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2007

623 /01067
Failed Diplomacy : The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb -
xii, 228 p.; 24 cm.
ISBN: 9780815772002
Author(s):
  1. Pritchard, Charles L.
Subject(s):
  1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS --KOREA (NORTH)
  2. USA --FOREIGN RELATIONS --KOREA (NORTH)
  3. KOREA (NORTH) --FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
Notes:
  Includes index.
'North Korea's development of nuclear weapons raises fears of
nuclear war on the peninsula and the specter of terrorists
gaining access to weapons of mass destruction. It also
represents a dangerous and disturbing breakdown in US foreign
policy. The author offers an insider's view of what went wrong
and allowed this isolated nation - a charter member of the Axis
of Evil - to develop nuclear weapons. He offers an
authoritative analysis of recent developments on the Korean
peninsula and reveals how the Bush administration's mistakes
damaged the prospects of controlling nuclear proliferation.
Although multilateral negotiations continue, the author
proclaims the six-party talks a failure.'
ID number: 80022181
Year: 2007
Type: M

2006

623 /01032
Russian Nonproliferation Policy and the Korean Peninsula - Carlisle
Barracks, PA : US Army War College.
vii, 39 p.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 1584872691
Author(s):
  1. Ha, Yong-Chool
  2. Shin, Beom-Shik
Subject(s):
  1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
  2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Added entry(s):
  1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
Notes:
'One of the key challenges of our time is the threat posed to the
security of Northeast Asia by North Korea's nuclear
proliferation. Efforts to resolve this problem through the
medium of a six-party negotiation are proceeding with great
difficulty. As in any multilateral process, a major problem is
understanding the goals and perspectives of each of the
participants. One of those participants is Russia, and this
monograph focuses upon Moscow's perspectives with regard to
North Korea's nuclear program and Russia's own standing in Northeast Asia.'

ID number: 80021142
Year: 2006
Type: M

2005

623 /00995
v, 14 p.; 28 cm.
(Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy)
ISBN: 1584871946
Author(s):
1. Bishop, David J.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
2. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (NORTH)
3. KOREA (NORTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
Added entry(s):
1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
Notes:
'This paper examines the choices available to the United States for dismantling North Korea's nuclear weapons programs. The options range from doing nothing to executing policies of engagement, containment, or preemption. Each option has advantages and disadvantages, and there are numerous factors influencing the problem. The major factors include US national interests, the role of China, the Republic of Korea (ROK)--US alliance, the difficult nature of North Korea, and the US war on terror.'

ID number: 80020009
Year: 2005
Type: M

2004

623 /00970
120 p. : ill.; 30 cm.
ISBN: 1403933243
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
2. WMD--KOREA (NORTH)
Added entry(s):
1. International Institute for Strategic Studies (GB)
Notes:
'The current crisis over North Korea's nuclear programme poses the greatest immediate threat to East Asian security and one of the most serious long-term challenges to the viability of the international non-proliferation regime. A number of different policy options have been advanced to deal with this issue, including pre-emptive military attacks, diplomacy, containment, sanctions and regime change. In addition to chapters on North Korea's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programmes, and its ballistic missile programme, this IISS net assessment includes chapters on the history of efforts to negotiate limits on North Korea's military capabilities and on the conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula. Each chapter has been written and reviewed by recognised experts. Importantly, the IISS does not advocate any particular policy option in dealing with North Korea. The objective of this book has been to assess, as accurately and dispassionately as possible, North Korea's current military capabilities in order to foster a
well-informed public debate.'

2003

327 /01142
Wrong War, Wrong Place, Wrong Time: Why Military Action Should Not Be Used to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Crisis - Washington: Cato Institute.
14 p.; 30 cm.
(Cato Foreign Policy Briefing; 76)
Author(s):
1. Bandow, Doug
Subject(s):
1. KOREA (NORTH) --FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
2. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (NORTH)
3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Added entry(s):
1. cato
Notes:
'Ever since North Korea's dramatic revelation that it was producing materials that could be used to make nuclear weapons, the Bush administration has considered a range of policy options - including a military strike on North Korean nuclear facilities. But a military strike is the least desirable of a range of unpalatable policy choices. Rather than adopting the most dangerous course of action as a first resort, the United States should instead take the opportunity to reduce its threat profile in the region by focusing on multilateral diplomatic efforts that place primary responsibility for resolving the crisis on those regional actors most threatened by the North Korean nuclear program.'

623 /00945
7 p.; 30 cm.
(Cato Foreign Policy Briefing; 73)
Author(s):
1. Carpenter, Ted Galen
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
2. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (NORTH)
3. KOREA (NORTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
Added entry(s):
1. Cato Institute (US)
Notes:
'North Korea's recent actions in violation of the clear intent of the agreement it signed in 1994 to freeze its nuclear program have ignited a crisis in northeast Asia. Unfortunately, all of the frequently discussed options for dealing with the crisis have major drawbacks.'
The authors step back from overheated political rhetoric and ill-informed cable news commentary to offer a reasoned and illuminating debate on the nature of the North Korean regime and its threat to the rest of the world. The authors come to the issues from different perspectives - Kang believes the threat posed by Pyongyang has been inflated and endorses a more open approach, while Cha is more skeptical and advocates harsher measures. They challenge much of the faulty thinking that surrounds the discussion of North Korea, particularly the idea that North Korea is an irrational nation. The authors also examine the implications of a nuclear North Korea for East Asia and US homeland security, assess historical and current US policy toward both North and South Korea, and provide a framework for constructive policy if engagement fails to stop North Korean nuclear proliferation.

ID number: 80021377
Year: 2003
Type: M
2009

Dealing with North Korea: 'Diplomatic Warfare' Ahead.
Author(s):
1. Wit, Joel S.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- KOREA (NORTH)
2. USA -- FOREIGN RELATIONS -- KOREA (NORTH)
3. KOREA (NORTH) -- FOREIGN RELATIONS -- USA
ID Number: JA025571
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

2008

Standoff at the 38th Parallel.
(NATIONAL INTEREST, no. 98, November - December 2008, p. 25-35.)
Author(s):
1. Bolton, John
2. Kelly, James A.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- KOREA (NORTH)
2. USA -- FOREIGN RELATIONS -- KOREA (NORTH)
3. KOREA (NORTH) -- FOREIGN RELATIONS -- USA
Notes:
A nuclear North Korea is more than a foreign-policy irritant. Sharing radioactive knowledge with other malcontents would be a disaster. With current negotiations facing hard times, two former statesmen go head-to-head on how to handle the DPRK. The one of the authors argues it is time for a harsh crackdown on a misbehaving North, while the other thinks we need to give talks a chance.
ID Number: JA025292
Year: 2008
Language: English
Type: ART

North Korea Nuclear Stand-Off: (Still) Waiting for New Year's Eve.
(INTernational ISSUES & SLOvak FOREIGN POLICY AFFAIRS, vol. 17, no. 2, 2008, p. 16-26.)
Author(s):
1. Cossa, Ralph A.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
Almost six months late, North Korea has finally submitted to the Six-Party Talks participants a declaration of its nuclear activities. The absence of specific information on the contents of the declaration makes it difficult to determine if it is 'complete and correct' but has not prohibited US (and other) critics of any negotiations with North Korea from criticizing the presumed contents. The article reminds what has (and has not) actually been agreed upon by now, and what the going in

** This list contains material received as of April 14th, 2009 – Cette liste est arrêtée au 14 avril 2009.
position of the two main protagonists - Washington and
Pyongyang - is and has been.

North Korea : The Beginning of a China-U.S. Partnership ?.
(WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 31, no. 3, Summer 2008, p. 165-180.)
Author(s):
1. Glaser, Bonnie S.
2. Liang, Wang
Subject(s):
1. CHINA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
2. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--CHINA
3. CHINA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (NORTH)
4. KOREA (NORTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--CHINA
5. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
China's role in the six-party talks has evolved from passive
onlooker to reticent host and, finally, honest broker. The
process provides a test case of U.S.-Chinese cooperation on a
critical security issue and of Beijing's willingness to become
a 'responsible stakeholder'.

