraient ainsi reagir de deux facons : en durcissant des tendances unilateralistes deja a l'oeuvre ou, au contraire, en s'ouvrant davantage a de nouvelles formes de cooperation internationale dans le cadre, et meme au-dela, de la lutte antiterroriste. La meme incertitude existe en matiere de relations internationales : les evenements du 11 septembre pourraient soit renforcer la cooperation existant dans de nombreux domaines, y compris economiques, soit favoriser les forces productrices de chaos. La Russie, enfin, en s'associant a la coalition antiterroriste, a change sa position sur la scene internationale : tout en se rapprochant de l'Occident, elle a rappele qu'elle entendait jouer un role de premier plan vis-a-vis du monde musulman, notamment en Asie centrale.

- Bardos, Gordon N. Balkan blowback ? Osama bin Laden and Southeastern Europe. MEDITERRANEAN QUARTERLY, vol. 13, no. 1, Winter 2002, p. 44-53. The 11 September 2001 attacks on New York's World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., should force us to reexamine US policy in the Balkans, for two reasons. First, important elements of Osama bin Laden's organization, al Qaeda, as well as other Islamic extremist organizations have been operating in the region for the better part of a decade. Consequently, any comprehensive policy to combat international terrorism must involve southeastern Europe. Second, a thorough examination of bin Laden's alliances in the Balkans also reveal a disturbing pattern - ironically, for much of the past decade, bin Laden and the United States have often found themselves supporting the same factions in the Balkan conflicts.

- Baverez, Nicolas Repenser la defense. COMMENTAIRE, vol. 24, no. 96, hiver 2001 - 2002, p. 795-802.
- Bearden, Milton
 Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires.
 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol. 80, no. 6, November December 2001, p. 17-30.
 The first engagement in the new war on terrorism with Osama bin Ladin in Afghanistan poses severe challenges for the United States. Rooting out bin Ladin's network will require military success in a country that the Soviet Union could not conquer in ten years of trying, as well as support from unstable surrounding nations. Washington may be tempted to try to oust the Taliban regime, but doing so could rekindle Afghanistan's brutal civil war. The United States must proceed with caution or end up on the ash heap of Afghan history.

- Beltran, Jacques
Parmentier, Guillaume
Les Etats-Unis a l' epreuve de la vulnerabilite.
POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 66e annee, no. 4, octobre - decembre 2001, p.

Au-dela du traumatisme psychologique, les attentats du 11 septembre auront des consequences profondes, a la fois sur la societe americaine et sur la politique etrangere des Etats-Unis. Sur le plan interne, ce sont bien les valeurs du contrat social americain qui pourraient etre affectees pour parer a la menace terroriste, qu'il s'agisse de la liberte de circulation ou des echanges. Sur le plan exterieur, on peut se demander si le multilateralisme affiche par l'Administration Bush depuis les evenements restera une constante de sa politique etrangere, ou si l'unilateralisme fera son retour une fois que les necessites de la riposte coalisee au terrorisme cesseront de se faire sentir. En matiere de defense antimissile, il est probable que la fin du mythe de l'invulnerabilite americaine et le souhait d'adopter une posture de defense renforcee accelerent ce programme. Quant aux relations transatlantiques, elles pourraient etre affectees par une grande devolution de responsabilites aux Europeens en matiere de securite sur le Vieux continent, ainsi que par le role joue par la Russie dans cette crise.

- Bennett, Christopher Aiding America.

NATO REVIEW, vol. 49, Winter 2001 - 2002, p. 6-7.

http://www.nato.int/docu/review.htm

The author examines how the Alliance has assisted the United States since 11 September and its contribution to the campaign against terrorism.

- Bergen, Peter

The Bin Laden Trial: What Did We Learn?
STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 24, no. 6, November - December 2001, p. 429-434.

http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod

The Manhattan trial of four men linked to Osama bin Laden was the result of the largest overseas investigation ever mounted by the U.S. government. The trial generated thousands of pages of documents and the testimony of dozens of witnesses with some knowledge of bin Laden's group. What was learned from the trial is that bin Laden's organization experienced severe cash flow problems in the mid-1990s; that the U.S. government has had some real successes in finding informants within bin Laden's organization; that bin Laden has taken steps to acquire weapons of mass destruction; that the training of bin Laden's followers in his camps in Afghanistan is quite rigorous, featuring tuition on a wide range of weapons and explosives and terrorism techniques; and that bin Laden's group operates transnationally, its membership drawn from over four continents. Finally, the trial underlines the strengths and limits of the law enforcement approach to bin Laden.

- Bonnefous, Marc La dechirure.

DEFENSE NATIONALE, 57e annee, no. 12, decembre 2001, p. 128-135. Le 11 septembre 2001 marque la date d'une dechirure dans notre maniere de voir le monde qui nous entoure. L'attentat s'apparente a un veritable bombardement, denotant une strategie ambitieuse, econome de moyens mais efficace, qui n'a peut-etre pas dit son dernier mot. Elle retourne a son profit les facilites de la modernite. La fragilite de la societe civile devient une donnee essentielle de la defense. Les Etats-Unis se livreront-ils a une revision de leur politique au Proche-Orient ? Elle ne saurait etre que limitee. Le deplacement plus a l'est du centre de gravite de l'islamisme est lourd d'incertitudes. Gardons-nous des politiques a courte vue dont les islamistes tirent profit.

- Bos, Bob van den Ook Europa ontwaakt uit Amerikaanse droom : op zoek naar een strategisch concept tegen terrorisme. INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, jg. 55, nr. 12, december 2001, p. 583-586. The author states that on September 11th Europe was rudely awakened from the 'American Dream'. Up to now, the reaction has mainly been focused on the fight against terrorism. Policy must however also aim to tackle the deeper causes of political violence. The United States are taking the lead in the struggle against terrorism. Europe does not yet have a sufficiently developed Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Member States are scrambling to create a distinct profile for themselves. The United States and Europe each have their own strengths and weaknesses with regard to solving global problems. They can learn a lot from each other's policies. The strategic concept must at least be concentrated on a new 'contact system' between different religions and cultures. Poverty reduction, democratic reform and effectively functioning governments are indispensable in a global strategy focused on stable and peaceful relations.

- Bouchet-Saulnier, Francoise Just War, Unjust Means ? WORLD TODAY, vol. 58, no. 8 - 9, August - September 2002, p. 26-28. Israeli actions against the Palestinians, US bombing in Afghanistan and the intervention of Russia's armed forces in Chechnya all have something in common : the fight against terrorism. They also share something else : a refusal to recognise the relevance of humanitarian law to this type of conflict.

- Bozo, Frederic

La relation transatlantique et la 'longue' guerre contre le terrorisme. POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 67e annee, no. 2, avril - juin 2002, p. 337-351. Au-dela de leur impact immediat, les attentats du 11 septembre ont agi comme un revelateur et comme un catalyseur des tendances longues de l'histoire de l'Alliance. Avant eux en effet, la situation etait paradoxale. D'un cote, pres de dix ans apres la chute de l'URSS, l'OTAN semblait durablement refondee : son role de garant de la securite europeenne etait reaffirme, son premier elargissement etait un succes, et le leadership americain etait renforce; de l'autre, la crise du Kosovo remettait a l'ordre du jour un possible 'decouplage' euro-americain, qu'il s'agisse des valeurs ou des interets des differents allies. Du coup, un nouveau grand debat transatlantique etait engage, avant meme les attentats, sur la redefinition des menaces, sur la gestion de certains conflits, en particulier au Proche-Orient, et sur les equilibres internes de l'Alliance - la relance de la PESD venant equilibrer, apres Saint-Malo et l'election de Bush, le regain d'unilateralisme americain. Mais, avec le 11 septembre, ces interrogations se sont trouvees demultipliees, et des lors, trois nouveaux scenarios ont du etre examines : celui d'une refondation de l'OTAN dans la lutte antiterroriste, celui d'un divorce transatlantique face a ce meme enjeu, et celui d'un nouveau partenariat strategique euro-americain dans une Alliance renovee.

- Brotons, Antonio Remiro Estados Unidos no se pregunta en que se equivoca. POLITICA EXTERIOR, vol. 16, no. 85, enero - febrero 2002, p. 111-124. La solidaridad con EE UU tras los atentados les da una oportunidad para ejercer el liderazgo del sistema multilateral centrado en la ONU. Sin embargo, su politica no parece moverse.

