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TOWARDS A NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR NATO

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Rome, September 2009
NATO Defense College Cataloguing-in-Publication-Data:
“TOWARDS A NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR NATO”

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(NATO Defense College “NDC Forum Papers Series”)
Copy-editing: Maria Di Martino

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Printed and bound by
Tipografia Facciotti s.r.l. – Vicolo Pian Due Torri, 74 – 00146 Roma
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Now that NATO’s 60th Anniversary Summit in Strasbourg/Kehl in early April 2009 has tasked the Secretary General with the development of a new Strategic Concept, this paper offers some ideas on content and method, based on experience with the development of NATO’s 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts. It proposes a Strategy of “Cooperative Security” to guide the Alliance for the foreseeable future.

The year-long reluctance among NATO member states to engage in a revision of the existing Strategic Concept has not yet been entirely overcome. However, that document, dating from 1999 and thus pre-dating 11 September 2001, the Afghanistan Operation, the war against Iraq, the progress in security policy of the European Union and the Russian-Georgian war, is undeniably outdated. A “divisive process” is feared by many, whilst the weakened strategic consensus within NATO in many areas would rather call for a “uniting effort”.

As a prerequisite for a new Strategic Concept, there is a need to fundamentally debate among Allies the entire spectrum of topics important for Alliance policy and strategy. In this effort, they must be aware of the different orientations of the Alliance’s regional groupings (not least regarding the balance between collective defence and out-of-area operations), of the increased difficulties in finding consensus, of the potentially centrifugal mechanisms and of the danger of overstretching NATO and taking on too many tasks.

Expectations that a Strategic Concept could create the consensus that is lacking should not be too high, nor should it paper over the cracks. But in its preparation the important subject areas need to be candidly debated in a truly strategic dialogue – with the aim to narrow down differences and to re-establish strategic consensus among Allies. Thus the process is as important as the result.
The purpose and role of NATO need to be redefined, with the right balance between collective defence and out-of-area operations as well as between regional and global orientation. Transatlantic unity is to be re-established, the cooperation with the European Union has to be made to function, and the relationship with Russia needs a new basis requiring a mutual learning process. Today’s security challenges call for an innovative approach and the awareness that the military is but one element of the solution. The role of military power requires conceptual debate, where not least the principle of deterrence needs to be rethought. This leads to the discussion of nuclear policy and strategy, which cannot be avoided as was the case 10 years ago, as well as of missile defence and the importance of space.

The discussion on broad cooperation includes the Comprehensive Approach, NATO’s cooperation with the UN and other International Organizations as well as with Non-Governmental Organizations. Reflections about multinationality and about Private Military Companies belong to this context. This leads to considerations regarding principles and lessons to be heeded in peace missions and operations. Partnerships and Enlargement are another large field for the strategic dialogue with the potentiality for diverging views which must be candidly addressed.

Regarding new security challenges, it is proposed that realistic analysis and conclusions are required concerning proliferation, biological attacks, terrorism, organized crime, maritime security and piracy, energy security, the relationship between climate, food and water with security, and cyber security.

Arms control and confidence-building is an area where NATO should raise its profile, but not neglect security. Furthermore, its activities in education and training, security sector reform and demobilization, disarmament and re-integration, as well as in civil emergency, disaster relief and Science for Peace have developed to such an extent that they should figure in the Strategic Concept, with the side-effect, it is hoped, that they will be better coordinated with national bilateral activities.
NATO’s Transformation with regard to the military concerns the balance between homeland protection and defence vs. the expeditionary orientation, military capabilities and the need for a critical look at “Transformation” activities. It also refers to their focus on the military side, whereas NATO requires political and internal transformation as well.

It is then proposed to dedicate part of the strategic dialogue and also, possibly, some statements in the new Strategic Concept to the main regions of the world in which NATO has interests.

Finally, the need for public support is addressed, requiring public diplomacy and strategic communication and, even more importantly, credibility in that NATO’s members honour words with deeds.

This long inventory of subjects should not be misunderstood as a “shopping list”. Priorities must be identified. But they must all figure in the strategic dialogue, and consensus on the “smaller” subjects may flow from enhanced unity in the “big” ones.

In the tasking contained in the “Declaration on Alliance Security”, it remains ambiguous how “new” the Strategic Concept is to be. It ought to start with a “clean sheet”, which does not exclude incorporating in the new document those parts of the 1999 Concept that can still be regarded as valid, and also some of the “acquis” of the last ten years contained in Summit Declarations and NATO documents on terrorism, proliferation, cyber security etc.

Still, much creative and innovative work is necessary, and the experience with the creation of the first Strategic Concept can be valuable here. That process was characterized by a thorough preparation phase with much innovative groundwork and informal “brainstorming” sessions of the Council before texts were drafted. Such a process would offer an appropriate role for the outside experts. It is not advisable to follow the opposite example of the restrictive remit in 1998 “to review and where necessary update” the Strategic Concept.
The initiative to develop a new Strategic Concept is an opportunity for NATO to come to terms with internal strategic disunity and often doubtful political will, to redefine its purpose and missions (including tasks it is not competent for), to advertise its “brand” in order to improve the organization’s image, to regain public support and to proclaim a strategy of “Cooperative Security” – cooperation among Allies and Partner states, cooperation among the “interlocking institutions”, cooperation within the Comprehensive Approach, cooperation with Russia and cooperation in the arms control field – an offer to the world in a truly comprehensive approach to security in the 21st century.
INTRODUCTION

At their Strasbourg/Kehl Summit in early April 2009, celebrating the Washington Treaty’s 60th anniversary, NATO’s Heads of State and Government commissioned a new Strategic Concept for the Alliance. For some years already that had been called for, but Chancellor Merkel’s initiative at the Munich Security Conference in February 2006¹ was followed by another two years of hesitation. Her insistence had created the expectation that a new Strategic Concept could be agreed at the jubilee summit.² But:”Everywhere there is discussion about a new Strategic Concept, except at NATO Headquarters,” observers quipped.

Twice after the end of the Cold War, NATO codified in “Strategic Concepts” its core tasks and politico-military guidelines - in 1991, two years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and again in 1999 for its 50th anniversary Washington Summit. Clearly the developments which the subsequent decade has seen in the security field call for a new one. But the reluctance within the Alliance stemmed from the concern that the necessary conceptual debate could result in a very “divisive process”.

This paper argues in favour of a truly new Strategic Concept and lays out some ideas and themes for the necessary strategic dialogue among member states that would lead there.³ It is offered as a “workshop contribution” with “food for thought” on the issues to be treated in the Strategic Concept and, in many cases, requiring substantial and frank debate as a prerequi-

¹ Speech by Chancellor Angela Merkel at the 42nd Munich Security Conference, 4 February 2007.
² For early ideas see Klaus Wittmann, Ein neues Strategisches Konzept, in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 July 2007.
³ This essay is to some extent informed by the author’s experience with the elaboration of the first Strategic Concept 1990/91 (as the Chairman of the Military Strategy Working Group in the International Military Staff at NATO Headquarters) and of the second one 1998/99 (as the Defence Advisor to the German NATO Ambassador). See Klaus Wittmann, The Road to NATO’s New Strategic Concept, in Gustav Schmidt (ed.), A History of NATO. The First Fifty Years (Houndmills/New York; Palgrave, 2001), vol. 3, pp. 219-237; and: Rob de Wijk, NATO On the Brink of the New Millennium. The Battle for Consensus (London/Washington, 1997).
site. It proposes a Strategy of “Cooperative Security”: cooperation among Allies and Partner states, cooperation among the “interlocking institutions”, cooperation within the Comprehensive Approach, cooperation with Russia and cooperation in the arms control field – an offer to the world in a truly comprehensive approach to security in the 21st century.

The Annex provides five key documents which appear to be quoted more often than known: the Harmel Report of 1967 (resulting from the one time when NATO “outsourced” a fundamental report about its future), the Strategic Concepts of 1991 and 1999, the “Comprehensive Political Guidance” (CPG) promulgated at NATO’s Riga Summit meeting in November 2006 – which compensated for the unwillingness to go ahead with work on a revision of the extant Strategic Concept – and the “Declaration on Alliance Security” agreed at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit with the tasking for the development of a new Strategic Concept.4

Before and around the 60-years Summit a plethora of studies, papers and op-eds appeared, containing useful ideas and proposals.5 This publication offers considerations and reflections on a large number of subjects. The aim is to ask the right questions and to identify problems – and in any event to go beyond the “NATO must-should-needs to” catalogues and

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4 Where these documents are referred to in the text, they are not specifically referenced in the footnotes.
“shopping lists” with their clear-cut recommendations, and also to avoid their often very prescriptive tone. Thus the Paper offers more questions than answers. But the debate among Allies must be conducted on these topics in a profound and candid dialogue with the aim to narrow down differences and to re-establish strategic consensus.

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6 The author’s ambition is not to draft the Strategic Concept, and he is well aware of what Lothar Rühl somewhat mockingly held against his 2007 essay on “A new Strategic Concept” (see note 2): “Many topics are not yet a concept.” (Lothar Rühl, Viele Themen sind noch kein Konzept, in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 August 2007).
BACKGROUND

1. Why a new Strategic Concept?

It is undeniable that the security landscape has dramatically changed since the last Strategic Concept was agreed in 1999. It stems from the period before, among others, 11 September 2001, the Afghanistan Operation, the war against Iraq, the progress in security policy of the European Union and the Russian-Georgian war. But neither the Summit in Riga (November 2006) nor the one in Bucharest (April 2008) issued the remit for a revision. True, Riga published the “Comprehensive Political Guidance” (CPG), a brief document meant to complement the present Strategic Concept – already an implicit acknowledgement of its outdatedness, but largely limited to the area of defence and force planning with regard to the capabilities needed by the Alliance.

Obviously, the 60-years Jubilee Summit was missed as a target date. But against the often-heard argument “this is not the right time”\(^7\) one can hold that there never seems to be a “right time” for potentially difficult conceptual and policy debates, for basic reflection and self-ascertainment of the Alliance.

Now the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit has finally agreed on the remit for the elaboration of a new Strategic Concept. But, as shown in the last chapter, it is a tasking “with strings attached”. And the “Declaration on Alliance Security” that should have underpinned it with substantial statements about the changed security environment, the centrality of Alliance consultation, NATO’s self-definition regarding its role in today’s world, its goals, its strategic views, the character of its operations and its cooperative relations turns out to be a rather bland document containing just the basic prin-

ciples. In any event, the moment was seized where the work can profit from the new US administration, from France’s full return, from the impetus provided by Chancellor Merkel’s support of NATO, and also from a thorough analysis of the NATO-Russia relationship post-Georgia.

The main argument that used to be advanced, in NATO HQ and by nations, against a revision of the Strategic Concept, says that this meant risking “a very divisive exercise”. But aren’t the Allies so divided in so many regards that, rather, a “uniting endeavour” is urgently required?

Former German Chancellor Schröder’s speech, read out by Defence Minister Struck to the Munich Security Conference in 2005, sounded in parts like a bitter farewell to the Alliance. But he was not wrong in stating that NATO was no longer the primary venue for transatlantic consultation and for the coordination of strategic positions. However, the “strategic dialogue” so frequently called for is indispensable and imperative. There are rifts across the Atlantic, made glaringly obvious by the Iraq crisis, but also fissures within Europe. To date they have, in spite of atmospheric improvements, been merely glossed over. And they have worsened again as Russia’s attack on Georgia, signalling reassertion in its “near abroad” and claiming the duty to protect all Russians outside Russia, has sent a chill through the NATO members who formerly belonged to the Warsaw Pact or even the Soviet Union.

Further counterarguments are raised: such basic documents are not programmatic and future-oriented, but mainly the codification of preceding policies. This was indeed the experience with the revision of the first Strategic Concept, leading to the new one in 1999. Theory followed practice, concepts resulted from events and decisions, whilst in the truly revolutionary situation after the end of the East-West conflict the experience was different and indeed something entirely new was created. Arguably, so much has changed since 1999, so much obscurity and uncertainty exist,

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8 Speech by Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder at the 41st Munich Security Conference, 12 February 2005.
and such vast divergences have occurred that, once again, a visionary and forward-looking fundamental document, providing clear orientation for NATO’s future and recommitting the Allies, is required.

Finally, sceptics say that an “academic” exercise made no sense. It is not “academic”; it is about the crafting of a new vision for the Alliance focusing on conceptual and policy issues that require clarification in the interest of re-establishing the strategic consensus.

2. Strategic Concepts I and II

The first Strategic Concept, agreed on 8 November 1991 at the NATO Summit meeting in Rome, constituted a marked contrast to the confrontational military strategy codified in the famous MC 14/3 document (“forward defence”, “flexible response”). It made the “broad concept of security” the conceptual basis of NATO thinking.

It was a “strategy without an adversary” and described, after the disappearance of the one-dimensional military threat from the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact, diffuse “risks” for peace and security. To Defence and Dialogue, the strategy “pillars” familiar from the Harmel Report, Cooperation, in particular with former adversaries, was explicitly added. Further innovative elements were crisis management, arms control (and its interaction with force planning), and a broader spectrum of armed forces’ tasks in peace, crisis and war. Linear military thinking was replaced by a call for greater flexibility of the forces, and the even more political, as opposed to war-fighting, role of nuclear weapons was highlighted (“circumstances …extremely remote”). The document was, in contrast with the NATO Secret MC 14/3, published in order to demonstrate transparency, trustworthiness and preparedness for cooperation. The Alliance thought it had safeguarded its persistent relevance by the great conceptual step made with its Strategic Concept.

However, the years following 1991 quickly brought further decisive changes: the demise of the Soviet Union; intervention and the assumption
of stabilization and peacekeeping missions in the context of the Balkan wars, but also an extension and concretization of the cooperative approach; NATO enlargement by the accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic; the establishment of special cooperation relationships with Russia and Ukraine as well as in the “Mediterranean Dialogue”; and finally “internal adaptation” through a new and leaner command structure and the emergence of a “European Security and Defence Identity” (ESDI).

These developments and decisions as well as their programmatic foundations were codified in the new Strategic Concept agreed on 25 April 1999 by the Washington Summit celebrating, amidst fighting in the Kosovo air campaign, NATO’s 50th anniversary. The document amended NATO’s main functions and declared as its “core security tasks”: Security, Consultation, Deterrence and Defence, Contribution to Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management, Partnership and Cooperation. The strategic environment was captured in a broadened description of challenges and dangers to security (including a first, albeit very cautious, mention of terrorism). The notion of “mutually reinforcing institutions” in the European security architecture (UN, EU, OSCE, NATO) included an acknowledgement of the increasing importance of the European Union’s ambitions in the field of security policy.

Further essential elements of the Concept were statements about the instruments necessary for crisis prevention and management, demands for the transformation of armed forces towards flexibility, deployability and sustainability, as well as about the stabilizing function of dialogue, cooperation and partnership. The focus on the “Euro-Atlantic area” meant rejection of a “world policeman” role for NATO, but was to be interpreted as “Europe and its periphery”, with “periphery” taken to be a quite elastic, expandable term. Finally, after the conduct of combat action in Yugoslavia in 1999 without a UN Security Council mandate, the Strategic Concept emphasized the central role of the United Nations and its Security Council’s prerogative, but avoided, through “constructively ambiguous” formulations, an unequivocal renunciation of any “self-mandated” action in the case of another stalemate in the Security Council.
Although the result of a quite conservative remit ("review, and where necessary adapt" the Concept of 1991), and product of many compromises, the 1999 document was a satisfactory description of Alliance policy and strategy. Ten years later, however, it is obvious that it no longer reflects in a timely and authoritative manner NATO’s *raison d’être*, its goals and tasks, its threat assessment, its forms of action, its cooperative network, the necessary political and military capabilities, its strategic principles – and the experience acquired in its most important missions in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan.

### 3. More changes – and warning signs for NATO

The security landscape has indeed changed again to a considerable extent since the issuance of the last Strategic Concept, and, most spectacularly, the terror attacks of 11 September 2001 that struck the USA. And if for Europeans the principal paradigm change in security policy was caused by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, for Americans it is dated from “9/11”. Further significant changes were brought about by the Afghanistan war and NATO’s long-term engagement in support of Afghan reconstruction and state-building; by the further NATO enlargement, with first seven (including, for the first time, former Soviet Republics) and then two more new members; by the US invasion of Iraq, assisted by a number of NATO members, and the ensuing fissures in the Alliance; by the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) for the Gulf states; by the further development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP); by the continued and accelerating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology; by the unfolding of global terrorism; as well as by the growing awareness of the relevance for security of raw material scarcity, energy, resource, health, climate, demographic and social problems, and of the dark sides of globalization. For some time now, NATO has no longer been a Eurocentric alliance.

And now even this statement has to be qualified, because of another dramatically critical development in the international situation: the Russian
attack on Georgia on 8 August 2008, which many commentators called a *caesura* comparable to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the terror attacks on New York and Washington. It accentuated more acutely some of the issues to be addressed in the new Strategic Concept, most prominently Russia’s goals and behaviour, as well as the prospects for cooperation or confrontation between NATO and Russia. More basically, it brought to the fore again the split of 2003 between some old and some new NATO members – this time in a more “existential” way because it is about the balance between Article 5, i.e. the Alliance’s security guarantee, and its out-of-area engagements and operations.

A Strategic Concept that originates from a time before all these events and developments, and their consequences, cannot continue to be valid, as still stated in the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) of November 2006. Few continue to believe this.

But also the state of the Alliance argues for a thorough self-assessment and -ascertainment, with a quite benevolent critic stating already three years ago that NATO was “losing acceptance and support (…), was being pushed by events to the limits of its military and political capacity” and failed in setting priorities.9 And criticism abounds of the lack of strategic consensus, the decision-making process, NATO’s standing in several parts of the world, lack of progress in Afghanistan etc.

Not all negative statements should be taken at face value. The North Atlantic Alliance has been a success story for many decades. It has existed for 60 years as the only efficient security organization. It has adapted to developments since the end of the Cold War in an admirable way and to an astonishing extent. Already then many analysts and commentators thought it was in an identity crisis and a victim of its own success – with nothing left to do than to report “mission accomplished” and to step off the global stage. Instead, NATO has made essential contributions towards the

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9 Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger, *Das Dilemma der NATO*, in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 September.
creation of a “Europe whole and free” as well as towards peace and stability beyond, and has proven to be an attractive alliance which no member wants to leave and many others want to join.

But that does not appear to be sufficient any longer. NATO should pay attention to the warning signs, such as its bad reputation in the Arab world (as a perceived instrument of the USA), a gap between ambition and wherewithal, the insufficient matching of political decisions with member states’ contributions in troops and capabilities, the unsatisfactory cooperation with the European Union, the deteriorated relationship with Russia, the lack of public interest and support, the manifold doubts about its continued relevance - and, topically, the concern about the developments in Afghanistan, where the Alliance’s authority and standing are very much at stake. The simultaneous dangers of NATO’s irrelevance” and “overstretch” have been described as the Alliance’s “dilemma”.10

Also, there are ever more marked regional groupings with different security experiences and interests within the Alliance, such as those advocating a global orientation (US, UK, partly Canada); others emphasizing NATO’s regional character and advocating cooperative security (“old Europe”, but far from being united); several new members who, particularly after the Georgia war, insist on the priority of Article 5 and collective defence; and the Southern members emphasizing the dangers in the Mediterranean region. This makes the need for re-establishing strategic consensus very obvious. Finally, critics deplore a “cumbersome political structure”, bureaucratic sclerosis, awkward decision-making processes, and a financing mechanism not adequate for an alliance acting “as one”.11

All this is damaging NATO’s credibility, which should be restored to the extent possible in the debate leading to a new Strategic Concept. There is a multitude of subjects requiring clarification in this process.

11 See, for instance, Naumann et al., p. 124.
THEMES FOR THE STRATEGIC DIALOGUE

A Strategic Concept guides the Alliance in the future, it sets and describes the comprehensive framework for the Alliance’s actions, activities and operations, and it should also establish and define their limits. And the sarcastic depreciation of the importance of this basic document by an expert on NATO, that reading the Strategic Concept was “akin to a visit to the Louvre – once in a lifetime”12 is witty, but not appropriate to the rank this document has. Nobody thinks of revising the Washington Treaty, but the Strategic Concept comes right behind it: it is indeed its concretization for an extended period. However, particularly in times of rapid change, it needs to be periodically reviewed.

What then are the principal themes requiring clarification, common agreement and renewed consensus? What are the main necessities for creating new unity among Allies – across the Atlantic and inside Europe? And which are the priorities?

It must be emphasized that of course not everything is obsolete and has to be thrown overboard. The Strategic Concepts of 1991 and 1999 also contained well-proven and novel elements; they were expressions of continuity and change. For instance, the “core security tasks” will presumably continue to be valid.

However, since many aspects require innovative thinking, one must warn against just “revising” the extant text, “wordsmithing”, as it were, from the outset. NATO should devise its new Strategic Concept on “a clean sheet of paper”. This certainly includes taking stock of the elements that would be carried over into a new document, but the following subject areas make it clear, in the view of the author, that a truly new Strategic Concept is required, not just a marginally updated one.

This paper does not attempt to draft a new Strategic Concept for NATO, but raises questions and themes in need of clarification in a genuine inter-Allied strategic dialogue deserving that name. There should be no illusion that all the issues raised would be neatly and consensually answered in the next Strategic Concept. It will certainly again be a product of compromise. But, already, the process of debating these themes in a systematic, purposeful fashion will make nations clarify their positions, for themselves also, and has the potential to narrow down divergences among Allies.

1. Purpose and role of NATO

Humorously the question has been posed whether 60 years of NATO’s existence would be reason for celebrating a jubilee or for retirement. The recurring debate about “identity crisis”, “original mission fulfilled”, “victim of its own success” will not be resumed here. However, instilling new life into NATO’s raison d’être appears desirable.

Does that mean that NATO needs to re-invent itself? That certainly would be going too far and might affect the Washington Treaty, which no serious participant in the debate wants to question, change or renew. But certainly the Alliance should re-define its character and role ten years after it last did that, re-state its relevancy under again changed circumstances, re-explain its contribution to international peace and stability, and re-commit its member states and their peoples to the common cause.

The main issues, summed up, concern:

• the tasks with regard to the balance between homeland defence (Article 5 tasks) and “out-of-area” missions/“expeditionary” operations, where the emphasis now appears to be almost exclusively on missions abroad;

• the reach, where the “out-of-area debate” is history since the Prague
(2002) Summit statement\textsuperscript{13} that the Alliance would meet security challenges “from wherever they may come”; and

- the character of NATO armed activities: no longer operations “of necessity” like the defence against a full-scale attack, but “of choice”, also referred to as “discretionary operations”, with all the implications this has for consensus-building.

In these three fields the pendulum has very markedly swung to an extreme side, of which the Alliance needs to be cognizant and where a new balance has to be found.

With regard to tasks, several new NATO members continue to hold Article 5 of the NATO treaty in higher esteem that some others and are concerned about uncertainties connected with Russia’s development. Even Iceland, since recently stripped of the US military presence and facing Russian long-range bomber flight patterns reminiscent of the Cold War era, is concerned. The Georgia crisis has increased worries about Russian intimidation of what it likes to see as its “near abroad”. And there are new security challenges, addressed below, which bring concerns “closer to home”. Still, the former German Defence Minister Struck’s dictum that “our security is also defended at the Hindukush” remains true, for others also. But if the “new mission spectrum” is evoked, it should be clear that this does not mean that security tasks have totally switched from one end of the spectrum to the other, but that, notwithstanding changed probabilities, it has just become broader. (And the fact that some nations have so radically shifted their priorities in force planning to the one side can also be interpreted as a “poor man’s solution”.)

Concerning the reach, the “from wherever” statement is quite far-reaching. It may not forever command public support in such a general way. Perhaps more precision is needed here. Notwithstanding the extension of NATO’s tasks and scope, it remains, according to the Washington Treaty,

\textsuperscript{13} Prague Summit Declaration, 21 November 2002, paragraph 3.
a regional organization. The compromise formulation in the 1999 Strategic Concept of the “Euro-Atlantic region” was wise, because it implied, apart from North America and the Atlantic, “Europe and its periphery” – periphery being a flexible term, with its extension depending on “concernedness”, for instance by missile ranges, terrorist training camps, refugee stream origins and the like. But that does not mean that NATO will become the “global policeman”. It means that Allies will have to debate, case-by-case, and achieve consensus about where NATO should become engaged. A balance is also needed with regard to new “global partners”, because this initiative also requires good relations with nations who may not be “Partners” or a “Contact Countries”, but nations such as China, who might become suspicious about global partnerships. The often sloppy talk about “NATO going global” considerably contributes to this.

With regard to the character of NATO operations, it is banal to restate that with the disappearance of the monolithic threat of a full-scale attack by the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact the central unifying element has disappeared, and today’s security challenges are much more open to interpretation. For “discretionary operations” support is less easy to muster, and the danger of NATO dissolving into “coalitions of the willing (and capable)” looms large.

In light of these three elements, grandiloquent descriptions of NATO’s development as a mutation “from a static defence alliance to a global security and stability provider” have their problems. The new Strategic Concept will have to develop and lay out very carefully the following fundamentals: the necessary balance between members’ security and missions abroad (and why they are also important for the members’ security interests); how the Treaty’s Article 5 is limited to the area of mutual assistance (often wrongly referred to as the “NATO area”); and that, however, Art. 4 provides for consultation on whatever security concern exists, which can certainly lead to decisions about actions, contributions and operations.

In drafting a new Strategic Concept, it is important to identify elements of continuity and elements of change. (This is in fact how the strategy revision in 1990 started.) NATO’s core security functions (the “fundamental security tasks” in the Strategic Concept of 1999), central aspects of NATO’s character and roles, belong to the elements of continuity and should be restated:

- **Security:** To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force.

- **Consultation:** To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members’ security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

- **Deterrence and Defence:** To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty.

And in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area:

- **Crisis Management:** To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.

- **Partnership:** To promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action with the Alliance.

All still appear valid, but this has to be debated, including proposals to add activities/ambitions such as “coercion” to the list.
NATO’s history is often described in three “phases”: the Cold War; the contribution to the creation of a peaceful “Europe whole and free” (“stability transfer”) through Partnership for Peace and enlargement; and “post-9/11” with the assumption of tasks “out-of-area”. The particular fact not realized everywhere is that a respective new “phase” has not simply superseded the previous one, but that all “three NATOs” are there to stay. That is to say that collective defence and protection of Allies continues to be the key responsibility of NATO, and that the peaceful unified Europe is far from accomplished, while certainly NATO missions beyond Europe have gained importance.15 To discuss this thoroughly and express it convincingly in the Strategic Concept is important, and demanding.

With regard to the developments of recent years, where every problem seems to be deposited at the doorstep of the only functioning security organization, NATO has sarcastically been compared to a Swiss Army knife “with all functions extended”, given its assumption of ever more and different tasks.16 Thus, it would be useful to consciously formulate clear limits between what NATO is willing and able to do, and what not.

This would lead to a description of how it sees itself in the concert of other security-relevant organizations. Ambitiously, this is often referred to as “security architecture”. More soberly it means the international community and particularly the concert of security-relevant organizations, where NATO makes its contributions within the “interlocking institutions” (which are, in turn, sometimes ridiculed as “interlocking institutions”, given the painful effects of institutional prestige thinking, over-ambition, competition and jealousy). Here defining and improving the relationship with the European Union claims priority.