Living with Ambiguity : Nuclear Deals with Iran and North Kor ea.
(SURVIVAL, vol. 50, no. 1, February - March 2008, p. 91-118.)
Author(s):
1. Litwak, Robert S.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--IRAN
2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
3. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--IRAN
4. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (NORTH)
5. IRAN--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
6. KOREA (NORTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
Notes:
Between the poles of nuclear-weapons acquisition and transparent
disarmament lies a third option : cultivating ambiguity about
capabilities. The current crises with Iran and North Korea are
playing out against the backdrop of the contrasting
non-proliferation precedents set in 2003 - in Iraq, through a
change of regime, and, in Libya, through change or behaviour
change. Coercive diplomacy, combining credible inducements and
penalties to roll back their nuclear programmes, is not
possible when the goal is the maximalist one of regime change.
But even if the United States clarifies its objective,
negotiations with North Korea and Iran can realistically aim
only to narrow, but not to eliminate, the ambiguity. A strategy
of containment, whose key elements are deterrence and
reassurance, offers the best approach for narrowing and
hedging against these states' nuclear ambiguity.
North Korea Takes on the World.
(CURRENT HISTORY, vol. 107, no. 701, September 2007, p. 263-267.)
Author(s):
1. Armstrong, Charles K.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
2. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (NORTH)
3. KOREA (NORTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
Notes:
Diplomacy has replaced bluster in response to Pyongyang's ambitions. Is it too late to put the nuclear genie back in the bottle?
ID Number: JA023985
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

The Culture of Self-Destruction: Pyongyang's Struggle for Regime Survival.
(CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 28, no. 2, August 2007, p. 244-266.)
Author(s):
1. Bi, Jianxiang
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
2. KOREA (NORTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS
Notes:
North Korea is at the top of the agenda of Asia-Pacific security, but the agenda remains almost exclusively reactive, not proactive. Against this backdrop, the article argues that the key to dealing with North Korea is Pyongyang's culture of self-destruction, collectively held ideas of state-centred sacrifice designed to ensure regime survival. Fears of insecurity embedded in unequal relations with Asia-Pacific powers have lead this authoritarian state to construct and reconstruct a national identity narrative of life and death, fostering domestic solidarity against foreign powers. As an inseparable part of this ideational power, its nuclear weapons are primarily utilized to attract international attention, to maximize political and economic gains and, in the end, to guarantee regime survival. Given the dynamic of increasing accessibility to dual-use technology, ideology-based non-proliferation rules, and North Korean determination to weaponize its nuclear technology, it is time for the Asia-Pacific powers to acknowledge that North Korean nuclear proliferation is about knowledge of nuclear technology and weapons, and will continue to remain uncontrolled and directionless. Autonomy of knowledge suggests that the Non-Proliferation Treaty if unenforceable in North Korea and, by extension, in other parts of the world, a problem the international community must face and accept. North Korea's neighbours, not the distant powers, must take the lead in regional security, seeking solutions acceptable to all the parties for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
ID Number: JA024108
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART
Coree du Nord : l'extravagant accord.
(POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, no. 115, printemps 2007, p. 129-139.)
Author(s):
  1. Delpech, Therese
Subject(s):
  1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
The agreement reached on February 13, 2007 by the Six-Party Talks on North Korea was presented as a first step towards the resolution of the North Korean problem. In fact, there was no agreement, but only what jurists call a 'joint statement', which is purposely vague and incomplete. Clearly, this text is not meant to be applied, but rather to sustain a diplomatic process which provides a cover for Pyongyang's continued blackmail. In any case, this agreement showed three things: the weakness of the Bush administration, now on its last legs and ready to accept even a slapdash text to give the impression that it's accomplishing something; South Korea's tendency to 'appease' North Korea; and the isolation of Japan, whose only choice was to agree to an arrangement that it knew had no meaning. In the final analysis, this agreement confirms a new stage in North Korea's strategy, which continually notches up provocation to wrest more concessions.

ID Number: JA023709
Year: 2007
Language: French
Type: ART

Six-Party Negotiations on North Korea.
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (Minneapolis), vol. 53, no. 6, 2007, p. 35-42.)
Author(s):
  1. Denisov, Valery
Subject(s):
  1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
ID Number: JA024578
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

Dangerous Dealings : North Korea's Nuclear Capabilities and the Threat of Export to Iran.
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 37, no. 2, March 2007, p. 6-11.)
Author(s):
  1. Hecker, Siegfried S.
  2. Liou, William
Subject(s):
  1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
  2. ARMS TRANSFERS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
North Korea has a full range of nuclear technologies and skills that it can market to states and nonstate groups with nuclear-weapons aspirations. The highest priority goal of the six-party agreement must be to prevent such exports.

ID Number: JA023538
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART
Moving Towards Engagement: George W. Bush's New Flexibility in Dealing with North Korea.

(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 152, no. 3, June 2007, p. 36-41.)

Author(s):
1. Hiemann, Roland

Subject(s):
1. USA -- FOREIGN RELATIONS -- KOREA (NORTH)
2. KOREA (NORTH) -- FOREIGN RELATIONS -- USA
3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- KOREA (NORTH)

Notes:
This article seeks to explain the Bush Administration's newfound flexibility toward the DPRK. After providing a brief background to the 2007 agreement and past policy approaches, it reflects on recent changes in both the international strategic and the US domestic political environments that have likely driven the Administration to revoke its hard-line stance in favour of a more accommodating approach at the negotiating table.

ID Number: JA023861
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

The Long Road to Pyongyang.

(FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol. 86, no. 5, September - October 2007, p. 75-94.)

Author(s):
1. Mazarr, Michael J.

Subject(s):
1. USA -- FOREIGN RELATIONS -- KOREA (NORTH)
2. KOREA (NORTH) -- FOREIGN RELATIONS -- USA
3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- KOREA (NORTH)

Notes:
The outcome of the North Korean nuclear saga has been held up as an example of the Bush administration defying its bellicose reputation and using multilateralism and diplomacy to defuse a crisis. But in fact, the story is one of extremely poor policymaking and a persistent failure to devise a coherent strategy - with the result that North Korea has managed to dramatically expand its nuclear capability.

ID Number: JA023995
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

Steunpilaar van schurkenstaten? Russische hulp aan Iran en Noord-Korea.

(INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, jg. 61, nr. 4, april 2007, p. 198-201.)

Author(s):
1. Meer, Sico van der

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- IRAN
2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- KOREA (NORTH)
3. RUSSIA (FEDERATION) -- FOREIGN RELATIONS -- IRAN
4. IRAN -- FOREIGN RELATIONS -- RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
5. RUSSIA (FEDERATION) -- FOREIGN RELATIONS -- KOREA (NORTH)
6. KOREA (NORTH) -- FOREIGN RELATIONS -- RUSSIA (FEDERATION)

Notes:
The author deals with the Russian support for the 'rogue states' Iran and North Korea. Russia is not only assisting Iran with its nuclear programme, it is also supplying Teheran with conventional weapons and blocking sanctions against Iran by the United Nations. North Korea is also being supported diplomatically: within the UN and the 'six parties negotiations' Russia opposes any strong measure towards the regime of Kim Jong II. The author argues that Russia has both economic and geopolitical reasons for this support. Moscow is playing a dangerous game, however, because the Russians
themselves do not want Iran and North Korea to possess nuclear weapons. The Russian support is only short-term policy. In the long run Moscow will also try to prevent these states from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Golden Eggs.
(WORLD TODAY, vol. 63, no. 5, May 2007, p. 4-6.)
Author(s):
1. Oh, Kongdan
2. Hassig, Ralph C.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
Negotiations over North Korea present a busy public face. With six parties meeting separately in five working groups and together at six-party talks, the negotiation process somewhat resembles a five- or six-ring circus, with something going on all the time. Diplomats are busily earning their salaries, the news media have something to report and government leaders can assure citizens that the nuclear proliferation issue is being actively addressed. And yet, amidst this flurry of activity, even most supporters of the talks doubt that North Korea will abandon its nuclear weapons programme completely. That will have to wait.

