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Welcome Comments
by Dr. Francois Melese

Welcome to the Proceedings of the third biennial NATO Building Integrity (BI) Conference. The conference took place 25–28 February 2013 and attracted nearly 200 civilian and military officials from over 39 nations including academicians, practitioners, and subject matter experts, as well as representatives from nearly a dozen international organisations. This distinguished group met in Monterey, California, home of NATO’s North American Partnership Training and Education Center—the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). The biennial conference is part of NATO’s Building Integrity (BI) Programme launched in 2007, endorsed by NATO Heads of State at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, and again at the NATO Summit held in Chicago in 2012. The U.S. supports the BI Programme through a biennial conference organized by the Defense Resources Management Institute (DRMI), jointly sponsored by OSD-Policy and NATO. The primary focus of the BI Programme is to minimize corruption risks and strengthen individual and collective security by encouraging countries to build integrity, increase transparency, and improve accountability in the defence sector.

Following Lisbon and Chicago, the BI Programme gave priority to developing tailored support for Afghanistan and South Eastern Europe. The conference was intended to shape these efforts, and to improve and expand the BI Tool Kit. The Tool Kit is available to all member and partner countries and consists of three main pillars: a diagnostic tool (survey questionnaire); a set of prescriptions (a “Compendium of Best Practices” translated into multiple languages); and an implementing strategy (BI Education & Training programmes). A key goal of the conference was to provide an opportunity for participants to share their knowledge and experience. The impact of weak defence institutions in the face of fiscal challenges is a risk all NATO member and partner countries take seriously, and is a well-known obstacle for stabilization and reconstruction in conflict zones. The conference provided a forum for participants to discuss how to improve the current BI Tool Kit and build stronger institutions that promote the best use of defence resources.

The evening reception hosted by NATO the first day allowed participants to meet and discuss collective security challenges. The second day’s plenary sessions opened with a keynote by Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, General Jean-Paul Paloméros. Next, a diverse group of distinguished speakers offered evidence of the risk corruption poses to individual and collective security efforts. The next day, four working group syndicates were tasked with identifying innovative approaches to address those risks. Every conference participant was asked to sign up for one of the working groups. Reports from the intense deliberations of the working group syndicates were shared with all participants the last day. The final session included closing remarks and a discussion of next steps.

Key issues highlighted in plenary sessions and syndicate working groups included:
1. The strategic impact of corruption on stabilization, reconstruction and governance efforts.
2. Lessons learned from other sectors, international organisations, and civil society.
3. Improvements to planning and implementation of operations and civil-military cooperation to support good governance.
4. Guidance for countries on choosing a mix of investments to build integrity, increase transparency, and improve accountability.
5. A review of the BI Tool Kit to help nations improve institutions and build force structures that offer value for money.

The wide-ranging discussions highlighted the fact that countries are rapidly joining the BI community as the burden of corruption is increasingly recognized as a significant political, economic, and national security liability. NATO members and Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries increasingly recognize the threat on NATO's ability to plan and conduct successful operations/missions. Some of the lessons learned include:

1. Need to better align civilian and military cooperation in anti-corruption efforts.
2. Need for an overarching framework to coordinate and strengthen common efforts.
3. Need for expert advice and technical assistance to develop Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and other developing security forces’ institutional capacity.
4. Need to further enhance BI Tool Kit to build capacity and promote good practice.

General recommendations for next steps identified by the NATO International Staff include:

1. **Translating values of integrity, transparency, and accountability into actions on the ground**
   Development of a framework document to complement North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved BI Education and Training Plan highlighting the strategic impact of corruption on stabilization, reconstruction, and governance, and how planning and implementa-

2. **Strengthening civil-military cooperation**
   Establishment of a civil-military taskforce including representatives of the Strategic Commands to address BI issues during all phases of a conflict.

3. **Improving capacity-building tools**
   Recommend implementing the BI Education and Training Plan and review of the BI Self Assessment and Peer Review Process, including strengthening measures of performance and taking stock of lessons learned from past assessments. Update the BI Compendium developing a second volume of best practices.

We hope you gain valuable insights from reading through these proceedings. On behalf of the organizers at the Defense Resources Management Institute (DRMI), I would like to express our gratitude to all participants, speakers, rapporteurs, moderators, and conference staff, and especially to OSD-Policy and NATO as sponsors of this flagship event. We look forward to continuing this valuable collaboration with colleagues and partners in the U.S., at NATO, and around the world.

Sincerely,

Francois Melese, Ph.D.
Professor of Economics & Executive Director
Defense Resources Management Institute (DRMI)
Naval Postgraduate School
Opening Remarks and Keynote Address

Rear Admiral Jan Tighe
Interim President, Naval Postgraduate School

H.E. Ambassador Dirk Brengelmann
Assistant Secretary General, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, NATO HQ

General Jean-Paul Paloméros (FRAAF)
Supreme Allied Commander Transformation

Rear Admiral Jan Tighe and Ambassador Dirk Brengelmann opened the conference and welcomed participants. Admiral Tighe’s and Ambassador Brengelmann’s comments are available at http://bi2013.org/conference-presentations.

Summary Reported by Walter Christman, Ph.D.

General Jean-Paul Paloméros gave the keynote address focused on the strategic impact of corruption in crisis, conflict, and stabilization efforts. In this address, he noted that while NATO has been fortunate to rely on military forces, which uphold the highest standards of integrity and honesty, its members have to accept that different nations might have a slightly different interpretation of the word “integrity,” and different tolerance of certain corrupt behaviors. Lessons learned from NATO operations in Afghanistan, the Balkans, and many other places have shown examples of corruption that had the potential to undermine the Alliance’s ability to conduct effective operations, and possibly even to prevent NATO from winning the battle for the “hearts and minds” of the population.

In response, the NATO Building Integrity Programme was launched in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 2007 to raise awareness, promote good practice, and reduce the risk of corruption. The Programme is part of NATO’s commitment to strengthening good governance, and it potentially encompasses all of the Alliance’s core tasks: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security.

General Paloméros indicated that there are a couple of guiding principles that a military should embrace, before it proactively engages on this subject. Firstly, there must be understanding of the environment within which NATO forces are operating. Secondly, analysis of the risk of corruption is to be embedded in a global planning perspective, and finally mitigation measures must be clearly identified.

More than ever, and thanks to increased access to information, populations are sensitive to the integrity of their leaders (or lack thereof). In fact, it appears that corruption is today the primary cause of populations’ dissatisfaction. This reinforces the permanent need to diffuse any suspicion that NATO forces could be involved in such practices, or even that they are perceived to be so.
General Paloméros argued that for NATO’s efforts to be effective, they must not be treated in isolation from wider anti-corruption efforts. They must be led in a comprehensive approach through an effective coordination and partnership among all involved stakeholders. And since the boundaries between organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism are more and more blurred, a stakeholder could be an actor, private or public, international or national, state, non-state, or even an individual with whom the Alliance needs to cooperate in order to deliver mutual benefits based on risk and gain.

In order to turn this conceptual approach into reality, General Paloméros observed that the Education and Training plan is at the very heart of the Allied Command Transformation’s (ACT’s) core mission. His Command is responsible, since the end of last year, for delivering all of NATO’s collective education, training, and exercises. ACT’s aim is first to integrate, within training and exercises, scenarios that reflect much of the lessons learned from operations. This will enable those trained to detect, identify, and correct activities that are counter to the principles of integrity. In addition, with the help of numerous national efforts, ACT has been able to help coordinate more than 30 courses that will be made available to NATO attendees in 2013. These courses should help in particular to install the necessary mind-set and to disseminate the best practices in the areas of transparency and accountability. The golden thread is teaching, educating the military not to create situations that can potentially trigger corruption. He cited, for instance, that when NATO employs an indigenous workforce in Kosovo or Afghanistan, it should be careful not to destabilize the local economy. NATO also needs to develop procurement processes that promote local ownership in using the best practices.

A second goal for ACT is to support the development of institutional capabilities and local forces. As a result of a set of complicated and interlinked situations and circumstances peculiar to each operation, all local forces’ education and training support must be developed and delivered on a case-by-case basis. General Paloméros then turned to the subject of Afghanistan, where the goal is to develop institutional and individual capabilities in support of the Afghan National Security Forces. The Afghan Ministries of Defence and Interior have already completed the Building Integrity Self Assessment, and with the help of subject matter experts, the BI team has developed a tailored programme focused on building resource management procedures and individual capabilities.

At the same time, it must be acknowledged that in Afghanistan corruption has a fertile ground in poppy cultivation and narcotics trade, which has developed partly because people must satisfy their fundamental needs. For many Afghan farmers, the alternative to poppy growing has been misery—if not starvation. In such circumstance, they could not be expected to obey a law banning poppy cultivation, enforced in such a way as to change deeply their way of life and at the end deprive them of their livelihood. Even so, not all poppy cultivation, of course, should be attributed to poor farmers with no alternatives. Some is attributable to greed and motivated by profit—the work of criminal organizations.

In addition, the Taliban has taken political advantage of the resurgence in poppy farming to present themselves as the defenders of the farmers against a foreign enemy, bent on destroying their livelihoods in order to shield their own drug dependent citizens and societies. The Taliban also have benefited from the informal—but organized—“taxation” of revenues from the traffic in drugs. It is well known as well that 98% of poppy production comes from the most insecure provinces.
Consequently, General Paloméros argued that one cannot imagine any anti-corruption, any anti-drug policy without security improvement. This underlines the challenge that stands before the Afghans and allies together, and why the comprehensive approach is indispensable to tackle such a wide, encompassing political, societal, economic, and security issue. Security and corruption are intricately linked, and as a golden rule, one can say that the absence of security implies systematic corruption. NATO and its military and civilian partners must have sufficient local knowledge to understand the intentions and capabilities of those local actors charged with implementing projects or administering grants.

As NATO shifts to the post–2014 phase of its Afghanistan mission—and prepares for other contingencies—one common feature will be the need for a broad and enduring commitment, requiring the integration of civilian and military efforts. Building integrity and stabilization need a realistic transition planning from the outset, along with trained militaries and civilians prepared to work, if needed, in a demanding environment. It can only be effective if anti-corruption strategies are properly taught and implemented.

General Paloméros concluded his remarks with a powerful thought from the 17th century French playwright, Jean Baptiste Poquelin, best known as "Moliere," who wrote in his famous play *Tartuffe*: "If everyone were clothed with integrity, if every heart were just, frank, kindly, the other virtues would be well-nigh useless."
Ms. Welsch concluded by discussing the UN’s role in countering corruption, specifically the history and attributes of the UN Convention Against Corruption. Ms. Welsch highlighted specific articles that address judicial and prosecutorial integrity, anti-corruption authorities, police and prisons, and fighting corruption through education.

Mr. Cardona delivered a presentation on institutional integrity, emphasizing that corruption destroys public trust in institutions. He noted that through his work, it was discovered that the greatest challenge was not simply building institutions, but rather building effective institutions trusted by citizens. Mr. Cardona noted that integrity allows for confidence in an institution, governance system, or a nation. He highlighted four different citizen trust generators: credibility of policies; reliability and resilience of the institutions implementing policies; predictability and contestability of public decisions; and accountability of those holding authority. Mr. Cardona noted that past governance reforms weakened public trust and led to more corruption, and therefore reforms must be carefully considered.

Mr. Cardona concluded by making recommendations to help address corruption. These recommendations included: strengthening core state institutions, particularly regulating institutions (administrative justice, ombudsman-type institutions, anti-corruption agencies, and court of accounts.) Additionally, he noted several important considerations: factoring ethics and inequality reduction into regulation agendas; strengthening the professionalism of the public service; and enhancing parliamentary oversight roles. Finally, he included in the list of considerations: improving internal financial control; integrity management; integrity plans and risk assessments; and enhancing the quality of public services delivery.

Ms. Thorolfsdottir gave the third presentation, focusing on the inclusion of women in the defence sector and UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security. She stated that there are notable gaps between good intentions and actions relating to equality, which impacts the inclusion of women in the security sector. She noted that women are still excluded from the peace process, and added that aid to post–conflict societies is not geared towards women. She further stated that the active participation of women in peace means participation in reducing corruption.