While NATO must not appear keen to be a “solo player” or to assume every task presenting itself, it should lay aside the sterile debate about

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15 See Patrick Keller, Unterwegs ins Ungewisse. Die Strategiedebatte der NATO nach dem Gipfel, in Internationale Politik, Mai 2009, p. 94-97, advocating an “allround strategy”.
whether it is a “political” or a “military” alliance. It should define itself as a politico-military “security alliance” and factually describe its specialities (which make it indeed the best-functioning security organization): its military forces, its integrated command structure, its decade-long experience in multinational military cooperation, and the joint defence and force planning process.

Identifying and explaining NATO’s purpose, character and roles is the first task of a new Strategic Concept, which should in its opening chapter or preamble make convincing, strong statements about Alliance solidarity and about the credibility that is not granted unless deeds match ambitions, decisions are properly resourced and political will is not only proclaimed but sustained, underpinned and communicated. And it should set priorities.

The world is waiting for the emergence of a new global order. It will not simply be the *pax americana*, which has served it well over many decades. It should not be “multipolar”, insofar as this concept carries confrontation-al connotations. It ought to be a cooperative world community, and NATO alone is certainly not the organization to bring it about. The Alliance, however, is a nucleus of stability and cooperation, which should continue to be at the service of the larger international community. In the transatlantic dialogue its member nations should debate what NATO’s contribution can be towards reinforcing the positive sides and opportunities of globalization, and also harmonize among themselves their respective stances in the other organizations of which they are members.

Obviously, many of the individual topics in the following sections are linked to this basic opening theme.

2. Transatlantic unity

Even if the new order may not be the *pax americana*, in spite of alleged overstretch, financial crisis and the Iraq debacle, it would be entirely wrong to write off the United States with its global reach and military
might. The US remains the indispensable, global, order-maintaining power and the leading member nation of NATO, this alliance of sovereign and democratic states.

Therefore a prime and foremost necessity is to determine anew and solidify the transatlantic relationship – in the awareness that it not only serves the West but indeed global security and stability. The close connection, solidarity and cooperation between Europe and the North American nations USA and Canada is the core of NATO. No other group of countries has stronger mutual affinity, a more solid common base of values, principles, interests and commitments, and cooperates more closely with one other. NATO continues to be a unique symbiosis of the Old and New Worlds.

Yet there are grave fissures, and not only since the crisis over Iraq, which is said to have led to a “near-death experience” for NATO. In order to improve the state of the transatlantic relationship, it must be candidly discussed where the differences, mainly between numerous European member nations and the United States, but also among Europeans, lie and how they could be overcome for the sake of greater NATO cohesion.

The list is long: European criticism of interventionism and the intended spread of democracy through “regime change”; different views about multi- and unilateralism; the fact that after 9/11 the US regard themselves as in a state of war, whilst for the Europeans terrorism is mainly a law enforcement problem; differing views about the use of force and its legitimization on both sides of the Atlantic. Limitation of freedom for the sake of security is seen differently; the Guantánamo prisoner camp was severely criticized in Europe, as are American approaches to Private Military Companies, torture and the possession of small arms. Also, Europeans, though equally concerned about Iran possibly acquiring nuclear weapons, are loath to issue military threats and are procrastinating decisions about a

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17 As the then US NATO Ambassador was quoted.
missile defence system. NATO enlargement, the relationship with Russia, and the interest in continued arms control are further areas of different opinions, and US policies on trade, climate change, technological cooperation and the International Criminal Court overlie the NATO-related issues.

Notwithstanding mistakes for which the Bush administration is to blame, the US is in a thankless situation: it is criticized for leading and acting, and when it leaves a problem such as, initially, the Balkans, for the Europeans to fix, then that is isolationism. The new administration will not bring about a complete reversal of US foreign and security policy and will not reduce demands on the Europeans in terms of burden- and risk-sharing, defence budgets and military transformation; but already, with gestures, style and method, it will be able to launch a new beginning and generate a more positive atmosphere. President Obama has created great hopes for changes in contentious issues, for better consultation and for joint decision-making.  

For a new beginning the Europeans should also do some soul-searching on their side. They should make offers and proposals instead of just waiting for, and replying to, American demands. Europe is needed as an active provider of ideas within the Atlantic community. The opportunity for this was largely missed in the period before the new president took office.

One should remain realistic, though, and not expect all differences in interests and positions to disappear, and some perennial debates are there to stay, for instance in Europe between Europeanists and Atlanticists, in the EU between integrationists and sovereignists, in NATO between voluntarists and minimalists and, more generally, between unilateralists and multilateralists and between a more robust attitude to the use of force and a more restrictive one.

In addition, the burden-sharing debate will continue, and the new openness of the US towards the European Union’s efforts for an autonomous military capacity may partly be just that in a new guise. However, even while remaining the leading power the US seems ready to distribute responsibility on more shoulders. To what extent the Europeans are ready for that remains questionable.

The US-Europe relationship in NATO is part of a larger picture. That is why some authors are more ambitious and call for a new, much broader “Transatlantic Compact” or “Covenant”.19 A “rejuvenation” of NATO might fit into such grand designs. In any event, a definition of common interests as well as a strong, credible re-commitment to the indivisibility of Allied security and to the mutual indispensability of Europe and North America should be the outcome of this debate. The candid treatment of the subsequent subjects is the prerequisite for such a result. Common goals and the guiding vision of acting together for common objectives must return to the fore.

Divisions among Europeans mentioned above are part of a larger division and it would be too simplistic just to focus on the split across the Atlantic. The craving for bilateral links with (and security guarantees from) the US that is prevalent in some of the new NATO member states is a sign of weakened reassurance about Article 5 and the mutual assistance pledge. It must be candidly addressed and overcome. All Allies must be sure that the potential threats they are concerned about are also of concern for all others.

19 See Hamilton et al. (note 5) or, for a long time already, Sloan’s proposal for a “New Atlantic Community Treaty”: Stanley R. Sloan, NATO, the European Union and the Atlantic Community (Washington: Atlantic Community, 2005).
3. Cooperation with the European Union

Since there are different views within the Alliance and the European Union about where Europe should be heading, it is paramount for the Strategic Concept to contain a “roadmap”, as it were, for improved cooperation of NATO with the EU. Its “European Security and Defence Policy” (ESDP) must develop in a complementary fashion and not in competition or opposition with NATO – and to this end should also enjoy US support. At the Strasbourg/Kehl summit both these aspects were emphasized, but more is needed.

This calls for a much more intensive exchange between both organizations which, as a Brussels wisecrack goes, “are located in the same city but live on different planets”. On the other hand, they have 21 members in common. It also requires overcoming institutional jealousy and national blockades. Turkey’s interests with regard to Cyprus and the EU should at last be subordinated to the vital necessity to make the ESDP work. Turkey’s NATO Allies, in turn, should better understand what is, i.a., behind Turkey’s positions: in the WEU it was an associate member, and when the WEU tasks were taken over by the European Union, Turkey lost what it regarded as the “WEU acquis”. But the frustration should be overcome in a new effort. Turkey’s participation in the ESDP and in the European Defence Agency (EDA) would be one way to enhance Turkey’s status, but would in return require concessions and a cooperative spirit on the part of Greece and Cyprus. And the Turkish candidacy for EU membership should be left out of the NATO debate.

Indeed, NATO and the EU should be the “strategic partners” that they proclaim themselves to be. On the basis of the “NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP” and the “Berlin Plus” agreement, their complementarity must be further developed. US ambiguity towards ESDP will be overcome gradually as the notions “emancipation from America” or even “counterweight” disappear. With France now pursuing the efforts towards “l’Europe de la défense” fully within the Alliance, that prospect has improved. The declared motive for the ESDP must not be “autonomy” for its own sake,
but the simple responsibility of European nations and their Union to take greater responsibility for the security of Europe and its periphery. To some extent, the European Union has made impressive progress in this regard in a few years. This must not be impeded by the present paralysis in European integration. And it must be underpinned by the civilian and military capabilities, in the awareness that both organizations can have recourse to the “single set of forces” their members dispose of. This argues for more adequate defence budgets, for more efficient spending of scarce resources, for a harmonization of the force planning processes and, as is also necessary within NATO, for more collective provision of capabilities.  

The division of labour within the Comprehensive Approach needs to be clarified. But that must be done more subtly than just by identifying NATO with “hard security” and the EU with “soft security” or the “lower end of the spectrum”. Each organization must contribute what it is best at. The discussion about a “Berlin plus reversed” (NATO recourse to EU civilian capabilities instead of creating such capabilities of its own) belongs to this context. One promising initiative potentially serving both organizations is the “European Gendarmerie Force”.

Harmonization of the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the EU Battle Group concepts are also required, including ideas about air and maritime rapid response. The same goes for the levels of ambition (LOA) of both NATO and the EU. And on NATO’s side some “magnanimity” should be shown with regard to the third of the “3 Ds” concerning the ESDP (no decoupling, discrimination or duplication), which would result in supporting the EU’s need for analysis, planning and command capacities.

Finally, the EU as such should undertake efforts to make its citizens better aware of present and future security challenges and the pertinent responsibilities, without fear of being accused of a “militarization” of its foreign

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policy. It should not leave such efforts to NATO. In the recent election campaign for the European Parliament, however, little was to be heard about foreign, let alone security, policy. However, “outsourcing” security to the United States is not a viable option any longer. It would be very constructive if the development of NATO’s new Strategic Concept proceeded in close coordination with the revision of the EU Security strategy, that very succinct document of 2003, whose further enhancement appears, however, hampered by differing views about how to deal with the Russia issue. So this is a subject on which member states of both organizations must come to an agreement.

4. NATO’s Relationship with Russia

The degree of cooperation or confrontation in the relationship with the Russian Federation is a subject of paramount importance for the Alliance. The diverging approaches between Allies who mainly sought protection against Russia when they entered NATO and others, keener on cooperation, have given rise to mutual suspicion and the implicit accusation of lack of solidarity.

For the NATO-Russia relationship, the Georgia Crisis of August 2008 indeed marks a turning point. Russia’s disproportionate attack on Georgia in reaction to the latter’s ill-advised military initiative to quell secessionism in South Ossetia, its well-prepared shattering of Georgia’s military and infrastructure, the dismemberment of a sovereign state and the *de facto* annexation of two of its territories are unacceptable to NATO members and allow no “business as usual”. But NATO has to ask itself whether it was sensible to “sanction” Moscow by deactivating the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), thus doing exactly what Russia was criticized for, when in the Kosovo Crisis of 1999 it walked out of the then Permanent Joint Council (PJC). In light of the failure of the UN and the OSCE as well as (at least before the war’s outbreak) the EU, it might have been better to call a NATO-Russia Summit on August 7, 2008. This is to say that the first rule should be to utilize and keep open the dialogue channels, particularly in times of disagreement.
However, long before the Georgia events, there had already been a constant deterioration in the NATO-Russia relationship. In the Strategic Concept of 1999 it was still described as “relations on the basis of common interests, reciprocity and transparency to achieve a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area based on the principles of cooperative security”, in the conviction that “a strong, stable and enduring partnership between NATO and Russia” was essential for achieving that aim. For some time already, increasing hostility towards NATO could be noted within the Russian elite. President Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007 was a public accusation against the Alliance and its leading power, expressing a new Russian assertiveness and Russia’s claim to be taken more seriously, and naming concretely the Western actions and positions he disagreed with.\(^2\)

President Obama’s visit to Moscow this July, his emphasis on common interests and on mutual respect, the apparently functioning chemistry between the two new and pragmatically-minded presidents and the commitment for a new strategic arms control treaty make the moment appear very propitious for a fundamental improvement of the bilateral relations. While Obama’s “reset button” metaphor was ridiculed by some commentators, it certainly did not mean that in “restarting” the same “programme” should be used.

The time has come to attempt a fresh beginning between NATO and Russia also, and the preparatory intra-Alliance discussion about a new Strategic Concept must have one important focus on a thorough reassessment of Russia’s policy and the chances for future cooperation. Ideally that should result in a comprehensive and concrete, though conditional, offer by NATO, underpinned conceptually, and then a new start for the relationship with the biggest country on the Euro-Asian landmass. After a systematic assessment among Allies, Russia might be included in the discussion, making the NRC of strategic use. For the fault for the deteriorated relationship does not seem to lie exclusively on the Russian side.

\(^2\) Speech by President Vladimir Putin at the 43rd Munich Security Conference, 10 February 2007.
While the frequent talk about a “new Cold War” is a gross overstatement (and ahistorical at that), Russia must decide whether it wants to be a partner or an opponent. The world, and particularly NATO, knows what it does not want: for instance, NATO enlargement, US/NATO missile defence, Kosovo’s independence and Western involvement in the Southern Caucasus. But it remains unclear what it does want and to what extent its foreign and security policy is mainly reactive or guided by a clear sense of strategic direction. Its objectives and decision-making processes require sophisticated analysis, but also dialogue. In that dialogue not least NATO members such as Germany having particularly close connections with, and understanding of, Russia, should act as the Alliance’s advocates. They, just like NATO as a whole, should make Russia understand that it needs integration, not isolation, and that broad cooperation with the West, in which democratic values are respected, is a precondition for Russia coping with the future.

Moreover, Russia must come to evaluate NATO’s nature soberly and in fairness, ceasing to regard it as a rival or adversary, overcoming the distorted, nationalist-inspired caricature of a hostile bloc “expanding” at the expense of Russian security. Serious analysis of the security landscape around Russia shows that it can potentially be threatened from the East and the South but not from the West. There should be much greater Russian enlightened self-interest in cooperation with the EU and NATO. Apart from the internal weaknesses (demography, health, economy, infrastructure failing military reform) which qualify the somewhat ephemeral strength based on oil and gas revenues, the Russian empire is threatened by some of the same menaces feared in the West. And a support for secessionist regions – against hitherto adamant Russian principles and citing the false parallel of NATO’s Kosovo policy – will backfire in territories such as Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia. With its neighbours, Russia must seek trustful relationships, and understand what concern is raised by the term “near abroad” and its connotations, as well as by the claim to “protect Russians” wherever they live.22

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22 See Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger. Worüber Russland sich klarwerden muss, in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29 September 2009.
Above all, Russia must be persuaded to use “21st century currency”, not 19th century methods, for today’s problems. It should overcome geopolitical and strategic categories like “spheres of influence”, “buffer zones”, “encirclement”, balance of power” and “isolation”. And it must realize that a huge Russia can only “isolate” itself, by actions such as those against Georgia, or by demonstrating its “nuisance power” rather than coming forward with constructive ideas. Also, “zero-sum” thinking must be dropped, where one side can only gain security, for instance, at the expense of the other. But here it is true that in the West such thinking is not totally unfamiliar.

Indeed, if a serious new beginning is desirable, some soul-searching is indispensable on NATO’s side as well. This might, firstly, begin with a better understanding that Russian hostility is to a large extent a phenomenon of political psychology. If Putin called the dissolution of the Soviet Union the “biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the 21st century”, this reveals “post-imperial phantom pain”. Secondly, even if there is no compelling historical evidence, Russia’s perception of the West having taken advantage of its weakness during the Yeltsin years must be better understood. And if, thirdly, the West criticizes “spheres-of-influence” dogmas, it should be aware that that this concept is not totally absent from some Western countries’ policies (leading to the accusation of double standards). One must also acknowledge that Russia’s brutal reaction at the edges of the empire, its resentments and its inflexibility, its interests and compulsions can, in geopolitical terms, be partly explained by the limited options which a “land empire” possesses or realizes.23 Certainly Russia must credibly defuse concerns that it is attempting a “roll-back” and reconstitution of the Soviet territorial domination. But the emphasis on the cooperative offer and its advantages over confrontation may require some magnanimity on NATO’s side and better understanding of “political psychology”.

Henry Kissinger, while acknowledging that Russia sees NATO’s advance eastwards as an “assertive intrusion”, wrote: “We can affect [Russia] more

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by patience and historical understanding than by offended disengagement and public exhortation”,24 and he was echoed by Strobe Talbot’s comment regarding the Georgian crisis: “outrage is no policy.”25

A case in point appears to be the CFE Treaty (Conventional Forces in Europe), suspended by Russia because of the non-ratification by NATO member states of its adaptation after the disappearance of the “blocs” on which the regime was predicated. Even if Russia formally failed to meet certain detailed conditions, the value of the verification and inspection regime such as transparency and confidence-building, including the instruments created, is so great that NATO should have better evaluated the pros and cons, and should certainly not have left Russia without serious answers to its proposals.

The NATO enlargement issue is even more serious and intricate. On the one hand each country is free to choose its preferred alliances, and no other power can be granted a veto against the Alliance’s decision to invite new members in accordance with the Washington Treaty. It has to be acknowledged, though, that until recently this development was accompanied by supporting measures taking account of Russian sensitivity: in 1997, in parallel with the invitation to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the NATO Russia Permanent Joint Council was created and the NATO Russia Founding Act solemnly signed. And the next round of NATO enlargement, for the first time also with former Soviet republics as new members, was “cushioned” by an upgrading of the PJC to become the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in a new format of formally equal participants.

That was a balanced approach, not over-considerateness towards Russian concerns and resistance. It was lacking in the cases of Ukraine and

Georgia, two European countries whose independence, security and territorial integrity must certainly enjoy NATO support. But they are far from being mature for NATO membership should the criteria laid down in the Enlargement Study of 1995 continue to be valid. The “Open Door” issue remains delicate with Moscow, and while Allies must insist on sovereignty over their decisions, this time there was no need to antagonize Russia, no point in provoking Moscow’s wrath over a matter of principle and no requirement to risk, again, splitting NATO, as happened at the Bucharest Summit. Lessons have to be drawn from this, and NATO enlargement should not be conducted in uncompromising confrontation with Russia. There must be a middle course to be steered between “no veto” and bending over to Russian indignation.

Cooperation in the NATO-Russia Council will continue to be difficult, because “inclusion” of Russia is accompanied by exclusion from any co-decision on strictly Alliance matters. But perhaps the list of “common matters” can be extended. Obviously, Russia and NATO member states have common interests with regard to most of the global concerns and dangers mentioned below such as, in particular, proliferation, terrorism, the security consequences of climate change, organized crime. A topical subject seems to be piracy: the capture of a Ukrainian freighter with Russian tanks, weapons and ammunition in September 2008 and the seizure of a pirate ship by Russia in April 2009 might encourage the converging of Russian and Western interests.

Also, the potential of the NATO-Russia Council is far from being realized, the programme including subjects such as terrorism, proliferation, peacekeeping, theatre missile defence, airspace management, civil emergencies, defence reform, logistics. But the list of subjects could be further developed, and should perhaps be prioritized. A candid discussion of the new Russian foreign and security documents could be one agenda item.

One can think of further helpful steps: a constructive move on NATO’s side could be a clear interest in, respect for and dialogue with the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) with which Moscow appears to emulate to some extent NATO (not wholly unsuccessfully, in terms of bureaucracy, acronym creation and document output). And it is perhaps revealing that at NATO Headquarters there is no longer the office of the “Special Advisor to the Secretary General on Central and Eastern European Affairs” – a function where at the time a most constructive work was done in bringing the two sides together and providing the Secretary General and the Council with “a second opinion”.

Finally, in his Berlin speech last year, President Medvedev raised questions challenging the present European security structure and made a proposal for a pan-European security treaty.27 Certainly the speech, as well as Foreign Minister Lavrov’s statements at the recent OSCE summit meeting at Corfu, can be seen critically from a NATO perspective. There is criticism of NATO and the EU (including an alleged “NATO centrism”), and they contain elements obviously intended to drive a wedge between the US and Europe. Also, an overarching pan-European organization with authority over NATO in a legally binding construction smacks of Soviet proposals of many decades ago. Furthermore, even one year after the president’s speech, details on the Russian ideas are still lacking, which fuels speculation about Moscow’s intent: a veto against the enlargement of alliances, prevention of OSCE “interference”, confirmation of a recognized sphere of interest on former Soviet territory? The Western interest will be maintenance of the proven security institutions and of the OSCE’s comprehensive character as well as better implementation of the 1990 Paris Charter and the 1991 Moscow declaration. Improvement of the cooperation among the “interlocking institutions” and with Russia is needed, but whether that requires a new treaty or just better adherence to principles jointly agreed several times remains debatable. An observer of the Corfu meeting stated: “After all, in recent years Russia again and again

27 President Dmitry Medvedev, Speech at Meeting with German Political, Parliamentary and Civic Leaders, Berlin, 5 June 2008.
grossly violated the principles which it wants to include in the security treaty.” This was not least through interference in the internal affairs of other countries - another kind of "interference" than that of the OSCE: While the OSCE is about enforcing certain principles, Russian interference aims at supporting Russia-friendly forces.

But in spite of all this from NATO’s perspective there would be no harm in making President Medvedev’s ideas the subject of a broad dialogue with Russia and in asking for clarifications. The OSCE would continue to be a well-suited forum for this, in spite of Russian misgivings about its development in recent years, where Moscow seemed to be pushing back the “human dimension” in favour of the political-military aspects. This dialogue could also be used to revive the Paris Charter, and it should not be forgotten that the Helsinki Final Act, which had such positive consequences in European history, was the result of Soviet proposals. The “Corfu process” might give the OSCE new life and meaning, although NATO and the EU must not be devalued in its course.

The NATO-Russia relationship still appears open to better results. NATO needs a coherent Russia policy, and in devising this should coordinate with the European Union. Russia’s stronger stance must not lead to a weakening of NATO’s unity, but the progress reached towards cooperative security must not fall prey to renewed confrontation. The Strategic Concept should render testimony to a confidence-building effort by NATO to include Russia and to use the NATO-Russia Council in the interest of common concerns and in a genuine, serious attempt to define and determine anew common and cooperative security.

5. **Today’s security challenges**

The one-dimensional threat, unifying Allies during the Cold War, is a matter of the past. Therefore NATO needs a common understanding about the

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character of threats, risks, security challenges, dangers and vulnerabilities which have much more diffuse causes and which softer language does not render less precarious. This must be based on a more functional than regional analysis of them – the threats no longer know any borders. “Agreed intelligence” and the vague (compromise) statements in the extant Strategic Concept do not appear precise enough for the future, and it may be that there would not be too much disagreement among Allies about the description of the security landscape.

The globalized world that has emerged since the end of the Cold War can still not be called a new world order; at present it is a rather a world disorder. It is characterized by numerous unsolved economic and social problems and a conglomerate of regional conflicts about ethnic, religious, territorial and historical issues, about distribution and dominance. Often these conflicts were frozen in the “glacier” of the Cold War, because their outbreak might have triggered a world war. With the “melting” of this “glacier”, they also became virulent again.

Polycentrism and rising powers, together with revisionism and revived nationalism, are part of this picture, as well as international and non-governmental organizations, and “good” and “bad” non-state actors. Violent conflict is increasingly intra-state, and the weakness of states can be more threatening than their strength.

Problems such as poverty, underdevelopment, overpopulation, expulsion, flight, migration, climate change, environmental destruction, pollution, pandemics, resource competition, energy needs, and lack of education have supra-national effects. Like global terrorism, organized crime, trafficking in human beings, computer criminality and proliferation (not only of weapons of mass destruction), they do not stop at national borders.

All these challenges have security implications, but they are not primarily military threats. Consequently they cannot be fought with military means. Military threats constitute only a small part of the spectrum. This is also true for international terrorism, about whose character views are as diverse as those
concerning the necessary countermeasures. Thus, if description and analysis appear rather uncontroversial, it will be much more difficult to agree about the relative importance of individual aspects, about priorities to set, and about countermeasures. But the debate must produce progress in these regards.

The threat against NATO member states’ information systems and networks may be rising, and piracy acquires ever more prominence, along with organized crime, money laundering, and the illegal drug trade, smuggling, and trafficking in human beings: all these modern scourges, some of which will receive more ample comment further on, have more to do with law enforcement that with military combat. They cannot, however, be ignored by a security alliance such as NATO. Preventive measures on a broad scale are important, going to the roots and the reasons of problems, of conflict causes and of the support that criminals and extremists enjoy. But equally important is a clearer identification of the relationship between the various instruments to fight them. And even if the nation states remain the principal actors, no state alone is capable of effectively responding to today’s global dangers to peace and stability. So it must be possible in the Strategic Concept to go beyond the brief mention of security challenges to which its predecessor limited itself.

It is often said that the development of the security situation is “unpredictable”. And it is true that surprises such as the fall of the Berlin Wall or 9/11 could not be predicted. This must, however, not be an excuse to wait for “events” (former prime minister Harold Macmillan’s famous response to the question about what determines policy). NATO needs to enhance its intelligence and capacity to analyze trends and developments in order to improve the “predictability” of the security landscape and to reduce the uncertainty that is a strong component of insecurity. The systematic approach in the Study by five former CHODs (global trends, global challenges, and regional challenges) offers one useful grid for analyzing complexity and uncertainty as well as many informative facts. Throughout, the impact of fragile and failed states should be assessed.

29 See section 12.
30 Naumann et al. throughout rightly emphasize the importance of improved Intelligence.
6. The role of military force

It is of particular conceptual importance to develop a better common understanding among Allies about the role of military power and the legitimacy of the use, or threat of use, of military force, given the quite differing views on both sides of the Atlantic. Kagan is not totally mistaken when he compares Europe to Venus, because of its commitment to multilateralism and diplomacy, and the United States to Mars, because of its less inhibited inclination to use military force.\(^3\)

In peace-ethical terms, but also in multilaterally oriented security policy, the use of military force is regarded as *ultima ratio*. But this is often interpreted in a misguided way, as in translations such as “last recourse”. What is meant is not the “last” instrument in a series of measures, but the ultimate, i.e. most extreme means, whose early (measured) employment, or at least credible demonstration, can prevent worse developments in the future.

A striking example continues to be autumn 1991, with the shelling of Dubrovnik by Serb artillery. Had the international community, the United Nations, or NATO for that matter, been in agreement, two sorties on that artillery, or even a convincing announcement that they would be conducted, would have turned the fate of the Western Balkans. Instead, Milosevic kept being led to believe that militarily he had nothing to fear. Years later, intervention became unavoidable, at a much higher price, while hundreds of thousands had meanwhile lost their lives and homes.

Such lessons need to be assessed among Allies and reflected in the Strategic Concept: diplomacy needs a military backbone, and the “ultimate means” must always be demonstrably available. Excluding military options from the outset all but favours crisis management, dispute settlement and conflict prevention. Such insights should make the Strategic

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Concept a vehicle for fostering better understanding, in the political class as well as in the public, of the military dimension of security. In the “broad approach to security” that NATO had embraced in its 1991 Strategic Concept, the non-military factors were emphasized, which was understandable, in contrast to the militarized era of the East-West conflict. It is time to make a case for not underrating the military elements of security.

In that context the concept of deterrence needs to be redefined. It may be true that “suicide bombers cannot be deterred”, as the conventional argument about the supposed outdatedness of any deterrence strategy goes. But regimes that sponsor, support or sanction terrorist groups certainly want to survive and retain their power. They should not be expected to act irrationally and are amenable to deterrent policies. Also, the dangers in today’s world are not limited to terrorism. Traditional threats may appear or re-appear, and it is advisable to “keep some powder dry” and explain this in a wholly unaggressive, non-confrontational way. “Assurance”, discussed above in a different context, must be worth the trust of all Allies across the board. This discussion should also include the emphasis shifting from “deterrence by punishment” to “deterrence by denial” (of options) by using defensive means and a larger panoply of instruments, thus making aggression, threat or blackmail less attractive.

