NATO’s Wales Summit comes at a critical time in the Alliance’s history. The global security environment is dangerous and unpredictable. Russia’s actions against Ukraine have challenged the fundamental principles of a Europe whole, free and at peace. An arc of crises surrounds the Alliance, with growing instability and security challenges across the Middle East and North Africa, and beyond, as well as newer threats such as cyber and missile attacks. At the same time, NATO is preparing to complete its longest combat mission and to open a new chapter in its relationship with Afghanistan.

In 1990, at the last NATO Summit hosted by the United Kingdom, Allies marked the end of the Cold War by extending a “hand of friendship” to countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 24 years later, in Wales, leaders will consider the multiple challenges facing the Alliance and ways to ensure that NATO remains ready, able and willing to defend all Allies against any threat. Leaders will adopt a Readiness Action Plan to make NATO’s forces more responsive and its partnerships more flexible, thus forging a strong foundation for Future NATO.

The Alliance will take further steps to enhance its partnership with Ukraine. Heads of State and Government will also address the impact of the security challenges posed by instability in the Middle East and North Africa.

This Summit will principally focus on the following themes:

- NATO readiness to reinforce collective defence, and investing in capabilities to ensure the Alliance remains ready to face any challenge;
- Demonstrating transatlantic resolve and stressing the importance of appropriate levels of defence spending;
- Relations with Russia, and stronger ties with Ukraine through increased cooperation;
- Deepening partnerships and maintaining NATO’s Open Door policy;

This Summit is the last to be chaired by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen.
I. NATO readiness

The Russia-Ukraine crisis has shown the volatility of the security environment and has accelerated the need for continued adaptation of the Alliance. Allied leaders will adopt a package of measures – the Readiness Action Plan – designed to make NATO forces more responsive, better trained and better equipped to respond to the changed and broader security environment in, or near, Europe so that the Alliance can meet challenges from wherever they may arise. NATO will continue to respond to the concerns of its members by initiating reassurance measures, in keeping with the Alliance's commitment to collective defence, and will be stepping up efforts in areas such as cyber defence and maritime security.

- Improving NATO's capabilities
- NATO Defence Planning Process
- Smart Defence
- The Connected Forces Initiative
- The NATO Response Force
- Exercises
- Education and training
- NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence
- Ballistic missile defence
- Strategic airlift
- Strategic sealift
- NATO's maritime domain
- Cyber defence
- NATO and the fight against terrorism
- Countering improvised explosive devices
- NATO's role in energy security
- Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR)
- Special Operations Forces
- Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS)
- AWACS: NATO's eye in the sky

II. The Transatlantic Bond and a renewed commitment to fundamental values and principles

In the present climate, the Wales Summit will be an opportunity for Allies to reiterate their commitment to fundamental principles and core values laid out in the Washington Treaty, in particular, the principle of collective defence (Article 5) and the need to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack (Article 3). The leaders will also discuss ways to ensure Allies support their military capacities with adequate financial resources.

A Transatlantic Declaration will be adopted at the Summit, inspired by the values that unite North America and Europe. It will reaffirm the essential security link between the two continents and the determination to share the responsibilities and rewards of security.
Meanwhile over the past four years, NATO's structures have been streamlined for greater efficiency and effectiveness, making them better equipped to help tackle today's security threats while reducing running costs.

III. The crisis in Ukraine and relations with Russia

Since the illegal annexation of Crimea, NATO has suspended all practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia, while leaving channels open for dialogue on the situation in Ukraine. The Alliance will review its relations with Russia at the Wales Summit. It will also continue to intensify cooperation with Ukraine. A meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission will take place to this effect on the first day of the Summit, with President Petro Poroshenko.

IV. Deepening relations with partners and NATO's Open Door policy

NATO is seeking to sustain the high levels of consultation, interoperability and defence cooperation that have been developed with partners contributing to ISAF. At the Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government will be presenting initiatives to build on and maintain the frequency of exchanges between partners and Allies, to preserve the benefits of the experience gained in working together during the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan. More specifically, they will look to enhance support to partners’ efforts in developing their capacity to operate more closely with NATO Allies. They will also reiterate, in the context of NATO enlargement, the right of each country to choose its own security arrangements.
NATO’s relations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹
NATO enlargement
Membership Action Plan (MAP)
Mediterranean Dialogue
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
NATO’s relations with partners across the globe
Comprehensive approach
NATO’s relations with the United Nations
NATO-EU: a strategic partnership
NATO’s relations with the OSCE

V. Afghanistan – NATO’s longest combat mission

NATO has led ISAF for over a decade to ensure Afghanistan no longer serves as a haven for terrorists. NATO is now focusing on completing ISAF in good order at the end of 2014, when it will turn a new page in its relationship with Afghanistan. From 2015, NATO will remain committed to Afghanistan through the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership (2010), the Afghan National Army Trust Fund and a follow-on mission – Resolute Support. The launch of Resolute Support - a “train, advise and assist” mission - is dependent on whether the necessary legal arrangements will be in place.

- NATO in Afghanistan

NATO also continues to lead and support a number of other operations and missions - ground, air and naval - in all types of environments.

- NATO operations and missions
- Kosovo
- Counter-piracy operations
- Operation Active Endeavour
- NATO assistance to the African Union
- Commitments to operations and missions
- Troop contributions

In parallel, the Alliance’s involvement in crisis-management operations has provided valuable lessons on the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. The resolution recognises the disproportionate impact war and conflicts have on women and children, and highlights the fact that women have been left out of peace processes and stabilisation efforts over time.

- Women, peace and security: NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325

1. Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
NATO summit meetings

NATO summit meetings provide periodic opportunities for Heads of State and Government of member countries to evaluate and provide strategic direction for Alliance activities.

These are not regular meetings, but rather important junctures in the Alliance's decision-making process. For instance, summits have been used to introduce new policy, invite new members into the Alliance, launch major new initiatives and build partnerships with non-NATO countries.

From the founding of NATO in 1949 until today there have been twenty-five NATO summits. The most recent one took place in Chicago, United States, 20-21 May 2012. The next one will be hosted by the United Kingdom on 4-5 September 2014 in Newport, Wales.

Summit meeting agendas
NATO summit meetings are effectively meetings of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) - the Alliance's principal political decision-making body - at its highest level, that of Heads of State and Government.

Due to the political significance of summit meetings, agenda items typically address issues of overarching political or strategic importance. Items can relate to the internal functioning of the Alliance as well as NATO's relations with external partners.

**Major decisions**

Many of NATO's summit meetings can be considered as milestones in the evolution of the Alliance. For instance, the first post-Cold War summit was held in London, 1990, and outlined proposals for developing relations with Central and Eastern European countries. A year later, in Rome, NATO Heads of State and Government published a new Strategic Concept that reflected the new security environment. This document was issued as a public document for the first time ever. At the same summit, NATO established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council – a forum that officially brought together NATO and partner countries from Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus.

The 1997 Madrid and Paris Summits invited the first countries of the former Warsaw Pact – Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – to join NATO, and established partnerships between NATO and Russia and Ukraine, while the 2002 Prague Summit saw major commitments to improving NATO's capabilities and transformed the military command structure.

These are just a few of the many decisions that have been taken over the decades (a full summary of all NATO summit meetings can be found under “Previous summit meetings”).

**Implementation of summit decisions**

Typically, the decisions taken at a summit meeting are issued in declarations and communiqués. These are public documents that explain the Alliance's decisions and reaffirm Allies' support for aspects of NATO policies.

The decisions are then translated into action by the relevant actors, according to the area of competency and responsibility: the NAC's subordinate committees and NATO's command structure, which cover the whole range of NATO functions and activities.
Timing

Summits are convened upon approval by the NAC at the level of Permanent Representatives (or Ambassadors) or foreign and defence ministers. They are usually called on an ad hoc basis, as required by the evolving political and security situation.

From the founding of NATO until the end of the Cold War – over forty years – there were ten summit meetings. Since 1990, their frequency has increased considerably in order to address the changes brought on by the new security challenges. In total, twenty-four summit meetings have taken place between 1949 and 2011.

Location

NATO summit meetings are held in one of the member countries, including Belgium, at NATO HQ. Members volunteer to host a summit meeting and, after evaluating all offers, the NAC makes the final decision concerning the location.

In recent years, summit locations have held some thematic significance. For example, the Washington Summit of 1999 commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in that city. Istanbul – which hosted a summit meeting in 2004 – connects Europe and Asia and is where the Alliance launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. This initiative is intended to foster linkages between NATO and the broader Middle East.

Previous summit meetings

The first time that Heads of State and Government from NATO countries met was at the actual signing ceremony of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949, but this was not a summit meeting. The first summit meeting was held six years later, in Paris in 1957, and subsequent summits occurred at key junctures in the history of the Alliance.

Paris, 16-19 December 1957

Reaffirmation of the principal purposes and unity of the Atlantic Alliance; Improvements in the coordination and organization of NATO forces and in political consultation arrangements; Recognition of the need for closer economic ties and for cooperation in the spirit of Article 2 of the Treaty, designed to eliminate conflict in international policies and encourage economic collaboration (Report of the Committee of the Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO, the so-called report of the Three Wise Men).

Brussels, 26 June 1974
Signature of the Declaration on Atlantic Relations adopted by NATO foreign ministers in Ottawa on 19 June, confirming the dedication of member countries of the Alliance to the aims and ideals of the Treaty in the 25th anniversary of its signature; Consultations on East-West relations in preparation for US-USSR summit talks on strategic nuclear arms limitations.

**Brussels, 29-30 May 1975**

Affirmation of the fundamental importance of the Alliance and of Allied cohesion in the face of international economic pressures following the 1974 oil crisis; Support for successful conclusion of negotiations in the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (to result in 1975, in the signing of the Helsinki Final Act).

**London, 10-11 May 1977**

Initiation of study on long-term trends in East-West relations and of a long-term defence programme (LTDP) aimed at improving the defensive capability of NATO member countries.

**Washington D.C., 30-31 May 1978**

Review of interim results of long-term initiatives taken at the 1977 London Summit; Confirmation of the validity of the Alliance’s complementary aims of maintaining security while pursuing East-West détente; Adoption of 3% target for growth in defence expenditures.

**Bonn, 10 June 1982**

Accession of Spain; Adoption of the Bonn Declaration setting out a six-point Programme for Peace in Freedom; Publication of a statement of Alliance’s goals and policies on Arms Control and Disarmament and a statement on Integrated NATO Defence.

**Brussels, 21 November 1985**

Special meeting of the North Atlantic Council for consultations with President Reagan on the positive outcome of the US-USSR Geneva Summit on arms control and other areas of cooperation.

**Brussels, 2-3 March 1988**

Reaffirmation of the purpose and principles of the Alliance (reference to the Harmel Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance published in 1967) and of its objectives for East-West relations; Adoption of a blue print for strengthening stability in the whole of Europe through conventional arms control negotiations.

**Brussels, 29-30 May 1989**
Declaration commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Alliance setting out Alliance policies and security objectives for the 1990s aimed at maintaining Alliance defence, introducing new arms control initiatives, strengthening political consultation, improving East-West cooperation and meeting global challenges; Adoption of a comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament.

**Brussels, 4 December 1989**

Against the background of fundamental changes in Central and Eastern Europe and the prospect of the end of the division of Europe, US President Bush consults with Alliance leaders following his summit meeting with President Gorbachev in Malta. While the NATO summit meeting is taking place, Warsaw Pact leaders denounce the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and repudiate the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty.

**London, 5-6 July 1990**

Publication of the London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, outlining proposals for developing cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe across a wide spectrum of political and military activities including the establishment of regular diplomatic liaison with NATO.

**Rome, 7-8 November 1991**

Publication of several key documents: the Alliance's new Strategic Concept, of the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation and of statements on developments in the Soviet Union and the situation in Yugoslavia.

**Brussels, 10-11 January 1994**

Launching of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative; All North Atlantic Cooperation Council Partner countries and members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) are invited to participate; Publication of the Partnership for Peace Framework Document; Endorsement of the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) and other measures to develop the European Security and Defence Identity; Reaffirmation of Alliance readiness to carry out air strikes in support of UN objectives in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

**Paris, 27 May 1997**

Signing of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Founding Act states that NATO and Russia are no longer adversaries and establishes the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.

**Madrid, 8-9 July 1997**
Invitations to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks;
Reaffirmation of NATO's Open Door Policy; Recognition of achievement and commitments
represented by the NATO Russia-Founding Act; Signature of the Charter on a Distinctive
Partnership between NATO and Ukraine; First meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council at summit level that replaces the North Atlantic Cooperation Council; An enhanced
Partnership for Peace; Updating of the 1991 Strategic Concept and adoption of a new
defence posture; Reform of the NATO military command structure; Special Declaration on
Bosnia and Herzegovina.

**Washington D.C., 23-24 April 1999**

Commemoration of NATO's 50th Anniversary; Allies reiterate their determination to put
an end to the repressive actions by President Milosevic against the local ethnic Albanian
population in Kosovo; The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland participate in their first
summit meeting; Adoption of the Membership Action Plan; Publication of a revised
Strategic Concept; Enhancement of the European Security and Defence Identity within
NATO; Launch of the Defence Capabilities Initiative; Strengthening of Partnership for
Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, as well as the Mediterranean Dialogue;
Launch of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative.

**Rome, 28 May 2002**

NATO Allies and the Russian Federation create the NATO-Russia Council, where they meet
as equal partners, bringing a new quality to NATO-Russia relations. The NATO-Russia
Council replaces the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.

**Prague, 21-22 November 2002**

Invitation of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to begin
accession talks; Reaffirmation of NATO's Open Door Policy; Adoption of a series of
measures to improve military capabilities (The Prague Capabilities Commitment, the NATO
Response Force and the streamlining of the military command structure); Adoption of a
Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism; Decision to support NATO member
countries in Afghanistan; Endorsement of a package of initiatives to forge new
relationships with partners.

**Istanbul, 28-29 June 2004**

Participation of seven new members to the event (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia); Expansion of NATO's operation in Afghanistan by
continuing the establishment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams throughout the country;
Agreement to assist the Iraqi Interim Government with the training of its security forces;
Maintaining support for stability in the Balkans; Decision to change NATO's defence-
planning and force-generation processes, while strengthening contributions to the fight against terrorism, including WMD aspects; Strengthening cooperation with partners and launch of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative with countries from the broader Middle East region.

**Brussels, 22 February 2005**

Leaders reaffirm their support for building stability in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq, and commit to strengthening the partnership between NATO and the European Union.

**Riga, 28-29 November 2006**

Review of progress in Afghanistan in light of the expansion of ISAF to the entire country and call for broader international engagement; Confirmation that the Alliance is prepared to play its part in implementing the security provisions of a settlement on the status of Kosovo; Measures adopted to further improve NATO's military capabilities; NATO Response Force declared operational; Comprehensive Political Guidance published.

Initiatives adopted to deepen and extend relations with partners; Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia invited to join Partnership for Peace.

**Bucharest, 2-4 April 2008**

At Bucharest, Allied leaders review the evolution of NATO's main commitments: operations (Afghanistan and Kosovo); enlargement and the invitation of Albania and Croatia to start the accession process (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* will also be invited as soon as ongoing negotiations over its name have led to an agreement); the continued development of military capabilities to meet.

**Strasbourg/ Kehl, 3-4 April 2009**

Against the backdrop of NATO's 60th anniversary, adoption of a Declaration on Alliance Security, calling for a new Strategic Concept; adherence to basic principles and shared values, as well as the need for ongoing transformation; in-depth discussion on Afghanistan, NATO's key priority; welcoming of two new members: Albania and Croatia, and the pursuit of NATO's open door policy (invitation extended to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* as soon as a solution to the issue surrounding the country's name is reached); France's decision to fully participate in NATO structures and the impact of this decision on the Alliance's relations with the European Union; and NATO's relations with Russia.

**Lisbon 19-20 November 2010**

Publication of a new Strategic Concept; gradual transition process to full Afghan security responsibility to start in 2011, backed by Allied agreement on a long-term partnership with
Afghanistan; decision to develop a NATO missile defence system to protect populations and territory in Europe, in addition to deployed troops, against potential ballistic missile attacks; Russia invited to cooperate as part of a broader “reset” of relations with NATO; adoption of a comprehensive approach to crisis management, including a greater role in stabilization and reconstruction for the Alliance and greater emphasis on training and developing local forces; continue to support arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, and maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces; adoption of the Lisbon Capabilities Package that identifies critical capabilities; agreement to develop a NATO cyber defence policy and action plan; streamlining of NATO’s military command structure and rationalization of NATO agencies; new impetus given to relations with partners and NATO’s partnership policy in the broad sense of the term.

**Chicago 20-21 May 2012**

NATO leaders set out a strategy to conclude the transition of security responsibility to Afghan forces by the end of 2014 and committed to a new post-2014 mission to train, advise and assist Afghan forces. The ISAF coalition of 50 states was joined by an unprecedented number of partners committed to Afghanistan’s stability, bringing the total number of countries and organisations represented at Chicago to over 60. NATO leaders approved the Defence and Deterrence Posture Review and adopted a Defence Package and new policy guidelines on counter-terrorism. An Interim Ballistic Missile Capability was declared and initiatives taken in other key capability areas such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and air policing. NATO leaders confirmed efforts to pursue cooperative security and engage with partners across the globe as well as countries that aspire to NATO membership.

### Organising and holding these events

NATO summit meetings are centred on the activities of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). As with all meetings of the NAC, the Secretary General chairs the meetings and plays an important role in coordination and deliberations, as well as acting as the principal spokesman of the Alliance.

As with meetings at the levels of Permanent Representatives and ministers, the work of the NAC is prepared by subordinate committees with responsibility for specific areas of policy. The Deputies Committee, which consists of Deputy Permanent Representatives is responsible for drafting declarations and communiqués after meetings of heads of state and government, as well as foreign and defence ministers.
Other aspects of political work may be handled by the Political and Partnerships Committee. Depending on the topic under discussion, the respective senior committee with responsibility for the subject assumes the lead role in preparing Council meetings and following up Council decisions.

Support to the Council is provided by the Secretary of the Council, who is also Director of the ministerial and summit meeting Task Forces. The Secretary of the Council ensures that NAC mandates are executed and its decisions recorded and circulated. A small Council Secretariat ensures the bureaucratic and logistical aspects of the Council's work, while the relevant divisions of the International Staff support the work of committees reporting to the NAC.

## Participation

NATO summit meetings normally involve member countries only. However, on occasion, and provided Allies agree, meetings can be convened in other formats although there is no formal obligation to hold such assemblies.

They include, for instance, meetings of defence or foreign ministers, Heads of State and Government of countries belonging to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Russia Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission or the NATO-Georgia Commission. They can also include leaders from ISAF troop-contributing countries, as was the case at the Lisbon Summit. External stakeholders can also be involved: for instance, top representatives from international organizations such as the UN, the EU Commission or the World Bank.
Member countries

At present, NATO has 28 members. In 1949, there were 12 founding members of the Alliance: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. The other member countries are: Greece and Turkey (1952), Germany (1955), Spain (1982), the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (1999), Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia (2004), and Albania and Croatia (2009).

Provision for enlargement is given by Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that membership is open to any “European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area”.

Archived material - Information valid up to 3 September 2014
Any decision to invite a country to join the Alliance is taken by the North Atlantic Council, NATO's principal decision-making body, on the basis of consensus among all Allies. Currently, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹ are aspiring members.

Alphabetical list of NATO member countries

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<th>Albania</th>
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About member countries and their accession

The founding members

On 4 April 1949, the foreign ministers from 12 countries signed the North Atlantic Treaty (also known as the Washington Treaty) at the Departmental Auditorium in Washington, D.C.: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Within the following five months of the signing ceremony, the Treaty was ratified by the parliaments of the interested countries, sealing their membership.

The 12 signatories

Some of the foreign ministers who signed the Treaty were heavily involved in NATO’s work at a later stage in their careers:

- Belgium: M. Paul-Henri Spaak (NATO Secretary General, 1957-1961);
Canada: Mr Lester B. Pearson (negotiated the Treaty and was one of the “Three Wise Men”, who drafted the report on non-military cooperation in NATO, published in 1956 in the wake of the Suez Crisis);

Denmark: Mr Gustav Rasmussen;

France: M. Robert Schuman (architect of the European institutions, who also initiated the idea of a European Defence Community);

Iceland: Mr Bjarni Benediktsson;

Italy: Count Carlo Sforza;

Luxembourg: M. Joseph Bech;

the Netherlands: Dr D.U. Stikker (NATO Secretary General, 1961-1964);

Norway: Mr Halvard M. Lange (one of the “Three Wise Men”, who drafted the report on non-military cooperation in NATO);

Portugal: Dr Jose Caerio da Matta;

the United Kingdom: Mr Ernest Bevin (main drive behind the creation of NATO and as Foreign Secretary from 1945 to 1951, he attended the first formative meetings of the North Atlantic Council);

the United States: Mr Dean Acheson (as US Secretary of State from 1949 to 1953, he attended and chaired meetings of the North Atlantic Council).

**Flexibility of NATO membership**

On signing the Treaty, countries voluntarily commit themselves to participating in the political consultations and military activities of the Organization. Although each and every signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty is subject to the obligations of the Treaty, there remains a certain degree of flexibility which allows members to choose how they participate. The memberships of Iceland and France, for instance, illustrate this point.

• Iceland

When Iceland signed the Treaty in 1949, it did not have – and still does not have – armed forces. There is no legal impediment to forming them, but Iceland has chosen not to have any. However, Iceland has a Coast Guard, national police forces, an air defence system and a voluntary expeditionary peacekeeping force. Since 1951, Iceland has also benefitted from a long-standing bilateral defence agreement with the United States. In 2006, US forces were withdrawn but the defence agreement remains valid. Since 2008, air policing has been conducted on a periodic basis by NATO Allies.

• France
In 1966, President Charles de Gaulle decided to withdraw France from NATO's integrated military structure. This reflected the desire for greater military independence, particularly vis-à-vis the United States, and the refusal to integrate France's nuclear deterrent or accept any form of control over its armed forces.

In practical terms, while France still fully participated in the political instances of the Organization, it was no longer represented on certain committees, for instance, the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group. This decision also led to the removal of French forces from NATO commands and foreign forces from French territory. The stationing of foreign weapons, including nuclear weapons, was also banned. NATO’s political headquarters (based in Paris since 1952), as well as the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe or SHAPE (in Rocquencourt since 1951) moved to Belgium.

Despite France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military structure, two technical agreements were signed with the Alliance, setting out procedures in the event of Soviet aggression. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, France has regularly contributed troops to NATO's military operations, making it one of the largest troop-contributing states. It is also NATO's fourth-biggest contributor to the military budget.

From the early 1990s onwards, France distanced itself from the 1966 decision with, for instance, its participation at the meetings of defence ministers from 1994 (Seville) onwards and the presence of French officers in Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation structures from 2003. At NATO's Strasbourg/Kehl Summit in April 2009, France officially announced its decision to fully participate in NATO structures².

**The accession of Greece and Turkey**

Three years after the signing of the Washington Treaty, on 18 February 1952, Greece and Turkey joined NATO. This enabled NATO to reinforce its “southern flank”.

At a time when there was a fear of communist expansion throughout Europe and other parts of the world (Soviet support of the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950), extending security to southeastern Europe was strategically important. Not only did NATO membership curb communist influence in Greece – a country recovering from civil war – but it also relieved Turkey from Soviet pressure for access to key strategic maritime routes.

**The accession of Germany**
Germany became a NATO member on 6 May 1955. This was the result of several years of deliberations among western leaders and Germany, whose population opposed any form of rearmament.

Following the end of the Second World War, ways of integrating the Federal Republic of Germany into west European defence structures was a priority. The Federal Republic of Germany - or West Germany - was created in 1949 and although the new state was anchored to the west, its potential was feared. Initially, France proposed the creation of a European Defence Community – a European solution to the German question. However, the French Senate opposed the plan and the proposal fell through leaving NATO membership as the only viable solution. Three conditions needed to be fulfilled before this could happen: post-war victors (France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union) had to end the occupation of the Federal Republic of Germany; Italy and West Germany needed to be admitted to the Western Union Defence Organisation (the military agency of the Western Union) and then there was the accession procedure itself.

When Germany joined the Western Union, the latter changed its name to become the Western European Union. This accession, together with the termination of the Federal Republic of Germany's status as an occupied country, was bringing the country closer to NATO membership. The Federal Republic of Germany officially joined the Western Union on 23 October 1954 and its status as an occupied country came to an end when the Bonn-Paris conventions came into effect on 5 May 1955. The next day, it became NATO's 15th member country.

With the reunification of Germany on 3 October 1990, the länders of the former German Democratic Republic joined the Federal Republic of Germany in its membership of NATO.

**The accession of Spain**

Spain joined the Alliance on 30 May 1982 despite considerable public opposition. The end of Franco's dictatorship in 1975, the military coup in 1981 and the rise of the Socialist Party (PSOE), the leading opposition party which was initially against NATO accession, made for a difficult social and political context, both nationally and internationally.

Spain fully participated in the political instances of the Organization, but refrained from participating in the integrated military structure - a position it reaffirmed in a referendum held in 1986. With regard to the military aspects, it was present as an observer on the Nuclear Planning Group; reserved its position on participation in the integrated communication system; maintained Spanish forces under Spanish command and did not accept to have troops deployed outside of Spain for long periods of time. Nevertheless, Spanish forces would still be able to operate with other NATO forces in an emergency.
Spain's reservations gradually diminished. The Spanish Parliament endorsed the country's participation in the integrated military command structure in 1996, a decision that coincided with the nomination of Dr Javier Solana as NATO's first Spanish Secretary General (1995-1999).

**The first wave of post-Cold War enlargement**

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact after the end of the Cold War opened up the possibility of further NATO enlargement. Some of the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe were eager to become integrated into Euro-Atlantic institutions.

In 1995, the Alliance carried out and published the results of a Study on NATO Enlargement that considered the merits of admitting new members and how they should be brought in. It concluded that the end of the Cold War provided a unique opportunity to build improved security in the entire Euro-Atlantic area and that NATO enlargement would contribute to enhanced stability and security for all.

The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were invited to begin accession talks at the Alliance's Madrid Summit in 1997 and on 12 March 1999 they became the first former members of the Warsaw Pact to join NATO.

Drawing heavily on the experience gained during this accession process, NATO launched the Membership Action Plan - or MAP - at the Washington Summit in April 1999. The MAP was established to help countries aspiring to NATO membership in their preparations, even if it did not pre-judge any decisions.

**The second wave of post-Cold War enlargement**

Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia were invited to begin accession talks at the Alliance's Prague Summit in 2002. On 29 March 2004, they officially became members of the Alliance, making this the largest wave of enlargement in NATO history.

All seven countries had participated in the MAP before acceding to NATO.

**The accession of Albania and Croatia**

The most recent accessions are those of Albania and Croatia. Albania had participated in the MAP since its inception in 1999 and Croatia joined in 2002. They worked with NATO in a wide range of areas, with particular emphasis on defence and security sector reform, as well as support for wider democratic and institutional reform.
In July 2008, they both signed Accession Protocols and became official members of the Alliance on 1 April 2009.

1. Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
2. However, France has chosen not to become a member of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group.
PARTNERS

NATO cooperates with a range of international organizations and countries in different structures. Below is a list of these partners with links to their information servers.

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)

The EAPC consists of all NATO Member countries and the following partner countries:

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¹ Includes the Republic of North Macedonia.
### NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue

The following seven countries of the Mediterranean region are currently involved:

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### Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)

To date, the following four countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council have joined:

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### Partners across the globe

In addition to its formal partnerships, NATO cooperates with a range of countries which are not part of these structures. Often referred to as “Partners across the globe”, these countries develop cooperation with NATO in areas of mutual interest, including emerging security challenges, and some contribute actively to NATO operations either militarily or in some other way.

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<th>Country</th>
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International Organizations

In addition to its partnerships with countries, NATO cooperates with a range of international organizations.

- European Union (EU) - http://europa.eu

Legend

1st Parliament, 1st Chamber
Sen Senate, 2nd Chamber
GOV Government
State Head Head of State / President
PM Prime Minister
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoD Ministry/Department of Defence
MIL Military / Chief of Staff
DEL National Mission or Delegation to NATO
Info Information Centre

1. Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
The NATO Secretary General

The Secretary General is the Alliance's top international civil servant. This person is responsible for steering the process of consultation and decision-making in the Alliance and ensuring that decisions are implemented.

The Secretary General is also NATO's chief spokesperson and the head of the Organization's International Staff.

The post is currently held by Anders Fogh Rasmussen, former Prime Minister of Denmark, who took up his responsibilities on 1 August 2009.