Ms. Thorolfsdottir raised questions for the audience to consider: How does corruption in the defence and security sector affect men and women differently? Do men and women support and engage in corrupt practices in the same way, or not? How do women contribute to building integrity and fighting corruption in the defence sector, and how does it differ from men? Ms. Thorolfsdottir followed these questions with personal observations, noting that she believes corruption to be gendered. Additionally, she believes when women are excluded from being hired, they are excluded from institutional decision-making, affecting women’s security. She also noted that when a blind eye is turned to security forces committing violence against women, women’s security is affected. However, she does not believe that women are inherently less corrupt than men.

Ms. Thorolfsdottir noted that education and training are generally recommended to facilitate change, but it is difficult to change when it does not appear beneficial to us. Additionally, it is difficult to instruct others to change, but not change ourselves. She concluded by asking the audience to consider whether or not those in the defence sector are really committed to gender equality and to consider how we can better transform words into actions.

Question & Answer
The Chair opened up the floor for questions and comments. The first respondent noted that it is paradoxical that many of the presenters...
mentioned corruption in Afghanistan, when surveys found that 85% of the Afghan population has confidence in security forces. The respondent noted that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) issued a highly positive economic perspective for Afghanistan, adding that the economy grew 11% in 2012, and investment in Afghanistan has increased. The respondent asked the audience to ponder how a country with high economic growth rates could be as corrupt as some presenters are suggesting. The respondent concluded by acknowledging that there is corruption in Afghanistan, but the level of corruption is exaggerated by some organisations. A panelist responded saying that they were not attempting to downplay the progress made in Afghanistan, but they were simply stating the data collected.

A second participant asked the panel about dealing with the media and public perception when a government is addressing corruption. The participant noted as government addresses corruption, more stories about corruption appear in the media. The public interprets these stories as increased corruption, rather than the government addressing corruption. In response to the presentation about gender, the participant noted that in his/her country, a female rose to the position of Administrative Chief of Contract Procurement in the National Police. She dramatically decreased the perception of corruption, and left her successor with an increased capacity for addressing corruption. Two panelists responded, the first suggesting that the government focus on public awareness to address the public perception of corruption. The second responded, saying that trust in the government is key; the more active and effective a government is against corruption, the more the public will be aware that the government is addressing corruption.

A third participant raised the question about the loss of trust of international organisations, specifically citing the IMF and its intervention in Central and Eastern Europe. A panelist responded, noting that international organisations could better assist not by instructing countries what to do, but rather instructing countries on the results they should try and achieve.

A fourth participant stated that he/she believes women are included in the security sector, and corruption should not be gendered. A panelist responded, stating that there is a “ways to go” to achieve gender equality, and that it is important to talk about how men and women can work together to achieve results in addressing corruption.

Why We Need Defence Institutions that Can Be Trusted and Offer Value for Money

Participants

Mr. Jim Schear  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations, US Office of the Secretary of Defense

Mr. Ahmed Yassine Foukara  
Head of the Strategy and Studies, Central Authority for Corruption Prevention in Morocco

Mr. Peter Watkins  
Director General, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom

Summary Reported by LTC Steven Hanson

The Chair opened this session and presented the key point of the discussion—that confidence in public institutions is crucial given the limited and decreasing resources that will be spent on defence in the future. Given this certainty, the fundamental questions to the panel were: What is “special” about defence institutions? Why is it that these institutions, more so than others, demand integrity of the public? Why is it important...
to invest in the integrity, transparency, and accountability of our defence institutions? How does this contribute to good governance, and how do we promote a virtuous cycle that delivers efficient and effective management that contributes to stability and economic growth? The panel was comprised of Mr. Jim Schear, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations, U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense; Mr. Ahmed Yassine Foukara, Head of the Strategy and Studies, Central Authority for Corruption Prevention (ICPC) in Morocco; and Mr. Peter Watkins, Director General, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom.

Mr. Jim Schear discussed security and summarized by saying that security is like oxygen—you tend to not notice it until you lose it. When asked by an audience member how defence institutions can gain the public's trust, he responded by saying that no one size solution fits all—building integrity is one small step in a larger problem of legitimizing our institutions to the populace. He went on to describe Defense Institution Building’s (DIB’s) core objectives in supporting partner nations in building effective, efficient, and accountable defence institutions. This requires a balance between near-term performance in supporting operational requirements, long-term capacity building, and the establishment of ministerial functions with an end goal of defence resource planning, programming, and budgeting. Mr. Schear discussed how DIB challenges are distinctive to each partner country as all have unique needs and aspirations and explained that patience and public acceptance is required for success. The biggest challenges for partners is the ability to generate the political will to support change, the ability to discuss it openly, and the ability to institutionalize it so that the changes outlive their original champions.

Mr. Foukara gave the second presentation. He first introduced the ICPC which is an independent authority that coordinates, supervises, and evaluates national policies for the prevention and fight against corruption in Morocco. It has investigative and audit powers and has been provided with sufficient resources, legal protections, and financial autonomy to be able to conduct its mandate. In the next portion of his presentation, Mr. Foukara focused on corruption in the defence industry and stated that studies have shown that corruption has had a dramatic effect on the industry. World Bank estimates have shown that the cost of corruption is 5% of world GDP, over a trillion dollars. Transparency International has found that countries with poor controls to prevent corruption in the defence sector include two-thirds of the largest arms importers and half of the biggest arms exporters in the world. Mr. Foukara discussed the notion that it is more difficult to combat corruption in the defence industry than in other sectors due to the uniqueness involved in the defence sector (such as secrecy, national security issues, and the perceived need to react quickly), and the multitude of different actors who play in defence. As a proposed way forward to combat corruption in defence, Mr. Foukara presented the ICPC approach which integrates prevention, education and training, repression, and information and awareness training. ICPC’s approach emphasizes communication; building political will and alliances in support of reform efforts; and setting reasonable goals and expectations.

The third panel presenter, Mr. Watkins, stated that the provision of security is an accepted part of the social contract, but that security institutions can exhibit predatory behaviors when they forget that they are part of a larger governmental institution; do not provide effective, efficient and well-managed services; and are not held accountable. Mr. Watkins stated that some evidence shows that certain forms of corruption can be stabilizing because individuals are tied to the system that enriches and/or empowers them. However, most types are not and can be major drivers of instability and insurgency. Additionally, the accumulated evidence shows that corruption erodes confidence in government and security institutions. Further, Mr. Watkins noted that incidents of corruption are invariably linked to the political economy in which they take place. In other words, corruption “thrives” where there are incentives to do so, and the political infrastructure is not mature enough/advanced enough to deal with it. In conclusion, Mr. Watkins urged NATO and its member states to recognize the importance, complexity, and situation-specific nature of corruption, and to plan prevention strategies using the Building Integrity Initiative that are active not only within individual governments and but also across NATO.

**Question & Answer**

An audience member pressed the panel on what can be done to combat corruption because, “We can’t afford NOT to! Due to the financial crises, countries cannot even afford the small dollar amounts that
we have now in building integrity.” Panelists responded that this was the wrong way to think about or approach the problem given the amount that corruption costs. The return on investment in building integrity efforts can be very large and seen in many areas. The panelists presented the following as specific efforts to combat corruption:

1. Strengthen human resources systems and financial systems that can detect and identify corruption through behavior.
2. Determine how the various activities to combat corruption complement each other.
3. Provide straightforward, practical guidance that our commanders can turn to in order to make these events (from point 2) a reality. This does not need to be a 50-page document, but something short and user-friendly.

Mr. Watkins mentioned that certain activities are more prone to corruption than others—he specifically mentioned Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) as a programme that was designed for quick use, to quickly help the local populace. He noted that the flip side of these programmes, by definition, is that they are more prone to corruption. This is the price we have to pay sometimes, to make things happen quickly. Another panel member also mentioned the costs of compliance in terms of combating corruption. These mitigating programmes are not free; they are, in fact, very expensive. We must take these costs into account. The view in some circles is that, after 2014, when we leave Afghanistan, we will not be involved in large operations like this, and therefore corruption might be less of an issue; however, other panel members commented that they believe this is faulty thinking.

A participant noted that in there is no uniformity in building integrity approaches or techniques—there are situations in which the British do one thing, the Americans do another thing, and the Germans do a third. The participant felt that there was a need to have a coordinated system for transparency. The panel agreed with this sentiment, but talked about the challenges in finding a system on which everyone agrees.

Finally, a participant queried, “Has corruption reached levels where a bubble might “burst” if nothing is done right now? Corruption is like a cancer—you can ignore it, but once you start seeing symptoms on your body, it is too late.” Panel members responded saying they have noticed some “hesitating in political will” in some governments, and our challenge is to convince policy makers that it is no longer an option to hesitate about corruption.

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**Building Integrity, Transparency, and Accountability in the Defence and Security Sector—The Ground Truth**

**Participants**

- **Mr. John Sopko**
  US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
- **Lieutenant General Philippe Stoltz (FRAAR)**
  Vice Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)
- **Mr. Orisi Rabukawaqa**
  Policy and Liaison Officer, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Secretariat

**Summary Reported by Samantha Schwellenbach**

This plenary session addressed the challenges of building integrity, transparency, and accountability in the defence and security sector in the reconstruction and stabilization environment. The panel was comprised of Mr. John Sopko, U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction; Lieutenant General Philippe Stoltz, Vice Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe; and Mr. Orisi Rabukawaqa, Policy and Liaison Officer, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Secretariat.

Mr. John Sopko delivered a briefing highlighting the role of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) and its efforts to ensure the unprecedented investment in Afghanistan is protected from fraud, waste, and abuse. All reports are published directly to its website at [http://www.sigar.mil/](http://www.sigar.mil/) and disseminated to media outlets. He believes that the media plays a vital role in the increased awareness of corruption. Mr. Sopko feels that media raises public awareness of the issues and often is a contributing factor in forcing future action to be taken. The SIGAR quarterly
reports are one of the largest data calls that a United States organisation prepares on Afghanistan. The most recent quarterly report, from January 2013, identifies a series of questions that decision makers should address before considering an implementation of a project or programme. These are:

1. Does the project or programme clearly contribute to U.S. national interests or strategic objectives?
2. Do the Afghans want it and need it?
3. Has the project or programme been coordinated with the Afghan government, other implementing agencies, and international donors?
4. Do security conditions permit effective implementation and oversight?
5. Does the project or programme include safeguards to detect, deter, and mitigate corruption?
6. Do the Afghans have the financial resources, technical capacity, and political will to sustain the project or programme?
7. Have implementation agencies established real metrics for determining outcomes and measuring success?

Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) Philippe Stoltz delivered a briefing describing how corruption reduces public trust, lessens operational effectiveness, wastes scarce resources, prevents companies from carrying out business, and prevents military forces from accomplishing the mission. One of the significant challenges being recognized is that corruption is often viewed as a side issue rather than crucial to mission success. He highlighted five factors that outline a framework essential to building integrity. These factors are:

1. Engage with national institutions to administer finance.
2. Provide expertise through ongoing programmes and training.
3. Provide military knowledge and advice.
4. Help civilian institutions develop oversight bodies.
5. Improve military justice systems.

Lt Gen Stoltz emphasized that strengthening of host nation institutions must be developed in cooperation with the country. As human resource management is particularly sensitive to corruption, leadership must be exemplary and provide honest objective assessment. Conduct in operations is essential, and stakeholders must be credible in theater and lead by example. Corruption, or even perceived corruption, will have a negative impact on the mission. Moving forward, anti-corruption policy needs to be developed and enforced, and increased training programmes should be implemented to raise awareness of corruption risks. Lt Gen Stoltz concluded by noting that NATO credibility is paramount in building integrity, and there needs to be a zero tolerance approach to corruption.

Mr. Orisi Rabukawaqa delivered a briefing highlighting the importance of an integrated approach to defence and security sector reform. The desire for reform needs to be identified by the nation, and there must be “buy in” from political leadership. In practice there will most likely be international stakeholders with the United Nations (UN) playing a support role. Types of potential UN support include reforms related to infrastructure, functionality, assets, legislation/policy, and combined reforms. Mr. Rabukawaqa concluded by noting that there are three essential dimensions—political, holistic, and technical—in security sector reform, and each of these must be addressed to provide an efficient, effective, accountable, and affordable solution.