Finally, the Strategic Concept should not duck the problem of prevention and pre-emption, but rather clear up the confusion of terms that reigns in this field: prevention writ large is desirable, going to the root of disputes, crises and conflicts in a broad-based approach. This is in line with the “broad concept of security”. Pre-emption is legal under international law in the face of an “imminent and overwhelming” attack (the famous Caroline criteria). What is problematic is the “preventive” use of military force, “preventive war” in view of a presumed developing danger of attack.

This seems obvious, and should be clearly stated, but a more profound discussion of the problem shows that after the terror attacks on New York and Washington politicians have to assess the potentially apocalyptic consequences, should such attacks include weapons of mass destruction or
“only” a radiological ("dirty") bomb. Given such potentialities and the almost non-existing warning time, “self-defence” and “imminent” do not have the same ring that they had in the time of conventional defence and bipolar nuclear deterrence. Questions of legality and legitimacy are to form part of this debate. In this reflection, it becomes clear that deterrence must not be predominantly identified with its nuclear aspect. There are all kinds of instruments available – economic, police, surveillance, judicial and political measures (the latter including public exposure, which in the case of cyber attacks on Estonia already seems to have had some effect). On the other hand, purely conventional deterrence is not promising, and the “appropriate mix” has to be explained, beyond this ever-used formula, in a publicly understandable way.

Indeed, how to convey and communicate deterrence messages is of the essence. Credibility and reassurance are key categories here. Furthermore, the Alliance’s reputation – gained or damaged – in Afghanistan also has to do with its deterrent power.

7. **Nuclear and Related Issues**

*NATO’s Nuclear Policy and Strategy*

Furthermore, NATO’s nuclear strategy cannot remain largely undeclared, as was the case in 1998/99, when, in the face of no-first-use demands by two NATO governments, Allies chose not “to open this bag” and decided to use the language from the 1991 Strategic Concept. This time, several factors make it necessary to discuss, agree on and publicly explain NATO’s nuclear policy and strategy. They include the doubts about the continued validity of deterrence, the broader discussion about nuclear disarmament, nuclear proliferation and the impending breakdown of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, nuclear-ambitioned Iran’s successful procrastination with the international community, and some public discussion of “nuclear participation” by non-nuclear Allies. All this makes debate within the Alliance on its nuclear strategy unavoidable, and
potentially fruitful.

The debate about nuclear disarmament was launched anew with an article by Henry Kissinger et al., setting out the goal of a nuclear-free world (“Global Zero”) and calling for concrete steps in nuclear disarmament. The debate was echoed and supported by a German “gang of four” elder statesmen, and in his Prague speech following the Strasbourg/Kehl NATO Summit, President Obama explicitly embraced this objective. However, he added, however, that he would probably not see the nuclear-free world in his lifetime. The long-term vision may have been used more in a tactical way to increase the pressure towards a resumption of nuclear arms control.

However, with a swelling tide of public expectations, thorough debate is required among Allies about the difference between a visionary goal and the means and steps to approach it, as well as the realities and obstacles on the way. As an impetus for swifter reductions of nuclear stockpiles and to bolster the United States’ and the West’s credibility in insisting on non-proliferation, the vision may have a useful function. But in the public domain it can easily create illusions, exaggerated hopes and more opposition to NATO’s nuclear policy, delegitimizing the latter. And it makes it all the harder to explain to NATO member states’ publics the requirement to retain the minimum means for deterrence as long as the vision is still a long-term goal on the horizon. Publics like to hear the first part of the message, but not what the US President also said in Prague: “As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defence to our allies.” So the vision might divert attention from the real security problems.

In addition, the task of explaining the difficulties of creating a nuclear-free world, such as monitoring and extremely intrusive verification, is a thank-

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34 Remarks by President Barack Obama, Prague, 5 April 2009.
less one. Moreover, it must be made clear in the public debate that even a nuclear-free world might not be inherently stable because compliance would be difficult to ascertain and nuclear weapons cannot be disinvested. Thus a conflict or international tension could always refuel a new arms race towards nuclear rearmament.

If NATO is to maintain its nuclear deterrence it must, on the one hand, explicitly subscribe to continuation of reducing nuclear stockpiles, preferably in a negotiated manner. At the same time, it would be important to reaffirm the political role of nuclear weapons and the principle of a potentially intolerable and incalculable risk for an aggressor. The continuing need for “uncertainty in the mind of the aggressor”, at the heart of deterrence, logically leads to the conclusion, to be reaffirmed, that NATO will not establish a “no-first-use” policy, because it does not have a declared “first-use policy” either. But at the same time NATO should refute the allegations made by critics, and sometimes fuelled by US expert planning, that it considers warfighting options for nuclear weapons. In that context NATO must credibly explain how the nuclear powers are increasingly fulfilling their (moral, not legal) obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and state that they are prepared to go further. At the same time the role of nuclear weapons in the hands of NATO powers vis-à-vis an increasingly growing number of nuclear-armed states should be explained with self-confidence.

There is thus the need for a deepened understanding of the requirements of deterrence, both conceptual and practical, and of the relevance of the full spectrum of policy instruments, from nuclear forces to conventional military assets and non-military capabilities. Also, “extended deterrence” and the requirement for burden-, risk and responsibility-sharing need to be addressed. Here the circumstances are changing: in an enlarged Alliance an increasingly smaller portion of Allies is involved, and opposition in the remaining member states grows. With a view to the indivisibility of Alliance security, the future forms of “nuclear participation” are to be addressed. This also appears important in a changed security context.
In any event, the necessity “to reconcile the continuing need for nuclear deterrence arrangements with the political imperative to pursue visible and substantive measures in nuclear arms control”\textsuperscript{35} has become ever more urgent and must be taken seriously in the dialogue about these issues, in order to produce consensual, solid and convincing statements in the Strategic Concept.

\textbf{Missile Defence}

Dealing with proliferation of WMD and their delivery means requires, in the panoply of available measures, deterrence against their use or threatened use. But as deterrence (“by punishment”) is no longer ascribed the same credibility as in the bipolar world of the East-West conflict, defensive measures that would neutralize the threat by denying it success as a viable option become more important. Hence the deliberations and efforts to establish a missile defence system against ballistic or cruise missile attacks emanating from the Larger Middle Eastern Region, most notably from Iran.

Because of the long-extended discussions in NATO, the inconclusive conversations in the NATO-Russia Council and the subsequent bilateral agreements of the US with two NATO Allies (Poland and the Czech Republic) about the stationing of radars and interceptors, the missile defence plans have become a serious conflict theme not only between NATO and Russia, but at times and to some extent also among Allies. For the countries who concluded bilateral deals, they seem to be part of a particular assurance which they seek beyond the – sometimes questioned – guarantee of Article 5. This is part of the split among European Allies addressed in this Paper. With the new US administration, the urgency of the project has decreased, but the rationale remains and should be in the

interest of NATO as well as of Russia.

Against regional actors striving for nuclear blackmail potential, protection and “deterrence by denial” are necessary. A broad debate about goals, concepts and technical options is required, and all NATO Partners, particularly Russia, should be included. A common approach to common future threats (since nobody knows how far or close they are) could overcome the present controversies. The efforts towards a comprehensive missile defence architecture to extend coverage to all European Allied territory and populations should be further pursued. But Russia should be made part of them. The Alliance ought to make greater efforts to demonstrate that it respects Russia’s interest in its undiminished strategic stability. Obviously, any argument against such Russian concerns finds its counter-argument. So missile defence should be offered as a truly collaborative endeavour to make it an “integrative factor”.

Space

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty forbids the stationing in outer space or on celestial bodies of nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction and limits their use to peaceful purposes. However, the latest US National Space Policy document has stiffened the US approach to operations in space, asserting the fundamental right of the US to conduct such operations and pledging to deny adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to US national interest.

Indeed, space has gained in strategic importance, and among terrestrial satellite applications are telecommunications, earth monitoring, military operations and logistics. But there are vulnerabilities in launch and control sites, communication links, the Electro-Magnetic Spectrum (EMS) and the satellite platforms themselves. This should raise concern about the securi-

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ty of systems on which the world’s commercial life and armed forces increasingly depend.

While a “militarization” or “weaponization” of space is regarded as undesirable and a cooperative approach is preferable, the uncontested supremacy of the US is coming to an end. Such issues require debate among Allies in the context of its evolving strategy, and the Strategic Concept should send out a message of cooperative intent, while demonstrating at the same time that NATO is not naïve in this regard.

8. Broad Cooperation

The Comprehensive Approach

In the discussions and in a new Strategic Concept the Alliance would have to reconfirm, and convincingly explain, the “broad concept of security” which already in 1991 formed the philosophical basis of NATO’s novel strategic thinking – the awareness that security and stability, besides their military dimension, have political, economic, social, cultural and economic aspects and are therefore multidimensional. But this concept also needs to be further developed: on the one hand it is reinforced and further diversified by globalization; on the other hand present-day peace missions and stabilization operations require, in addition to their continued joint, inter-agency and multinational character, a much closer and synergetic cooperation with International Organizations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). To this end, NATO’s Riga Summit proclaimed the “Comprehensive Approach”, but this needs to be further conceptualized and convincingly presented to many actors.

Allies have to acknowledge that in the work on the Comprehensive Approach and the preceding concept of “Effects-Based Approach to Operations” (EBAO) in previous years much counterproductive confusion was created through a plethora of terms, an over-ambitious and semi-scientific “systems analysis” approach, the predominantly military focus, and
particularly NATO’s inability to avoid or allay the suspicion in others that it wanted to be the lead organization, coordinating all other actors, instead of coordinating with them.

Theoretically, the Comprehensive Approach should not appear as something revolutionarily new. So it is surprising that some seem to have realized only many years after the Bonn conference (2001) that for Afghanistan the solution cannot be a military one. The relevant lessons from the Afghanistan operation with regard to the Comprehensive Approach must be reflected in the Strategic Concept, including an explanation of the conditions for it to work and an unpretentious description of how NATO sees and defines its own role in the concert of the multitudinous actors within the international community.37

**NATO and the United Nations**

NATO’s cooperation with the United Nations, maybe sometimes close to satisfactory on the ground in foreign missions, requires massive enhancement with regard to consultation at the political-strategic level. The UN-NATO Declaration, which remained unsigned for several years, at the time was presumably a victim of NATO’s disagreements with Russia. And now, since its signing in late 2008, it turns out to be quite a neutral statement.38

But even so, it has the potential to be injected with life. This requires overcoming the suspicion towards NATO prevalent at the East River.39 For closer cooperation, it will be necessary to develop channels, procedures and effective consulting practices, including a denser exchange of personnel. The UN’s new Peacebuilding Commission should, for instance, be a venue for institutional cooperation.

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38 Joint Declaration on UN/NATO Secretariat Cooperation, New York, 23 September 2008.
In this context, NATO should discuss the UN Security Council’s prerogative to authorize military action beyond sheer and direct self-defence, clearly aligning itself with it. But in the event of paralysis of the Security Council, NATO itself should not be entirely paralyzed. In the Strategic Concept negotiations taking place 1999 during the Kosovo air campaign, this problem was glossed over by diplomatic language. But this time it should be clearly identified: NATO does not regard the Kosovo intervention as a precedent in that it would always intend to act this way. Honestly, however, it is a precedent in the sense that NATO refuses to be wholly incapable of action (although in future there would be even greater reluctance among member states, given the experience with Kosovo after the intervention). A very telling example is the UNPREDEP Operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)\(^40\), historically the first case of (very successful) “preventive deployment”. This operation was prolonged every half year, until in February 1999 the People’s Republic of China vetoed its renewal in the UN Security Council – for reasons that had nothing to do with the Balkans, but with FYROM’s assuming relations with Taiwan. Thus, if urgent international requirements become hostage to other interests, NATO must remain capable of acting. The endorsement of its Kosovo intervention by the EAPC in Heads of State and Government session at the Washington Summit was strong testimony, if not to its legality, at least to its legitimacy.

NATO, through its members, but perhaps also as an organization, should take part in the necessary debates about the further development of international law with regard to the future understanding of “imminent” threat and “self-defence” as well as the meaning of “humanitarian intervention” (or better, “intervention for humanitarian reasons”) and the “responsibility to protect”.

**Other International Organizations**

NATO’s relationship and potentially intensified cooperation with other International Organizations (IOs) are also important in the interest of a

\(^{40}\) Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
truly Comprehensive Approach. Here, NATO should be clear about the discussion of a “security architecture” as brought to the fore again by the Medvedev proposals mentioned above. Without any wish to evade constructive discussion about improvements to the international system, it must be said that real life is not about presenting the task of devising a new “architecture” with hierarchical structures. Rather, the challenge is to develop the strength of the existing organizations and institutions developed over time, and to better coordinate their cooperation, so that they become the frequently mentioned “interlocking”, mutually reinforcing institutions producing synergy effects in problem-solving.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) will probably not become the overarching organization some would like it to be. But there are a number of issues of common interest in the realms of “soft security”, arms control and confidence-building, without the temptation of the kind of competition that exists between NATO and the EU. NATO and the OSCE cooperate in areas where they fulfil complementary functions such as conflict prevention and crisis management. Even more informal exchange is desirable. A formalization of OSCE-NATO relations, as proposed at times, does not appear necessary, though. In any event, the Russian proposal to make the OSCE the top organization in Europe, even in the framework of a legally binding treaty, should not be supported by NATO (which does not exclude, as argued above, discussions with Moscow on European security).

The creation of the African Union (AU) marks great progress over its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU). It is an approach to taking ownership of African problems, which is also in the interest of NATO members. Thus the African Union deserves all possible support by NATO. Such support should not only relate to concrete operations, but offer the wealth of NATO’s experience with regard to consultation, civil-military cooperation, decision making, military education and training, SSR, DDR, multinational military cooperation, defence planning, arms

\[41\text{ See note 40.}\]
control and confidence building, thus helping to underpin economic, social and governance development.

There are two additional organizations to consider: the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is a defence organization of former Soviet republics under the *de facto* leadership of Russia. On the one hand, it sees itself as a counterweight to NATO. But on the other, it has made advances towards dialogue or even cooperation with the Alliance. Allies should discuss the pros and cons. Lending status to a potentially opposing organization might be undesirable, but exchange outside the NATO-Russia Council and the EAPC could also be constructive. It should be easy to find some consultation subjects of common interest. And showing some respect for its Treaty Organization (which appears to emulate NATO in some regards) might be in the spirit of improving relations with Russia.

Finally, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization comprises China, the important rising power entirely outside the NATO orbit. Some structured contact might be desirable, starting with confidence building and mutual information, but possibly moving to subjects of common concern such as terrorism, humanitarian relief and border security, and perhaps even progress in Afghanistan.

The difficulties regarding institutional cooperation must not be overlooked: ambitions, prestige, autonomy and primacy issues. Also, the exchange of classified information is often problematic. In some regards, “bottom-up” concrete cooperation in operation theatres can make up for difficulties at the political level, and the politicization of practical issues should be avoided. Finally, the differences in Allies’ approaches concerning civil-military cooperation have to be recognized. There are many proposals for improvement of the cooperation among IOs, which should be the subject of debate and short programmatic statements in the Strategic Concept.

*Non-Governmental Organizations*

The crucial improvement of NATO’s interaction with Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) warrants particular attention. The complex nature of today’s missions and the interconnection between security and development requires close cooperation. But it is clear that this interaction brings about the meeting of different, often opposing, institutional “cultures”, where the military wishes to take control, whilst the NGOs seek to preserve their independence and impartiality as critical for their success. The great number and diversity of NGOs multiply the practical and institutional problems of the relationship.

On the ground, cooperation, information sharing, coordination and protection are already problematic, but often produce pragmatic solutions. This cannot, however, be achieved by “muddling through”. Conceptual thought is required as well as approaches to joint planning, training and harmonization in the early phases of an operation. Also, the development of “cultural” understanding through dialogue and joint training is desirable (the proposal of 2006 to open the NATO Defense College’s courses to NGO representatives is still not realised).

The UN mechanisms of cooperation with NGOs should be used by NATO, and even the establishment of a Consultation and Advisory Cell at NATO HQ might be useful.

**Multinationality**

Allies need a candid dialogue about multinationality and interoperability which results in formulations for the Strategic Concept going beyond the statement that they are necessary and helpful. The Concept should be as straightforward as the MC 400 of December 1991 was. Long before NATO started its first multinational operations and mixed the national contributions, in some cases down to the battalion level, that document stated that multinational forces entail important requirements with regard

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43 Ibid., p. 59.
to standardization, in particular interoperability, and that they are complex formations which present a significant training and support challenge, if a demonstrable operational capability is to be forged.

Even after almost 15 years of multinational cooperative experience with NATO members’ and Partners’ military forces, this remains true. The political value with regard to solidarity and mutual support as well as to the legitimacy of an operation is unquestioned, and there are certainly many military benefits, with various nations contributing their capabilities. But the challenges have not become smaller, the progress in multinational logistics is slow, the national limitations for the employment of forces (“caveats”) have been characterized as a “cancer”, force generation constantly leaves gaps in key capabilities, the “costs lie where they fall” principle has nearly paralyzed the further development of the NATO Response Force (because those who happen to provide the forces in the event of use of the NRF have to pay – a process described by nations concerned as a “negative lottery”). These are some issues which require clarity at a strategic level, worth a debate.

**Private Military Companies**

In the context of NATO’s future tasks, particularly its expeditionary activities, the growth of Private Military Companies (PMC) also calls for debate and some normative statements in the Strategic Concept.\(^{44}\) For the “Westphalian” achievement of the state’s monopoly on the use of military force is being eroded faster than regulatory measures are put into place. To be sure, privatization and outsourcing of logistical, transport, supply, maintenance and medical services, as a trend in all modern armed forces, pose potential basic problems only with regard to their reliable availability in foreign missions and dangerous environments.

On the other hand, the expanding role of PMCs in conflicts worldwide,

providing training, security services, armed support, or even active participation in combat within foreign missions, raises important ethical, political, legal and military concerns to which an alliance which prides itself on being a community of values cannot turn a blind eye. Ethically, warfare for profit is highly problematic. And not easily justifiable is the inclination of some Western governments to have PMCs or mercenaries fulfil tasks that would arouse public controversy if conducted by their regular armed forces – PMCs as a reserve army outside public interest. “License to kill” in a foreign country without a firm legal base, accountability, jurisdiction and transparency should not occur in connection with NATO operations. Recent incidents have raised public concerns and possess the potential to damage the credibility not only of individual member states, but also of the Alliance in toto.

NATO ought to support efforts to expand current, insufficient, legislation, such as the US Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, to apply arms export regulations, to establish codes of conduct, to improve reglementation and accountability, to encourage prosecution of wrongdoing, to enhance military commanders’ oversight over PMCs and to improve the democratic transparency of the subject. It should take a clear, critical stand on this admittedly controversial issue in its basic strategy document.

9. Peace Missions and Operations

NATO capacities are increasingly absorbed by the ongoing operations, given the daily problems and the fact that, particularly in Afghanistan (Strasbourg/Kehl: “our key priority”), its credibility appears to be on the line. But this contributes to conceptual issues falling by the wayside. The debate leading to a new Strategic Concept should thus stay aloof of the purely operational issues.

On the other hand, that document needs to clearly reflect politico-military and strategic experience and lessons mainly from the operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. First of all, these seem to call for ideas
about nation building and the spread of democracy to be examined self-critically. Furthermore, in all cases scale, duration and cost were dramatically underestimated. Clear concepts are required that reflect modesty in objectives, realism in timelines, criteria for “progress” – and the awareness that democracy is not an export/import article but a culture that must grow over time. Also, NATO is but one actor among others (and not the leading one).

True, the long effort in the Balkans has produced a measure of success. And in Iraq, an important though not a NATO operation, after many mistakes and errors the tide appears to have been reversed. But the international effort in Afghanistan in particular, after the toppling of the Taliban regime following the terror attacks on the United States, holds many uncertainties and, already, painful lessons. It is thus referred to by way of example.

Clearly, elements of progress in the reconstruction of Afghanistan do not receive sufficient public attention, such as schooling, health, women’s rights, build-up of Afghan armed forces and the work of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) as small-scale models of the Comprehensive Approach. But in several regards (e.g. women’s rights) the achievements do not appear irreversible, and still the problematic aspects seem to prevail. Troop strengths, to begin with, are not sufficient for a country twice the size of Germany. Also, even for the agreed requirements force generation results in many deficiencies. And commanders do not have full operational control, because there are numerous national limitations (“caveats”). All this jeopardizes stability and encourages the insurgency, and the lack of ground troops leads to the calling-in of air strikes entailing, in turn, increased civilian casualties. Warningly, the renowned military historian van Creveld speaks of the “demoralization” of the superior powers, and their final defeat, in almost all wars against insurgents.45

Furthermore, critical systemic problems persist in the country, such as decentralization, lack of governance, a growing distance between the government and the people, the narcotics economy, the slow reform of the

judicial system, failure to form an incorrupt police force, wider corruption threatening legitimacy and credibility, lack of any reconciliation concept, inflation and food crisis.

What needs to be done includes a comprehensive policy towards the region, strengthening of Parliament, improved links between the government and the people, creation of institutions and civil society, job creation, action against officials who are linked to narcotics – in short, a serious implementation of the London and Paris agreements.

The daunting list of what is necessary merely shows how little NATO per se is capable of achieving. Reflection among Allies has already led to a more wide-ranging plan (“a clear vision”) that was agreed at the Bucharest Summit and has four strands: a firm and shared long-term commitment; enhanced Afghan leadership and responsibility; a Comprehensive Approach by the international community, bringing together civilian and military efforts; and increased cooperation and engagement with Afghanistan’s neighbours. But it is clear that bolder steps for its implementation are needed, and the devil lies in the detail (for instance, are Allies ready to engage with all of Afghanistan’s neighbours?). Moreover, the main dangers now emanate from a bordering country, Pakistan, which has been giving rise to increasing concerns.

Such principles, in greater abstraction, need to be codified in the new Strategic Concept, as well as the need for agreed, clear and realistic objectives in missions of this nature. But several broader insights should also be reflected there: the recognition that if the international community intervenes in a country, it takes the responsibility for it; the awareness (which to some came very late) that the job of pacification and reconstruction cannot be done mainly by the military; and the insight that development presupposes security, though not as sequential tasks: they are conditional upon one another and must proceed simultaneously, and the population of a war-stricken country under reconstruction must see rapid and tangible progress in its basic living conditions, such as food, power, infrastructure, health services and public order. “Winning the hearts and minds” must succeed or can fail in the very early phases of an operation; if there is not sufficient
progress and if the disappointment is compounded by mounting civilian casualties, the peace troops are increasingly seen as occupying forces.

The reflection should also lead to greater clarity about what jobs NATO does not regard itself as competent and responsible for. The variety of NATO missions in the last years is breathtaking: maritime interdiction, peace enforcement, security assistance, training support, capacity building, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief. They may all be justified. But they should not be the result of “ad-hocery”, rather of a coherent concept. Clearly there is a requirement for NATO to limit its ambitions and the charges it takes on. This would include the appeal to the international community, particularly the United Nations, to live up to its responsibility. NATO, which does most, is criticized most – for neglects and failures that are in fact those of the political and civilian authorities. Often the military is almost blamed for “usurping” functions which would belong to “civilian peace work”, whereas in reality the civilian peace workers and institutions are not sufficient and do not match up to the tasks, none of which can be achieved without the close interaction, cooperation and coordination of all actors involved. Indeed, in Afghanistan coordination appears to be one of the particularly weak points.

In going about its peace missions, aware of the above-mentioned limitations, Allies also ought to recognize that a paradigm shift is taking place with regard to how security is to be defined. Since, in a report by the UN Development Programme of 1994, “Human Security” was to complement “Human Development”, it is a challenge to conventional state-centred security concepts. The UN Report “In Larger Freedom” (2005) reinforced the notion of “freedom from want and fear”. Focusing on the threats in the concrete life of people, it poses additional responsibilities in the framework of peace missions, making them ever more complex: human rights abuses, criminal violence, targeting of civilians in war, “human shields”, forced displacement, human trafficking, sexual violence and the use of child soldiers have to be tackled and reduced. Clearly these are not mainly military tasks, but should

\[\text{46 See, among other documents, the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A more secure world: our shared responsibility (New York; United Nations, December 2004).}\]
form part of NATO’s objectives in post-conflict stabilization operations, including an effort to enforce a better observation of the laws of war, even in asymmetric conflicts. Sure enough, this is akin to the problematic subjects of “humanitarian interventions” and “responsibility to protect” mentioned above. Finally, certain themes on the international arms control agenda, e.g. small arms and light weapons, antipersonnel mines, cluster bombs, and also aspects of security sector reform (SSR) are connected to this subject.

To return to the opening of this section: failure in Afghanistan will not be the end of NATO. But it would do damage to its credibility, deter Allies from taking on further demanding tasks and promote a development towards “coalitions of the willing”. It would be useful to tone down the (self-defeating) rhetoric about “victory” and “defeat”, to be aware that to some extent the Taliban need not “win” but only have “not to lose”, and to better define criteria for “success” and “progress”. Also, it is necessary for many Allied governments to make greater efforts to explain the connection between their country’s security and peace missions on other continents.

10. Partnerships

NATO’s various Partnerships – Partnership for Peace (PfP), Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) as well as the special relationships with Russia, Ukraine and, since recently, Georgia – require conceptual considerations and perhaps some disentangling and reordering. They were based on the concept, so successful in Europe after the end of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, of “stability transfer”. But, apart from the development of manifold and bureaucratic structures, new aspects have to be taken into account: many Partners are now NATO members; others, such as Sweden, Finland and Austria, will remain neutral but have established a particularly close relationship with the Alliance; the Mediterranean and Middle East regions have gained in importance, and

“global” Partners such as Japan, Australia, New Zealand and South Korea, who are regarded as likeminded and contribute to the NATO operation in Afghanistan, have been added in the form of “Contact Countries”.

A neat reordering according to geometrical schemes with “inner” and “outer” circles is probably not on the cards.\(^{48}\) What are needed, however, are an adapted, clear rationale for the now 15 year-old Partnership concept and for the different fora, its convincing explanation, some weeding out of the PfP terminology and bodies, new life for the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), and clarity about the fact that “global partners” does not mean NATO “going global”. Loose talk in this regard has created counter-productive misunderstandings and suspicion. It must be clear that Partnership is not necessarily meant as a pre-stage to membership and that in the MD and ICI confidence building and pragmatic cooperation are in the focus. Also, the “two-way street” philosophy must be explicit (meaning that this is not about NATO preaching to others but about both sides learning from each other and tackling problems together). In particular Partnerships “out of area” must be seen to serve pragmatic purposes such as cooperation in operations and consultation in the context of Article 4 of the NATO Treaty. They must be explained and pursued in a demonstrably transparent way, and even if not “Contact Countries” as such, China, India and the wider Arab world must be included in dialogue and information efforts.

All this requires some innovative thinking and candid dialogue among NATO members as well as between NATO and the Partner nations. Also, in the effort of gaining trust in NATO, ways should be found to reach out beyond politicians, diplomats, officials and officers to the societies of Partner nations.