The function of Secretary General is filled by a senior statesman with high-level political experience in the government of one of the member countries. The person is nominated by member governments for an initial period of four years, which can be extended by mutual consent.
Three principal responsibilities

**Chairman of the North Atlantic Council and other key bodies**

First and foremost, the Secretary General chairs the North Atlantic Council - the Alliance’s principal political decision-making body - as well as other senior decision-making committees. These include the Nuclear Planning Group, the NATO-Russia Council, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Mediterranean Co-operation Group. Additionally, together with a Ukrainian representative, he is the chairman of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, as well as the chairman of the NATO-Georgia Commission.

Above and beyond the role of chairman, the Secretary General has the authority to propose items for discussion and use his good offices in case of disputes between member states. He acts as a decision facilitator, leading and guiding the process of consensus-building and decision-making throughout the Alliance.

He maintains direct contact with heads of state and government, foreign and defence ministers in NATO and partner countries, in order to facilitate this process. This entails regular visits to NATO and partner countries, as well as bilateral meetings with senior national officials when they visit NATO Headquarters.

Effectively, his role allows him to exert some influence on the decision-making process while respecting the fundamental principle that the authority for taking decisions is invested only in the member governments themselves.

**Principal spokesperson**

The Secretary General is also the principal spokesman of the Alliance and represents the Alliance in public on behalf of the member countries, reflecting their common positions on political issues.

He also represents NATO vis-à-vis other international organizations as well as to the media and the public at large. To this end the Secretary General regularly holds press briefings and conferences as well as public lectures and speeches.

**Head of the International Staff**

Third and lastly, the Secretary General is the senior executive officer of the NATO International Staff, responsible for making staff appointments and overseeing its work.
Support to the Secretary General

In his day-to-day work, the Secretary General is directly supported by a Private Office and a Deputy Secretary General, who assists the Secretary General and replaces him in his absence. The Deputy Secretary General is also the chairman of a number of senior committees, ad hoc groups and working groups.

More generally speaking, the entire International Staff at NATO Headquarters supports the Secretary General, either directly or indirectly.

The selection process

The Secretary General is a senior statesman from a NATO member country, appointed by member states for a four-year term. The selection is carried through informal diplomatic consultations among member countries, which put forward candidates for the post.

No decision is confirmed until consensus is reached on one candidate. At the end of his term, the incumbent might be offered to stay on for a fifth year.

The position has traditionally been held by a European statesman.
Improving NATO’s capabilities

NATO has been engaged in continuous transformation for many years to ensure that it has the policies, capabilities and structures required to deal with current and future challenges, including the collective defence of its members. With Allied forces militarily engaged across several continents, the Alliance needs to ensure that its armed forces remain modern, deployable and sustainable.
The 2010 Strategic Concept sets out NATO's strategic priorities and defines the Organization's vision of Euro-Atlantic security for the next decade. It provides an analysis of the strategic environment and a framework for all Alliance capability development planning disciplines and intelligence, identifying the kinds of operations the Alliance must be able to perform and setting the context in which capability development takes place.

At the May 2012 Summit in Chicago, Allied leaders reaffirmed their determination to ensure that NATO retains and develops the capabilities necessary to perform its essential core tasks: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security - and thereby to play an essential role promoting security in the world. This responsibility needs to be met while dealing with an acute financial crisis and responding to evolving geo-strategic challenges.

By working together through NATO, Alliance members are better able to ensure the security of their citizens than would be possible by acting alone. Over the past six decades, they have cooperated closely together, have made firm commitments and taken a range of initiatives to strengthen capabilities in key areas.

Meeting immediate and long-term challenges

The objectives of the 2010 Strategic Concept are further specified by the 2011 Political Guidance. This Political Guidance establishes in broad terms what the Alliance should be able to do, how much it should be able to do, and sets priorities, thereby guiding procurement and other key activities in the context of the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP).

The NATO Defence Planning Process

The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) provides a framework within which national and Alliance processes can be harmonised to meet Alliance objectives. It establishes in detail how to meet the mandates of the Political Guidance and sets targets for Allies and the Alliance collectively, thereby guiding national and collective capability development.

Implemented in a four-year cycle, the NDPP seeks forces and capabilities that are deployable, sustainable and can contribute to Alliance missions. The forces provided by Allies have to be able to operate together in a multinational context, prepared, trained, equipped and supported to contribute to the full range of missions, including in distant and remote areas.

Defence planning has a short- to long-term perspective, including with respect to identifying requirements, the development and delivery of capabilities, the adjustment of military and civilian structures, personnel issues, equipment procurement and the development of new technologies.
Very short-term and critical capability shortfalls that arise during operations are tackled by a separate mechanism. Urgent operational requirements are raised by the operational commands, scrutinised by the Military Committee and the relevant budget committees and put to the North Atlantic Council, NATO's principal political decision-making body, for consideration.

**Current objectives**

With the adoption of the 2010 Strategic Concept, Alliance leaders committed to ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of Allies' populations. Therefore the Alliance will:

- maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces;
- maintain the ability to sustain concurrent major joint operations and several smaller operations for collective defence and crisis response, including at strategic distance;
- develop and maintain robust, mobile and deployable conventional forces to carry out both its Article 5 responsibilities and expeditionary operations, including with the NATO Response Force;
- carry out the necessary training, exercises, contingency planning and information exchange for assuring its defence against the full range of conventional and emerging security challenges, and provide appropriate visible assurance and reinforcement for all Allies;
- ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control and consultation arrangements;
- develop the capability to defend NATO European populations, territories and forces against ballistic missile attack as a core element of its collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance;
- further develop its capacity to defend against the threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction;
- develop further its ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber attacks, including by using the NATO planning process to enhance and coordinate national cyber defence capabilities, bringing all NATO bodies under centralised cyber protection, and better integrating NATO cyber awareness, warning and response with member countries;
- enhance the capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism, including through enhanced analysis of the threat, more consultations with partners, and the development of appropriate military capabilities, including to help train local forces to fight terrorism themselves;
• develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and consultations among Allies on the basis of strategic assessments and contingency planning;
• ensure that the Alliance is at the front edge in assessing the security impact of emerging technologies, and that military planning takes the potential threats into account;
• sustain the necessary levels of defence spending, so that its armed forces are sufficiently resourced;

continue to review its overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance, taking into account changes to the evolving international security environment.

Prioritising capabilities

Given the evolving geo-strategic environment, NATO leaders are regularly assessing and reviewing the capabilities needed to conduct the full range of the Alliance's missions.

At the Chicago Summit in May 2012, NATO leaders made a pledge to improve the Alliance's planning processes and specific capabilities in pursuit of the "NATO Forces 2020" goal. The vision for NATO forces in 2020 and beyond is one of modern, tightly connected forces equipped, trained, exercised and commanded so that they can operate together and with partners in any environment.

This constitutes the Chicago Defence Package, which aims to ensure the Alliance has all the requisite capabilities to implement the 2010 Strategic Concept and the 2011 Political Guidance. The package is based largely on existing plans and programmes and a realistic projection of resources. It therefore provides a renewed focus and mandate to ensure that in the competition for resources the most urgent capabilities are delivered.

The Chicago Defence Package consists of a mix of new and existing initiatives. The new initiatives consist of Smart Defence and the Connected Forces Initiative; the existing initiatives include the Lisbon Summit package focused on the Alliance's most pressing capability needs; the ongoing reform of Alliance structures and processes; and the NATO Defence Planning Process, mentioned previously.

Smart Defence
In light of growing military requirements, developing capabilities becomes more complex and therefore in many cases more expensive. As a result, multinational cooperation offers a viable solution to deliver critical capabilities in a cost-effective manner. For certain high-end key capabilities Allies may in fact only be able to obtain them if they work together to develop and acquire them. Smart Defence is NATO's approach for bringing multinational cooperation to the forefront of Allies' capability delivery efforts.

Since its formal inception at the 2012 Chicago Summit Smart Defence has started to promote and reinvigorate a culture of multinational cooperation, which has and will continue to enable NATO to meet the challenges it will face in 2020 and beyond. Since Chicago, Allies have already successfully concluded a series of concrete Smart Defence projects, which delivered needed capabilities more effectively and efficiently through the formula of doing things together instead of doing them alone.

Developing greater European military capabilities through multinational cooperation will continue to strengthen the transatlantic link, enhance the security of all Allies and foster an equitable sharing of the burdens, benefits and responsibilities of Alliance membership. In this context, NATO works closely with the European Union (EU), utilising agreed mechanisms, to ensure that Smart Defence and the EU's Pooling and Sharing initiative are complementary and mutually reinforcing. Concurrently, Smart Defence also contributes toward maintaining a strong defence industry in Europe by making the fullest possible use of defence industrial cooperation across the Alliance. Moving forward NATO will continue to support Allies in their endeavour to exploit the full potential multinational capability delivery offers.

**Connected Forces Initiative**

The Connected Forces Initiative builds on experience gained from NATO operations to maintain and improve interoperability and Alliance capability. It will enhance exercises, strengthen the bonds between the NATO Command Structure, the NATO Force Structure, and national headquarters and reinforce the NATO Response Force so that it can play a greater role in helping Allied forces to operate together and to contribute to NATO's deterrence and defence posture. It also seeks to expand education and training of personnel, complementing national efforts.

NATO is also taking steps to enhance the linkages between its forces, and with partner countries as well. The 2011 NATO operation over Libya showed the importance of such connections; as soon as the political decision was taken to initiate the NATO mission, Alliance pilots were flying wing to wing with each other, and with pilots from non-NATO European and Arab partner countries. Modalities for partners to take part in the
Connected Forces Initiative and Smart Defence have been published to maximise partner participation in these initiatives.

**Framework Nations Initiative**

In June 2014, NATO Defence Ministers agreed a Framework Nations Concept, which sees groups of countries coming together for two purposes. First, for the maintenance of current capabilities and as a foundation for the coherent development of new capabilities in the medium to long term. This builds on the notions of multinational development of capabilities that are at the heart of Smart Defence and the ideas associated with groups of countries coming together to produce them. Second, as a mechanism for collective training and exercises in order to prepare groupings of forces. For example, those Allies that maintain a broad spectrum of capabilities provide a framework for other Allies to “plug” into.

**Countering improvised explosive devices**

The improvised explosive device (IED) has proven to be the weapon of choice for non-conventional adversarial forces. Although the ISAF operation is coming to a close, NATO must remain prepared to counter IEDs in any land or maritime operation involving asymmetrical threats, in which force protection will remain a paramount priority. Institutionalising counter-IED lessons learned across the last two decades of operations, NATO’s ambitious Counter-IED Action Plan has increased its focus on capabilities for attacking threat networks behind these destructive devices. Although developed in the C-IED context, such capabilities can also contribute to counter-piracy, counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism operations.

**Improving air- and sealift capabilities**

Air- and sealift capabilities are a key enabler for operations which allow forces and equipment to be deployed quickly to wherever they are needed. While there is significant procurement nationally, many Allies have pooled resources, including with partner countries, to acquire new capacities through commercial arrangements or through purchase, to give them access to additional transport to swiftly move troops, equipment and supplies across the globe.

**Collective logistics contracts**

To improve effectiveness, NATO is examining procedures for the development and administration of rapidly usable contracts, including for medical support, for repayment by countries when used. More broadly, collective logistics is being implemented by NATO in Kosovo and Afghanistan during redeployment to optimise the use of multinational
capabilities. In June 2013, Exercise Capable Logistician brought together a large number of logisticians from member and partner countries to work on improving interoperability.

**Dealing with evolving and emerging threats**

**Missile defence**

In the context of a broader response to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, NATO has already been pursuing an Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence Programme since 2005. This Programme is aimed at protecting deployed Allied forces against ballistic missile threats with ranges up to 3,000 kilometres. In 2010, it delivered an interim capability to protect troops in a specific area against short-range and some medium-range ballistic missiles.

At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO leaders decided to expand this Programme to include protection of NATO European populations and territories, and at the same time invited Russia to cooperate on missile defence and to share in its benefits. The dialogue with Russia on missile defence cooperation is currently suspended.

At the 2012 Chicago Summit, Allies declared an Interim NATO ballistic missile defence (BMD) capability as an initial step to establish NATO’s missile defence system, which will protect all NATO European populations, territory and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles.

**Cyber defence**

NATO’s cyber defence capability for the protection of its own networks is the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC), which provides centralised cyber defence support to the NATO sites. NATO continues to invest in follow-on requirements to the NCIRC following the NATO capability development and procurement procedures.

NATO defines also, through the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), cyber defence capability targets for the member countries’ implementation of national cyber defence capabilities to facilitate an Alliance-wide and common approach to cyber defence capability developments. Relevant parts of the new cyber defence policy will be taken into account in subsequent NDPP cycles.

Cyber defence has also been integrated into NATO’s Smart Defence initiative, endorsed at the 2012 Chicago Summit. As such, Smart Defence is meant to enable countries to work together to develop and maintain capabilities they could not afford to develop or procure alone, and to free resources for developing other capabilities. Such Smart Defence projects in cyber defence, so far, are the Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP), the
Stabilisation and reconstruction

The Alliance's experience with crisis-response operations has shown the importance of stabilisation and reconstruction which are activities undertaken in fragile states or in conflict or post-conflict situations to promote security, development and good governance in key sectors. The primary responsibilities for such activities normally lie with other actors, but the Alliance has established political guidelines that will help to improve its involvement in stabilisation and reconstruction. It will be important in this context for the Alliance to seek, in accordance with the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan, unity of effort with the other members of the international community, in particular its strategic partners, the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU).

To this end, NATO must have the ability to plan for, employ, and coordinate civilian as well as military crisis-management capabilities that countries provide for agreed Allied missions. NATO's defence planning therefore also includes non-military capabilities and expertise to complement the military support to stabilisation operations and reconstruction efforts. These non-military capabilities are sought from existing and planned means in national inventories of those countries that are willing to make them available.

Critical long-term enabling capabilities

Information superiority is a key enabling element in the battlespace and helps commanders at every level make the best decisions, creating the circumstances for success at less risk and greater speed. NATO will therefore continue to develop and acquire a range of networked information systems (Automated Information Systems) that support the two Strategic Commands. They cover a number of domains, including, land, air, maritime, intelligence, logistics and the common operating picture, with a view to enabling more informed and effective, holistic oversight, decision making and command and control.

Federated Mission Networking

The Afghanistan Mission Network is a single federated network which improves information-sharing by easing the information flow and creating better situational awareness among countries participating in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Taking into consideration best practices and lessons learned from its implementation, a Federated Mission Networking framework is now being developed, which will underpin
the Alliance's ability to connect its information systems and operate effectively together, including with partners, on training, exercises and operations.

**Air Command and Control**

NATO is putting into place a fully interoperable Air Command and Control System (ACCS), which will provide for the first time a fully integrated set of tools to support the conduct of all air operations in both the real-time and non-real-time environments. ACCS will make available the capability to plan, direct, task, coordinate, supervise, assess and report on the operation of all allocated air assets in peace, crisis and conflict.

The system is composed of both static and deployable elements with equipment that will be used both within the NATO Command Structure and in individual Allies. With the further inclusion of command and control functionality for ballistic missile defence (BMD), a fully integrated system for air and missile defence at the tactical level will be fielded.

**Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance**

NATO needs a Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) capability that will provide for the coordinated collection, processing, dissemination and sharing within NATO of ISR material gathered by the future Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system, the current NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force (NAEW&C Force) and nationally supplied ISR assets. While NATO is delivering a critical JISR capability in ISAF, an enduring JISR capability is being developed in a phased approach, starting with the implementation of an initial operational capability on time for the NATO Response Force 2016.

**Alliance Ground Surveillance**

The Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system is a key element of transformation and an essential enabling capability for forces across the full spectrum of NATO's current and future operations and missions. The AGS will be an airborne, stand-off ground surveillance system that can detect and track vehicles, such as tanks, trucks or helicopters, moving on or near the ground, in all weather conditions. The AGS airborne vehicle acquisition contract was signed during the 2012 Chicago Summit, and production of the first AGS aircraft began in December 2013.

**NATO Airborne Warning & Control System**

As one of the most visible and tangible examples of what cooperation between Allies can achieve, the NATO Airborne Warning & Control System (AWACS) provides NATO-owned and operated airborne command and control, air and maritime surveillance, and battlespace management capability. AWACS has continuously proven itself a critical asset over Libya and Afghanistan.
Other initiatives
The NATO Response Force

The NATO Response Force (NRF) is a technologically advanced, multinational force made up of land, air, maritime and Special Operations Forces (SOF) components that the Alliance can deploy quickly to wherever it is needed. It has the overarching purpose of being able to provide a rapid military response to an emerging crisis, whether for collective defence purposes or for other crisis-response operations. It is also a driving engine of NATO's military transformation.

Aviation modernisation programmes

The Alliance will continue to develop its capabilities in the field of air traffic management (ATM) and engage in civil aviation modernisation plans in Europe (Single European Sky ATM Research) and North America (NextGen). The aim is threefold: to ensure safe access to airspace; effective delivery of services; and civil-military interoperability in order to safeguard military mission effectiveness at global level and the ability to conduct the full range of NATO operations, including the airspace integration of unmanned aircraft systems.

Energy security

Allies recognise that a stable and reliable energy supply, diversification of routes, suppliers and energy resources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks remain of critical importance. While these issues are primarily the responsibility of national governments and other international organisations concerned, NATO contributes to energy security in various ways NATO raises strategic awareness through political discussions and intelligence-sharing, further develops its competence to contribute to the protection of critical energy infrastructure, improves the energy efficiency of military forces, enhances its training and education efforts, and engages with partner countries and other international organisations.

Reforming NATO's structures

In line with the 2010 Strategic Concept, over the last few years the Alliance has been engaged in a process of continual reform by streamlining structures, improving working methods and maximising efficiency.

Political will of Allies to pursue change has helped to ensure that the Alliance continues to be effective in a changing world.

The Alliance's military command structure is being fundamentally transformed into a leaner, more effective and affordable structure. The new structure reached initial operational capability in December 2013, opening the way to an entity that is more agile,
flexible and better able to deploy headquarters for remote operations as well as to protect Alliance territory.

In the same spirit, a major reform of NATO's agencies was conducted with a view to consolidating and rationalising various services and programmes and ensuring more effective and efficient service and capability delivery. As a result, NATO now has a NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA), NATO Support Agency (NSPA), and NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO).

NATO Headquarters has also been reformed, including with regard to a smaller but more efficient International Staff, intelligence-sharing and production, the establishment of a division responsible for emerging security challenges, and a significant reduction in the number of committees. Furthermore, the transition to the new NATO headquarters will enable further improvements to efficiency and effectiveness of the Alliance.

Resource reform in the area of programming, transparency, accountability and information management has also helped making NATO resource and financial management more efficient.

**Maritime security**

In January 2011, NATO adopted the Alliance Maritime Strategy. Consistent with the 2010 Strategic Concept, the Strategy sets out ways in which NATO's unique maritime power can be used to address critical security challenges.

There are four areas in which NATO's maritime forces can contribute to Alliance security. The first three are the "core tasks" of NATO, as defined by the Alliance's Strategic Concept: deterrence and collective defence; crisis management; and cooperative security. In addition, the Maritime Strategy sets out a fourth area: maritime security. This includes surveillance, information sharing, maritime interdiction, and contributions to energy security, including the protection of critical infrastructure.

As a major deliverable for its Wales Summit in September 2014, the Alliance will now implement its Maritime Strategy. This ambitious endeavour encompasses a complete revamping of NATO's maritime assets, an extensive programme of maritime exercises and training, and the enhancement of cooperation between NATO and its partners, as well as other international actors, in particular the European Union.

2. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_51633.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_51633.htm)
The NATO Defence Planning Process

Allies undertake to provide, individually or together, the forces and capabilities needed for NATO to fulfil its security and defence objectives. The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) is the primary means to identify the required capabilities and promote their timely and coherent development and acquisition by Allies.

An effective defence planning process is essential to deliver the collective political, military and resource advantages expected by NATO members. By participating in the NDPP, and without compromising their national sovereignty, Allies can harmonise their national defence plans with those of NATO to identify, develop and deliver a fair share of the overall forces and capabilities needed for the Alliance to be able to undertake its full range of missions.
The NDPP is designed to influence national defence planning efforts and identifies and prioritises NATO’s future capability requirements, apportions those requirements to each Ally as targets, facilitates their implementation and regularly assesses progress. It provides a framework for the harmonisation of national and Alliance defence planning activities aimed at the timely development and delivery of all the capabilities, military and non-military, needed to meet the agreed security and defence objectives inherent to the Strategic Concept.

The Defence Policy and Planning Committee (DPPC) is responsible for the development of policy and overall coordination and direction of activities related to defence planning.

The key characteristics of the NDPP are that:

- It is a coherent and integrated process in which Allies choose to participate, on a voluntary basis, to deliver the required capabilities in the short, medium and long term.
- It supports a capability-based approach but provides sufficient detail to assist participating countries and the Alliance to develop the forces necessary to undertake the full range of NATO missions.
- It is sufficiently flexible to respond to the needs of both individual Allies and the Alliance, informs and guides national defence plans, provides transparency, promotes multinational approaches and offers opportunities to capitalise on best practices.

Efforts to enhance the NDPP, by making it more flexible and responsive, continue. The defence planning process evolves continuously; however two milestones stand out. In 2009, initiatives were taken to improve the harmonisation of the planning domains and Allies were encouraged to integrate their national defence planning activities to complement NATO efforts. Another milestone came earlier with the Alliance’s engagement in non-Article 5 operations. With collective defence war plans during the Cold War, members were expected to assign and employ the requested forces virtually without question. The non-Article 5 operations Allies have conducted since the fall of the Berlin Wall are, by agreement, on a case-by-case and the provision of national forces is discretionary. As such, the automaticity associated with force planning during the Cold War period was lost. This led to the need for “force generation conferences” to solicit the relevant forces and “operational planning” to develop the plans. Existing processes were adjusted and then reviewed on a regular basis in view of the changing security environment.

### NATO Defence Planning Process

The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) consists of five steps conducted over a period of four years.

**Step 1 - Establish political guidance**

A single, unified political guidance for defence planning sets out the overall aims and objectives to be met by the Alliance. It translates guidance from higher strategic policy documents, such as the Strategic Concept, in sufficient detail to direct the defence planning efforts of the planning domains in order to determine the capabilities required.
Political guidance aims at defining the number, scale and nature of the operations the Alliance should be able to conduct in the future (commonly referred to as NATO’s Level of Ambition). It also defines the qualitative capability requirements to support this ambition. By doing so, it steers capability development efforts within the Allies and NATO. It defines associated priorities and timelines for use by the planning domains.

Political guidance is normally reviewed every four years. The most recent was published in March 2011.

**Step 2 - Determine requirements**

NATO’s capability requirements (current and future) are consolidated into a single list called the Minimum Capability Requirements. These requirements are identified by the planning domains and the two Strategic Commands (Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT)). ACT has the lead in determining the requirements. The process is structured, comprehensive, transparent and traceable and uses analytical tools coupled with relevant NATO expert analysis. This is done once every four years, although out-of-cycle activity for particular capabilities can be undertaken as circumstances dictate.

**Step 3 - Apportion requirements and set targets**

Target setting apportions the Minimum Capability Requirements to the Allies (either individually or as part of an agreed multinational undertaking) and NATO entities in the form of target packages. The apportionment process aims to apply the principles of fair burden-sharing and reasonable challenge.

The Strategic Commands (with ACT in the lead) develop a target package for each Ally for existing and future capabilities, with associated priorities and timelines. Targets are expressed in capability terms and are flexible enough to allow innovative solutions to be developed rather than replacing ‘like with like’.

Once each Ally has been consulted, the International Staff replaces the Strategic Commands in leading the process. Target packages are forwarded to Allies with a recommendation of which targets should be retained or removed. Allies review these packages during a series of Multilateral Examinations and agree a target package for each Ally on the basis of “consensus minus one”, meaning that a single Ally cannot veto what otherwise would be a unanimous decision on its own target package.

Agreed target packages are subsequently forwarded to Allies for submission to defence ministers for adoption. A summary report is also prepared which includes an assessment
of the potential risk and possible impact caused by the removal of targets from packages on the delivery of the Alliance's Level of Ambition.

**Step 4 - Facilitate implementation**

This step assists national measures, facilitates multinational initiatives and directs NATO efforts to satisfy agreed targets and priorities in a coherent and timely manner. Unlike other steps in the process, this step – or function - is continuous in nature.

**Step 5 - Review results**

This step seeks to examine the degree to which NATO's political objectives, ambitions and associated targets have been met and to offer feedback and direction for the next cycle of the defence planning process. Step 5 provides an overall assessment of the degree to which the Alliance's forces and capabilities are able to meet the political guidance, including the NATO Level of Ambition. It is carried out by a Defence Planning Capability Review which scrutinises and assesses Allies' defence and financial plans.

Every two years, Allies complete a Defence Planning Capability Survey which seeks data on Allies' national plans and policies, including efforts (national, multinational and collective) to address their capability targets. The survey also seeks information on the national inventory of military forces and associated capabilities, any relevant non-military capabilities potentially available for Alliance operations and national financial plans.

Assessments for each participating Ally are produced. They constitute a comprehensive analysis of national plans and capabilities, including force structures, specific circumstances and priorities. These assessments also include a statement by the Strategic Commands regarding the impact each country's plans have on the ability of ACO to conduct missions. They may also include recommendations which seek to redirect resources from areas where the Alliance has a surfeit of capability, to deficiencies areas.

The assessments are submitted for examination to the Defence Policy and Planning Committee (DPPC) for review and approval during a series of multilateral examinations. In parallel with and based on the Strategic Commands' Suitability and Risk Assessment, the Military Committee develops a Suitability and Risk Assessment. It effectively provides a risk assessment on the military suitability of the plans and the degree of military risk associated with them in relation to political guidance for defence planning.

On the basis of this and the individual assessments, the DPPC prepares a NATO Capabilities Report, highlighting individual and collective progress on capability development as it relates to NATO's Level of Ambition.
Support structures

- **The senior committee for defence planning**

The DPPC is the senior committee for defence planning. It is responsible for the development of defence planning-related policy and the overall coordination and direction of NDPP activities. The DPPC is the central body that oversees the work of the NATO bodies and committees responsible for the planning domains on behalf of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). It can provide feedback and defence planning process-related direction to them. The DPPC will often meet with appropriate subject-matter experts invited to “reinforce” the regular representatives. When meeting in this format, the DPPC is referred to as the DPPC “Reinforced” or DPPC(R).

- **Capability Development Executive Board**

The Capability Development Executive Board provides unity of oversight, policy, direction and guidance and enforces authority and accountability throughout NATO capability development. It brings together the senior leadership of the relevant civil and military capability development stakeholders in the NATO staffs and acts as a steering board to direct staff efforts associated with NATO capability development in accordance with the guidance provided by Allies through the relevant committees.

- **Defence Planning staff**

The work of the DPPC and CDEB is supported by relevant NATO Defence Planning staff. This staff comprises civil and military expertise resident within the various NATO HQ staffs and Strategic Commands, and supports the NDPP throughout the five steps.

Planning domains and related committees

NATO Defence Planning encompasses many different domains: force, resource, armaments, logistics, C3 (consultation, command and control), civil emergency, air and missile defence, air traffic management, standardization, intelligence, military medical support and science and technology. In April 2012, the integration of cyber defence into the NDPP began. Relevant cyber defence requirements are also identified and prioritised through the defence planning process.
**Force planning**

Force planning aims to promote the availability of national forces and capabilities for the full range of Alliance missions. It seeks to ensure that Allies develop modern, deployable, sustainable and interoperable forces and capabilities, which can undertake demanding operations wherever required, including being able to operate abroad with limited or no support from the country of destination. The focus of force planning is on “capabilities” and how Allies should prioritise their resources to achieve these.

**Resource planning**

NATO resource planning focuses on the financing of capabilities that are jointly or commonly funded, where members pool resources within a NATO framework. Resource planning is closely linked to operational planning.

There is a distinction between joint funding and common funding: joint funding covers activities managed by NATO agencies, such as the NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and NATO pipelines; common funding involves three different budgets; the civil budget, the military budget, and the NATO Security Investment Programme.

These budgets are relatively small, but the specific use of each is key to ensuring the cohesion of the Alliance and the integration of capabilities.

**The Resource Policy and Planning Board**

The Resource Policy and Planning Board is the senior advisory body to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on the management of all NATO resources. It has responsibility for the overall management of NATO's civil and military budgets, as well as the NATO Security Investment Programme and manpower.

**Armaments planning**

Armaments planning focuses on the development of multinational (but not common-funded) armaments programmes. It promotes cost-effective acquisition, cooperative development and production of armaments. It also encourages interoperability, and technological and industrial cooperation among Allies and partners.

**The Conference of National Armaments Directors**

The Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) is the senior NATO committee responsible for Alliance armaments cooperation, material standardization and defence procurement. It brings together the top officials responsible for defence procurement in NATO member and partner countries to consider the political, economic and technical
aspects of the development and procurement of equipment for NATO forces, with the aim of arriving at common solutions.