**Question & Answer**

After completion of the panel discussions the Chair opened the floor for questions and comments. The first comment emphasized that building integrity efforts must be integrated into early plans rather than as an afterthought. A panelist agreed that within defence security sector reform there is additional scope for harmonization and interagency coordination.

A second participant raised the question on the effect of the drawdown on the Inspector General’s (IG) mission in Afghanistan. The panelist advised the drawdown is already having an effect on its operations. The IG operates under Chief of Mission rules. Thus security is provided by U.S. military. As the drawdown occurs a decreasing number of military personnel are available to provide these escorts. Another significant impact seen is that audit teams are unable to visit as many locations due to base closures. The Golden Hour rule means U.S. military personnel are not able to travel beyond one hour’s “reach” to a military medical facility, thus
limiting the reach of the visiting teams and their escorts. In special cases exemptions may be approved; however, after Benghazi, the number of exemptions will be greatly reduced due to the increase in perceived risk.

A third participant raised the question of the best body to coordinate security sector reform, and what might be the roles of the UN and NATO. A panelist admitted that there is often abysmal interagency coordination and advised that efficient interagency coordination would require mutually agreed upon milestones.

A fourth participant noted that in pouring capacity into a country, you may slow the growth of a government because leaders are no longer able to manage matters themselves. The question was asked: Is there a tradeoff in building capacity immediately with limiting the institutional capability? In response a panelist responded that host nation governments and allies need to learn from past experiences and improve upon them for the future.

In conclusion, the Chair noted that whilst there are many challenges of building integrity, transparency, and accountability in the defence and security sector, especially in the reconstruction and stabilization environment, the importance has never been higher. These efforts to help nations enhance integrity, reduce risks of corruption, and enable partner nations’ efforts to promote good governance. ■

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**Meeting Commitments Made at Chicago Summit and Tokyo Conference to Strengthen Transparency, Accountability, and Integrity in Afghanistan**

**Participants**

- H.E. Ambassador Homayoun Tandar  
  *Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to NATO*

- Brigadier General Flemming Agerskov (DAAR)  
  *Commander Joint Interagency Task Force Shafafiyyat, ISAF HQ*

- Mr. Joris Ghesquière  
  *Head Plans and Policy Branch, NATO Office of Resources, NATO HQ*

**Summary Reported by Jonathan Lipow, Ph.D.**

This plenary session focused on progress in the implementation of international commitments made at the Chicago Summit and Tokyo Conference to strengthen transparency, accountability, and integrity in Afghanistan. Participants included H.E. Homayoun Tandar, the ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to NATO; Brigadier General (BG) Flemming Agerskov, Commander of the Joint Interagency Task Force (CJITF) Shafafiyyat–International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) HQ; and Mr. Joris Ghesquiere, Head of Plans and Policy Branch, NATO Office of Resources, NATO HQ.

Ambassador Tandar gave a presentation that focused on progress in meeting the commitments Afghanistan and the international community made at the Chicago Summit and Tokyo Conference. First, he reviewed the nature of the commitments made by the international community and the Afghan government. He emphasized that, first and foremost, the international community had made a binding long-term commitment to be engaged in Afghanistan and support its government. In addition, he reminded the audience that the international community pledged $16 billion in financial support for Afghanistan during 2012–2015, and made it clear that while Afghanistan’s leaders recognize the difficult economic conditions facing its allies, these resources remain absolutely vital to the success of the allied effort in Afghanistan.
Turning to Afghan commitments, Ambassador Tandar recounted that his government had agreed to meet requirements laid out in the Tokyo Accountability Framework, and said that Afghanistan takes this commitment very seriously. The ambassador outlined five areas where Afghanistan was striving, in cooperation and with the assistance of the international community, to meet its Tokyo Commitments:

1. Democratic elections,
2. Rule of law,
3. Human rights,
4. Government budget execution, and
5. Inclusive, sustained economic growth and social development.

He concluded this portion of his remarks by discussing arrangements for monitoring the progress of Afghanistan and the international community in meeting commitments, and explained that progress would be reviewed next by a standing committee to be convened in 2015, to be chaired by Afghanistan and the United Kingdom.

The Ambassador next reported on the progress made in developing Afghanistan’s armed forces and internal security forces. He began by reminding the audience that there had been an argument in Chicago regarding the proper size of the Afghan military, with the international community generally supporting a reduction in size, but that the conclusion had been that the current size of the force would be retained until at least 2017. He reported that the cost of the force was in the range of $4 billion per year, with Afghanistan paying only $500 million of that, and that Afghanistan was steadily increasing its share of funding.

The Ambassador then outlined various initiatives to enhance the effectiveness of Afghanistan’s armed forces and police. The first was the decentralization of responsibility for budgeting, human rights monitoring, and manpower allocation from the national headquarters to the provincial and even divisional level. The second was to integrate “Building Integrity” topics into all courses and training conducted by the Ministries of Defence (MoD) and Interior (MoI). The third was to create “Building Integrity” working groups at MoD and MoI that work in coordination with ISAF, and to create similar working groups at the provincial level for the army and the police. Looking forward, the Ambassador recounted that all contracting will soon be transitioned from ISAF to the MoD, and that this is a big challenge since MoD has no procedures or standards for how to deal with contracts.

The Ambassador concluded his remarks by addressing Afghanistan’s reputation for corruption. He pointed out that recent studies had stated that Afghanistan was the most corrupt country on earth, but argued that this is not true. To illustrate this, he recounted that the United Nations (UN) Office on Crime and Drugs had estimated that the value of bribes in Afghanistan came to $3.1 billion per year. He explained that such sums do not exist in Afghanistan, that injection of such sums into the economy would fuel rampant inflation that we do not see, and that the entire Afghan banking system holds $5 billion in deposits.

Following the Ambassador, BG Agerskov reported on ISAF efforts to combat corruption on the ground. The general explained that the task force had four separate efforts. The first is Task Force 110, which focuses exclusively on contracting. The second is an effort led by the State Department that seeks to identify and cut off Taliban funding sources. The third is a joint military intelligence and Drug Enforcement Agency effort to combat heroin production and smuggling. This effort seeks to “roll up” one smuggling network each calendar quarter. Finally, the fourth is a high-level counter corruption group that worked in cooperation with the Afghan MoD and MoI to develop “Building Integrity” initiatives and strategies.

BG Agerskov began to outline these various initiatives, and prefaced his discussion by admitting that he had failed to coordinate his efforts with those of regional and local commands, both Afghan and Allied. He also said that recent progress has been made in working with the UN, and that “we would do the best as we can for the remaining 22 months.”

In terms of CJITC efforts, he explained that his unit conducts field audits in conjunction with the Inspectors General of MoD and MoI, where units have to explain what they are doing and account for the funds spent. The CJITC is also establishing working groups that combine security forces, media, civil society, religious leaders, and women’s groups.
at each level, from the local to the central level in Kabul. These groups identified complaints and forwarded hundreds of cases to prosecutors. The general also emphasized that his team was making an aggressive effort to promote media coverage and suggested that a free media was an important means of enhancing accountability and transparency.

Turning to budgeting, BG Agerskov explained that he is working to develop budget arrangements that will work long after ISAF departs, something he characterized as the “Afghan Solution.” To illustrate the great progress being made, he recounted that under the Taliban, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) consisted of tin cans of cash under Mullah Omar’s bed, and that the MoF now had reached the same level of accountability and transparency as Poland.

That said, the general emphasized that there was still a lot of corruption and that more funds were flowing into Afghanistan than could be effectively managed and monitored. He specifically mentioned the scandals at Kabul Bank and the National Military Hospital, and concluded his remarks by stating that it was still hard to convict high-level criminals, of which he felt the most notorious was President Karzai’s brother.

Mr. Joris Ghesquiere, Head of Plans and Policy Branch at the NATO Office of Resources, then delivered remarks focused on international sustainability efforts for Afghan forces. He began by explaining that, at this time, NATO uses trust funds as the main conduit for resources being channeled to Afghan forces.

Addressing the main topic, Mr. Ghesquiere reminded the audience that the Chicago Summit had indeed resulted in a long-term international commitment to support Afghanistan, and that it also had resulted in a commitment by Afghanistan to create accountable defence forces that the Afghan government would fund through its own financial resources. He emphasized that NATO was not directly involved in those commitments, but only worked as a facilitator to help donors identify what was being done with their money and why, while Afghanistan built up its capacity for accountability and transparency.

He then argued that progress in the field had been grossly inadequate relative to international goals. There were multiple funding streams that were not coordinated. Afghans were, in practice, excluded from efforts to develop institutions for planning, budgeting, and accountability. Foreign funds were kept “off budget” and handled by individual donors from the international community. Human resources management was not connected in any way to payroll management. In short, he argued that there had been no long-term vision guiding accountability efforts, and that short-term thinking had prevailed.

He concluded that Afghans must lead their own institution building process. For example, Task Force Alpha handles all budget planning for the MoD and will continue to do so until 2014, at which point there is no clarity regarding what will happen. He also pointed out that the MoF is far ahead of MoD and MoI in developing structures for planning, budgeting, and management, and that its success had to be replicated.

Mr. Ghesquiere concluded his remarks with three conclusions. The first was that there was widespread awareness in Afghanistan that accountability is a problem, and that this was an important success. The second was that training and education in Building Integrity were key to future progress, but that no progress could be made without encouragement from senior Afghan leaders. Finally, he argued that decentralization was important, and that too much work was done in Kabul. Decentralization of decision-making would lower the headquarters workload, and more closely align incentives between those who make decisions and those who have to live with the consequences.

Question & Answer
At this point, the Chair opened up the floor for questions and comments. One speaker asked how corruption cases would be dealt with following 2014. A second argued that the dual roles of ISAF in war fighting and nation building led to challenges in prioritization, and asked how these could be handled. A third questioned whether decentralization would really reduce corruption.

BG Agerskov and Mr. Ghesquiere responded by saying that, first and foremost, every effort needed to be made in the time that remains to build the competence of MoF, MoD, and MoI. They also explained that human
resources decisions needed to be decentralized because positions were being sold at the central level, and that the belief was that the consequences at the local level of using the wrong people would result in greater accountability.

Addressing ISAF’s dual role, Mr. Ghesquiere agreed that there was often a tradeoff between good nation building practices and essential war fighting decisions, and he pointed out that often contracts are made without any information regarding what reasonable cost constitutes in Afghanistan. However, he emphasized that in any conflict among priorities, war fighting came first.

Finally, addressing corruption, BG Agerskov recounted that opium generated $2 billion in revenue in Afghanistan per year, but that there was $4 billion in annual corruption, and $8 billion of capital is leaving Afghanistan every year. He emphasized that corruption CAUSED smuggling and aided the Taliban, not vice versa. As an example, he explained that only 1% of trucks are checked at the Afghan border with Pakistan. That 1% refused to pay to avoid inspection. Looking at this a few months previously, he had found that five different agencies handled border security, and that proper toll collection would generate $2–$3 billion in revenue. He then concluded his remarks by arguing that much of the corruption in Afghanistan emanated from the Attorney General’s Office, which was refusing to prosecute high-level offenders.

Managing Finances in the Defence Sector

Participants

Vice Admiral (VADM) Bill Landay of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and Brigadier General (BG) Adnan Al-Shoumali, head of the international cooperation department at the Directorate of Strategic Planning of the Royal Jordanian Armed Forces.

VADM Landay began his presentation by asking what government processes actually build integrity, and what arrangements are exploited by the U.S. military to do so. He identified a number of key aspects of the U.S. approach. The first was an emphasis on training and acculturation of military personnel to develop their personal sense of integrity and their moral judgment. The second was the development of processes and mechanisms that would naturally align incentives. The third was the development of a robust legal infrastructure that could independently identify and prosecute instances of wrongdoing. Finally, the fourth —and most important—was the integration of external entities into security sector processes.

As an example, VADM Landay described the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS). The group conducting FMS is an entity responsible to OSD-Policy, and as such, it is tasked with the advancement of U.S. strategic goals. It is not tasked with drumming up arms sales at all costs. One of the central objectives of the FMS mission is the development of transparent and accountable institutions in allied countries. All FMS sales have to be done to U.S. standards of conduct, something that introduces and promotes higher standards of integrity. Furthermore, he emphasized that given the large size of the defence sectors, that development of greater integrity in the security sector would spill over and enhance anti-corruption efforts throughout the society.