11. NATO Enlargement

A thorough debate appears necessary about the impact of NATO’s enlarge-
ment to date, its finality and its continuation – resulting in unambiguous programmatic statements in the new Strategic Concept. Through the urging by the former US administration to proceed energetically with Ukraine and Georgia, at the Bucharest Summit the subject came back to the top of NATO’s agenda much more swiftly than expected by those who would have preferred a “consolidation” phase during which to systematically absorb the seven new members welcomed in 2004.

NATO enlargement, which is in line with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, and according to which NATO Members can “invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede”, has been a great success. It has removed Cold War divisions in Europe, has served the concept of “stability transfer” and has contributed to the vision of a “Europe whole and free”.49

It does, however, also have problematic aspects, the most recent and spectacular of which was the controversy with Russia, and inside the Alliance, about granting a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia and Ukraine. Other concerns are whether each new member really enriches NATO and contributes to its security and whether certain aspirants are ready for membership with regard to their internal conditions, governance and security sector reforms. Also questionable, particularly after the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008, is whether Western European and Central/Eastern European Allies share the same threat perceptions and an equal concept of the “new NATO”, and how the Article 5 security guarantee can be kept equally credible for all member states. The venomous distinction between “old” and “new” Europe made by former Secretary Rumsfeld at the height of the controversy about the attack on Iraq lives on, and consensus will not be easier against that background.

Furthermore, to date only countries were invited who had managed to put to rest neighbourhood and minority conflicts (a very beneficial effect of the sheer hope for NATO membership) and whose governments enjoyed clear public support for this course. And finally, there is the confrontation with Russia, which regards NATO “expansion” as a threat and as encirclement and opposes it ever more vigorously. It is right that NATO’s “door remain open”, undeniable that democratic, sovereign states are free to choose their security alignment and alliance orientation, and justified to deny any third party a droit de regard, or even a veto, in this respect. But on the other hand there is no God-given claim to be accepted as a NATO member, no semi-automatic process of accession exists, and the conditions have to be right for it in every single case. Not least in the important relationship with Russia, further plans for NATO enlargement call for a more concordant way of proceeding, taking better account of Russian concerns and assuaging Moscow through explanation, supporting measures and constructive use of the NATO-Russia Council. There must be a middle road between “no veto for Russia”, just confronting it with new members, and granting it a droit de regard. (It would also be helpful if people within NATO avoided carelessly using the Russian propaganda term “expansion”, thus unintentionally making their case.)

After the Georgia crisis and Russia’s brutal and aggressive reaction, Georgia’s and Ukraine’s membership prospects did not become the subject of new dispute at the December 2008 Foreign Ministers’ Council (which met to reassess granting of the MAP) and at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit. But the front between the two camps of supporters and opponents can harden again. This should be avoided through a fundamental stocktaking, so that statements in preparation for the new Strategic Concept about NATO’s further enlargement process can answer the “how far” and “how fast” questions.

In attempting this, it would be advisable to have explicit recourse to NATO’s 1995 “Study on Enlargement”, which underpinned the beginning of this process and which, after explaining the positive contributions enlargement would make, insisted on countries seeking membership to
demonstrate that they have fulfilled certain requirements. These include a functioning democratic political system based on market economy; the treatment of minority populations in accordance with OSCE guidelines; demonstrable work to resolve outstanding disputes with neighbours and an overall commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes; the ability and willingness to make a military contribution to the Alliance and to achieve interoperability with other members’ forces; and the commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutional structures.

The Enlargement Study does not specifically address the fact that a country such as Ukraine, whose government and population are deeply divided over the NATO membership issue, cannot qualify at present. So the issue should be defused by intensive use of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, which is an expression of the importance NATO attaches to the security and sovereignty of this important European country. The same goes for the newly-established NATO-Georgia Commission. But it does not appear helpful always to place these two countries in the same basket.

In this context, for a better understanding among the public as well as in Moscow and in the aspirant country itself, it should also be clearly explained that offering the MAP is by no means a guarantee for “automatic” membership nor for quick accession. Rather it is, or should be, the beginning of an arduous and demanding process of security sector and military reform that can stretch over a considerable period of time – perhaps a decade or more. By emphasizing this, NATO would also revert enlargement from a predominantly political process to its original, performance-based principles.

12. New Tasks for NATO?

As stated above, it should be possible and would be useful in the new Strategic Concept to go beyond just listing some of the threats and security challenges, especially in the case of relatively novel ones. And once

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50 NATO Study on Enlargement, 3 September 1995.
they have been laid out, it would be important to succinctly and convincingly sum up and explain the security landscape, including the vulnerabilities of NATO’s members, to determine the contribution NATO can make towards effectively tackling the problems, the necessary cooperation with others and the role of military force.

The following security issues and challenges appear to be particularly worth profound debate: proliferation, biological attacks, terrorism, organized crime, maritime security including piracy, the security implications of climate change as well as food, water and resource scarcity, and cyber security. Throughout, the problem of fragile and failed states and their impact deserves debate and analysis, because it has implications in many security areas.

**Proliferation**

Nuclear proliferation has for some time been regarded as one of the top threats of the 21st century, and there is the prospect of a growing number of nuclear powers, and even a danger of a collapse of the regime established by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Such a breakdown was on the horizon at the very unsuccessful Review Conference in 2005. The development includes not only North Korea and Iran as new or prospective nuclear-armed states, but also the risk of a nuclear arms race in the Larger Middle East following Iranian nuclear armament.

But the problem has many other worrying aspects, such as the structural weaknesses of the NPT regime, the black market for components and nuclear materials, the dual-use problem, shifts in international power relations, the acquisition of ballistic and cruise missiles by many states, and even the scenario of a “Talibanization” of Pakistan, resulting in the establishment of a fundamentalist religious power for whom “the experience of decades of nuclear reticence would presumably be without relevance”.

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Also, predictions increase about the danger of non-state actors such as terrorist groups acquiring and using nuclear materials or weapons.\footnote{See: Terrorists could mount nuclear or biological attack within 5 years, warns Congress inquiry (on the Report of a Bipartisan Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction), The Guardian, 4 December 2008.}

Even if weak, the NPT must be retained, if only to allow identification of undesirable policies, and the IAEA supported. But it appears that measures and initiatives besides or beyond the treaty are gaining ground, such as the “Proliferation Security Initiative” (PSI) and the UN Security Council’s practice of calling proliferation a threat under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.\footnote{UN Security Council Resolution 1540, April 2004.}

In the preparation of the Strategic Concept, Allies must create a common understanding of the threats and vulnerabilities. They must discuss the concrete Iran and North Korea issues and be aware that only tight solidarity, the use and improvement of measures beyond the NPT and the inclusion of Russia offer a chance to contain the threat. Unity and the resolve to deny Iran and North Korea military nuclear capabilities are vital. NATO must further develop its principles and policy regarding prevention and countermeasures, including the function of its WMD Centre, its CBRN capability and the work of the different committees working on Proliferation issues (and which could be pulled together). Those are not “routine” matters, and the NATO Council ought to deal with them on a regular basis as a globally relevant threat.

This urgency should become apparent in the new Strategic Concept. And on the basis of unity with regard to these aspects, the Strategic Concept should send a powerful and convincing message about NATO Members’ resolve and preparedness for cooperation with all who are also concerned.

**Biological Attacks**

The difficulties of deterring and combating potential biological attacks are even greater. But the danger of pathogenic agents or biological toxins
being used for terror attacks may be rising. A recent study predicted a catastrophic event of this kind, more likely with biological than with nuclear weapons, before the end of 2013\textsuperscript{54}. Even if this would perhaps not amount to apocalyptic mass murder, the anthrax attacks on the US in 2001 gave a foretaste of the panic and economic paralysis that can be achieved already today.

Biotechnical and nano-technological developments could also facilitate such efforts. Even more than in the nuclear field the dual-use problem complicates early warning. Scientists as well as a security alliance must be alert to this complex problem and to the requirement to make progress on verification issues with regard to the Biological Weapons Convention.

**Terrorism**

NATO sometimes prides itself on having already “addressed” terrorism in the 1999 Strategic Concept. However, in the very brief paragraph on “risks of a wider nature”, “acts of terrorism” are only mentioned in passing. That was at the insistence of Turkey, who, as always in defence ministerial communiqués, wanted an implicit reference to the PKK, and no consequences were drawn from that reference. Only the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon two and a half years later made “global”, “Islamist” or “Jihad” terrorism a priority subject of international security policy and a prime theme for NATO. Nearly frontier-less terrorism and its potential scale have given the threat an entirely new dimension.

“War on terror”, an understandable reaction to the wake-up call of 9/11, has led to undesirable polarization within the Alliance also. And this has promoted the impression that terrorism was to be fought mainly by military force. Allies will have to address the difficulties of cooperation in fighting terrorism, to come to terms with conflicting definitions and concepts of terrorism, to reflect past mistakes in fighting it and to be aware of differences

\textsuperscript{54} See note 52.
in US and European approaches. These are well captured in the famous “Rumsfeld’s 5 Ds” (Defeat international terrorism by denying the terrorists financing and freedom of movement, by disrupting their actions and plans, by degrading their capabilities and by destroying them and their infrastructure) and the UK’s “4 Ps” (Reduce the threat by preventing underlying causes and by pursuing the terrorists, and reduce vulnerability by protecting the public and by preparing new legislation and resilience measures).55

NATO must get beyond the consensus formulae in communiqués and realize that divergent views and concepts produce difficulties in fighting a global network of loosely associated and often independently acting terrorists. Still, an “Alliance Action Plan against Terrorism” already exists, complemented by a “Partnership Action Plan” and a “NATO-Russia Action Plan”, frameworks for improving cooperation and coordination in the fight against terrorism through political consultation and a range of practical measures. PfP training and education centres as well as Centres of Excellence are to contribute to the latter. These concrete efforts have to be reflected in the Strategic Concept.

If terrorism, including the quest of terrorists for weapons of mass destruction, is considered one of the pre-eminent threats of the beginning of the 21st century, it deserves full treatment in the new Strategic Concept, including: firstly, a definition of what kind of terrorism NATO addresses; secondly, a reflection on the roots of terrorism and its breeding grounds; thirdly, an explanation of the relative value of the military instrument and its utility together with political, police, financial, judiciary and economic measures; and, finally, a description of NATO’s role in the framework of the UN’s Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the Security Council’s relevant resolutions as well as its concrete contributions, such as consultation, intelligence-sharing, training, protection (including with technical means) and consequence management. All this must reflect NATO’s awareness of its limited, but important, role in an international, multifaceted and comprehensive response.

55 I owe this illustration to one of the lectures by Rod Thornton at the NATO Defense College.
The debate leading to those statements should take account of scholarly research regarding historical experience of the decline and end of terrorist campaigns in the past, from which insights for devising more effective counter-strategies could be drawn.\textsuperscript{56} Also, the danger of terrorists being ready for nuclear or biological attack in the near future deserves greater focus. A crystal clear warning to states providing sanctuary and support should also be sent by the Strategic Concept.

\textit{Organized Crime}

Already, among “threats of a wider nature”, the 1999 Strategic Concept mentioned organized crime, which was causing increased concerns in the 1990s. The reasons were the rise in the illegal drugs industry, the development of human smuggling and trafficking, and also the explosion of illegal markets and activities in the former Warsaw Pact and Soviet area. Globalization, economic liberalization and increasingly porous borders added to this. The latter contributed to the “internationalizing” of organized crime, and transnational organized crime had indeed become a broader security threat – not to be combated militarily, but to be observed, analyzed and addressed in its numerous implications.

These concern, for instance, piracy, the drugs trade and connected money-laundering, which in turn contributes to financing illegal arms trade. Here links between organized crime and terrorism are to be found and can increase. Also, cyber criminality is on the rise. Furthermore, the connections between crime, corruption, bad governance and the potential failing of states have direct consequences for NATO in the countries and regions where it has invested so much in stabilization and reconstruction. The security implications of transnational organized crime have grown and deserve attention by NATO.

“Because of its cross-cutting nature, straddling issues of international security, sovereignty, energy assurance, economic prosperity, law enforcement and defence”, maritime security will have increased importance for NATO in the future. World trade, 90% of which is transported on oceans and seas, can be interrupted and sabotaged at a small number of choke points. Oceans and seas have also become increasingly accessible for criminal activities such as illegal immigration, human trafficking, weapons smuggling, narcotics trafficking, as well as for hostile endeavours like terrorism, piracy and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Geopolitical competition, for instance in the High North, may also rise.

The existing legal instruments must be enforced through strengthened international cooperation involving intelligence, law enforcement and military capabilities. Generally speaking, this is not a new theme. Following Cold War deterrence through patrols and exercises, the post-Cold War era has seen several UN-mandated NATO maritime interdiction operations (MIO) such as “Sharp Guard” (1992-1996) and “Active Endeavour” (since 2001), disrupting criminal activities and networks and cooperating with civilian law enforcement agencies such as the coast guard, border police and customs and commercial shipping companies. An experimental Joint Information Analysis Centre in Naples, the NATO Shipping Centre at Northwood and the International Maritime Organization in London have fostered this cooperation, a Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre was established on the island of Crete in 2004, and with the NATO Military Authorities a concept for maritime security operations is under development. To these should be added NATO’s four standing maritime groups and five on-call high readiness maritime forces, the NATO planning board for Ocean Shipping, the Naval Armaments Group and other bodies.

For all these activities the relevant conceptual underpinning needs to be

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expressed in the Strategic Concept, explaining how NATO is to assume “a specific and distinct role, complementary to the functions performed by national and international civilian law-enforcement agencies and maritime administrations”, which should “focus particularly on those tasks which require timely, high-grade intelligence and permanently available capabilities and where NATO has particular interests and value to add”.

These include: the protection of energy-related shipping and associated sea-based infrastructure, terrorism, piracy and WMD proliferation. Cooperation with Partners in the PfP, the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, Russia and Ukraine as well as Contact Countries is of the essence here and should be explicitly addressed. Also, this is an obvious field for cooperation with the EU.

The EU Operation Atlanta is having some limited success against the rising piracy around the Horn of Africa, and NATO has supported it with naval assets. But this scourge requires more thorough fighting before a connection forms between pirates and terrorists and before pirate-terrorists stage what has already been referred to as a “maritime 9/11”. And NATO, as the prime security organization, ought to take a lead role here, aware of the difficulty of combating piracy only at sea, given the vastness of the area, the surveillance problems and the potentiality of one out of thousands of fishing boats suddenly turning into a pirate vessel. Among the requirements to be debated are what can be done against the mother ships, how bases ashore can be dried out or neutralized, how the assistance of riparian states can be mobilized and what kind of headquarters close to the zone of operations may be necessary.

Still, notwithstanding the topicality, “maritime security” should not be exclusively focused on piracy. For “a better structured NATO role in enhancing maritime security”, a recent, thorough article sensibly proposes the following key functions: regular patrolling of shipping lanes and choke points as well as the surveillance of sea-based infrastructure; plan-

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59 Ibid., p. 14f.
ning and conduct of maritime security operations, particularly MIOs; development of doctrine and civil-military, inter-agency cooperation arrangements; and provision of maritime situational awareness. Certainly, now, combating piracy has to be added.

Of course, a Strategic Concept should not go into any operational details, but it is clear that a lot of conceptual ground work needs to be done whose essence needs to be reflected in basic statements about NATO’s interest and role in the field of maritime security.

**Energy Security**

It is true that “NATO cannot avoid discussing energy security”. 60 The Alliance has not voluntarily seized the subject, it has been seized by it – far beyond the vague statement in the 1999 Strategic Concept that its security interests could be affected by the “disruption of the flow of vital resources”. Increasingly, geostrategic considerations apply to energy availability, oil and gas sources are located in politically unstable regions, anti-Western energy producer alliances have emerged, sea transport routes and pipelines are under potential threat, not least from terrorists and pirates, and Russia’s energy policy has raised concerns.

What NATO’s new Strategic Concept might state about NATO’s future role regarding energy security must take account of three salient aspects: first, the two different roots of this debate entailing divergent approaches, i.e. the military one concerning infrastructure and supply routes, and the political one, which is about consumer dependency on potentially unreliable suppliers or about oil and gas as political “weapons”; second, the fact that signals from inside NATO as well as from individual member governments have produced confusing perceptions about the Alliance’s ambition in this field,

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which in turn renders more difficult any consensus about its respective role and contribution. Finally, there is the principle that in this area, in which other organizations such as the EU may have a more comprehensive part, the Alliance should only envisage activities which have an “added value” – which argues for a limited and complementary NATO role.

In light of these considerations, the principles, options and recommendations stated in a report on “NATO’s Role in Energy Security” for the Bucharest Summit and a progress report for the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, have to be reflected in the Strategic Concept: engagement in the fields of information and intelligence fusion and sharing; projecting stability; advancement of international and regional cooperation; supporting consequence management and enhancing the protection of critical energy infrastructure. It remains to be seen whether a clearer focus can also be placed on the protection of sea lines for oil and gas transport or whether that is a contentious issue.

It is no secret that some Allies would like to go further: for instance the US, who spends a considerable part of its military expenditure on militarily securing energy imports, would clearly prefer a higher NATO profile in energy security, or Poland, who suggested something like an “Energy NATO” with a solidarity clause as well as common oil and gas reserves. Yet although the Washington Treaty stipulates the possibility of consultation on any security-relevant subject, it should be recognized that a coherent energy policy is mainly a matter for the European Union. This means that, in this field also, some explicit self-restraint and limitation of NATO’s scope would be in order – not least to avoid misunderstandings and speculation, mistrust and unnecessary controversy. Also, NATO should not chime in the lamenting over dependence on Russia (which in fact is mutual, since Russia needs markets as well as Western investment in exploitation facilities and does not have the storage facility required for an extended interruption of deliveries).

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61 See Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration, paragraph 59.
Climate, Food, Water and Security

The global and regional security situation is strongly affected by the many unsolved socio-economic problems of the world. Among these are poverty, hunger, lack of usable water, global warming, pollution, migration and megacity development. Their security implications are clearly demonstrable.

For instance, Darfur can be regarded as the first war caused by climate change, given the drought-caused population movements. Migration motivated by poverty and hopelessness may become ever more violent, so that Europe will not be an unaffected island of affluence. Demographic trends support this prognosis. The lack of prospects for young people facilitates recruitment for terrorist groups. 40 % of the world population depends on water supplies originating from other states. The rise of sea levels will drive masses of people from coast regions, which might cause battles for survival. The increasing piracy and armed robbery at the Horn of Africa has to do not only with Somalia’s situation as a failed state, but also with overfishing in those waters and the fishermen’s loss of livelihood. Sea warming will lead to the permanent opening of the Northeast Passage with consequences for the pursuance of interests by several states. Organized crime, drug trade and trafficking, bad governance and trafficking in human beings damage security efforts not least in NATO’s stabilization and reconstruction missions.62

In some of these contexts, the re-emergence of interstate war is likely. Even the present global financial and economic crisis will not be without impact on security as it aggravates some of these problems and limits the space for manoeuvre in defence spending.

Not that NATO as such should take a prime responsibility in this field, but its Strategic Concept must acknowledge the security implications of those phenomena. The Alliance, as the prime transatlantic forum for consulta-

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62 Detailed and colourful: Thomas Friedman, Hot, Flat and Crowded. Why we need a Green Revolution and how it can renew America (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008).
tion on security matters, should see a role in analyzing and discussing such correlations. And as it consults with NGOs in the context of its peace missions, some consultation, about the security implications of their work, with institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization (let alone the United Nations) might also be useful. Also, just as the inextricable nexus between security and development is rightly emphasized for the peace missions, the limited success of development aid has consequences for stability and security.

This is a huge subject, but worth some serious debate among Allies and a few sentences in the Strategic Concept that would manifest NATO’s awareness of the larger context and would encourage intensified common attention to the security implications of the global socio-economic problems. Left to themselves, the poverty regions of this planet will increasingly become a danger for the globalized world.

**Cyber Security**

Complex modern societies with their interwoven and highly computerized energy, logistic, water supply and banking systems, where small defects can lead to self-reinforcing instabilities, are extremely vulnerable and sensitive to disturbances, be they accidental or intentional. The question whether a cyber attack “constitutes an Article 5 case” is not wholly hypothetical. Attacks on the information systems of Allies have occurred, most dramatically to date in April and May 2007 on Estonian public and private networks. NATO has a responsibility to plan for strengthening and protecting its own and member states’ information systems against such assaults, which are potentially extremely damaging, on their ability to act or on vital functions of states and societies.

The last Summit Declarations show that this is happening, after in Prague 2002 a first tasking was formulated with regard to cyber defence activities, aimed at enhancing the protection of NATO’s communication and information systems against attempts at disruption through attacks or illegal
access. A Policy on Cyber Defence has been adopted, which establishes basic principles and provides direction to NATO’s civil and military bodies in order to ensure a common and coordinated approach, and also contains recommendations for individual NATO countries on the protection of their national systems. The Military Committee also agreed on a Cyber Defence Concept. The structure and authorities to carry out this policy are being developed, including a Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC), and a corresponding Centre has been set up in Tallinn.

This is probably a less controversial debate subject among Allies, but clearly these developments have to be addressed in the Strategic Concept in relation to the need for NATO and nations to protect key information systems, to share best practices, to be prepared for, and capable of, rendering mutual assistance, and to regard this as yet another field for cooperation with many actors outside NATO.

13. Arms Control and Confidence-building

Until the advent of the Obama administration, arms control was in decline or, to say the least, did not figure high on the international agenda. However, acknowledging that the CFE Treaty is suspended (with great potential damage for transparency and the existing instruments), the ABM Treaty a thing of the past, the START Treaty expiring, the Moscow Agreement not a real arms control treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty and regime moribund, the biological arms convention in limbo, the Geneva conference waiting for a subject, the Open Sky procedure stalled and the INF treaty questioned by some, a more profound debate about the present state and future prospects of all aspects of arms control appears necessary – leading to common views among the Allies about the importance of arms control and to the formulation of NATO’s objectives and policy in this field. NATO is the locus for the transatlantic discourse on these matters.

The new US administration has made a new strategic nuclear arms-control agreement with Russia its concrete priority goal. NATO should unani-
mously support that intent. At the same time, in all other fields there is continued value in arms control with regard to defensiveness, moderation, transparency and confidence-building. NATO should make that clear in its new Strategic Concept and opt for a comprehensive revitalization of the arms control agenda, including an adaptation of the CFE Treaty that takes into account justified Russian concerns after the end of the bloc-to-bloc situation (instead of ignoring Russian proposals because of comparatively small instances of non-compliance); implementation of the Test Ban Treaty; discussions about the limitation of space militarization; progress in the fissile material cut-off issue; conformity with regard to missile defence (rules for limitation and possibilities for a comprehensive system); biological and chemical arms control; and steps forward on the issue of small arms and light weapons, antipersonnel mines and certain ammunitions such as cluster bombs.

Concurrently, Allies have to cautiously counteract the idealistic wave of public sentiment regarding nuclear disarmament. The vision of a nuclear-free world is putting great public pressure on political leaders and tends to delegitimize nuclear deterrence, which will remain necessary for a long time to come. As quoted before, it is necessary “to reconcile the continuing need for nuclear deterrence arrangements with the political imperative to pursue visible and substantive measures in nuclear arms control”.63

NATO must not be overrun by disarmament expectations, but in its Strategic Concept steer a convincing middle course between genuine support for arms control, leading to the lowest possible level of forces at which security and stability can be secured, and the explanation of deterrence and defence requirements.64 This includes the simple truth that the easing of tensions or potential conflicts is an important prerequisite for arms control, not the reverse. This highlights the essential role of confidence-building. Publics will also be impatient with the complexity of nuclear arms control and the time required for it (already for

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63 See note 35.
64 See section 6.
technical reasons). And it will be demanding to explain that the salience of nuclear weapons in NATO must not decrease too drastically while it increases outside.

Arms control cannot replace politics, but arms competition and lack of transparency can increase tensions and confrontation. NATO should ostensibly and publicly promote a revival of cooperative security that takes account of the interests of all parties. The (non-published) report on arms control presented to the Bucharest Summit points in this direction. It should be the basis for programmatic Strategic Concept statements. The Alliance must do some homework in all areas of arms control, not least including in the NATO-Russia Council, put itself behind constructive and promising initiatives and raise its profile in this field – but not at the expense of security.

14. Corresponding Activities

NATO’s Role in Education and Training, DDR and SSR

One of NATO’s major assets consists of expertise and experience, collectively and in the member states. They are relevant in many fields: military operations, inter-service and multinational (joint and combined) cooperation, integration of the security forces in democratic societies, political control of the military, as well as ordinary military and technical skills, education, training and leadership culture.

In the SFOR and KFOR missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, in the NATO Training Mission Iraq and, most topically, in Afghanistan, NATO and its members have been much involved in Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Demobilization, Disarmament, Reintegration (DDR) efforts. Great experience in these fields was already gathered in assisting

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the Central and Eastern European countries and their militaries after the
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. The PfP programmes
with them led, in many cases, to the Membership Action Plan (MAP) and
the subsequent invitation to join the Alliance. Without NATO’s and its tra-
ditional members’ intensive activities in these fields, such a rapid integra-
tion of the reform countries in the Euro-Atlantic community would not
have been possible.

Some of these activities are also on offer beyond the PfP framework, i.e.
for participants in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the Istanbul
Cooperation Initiative (ICI). The Riga Summit meeting in November 2006
launched a “NATO Training Cooperation Initiative” (NTCI) for MD and
ICI countries, proposing the establishment, at the NATO Defense College
in Rome, of a “Middle East Faculty”, meanwhile set up as the “NATO
Regional Cooperation Course” (NRCC).

It thus appears in order for the new Strategic Concept to highlight NATO’s
contribution to Education and Training, SSR and DDR as an important and
strategic, albeit complementary, task that has considerably expanded and
also contributes to interoperability and the projection of stability. Such
statements should be prepared by a solid discussion about the objectives
and about lessons learnt – not least with regard to “ownership” and mutu-
al learning (vs. “NATO preaching”). Also, improved mutual information
within NATO (“clearing house”) about the individual activities of member
states, bilateral and sometimes competing with those of others, should lead
to better coordination and targeting. Finally, the NATO and Partner train-
ing centres and Centres of Excellence should at least be mentioned as
instruments of these common efforts.

Civil Emergency, Disaster Relief and Science for Peace Activities

This is another field where NATO and its members contribute expertise,
experience and organizational skills that are not well known to the larger
public. These tasks and activities, therefore, deserve a short reference in
the new Strategic Concept. This would mention the mission of the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) and its task to collect, analyze and share information on national planning activity to ensure the most effective use of civil resources during emergency situations, enabling Allies and Partners to assist one another in preparing for and dealing with the consequences of crisis, disaster or conflict.

It would also refer to the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), the focal point for coordinating relief efforts among NATO member and Partner countries in natural or man-made disasters, and mention its close cooperation with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian affairs (UN-OCHA), as well as the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit (EADRU).

A third element of such seemingly marginal but useful activities that should be acknowledged is NATO’s Science for Peace programme. A look at some of its projects (such as rocket fuel destruction in Azerbaijan, cleaning up of harmful pesticides in Moldova, pilot study on the link between food and security) shows that this is not at all “academic”, but of practical utility.

15. **NATO’s Transformation**

*Homeland Protection and Defence vs. Expeditionary Orientation*

Allies have to decide how interventionist they want NATO to be in future, and what the relationship is between homeland defence and protection vis-à-vis expeditionary capabilities. The implications of this choice for the adjustment of military capabilities determine the orientation for further transformation of Allied military forces.

