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No. 5/2002

INDIA AND PAKISTAN

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All previous Library publications edited since 1999 are available on the NATO Intranet site at http://nt15b.hq.nato.int/library (Minerva network) or http://eapcbdc/library (EAPC network).
Afghanistan: Crisis of Impunity: The Role of Pakistan, Russia and Iran in Fueling the Civil War - New York: Human Rights Watch. 58 p.; 30 cm.

Subject(s):
1. AFGHANISTAN--HISTORY--CIVIL WAR
2. ARMS SALES--AFGHANISTAN
3. MILITARY ASSISTANCE--AFGHANISTAN

Added entry(s):
1. Human Rights Watch (US)

Notes:

'The civil war in Afghanistan, a geopolitical battleground during the cold war, is once again being sponsored by outside parties: Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and other neighboring countries, with the United States and India working in other ways to influence the war's outcome. A country whose main economic activity is as a global arms market and smuggling hub is threatening to become, again, a theater of geopolitical competition. Meanwhile, the humanitarian toll of twenty years of fighting has not figured prominently in international policy on Afghanistan. Instead, several members of the Six Plus Two contact group, the six countries bordering Afghanistan, plus Russia and the US that are nominally committed to negotiating an end to the war, are providing military and material support to Afghan parties that have committed gross violations of the laws of war. The general outlines of the delivery of military support to both sides in Afghanistan are well known to experts monitoring the situation but not to a wider public. In light of the possibility of broadening military sponsorship of the warring factions, Human Rights Watch has investigated the delivery of arms and other forms of military aid to both sides and the impact of this aid on human rights. This report details the nature of military support provided to the warring parties, the major transit routes used to move arms and other equipment, the suppliers, the role of state and nonstate actors, and the response of the international community. The implications of foreign military assistance go beyond Afghanistan, as the war also poses a threat to regional security: armed groups in neighboring Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are obtaining military support from the well-supplied Afghan factions.'

ID number: 80017426
Year: 2001
The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon turned US South Asia policy temporarily upside down, bringing Pakistan to center stage and putting parts of the US-India agenda on hold. In the medium term – after the military operation most observers expect to take place in Afghanistan – the US agenda will become more complicated. Besides pursuing its long term geopolitical interests, the United States will be trying to promote stability in the countries at the epicenter of the terrorism campaign. It will also need to deal with the incompatible agendas of its coalition partners.
This report examines three recent seismic events which can be seen as case studies of the effectiveness of the verification system of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The events are an incident in August 1997 near the northern Russian island of Novaya Zemlya, and the May 1998 nuclear explosions by India and Pakistan. By banning nuclear test explosions, the CTBT aims to constrain the development of new nuclear weapons systems and to develop an international norm against nuclear testing. The Treaty was opened for signature in September 1996. The CTBT itself is not yet in force, but its provisional implementing institutions, including the verification system, are being set up in advance. The CTBT verification system consists of global monitoring networks using four technologies: seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide; an international data centre to collate and screen the data; and the possibility of on-site inspections to resolve situations where ambiguities about compliance with the Treaty remain. This paper concludes that the prototype CTBT verification system, notably the seismic monitoring system, although still voluntary and informal in parts and far from complete, did what it was supposed to do in the three cases studied: it detected the events, located them and provided evidence of their nature.

ID number: 80015567
Year: 1998
vii, 88 p.; 23 cm.
(Special report)
ISBN/ISSN: 0080344879
Subject(s):
1. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--PAKISTAN
2. PAKISTAN--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
3. AFGHANISTAN--HISTORY--SOVIET OCCUPATION, 1979-1989
4. USSR--MILITARY RELATIONS--PAKISTAN
5. PAKISTAN--MILITARY RELATIONS--USSR
Added entry(s):
2. Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., ed.
3. Asia Foundation. Center for Asian Pacific Affairs (US)
Notes:
'A joint publication of the Institute for Foreign Policy Affairs, Inc. and the Center for Asian Pacific Affairs, the Asia Foundation.'
'May 1986.'
Includes bibliographical references.
ID number: 70001463
Year: 1986

xxix, 372 p.: ill.;
(Area handbook)
Added entry(s):
1. Nyrop, Richard F., ed.
2. Department of the Army (US)
3. Library of Congress (US)
Notes:
Includes index.
ID number: 80003870
Edition: 5th ed.
Year: 1984

The Politics of Violence in India and South Asia: Is Democracy an endangered Species? - London: RISCT.
34 p.; 25 cm.
(Conflict studies, 0069-8792; 233)
Author(s):
1. Austin, Dennis, 1922-
2. Gupta, Anirudha
Subject(s):
1. INDIA--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
2. SOUTH ASIA--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
Added entry(s):
1. Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism (GB)
ID number: 80004938
Year: 1990
L'Inde, le pouvoir et la puissance - Paris : Fayard.
394 p. : ill. ; 25 cm.
(Les sept epees)
ISBN/ISSN: 2857890486
Author(s):
1. Bernard, Jean Alphonse
Subject(s):
1. INDIA--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
2. INDIA--ECONOMIC POLICY
3. INDIA--MILITARY POLICY
4. INDIA--FOREIGN RELATIONS
Added entry(s):
1. Fondation pour les Etudes de Defense Nationale (FR)
Notes:
ID number: 70001295
Year: 1985

Testament of Subhas Bose : being a complete and authentic record of
Netaji's broadcast speeches, press statements, etc. : 1942-1945 -
Delhi : Rajkamal.
i, 275 p. : ill., ports.; 22
Author(s):
1. Bose, Subhas Chandra, 1897-1945
Subject(s):
1. INDIA--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
2. BOSE, NETAJI SUBHAS CHANDRA--BIOGRAPHY
Added entry(s):
1. Arun, ed.
ID number: 70004857
Year: 1946

India's New Armament Strategy : A Return to Self-Sufficiency ? - London :
Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies.
i, 71 p. ; 22 cm.
(RUSI Whitehall Paper Series ; 31)
ISBN/ISSN: 0855161051
Author(s):
1. Bristow, Damon
Subject(s):
1. INDIA--ARMED FORCES--PROCUREMENT
2. INDIA--MILITARY POLICY
Added entry(s):
1. Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (GB)
Notes:
'This study starts with how the combination of India's approach to
economic management and the military relationship with the Soviet
Union served to sculpt Indian procurement policy throughout the
Cold War years. It proceeds to describe how the changes in the
country's economic policy and the international political system have led
the Indian government to adopt a fundamentally different approach to
defence procurement. Like many countries on the eastern side of
the Pacific Rim, India now views rearmament as part of a strategy
aimed not only at increasing its wider military significance, but also
at advancing its political and economic influence.'
ID number: 80012047
Year: 1995
xii, 322 p.; 24 cm.
ISBN/ISSN: 0333262530
Author(s):
1. Clarkson, Stephen
Notes:
Includes index
ID number: 80002699
Year: 1979

xxi, 95 p.; 19 cm.
(Strategy paper; 33)
ISBN/ISSN: 0844813532
Author(s):
1. Cohen, Stephen P.
2. Park, Richard L.
Added entry(s):
1. National Strategy Information Center (US)
Notes:
Includes bibliography
ID number: 80002465
Year: 1978