Hope Over Experience.
(NATIONAL INTEREST, no. 89, May - June 2007, p. 20-25.)
Author(s):
1. Reiss, Mitchell B.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
A cautious assessment as to whether the fruits of the six-party talks have the potential to bolster American and northeast Asian security rather than reward Pyongyang's bad behavior.

Responses to North Korea's Nuclear Test: Capitulation or Collective Action?.
(WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 30, no. 4, Autumn 2007, p. 33-43.)
Author(s):
1. Snyder, Scott
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--TESTING
Notes:
North Korea's nuclear test may have unexpectedly catalyzed a paradigm shift, enhancing the potential effectiveness of the six-party process. The question now is whether such cohesion can continue as the impact of the nuclear test fades.
Enhancing U.S. Engagement with North Korea.
(WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 30, no. 2, Spring 2007, p. 53-69.)
Author(s):
1. Wit, Joel S.
Subject(s):
1. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (NORTH)
2. KOREA (NORTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
Although the domestic politics of engaging Pyongyang will be
complicated, a possibility exists for securing bipartisan
support that has never been present before. A policy of
enhanced engagement, based on these six elements, holds the
best chance for resolving the crisis and securing U.S.
interests.
ID Number: JA023581
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

La crise nord-coreenne et l'alliance nippo-americaine.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE ET SECURITE COLLECTIVE, 62e annee, no. 12, decembre
2006, p. 129-138.)
Author(s):
1. Couraye, Herve
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--TESTING
ID Number: JA023170
Year: 2006
Language: French
Type: ART

Proliferation nucleaire : le passage en force de la Coree du Nord.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE ET SECURITE COLLECTIVE, 62e annee, no. 12, decembre
2006, p. 121-128.)
Author(s):
1. Drouhaud, Pascal
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
Malgre le vote de la resolution 1718 par le Conseil de securite de
l'ONU, prevoyant un embargo sur les materiels sensibles moins
d'une semaine apres son premier essai nucleaire, la Coree du
Nord est apparue determinee a poursuivre le passage en force de
sa politique nucleaire. Elle fait le pari que la situation
internationale s'y prete et lui offre les opportunites
politiques en faveur d'une nuclearisation de son territoire
national. Celle-ci signifierait une 'sanctuarisation' du regime
de Kim Jong II, mais transformerait l'equilibre strategique
d'une region qui serait désormais, placee sous la menace et le
chantage de la Coree du Nord.
ID Number: JA023171
Year: 2006
Language: French
Type: ART
Iran and North Korea: The Proliferation Nexus.
(SURVIVAL, vol. 48, no. 1, Spring 2006, p. 61-80.)
Author(s):
1. Fitzpatrick, Mark
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--IRAN
2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
As international pressure mounts against the nuclear and missile proliferation threats posed by North Korea and Iran, the two nations are increasingly likely to turn to one another. While nuclear cooperation is a matter of unconfirmed speculation, North Korea-Iran missile cooperation is well documented. To what extent the two pariahs coordinate strategy is unclear; certainly they keep an attentive eye toward each other. The United States, meanwhile, appears not to coordinate its own policies toward the two states. Washington engages with Pyongyang and has offered it security assurances, policies that remain off limits for Tehran.
ID Number: JA022279
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

Nuclear Shockwaves: Making the Best of Bad Options.
(ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 36, no. 9, November 2006, p. 9-13.)
Author(s):
1. Green, Michael J.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--TESTING
Notes:
North Korea's October 9 nuclear test has been called a failure of US, South Korean, and Chinese policy, and those criticisms are undoubtedly accurate to some degree. Lost in the finger pointing, however, is the strong evidence that Kim Jong II intended all along to demonstrate North Korea's unambiguous status as a nuclear-weapon state regardless of what steps the other parties took.
ID Number: JA023256
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

The Twin Peaks of Pyongyang.
(ORBIS, vol. 50, no. 1, Winter 2006, p. 5-21.)
Author(s):
1. Hassig, Ralph C.
2. Oh, Kongdan
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
2. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (NORTH)
3. KOREA (NORTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
Notes:
The United States has been negotiating with North Korea in an effort to have it renounce its nuclear program for over a decade, since Washington negotiated an Agreed Framework in 1994. In this time, North Korea has only amassed more plutonium. The negotiations are hindered by mutual distrust and hostility, but it is doubtful whether any change in Washington's attitude toward the DPKK would help solve the nuclear issue. It is the Kim regime that is the core problem. Until the regime is removed, there can be no durable peace in the region. This article suggests that with the prospect for a negotiated resolution of the nuclear issue remote, and since
any attempt to remove the Kim regime militarily would entail huge costs, Washington might consider a third option: directly engaging the North Korean people.
North Korean Test Provokes Widespread Condemnation.
(Arms Control Today, vol. 36, no. 9, November 2006, p. 23-31.)
Author(s):
  1. Kerr, Paul
Subject(s):
  1. Nuclear Weapons--Korea (North)
  2. Nuclear Weapons--Testing
ID Number: JA023253
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

China Card Fails.
(WORLD TODAY, vol. 62, no. 11, November 2006, p. 4-6.)
Author(s):
  1. Khoo, Nicholas
Subject(s):
  1. Nuclear Weapons--Korea (North)
  2. China--Foreign Relations--Korea (North)
  3. Korea (North)--Foreign Relations--China
Notes:
  Faced with the possibility of a North Korean nuclear test, Washington reached for the China card to stop such a disastrous development. The fact that the test went ahead demonstrates that the White House overestimated Beijing's foreign policy prowess.
ID Number: JA023006
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

A Nuclear-Armed North Korea: Accepting the 'Unacceptable' ?.
Author(s):
  1. Reiss, Mitchell B.
Subject(s):
  1. Nuclear Weapons--Korea (North)
  2. USA--Foreign Relations--Korea (North)
  3. Korea (North)--Foreign Relations--USA
Notes:
  Perhaps the least noted and most astonishing aspect of the entire diplomatic process involving North Korea during the past few years has been the almost complete inability of four of the world's strongest military and economic powers - the United States, China, Russia and Japan, which include three nuclear weapons states and three members of the UN Security Council - to shape the strategic environment in Northeast Asia. They have proven thoroughly incapable of preventing an impoverished, dysfunctional country from consistently endangering the peace and stability of the world's most economically dynamic region. This has been nothing less than a collective failure. Only when the other parties to the Six-Party Talks undertake a fundamental reassessment of the costs and benefits of their current policies will there be a chance to rein in, never mind reverse, Pyongyang's nuclear-weapons programme.
ID Number: JA023087
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART
The Lessons of North Korea's Test.

Author(s):
1. Sigal, Leon V.

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--TESTING
2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
3. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (NORTH)
4. KOREA (NORTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA

Notes:
The lesson of North Korea's nuclear test is that countries that seek nuclear weapons are insecure. Trying to isolate or coerce them can easily backfire. They crave reassurance to ease their insecurity and often respond better to inducements than to threats.

ID Number: JA023039
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

North Korea: The Case for Strategic Entanglement.
(ORBIS, vol. 50, no. 2, Spring 2006, p. 343-353.)

Author(s):
1. Smith, Chadwick I.

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
2. KOREA (NORTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS

Notes:
North Korea is a state shrouded in secrecy, yet it receives an enormous amount of media attention. Its reclusive nature makes analysis difficult and speculative. What is certain is that a dangerous stalemate regarding nuclear weapons has persisted for far too long and is an obstacle to any real change in the political system. History, culture, and ideology all rule the state's actions; it is therefore a mistake to assume North Korean negotiators can act with autonomy. A new and dynamic means to deal with this dilemma should be developed, for the past has demonstrated that threats and demands will not coerce Pyongyang into submitting, in fact, that approach will only exacerbate the problem. An effective means to move beyond the stalemate is needed.