But it is also of significance for NATO’s self-definition. As indicated above, an important split looms between two groups of Allies; on the one hand, there are those new members who have entered NATO in order to “join the West”, to be allied with the US and to be secure from Russia. On
the other hand, there are the “old” members for whom East-West confronta-
tion is over for good, who have profited greatly from the end of the Cold
War and for whom inter-state confrontation in Europe has not much likeli-
hood any more. The Russian onslaught against Georgia has increased the
concerns of the former, and some begin to doubt the solidarity of European
Allies as well as the continued credibility of the mutual assistance and
defence guarantee stated in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. These fears
cannot be assuaged by merely restating, as in the Declaration on Alliance
Security, that Article 5 and collective defence, “based on the indivisibility
of Allied security, are, and will remain, the cornerstone of our Alliance”.

This has to be underpinned by operational contingency planning and the
pertinent capabilities. Such planning was neglected after the first round of
enlargement. It need not be spectacular, but reinforcements have to be
catered for, and NATO’s commitment and presence must be visible, as with
the Baltic Air Policing and through exercises. And it must be explained that
all this is not directed against any state such as Russia and that it does not
require a concrete adversary but is an element of the European continent’s
stability, an “insurance policy against the unforeseen”.

Behind this is the simple thought that when, after the end of the East-West
conflict, ministers sought to replace “threat” by something softer and
politically more “correct”, “risk” was never a good terminological substi-
tute. “Risk” logically includes both the danger and the precautionary
measure. If little is done to hedge against a danger or security challenge,
the risk is high; if much is done, the risk is low, and the development of a
potentiality into a threat can be prevented. Certainly there is the addition-
al difficulty that having prevented a potential threat from materializing can
almost never be proven. But it is important to debate this more candidly
among Allies and convey more convincingly in the public domain the
understanding of the elements of security and stability, which, of course,
also include transparency, dialogue, confidence-building and cooperation.

One thing is clear: only on the basis of reassurance and a genuine sense
of security in all member countries (governments and peoples) can NATO
sustain its out-of-area efforts. The “changed mission spectrum” does not mean a replacement of “old” by “new” tasks. It means that the spectrum has become broader, albeit with different grades of probability. It is true that in its declarations NATO continues to state that its forces must be able to “conduct the full range of military operations and missions”. It is also true that there still is some way to go in replacing the Cold War static armed forces with more agile ones. But some in the Alliance think that the pendulum has swung too far to one side – conceptually as well, in several countries, with the reduction in heavy weapons.

It is vital for the Alliance to restore a convincing balance of homeland defence and protection with out-of-area operations and expeditionary activities. This includes convincingly describing and explaining a continuum between security at home and out-of-area operations and how the latter contribute to keeping dangers at a distance. But that is not enough. The UK-proposed “NATO Solidarity Force” may be one good idea – the name is not, because all armed forces in the Alliance should be “solidarity forces”.

Capabilities

Thus, “shifting from territorial defense to expeditionary operations” must not result in an either-or. But that said, the call for greater flexibility, deployability and sustainability of NATO’s (members’) armed forces is justified (not least because flexible and deployable forces are also useful for homeland defence, and are no longer to be imagined in merely static terms). And the goal of having 40% of each member nation’s land forces structured, prepared and equipped for deployed operations, as well as the proportion of 8% undertaking, or planned for, deployed operations at any one time, is far from being achieved.

66 Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration, 4 April 2009, paragraph 3.
The deficiencies are well known and were addressed several times: e.g. in the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) of NATO’s 50th Anniversary Summit in Washington 1999, in the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) of 2002 and, quite exhaustively, in the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) of the 2006 Riga Summit. In each case the success was limited, for many reasons. They include the low defence budgets and a lack of political determination to honour commitment with action, and words with deeds, as well as national military-industrial interests, lack of efficient cooperation in armaments production and long lead times for new equipment (so that some countries are still spending huge sums on weapon systems ordered during the East-West conflict).

A mere repetition of the very solid CPG document will not suffice. The main statements of the PCG require debate, adaptation and reflection in the new Strategic Concept as a clear commitment of the Allies. It would be important to find a way to credibly commit member states to procuring and providing the most-lacking capabilities and enablers such as intelligence and surveillance means, strategic air lift, helicopters, gendarmerie forces, interoperable command and control, multinational logistics – and to express this commitment in the new Strategic Concept, together with clear, agreed guidelines for the further development of the armed forces.

A new readiness is required to ensure that “commitments from nations … to NATO operations be translated into concrete terms by the development and fielding of flexible and sustainable contributions, and also by a fair sharing of the burden”. The concept of the NATO Response Force (NRF), its difficulties and the connected necessities of rapid military decisions belong to this context. Further controversial aspects of the military side of transformation are the necessary budgetary volumes, interoperability, the technological gap between US and European armed forces, arms cooperation vs. national interests, and the financing of Alliance operations. Also, “asymmetry” of threats and in warfare needs to be addressed.

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68 Comprehensive Political Guidance, 29 November 2006; paragraph 8.
“Transformation”

“Transformation” has come to be the Alliance’s key buzzword, meaning not least that the present security environment demands not “reform” towards another static state of affairs, but permanent adaptation. The main goal of Transformation – within NATO but also in the member states – is to improve the military effectiveness of the Alliance by modernizing the military structures, forces, capabilities and doctrines. The “forcing agent for change” is Allied Command Transformation (ACT), collocated with the US Joint Forces Command (USJFC) in Norfolk, Virginia. It is a strategic “command” like the Allied Command Operations (ACO), because it grew, after the NATO command structure decisions of the 2002 Prague Summit, out of the former Supreme Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT), which the US wanted abandoned, while European Allies found it important to maintain a strategic command on US territory.

It would be desirable to find in the new Strategic Concept a succinct passage describing and explaining Transformation, which has been hugely overcomplicated, not least through the vast manpower establishment and the diversified tasks of the numerous sub-units at ACT: missions, Integrated Project Teams, “Transformation Goals”, “Objective Areas” – all this constitutes a mind-boggling complexity. An illustrative case in point was the way in which ACT prepared what later became the “Comprehensive Approach”; the “Effects-Based Approach to Operations” (EBAO).69

Some of the confusion should be cleared away, and also certain American-European divergences about “Transformation” candidly discussed, in order to arrive at a conclusive statement explaining its meaning for NATO – and reversing the limitation to its military aspects, stemming from the American “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA).70 In its London

69 See section 8.
70 See the various American and European views in: Daniel S.Hamilton (ed.), Transatlantic Transformations: Equipping NATO for the 21st Century (Washington: Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, 2004). Also, the critical comments by Smith-Windsor (note 37), p. 3, about “a unique jargon, peppered with a plethora of new acronyms as well as heavily scientific systematic planning methodology”.
Declaration of July 1990, Allied Heads of State and Government stated: “Today our Alliance begins a major transformation.” Since then, “Transformation” has been used in an ever narrower way. The notion should be broadened anew to include political and administrative transformation of the Alliance. The advent of a French Supreme Commander at ACT, the “price” for France’s rejoining NATO’s military structure, seems to be a good opportunity for this.

16. Internal Conditions for Effectiveness and Credibility

Thus, Transformation should not be limited to adapting military forces, capabilities and doctrines to the demands of the 21st century. NATO’s internal reform is important, too, and should be reflected in the Strategic Concept.

Jestingly it was said that even after a failure in Afghanistan, the present tested of the Alliance, NATO would never cease to exist, be it only because of bureaucratic inertia. Indeed, NATO’s bureaucracy has developed into a Moloch in terms of personnel management, budgeting mechanisms, the security apparatus, the committee structure with hundreds of bodies, and the military command structure.

And the decision-making: forging consensus has become ever more difficult because the increased number of member states and the more diffuse security environment have produced a much greater variety of views.

Following 9/11, the toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the dramatic disagreements over the Iraq war, the temptation has grown to act through “coalitions of the willing” and to regard NATO as nothing more than a “toolbox” for that end. And the former US Secretary of Defense’s dictum that “the mission determines the coalition” has contributed to undermining Alliance cohesion. To this enumeration can be added the frequent failure to honour political decisions and commitments with the necessary amount of forces and capabilities, and also, as mentioned above, the potential split between Article 5 and out-of-area orientation.
All this undermines not only NATO’s effectiveness, but also its credibility, and a determined effort is required to restore cohesion and solidarity among Allies. In recent years several efforts for internal reform of the Alliance have failed because of national interests and positions. The fundamental debate preparing the new Strategic Concept should be used to get to grips with some of the issues so that the document could reflect newfound unity. A common analysis of deficiencies should be made at the outset. It would already reveal some of the divergences: for instance, while the US and the UK complain about oversized bureaucracy and the constant need for consensus, some smaller member states bewail the lack of transparency in the preparation of decisions among the “big ones”.

Among the issues to be dealt with, the following appear salient (and if a former Chairman of the Military Committee says that “the NATO political structure is crying out for review, adaptation and restructuring”, this has to be taken seriously).71

Consensus as NATO’s decision-making procedure is often criticized for being too lengthy and for producing only the lowest common denominator and diluted compromise decisions. It will, however, continue to be the core of the inter-governmental organization that NATO is, lending full authority to a decision behind which all members stand. In view of the awkwardness of many a decision process it has been proposed by some to limit the consensus principle to the level of the NATO Council (NAC) and to apply the majority vote at the lower committee levels (perhaps with the exclusion of budgetary decisions). This has to be debated, but the proposal is doubtful, not least because controversial issues would anyway rise to the NAC level. There is also a proposal to give more authority to the Secretary General, but he will not be able to overcome the inter-governmental character of the organization. The proposal by the former CHODs to create a kind of “US-EU-NATO Steering Directorate” has not a great chance of being acceptable, though.72

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71 Naumann et al., p. 125.
72 Ibid., p. 144f.
Furthermore, for operations, creation of an “opt-out option” has been suggested, whereby member states would agree to NATO conducting an operation but not taking part (and then not having a say in decisions about its conduct). However, as with Article 5, no nation is committed to a particular degree or way of participation, and the trend towards “coalitions of the willing” should not be promoted within the Alliance.

Political-military cooperation in NATO Headquarters is frequently criticized. There are proposals to merge the International Staff (IS) and the International Military Staff (IMS). This is worth debating, but, realistically, there will never be agreement about diminishing the role of the Military Committee (MC), which provides “independent military advice”. The MC has to realize, though, that often its advice is already tainted by the awareness of the political positions of its members’ governments, which qualifies its “independence”.

A thorough committee review was attempted several times. The work of the numerous NATO committees and working groups is very specialized and regarded by many as “stove-piped” and sclerotic. The step taken by the Military Strategy Working Group (MSWG), in December 1991, when it delivered the MC 400 military strategy document to Defence Ministers, then reported to the MC “mission fulfilled” and proposed its own disbandment, was to remain a unique case in NATO. The creation of “lead committees” already brought some improvement, but a much more radical weeding-out of the NATO bureaucracy is required. In the IS, national “hereditary domains” for, e.g., the filling of Assistant Secretary General (ASG) posts, have to be debated, and the personnel management in NATO HQ has become quite static.

Also, NATO’s military command structure must be further streamlined. Few static headquarters are needed anymore, and the question is posed whether Allied Command Transformation (ACT) needs to be a “command” or should rather be a kind of planning staff. With regard to operations, there are questions about giving commanders clear “operational command”, while doing away with national reservations (“caveats”). But
this last proposal must take account of the fact that in several member states parliamentary prerogatives are impossible to overcome.

It seems obvious that in its Headquarters the Alliance needs more capacity for thorough and focused analysis of potential threats and scenarios, of “multiple futures” (the theme of a long-term project in ACT). The staffs are too occupied with operational, day-to-day work to cope with future-oriented tasks. The establishment of such a capacity could well be done by drawing on the huge personnel reservoir available at the ACT.

Finally, there is the issue of funding NATO’s running and operations. Nations have very divergent views about “common funding”. The “negative lottery”, in which the principle of “costs lay where they fall” applies to the nations concerned, paralyses the readiness for contributions, not least to the NATO Response Force (NRF). In this context, there is an obvious need for “pooling” of resources and for creating more NATO common capabilities such as the AWACS radar force. This is conceivable for, i.a. transport, air-to-air-refuelling, training, combat search-and rescue (CSAR) and logistics.

There are many aspects of possible internal reform of NATO. Still, with all imaginable institutional improvements it remains true that NATO will only continue to be efficient if all member states remind themselves that it is the best possible community of like-minded nations and that the political will to consult and act together is the recipe for success. This requires new readiness to see the big aims and to compromise on paltry national needs and desires.

17. Regions

Besides all these “functional” areas and topics, the Strategic Concept should also deal with some main world regions and express NATO’s pertinent assessments, interests and objectives. It is not acceptable that the consultation on the burning issues of the present world takes place mainly
outside the NATO Council. The Strategic Concept would have to reflect conclusions in this regard, expressing the interest of NATO’s members in the peaceful, prosperous development of key regions and in cooperative relations with the regional powers. Here are some considerations with regard to individual regions (with Russia and Ukraine discussed in other contexts):

The Western Balkans must continue to be of interest for NATO after the investment made in this part of Europe. Further stabilization and the provision of security, as well as SSR and DDR, remain important for Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Kosovo and for the integration into NATO of Croatia, Albania and (soon, it is hoped) FYROM. Also, the Alliance remains part of the Euro-Atlantic perspective for Serbia and Montenegro. The standards set down in the Enlargement Study continue to be valid yardsticks.

In the “Broader Middle East”, NATO’s support for US and EU efforts towards the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians is required, but it must also be concerned with the many other problems of this volatile region, including a looming nuclear arms race should Iran acquire nuclear weapons. Safety of shipping routes including the fight against piracy and the stability of oil regions are among the interests of all Allies. Through its Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative NATO is involved in confidence-building and cooperation, which should reach not only the political and military elites, but also the populace of these countries.

This is also valid for the Maghreb, where countries are averse to being included in the “Middle East” notion. The socio-economic problems there, lack of economic progress and the bleak prospects of ever younger populations must be of serious concern to the nations on the Mediterranean’s northern shore too. The statement “Si le sud va mal, le nord ne peut pas aller bien”\textsuperscript{73} calls for solidary development.

\textsuperscript{73} The recurring theme of Professor Mustapha Benchenane’s lectures at the NATO Defense College.
South Asia is a particular focus of NATO not least because of its engagement in Afghanistan. Among the elements of the evolving Afghanistan strategy of the United States and NATO, proclaimed at Bucharest in 2008 and reaffirmed at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, the “regional approach” appears to be the most salient. “At the heart of the US’ geostrategic challenge lie five countries with linked borders; Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan.” The extremists are a common danger, and with the necessary concentration on Pakistan as part of the Afghan task, India should not be neglected. A revalorization of Turkey’s role also appears important.

The particular problem of Iran and its quest for nuclear weapons should be discussed among NATO Allies. They must demonstrate unity in resolve and in the concrete approach. Diplomacy needs a military backbone and, improbable as it may be, there is no point in excluding from the outset any military option. The Balkan lesson should be heeded: implicitly reassuring Milosevic that militarily he had nothing to fear made things worse and did not save the Alliance from having to intervene later, when already hundreds of thousands had lost their lives and homes. But the diplomatic approach is preferable, and Alliance unanimity may increase its chances of success.

In any event, NATO should be part of the respectful and mutual dialogue with the Islamic-Arabic world that the new US President has offered in a very convincing way and tone.

The Caucasus, this “Europe in between”, is at the crossroads of energy interests, a region of great ethnic diversity and historical legacies. NATO cannot tolerate an exclusive Russian “sphere of influence” there, but needs to take account of Russia’s interests. The Alliance could assist in promoting solutions for the so-called “frozen conflicts” (where, in fact, the efforts to resolve them are “frozen”, while the conflicts are protracted, simmering and, as demonstrated in August 2008, potentially explosive). In its rela-

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tions with the countries of the region, NATO can foster moderation and peaceful conflict resolution. The Caucasus might become a region where “zero-sum” thinking could be overcome by developing common interests with Russia as well.

Like the other former Warsaw Pact members and components of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian republics are included in the Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. The oil and gas interests Western countries have there are obvious. But the question as to what extent governance in those countries matches the PfP standards deserves scrutiny within NATO.

In East Asia, NATO has an interest in seeing China’s “rise” (in their view “return”) to great power status develop in a benign way. That presupposes dialogue and transparency in the way NATO develops relations with “like-minded” global partners such as Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand (the “Contact Countries”). Conversely, China must understand that the development of its regional military power should not awaken mistrust in its neighbourhood. For instance, the procurement of one aircraft carrier might have very limited military utility, but carry a disproportionate political cost. Also, the danger emanating from North Corea, and its intransigence, should be a subject of interest within the Alliance.

In Africa, the Allies’ focus is on Darfur and the Congo. But the dire state of affairs in most of Sub-Saharan Africa is reason to take an interest, to debate, and to support the African Union. Such support should not only relate to concrete operations, but also offer the wealth of NATO’s experience as proposed above.75 The establishment of the US regional command AFRICOM points to increased interest and concern on the part of NATO’s leading power.76

75 See section 8.
76 See Wolf Kinzel, Sascha Lange, Afrika im Fadenkreuz der USA? Warum die USA ein Afrikakommando einrichten (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, März 2007, SWP-Aktuell 17).
Finally, on the subject of the High North, Norway in particular has been articulating concerns, and Denmark recently decided to create a special task force. There is “solid evidence that the Arctic, and particularly the Arctic Ocean, is gradually attracting international attention over a wide spectrum of issues, including military security.” The drivers of the evolution in this region are climate change and energy. The increasing usability of the Northwest Passage in the not too distant future and the assumed large oil and gas deposits, together with technological advances, will allow unprecedented economic activity – and raise competing stakes and claims. Although individual NATO countries also have diverging economic interests in the region, early consultation within NATO about the security aspects will be important. Cooperative elements, not least in the relationship with Russia, need to be promoted, in order to diminish potential disputes and lay the foundations for stability in the High North.

Certainly, a Strategic Concept cannot discuss at length NATO’s stance vis-à-vis the geopolitical regions of the world. But such debate must be conducted, and its results should be reflected in the Concept, in order to document, in a confidence-building way, where NATO stands.

18. Political Resolve and Public Support

It is vital for NATO to enjoy public understanding of, confidence in, and support for its mission. But backing for the Alliance, according to opinion polls, is below the desirable. The absence of an acute threat, predominant economic concerns, the public’s limited attention span, “one-issue societies” – the reasons for the fading interest and support as well as for the lack of debate in public and in parliaments are well known. The new Strategic Concept should aim to convey well-targeted key messages to the publics of NATO countries and beyond. And the process of its preparation might already be a vehicle to rekindle public

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debate about security as well as the institutions and means to safeguard it. An interesting initiative was the “NATO Shadow Summit” just prior to Strasbourg/Kehl, which produced a “Citizens Declaration of Alliance Security” and was preceded by the foundation of a new NGO, “NATO Watch”. And on 7 July 2009, at a conference in Brussels, the Secretary General explicitly launched a “public debate on the Strategic Concept”.

Also, more topically, with regard to Afghanistan, public support in NATO and Partner countries is in decline, and “winning the hearts and minds” of Afghans has had limited success so far or is even being reversed through Taliban successes and propaganda as well as civilian casualties. On the “home front” the political objective of the ISAF effort must be clearly communicated. To depict it merely as a stabilization and reconstruction operation while avoiding the notion of combat operations is not sufficient. “Public diplomacy” and “strategic communication” are critical instruments to sustain support, in parliaments and publics, for NATO’s operations. They must be part of a holistic political effort, and it is important for NATO to win and maintain “information dominance” in the public domain. This demands efforts by the member governments as well as by NATO.

The Alliance is aware of the deficiencies and takes great pains to make improvements. “Reinventing” its public diplomacy does not appear necessary. But taking stock, involving publics in the debate, recognizing the limits of what the organization as such can do, should member governments remain too passive – all this is required.

NATO’s new Public Diplomacy Division has made progress in recent years, recognizing the new media and communication tools as results and drivers of globalization, as well as the need to have an interactive relationship between the organization and its audiences, to tailor messages and

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instruments to the different target groups, not to limit communication to elites, and to be aware of certain peculiarities of today’s public opinion. These include: vague ideas about security, particularly in the generations that have grown up after the Cold War; Cold War stereotypes among the older generation, in which NATO’s image has not changed as rapidly as the Alliance itself; stronger support in new member states who are cognizant of their recent history and their closeness to Russia as their “near abroad”. Also, during the last US administration, the image of the United States (and with it NATO’s) declined considerably among large segments of global public opinion. The “Obama boost” may enhance public feeling that transatlantic relations and NATO are a force for good and should be exploited in the Alliance’s public diplomacy.

The Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration dedicated an entire paragraph to Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, reflecting the progress made by the new Division, and underscored members’ “commitment to support further improvement of our strategic communications by the time of our next Summit”. But that requires personnel, training, sufficient analysis capacity to track trends in public opinion, and financial resources. It also requires an understanding and intelligent use of the communication technologies of the 21st century, while there still seem to be obstacles to making strategic communication a “NATO-agreed” concept. Concrete ideas include better use of radio broadcasts, less static websites, human interest stories (instead of “featuring male senior diplomats or military officials” to embody “NATO’s face”). Also, some reflection seems necessary about why the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) have so little impact beyond audiences which are already convinced.

In sum, the preparation of the Strategic Concept should be used for a broad public debate with the active participation of member countries, and the new Strategic Concept should reflect NATO’s Public Diplomacy strategy,

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80 Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration, paragraph 16.
81 Babst., p. 6
82 Ibid., p. 8.
promote NATO’s “brand” and positive image and be testament to the Alliance’s relevance.

However, as was stated in the context of internal reforms, all efforts are futile without the political will of governments to overcome national positions, to honour commitments and to find and display strategic consensus in the important matters.
THE WAY AHEAD

It is not the author’s intent that this long list of subjects should contribute to deterring NATO and its members from “opening Pandora’s box”. But they all form part of the necessary NATO transformation writ large. Some are more important than others, but none appears negligible. The answers to the questions cannot be given here, and the subjects need to be prioritized, although the quest for a hierarchical prioritization of tasks may conflict with political reality. The most salient requirements for NATO appear to be: candidly and frankly to analyze splits and disagreements in today’s Alliance; to restate, develop and explain NATO’s purpose; to resolve the “global vs. regional” and “defence vs. out-of area” dichotomies; to recommit member states to indivisible transatlantic security and solidarity; to establish true, and functioning, strategic partnership with the European Union; and to forge a constructive working relationship with Russia. Furthermore, it is imperative to determine and explain the role of military force, including nuclear deterrence, as one contribution to solving security problems; to agree on the character of today’s security threats; to concretely lay out NATO’s vision of broad cooperation and a Comprehensive Approach; to find a common line on NATO enlargement; and to (re-)establish strategic consensus on these priority subjects.

It would seem that much of the rest will flow from agreement on these main issues. Political resolve and public communication will then be based on a renewed, solid and credible foundation.

“Muddling through” will not be good enough for NATO’s future in the 21st century. It cannot replace strategic thinking in the long run. The work on its new Strategic Concept should not be limited to a drafting and word-smithing exercise. A fundamental review of Alliance goals and policies is required. The French president, having assumed a more active role in

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NATO, the Atlanticist-minded leaders of Germany, Italy and Italy as well as, in particular, the new US administration, seem to offer the opportunity for a new beginning in many respects. The objective must be to reduce the differences and forge greater unity on a number of subjects, some of which have high “centrifugal” potential.

So, in view of the lack of strategic consensus and the potentially divisive effects of certain debates, there is still some reluctance among Allies to tackle them. Also, there still remains some disagreement between those who want to develop a fresh document and those who, as in 1998/99, would prefer a cautious approach of “adapting” the Concept to the changes that have occurred in the last decade. The tasking in the “Declaration on Alliance Security” does not give the impression that this discussion has come to a conclusive end. It does speak of a “new” Strategic Concept and takes up the idea of a “wise men’s group”. But inside governments also there still appears to be some debate. For instance, in Berlin, the Defence Minister made a point of stressing that it would suffice to “adapt, specify and supplement” the existing Strategic Concept, whereas Chancellor Merkel (who three years ago had been among the earliest advocates of a revision of the Strategic Concept) announced “comparatively revolutionary” changes.

A closer look at the remit contained in the Declaration on Alliance Security reveals the strings attached to it. The Secretary General is tasked “to convene and lead a broad-based group of qualified experts”, which is to “lay the ground for the Secretary General to develop a new Strategic Concept”. The experts are to do their work “in close consultation with all Allies”. Having developed the new Strategic Concept, the Secretary General has to “submit proposals for its implementation for approval at [the] next summit”. (The Summit Declaration, in turn, says that at the next summit Heads of State and Government will “approve a new Strategic Concept”.)

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Secretary General is specifically reminded that he, too, has “to keep the Council in permanent session involved throughout the process”.

It seems that this time the exercise will have many participants: the Secretary General; the Council, who will want close oversight; the Military Committee, who, as one of the main addressees of the Strategic Concept, will make their voice heard from the outset. And obviously the process will also involve broader publics such as think tanks and NGOs. This is clear from the 7 July 2009 “kick-off conference” mentioned above. So a quite democratic and public process has been launched and will be accompanied by “NATO Watch”, which will be good for public debate, but hazardous for the readiness to compromise on contentious issues.

And if a “new” Strategic Concept is really intended and not just editorial work, one year appears relatively short for the debate required among Capitals. For prior to any drafting, much political and conceptual homework will have to be done. Immediately after assumption of office, Secretary General Rasmussen appointed a “Group of Experts to lay the groundwork for the new Strategic Concept”, headed by former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and explained his “roadmap” envisaging a three-phased approach. First, there will be a “reflection phase” with four conferences on NATO’s core tasks and functions, on NATO as part of the network of security actors, on NATO and the Euro-Atlantic security environment, and on forces and capabilities. This could cover many of the topics proposed in this Forum Paper, but there are more which the group may choose to engage in additionally. In a subsequent “consultation phase”, the experts will discuss their proposals with governments and parliamentary committees. In April 2010 the Group of Experts is to present their analysis and recommendations to the Secretary General, who in turn will produce a report on elements of a new Strategic Concept in order to solicit political guidance from NATO governments.

The “drafting and final negotiation phase” will be very short: from “after

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86 See the previous section and note 79.
the summer 2010” till the NATO summit “in the autumn of 2010”. This may aim at accelerating consensus-building, but it is doubtful whether that period will be sufficient, given that more than a dozen drafts were needed before an agreement was reached on the text of the 1999 Strategic Concept. Also, the difficulty of establishing genuine consensus among governments about the controversial issues must not be underrated. Moreover, this is a process requiring some confidentiality, which has to be balanced with the “inclusive and participatory” approach” and the “interactive dialogue with the broader public”, and must not lead to frustration in the public domain.

By the 2010 autumn summit several aspects of the international situation will also be clearer: the NPT Review Conference will have taken place; the results of the US-Russian arms negotiations will be known; it will be more evident where NATO stands regarding Afghanistan and Pakistan; and perhaps there will be more clarity about Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

This author argues in favour of taking sufficient time and starting with a “clean sheet of paper”. This would, of course, not exclude reiterating in the new Strategic Concept those statements from the present one which continue to be valid. (Even in the truly revolutionary situation of spring 1990, one of the first IMS “think pieces” about a future, post-Cold War NATO strategy was titled “Elements of Continuity and Elements of Change”.)