L'Asie nucleaire - Paris: IFRI.
183 p.; 24 cm.
(Travaux et Recherches de l'IFRI)
ISBN/ISSN: 2865921069
Author(s):
1. Cordonnier, Isabelle
2. Tertrais, Bruno
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--ASIA
2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--CHINA
3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--INDIA
4. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--PAKISTAN
Added entry(s):
1. Institut Francais des Relations Internationales (FR)
Notes:
Bibliography: p. 177-179. Includes index.
'Dix ans apres la fin de la guerre froide, le risque nucleaire s'est deplace d'Europe en Asie. La Chine, l'Inde et le Pakistan ont entame la constitution d'arsenaux nucleaires et balistiques importants. Dans un contexte de rivalites et de tensions, la proliferation de ces armes est devenue l'une des clés des rapports de force entre les acteurs de la securite dans la region. Quel est l'impact du nucleaire sur la securite en Asie? Le deploiement de defenses antimissiles est-il de nature a susciter de nouvelles courses aux armements? Y a-t-il un risque de guerre nucleaire sur le continent? Telles sont, parmi d'autres, les questions auxquelles cet ouvrage, le premier en France sur ce sujet, s'attache a repondre. Il explique les logiques qui determinent les politiques nucleaires en Asie, decrit la nouvelle donne Strategique qui s'y dessine, et tente d'evaluer les consequences de ces evolutions sur le debat nucleaire international et sur la stabilite mondiale.'
ID number: 80017818
Year: 2001
93 p.; 22 cm.
(ISBN/ISSN: 0198280696
Author(s):
1. Dibb, Paul, 1939-
Subject(s):
1. ASIA--FOREIGN RELATIONS
2. ASIA--STRATEGIC ASPECTS
Added entry(s):
1. International Institute for Strategic Studies (GB)
Notes:
'This paper examines the prospects for the balance of power and regional order in Asia up to the year 2010. It seeks to answer the question: is the concept of the balance of power still valid in a post-Cold War international system where structures and methods of operating are changing dramatically and where economic interdependence is increasing and the utility of military power is declining? Can the concept of the balance of power be made relevant to contemporary policy in Asia? The likely roles of the external great powers in the region - the United States and Russia - are analysed as well as those of the Asian great powers - China, India and Japan. The paper concludes by offering some ideas for securing the interests of the Asian middle powers in a complex and potentially unstable strategic environment.'
ID number: 80011936
Year: 1995

viii, 150 p.; 21 cm.
(ISBN/ISSN: 0415002125
Author(s):
1. Duncan, Peter J. S., 1953-
Subject(s):
1. USSR--FOREIGN RELATIONS--INDIA
2. INDIA--RELATIONS--USSR
3. USSR--FOREIGN RELATIONS
Added entry(s):
1. Royal Institute of International Affairs (GB)
Notes:
Bibliography: p.
ID number: 70001544
Year: 1989

Ambassador's journal : a personal account of the Kennedy years - London :
Hamilton.
xxii, 656 p. : 58 plates., ill
(ISBN/ISSN: 0241016193
Author(s):
1. Galbraith, John Kenneth, 1908-
Subject(s):
1. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--INDIA
2. INDIA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
3. GALBRAITH, JOHN KENNETH, 1908---BIOGRAPHY
ID number: 70004876
Year: 1969
Nuclear Rivalry in South Asia: Strategic Imperatives and National Pride

- London: RISCT.
- 22 p.: ill.; 25 cm.
- (Conflict studies, 0069-8792 ; 274)
- Author(s):
  1. Ghosh, Partha Sarathy, 1947-
- Subject(s):
  1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--INDIA
  2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--PAKISTAN
- Added entry(s):
  1. Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism (GB)
- Notes:
  'Partha S. Ghosh describes the rationale behind nuclear defence strategies in India and Pakistan in the light of current 'carrot and stick' diplomatic initiatives and the different approaches of the two states to regional security. Dr. Ghosh shows how each state accuses the other of nuclear ambitions and that - with almost half a century of conflict between them - the matter has now assumed serious dimensions. While the region is strategically less important in the global system it is growing in significance in international trade and investment. The West is increasingly uneasy, therefore, about a nuclear arms race in South Asia. The study examines national pride and international concern in a region where three rival nations - China, India and Pakistan - are confronting each other across disputed borders with nuclear weapons.'

ID number: 80010586
Year: 1994

Cross-Border Population Movements and Regional Security in South Asia

- London: RISCT.
- 23 p.: ill.; 25 cm.
- (Conflict studies, 0069-8792 ; 303)
- Author(s):
  1. Ghosh, Partha Sarathy, 1947-
- Subject(s):
  1. SOUTH ASIA--EMIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION
  2. REFUGEES--SOUTH ASIA
  3. SOUTH ASIA--NATIONAL SECURITY
- Added entry(s):
  1. Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism (GB)
- Notes:
  'In South Asia there is an acute problem of cross-border population movement. Ever since the partition of India half a century ago about 35m people have migrated across borders in search of security, work or sustenance. Many have been forced out by war or ethnic, racial and religious divisions as well as, lately, on environmental grounds. In this informed study, the author highlights the interconnection of these population movements with the question of South Asian regional security. Cross-border espionage, trafficking in drugs and guns, the growing problem of international terrorism and political corruption and violence exacerbate the original ethnic and religious conflicts - all of which affect international relations. The geographical scope of the study is defined by the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and includes Bangladesh, Buthan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka together with their immediate neighbours.'

ID number: 80014424
Year: 1997
327 /00304
The Fulcrum of Asia: relations among China, India, Pakistan, and the USSR - New York: Pegasus.
xvi, 383 p.; 21 cm.
Author(s):
  1. Gupta, Bhabani Sen
Notes:
  Includes index
ID number: 80002333
Year: 1970

323 /00565
72 p.: ill.; 22 cm.
(Adelphi papers, 0567-932X; 293)
ISBN/ISSN: 0198280211
Author(s):
  1. Gupta, Shekhar
Subject(s):
  1. INDIA--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
  2. INDIA--FOREIGN RELATIONS
Added entry(s):
  1. International Institute for Strategic Studies (GB)
ID number: 80011236
Year: 1995

355.4 /00877
73 p.: ill.; 22 cm.
(Adelphi papers, 0567-932X; 246)
ISBN/ISSN: 0080407153
Author(s):
  1. Ispahani, Mahnaz
Added entry(s):
  1. International Institute for Strategic Studies (GB)
ID number: 80004284
Year: 1990

327.5 /00174
South asian crisis: India, Pakistan, Bangla Desh - London: Chatto & Windus.
240 p.; 22 cm.
(Studies in international security; 17)
ISBN/ISSN: 0701120592
Author(s):
  1. Jackson, Robert, 1941-
Added entry(s):
  1. International Institute for Strategic Studies (GB)
Notes:
  Includes index
ID number: 80003233
Year: 1975
Indo-Pakistani relations are shadowed by nuclear weapons, and nuclear-capable ballistic missiles may soon be deployed. The two countries' nuclear capabilities neither explain the absence of war over the past decade, nor why war is currently unlikely. The development of command-and-control mechanisms would enhance stability in a crisis and improve India and Pakistan's ability to avoid nuclear use if war breaks out. With nuclear weapons in hand, the price if deterrence fails is high: investing more resources on a bet that nuclear capabilities ensure safety only raises the penalties if the initial decision was wrong. Command and control and diplomatic engagement will provide some insurance that, if the bet is called, nuclear use is not the only choice left.'