**Logistics planning**

Logistics planning aims at ensuring responsive and usable logistics support to NATO operations. This is achieved by promoting the development of military and civil logistics capabilities and multinational logistic cooperation.

**The Logistics Committee**

The Logistics Committee is the senior advisory body on logistics at NATO. Its mandate is two-fold: to address consumer logistics matters to enhance the performance, efficiency, sustainability and combat effectiveness of Alliance forces; to exercise, on behalf of the NAC, a coordinating authority across the NATO logistics spectrum.

**C3 planning**

NATO's political and military functions require the use of NATO and national consultation, command and control (C3) systems, services and facilities, supported by personnel and NATO-agreed doctrine, organisations and procedures.

C3 systems include communications, information, navigation and identification systems as well as sensor and warning installation systems. They are designed and operated in a networked and integrated form to meet the needs of NATO. Individual C3 systems may be provided by NATO via common-funded programmes or by Allies via national, multinational or joint-funded cooperative programmes.

There is no established C3 planning cycle which allows C3 planning to be responsive. However, activities are harmonised with the cycles of the other associated planning disciplines.

**The Consultation, Command and Control (C3) Board**

The Consultation, Command and Control Board is a senior multinational body acting on behalf of and responsible to the NAC on all matters relating to NATO C3 issues. This includes interoperability of NATO and national C3 systems, and advising the CNAD on C3 cooperative programs.

**Civil emergency planning**

Civil emergency planning aims to collect, analyse and share information on national planning activity to ensure the most effective use of civil resources for use during emergency situations, in accordance with Alliance objectives. It enables Allies and
partners to assist each other in preparing for and dealing with the consequences of crisis, disaster or conflict.

The Civil Emergency Planning Committee

The Civil Emergency Planning Committee is the top advisory body for the protection of civilian populations and the use of civil resources in support of NATO's objectives.

Air and missile defence planning

Air and missile defence planning enables members to harmonise national efforts with international planning related to air command and control and air and missile defence weapons. The NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATINAMDS) comprises sensors, command and control facilities and weapons systems, such as surface-based air defence and fighter aircraft. It is a cornerstone of NATO's air and missile defence policy, and a visible indication of cohesion, shared responsibility and solidarity across the Alliance. A NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme has been initiated to enhance the previous NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence (NATINAD) system, particularly against theatre ballistic missiles.

The Air and Missile Defence Committee

It is the senior multinational policy advisory and coordinating body regarding all elements of NATO's integrated air and missile defence and relevant air power aspects in a joint approach. It advises the NAC and the relevant Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council bodies on all elements of air defence, including missile defence and relevant air power aspects. It promotes harmonisation of national efforts with international planning related to air command and control and air defence weapons. It reports directly to the NAC and is supported by its Panel on Air and Missile Defence.

The Military Committee Working Group (Air Defence) is responsible for reviewing, advising and making recommendations to the Military Committee on air and missile defence issues.

Other groups dealing with air and missile defence-related issues include the DPPC(R) with particular responsibilities on ballistic missile defence, the Missile Defence Project Group, which oversees the BMD Programme Office, and the NATO-Russia Council Missile Defence Working Group.

Air traffic management

NATO's role in civil-military air traffic management is to ensure, in cooperation with other international organisations, the following: safe access to airspace, effective delivery of
services and civil-military interoperability for air operations conducted in support of the Alliance’s security tasks and missions. The aim is to achieve these objectives while minimising disruption to civil aviation, already constrained by the limited capacity of systems and airports, and mitigating the cost implications of new civil technologies on defence budgets.

The Air Traffic Management Committee

This committee is the senior civil-military advisory body to the NAC for airspace use and air traffic management. Its mission is to develop, represent and promote NATO’s view on matters related to safe and expeditious air operations in the airspace of NATO areas of responsibility and interest.

Standardization

At NATO, standardization is the process of developing shared concepts, doctrines, procedures and designs to achieve and maintain the most effective levels of “compatibility, interchangeability and commonality” in operations, procedures, materials, technology and administration. The primary products of this process are Standardization Agreements (STANAGS) between member countries.

The Committee for Standardization

The Committee for Standardization is the senior authority of the Alliance responsible for providing coordinated advice to the NAC on overall standardization issues.

Intelligence

Intelligence plays an important role in the defence planning process, especially with the emergence of multidirectional and multidimensional security challenges such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The Intelligence Steering Board

The Intelligence Steering Board acts as an inter-service coordination body responsible for steering intelligence activities and for providing effective support to the decision-making process at NATO Headquarters. It is tasked, among others, with developing the Strategic Intelligence Requirements from which any capability requirements are derived.

The Civilian Intelligence Committee
It is the sole body that handles civilian intelligence issues at NATO. It reports directly to the NAC and advises it on matters of espionage and terrorist or related threats, which may affect the Alliance.

*The Military Intelligence Committee*

It is responsible for developing a work plan in particular in the areas of NATO intelligence support to operations and oversight of policy guidance on military intelligence.

*Military medical support*

Military medical support is normally a national responsibility; however planning needs to be flexible to consider multinational approaches. The degree of multi-nationality varies according to the circumstances of the mission and the participation of Allies.

*The Committee of the Chiefs of Military Medical Services in NATO*

The Committee of the Chiefs of Military Medical Services in NATO is composed of the senior military medical authorities of member countries. It acts as the central point for the development and coordination of military medical matters and for providing medical advice to the Military Committee.

*Science and technology*

NATO promotes and conducts cooperative research and information exchange to support the effective use of national defence science and technology and further the military needs of the Alliance.

*The NATO Science and Technology Organization*

The NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO) acts as NATO’s principal organisation for science and technology research.

It is composed of a Science and Technology Board, Scientific and Technical Committees and three Executive Bodies (the Office of the Chief Scientist, the Collaboration Support Office, and the Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation).

The STO was created through the amalgamation of the Research and Technology Organization and the NATO Undersea Research Centre. These bodies were brought together following a decision at the 2010 Lisbon Summit to reform the NATO agency structure.
Smart Defence

In these times of austerity, each euro, dollar or pound sterling counts. Smart Defence is a cooperative way of thinking about generating the modern defence capabilities that the Alliance needs for the future. In this renewed culture of cooperation, Allies are encouraged to work together to develop, acquire, operate and maintain military capabilities to undertake the Alliance’s essential core tasks agreed in NATO’s Strategic Concept. That means harmonising requirements, pooling and sharing capabilities, setting priorities and coordinating efforts better.

From 2008 onwards, the world economy has been facing its worst financial period since the end of the Second World War. Governments have been applying budgetary restrictions to tackle this serious recession, which is having a considerable effect on defence spending.

Furthermore, the Alliance’s security environment has been changing, and has become more diverse and unpredictable. The most recent crisis in Ukraine serves as a reminder that peace and stability cannot be taken for granted, and that the Alliance needs to invest in sufficient defence capabilities.
Rebalancing defence spending and the capabilities that are generated between the European member countries, Canada and the United States is a necessity now more than ever. The other Allies must reduce the gap with the United States by equipping themselves with capabilities that are deemed to be critical, deployable and sustainable, and must demonstrate political determination to achieve that goal. There must be equitable sharing of the defence burden. Smart Defence is one of NATO's tools to meet this challenge.

### Components

Allied nations must give priority to those capabilities which NATO needs most, specialise in what they do best, and look for multinational solutions to shared problems. NATO can act as intermediary, helping the nations to establish and build on what they can do together at lower cost.

**Prioritisation**

Aligning national capability priorities with those of NATO has been a challenge for some years. Smart Defence is the opportunity for a transparent, cooperative and cost-effective approach to meet essential capability requirements.

**Specialisation**

With budgets under pressure, nations often make unilateral decisions when shaping their equipment plans. When this happens, other nations can fall under an increased obligation to maintain certain capabilities. Such specialisation "by default" is the inevitable result of uncoordinated budget cuts. NATO should encourage specialisation "by design" so that members concentrate on their national strengths and agree to coordinate planned defence budget cuts with the Allies.

**Cooperation**

Acting together, nations can develop capabilities which they could not afford individually, for example by sharing the often considerable development costs of complex military capabilities, and achieving savings simply through economies of scale. Cooperating groups of nations may take different forms, such as a small group of nations led by another nation, or strategic sharing by those who are close together in terms of geography, culture or common equipment requirements.

### Mechanisms

**Special Envoys**
The NATO Secretary General has designated the Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation (SACT), General Jean-Paul Paloméros, and the Deputy Secretary General, Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, as Special Envoys for Smart Defence. National support is essential, regarding both the concept of Smart Defence and the development of concrete multinational projects. The Special Envoys engage with senior military and political leaders to encourage participation by Allied nations.

**Coordination with partners**

Working together as Allies also means seeking cooperation with players outside NATO. NATO and the European Union (EU) are facing a similar challenge, that of reconciling the urgency of savings with the financial challenges of maintaining a modern and capable defence capability. NATO and the EU, specifically the European Defence Agency, are coordinating their efforts to avoid needless duplication of work and to seek synergies. Concrete opportunities for cooperation have already been identified, in particular in the areas of medical support, combating improvised explosive devices (IEDs), as well as nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The Alliance is also involving partner nations in specific Smart Defence efforts when the participating nations agree.

Smart Defence also benefits from innovative multinational cooperation by industry. Our industrial partners are essential players in this enterprise, and work is underway within the Framework for NATO-Industry Engagement to develop new ways of harnessing the innovation and creativity that our suppliers can provide.

▲ Smart Defence in the long term

At the Chicago Summit in May 2012, NATO leaders agreed to embrace Smart Defence to ensure that the Alliance can develop, acquire and maintain the capabilities required to achieve the goals of ‘NATO Forces 2020’: modern, tightly connected forces that are properly equipped, trained, exercised and led.

Since then, Smart Defence has developed into a major consideration by Allies to deliver needed capabilities in a cost-effective and efficient manner. This is reflected through an extensive portfolio of evolving projects and proposals and an ever-growing number of successfully completed efforts. The latter have been delivering real benefits to Allies through the formula of doing things together instead of doing them alone.
The Smart Defence mindset has started to take hold. NATO will continue to capitalise on the momentum gained over the last few years through implementation and evolution of Smart Defence projects.
After 2014, NATO is expected to shift its emphasis from operational engagement to operational preparedness. This means NATO will need to remain capable of performing its core tasks - described in its Strategic Concept¹ - and of maintaining its forces at a high level of readiness. To help achieve this, Allied leaders have set out the goal of ‘NATO Forces 2020’: modern, tightly connected forces that are properly equipped, trained, exercised and led. The Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) will help maintain NATO’s readiness and combat effectiveness through expanded education and training, increased exercises and better use of technology.
After the end of the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, CFI will build on the Alliance's experience - including lessons learned from 20 years of operations - to ensure that Allies can work even more effectively together and with partners.

The main requirements of CFI are to ensure that Allies can communicate, train and operate together effectively, and that NATO has increasing opportunities to validate and certify their ability to do so. The NATO Response Force will also play an important role in this context by providing a vehicle both to demonstrate operational readiness and serve as a “testbed” for Alliance transformation.

A Fundamental elements of CFI

**Expanded education and training** is focused on individuals or small groups and aims to concentrate on key requirements, harmonise current efforts and address any gaps. NATO will capitalise collectively on the individual training efforts of Allies and identify areas for collaboration and potential synergies. It will also provide training for NATO-specific capabilities and any necessary overarching collective training so that Allies can come together and be ready for any eventuality.

**Increased exercises** provide an essential means for forces to practise tactics, techniques and procedures, promote and gauge interoperability, validate training and, when required, certify headquarters, units and formations. Exercises should cover the full spectrum of intensity, promote interoperability and also compensate for the reduced operational experience of forces working together. NATO will build a robust exercise and training programme that will underpin the Alliance's interoperability in the future. High-intensity, large-scale exercises will provide the demanding scenarios necessary for NATO to retain its “fighting edge”.

On 22 October 2013, NATO Defence Ministers agreed that the Alliance will hold a major live exercise in 2015 that will involve a significant number of land, maritime and air forces deployed. Spain, Portugal and Italy offered to host the exercise. From 2016 onwards, NATO will also conduct such major live exercises on a regular basis, with a broader scope and covering the full range of Alliance missions. NATO Defence Ministers also agreed to draw up a broader concept for training and exercises up to 2020.

**Better use of technology** will help Allied and partner forces to work together. This supports and enhances connectivity and interoperability of equipment and systems. It also capitalises on modern technologies and capabilities to assist in training, educating, exercising, deploying and sustaining the forces. Federated, modern simulators will enable Allies to train together while remaining in their peacetime locations – reducing
expenditure but at the same time providing the necessary interaction between diverse forces.

### NATO Response Force

The NATO Response Force (NRF) is a high-readiness, technologically advanced multinational force made up of land, air, maritime and Special Operations Forces components that the Alliance can deploy rapidly if needed. The NRF comprises a joint force of about 13,000 high-readiness troops provided by Allies and is based on a rotational system; the nations commit forces for a 12-month period.

Under the Connected Forces Initiative, Allied Defence Ministers agreed at their meeting on 21 February 2013 that the NRF will become even more important post-ISAF and provide a vehicle both to demonstrate operational readiness and to serve as a “testbed” for Alliance transformation. NRF exercises will strike a balance between these two objectives.

The NRF will support NATO’s shift from operational engagement to operational preparedness. It provides a collective approach with a ready, integrated, deployable and effective military response to show Alliance resolve, solidarity and commitment.

The NRF is a vehicle which can be built upon to address the three main CFI elements.

### Special Operations Forces

Finally, enhancing Special Operations Forces will support this initiative. The NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) has a vital role in planning and coordinating missions and in improving the cooperation and connectivity between Special Operations Forces.
1. The Strategic Concept endorsed at the 2010 Lisbon Summit lays out NATO's vision for an evolving Alliance that will remain able to defend its members against modern threats and commits NATO to become more agile, more capable and more effective.
NATO Response Force

The NATO Response Force (NRF) is a highly ready and technologically advanced multinational force made up of land, air, maritime and Special Operations Forces components that the Alliance can deploy quickly, wherever needed. The NRF will become more important post-2014, after the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has completed its mission in Afghanistan. It will provide a vehicle to demonstrate operational readiness and act as a “testbed” for Alliance transformation. It can be used in the implementation of NATO's Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) as a vehicle for greater cooperation in education and training, increased exercises and better use of technology.
On 21 February 2013, NATO Defence Ministers agreed that the NRF will be at the core of the CFI in order to maintain NATO's readiness and combat-effectiveness.

As part of the initiative, the ministers agreed that the Alliance should hold a major live exercise in 2015 that will include the NATO Response Force, and draw up a comprehensive programme of training and exercises for the period 2015-2020.

The NRF is comprised of three parts: a command and control element from the NATO Command Structure; the Immediate Response Force, a joint force of around 13,000 high-readiness troops provided by Allies; and a Response Forces Pool, which can supplement the Immediate Response Force when necessary.

Purpose

The NRF has the overarching purpose of being able to provide a rapid military response to an emerging crisis, whether for collective defence purposes or for other crisis-response operations.

The NRF gives the Alliance the means to respond swiftly to various types of crises anywhere in the world. It is also a driving engine of NATO's military transformation.

A rotational force

The NRF is based on a rotational system where Allied nations commit land, air, maritime or Special Operations Forces units to the Immediate Response Force. Rotations were initially for a six-month period, but since 2012, the rotation periods have been extended to 12 months.

The flexibility offered by the Response Forces Pool, which permits NATO nations to make contributions on their own terms for durations of their choosing, is particularly relevant in this regard.

The NRF is also open to partner countries, once approved by the North Atlantic Council.

Participation in the Immediate Response Force is preceded by national preparation, followed by training with other participants in the multinational force. As units rotate through the NRF, the associated high standards, concepts and technologies are gradually spread throughout the Alliance, thereby fulfilling one of the key purposes of the NATO Response Force – the further transformation of Allied forces.

Operational command of the NRF currently alternates among NATO's Joint Force Commands in Brunssum, the Netherlands and Naples, Italy.

A powerful package
The Immediate Response Force has:

- a brigade-sized land component based on three Battle Groups and their supporting elements;
- a maritime component based on the Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG) and the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group (SNMCMG);
- a combat air and air-support component;
- Special Operations Forces; and
- a chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defence task force.

Before use, the force will be tailored (adjusted in size and capability) to match the demands of any specific operation to which it is committed.

**Any mission, anywhere**

The NRF provides a visible assurance of NATO's cohesion and commitment to deterrence and collective defence. Each rotation of the force has to prepare itself for a wide range of tasks. These include contributing to the preservation of territorial integrity, making a demonstration of force, peace-support operations, disaster relief, protecting critical infrastructure and security operations. Initial-entry operations are conducted jointly as part of a larger force to facilitate the arrival of follow-on forces.

Elements of the NRF helped protect the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens, Greece, and were deployed to support the Afghan presidential elections in September of the same year.

The NRF has also been used in disaster relief.

- In September and October 2005, aircraft from the NATO Response Force delivered relief supplies donated by NATO member and partner countries to the US to assist in dealing with the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
- From October 2005 to February 2006, elements of the NATO Response Force were used in the disaster-relief effort in Pakistan, following the devastating 8 October earthquake. Aircraft from the NRF were used in an air bridge that delivered almost 3,500 tons of urgently needed supplies to Pakistan, while engineers and medical personnel from the NATO Response Force were deployed to the country to assist in the relief effort.
The NATO Response Force initiative was announced at the Prague Summit in November 2002.

In the words of General James Jones, the then NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, "...NATO will no longer have the large, massed units that were necessary for the Cold War, but will have agile and capable forces at Graduated Readiness levels that will better prepare the Alliance to meet any threat that it is likely to face in this 21st century."

The NRF concept was approved by Allied Ministers of Defence in June 2003 in Brussels.

**From concept to reality**

On 13 October 2004, at an informal meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in Poiana Brasov, Romania, the NATO Secretary General and Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) formally announced that NRF had reached its initial operational capability and was ready to take on the full range of missions.

The capabilities of the NRF were tested in a major live exercise, Steadfast Jaguar 06, in the Cape Verde Islands in June 2006. The challenging location was specifically designed to demonstrate and prove the viability of the NRF concept. At NATO's Riga Summit in November 2006, the NRF was declared to be fully ready to undertake operations.

Since then, the way the NRF is generated and composed has been adjusted twice, in 2008 and 2010. This was to provide a more flexible approach to force generation, thereby facilitating force contributions which were being hampered by the enduring high operational tempo arising from Iraq, Afghanistan and other missions. To further support force generation, Allies have set themselves voluntary national targets for force contributions.

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**Authority**

Any decision to use the NRF is a consensual political decision, taken on a case-by-case basis by all 28 Allies in the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s principal decision-making body.
Exercises

Exercises are important tools through which the Alliance tests and validates its concepts, procedures, systems and tactics. More broadly, they enable militaries and civilian organisations deployed in theatres of operation to practice working together. Exercises have many other functions, not least helping to identify “best practices” (what works) and “lessons learnt” (what needs improving).

NATO has been conducting military exercises since 1951 and individual NATO countries conduct their own exercises as a routine part of their national preparation for operations. Holding frequent exercises that test many different capabilities helps forces operate more effectively and efficiently together in demanding crisis situations.
Exercises vary in scope, duration and form – ranging between live exercises in the field to computer-assisted exercises that take place in a classroom. They are planned in advance by NATO's two strategic commands – Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation – taking into account strategic priorities and objectives, operational requirements and specific exercise objectives. They have been open to all formal partner countries since 2010 and while a majority of them are military exercises, the Alliance also organizes political exercises too.

**Highlights**

- Exercises allow NATO to test and validate concepts, procedures, systems and tactics.
- They enable military and civilian organizations deployed on the ground to work together to identify "best practices" (what works) and "lessons learnt" (what needs improving).
- Exercises contribute to improved interoperability and defence reform.
- NATO exercises are open to all formal partner countries, in addition to member countries.
- The Alliance has been conducting exercises since 1951.

▲ The aim of NATO exercises

Exercises serve a number of specific purposes:

- **Training and experience**

Exercises allow forces to build on previous training in a practical way, thereby heightening forces' level of proficiency in a given area. Exercises have varying levels of complexity but most assume that basic training is complete and that a sufficient number of trained personnel are available.

- **Testing and validating structures**

Exercises are designed to practice the efficiency of structures as well as personnel. This is particularly true when periodically the NATO military command structure is reformed and new headquarters need to test their ability to fulfill new responsibilities. A structure consists of many components – concepts, doctrine, procedures, systems and tactics – that must function together. Supply structures, for instance, require specialised training, equipment and operating procedures, which must be combined to effectively support a mission's objectives. Putting these structures into practice allows them to be tested and, if need be, refined.

- **Interoperability**
NATO-led forces must be able to work together effectively despite differences in doctrine, language, structures, tactics and training. Interoperability is built, in part, through routine inter-forces training between NATO member states and through practical cooperation between personnel from Allied and partner countries. Exercises are open to all formal partners, either as observers or as participants, or as hosts of an exercise. The type of participation is determined by NATO and the partner’s level of ambition in cooperating (whether, for instance, it intends to provide forces to current or future NATO-led operations).

 Defence Reform

Participation in NATO exercises is one of the options available to help with defence reform. They provide the possibility for NATO member countries to test reforms implemented nationally and give partner countries the opportunity to be involved in and observe the structures and mechanisms that Alliance members have in place.

The making of an exercise

Exercise scenarios

During an exercise, forces are asked to respond to a fictional scenario that resembles what might occur in real life. Exercises cover the full range of military operations, from combat to humanitarian relief and from stabilisation to reconstruction. They can last from a day to several weeks and can vary in scope from a few officers working on an isolated problem, to full-scale combat scenarios involving aircraft, navy ships, artillery pieces, armoured vehicles and thousands of troops.

Alliance exercises are supported by NATO countries and, as appropriate, by partner countries, which provide national commitments in the form of troops, equipment or other forms of support. The participating countries are normally responsible for funding any form of national contribution.

Each exercise has pre-specified training objectives which drive the selection of activities. Objectives may be to build skills and knowledge, practice coordination mechanisms, or validate procedures.

At the conclusion of an exercise, commanders and, in many cases, troops collectively review their performance. This process allows them to identify areas that work well ("best practices")
and areas that can be improved ("lessons learnt"). In this way, exercises facilitate continuous improvement of interoperability, efficiency and performance.

**The Military Training and Exercise Programme**

Events and activities related to NATO training and exercises are developed by both Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT). This process culminates with the publication of the annual Military Training and Exercise Programme (MTEP). Since July 2012, ACO is responsible for setting the training requirements and conducting NATO’s evaluations, while ACT is responsible for managing the MTEP and executing the exercise programme.

The MTEP provides detailed information on training, exercises and related activities scheduled for the first two calendar years, and outlines information on training and exercise activities scheduled for the following three calendar years.

The document is based on the priorities and intent of the strategic commanders. The areas typically included are current and future operations, the NATO Response Force, transformational experimentation and NATO’s military cooperation programmes.

NATO exercise requirements are coordinated during MTEP Programming Board Meetings (which are open to representatives from partner countries) starting at least eighteen months before the beginning of the next cycle. Preliminary planning culminates in the NATO Training and Exercise Conference, where NATO Commands, NATO and partner countries, and other invitees conduct final exercise coordination and provide support to the annual MTEP.

**Political exercises**

Exercises are organised in both the military and civilian structures of the Alliance. NATO holds exercises based on its political arrangements, concepts and procedures so as to refine consultations and decision-making architecture and capabilities. Political exercises also aim to ensure that primary advisers – non-elected senior political officials and military commanders in capitals and within the NATO structures – are provided with opportunities to maintain their awareness of how complex, multinational organisations such as NATO work. In some instances, partners engaged in NATO-led operations are able to participate in certain aspects of these exercises.

**What is in an exercise name?**

At the present time, NATO exercises are identified by two words. The first letter of the first word denotes the NATO command responsible for scheduling the exercise.

- **S** Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
- **T**
The strategic commands in the lead

ACO and ACT work closely together on NATO military exercises. Both are assisted by the Alliance’s network of education, training, and assessment institutions, as well as national structures.

Since July 2012, ACO has been given the main responsibility for setting collective training requirements and conducting the evaluation of headquarters and formations. ACT has been given the responsibility of managing collective training and exercises, based on ACO’s requirements. ACT also holds lead responsibility for NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) joint education, individual training and associated policy and doctrine development, as well as for directing NATO schools.

Exercises through time

NATO has been conducting Alliance-level exercises since 1951. In the early years of the Alliance, NATO forces conducted exercises to strengthen their ability to practice collective defence. In other words, they were conducted to ensure that forces were prepared in the case of an attack.
An integrated force under centralised command was called for in September 1950. By December 1950, the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe, U.S. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, was appointed. Following this appointment, national forces were put under centralised command.

The Alliance's first exercises were held in the autumn of 1951. During 1953, there were approximately 100 exercises of various kinds conducted by NATO commanders. From this point on, NATO forces were no longer a collection of national units, but were beginning to gain cohesion. A year after Allied Command Europe became operational, General Eisenhower reported that "the combat readiness of our troops has improved markedly."

In 1994, the Alliance launched the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative. One of the initiative's objectives is to promote closer military cooperation and interoperability. From that time on, PfP members were able to participate in peacekeeping field exercises.

In 2002, the NATO Response Force (NRF) was created. The original NRF concept was revised in 2009 and since then, the emphasis has been placed on exercises conducted in support of the NRF. This training is intended to ensure that the NRF is able to deploy quickly and operate effectively in a variety of situations.

At the 2004 Istanbul Summit, Alliance leaders elevated the Mediterranean Dialogue initiative to a genuine partnership to include increased participation in exercises and individual training at NATO institutions. At the same time, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative was introduced, paving the way for cooperation between NATO and countries from the broader Middle East in areas such as education and training, and made provision for partners to engage in joint training for terrorism. Since the Lisbon Summit in November 2010 and the introduction of the 2010 Strategic Concept and the new partnerships policy, NATO exercises have been open to all partners.
Education and training

NATO conducts education and training to ensure that forces from member countries are effective and interoperable, and as part of its cooperation with non-member countries. The three main purposes are to increase the interoperability and effectiveness of NATO-led multinational forces, assist partner countries in their reform efforts, and help bring peace and stability to crisis-hit areas.

Education and training are key agents for transformation. They are complementary activities which reinforce each other. Education focuses on the function of explaining concepts, doctrines and practices and teaching procedures, for instance English language classes and history. Training focuses on practising and applying that knowledge, which helps to assimilate the subject matter completely. Exercises take training a step further by testing acquired knowledge
during real-life or computer-assisted exercises with a scenario involving large numbers of participants from a broad range of countries.

Historically, NATO education and training has been focused on ensuring that military forces from member countries can work together effectively in operations and missions. Today, NATO education and training functions have expanded significantly both geographically and institutionally. Geographically, NATO is working with a larger number of countries through its cooperation with partner countries and through the creation of NATO training missions as far away as Afghanistan and Africa. Institutionally, education and training have been reinforced through the creation, in 2002, of Allied Command Transformation, entirely dedicated to leading the ongoing transformation of NATO's military structure, forces, capabilities and doctrine. Subsequently, the introduction of new bodies and initiatives has also demonstrated the resolve to reinforce education and training activities for the Organization.

At the Chicago Summit in 2012, NATO leaders stressed the importance of expanding education and training, especially within the context of the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI). CFI aims to ensure the ability of forces to communicate and work with each other. At the most basic level, this implies individuals understanding each other and, at a higher level, the use of common doctrines, concepts and procedures, as well as interoperable equipment. Forces also need to increasingly practise working together through joint and combined training and exercising, after which they need to standardize skills and make better use of technology.¹

CFI seeks to make greater use of education, training and exercises to reinforce links between the forces of NATO member countries and maintain the level of interoperability needed for future operations.

¹ Joint training means forces from two or more military departments working under a single command and combined forces are forces from different countries working under a single command.

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**Purpose and practical implementation**

As explained above, the three main purposes of NATO's education and training programmes are to increase the interoperability and effectiveness of NATO-led multinational forces, assist partner countries in their reform efforts, and help bring peace and stability to crisis-hit areas.

**Enhancing interoperability**

Troops for NATO operations are drawn from many different countries: the forces of NATO member and partner countries, as well as from countries which are not NATO member or partner countries. Ensuring that these multinational forces can work together effectively despite differences in tactics, doctrine, training, structures, and language is a priority for NATO. This “interoperability” is built in a number of ways.

- **Courses and seminars**
NATO’s network of educational institutions offers a broad range of courses on both strategic and operational issues. While courses differ, they tend to focus on knowledge and skills required by individuals who will occupy senior or specialised positions within the structure of the Alliance, or who hold NATO-related posts in their own countries.

The NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy is NATO’s primary strategic-level educational facility and includes areas of study such as trends in the international security environment and their potential effects on NATO countries. It provides training for senior commanders. The NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany is the primary operational-level training centre for students. Operational-level training focuses on joint planning of NATO operations, logistics, communications, civil emergency planning, or civil-military cooperation.

Courses are being offered in an increasing number of locations to ensure all available expertise is being utilised, for instance, civil-military training at the Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Centre of Excellence, the Netherlands. Courses vary in duration (from a day to several months) and are open to personnel from NATO member countries and some to personnel from countries participating in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, as well as selected “partners across the globe” (countries which are neither NATO members nor partner countries, also referred to as “global partners”). Some are also open to civilian participants.

- **Experimentation and development**

NATO is constantly trying to improve the way its forces operate. In line with its transformation agenda, the Alliance is continuing to focus on the development of new concepts and capabilities to ensure future NATO forces are trained and equipped to the highest possible standard.

NATO countries conduct their own experimentation. The Alliance provides a forum for members to engage in knowledge-sharing regarding concepts and capabilities. It does this through Allied Command Transformation (ACT), which leads the transformation of NATO’s military structure, forces, capabilities and doctrine. ACT enhances training, particularly of commanders and staff, conducts experiments to assess new concepts and promotes interoperability throughout the Alliance.

- **Exercises**
Exercises provide opportunities to test and validate all aspects of NATO operations, including procedures, concepts, systems, and tactics. Exercises also build and reinforce interoperability by focusing on practical training for personnel from NATO countries and partners with which the Alliance cooperates.

**Working with NATO partners on defence reform**

NATO members have reduced levels of military personnel, equipment and bases from Cold War levels and transformed their forces to meet today's needs. Many partner countries are still going through this process, often with scarce resources and limited expertise.

In 2005, NATO started developing an “Education and Training for Defence Reform” (EfR) initiative that provides a framework for cooperation for both military and civilian personnel. EfR helps educators incorporate principles linked to defence institution building into their curricula. Since the courses are aimed at civil servants and other persons participating in defence institution building, they contribute indirectly to improving defence reform. Education is effectively a key agent of transformation and NATO is using it to support institutional reform in partner countries. The Alliance's education and training programmes initially focused on increasing interoperability between NATO and partner forces. They have since been expanded to provide a means for members and partners to collaborate on how to build, develop and reform educational institutions in the security, defence and military domain.

- **Tailor-made defence education**

Through the Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP), the Alliance advises partners on how to build, develop and reform educational institutions in the defence and military domain. This effort is embedded in partners' individual programmes (Individual Partnership Action Plans, Annual National Programmes and Individual Partnership Cooperation Programmes), and is a key part of the Enduring Partnership with Afghanistan. There are currently 13 individual country DEEP programmes, with different focuses and at different stages of development, engaging Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritania, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Serbia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. They are run with the support of the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes (see “Additional training institutions and organisations” for explanations), the Partnership Training and Education Centres and Allied as well as partner defence institutions.

Each partner country participating in defence reform agrees on an individualised programme with NATO that varies in depth and breadth, depending on its interests and
level of commitment and cooperation. This can include tailor-made education programmes such as on-the-job training, language training, and resettlement and retraining of redundant military personnel.

Aside from helping individual countries to develop their educational institutions, NATO is also helping develop teaching curricula ("what to teach"), available to all Allies and partners. Six years of committed effort by prominent experts from Allied and partner countries have produced three unique products: the Reference Curricula on defence institution building, on the professional military education for officers and – the most recent one – on professional military education for non-commissioned officers. Work continues on a reference curriculum on the Comprehensive Approach, and the development of curricula related to emerging security challenges is being considered.

Faculty development ("how to teach") is the third pillar of DEEP. NATO helps maintain an international professional network which brings together defence and military educators from Allied and partner countries to exchange experience in teaching methodologies and help those interested in advice and assistance.

To do all that, the Alliance has developed and relies upon a vast transatlantic web of institutions and individuals who support these projects on a voluntary basis. A large number of Allied and partner institutions have engaged in DEEP: the US Army War College, the Canadian Defence Academy, the National Defence University of Poland, the National Defence University of Romania, the Czech University of Defence, the Slovak Armed Forces Academy, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, the George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, to name just a few. The NATO Defense College and the NATO School Oberammergau also support the programme. The Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes - an Austrian-German-Swiss-US initiative - is instrumental in helping NATO to manage the network and the DEEP projects.

The functional Educational Clearing House, led by the Czech Republic, Italy, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland and the United States, and supported by the PfP Consortium, plays a critical role in coordinating NATO and national efforts in support of DEEP projects.

Of note, the Alliance is also the hub for a growing network of Partnership Training and Education Centres (PTECs), which currently brings together 29 civilian and military institutions from Allied and partner countries. While originally developed in the framework of Partnership for Peace, the network already includes Egyptian, Jordanian and Mongolian centres. The PTECs, while national institutions, conduct education and training
activities related to NATO partnership programmes and policies and contribute substantially to the Partnership Cooperation Menu (PCM).

- **Courses, seminars and workshops**

  Partner countries which work with NATO are able to participate in an array of NATO education activities – courses, roundtables, seminars, and workshops.

- **Advice and expertise**

  NATO countries are among the most advanced in the world in terms of defence capabilities. Countries cooperating with the Alliance on defence reform are able to take advantage of this expertise. For most countries, this is done through the Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP), a mechanism that helps to identify partner forces and capabilities that could be available to the Alliance for multinational training, exercises and operations.

  Countries with special relationships with NATO can have additional mechanisms for exchanging advice and expertise. For instance, the NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform provides a forum through which consultation can take place on initiatives as diverse as civil-military relations, democratic oversight and civilian management of the armed forces and other security sector agencies, defence planning, policy, strategy and national security concepts. Moreover, NATO-led multinational teams of experts can visit partner countries to address the education and training requirements listed in the individual action plans of the countries concerned. This has been the case, for instance, for the South Caucasus countries and Moldova, as well as Mauritania.

- **An initiative for the Mediterranean and the Middle East**

  A dedicated Middle East faculty has been established at the NATO Defense College in Rome as part of the NATO Regional Cooperation Course.

**Education and training in NATO-led operations**

NATO’s efforts to bring stability to crisis areas go beyond deploying troops. Through education and training programmes, NATO is helping countries such as Afghanistan develop its own security institutions and provide for its own security.

- **Afghanistan**
An important aspect of NATO's engagement in Afghanistan is assisting the country in developing its security structures and forces. NATO's Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) was established in November 2009, bringing together NATO and national efforts under one umbrella and working closely with Afghan authorities. Its key tasks include the training and mentoring of the Afghan National Security Forces, support to the Afghan National Army's institutional training base, and the reform of the Afghan National Police at the district level and below. The Alliance also deployed Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams to Afghan National Army units at various levels of command. These gradually evolved into Military Advisory Teams and Police Advisory Teams, more generally known as Security Force Assistance Teams.

In 2006, NATO signed a declaration with Afghanistan, establishing a substantial programme of long-term cooperation. This Afghan Cooperation Programme provides for further training assistance, including opening NATO courses and partnership activities to Afghan participation, providing advice and expertise on defence reform and the development of security institutions, as well as specific assistance such as language training.

Subsequently, on 20 November 2010, NATO and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan signed a Declaration on an Enduring Partnership at the NATO Summit in Lisbon. The Enduring Partnership is intended to provide long-term political and practical support to Afghanistan as it rebuilds its security institutions and assumes full responsibility for its own security through the transition process. It includes a series of agreed programmes and activities undertaken as part of the ongoing cooperation between NATO and Afghanistan. This includes the Professional Military Education Programme for Afghanistan, which aims to further develop Afghan institutions, as well as other initiatives such as a counter-narcotics training pilot project.

- **The African Union**

At the request of the African Union (AU), NATO assisted the AU (June 2005-end December 2007) in strengthening its peacekeeping force in Darfur in a bid to halt the continuing violence. Initially, NATO's support consisted in training AU troops in strategic-level planning and operational procedures. It provided support to a UN-led map exercise and later, in summer 2006, provided training assistance in the fields of pre-deployment certification and "lessons learned", as well as information management.

Additionally, NATO has been providing subject-matter experts to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) since 2007, offering expertise in areas such as maritime planning, air movement coordination and logistics. NATO also provides expert and training support to
the African Standby Force (ASF), at the AU’s request. The ASF is part of the AU’s efforts to develop long-term peacekeeping capabilities.

- **Iraq**

From 2004 to end 2011, NATO helped Iraq provide for its own security by training Iraqi personnel and supporting the development of the country’s security institutions. NATO trained and mentored middle- and senior-level personnel from the Iraqi security forces in Iraq and outside of Iraq, at NATO schools and training centres. The Alliance also played a role in coordinating offers of equipment and training from individual NATO member and partner countries.

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**The training bodies and institutions**

There are a number of main bodies through which education and training is organised and run. Some operate under the direction of the Alliance and others are external, but complementary to Alliance structures.

**Allied Command Transformation**

Allied Command Transformation (ACT) was created as part of the reorganisation of NATO’s Command Structure in 2002. It holds lead responsibility for NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) joint education, individual training, and associated policy and doctrine development as well as for directing NATO schools. Since July 2012, ACT has also been given the responsibility of managing collective training and exercises based on Allied Command Operations’ requirements.

All of the entities attached to ACT fulfil an education and training function. For detailed information, please refer to the “Allied Command Transformation” A to Z page.

**Additional training institutions and organisations**

These are entities that have a relationship with NATO, but are typically administered by sponsor countries, national authorities or civil organisations. They are open to participation by personnel from NATO member and partner countries.

**Centres of Excellence**

These are centres that have been accredited by NATO. One of their roles is to provide high-quality education and training to the Euro-Atlantic community.
They are funded nationally or multinationally and their relationship with NATO is formalised through memoranda of understanding. The first Centres of Excellence to be fully accredited by NATO were the Joint Air Power Competence Centre in Germany and the Defence Against Terrorism Centre of Excellence in Turkey. Many more have been established since then.

**Partnership Training and Education Centres**

Partnership Training and Education Centres focus on the operational and tactical levels of a military operation. Each one has a different area of expertise and provides enhanced training and facilities for personnel from all partner countries. There are currently 24 Partnership Training and Education Centres, which now go beyond the original Euro-Atlantic borders to include Egypt and Jordan. Education and training activities conducted within these centres are related to NATO partnership programmes and policies.

The NATO School in Oberammergau and ACT co-chair the annual conference of the Commandants of the Partnership Training and Education Centres. This community has been opened to the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and to the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI).

In April 2011, NATO adopted a concept for Partnership Training and Education Centres. It is based on the “Policy for a More Efficient and Flexible Partnership”, which states that “all partners will be offered deeper political and practical engagement with the Alliance, including through support for defence education, training and capacity building, within existing resources.” With this initiative, NATO has committed itself to supporting interested partners in developing their defence education and training capacities even further.

**Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes**

The PfP Consortium was established in 1999 to help promote education in security-related topics. It does this by facilitating cooperation between both civilian and military institutions in NATO and PfP countries in support of NATO priorities such as defence institution building and defence reform.

In 2008 for instance, the PfP Consortium produced what is called a reference curriculum on the Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB). This document aims to provide partner countries with in-depth learning objectives and curriculum support for academic courses focused on reforming or building defence institutions. In 2011, a similar reference curriculum was produced on professional military education for officers and, more recently, one has been developed for non-commissioned officers.
The PfP Consortium is also running an Educators’ Programme to familiarise partners with modern teaching methodologies and is supporting Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in education-related aspects of their Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs).

The PfP Consortium establishes working groups where experts, policy-makers, and defence and security practitioners pool information and develop products such as educational tools or scholarly publications. Participating organisations include universities, research institutions and training centres. The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Germany forms the Secretariat.

Education and training: a key activity since 1949

Collective education and training has been ongoing since the inception of the Alliance in 1949. Over time, it has expanded dramatically and has become an integral aspect of the Alliance’s ability to provide security.

Interoperability

In the early years of the Alliance, NATO forces conducted joint training to strengthen their ability to practise collective defence. In other words, education and training was conducted to ensure that forces were prepared in the case of an attack.

An integrated force under centralised command

An integrated force under centralised command was called for as early as September 1950, following the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. The first Supreme Allied Commander Europe, US General Dwight D. Eisenhower, was appointed in December 1950. Following this appointment, national forces were put under centralised command.

The Alliance’s first exercises

The Alliance’s first exercises were held in the autumn of 1951. During 1953, there were approximately 100 exercises of various kinds conducted by NATO. From this point on, NATO forces began to gain cohesion.

Education for individuals

Individual education soon followed. The need for a specialised setting to explore issues unique to the Alliance was first recognised by General Eisenhower in April 1951. The NATO Defense College was inaugurated later that year, on 19 November, and was transferred from Paris to Rome, Italy in 1966, where it is still located.
The NATO Communications and Information Systems School in Latina, Italy was established in 1959, when a civil contractor began to train a small number of NATO personnel on what would become NATO's 'ACE HIGH Communications System.' On 2 May of the same year, the NATO Undersea Research Centre in La Spezia, Italy was commissioned. During the 2002 reform process, this Undersea Research Centre was moved to the agency structure of the Alliance as an organisational element linked to research.

In 1971, the Military Committee established the NATO Training Group. The NATO Training Group met for many years in joint session with the Euro-training sub-group, which was set up to improve multinational training arrangements between European countries (its responsibilities were passed on to NATO in 1993). The NATO Training Group was formally transferred from the Military Committee to Allied Command Transformation in 2004. Its principal aim is to improve interoperability among Allies and, additionally, between the forces of partner countries.

In 1975, the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, received its charter and present name. For almost 25 years, its principal focus was on issues relating to collective defence.

More recently in 2003, the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre was established at Souda Bay, Greece to conduct training for NATO forces in surface, sub-surface, aerial surveillance and special operations activities. It does this through theoretical and practical training programmes, as well as through simulations.

**NATO training opens to partners**

Since the end of the Cold War, the Alliance has increased its political engagement with non-member countries and opened its education and training to these countries.

*Partnership for Peace countries*

When NATO invited former Warsaw Pact countries, former Soviet Republics and non-member western European countries to join the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme in 1994, participating countries committed to increase interoperability with NATO forces. This opened the way for joint training and marked the beginning of NATO's support for defence reform.

NATO training institutions soon followed suit. The first officers' course for partner countries was conducted in October 1994 at the NATO Communications and Information Systems School. Similarly, the NATO Defense College integrated PfP issues into its Senior Course.

*Mediterranean Dialogue countries*
The Mediterranean Dialogue was likewise created in 1994, initially as a forum for political dialogue. In 1997, at a meeting in Sintra, Portugal, the Alliance decided to open selected military training activities to countries participating in this initiative (currently seven countries: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia).

*Increasing cooperation with all partners*

In 1998, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council approved the creation of the Partnership for Peace Consortium and at the 1999 Washington Summit NATO leaders approved plans for an “Enhanced and More Operational Partnership”. In addition, with the revision of the NATO Strategic Concept in 1999, the role of the NATO School was fundamentally altered to include cooperation and dialogue with civilian personnel from non-NATO countries.

In May 2002, the Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre in Monsanto, Portugal was established. This facility's mission is to perform joint analysis and experimentation of operations, training and exercises, also with partners.

In February 2005, the North Atlantic Council noted the Education and Training for Defence Reform (EfR). EfR helps EAPC educators incorporate principles linked to defence institution building into their curricula. Since the courses are aimed at civil servants and other persons participating in defence institution building, they contribute indirectly to improving defence reform.

*Transformation through training*

With the creation of the two new strategic commands in 2002, the coordination and coherence of NATO education and training activities was greatly increased. This led to the creation of additional training institutions and initiatives.

*New training centres*

A Joint Warfare Centre in Stavanger, Norway was inaugurated on 23 October 2003. The Joint Force Training Centre in Bydgoszcz, Poland, inaugurated on 31 March 2004, supports training for both NATO and partner forces to improve joint and combined tactical interoperability.

*Stepping up training and partnerships*

At the 2004 Istanbul Summit, Alliance leaders elevated the Mediterranean Dialogue initiative to a genuine partnership, to include increased participation in exercises and individual training at NATO institutions. Provision was also made for cooperation on defence reform. At the same time, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) was introduced, which paved the way for cooperation between NATO and countries from the broader
Middle East (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates) in areas such as education and training.

This Summit also made provision for partners to engage in joint training to combat terrorism and to train jointly with the NATO Response Force.

NATO's efforts on defence reform gained added momentum with the creation of the Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building, which outlines what NATO and partners want to achieve in this area.

The Chicago Summit in 2012 reiterated the importance of education and training for the future of the Alliance, a statement which was reinforced by the introduction of the Connected Forces Initiative.
NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence

NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence is the integration of capabilities and overlapping operations of all services (air, land and maritime forces) to deter and defend all Alliance territory, populations and forces to ensure freedom of action by negating an adversary’s ability to achieve adverse effects from its air and missile capabilities. It includes a network of interconnected systems to detect, track, classify, identify and monitor airborne objects, and – if necessary – to intercept them using surface-based or airborne weapons systems, as well as the procedures necessary to employ the systems.

NATO member countries started working together in the 1970s to establish an integrated air defence structure and system, combining national assets supplemented as needed by NATO
elements. Operating together is both more effective and more efficient in protecting against air attacks than national air defence systems operating independently. With the advent of an Alliance ballistic missile defence (BMD) capability, this structure is now known as the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATINAMDS). It comes under the command and control of NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The NATINAMDS is a cornerstone of NATO air and missile defence policy, and a visible indication of cohesion, shared responsibility and solidarity across the Alliance.

Components

The NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System is comprised of the four functional areas of ‘Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence’ ‘Surveillance’, ‘Active Air Defence’ and ‘Passive Air Defence’. All four functional areas contribute to the Defensive Counter Air (DCA) mission and provide the basis for the protection of Alliance populations, territory and forces and the projection of air and missile defence firepower.

Depending on the mission, NATO Allies commit forces (land, air and maritime) which are assigned to SACEUR. However, the decision on the size and shape of the forces and their equipment to be provided remains a national responsibility.

The Air Command and Control System

Air Command and Control (Air C2) is essential to the success of any operation. The Air C2 structure in NATO is a patchwork of disparate and aging systems that in many cases are reaching the end of their planned operational life.

In recognition of the increasingly joint nature of military operations – as well as of the need to replace aging equipment – NATO has developed a new and more robust capability that will be a C2 system for all air operations. This system, called Air Command and Control System (ACCS), will facilitate the planning, tasking, execution and coordination of all integrated air and missile defence missions in peacetime, crisis and conflict. ACCS will support all of NATO's static and deployed operations and missions.

Tasks

NATO air policing

NATO air policing is a peacetime mission which requires an Air Surveillance and Control System (ASACS), an Air Command and Control (Air C2) structure and Quick Reaction Alert (Interceptor) (QRA(I)) aircraft to be available on a 24/7 basis. This enables the Alliance to detect, track and identify to the greatest extent possible all aerial objects approaching or
operating within NATO airspace so that violations and infringements can be recognised, and the appropriate action taken.

Although not all Allies possess the necessary means to provide air policing of their airspace, other countries provide assistance when needed to ensure that no country is left at a disadvantage and equality of security is provided for all.

SACEUR is responsible for the conduct of the NATO air policing mission.

**Theatre ballistic missile defence**

In 2010, NATO fielded an Interim theatre ballistic missile defence capability to protect Alliance forces against ballistic missile threats.

**Ballistic missile defence**

At the 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon, Allied leaders decided to develop a ballistic missile defence (BMD) capability to pursue collective defence. Specifically, they decided that the scope of the current Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme’s command, control and communication capabilities would be expanded beyond the capability to protect deployed forces to also include NATO European territory, forces and populations.

The United States' European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and other possible national contributions were welcomed as valuable national contributions to the NATO BMD architecture.

In May 2012 at the Chicago Summit, NATO leaders declared that the Alliance had achieved an Interim NATO BMD capability. This is a significant first step in implementing NATO’s BMD capability. It offers the maximum coverage within available means to defend NATO’s populations, territory and forces across southern Europe against a ballistic missile attack. The Alliance remains committed to installing full BMD coverage for all NATO European territory by the end of this decade.

**Mechanisms**

The Air and Missile Defence Committee (AMDC) is the senior multinational policy advisory and coordinating body regarding all elements of NATO’s integrated air and missile defence, and relevant air power aspects. It reports directly to the North Atlantic Council (NAC).
The Military Committee Working Group (Air Defence) is responsible for reviewing, advising and making recommendations on air and missile defence issues to NATO's Military Committee.

Other groups dealing with air and missile defence-related issues include NATO's Defence Policy and Planning Committee (Reinforced) with particular responsibilities on ballistic missile defence, the Missile Defence Project Group, the BMD Programme Office, and the NATO-Russia Council Missile Defence Working Group. In October 2013, NATO-Russia missile defence-related discussions were paused by Russia, and in April 2014, NATO suspended all cooperation with Russia in response to the Ukraine crisis.

**AMDC and cooperation with partners**

Since 1994, the AMDC has maintained a dialogue with NATO partner countries to promote mutual understanding, transparency and confidence in air defence matters of common interest.

The air defence partner cooperation programme includes fact-finding meetings with air defence experts, seminars and workshops, visits to air defence facilities and installations, joint analytical studies and a programme for the exchange of unclassified air situation data.
Ballistic missile defence

Ballistic missiles pose an increasing threat to Allied populations, territory and deployed forces. Over 30 countries have, or are acquiring, ballistic missile technology that could eventually be used to carry not just conventional warheads, but also weapons of mass destruction. The proliferation of these capabilities does not necessarily mean there is an immediate intent to attack NATO, but it does mean that the Alliance has a responsibility to take this into account as part of its mission to protect its European populations, territory and forces.

Beginning in early 2010, NATO acquired the first phase of an initial capability to protect Allied deployed forces against limited ballistic missile threats. At the November 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon, NATO’s leaders decided to develop a ballistic missile defence (BMD) capability to pursue its core task of collective defence. To this end, they decided that the scope of the existing Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme’s command, control and communication capabilities will be expanded beyond the capability to protect forces to also include NATO European populations and territory. In this context, the US European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and other national contributions were welcomed as valuable to the NATO BMD architecture.

NATO's work on BMD started in the early 1990s in response to the increasing threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, including ballistic missiles. The initial focus was on protecting deployed NATO troops (theatre missile defence), but study work was expanded in 2002 to include considerations on the protection of population centres and territory (territorial missile defence).

Components

The Alliance is conducting three BMD-related activities:

1. **Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence System capability**

The aim of this capability is to protect deployed NATO forces against short- and medium-range ballistic missile threats (up to 3,000-kilometer range). In order to manage the risk associated with the development of such a complex capability, ALTBMD will be fielded in several phases.

The completed capability will consist of a system of systems, comprising low- and high-altitude defences (also called lower- and upper-layer defences), including battle management, communications, command and control and intelligence (BMC3I), early-warning sensors, radars and various interceptors. NATO member countries will provide the sensors and weapon systems, while NATO will develop the BMC3I segment and facilitate the integration of all these elements into a coherent and effective architecture.

In 2005, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) established the NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence Programme Management Organization (ALTBMD PMO) to oversee the ALTBMD Programme. The NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A) and the NATO Air Command and Control System Management Agency (NACMA) are other key NATO bodies involved in the programme. As part of the NATO agencies reform, this programme is now managed by the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA).

The initial activities were mainly focused on system engineering and integration work, and on the development of an integration test bed hosted at the NCIA facilities in The Hague, the Netherlands. The integration testbed is essential to validate development work.

In early 2010, the first operational ALTBMD capability (called Interim Capability) was fielded. It provides military planners with a planning tool to build the most effective defence design for specific scenarios or real deployments. A more robust version of that
capability was fielded at the end of 2010 and provides shared situational awareness. The next version will be delivered in the 2016-2017 timeframe. After that, ALTBMD will be merged with the BMD effort detailed below.

2. BMD for the protection of NATO European territory, populations and forces

At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, NATO leaders decided to develop a BMD capability. They agreed that an expanded ALTBMD Programme should form the command, control and communications backbone of such a system. That decision was based on almost eight years of studies and discussions.

As part of the US European Phased Adative Approach (EPAA), Turkey announced in autumn 2011 its decision to host a US-owned and -operated BMD radar at Kürecik. Romania and the United States agreed in 2011 to base Aegis Ashore capabilities at Deveselu airbase in Romania, and a similar basing agreement between the United States and Poland entered into force in 2011 to host Aegis Ashore at the Redzikowo military base. Also in 2011, Spain and the United States announced an agreement to base four Aegis missile defence ships in Rota, Spain. These assets are national contributions, and are integral parts of the NATO BMD capability.

In September 2011, the Netherlands announced plans to upgrade four air-defence frigates with extended long-range missile defence early-warning radars as its national contribution to NATO's ballistic missile defence capability.

Separately, France is studying options to develop an early-warning system for the detection of ballistic missiles.

In February 2012, Germany announced that its Patriot air- and missile-defence systems would form a national contribution to the NATO BMD system.

In May 2012 at the Chicago Summit, NATO leaders declared the Interim NATO BMD capability operational. It offers the maximum coverage within available means to defend NATO's populations, territory and forces across southern Europe against a limited ballistic missile attack. The Alliance aims to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles. This coverage is based on the principles of indivisibility of Allied security and NATO solidarity, equitable sharing of risks and burdens, as well as reasonable challenge. It also takes into account the level of threat, affordability and technical feasibility, and is in accordance with the latest common threat assessments agreed by the Alliance. Should international efforts reduce the threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation, NATO missile defence can, and will, adapt accordingly.
3. Missile defence cooperation with Russia

In 2003, under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), a study was launched to assess possible levels of interoperability among the theatre missile defence systems of NATO Allies and Russia.

Together with this study, several successful computer-assisted exercises have been held to provide the basis for future improvements to interoperability, and to develop mechanisms and procedures for joint operations in the area of theatre missile defence.

NATO and Russia also examined possible areas for cooperation on territorial missile defence. At the Lisbon Summit, the NRC agreed to discuss pursuing ballistic missile defence cooperation, and to resume territorial missile defence cooperation. They agreed on a joint ballistic missile threat assessment, and to continue dialogue in this area. The NRC was tasked to develop a comprehensive joint analysis of the future framework for BMD cooperation. In April 2012, NATO and Russia successfully conducted a computer-assisted missile defence exercise hosted by Germany.

In October 2013, NATO-Russia missile defence-related discussions were paused by Russia, and in April 2014, NATO suspended all cooperation with Russia in response to the Ukraine crisis.

Mechanisms

The Defence Policy and Planning Committee (Reinforced) (DPPC(R)) is the senior NATO committee that oversees and coordinates all efforts to develop the NATO ballistic missile defence capability at the political-military level, as well as providing political-military guidance and advice on all issues related to NATO BMD policy.

The Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) is the senior policy committee responsible for the ballistic missile defence programme.

Evolution

The key policy document providing the framework for NATO's activities in the area of ballistic missile defence is NATO's Strategic Concept. In addition, ballistic missile defence is an important aspect of the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review of 2012.
The Strategic Concept recognises, inter alia, that “the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, threatens incalculable consequences for global stability and prosperity. During the next decade, proliferation will be most acute in some of the world’s most volatile regions.” Therefore, NATO will “develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of our Alliance. We will actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners.” As a defensive capability, BMD will be one element of a broader response to the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles.

The Deterrence and Defence Posture Review of 2012 states that missile defence can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence; it cannot substitute for them. It is a purely defensive capability and is being established in the light of threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic area. It is expected that NATO’s missile defence capabilities would complicate an adversary’s planning, and provide damage mitigation. Effective missile defence could also provide valuable decision space in times of crisis. Like other weapons systems, missile defence capabilities cannot promise complete and enduring effectiveness. NATO missile defence capability, along with effective nuclear and conventional forces, will signal our determination to deter and defend against any threat from outside the Euro-Atlantic area to the safety and security of our populations.

Key milestones

**Theatre Missile Defence**

May 2001  
NATO launches two parallel feasibility studies for a future Alliance theatre missile defence system.

June 2004  
At the Istanbul Summit, Allied leaders direct that work on theatre missile defence be taken forward expeditiously.

March 2005  
The Alliance approves the establishment of a Programme Management Organization under the auspices of the CNAD.

September 2006  
The Alliance awards the first major contract for the development of a testbed for the system.

February 2008  
The testbed is opened and declared fully operational nine months ahead of schedule.

Throughout 2008  
The system design for the NATO command and control component of the theatre missile defence system is verified through testing with national systems and facilities via the integrated testbed; this paves the way for the procurement of the capability.

March 2010  
The Interim Capability (InCa) Step 1 is fielded.

June 2010
NATO signs contracts for the second phase of the interim theatre missile defence capability, which will include the capability to conduct a real-time theatre missile defence battle.