Useful experience has been gained from the development of the first Strategic Concept in 1990/91 (in contrast to the revision in 1998/99, when the remit was cautious and conservative: “to review and where necessary adapt” the Strategic Concept”): A Military Strategy Working Group (MSWG), chaired by the IMS and comprising the “strategy colonels” from the national Delegations/Missions produced the military input and contribution for the Strategic Concept. Indeed, this group had also launched the first ideas for a rapid renovation of NATO’s military strategy right after the fall of the Berlin Wall.87

87 See note 3.
In the MSWG, food-for-thought papers ("point papers") were produced for those topics where, at that time, innovative thinking was required. These included themes such as future risks, crisis management, force build-up capability, multinationality, reinforcement options, future tasks of armies, navies and air forces, flexibility, sustainability, cooperative security, arms control. These papers were drafted, discussed, offered to the capitals and, on the basis of instructions, discussed again and amended. When they appeared sufficiently “mature”, they were, without seeking final consensus, passed to the Strategy Review Group (SRG) on the political side of the Headquarters. Much of the innovative content of the first Strategic Concept was produced in this fashion.

Also, in the 1990/91 process, in addition to the MSWG and SRG work, the NATO Council regularly met for “brainstorming sessions”, rather free-wheeling discussions of individual subjects in a very limited format.

For many of the themes addressed in this pamphlet, a comparable procedure might be productive. This time, outside experts, knowledgeable about and familiar with NATO, but independent and not constrained by government directives, could play a similar role. For with today’s sensitivities it cannot be expected that a staff group would be granted the same creative liberty enjoyed by the MSWG. The experts could contribute such input papers on the most salient individual topics for discussion in workshops, refinement and transmission to the NAC for further debate. Those papers would not have any official status and thus would not commit nations prematurely. For certain topics, (re-) establishing the consensus may call for reinforcement of the NAC by Political Directors or even for ministerial meetings.

In addition, many of those subjects are already dealt with to some extent in the Summit Declarations since Washington 1999 (Prague 2002, Istanbul 2004, Riga 2006, Bucharest 2008, Strasbourg/Kehl 2009). This material has to be reviewed and taken on board as an *acquis* which is already an object of Alliance consensus. The Alliance, PfP and NATO-Russia documents on Terrorism, Proliferation, Energy Security, and Cyber Threat also
form part of this *acquis*.
Furthermore, it would be advisable to find a way of harmonizing the Strategic Concept already during its production with the revision of the European Union’s Security Strategy, and perhaps also with the development of the next US Security Strategy. It might even be possible to engage the OSCE, the African Union and the United Nation staffs in part of the dialogue. And NATO can only be encouraged, in the spirit of transparency and confidence-building, to even invite Russian experts to certain debates, workshops or seminars.88

Finally, it might be wise to envisage periodic revision of the Strategic Concept in order to avoid, in the future, the prolonged debate about whether it was necessary or whether the right time had come.

Often, as in 1990, the warning can be heard “not to open Pandora’s box”. It *is* already open, and even if not in all areas quick agreement can be expected, already the process of an intensive, focused debate about these issues would be of great value. Even an alliance based on consensus cannot, as the NATO Secretary General has been aware for some time, do without a constructive “debate culture”.

What a former Chairman of the Military Committee and a former SACEUR wrote before the Riga Summit is as true now as it was then: “Leaving too many questions about NATO’s purpose and planning priorities unaddressed for too long risks leaving the Alliance susceptible to stagnation and fractious internal bickering.”89 A vigorous process of strategic debate leading to conceptual guidelines and principles, inspiring innovative thinking about NATO’s role and tasks in the 21st century (including a definition of what NATO does *not* aspire to be and to do) and promoting

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88 At the above mentioned “kick-off conference” Dmitri Trenin was invited to present a view of NATO “from the outside”.

89 Julianne Smith et al., Transforming NATO (…again). A Primer for the NATO Summit in Riga 2006 (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2006), p. 6 (from the Foreword by Generals Klaus Naumann and Joseph Ralston).
convergence in positions could be a powerful rejuvenating cure for the 60-year-old Alliance. The opportunity of a “uniting effort” should prevail over the danger of a “divisive exercise”.

The result could this time be a Strategy of “Cooperative Security”: cooperation among Allies and Partner states, cooperation among the “interlocking institutions”, cooperation within the Comprehensive Approach, cooperation with Russia and cooperation in the arms control field – an offer to the world in a truly comprehensive approach to security in the 21st century.
1. A year ago, on the initiative of the Foreign Minister of Belgium, the governments of the fifteen nations of the Alliance resolved to “study the future tasks which face the Alliance, and its procedures for fulfilling them in order to strengthen the Alliance as a factor for durable peace”. The present report sets forth the general tenor and main principles emerging from this examination of the future tasks of the Alliance.

2. Studies were undertaken by Messrs. Schutz, Watson, Spaak, Kohler and Patijn. The Council wishes to express its appreciation and thanks to these eminent personalities for their efforts and for the analyses they produced.

3. The exercise has shown that the Alliance is a dynamic and vigorous organization which is constantly adapting itself to changing conditions. It also has shown that its future tasks can be handled within the terms of the Treaty by building on the methods and procedures which have proved their value over many years.

4. Since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 the international situation has changed significantly and the political tasks of the Alliance have assumed a new dimension. Amongst other developments, the Alliance has played a major part in stopping Communist expansion in Europe; the USSR has become one of the two world super powers but the Communist world is no longer monolithic; the Soviet doctrine of “peaceful co-existence” has changed the nature of
the confrontation with the West but not the basic problems. Although the disparity between the power of the United States and that of the European states remains, Europe has recovered and is on its way towards unity. The process of decolonisation has transformed European relations with the rest of the world; at the same time, major problems have arisen in the relations between developed and developing countries.

5. The Atlantic Alliance has two main functions. Its first function is to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur. Since its inception, the Alliance has successfully fulfilled this task. But the possibility of a crisis cannot be excluded as long as the central political issues in Europe, first and foremost the German question, remain unsolved. Moreover, the situation of instability and uncertainty still precludes a balanced reduction of military forces. Under these conditions, the Allies will maintain as necessary, a suitable military capability to assure the balance of forces, thereby creating a climate of stability, security and confidence.

In this climate the Alliance can carry out its second function, to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved. Military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary. Collective defence is a stabilizing factor in world politics. It is the necessary condition for effective policies directed towards a greater relaxation of tensions. The way to peace and stability in Europe rests in particular on the use of the Alliance constructively in the interest of détente. The participation of the USSR and the USA will be necessary to achieve a settlement of the political problems in Europe.

6. From the beginning the Atlantic Alliance has been a co-operative grouping of states sharing the same ideals and with a high degree of common interest. Their cohesion and solidarity provide an element of stability within the Atlantic area.
7. As sovereign states the Allies are not obliged to subordinate their policies to collective decision. The Alliance affords an effective forum and clearing house for the exchange of information and views; thus, each of the Allies can decide its policy in the light of close knowledge of the problems and objectives of the others. To this end the practice of frank and timely consultations needs to be deepened and improved. Each Ally should play its full part in promoting an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, bearing in mind that the pursuit of détente must not be allowed to split the Alliance. The chances of success will clearly be greatest if the Allies remain on parallel courses, especially in matters of close concern to them all; their actions will thus be all the more effective.

8. No peaceful order in Europe is possible without a major effort by all concerned. The evolution of Soviet and East European policies gives ground for hope that those governments may eventually come to recognize the advantages to them of collaborating in working towards a peaceful settlement. But no final and stable settlement in Europe is possible without a solution of the German question which lies at the heart of present tensions in Europe. Any such settlement must end the unnatural barriers between Eastern and Western Europe, which are most clearly and cruelly manifested in the division of Germany.

9. Accordingly the Allies are resolved to direct their energies to this purpose by realistic measures designed to further a détente in East-West relations. The relaxation of tensions is not the final goal but is part of a long-term process to promote better relations and to foster a European settlement. The ultimate political purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees.

10. Currently, the development of contacts between the countries of Western and Eastern Europe is mainly on a bilateral basis. Certain subjects, of course, require by their very nature a multilateral solution.
11. The problem of German reunification and its relationship to a European settlement has normally been dealt with in exchanges between the Soviet Union and the three Western powers having special responsibilities in this field. In the preparation of such exchanges the Federal Republic of Germany has regularly joined the three Western powers in order to reach a common position. The other Allies will continue to have their views considered in timely discussions among the Allies about Western policy on this subject, without in any way impairing the special responsibilities in question.

12. The Allies will examine and review suitable policies designed to achieve a just and stable order in Europe, to overcome the division of Germany and to foster European security. This will be part of a process of active and constant preparation for the time when fruitful discussions of these complex questions may be possible bilaterally or multilaterally between Eastern and Western nations.

13. The Allies are studying disarmament and practical arm control measures, including the possibility of balanced force reductions. These studies will be intensified. Their active pursuit reflects the will of the Allies to work for an effective détente with the East.

14. The Allies will examine with particular attention the defence problems of the exposed areas e.g. the South-Eastern flank. In this respect the present situation in the Mediterranean presents special problems, bearing in mind that the current crisis in the Middle East falls within the responsibilities of the United Nations.

15. The North Atlantic Treaty area cannot be treated in isolation from the rest of the world. Crises and conflicts arising outside the area may impair its security either directly or by affecting the global balance. Allied countries contribute individually within the United Nations and other international organizations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the solution of important international problems. In accordance with established usage the Allies or such of them
as wish to do so will also continue to consult on such problems without commitment and as the case may demand.

16. In the light of these findings, the Ministers directed the Council in permanent session to carry out, in the years ahead, the detailed follow-up resulting from this study. This will be done either by intensifying work already in hand or by activating highly specialized studies by more systematic use of experts and officials sent from capitals.

17. Ministers found that the study by the Special Group confirmed the importance of the role which the Alliance is called upon to play during the coming years in the promotion of détente and the strengthening of peace. Since significant problems have not yet been examined in all their aspects, and other problems of no less significance which have arisen from the latest political and strategic developments have still to be examined, the Ministers have directed the Permanent Representatives to put in hand the study of these problems without delay, following such procedures as shall be deemed most appropriate by the Council in permanent session, in order to enable further reports to be subsequently submitted to the Council in Ministerial Session.
ANNEX II

THE ALLIANCE’S STRATEGIC CONCEPT (1991)

Agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7th-8th Nov. 1991

The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept

At their meeting in London in July 1990, NATO’s Heads of State and Government agreed on the need to transform the Atlantic Alliance to reflect the new, more promising, era in Europe. While reaffirming the basic principles on which the Alliance has rested since its inception, they recognized that the developments taking place in Europe would have a far-reaching impact on the way in which its aims would be met in future. In particular, they set in hand a fundamental strategic review. The resulting new Strategic Concept is set out below.

Part I - The Strategic Context
1. The new strategic environment
2. Security challenges and risks
Part II - Alliance Objectives And Security Functions
3. The purpose of the Alliance
4. The nature of the Alliance
5. The fundamental tasks of the Alliance
Part III - A Broad Approach To Security
6. Protecting peace in a new Europe
7. Dialogue
8. Co-operation
9. Collective Defence
10. Management of crisis and conflict prevention
Part IV - Guidelines For Defence
11. Principles of Alliance strategy
12. The Alliance’s new force posture
The new strategic environment

1. Since 1989, profound political changes have taken place in Central and Eastern Europe which have radically improved the security environment in which the North Atlantic Alliance seeks to achieve its objectives. The USSR’s former satellites have fully recovered their sovereignty. The Soviet Union and its Republics are undergoing radical change. The three Baltic Republics have regained their independence. Soviet forces have left Hungary and Czechoslovakia and are due to complete their withdrawal from Poland and Germany by 1994. All the countries that were formerly adversaries of NATO have dismantled the Warsaw Pact and rejected ideological hostility to the West. They have, in varying degrees, embraced and begun to implement policies aimed at achieving pluralistic democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and a market economy. The political division of Europe that was the source of the military confrontation of the Cold War period has thus been overcome.

2. In the West, there have also been significant changes. Germany has been united and remains a full member of the Alliance and of European institutions. The fact that the countries of the European Community are working towards the goal of political union, including the development of a European security identity, and the enhancement of the role of the WEU are important factors for European security. The strengthening of the security dimension in the process of European integration, and the enhancement of the role
and responsibilities of European members of the Alliance are positive and mutually reinforcing. The development of a European security identity and defence role, reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will not only serve the interests of the European states but also reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole.

3. Substantial progress in arms control has already enhanced stability and security by lowering arms levels and increasing military transparency and mutual confidence (including through the Stockholm CDE agreement of 1986, the INF Treaty of 1987 and the CSCE agreements and confidence and security-building measures of 1990). Implementation of the 1991 START Treaty will lead to increased stability through substantial and balanced reductions in the field of strategic nuclear arms. Further far-reaching changes and reductions in the nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Union will be pursued following President Bush’s September 1991 initiative. Also of great importance is the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), signed at the 1990 Paris Summit; its implementation will remove the Alliance’s numerical inferiority in key conventional weapon systems and provide for effective verification procedures. All these developments will also result in an unprecedented degree of military transparency in Europe, thus increasing predictability and mutual confidence. Such transparency would be further enhanced by the achievement of an Open Skies regime. There are welcome prospects for further advances in arms control in conventional and nuclear forces, and for the achievement of a global ban on chemical weapons, as well as restricting destabilising arms exports and the proliferation of certain weapons technologies.

4. The CSCE process, which began in Helsinki in 1975, has already contributed significantly to overcoming the division of Europe. As a result of the Paris Summit, it now includes new institutional arrangements and provides a contractual framework for consultation and cooperation that can play a constructive role, comple-
mentary to that of NATO and the process of European integration, in preserving peace.

5. The historic changes that have occurred in Europe, which have led to the fulfilment of a number of objectives set out in the Harmel Report, have significantly improved the overall security of the Allies. The monolithic, massive and potentially immediate threat which was the principal concern of the Alliance in its first forty years has disappeared. On the other hand, a great deal of uncertainty about the future and risks to the security of the Alliance remain.

6. The new Strategic Concept looks forward to a security environment in which the positive changes referred to above have come to fruition. In particular, it assumes both the completion of the planned withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Central and Eastern Europe and the full implementation by all parties of the 1990 CFE Treaty. The implementation of the Strategic Concept will thus be kept under review in the light of the evolving security environment and in particular progress in fulfilling these assumptions. Further adaptation will be made to the extent necessary.

Security challenges and risks

7. The security challenges and risks which NATO faces are different in nature from what they were in the past. The threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO’s European fronts has effectively been removed and thus no longer provides the focus for Allied strategy. Particularly in Central Europe, the risk of a surprise attack has been substantially reduced, and minimum Allied warning time has increased accordingly.

8. In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess. NATO must be capable of responding to such risks if stability in Europe and the
security of Alliance members are to be preserved. These risks can arise in various ways.

9. Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe. The tensions which may result, as long as they remain limited, should not directly threaten the security and territorial integrity of members of the Alliance. They could, however, lead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of the Alliance.

10. In the particular case of the Soviet Union, the risks and uncertainties that accompany the process of change cannot be seen in isolation from the fact that its conventional forces are significantly larger than those of any other European State and its large nuclear arsenal comparable only with that of the United States. These capabilities have to be taken into account if stability and security in Europe are to be preserved.

11. The Allies also wish to maintain peaceful and non-adversarial relations with the countries in the Southern Mediterranean and Middle East. The stability and peace of the countries on the southern periphery of Europe are important for the security of the Alliance, as the 1991 Gulf war has shown. This is all the more so because of the build-up of military power and the proliferation of weapons technologies in the area, including weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles capable of reaching the territory of some member states of the Alliance.

12. Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global con-
text. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, coordination of their efforts including their responses to such risks.

13. From the point of view of Alliance strategy, these different risks have to be seen in different ways. Even in a non-adversarial and cooperative relationship, Soviet military capability and build-up potential, including its nuclear dimension, still constitute the most significant factor of which the Alliance has to take account in maintaining the strategic balance in Europe. The end of East-West confrontation has, however, greatly reduced the risk of major conflict in Europe. On the other hand, there is a greater risk of different crises arising, which could develop quickly and would require a rapid response, but they are likely to be of a lesser magnitude.

14. Two conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of the strategic context. The first is that the new environment does not change the purpose or the security functions of the Alliance, but rather underlines their enduring validity. The second, on the other hand, is that the changed environment offers new opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within a broad approach to security.

**Part II - Alliance Objectives And Security Functions**

The purpose of the Alliance

15. NATO’s essential purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty and reiterated in the London Declaration, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has
worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. This Alliance objective remains unchanged.

The nature of the Alliance

16. NATO embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe. It is the practical expression of effective collective effort among its members in support of their common interests.

17. The fundamental operating principle of the Alliance is that of common commitment and mutual co-operation among sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of security for all of its members. Solidarity within the Alliance, given substance and effect by NATO’s daily work in both the political and military spheres, ensures that no single Ally is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the field of defence, the Alliance enables them through collective effort to enhance their ability to realise their essential national security objectives.

18. The resulting sense of equal security amongst the members of the Alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances or in their national military capabilities relative to each other, contributes to overall stability within Europe and thus to the creation of conditions conducive to increased co-operation both among Alliance members and with others. It is on this basis that members of the Alliance, together with other nations, are able to pursue the development of co-operative structures of security for a Europe whole and free.

The fundamental tasks of the Alliance

19. The means by which the Alliance pursues its security policy to preserve the peace will continue to include the maintenance of a mili-
tary capability sufficient to prevent war and to provide for effective
defence; an overall capability to manage successfully crises affect-
ing the security of its members; and the pursuit of political efforts favou-
ing dialogue with other nations and the active search for a co-
operative approach to European security, including in the field of
arms control and disarmament.

20. To achieve its essential purpose, the Alliance performs the following
fundamental security tasks:

I. To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable
security environment in Europe, based on the growth of dem-
ocratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution
of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate
or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony
through the threat or use of force.

II. To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic
Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any
issues that affect their vital interests, including possible devel-
opments posing risks for members’ security, and for appropri-
ate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

III. To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against
the territory of any NATO member state.

IV. To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.

21. Other European institutions such as the EC, WEU and CSCE also
have roles to play, in accordance with their respective responsibili-
ties and purposes, in these fields. The creation of a European identity
in security and defence will underline the preparedness of the
Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for their security
and will help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity. However the extent
of its membership and of its capabilities gives NATO a particular
position in that it can perform all four core security functions. NATO
is the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the
forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence
commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty.
22. In defining the core functions of the Alliance in the terms set out above, member states confirm that the scope of the Alliance as well as their rights and obligations as provided for in the Washington Treaty remain unchanged.

Part III - A Broad Approach To Security

Protecting peace in a new Europe

23. The Alliance has always sought to achieve its objectives of safeguarding the security and territorial integrity of its members, and establishing a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe, through both political and military means. This comprehensive approach remains the basis of the Alliance’s security policy.

24. But what is new is that, with the radical changes in the security situation, the opportunities for achieving Alliance objectives through political means are greater than ever before. It is now possible to draw all the consequences from the fact that security and stability have political, economic, social, and environmental elements as well as the indispensable defence dimension. Managing the diversity of challenges facing the Alliance requires a broad approach to security. This is reflected in three mutually reinforcing elements of Allied security policy; dialogue, co-operation, and the maintenance of a collective defence capability.

25. The Alliance’s active pursuit of dialogue and co-operation, underpinned by its commitment to an effective collective defence capability, seeks to reduce the risks of conflict arising out of misunderstanding or design; to build increased mutual understanding and confidence among all European states; to help manage crises affecting the security of the Allies; and to expand the opportunities for a genuine partnership among all European countries in dealing with common security problems.
26. In this regard, the Alliance’s arms control and disarmament policy contributes both to dialogue and to co-operation with other nations, and thus will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance’s security objectives. The Allies seek, through arms control and disarmament, to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the requirements of defence. Thus, the Alliance will continue to ensure that defence and arms control and disarmament objectives remain in harmony.

27. In fulfilling its fundamental objectives and core security functions, the Alliance will continue to respect the legitimate security interests of others, and seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. The Alliance will promote peaceful and friendly international relations and support democratic institutions. In this respect, it recognizes the valuable contribution being made by other organizations such as the European Community and the CSCE, and that the roles of these institutions and of the Alliance are complementary.

Dialogue

28. The new situation in Europe has multiplied the opportunities for dialogue on the part of the Alliance with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The Alliance has established regular diplomatic liaison and military contacts with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as provided for in the London Declaration. The Alliance will further promote dialogue through regular diplomatic liaison, including an intensified exchange of views and information on security policy issues. Through such means the Allies, individually and collectively, will seek to make full use of the unprecedented opportunities afforded by the growth of freedom and democracy throughout Europe and encourage greater mutual understanding of respective security concerns, to increase transparency and predictability in security affairs, and thus to reinforce stability. The military can help to overcome
the divisions of the past, not least through intensified military contacts and greater military transparency. The Alliance’s pursuit of dialogue will provide a foundation for greater co-operation throughout Europe and the ability to resolve differences and conflicts by peaceful means.

Co-operation

29. The Allies are also committed to pursue co-operation with all states in Europe on the basis of the principles set out in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. They will seek to develop broader and productive patterns of bilateral and multilateral co-operation in all relevant fields of European security, with the aim, inter alia, of preventing crises or, should they arise, ensuring their effective management. Such partnership between the members of the Alliance and other nations in dealing with specific problems will be an essential factor in moving beyond past divisions towards one Europe whole and free. This policy of co-operation is the expression of the inseparability of security among European states. It is built upon a common recognition among Alliance members that the persistence of new political, economic or social divisions across the continent could lead to future instability, and such divisions must thus be diminished.

Collective Defence

30. The political approach to security will thus become increasingly important. Nonetheless, the military dimension remains essential. The maintenance of an adequate military capability and clear preparedness to act collectively in the common defence remain central to the Alliance’s security objectives. Such a capability, together with political solidarity, is required in order to prevent any attempt at coercion or intimidation, and to guarantee that military aggression directed against the Alliance can never be perceived as an option with any prospect of success. It is equally indispensable so that dia-
logue and co-operation can be undertaken with confidence and achieve their desired results.

Management of crisis and conflict prevention

31. In the new political and strategic environment in Europe, the success of the Alliance’s policy of preserving peace and preventing war depends even more than in the past on the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy and successful management of crises affecting the security of its members. Any major aggression in Europe is much more unlikely and would be preceded by significant warning time. Though on a much smaller scale, the range and variety of other potential risks facing the Alliance are less predictable than before.

32. In these new circumstances there are increased opportunities for the successful resolution of crises at an early stage. The success of Alliance policy will require a coherent approach determined by the Alliance’s political authorities choosing and co-ordinating appropriate crisis management measures as required from a range of political and other measures, including those in the military field. Close control by the political authorities of the Alliance will be applied from the outset and at all stages. Appropriate consultation and decision making procedures are essential to this end.

33. The potential of dialogue and co-operation within all of Europe must be fully developed in order to help to defuse crises and to prevent conflicts since the Allies’ security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. To this end, the Allies will support the role of the CSCE process and its institutions. Other bodies including the European Community, Western European Union and United Nations may also have an important role to play.
Part IV - Guidelines For Defence

Principles of Alliance strategy

34. The diversity of challenges now facing the Alliance thus requires a broad approach to security. The transformed political and strategic environment enables the Alliance to change a number of important features of its military strategy and to set out new guidelines, while reaffirming proven fundamental principles. At the London Summit, it was therefore agreed to prepare a new military strategy and a revised force posture responding to the changed circumstances.

35. Alliance strategy will continue to reflect a number of fundamental principles. The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence, and it does not consider itself to be anyone’s adversary. The Allies will maintain military strength adequate to convince any potential aggressor that the use of force against the territory of one of the Allies would meet collective and effective action by all of them and that the risks involved in initiating conflict would outweigh any foreseeable gains. The forces of the Allies must therefore be able to defend Alliance frontiers, to stop an aggressor’s advance as far forward as possible, to maintain or restore the territorial integrity of Allied nations and to terminate war rapidly by making an aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack and withdraw. The role of the Alliance’s military forces is to assure the territorial integrity and political independence of its member states, and thus contribute to peace and stability in Europe.

36. The security of all Allies is indivisible: an attack on one is an attack on all. Alliance solidarity and strategic unity are accordingly crucial prerequisites for collective security. The achievement of the Alliance’s objectives depends critically on the equitable sharing of roles, risks and responsibilities, as well as the benefits, of common defence. The presence of North American conventional and US nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe,
which is inseparably linked to that of North America. As the process of developing a European security identity and defence role progresses, and is reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, the European members of the Alliance will assume a greater degree of the responsibility for the defence of Europe.

37. The collective nature of Alliance defence is embodied in practical arrangements that enable the Allies to enjoy the crucial political, military and resource advantages of collective defence, and prevent the renationalisation of defence policies, without depriving the Allies of their sovereignty. These arrangements are based on an integrated military structure as well as on co-operation and co-ordination agreements. Key features include collective force planning; common operational planning; multinational formations; the stationing of forces outside home territory, where appropriate on a mutual basis; crisis management and reinforcement arrangements; procedures for consultation; common standards and procedures for equipment, training and logistics; joint and combined exercises; and infrastructure, armaments and logistics co-operation.

38. To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary, although at a significantly reduced level. Both elements are essential to Alliance security and cannot substitute one for the other. Conventional forces contribute to war prevention by ensuring that no potential aggressor could contemplate a quick or easy victory, or territorial gains, by conventional means. Taking into account the diversity of risks with which the Alliance could be faced, it must maintain the forces necessary to provide a wide range of conventional response options. But the Alliance’s conventional forces alone cannot ensure the prevention of war. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of any aggression incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.
The Alliance’s new force posture

39. At the London Summit, the Allies concerned agreed to move away, where appropriate, from the concept of forward defence towards a reduced forward presence, and to modify the principle of flexible response to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. The changes stemming from the new strategic environment and the altered risks now facing the Alliance enable significant modifications to be made in the missions of the Allies’ military forces and in their posture.

The Missions of Alliance Military Forces

40. The primary role of Alliance military forces, to guarantee the security and territorial integrity of member states, remains unchanged. But this role must take account of the new strategic environment, in which a single massive and global threat has given way to diverse and multi-directional risks. Alliance forces have different functions to perform in peace, crisis and war.

41. In peace, the role of Allied military forces is to guard against risks to the security of Alliance members; to contribute towards the maintenance of stability and balance in Europe; and to ensure that peace is preserved. They can contribute to dialogue and co-operation throughout Europe by their participation in confidence-building activities, including those which enhance transparency and improve communication; as well as in verification of arms control agreements. Allies could, further, be called upon to contribute to global stability and peace by providing forces for United Nations missions.

42. In the event of crises which might lead to a military threat to the security of Alliance members, the Alliance’s military forces can complement and reinforce political actions within a broad approach to security, and thereby contribute to the management of such crises.
and their peaceful resolution. This requires that these forces have a capability for measured and timely responses in such circumstances; the capability to deter action against any Ally and, in the event that aggression takes place, to respond to and repel it as well as to reestablish the territorial integrity of member states.