- Brovkin, Vladimir N. How to Fight a Religious Protest Movement ? DEMOKRATIZATSIYA, vol. 9, no. 4, Fall 2001, p. 469-475.

- Byers, Michael
 Unleashing Force.
 WORLD TODAY, vol. 57, no. 12, December 2001, p. 20-22.
 The war against terrorism has already significantly eased the legal limits on the use of force. Despite a Security Council mandate for action, Washington has chosen instead to rely on its right of self-defence. It is this area that has seen the most dramatic change in the current conflict states that support terror groups may now themselves be legally attacked.
- Byford, Grenville
 The Wrong War.
 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol. 81, no. 4, July August 2002, p. 34-43.
 Defining who is a terrorist is more complicated than it might seem and even if it were not, choosing one's enemies on the basis of their tactics alone has little to recommend it. This is why the Bush administration now finds itself caught between the policies it needs to adopt and the language it is using to describe them.
- Cannistraro, Vincent M. Iraq, Terrorism and the New Pax Americana.
 MEDITERRANEAN QUARTERLY, vol. 13, no. 2, Spring 2002, p. 1-8.
- Carter, Ashton B. The Architecture of Government in the Face of Terrorism. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, vol. 26, no. 3, Winter 2001 - 2002, p. 5-23. http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod
- Cilluffo, Frank J.
 Marks, Ronald A.
 Salmoiraghi, George C.
 The Use and Limits of U.S. Intelligence.
 WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 25, no. 1, Winter 2002, p. 61-74.
 http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod
- Claudin, Carmen
 Putin en Occidente: una apuesta estrategica?
 POLITICA EXTERIOR, vol. 16, no. 85, enero febrero 2002, p. 14-20.
 Tras el 11 de septiembre se ha producido un cambio radical en las relaciones de Rusia con Estados Unidos y Europa. De esta actitud podria surgir un nuevo diseno en las relaciones internacionales.
- Clement, Rolf
 Die 'Idee' eines Generalsekretars.
 EUROPAISCHE SICHERHEIT, 51. Jg., Nr. 1, Januar 2002, S. 20-21.

- Cox, Michael

American Power Before and After 11 September: Dizzy with Success? INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, vol. 78, no. 2, April 2002, p. 261-276. http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod
One of the most interesting consequences of the war against international terrorism is the discovery by many analysts of American power. However, if the experts had been more attentive they might have noticed that a power shift in favour of the United States is not just some recent phenomenon arising from US victory over the Taliban or the new Bush military build-up. Rather, it can, and should be, traced back to important trends of the early 1990s. What the war has done is to reveal the extent of America's renaissance in the postwar decade while its position as true hegemon was being consolidated. However, victory in war may not bring order in peace if the United States does not draw the

correct lessons.

- Crenshaw, Martha

Why America ? : The Globalization of Civil War. CURRENT HISTORY, vol. 100, no. 650, December 2001, p. 425-432. http://www.currenthistory.com

Terrorism should be seen as a strategic reaction to American power in the context of a globalized civil war. Extremist religious beliefs play a role in motivating terrorism, but they also display an instrumental logic.

- Cronin, Audrey Kurth Rethinking Sovereignty: American Strategy in the Age of Terror. SURVIVAL, vol. 44, no. 2, Summer 2002, p. 119-140. http://www4.oup.co.uk/surviv

Terrorism is an act of political violence aimed not only at innocent civilians, but at the legitimacy of the state. Twenty-first century terrorism is gradually shifting away from direct state sponsorship and toward more amorphous groups, often having access to state resources but less and less likely to be under the control of the state itself. In an increasingly globalised environment, the traditional state-centric means of responding to terrorism will not be sufficient and may even be counterproductive. Thus, to be effective, American strategy must change fundamentally: the threat requires a flexible, broad-based globalised strategy, seamlessly incorporating international economic, political, legal, diplomatic, cultural and military elements. International terrorism is not dangerous because it can defeat the United States and its allies in a war, but because by marshalling unprecedented destructive power it can destroy the integrity of the state by undermining its ability to protect its citizens from direct attacks.

- Cryer, Robert

The Fine Art of Friendship: Jus in Bello in Afghanistan.

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW, vol. 7, no. 1, April 2002, p. 37-83.

http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod

The armed conflicts in Afghanistan have been surrounded by an almost unprecedented level of public debate relating to the law of armed conflict. This article seeks to provide an assessment of both the ground and air campaigns by the Coalition and their Afghan allies, primarily the Northern Alliance. Taking as its point of departure the idea that how someone (the Coalition) treats their friends (Afghan civilians) and how that person's friends (currently the Northern Alliance) treat others reflects back upon them, this article evaluates the Coalition and Northern Alliance campaigns in Afghanistan. The nature of the various conflicts is investigated, as is, for the air campaign, the targeting process and weapon choice of the Coalition. In relation to the ground war, the actions of the Northern Alliance/United Front and the Coalition are subjected to scrutiny, in particular from the point of the rules relating to surrender and the treatment of detainees. The article $\frac{1}{2}$ identifies some areas of concern, although nothing attributable to the Coalition rising remotely close to the level of the shocking attacks on the United States on September 11.

- Daalder, Ivo H.
Lindsay, James M.
Nasty, Brutish, and Long : America's War on Terrorism.
CURRENT HISTORY, vol. 100, no. 650, December 2001, p. 403-409.
http://www.currenthistory.com

- Dean, Sidney E.
Kontinuitat oder Kreuzzug ? Auswirkungen des Terroranschlags auf die US-Aussenpolitik.
EUROPAISCHE SICHERHEIT, 50. Jg., Nr. 11. November 2001, S. 8-10.

- Debat, Alexis

Voyage au coeur du renseignement americain. POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, no. 95, printemps 2002, p. 169-190. Despite accounting for just 8% of the US intelligence budget, the CIA has borne the brunt of criticisms leveled at intelligence agencies since September 11. This bloated bureaucracy, with its over-reliance on electronic versus human intelligence methods, staggered into the new millennium. The disappearance of its main enemy (the Soviet Union), the disinterest of the Clinton administration, plus a rash of scandals, resignations and forced retirements of top officials, came as a series of body blows to the agency. George Tenet took over the reins in 1997, becoming the fifth Director of Central Intelligence since 1992, and it was the reforms he introduced at Langley that set the CIA on the road to recovery. Following the September 11 attacks, which sent shock waves around Washington, the legislative and statutory constraints that had weighed increasingly heavily on the CIA since 1975 were considerably relaxed, and it is now in the process of being fully restored to its role as coordinating agency for the US's 13 intelligence services. It remains to be seen whether these measures will be sufficient to defeat the faceless enemy behind the strikes of September 11.

- deLisle, Jacques
The Roles of Law in the Fight Against Terrorism.
ORBIS, vol. 46, no. 2, Spring 2002, p. 301-319.

- Delpech, Therese
The Imbalance of Terror.
WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 25, no. 1, Winter 2002, p. 31-40.
http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod
This new, previously unrecognizable terror has a name: assymetric warfare, which now has a horrific shape. To where is the new world leading? The messages are confusing but they are reshaping international relations.

- Desportes, Vincent

L' etat de l' Union 2002, discours de guerre pour les Etats-Unis. DEFENSE NATIONALE, 58e annee, no. 4, avril 2002, p. 64-78. Plus qu'un discours sur l'etat de l'Union, l'intervention presidentielle du 29 janvier est un discours de guerre et de mobilisation. Si le ton peut surprendre, il reste dans la veine de la rhetorique traditionnelle americaine, en amorcant cependant une evolution majeure : l'executif americain se donne desormais la possibilite de frapper militairement de maniere preventive. Le discours de G. W. Bush annonce un effort financier important pour les forces armees, ce que reflete le projet presidentiel de budget propose au Congres : sans etre veritablement un budget de changement, il marque la premiere etape importante d'un accroissement considerable des depenses americaines de defense, planifie sur plusieurs annees.

Deutch, John
 Smith, Jeffrey H.
 Smarter Intelligence.
 FOREIGN POLICY, no. 128, January - February 2002, p. 64-69.
 What's needed to fix U.S. counterterrorism intelligence? Not more spies nor the power to assassinate terrorist leaders, say the authors of this article. Instead, start by giving the director of central intelligence the authority to break down the walls that divide domestic and foreign intelligence gathering.

