This contribution by leading Ukrainian security experts to the development of NATO’s New Strategic Concept is conditioned by our country’s two-fold interest in NATO's future – firstly, as an active partner of the Alliance; secondly, we see future membership as essential for our national security. We consider that the Alliance:

- Is the main basis for security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area today and will remain so in the foreseeable future;
- Brings together Europe and North America in a Trans-Atlantic security alliance of democratic nations;
- Has real capabilities linked to political decisions;
- Can operate across a full spectrum of operations;
- Has clearly demonstrated its effectiveness and ability for internal transformation.

Our proposals for NATO’s New Strategic Concept are not focused on a Ukraine-specific agenda but rather reflect a vision of NATO's future that is relevant to Ukraine's perspectives and national security interests. Demonstrating this relevance, combined with progress in Ukraine’s development as a European democracy, will positively impact public perceptions of the Alliance within Ukraine far more than any “marketing” campaign.

**Mission**

NATO’s core mission should remain the collective defence of the Allies' territories and population. The fulfilment of this mission today and in the future will require new approaches and new capabilities. Collective defence cannot be achieved within national borders of the member-states, and must be closely linked with efforts to project security and stability through partnership. Such efforts should be linked by values and geography to NATO’s core mission, to avoid overstretching the Alliance’s capabilities and political will. Responsibility for global security should remain with the United Nations.

**Strategic perspective**
Emphasis should be on the values and way of life that the Alliance defends, rather than what it defends against. The New Strategic Concept should indicate that Article 5 can apply to both military and non-military acts of aggression, and that it is not only a collective commitment, but also a commitment by individual countries to respond to aggression against a member.

The New Strategic Concept must present clear messages for societies and leaders of the member-states, Partners, and aspirant countries as well as for those who may wish to undermine the security of its members or challenge its capability to function as a military and political Alliance. This should include:

- Commitment to projecting security and stability in the region, in particular along its borders;
- Confirmation of the Alliance's interest in the independence, territorial integrity and stable democratic development of neighbouring countries;
- Articulation of a security risk to NATO from the existing conflict zones near its borders;
- Willingness to develop and strengthen international confidence building regimes and measures in Europe, and to work toward this aim with partners (to include local arrangements to address specific issues and mitigate the negative impact of the CFE regime’s breakdown).

NATO should demonstrate its willingness to discuss European security arrangements that will meet the legitimate interests of non-NATO states, with the clear understanding that these cannot replace NATO, cannot change its nature as an Alliance of democratic nations, and should not create external constraints on its freedom to make and carry out its legitimate decisions.

**Comprehensive security approach and capabilities**

The New Strategic Concept should give clear direction on the mix of capabilities needed to address complex global and regional challenges, including military, non-military, and asymmetric aspects. It should provide guidance on how capabilities should be developed and ambitions balanced with resources.

Major risks or threats should be named and prioritised, including articulation of non-military risks that demand Alliance attention. Enhanced political dialogue is needed to foster consensus on approaches and common action on issues such as energy security, cyber defence, climate change, corruption, illegal migration, illegal arms trade, human trafficking, drug trafficking, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

In an effort to develop a well-integrated approach to security, the non-military component of Alliance activities should be strengthened in areas like environment, public health, cyber-security, civil emergency, as well as science, education, and humanitarian/cultural activities. This should include improving coordinating structures for its non-military activities. NATO should seek to increase the civil component in NATO operations, principally through cooperation with other international institutions (EU first of all) and NGOs. However, the Alliance should also develop its own ability to generate and direct civil capacity when needed.

**Cooperation with other organisations**
The modalities of the Alliance’s interaction with other international organizations should be articulated. Linkage between NATO’s activities and UN/OSCE principles should be strengthened to improve international legitimacy for Alliance operations. Political consultation and practical cooperation with the EU should be strengthened, based on principles of joint responsibility on one hand and clarified division of competences on the other, in order to avoid functional overlapping and competition in the regional and global arena.