43. While in the new security environment a general war in Europe has become highly unlikely, it cannot finally be ruled out. The Alliance’s military forces, which have as their fundamental mission to protect peace, have to provide the essential insurance against potential risks at the minimum level necessary to prevent war of any kind, and, should aggression occur, to restore peace. Hence the need for the capabilities and the appropriate mix of forces already described.

**Guidelines for the Alliance’s Force Posture**

44. To implement its security objectives and strategic principles in the new environment, the organization of the Allies’ forces must be adapted to provide capabilities that can contribute to protecting peace, managing crises that affect the security of Alliance members, and preventing war, while retaining at all times the means to defend, if necessary, all Allied territory and to restore peace. The posture of Allies’ forces will conform to the guidelines developed in the following paragraphs.

45. The size, readiness, availability and deployment of the Alliance’s military forces will continue to reflect its strictly defensive nature and will be adapted accordingly to the new strategic environment including arms control agreements. This means in particular:

a. that the overall size of the Allies’ forces, and in many cases their readiness, will be reduced;

b. that the maintenance of a comprehensive in-place linear defensive posture in the central region will no longer be required. The peacetime geographical distribution of forces will ensure a sufficient military presence throughout the territory of the Alliance, including where necessary forward
deployment of appropriate forces. Regional considerations and, in particular, geostrategic differences within the Alliance will have to be taken into account, including the shorter warning times to which the northern and southern regions will be subject compared with the central region and, in the southern region, the potential for instability and the military capabilities in the adjacent areas.

46. To ensure that at this reduced level the Allies’ forces can play an effective role both in managing crises and in countering aggression against any Ally, they will require enhanced flexibility and mobility and an assured capability for augmentation when necessary. For these reasons:

a. Available forces will include, in a limited but militarily significant proportion, ground, air and sea immediate and rapid reaction elements able to respond to a wide range of eventuations, many of which are unforeseeable. They will be of sufficient quality, quantity and readiness to deter a limited attack and, if required, to defend the territory of the Allies against attacks, particularly those launched without long warning time.

b. The forces of the Allies will be structured so as to permit their military capability to be built up when necessary. This ability to build up by reinforcement, by mobilising reserves, or by reconstituting forces, must be in proportion to potential threats to Alliance security, including the possibility - albeit unlikely, but one that prudence dictates should not be ruled out - of a major conflict. Consequently, capabilities for timely reinforcement and resupply both within Europe and from North America will be of critical importance.

c. Appropriate force structures and procedures, including those that would provide an ability to build up, deploy and draw down forces quickly and discriminately, will be developed to permit measured, flexible and timely responses in order to reduce and defuse tensions. These arrangements must be exercised regularly in peacetime.
d. In the event of use of forces, including the deployment of reaction and other available reinforcing forces as an instrument of crisis management, the Alliance’s political authorities will, as before, exercise close control over their employment at all stages. Existing procedures will be reviewed in the light of the new missions and posture of Alliance forces.

**Characteristics of Conventional Forces**

47. It is essential that the Allies’ military forces have a credible ability to fulfil their functions in peace, crisis and war in a way appropriate to the new security environment. This will be reflected in force and equipment levels; readiness and availability; training and exercises; deployment and employment options; and force build-up capabilities, all of which will be adjusted accordingly. The conventional forces of the Allies will include, in addition to immediate and rapid reaction forces, main defence forces, which will provide the bulk of forces needed to ensure the Alliance’s territorial integrity and the unimpeded use of their lines of communication; and augmentation forces, which will provide a means of reinforcing existing forces in a particular region. Main defence and augmentation forces will comprise both active and mobilisable elements.

48. Ground, maritime and air forces will have to co-operate closely and combine and assist each other in operations aimed at achieving agreed objectives. These forces will consist of the following:
   a. **Ground forces**, which are essential to hold or regain territory. The majority will normally be at lower states of readiness and, overall, there will be a greater reliance on mobilization and reserves. All categories of ground forces will require demonstrable combat effectiveness together with an appropriately enhanced capability for flexible deployment.
   b. **Maritime forces**, which because of their inherent mobility, flexibility and endurance, make an important contribution to the Alliance’s crisisresponse options. Their essential mis-
sions are to ensure sea control in order to safeguard the Allies’ sea lines of communication, to support land and amphibious operations, and to protect the deployment of the Alliance’s sea-based nuclear deterrent.

c. **Air forces**, whose ability to fulfil their fundamental roles in both independent air and combined operations - counter-air, air interdiction and offensive air support - as well as to contribute to surveillance, reconnaissance and electronic warfare operations, is essential to the overall effectiveness of the Allies’ military forces. Their role in supporting operations, on land and at sea, will require appropriate long-distance airlift and air refuelling capabilities. Air defence forces, including modern air command and control systems, are required to ensure a secure air defence environment.

49. In light of the potential risks it poses, the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction should be given special consideration. Solution of this problem will require complementary approaches including, for example, export control and missile defences.

50. Alliance strategy is not dependent on a chemical warfare capability. The Allies remain committed to the earliest possible achievement of a global, comprehensive, and effectively verifiable ban on all chemical weapons. But, even after implementation of a global ban, precautions of a purely defensive nature will need to be maintained.

51. In the new security environment and given the reduced overall force levels in future, the ability to work closely together, which will facilitate the cost effective use of Alliance resources, will be particularly important for the achievement of the missions of the Allies’ forces. The Alliance’s collective defence arrangements in which, for those concerned, the integrated military structure, including multinational forces, plays the key role, will be essential in this regard. Integrated and multinational European structures, as they are further developed
in the context of an emerging European Defence Identity, will also increasingly have a similarly important role to play in enhancing the Allies’ ability to work together in the common defence. Allies’ efforts to achieve maximum co-operation will be based on the common guidelines for defence defined above. Practical arrangements will be developed to ensure the necessary mutual transparency and complementarity between the European security and defence identity and the Alliance.

52. In order to be able to respond flexibly to a wide range of possible contingencies, the Allies concerned will require effective surveillance and intelligence, flexible command and control, mobility within and between regions, and appropriate logistics capabilities, including transport capacities. Logistic stocks must be sufficient to sustain all types of forces in order to permit effective defence until resupply is available. The capability of the Allies concerned to build-up larger, adequately equipped and trained forces, in a timely manner and to a level appropriate to any risk to Alliance security, will also make an essential contribution to crisis management and defence. This capability will include the ability to reinforce any area at risk within the territory of the Allies and to establish a multinational presence when and where this is needed. Elements of all three force categories will be capable of being employed flexibly as part of both intra-European and transatlantic reinforcement. Proper use of these capabilities will require control of the necessary lines of communication as well as appropriate support and exercise arrangements. Civil resources will be of increasing relevance in this context.

53. For the Allies concerned, collective defence arrangements will rely increasingly on multinational forces, complementing national commitments to NATO. Multinational forces demonstrate the Alliance’s resolve to maintain a credible collective defence; enhance Alliance cohesion; reinforce the transatlantic partnership and strengthen the European pillar. Multinational forces, and in particular reaction forces, reinforce solidarity. They can also provide a way of deploying more capable formations than might be available purely nation-
ally, thus helping to make more efficient use of scarce defence resources. This may include a highly integrated, multinational approach to specific tasks and functions.

**Characteristics of Nuclear Forces**

54. The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. They will continue to fulfil an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies’ response to military aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not a rational option. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.

55. A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe. These forces need to have the necessary characteristics and appropriate flexibility and survivability, to be perceived as a credible and effective element of the Allies’ strategy in preventing war. They will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability.

56. The Allies concerned consider that, with the radical changes in the security situation, including conventional force levels in Europe maintained in relative balance and increased reaction times, NATO’s
ability to defuse a crisis through diplomatic and other means or, should it be necessary, to mount a successful conventional defence will significantly improve. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated by them are therefore even more remote. They can therefore significantly reduce their sub-strategic nuclear forces. They will maintain adequate sub-strategic forces based in Europe which will provide an essential link with strategic nuclear forces, reinforcing the trans-Atlantic link. These will consist solely of dual capable aircraft which could, if necessary, be supplemented by offshore systems. Sub-strategic nuclear weapons will, however, not be deployed in normal circumstances on surface vessels and attack submarines. There is no requirement for nuclear artillery or ground-launched short-range nuclear missiles and they will be eliminated.

Part V - Conclusion

57. This Strategic Concept reaffirms the defensive nature of the Alliance and the resolve of its members to safeguard their security, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Alliance’s security policy is based on dialogue; co-operation; and effective collective defence as mutually reinforcing instruments for preserving the peace. Making full use of the new opportunities available, the Alliance will maintain security at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the requirements of defence. In this way, the Alliance is making an essential contribution to promoting a lasting peaceful order.

58. The Allies will continue to pursue vigorously further progress in arms control and confidence-building measures with the objective of enhancing security and stability. They will also play an active part in promoting dialogue and co-operation between states on the basis of the principles enunciated in the Paris Charter.

59. NATO’s strategy will retain the flexibility to reflect further developments in the politico-military environment, including progress in the
moves towards a European security identity, and in any changes in the risks to Alliance security. For the Allies concerned, the Strategic Concept will form the basis for the further development of the Alliance’s defence policy, its operational concepts, its conventional and nuclear force posture and its collective defence planning arrangements.
ANNEX III

THE ALLIANCE’S STRATEGIC CONCEPT (1999)

Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C.

Introduction

1. At their Summit meeting in Washington in April 1999, NATO Heads of State and Government approved the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept.

2. NATO has successfully ensured the freedom of its members and prevented war in Europe during the 40 years of the Cold War. By combining defence with dialogue, it played an indispensable role in bringing East-West confrontation to a peaceful end. The dramatic changes in the Euro-Atlantic strategic landscape brought by the end of the Cold War were reflected in the Alliance’s 1991 Strategic Concept. There have, however, been further profound political and security developments since then.

3. The dangers of the Cold War have given way to more promising, but also challenging prospects, to new opportunities and risks. A new Europe of greater integration is emerging, and a Euro-Atlantic security structure is evolving in which NATO plays a central part. The Alliance has been at the heart of efforts to establish new patterns of cooperation and mutual understanding across the Euro-Atlantic region and has committed itself to essential new activities in the interest of a wider stability. It has shown the depth of that commitment in its efforts to put an end to the immense human suffering created by conflict in the Balkans. The years since the end of the Cold War have also witnessed important developments in arms control, a process to
which the Alliance is fully committed. The Alliance’s role in these positive developments has been underpinned by the comprehensive adaptation of its approach to security and of its procedures and structures. The last ten years have also seen, however, the appearance of complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, including oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

4. The Alliance has an indispensable role to play in consolidating and preserving the positive changes of the recent past, and in meeting current and future security challenges. It has, therefore, a demanding agenda. It must safeguard common security interests in an environment of further, often unpredictable change. It must maintain collective defence and reinforce the transatlantic link and ensure a balance that allows the European Allies to assume greater responsibility. It must deepen its relations with its partners and prepare for the accession of new members. It must, above all, maintain the political will and the military means required by the entire range of its missions.

5. This new Strategic Concept will guide the Alliance as it pursues this agenda. It expresses NATO’s enduring purpose and nature and its fundamental security tasks, identifies the central features of the new security environment, specifies the elements of the Alliance’s broad approach to security, and provides guidelines for the further adaptation of its military forces.

Part I - The Purpose and Tasks of the Alliance

6. NATO’s essential and enduring purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has striven since its inception to secure a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. It will continue to do so. The achievement of this aim can be put at risk by crisis and conflict affecting the security of the Euro-Atlantic area.
The Alliance therefore not only ensures the defence of its members but contributes to peace and stability in this region.

7. The Alliance embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe. It is the practical expression of effective collective effort among its members in support of their common interests.

8. The fundamental guiding principle by which the Alliance works is that of common commitment and mutual co-operation among sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of security for all of its members. Solidarity and cohesion within the Alliance, through daily cooperation in both the political and military spheres, ensure that no single Ally is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the field of defence, the Alliance enables them through collective effort to realise their essential national security objectives.

9. The resulting sense of equal security among the members of the Alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances or in their national military capabilities, contributes to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance does not seek these benefits for its members alone, but is committed to the creation of conditions conducive to increased partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with others who share its broad political objectives.

10. To achieve its essential purpose, as an Alliance of nations committed to the Washington Treaty and the United Nations Charter, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks:

**Security:** To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force.
Consultation: To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members’ security, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

Deterrence and Defence: To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty.

And in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area:

- Crisis Management: To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.

- Partnership: To promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action with the Alliance.

11. In fulfilling its purpose and fundamental security tasks, the Alliance will continue to respect the legitimate security interests of others, and seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set out in the Charter of the United Nations. The Alliance will promote peaceful and friendly international relations and support democratic institutions. The Alliance does not consider itself to be any country’s adversary.

Part II - Strategic Perspectives

The Evolving Strategic Environment

12. The Alliance operates in an environment of continuing change. Developments in recent years have been generally positive, but uncertainties and risks remain which can develop into acute crises.
Within this evolving context, NATO has played an essential part in strengthening Euro-Atlantic security since the end of the Cold War. Its growing political role; its increased political and military partnership, cooperation and dialogue with other states, including with Russia, Ukraine and Mediterranean Dialogue countries; its continuing openness to the accession of new members; its collaboration with other international organisations; its commitment, exemplified in the Balkans, to conflict prevention and crisis management, including through peace support operations: all reflect its determination to shape its security environment and enhance the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.

13. In parallel, NATO has successfully adapted to enhance its ability to contribute to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability. Internal reform has included a new command structure, including the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, the creation of arrangements to permit the rapid deployment of forces for the full range of the Alliance’s missions, and the building of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance.

14. The United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), and the Western European Union (WEU) have made distinctive contributions to Euro-Atlantic security and stability. Mutually reinforcing organizations have become a central feature of the security environment.

15. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and, as such, plays a crucial role in contributing to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

16. The OSCE, as a regional arrangement, is the most inclusive security organization in Europe, which also includes Canada and the United States, and plays an essential role in promoting peace and stability, enhancing cooperative security, and advancing democracy
and human rights in Europe. The OSCE is particularly active in the fields of preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation. NATO and the OSCE have developed close practical cooperation, especially with regard to the international effort to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia.

17. The European Union has taken important decisions and given a further impetus to its efforts to strengthen its security and defence dimension. This process will have implications for the entire Alliance, and all European Allies should be involved in it, building on arrangements developed by NATO and the WEU. The development of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) includes the progressive framing of a common defence policy. Such a policy, as called for in the Amsterdam Treaty, would be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within the framework of the Washington Treaty. Important steps taken in this context include the incorporation of the WEU’s Petersberg tasks into the Treaty on European Union and the development of closer institutional relations with the WEU.

18. As stated in the 1994 Summit declaration and reaffirmed in Berlin in 1996, the Alliance fully supports the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance by making available its assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations. To this end, the Alliance and the WEU have developed a close relationship and put into place key elements of the ESDI as agreed in Berlin. In order to enhance peace and stability in Europe and more widely, the European Allies are strengthening their capacity for action, including by increasing their military capabilities. The increase of the responsibilities and capacities of the European Allies with respect to security and defence enhances the security environment of the Alliance.

19. The stability, transparency, predictability, lower levels of armaments, and verification which can be provided by arms control and non-proliferation agreements support NATO’s political and military
efforts to achieve its strategic objectives. The Allies have played a major part in the significant achievements in this field. These include the enhanced stability produced by the CFE Treaty, the deep reductions in nuclear weapons provided for in the START treaties; the signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the accession to it of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine as non-nuclear weapons states, and the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Ottawa Convention to ban anti-personnel landmines and similar agreements make an important contribution to alleviating human suffering. There are welcome prospects for further advances in arms control in conventional weapons and with respect to nuclear, chemical, and biological (NBC) weapons.

Security challenges and risks

20. Notwithstanding positive developments in the strategic environment and the fact that large-scale conventional aggression against the Alliance is highly unlikely, the possibility of such a threat emerging over the longer term exists. The security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of military and non-military risks which are multi-directional and often difficult to predict. These risks include uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance, which could evolve rapidly. Some countries in and around the Euro-Atlantic area face serious economic, social and political difficulties. Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional instability. The resulting tensions could lead to crises affecting Euro-Atlantic stability, to human suffering, and to armed conflicts. Such conflicts could affect the security of the Alliance by spilling over into neighbouring countries, including NATO countries, or in other ways, and could also affect the security of other states.
21. The existence of powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance also constitutes a significant factor which the Alliance has to take into account if security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area are to be maintained.

22. The proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery remains a matter of serious concern. In spite of welcome progress in strengthening international non-proliferation regimes, major challenges with respect to proliferation remain. The Alliance recognises that proliferation can occur despite efforts to prevent it and can pose a direct military threat to the Allies’ populations, territory, and forces. Some states, including on NATO’s periphery and in other regions, sell or acquire or try to acquire NBC weapons and delivery means. Commodities and technology that could be used to build these weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means are becoming more common, while detection and prevention of illicit trade in these materials and know-how continues to be difficult. Non-state actors have shown the potential to create and use some of these weapons.

23. The global spread of technology that can be of use in the production of weapons may result in the greater availability of sophisticated military capabilities, permitting adversaries to acquire highly capable offensive and defensive air, land, and sea-borne systems, cruise missiles, and other advanced weaponry. In addition, state and non-state adversaries may try to exploit the Alliance’s growing reliance on information systems through information operations designed to disrupt such systems. They may attempt to use strategies of this kind to counter NATO’s superiority in traditional weaponry.

24. Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised
crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination of their efforts including their responses to risks of this kind.

Part III - The Approach to Security in the 21st Century

25. The Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which recognises the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension. This broad approach forms the basis for the Alliance to accomplish its fundamental security tasks effectively, and its increasing effort to develop effective cooperation with other European and Euro-Atlantic organizations as well as the United Nations. Our collective aim is to build a European security architecture in which the Alliance’s contribution to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area and the contribution of these other international organizations are complementary and mutually reinforcing, both in deepening relations among Euro-Atlantic countries and in managing crises. NATO remains the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty.

26. The Alliance seeks to preserve peace and to reinforce Euro-Atlantic security and stability by: the preservation of the transatlantic link; the maintenance of effective military capabilities sufficient for deterrence and defence and to fulfil the full range of its missions; the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance; an overall capability to manage crises successfully; its continued openness to new members; and the continued pursuit of partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other nations as part of
its co-operative approach to Euro-Atlantic security, including in the field of arms control and disarmament.

The Transatlantic Link

27. NATO is committed to a strong and dynamic partnership between Europe and North America in support of the values and interests they share. The security of Europe and that of North America are indivisible. Thus the Alliance’s commitment to the indispensable transatlantic link and the collective defence of its members is fundamental to its credibility and to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.

The Maintenance Of Alliance Military Capabilities

28. The maintenance of an adequate military capability and clear preparedness to act collectively in the common defence remain central to the Alliance’s security objectives. Such a capability, together with political solidarity, remains at the core of the Alliance’s ability to prevent any attempt at coercion or intimidation, and to guarantee that military aggression directed against the Alliance can never be perceived as an option with any prospect of success.

29. Military capabilities effective under the full range of foreseeable circumstances are also the basis of the Alliance’s ability to contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management through non-Article 5 crisis response operations. These missions can be highly demanding and can place a premium on the same political and military qualities, such as cohesion, multinational training, and extensive prior planning, that would be essential in an Article 5 situation. Accordingly, while they may pose special requirements, they will be handled through a common set of Alliance structures and procedures.

The European Security And Defence Identity

30. The Alliance, which is the foundation of the collective defence of its
members and through which common security objectives will be pursued wherever possible, remains committed to a balanced and dynamic transatlantic partnership. The European Allies have taken decisions to enable them to assume greater responsibilities in the security and defence field in order to enhance the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area and thus the security of all Allies. On the basis of decisions taken by the Alliance, in Berlin in 1996 and subsequently, the European Security and Defence Identity will continue to be developed within NATO. This process will require close cooperation between NATO, the WEU and, if and when appropriate, the European Union. It will enable all European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance as an expression of our shared responsibilities; it will reinforce the transatlantic partnership; and it will assist the European Allies to act by themselves as required through the readiness of the Alliance, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, to make its assets and capabilities available for operations in which the Alliance is not engaged militarily under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed, taking into account the full participation of all European Allies if they were so to choose.

**Conflict Prevention And Crisis Management**

31. In pursuit of its policy of preserving peace, preventing war, and enhancing security and stability and as set out in the fundamental security tasks, NATO will seek, in cooperation with other organisations, to prevent conflict, or, should a crisis arise, to contribute to its effective management, consistent with international law, including through the possibility of conducting non-Article 5 crisis response operations. The Alliance’s preparedness to carry out such operations supports the broader objective of reinforcing and extending stability and often involves the participation of NATO’s Partners. NATO recalls its offer, made in Brussels in 1994, to support on a case-by-case basis in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or
the responsibility of the OSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise. In this context NATO recalls its subsequent decisions with respect to crisis response operations in the Balkans. Taking into account the necessity for Alliance solidarity and cohesion, participation in any such operation or mission will remain subject to decisions of member states in accordance with national constitutions.

32. NATO will make full use of partnership, cooperation and dialogue and its links to other organizationsto contribute to preventing crises and, should they arise, defusing them at an early stage. A coherent approach to crisis management, as in any use of force by the Alliance, will require the Alliance’s political authorities to choose and co-ordinate appropriate responses from a range of both political and military measures and to exercise close political control at all stages.

**Partnership, Cooperation, And Dialogue**

33. Through its active pursuit of partnership, cooperation, and dialogue, the Alliance is a positive force in promoting security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. Through outreach and openness, the Alliance seeks to preserve peace, support and promote democracy, contribute to prosperity and progress, and foster genuine partnership with and among all democratic Euro-Atlantic countries. This aims at enhancing the security of all, excludes nobody, and helps to overcome divisions and disagreements that could lead to instability and conflict.

34. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) will remain the overarching framework for all aspects of NATO’s cooperation with its Partners. It offers an expanded political dimension for both consultation and cooperation. EAPC consultations build increased transparency and confidence among its members on security issues, contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management, and develop
practical cooperation activities, including in civil emergency planning, and scientific and environmental affairs.

35. The Partnership for Peace is the principal mechanism for forging practical security links between the Alliance and its Partners and for enhancing interoperability between Partners and NATO. Through detailed programmes that reflect individual Partners’ capacities and interests, Allies and Partners work towards transparency in national defence planning and budgeting; democratic control of defence forces; preparedness for civil disasters and other emergencies; and the development of the ability to work together, including in NATO-led PfP operations. The Alliance is committed to increasing the role the Partners play in PfP decision-making and planning, and making PfP more operational. NATO has undertaken to consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.

36. Russia plays a unique role in Euro-Atlantic security. Within the framework of the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, NATO and Russia have committed themselves to developing their relations on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency to achieve a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area based on the principles of democracy and co-operative security. NATO and Russia have agreed to give concrete substance to their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe. A strong, stable and enduring partnership between NATO and Russia is essential to achieve lasting stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

37. Ukraine occupies a special place in the Euro-Atlantic security environment and is an important and valuable partner in promoting stability and common democratic values. NATO is committed to further strengthening its distinctive partnership with Ukraine on the basis of the NATO-Ukraine Charter, including political consultations on issues of common concern and a broad range of practical cooperation activities. The Alliance continues to support Ukrainian sover-
eignty and independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic prosperity and its status as a non-nuclear weapons state as key factors of stability and security in central and eastern Europe and in Europe as a whole.

38. The Mediterranean is an area of special interest to the Alliance. Security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue process is an integral part of NATO’s co-operative approach to security. It provides a framework for confidence building, promotes transparency and cooperation in the region, and reinforces and is reinforced by other international efforts. The Alliance is committed to developing progressively the political, civil, and military aspects of the Dialogue with the aim of achieving closer cooperation with, and more active involvement by, countries that are partners in this Dialogue.

Enlargement

39. The Alliance remains open to new members under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. It expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance, strengthen its effectiveness and cohesion, and enhance overall European security and stability. To this end, NATO has established a programme of activities to assist aspiring countries in their preparations for possible future membership in the context of its wider relationship with them. No European democratic country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration.

Arms Control, Disarmament, And Non-Proliferation

40. The Alliance’s policy of support for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achieve-
ment of the Alliance’s security objectives. The Allies seek to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the Alliance’s ability to provide for collective defence and to fulfil the full range of its missions. The Alliance will continue to ensure that - as an important part of its broad approach to security - defence and arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation objectives remain in harmony. The Alliance will continue to actively contribute to the development of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements as well as to confidence and security building measures. The Allies take seriously their distinctive role in promoting a broader, more comprehensive and more verifiable international arms control and disarmament process. The Alliance will enhance its political efforts to reduce dangers arising from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The principal non-proliferation goal of the Alliance and its members is to prevent proliferation from occurring or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means. The Alliance attaches great importance to the continuing validity and the full implementation by all parties of the CFE Treaty as an essential element in ensuring the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.

**Part IV - Guidelines for the Alliance’s Forces Principles**

**Of Alliance Strategy**

41. The Alliance will maintain the necessary military capabilities to accomplish the full range of NATO’s missions. The principles of Allied solidarity and strategic unity remain paramount for all Alliance missions. Alliance forces must safeguard NATO’s military effectiveness and freedom of action. The security of all Allies is indivisible: an attack on one is an attack on all. With respect to collective defence under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the combined military forces of the Alliance must be capable of deterring any potential aggression against it, of stopping an aggressor’s advance as far forward as possible should an attack nevertheless occur, and of ensuring the political independence and territorial integrity of its
member states. They must also be prepared to contribute to conflict prevention and to conduct non-Article 5 crisis response operations. The Alliance’s forces have essential roles in fostering cooperation and understanding with NATO’s Partners and other states, particularly in helping Partners to prepare for potential participation in NATO-led PfP operations. Thus they contribute to the preservation of peace, to the safeguarding of common security interests of Alliance members, and to the maintenance of the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. By deterring the use of NBC weapons, they contribute to Alliance efforts aimed at preventing the proliferation of these weapons and their delivery means.

42. The achievement of the Alliance’s aims depends critically on the equitable sharing of the roles, risks and responsibilities, as well as the benefits, of common defence. The presence of United States conventional and nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North America. The North American Allies contribute to the Alliance through military forces available for Alliance missions, through their broader contribution to international peace and security, and through the provision of unique training facilities on the North American continent. The European Allies also make wide-ranging and substantial contributions. As the process of developing the ESDI within the Alliance progresses, the European Allies will further enhance their contribution to the common defence and to international peace and stability including through multinational formations.

43. The principle of collective effort in Alliance defence is embodied in practical arrangements that enable the Allies to enjoy the crucial political, military and resource advantages of collective defence, and prevent the renationalisation of defence policies, without depriving the Allies of their sovereignty. These arrangements also enable NATO’s forces to carry out non-Article 5 crisis response operations and constitute a prerequisite for a coherent Alliance response to all possible contingencies. They are based on procedures for consulta-
tion, an integrated military structure, and on co-operation agree-
ments. Key features include collective force planning; common
funding; common operational planning; multinational formations,
headquarters and command arrangements; an integrated air defence
system; a balance of roles and responsibilities among the Allies; the
stationing and deployment of forces outside home territory when
required; arrangements, including planning, for crisis management
and reinforcement; common standards and procedures for equip-
ment, training and logistics; joint and combined doctrines and exer-
cises when appropriate; and infrastructure, armaments and logistics
cooperation. The inclusion of NATO’s Partners in such arrange-
ments or the development of similar arrangements for them, in
appropriate areas, is also instrumental in enhancing cooperation and
common efforts in Euro-Atlantic security matters.