ID Number: JA022266
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

2005

North Korea's New Cash Crop.
(WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 28, no. 3, Summer 2005, p. 73-84.)

Author(s):
1. Coe, Andrew J.

Subject(s):
1. ARMS TRANSFERS--KOREA (NORTH)
2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)

Notes:
If Pyongyang can no longer use its nuclear program to extort aid from the international community, rising economic pressures on the Kim Jong-il regime may force it to sell its nuclear resources to one or more of a number of dangerous customers.

ID Number: JA021667
Year: 2005
Language: English
Type: ART
As a US-led coalition operation designed to obstruct weapons proliferation, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is especially applicable to North Korea. Though practical measures have been developed to implement the interdiction of seaborne weapons shipments in particular, the PSI has yet to be rendered consistent with the international legal regime supporting free navigation of the high seas. Nor has it attracted specific United Nations support. A review of the 1962 'quarantine' of Cuba demonstrates that in the absence of a more restrictive approach towards Pyongyang and conclusive evidence that North Korean weapons capability poses a current threat to the United States, the appellation 'Cuba Lite' is not inappropriate. Furthermore, in the context of multilateral diplomacy intended to persuade North Korea to relinquish its nuclear weapons programs in exchange for security guarantees, the PSI may be interpreted as pressuring Pyongyang and thus may not be perceived - even by PSI coalition partners - as consistent with that diplomacy.

La strategie du flou de Pyongyang.

Le 19 septembre 2005, un accord qualifie d'historique etait signe entre les Etats-Unis et la Coree du Nord, concernant l'abandon du programme nucleaire de Pyongyang, en echange d'une aide energetique et humanitaire, et de garanties securitaires de la part de Washington. Pourtant, il y a lieu de s'interroger sur la durabilite de cet accord, qui ressemble a s'y meprendre a la Kedo, signee en 1994, et qui fut denoncee huit ans plus tard par le regime de Kim Jong-il. La Coree du Nord, en entretenant le flou sur l'état de son arsenal, et maniant l'art de la menace vis-a-vis de la premiere puissance mondiale, parvient a assurer sa survie. Cette strategie payante pourrait se repeter a l'envie, provoquant un statu quo perpetuel qui, s'il semble profitable a tous, permet surtout au regime de Pyongyang de continuer a exister.
Insecurity Triumphs.
(WORLD TODAY, vol. 61, no. 4, April 2005, p. 15-17.)
Author(s):
  1. Cox, Michael
Subject(s):
  1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
  2. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (NORTH)
  3. KOREA (NORTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
Notes:
Where does responsibility lie for the deteriorating situation on the Korean Peninsula? Is the answer to be found in secretive Stalinist North Korea or in Washington? Which state was responding rationally to events with a likely chance of its policy succeeding?
ID Number: JA021399
Year: 2005
Language: English
Type: ART

North Korea's Weapons Quest.
(NATIONAL INTEREST, no. 80, Summer 2005, p. 49-52.)
Author(s):
  1. Eberstadt, Nicholas
Subject(s):
  1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
With nuclear weapons, North Korea aims to finish what it started: the Korean War.
ID Number: JA021768
Year: 2005
Language: English
Type: ART

Did North Korea Cheat ?.
(FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol. 84, no. 1, January - February 2005, p. 99-110.)
Author(s):
  1. Harrison, Selig S.
Subject(s):
  1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
Two years ago, Washington accused Pyongyang of running a secret nuclear weapons program. But how much evidence was there to back up the charge? A review of the facts shows that the Bush administration misrepresented and distorted the data - while ignoring the one real threat North Korea actually poses.
ID Number: JA021175
Year: 2005
Language: English
Type: ART

Author(s):
  1. O'Neil, Andrew
Subject(s):
  1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
This article challenges the popular assumption that North Korea's nuclear weapons capability poses a dire threat to international security. It argues that the adverse impact of North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons has been exaggerated and that pessimistic accounts of the strategic implications of this
capability have overlooked the strong status quo bias inherent in North Korea's worldview. These accounts have also glossed over the primarily defensive motives underpinning Pyongyang's quest for nuclear weapons. There are dangers attached to North Korea's nuclear capability, especially the possible transfer of fissile material to terrorist groups or rogue states, and the effect it may have in spurring regional neighbours to reassess their non-nuclear status. Contrary to common assumptions, however, the idea that a nuclear-armed North Korea is determined to foment regional instability and challenge the strategic status quo in East Asia is not supported by a close reading of Pyongyang's motives and worldview. The behaviour and statements of the regime suggest that the DPRK is predisposed to accept the logic of deterrence in its relationship with the US. As long as Washington maintains an active and robust posture of extended strategic deterrence on the Korean peninsula, the regime in Pyongyang will continue to be dissuaded from initiating the use of nuclear weapons against other regional states.

ID Number: JA021861
Year: 2005
Language: English
Type: ART

Inside Multilateralism: The Six-Party Talks.
(WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 28, no. 4, Autumn 2005, p. 75-91.)
Author(s):
1. Park, John S.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
Despite extensive diplomatic efforts to facilitate the six-party talks, domestic policy constraints, differing priorities, and conflicting historical analogies among each of the countries have brought vastly differing perspectives to the multilateral negotiating table.

ID Number: JA021876
Year: 2005
Language: English
Type: ART

The Fallout of a Nuclear North Korea.
Author(s):
1. Scobell, Andrew
2. Chambers, Michael R.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
Assuming that talks fail to separate North Korea from its nuclear weapons, the question then is: what will the neighbors think - and do?

ID Number: JA021854
Year: 2005
Language: English
Type: ART
South Korea's Squeeze Play.
(WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 28, no. 4, Autumn 2005, p. 93-106.)
Author(s):
  1. Snyder, Scott
Subject(s):
  1. KOREA (SOUTH) --FOREIGN RELATIONS --KOREA (NORTH)
  2. KOREA (NORTH) --FOREIGN RELATIONS --KOREA (SOUTH)
  3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
  Seoul's independent options are almost nonexistent as it has been and remains trapped between obligations to its US alliance and its efforts to improve relations with North Korea. Nevertheless, South Korea may choose to play a politically risky role as an honest broker.
ID Number: JA021877
Year: 2005
Language: English
Type: ART

Bluffing with Nukes.
(WORLD TODAY, vol. 61, no. 4, April 2005, p. 17-18.)
Author(s):
  1. Wall, David
Subject(s):
  1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
  North Korea has admitted it has nuclear weapons, so now the world knows what it is facing - or does it? Not even Washington agrees on the facts, so is Pyongyang playing a weak hand rather well?
ID Number: JA021400
Year: 2005
Language: English
Type: ART

What China Whispers to North Korea.
(WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 28, no. 2, Spring 2005, p. 35-48.)
Author(s):
  1. Wu, Anne
Subject(s):
  1. CHINA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (NORTH)
  2. KOREA (NORTH) --FOREIGN RELATIONS--CHINA
  3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
  Before asking what leverage Beijing holds over Pyongyang, a more fundamental question remains: what exactly are the messages that China is sending to North Korea? A former Chinese foreign ministry official conveys five in this article and predicts whether they will work.
ID Number: JA021434
Year: 2005
Language: English
Type: ART
A View from Asia: Vladimir Putin's Korean Opportunity: Russian Interests in the North Korean Nuclear Crises.
(COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 24, no. 2, April - June 2005, p. 185-201.)
Author(s):
1. Yoon, Esook
2. Lee, Dong Hyung
Subject(s):
1. RUSSIA (FEDERATION)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (NORTH)
2. KOREA (NORTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
This paper examines Russia's strategic interests related to the regional security dilemma surrounding North Korean nuclear weapons programs. Based on two basic principles - a nuclear-free Korean peninsula and political resolution of the crisis - the Putin administration has attempted to represent itself as an even-handed broker striving to normalize the situation. Peaceful resolution of the crisis would benefit not only Russia but the entire region; however, Putin's efforts have not been instrumental toward these ends, notwithstanding his close contact with the North Korean leader. Russia has produced no policy suggestions capable of accommodating the conflicting interests of the United States and North Korea. Despite a lack of progress, Russia continues to desire multilateral talks since the meetings forestall unilateral actions by the two countries that would be detrimental to Russian interests.
ID Number: JA021663
Year: 2005
Language: English
Type: ART