- Dibb, Paul

The Future of International Coalitions: How Useful? How Manageable? WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 25, no. 2, Spring 2002, p. 131-144. http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod

Can the global coalition against terrorism be sustained? Members may share a common fear of terrorism, but only the United States has suffered a severe terrorist attack. This, and the risk that the war may widen, will put intense pressure on the coalition's future.

- Eickelman, Dale F.

Bin Laden, the Arab 'Street,' and the Middle East's Democracy Deficit. CURRENT HISTORY, vol. 101, no. 651, January 2002, p. 36-39. http://www.currenthistory.com

Bin Laden speaks in the vivid language of popular Islamic preachers, and builds on a deep and widespread resentment against the West and local ruling elites identify with it. The lack of formal outlets to express opinion on public concerns has created a democracy deficit in much of the Arab world, and this makes it easier for terrorists such as bin Laden, asserting that they act in the name of religion, to hijack the Arab street.

- Encel, Frederic

Les enseignements de la guerre Etats-Unis-Al Quaida (lere partie). DEFENSE NATIONALE, 58e annee, no. 3, mars 2002, p. 39-48. Les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 ont donne lieu a une vaste offensive americaine contre le terrorisme islamiste a travers le monde. La premiere phase de cette lutte fut victorieusement menee en Afghanistan, dont le regime barbare taliban abritait Al Quaida. Tandis que le reseau d'Oussama ben Laden entretient des objectifs de nature apocalyptique lies a la soumission de l'Occident judeo-chretien par l'islam, les Etats-Unis d'Amerique entendent conserver leur suprematie d'hyperpuissance. Au service de ces objectifs diametralement opposes, les deux camps menent ainsi, respectivement, une strategie de destabilisation des Etats musulmans allies de Washington, et le maintien au pouvoir de ces memes regimes (Pakistan, Arabie saoudite ...). Comme apres la guerre du Golfe de 1991, on assiste a une redistribution des donnees geostrategiques du Proche a l'Extreme-Orient. Au-dela de l'analyse objective de cette nouvelle guerre, les democraties occidentales - la France en particulier - doivent s'impliquer directement; a travers New York, c'est en effet l'ensemble du monde libre dont les fondements philosophiques ont ete frappes par une nouvelle forme de totalitarisme belliqueux. Le terrorisme islamique, comme tous les autres, doit etre impitoyablement combattu.

- Encel, Frederic

Les enseignements de la guerre Etats-Unis-Al Quaida (2eme partie). DEFENSE NATIONALE, 58e annee, no. 4, avril 2002, p. 102-113. Les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 ont donne lieu a une vaste offensive americaine contre le terrorisme islamiste a travers le monde. La premiere phase de cette lutte fut victorieusement menee en Afghanistan, dont le regime barbare taliban abritait Al Quaida. Tandis que le reseau d'Oussama ben Laden entretient des objectifs de nature apocalyptique lies a la soumission de l'Occident judeo-chretien par l'islam, les Etats-Unis d'Amerique entendent conserver leur suprematie d'hyperpuissance. Au service de ces objectifs diametralement opposes, les deux camps menent ainsi, respectivement, une strategie de destabilisation des Etats musulmans allies de Washington, et le maintien au pouvoir de ces memes regimes (Pakistan, Arabie saoudite ...). Comme apres la guerre du Golfe de 1991, on assiste a une redistribution des donnees geostrategiques du Proche a l'Extreme-Orient. Au-dela de l'analyse objective de cette nouvelle guerre, les democraties occidentales - la France en particulier - doivent s'impliquer directement; a travers New York, c'est en effet l'ensemble du monde libre dont les fondements philosophiques ont ete frappes par une nouvelle forme de totalitarisme belliqueux. Le terrorisme islamique, comme tous les autres, doit etre impitoyablement combattu.

- Everts, Philip Isernia, Perangelo

Toeschouwers of deelnemers : de publieke opinie over problemen van het internationaal terrorisme buiten de Verenigde Staten sinds september 2001.

VREDE EN VEILIGHEID, jg. 31, nr. 2, 2002, p. 154-180.

Dit artikel is een van de resultaten van doorlopend onderzoek naar aard, inhoud en invloed van de publieke opinie over het internationaal gebruik van militair geweld. Dit onderzoek richt zich vooral op de factoren die de bereidheid tot geweldgebruik bepalen. De terroristische aanslagen in de Verenigde Staten van 11 september 2001 - hoe afschuwelijk op zich ook - bieden een unieke mogelijkheid internationale opvattingen te bestuderen onder omstandigheden die geheel afwijken van eerdere gevallen van internationaal geweldgebruik. Het artikel bevat de resultaten van een eerste vergelijkende analyse van beschikbare onderzoeksgegevens uit een groot aantal landen buiten de Verenigde Staten. De gegevens betreffen in hoofdzaak de periode september to december 2001. De resultaten van het beschikbare opinieonderzoek worden vooral beoordeeld met betrekking tot de volgende aspecten : bekendheid en betrokkenheid bij de problemen; steun voor de militaire acties van de Verenigde Staten en voor deelname daaraan (de 'geografie van de politieke steun'); en de factoren die steun aan geweldgebruik bepalen. Het materiaal biedt de mogelijkeid tot een bepertke toets van het in dit verband eerder ontwikkelde model.

- Fitzgerald, Peter L.
 - Tightening the Screws: The Economic War Against Terrorism.

 NATIONAL INTEREST, no. 66, Winter 2001 2002, p. 76-82.

 Short of the actual use of force, economic sanctions are among the US government's most powerful tools in the war on terrorism. They seek to deprive terrorist organizations of the financial wherewithal to support and conduct operations such as the September 11 attacks on Washington and New York. The pre-existing anti-terrorist sanctions framework has now been bolstered by a new Presidential Executive Order on Terrorism, as well as by UN Security Council Resolution 1373 calling for similar sanctions by other nations. These new measures add another layer to an already complex system of financial regulations with relevance to US diplomacy.
- Francois-Poncet, Jean
 Un tournant de l' histoire ?
 COMMENTAIRE, vol. 24, no. 96, hiver 2001 2002, p. 759-768.
- Freedman, Lawrence
 The Third World War ?
 SURVIVAL, vol. 43, no. 4, Winter 2001, p. 61-87.
 http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod

Osama bin Laden does not speak for Islam. However, it is his objective to do so, so this is a war about the future of Islam, and therefore about the governance of all states with Muslim populations, and all conflicts in which Muslim groups are directly involved. These conflicts occupy much of the current international agenda, taking in the Middle East, the Gulf, the Balkans, Central and East Asia, and parts of Africa. While the individual conflicts still have their critical distinctive features, a global struggle of sorts is emerging that cannot but shake up local and global structures, often in quite surprising and unintended ways. Whether or not international politics will be so transformed at the end of this process that it can be described as the 'third world war' remains to be seen. A key test will be how the United States emerges from this as an international actor.

- Glennon, Michael J. Terrorism and the Limits of Law. WILSON QUARTERLY, Spring 2002, p. 12-19. http://www.uspolicy.be/aa/aamay202.htm

Few institutions have been more severely tested in the wake of September 11 than the law. How do we treat suspected foreign terrorists? What is the proper balance between self-defense and the protection of civil liberties? A legal scholar sees an important lesson in how America has responded.

- Godement, Francois

Apres le 11 septembre : la riposte et sa cible.
POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 66e annee, no. 4, octobre - decembre 2001, p. 801-809.

En decidant une action militaire en Afghanistan en replique aux attentats du 11 septembre, les Etats-Unis ont place l'Asie centrale au coeur du conflit ouvert par les attaques terroristes sur New York et Washington. Cette action minimale comporte evidemment des risques: risque d'enfermement dans le piege afghan; risque de destabilisation du Pakistan, qui sert a la fois de point d'appui discret a l'intervention americaine et de base arriere taliban; risque d'echec, enfin, a neutraliser Ben Laden, son organisation et ses affides. Or les Etats-Unis ne peuvent se permettre d'echouer, car c'est leur propre capacite de dissuader une agression qui est aujourd'hui mise a l'epreuve. Washington va donc se trouver devant des choix importants, auxquels les Europeens devront s'associer, et dont dependra dans une large mesure les equilibres regionaux au Moyen-Orient, en Asie centrale et en Asie du Sud.