In describing FMS’s standards and strategies for building integrity, VADM Landay emphasized:

1. The role of civilian control and oversight,
2. Anti-corruption and human rights standards,
3. Open competition and transparency in contracting and purchasing,
4. The use of internal and external audits, and
5. The requirement that only trained and certified personnel be involved in FMS.

Summary Reported by Jonathan Lipow, Ph.D.

This plenary session focused on international practices for the building of integrity in the defence sector. Panel members included
He also cited legislative oversight and media coverage as external factors that contributed greatly to the process of building integrity.

VADM Landay concluded his remarks by pointing out that there are 13,000 FMS cases each year, and that each and every case is regarded as an opportunity to reinforce concepts of integrity.

BG Al-Shoumali began his talk by arguing that as transactions had become more complicated and technologically intensive, the importance of integrity in their execution had only increased. This trend could be expected to continue indefinitely into the future.

BG Al-Shoumali pointed out that forces were not immune to corrupt practices and then described Jordan’s efforts to combat corruption in its defence and security institutions. First, he explained that education and training in ethics had been integrated into all courses in the Jordanian armed forces, and that exposure to the concept of ethics was introduced as early as basic training. Second, he mentioned the creation of an anti-corruption committee that investigated and prosecuted corruption cases. Third, he explained that each branch of the Royal Jordanian Armed Forces had a completely separate budget as a means of increasing transparency and accountability. Fourth, he explained that the Ministry of Finance regularly monitored expenditures to make sure that funds were being spent on the purposes for which they had been allocated.

Question & Answer
At this point, the floor was opened for questions. One participant asked whether a “total package approach” (effectively, an analysis that took into account life cycle costs) was being used for institutional arrangements. In response, VADM Landay explained that it was used, and it was necessary to use the total package approach since one of the objectives of U.S. FMS was to build long-term relationships.

Another participant asked whether, given that human resources accounts for a far greater portion of defence budgets than procurement, insufficient resources had been allocated to dealing with corruption in that sector. Addressing this question, BG Al-

Shoumali explained that Jordan had a five-year plan for its human resources and was using this plan to help combat corruption.

Managing People in the Defence and Security Sector

Participants
Ms. Tamar Karosanidze
Deputy Minister of Defence of the Republic of Georgia

Mr. Miroslav Jovanovic
Assistant Minister for Defence Policy, Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia

Mr. Svein Eriksen
Senior Advisor, Agency for Public Management and eGovernment, Norway

Summary Reported by Cameron MacKenzie, Ph.D.
This plenary session addressed the relationship between human resources and building integrity in the defence and security sectors. Three individuals presented talks: Ms. Tamar Karosanidze, Deputy Minister of Defence of the Republic of Georgia; Mr. Miroslav Jovanovic, Assistant Minister for Defence Policy, Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia; and Mr. Svein Eriksen, Senior Advisor, Agency for Public Management and Government, Norway.
Ms. Karosanidze argued that corruption is not an integral part of a people's culture. The sentiment that corruption was a part of the culture used to be used as an excuse in Georgia since corrupt practices were so common. However, the new government that came into power in 2002 tackled corruption in patrol police and university admission, and these two sectors were fixed. Recent surveys reveal that 90% of the Georgian populace feels that those two sectors are now clean.

Ms. Karosanidze believes that there is a need to show to your people that you can achieve results and tackle difficult problems. The Georgian defence sector was not very transparent, but human resources are now one of the top priorities of the Georgian Ministry of Defence (MoD). The MoD is trying to design rules about how manpower (both civilian and military) should be developed within the MoD. The MoD is engaging employees in the process while developing these rules, and the next step is to apply these rules consistently.

For recruitment, the Georgian MoD is beginning to publicize vacancy announcements. It is also coordinating with education ministry on necessary skills from bachelors and masters candidates. For evaluation and training, the MoD is using evaluations to determine the types of training people need. As people come back from training courses or exercises, they will conduct mini-trainings of their colleagues. For promotion, salaries of officials are increasing, and working conditions are improving. Money is not always the best incentive, but people need to understand that they are being fairly evaluated. For release, the budget does not have enough money to provide pensions for the Georgian military. The MoD is still working on how to develop policies for retirees.

The Georgian MoD is working hard on making the ministry transparent, and civil society organisations are helping asserted Ms. Karosanidze. Media and international attention on the MoD is making them work harder. Georgia has decided to join the Building Integrity (BI) Initiative and will take part in the BI Self Assessment and Peer Review Process.

Mr. Jovanovic described the two entities responsible for human resources in the defence sector in Serbia: one resides within the MoD, and one resides within the General Staff. The legal basis for managing human resources in the Serbian MoD derives from laws for defence and the Serbian Armed Forces. The process for human resource management in the Serbian MoD includes:

1. Forming a list of candidates,
2. Selecting of candidates for education and training, and
3. Promoting to higher rank.

Mr. Jovanovic explained that the MoD is also introducing codes of conduct. The rules and regulations against corruption are being implemented; eight people from the Serbian MoD were recently arrested for corruption.

The Serbian MoD joined the NATO BI Initiative in December 2011. It performed a Self Assessment in 2012 with help from NATO and Transparency International. The report is posted on the MoD website.

Concluding his presentation, Mr. Jovanovic stated that the Serbian MoD is working at different levels to build integrity. At the national level, it is continuing activities in building integrity and fighting corruption. It is continuing to work on the BI Initiative with NATO. The MoD is establishing connections with international organisations. At a bilateral level, the MoD would like to work with neighbors in sharing experience and knowledge.

Mr. Eriksen focused his presentation on the interconnectedness of different organisations in building integrity. As a general principle for building integrity, Ministries of Defence should be seen as an integral part of the general public administration and not as a separate entity that can be carved out from the rest of government. Focusing exclusively on the MoD is not sufficient, and it is necessary to consider administrative arrangements that cut across the MoD and other ministries. Within a NATO context (especially when considering NATO enlargement), the challenges facing a MoD are often located outside of the MoD itself. Arrangements and rules for budgeting, human resources, and financial management apply across the entire government, not just within the MoD. Creating islands of excellence (like a transparent MoD) is not sustainable if the rest of the government does not follow the same principles.
NATO is not just a defence organisation but also a community of universally applicable values, and these values have to guide all civil service reform. Mr. Eriksen believes that NATO tasks and challenges are complex and cannot just be addressed by one ministry alone. MoDs may be catalysts for wider civil service and public administration reform. However, they are currently underutilized in providing incentive for greater reform for the whole of government.

**Question & Answer**

At this point, the floor was opened for questions. During this time, it was clarified that the Serbian MoD is working on promoting its code of conduct so that it becomes part of the personal values of the military.

The Georgian MoD is also intending to introduce a code of conduct for both military and civilian personnel. The Georgian MoD is still working on how to understand what people have learned with their training outside Georgia, but no system is in place yet.

There was also a discussion that there are certain cases where there may be some benefit for maintaining centers of excellence, for example separate units for training humanitarian crises. However, there is a body of evidence in public administrative reform that it is impossible to improve one ministry without tackling the crosscutting issues within a government.

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**What Can We Learn from Others?**

**Participants**

- **Mr. Andrew Karlyn**
  Senior Advisor and Lead Mobile Money, USAID

- **Mr. Charles Chadwick**
  Chairman of the International Forum on Business Ethical Conduct for the Aerospace and Defence Industry

- **Ms. Renée Acosta**
  President, Global Impact

**Summary Reported by Walter Christman, Ph.D.**

The speakers in this panel presented practical examples of how to promote good practice—making better use of knowledge, smarter use of technology, and empowering good people to make good decisions. The three panelists were: Mr. Andrew Karlyn, Senior Advisor and Lead for Mobile Money at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); Mr. Charles Chadwick, Chairman of the International Forum on Business Ethical Conduct (IFBEC) for the aerospace and defence industry; and Ms. Renée Acosta, President of Global Impact. They presented diverse points of view representing the responses of government, industry, and civil society, respectively.

Mr. Karlyn from USAID started off the session with a discussion of how mobile technology is being used to increase transparency and fight corruption in Afghanistan. Technology is not a magic bullet, but a tool. His presentation covered what corruption means to the average citizen, how to address corruption at the policy and implementation level, how technology might help in this process, and how NATO and partners may use technology to improve transparency and reduce corruption.

According to the 2012 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Report, half of Afghan adults paid bribes while requesting public services. Cumulatively those Afghans handed over a total of $3.9 billion. That figure is twice as large as Afghanistan's domestic revenue. Total corruption cost has increased by some 40 percent over the last three years to reach $3.9 billion. According to Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction smuggling bulk...
cash is one of the principal forms of laundering money. In 2011 alone, an estimated $4.5 billion was spirited out of Afghanistan to places like Dubai.

Mr. Karlyn noted that there is a market for corruption in terms of “a bribe price,” in which the bribe price is function of the supply of services. One fundamental question is how to move the price of a bribe downward. He cited that the key success factor to address corruption is the coupling of monitoring and incentives; in other words, the results of the monitoring had to translate into punishment, whether of a monetary nature such as a reduction in wages, or non-monetary forms such as publication of the corruption charges, termination of employment, or reduction of allocated funds.

The best research, Mr. Karlyn explained, indicates that publishing information about corrupt officials served as a deterrent to corrupt behavior leaving the punishment to the community, either through the ballot box or through other types of pressure. Some studies have focused on assessing results of interventions that sought to change the rules of the system, such as procurement auctions and decentralization approaches. Findings suggest that infrastructure and capacity building at the local level and the degree of community engagement and participation in the decentralization process are likely to be important factors in the success of decentralization measures.

Mr. Karlyn then addressed the question: what role does technology play? He gave a series of examples of mobile solutions on how mobile money accelerates financial inclusion, roots out corruption, and unlocks the private sector. Mobile data empowers citizens and improves decision making, while mobile access and mobile payments probably have the most transformative impact.

Mr. Charles Chadwick, Chairman of the IFBEC, explained in his presentation the role of IFBEC as an international organisation focused on the promotion of ethical business conduct worldwide in its industry. IFBEC members have developed and published a set of “Global Principles of Business,” and IFBEC membership provides an opportunity to exchange information on best practices. The global principles focus on zero tolerance of corruption.

The IFBEC is an attempt at self-governance within the industry. Mr. Chadwick cited General Electric CEO Jack Welch, who said, “If we don’t regulate, someone will.” There is a general belief that industry needs to be involved in the sharing of best practices to combat corruption, because governments cannot stop corrupt practices solely by themselves. By imposing regulations in the industry, it may be possible to catch corrupt behaviors closer to the source, before it spreads. Industry self-governance is about prevention. Further, all firms compete against each other, and the competition should be on a level playing field. Corruption tilts the field and allows for unfair competition. Finally, Mr. Chadwick argued that the IFBEC was also a moral obligation, citing the figure of one trillion dollars in bribes worldwide, or five percent of gross domestic production, all of which deprives citizens.

Big companies joined the IFBEC first and realized the need to help small companies. In 2009, IFBEC promulgated the global principles, leading to sharing of best practices, a gathering of multi-stakeholders, and pushing for a pilot programme that would lead to public accountability reports. Within the industry, there is now an established a working group to develop a tool for risk mitigation that smaller companies and suppliers can use. Mr. Chadwick emphasized the need for outreach, stating that if only the U.S. and Europe do well, it is not enough. The task of fighting corruption needs to expand; global islands of excellence are not an alternative. Corruption can't be fought in isolation, because there is a demand side and a supply side.

Rene Acosta of Global Impact followed and represented the point of view of civil society and philanthropy. She noted that government, industry, and civil society must come together in a multi-stakeholder partnership, as the effective roles between them have become very blurred. She asked: what can each learn from the other if stovepipes prevail? The role of government is to provide safety and security, as well as infrastructure. The role of NGOs, IOs, and nonprofits is to provide humanitarian assistance and developmental technical assistance. The role of the private sector is to focus on economic growth. She provided data showing that in 2010 U.S. private philanthropy investment surpassed assistance from the U.S. government ($39 billion vs. $30.4 billion), and that public-private partnerships are on the rise. Government, plus business, plus NGOs is the new model of Public Private Partnerships.