2004

Attacking North Korea: Why War Might Be Preferred.
(COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 23, no. 3, July - September 2004, p. 263-279.)
Author(s):
1. Ayson, Robert
2. Taylor, Brendan
Subject(s):
1. KOREA (NORTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
2. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (NORTH)
3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
An air of complacency surrounds the continuing nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Many analysts assert that the chances of a second Korean War erupting are small, barring a serious act of miscalculation or misadventure on the part of Pyongyang. This paper confirms that there is indeed a range of important reasons why the United States would not wish to initiate hostilities on the peninsula in the short to medium term. However, it also finds that the case that US policymakers could, over time, build for a deliberate and very major attack on North Korea is actually more comprehensive and its logic more robust than is commonly acknowledged. While it is easy for analysts to continue to regard the attack option as both unlikely and irrational, therefore, this paper concludes that the prospect of a US-led war against North Korea is one that still ought to be taken seriously.
ID Number: JA020828
Year: 2004
Language: English
Type: ART
Can North Korea be Engaged?.
(SURVIVAL, vol. 46, no. 2, Summer 2004, p. 89-108.)
Author(s):
1. Cha, Victor D.
2. Kang, David C.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- KOREA (NORTH)
2. KOREA (NORTH) -- ECONOMIC POLICY
3. USA -- FOREIGN RELATIONS -- KOREA (NORTH)
4. KOREA (NORTH) -- FOREIGN RELATIONS -- USA
Notes:
Discussion of North Korea's nuclear programme and what to do about it has become ideological and emotionally charged. Convinced that good policy serving American and allied interests is unlikely to emerge from such a debate, Korea experts Victor Cha and David Kang decided to step back from the histrionics and engage in a reasoned, rational and logical exchange on the nature of the North Korean regime and the policy that should be followed by the United States, Japan and South Korea.

Pyongyang-Pekin : les maîtres de l'ambiguïté.
(POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, no. 105, automne 2004, p. 341-352.)
Author(s):
1. Delpech, Therese
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- KOREA (NORTH)
2. KOREA (NORTH) -- FOREIGN RELATIONS -- CHINA
3. CHINA -- FOREIGN RELATIONS -- KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
For the past ten years North Korea has been blackmailing the rest of the world by patiently and discreetly pursuing its nuclear weapons program. Despite the increasingly well-defined nature of this dangerous program, the UN Security Council has consistently faced difficulties in bringing the issue before it for consideration. This is quite simply because one of the permanent members, China, considers Pyongyang as a key piece in its maneuvering with Washington over Taiwan. North Korea allows China to brandish a credible threat of retaliation in front of the United States in the event that the Americans react a bit too vociferously towards China's attempts to 'recover' Taiwan. Beijing has offered its services to help set up international negotiations, while at the same time supporting North Korea's arguments. In reality, although the two countries do not agree on every issue, they share numerous strategic interests. This is a fundamental reality that the next US administration will have to take into account.

Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula.
(international affairs (minneapolis), vol. 50, no. 6, 2004, p. 40-51.)
Author(s):
1. Denisov, Valery
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- KOREA (NORTH)
ID Number: JA021541
Year: 2004
Language: English
Type: ART
Who's Behind That Curtain? Unveiling Potential Leverage over Pyongyang.
Author(s):
1. Horowitz, Michael
Subject(s):
1. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (NORTH)
2. KOREA (NORTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
To influence Pyongyang's strategic choices, US options may be much broader than military threats or appeals to China. Here are the cultural-political, military, and five key economic sources of potential leverage over Pyongyang today and the states that wield them.
ID Number: JA021348
Year: 2004
Language: English
Type: ART

China and North Korea: Risky Neighbourhood.
(WORLD TODAY, vol. 60, no. 10, October 2004, p. 12-14.)
Author(s):
1. Kahrs, Tuva
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
2. CHINA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (NORTH)
3. KOREA (NORTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--CHINA
Notes:
North Korea's nuclear ambitions present China with one of its greatest diplomatic challenges since it began to forge links beyond the communist world three decades ago. Beijing faces a testing dilemma. It wants to stop its neighbour developing a nuclear arsenal, but holds back from exercising its influence fully and is wary of becoming trapped in a conflict that could convulse the whole region. After months of effort, the Six Party Talks Beijing convened to defuse the crisis have achieved little. China finds itself between the intransigence of North Korea and the United States. In this finely balanced situation, the unexpected revelation that the South has been experimenting with uranium enrichment has refocused international attention on east Asia's most incendiary problem.
ID Number: JA020908
Year: 2004
Language: English
Type: ART

North Korea's Nuclear Politics.
(CURRENT HISTORY, vol. 103, no. 674, September 2004, p. 273-279.)
Author(s):
1. Oh, Kongdan
2. Hassig, Ralph C.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
Blessed with enormous military and economic power, Americans expect to find quick and effective solutions to whatever crises they encounter. For North Korea's Kim Jong-il, however, generating one crisis after another may be the best way to stay in power.
ID Number: JA020838
Year: 2004
Language: English
Type: ART
In June the Bush administration made its first serious proposal to end a nearly two-year-old standoff over North Korea's nuclear program. The administration is to be commended for abandoning its 'take it or leave it' position after a year of intense diplomacy and three formal rounds of negotiations. Nevertheless, Pyongyang has treated the proposal as little more than 'old wine in a new bottle'.

The North Korean Nuclear State.

Libya's surprising decision to stop trying to acquire nuclear weapons - and its accompanying revelations about a clandestine Pakistan-centered network of suppliers of nuclear equipment and know-how - has not changed the situation in North Korea. Pyongyang is still playing a game of nuclear blackmail. The risks are so high, however, that the US cannot choose a military strike against North Korean military facilities. Its only option is negotiations.

Confrontational United States policies toward North Korea, adopted unilaterally, would not only exacerbate the nuclear crisis but also undermine United States relations with Northeast Asia as a whole. The United States would end up with the worst of both worlds: a nuclear-capable North Korea and severely strained relations with key powers important to United States interests globally as well as regionally. Conversely, by pursuing constructive engagement in concert with its friends and allies in the region, the United States would maximize the pressure on North Korea for an acceptable nuclear settlement and promote the long-term United States objective of liberalizing the North Korean system.
(EUROPAISCHE SICHERHEIT, 52. Jg., Nr. 3, Marz 2003, S. 44-48.)
Author(s):
1. Blanke, Stefan
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
2. KOREA (NORTH)--DEFENSES
3. KOREA (NORTH)--MILITARY POLICY
ID Number: JA018893
Year: 2003
Language: German
Type: ART

A Rogue is a Rogue is a Rogue : US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis.
(International Affairs, vol. 79, no. 4, July 2003, p. 719-737.)
Author(s):
1. Bleiker, Roland
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
2. KOREA (NORTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
3. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
Two nuclear crises recently haunted the Korean peninsula, one in 1993/4, the other in 2002/3. In each case the events were strikingly similar: North Korea made public its ambition to acquire nuclear weapons and withdrew from the Nonproliferation Treaty. Then the situation rapidly deteriorated until the peninsula was literally on the verge of war. The dangers of North Korea's actions, often interpreted as nuclear brinkmanship, are evident and much discussed, but not so the underlying patterns that have shaped the conflict in the first place. This article sheds light on some of them. It examines the role of the United States in the crisis, arguing that Washington's inability to see North Korea as anything but a threatening 'rogue state' seriously hinders both an adequate understanding and possible resolution of the conflict. Particularly significant is the current policy of pre-emptive strikes against rogue states, for it reinforces half a century of American nuclear threats towards North Korea. The problematic role of these threats has been largely obscured, not least because the highly technical discourse of security analysis has managed to present the strategic situation on the peninsula in a manner that attributes responsibility for the crisis solely to North Korea's actions, even if the situation is in reality far more complex and interactive.