- Gordon, Philip H.
 NATO After 11 September.
 SURVIVAL, vol. 43, no. 4, Winter 2001, p. 89-106.
 http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod

On the evening of 12 September 2001, the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation invoked that treaty's mutual defence guarantee for the first time in the alliance's 52 years. When that treaty's Article 5 was drafted - pledging that an attack on one ally would be treated as an attack on all - not a single signatory could have imagined that its first invocation would involve Europeans coming to the aid of the United States rather than the other way around. Yet that is precisely what happened, and NATO will never be the same again. The notion that mutual defence could be a two-way street, and that NATO might use its military power to deal with international terrorism - in Central Asia no less - are just some of the ways that the attacks have begun to transform the world's largest and longest-standing defence alliance.

- Gormley, Dennis M.
 Enriching Expectations : 11 September's Lessons for Missile Defence.
 SURVIVAL, vol. 44, no. 2, Summer 2002, p. 19-35.
 http://www4.oup.co.uk/surviv

At a time when Americans feel more vulnerable than ever before, it is appropriate that a programme for the development of national missile defence moves forward. That programme, however, should fit within a broader strategic reckoning of America's new threat environment. The lessons of 11 September ought to guide the Bush administration's decision-making as it grapples with an expensive array of new and traditional security requirements. Critical to such decision-making are intelligence estimates on the ballistic-missile threat to the United States. Yet, 11 September is seen by many as a catastrophic 'intelligence failure'. In fact, it was more a failure of 'strategic imagination' than of intelligence per se. As policymakers look to the future, they should take care not to mistake the most familiar threats - such as ballistic missiles - for the most likely ones. Likewise, in pursuing military-hardware solutions, they should not discount the importance of multilateral arms control.

- Goulding, Marrack
No Military Solution.
WORLD TODAY, vol. 58, no. 8 - 9, August - September 2002, p. 19-21.
President George Bush called for a 'war' against terror after September 11. But is war the right way to deal with the likes of Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda ? Here a self-confessed 'bleeding hart' answers no to that. It's an assessment based on years in charge of the UN's peacekeeping operations.

- Greenwood, Christopher
International Law and the 'War Against Terrorism'.
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, vol. 78, no. 2, April 2002, p. 301-317.
http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod

This article analyses some of the international legal issues arising out of the events of 11 September 2001. Those who perpetrated the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were guilty of serious offences under United States law and possibly also under international law. The fact that their conduct was a crime does not, however, preclude it also being a threat to international peace and an armed attack. The author argues that the United States and its allies were entitled to respond to that attack and the threat of future attacks by using force against Al-Qa'ida and that, in the circumstances, it was also legitimate to take military action against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan which had sheltered Al-Qa'ida and permitted it to conduct operations from Afghan territory. The article also examines the application of the laws of armed conflict to the ensuing fighting and the status and treatment of those captured and held at Guantanamo Bay.

- Halliday, Fred In Retrospect.

WORLD TODAY, vol. 58, no. 8 - 9, August - September 2002, p. 22-23. We are close to a year on from September 11. The main consequence is clear: the attacks on mainland America have provoked the United States into a new strategic campaign, likely to dominate US foreign policy for a long time to come. The impact will be protracted not only because of the broad ramifications of this policy, but because the very goal - the elimination of an enemy, unseen and drawing on considerable support - will remain elusive.

- Hashim, Ahmed S.
The World According to Usama Bin Laden.
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, vol. 54, no. 4, Autumn 2001, p. 11-35.
http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press
Usama Bin Laden is a dangerous opponent, and so are those who might succeed him should he be killed. Bin Laden's ideas and goals, however, and the succeed him should he be killed. Bin Laden's ideas and goals, however, and the succeed him should he be killed. Bin Laden's ideas and goals, however, and the succeed him should he be killed. Bin Laden's ideas and goals, however, and the succeed him should he be killed. Bin Laden's ideas and goals, however, and the succeed him should he be killed. Bin Laden's ideas and goals, however, and the succeed him should he be killed. Bin Laden's ideas and goals, however, and the succeed him should he be killed. Bin Laden's ideas and goals, however, and the succeed him should he be killed. Bin Laden's ideas and goals, however, and the succeed him should he be killed. Bin Laden's ideas and goals, however, and the succeed him should he be killed. Bin Laden's ideas and goals, however, and the succeed him should he be killed. Bin Laden's ideas and goals, however, and the succeed him should he be killed. Bin Laden's ideas and goals, however, and the succeed him should he be killed. Bin Laden's ideas and goals, however, and the succeed him should he be killed. Bin Laden's ideas and goals, however, and the succeed him should he be killed.

succeed him should he be killed. Bin Laden's ideas and goals, however, remain little explored or understood. To grasp them, it is necessary to examine the regional and historical context, his experiences, and the sources of fundamentalist thought upon which he draws.

- Heng, Yee-Kuang
 Unravelling the 'War' on Terrorism : A Risk-Management Exercise in War
 Clothing ?
 SECURITY DIALOGUE, vol. 33, no. 2, June 2002, p. 227-242.
 http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod

Since the 11 September terrorist outrages, policymakers have waxed lyrical about a 'war' on terrorism as the greatest challenge to international security. The word 'war' implies easily identifiable (normally state) adversaries, and dramatic military action producing decisive, highly visible results at the end. However, this 'war' is in fact more rhetorical than about interstate warfare. Like other rhetorical wars on drugs or crime, it has no visible end, and outcomes will be neither easily apparent nor decisive. This article addresses the conceptual difficulties of a rhetorical 'war' on terrorism from a

perspective of risk management. Drawing on military issues in Afghanistan so far, it seeks to provide a more appropriate analytic prism for understanding such a 'war' where enemies are elusive networks, the aim is simply avoiding harm with no prospect of closure, and success is defined more by non-events than by what can be seen.

- Heymann, Philip B.
Dealing with Terrorism : An Overview.
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, vol. 26, no. 3, Winter 2001 - 2002, p. 24-38.
http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod
What are the possibilities for stopping groups, organized largely abroad, from undertaking sustained campaigns in the United States of lethal terrorism? That - and not the more traditional problem of occasional, low-level terrorism - is the subject of this article.

- Hoffman, David Beyond Public Diplomacy. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol. 81, no. 2, March - April 2002, p. 83-95. The United States has put legions of spokespersons on the airwaves at home and abroad in a campaign to 'win the hearts and minds' of the Muslim world. So far, however, the world's superpower is losing the propaganda war to a terrorist in hiding. This is not surprising, given the virulent anti-Western messages that repressive Middle Eastern regimes spread through state-run media. Washington should focus instead on bringing freedom of the press to those countries where oppression breeds terrorism.

- Howard, Michael
 Mistake to Declare this a 'War'.
 RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 146, no. 6, December 2001, p. 1-4.

great-power relations well into the future.

- Ikenberry, G. John

- American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror. SURVIVAL, vol. 43, no. 4, Winter 2001, p. 19-34. http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod The surprise attacks on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon have been called this generation's Pearl Harbor, exposing America's vulnerabilities to the outside world and triggering a fundamental reorientation of foreign policy. To some, 11 September marks the end of the post-Cold War era; after a decade of drift, the United States has finally rediscovered its grand strategic purpose. But this evocative image of historical transition in American foreign policy and world order is misleading. The events of 11 September and the Bush administration's declaration of war on terrorism will have an enduring impact on world politics, primarily in reinforcing the existing Western-centred international order and providing new sinews of cohesion among the great powers, including Russia and China. If Washington plays its cards well, it is possible that engagement and accommodation - rather than balance-of-power and security rivalry - will continue to define
- Immarigeon, Jean-Philippe
 Le droit en etat de guerre.
 DEFENSE NATIONALE, 57e annee, no. 12, decembre 2001, p. 136-143.
 Les attentats de New York ont fait ressurgir dans les discours des dirigeants americains des appels a la guerre totale, inquietants parce que d'un autre age et miroir du delire des fondamentalistes islamiques.
 La guerre sainte est proclamee des confins de l'Indus aux rives du Potomac. Graves errements, dont s'inquietent a juste titre les Europeens, opinions et gouvernements confondus. La perspective d'un nouveau cycle de guerres, que les Americains semblent tout a la fois craindre et appeler de leurs voeux, est rejetee par tous ceux qui cherchent au contraire a en

sortir. Et l'on decouvre que s'affrontent, de part et d'autre de l'Atlantique, deux visions radicalement differentes du droit, donc du monde. Et si le choc des civilisations tant redoute s'averait ne pas etre, au terme de ce qui apparait encore malgre tous les discours millenaristes comme une guerre du XXe siecle, celui que l'on croit?