ID number: 80014348
Year: 1997

In this study, Dr. Joshi describes the extent of the atrocities in Punjab over the last 10 years and analyses the political motives behind the terror campaign - in effect a form of "ethnic cleansing to create a Sikh homeland in India (Khalistan). Dr. Joshi details the forceful counter-terrorist tactics instituted. He also explains that in the current chaos the enormous powers of the security forces could, if unchecked, further undermine the political system in a country where democracy is already fragile.'

ID number: 80008491
Year: 1993
India and Pakistan: Nature and Elements of Nuclear Deterrence between two Regional Rivals - Winnipeg, CAN: University of Manitoba. 27 p.: ill.; 28 cm. (Occasional Paper; 28)

Author(s):
1. Kapur, Ashok

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--INDIA
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--PAKISTAN

Added entry(s):
1. University of Manitoba. Centre for Defence and Security Studies (CA)

Notes:
'This paper examines the nature and key elements in the ambiguous nuclear deterrence relationship between India and Pakistan. The external and domestic contexts of the nuclear policies of the two countries are multifaceted. A new and stable security architecture has emerged in South Asia and it recognises the permanence of Indo-Pakistani nuclear weapons capability and nuclear deterrence under foreseeable conditions. Non-discriminatory and universal agreements such as a comprehensive test ban and Fissile Material Production Ban are likely to cap Indo-Pakistani nuclear programs but they are not meant to roll them back. The NPT and IAEA arrangements are irrelevant in Indo-Pakistani security issues.'

ID number: 80012238
Year: 1995

The Soviet Union and the emerging nations: a case study of soviet policy towards India - Geneva: Joseph. 124 p.; 24 cm.

Author(s):
1. Kapur, Harish

Added entry(s):
1. Graduate Institute of International Studies (CH)

Notes:
Includes bibliography and index
ID number: 80002376
Year: 1972


Author(s):
1. Kux, Dennis, 1931-

Subject(s):
1. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--INDIA
2. INDIA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA

Added entry(s):
1. National Defense University (US)

Notes:
'Bibliography: p. 455-469. Includes index. Dennis Kux analyses here the five-decade relationship between India and the United States, beginning with the World War II and postwar years during which the United States supported Indian independence from Great Britain, America's closest wartime ally. Also reviewed is the most recent history of India's close ties with the former Soviet Union, even as she proclaimed a policy of nonalignment.'

ID number: 80009287
Year: 1992
327.5 /00090
The China-India border: the origins of the disputed boundaries - London:
Oxford University Press.
xi, 192 p.; 19 cm.
(Chatham House essays; 2)
Author(s):
1. Lamb, Alastair
Added entry(s):
1. Royal Institute of International Affairs (GB)
Notes:
Includes bibliography
ID number: 80003129
Year: 1964

327 /00803
The Continuing Conflict in Kashmir: Regional Detente in Jeopardy -
London: RISCT.
25 p.: ill.; 25 cm.
(Conflict studies, 0069-8792; 259)
Author(s):
1. Malik, Iftikhar H.
Subject(s):
1. INDIA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--PAKISTAN
2. PAKISTAN--FOREIGN RELATIONS--INDIA
3. KASHMIR, VALE OF (INDIA)
Added entry(s):
1. Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism (GB)
Notes:
'The tense Hindu-Muslim situation in India is posing new strains
on Indo-Pakistan relations. At the same time the unabated conflict in
the disputed territory of Kashmir remains a major threat to regional
peace and security. Kashmir, with its overwhelming Muslim majority which
rejects Indian authority, has been the major flash-point between
India and Pakistan since their independence in 1947. In this study,
Dr. Malik explains the origins of the apparently interminable
conflict and its ramifications. He assesses the risks of another war
between India and Pakistan which could have a nuclear dimension. Dr. Malik
concludes by reviewing the range of possible solutions which
include a UN supervised plebiscite, complete independence,
regionally-guaranteed autonomy or further "partitions".'
ID number: 80008334
Year: 1993

323 /00380
Collective Conflict in India - London: Centre for Security and Conflict
Studies.
27 p.: ill.; 25 cm.
(Conflict studies, 0069-8792; 212)
Author(s):
1. Manor, James
Subject(s):
1. INDIA--ETHNIC RELATIONS
2. INDIA--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
3. VIOLENCE--INDIA
Added entry(s):
1. Centre for Security and Conflict Studies (GB)
2. Institute for the Study of Conflict (GB)
Notes:
Bibliography: p. 27.
ID number: 70001355
Year: 1988
236 p. : ill.; 20 cm.
Author(s):
1. Morris-Jones, Wyndraeth Humphreys
Subject(s):
1. INDIA--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
Notes:
ID number: 80010247
Year: 1964

The Kashmir Question - Bombay : Manaktalas.
125 p.; 23 cm.
Author(s):
1. Noorani, Abdul Gafoor Abdul Majeed, 1930-
Subject(s):
1. JAMMU AND KASHMIR (INDIA)--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
ID number: 80010529
Year: 1964

Communism in India - Berkeley : University of California Press.
xiv, 603 p.; 24 cm.
Author(s):
1. Overstreet, Gene D.
2. Windmiller, Marshall
Subject(s):
1. COMMUNISM--INDIA
2. COMMUNIST PARTIES--INDIA
Notes:
ID number: 80011620
Year: 1959

91 p. : ill.; 24 cm.
(Adelphi papers, 0567-932X ; 313)
ISBN/ISSN: 0198294093
Author(s):
1. Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh
Subject(s):
1. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--INDIA
2. INDIA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--INDIA
4. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--INDIA
Added entry(s):
1. International Institute for Strategic Studies (GB)
Notes:
'India's strategic and nuclear-weapon behaviour is driven by legitimate security concerns, national prestige and technical and scientific lobbies. An Indo-US strategic relationship cannot be established without addressing these issues. This paper argues that the challenge facing Washington and New Delhi is to find an innovative approach to proliferation that meets India's concerns. Security concerns could be satisfied by providing India with access to high-technology conventional weaponry or recognising New Delhi's nascent nuclear-deterrence capability as an interim measure, with abolition of nuclear weapons the ultimate objective. To address the prestige issue,
nuclear capabilities could be replaced by an equally powerful symbol, such as a vibrant economy or a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. India's nuclear and missile scientists must be offered other challenging options for their professional skills if the technical lobby is to be satisfied.'
The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998 shook the region and challenged the near-global consensus on non-proliferation. In their wake, the region's underlying problems have become still more intractable, and the need to resolve them has become more urgent than ever. The international community has been powerless in its response, and a new approach is now called for. Political stability should be encouraged within the countries concerned, in their relations with each other and in the wider region. Arms control and measures to increase confidence and security need to be re-examined and adapted to the changed circumstances. The nuclear-weapon states themselves should look again at their attitudes towards arms-control instruments, while India and Pakistan need to reappraise or clarify their nuclear doctrines, and take steps to improve relations.