Ms. Acosta believes that universities have a role as well because academia is a place of innovation. She noted that university campuses are increasingly
involved in aid and development. Global Impact assists them in terms of programme outcomes and financial outcomes. Companies are seeking partners and looking for innovative projects and partnerships in the developing world because they are looking for a competitive advantage, and most economic growth happens outside of mature markets. Companies have found that social well-being affects the bottom line. For example, Coca Cola has a corporate social responsibility project focused on clean water. This is because safe water for bottling Coke is key. Essentially, they are in the water business, and if public infrastructure isn’t up to standard, they have to step in.

This raises the question: “What does it take to build multi-stakeholder partnership?” According to Ms. Acosta, partnerships between governments, NGOs, and corporations are complex and require:

1. Strategies with realistic and attainable goals,
2. Adequate resources,
3. Trust between partners,
4. Parties to be explicit about goals and results,
5. Accountability systems in place for measuring the performance and progress,
6. Decision-making to be effective and to good effect,
7. Roles and responsibilities are clear and understood, and
8. To be purposeful and predicated on mutual accountabilities.

Ms. Acosta outlined the guiding principles for partnership. She noted that determining the goal and scope of humanitarian assistance was essential. Parties needed to define and agree on clear expectations, outlining roles and responsibilities, and agreeing to financial practices. They would need to determine who the lead partner is, and assess the relationship and reputation capital of each partner. They would need to establish a system for frequent, open, and meaningful communications and agreeing on how credit and acknowledgement will be given publicly. Finally, they need to establish an exit strategy for all partners, including the final evaluation of the project, reporting results, and recommending improvements.

Examining lessons learned in projects carried out in developing nations, Ms. Acosta noted that it is imperative to develop the capacity of the host country to coordinate and implement aid. NGOs must also consult with donor governments on aid priorities, and to the extent feasible, locals should lead implementation. Aid projects should fit into a broader long-term strategy and be constantly monitored and evaluated for effectiveness. Aid projects need to understand and address the needs of the host country as well as work within the given political context of the country in which they are carried out. Beware hastily planned aid projects, Ms. Acosta advised.

Thursday 28 February

Impact of Corruption—Recommendations

Participants

Air Commodore (Ret.) Alan Waldron
Transparency International, UK Defence Team

Mr. Bard B. Knudsen
Director, Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector, Norway

Nr. Nigel Branston
Senior Analyst, NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre

Summary Reported by Jonathan Lipow, Ph.D.

This plenary session focused on the progress in combating corruption in the security sector. Panel members included Air Commodore Alan Waldron (Ret.) of Transparency International; Mr. Bard Knudsen, Director of Norway’s Centre for Integrity in the Defence sector; and Nr. Nigel Branston, Senior Analyst at NATO’s Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre.

Air Commodore Waldron began his remarks by recounting that when he first met Susan Pond in 2006, she had been noticeably unenthusiastic about meeting him, but that she had hugged him when they met at this meeting. He took this as evidence of the progress made in combating corruption in Afghanistan in the intervening seven years, and argued that Susan Pond was responsible for making NATO’s Building Integrity effort what it is today.

He went on to explain Transparency International’s (TI) role in combating corruption, and its emphasis on advocacy and the building of practical tools.
In particular, he emphasized the value of TI’s index of corruption in the defence sector. The index has a 29-point typology, allowing policy makers to see where their countries stood in terms of different aspects of the problem and where the best practices were being followed. The index also makes it possible to track a country’s progress. Commodore Waldron pointed out that while Germany and the U.S. were highly ranked on the index, Georgia and Bulgaria had made the most improvement over recent years. He also stated that Afghanistan—widely perceived to be the most corrupt country in TI’s sample—had also made rapid progress as measured by the index.

Commodore Waldron went on to discuss an anti-corruption index of defence firms that TI had developed. He mentioned that only 10 firms in the sample had good levels of protection against corrupt practices, and two-thirds of defence firms do not themselves offer adequate levels of transparency. Furthermore, firms that exported their products heavily were those with the lowest scores for transparency and accountability.

Addressing a new topic, Commodore Waldron touched on TI activities around the world, highlighting its efforts in Ukraine, Saudi Arabia, South East Europe, and east Africa. He particularly emphasized TI’s effort in Afghanistan, which began in 2009. Commodore Waldron recounted that at the time, the Afghan military was very enthusiastic, but that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and other international actors had been uninterested in TI’s effort. This had recently changed, and TI visited the Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force—Shafafiyat in February 2013. Summarizing TI’s view of Afghanistan, the Commodore stated that bribe rates had gone down, and public confidence in the government had risen, but that—overall—there was still no focus, no interest in doctrine, and too much emphasis on kinetic operations.

Mr. Knudsen began his remarks by stating that corruption is fraud, and fraud is—plain and simple—a crime. He also pointed out that once you commit a crime like fraud, you will commit even more crimes of fraud, and he described what he called the “Fraud Triangle”—motivation, opportunity, and rationalization. In combating fraud, Mr. Knudsen argued that you have to attack all three sides of the fraud triangle at the same time, and that required understanding what they were. He described various sources of motivation for fraud, including personal gain, a need to meet short-term goals, and a desire to hide bad news. Opportunity was dictated by lax controls and physical realities. As for rationalization, this was a function of personal integrity.

Mr. Knudsen went on to describe Norway’s effort to combat fraud in the defence sector. He explained that Norway’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) focused on combating opportunity and rationalization. Much of the effort involved training. Their training employs a case study method where trainees are introduced to complicated problems with lots of grey areas, and then participate in “Dilemma Training” that prepares them to deal with the tricky problems they will actually encounter during their service.

Norway’s military had adopted the motto “for everything we have and everything we are” as a way of emphasizing the symbolic importance of integrity in defence. However, Mr. Knudsen admitted that the Norwegian defence sector is still regarded by the Norwegian public as being corrupt. As the most recent step to combat this, the Centre for Integrity in the Defence sector was established in 2012, and Mr. Knudsen had been appointed its first director.

Mr. Branston began his remarks by introducing the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center (JALLC) in NATO/Allied Transformation Command, whose mission is to analyze NATO operations, training, and exercises to look for improvements. ISAF requested that the JALLC conduct an analysis of best practices, lessons, and challenges for combating corruption in Afghanistan and other post-conflict States in order to support decision-making / policy development for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and future NATO-led operations.

Mr. Branston reported the initial findings of the analysis, but cautioned that all of the findings were preliminary. The first finding is that corruption handicaps operations and operations cause corruption. There is a tradeoff between security and integrity, and while it is attractive to choose security in the short run, the long run costs of this were extremely high. Second, the JALLC had found that there were
too many actors involved in efforts to establish security and good governance in Afghanistan, and that this complicated all efforts.

Mr. Branston went on to touch on other issues, such as:

1. The importance that ISAF itself avoids becoming corrupt,
2. The need to focus on Afghan MoD capacity building, and
3. The value of media as a watchdog.

He also stated that NATO needed to improve pre-deployment training in how to deal with integrity issues and that intelligence resources needed to be brought to bear on the problem as well.

**Question & Answer**

The floor was then opened for questions. The audience asked no questions, but the panelists discussed and debated each other’s presentations. Commodore Waldron emphasized that the idea that the military shouldn’t take the lead in combating corruption was wrong. He stated bluntly that the United Nations would not produce good results, and that TI had found in Africa that militaries were the best equipped to deal with corruption problems. Mr. Knudsen added that legal participation was also important, and that public service laws and regulations were often ambiguous—something that greatly contributed to the problem. Mr. Branston closed out the session by agreeing that the military should be involved in combating corruption, but that it might be a mistake for the military to always take the lead on these issues.

**Are We Doing the Right Things, and Are We Doing Them Right?**

**Participants**

- Air Marshal Graham Stacey (UKAF)
  
  *Deputy Commander, Allied Joint Forces Command Brunssum, Netherlands*

- Mr. Wim Peeters
  
  *Counsellor on NATO Operations, Belgian Delegation to NATO*

- Mr. Kristo Perovic
  
  *Head of Defence Section, Mission of Montenegro to NATO*

- Ms. Susan Pond (NATO-IS)
  
  *Head of the NATO Building Integrity (BI) Programme*

**Summary Reported by Anna Miro**

At the final session of the conference, panelists were asked to address the challenge of developing an implementation strategy that embeds integrity, transparency, and accountability in the defence and security sectors. The panel was comprised of: Air Marshall Graham Stacey (UKAF), Deputy Commander, Allied Joint Forces Command Brunssum; Mr. Wim Peeters, Counsellor on NATO Operations, Belgian Delegation to NATO; Mr. Kristo Perovic, Head of the Defence Section, Mission of Montenegro to NATO; and Ms. Susan Pond, Head of the NATO Building Integrity (BI) Programme.

Air Marshall Stacey gave a presentation focusing on current and future deployed operations. He affirmed it would be naive to think that Building Integrity (BI) is not at the core of what NATO does. Further, in not addressing BI, the international community invites a host of problems such as permitting resources to be wasted and permitting resources to be diverted to enemy forces. In turn, this allows for the loss of public trust, the loss of political and media support, and, as a result, the loss of the moral basis the intervention was based on.

Having been in both Kosovo and Baghdad in the early days of the interventions therein, Air Marshall Stacey is acutely aware of the challenges faced during that period. He believes that a doctrine or tool kit is essential for future commanders, noting the importance of building upon and learning
from past experiences. Given the assumption that a tool kit is needed, the Air Marshall reviewed what he envisioned such a tool kit would consist of. He believes it must be pithy, pragmatic, and progressive. It must offer options and solutions, not just a list of what not to do. The tool kit should be useful during all phases of an intervention, from planning to post–conflict reconstruction and stability operations. It needs to be supported and facilitated by resources from the international community and sustained through training, education, and exercises. Finally, Air Marshall Stacey noted a need for higher-level NATO policy as well as clarification of NATO's ambitions. However, due to the imminent need for a tool kit, the international community cannot wait for NATO clarification.

Regarding the role of the military in building integrity, Air Marshall Stacey does believe there is a role for the military to play, especially during the early days of an intervention. He argued that the military is one of the only institutions capable of providing the necessary infrastructure within the initial days of an intervention. However, to be successful, the integration with non-military actors is vital. He underscored the necessity for trust between actors, and that actors must clearly communicate their strengths and weaknesses. He concluded by reiterating the need to learn from previous interventions and to not lose the momentum built towards the BI initiative.

Mr. Peeters presented on lessons learned in previous interventions and how they can be applied to future operations. He began by affirming the necessity of Building Integrity in future operations, specifically the critical nature of embedding BI in all phases of an operation. He cited the case of Kosovo and the corrosive legacy left behind by NATO, which remains an institutional memory of the local population.

Mr. Peeters main point was the necessity of awareness of corruption at all levels, from a platoon commander to high command. One problem the international community faces is that almost by definition, the arrival of an international presence is poor and disorganized. He cited specific examples of unintended corruption created by NATO operations such as: the wage difference between international soldiers and local soldiers; the inflated prices paid by international soldiers to local suppliers; and inadvertently creating local power brokers. He noted the need for cultural awareness to counter these unintended consequences. Mr. Peeters explained that NATO unknowingly gives a seal of approval to corrupt practices by allowing them to arise and not combatting them, creating a corrosive cycle of corruption among the local population. He believes that NATO must become aware that the situation exists and that they are inadvertently the source.

Mr. Peeters argued that there are three specific moments during an operation that are more permissive to corruption than others. The first is the entrance into an operation, where the international community has to move very quickly. A second is when the operation moves from war fighting to the stabilization and reconstruction phase. In this second moment there are all of the challenges faced when setting up contracts, determining the process of contracts and wages, and deciding whom to work with. The third susceptible moment is the drawdown, wherein others take up the operation. Often there is a lack of regulation and transparency in this transition process, and the availability of resources is suddenly greatly diminished. He concluded by stating that BI can only function if the entire international community applies the same standards and employs a comprehensive approach.

Mr. Perovic discussed the changing role of NATO in the post–Cold War era, and its move towards fostering good governance, building integrity, and building institutions. He stated that Montenegro is very proud to have completed the BI Self Assessment, and plans to continue working with NATO experts. He noted that completing the assessment led to improvements in interagency cooperation. While corruption is very sensitive issue in many countries, Mr. Perovic advocated that Allied countries serve as a good example to Partner Nations by completing the Self Assessment, demonstrating their commitment to addressing corruption.