At the June 2010 meeting of NATO Defence Ministers, it is agreed that, should Allies decide at the Lisbon Summit to develop a ballistic missile defence capability for NATO which would provide protection to European Allied populations and territory against the increasing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles. An expanded theatre missile defence programme could form the command, control and communications backbone of such a system. The US EPAA would provide a valuable national contribution to this capability.

**July 2010** The more robust Interim Capability (InCa 2) passes key tests during the Dutch Air Force Joint Project Optic Windmill 2010 exercise.

**December 2010** At the end of 2010, all InCa 2 components – including BMD sensors and shooters from NATO nations – are linked and successfully tested in an ‘ensemble’ test prior to handover to NATO’s military commanders. InCa 2 is subsequently delivered to the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) in Uedem, Germany.

**Territorial Missile Defence**

**November 2002** At the Prague Summit, Allied leaders direct that a missile defence feasibility study be launched to examine options for protecting Alliance forces, territory and populations against the full range of ballistic missile threats.

**April 2006** The study concludes that ballistic missile defence is technically feasible within the limits and assumptions of the study. The results are approved by NATO’s CNAD.

**2007** An update of a 2004 Alliance assessment of ballistic missile threat developments is completed.

**April 2008** At the Bucharest Summit, Allied leaders agree that the planned deployment of European-based US BMD assets should be an integral part of any future NATO-wide missile defence architecture. They call for options for a comprehensive ballistic missile defence architecture to extend coverage to all Allied territory not otherwise covered by the US system to be prepared in time for NATO’s next Summit.

**April 2009** At the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, Allies recognise that a future US contribution of important architectural elements could enhance NATO elaboration of the Alliance effort and judge that ballistic missile threats should be addressed in a prioritised manner that includes consideration of the level of imminence of the threat and the level of acceptable risk.

The United States announces its plan for the EPAA.
At the Lisbon Summit, the Allies agree to acquire a territorial missile defence capability. They agree that an expanded theatre missile defence programme should form the command, control and communications backbone of such a system. The NRC agrees to discuss pursuing missile defence cooperation.

NATO Defence Ministers approve the NATO Ballistic Missile Defence Action Plan.

Turkey announces a decision to host a US-owned missile defence radar as part of the NATO BMD capability.

Romania and the United States sign an agreement to base a US Aegis Ashore system in Romania as part of NATO's BMD capability.

An agreement between Poland and the United States on basing a US Aegis Ashore system in Poland enters into force.

The Netherlands announces plans to upgrade four air-defence frigates with extended long-range radar systems as its national contribution to NATO's BMD capability.

Spain and the United States announce an agreement to port US Aegis ships in Rota, Spain, as part of the US contribution to NATO's ballistic missile defence capability.

Germany announces a decision to offer its Patriot air- and missile-defence systems as a national contribution to NATO's BMD capability.

NATO successfully installs and tests the command and control architecture for the Interim Capability at Allied Air Command in Ramstein, Germany.

NATO Summit in Chicago. Declaration of the Interim BMD Capability.

NATO decides to augment Turkish air defence against missiles from Syria.

Germany, the Netherlands and the United States deploy Patriot air- and missile-defence systems to eastern Turkey.

The United States announces a revised EPAA.

Ground-breaking ceremony for the US Aegis Ashore system in Deveselu, Romania.

First US Aegis destroyer stationed in Rota, Spain.

A study is launched under the NRC to assess possible levels of interoperability among theatre missile defence systems of NATO Allies and Russia.

An NRC theatre missile defence command post exercise is held in the United States.
March 2005 An NRC theatre missile defence command post exercise is held in the Netherlands.

October 2006 An NRC theatre missile defence command post exercise is held in Russia.

January 2008 An NRC theatre missile defence computer-assisted exercise takes place in Germany.

December 2010 First meeting of the NRC Missile Defence Working Group aimed at assessing decisions taken at the Lisbon Summit and exploring a possible way forward for cooperation on ballistic missile defence.

June 2011 NRC Defence Ministers take stock of the work on missile defence since the 2010 Lisbon Summit.

April 2012 Computer-assisted exercise in Ottobrunn, Germany.

October 2013 Russia unilaterally pauses the discussions on missile defence in the NRC framework.

April 2014 In response to the Ukraine crisis, NATO suspends all cooperation with Russia, including missile defence.
Strategic airlift

NATO member countries have pooled their resources to acquire special aircraft that will give the Alliance the capability to transport troops, equipment and supplies across the globe. Robust strategic airlift capabilities are vital to ensure that NATO countries are able to deploy their forces and equipment rapidly to wherever they are needed.

By pooling resources, NATO countries have made significant financial savings, and have the potential of acquiring assets collectively that would be prohibitively expensive to purchase as individual countries.

There are currently two initiatives aimed at providing NATO nations and participating partners with strategic airlift capabilities: the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) initiative, and the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC).
Strategic Airlift Interim Solution

Context

A multinational consortium of 14 countries is chartering Antonov AN-124-100 transport aircraft as a Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS). SALIS provides assured access to up to six AN-124-100 aircraft (mission-ready within nine days in case of crisis) in support of NATO/EU operations.

The Russian and Ukrainian Antonov aircraft are being used as an interim solution to meet shortfalls in the Alliance’s strategic airlift capabilities, pending deliveries of Airbus A400M aircraft. This is why the project is called Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS).

The SALIS initiative is planned to continue until the end of 2014. Participating nations have already expressed a need for the continuation of the initiative but will adjust their requirement as the Airbus A400M aircraft come into service, and as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan comes to a close.

Components

The SALIS contract provides two Antonov AN-124-100 aircraft on part-time charter, two more on six days’ notice and another two on nine days’ notice. The consortium countries have committed to using the aircraft for a minimum of 2,800 flying hours per year for 2013, and for a minimum of 2,450 flying hours for 2014. Additional aircraft types such as IL-76 and AN-225 are included in the contract and can be used subject to availability.

A single Antonov AN-124-100 can carry up to 120 tons of cargo. NATO has used Antonovs in the past to transport equipment to and from Afghanistan, deliver aid to the victims of the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, and airlift African Union peacekeepers in and out of Darfur. Today, support missions for forces in Afghanistan and Africa are predominant.

Participants

The consortium includes 12 NATO nations (Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, the United Kingdom) and two partner nations (Finland and Sweden).

Mechanisms

The capability is coordinated on a day-to-day basis by the Strategic Airlift Coordination Cell, which is collocated with the NATO Movement Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE).
based in Eindhoven, the Netherlands. The NATO Support Agency (NSPA) provides support by managing the SALIS contract and the SALIS partnership.

**Evolution**
- In June 2003, NATO Ministers of Defence signed letters of intent on strategic air- and sealift.
- At the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, defence ministers of 15 countries signed a memorandum of understanding to achieve an operational airlift capacity for outsize cargo by 2005, using up to six Antonov AN-124-100 transport aircraft. In addition, the Defence Ministers of Bulgaria and Romania signed a letter of intent to join the consortium.
- In January 2006, the 15 countries tasked the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (currently known as the NATO Support Agency) to sign a contract with Ruslan SALIS GmbH, a subsidiary of the Russian company Volga-Dnepr, based in Leipzig.
- In March 2006, the 15 original signatories were joined by Sweden at a special ceremony in Leipzig to mark the entry into force of the multinational contract. The contract's initial duration was for three years, but this has now been extended until the end of 2014. Finland and Poland have also joined the SALIS programme. The SALIS contract was re-competed in 2012, and Ruslan SALIS GmbH was awarded a new two-year contract (2013/2014) with options to extend until December 2017.
- The NATO Support Agency (NSPA) has contractual arrangements with the Russian company Volga-Dnepr and Ukraine’s ADB airlines to provide SALIS aircraft and Antonov AN-124-100 aircraft to support the Afghanistan mission, with weekly sorties to and from Europe/Afghanistan.
- The capabilities of SALIS play a significant role in the ongoing Afghanistan redeployment.

**Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC)**

**Context**

The second initiative aimed at providing NATO nations and partners with access to strategic airlift is the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC), which has procured several Boeing C-17 transport aircraft on behalf of a group of ten Allied and two partner nations.

The first C-17 was delivered in July 2009 with the second and third aircraft following in September and October 2009, respectively. Its operational arm, the Heavy Airlift Wing (HAW) at Pápa Airbase in Hungary operates the aircraft.
The HAW is manned by personnel from all participating nations and its missions support national requirements. Operations have included support to ISAF (Afghanistan), the Kosovo Force (KFOR), Operation Unified Protector in Libya, humanitarian relief in Haiti and Pakistan, African peacekeeping, and assistance to the Polish authorities following the air disaster in Russia.

In addition, there are national procurement programmes in place to improve airlift capabilities, including the acquisition by seven NATO nations of 180 Airbus A400M aircraft, and the purchase by Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States of C-17s for national use.

**Components**

The C-17 is a large strategic transport aircraft capable of carrying 77,000 kilograms (169,776 pounds) of cargo over 4,450 kilometres (2,400 nautical miles) and is able to operate in difficult environments and austere conditions.

The planes are configured and equipped to the same general standard as C-17s operated by the US Air Force. The crews and support personnel are trained for mission profiles and standards agreed by the countries.

These strategic lift aircraft are used to meet national requirements, but could also be allocated for NATO, UN or EU missions, or for other international purposes.

**Participants**

The participants include ten NATO nations (Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and the United States) and two partner nations (Finland and Sweden). Membership in the airlift fleet remains open to other countries upon agreement by the consortium members.

**Mechanisms**

The Multinational SAC Steering Board has the overall responsibility for the guidance and oversight of the programme and formulates its requirements. The NATO Airlift Management Programme provides administrative support to the Heavy Airlift Wing at Pápa Airbase.

**Evolution**

- On 12 September 2006, a Letter of Intent (LOI) to launch contract negotiations was publicly released by 13 NATO countries. In the intervening period, Finland and Sweden joined the consortium and NATO participation evolved to the current ten members.
In June 2007, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved the Charter of a NATO Production and Logistics Organisation (NPLO), which authorises the establishment of the NATO Airlift Management Organisation (NAMO).

The Charter came into effect upon signature to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and notification to the North Atlantic Council, in September 2008. The Charter authorised the establishment of the NATO Airlift Management Agency (NAMA), which acquired, manages and supports the airlift assets on behalf of the SAC nations.

On 1 July 2012, in line with NATO Agencies Reform decisions, NAMO/NAMA became part of the NATO Support Agency.
Strategic sealift

NATO member countries have pooled their resources to assure access to special ships, giving the Alliance the capability to rapidly transport forces and equipment by sea.

This multinational consortium finances the charter of up to 11 special “roll-on/roll-off” ships (commonly, Ro/Ro; so called because equipment can be driven onto and off of the ships via special doors and ramps into the hold). The consortium includes Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia and the United Kingdom.

Components

The Sealift Consortium provides the Alliance with access to the Sealift Capability Package (SCP), which consists of:
three Ro/Ro ships on assured access;
residual capacity of five Danish/German ARK Ro/Ro ships on full-time charter;
residual capacity of four UK Ro/Ro ships;
and a Norwegian Ro/Ro ship on dormant contract.

The three assured access ships are covered by an Assured Access Contract (AAC) through the NATO Support Agency (NSPA) based in Luxembourg. Finance is provided by eight of the eleven signatories (all but Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom).

Denmark and Germany provide the residual capacity of five ARK Ro/Ro vessels, which are chartered on a full-time contract basis until 2021. The United Kingdom offers the residual capacity of their four Ro/Ro vessels being provided to its Ministry of Defence under a Private Finance Initiative contract. This contract lasts until December 2024. In addition, Norway has a dormant contract for one Ro/Ro ship.

As an example of the capacity of the ships, the Danish/German ARK ships and UK ships can each carry around 2,500 lane meters of vehicles and equipment – in other words, if the vehicles and equipment were parked one behind the other in single file, the line would stretch for two and a half kilometres.

Evolution

To overcome the shortfall in Alliance strategic sealift capabilities, a High Level Group on Strategic Sealift was established at the NATO Prague Summit in 2002. NATO countries agreed to increase their multinational efforts to reduce the strategic sealift shortfalls for rapidly deployable forces by using a combination of full-time charter and multinational assured access contracts.

In June 2003, at the annual spring meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in Brussels, 11 ministers signed a letter of intent on addressing the sealift shortfalls on behalf of Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Turkey.

Six months later at the autumn meeting of NATO Defence Ministers, nine countries (Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom) signed an agreement to implement the letter of intent, which resulted in the formation of the Multinational Sealift Steering Committee (MSSC)
In February 2004, the consortium, led by Norway, signed a contract with the NATO Support Agency (NSPA) (formerly the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA)) for the provision of the sealift capability.

The countries pursued an incremental approach, using 2004 as the trial year, with the aim of developing further capacity for subsequent years.

At the 2004 Istanbul Summit, the defence ministers of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Romania and Slovenia signed a supplementary letter of intent on strategic sealift, where they declared their intent to improve strategic sealift and to provide additional sealift capacity for rapidly deployable forces.

## Mechanisms

The SCP has been coordinated by the Sealift Coordination Centre (SCC) since its establishment in September 2002. Since July 2007, this role has been taken over by the Movement Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE). Through improved coordination, the SCC and, now, the MCCE have managed to establish many sealift requirement matches between nations. By making more efficient use of available assets, these nations have made, and are making, significant financial savings.

The activation of the Assured Access Contract can be undertaken by either an authorised national representative, or by NSPA, under bilateral arrangements between the activating nation and NSPA.
NATO’s maritime domain

The world’s oceans are increasingly busy maritime highways. Today, 85 per cent of all international trade in raw material and manufactured goods travels by sea, and tankers carry more than half of the world’s oil. The stakes of maritime security are high, and NATO is determined to help protect its Allies from any possible threats at sea or from the sea.

NATO has Standing Naval Forces that provide the Alliance with a continuous naval presence. This multinational deterrent force constitutes an essential maritime
requirement for the Alliance. It carries out a programme of scheduled exercises, manoeuvres and port visits, and can be rapidly deployed in times of crisis or tension.

NATO's Standing Naval Forces consist of four groups: the Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMGs) composed of the SNMG1 and the SNMG2; and the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Groups (SNMCMG1 and SNMCMG2). All four groups are integrated into the NATO Response Force (NRF), the Alliance's rapid-reaction force.

**SNMG1 and SNMG2**

The Standing NATO Maritime Groups are a multinational, integrated maritime force made up of vessels from various Allied countries. These vessels are permanently available to NATO to perform different tasks ranging from exercises to operational missions. They also help to establish Alliance presence, demonstrate solidarity, conduct routine diplomatic visits to different countries, support partner engagement and provide a variety of maritime military capabilities to ongoing missions.

SNMG1 and SNMG2 currently alternate for six-month rotations conducting NATO's counter-piracy Operation Ocean Shield and otherwise function according to the operational needs of the Alliance, therefore helping to maintain optimal flexibility. Their composition varies and they are usually composed of between two and six ships from as many NATO member countries.

SNMG1 and SNMG2 fall under the authority of Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM), Northwood, United Kingdom, following MARCOM's December 2012 inauguration as the operational hub for all Alliance maritime operations. MARCOM also has two subordinate commands – Submarine Command (COMSUBNATO) and Maritime Air Command (COMMARAIR) – as well as the NATO Shipping Centre, which plays an important role in countering piracy.

**SNMCMG1 and SNMCMG2**

The Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Groups SNMCMG1 and SNMCMG2 are multinational forces that primarily engage in search and explosive ordnance disposal operations. SNMCMG2 also conducts historical ordnance disposal operations to minimise the threat from mines dating back to the Second World War.

Both SNMCMG groups are key assets in the NATO Response Force (NRF) and are able to fulfill a wide range of roles from humanitarian tasks to operations. They can deploy at short notice and are often the first assets to enter an operational theatre.

SNMCMG1 was formed in the Belgian port of Ostend on 11 May 1973 to ensure safety of navigation around the ports of the English Channel and northwest Europe. Originally
called “Standing Naval Force Channel”, its name was changed several times to reflect its expanding area of operation. Today, the Group is capable of operating nearly anywhere in the world.

SNMCMG2 developed from an on-call force for the Mediterranean, which was created in 1969. It also evolved over time to reflect its new responsibilities.

SNMCMG2 and SNMCMG1 were both given their current names in 2006.

▲ NATO’s maritime operations

Built on the strength of its naval forces, NATO's maritime operations have demonstrated the Alliance's ability to achieve strategic objectives in vastly different contexts. Since October 2001, Operation Active Endeavour has been established to deter, detect, and if necessary disrupt the threat of terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea. The operation evolved out of NATO’s immediate response to the terrorist attacks against the United States of 11 September 2001 and, in view of its success, is being continued. Since 2009, Operation Ocean Shield has contributed to international efforts to suppress piracy and protect humanitarian aid shipments off the Horn of Africa. And in 2011, Operation Unified Protector delivered power from the sea and comprised a major maritime arms embargo on Libya.

▲ Alliance Maritime Strategy

In order to address new threats, NATO adopted the Alliance Maritime Strategy in January 2011. In full consistency with the 2010 Strategic Concept, the Strategy sets out ways in which NATO's unique maritime power could help resolve critical security challenges.

There are four areas in which NATO’s maritime forces can contribute to Alliance security. The first three are the “core tasks” of NATO, as defined by the Alliance's Strategic Concept: deterrence and collective defence; crisis management; and cooperative security. In addition, the Maritime Strategy sets out a fourth area: maritime security.

Deterrence and collective defence

NATO has significant maritime capabilities and inherently flexible maritime forces, which are key to deterring aggression. As such, maritime activities contribute to nuclear
deterrence as well as to deterrence from conventional attacks. NATO will ensure it can deploy its maritime forces rapidly, control sea lines of communication, preserve freedom of navigation and conduct effective mine counter-measure activities.

**Crisis management**

NATO maritime forces can also play an important role in crisis management. These responsibilities can include enforcing an arms embargo, conducting maritime interdiction operations, contributing to the Alliance’s counter-terrorism efforts, and providing immediate humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of a natural disaster.

**Cooperative security**

NATO’s maritime forces not only contribute to ensuring Alliance security. Engagement with partners also helps to build regional security and stability, contributes to conflict prevention and facilitates dialogue. These efforts also promote cooperation and complementarity with other key actors in the maritime domain, such as the United Nations and the European Union.

**Maritime security**

The Alliance Maritime Strategy reiterates NATO’s commitment to help protect vital sea lines of communication and maintain freedom of navigation. This includes surveillance, information sharing, maritime interdiction, and contributions to energy security, including the protection of critical infrastructure.

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**Looking to the future**

Maritime security is rising on NATO’s agenda and Allies are increasingly determined to implement the Maritime Strategy – an objective the Alliance has set itself for the Wales Summit in September 2014. This endeavour encompasses a complete revamping of NATO’s maritime forces, an extensive multi-year programme of maritime exercises and training, and the enhancement of cooperation between NATO and its partners, as well as other international actors, in particular the European Union.

**Video**
NATO and cyber defence

Against the background of increasing dependence on technology and on the Internet, the Alliance is advancing its efforts to confront the wide range of cyber threats targeting NATO’s networks on a daily basis. The growing sophistication of cyber attacks makes the protection of the Alliance’s communications and information systems (CIS) an urgent task. This objective has been recognised as a priority in NATO’s Strategic Concept, and has been reiterated in the two most recent Summit Declarations, as well as at NATO ministerial meetings.
Principal cyber defence activities

NATO Policy on Cyber Defence

In order to keep abreast with the rapidly changing threat landscape and maintain a robust cyber defence, NATO has adopted a new enhanced policy, which was endorsed by Allied Defence Ministers in June 2014. The policy establishes that cyber defence is part of the Alliance's core task of collective defence, confirms that international law applies in cyberspace and intensifies NATO's cooperation with industry. The top priority is the protection of the communications systems owned and operated by the Alliance.

The new policy also reflects Allied decisions on issues such as streamlined cyber defence governance, procedures for assistance to Allied countries, and the integration of cyber defence into operational planning (including civil emergency planning). Further, the policy defines ways to take awareness, education, training and exercise activities forward, and encourages further progress in various cooperation initiatives, including those with partner countries and international organisations. It also foresees boosting NATO's cooperation with industry based on information sharing and cooperative supply chain management.

The Allies have also committed to enhancing information sharing and mutual assistance in preventing, mitigating and recovering from cyber attacks. The new policy is complemented by an action plan with concrete objectives and implementation timelines.

Assisting individual Allies

While NATO's top priority for cyber defence is the protection of communications and information systems (CIS) which are owned and operated by NATO, the Alliance requires a reliable and secure supporting national infrastructure, in particular those national networks which may be considered critical for NATO missions. To this end, NATO works with national authorities to develop principles, criteria and mechanisms to ensure an appropriate level of cyber defence for national CIS. The Alliance will continue to identify NATO dependencies on the Allies' national CIS for critical Alliance tasks and will work with NATO countries to develop common standards.

NATO is also helping member countries in their efforts to protect their own critical infrastructures by sharing information and best practices, and by conducting cyber defence exercises to help develop national expertise. Similarly, individual Allied countries may, on a voluntary basis and facilitated by NATO, assist other Allies to develop their national cyber defence capabilities.

Developing the NATO cyber defence capability
The NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) protects NATO’s own networks by providing centralised and round-the-clock cyber defence support to the various NATO sites. This capability is expected to evolve on a continual basis, to maintain pace with the rapidly changing threat and technology environment.

To facilitate an Alliance-wide and common approach to cyber defence capability development, NATO also defines targets for Allied countries’ implementation of national cyber defence capabilities via the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP).

Cyber defence has also been integrated into NATO’s Smart Defence initiative. Smart Defence enables countries to work together to develop and maintain capabilities they could not afford to develop or procure alone, and to free resources for developing other capabilities. The Smart Defence projects in cyber defence, so far, include the Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP), the Smart Defence Multinational Cyber Defence Capability Development (MN CD2) project, and the Multinational Cyber Defence Education and Training (MN CD E&T) project.

**Increasing NATO cyber defence capacity**

Recognising that cyber defence is as much about people as it is about technology, NATO continues to improve the state of its cyber defence education, training, exercises and evaluation.

NATO conducts regular exercises, such as the annual Cyber Coalition Exercise, and aims to integrate cyber defence elements and considerations into the entire range of Alliance exercises. NATO is also enhancing its capabilities for cyber education, training and exercises, including the NATO Cyber Range, which is based on a facility provided by Estonia.

The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD CoE) in Tallinn, Estonia is the foremost NATO-accredited research and training facility dealing with cyber defence education, consultation, lessons learned, research and development. Although it is not part of the NATO command structure, the CCD CoE offers recognised expertise and experience.

The NATO Communications and Information Systems School (NCISS) in Latina, Italy provides training to personnel from Allied (as well as non-NATO) nations relating to the operation and maintenance of some NATO communication and information systems. NCISS will soon relocate to Portugal, where it will provide greater emphasis on cyber defence training and education.
The NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany conducts cyber defence-related education and training to support Alliance operations, strategy, policy, doctrine and procedures. The NATO Defense College in Rome fosters strategic thinking on political-military matters, including on cyber defence issues.

Cooperating with partners

Because cyber threats defy state borders and organisational boundaries, NATO engages with relevant countries and organisations to enhance international security.

Engagement with partner countries is based on shared values and common approaches to cyber defence. Requests for cooperation with the Alliance are handled on a case-by-case basis.

NATO also works with, among others, the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The Alliance's cooperation with other international organisations is intended to ensure that actions are complementary and avoid unnecessary duplication of work.

Cooperating with industry

The private sector is a key player in cyberspace, and technological innovations and expertise from the private sector are crucial to enable NATO and Allied countries to mount an effective cyber defence.

Via the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership (NICP), NATO and Allies will work to reinforce their relationships with industry. The principal aim of the NICP will be to facilitate voluntary engagement between NATO and industry. This partnership will rely on existing structures and will include NATO entities, national Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and NATO member countries’ industry representatives.

Governance

The NATO Policy on Cyber Defence is implemented by NATO’s political, military and technical authorities, as well as by individual Allies. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) provides high-level political oversight on all aspects of implementation. The Council is apprised of major cyber incidents and attacks, and it exercises principal authority in cyber defence-related crisis management.

The Cyber Defence Committee (formerly the Defence Policy and Planning Committee/Cyber Defence), subordinate to the NAC, is the lead committee for political
governance and cyber defence policy in general, providing oversight and advice to Allied countries on NATO's cyber defence efforts at the expert level. At the working level, the NATO Cyber Defence Management Board (CDMB) is responsible for coordinating cyber defence throughout NATO civilian and military bodies. The CDMB comprises the leaders of the policy, military, operational and technical bodies in NATO with responsibilities for cyber defence.

The NATO Consultation, Control and Command (NC3) Board constitutes the main committee for consultation on technical and implementation aspects of cyber defence.

The NATO Military Authorities (NMA) and the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) bear the specific responsibilities for identifying the statement of operational requirements, acquisition, implementation and operating of NATO’s cyber defence capabilities. Allied Command Transformation (ACT) is responsible for the planning and conduct of the annual Cyber Coalition Exercise.

Lastly, NCIA, through its NCIRC Technical Centre in Mons, Belgium, is responsible for the provision of technical cyber security services throughout NATO. The NCIRC Technical Centre has a key role in responding to any cyber aggression against the Alliance. It handles and reports incidents, and disseminates important incident-related information to system/security management and users.

The NCIRC Coordination Centre is a staff element responsible for the coordination of cyber defence activities within NATO and with member countries, and for staff support to the CDMB. It ensures the cyber defence liaison with other international organisations such as the EU, the OSCE and the United Nations/International Telecommunication Union (UN/ITU).

Evolution

Although NATO has always protected its communication and information systems, the 2002 Prague Summit first placed cyber defence on the Alliance’s political agenda. Allied leaders reiterated the need to provide additional protection to these information systems at the Riga Summit in 2006.

Following the cyber attacks against Estonia's public and private institutions in April and May of 2007, Allied Defence Ministers agreed in June 2007 that urgent work was needed in this area. As a result, NATO approved its first Policy on Cyber Defence in January 2008.
In the summer of 2008, the conflict between Russia and Georgia demonstrated that cyber attacks have the potential to become a major component of conventional warfare.

NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, during which the NAC was tasked to develop an in-depth NATO cyber defence policy and to prepare an action plan for its implementation.

In June 2011, NATO Defence Ministers approved the second NATO Policy on Cyber Defence, which set out a vision for coordinated efforts in cyber defence throughout the Alliance within the context of the rapidly evolving threat and technology environment, and an associated action plan for its implementation.

In April 2012, the integration of cyber defence into the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) began. Relevant cyber defence requirements are identified and prioritised through the defence planning process.

At the Chicago Summit in May 2012, Allied leaders reaffirmed their commitment to improve the Alliance's cyber defences by bringing all of NATO's networks under centralised protection and implementing a series of upgrades to the NCIRC.

In July 2012, as part of the reform of NATO's agencies, NCIA was established.

In February 2014, Allied Defence Ministers tasked NATO to develop a new, enhanced cyber defence policy regarding collective defence, assistance to Allies, streamlined governance, legal considerations and relations with industry.

In April 2014, the NAC agreed to rename the Defence Policy and Planning Committee (Cyber Defence) as the Cyber Defence Committee.

In May 2014, the full operational capability of the NCIRC (NCIRC FOC) was achieved, providing enhanced protection to NATO networks and users.

In June 2014, NATO Defence Ministers endorsed the new cyber defence policy, which is currently being implemented. The new policy and its implementation will be kept under close review at both the political and technical levels within the Alliance and will be refined and updated in line with the evolving cyber threat.
Countering terrorism

Terrorism poses a real and serious threat to the security and safety of the Alliance and its members. It is a global threat that knows no border, nationality or religion – a challenge that the international community must tackle together. NATO's work on counter-terrorism focuses on improved threat awareness and preparedness, developing adequate capabilities and enhancing engagement with partner countries and other international actors.

Since the terrorist attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001, NATO has been actively engaged in the fight against terrorism. In response to those attacks, NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the Alliance's collective defence clause, for the first time in its history.
The multifaceted nature of terrorism is such that NATO has engaged in a number of initiatives – political, operational, conceptual, military, technological and scientific – to address this issue. The creation of the Emerging Security Challenges Division within NATO Headquarters in August 2010 reflected NATO's intent to deal with a growing range of non-traditional risks and challenges, including terrorism, in a cross-cutting manner. NATO has since agreed on new policy guidelines on counter-terrorism, which were endorsed at the Chicago Summit in May 2012 and are implemented through an associated Action Plan.

The Alliance contributes to the international community's counter-terrorism effort in several ways. First, NATO is a permanent transatlantic consultation forum, capable of transforming discussions into collective decisions and action. Second, NATO has at its disposal unique military and civilian capabilities that can contribute to taking action against terrorism or managing the consequences of an attack. Third, NATO cooperates as part of a large network of partnerships involving other countries and international organisations.