ID number: 80016213
Year: 1999

This book offers a detailed analysis of the enduring problems which have beset Pakistan's nation-building enterprise since its chaotic birth in 1947. The author explores why authoritarianism has prevailed over repeated attempts to establish democracy, and how foundational flaws and socio-political obstacles continue to obstruct the path to representative politics and national integration. He first surveys security, authoritarian rule and conflicting regional and cultural interests in the late 1930s and '40s. These factors, compounded by the refugee situation and the collapse of Indo-Pakistan relations after Partition, created severe difficulties for the new state. Successive regimes are reviewed in the light of these and other institutional and social fault-lines which undermined democracy and consolidated the hegemony of the military and other unelected institutions. Talbot explores the 'second Partition' of 1971, the intricacies of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's fall from power, the Islamic dictatorship of General Zia ul-Haq, the collapse of Benazir Bhutto's two governments and the ouster of the Nawaz Sharif regime. This revised edition covers events in Pakistan over the last two years, including developments in Afghanistan, where Pakistan plays a pivotal role.
954 /00001
126 p. ; 18 cm.
('Que sais-je?' : Le point des connaissances actuelles ; 970)
Author(s):
1. Testa, Francois de
Subject(s):
1. PAKISTAN
Notes:
Includes bibliography.
ID number: 70005308
Year: 1962
- Afghanistan Agreement Signed in Geneva.
  UN CHRONICLE, vol. 25, no. 2, June 1988, p. 4-17.

- India and South Asia.

- India and South Asia.
  CURRENT HISTORY, vol. 95, no. 600, April 1996, Whole Issue.

- Ahmed, Samina
  The (Nuclear) Testing of Pakistan.
  For Pakistan, the bomb has brought hard times, political conflict and the specter of international isolation. Has the fallout just begun?

- Ahmed, Samina
  Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program : Turning Points and Nuclear Choices.
  The author examines Pakistan's motivations for responding to the Indian tests with its own series of tests on May 28 and 30. She begins by tracing the history of the Pakistani nuclear program. She then assesses the consequences of testing – in particular, the devastating impact of sanctions on the Pakistani economy – and details Islamabad's three-pronged strategy for the future of its nuclear weapons program.

- Ahrari, M. Eshan
  Growing Strong : The Nuclear Genie in South Asia.
  The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998 were results of rational decisionmaking involving relevant strategic calculations. India's desire to enhance its international status needs to be juxtaposed with growing security concerns. New Delhi concluded that it had to unsheathe its nuclear capabilities in order to address security challenges from China and Pakistan. It is quite possible that India has miscalculated the strategic gains vis-a-vis Pakistan, but strategic assessments related to China may well be accurate. Now a realistic policy for Washington is to face the facts and deal with India and Pakistan as nuclear powers. Through continued strategic dialogue, the USA, India and Pakistan are in the long run likely to find some common ground involving nuclear issues. Neither India nor Pakistan is likely to sign the CTBT without noticeable economic and technology-related concessions from the USA and Western Europe.

** This list contains material received as of June 3rd, 2002 – Cette liste est arrêtée au 3 juin 2002.
The character of the burgeoning nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan suggests that, in the post-cold war world, the spread of weapons of mass destruction may increase the likelihood of lower intensity conventional conflict rather than that of total war. In South Asia, where ethnic, religious, and territorial disputes persist, the mutual fear of big weapons may help to form a set of 'rules of the game', adherence to which will allow limited but not excessive use of force in pursuit of national aims. However, insufficiently formed military command, control, and strategic nuclear doctrine in India and Pakistan, along with ill-focused, tardy Western pressure to stem the tide of proliferation in South Asia, may create serious problems for the careful management of a fractious relationship between two democracies that have much to quarrel about.

Now that the dust seems to be settling on the Indian nuclear tests, it is time to take stock of the reasons for the Indian decision and its short- and long-term impacts on Indo-American relations. In order to do so, one must place the Indian decision to test nuclear weapons within the overall context of India's foreign policy objectives as well as examine the immediate domestic and external compulsions faced by New Delhi. For to attempt to divorce discussion of the future prospects for Indo-American relations from such compulsions and contexts would ignore the basic wellsprings of Indian foreign policy.

Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf deserves American support if he can demonstrate continued determination to divert his country from an extremist trajectory. Yet, in the long run, it is India and (perhaps less obviously) Iran - preeminent states in South Asia and the Gulf and natural status quo powers - that stand out as logical American partners. Iran may look like an unlikely partner, especially after US President George W. Bush's hard-line classification of the country, in his 30 January 2002 State of the Union address, as part of an 'axis of evil'. Yet, the American decision to renounce hopes for rapprochement with Iran - if that is indeed what has been decided - is misguided. The US should not neglect the strategic logic of increasingly converging interests between Washington, New Delhi and Tehran.

The certitudes of two decades of U.S. strategy in the Middle East were destroyed by the terrible attacks of September 11. Strangely enough, at the origin of this global disaster was a purely local conflict - a border dispute half a century old between Pakistan and Afghanistan - which spread like a cancer. Determined to reduce its neighbor to the status of a protectorate following the retreat of the Soviets from Afghanistan, the Pakistanis and their Saudi financial backers, with the blessing of the United States, armed the most radical Islamist factions against the Russians. The objective was to take power in Kabul and replace age-old Afghan nationalism with a religious ideology capable of keeping the country in a state of dual political submission to Islamabad and Riyadh. The inherent logic of this ideology inevitably led to the explosion of international terrorism.
- Bedi, Rahul
  Mixed Fortunes for India's Defense Industrial Revolution.
  India's defense industrial programs are complex and ambitious - and
  frequently dogged by delays.

- Bernard, Jean Alphonse
  L' Inde, la Chine et le nucleaire.

- Bradsher, Henry S.
  Afghanistan.

- Braun, Dieter
  Wie friedlich ist Neu-Delhis Atomprogramm ? : Aspekte der indischen
  Nuklearpolitik.

- Carranza, Mario E.
  At the Crossroads : US Non-proliferation Policy Toward South Asia After
  the Indian and Pakistani Tests.
  This article critically examines US non-proliferation policy toward South
  Asia, arguing that there are formidable obstacles to achieving stable
  nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan. The nuclearization of the
  subcontinent can still be reversed if the United States assumes the
  responsibility of enforcing the norm against proliferation while moving
decisively toward the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide.
The article considers the Clinton administration's response to India's
and Pakistan's nuclear tests of May 1998, whether economic sanctions
could have been more effective, the failure of Clinton's nuclear
diplomacy to obtain Indian and Pakistani accession to the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the US tilt toward India, and the danger of a
nuclear exchange in the subcontinent after the Kargil war. President
Bush's missile defence plans have exacerbated the South Asian nuclear
predicament, making it very difficult to achieve any non-proliferation
goals in the region. The conclusion discusses two alternative scenarios
for international nuclear relations in the 21st century and the prospects
for nuclear arms control in South Asia in each scenario.

- Chellaney, Brahma
  After the Tests : India's Options.
  http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod
  India's 1998 nuclear tests were only a first step in dealing with threats
to its security. The country should aim for a small, affordable but
survivable nuclear force, with a doctrine that eschews both a
war-fighting approach and the course of recessed or non-weaponised
terrence advocated by the US. In contrast to deterrence relationships
elsewhere, Indian doctrine has to deal with two linked nuclear
adversaries, Pakistan and China. Its priority must be to close its
vulnerability against China; a nuclear-deterrent capability against
Pakistan alone will not adequately address New Delhi's security
interests.

- Chellaney, Brahma
  The Challenge of Nuclear Arms Control in South Asia.
- Chellaney, Brahma
La securite de l'Inde apres les essais nucleaires.
Cet article analyse, d'un point de vue indien, les consequences des essais nucleaires de mai 1998 sur la securite de l'Inde. Partant d'une vision realiste de relations interetatiques fondees sur la puissance et la force militaire s'appuyant sur la detention d'armes de destruction massive, il justifie la volonte indienne de constituer une dissuasion nucleaire credible et une politique de puissance notamment face a la menace nucleaire et balistique qui pese sur elle et au souhait de Pekin de confiner l'Inde au sous-continent. L'Inde, selon lui, doit s'efforcer de depasser la 'mentalite de colonise' qui la caracterise et qui a inhibe pendant longtemps sa politique exterieure, et ainsi devenir une grande puissance qui soit capable, en particulier, de tenir tete a la Chine.