ID Number: JA019446
Year: 2003
Language: English
Type: ART
The Art of the Bluff.
(NATIONAL INTEREST, no. 73, Fall 2003, p. 33-36.)
Author(s):
1. Bremmer, Ian
Subject(s):
1. KOREA (NORTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
2. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (NORTH)
3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
With major combat operations in Iraq consigned to the history books, the United States can now give greater focus to North Korea's rogue regime. Kim Jong-il has captured public attention as a dangerous lunatic in the Saddam Hussein mold, and therein lies an error. Kim is not the next Saddam. This has serious policy implications, for the US strategy that removed Saddam is not the most advantageous way to deal with Kim.
ID Number: JA019770
Year: 2003
Language: English
Type: ART

Living with the Unthinkable.
(NATIONAL INTEREST, no. 74, Winter 2003 - 2004, p. 92-98.)
Author(s):
1. Carpenter, Ted Galen
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
2. KOREA (NORTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
3. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
There is a pervasive desire in the United States and throughout East Asia to prevent North Korea from becoming a nuclear-armed power, for the prospect of Kim Jong-il's bizarre and unpredictable regime having such a capability is profoundly disturbing. Two factions have emerged in the United States about how to deal with the crisis, and they embrace sharply different strategies. Yet they share an important underlying assumption: that North Korea is using its nuclear program merely as a negotiating ploy, and that Pyongyang can eventually be induced to give up that program.
ID Number: JA020121
Year: 2003
Language: English
Type: ART

North Korea: The Sequel.
(CURRENT HISTORY, vol. 102, no. 663, April 2003, p. 147-151.)
Author(s):
1. Cumings, Bruce
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
2. KOREA (NORTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
3. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
The current crisis with North Korea has the same solution as the original in 1994: get North Korea's nuclear program mothballed and its medium- and long-range missiles decommissioned by buying them out at a set price. That price is American recognition of North Korea, written promises not to target the North with nuclear weapons, and indirect compensation in the form of aid and investment.
ID Number: JA019061
Year: 2003
Language: English
Type: ART
A Test for Beijing: China and the North Korean Nuclear Quandary.
(Arms Control Today, vol. 33, no. 4, May 2003, p. 12-14.)
Author(s):
   1. Gill, Bates
   2. Thompson, Andrew
Subject(s):
   1. Korea (North) -- Foreign Relations -- China
   2. China -- Foreign Relations -- Korea (North)
   3. Nuclear Weapons -- Korea (North)
Notes:
   Beijing's priorities with regard to North Korea derive from a complex and often contradictory mix of long-term geostrategic interests and near-term concerns over stability and proliferation.
ID Number: JA019227
Year: 2003
Language: English
Type: ART

Nordkoreas nukleare Waffenprogramme: Entstehung, Fahigkeiten und die internationalen Bemuhungen um ihre Eindammung.
(Osterreichische Militarische Zeitschrift, 41. Jg., Heft 2, Marz - April 2003, S. 149-162.)
Author(s):
   1. Harnish, Sebastian
Subject(s):
   1. Nuclear Weapons -- Korea (North)
ID Number: JA019012
Year: 2003
Language: German
Type: ART

Bush's Bipolar Disorder and the Looming Failure of Multilateral Talks with North Korea.
(Arms Control Today, vol. 33, no. 8, October 2003, p. 3-6.)
Author(s):
   1. Hayes, Peter
Subject(s):
   1. Nuclear Weapons -- Korea (North)
   2. Korea (North) -- Foreign Relations -- USA
   3. USA -- Foreign Relations -- Korea (North)
Notes:
   Contrary to the blithe talk of hardliners, the lack of progress to date and the poor prospects for future talks reveal the limits of political and military coercion to achieve nonproliferation goals in Korea.
ID Number: JA019795
Year: 2003
Language: English
Type: ART
A Disillusioned Japan Confronts North Korea.

(Arms Control Today, vol. 33, no. 4, May 2003, p. 19-22.)

Author(s):
1. Kamiya, Matake

Subject(s):
1. Japan--Foreign Relations--Korea (North)
2. Korea (North)--Foreign Relations--Japan
3. Nuclear Weapons--Korea (North)

Notes:
The resurgence of North Korea's nuclear weapons program took place when the reputation and credibility of North Korea among the Japanese public had hit rock bottom.

ID Number: JA019229
Year: 2003
Language: English
Type: ART

The Avoidable Crisis in North Korea.

(Orbis, vol. 47, no. 3, Summer 2003, p. 495-510.)

Author(s):
1. Kang, David C.

Subject(s):
1. Nuclear Weapons--Korea (North)
2. Korea (North)--Foreign Relations--USA
3. USA--Foreign Relations--Korea (North)

Notes:
Northeast Asia poses the threat of nuclear confrontation. This year, which marks the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Korean War, finds North Korea high on, if not leading, most analysts' shortlists of security threats to be dealt with in the aftermath of Iraq. Once again, America the hyperpower poses obstacles by its very presence. America also holds the keys to a settlement of this vital regional issue. Moreover, the author explains why North Korea does not pose quite the threat to the United States as is generally believed.

ID Number: JA019356
Year: 2003
Language: English
Type: ART

Nuclear Diplomacy in the Axis of Evil: The Challenge of North Korea.

(Rusi Journal, vol. 148, no. 3, June 2003, p. 66-70.)

Author(s):
1. Kennedy, Andrew

Subject(s):
1. Nuclear Weapons--Korea (North)
2. Korea (North)--Foreign Relations--USA
3. USA--Foreign Relations--Korea (North)

ID Number: JA019322
Year: 2003
Language: English
Type: ART

Time for Action.


Author(s):
1. Khoo, Nicholas

Subject(s):
1. Korea (North)--Foreign Relations--China
2. China--Foreign Relations--Korea (North)
3. Nuclear Weapons--Korea (North)

Notes:
North Korea's declaration on June 9 that it may have no option but to develop a nuclear deterrent is as much a challenge to
Beijing as to Washington. Pyongyang's actions in the escalating crisis are disrupting the regional stability that China's security policy aims for, and its economic development requires. From the Chinese perspective, the latest episode is the continuation of a trend rather than an aberration. China's prestige is at stake, its foreign policy unnecessarily paralysed.

How to Deal with North Korea.
(FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol. 82, no. 2, March - April 2003, p. 16-30.)

Author(s):
1. Laney, James T.
2. Shaplen, Jason T.

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
2. KOREA (NORTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
3. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (NORTH)
4. KOREA (NORTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS

Notes:
Pyongyang's belligerent behavior should not obscure other dramatic, conciliatory steps North Korea has taken in recent years - steps suggesting that, even now, a solution lies within reach. The trick is to craft a plan that does not reward the North for its misdeeds. In such a plan, all major outside powers should guarantee the security of the entire Korean Peninsula first. This will remove Pyongyang's excuse for nuclear proliferation - and break the deadlock on the world's last Cold War frontier.

The North Korean Nuclear Crisis Revisited: The Case for a Negotiated Settlement.
(SECURITY DIALOGUE, vol. 34, no. 2, June 2003, p. 135-151.)