Mr. Perovic suggested that a comprehensive approach to building integrity courses should include a wider scope of people invited from all aspects of society, including the media. He addressed the notion of a regional approach to corruption, citing the South East Europe (SEE) Initiative as a good example. Additionally, he believes that the international community should not limit themselves to the SEE and Afghanistan approaches, but consider opportunities for engagement in places such as Mali, where NATO troops are not on the ground. Mr. Perovic concluded by stating it would be
useful to have the Building Integrity Compendium into various languages, and expressed his hope to organize a BI conference in Montenegro.

Ms. Pond presented an evaluation of the BI Initiative, focusing on what has been done well and what could be done better. In designing the BI Initiative, the biggest questions that needed to be answered were:

1. How to build trusted institutions,
2. How to make the security sector an engine for good governance, and
3. How to pay it forward to the region.

Ms. Pond gave an overview of the things the international community did right. She highlighted the focus on prevention and raising awareness to reduce the risk of corruption. She noted that participation in BI is completely voluntary, and yet NATO has eight countries lined up to take the Self Assessment this year. Additionally, almost all materials are unclassified, which makes it highly accessible and transparent. Organizers understood at the outset that training and education is the way to sustain change. Finally, the international community recognized that there is no one size fits all approach to BI, emphasizing the tailored approaches taken in South East Europe and Afghanistan.

Ms. Pond continued by giving her recommendations of what could be done better in the future. She believes that the Self Assessment tool should be revisited and adjustments made to the questions. The tool should expand to incorporate measures of performance. She recommended linking BI to NATO operations, noting the need for better understanding of the strategic impact of corruption on operations and corruption as an obstacle to peace. Since the introduction of large-scale operations (humanitarian and military) contributes to corruption, NATO needs to apply good practices so they can better cooperate with partners on the ground. Ms. Pond recommended ensuring lessons learned are reflected in all phases of planning. Finally, she underscored the need for the creation of a central document capturing the most important aspects of BI. This document would provide basic principles that every nation could work towards, and everyone could use as a basis.

Question & Answer
The Chairman then opened up the floor for comments and questions. The first participant expressed his support for the suggestion made by Mr. Perovic that Allies also conduct BI Self Assessments. The Allies should lead by example, and doing so would improve NATO's image. A second participant echoed the point made by the first. He stated he holds courses on leadership and building integrity, and few "old" members of NATO (Allies) participate; his courses are mostly attended by Partner Nations. He reiterated that it is just as important for large states to participate in BI exercises as it is for Partner Nations.

A third participant noted the line between crime, corruption, and the State must be broken. A fourth participant commented on integrity and ethics, suggesting that while NATO focuses at the institutional level, they may be missing the boat by not focusing on the people in those institutions. Further, the participant added that while most young cadets receive some form of integrity training, there is little continued education as officers move up throughout their professional career. The participant suggested that Allied Command Transformation could look at best practices for reinforcing ethics training throughout officers' careers.
Syndicate 1

Reducing Corruption Risks in Capability/Programme Development and Budgeting through Investments in Integrity, Transparency and Accountability

Led by

Ms. Susan Pond (NATO-IS)
Head of NATO Building Integrity (BI) Program

Dr. Francois Melese
Executive Director, DRMI

Summary Reported by Samantha Schwellenbach

I. Introduction

Syndicate 1 explored good practices in financial control and accountability. The following questions were distributed ahead of time as “food for thought” for the discussions:

1. What are the core capabilities required in the defence and security sector?
2. Can these be measured or benchmarked to promote good practice and help nations map the development of capabilities/performance?

To frame the discussions, Syndicate 1 broke the topic into two primary areas, the first to identify risks in building the defence budget and the second to ascertain cost effective mitigation techniques to combat these risks. A total of approximately thirty (30) persons participated in Syndicate 1.

II. Key Elements of Discussion

1) The first step to increasing transparency and reducing corruption in the budget process is to have a coherent interagency approach to developing clear national security and defence strategies. If the strategies are unclear, it becomes difficult to link the budget/resources to the mission

...
and thus “the budget is built on sand.” Conflicting objectives amongst key stakeholders increases the risk of corruption as interested parties compete for larger portions of the budget. With both internal influence by elected or appointed officials and the armed services, and external influence by profit (or not for profit) companies and other private contractors, lobbying occurs. The quality (and accuracy) of information and personnel utilized to build the budget plays a role in the integrity of the budget. Many revenue streams such as donor aid and military revenues are opaque. For example, in Chile a percentage of copper mining revenues goes directly to fund a portion of the military. Often there are off budget expenditures, such as black programmes, that should be included in the budget. Additionally, there are often on budget expenditures that maybe should not be included in the budget. These are frequently a reflection of special interests.

2) Increased transparency in which senior civilian and military leadership clearly articulate and regularly update national security direction would better help to guide planning. Linking capability-based requirements to the security strategy would assist in the implementation of such strategy. Frequent training and enforcement of codes of ethics/conduct would increase the integrity and reduce corruption of personnel involved in the budget process. Creation of a semi-autonomous oversight committee and costing office to ensure accurate estimates would assist in the integrity of the budget.

III. Final Distillation of Key Elements

One of the common themes in the syndicate discussion was affirmation that there must be clear national security and defence strategies to allow for linkage of capabilities based requirements to the aforementioned plans. Internal lobbying seemed to be of particular concern, especially the possibility that armed forces may choose to implement their own agendas rather than to follow the strategy of the elected government. There is often a lack of transparency in the military budgeting process, which limits both the legislative and public potential to act as oversight bodies.

Strategic management of personnel and ensuring that the right personnel are in the right place in the budget process helps to improve integrity. Also of concern is the competence and integrity of personnel involved in developing the budget. A number of syndicate participants spoke of the idea of a “monopoly of expertise,” in which the required knowledge is shared amongst a small number of people. In this case, you must be careful to not lose the ability to have oversight.

IV. Conclusions (Syndicate out brief session)

Dr. Francois Melese, the Syndicate 1 leader, highlighted the themes addressed in the above sections and emphasized the importance of mitigating corruption risks in the budgeting process. Important concepts include: awareness that the legal use of public funds builds trust and confidence in institutions; the efficient use of funds minimizes the burden of defence on taxpayers; and the effective use of funds guarantees best possible outcomes.

V. Expected Action Items and Outcomes

Periodic strategic reviews should be required to evaluate cohesiveness between the national security and strategies. Military capabilities must be in accordance with the outlined strategies. Increased transparency of budgets would allow for scrutiny from both the press and the public. Assuring the integrity and accountability of personnel developing the budget would reduce the corruption risk.

Syndicate 2

Reducing Corruption Risks in Budget Execution, Contracting and Acquisition through Investments in Integrity, Transparency, and Accountability

Led by

Dr. Elisabeth Wright (CPCM)
International Defense Acquisition Resource Management Program

Mr. Cory Yoder
Faculty, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy, NPS
Summary Reported by Cory Yoder

I. Introduction
Syndicate 2 was chartered to explore good practices in budget execution and acquisition. Syndicate 2 embraced its charter in the context of reducing risks in budget execution and acquisition in the defence and security sectors, and specifically explored concepts for promoting good practice and enhancing the Building Integrity (BI) Tool Kit.

II. Background
An examination of the background of Syndicate 2 is important to properly understand the context of the mission, specific questions addressed, the discussion framework, and mix of participants. As with all syndicate sessions, Chatham House rules were in effect, and thus, the participants and proceedings, along with this Compendium Addendum were and are subject to the protocol stating, “When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.” (Chatham House, 2013)

Key mission elements and questions of the syndicate session:
An initial Syndicate 2 “food for thought” paper was circulated prior to and again at the 2013 BI conference and was utilized to stimulate lines of inquiry and thinking of participants. Questions were posed within the initial Syndicate 2 paper including:

1. What core capabilities are required in the defence and security sector?
2. Can these be measured or benchmarked to promote good practice and help nations map the development of capabilities/performance?

Additionally, two Syndicate 2 leaders/facilitators developed lines of questioning germane to the overarching mission of reducing risks in budget execution and acquisition in the defence and security sectors, and specifically explored concepts for promoting good practice and enhancing the BI Tool Kit. These questions included:

1. What can/should be done to strengthen enforcement of integrity-focused laws and policies?
2. Are laws and policies for enhanced transparency and oversight in place?
3. Are laws and policies enforced?
4. What mechanisms are available for transparency and oversight?

Framework for conducting and executing the syndicate session:
The Syndicate 2 working group was chartered to examine and identify ways to build integrity, increase transparency, and improve accountability—with emphasis on reducing corruption risks in Budget Execution, Contracting, and Acquisition. Syndicate 2 utilized two discussion leaders/facilitators and employed a professional rapporteur to effectively capture key discussion elements, and associated recommendations.

Mix of participants:
Syndicate 2 was co-led and facilitated by Dr. Elizabeth Wright and E. Cory Yoder, both from the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Participants came from seven countries representing Ministries of Defence, private contractors/stakeholders, NATO nations, NATO aspirant nations, and others. In total, fifteen persons participated in the Syndicate 2 proceedings.

III. Key Elements of Discussion
Initial facilitation and discussions centered around identifying areas of concern and those affecting transparency and accountability within NATO operations. Of particular note is that each participating nation, and the contracting organisations within the purview and administrative control of that nation, sets the “rules” for the conduct of business. While the participating nation control has been heralded as the way to do business, based on existing national law and regulation of those participating nations, several problems were identified with this practice. First, laws, regulations, and customs may vary widely from country to country, presenting a disarray of commonly accepted standards organic to NATO operations. While several noteworthy Private Volunteer Organisation and Non-Governmental Organisational standards have been referenced as benchmarks, there is no NATO policy or published tenets of ethical and transparent business practices in place.
Hence, various nations and participants within the same theater of operation may apply a rather ad hoc set of rules. This has created opportunities for less than transparent and often corrupt practices, including single source procurement, where adequate competition could and should have been employed, and money used as an award facilitator (bribery), and worse.

How could NATO create a more unified set of rules, principles, or tenets, and how could they be enforced? Syndicate 2 participants agreed that it is essential that NATO institute some key business tenets organically (i.e. within NATO). First, NATO needs a Building Integrity “knight” or champion. This could be an ombudsman of sorts, depending on the desired functionality of the NATO position. They would have to function as a senior integrity officer—a compliance officer, senior transparency officer, and senior accountability officer. They would require a strong charter over the areas of the ministry to allow them to develop, promulgate, implement, and monitor the BI business tenants (yet to be developed) and to enhance integrity. They must be accountable to NATO Chief of Staff as an independent reporting authority.

Additionally, Syndicate 2 examined the personnel, platforms, and protocols that are required to make universal BI business tenets effective and efficient. This framework was proffered by the Syndicate 2 leaders-facilitators as a practical way to examine the maturity of the business rules, guidance, and adherence to the same.

“Personnel” refers to having the right people, with the right credentials and authority, able to plan and execute finance and procurement at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Personnel training is essential, but without established tenets of ethical business conduct such training would be pointless. Currently, NATO lacks the personnel and resources, as developing, promulgating, and monitoring business tenets has not been a NATO priority. The Syndicate participants believe that this MUST be a NATO priority for meeting goals of integrity and transparency.

“Platforms” refers to the systems of business communications and IT systems utilized to plan and conduct business, both within finance and contracting/procurements. Since multi-national participants may bring their own systems or platforms, developing transparency and a common NATO framework may be challenging. But, having established business platforms with common business tenets at play, if adopted, this may not be too difficult.

“Protocols” in this context, refers to the laws, regulations, direction, and agreements which govern the conduct of business. This area, along with personnel, is of the utmost importance, as per Syndicate 2. Here, the protocols are viewed as a composite of sovereign nation participants laws, regulations, and guidance, and a yet to be developed set of key NATO tenets of ethical business operations for participants.

Within the aforementioned framework for analysis, the syndicate determined that NATO must come up with common standards for business ethics and tenets for sound operations.