- Cordesman, Anthony H.
Western Strategic Interests and the India-Pakistan Military Balance (Part 1).

- Cordesman, Anthony H.
Western Strategic Interests and the India-Pakistan Military Balance (Part 2).

- Dalton, Toby F.
Toward Nuclear Rollback in South Asia.
Induce India and Pakistan to renounce their nuclear weapons programs? Not easy, but the cases of Argentina, Brazil and South Africa show that it can be done.

- Delpech, Therese
Les consequences strategiques des essais indiens et pakistanais.
L'auteur etudie ici les consequences des essais indiens et pakistanais tant sur le regime de non-proliferation que sur la situation strategique de l'Asie. Ces essais se sont produits a un mauvais moment dans les deux cas : le regime de non-proliferation traverse une crise liee notamment a la non-ratification de START II par la Douma russe et l'Asie doit faire face a de profonds bouleversements financiers, mais aussi sociaux et politiques. Ils peuvent avoir des effets strategiques importants du Moyen-Orient jusqu'a l'Extreme-Orient, en passant par l'Asie du Sud-Est et l'Asie centrale - deux arcs de crise potentielle. L'une des principales clefs de la crise, selon l'auteur, se trouve en Chine.

- Delpech, Therese
Inde-Chine : le face-a-face ?
India justified its nuclear tests of May 1998 in light of the threat from China. This was one way of spotlighting the many bones of contention between India and the People's Republic of China. With persistent territorial disputes, China's sustained development of its nuclear arsenal, close military cooperation between China and Pakistan and strengthened ties between China and Burma, India increasingly feels stuck between a rock and a hard place. This rivalry between the two most populous countries on the planet will inevitably impact global security at the dawn of the 21st century. The international community has a role to play if we are to avoid a further deterioration in Chinese-Indian relations. In particular, it must apply a more balanced regional policy, less complacent towards China; encourage New Delhi to accept an international settlement of the Kashmir conflict; and support India's
determination to sign the Comprehensive test-ban treaty and the so-called cut-off treaty, which prohibits the production of fissile material for explosive applications.

- Dixit, Aabha
  Indian Defence Industry Programme.

- Duval, Marcel
  Gueltte, Georges Le
  Les essais nucleaires de l'Inde et du Pakistan hier, aujourd'hui, demain.

- Etienne, Gilbert
  D' Indira a Rajiv Gandhi.
  POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 50e annee, no. 1, printemps 1985, p. 139-156.

- Evans, Alexander
  India, Pakistan, and the Prospect of War.
  India seized an opportunity in December 2001. In escalating a crisis into a global drama, Prime Minister Vajpayee and his colleagues took a calculated risk. Has it worked?

- Evans, Alexander
  Talibanising Kashmir.
  The Kashmir dispute has changed since September 11. As a result of the campaign against terrorism, militant groups fighting there will come under sharp pressure to cull their ranks of Bin Laden sympathisers and Arab and Afghan fighters. But just how Islamist is the insurgency? The Kashmir Valley is physically closer to Kabul than New Delhi but what impact will the Afghan war have on this dispute that goes back to the division of the subcontinent?

- Fischer, Georges
  L'Inde et la bombe.

- Ganguly, Sumit
  Beyond the Nuclear Dimension: Forging Stability in South Asia.
  http://www.armscontrol.org

- Ganguly, Sumit
  India's Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi's Nuclear Weapons Program.
  May 1998 signaled a major turning point in the nuclear arms race in South Asia. The author cites three factors that combined in setting the stage for India's decision to detonate five nuclear devices on May 11 and 13: political choices made over the last fifty years, reflecting a mix of ideological and pragmatic concerns; a long-held desire by influential members of the Indian scientific establishment to make India a nuclear weapons state; and an increasing perception of threat from China and Pakistan as well as the lack of security guarantees.
While officials in India and Pakistan have been virtually silent on the issue of nuclear deterrence in South Asia, a small number of nonofficial strategists in both countries are moving to fill the void. They describe the current low-level nuclear standoff as 'recessed deterrence'. Nuclear weapons advocates within this group have voiced their dissatisfaction with the status quo, ostensibly because nuclear ambiguity undermines stability. This has led them to promote the concept of 'minimum deterrence', described essentially as a scaled-down version of the superpower assured destruction doctrine. Generally, strategists that favor nuclear deployment have high confidence that India and Pakistan would be responsible nuclear powers. They also contend that just as nuclear deterrence stabilized US-Soviet relations, so too can it work for South Asia. Other analysts are more skeptical, both of the premise behind minimum deterrence and the observance of nuclear restraint in the subcontinent. They likewise question the applicability of the superpower model of deterrence for India and Pakistan.

India and Pakistan recognize the dangers of a nuclear confrontation and need to stabilize their nuclear options. The nuclear forces they are likely to develop will be small in size, localized rather than extra-regional, and 'recessed' rather than deployed. Developing the Lahore process, India and Pakistan could agree to place restrictions on specific categories of nuclear weapons, or at least on their development. At the international level, the legal regime needs to be reshaped to fit today's realities and recognize the three de facto nuclear-weapons states - Israel, India and Pakistan - which are democratic states that have shown responsible behaviour.
Economically and politically India approaches the twenty-first century a very different country from that which emerged from colonial rule into independence in 1947. By the year 2020 India is expected to be the fourth largest economy in the world in terms of purchasing power parity. In the light of a new foreign policy doctrine, this article examines the contradictions between India's economic and political compulsions and assesses the prospects for the world's largest democracy as it looks East to new trading partners and political links and to the resolution of long-standing security issues with its neighbours.

The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May could impact on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In the meantime, three major questions have arisen: what type of nuclear arms will the two countries deploy? Will there be mutual deterrence, or is there a real risk of a nuclear war? And how should the West react? Both India and Pakistan will soon have aircraft and land-based missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. While the concept of deterrence is understood by both countries, various geographical, geopolitical and technical factors make the risk of nuclear war more likely now than during the Cold War. This unsettling fact should force Western powers to actively resolve the Kashmir question and to work closely with the two countries on technical issues, rather than simply impose economic sanctions.

It will be more difficult to establish a stable nuclear relationship between India and Pakistan than it was to establish deterrence between the Cold War's nuclear contenders. Given the awesome consequences of nuclear war, reducing nuclear instability in the subcontinent must be the West's overriding priority in handling India and Pakistan's nuclear ventures. Rather than imposing inconsistent sanctions or engaging in needless lecturing, the West's industrialised countries should consider a set of positive moves, while at the same time avoiding signals of approval for India and Pakistan's nuclear build-up. Initiatives to enhance stability could include arms control measures, particularly if China actively participated, and more direct technical-military measures. These could range from improvements in command, control, communications and intelligence capabilities to the sharing of early-warning information.
This article assesses prospects for nuclear proliferation reversal in India and Pakistan by examining previous case studies of nuclear reversal (South Africa, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Argentina, Brazil) and drawing comparisons with the positions of the two South Asian powers. In the six cases of nuclear reversal change became possible when national leaders became convinced that the security threats to the nation did not require a nuclear deterrent and when there were economic incentives for abandoning nuclear weapons. Neither of these conditions applies to India or Pakistan. However, both countries have a shared history of negotiation and compromise that can lead to agreement on smaller issues, thereby building trust.