Author(s):
1. Lee, Jung-Hoon
2. Moon, Chung-In

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)

Notes:
Despite the Kim Dae-jung government's active pursuit of its 'sunshine policy' the Korean peninsula is once again caught up in a major nuclear crisis. The current crisis emerged when Pyongyang revealed that it was conducting a uranium-enriched nuclear weapons program in violation of the Geneva Agreed Framework of 1994. The new development suggests the Pyongyang regime's continuing reliance on a pattern of raising stakes for political and economic 'rewards'. For Kim Jong II, there would appear to be no reason to act otherwise in the light of the previous successes of his brinkmanship. Since the regime believes that there is a positive causal relationship between the nuclear weapons program and its own survival, it may be difficult to engage Pyongyang in a genuine dialogue, let alone persuade it to dismantle its WMD programs. If a peaceful resolution is to have a chance, a consensus must emerge between the governments of the USA, South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia, signaling to Pyongyang that the only way to ensure its survival is not to threaten for rewards, but in fact to earn them. Meanwhile, every effort must be made to achieve a
negotiated settlement. This article chronicles the trends of crisis on the Korean peninsula and offers a negotiated-settlement option as the most viable policy option for dealing with the North Korean nuclear challenge, especially in the apparent absence of the traditional US-South Korea alliance cohesion.

Author(s):
1. Litwak, Robert S.
Subject(s):
1. WMD NONPROLIFERATION--USA
2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--IRAN
4. IRAQ WAR, 2003-
Notes:
The Iraq war was unprecedented in at least one respect: it was the first case in which forcible regime change was the means employed to achieve non-proliferation ends. In addressing the current proliferation crises with North Korea and Iran, however, the Bush administration confronts major constraints on both the use of force and the US ability to bring about regime change. This has prompted a shift in strategy to the alternative combination of deterrence and reassurance. Implementing a strategy of deterrence and reassurance requires effective policy coordination to ensure that the two components are in sync. Military moves for purposes of deterrence should not undercut the message of political reassurance and thereby provide further incentive for either country to cross the nuclear threshold.

Averting the Unthinkable. (NATIONAL INTEREST, no. 74, Winter 2003 - 2004, p. 99-107.)
Author(s):
1. Morris, Stephen J.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
2. KOREA (NORTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
3. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
The imminent prospect of North Korea becoming a nuclear power is the most severe threat to the security of the United States and the rest of the Western world today. The anxiety that this prospect brings with it is compounded by the fact that there are no realistic prospects of solution to this threat being offered.
Toward a Great Bargain with North Korea.
(WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 26, no. 4, Autumn 2003, p. 7-18.)
Author(s):
1. O'Hanlon, Michael
2. Mochizuki, Mike
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
The most promising route to resolve the worsening nuclear crisis in Northeast Asia is for Washington, Tokyo, Seoul, and Beijing to pursue a grand bargain with Pyongyang. These governments need to recognize that North Korean economic atrophy, caused largely by North Korea's excessive conventional military force as well as its failed command-economy system, is at the core of the nuclear crisis and that curing the latter can only be done by recognizing the underlying disease. This grand bargain should be big and bold in scope, addressing the underlying problem while providing bigger and better carrots with the actual potential to entice, together with tough demands on North-Korea that go well beyond the nuclear issue. In this comprehensive way, policymakers would provide a road map for the vital and ultimate goal of denuclearizing North Korea. Through the stages of implementation, each side would retain leverage over the other as aid would be provided gradually to the Democratic People's Republic Korea (DPRK) while the DPRK would cut or eliminate its weapons and reform its economy over time, thus reassuring each side that it was not being hoodwinked.
ID Number: JA019622
Year: 2003
Language: English
Type: ART

Steering Between Red Lines : A South Korean View.
(ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 33, no. 4, May 2003, p. 15-18.)
Author(s):
1. Paik, Haksoon
Subject(s):
1. KOREA (NORTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (SOUTH)
2. KOREA (SOUTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (NORTH)
3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
For President Roh avoiding a conflict has become almost an obsession; he has refused to contemplate or even give lip service to the possibility of war on the Korean Peninsula.
ID Number: JA019228
Year: 2003
Language: English
Type: ART

The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework.
(NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, vol. 56, no. 3, Summer 2003, p. 11-49.)
Author(s):
1. Pollack, Jonathan D.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
2. KOREA (NORTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
3. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
The abrupt collapse of the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework has triggered mounting international concern over the longer-term consequences for the global nonproliferation regime. It has also exacerbated the most serious tensions in the fifty-year history of the U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance, quite possibly laying the groundwork for a major regional crisis unparalleled
since the Korean War. How and why did this major policy breakdown occur?

ID Number: JA019579
Year: 2003
Language: English
Type: ART

Coree du Nord : la prochaine cible ?.
(POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, no. 99, printemps 2003, p. 201-216.)

Author(s):
1. Rigoulot, Pierre

Subject(s):
1. KOREA (NORTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
2. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (NORTH)
3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)

Notes:
Do the U.S.'s conflicts with Iraq and North Korea really amount to the same thing? In his famous 'axis of evil' speech, George W. Bush put the two countries in the same bag, and it's true that these rogue states have many points in common. And yet one major difference is that the US cannot go to war with North Korea, as it has done with Iraq. Pyongyang's ballistic weapons, which may include nuclear warheads, mean that military intervention is not an option, North Korea even scored a few diplomatic points last fall by justifying its decision to develop nuclear weapons as a reaction to a supposed American threat. But in the long term, the world's last Stalinist regime knows that it will have to either disarm or disappear. Washington is determined to end nuclear proliferation, and to this end has received support - to varying degrees - from all the regional powers: Japan, Russia, South Korea and even China. Once Iraq has been dealt with, the U.S. will probably next turn to Kim Jong-II's regime.

ID Number: JA019299
Year: 2003
Language: French
Type: ART

The North Korea Nuclear Crisis : A Strategy for Negotiation.
(ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 33, no. 4, May 2003, p. 4-7.)

Author(s):
1. Romberg, Alan D.
2. Swaine, Michael D.

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
2. KOREA (NORTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
3. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (NORTH)

Notes:
It is by no means clear that North Korea will refuse to dismantle its nuclear weapons program if it obtains political security and economic benefits sufficient to ensure regime survival.

ID Number: JA019225
Year: 2003
Language: English
Type: ART
The Korean Nuclear Crisis.
(SURVIVAL, vol. 45, no. 1, Spring 2003, p. 7-24.)
Author(s):  
1. Samore, Gary
Subject(s):  
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:  
As the world focuses on Iraq, North Korea is seeking to expand its nuclear arsenal as quickly as possible. By summer 2003, barring major technical mishaps, North Korea will be able to extract enough plutonium from spent nuclear fuel for up to half a dozen nuclear weapons, to add to its current suspected stockpile of one or possibly two nuclear weapons. Over the next several years, North Korea could complete facilities capable of producing sufficient plutonium and highly enriched uranium for up to a dozen nuclear weapons annually. Options for dealing with this threat are limited. For now, at least, Washington's basic approach seems to be to ignore and downplay the North Korean threat as much as possible, while focusing its energies on Iraq. Once Iraq is out of the way, Washington will face an even greater challenge in overcoming internal divisions and designing an effective strategy to deal with North Korea, where military and political options are more limited and the adversary is more powerful.

ID Number: JA018925  
Year: 2003  
Language: English  
Type: ART

Confronting Ambiguity : How to Handle North Korea's Nuclear Program.  
(ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 33, no. 2, March 2003, p. 11-15.)
Author(s):  
1. Saunders, Philip C.
Subject(s):  
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:  
Has North Korea decided that nuclear weapons are essential to its survival, or is the nuclear weapons program a bargaining chip that North Korea is prepared to trade away ?