NATO's joint efforts

Operations

Since October 2001, Operation Active Endeavour has been established under Article 5 as NATO's immediate response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 to deter, detect and, if necessary, disrupt the threat of terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea. NATO operations often have relevance to international counter-terrorism efforts, even if their mandate is not specifically tailored to the terrorist threat. NATO maritime forces can play an important role *inter alia* in counter-terrorism, crisis management and humanitarian assistance. The NATO-led operation in Afghanistan, while not a counter-terrorism operation as such, is helping to prevent Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe haven for international terrorism by assisting the government of Afghanistan to expand its authority and implement security.

Securing major public events

NATO can provide assistance in promoting the security of major public events that might attract the interest of terrorists. At the request of the government concerned, it can deploy capabilities such as the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft or elements of the multinational Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence Battalion. The Alliance has assisted high-visibility events such as NATO Summits and ministerial meetings, as well as events like the Athens Olympic Games, the European Football Championship held in Poland and Ukraine in 2012 and the 2013 Dutch royal handover.

Protecting populations and critical infrastructure against the consequences of terrorist attacks
National authorities are primarily responsible for protecting their population and critical infrastructure against the consequences of terrorist attacks, CBRN incidents and natural disasters. NATO serves as a forum to develop non-binding guidelines and minimum standards as well as to exchange best practices and lessons learned for such eventualities to improve preparedness and national resilience. NATO has developed ‘Guidelines for first response to a CBRN incident’ and organises ‘International Courses for Trainers of First Responders to CBRN Incidents’ in six regional training centres. Providing timely information to the public is also a key component of consequence management, so NATO has developed guidelines to advise national authorities on warning the general public and alerting emergency responders.

A network of 380 civil experts from across the Euro-Atlantic area exists to support these efforts. Their expertise covers all civil aspects relevant to NATO planning and operations, including crisis management, consequence management and critical infrastructure protection. Drawn from government and industry, experts participate in training and exercises, and respond to requests for assistance.

The role of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre

Under the auspices of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), Allies have established an inventory of national civil and military capabilities that could be made available to assist stricken countries – both member and partner countries – following a CBRN terrorist attack. Originally created in 1998 to coordinate responses to natural and man-made disasters, since 2001 the EADRCC also coordinates responses to potential terrorist acts involving CBRN agents. The Centre has a standing mandate to respond to a national request for assistance in the event of a terrorist attack using CBRN agents. It organises major international field exercises to practise responses to simulated disaster situations and consequence management.

NATO Crisis Management System

The NATO Crisis Management System provides the Alliance with a comprehensive set of options and measures to manage and respond to the full range of crises that the Alliance may be required to face in a timely, coordinated and discriminate manner. Specific Civil Emergency Planning Crisis Management Arrangements define the roles of the Civil Emergency Planning Committee, the Planning Groups, the EADRCC and the use of civil experts during times of crisis.
NATO's capabilities

NATO supports the development of capabilities and innovative technology that specifically address the threat of terrorism. The aim is to protect troops, civilians and critical infrastructure against attacks perpetrated by terrorists, such as suicide attacks with improvised explosive devices, rocket attacks against aircraft and helicopters and the potential use of weapons of mass destruction.

The Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work

The Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work (DAT POW), which was developed by the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) in 2004, is an important part of measures taken to strengthen the Alliance's fight against terrorism. The DAT POW primarily focused on technological solutions to mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks but has widened its scope to support comprehensive capability development. Most projects launched under the programme are focused on finding solutions that can be fielded in the short term. Individual NATO countries lead the projects with support and contributions from other member countries (and partner countries in some cases), NATO bodies and other stakeholders. The DAT POW uses new or adapted technologies or methods to detect, disrupt and defeat asymmetric threats under three capability umbrellas: incident management, force protection/survivability, and network engagement.

Countering chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats

The spread and potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems and the possibility that terrorists will acquire them are acknowledged as principal threats to the Alliance. Therefore, NATO places a high priority on preventing the proliferation of WMD and defending against CBRN threats and hazards. NATO's Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of WMD and Defending against CBRN Threats states that NATO will work actively to prevent the proliferation of WMD by state and non-state actors. The Alliance is determined to ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of Allied populations, including the threat posed by CBRN weapons.

The Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force (which consists of a CBRN Defence Battalion and a CBRN Joint Assessment Team) is designed to respond to and manage the consequences of the use of CBRN agents both within and beyond NATO's area of responsibility. In addition, efforts are underway to establish a NATO CBRN Reach Back capability, providing coordinated, on-demand advice on CBRN threats, risks and hazards.
to support NATO's response to WMD proliferation, protection and recovery. The NATO-certified Centre of Excellence on Joint CBRN Defence, in the Czech Republic, further enhances NATO's capabilities to counter CBRN threats.

**Improved intelligence-sharing**

Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, NATO increased consultations on terrorism and terrorism-related issues among its members, as well as with non-member countries. Information-sharing and, more specifically, intelligence-sharing are key aspects of this exchange. Over the years, various steps have been taken to improve intelligence-sharing mechanisms and structures, based on decisions taken at the 2002 Prague Summit, the 2004 Istanbul Summit and with the reform of intelligence structures in 2010-2011.

As a result of reform, analysis of intelligence at NATO Headquarters — including of terrorist issues — was enhanced with the creation of the Intelligence Unit, which benefits from the increased sharing of intelligence between member services and the Alliance. Via the Intelligence Unit, analytical approaches to terrorism and its links with other transnational threats have been enhanced, as has cooperation among the NATO civilian and military intelligence components.

Intelligence-sharing between specialised NATO international bodies and partner countries' agencies has continued, through the Intelligence Liaison Unit at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, and an intelligence liaison cell at Allied Command Operations in Mons, Belgium.

**Strengthening cooperation with partners**

The threat of terrorism does not affect NATO alone so counter-terrorism work has become an important element of NATO's cooperation activities with partners around the world. The contributions by a number of partners to NATO's operations, as well as their efforts to introduce defence reforms supported by NATO programmes, strengthen efforts to counter terrorism. Dialogue and cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism are priorities in relations with many of NATO's partners.

Partners interested in engaging in bilateral cooperation with NATO in the area of counter-terrorism are encouraged to include the subject in all relevant documents, such as the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP), Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs) and Annual National Programmes (ANPs), according to their specific interests and needs. Additionally, the 2002 Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism
(PAP-T) provides a framework for multinational practical cooperation. Originally developed under the auspices of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the PAP-T is now open to all partner countries.

On 1 April 2014, NATO Foreign Ministers condemned Russia's illegal military intervention in Ukraine and Russia's violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Ministers underlined that NATO does not recognise Russia's illegal and illegitimate attempt to annex Crimea. As a result, NATO Foreign Ministers decided to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and Russia, including in the area of counter-terrorism cooperation.

Combating terrorism was among the main drivers behind the creation of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in May 2002 and remained a key aspect of NATO's dialogue and practical cooperation with Russia. An NRC Action Plan on Terrorism first agreed in December 2004 and subsequently updated, sets out areas of cooperation. It aims to enhance capabilities to act, individually and jointly, in three critical areas: preventing terrorism, combating terrorist activities and managing the consequences of terrorist acts (for more information, see NATO-Russia Council Action Plan on Terrorism).

The NRC also launched the Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI) in 2003 to foster cooperation on airspace surveillance and air traffic coordination, with the underlying goal to enhance confidence-building and to strengthen capabilities required for the handling of situations in which aircraft are suspected of being used as weapons to perpetrate terrorist attacks. The CAI system became operational in 2011. Russia has also participated in Operation Active Endeavour in 2006 and 2007.

To date, cooperation remains suspended.

Strengthening cooperation with other organisations

NATO is cooperating with other international organisations – in particular the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) – to ensure that information is shared and appropriate action can be taken more effectively in the fight against terrorism. The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, international conventions and protocols against terrorism, together with relevant UN resolutions provide a common framework for efforts to combat terrorism.
In cooperating with the United Nations on counter-terrorism, NATO works closely with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate as well as with the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and many of its relevant component organisations. On broader issues NATO works closely with the UN agencies that play a leading role in responding to international disasters and in consequence management, including the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the UN 1540 Committee.

NATO maintains close relations with the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department’s Action against Terrorism Unit.

The use of civilian aircraft as a weapon on 11 September 2001 led to efforts to enhance aviation security. NATO’s efforts in this field include improving civil-military coordination of air traffic control by working with EUROCONTROL, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the US Federal Aviation Authority, major national aviation and security authorities, airlines and pilot associations and the International Air Transport Association (IATA), so that information is shared and action taken more effectively.

Improving training, education and cooperation through science

NATO offers a range of training and education opportunities in the field of counter-terrorism to both Allies and partner countries. It can draw on a wide network that includes the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany and the Centres of Excellence (COEs) that support the NATO command structure. Currently, there are 18 COEs fully accredited by NATO. Several of the COEs have a link to the fight against terrorism, in particular the Centre of Excellence for Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) in Ankara, Turkey that serves as both a location and a catalyst for international dialogue and discussion regarding defence against terrorism issues. COE-DAT has established links with over 50 countries and 40 organisations to provide subject matter expertise on terrorism.

Counter-terrorism is also an important priority of the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme, which is a longstanding platform for enhancing cooperation and dialogue with partners based on civil science and innovation. The SPS Programme has been successful in bringing together scientists and experts from NATO and partner countries in the field of counter-terrorism, thereby contributing to a better understanding of threats, the development of detection and response measures, as well as fostering an effective network of experts. Activities include workshops, training courses and multi-year research and development projects. The principal themes under the SPS Programme for
activities in the area of counter-terrorism include: exploring methods for the protection of critical infrastructure, supplies and personnel; human factors in defence against terrorism; detection technologies against the terrorist threat from explosive devices and illicit activities; and risk management, best practices, and technologies in response to terrorism.

Milestones in NATO’s work on counter-terrorism

1999 The Alliance’s 1999 Strategic Concept identifies terrorism as one of the risks affecting NATO’s security.

11 September 2001 Four coordinated terrorist attacks are launched by the terrorist group al-Qaeda upon targets in the United States.

12 September 2001 Less than 24 hours after the 9/11 terrorist attacks – NATO Allies and partner countries, in a meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, condemn the attacks, offering their support to the United States and pledging to “undertake all efforts to combat the scourge of terrorism”. Later that day, the Allies decide to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the Alliance’s collective defence clause for the first time in NATO’s history, if it is determined that the attack had been directed from abroad against the United States.

13-14 September 2001 Declarations of solidarity and support are given by Russia and Ukraine.

2 October 2001 The North Atlantic Council is briefed by a high-level US official on the results of investigations into the 9/11 attacks -- the Council determines that the attacks would be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

4 October 2001 NATO agrees on eight measures to support the United States:

- to enhance intelligence-sharing and cooperation, both bilaterally and in appropriate NATO bodies, relating to
the threats posed by terrorism and the actions to be taken against it;
◦ to provide, individually or collectively, as appropriate and according to their capabilities, assistance to Allies and other countries which are or may be subject to increased terrorist threats as a result of their support for the campaign against terrorism;
◦ to take necessary measures to provide increased security for facilities of the United States and other Allies on their territory;
◦ to backfill selected Allied assets in NATO’s area of responsibility that are required to directly support operations against terrorism;
◦ to provide blanket overflight clearances for the United States and other Allies’ aircraft, in accordance with the necessary air traffic arrangements and national procedures, for military flights related to operations against terrorism;
◦ to provide access for the United States and other Allies to ports and airfields on the territory of NATO member countries for operations against terrorism, including for refuelling, in accordance with national procedures;
◦ that the Alliance is ready to deploy elements of its Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean in order to provide a NATO presence and demonstrate resolve;
◦ that the Alliance is similarly ready to deploy elements of its NATO Airborne Early Warning Force to support operations against terrorism.

Mid-October 2001   NATO launches its first-ever operation against terrorism – Operation Eagle Assist: at the request of the United States, seven NATO AWACS radar aircraft are sent to help patrol the skies over the United States (the operation runs through to mid-May 2002 during which time 830 crewmembers from 13 NATO countries fly over 360 sorties). It is the first time that
NATO military assets have been deployed in support of an Article 5 operation.

26 October 2001  
NATO launches its second counter-terrorism operation in response to the attacks on the United States, Operation Active Endeavour: elements of NATO's Standing Naval Forces are sent to patrol the eastern Mediterranean and monitor shipping to detect and deter terrorist activity, including illegal trafficking.

May 2002  
At their Reykjavik meeting, NATO Foreign Ministers decide that the Alliance would operate when and where necessary to fight terrorism. This landmark declaration effectively ends the debate on what constituted NATO's area of operations and paves the way for the Alliance's future engagement with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

November 2002  
At the Prague Summit, NATO leaders express their determination to deter, defend and protect their populations, territory and forces from any armed attack from abroad, including by terrorists. To this end, they adopt a Prague package, aimed at adapting NATO to the challenge of terrorism. It comprises:

- a Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism;
- a Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T);
- five nuclear, biological and chemical defence initiatives;
- protection of civilian populations, including a Civil Emergency Planning Action Plan;
- missile defence: Allies are examining options for addressing the increasing missile threat to Alliance populations, territory and forces in an effective and efficient way through an appropriate mix of political and defence efforts, along with deterrence;
- cyber defence;
- cooperation with other international organisations; and
- improved intelligence-sharing.
In addition, they decide to create the NATO Response Force, streamline the military command structure and launch the Prague Capabilities Commitment to better prepare NATO's military forces to face new challenges, including terrorism.

10 March 2003  
Operation Active Endeavour is expanded to include escorting civilian shipping through the Strait of Gibraltar.

March 2004  
As a result of the success of Active Endeavour in the Eastern Mediterranean, NATO extends its remit to the whole of the Mediterranean.

November 2006  
At the Riga Summit, NATO leaders recognise that “terrorism, increasingly global in scope and lethal in results, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction are likely to be the principal threats to the Alliance over the next 10 to 15 years”.

2010  
NATO's Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, recognises that terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly. It commits Allies to enhance the capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism, including through enhanced threat analysis, more consultations with NATO's partners, and the development of appropriate military capabilities.

May 2012  
At the Chicago Summit, NATO leaders endorse new policy guidelines for Alliance work on counter-terrorism, which focus on improved threat awareness, adequate capabilities and enhanced engagement with partner countries and other international actors.
Countering improvised explosive devices

An improvised explosive device (IED) is a type of unconventional explosive weapon that can take any form and be activated in a variety of ways. They target soldiers and civilians alike. In today's conflicts, IEDs play an increasingly important role and will continue to be part of the operating environment for future NATO military operations.

IEDs are one of the main causes of casualties among troops and exact a heavy toll on local populations. With the aim of reducing the risks posed by IEDs, the Alliance helps members and partners in developing their own counter-IED (C-IED) capabilities, with a particular emphasis on education and training, doctrine development and improving counter-measure technologies.
In 2010, NATO developed a C-IED Action Plan with three main focus areas: defeating the device (DtD) itself, attacking the network (AtN) and preparing the forces (PtF). With DtD, various branches within NATO look at how to detect and neutralise IEDs, exploit the IEDs as a source of information, prepare and train soldiers for an IED environment, develop technology to prevent IED attacks and protect soldiers and civilians.

Neutralisation of IED may be the most visible part of the C-IED effort but in order for it to be truly effective, it must be preceded by efforts to indentify and disrupt the networks emplacing, building and procuring IEDs. The Alliance focuses on reducing the frequency and severity of IED attacks, while also attacking the networks (AtN) that facilitate them. Understanding the various threat networks at the tactical to strategic levels is vital to success in current and future operations where battle lines are no longer linear.

C-IED efforts are conducted at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, Virginia (United States), International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Headquarters in Afghanistan, as well as at various Centres of Excellence (CoEs) and NATO Agencies. These different commands, agencies and divisions focus on research, training, exercises, doctrine development, development of capabilities to defeat IEDs, sharing information and bringing together non-NATO actors to disrupt the network before IEDs kill or injure troops and civilians.

Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) Action Plan

The C-IED Action Plan guides the Alliance's efforts to reduce the effects of IEDs and acts as an umbrella for the coordination of the various actors involved in C-IED. It covers all levels of C-IED, from the strategic to the tactical.

It is built around several different areas, including information-sharing, closer cooperation with other international organisations and law enforcement agencies. It also includes specialised training for troops deployed to areas where IEDs are widely used and improving equipment used to detect IEDs and protect troops.

A revised version of the Action Plan was approved by NATO in October 2013. The new Action Plan emphasises the need to institutionalise C-IED in the NATO Command and Force structures and to support nations' efforts in doing the same. It also recognises the need to improve understanding and intelligence to support the main effort of the AtN pillar of C-IED capability in support of NATO operations. In this context, the use of biometric information is seen as a key element in countering threat anonymity.

ACT has the overall responsibility for monitoring the implementation of different aspects of the Action Plan and leverages the NATO C-IED Task Force to coordinate and synchronise efforts across NATO Headquarters, Strategic Commands and other NATO bodies.
Equipment and technology

IEDs can be hidden anywhere: on animals, planted in roads or strapped to a person. They can be detonated via cell phones or trip wires, among other methods. They can be deployed everywhere: in a combat environment or in the middle of a busy city. The adaptability of IEDs to almost any situation makes them difficult to detect and stop, which is why NATO members and partners are using several methods to increase counter IED capabilities.

In line with the NATO Secretary General's goal of promoting multinational cooperation in defence spending, the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) has identified 19 initiatives for multinational armaments cooperation in the fight against IEDs. These initiatives, such as joint acquisition of equipment, joint testing of new technology, technological research cooperation and development of common equipment standards, have been grouped into a C-IED Materiel Roadmap.

The expert communities within NATO's Air Force, Army and Naval Armaments Groups have a multitude of studies covering diverse issues from detection capabilities to neutralisation, to minimising effect through protection of soldiers, platforms and installation devices. These studies prompt information-sharing among Allies and partners, standards for effective C-IED in a coordinated and interoperable manner throughout operations, and many cooperative activities including Smart Defence initiatives. These efforts are closely supported by the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) studies as well as work ongoing under the Science and Technology Organization (S&TO).

The CNAD has also developed a Voluntary National Contribution Fund (VNCF) to support multinational projects in the C-IED Action Plan, such as pre-deployment training of Weapon Intelligence Teams. NATO members also have access to a Clearing House database, established to facilitate information-sharing on current and future C-IED equipment programmes and to help identify possible areas of cooperation.

Additionally, NATO has several capability development projects within the Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work (DAT POW) that focus on developing sensors and information technology to detect IEDs. The DAT POW, a programme designed to identify and deliver short-term capability solutions, specifically includes a C-IED initiative. Among various actors supporting this initiative, the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCI Agency) is taking the lead in testing various stand-off detection technologies. The C-IED Centre of Excellence in Spain is concentrating on collecting and sharing lessons learned, as well as researching explosively formed projectiles—this kind of IED allows
insurgents to hit and destroy both light and heavy armoured vehicles at low cost and with poorly designed penetrators.

For its part, the EOD Centre of Excellence in Slovakia is focusing on activities, technologies and procedures for IED “Render-Safe” operations in line with the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) initiative.

Additional DAT POW C-IED projects focus on route clearance, building a NATO C-IED information-management tool or conducting table-top and live exercises to train troops in a high-threat IED environment. One such exercise is Northern Challenge, led by the Icelandic Coast Guard. The aim of the exercise is to provide a unique training opportunity for IED teams serving in, or being deployed to, international missions.

NATO, in cooperation with NCI Agency, helps to coordinate and execute the joint acquisition of C-IED capabilities through a common-funded system or nationally provided funds. NCI Agency analyses emerging technology in an operational environment and conducts research and experimentation in response to the Alliance's urgent requirements.

Information-sharing and intelligence

NATO’s initial C-IED efforts were on detecting and neutralising IEDs. They focused on protecting troops against the device by adapting equipment and personal protection, which also led to changes in pre-mission training to include IED disposal. However, C-IED work is not just about detection and neutralisation, but also about addressing the networks behind the IEDs. In line with this, NATO utilises both military and civilian means in the fight against IEDs.

Information-sharing between international and national law enforcement agencies, as well as border and customs agencies, is instrumental in mapping adversary networks. NATO also trains its troops on how to interact with civilians during deployment. The information provided by civilians who know the area can be instrumental in preventing IED attacks.

Education and training
NATO forces undergo pre-deployment training to prepare them for operations in an IED environment. They also receive further instruction in-theatre to update their training and deal with regional challenges. NATO, with Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in the lead, also focuses on decreasing the gaps between countries in training, standardization and doctrine development regarding C-IED.

One of the most important aspects of C-IED training is being able to stop networks before emplacement of IEDs, recognise IEDs and safely disable them before they injure or kill troops and civilians. In line with this, ACT offers several C-IED training programmes executed by the C-IED Integrated Product Team, including a Staff Officer Awareness Course, an Attack the Network Tactical Awareness Course, a Weapons Intelligence Team Course and a C-IED Train the Trainer Course.

Several Centres of Excellence (COEs) also offer specialised courses and training useful for an IED environment. The C-IED COE in Madrid, Spain offers multinational courses for C-IED experts to help countries counter, reduce and eliminate threats from IEDs. The Centre can also provide a wide range of subject-matter experts to train and educate national and international forces to conduct C-IED operations. The C-IED COE, in cooperation with the private sector, also focuses on AtN.

The Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) COE in Trenčín, Slovakia concentrates on DtD. Centre It improves the capabilities of EOD specialists called upon to neutralise IEDs by providing training and expertise in the field of explosive ordnance detection, neutralisation and disposal. In addition to training, the EOD COE also focuses on standardization and doctrine development and developing capabilities for EOD and IED technology improvements.

Due to their related fields of specialisations, the EOD COE and the C-IED COE cooperate closely. The COEs also have close links with others that specialise in areas that add to the field of countering IEDs, including the Military Engineering (MILENG) COE in Ingolstadt, Germany, the Defence Against Terrorism (DAT) COE in Ankara, Turkey, the Military Medical (MILMED) COE in Budapest, Hungary, and the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) COE in Oradea, Romania.
NATO’s role in energy security

Allies recognise that the disruption of energy supply could affect the security of their societies and have an impact on NATO's military operations. While these issues are primarily the responsibility of national governments, NATO continues to consult on energy security and further develops the capacity to contribute to energy security, concentrating on areas where NATO can add value. To this end, NATO seeks to enhance its strategic awareness of energy developments with security implications; develop its competence in supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure; and work towards significantly improving the energy efficiency of the military.

The report identified the five following key areas where NATO can provide added value:
• information and intelligence fusion and sharing;
• projecting stability;
• advancing international and regional cooperation;
• supporting consequence management; and
• supporting the protection of critical infrastructure.

Consultations started after the Bucharest Summit regarding the depth and range of NATO's involvement in this issue. Both within the Alliance and with NATO's partner countries, a number of practical programmes, such as workshops and research projects, are ongoing.

Work in practice

Enhancing strategic awareness of the security implications of energy developments

While NATO is not an energy institution, energy developments, such as supply disruptions, affect the international security environment and can have far-reaching security implications for some Allies. As a result, NATO closely follows relevant energy trends and developments and seeks to raise its strategic awareness in this area. This includes consultations on energy security among Allies and partner countries, intelligence-sharing, as well as specific events, such as workshops, table-top exercises, and briefings by external experts. An important event in this regard was the North Atlantic Council’s seminar on global energy developments in January 2014, which underscored the security implications of recent energy trends. NATO also seeks to ensure that its military is well aware of the role energy developments can play in the NATO’s strategic environment, and has started to organise training courses in this regard.

Supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure

All countries are increasingly reliant on vital energy infrastructure, including in the maritime domain, on which energy security and prosperity depend. Energy infrastructure is also one of the most vulnerable assets, especially in areas of conflict. Since infrastructure networks extend beyond borders, attacks on complex energy infrastructure by hostile states, terrorists or hacktivists can have repercussions across regions. For this reason, NATO seeks to increase its competence in supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure, mainly through training and exercises. Protecting energy infrastructure is, however, primarily a national responsibility. Hence, NATO’s contribution focuses on areas where it can add value, notably the exchange of best practices with partner countries, many of which are important energy producers or transit countries, and with other international institutions and the private sector. By protecting important sea lanes, NATO's counter-piracy operations also make an indirect contribution to energy security.
Enhancing energy efficiency in the military

Enhancing energy efficiency in the military focuses on reducing the energy consumption of military vehicles and camps, as well as minimising the environmental footprint. Work in this area concentrates on bringing together experts to examine existing national endeavours and proposing multinational projects. It also includes studying the behavioural aspects of saving energy in exercises and operations, as well as developing common energy efficiency standards and procedures. A significant step forward in this area is the adoption of NATO's “Green Defence” framework in February 2014. It seeks to make NATO more operationally effective through changes in the use of energy, while saving resources and enhancing environmental sustainability. NATO also continues to implement the Smart Energy Team (SENT) project, supported by the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme, with the goal to find Smart Energy solutions for the military.

Evolution

At the Bucharest Summit in 2008, Allies noted a report on “NATO's Role in Energy Security”, which identified guiding principles and outlined options and recommendations for further activities. These were reiterated at subsequent summits, while at the same time giving NATO's role clearer focus and direction. The 2010 Strategic Concept, the setting up of an Energy Security Section in the Emerging Security Challenges Division at NATO Headquarters, and the accreditation of the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence in Lithuania in 2012 were major milestones in this process.

The decision of NATO Heads of State and Government to “integrate ... energy security considerations in NATO's policies and activities” (2010 Lisbon Summit Declaration) also meant the need for NATO to reflect energy security in its education and training efforts, as well as in its exercise scenarios. Work is under way in this regard.

In the years to come, NATO will seek to further enhance the strategic dialogue, both among Allies and with partner countries, offer more education and training opportunities, and deepen its ties with other international organisations, (such as the International Energy Agency), academia, and the private sector. With increased awareness of energy risks, enhanced competence to support infrastructure protection, and enhanced energy efficiency in the military, NATO will be better prepared to respond to the emerging security challenges of the 21st century.
Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR)

Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance is vital for all military operations. It provides information and intelligence to decision-makers and action-takers, helping them make informed, timely and accurate decisions. While surveillance and reconnaissance can answer the questions “what,” “when” and “where”, the combined elements from various intelligence sources and disciplines provide the answers to “how” and “why”. When all of this is combined, you create Joint ISR.

For over 60 years, the enduring success of NATO has been achieved through the close cooperation between Allies who are driven by a shared set of democratic beliefs and values.
These Allies work together in NATO to bring stability to a complex 21st century security environment.

NATO’s 2012 Chicago Summit established the objective to strengthen cooperation and ensure tighter connections between Allied forces. During the Summit, the Allied Heads of State and Government expressed the ambition to provide NATO with an enduring and permanently available JISR capability, giving the Alliance the eyes and ears it needs to achieve strategic decision advantage.

Components

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) provides the foundation for all military operations, and its principles have been used in warfare for centuries. The individual elements of ISR are:

- **Intelligence**: the final product derived from surveillance and reconnaissance, fused with other information;
- **Surveillance**: the persistent monitoring of a target; and
- **Reconnaissance**: information-gathering conducted to answer a specific military question.

Both surveillance and reconnaissance can include visual observation (for example soldiers on the ground covertly watching a target, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) with cameras), as well as electronic observation.

The difference between surveillance and reconnaissance has to do with time and specificity; surveillance is a more prolonged and deliberate activity, while reconnaissance missions are generally rapid and targeted to retrieve specific information.

Once surveillance and reconnaissance information has been obtained, intelligence specialists can analyse it, fuse it with other information from other data sources and produce the intelligence which is then used to inform military and civilian decision-makers, particularly for the planning and conduct of operations.
While all countries have their own sources and methods for the production of intelligence, it is not always easy for them to share their intelligence with Allies. Sometimes this is due to security concerns, sometimes to internal procedural requirements, and sometimes to technological constraints.

The objective of NATO Joint ISR is to champion the concept of “need to share” over the concept of “need to know.” This does not mean that all Allies will automatically share everything, but rather that NATO can facilitate the procedures and technology to promote sharing while simultaneously providing information assurance (i.e., the protection of data and networks). This way, Allies can have a holistic picture of whatever crisis is occurring and NATO decision-makers can make well-informed, timely and accurate decisions.

To achieve this ambition, the following must be in place:

1. **Trained ISR experts**
   - Having a cadre of experts within NATO who fully understand how to use ISR to support NATO's decision-makers; and
2. **Information assurance: protection of data and networks**
   - Special procedures need to be in place to provide information assurance; it takes time and resources to obtain a genuinely efficient, secure, holistic and relevant Joint ISR system. In fact, it took ten years to develop the successful mission network used in Afghanistan, and NATO intends to capitalise on that effort.