IV. Conclusions (Syndicate out brief session)
Throughout the syndicate, participants emphasized the need for national self-determination, incentives for accepting NATO tenets (if and when they are established and promulgated), and training of national and international stakeholders. Additionally, respect for sovereignty of participants will require an integrative approach to the formulation and adoption of key BI business tenets. If nations are part of the formulation and promulgation process, they are more likely to be willing participants to the implementation. Specific concerns expressed include, but are not limited to:

1. NATO should work within the international organisations/mechanisms we have. Use the Individual Partnership Action Plan, Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process.
2. NATO needs a strategic-level adaptation of key tenets of operation within business and financial participants.
3. Sovereign legal frameworks are adequate and acceptable, although necessary commonality is lacking in the NATO specific business arena.
4. Most nations lack sufficiency in personnel, resources, and facilities to adequately perform necessary implementation of monitoring and oversight processes in remote regions of operation.
5. Culture in emergent countries may struggle to adopt more open and transparent protocols needed to safeguard public funds administration. Cultural change is needed.

Syndicate 2 was clear and unequivocal in its expressed belief that NATO common standards or tenets be adopted and put into practice. This translated into out-briefings which emphasized these principles and made further examination of the mechanisms which could be utilized to effect such adaptation and implementation. During the out-briefing, Syndicates 2 and 4 proposed utilizing NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG) as proffered as a means to determine the key tenets, have sovereign review, and ultimate adaptation at the strategic level. This was well-received by other participants at the brief, as most believed the common key tenets approach would foster “buy-in” at the strategic level and allow for a more integrated force planning and execution structure for current and future operations.

V. Expected Action Items and Outcomes

Syndicate 2 successfully addressed, in a very succinct manner, the nature of the problems faced by NATO operators in the business and financial arenas, and developed sound concepts for future NATO Building Integrity initiatives. These concepts included the following:

1. Key BI business tenets must be agreed to, published and promulgated among all NATO participants.
2. Tenets, once in place, must be monitored by participants to ensure they are achieved.
3. Common key tenets must be used to transform self-assessment, legislation (as required), and sovereign business practices.
4. Ensure that self-determination, incentives, and proper training take place for any newly adopted tenets.
5. NATO force planning and operational planning must incorporate provisions for adopting and utilizing key tenets.

While many of the presentations during the 2013 NATO BI Conference addressed/identified the “problems”, Syndicate 2 purposely charted the next step by ensuring a workable framework for the next stage of the process is recognized and publicized for NATO consideration. First, NATO should charter a STANAG working group with the mission of determining and publishing key tenets of business operating standards for transparency and accountability for NATO participants (nations and non-nationals). Second, the key BI business tenets, once approved and promulgated, should be included in force structure and operations planning design constructs at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. These elements are urgently needed. NATO should commence these efforts and functions immediately to create the desired effect for current and future operations. The next scheduled NATO BI Conference should have as part of its charter a mandate for reviewing progress in creating and promulgating the key tenets, and in incorporating them throughout the military and business personnel, platforms, and protocols essential for effective and efficient adaptation.

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Syndicate 3

What are We Doing Currently in Theater to Reduce the Corruption Risk? Do We Have the Right Procedures and Guidance to Support Effective Civil-Military Cooperation in Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Governance Efforts?

Led by

Joint Forces Command Brunssum
SHAPE, and Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre

Summary Reported by Maj Mike McPherson

I. Introduction

The 2013 BI Conference Syndicate 3 focused on the operational concerns and implications of corruption currently being observed on the ground in Afghanistan. It also considered the corruption has on ongoing military and civilian efforts. The breakout session was attended by approximately 40 individuals, and most individuals had considerable experience in Afghanistan with firsthand experience of the impacts of corrupt activities on ongoing operations. Four questions were posed to the group to
guide the discussion. As with all syndicate sessions, Chatham House rules were in effect. Thus, the participants and proceedings, along with this Compendium Addendum, were and are subject to the protocol stating, “When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.” (Chatham House, 2013)

II. Framework for Conducting and Executing the Syndicate Session

Syndicate 3 was focused on the operational impacts of corruption, and the discussion was broken down to four discussion areas. Focus questions were used to guide discussion in each area and were as follow:

1. What are we doing currently in theatre to reduce the risk of corruption?
2. Do we have the right procedures and guidance to support effective civil-military cooperation in stabilization, reconstruction and governance efforts?
3. What are the main concerns regarding the impact of corruption in Afghanistan?
4. What areas should be improved?

III. Key Elements of Discussion

Question 1: What are we doing currently in theatre to reduce the risk of corruption?

Several comments and insights were provided involving military and non-military actors; however, most of the comments were presented with caveats. For example: “Making payments through the Afghan process has its pluses and minuses. It forces Afghans to do the work, thus they learn the processes, and they can be held accountable, but it also means we have to give up control of financial resources and in some cases this leads to corruption.”

On the civilian side it was noted as a positive that international groups and Afghans alike are focusing more on legitimate agriculture development, small business growth, women run businesses, and school systems. These were all noted as positive steps towards lowering corruption; however, they have not had a significant impact yet.

Reporting of corruption is also on the upswing due to increased means of reporting offenders. Anonymous anti-corruption hotlines and cell phone applications have been established, and a limited but growing amount of Afghan media coverage has increased transparency and public scrutiny. Additionally, the Ministry of Finance publishes a “Citizens Budget” summary document every year which increases public awareness of public budgeting.

On several occasions the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework was held up as positive step forward towards reducing corruption. At the international level it effectively establishes conditions that Afghanistan must achieve in order for the country to receive continued funding from partner nations.

A U.S. military representative in the syndicate cited the U.S. Money as a Weapon System (MAAWS) operating instruction as a good tool towards safeguarding coalition funds because it standardizes processes, and it is universally accepted as the authoritative document in theater. It is also updated on annual bases to ensure processes are current and neither to loose nor too restrictive. The success of the MAAWS-Afghanistan was cited due to the fact it was generated in Afghanistan for Afghanistan, so it is tailored specifically for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. It was acknowledged that it is not a perfect document, but it does have buy in from all coalition members and reduces corruption through standardization and communication. Thus, it helps strengthens weak processes that are more susceptible to corruption and manipulation.

Recent uses of technology have also been leveraged to reduce corruption. For example, the Ministry of Finance website is used to publish the Afghan budget documents, which increases transparency and public commentary. Another example cited was forcing trucking contractors to use GPS tracking devices on trucks that are mov-
ing coalition supplies in Afghanistan. This has significantly reduced the amount of pilferages and other unexplained losses of supplies.

Finally a positive and significant anti-corruption process noted was the strong contracting and contract management procedures used by the NATO Support Agency (NSPA) Logistics organisation. The NSPA management processes were developed on the ground in Afghanistan and designed in part to prevent corruption through tight contract oversight processes, transparency, contractor screening, and good documentation. It was stated that the NSPA contracting and management processes should be benchmarked, and NSPA should be leveraged to manage coalition contracts more widely.

**Question 2:** Do we have the right procedures and guidance to support effective civil-military cooperation in stabilization, reconstruction, and governance efforts?

The overall answer to this question is no. Syndicates participant cited the disparity between the mission and cultures of the State Department and Department of Defense as an example because of the apparent dysfunctional and often counterproductive relationship. Additionally, there is often an oppositional relationship between coalition military forces and NGOs operating in theater, with each stating the others are often getting in the way of progress.

The “Golden Hour” policy also has an impact on civil-military relations. This policy essentially limits U.S. military from traveling more than one hour away from medical facilities. Thus, the military cannot provide security in remote areas where non-military government and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) operating are conducting operations. Because the military is often required to provide security for non-military organisations, they too are limited by the “Golden Hour” policy. As the coalition decreases the number of military in theater, the areas where U.S. personnel can go will be even more limited and reduces the effectiveness in remote areas.

Another problem cited as a civil-military issue was related to the common Afghan perception of U.S. military as having all the money and strength, so the Afghan officials only want to work with the military. This subverts the efforts of the civilian agencies working on the ground.

**Question 3:** What are the main concerns regarding the impact of corruption in Afghanistan?

The participants all agreed that there are two primary concerns regarding corruption in the operational environment. First, it subverts the authority of the government because the people do not trust their government officials. This lack of trust creates a lack of buy in and lack of adherence to the law of the land. This catch 22 is a vicious cycle that is extremely difficult to get out of. The second main concern is that the funding is taken directly from the people of Afghanistan and severely limits the effectiveness of donor country funding efforts. Many donor countries are now threatening to refuse continued support if corruption is not brought under check.

The growth of poppy cultivation was cited as a very concerning development as it pertains to Afghan rule of law and creates a ripe environment for corruption. It creates a source of funding for maligned actors and a black market that spreads to other areas of the economy. In recent years, increases in Afghan heroin uses have had a devastating impact on the civilian and government (military/police) population.

Another major concern voiced by the syndicate participants was that Afghan people do not feel empowered, and the people in authoritative positions in government do not feel beholden to Afghan citizens. The democratic process only works if officials fear the power of the people to vote them out of office or impact their career in some way. Without this check and balance provided by the general public, corruption appears to have flourished.

The idea that corruption is in the eye of the beholder was brought up as a concern. If corruption is accepted by senior officials in the Afghan government, it ceases to be an act of corruption and becomes a culture of corruption. It is much harder to clean up a culture of corruption because fewer people actually believe in the cause, and more people are corrupt. Some participants argued that the acceptance of corruption is cultural in and of itself. “The people may not like it but they feel power-
less to change it, and in some ways they benefit from it. At a minimum they know how the system works.” There are some benefits to the Afghan people even if they are not participating in corrupt acts themselves. For example police who take bribes or collect dues on the street would not have enough money to support their families based on their salary alone. The ability for police to extort money keeps the position desirable and ensures there are police on the street acting as a deterrent to insurgents. “Corruption may not be in the blood of the people, but it may be useful to them in some ways.”

There was a concern raised which claimed some coalition “vetting” programmes such as the Afghan Trucking Network programme or other coalition programmes are often seen as buying off local war lords in exchange for safe transport. This, some participant argue, gives war lords and powerful businessmen more power, promotes corruption, and subverts the authority of the central and local governments.

Finally, it was noted that the “Afghan way” and the “official way” as outlined in Afghan laws, decrees, and policies supported by the coalition are different. This creates an environment where no one trusts the proposed system to work. The Afghan way refers to a multitude of collateral and often creative means of getting supplies, services or event supporting one's self or family. The problem is that it often comes in the form of corruption. On top of this, “Many do not perceive that anyone is being hurt by the corruption because it is American money, not Afghan money”.

Question 4: What areas should be improved?

It was recognized in the Syndicate that in the rush to establish Afghan institutions, many processes and systems were not well thought out. In practice many of the systems and processes stood up by the coalition are not functional or even necessary. For example, in some cases schools and hospitals were built when there was no population to support. Another example cited was the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) logistics system. The logistics doctrine was designed at time when the country had zero infrastructures and was designed to appease certain Afghan individu-
corruption or incompetence. This must change. If there is no fear of penalty for inappropriate behavior, it soon becomes normal and accepted behavior.

Continuity of effort must be improved. "Lessons learned are not well distributed, recorded, or taught to incoming personnel". Leadership in all civil military organisation must make continuity a high priority. Losing corporate knowledge due to rotations is a fact of life, but we must find better ways of retaining corporate knowledge and experience when people leave. It must be integrated into training and daily activities. No plan of action to address corruption will work if it does not last through the first set of action officer and leadership.

It was also agreed on by the syndicate that proper training on building institutional integrity and anti-corruption techniques should be included in the training requirements for incoming personnel. It is believed this would help create greater awareness of ongoing efforts, foster continuity, and increase communication between all players.

Finally, communication between coalition actors needs to be better. There are so many actors in theater, and few people know who other actors are or what they’re doing. In some cases combat operations are taking place in the same locations that NGOs are operating. While this is bound to happen in a war zone, it should be a constant focus of everyone involved to know who is operating around them and what other coalition efforts are being conducted. Corruption thrives when coalition partners do not know who is responsible for what action, and when a fabricated need is confused with a bonafide need. Better communication will help to establish actual resource requirements, fair pricing, and safer relationships.