- Immarigeon, Jean-Philippe La guerre introuvable. DEFENSE NATIONALE, 58e annee, no. 4, avril 2002, p. 94-101. Dans la guerre ouverte le 11 septembre 2001, si l'on mesure une victoire a l'objectif initialement fixe, celui-ci n'a de toute evidence pas ete atteint. Reconnaissons que nous sommes entres dans une pure representation de la crise pour ne pas en voir les fondements, que les Etats-Unis recherchent la guerre pour la guerre et non la victoire, et que leur pouvoir reside fort logiquement non dans le fait de vaincre le plus rapidement possible, mais dans celui de faire etalage de leur puissance le plus longtemps possible. Derriere la maladresse tres calculee des discours du president Bush apparait la mise en gerbe de plusieurs projets convergents : la croyance messianique de l'Amerique en son destin, la foi dans un progres continu et bienfaisant, une philosophie deterministe de l'Histoire et la soumission a des lois supposees naturelles. Tout cela vient de loin, de la fondation de la Republique americaine, et se trouve resume dans la conception de la guerre que les Etats-Unis tentent d'imposer au monde.

- Jervis, Robert

An Interim Assessment of September 11: What Has Changed and What Has Not?

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, vol. 117, no. 1, Spring 2002, p. 37-54. http://www.uspolicy.be/aa/aajune102.htm

The author argues that the threat of terrorism is not as new as is often claimed, that terrorism reinforces state power more than it undermines it or exemplifies the decreasing importance of states, that the claims for reducing terrorism by getting at its root causes are largely tendentious, that viewing the struggle against terrorism as a war is problematic, and that the attacks of September 11 are not likely to greatly change world politics.

- Katz, Mark N.

Osama bin Laden as Transnational Revolutionary Leader. CURRENT HISTORY, vol. 101, no. 652, February 2002, p. 81-85. http://www.currenthistory.com

Although the same 'root causes' that helped previous transnational revolutionary leaders have also aided Osama bin Laden, he also faces the same obstructing factors they did, and thus his grandiose revolutionary ambitions are failing too.

- Kitfield, James

NATO Metamorphosis.

NATIONAL JOURNAL, vol. 34, no. 6, 2002, p. 374-378.

http://www.uspolicy.be/aa/aamar202.htm

Throughout the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's half-century of existence, its mutual-defense guarantee - enshrined in Article 5 of the founding Washington Treaty - has served as the philosophical backbone of the alliance. Though never formally invoked, Article 5's unequivocal pledge that an attack on one NATO ally would be treated as an attack on all has been the essential principle separating NATO from looser security alliances and multinational organizations. No one expected, however, that the security guarantee would be first activated so that Europe could come to the aid of the United States, rather than vice versa. But in the hours after the September 11 attacks, Lord Robertson decided that it was time, at long last, to sound the trumpet of collective defense. Now, however, some NATO officials are having second thoughts.

- Korgun, Viktor Afghanistan on the Threshold of Peace. CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS, no. 1, 2002, p. 7-13.
- Kurth, James

The War and the West.

ORBIS, vol. 46, no. 2, Spring 2002, p. 321-332.

How can the nations of the West, and especially their leader, the United States, meet and master the new challenge coming out of the East? The United States must wage its war against Islamic terrorists on two different fronts and in two different ways. These are (1) the war on the foreign front, which began with the campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and (2) the war on the domestic front, which began with the security measures directed against potential terrorist cells within the United States itself.

- Lesch, Ann M.

Osama bin Laden : Embedded in the Middle East Crises. MIDDLE EAST POLICY, vol. 9, no. 2, June 2002, p. 82-91.

http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod

Osama bin Laden has been elevated to iconic status as the avowed mastermind behind the devastating attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. That focus on his persona exaggerates his individual importance while diminishing the significance of the wider crisis in which he and his movement are embedded. In order to investigate this issue, the author addresses four key aspects of the Bin Laden phenomenon : the centrality of the fight against the Soviet-supported regime in Afghanistan for legitimizing the concept of a twentieth-century jihad; the subsequent violent attacks by the returning Arab fighters against their own governments; the mounting resentment against the US military presence in Saudi Arabia during and especially following the Gulf War of 1990-1991; and the widening of the jihad into a global attack on the United States, as the sole superpower. These four aspects are not exhaustive, and yet they are sufficiently comprehensive to explain why Bin Laden's message resonates widely in the Middle East and why the demise of the messenger will not, in itself, curb this dangerously militant movement.

- Lesch, Ann M.

Osama bin Laden's 'Business' in Sudan.

CURRENT HISTORY, vol. 101, no. 655, May 2002, p. 203-209.

http://www.currenthistory.com

What was the importance of the Sudanese sojourn for Osama bin Laden ? One can argue that, without the sanctuary in Sudan, the Arabs who had fought in Afghanistan would have dispersed. Some would have gone home; others would have scattered in exile. Over time, their strength would have waned and they would have had difficulty communicating and coordinating their efforts ... Without Sudan bin Laden could not have incubated the networks that have caused such devastation in subsequent years.

- Leurdijk, Dick A.

De strijd tegen het internationale terrorisme en het recht op zelfverdediging.

INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, jg. 56, nr. 1, januari 2002, p. 12-14. The author argues that the furnishing of proof in invoking the right of self-defence by the United States has left an uneasy feeling. The author argues that the bases for the justification of the use of force are somewhat ambivalent. Immediately after the terrorist attacks, the discussion was focused on three levels. At the Security Council level, two resolutions were adopted by the United States and proponents, as legitimising the use of force in the war against terrorism. Nevertheless, on analysing the resolutions, the author cannot find a formal foundation for such a legitimised military response. Next, the author discusses NATO

and the adoption of its Article 5. On October 2nd, the North Atlantic Council formally determined that there had been an attack from outside the United States and invoked Article 5. Yet, when it comes to the evidence, the Article shows that doubt must remain. Finally, the author focuses on the discussion in the United States. Within days of the attacks, the Congress gave President Bush a virtually free hand in responding to the attacks with the use of force. However, according to the author, the American justification for the use of force lies rather with the right of self-defence, which under Article 51, is a cornerstone of the UN charter.

- Leveau, Remy

11 septembre : le monde arabe a la croisee des chemins. POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 66e annee, no. 4, octobre - decembre 2001, p. 793-799.

Les attentats terroristes du 11 septembre a New York et Washington placent le monde arabe dans une situation nouvelle. Le pacte de stabilite regionale, mis en place par les accords de Camp David (1979), n'est plus guere adapte a une region ou le fosse entre les elites et la population semble s'etre creuse de maniere irreversible. Les Etats-Unis, allies d'Israel et de l'Arabie Saoudite, et menaces directement par une mouvance terroriste issue du wahhabisme saoudien, doivent aujourd'hui redefinir leur politique dans la region. Peut-etre auraient-ils interet, pour y promouvoir une meilleure repartition de la rente petroliere et un debut d'ouverture democratique, a se joindre a d'autres acteurs, tels que l'Europe, l'ONU, voire meme la Russie, pour aboutir a un nouveau pacte de stabilite associant les interets des peuples a ceux des dirigeants.

- Lieven, Anatol

The Secret Policemen's Ball: the United States, Russia and the International Order after 11 September. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, vol. 78, no. 2, April 2002, p. 245-259. http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod

In this article, the author argues that the collapse of the Soviet and communist threats and the triumph of capitalism and bourgeois values gave the United States an unprecedented chance to act as a status quo hegemon, dominating the world with the consent of other major powers. The United States threw up this chance by acting instead as a 'dissatisfied' and even revolutionary power, creating a sense of menace and resentment across much of the world. After the 11 September attacks, the near-global threat of Sunni Islamist terrorism and revolution gives the United States another opportunity to rally much of the world behind it, in a kind of new 'Holy Alliance' of states against threats from below. But by mixing up the struggle against terrorism with a very different effort at preventing nuclear proliferation, and by refusing to take the interests of other states into account, the US risks missing this opportunity for a second time, and endangering itself and its closest allies such as Britain.

- Luong, Pauline Jones
Weinthal, Erika
New Friends, New Fears in Central Asia.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol. 81, no. 2, March - April 2002, p. 61-70.
To wage its war in Afghanistan, the Bush administration needed
Uzbekistan's help - and promised a lot to get it. But Washington must not
let this short-term marriage of convenience give Uzbekistan long-term
regional hegemony. The Uzbek regime's authoritarianism fosters Islamic
extremism, which in turn exacerbates tensions among Central Asia's
unstable governments. Only a multilateral approach can handle the
region's many problems.