Pakistan played a key role in creating the Taliban, which then became its very own Frankenstein's monster. In the run-up to 11 September, debates raged at the heart of its foreign-policy establishment as it became increasingly clear to Pakistani officials that the Taliban were out of control and that Pakistan's attempts to influence the fundamentalist regime were failing. These anxieties are revealed in a set of Pakistani Foreign Ministry documents, providing a picture of Pakistani-Taliban relations for much of the year 2000 and up to June 2001. The documents, which were obtained in Kabul following the collapse of the Taliban, also reveal splits within the Pakistani administration, with the Foreign Ministry complaining that the Ministry of the Interior was undermining its policy of trying to curb the Taliban by letting what it openly described as 'terrorists' transit across and find safe haven in Pakistan.

When India and Pakistan conducted a cumulative total of eleven nuclear weapons tests during a three-week period in May 1998, the Indian subcontinent was said to be suddenly staring in the face of a nuclear conflict - something the rest of the world has vowed never to let happen after witnessing the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.
- Khan, Munir Ahmad
  La nuclearisation de l' Asie du Sud et ses consequences.
  Pour l'auteur, ancien haut responsable du nucleaire pakistanais, le
programme atomique d'Islamabad n'est qu'une reponse sous forme
d'autodefense a la menace indienne. Selon lui, le programme indien emane
d'une volonte belliqueuse de New Delhi a l'encontre de ses voisins
(Pakistan et Chine surtout) et d'une aspiration a acceder au statut de
grande puissance nucleaire, volonte reaﬃrmee par le BJP actuellement au
pouvoir en Inde et a travers les essais du printemps 1998. Le Pakistan,
pour lui, n'aurait ete qu'une victime, oblige de riposter a la menace
indienne notamment en raison des faibles garanties de securite apportees
par les Etats dotes de l'arme nucleaire. En fait, ce discours qui fait de
l'Inde l’unique agresseur et du Pakistan une simple victime en dit long
sur l'état actuel des relations indo-pakistanaises.

- Krause, Joachim
  Indiens nukleare Option : eine widerspruchliche und inkonsequente
Politik.
  Indien gegen den Rest der Welt - so konnte man die Position dieses Landes
im Herbst 1996 bezeichnen, als es das einvernehmliche Zustandekommen des
Nukersteststoppvertrags verhinderte. Krause zeigt auf, dass diese
Position auch und gerade fur Indien schwere Nachteile hat. Er fordert von
der deutschen Regierung, die betrachtliche deutsche Wirtschaftshilfe fur
dieses Land abhangig zu machen von einem Beitritt Indiens zum
Nichtverbreitungsvertrag.

- Krause, Joachim
  Die 'offene' Nuklearfrage : nach den Kernwaffenversuchen Indiens und
Pakistans.
  Auf dem indischen Subkontinent muss die internationale
Staatengemeinschaft zwei Hauptaufgaben losen : eine Verscharfung der
Krise abwenden und das Problem des indischen Grossmachtstatus angehen.
Ersteres setzt, so Krause, internationale Bemuhungen um eine Beilegung
der Kaschmir-Krise sowie um eine Rustungskontrollregime voraus. Fur den
indischen Grossmachtstatus musse eine Losung gefunden werden, in der die
Frage des Kernwaffenbesitzes keine Rolle spielt.

- Labbe, Marie-Helene
  Les essais nucleaires indiens et pakistanais et la non-proliferation.
  POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 63e annee, no. 3, automate 1998, p. 531-547.
  L'auteur explique ici en quoi les essais nucleaires de mai 1998 effectues
par l'Inde et le Pakistan peuvent avoir une incidence sur le regime de
non-proliferation et s'interroge sur ce que les Etats soucieux de
contenir la proliferation nucleaire peuvent faire pour proteger ce
regime. Pour elle, ces essais tendent certes a le fragiliser et a
favoriser une situation ou le risque d'une guerre nucleaire en Asie du
Sud n'est pas a ecarter. Cependant, elle considere que le regime de
non-proliferation n'est pas mort. Les Etats dotes d'armes nucleaires ont
un role important a jouer. Ils doivent, en particulier, inciter l'Inde et
le Pakistan a signer le CTBT et amener la Chine a developper une
politique moins 'proliferante'.

Page 27
- Laforce, Kurt
India en Pakistan zoeken toenadering tot het CTBT : een versterking van de norm tegen kernproeven?
INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, jg. 53, nr. 4, april 1999, p. 205-209.
The author discusses India's and Pakistan's advance towards the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and wonders whether the CTBT regime will strengthen the norm against nuclear weapon tests. May 1998 was marked by the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. Although neither state violated the CTBT, it was felt that the tests did go against the growing international norm on nuclear tests. The author argues that Indian and, to a lesser extent, Pakistani promises to sign and ratify the CTBT might bring about a Trojan Horse for the nuclear test regime. Furthermore, the CTBT, as a mere arms control measure, will indirectly weaken the nuclear non-proliferation norm by acknowledging their nuclear weapons status. In order to diminish the threat of a Trojan horse and to strengthen the nuclear test regime, the Nuclear Five and proponents of a CTBT should start ratifying the treaty before the treaty-based Conference of States will convene in September 1999.

- Latham, Andrew
Constructing National Security : Culture and Identity in Indian Arms Control and Disarmament Practice.
The goal of this study is to redress some of the weaknesses inherent in the dominant realist literature dealing with Indian international security policy by outlining the various ways in which culture (understood in terms of enduring and widely shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes and symbols) and identity (understood in terms of the self-representation of the nation and its 'proper' role in regional and global politics) inform Indian approaches to non-proliferation, arms control, disarmament and security-building issues. A fundamental assumption adopted here is that political and military elites socialized in different cultural contexts may behave in different ways and make different choices, even when placed in similar situations. Members of different societies understand security and security-building issues in very different ways because their assumptions about the world and themselves vary greatly. Cultural values, in sometimes very subtle ways, exercise a powerful influence on these assumptions, shaping not only perceptions of interest and threat (what might be called substantive issues) but also beliefs regarding form and method (what might be called stylistic issues). As a consequence, in order to grasp fully a state's approach to international security it is necessary to examine the often hidden cultural premises upon which that policy rests. This essay presents a preliminary assessment of the role of culture and identity in Indian international security policy, paying particular attention to the self-representation, symbols, myths, icons and archetypes that structure Indian approaches to international security.

- Lodhi, Maleeha
Still a Cold War.
Apart from the Middle East, South Asia is the world's most daunting challenge to conflict resolution and the promotion of peace. Nearly a fifth of humanity lives on the Subcontinent, and the peace dividend could be enormous, as is the mounting cost of the absence of peace. The threat to international peace and security is all the more ominous since both Pakistan and India are nuclear-capable states, and Pakistan has just countered India's missiles by successfully testing a medium range one of its own.
Following three years of instability, a new government coalition has come to power in New Delhi. But with its disparate combines of about twenty parties and led by the BJP Hindu nationalist party, the Vajpayee cabinet will be equally fragile. Moreover, it will be forced to adopt a more moderate line than was suggested in its electoral platform. This approach is all the more critical given that the time has now come to pursue reconciliation between India and Pakistan. Since partition in 1947, hostility has formed the basis of relations between the two countries. Pakistan was built on the 'myth of the two nations' - Hindu and Muslim - and is only able to justify its existence by nurturing tension with India, especially regarding Kashmir. Furthermore, the country is held hostage by a feudal, bureaucratic and military oligarchy, which is more concerned with preserving its power and pursuing aggressive, dangerous regional policies than ensuring the well-being of its people. Pakistan's new prime minister, Nawaz Sharif is intent on elevating his country from its underdeveloped status and breaking with the anti-democratic methods of his predecessors and the confrontational stance with India. But to be able to meet this challenge, he must start acting ... soon.