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**Mechanism**

The experience the Alliance gained from its operations in Afghanistan and Libya has resulted in collection assets (for example information gathering equipment such as surveillance aircraft) becoming far more accessible to military personnel, even at the lowest tactical levels. Assets that would have been used only for strategic purposes at the discretion of military generals 15 years ago are now widely available and their use is decentralised. This shift occurred because NATO member countries procured significant numbers of maritime, land and airborne collection assets to help them locate adversaries, who often operate in complex environments and among civilian populations.

To enable information-gathering to take place, and to ensure that information is analysed and intelligence is produced for decision-makers, there are a number of primary actors involved, including:
Surveillance and reconnaissance collection assets

Their role is to collect information. Examples include Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS), AWACS aircraft which use radar, observation satellites, electronic assets and special ground reconnaissance troops.

Intelligence analysts

Their role is to exploit and analyse information from multiple sources. Examples include national military and civilian analysts working at the strategic level in intelligence organisations, imagery analysts at all levels, and encryption experts.

Decision-makers

Their role is to use intelligence to inform their decision-making. Examples include political leaders and military commanders.

Evolution

Based on the experience NATO Allies gained in recent operations, the Alliance is looking to establish a permanent, effective ISR system. NATO aims to provide Allies with a mechanism which brings together:

- data and information gathered through Smart Defence projects such as the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system or the AWACS; and
- a wide variety of national ISR capabilities, including troops on the ground, maritime and air assets, space-based platforms such as satellites, and Special Operations Forces.

To provide a foundation for NATO’s Joint ISR ambition, the Alliance is currently developing a JISR project aimed at providing the following pillars:

- Training and education
  
The personnel involved with the Joint ISR capability in NATO will possess expertise to guarantee the efficiency of the JISR enterprise. This area of the project examines ways to ensure that NATO personnel receive the highest standard of ISR training and education.

- Doctrine and procedures
  
  To improve interoperability, efficiency, coherence and effectiveness, Joint ISR doctrine and procedures will be continuously developed and reviewed, from strategic thinking to tactical procedures.
Networking environment

NATO communication and information systems (CIS) will guarantee efficient collaboration and sharing of ISR data, products and applications between the Allies. This is the core business of NATO's Joint ISR effort.

Technical trials take place every two years in order to demonstrate and assess progress on the Alliance's JISR capabilities in a real-world environment. The latest trial, Unified Vision, took place in Norway in 2014. It was the largest JISR event in the history of the Alliance.
Special Operations Forces

NATO Special Operations Forces (SOF) provide capabilities that complement those of NATO air, maritime and land forces and are relevant across the full range of military operations. These SOF capabilities are also applicable to the Alliance’s core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. The NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) is the primary point of development, coordination and direction for all NATO Special Operations activities.

Lithuanian Special Forces

Located at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium and under the daily direct operational command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), the NSHQ focuses on ensuring Allied Joint SOF personnel possess a multinational foundation to
allow them to operate as effectively, efficiently and coherently as possible in support of the Alliance’s objectives from the strategic to the tactical level. Twenty-six NATO member countries and three partners (Austria, Finland and Sweden) are represented among 200 plus headquarters staff.

The NSHQ is a unique hybrid organisation. It is involved in a very diverse set of activities such as NATO SOF policy, doctrine, capabilities, standards, training and education. On a daily basis the NSHQ is actively coordinating, advocating and advising reference SOF across NATO. These activities include areas such as SOF-specific intelligence, aviation, medical support and communications.

The NHSQ also supports SOF involvement in NATO operations. This includes assisting with SOF force generation, integration into strategic and operational planning, and SOF-specific intelligence analysis. There is a Special Operations Component Command element responsible for command and control of SOF within the NATO Response Force (NRF). This element is provided on a rotational basis by a handful of countries which possess the requisite SOF capacity and capability. Enhancing SOF command and control mechanisms is also an area where the NSHQ works diligently to better integrate SOF into NATO exercises from their initial inception and design all the way through gathering of lessons learned.

As a Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) deliverable, the declaration of full operational capability of a Special Operations Component Command is scheduled for the Wales Summit in September 2014. This is a scalable expeditionary NATO SOF command and control capability, agile and responsive, capable of deploying to support NATO operations. It serves to provide an additional deployable NATO SOF command and control option to complement other existing mechanisms provided by NATO member countries.

The NSHQ is also a pillar of the CFI, which aims to ensure that Allies and partners retain the progress made in terms of interoperability and collaboration from their experience working together during multinational deployments, such as in Afghanistan, Libya, the Horn of Africa and the Balkans.

1. ‘Joint’ refers to activities, operations and organisations in which elements of at least two services participate (land, air, maritime, SOF).

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**Connecting forces**

The NSHQ plays a vital part in connecting forces – planning and coordinating missions, and improving cooperation and connectivity between the countries’ SOF personnel. The *raison d’être* for the NSHQ is the need to better connect SOF personnel from NATO Allies so as to enable their coherent deployment on NATO operations.

The SOF network is underpinned by a sophisticated technological network and associated tools that enable real-time collaboration from the strategic to the tactical level. These ingredients collectively allow NATO SOF personnel to operate with confidence in today’s complex and uncertain operational security environment.
Training and education

Training and education is the main effort at the NSHQ because these efforts create the long-term effect of building a coherent framework for NATO SOF.

NSHQ training largely takes place at the purpose-built NATO SOF School on nearby Chièvres Air Base, where the students are exposed to a wide array of subjects, common doctrine and current NATO processes. These tools enable NATO SOF personnel from multiple countries to seamlessly come together on operations and in exercises employing common methods.

While most of the SOF relationships are formed in the field or during training, the NSHQ also uses advanced communications connectivity such as secure video teleconferencing to complement face to face interaction and bring together personnel from all areas of operations for conferences, workshops and exchanges of views on a daily basis.

While the origins of the NSHQ stem from the NATO SOF Transformation Initiative announced at the 2006 Riga Summit, the NSHQ has only really been on the scene since March 2010. In that short time, the NSHQ and its precursor organisation, the NATO SOF Coordination Centre, have made immense, rapid strides in bringing SOF capabilities to the fore in the Alliance.
Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS)

NATO is acquiring the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system that will give commanders a comprehensive picture of the situation on the ground. NATO’s operation to protect civilians in Libya showed how important such a capability is. A group of Allies is acquiring five Global Hawk remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) and the associated command and control base stations that make up the AGS system. NATO will then operate and maintain them on behalf of all 28 Allies.

The AGS system is being acquired by 15 Allies (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the United States), and will be made available to the Alliance in the 2017-2018 timeframe. All Allies will contribute to the development of the AGS capability through financial contributions.
covering the establishment of the AGS main operating base, as well as to communications and life-cycle support of the AGS fleet. Some Allies will replace part of their financial contribution through ‘contributions in kind’ (national surveillance systems that will be made available to NATO).

The NATO-owned and -operated AGS core capability will enable the Alliance to perform persistent surveillance over wide areas from high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) aircraft, operating at considerable stand-off distances and in any weather or light condition. Using advanced radar sensors, these systems will continuously detect and track moving objects throughout observed areas and will provide radar imagery of areas of interest and stationary objects.

The main operating base for AGS will be located at Sigonella Air Base in Italy, which will serve a dual purpose as a NATO Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) deployment base and data exploitation and training centre.

Just as NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control (NAEW&C) aircraft – also known as AWACS – monitor Alliance airspace, AGS will be able to observe what is happening on the earth's surface, providing situational awareness before, during and, if needed, after NATO operations.

AGS responds to one of the major capability commitments of the Lisbon Summit.

#### Components

The AGS Core will be an integrated system consisting of an air segment, a ground segment and a support segment.

The air segment consists of five RQ-4B Global Hawk Block 40 aircraft. The aircraft will be equipped with a state-of-the-art, multi-platform radar technology insertion programme (MP-RTIP) ground surveillance radar sensor, as well as an extensive suite of line-of-sight and beyond-line-of-sight, long-range, wideband data links. The air segment will also contain the remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) flight control stations.

The ground segment will provide an interface between the AGS Core system and a wide range of command, control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C2ISR) systems to interconnect with and provide data to multiple deployed and non-deployed operational users, including reach-back facilities remote from the surveillance area.

The ground segment component will consist of a number of ground stations in various configurations, such as mobile and transportable, which will provide data-link connectivity, data-processing and exploitation capabilities and interfaces for interoperability with C2ISR systems.
The AGS Core support segment will include dedicated mission support facilities at the AGS main operating base (MOB) in Sigonella, Italy.

Contributions in kind provided by France and the United Kingdom will complement the AGS with additional surveillance systems.

The composition of the AGS Core system and these contributions in kind will provide NATO with considerable flexibility in employing its ground surveillance capabilities.

This will be supplemented by additional interoperable national airborne surveillance systems from NATO member countries, tailored to the needs of a specific operation or mission conducted by the Alliance.

Mechanisms

The NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance Management Organisation (NAGSMO) is responsible for the acquisition of the AGS core capability on behalf of the 15 participating countries. The AGS Implementation Office (AGS IO) is located at the headquarters of Allied Command Operations (SHAPE) is responsible for ensuring the successful operational integration and employment of the NATO AGS core capability.

The NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance Management Agency (NAGSMA), representing the 15 AGS acquisition nations, awarded the prime contract for the system to Northrop Grumman in May 2012 during the Chicago Summit. Northrop Grumman has begun the production of the first AGS aircraft. The company's primary industrial team includes Airbus Defence and Space (Germany), Selex ES (Italy) and Kongsberg (Norway), as well as leading defence companies from all participating countries. The industries of all 15 participating countries are contributing to the delivery of the AGS system.

The engagement of NATO common funds for infrastructure, communications, operation and support will follow normal funding authorisation procedures applicable within the Alliance.

By the time AGS becomes fully operational in 2018, France and the United Kingdom will sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), outlining the modalities for making their contributions in kind available to the Alliance.
Supporting NATO’s core tasks

The Lisbon Summit set out the vision of Allied Heads of State and Government for the evolution of NATO and the security of its member countries. This vision is based on three core tasks, which are detailed in the new Strategic Concept:

- collective defence
- crisis management
- cooperative security

AGS was recognised at Lisbon as a critical capability for the Alliance and is planned to be a major contributor to NATO’s Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) ambition.

AGS will contribute to these three core tasks through using its MP-RTIP radar sensor to collect information that will provide political and military decision makers with a comprehensive picture of the situation on the ground.

Facts and figures

General characteristics of the RQ-4B Global Hawk Block 40 Remotely Piloted Aircraft:

- Primary function: High-altitude, long-endurance intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
- Power Plant: Rolls Royce-North American AE 3007H turbofan
- Thrust: 7,600 lbs
- Wingspan: 130.9 ft / 39.8 m
- Length: 47.6 ft / 14.5 m
- Height: 15.3 ft / 4.7 m
- Weight: 14,950 lbs / 6,781 kg
- Maximum takeoff weight: 32,250 lbs / 14,628 kg
- Fuel Capacity: 17,300 lbs / 7,847 kg
- Payload: 3,000 lbs / 1,360 kg
- Speed: 310 knots / 357 mph / 575 kph
- Range: 8,700 nautical miles / 10,112 miles / 16,113 km
- Ceiling: 60,000 ft / 18,288 m
Evolution

Originating from the Defence Planning Committee in 1992, the AGS programme was defined as a capability acquisition effort in 1995, when the NATO Defence Ministers agreed that “the Alliance should pursue work on a minimum essential NATO-owned and -operated core capability supplemented by interoperable national assets.”

The AGS programme was to provide NATO with a complete and integrated ground surveillance capability that would offer the Alliance and its member countries unrestricted and unfiltered access to ground surveillance data in near real time, and in an interoperable manner. It was to include an air segment comprising airborne radar sensors, and a ground segment comprising fixed, transportable and mobile ground stations for data exploitation and dissemination, all seamlessly interconnected linked through high-performance data links.

From the outset, the AGS capability was expected to be based on one or more types of ground surveillance assets either already existing or in development in NATO member countries, an approach that later also came to include proposed developmental systems based on US or European radars. However, all those approaches failed to obtain sufficient support by the Allies to allow their realisation. In 2001, the Reinforced North Atlantic Council (NAC(R)) decided to revitalise AGS through a developmental programme available to all NATO countries and a corresponding cooperative radar development effort called the Transatlantic Cooperative AGS Radar (TCAR).

In 2004, NATO decided to move ahead with what was labelled as a mixed-fleet approach. The air segment was to include Airbus A321 manned aircraft and Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), both carrying versions of the TCAR radar, while the ground segment was to comprise an extensive set of fixed and deployable ground stations.

Due to declining European defence budgets, NATO decided in 2007 to discontinue the mixed-fleet approach and instead to move forward with a simplified AGS system where the air segment was based on the off-the-shelf Global Hawk Block 40 UAV and its associated MP-RTIP sensor. The ground segment, which would largely be developed and built by European and Canadian industry, remained virtually unchanged as its functional and operational characteristics were largely independent of the actual aircraft and sensor used.
In February 2009, the NATO Allies participating in the AGS programme started the process to sign the Programme Memorandum of Understanding (PMOU). This was a significant step forward on the road towards realising an urgently required, operationally essential capability for NATO. NAGSMA was established in September 2009, after all participating countries had agreed on the PMOU. The PMOU serves as the basis for the procurement of this new NATO capability.

Another important milestone for the AGS programme was the 2010 Lisbon Summit, where the strong operational need for a NATO-owned and -operated AGS capability was reconfirmed with NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept. AGS also featured in the Lisbon Package as one of the Alliance's most pressing capability needs.

On 3 February 2012, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) decided on a way ahead to collectively cover the costs for operating AGS for the benefit of the Alliance. The decision to engage NATO common funding for infrastructure, satellite communications and operations and support paves the way for awarding the AGS acquisition contract. In addition, an agreement was reached to make the UK Sentinel system and the future French Heron TP system available as national contributions in kind, partly replacing financial contributions from those two Allies.
AWACS: NATO’s 'Eye In The Sky'

NATO operates a fleet of Boeing E-3A 'Sentry' Airborne Warning & Control System (AWACS) aircraft, which provide the Alliance with an immediately available airborne command and control (C2), air and maritime surveillance and battle-space management capability. NATO Air Base (NAB) Geilenkirchen, Germany, is home to 17 AWACS aircraft.

The NE-3A is a modified Boeing 707 equipped with long-range radar and passive sensors capable of detecting air and surface contacts over large distances. Information collected by AWACS can be transmitted directly from the aircraft to other users on land, at sea or in the air.

The NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force (NAEW&C Force) is one of the few military assets that is actually owned and operated by NATO. It is the Alliance’s largest collaborative venture and is an example of what NATO member countries can achieve by pooling resources and working together in a truly multinational environment.

Role and responsibilities

The NAEW&C Force performs a unique and valuable role for the Alliance by conducting a wide range of missions such as air policing, support to counter-terrorism, consequence management, non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), embargo, initial entry, crisis response and demonstrative force operations.
In recent years, the force has been deployed on increasingly complex and demanding tactical missions, including among numerous others:

- support to maritime operations;
- close air support (CAS);
- airspace management;
- combat search and rescue (CSAR);
- disaster relief; and
- counter-piracy.

**Critical asset for crisis management**

Since it commenced flight operations in 1982, the NAEW&C Force has proven to be a key asset in crisis-management and peace-support operations.

Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, aircraft from the NATO E-3A Component (NAB Geilenkirchen) deployed to eastern Turkey to help reinforce NATO’s southern flank during the war. Operation Anchor Guard included monitoring air and sea traffic in the eastern Mediterranean and providing airborne surveillance along the Iraqi-Turkish border. The mission was conducted from August 1990 to March 1991.

For most of the 1990s, aircraft from both the NATO and United Kingdom’s AEW&C fleets operated extensively in the Balkans, supporting United Nations resolutions and Alliance missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo during Operations Deliberate Force and Allied Force. AWACS aircraft from the French Armée de l’Air and the US Air Force also helped achieve the objectives of these missions.

In early 2001, the Force also supported NATO’s defensive deployment to southeastern Turkey during Operation Display Deterrence.

In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, NATO E-3A aircraft were deployed to the mainland US to help defend North America against further attacks during Operation Eagle Assist. This represented the first time in Alliance history that NATO assets were deployed in support of the defence of one of its member nations.

Since 2007, the NAEW&C Force has been used successfully in support of NATO’s counter-terrorism activities in the Mediterranean Sea during Operation Active Endeavour and for numerous other high-visibility events.
Since January 2011, aircraft from NAB Geilenkirchen have been deploying to Afghanistan to support the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) by providing air surveillance coverage as part of Operation Afghan Assist. During Operation Unified Protector, the NAEW&C Force also performed the crucial function of commanding and controlling all Alliance air assets operating over Libya. This included the issuing of real-time tactical orders and taskings to NATO fighter aircraft, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft, air-to-air refuellers or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). NATO E-3A aircraft also supported Allied ships and submarines enforcing the maritime arms embargo against Libya by providing an aerial maritime surveillance capability.

### Protecting NATO populations

As a consequence of the 9/11 attacks, NATO governments have been able to request the air surveillance and control capability offered by the NAEW&C Force to assist with security for major public occasions. These high-visibility events have included the 2004 Summer Olympic Games in Greece, the 2006 World Cup Football Championship in Germany, the 2012 European Football Championship in Poland as well as important meetings held by other international organisations such as the 2010 Nobel Prize award ceremony in Sweden and the 2013 Dutch royal handover in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Further, the NAEW&C fleets have consistently provided air support to NATO summit meetings.

### Working Mechanism

Multinational cooperation is the key characteristic of the NAEW&C Programme Management Organisation (NAPMO). Currently, the 16 full NAPMO nations are: Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey and the United States.

The United Kingdom exercises limited participation as a NAPMO member, but its fleet of E-3D aircraft is an integral part of the NAEW&C Force. France has an observer role and maintains continual coordination to ensure its E-3F aircraft remain interoperable with the other E-3 fleets. France also often assists in coordinated operations with the NAEW&C Force.

The NAEW&C Force Command Headquarters is co-located with Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, and exercises operational control over the Force, consisting of two operational components:
the E-3A Component based at NAB Geilenkirchen, which operates the 17 NATO-owned NE-3A aircraft (the squadrons are manned by integrated international crews from 15 nations); and
the E-3D Component based at RAF Waddington, United Kingdom, which operates their six Boeing E-3D aircraft (the component is manned by Royal Air Force personnel only).

The Force also maintains three forward-operating bases (FOBs) at Konya in Turkey, Aktion in Greece, Trapani in Italy, and a forward-operating location (FOL) at Oerland, Norway.

The AWACS programme, including execution of modernisation projects, is managed on a day-to-day basis by the NAEW&C Programme Management Agency (NAPMA), which is located at Brunssum, the Netherlands. The agency is staffed by military officers seconded to the agency and by civilian officials from the nations participating in the programme. In 2011, the NAPMA General Manager was assigned by the NAPMO nations as the Technical Airworthiness Authority (TAA) for the NE-3A fleet. Supported by a dedicated engineering office, the TAA shares responsibilities for airworthiness certification, together with the NAEW&C Force Commander who is responsible operations and support of the fleet.

**How the NAEW&C Force works**

All AWACS aircraft undergo continuous modifications for modernisation and for operations and support. An NE-3A aircraft modified under the NATO Mid-Term (NMT) Programme has a standard crew of 16, while the original E-3D requires a standard crew of 18. Whatever the variant, the flight and mission crews are highly-trained men and women whose expertise covers all areas of flight operations, including battle space management, weapons control, surveillance control, data link management and the technical aspects of communications, data systems and mission radar.

Under normal circumstances, the aircraft can operate for about eight hours (and longer with air-to-air refuelling) at 30,000 feet (9,150 metres).

The active surveillance sensors are located in the radar dome (“rotodome”) which makes the NE-3A such a uniquely recognisable aircraft. This structure rotates once every ten seconds and provides the NE-3A with 360-degree radar coverage that can detect aircraft out to a distance of more than 215 nautical miles (400 kilometres).

One aircraft flying at 30,000 feet has a surveillance area coverage of more than 120,000 square miles and three aircraft operating in overlapping, coordinated orbits can provide unbroken radar coverage of the whole of Central Europe.
The aircraft is able to track and identify potentially hostile aircraft operating at low altitudes, as well as provide fighter control of Allied aircraft. It can simultaneously track and identify maritime contacts, and provide coordination support to Allied surface forces.

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Evolution

During the 1960s, it became clear that military aircraft could no longer fly high enough to avoid surface-to-air missiles. To survive in an increasingly lethal air defence environment, aircraft were forced down to levels little higher than tree-top. By the 1970s, the requirement to detect high-speed combat aircraft with low-level penetration capability made it necessary to augment NATO's system of ground-based radars with new means.

The NATO military authorities determined that an Airborne Early Warning (AEW) capability would provide the key to meeting the challenge. The operational requirement for the NATO AEW system stressed the need to detect small, high-speed intruder aircraft at long range. The need to detect maritime surface targets (such as ships and boats) was also specified because of the geographical regions where the AEW aircraft would have to operate. The inherent mobility and flexibility of the system, especially for control function, were also foreseen by NATO planners as providing air, maritime, and land force commanders with an enhanced command and control (C2) capability. The creation of a NATO AEW Force was therefore designed to make a significant contribution to the Alliance's deterrent posture.

In December 1978, the NATO Defence Planning Committee approved the joint acquisition of 18 aircraft based on the US Air Force (USAF) Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), to be operated as an Alliance-owned Airborne Early Warning System. In addition to the delivery of the 18 E-3A aircraft between February 1982 and May 1985, the NAEW&C programme included the upgrade of 40 NATO Air Defence Ground Environment (NADGE) sites and the establishment of a main operating base (MOB) at Geilenkirchen, Germany, along with three FOBs and an FOL.

Transformation

Originally designed as an elevated radar platform, the NATO E-3A has constantly evolved to address the realities of geopolitical change and NATO's new mission over the last 30
years. In emphasising the control aspect of the AEW&C, the NE-3A has become an essential part of air battle management and has continued to remain operationally relevant through successive modernisation programmes involving state-of-the-art engineering and manufacturing developments. From the Initial NAEW&C Acquisition Programme through the Near-Term Programme and on through the Mid-Term Programme, the NAPMO nations have collectively spent/committed, for acquisition and follow-on support, in excess of US$6.8 billion – prohibitively expensive for any single country, but realisable through the collective contribution of the NAPMO nations.

Today NATO is moving forward with a new and improved method of planning and conducting operations. To support the dynamic NATO transformation process, NAPMO is committed to adopt new business approaches and enter into cooperative programmes. The purpose is to expedite the fielding of operational capabilities in response to emerging requirements at a cost that takes into consideration today's economic realities. In that sense, efforts are underway for the next phase of NAEW&C enhancements, which will allow the force to continue fulfilling its operational mandate well into the future.

To be completed by 2018, Future Upgrade Programmes (FUP) are primarily aimed at enhancing the identification system (Mode5/Enhanced Mode S) and replacing the analogue cockpit technology with modern, digital technology (known as a “glass” cockpit). Communication systems which use Internet Protocol (IP) are also being developed and fielded to support text communications with other command and control (C2) assets.

Possible future enhancements beyond 2018 are currently being assessed by NATO military authorities, which might culminate in a new modernisation programme.
Washington Treaty

The foundations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were officially laid down on 4th April 1949 with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, more popularly known as the Washington Treaty. It is a model of brevity and provides for in-built flexibility on all fronts. Without the original text being modified at any stage, the Alliance has been able to adapt to a changing security environment through time and each Ally can implement the text in accordance with its capabilities and circumstances.

The Treaty derives its authority from Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which reaffirms the inherent right of independent states to individual or collective defence. Collective defence is at the heart of the Washington Treaty and is enshrined in Article 5. It commits members to protect each other and sets a spirit of solidarity within the Alliance.
Only 14 articles long, the Treaty is one of the shortest documents of its kind. The carefully crafted articles were the subject of several months of discussion and negotiations before the Treaty could actually be signed by the 12 founding members in the Departmental Auditorium in Washington D.C. There were several areas of contention on fundamental issues such as the duration of the Treaty, its geographical scope, membership and the rights and obligations implied by Article 5.

Once signed, the Treaty gave birth to the Alliance and only later did a fully-fledged organization develop. Strictly speaking, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) provides the structure which enables the goals of the Alliance to be implemented. To date, those goals have not fundamentally changed nor the Treaty been rewritten. The only so-called “amendments” made so far stem from the series of accession protocols which have been added as new members join, illustrating the foresight of its drafters and their ability to marry international concerns and objectives with national interests.

Political context of the Alliance’s birth

The hostilities that had characterized relations between soviet and western powers since 1917 gradually re-emerged at the end of the Second World War. This “East-West” divide was fuelled by conflicting interests and political ideologies. There were clashes over peace agreements and reparations, and tensions were exacerbated by events such as the Berlin blockade in April 1948, the June 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia and direct threats to the sovereignty of Norway, Greece and Turkey.

As the power of the Soviet Union spread to several Eastern European countries, there was concern among Western European countries that the USSR would impose its ideology and authority across Europe. From 1945, Western governments started reducing their defence establishments and demobilizing their forces. But in January 1948, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin spoke of the need for a “treaty of alliance and mutual assistance”, a defensive alliance and a regional grouping within the framework of the UN Charter.

The United States would only agree to provide military support for Europe if it were united. In response, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, signed the Brussels Treaty in March 1948, creating the Western Union. Designed to strengthen ties between the signatories while providing for a common defence system, the Brussels Treaty ultimately became the basis for the Washington Treaty.

In the meantime, the US Senate adopted the Vandenberg Resolution – a resolution that would change the course of American foreign policy since it allowed the United States to constitutionally participate in a mutual defence system in times of peace.

The ground was set for negotiations to start on a transatlantic treaty.
Negotiating and drafting the Treaty

The talks on what would become the Washington Treaty took place between the powers of the Brussels Treaty (except Luxembourg, which was represented by Belgium) plus the United States and Canada. Representatives from Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States constituted the core drafting team, but participants from other countries also contributed to the initial discussions, with the assistance of a working group. What has been coined as the “six-power talks” gave birth to the Washington Paper, issued 9 September 1948, which contained an outline of possible future articles for the Treaty.

Formal public treaty negotiations began 10 December 1948 with the Ambassadors Committee in Washington, D.C. For these talks, Luxembourg sent its own representative. Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal and Italy were later invited to the final sessions of negotiations, which began 8 March 1949. Although the participating countries agreed that collective defence would be at the heart of the new Alliance, several other issues were still not resolved and needed to be worked out before the formation of the Alliance could become a reality.

Collective defence

Views on the implementation of Article 5 differed. The United States had previously taken a stance of officially avoiding foreign entanglements. Because of this, it was concerned that Article 5 would draw the country into a conflict through treaty obligations. Something had to be put in place to allow for the US to send aid to attacked countries without having to declare war.

The European countries, on the other hand, wanted to ensure that the United States would come to their aid if one of the signatories came under attack. The United States refused to make this pledge and believed US public opinion would not follow so they proposed an option that would allow each country to assist other signatories “as it deems necessary.” In other words, there would be no automatic declaration of war or obligation to commit militarily on the part of member countries; the action to be taken would be up to each individual member country. Ultimately, the American viewpoint on collective defence won out.

Political and military cooperation

Some drafters wanted more than just military cooperation between signatories. They wanted to expand cooperation to social and economic cooperation, but there were
differing views on how to treat non-military issues. Ultimately, Article 2 went through, and now forms the basis of the Alliance’s political and non-military work.

Article 2 is reinforced by Article 4, which encourages the Allies to “consult together” whenever they consider it necessary, therefore facilitating consensus-building. The practice of regularly exchanging information and consulting together strengthens the links between governments and knowledge of their respective preoccupations so that they can agree on common policies or take action more easily.

**Geographical scope of the Alliance**

The geographical scope of the Alliance, both in terms of membership and area of responsibility, was yet another topic on which the negotiators had a difference of opinion. The United States and the United Kingdom saw NATO as more of a regional organization while other countries, such as France, felt it should take on a more global role.

Ultimately Article 6 of the Washington Treaty details specific countries in the North Atlantic area, along with the caveat that in certain conditions the Alliance’s responsibility could be extended as far south as the Tropic of Cancer to encompass any islands, vessels or aircrafts attacked in that area.

However, according to one of the original drafters, Theodore C. Achilles, there was no doubt in anybody’s minds that NATO operations could also be conducted south of the Tropic of Cancer and basically, worldwide. This interpretation of the Treaty was reaffirmed by foreign ministers in Reyjavik in May 2002 in the context of the fight against terrorism: “To carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives.”

**Membership of the Alliance**

In terms of whom to invite to join the Alliance, again the drafters held diverging views. The United Kingdom wanted to keep the Alliance small and strong, avoiding commitments to peripheral countries, while the United States advocated inviting weaker countries or countries that were more likely to fall to Soviet aggression. France, on the other hand, was mainly concerned with protecting its colonial territories. Of concern to all three countries was Germany, whose membership was not immediately considered due to the complexity of its situation.