44. Multinational funding, including through the Military Budget and
the NATO Security Investment Programme, will continue to play an
important role in acquiring and maintaining necessary assets and
capabilities. The management of resources should be guided by the
military requirements of the Alliance as they evolve.

45. The Alliance supports the further development of the ESDI within
the Alliance, including by being prepared to make available assets
and capabilities for operations under the political control and strate-
gic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed.

46. To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the
Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix
of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe and kept up to
date where necessary, although at a minimum sufficient level.
Taking into account the diversity of risks with which the Alliance
could be faced, it must maintain the forces necessary to ensure cred-
ible deterrence and to provide a wide range of conventional
response options. But the Alliance’s conventional forces alone can-
not ensure credible deterrence. Nuclear weapons make a unique
contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.

The Alliance’s Force Posture

The Missions of Alliance Military Forces

47. The primary role of Alliance military forces is to protect peace and to guarantee the territorial integrity, political independence and security of member states. The Alliance’s forces must therefore be able to deter and defend effectively, to maintain or restore the territorial integrity of Allied nations and - in case of conflict - to terminate war rapidly by making an aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack and withdraw. NATO forces must maintain the ability to provide for collective defence while conducting effective non-Article 5 crisis response operations.

48. The maintenance of the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area is of key importance. An important aim of the Alliance and its forces is to keep risks at a distance by dealing with potential crises at an early stage. In the event of crises which jeopardise Euro-Atlantic stability and could affect the security of Alliance members, the Alliance’s military forces may be called upon to conduct crisis response operations. They may also be called upon to contribute to the preservation of international peace and security by conducting operations in support of other international organisations, complementing and reinforcing political actions within a broad approach to security.

49. In contributing to the management of crises through military operations, the Alliance’s forces will have to deal with a complex and diverse range of actors, risks, situations and demands, including humanitarian emergencies. Some non-Article 5 crisis response operations may be as demanding as some collective defence missions. Well-trained and well-equipped forces at adequate levels of readiness
and in sufficient strength to meet the full range of contingencies as well as the appropriate support structures, planning tools and command and control capabilities are essential in providing efficient military contributions. The Alliance should also be prepared to support, on the basis of separable but not separate capabilities, operations under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed. The potential participation of Partners and other non-NATO nations in NATO-led operations as well as possible operations with Russia would be further valuable elements of NATO’s contribution to managing crises that affect Euro-Atlantic security.

50. Alliance military forces also contribute to promoting stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area by their participation in military-to-military contacts and in other cooperation activities and exercises under the Partnership for Peace as well as those organised to deepen NATO’s relationships with Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean Dialogue countries. They contribute to stability and understanding by participating in confidence-building activities, including those which enhance transparency and improve communication; as well as in verification of arms control agreements and in humanitarian de-mining. Key areas of consultation and cooperation could include inter alia: training and exercises, interoperability, civil-military relations, concept and doctrine development, defence planning, crisis management, proliferation issues, armaments cooperation as well as participation in operational planning and operations.

Guidelines for the Alliance’s Force Posture

51. To implement the Alliance’s fundamental security tasks and the principles of its strategy, the forces of the Alliance must continue to be adapted to meet the requirements of the full range of Alliance missions effectively and to respond to future challenges. The posture of Allies’ forces, building on the strengths of different national defence structures, will conform to the guidelines developed in the following paragraphs.
52. The size, readiness, availability and deployment of the Alliance’s military forces will reflect its commitment to collective defence and to conduct crisis response operations, sometimes at short notice, distant from their home stations, including beyond the Allies’ territory. The characteristics of the Alliance’s forces will also reflect the provisions of relevant arms control agreements. Alliance forces must be adequate in strength and capabilities to deter and counter aggression against any Ally. They must be interoperable and have appropriate doctrines and technologies. They must be held at the required readiness and deployability, and be capable of military success in a wide range of complex joint and combined operations, which may also include Partners and other non-NATO nations.

53. This means in particular:

a. that the overall size of the Allies’ forces will be kept at the lowest levels consistent with the requirements of collective defence and other Alliance missions; they will be held at appropriate and graduated readiness;

b. that the peacetime geographical distribution of forces will ensure a sufficient military presence throughout the territory of the Alliance, including the stationing and deployment of forces outside home territory and waters and forward deployment of forces when and where necessary. Regional and, in particular, geostrategic considerations within the Alliance will have to be taken into account, as instabilities on NATO’s periphery could lead to crises or conflicts requiring an Alliance military response, potentially with short warning times;

c. that NATO’s command structure will be able to undertake command and control of the full range of the Alliance’s military missions including through the use of deployable combined and joint HQs, in particular CJTF headquarters, to command and control multinational and multiservice forces. It will also be able to support operations under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as other-
wise agreed, thereby contributing to the development of the ESDI within the Alliance, and to conduct NATO-led non-
Article 5 crisis response operations in which Partners and other countries may participate;

d. that overall, the Alliance will, in both the near and long term and for the full range of its missions, require essential operational capabilities such as an effective engagement capability; deployability and mobility; survivability of forces and infrastructure; and sustainability, incorporating logistics and force rotation. To develop these capabilities to their full potential for multinational operations, interoperability, including human factors, the use of appropriate advanced technology, the maintenance of information superiority in military operations, and highly qualified personnel with a broad spectrum of skills will be important. Sufficient capabilities in the areas of command, control and communications as well as intelligence and surveillance will serve as necessary force multipliers;

e. that at any time a limited but militarily significant proportion of ground, air and sea forces will be able to react as rapidly as necessary to a wide range of eventualities, including a short-notice attack on any Ally. Greater numbers of force elements will be available at appropriate levels of readiness to sustain prolonged operations, whether within or beyond Alliance territory, including through rotation of deployed forces. Taken together, these forces must also be of sufficient quality, quantity and readiness to contribute to deterrence and to defend against limited attacks on the Alliance;

f. that the Alliance must be able to build up larger forces, both in response to any fundamental changes in the security environment and for limited requirements, by reinforcement, by mobilising reserves, or by reconstituting forces when necessary. This ability must be in proportion to potential threats to Alliance security, including potential long-term developments. It must take into account the possibility of substantial
improvements in the readiness and capabilities of military forces on the periphery of the Alliance. Capabilities for timely reinforcement and resupply both within and from Europe and North America will remain of critical importance, with a resulting need for a high degree of deployability, mobility and flexibility;

g. that appropriate force structures and procedures, including those that would provide an ability to build up, deploy and draw down forces quickly and selectively, are necessary to permit measured, flexible and timely responses in order to reduce and defuse tensions. These arrangements must be exercised regularly in peacetime;

h. that the Alliance’s defence posture must have the capability to address appropriately and effectively the risks associated with the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery, which also pose a potential threat to the Allies’ populations, territory, and forces. A balanced mix of forces, response capabilities and strengthened defences is needed;

i. that the Alliance’s forces and infrastructure must be protected against terrorist attacks.

Characteristics of Conventional Forces

54. It is essential that the Allies’ military forces have a credible ability to fulfil the full range of Alliance missions. This requirement has implications for force structures, force and equipment levels; readiness, availability, and sustainability; training and exercises; deployment and employment options; and force build-up and mobilisation capabilities. The aim should be to achieve an optimum balance between high readiness forces capable of beginning rapidly, and immediately as necessary, collective defence or non-Article 5 crisis response operations; forces at different levels of lower readiness to provide the bulk of those required for collective defence, for rotation of forces to sustain crisis response operations, or for further reinforcement of a particular region; and a longer-term build-up and augmentation capabil-
ity for the worst case — but very remote — scenario of large scale operations for collective defence. A substantial proportion of Alliance forces will be capable of performing more than one of these roles.

55. Alliance forces will be structured to reflect the multinational and joint nature of Alliance missions. Essential tasks will include controlling, protecting, and defending territory; ensuring the unimpeded use of sea, air, and land lines of communication; sea control and protecting the deployment of the Alliance’s sea-based deterrent; conducting independent and combined air operations; ensuring a secure air environment and effective extended air defence; surveillance, intelligence, reconnaissance and electronic warfare; strategic lift; and providing effective and flexible command and control facilities, including deployable combined and joint headquarters.

56. The Alliance’s defence posture against the risks and potential threats of the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery must continue to be improved, including through work on missile defences. As NATO forces may be called upon to operate beyond NATO’s borders, capabilities for dealing with proliferation risks must be flexible, mobile, rapidly deployable and sustainable. Doctrines, planning, and training and exercise policies must also prepare the Alliance to deter and defend against the use of NBC weapons. The aim in doing so will be to further reduce operational vulnerabilities of NATO military forces while maintaining their flexibility and effectiveness despite the presence, threat or use of NBC weapons.

57. Alliance strategy does not include a chemical or biological warfare capability. The Allies support universal adherence to the relevant disarmament regimes. But, even if further progress with respect to banning chemical and biological weapons can be achieved, defensive precautions will remain essential.

58. Given reduced overall force levels and constrained resources, the
ability to work closely together will remain vital for achieving the Alliance’s missions. The Alliance’s collective defence arrangements in which, for those concerned, the integrated military structure plays the key role, are essential in this regard. The various strands of NATO’s defence planning need to be effectively coordinated at all levels in order to ensure the preparedness of the forces and supporting structures to carry out the full spectrum of their roles. Exchanges of information among the Allies about their force plans contribute to securing the availability of the capabilities needed for the execution of these roles. Consultations in case of important changes in national defence plans also remain of key importance. Cooperation in the development of new operational concepts will be essential for responding to evolving security challenges. The detailed practical arrangements that have been developed as part of the ESDI within the Alliance contribute to close allied co-operation without unnecessary duplication of assets and capabilities.

59. To be able to respond flexibly to possible contingencies and to permit the effective conduct of Alliance missions, the Alliance requires sufficient logistics capabilities, including transport capacities, medical support and stocks to deploy and sustain all types of forces effectively. Standardisation will foster cooperation and cost-effectiveness in providing logistic support to allied forces. Mounting and sustaining operations outside the Allies’ territory, where there may be little or no host-nation support, will pose special logistical challenges. The ability to build-up larger, adequately equipped and trained forces, in a timely manner and to a level able to fulfil the full range of Alliance missions, will also make an essential contribution to crisis management and defence. This will include the ability to reinforce any area at risk and to establish a multinational presence when and where this is needed. Forces of various kinds and at various levels of readiness will be capable of flexible employment in both intra-European and transatlantic reinforcement. This will require control of lines of communication, and appropriate support and exercise arrangements.
60. The interaction between Alliance forces and the civil environment (both governmental and non-governmental) in which they operate is crucial to the success of operations. Civil-military cooperation is interdependent: military means are increasingly requested to assist civil authorities; at the same time civil support to military operations is important for logistics, communications, medical support, and public affairs. Cooperation between the Alliance’s military and civil bodies will accordingly remain essential.

61. The Alliance’s ability to accomplish the full range of its missions will rely increasingly on multinational forces, complementing national commitments to NATO for the Allies concerned. Such forces, which are applicable to the full range of Alliance missions, demonstrate the Alliance’s resolve to maintain a credible collective defence; enhance Alliance cohesion; and reinforce the transatlantic partnership and strengthen the ESDI within the Alliance. Multinational forces, particularly those capable of deploying rapidly for collective defence or for non-Article 5 crisis response operations, reinforce solidarity. They can also provide a way of deploying more capable formations than might be available purely nationally, thus helping to make more efficient use of scarce defence resources. This may include a highly integrated, multinational approach to specific tasks and functions, an approach which underlies the implementation of the CJTF concept. For peace support operations, effective multinational formations and other arrangements involving Partners will be valuable. In order to exploit fully the potential offered by multinational formations, improving interoperability, inter alia through sufficient training and exercises, is of the highest importance.

Characteristics of Nuclear Forces

62. The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. They will continue to fulfil an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies’ response to mil-
itary aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not a rational option. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.

63. A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe. These forces need to have the necessary characteristics and appropriate flexibility and survivability, to be perceived as a credible and effective element of the Allies’ strategy in preventing war. They will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability.

64. The Allies concerned consider that, with the radical changes in the security situation, including reduced conventional force levels in Europe and increased reaction times, NATO’s ability to defuse a crisis through diplomatic and other means or, should it be necessary, to mount a successful conventional defence has significantly improved. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated by them are therefore extremely remote. Since 1991, therefore, the Allies have taken a series of steps which reflect the post-Cold War security environment. These include a dramatic reduction of the types and numbers of NATO’s sub-strategic forces including the elimination of all nuclear artillery and ground-launched short-range nuclear missiles; a significant relaxation of the readiness criteria for nuclear-roled forces; and the termination of
standing peacetime nuclear contingency plans. NATO’s nuclear forces no longer target any country. Nonetheless, NATO will maintain, at the minimum level consistent with the prevailing security environment, adequate sub-strategic forces based in Europe which will provide an essential link with strategic nuclear forces, reinforcing the transatlantic link. These will consist of dual capable aircraft and a small number of United Kingdom Trident warheads. Sub-strategic nuclear weapons will, however, not be deployed in normal circumstances on surface vessels and attack submarines.

**Part V – Conclusion**

65. As the North Atlantic Alliance enters its sixth decade, it must be ready to meet the challenges and opportunities of a new century. The Strategic Concept reaffirms the enduring purpose of the Alliance and sets out its fundamental security tasks. It enables a transformed NATO to contribute to the evolving security environment, supporting security and stability with the strength of its shared commitment to democracy and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The Strategic Concept will govern the Alliance’s security and defence policy, its operational concepts, its conventional and nuclear force posture and its collective defence arrangements, and will be kept under review in the light of the evolving security environment. In an uncertain world the need for effective defence remains, but in reaffirming this commitment the Alliance will also continue making full use of every opportunity to help build an undivided continent by promoting and fostering the vision of a Europe whole and free.
ANNEX IV

COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL GUIDANCE

Endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government on 29 November 2006

Introduction

1. This Comprehensive Political Guidance provides a framework and political direction for NATO’s continuing transformation, setting out, for the next 10 to 15 years, the priorities for all Alliance capability issues, planning disciplines and intelligence. This guidance, to be reviewed periodically, also aims to increase their coherence through an effective management mechanism.

Part 1 - The Strategic Context

2. NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept described the evolving security environment in terms that remain valid. This environment continues to change; it is and will be complex and global, and subject to unforeseeable developments. International security developments have an increasing impact on the lives of the citizens of Allied and other countries. Terrorism, increasingly global in scope and lethal in results, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction are likely to be the principal threats to the Alliance over the next 10 to 15 years. Instability due to failed or failing states, regional crises and conflicts, and their causes and effects; the growing availability of sophisticated conventional weaponry; the misuse of emerging technologies; and the disruption of the flow of vital resources are likely to be the main risks or challenges for the Alliance in that period. All of these factors can be inter-related or combined, most dangerously
in the case of terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction.

3. Peace, security and development are more interconnected than ever. This places a premium on close cooperation and coordination among international organizations playing their respective, interconnected roles in crisis prevention and management. Of particular importance because of their wide range of means and responsibilities are the United Nations and the European Union. The United Nations Security Council will continue to have the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The European Union, which is able to mobilise a wide range of military and civilian instruments, is assuming a growing role in support of international stability. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe also continues to have important responsibilities in this field.

**Part 2 - Implications for the Alliance**

4. The Alliance will continue to follow the broad approach to security of the 1999 Strategic Concept and perform the fundamental security tasks it set out, namely security, consultation, deterrence and defence, crisis management, and partnership.

5. Collective defence will remain the core purpose of the Alliance. The character of potential Article 5 challenges is continuing to evolve. Large scale conventional aggression against the Alliance will continue to be highly unlikely; however, as shown by the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 following which NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time, future attacks may originate from outside the Euro-Atlantic area and involve unconventional forms of armed assault. Future attacks could also entail an increased risk of the use of asymmetric means, and could involve the use of weapons of mass destruction. Defence against terrorism and the ability to respond to challenges from wherever they may come have assumed and will retain an increased importance.
6. The Alliance will remain ready, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including through non-Article 5 crisis response operations, as set out in the Strategic Concept. The Alliance has undertaken a range of operations of this kind since the end of the Cold War. Experience has shown the increasing significance of stabilisation operations and of military support to post-conflict reconstruction efforts. The role of the UN and EU, and other organisations, including as appropriate non-governmental organisations, in ongoing operations and future crises will put a premium on practical close cooperation and coordination among all elements of the international response.

7. Against this background, NATO must retain the ability to conduct the full range of its missions, from high to low intensity, placing special focus on the most likely operations, being responsive to current and future operational requirements, and still able to conduct the most demanding operations. There will continue to be a requirement for a mix of conventional and nuclear forces in accordance with extant guidance. In particular, the Alliance needs to focus on:
   a. strengthening its ability to meet the challenges, from wherever they may come, to the security of its populations, territory and forces;
   b. enhancing its ability to anticipate and assess the threats, risks, and challenges it faces, with special attention to the threats posed by terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
   c. providing forces able to conduct the full range of military operations and missions;
   d. being able to respond quickly to unforeseen circumstances;
   e. ensuring that NATO’s own crisis management instruments are effectively drawn together. While NATO has no requirement to develop capabilities strictly for civilian purposes, it needs to improve its practical cooperation, taking into account existing arrangements, with partners, relevant inter-
national organizations and, as appropriate, non-governmental organizations in order to collaborate more effectively in planning and conducting operations;
f. continuing to adapt planning processes to meet the new demands.

8. The evolving security environment requires that commitments from nations, recognising the primacy of national political decisions, to NATO operations be translated into concrete terms by the development and fielding of flexible and sustainable contributions, and also by a fair sharing of the burden. It is also important to have an early indication of the likely military demands and potential availability of forces and resources when making an Alliance decision to launch an operation.

9. All of this requires Allies to continue the process of transformation, including conceptual and organisational agility and the development of robust capabilities that are deployable, sustainable, interoperable, and usable.

**Part 3 – Guidelines for Alliance Capability Requirements**

10. Given the likely nature of the future security environment and the demands it will impose, the Alliance will require the agility and flexibility to respond to complex and unpredictable challenges, which may emanate far from member states’ borders and arise at short notice. The Alliance will also require effective arrangements for intelligence and information sharing. As in the past, intelligence and lessons learned from operations will also inform capability development.

11. In order to undertake the full range of missions, the Alliance must have the capability to launch and sustain concurrent major joint operations and smaller operations for collective defence and crisis response on and beyond Alliance territory, on its periphery, and at strategic distance; it is likely that NATO will need to carry out a greater number of smaller demanding and different operations, and
the Alliance must retain the capability to conduct large-scale high-intensity operations.

12. Regardless of its overall size, each operation is likely to require a command and control structure able to plan and execute a campaign to accomplish a strategic or operational objective, employing the appropriate mix of air, land and maritime components. It also requires forces that are structured, equipped, manned and trained for expeditionary operations in order to respond rapidly to emerging crises, for which the NATO Response Force would be a key element, effectively reinforce initial entry forces, and sustain the Alliance’s commitment for the duration of the operation.

13. On this basis, the Alliance requires sufficient fully deployable and sustainable land forces, and appropriate air and maritime components. This requirement is supported by political targets as set out by Defence Ministers for the proportion of their nation’s land forces which are structured, prepared and equipped for deployed operations (40%) as well as the proportion undertaking or planned for sustained operations at any one time (8%), and by the Allies undertaking to intensify their efforts, taking into account national priorities and obligations, to this end.

14. NATO and the EU and their respective members states have already agreed procedures to ensure coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the capability requirements common to both organisations. NATO’s planning disciplines should continue to take full account of these principles, objectives and procedures.

15. The development of capabilities will not be possible without the commitment of sufficient resources. Furthermore, it will remain critically important that resources that Allies make available for defence, whether nationally, through multi-national projects, or through NATO mechanisms, are used as effectively as possible and are focused on priority areas for investment. Increased investment in
key capabilities will require nations to consider reprioritisation, and the more effective use of resources, including through pooling and other forms of bilateral or multilateral cooperation. NATO’s defence planning should support these activities.

16. Over the next 10 to 15 years, the evolving security environment and the need to deal with conventional and especially asymmetric threats and risks, wherever they arise, will put a premium on improvements in meeting the following capability requirements:
   a. the ability to conduct and support multinational joint expeditionary operations far from home territory with little or no host nation support and to sustain them for extended periods. This requires forces that are fully deployable, sustainable and interoperable and the means to deploy them. It also requires a fully coordinated and, where appropriate, multinational approach to logistic support;
   b. the ability to adapt force postures and military responses rapidly and effectively to unforeseen circumstances. This requires, inter alia, an effective capability to analyse the environment and anticipate potential requirements, a high level of readiness for our forces, and the necessary flexibility to respond to any sudden shifts in requirements;
   c. the ability to deter, disrupt, defend and protect against terrorism, and more particularly to contribute to the protection of the Alliance’s populations, territory, critical infrastructure and forces, and to support consequence management;
   d. the ability to protect information systems of critical importance to the Alliance against cyber attacks;
   e. the ability to conduct operations taking account of the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear hazards, including the ability to defend deployed NATO forces against theatre missile threats;
   f. the ability to conduct operations in demanding geographical and climatic environments;
g. the ability, through appropriate equipment and procedures, to identify hostile elements, including in urban areas, in order to conduct operations in a way that minimises unintended damage as well as the risk to our own forces;

h. the ability and flexibility to conduct operations in circumstances where the various efforts of several authorities, institutions and nations need to be coordinated in a comprehensive manner to achieve the desired results, and where these various actors may be undertaking combat, stabilisation, reconstruction, reconciliation and humanitarian activities simultaneously;

i. the ability to bring military support to stabilisation operations and reconstruction efforts across all phases of a crisis, including to establish a safe and secure environment, within the full range of missions; military support to reconstruction efforts will be provided to the extent to which conditions in the theatre of operations prevent other actors with primary responsibilities in this field from carrying out their tasks. This should embrace the ability to support security sector reform, including demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration, and to bring military support, within available means and capabilities, to humanitarian relief operations;

j. the ability to field forces with the greatest practicable interoperability and standardisation amongst Allies, and the flexibility also to cooperate with the forces of partners, including, to the extent possible, through the release of appropriate standards.

17. Delivering these capabilities requires an openness to new technologies, concepts, doctrines and procedures supporting, in particular, an approach to operations which, bearing in mind the provisions of paragraph 7e above, aims at the coherent and comprehensive application of the various instruments of the Alliance to create overall effects that will achieve the desired outcome. Such an effects based approach should be developed further and might include enhancing
situational awareness, timely operational planning and decision making, improving links between commanders, sensors and weapons, and deploying and employing joint expeditionary forces coherently and to greatest effect.

18. Among these qualitative requirements, the following constitute NATO’s top priorities: joint expeditionary forces and the capability to deploy and sustain them; high-readiness forces; the ability to deal with asymmetric threats; information superiority; and the ability to draw together the various instruments of the Alliance brought to bear in a crisis and its resolution to the best effect, as well as the ability to coordinate with other actors. The NATO Response Force is a fundamental military tool in support of the Alliance and a catalyst for further transformation and has top priority together with operational requirements.

**Part 4 - Principles for a Management Mechanism**

19. The NATO committees and bodies responsible for the relevant planning disciplines, including operational planning and intelligence, are to implement the Comprehensive Political Guidance in their work through the development, as necessary, of detailed policies, directives and guidance which they in turn provide for their respective disciplines.

20. An effective Management Mechanism is an integral part of the implementation of the Comprehensive Political Guidance. The Management Mechanism will be established by the NATO Council in Permanent Session to provide for the development of further detailed guidance, and for monitoring and ensuring compliance of these planning disciplines with the provisions of the Comprehensive Political Guidance and ensuring coherence and harmonisation among them*. The Management Mechanism will comprise a system of effective arrangements, including, as required, formal direction, with the aim of achieving aligned planning processes, consistent guidance and harmonised requirements and supporting structures.
21. Implementation of this Comprehensive Political Guidance should lead to the development of more usable capabilities for future operations and missions.
ANNEX V

DECLARATION ON ALLIANCE SECURITY

Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg / Kehl on 4 April 2009

We, the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, met today in Strasbourg and Kehl to celebrate the 60th anniversary of our Alliance. We have reaffirmed the values, objectives and obligations of the Washington Treaty which unite Europe with the United States and Canada, and have provided our transatlantic community with an unprecedented era of peace and stability. We have also reaffirmed our adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

NATO continues to be the essential transatlantic forum for security consultations among Allies. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and collective defence, based on the indivisibility of Allied security, are, and will remain, the cornerstone of our Alliance. Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy. NATO will continue to play its part in reinforcing arms control and promoting nuclear and conventional disarmament in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as non-proliferation efforts.

NATO’s enlargement has been an historic success in bringing us closer to our vision of a Europe whole and free. NATO’s door will remain open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and whose inclusion can contribute to common security and stability. Today, our nations and the world are facing new, increasingly global
threats, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and cyber attacks. Other challenges such as energy security, climate change, as well as instability emanating from fragile and failed states, may also have a negative impact on Allied and international security. Our security is increasingly tied to that of other regions.

We will improve our ability to meet the security challenges we face that impact directly on Alliance territory, emerge at strategic distance or closer to home. Allies must share risks and responsibilities equitably. We must make our capabilities more flexible and deployable so we can respond quickly and effectively, wherever needed, as new crises emerge. We must also reform the NATO structures to create a leaner and more cost-effective organization. We will strengthen NATO’s capacity to play an important role in crisis management and conflict resolution where our interests are involved.

We aim to strengthen our cooperation with other international actors, including the United Nations, European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and African Union, in order to improve our ability to deliver a comprehensive approach to meeting these new challenges, combining civilian and military capabilities more effectively. In our operations today in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, our armed forces are working alongside many other nations and organisations. In Afghanistan, our key priority, we are committed to helping the Afghan Government and its people to build a democratic, secure and stable country that will never again harbour terrorists who threaten Afghan and international security.

NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence and welcomes the European Union’s efforts to strengthen its capabilities and its capacity to address common security challenges. Non-EU Allies make a significant contribution to these efforts in which their fullest involvement possible is important, as agreed. We are determined to ensure that the NATO-EU relationship is a truly functioning
strategic partnership as agreed by NATO and by the EU. Our efforts should be mutually reinforcing and complementary.

We will develop our relationships with all our partners, both in our neighborhood and beyond, with whom we have a joint commitment to cooperative security. Our partners are key in enabling us to implement our vision of a community of shared values and responsibilities. We value the support that many of our partners bring to our operations and missions.

A strong, cooperative partnership between NATO and Russia, based on respect for all the principles of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and the 2002 Rome Declaration, best serves security in the Euro-Atlantic area. We stand ready to work with Russia to address the common challenges we face. We are committed to renovating our Alliance to better address today’s threats and to anticipate tomorrow’s risks. United by this common vision of our future, we task the Secretary General to convene and lead a broad-based group of qualified experts, who in close consultation with all Allies will lay the ground for the Secretary General to develop a new Strategic Concept and submit proposals for its implementation for approval at our next summit. The Secretary General will keep the Council in permanent session involved throughout the process.