**Decision-making and consensus**

While the Alliance has significant internal difficulties in reaching consensus on some issues, there is a clear consensus on the need to preserve the Alliance, while transforming it to continue its relevance. The fundamental substance of the North Atlantic Treaty should be preserved, maintaining the equal rights of "small" and "big" members. Mutual confidence in the readiness of all to fulfil commitments would be improved by more concrete definition of the allies' obligations related to collective security and the development and maintenance of the capabilities needed. Balance should be provided between the consensus rule and the need to avoid the possibility of operational paralysis, particularly in a crisis.

Consultation, information sharing, contingency planning, and crisis management gaming on existing and emerging security threats should be increased, with the inclusion of Partners where relevant.

**Enlargement**

The Alliance should re-iterate that it has an Open Door policy for any European democracy, in order to keep what has been a powerful tool for motivating democratic reforms and a commitment to collective security in potential candidates. The Alliance should also consider how to support the legitimate national security interests of candidate-countries during the accession process. The final decision on accession must be a sovereign right of the national governments and the Allies.

**Partnership**

Partnership has demonstrated exceptional effectiveness. The New Concept should acknowledge this and in the first place improve the effectiveness of partnership in the existing formats (EAPC, PfP Programme, Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Initiative), in addition to new initiatives that expand partnership globally and including international and non-governmental organisations. Partnership should be more flexible, in order to keep it relevant and useful for each partner country and NATO. In addition to self-differentiation by Partners, the Alliance should tailor its relations with partners based on common values, interests, and the potential to contribute to collective security, including through future membership. This should include strengthened bilateral dialogue and activities.

The New Concept should be more relevant to Partners’ security concerns, and be used by the Alliance to pro-actively promote regional security. The Alliance should be open to discuss the full spectrum of Partners’ concerns, and work to develop a program of practical work to meet these concerns in a way consistent with Alliance principles and policies. This should involve greater consultation with partners on crisis prevention and crisis management. Joint planning mechanism should be strengthened to link possible crisis consultations with a menu of possible concrete actions and relevant capabilities.
The Alliance should increase its commitment to the security of Partners actively contributing to NATO operations, undergoing Euro-Atlantic reforms, or preparing for membership. This could include articulating a principle of democratic solidarity, which would not place any formal obligations on NATO but would give some decree of assurance to Partners regarding NATO's readiness for decisive actions to protect peace and stability and help deter potential aggressors.

Russia

The New Strategic Concept should support development of relations with the Russian Federation on a basis of cooperation, engagement, a search for common interests and avoiding artificial confrontation. However, it should be clear that this is not at the risk of Alliance values and unity. The effectiveness of this cooperation should be measured by the practical, rather than political, results. Should one partner's readiness for compromise be perceived by the other as a sign of weakness, this could provoke further aggressiveness. NATO must therefore have a set of tools to simultaneously engage and to defend its interests. The Alliance should help its Partners in the region enhance their mutual confidence with Russia, in order to ensure common approaches and avoid a security grey zone.

Public Diplomacy & Public Support

Broad public support for NATO and national policies is essential for the success of NATO’s operations and ongoing transformation. Public diplomacy should become an indispensable element of NATO activities; the Alliance should learn how to deliver credible, convincing and consistent messages to global society regarding its mission, goals and policies. Partners’ specifics should be taken into account; for example geopolitical challenges, dominative stereotypes and the nature of national information spaces. The New Strategic Concept should be a useful tool to help NATO become more specific in its messaging and better understood. The document should be a concise statement of strategic approaches and priorities, easy for non-experts to understand, that makes use of the wide format of discussions on its development.

National governments, supported by NATO, should maintain a strong two-way communication line with their societies in order to ensure that the public considers itself a stakeholder in security policy. For this purpose, non-governmental experts should be consistently involved ongoing strategic assessments and planning, as well as in public diplomacy efforts.

*This Paper was prepared within the framework of the NATO-Ukraine Partnership Network, by experts from: Razumkov Centre, Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, Ukraine-NATO Civic League, Atlantic Council of Ukraine, Foreign Policy Research Institute of the Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine, Democratic Initiatives Foundation, Centre for European and Trans-Atlantic Studies, Defence and Security Policy Centre, Nomos Centre and independent experts.*

*These proposals from Ukraine’s expert community are consulted with, but do not necessarily coincide with, official Ukrainian views.*