- MacIntyre, Dave Homeland Security: What Is to Be Done. MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, vol. 25, no. 12, 2001, p. 12-21.
- Mackinlay, John
 Global Insurgent.
 WORLD TODAY, vol. 57, no. 11, November 2001, p. 15-17.
 The idea of insurgency provides a useful way of analysing the motives of the hijack bombers who attacked America. But the lessons of counter insurgency are far from comforting as we search for ways of dealing with them. Western society has created a virus which is allowing the global insurgent to thrive.
- Mackinlay, John
 NATO and Bin Laden.
 RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 146, no. 6, December 2001, p. 36-40.
 Bin Laden represents a more powerful phenomenon than terrorism, his reach is almost global and his supporting constituency is numbered in millions. In the longer term the West will have to recognize that his growing army of outraged supporters pose a much greater danger than bin Laden himself. An effective campaign to contain and disarm the hostility of bin Laden's growing constituency of Muslim supporters will require a multi-faceted counter strategy which involves political, humanitarian, developmental and human rights initiatives working alongside an international military security force. Can NATO, the slow moving military giant, influence a campaign which continues to widen beyond its European reach and proliferate into areas of governance and development that lie beyond its provenance?
- Malvesti, Michele L. Bombing bin Laden: Assessing the Effectiveness of Air Strikes as a Counter-Terrorism Strategy. FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS, vol. 26, no. 1, Winter 2002, p. 17-29. http://www.uspolicy.be/aa/aaapr102.htm In the wake of the September 11, 2001, aerial suicide attacks on US soil, the United States has responded to the deadliest terrorist operation in history with a multifaceted counter-terrorism (CT) strategy aimed at defeating the perpetrators of the attacks and, more broadly, undermining terrorism in general. More prominently, the US response has included military air strikes against targets in Afghanistan that directly and indirectly support Al-Qaeda. An evaluation of the United States' three previous CT military air strikes reveals that this option is a blunt, ineffective instrument that creates a cycle of vengeance with minimal gains at best. Moreover, these previous strikes have failed to achieve US CT policy objectives of prevention and accountability.
- Marchat, Philippe Reflexions sur un attentat. DEFENSE NATIONALE, 58e annee, no. 1, janvier 2002, p. 41-51. Les attentats hyper-mediatises du 11 septembre 2001 incitent a certaines reflexions sur les protagonistes, sur les principles causes de ce drame et sur ses effets les plus notables.

- Meiers, Frans-Joseph
Was zahlt und wer zahlt nach dem 11. September 2001 ?
EUROPAISCHE SICHERHEIT, 51. Jg., Nr. 8, August 2002, S. 8-12.
The terror attacks have lastingly changed the American self-identity. The American founding myth of living far away in a country where we as a 'town on a hill' start the world all over again was based on the conception that the Americans led an own national life, wonderfully isolated behind two oceans. After the September 11 attacks, the Americans are now part of an organic whole of a world from which, as George Washington had advised his fellow countrymen, they were to keep a distance and stay aloof from. The war against terrorism can be won only by a long-term commitment of the USA in the world. That is the new tradeoff which confronts America: in order to secure the core of its foundation principles - the freedom - it must give up one of its founding myths - a nation far away.

- Miller, Steven E. The End of Unilateralism or Unilateralism Redux ? WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 25, no. 1, Winter 2002, p. 15-23. http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod Many have claimed that September 11 and its aftermath must spell the end of U.S. unilateralism. They may be mistaken. The very real pressure for

- Myers, Richard B.
Six Months After: The Imperatives of Operation Enduring Freedom.
RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 147, no. 2, April 2002, p. 10-14.

change in U.S. policy may not be as powerful or as inevitable as many

- Myjer, Eric P. J.
 White, Nigel D.
 The Twin Towers Attack: An Unlimited Right to Self-Defence?
 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW, vol. 7, no. 1, April 2002, p. 5-17.
 http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod
 This article considers the limited role of international organizations (the UN and NATO) in Operation Enduring Freedom against Afghanistan. Both organizations have played a peripheral role, legitimating but not regulating the use of force by the United States. This seems to be part of a continuing process of attempting to widen customary rights while eroding the effective powers of organizations. The consequences for collective security and the international legal order are immense.
- O'Connell, Mary Ellen Evidence of Terror. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW, vol. 7, no. 1, April 2002, p. 19-36.

http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod
In the hours after the 11 September attacks on the United States, some
called for counter-attacks on America's enemies, regardless of any

seem to believe.

called for counter-attacks on America's enemies, regardless of any evidence of wrong-doing. Those calls were rejected and some evidence was produced linking Osama bin Laden, his organization, al-Qaeda, and the Taliban regime of Afghanistan to the attacks. The United States and United Kingdom began a bombing campaign of Afghanistan on the strength of that evidence on 7 October 2001. This article explores the law of evidence in international law. It seeks to identify what evidence is sufficient for supporting a case of self-defence to clandestine terror attacks.

- O'Hanlon, Michael E.
A Flawed Masterpiece.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol. 81, no. 3, May - June 2002, p. 47-63.
The military campaign in Afghanistan has been, for the most part, a masterpiece of creativity and finesse. It may wind up being one of the most notable U.S. military successes since World War II. But the American strategy has also had flaws. Most important, by contracting out much of the work to undependable local proxies, it may have allowed Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders to escape - and menace the world down the road

- Posen, Barry R.

The Struggle Against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, vol. 26, no. 3, Winter 2001 - 2002, p. 39-55. http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod

In this article, the author asks four questions related to the September 11th attacks: First, what is the nature of the threat posed by al-Qaeda? Second, what is an appropriate strategy for dealing with it? Third, how might the U.S. defense establishment have to change to fight this adversary? And fourth, what does the struggle against al-Qaeda mean for overall U.S. foreign policy?

- Post, Harry

Al-Qaeda- en Talibanstrijders : krijgsgevangenen of niet ? INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, jg. 56, nr. 5, mei 2002, p. 258-260. The author addresses the problem of the status of the Al Qaida and Taliban fighters who were captured by the Americans during the recent Afghan War and are now kept in prison at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. The Americans argue that the 1949 Geneva Conventions are not applicable in respect to these prisoners, and that as 'unlawful combatants' they have no right to be accorded prisoner-of-war status. This position has been criticized, in particular by the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The author shares this criticism and presents a legal argumentation on the basis of a thorough study of the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols.

- Rapoport, David C.

The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism. CURRENT HISTORY, vol. 100, no. 650, December 2001, p. 419-424. http://www.currenthistory.com

The September 11 attack has created a resolve in America and elsewhere to end terror everywhere. But the history of terror does not inspire much confidence that this determination will be successful.

- Reiter, Erich

Strategische Situation nach den Anschlagen in Amerika. EUROPAISCHE SICHERHEIT, 51. Jg., Nr. 8, August 2002, S. 27-29. The 11th of September 2001 has demonstrated to the general public that the international terrorism can become a serious challenge to our security policy. Terrorist threat scenarios of a larger scale have shifted from an abstract danger to a concrete and real threat. For quite some time already do modern security concepts regard the threat posed by terrorism - especially by the new types of terrorism - as an essential element of the risk analysis. Both in academic and military scenarios similar and even worse incidents than the 9-11 attacks - albeit not in this concrete form - are considered to be possible and thinkable to occur. For security analysts the 9-11 incidents are therefore no reason for a change of the concepts; on the contrary, they were confirmed by them. It should be noted that these attacks did not yet have the new dimension of terrorism as described by Walter Laquer in the 1970s which will then in fact present a formidable threat to mankind, that is when weapons of 'superviolence' (use of biological and chemical agents aside from nuclear weapons) will some day enable small groups as well as to

blackmail entire cities or countries or to impair and restrict the capacity of state institutions to act or even eliminate it in part.

- Roberts, Adam

Counter-Terrorism, Armed Force and the Laws of War. SURVIVAL, vol. 44, no. 1, Spring 2002, p. 7-32. http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod

In military operations involving action against terrorists, the relevance of the laws of war, often now called international humanitarian law, is problematic. The US-led 'war on terror', especially the use of armed force in Afghanistan, raises three questions. Is the law applicable to such operations ? Should it be applied in situations different from what was envisaged in treaties ? And are detainees 'prisoners of war' ? A difficulty in applying law is that governments usually view terrorists, like rebels in civil wars, as simply criminal. In the bombing in Afghanistan, the US has sought to observe the legal requirement of discrimination, but difficult issues are raised by the use of cluster bombs and the continued bombing after the Taliban regime's fall. As regards prisoners, US policy was ill-thought-out; and the perfectly justifiable classification of certain prisoners as 'unlawful combatants' should not mean that they are in a legal limbo. Treating the law cavalierly causes problems, especially for coalitions. The law, however imperfect, is irreplaceable.

