Zwack, Peter B.
A NATO-Russia Contingency Command.

The author advocates the establishment of a combined NATO and Russian military force to meet the challenges of the post-9/11 world. He cites the continuing threat of transnational terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to call for a NATO-Russian force based on the 'NATO-Russia Contingency Command' first suggested in 1996. The author analyzes and refutes each of the many arguments against the establishment of such a force and determines that now is the time for NATO and Russia to take the next major military step in their maturing relationship: the establishment of a NATO-Russia Contingency Command based in Russia.

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Hunter, Robert E.
NATO-Russia Relations after 11 September.

11 September 2001. This date has already entered international parlance as a single set of numbers that needs no further explanation: '9-11'. The shock to the United States was also a shock to the international system, to a degree and in a way that is still not entirely apparent. One immediate result of 11 September was a change in Russian policy toward the United States and - eventually - to NATO. This change, which is described and analyzed in this article, may prove to be only tactical - a set of moves by Russian President Vladimir Putin to take advantage of circumstances; or it may prove to be of strategic significance: presaging a more lasting Russian engagement with the West, its powers, and its institutions. To assess the possibility of such a more lasting engagement, it is first necessary to understand what has happened in Russia's relationship with the West and - in particular for this article - the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

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Relations between NATO and Russia have evolved through six distinct phases since December 1991. An initial 'honeymoon' in 1991-93 was followed by deterioration. This was temporarily arrested in 1996-97 by NATO upgrading its institutional links with Russia. The relationship was severely tested during the Kosovo crisis in early 1999. Relations were not severed, however, and a gradual rebuilding occurred from the summer of 1999. The impact of 11 September 2001, finally, has been limited. Since 1991, the development of NATO-Russia relations has been uneven. Overall objectives have not been identified by either side. Nevertheless, an underlying stability has become apparent in the relationship.

The new Russian-NATO relationship plunged to the lowest point during NATO's 78 day Kosovo air campaign in Spring 1999. Despite the difficulties at the political level, the analysis suggests that Russia's participation in joint peacekeeping with US/NATO forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina (IFOR/SFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR) stand as perhaps the most encouraging aspect of the contemporary Russian-NATO relationship. These successes in peacekeeping tended to be overshadowed by the serious strains between Russia and NATO in developing a response to the implosion of Yugoslavia. While such practical cooperation between Russia and NATO can contribute to eroding the barriers of the past and to the development of a constructive relationship for the twenty-first century, these military-to-military accomplishments cannot shape broader Russian-NATO strategic priorities. The article concludes with examination of Moscow's post-mortem assessments on Kosovo and evaluation of prospects for the future of the Russian-NATO relationship in the aftermath of the Yugoslav experience.