ID Number: JA019060  
Year: 2003  
Language: English  
Type: ART

Praventive Sicherheitspolitik gegenüber Nordkorea.  
(EUROPAISCHE SICHERHEIT, 52. Jg., Nr. 3, Marz 2003, S. 42-44.)
Author(s):  
1. Schilling, Walter
Subject(s):  
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)  
2. KOREA (NORTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA  
3. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:  
When President George W. Bush in his 29 January 2002 state of the union address placed North Korea, aside from Iraq and Iran, in the 'axis of evil', it caused incredulous astonishment and open annoyance with some representatives of European governments who never grew tired of tutoring the Americans especially in foreign policy and security policy issues and also on other occasions. The avowal of the North Korean government in October 2002 to have nonetheless secretly developed nuclear weapons contrary to the Agreed Framework concluded with the USA on 21 October 1994 should therefore not be underestimated with regard to the soundness and validity of important positions of American politics.
Pyongyang: The Case for Nonproliferation With Teeth.
(ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 33, no. 4, May 2003, p. 8-11.)
Author(s):
1. Sokolski, Henry
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
2. KOREA (NORTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
3. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (NORTH)
4. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
Inaction against Pyongyang would foment more diplomatic and military intrigue than any bureaucracy could ever hope to reign in - a global 1914 spring-loaded to go nuclear.

The Korean Issue.
(INternational Affairs (Minneapolis), vol. 49, no. 4, 2003, p. 37-47.)
Author(s):
1. Torkunov, A.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
2. KOREA (NORTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (SOUTH)
3. KOREA (SOUTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
The ongoing crisis around the DPRK's nuclear program has highlighted the aspects of the Korean problem that have to do with ensuring the international nonproliferation and missile technology regime, the DPRK's purported possession of weapons of mass destruction, and the outstanding US-North Korean contradictions, which exacerbated especially after Washington included North Korea into the 'axis of evil'. Meanwhile, the Korean question is a tangled knot of internal Korean and international problems. They have roots that go deep in history, multiplied by the dramatic changes that have occurred in the world on the threshold of the 20th and 21st centuries.

Na Irak: Noord-Korea ?.
(INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, jg. 57, nr. 5, mei 2003, p. 246-252.)
Author(s):
1. Vogelaar, Marc
Subject(s):
1. KOREA (NORTH)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
2. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--KOREA (NORTH)
3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
The author examines two possible scenarios for handling the present nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula once the war against Iraq is over. The first is that the DPRK (North Korea) is attacked by a coalition of willing nations to disarm the regime before the country becomes a nuclear power. The other scenario is that the current crisis is defused through negotiations. The author believes that the second option is
preferable and that there is still time to explore whether, and if so what, carrots might induce Pyongyang to adopt a more moderate stance with regard to its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), while maintaining the option of disarmament through force as a stick. The international response to the crisis should depend on what the goals of the DPRK really are. If it appears that its sole objective is to obtain more aid and normalise its relations with the United States, the author argues that providing such assistance and offering normal relations are preferable to a second Korean war, which might turn into a nuclear conflict if China and Russia side with the DPRK (as they did in 1950). He adds, however, that such concessions would come at a stiff price for Pyongyang, i.e. stopping its nuclear programme, allowing IAEA inspections, which would also permit KEDO's light-water reactor project to be completed by the end of the decade, reducing its conventional armed forces which pose a threat to the Republic of Korea, stopping the testing and exporting of ballistic missiles, and respecting human rights. The author dismisses the current debate on whether or not a renewed US-DPRK dialogue should be 'embedded' in a multilateral framework as a secondary issue but hopes that China, Russia and the EU will be ready to provide their good offices where needed. If negotiations prove unsuccessful, only the UN Security Council can authorise the legitimate use of force to prevent the DPRK from obtaining nuclear weapons, or to disarm it if it already has them.

A Strategy for Defusing the North Korean Nuclear Crisis.
(Arms Control Today, vol. 33, no. 1, January - February 2003, p. 6-10.)
Author(s):
1. Wit, Joel S.
Subject(s):
1. Nuclear Weapons--Korea (North)
Notes:
North Korea's bold defiance may be a first step in an unfolding strategy of trying to negotiate a solution that avoids crisis while reinforcing efforts to ensure regime survival.

Rewarding North Korea: Theoretical Perspectives on the 1994 Agreed Framework.
Author(s):
1. Martin, Curtis H.
Subject(s):
1. Economic Sanctions, American--Korea (North)
2. Nuclear Weapons--Korea (North)
Notes:
This article tests theoretical propositions of sanctions theory against a 'crucial case study' of the US-DPRK Agreed Framework, which since 1994 has employed incentives to influence North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program. By electing an incentives-based strategy, the Agreed Framework appears to invalidate the proposition that positive sanctions are unlikely to be employed between adversaries. However, the choice can be explained in part by the unique political and security
environment on the Korean peninsula, by the absence of viable policy alternatives for the USA and its allies, and by the relatively low cost to the USA. The subsequent history of implementation, however, amply confirms a number of theoretical caveats and leaves in doubt the ultimate success of the Agreed Framework. The case illustrates how diplomatic and political pressures on both sender and recipient have altered the baseline of expectations away from pragmatic and partial improvement in relations and toward the sweeping and more problematic goal of an 'all or nothing' transformation of the adversarial relationship. Positive sanctions were caught between the perceived advantages of de-linking proliferation concerns from other contentious security issues and the domestic political advantages to the sender of greater linkage. The latter tendency is illustrated by the 1999 Perry plan, which abandoned 'limited engagement' in favor of a 'comprehensive and integrated approach'. While this policy shift may have bought time for administration policy, it did not resolve the contradictions inherent in a low-trust relationship. As it reassesses US policy towards the DPRK, the new US administration is likely to draw on the more skeptical view of positive incentives found in sanctions theory. The case of the Agreed Framework challenges several assumptions of sanctions theory, but it is too soon to claim that it invalidates them.

ID Number: JA017519
Year: 2002
Language: English
Type: ART

North Korea is No Iraq: Pyongyang's Negotiating Strategy.
(Arms Control Today, vol. 32, no. 10, December 2002, p. 8-12.)
Author(s):
1. Sigal, Leon V.
Subject(s):
1. Nuclear weapons--Korea (North)
Notes:
The revelation that North Korea is buying equipment useful for enriching uranium has led many in Washington to conclude that North Korea, like Iraq, is again making nuclear weapons and that the appropriate response is the punish it for brazenly breaking its commitments. According to this article, both the assessment and the policy that flows from it are wrong.

ID Number: JA018601
Year: 2002
Language: English
Type: ART

Contending with a Nuclear-Armed North Korea.
(Joint Force Quarterly, no. 32, Autumn 2002, p. 35-40.)
Author(s):
1. Sokolski, Henry
Subject(s):
1. Nuclear weapons--Korea (North)
2. Korea (North)--Foreign relations--USA
3. USA--Foreign relations--Korea (North)
Notes:
A review of the North Korean weapons program and nonproliferation violations, how its nuclear capabilities might increase, and the risks of cutting a new wide-ranging nuclear deal can suggest what Washington must do to neutralize the severity of this threat.

ID Number: JA019367
Year: 2002
Language: English
Noord-Korea : Survival of the Weakest.

(INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, jg. 56, nr. 10, oktober 2002, p. 475-480.)

Author(s):
1. Vogelaar, Marc

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- KOREA (NORTH)
2. KOREA (NORTH) -- FOREIGN RELATIONS

Notes:
The author recalls how North Korea managed to get to the forefront of international crisis management after the end of the Cold War. The impoverished nation once had a BNP that exceeded that of South Korea. In spite of its guiding principle of 'juche' (self-reliance) the regime now has to rely on foreign aid to feed its population. Human rights are a shambles and several hundred thousands have fled to neighbouring China. When in 1993 an international crisis erupted over North Korea's capacity to produce weapons trade plutonium, a last-minute deal was struck, the Agreed Framework, under which the West will replace Soviet type, proliferation-prone installations by less dangerous light-water reactors (LWR). In exchange, the North will provide complete transparency with respect to its nuclear weapons programme to the IAEA. An international consortium based in New York, KEDO, implements the LWR project. The author expects that negotiations between the USA and North Korea, addressing outstanding security issues as well as human rights, will bring about a more harmonious relationship between North Korea and its international environment.

ID Number: JA018377
Year: 2002
Language: Dutch
Type: ART
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