Not since India conducted its only nuclear test in 1974 has its nuclear policy been under such close international scrutiny. Despite domestic pressure, however, India is unlikely to conduct another test or deploy nuclear weapons. India would gain little from testing or deploying nuclear weapons, and it would risk incurring heavy costs. Still, India is unlikely to give up its nuclear option unless the nuclear powers commit themselves to global nuclear disarmament, nor is it likely to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) without such a promise. External pressure to sign the CTBT is likely to harden India's stance.

This article explains that the attitudes which shape Western behaviour and its approach to international relations are a product of the circumstances that prevailed from 1945 to 1953, which became entrenched by the Cold War. This article argues that the 'adversarial national security paradigm' is increasingly dysfunctional; it is ill-suited to the global problems that lie ahead and the West should shift to a 'cooperative global security paradigm'. The reflexive aspects of international relations are highlighted and the utility of attitudinal paradigms is discussed, before turning to consider how a paradigm shift might be engineered. Drawing on recent examples, the prerequisites are shown to be: an impulse for change (common fears, a shared vision); the removal of obstacles to change (usually the most difficult); an engine of change; and a precipitating event or agency. The rest of the article discusses how these prerequisites could be met and shows how Britain could act as precipitator. A postscript considers the relevance of 11
September 2001 to these ideas.

- Mehta, Pratap Bhanu
  India: The Nuclear Politics of Self-Esteem.
  India's nuclear tests may have been a politically expedient move for the
  country's ruling nationalist party, but they were also the product of
  years of territorial insecurity, strategic isolation, and 'wounded
  cultural pride'.

- Mey, Leo M. van der
  India tussen kernstopverdrag en bom.
  INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, jg. 51, nr. 1, januari 1997, p. 30-35.
  The author explains why India played the maverick and said 'No' to the
  Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) (which was finalized in August 1996
  and signed by a majority of members of the General Assembly of the United
  Nations in September last year). India's obstruction is not a case of
  lost innocence. It results from its consistent opposition to any
  perceived discriminatory elements in nuclear non-proliferation regimes.
  Though some of India's criticisms were not altogether out of place and
  not unique as an example of the discrepancy between declaratory and
  actual policies of nation-states, and though tactical mistakes have been
  made by other parties in the negotiation process, India's hypercritical
  position may be questioned because it denies the positive contribution of
  CTBT to the control of horizontal as well as vertical nuclear
  proliferation.

- Milhollin, Gary
  India's Nuclear Cover-Up.
  FOREIGN POLICY, no. 64, Fall 1986, p. 161-175.

- Muraka, Dev
  Afghanistan: the Russian Intervention: a Moscow Analysis.
  ROUND TABLE, April 1981, p. 122-139.

- Nair, Vijai K.
  Nuclear Proliferation: US Aims and India's Response.
  STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 17, no. 2, April - June 1994,
  p. 165-180.

- Niu, Sien-Chong
  New Strategic Outlook of the Indian Subcontinent.
  62-70.

- Nizamani, Haider K.
  South Asian Nuclear Weapons and Dilemmas of International
  Non-Proliferation Regimes.
  The May 1998 nuclear tests initiated by India and followed by Pakistan
  call into question the effectiveness of international non-proliferation
  regimes such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the
  Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). These explosions demonstrate that
  the norm against nuclear testing and the spread of nuclear weapons is not
  as strong as the norm against their use. A closer look at the dynamics of
  politics of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan proves the primacy of
  domestic politics as the determining factor behind the 1998 tests. The
  international community's attitude toward India and Pakistan proves that
  the proliferation issue has been subsumed by other concerns such as
  economic co-operation in the case of India, and international terrorism
in the case of Pakistan. Unless the norm against the spread of nuclear weapons becomes as strong as the norm against their use, the world is destined to live with de facto nuclear powers like India and Pakistan.

- Palmer, Norman D.
The Crisis of Democracy in India.

- Perkovich, George
India's Nuclear Weapons Debate: Unlocking the Door to the CTBT.

- Quester, George H.
Nuclear Pakistan and Nuclear India.

- Quinlan, Michael
How Robust is India-Pakistan Deterrence?
http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod
The risk that hostility between India and Pakistan may generate nuclear war depends upon factors too diverse and shifting for a simple prediction or assessment. Overall, the underpinnings of deterrence seem less solid than they had become in at least the later years of the Cold War between the US and Soviet Union. Stability in that setting became, however, very robust, and to say that risk is higher in South Asia is not to say that it is in absolute terms at all high. Nevertheless, the magnitude and repercussions of the catastrophe, should it happen, require that everything practicable be done to reduce the risk. By far the biggest contribution would be a settlement of the Kashmir conflict.

- Rebolledo, Vicente Garrido
India, Pakistan y el regimen de no proliferacion nuclear.
The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan have not only altered the nuclear balance in South Asia; they mean the failure of the nonproliferation regime sponsored by the United States. To fully understand the domestic and international implications of the tests it is also necessary to review the two countries' nuclear history and positions vis-a-vis nonproliferation. India can not be treated as a minor league player.

- Reiss, Mitchell
The Illusion of Influence: The United States and Pakistan's Nuclear Programme.

- Rizvi, Hasan-Askari
Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary Pakistan.
http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod
Despite the restoration of the democratic process in Pakistan, the military continues to be the most formidable actor in the political process. Top military leaders may not be interested in assuming power, but they have a significant input into decision-making on foreign policy, security affairs and key domestic issues. Their disposition towards the civilian government is shaped primarily by their professional and corporate interests. They are prepared to work with a government as long as it can cope with the problems of governance in an effective and transparent manner and does not threaten their interests. The civilian government enjoys sufficient freedom for political and economic
management, but it has to give due consideration to the military's sensibilities.

- Sawhney, Pravin
  The Challenge for India's Nuclear Deterrent.
  In this article, Pravin Sawhney explores India's various nuclear options, setting them in the context of regional tension with Pakistan, providing a detailed analysis of the nuclear potential of India's two main missile programmes and looking at where a nuclear strategy would fit in to current deterrence and war fighting doctrine.

- Sen, Samir K.
  He Who Rides a Tiger : The Rationale of India's Nuclear Tests.
  Although India is not a signatory to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and, in fact, had exploded a nuclear device as early as in 1974, India committed arguably the most provocative act of defiance against the nonproliferation regime by exploding five nuclear devices in May 1998. Soon thereafter similar tests were conducted by Pakistan. However, the United States and its allies were, understandably, more shocked by the Indian tests and blamed India for escalating tensions. Unprecedented economic sanctions since have been imposed against both India and Pakistan. Why did India undertake these tests and at this time ? Did domestic political factors play any role ? Is there a credible nuclear doctrine that will govern India ? What is the role of nuclear weapons in India's overall military strategy ? Will India now choose to abide by the comprehensive test ban treaty ? The future of South Asia's peace and, indeed, that of the world hinge on the answers to these and related questions. An attempt has been made in this article to understand the genesis of the Indian decision making for these tests and final answers to some of these questions. Some comments on how, from an Indian point of view, the United States may assist in the build-up of a durable peace in South Asia also have been offered.