**IV. Conclusions (Syndicate out brief session)**

The Syndicate 3 out brief session detailed the corruption risks currently facing the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. The Syndicate believes that corruption is the number one risk to the ISAF mission. Efforts to counter corruption are being hampered by the lack of a “Safe and Secure Environment” (SASE), a lack of “Freedom of Movement” (FOM), and the fact that military planning is short term while counter-corruption is long term. Shortfalls in the military power of NATO forces and the uncertainty of NATO’s role post 2014 may also lead to increasing corruption. Several host nation factors may also affect the growth of corruption such as resources becoming scarce, a dependency economy, and a lack of proper assessment of the environment regarding prices, wages, etc. by outside (non-local) organisations.

Many of the difficulties can be traced to proper personnel management (the right person in the right position) and the continuity seen within the positions. Other difficulties arise due to a lack of coordination between key stakeholders and actors within theater as well as a lack of a common long-term strategy.

The syndicate identified the need for a unified, overarching policy which should be comprised of guidelines rather than dictates as “one size does not fit all”. This policy should incorporate existing guiding principles, should create an approach for effective civil-military cooperation, and should be incorporated in NATO training. There are several existing policies documents that could form a basis for this overarching policy such as the ISAF Evidence based operations and quality control through the overall contracting/procurement process, the policy “Afghan First”, and the U.S. document “Money as a Weapon System”. However, these could be much improved in the development of the global policy. A task force needs to be created to lead the development and implementation of the integrated framework into the campaign plan. The syndicate also felt that while countering corruption is not core role for military, the negative effect of corruption erodes the military mission. Integration of the other key stakeholders is essential in order for this process to work and to create a successful and sustainable fight against corruption. If successful, the initiative will promote good governance, a stable host nation, and a strong economy.

**V. Expected Action Items and Outcomes**

Over the last 12 years, the coalition presence has led to the flooding of Afghanistan with billions of dollars in war time and reconstruction funds, but with poor controls and oversight over those funds. This along with other contributing illicit activities has produced a
situation ripe for corruption. There is currently a tremendous international focus on reducing corruption in Afghanistan; however, there are several weak areas that must be addressed before it can be expected to have a meaningful impact on operations in Afghanistan.

Syndicate 3 evaluated the operational impacts of corruption in both the military and civilian sectors. There are a number of constructive procedures and tools in place which help to mitigate corruption in Afghanistan; however, the impact of corruption continues to have a detrimental effect on operations. The participants of Syndicate 3 produced several observations and proposed courses of actions intended to further reduce corruption, but implementation will take a coordinated effort and significant involvement from senior leaders in both the Afghan and coalition civilian and military realms.

**Syndicate 4**

*How Should NATO Prepare for Future Operations? What are the Best Practices and Lessons Learned from Theatre?*

Led by

Captain Morten Svinndal and Mr. John Kelley  
*Allied Command Transformation (ACT)*

Summary Reported by Max Kidalov, JD, LLM and MAJ Cristian Ivanescu

**I. Introduction**

Syndicate 4, using building integrity lessons, best practices, and principles in NATO command structure, education, and training, explored the positive and negative factors affecting the ability to maintain building integrity standards, both by NATO and other stakeholders, within the field of operations in Afghanistan.

**II. Key Elements of Discussion**

NATO has a tailored educational and training system/process which targets different phases of military operational planning, different political and military decision-making levels, and different military communities (staff, logistics, line, etc.). It is presently preparing for transition from post-Afghanistan interoperable engagement to interoperable preparedness under the rubric of the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI). CFI emphasizes common education, exercise, and training of the joint NATO Response Force as well individual forces of NATO Alliance members. Integrity is crucial to cohesion of NATO Alliance forces. A great education and training structure has been achieved through the endorsement and approval of the Building Integrity (BI) Strategic Training Plan, but it lacks the content. There is no established policy, concept, doctrine, or standards. A center of gravity for NATO operations is cohesion, which is highly vulnerable to the effects of corruption and could be seriously affected if mutual trust and faith is not maintained. However, it is not just trust between NATO nations and partners that is critical. Trust between these entities, the host nation, and local security forces are very important and should be considered as well.

The consensus between nations is hard to achieve. Therefore, there is a need for a contingency plan to overcome this current lack of an overarching, integrative policy. The Director General of NATO’s International Military Staff did not seem to believe that a policy agreement is feasible. It is possible that the only way forward will be to create some kind of doctrine, directive, or NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG) at the military level that will be able to generate nations’ agreement. From the education and training perspective, this may be the best way forward until a larger policy is created and it is immediately feasible, as we already have the lessons learned and best practices that were developed out of the current missions. As BI is very much about awareness, this will be an excellent, practical first step.

A question that remains is who has the responsibility for the coordination of these efforts. This issue was also discussed in the plenary sessions. Regardless of the cooperation seen in NATO, each organisation tends to follow its own sovereign projects and objectives. The “supported – supporting” concept seems not to be exploited enough. The roles
could shift within the cooperation framework from the “supported” to the “supporting” in accordance with the phase of an operation.

III. Conclusions (Syndicate out brief session)

The time for talking about Building Integrity is over, and there is a pressing operational need to capture, use, and train BI lessons across NATO. This will require development of BI-related NATO policy, concept, and doctrine. Respecting proper civilian-military relations, NATO has the opportunity to do so within the framework of a BI Training Plan approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC). However, the standard military decision-making sequence of “policy, concept, doctrine” covering BI issues may be delayed while political consensus is achieved among NATO Allies.

BI is moving from the tool kit to operational level. It is important to consider:

1. Legacy of a NATO operation—what remains after a NATO Operation?
2. Awareness of corruption and patronage.
3. Amount of money and operational needs might create corruption opportunities.
4. Time factor in terms of corruption opportunities—the focus in different stages of an operation might have a different impact on the overall success of the mission.

There is a window of opportunity right now as the “lessons learned” are still very recent and very vivid. We should take advantage of this opportunity. The lessons learned should be implemented in the NATO Response Force (NRF) exercises as well as the Crisis Management Exercises (CMX). Within the exercises, it will be important to address the matter of corruption risks to depersonalize the term “corruption”. If the lessons learned are implemented in the major NATO exercises, the mainstreaming of these ideas will happen naturally.

IV. Expected Action Items and Outcomes

With these constraints and framework in mind, NATO must explore all possible means to integrate and train BI principles, best practices, and lessons learned. Possible operational steps forward are:

   a. Possible example is ISAF/JFC/SHAPE/ACT MODEL OPLAN ANNEX addressing contracting issues.
2. Drafting a new Bi-Strategic Command Directive (Bi-SCD) on BI issues.
   a. Possible example is Bi-SCD 40–1 which addresses gender issues or Bi-SCD 60–70 which addresses procurement issues.
3. Development of new educational curricula in NATO, Partnership for Peace (PiP), and national institutions (such as military academies, NATO schools, and centres of excellence) in order to guide staff and ground commanders.
4. Development of BI guidance for key leaders down to lower commanders, making BI enhancement part of the operations.
5. Development of a NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG) which establishes common body of BI knowledge for use in education and training.
   a. Possible example is STANAG 2449, Rule of Law.
6. Drafting of a NATO BI Compendium chapter focused on integrating BI principles into military decision-making as well as education and training.
7. Creating a community of BI practice through designation of BI points of contact in each NATO/PiP ministry.
8. Possible survey or compilation of national common points of agreement.
Participants in the conference, especially syndicate participants, provided surprisingly consistent and exceptionally specific and direct messages about recommendations and the way forward for Building Integrity (BI). Participants first stated that although we have a lot of information in the field of BI, the information is not well organized and does not provide enough insight on implementation. Researchers and practitioners have solidly elaborated theories underpinning BI, but once theory meets practice, participants observe a lot of divergence. The recommendations in this area were that we need to focus on organizing and standardizing the information, and obtaining buy-in from NATO members, partners, and Allies. All four syndicate groups and several conference presenters repeatedly stated their desire for standards and international agreement to these standards.

Participants also noted the criticality of timing. They felt that many countries and individuals currently have a lot of experiences and lessons learned from recent engagements, and lessons learned provide significant insight for illustrating tactics that worked and highlighting those strategies that did not. Personnel observing these insights must capture lessons learned before moving on to other duties. Participants felt that countries currently have the momentum and political will to address BI issues, as seen by its prominence in NATO communications, the Chicago Summit, and this very conference itself. Those of us at this conference must push ahead while the determination exists before political leaders and political will are diverted to other crises.

In effect, this conference has been a call to action. Participants felt that the academic underpinnings of building integrity have been well established by researchers and practitioners alike, and now the BI community needs to focus on implementation. In order to achieve this, the BI community needs consensus, standardization, and instruction. The community’s main aim is to move to a point where we can effectively teach and implement BI ideals. With implementation and use of these ideals, everyone will obtain the benefits that can be accrued from creating greater transparency and integrity.

Bibliography:
The NATO Building Integrity (BI) Programme was launched in 2007 to promote good practice and support nations to develop effective forces that are capable and defence institutions that are accountable to the people. Participation is on a voluntary basis, and practical tools including education and training activities are available to civilian and military personnel. The BI Self Assessment and Peer Review process are available to all Allies and partners, and tailored BI programmes have been developed to support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the nations of South Eastern Europe (SEE).

The 2013 NATO Building Integrity Conference brought together more than 170 civil and military representatives drawn from civil and national authorities, international organisations, and the private sector. The conference participants discussed the strategic impact of corruption in operations as well as the importance of institution building as a keystone to developing good governance in the defence and security sector. The plenary and working group discussions focused on practical action and concluded with a number of recommendations. Among them, it has been agreed that the BI Programme should continue to offer practical support to strengthen transparency, accountability, and integrity in the defence and security sector and promote good practices. The conference identified a number of lessons learned and generated a number of ideas and recommendations. Have these exchanges resulted in action by NATO and nations? The answer is yes; there have been a number of developments in the months since the conference was conducted.

At NATO HQ, allies consulted with partners and agreed to develop a political guidance to complement the existing North Atlantic Council agreed Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building and the BI Education and Training Plan. This work will be taken forward by the newly established BI task force composed of NATO International Staff (IS) and NATO Military Representatives. The NATO IS and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime are also exploring ways to further strengthen cooperation.

The tailored BI programme for GIRoA will be updated and included as part of the post 2014 NATO led operations. This includes follow up to the report completed by the Joint Analysis Lessons Learned Centre.

While these developments at NATO HQ represent a notable step forward to embedding BI aspects in NATO policy and procedures, the most significant achievements are the actions undertaken by nations since the end of February 2013.

Norway has offered the newly established Centre for Integrity in Oslo to work with the NATO IS and BI Implementing Partners to support implementation of the NATO BI Education and Training Plan and the tailored BI programme for South Eastern Europe.

A number of nations have offered subject matter experts to enhance the existing BI pool of experts and reinforce the NATO HQ efforts. The UK has
offered an expert to map ongoing institution activities, and identify gaps and areas to be strengthened. Iceland has offered an expert to support gender perspective, and Italy has offered a military expert to support BI efforts.

A number of nations have also expressed support for the BI tailored programme developed in cooperation with the South Eastern Europe Defence Ministers. The Bulgarian and Georgian Ministers of Defence took active part in the BI workshop conducted in April 2013 in Sofia. The Ukrainian Minister of Defence has confirmed support for the BI tailored programme.

Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to develop BI courses to be conducted at the Peace Support Operations Centre for non-commissioned and junior officers.

The conference provided an opportunity for nations to share their experiences regarding the BI Self Assessment and Peer Review Process. A number of nations have approached the NATO IS to discuss how to initiate this process. As announced at the conference, Georgia has completed the BI Self Assessment Survey and requested a Peer Review. Colombia (a first time participant in the BI Conference) has confirmed that it will complete the BI Self Assessment and Peer Review. Peer reviews for Hungary, Montenegro, and Ukraine will be completed before the end of 2013.

The conference also discussed updating BI tools. Poland and the U.S. have offered to lead an ad hoc group to review lessons learned and to offer suggestions for a revised BI Self Assessment Survey. Norway, Switzerland, and the U.S. have also offered to develop additional resource material to further promote good practice.

The recommendations developed at the 2013 BI Conference have resulted in direct action by NATO and nations. This is an impressive start. Many thanks to the U.S. authorities for their generous support in the planning and conduct of the 2013 BI Conference. Thanks also to the many speakers and experts who continue to support the BI Programme.

Further updates on the BI Programme can be found at the NATO website http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_68368.htm.