- Rogers, Paul

Right for America, Right for the World.
WORLD TODAY, vol. 58, no. 2, February 2002, p. 13-15.
There was much talk of coalitions after the traumatic events of last
September. Critics of Washington's politics hoped that their agenda of
international cooperation would find new favour. They have been
disappointed. What is right for America is regarded by the White House as
right for the world.

- Roy, Olivier

Ben Laden et ses freres.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, no. 93, automne 2001, p. 67-81. A hasty analysis of the terrorist attacks of September 11 might lead one to link them to the radical Islamic movement. And yet this is not really the case. Unlike the terrorists who since the 1980s have fought for the Palestinian or Islamic cause, Osama bin Laden has no political strategy. Nor is he pursuing any achievable goal. The destruction of the World Trade Center is simply the execution of his apocalyptic vision. The larger, traditional Islamic movements have all condemned the attacks. Those who support bin Laden come from outside the wider Islamic tradition. This distinction is key to understanding the bin Laden phenomenon. The bin Laden networks are a product of globalization and know no borders. They have no country, no social base and no program, except perhaps the application of the Sharia. Essentially, the bin Laden system is more of a sect than a political movement.

- Ruhe, Volker

Der 11. September 2001 : neues Selbstverstandnis amerikanischer Aussenpolitik.

INTERNATIONALE POLITIK, 56. Jahr, Nr. 12, Dezember 2001, S. 37-42. Washington braucht jetzt mehr denn je zuvor den Beistand der Europaer, so der ehemalige Verteidigungsminister. Dies bedeutet, dass die Europaer rasch Fahigkeiten zur Ubernahme internationaler Verantwortung entwickeln. Amerika wird seine Verbundeten in die Pflicht nehmen.

- Sayyid, Mustafa Al

Mixed Message: The Arab and Muslim Response to 'Terrorism'. WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 25, no. 2, Spring 2002, p. 177-190.

http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod

Many Arabs and Muslims, and their governments, do not share the same definition of terrorism with the United States and suspect a hidden agenda behind future phases of this campaign. Thus, full Arab and Muslim support cannot be offered in the future.

- Schilling, Walter

Eine neue Dimension der Gewalt : internationale Sicherheit nach dem 11. September.

INTERNATIONALE POLITIK, 56. Jahr, Nr. 12, Dezember 2001, S. 31-36. Nach den Anschlagen des 11. September geht es jetzt darum, erfolgreich und angemessen gegen den islamistischen Terrorismus vorzugehen. Fur dieses Ziel durfen die westlichen Demokratien ihre freiheitlichen Errungenschaften jedoch nicht auf dem altar der Sicherheit opfern.

- Shea, Jamie
NATO and Terrorism.
RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 147, no. 2, April 2002, p. 32-40.

- Sicherman, Harvey

The New Protracted Conflict: Finding a Foreign Policy.

ORBIS, vol. 46, no. 2, Spring 2002, p. 215-227.

The events of September 11, 2001, transformed George W. Bush's presidency and with it American foreign policy. It will now use the war on terrorism as the fulcrum upon which to refashion its most important relationships. Priorities include a new deal with Russia, a deepening role in reconciling India and Pakistan, a quick revival of the Arab-Israeli negotiations and a possible fresh start with Iran. All of this will be measured against progress in the war itself. Experience thus far reinforces the view that success in the protracted conflict, even as victory in the Cold War, will not guarantee the peace. That will have to be won anew, region by region, relationship by relationship. This mission will soon make the Bush pragmatists new visionaries and not only to see the world safe from terrorism. The opportunity to win a new, more secure peace has risen from the ashes of September 11.

- Silvestri, Stefano
Global Security after 11 September.
INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR, vol. 36, no. 3, July - September 2001, p. 5-9.
The author of this article offers some preliminary considerations on the impact that the new terrorist threat is likely to have on the foreign and security policies of the US, on its relations with European allies and other major powers and, more generally, on the evolution of security concepts and principles.

- Simon, Steven
Benjamin, Daniel
The Terror.
SURVIVAL, vol. 43, no. 4, Winter 2001, p. 5-15.
http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod
The likelihood that al-Qaeda will lose its Afghan base raises the question of whether practical sovereignty within contiguous territory is necessary for the terror-group's success, or whether advances in communications and encryption - coupled with increasingly good tradecraft - will over time obviate the need for a territorial base. This is a crucial question for the US and others who are fighting the network,

because even complete success in Afghanistan will not destroy this

terrorist threat. Nor will the terrorists be appeased by any conceivable change in US policies toward the Muslim world. Moreover, preemptive or

preventive strikes against terrorist operations will not be feasible. In this kind of world, a strategy dependent upon identification and elimination of specific threats will have to be combined with one focussed on remedying vulnerabilities to ill-defined, all-azimuth threats of potentially catastrophic scope.

- Simoniia, N.
Baranovskii, V.
What Is in Store for the World?
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (Minneapolis), vol. 48, no. 1, 2002, p. 9-16.
http://home.eastview.com/epubs.shtml
The academic community in Russia is actively discussing possible political repercussions of the terrorist acts of 11 September 2001. The state of the

political repercussions of the terrorist acts of 11 September 2001. The present authors offer their vision of the much-discussed issue and its three dimensions: possible consequences for the US policies, the system of international relations as a whole, and for Russia in particular.

- Sloan, Stanley R.
 Transatlantic Alliance: Dissipated or Deepened?
 INTERNATIONALE POLITIK, vol. 3, no. 1, 2002, p. 95-100.
 Europe and America will either hang together or they will hang separately. Despite much negative speculation, 9/11 did not demonstrate NATO's growing irrelevance. But it did suggest that a conscious effort to deepen the alliance must now be made to avoid 'dissipation' by default. Following in the footsteps of the Marshall Plan and early European integration, we should now form a new overarching Atlantic Community covering all aspects of the transatlantic relationship.
- Smith, Paul J.
 Transnational Terrorism and the al Qaeda Model: Confronting New Realities.
 PARAMETERS, vol. 32, no. 2, Summer 2002, p. 33-46.
 http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters
 The author tells us that the terrorist organization known as al Qaeda (The Base) was well known to members of the international intelligence and police communities long before the events of 9/11 Tracing al Caeda (The Base) was sell known to members of the international intelligence and police communities long before the events of 9/11 Tracing al Caeda

The author tells us that the terrorist organization known as al Qaeda (The Base) was well known to members of the international intelligence and police communities long before the events of 9/11. Tracing al Qaeda back to its origins, Smith details the history and composition of the organization. He shows how the events of 11 September were not, as some suggest, the result of a massive 'failure of intelligence', but rather the acts of an organization well established in over 50 countries. The author says al Qaeda, 'the ultimate transnational terror organization', represents a new type of terrorist group, one not anchored to specific geographic locations or political constituencies, and possessing transglobal strategic reach.

- Sobell, Vlad
 Russia Turns West.
 WORLD TODAY, vol. 57, no. 11, November 2001, p. 18-19.
 The campaign against terrorism is fundamentally changing the international climate. Russia's relations with the west are high on the list of areas under transformation. Ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia is finally arriving as a fully-fledged member of the western community.
- Solis, Gary D.
 Are We Really at War?
 PROCEEDINGS, vol. 127, no. 12, December 2001, p. 34-40.
 President George Bush declared that the United States is at war in his 20 September address to Congress. This 'war on terrorism' in response to the 11 September attacks raises questions about the meaning of the term war.

- Stevenson, Jonathan
Pragmatic Counter-terrorism.
SURVIVAL, vol. 43, no. 4, Winter 2001, p. 35-48.
http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod

Within ten days of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President George W. Bush proclaimed: 'our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated'. Despite the sweeping cast of the 'Bush doctrine', however, the qualification 'with global reach' gave him the leeway to circumscribe the operative definition of terrorism. Practical considerations require a policy that does so. The counter-terrorism effort against al-Qaeda alone will require diverse and sustained military, law-enforcement and intelligence resources that will stretch the capacities of the United States and its allies. The US and its allies enjoy greater leverage over some terrorist groups, and less over others. The upshot is that different policies will fit different terrorist groups and sponsors.