- Sharma, Virendra C.
  Le programme spatial indien.
  Sixieme puissance spatiale apres les Etats-Unis, la Russie, l'Europe, le Japon et la Chine, l'Inde mene une politique spatiale determinee depuis les annees 60. Sous l'impulsion de Vikram Sarabhai, le programme spatial indien fut lance avec comme principaux objectifs le developpement socio-economique de l'Inde et une volonte d' independance dans ce domaine strategique. Des besoins importants en telecommunication et en telediffusion ainsi que la necessite d'une bonne gestion des ressources naturelles ont donne naissance a deux familles de satellites, les INSAT pour les telecommunications et les IRS pour la teledetection. L' independance en matiere de lanceurs, au moins pour les satellites IRS, fut atteinte avec la fusee PSLV. Le programme spatial, d' abord purement national au service du developpement du pays, vise maintenant les marches internationaux ou l' on constate quelques succes notamment dans le domaine de la teledetection et dans celui des lancements. L' importance strategique du programme s' est aussi considerablement accrue avec la mise en place de la doctrine de dissuasion nucleaire en 1998 puis les incidents de Kargil en 1999. La prochaine decennie devrait voir l' espace devenir encore plus qu' avant un moyen d' exprimer la volonte de puissance indienne a la fois au niveau regional et a l' echelle mondiale.
This paper discusses the current state of Pakistan's defense industry and its potential. Like most of the developing Third World countries, Pakistan also has a number of weapons production and related R&D facilities. The defense industrial infrastructure was considered necessary to maintain an ability to fight without compromising foreign policy or other state objectives. However, the present state of the defense industry does not give one the satisfaction that Pakistani policy-makers could depend upon local capabilities to fight a war. A variety of reasons pertaining to lack of an industrial culture, technological, industrial and educational backwardness, poor quality of human resource, dearth of resources, financial management and lack of a political will to establish a sound defense industry are some of the factors analysed in the paper.

The announcements of nuclear tests by India and Pakistan immediately generated scenes of intense enthusiasm in both countries: they are clearly seen as a defining moment in Indo-Pakistan relations. The stimulus appears to have been a Pakistani missile test and domestic political developments in India. Both countries indicated that they are going to use such devices for weapons and deploy them on delivery systems. However, for analysts attempting to evaluate the consequences, the situation is less clearly defined: we appear to be in the territory of smoke and mirrors. It has left the international community in significant difficulties over its response.

Since independence, India's nuclear policy has been to seek either global disarmament or equal security for all. The old nonproliferation regime was discriminatory, ratifying the possession of nuclear weapons for the permanent five members of the UN Security Council while preaching to the nuclear have-nots about the virtues of disarmament. India was left sandwiched between two nuclear weapons powers, Pakistan and a rising China. The end of the Cold War has not ushered in an era where globalization and trade trump old-fashioned security woes. If nuclear deterrence works in the West, why won't it work in India?

The clash with radical Islam is at its most serious in Pakistan where nuclear weapons could change hands. The President, Pervez Musharraf, has set out to deal with the radical Islamists. A great deal depends on his success.
India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests last May were a double setback: for security on the subcontinent and worldwide nonproliferation efforts. US attempts to forge warmer relations with both countries were also casualties of the blasts. The tests could spark a chain of withdrawals from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, undermining the international consensus against the spread of nuclear arms. Cold War brinkmanship is no model for diplomacy. For their sake as well as the world's, India and Pakistan need to stabilize their nuclear rivalry at the lower possible level, ban further tests, and embrace frequent, high-level bilateral talks to ease tensions.

In 1998 and 1999 a series of simulations and 'decision events' examined the possible consequences of recent ominous developments in South Asia. The most compelling result was that none of the experts, from a variety of backgrounds, nations, and organizations, argued that the scenario - a dispute over Kashmir leading to a nuclear exchange - could not happen.

This article seeks to examine the broader strategic implications of the Indian decision to develop a nuclear deterrent. It focuses on three distinct but related sets of issues. First, how does the formal Indian decision to develop a nuclear deterrent change the strategic environment in Southern Asia? Second, how does it affect the prospects of war and peace in the greater South Asian region? And, third, how will it affect American regional nonproliferation objectives and, in particular, India's relationship with the United States? This article will argue that India's prospective nuclearization is unlikely to dramatically alter the prevailing patterns of security competition in the region; that its prospective consequences for deterrence and crisis stability are more or less positive, though tinged with some uncertainty when subjective factors and third-party actions are taken into account; and that so long as it maintains a certain modicum of restraint India's relationship with the United States is unlikely to be undermined. The article concludes with a brief comment on the role nuclear issues ought to play in the evolving U.S. relations with India.


India's Naval Expansion: Reflections on History and Strategy.
India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests have dismayed the international community. However, they can be seen as a culmination of the deterioration of international nuclear relations that has taken place since the mid-1990s. The author examines the reasons for this deterioration which he finds in US-Russian relations, the Middle East and South Asia, in disputes over arms control objectives, and in normative and procedural dilemmas that emerged as the number of countries with nuclear weapon programmes was reduced to a 'hard core' of eight states. This discussion provides the background for an assessment of the consequences of the actions of India and Pakistan. Despite the dangers, the author stresses the opportunities that could lie ahead. If key states act positively and cooperatively, the climate and processes of nuclear arms control could be transformed.

- Walker, William
The Risks of Further Nuclear Testing in South Asia.
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 29, no. 6, September - October 1999, p. 20-25.

- Wijk, Rob de
India en Pakistan : nucleaire paria's of nette kernwapenstaten ?
INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, jg. 52, nr. 7-8, juli - augustus 1998, p. 390-394.
The author concludes that the risk of a nuclear holocaust in India and Pakistan is greater than in Europe during the Cold War. In South Asia, there is no informed political and public debate on the role nuclear weapons play in the security policies of these countries. Public opinion in both countries is enthusiastically in favour of the new nuclear capabilities. They have simplistic views about nuclear weapons and show a clear willingness to use them 'if necessary'. There is one important similarity with the nuclear debate in NATO and Warsaw Pact during the early phases of the Cold War. In the 1950s and 1960s the nuclear arsenals of both military blocks were vulnerable. This resulted in the 'use them or loose them' dilemma. Only after the United States and the Soviet Union had developed an invulnerable second strike capability, they entered into a stable situation of Mutually Assured Destruction. At present India and Pakistan seem to have no other option but to develop invulnerable means of delivery, such as highly mobile missile systems, missiles deployed in underground silo's and those deployed in submarines. Thus a new arms race may start in this part of Asia which could further undermine the already unstable situation.

- Withington, Thomas
The Other Allies : Russia, India, and Afghanistan's United Front.
Russia and India can argue that without their support, the United Front would have not defeated the Taliban. Because of this instrumental support, India and Russia will undoubtedly expect to have a voice in Afghanistan's future.

- Zahra, Farah
Pakistan's Road to a Minimum Nuclear Deterrent.

- Zook, Darren C.
A Culture of Deterrence : Nuclear Myths and Cultural Chauvenism.
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