- Telhami, Shibley
 Understanding the Challenge.
 MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, vol. 56, no. 1, Winter 2002, p. 9-18.
 This article considers the extent to which faith explains the terror the US faced on September 11th, including the use of suicide bombers as an instrument, the extent to which the prevalent anger with the US in the Middle East over policy issues is related to the attacks, why Arab moderate voices have not been louder after the attacks, and what the US can do to reduce both the anger in the region and the chance of anti-US terrorism.
- Tompson, William
 Begging Ends.
 WORLD TODAY, vol. 58, no. 2, February 2002, p. 16-18.
 Two years in power, Russian President Vladimir Putin is having a good crisis. The strongly pro-western course he adopted after the events of September 11 has enhanced his standing in the west and won some significant benefits for his country. Yet, it has left him politically exposed should he be unable to demonstrate the longer term advantages of closer cooperation.
- Touchard, Georges-Eric
 Le cassure du 11 septembre 2001 : elements d' analyse.
 DEFENSE NATIONALE, 58e annee, no. 1, janvier 2002, p. 24-40.
 Les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 sur le territoire meme des Etats-Unis d'Amerique appellent deux questions : pourquoi et que faire? La presente synthese ne pretend evidemment pas repondre a ces deux vastes interrogations. Elle a pour simple ambition de rassembler, de maniere synthetique, certains elements d'analyse, susceptibles de clarifier la reflexion globale autour des interrogations majeures provoquees par les attentats du 11 septembre 2001.
- Vaisse, Justin
 Diplomatie americaine: un nouveau leadership?
 POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, no. 93, automne 2001, p. 177-189.
 It is generally agreed that the terrible attacks of September 11 will change the United States and its relations with the rest of the world.
 The real question is to what extent and in what way. What we do know is that American opinion has been profoundly traumatised by these massive terrorist attacks. Americans have become aware of their vulnerability, now that the very symbols of their leadership the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have been hit. Once emotions subside, there are those who will feel even more justified in their belief that this leadership is too costly on all levels. But those in favor of American isolationism especially with regards to the Middle East will probably end up

disappointed. The most likely scenario is that America's engagement in global politics will be stepped up. And yet contradictions within the Bush administration's foreign policy may well emerge. The September 11 attacks have strengthened the belief that America needs to act and defend itself alone, but at the same time have proven the necessity for expanded international cooperation in order to effectively fight against terrorism.

- Valasek, Tomas
 The Fight Against Terrorism : Where's NATO ?
 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, vol. 18, no. 4, Winter 2001 2002, p. 19-25.
- Walker, Martin
 Post 9/11 : the European Dimension.
 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, vol. 18, no. 4, Winter 2001 2002, p. 1-10.

- Walt, Stephen M.

- Beyond bin Laden : Reshaping U.S. Foreign Policy. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, vol. 26, no. 3, Winter 2001 - 2002, p. 56-78. http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod This article analyzes how the campaign against global terrorism has altered the broad agenda of U.S. foreign policy. The first section considers what the events of September 11 tell us about the U.S. position in the world and identifies four lessons that should inform U.S. policy in the future. The second section explores how the campaign on terrorism should alter the foreign policy agenda in the near-to-medium term: what new policies should the United States pursue and what prior goals should be downgraded or abandoned? The third section addresses the long-term implications, focusing on whether the United States will be willing to accept the increased costs of its current policy of global engagement. The author argues that this decision will depend in part on the success of the current campaign, but also on whether the United States can make its dominant global position more palatable to other countries.
- Wersch, Stefan van Islamistisch terrorism ? : Over de werking van het islamitisch slachtoffercomplex, samenzweringstheorieen en fundamentalisme. INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, jg. 56, nr. 2, februari 2002, p. 67-75. The author addresses the question : were the September 11 terrorist attacks about Islam ? Obviously, megaterrorism is rooted in anti-Western feelings. However, it is not the anti-Western attitude - a general Third World phenomenon - that points to Islam, but rather the intensity of these feelings that sets the Islamic world apart. For more than a century the Islamic-Arab world has been in the grip of anti-Western ideologies. According to the author, one may speak of an Islamic-Arab 'selfvictimization complex' expressing itself by a quagmire of conspiracy theories. The concurrence of this complex conspiracy theories and personal pathology constitute the breeding room for terrorism. Why is it that from the shocking realization in the colonial period that Europe was ahead, until the current phase of globalization, Muslim anger at the West has remained so vehement ? The author argues that in the Quarnic world view, 'blessed' Islam is considered the final phase of revelation, and the successor to Judaism and Christianity, which had both become corrupted and backward. Ever since the days of imperialism, the discrepancy between the Qur'an and the daily newspapers has been confusing. The author further points to the effects of the fundamentalist revival. Western possibilities to influence this state of mind are limited but not absent, and should focus, without denying the legitimacy of certain Muslim complaints, on confronting the Islamic world with its own responsibilities.

- Wijk, Rob de '11 september' en de nieuwe wereldorde. INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, jg. 56, nr. 1, januari 2002, p. 8-11. The author elaborates on the question of whether the dramatic events of September 11 have fundamentally changed international relations or whether they have merely reinforced the trends of the 1990s. The author argues that the latter is the most likely. The evidence suggests that the Americans have not seized upon the terrorist attacks on their territory, as a catalyst for creating new forms of permanent international

cooperation.

- Wijk, Rob de The Limits of Military Power. WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 25, no. 1, Winter 2002, p. 75-92. http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod Defense planning had only fleetingly dealt with the threat of apocalyptic terrorism previously. Significant practical and conceptual challenges confront the United States and its allies, requiring a new approach as well as new assets to make the military useful.

- Wouters, Jan Naert, Frederik Het antwoord van de Europese Unie op '11 september' : enkele kritische kanttekeningen. INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, jg. 55, nr. 12, december 2001, p. 587-591. The authors deal with the reaction of the European Union to the terrorist attacks in the United States, which has been swift and aims to be interdisciplinary and coordinated, but, it is submitted, in practice the overall reaction is not sufficiently balanced. With regard to police and judicial cooperation and legal matters, the response has been very broad and far-reaching, as is illustrated by the proposals for a European arrest warrant. The EU has also made serious efforts to build a coalition supporting the current campaign, albeit sometimes to the detriment of long-term policy objectives. The EU's position regarding the military response is less satisfactory. It highlights the predominant power of the large Member States in this area, the slow progress in constructing a European Security and Defence Policy and the current limits of the scope of that policy, which does not include defence in the proper sense. It is submitted that the latter situation is no longer tenable in a union which is that closely integrated. Furthermore, it is questioned whether the EU's position on the legality of the military action is appropriate. Finally, the Union's response fails above all in the field of eradicating the causes of terrorism, since in that area it has the means to make a difference but it has, at least up till now, not done so.
- Zaldivar, Carlos Alonso
 Poder, orden y percepciones tras el 11 de septiembre.
 POLITICA EXTERIOR, vol. 16, no. 87, mayo junio 2002, p. 59-70.
 La capacidad de una red transnacional para atacar a la primera potencia;
 la legitimacion de la lucha mundial contra el terrorismo; y la nueva
 percepcion de vulnerabilidad de EE UU han transformado la estructura de
 las relaciones internacionales.

- Zeghal, Malika

Les usages du savoir et de la violence : quelques reflexions autour du 11 septembre.

POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 67e annee, no. 1, janvier - mars 2002, p. 21-38. Les attentats du 11 septembre sont lies a la fois a la fin de la guerre froide et a la deconnection des mouvements islamistes radicaux de leurs bases nationales. L'islamisme radical a construit une image de l'ennemi fixee sur l'Occident, et en particulier sur les Etats-Unis. En 1996, le proces du cheick Omar Abd-al-Rahman temoigne a la perfection de cette hostilite, ainsi que du changement de la politique americaine vis-a-vis de l'islam sunnite radical a partir du debut des annees 1990. Certes, le discours radical qui legitime l'usage de la violence ne represente qu'un courant minoritaire parmi le large eventail des mouvements islamistes. Il repose neanmoins sur une interpretation de l'islam qui trouve son origine dans une lecture litterale des textes sacres, produite par de nombreux oulemas salafistes et donnant forme a une vision commune et repandue de l'islam qui refuse toujours de proceder a une lecture critique des textes religieux.

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