The drafters also discussed inviting Italy, Greece, Turkey, Portugal, Iceland and the Scandinavian countries, essentially for their strategic value. Italy, Portugal and Iceland were among the founding members and ultimately, Greece and Turkey joined the Alliance.
in 1952. Iceland linked its membership to that of Denmark and Norway, which also joined in 1949; Sweden, on the other hand, categorically refused to have any links with NATO.

Consideration was also given to offering membership to Ireland, Iran, Austria and Spain, but the idea was dropped largely due to internal conditions in each country.

**Colonial territories**

The status of colonial territories was one of the biggest bones of contention in the drafting of the Washington Treaty. France insisted on including Algeria, while Belgium requested the Congo's inclusion. However, the United States and Canada wanted to exclude all colonial territory, the main concern being that NATO would end up having to resolve problems stemming from the native population of overseas territories.

Ultimately, the drafters granted France's request to include Algeria¹, which had been fully integrated into the French political and administrative organization as a French department, but rejected Belgium's request regarding the Congo.

**Duration of the Treaty**

The negotiating countries disagreed on how long the treaty should last. Some countries favoured a long-term agreement that would set the initial duration at 20 years, while others feared that anything beyond 10 years would be seen as an unnecessary extension of the war effort. Finally, at the insistence of Portugal, the Treaty was made valid for a 10-year period, after which the Treaty could be reviewed (Article 12); and only after the Treaty had been in force for 20 years could a member withdraw from the Organization (Article 13). To date, these two provisions have never been used, i.e., the Treaty has never been reviewed nor a member withdrawn from the Organization.

1. The Article dealing with French Algeria no longer became applicable from 3 July 1962, following the independence of Algeria.
The treaty committed each member to share the risk, responsibilities and benefits of collective security and required them not to enter into any international commitments that conflicted with the Treaty. It also committed them to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and stated that NATO members formed a unique community of values committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

In addition to collective defence and key values, the principle of consensus decision-making and the importance of consultation define the spirit of the Organization, together with its defensive nature and its flexibility.
NATO’s fundamental security tasks

NATO’s essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Collective defence is at the heart of the Alliance and creates a spirit of solidarity and cohesion among its members.

NATO strives to secure a lasting peace in Europe, based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Since the outbreak of crises and conflicts beyond the borders of NATO member countries can jeopardize this objective, the Alliance also contributes to peace and stability through crisis management operations and partnerships. Essentially, NATO not only helps to defend the territory of its members, but engages where possible and when necessary to project its values further afield, prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction.
NATO also embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is tied to the security of Europe. It is an intergovernmental organization which provides a forum where members can consult together on any issues they may choose to raise and take decisions on political and military matters affecting their security. No single member country is forced to rely solely on its national capabilities to meet its essential national security objectives. The resulting sense of shared security among members contributes to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

NATO's fundamental security tasks are laid down in the Washington Treaty. They are sufficiently general to withstand the test of time and are translated into more detail in strategic concepts. Strategic concepts are the authoritative statement of the Alliance's objectives and provide the highest level of guidance on the political and military means to be used in achieving these goals; they remain the basis for the implementation of Alliance policy as a whole.

During the Cold War, NATO focused on collective defence and the protection of its members from potential threats emanating from the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, along with the rise of non-state actors affecting international security, many new security threats emerged. NATO now focuses on countering these threats by utilizing collective defence, managing crisis situations and encouraging cooperative security, as outlined in the 2010 Strategic Concept.
Collective defence

The principle of collective defence is at the very heart of NATO's founding treaty. It remains a unique and enduring principle that binds its members together, committing them to protect each other and setting a spirit of solidarity within the Alliance.

This principle is enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that an attack on one Ally shall be considered an attack on all Allies.

NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time in its history following the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States.

The principle of collective defence has also been raised in the context of Russia's military aggression against Ukraine. Russia's actions have raised justified concerns among its neighbours, including those who are NATO members. That is why NATO Foreign Ministers, on 1
April, directed Allied military authorities to develop extra measures to strengthen collective defence.

A cornerstone of the Alliance

**Article 5**

In 1949, the primary aim of the North Atlantic Treaty was to create a pact of mutual assistance to counter the risk that the Soviet Union would seek to extend its control of Eastern Europe to other parts of the continent.

Every participating country agreed that this form of solidarity was at the heart of the Treaty, effectively making Article 5 on collective defence a key component of the Alliance.

Article 5 provides that if a NATO Ally is the victim of an armed attack, each and every other member of the Alliance will consider this act of violence as an armed attack against all members and will take the actions it deems necessary to assist the Ally attacked.

**Article 5**

“*The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.*

*Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.***

The “out-of-area” debate

This article is complemented by Article 6, which stipulates:

**Article 6¹**

"*For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian departments of France², on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties.*"
According to one of the drafters of the Treaty, Theodore C. Achilles, there was no doubt in anybody’s minds that NATO operations could also be conducted south of the Tropic of Cancer. This was confirmed by foreign ministers in Reykjavik in May 2002 in the context of the fight against terrorism: “To carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives”. (Extract from the Reykjavik communiqué).

The principle of providing assistance

With the invocation of Article 5, Allies can provide any form of assistance they deem necessary to respond to a situation. This is an individual obligation on each Ally and each Ally is responsible for determining what it deems necessary in the particular circumstances.

This assistance is taken forward in concert with other Allies. It is not necessarily military and depends on the material resources of each country. It is therefore left to the judgment of each individual member country to determine how it will contribute. Each country will consult with the other members, bearing in mind that the ultimate aim is to “to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”.

At the drafting of Article 5 in the late 1940s, there was consensus on the principle of mutual assistance, but fundamental disagreement on the modalities of implementing this commitment. The European participants wanted to ensure that the United States would automatically come to their assistance should one of the signatories come under attack; the United States did not want to make such a pledge and obtained that this be reflected in the wording of Article 5.

1. Article 6 has been modified by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey.
2. On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council modified this Treaty in its decision C-R (63)2, point V, on the independence of the Algerian departments of France.
3. Documents on Canadian External Relations, Vol. 15, Ch. IV.

Invocation of Article 5

The 9/11 terrorist attacks

The United States was the object of brutal terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. The Alliance's 1999 Strategic Concept already identified terrorism as one of the risks affecting
NATO's security. The Alliance's response to September 11, however, saw NATO engage actively in the fight against terrorism, launch its first operations outside the Euro-Atlantic area and begin a far-reaching transformation of its capabilities.

An act of solidarity

On the evening of 12 September 2001, less than 24 hours after the attacks, and for the first time in NATO’s history, the Allies invoked the principle of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson subsequently informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the Alliance's decision.

The North Atlantic Council - NATO's principal political decision-making body - agreed that if it determined that the attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it would be regarded as an action covered by Article 5. On 2 October, once Council had been briefed on the results of investigations into the 9/11 attacks, it determined that they were regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

By invoking Article 5, NATO members showed their solidarity toward the United States and condemned, in the strongest possible way, the terrorist attacks against the United States.

Taking action

After 9/11, there were consultations among the Allies and collective action was decided by the Council. The United States could also carry out independent actions, consistent with its rights and obligations under the United Nations Charter.

On 4 October, once it had been determined that the attacks came from abroad, NATO agreed on a package of eight measures to support the United States. On the request of the US, it launched its first-ever anti-terror operation - Eagle Assist - from mid-October 2001 to mid-May 2002. It consisted in seven NATO AWACS radar aircraft that helped patrol the skies over the United States; in total 830 crew members from 13 NATO countries flew over 360 sorties. This was the first time that NATO military assets were deployed in support of an Article 5 operation.

On 26 October, the Alliance launched its second counter-terrorism operation in response to the attacks on the United States, Active Endeavour. Elements of NATO's Standing Naval Forces were sent to patrol the eastern Mediterranean and monitor shipping to detect and deter terrorist activity, including illegal trafficking. In March 2004, the operation was expanded to include the entire Mediterranean.
Enhanced collective defence measures in wake of Ukraine crisis

Similarly to the reassurance measures put into place for Turkey in 1991 (deployment of Patriot Missiles during the Gulf War), in 2003 (agreement on a package of defensive measures and conduct of Operation Display Deterrence during the crisis in Iraq) and in 2012 in response to the situation in Syria (deployment of Patriot missiles), the Alliance has taken steps to enhance the defence of Allies following Russia's illegal military intervention in Ukraine. As part of the measures, NATO has deployed AWACS planes over Poland and Romania, sent ships on patrol to the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas, and deployed additional fighter jets to police the airspace over the Baltics. NATO is also conducting additional exercises to test the readiness of NATO forces to defend Allies, including in an Article 5 context. In light of the new security situation, NATO has also decided to review and update defence plans.

Standing forces

Collective defence measures are not solely event-driven. NATO has a number of standing forces on active duty that contribute to the Alliance's collective defence efforts on a permanent basis. These include NATO's standing maritime forces, which are ready to act when called upon. They perform different tasks ranging from exercises to operational missions, in peacetime and in periods of crisis and conflict.

Additionally, NATO has an integrated air defence system to protect against air attacks, which also comprises the Alliance's ballistic missile defence system. NATO also conducts several air policing missions, which are collective peacetime missions that enable NATO to detect, track and identify all violations and infringements of its airspace and to take appropriate action. As part of such missions, Allied fighter jets patrol the airspace of Allies who do not have fighter jets of their own. They run on a 24/7 basis, 365 days per year.
The consultation process and Article 4

All NATO decisions are made by consensus, after discussion and consultation among member countries. Consultation between member states is a key part of the decision-making process at NATO, allowing Allies to exchange views and information, and to discuss issues prior to reaching agreement and taking action.

Consultations take place on all subjects of interest to the Alliance: developing new military capabilities and cooperative relationships with non-member countries, military operations etc. Discussions effectively touch on NATO’s day-to-day business, its core objectives and its fundamental role. Additionally, members are encouraged to bring subjects to the table for
discussion within the North Atlantic Council (NAC). This prerogative is outlined in Article 4 of NATO's founding treaty: “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”

The consultation process is therefore at the heart of NATO. It reinforces the Alliance's political dimension by giving members the opportunity to voice opinions and official positions, and it also gives NATO an active role in preventive diplomacy by providing the means to help avoid military conflict.

Consultation is continuous and takes place both on a formal and informal basis. It can happen quickly due to the fact that all member states have permanent delegations at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Governments can come together at short notice whenever necessary, often with prior knowledge of their respective national preoccupations, in order to agree on common policies or take action on the basis of consensus. NATO's network of committees facilitates consultation by enabling government officials, experts and administrators to come together on a daily basis to discuss a broad range of issues.

Different forms of consultation

Consultation takes many forms. At its most basic level it involves simply the exchange of information and opinions. At another level it covers the communication of actions or decisions, which governments have already taken or may be about to take. Finally, it can encompass discussion with the aim of reaching a consensus on policies to be adopted or actions to be taken.

The principle of consensus decision making is applied throughout NATO, which means that all “NATO decisions” are the expression of the collective will of all sovereign states that are members of this inter-governmental organisation. While consensus decision-making can help a member country preserve national sovereignty in the area of defence and security, Article 4 can be an invitation for member countries to concede this right to the group or it can simply lead to a request for NATO support.

Article 4

Under Article 4 of NATO's founding treaty, member countries can bring an issue to the attention of the Council and discuss it with Allies. The article states:

“The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”

Any member country can formally invoke Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. As soon as it is invoked, the issue is discussed and can potentially lead to some form of joint decision or action on behalf of the Alliance. Whatever the scenario, fellow members sitting around
the Council table are encouraged to react to a situation brought to their attention by a member country.

Since the Alliance's creation in 1949, Article 4 has been invoked several times. Once by Poland on 3 March 2014 following increasing tensions in neighbouring Ukraine. On two occasions in 2012, Turkey requested that the North Atlantic Council (NAC) convene under Article 4: once on 22 June after one of its fighter jets was shot down by Syrian air defence forces and the second time on 3 October when five Turkish civilians were killed by Syrian shells. Following these incidents, on 21 November, Turkey requested the deployment of Patriot missiles. NATO agreed to this defensive measure so as to help Turkey defend its population and territory, and help de-escalate the crisis along the border.

Previously, on 10 February 2003, Turkey formally invoked Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, asking for consultations in the NAC on defensive assistance from NATO in the event of a threat to its population or territory resulting from armed conflict in neighbouring Iraq. NATO agreed a package of defensive measures and conducted Operation Display Deterrence from end February to early May 2003.

The political dimension of NATO

Encouraging members of an inter-governmental organisation who have not given up their right of free and independent judgment in international affairs to consult more systematically on an issue is a challenge – be it today or in the ‘50s.

In the early ‘50s, the NAC recognised NATO's consultative deficiency on international issues and recommended that measures be taken to improve the process. In April 1954, a resolution on political consultation was adopted:

“... all member governments should bear constantly in mind the desirability of bringing to the attention of the Council information on international political developments whenever they are of concern to other members of the Council or to the Organization as a whole; and (...) the Council in permanent session should from time to time consider what specific subject might be suitable for political consultation at one of its subsequent meetings when its members should be in a position to express the views of their governments on the subject.” C-M(54)38.

The resolution, which was put forward by Canada and immediately approved, provoked nonetheless a reaction from the American representative:

“Mr. Dulles (United States) supported the Canadian resolution on the understanding that consultation would be limited within the bounds of common sense. Countries like his own with world-wide interests might find it difficult to consult other NATO governments in every case. For a sudden emergency, it was more important to take action than to discuss the emergency. In
other words, consultation should be regarded as a means to an end, rather than an end in itself.” (C-R(54)18).

The reservations made by the United States, which no doubt were shared by other member countries, could still be voiced today. Building on this resolution, on 8 March 1956, the Secretary General of NATO, Lord Ismay, made a statement which widened the debate by explaining the consequences of systemising political consultation within the Alliance:

“A direct method of bringing home to public opinion the importance of the habit of political consultation within NATO may be summed up in the proposition “NATO is a political as well as a military alliance”. The habitual use of this phraseology would be preferable to the current tendency to refer to NATO as a (purely) military alliance. It is also more accurate. To refer to NATO as a political alliance in no sense denies, depreciates or deprecates the fact that the alliance is also military.” (C-M(56)25-1956).

The same year, the “Three Wise Men” produced their report, which inter alia sought to improve consultation within the Alliance on issues of common concern (Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO”). However, ironically it was published as the Suez crisis emerged. Suez severely divided the leading founding members of the Organization (France, the United Kingdom and the United States). The Suez crisis acted as a catalyst for NATO, leading it to put into practice something it knew was of vital importance for the unity and solidarity of the Alliance – political consultation.

“Animus in consulendo liber”

For its anecdotal value, it is worth noting that when NATO moved to its headquarters at the Porte Dauphine in Paris, December 1959, the Secretary General, M. Paul-Henri Spaak, enlisted the help of the Dean of the Council in finding a suitable Latin maxim which would capture the spirit of consultation between Allies to which he attached so much importance. The Dean, Belgian Ambassador André de Staercke, recalled a visit he had made to the Tuscan town of San Gimignano. There, in the Palazzo del Podestà, engraved on the back of the seat reserved for the man who presided over the destinies of the city, he had seen the motto: Animus in consulendo liber.

It seems that an entirely satisfactory translation of the phrase cannot be found, although a French version “l’esprit libre dans la consultation” comes close. Renderings in English have ranged from the cryptic “in discussion a free mind” to the more complex “Man’s mind ranges unrestrained in counsel”.

Archi...
The motto adorned the conference area at the Porte de Dauphine for several years and, in 1967, was moved to NATO's new home in Brussels, where it has since graced the wall of the Council room.

Setting up a consultation system

As explained above, consultation and consensus were accepted as the basis for all NATO decisions when the Alliance was created in 1949.

However, it was only gradually that NATO set up a consultation system. In broad terms, this was done in three stages:

- 1949-1952: at the signing of the Treaty, NATO introduced the consultation process as a key principle in its working mechanisms. This was reinforced at the Lisbon Conference (1952) where the contours of today's NATO were put into place: the NAC was made permanent and the position of Secretary General was created, together with an international staff that would support Council decisions on a permanent basis;

- 1952-1956: between 1952 and the publishing of the Committee of Three's report on non-military cooperation, attempts had been made to encourage political consultation beyond the geographical limitations defined in the founding treaty, ie, beyond the defined NATO area.

- From 1956: the principles of the Report of the Committee of Three were further developed and implemented. The Committee recommended measures in the area of political cooperation with regard to foreign policies, the peaceful settlement of inter-member disputes, economic cooperation, scientific and technical cooperation, cultural cooperation and cooperation in the information field.

The Committee of Three left a lasting legacy by encouraging NATO members to reconcile differences within the Organization through productive consultation on matters of common concern, including issues outside the defined NATO area. The Suez crisis provided a firsthand example of why close political consultation and non-military cooperation are necessary.
The fora for political consultation

The principal forum for political consultation is the North Atlantic Council, the NAC. The NAC is NATO's principal political decision-making committee. The Secretary General, by virtue of his chairmanship, plays an essential part in this process. Consultation also takes place on a regular basis in other fora, including NATO committees and working groups. All of these bodies derive their authority from the Council.
Information on Defence Expenditures

NATO publishes an annual compendium of financial, personnel and economic data for all member countries. Since 1963, this report has formed a consistent basis of comparison of the defence effort of Alliance members based on a common definition of defence expenditure. Through the links below, you can find data covering the years from 1949 to the present.

Working mechanism

The figures represent payments actually made or to be made during the course of the fiscal year. They are based on the NATO definition of defence expenditure. In view of the differences between this and national definitions, the figures shown may diverge considerably from those which are quoted by national authorities or given in national budgets.

Evolution

Each year, updated tables with nations’ defence expenditures are published on the NATO website in PDF and Excel format. The latest version of the compendium provides tables covering key indicators on the financial and economic aspects of NATO defence, including:

- Total defence expenditures
- Defence expenditure and GDP growth rates
- Defence expenditures as a percentage of GDP
- Defence expenditures and GDP per capita
- Defence expenditures by category
- Armed forces personnel strength

Archive of tables

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NATO transparency and reforms

NATO funding

Member countries make direct and indirect contributions to the costs of running NATO and implementing its policies and activities. The greatest part of these contributions is indirect and comes through participation in NATO-led operations and missions, and in efforts to ensure that national armed forces are interoperable with those of other member countries. Member countries incur the deployment costs involved whenever they volunteer forces to participate in NATO-led operations. With a few exceptions, member countries also pay for their own military forces and military capabilities. Member countries make direct and indirect contributions to the costs of running NATO and implementing its policies and activities.

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The Resource Policy and Planning Board

The Resource Policy and Planning Board (RPPB) is the senior advisory body to the North Atlantic Council on the management of all NATO resources. It has responsibility for the overall management of NATO's civil and military budgets, as well as the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP) and manpower.

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Information on Defence Expenditures

NATO publishes an annual compendium of financial, personnel and economic data for all member countries. Since 1963, this report has formed a consistent basis of comparison of the defence effort of Alliance members based on a common definition of defence expenditure. Through the links below, you can find data covering the years from 1949 to the present.

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International Board of Auditors for NATO (IBAN)

The International Board of Auditors for NATO (IBAN) is the independent, external audit body of NATO. Its main mandate is to provide the North Atlantic Council and the governments of NATO member countries with assurance that common funds have been properly used for the settlement of authorised expenditure.

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**Troop contributions**

When a NATO operation or mission is deemed necessary, NATO member and partner countries volunteer personnel, equipment, and resources for the mission. These national contributions operate under the aegis of the Alliance.

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**NATO Reform**

At the Lisbon Summit, in November 2010, NATO leaders endorsed a new Strategic Concept, which states that the Alliance will “engage in a process of continual reform, to streamline structures, improve working methods and maximise efficiency.”

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**Organisations and agencies**

NATO Agencies are an essential part of NATO and constitute a vital mechanism for procuring and sustaining capabilities collectively. They are executive bodies of their respective NATO procurement, logistics or service organisations, and operate under North Atlantic Council-approved charters.

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NATO funding

Member countries make direct and indirect contributions to the costs of running NATO and implementing its policies and activities.

The greatest part of these contributions is indirect and comes through participation in NATO-led operations and missions, and in efforts to ensure that national armed forces are interoperable with those of other member countries. Member countries incur the deployment costs involved whenever they volunteer forces to participate in NATO-led operations. With a few exceptions, member countries also pay for their own military forces and military capabilities.

Direct contributions to budgets managed by NATO are made by members in accordance with an agreed cost-sharing formula based on relative Gross National Income. These contributions represent a very small percentage of each member’s overall defence budget, and finance the expenditures of NATO’s integrated structures. Direct contributions generally follow the principle of common funding, that is to say, member countries pool resources within a NATO framework. There are three budgets that come under common funding arrangements:

- the civil budget;
- the military budget, and
- the NATO Security Investment Programme.

Common funding covers collective requirements such as the NATO command structure, NATO-wide air defence, command and control systems or Alliance-wide communications systems, which are not the responsibility of any single member.

Projects can also be jointly funded, which means that the participating countries can identify the requirements, the priorities and the funding arrangements, but NATO provides political and financial oversight.

Financial management of these different types of contributions is structured to ensure that the ultimate control of expenditure rests with the member countries supporting the cost of a defined activity, and is subject to consensus among them. The North Atlantic Council, NATO’s highest political decision-making body, approves NATO budgets and investments, and exercises oversight over NATO financial management. The Council takes into account resource considerations in its decision-making. The Resource Policy and Planning Board (RPPB) advises the Council on resource policy and allocation. For example, when the Council decided to undertake the Libya operation, it did so with the benefit of a full evaluation of the costs from
Allied Command Operations and the RPPB. The Budget Committee and the Investment Committee, which report to the RPPB, also review and approve planned expenditures.

### Voluntary, indirect funding of NATO

When the North Atlantic Council unanimously decides to engage in an operation, there is no obligation for each and every country to contribute to the operation unless it is an Article 5 collective defence operation, in which case expectations are different. In all cases, contributions are voluntary and vary in form and scale, from for instance a few soldiers to thousands of troops, and from armoured vehicles, naval vessels or helicopters to all forms of equipment or support, medical or other \(^1\). These voluntary contributions are offered by individual Allies and are taken from their overall defence capability to form a combined Alliance capability.

**The two per cent defence expenditure guideline**

In 2006, NATO member countries agreed to commit a minimum of two per cent of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to spending on defence. This guideline principally serves as an indicator of a country's political will to contribute to the Alliance's common defence efforts. Additionally, the defence capacity of each member country has an important impact on the overall perception of the Alliance's credibility as a politico-military organisation.

The combined wealth of the non-US Allies, measured in GDP, exceeds that of the United States. However, non-US Allies together spend less than half of what the United States spends on defence. This imbalance has been a constant, with variations, throughout the history of the Alliance and more so since the tragic events of 11 September 2001, after which the United States significantly increased its defence spending. The gap between defence spending in the United States compared to Canada and European members combined has therefore increased. Today, the volume of the US defence expenditure effectively represents 73 per cent of the defence spending of the Alliance as a whole. This does not mean that the United States covers 73 per cent of the costs involved in the operational running of NATO as an organisation, including its headquarters in Brussels and its subordinate military commands, but it does mean that there is an over-reliance by the Alliance as a whole on the United States for the provision of essential capabilities, including for instance, in regard to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; air-to-air refuelling; ballistic missile defence; and airborne electronic warfare.

The effects of the financial crisis and the declining share of resources devoted to defence in many Allied countries have exacerbated this imbalance and also revealed growing asymmetries in capability among European Allies. France, Germany and the United
Kingdom together represent more than 50 per cent of the non-US Allies defence spending, which creates another kind of over-reliance within Europe on a few capable European Allies. Furthermore, their defence spending is under increasing pressure, as is that of the United States, to meet deficit and indebtedness reduction targets. With disparities persisting and defence spending generally being reduced, significant and worrying deficiencies in some key capabilities have been revealed. While the two percent of GDP guideline alone is no guarantee that money will be spent in the most effective and efficient way to acquire and deploy modern capabilities, it remains, nonetheless, an important indicator of the political resolve of individual Allies to devote to defence a relatively small, but still significant, level of resources at a time of considerable international uncertainty and economic adversity.

**The major equipment spending guideline**

National defence budgets cover essentially three categories of expenditures: personnel expenses and pensions; research, development and procurement of defence equipment; and, lastly, operations, exercises and maintenance. Budget allocation is a national, sovereign decision, but NATO Allies have agreed that at least 20 per cent of defence expenditures should be devoted to major equipment spending, perceived as a crucial indicator for the scale and pace of modernisation. Although investment across the Alliance in the development and procurement of defence equipment rose between 2003 and 2010 as a result of increases in spending by the United States, several other Allies also increased their equipment expenditures to meet the particular modernisation requirements associated with expeditionary operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Where expenditures fail to meet the 20 percent guideline, however, there is an increasing risk of block obsolescence of equipment, growing capability and interoperability gaps among Allies, and a weakening of Europe's defence industrial and technological base.

1. Even though all Allies may not contribute forces to an operation, Allies have agreed that the funding for the deployment of the NATO part of a NATO-led operation would be commonly funded.

**The direct funding of NATO's three budgets**

Direct contributions to NATO come principally in two different forms: common funding and joint funding. They can also come in the form of trust funds, contributions in kind, *ad hoc* sharing arrangements and donations.
Several factors influence the choice of funding source to address a given priority. These include the required level of integration or interoperability, affordability at the national level, the complexity of the system involved, and the potential for economies of scale. Often, a combination of funding sources is used.

**The principle of common funding**

When a need for expenditure has been identified, countries in the Resource Policy and Planning Board discuss whether the principle of common funding should be applied – in other words whether the requirement serves the interests of all the contributing countries and should therefore be borne collectively.

The criteria for common funding are held under constant review and changes may be introduced as a result of changing circumstances, for instance, the need to support critical requirements in support of Alliance operations and missions.

Common funding arrangements principally include the NATO civil and military budgets, as well as the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP). These are the only funds where NATO authorities identify the requirements and set the priorities in line with overarching Alliance objectives and priorities.

Where military common funding is concerned - the military budget and the NATO Security Investment Programme – the guiding principle for eligibility is the “over and above” rule: “Common funding will focus on the provision of requirements which are over and above those which could reasonably be expected to be made available from national resources.”

Member countries contribute to NATO in accordance with an agreed cost-sharing formula based on Gross National Income.
The civil budget

The civil budget provides funds for personnel expenses, operating costs, and capital and programme expenditure of the International Staff at NATO Headquarters. It is financed from national foreign ministry budgets (in most countries), supervised by the Budget Committee and implemented by the International Staff. The civil budget for 2014 is €217 million.

The civil budget is formulated on an objective-based framework, which establishes clear links between NATO’s strategic objectives and the resources required to achieve them. There are four frontline objectives and four support objectives. The frontline objectives comprise support for: active operations; Alliance capabilities; consultation and cooperation with partners; and public relations. The four support objectives consist in:
providing support to the consultation process with Allies; maintaining the facilities and site of NATO Headquarters (Headquarters operational environment); governance and regulation through the monitoring of business policies, processes and procedures; and Headquarters security.

The military budget

This budget covers the operating and maintenance costs of the international military structure. It is composed of over 50 separate budgets, which are financed from national defence budgets (in most countries). It is supervised by the Budget Committee and implemented by the individual budget holders. In all cases, the provision of military staff remains a nationally-funded responsibility. The military budget for 2014 is €1.4 billion.

The military budget effectively provides funds for the International Military Staff, the strategic commanders and the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control (NAEW&C) Force and, more specifically for:

- the Military Committee, the International Military Staff and military agencies;
- the two strategic commands and associated command, control and information systems;
- theatre headquarters for deployed operations and support of critical theatre-level enabling capabilities such as theatre medical capabilities or theatre engineering capabilities;
- the NATO Standardization Agency, the NATO ACCS Management Agency, the NATO Command and Control Agency and the NATO CIS Services Agency;
- the NATO static and deployable Combined Air Operations Centres, deployable ARS and radar systems, and deployable HQ communication systems;
- the Joint Warfare Centre (Norway), the Joint Force Training Centre (Poland), the Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre (Portugal), the NATO Defense College (Italy), the Communications and Information Systems School (Italy), the NATO Programming Centre (Belgium), the Multi-Service Electronic Warfare Support Group (United Kingdom);
- the Scientific Programme of Work of the NC3A, Allied Command Transformation experimentation funds, the Research and Technology Agency (France) and the NATO Undersea Research Centre (Italy);
- limited partnership support activities and part of the Military Liaison Offices in Moscow and Kyiv.

During a crisis-management operation, when an operational decision with financial implications is taken by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the Resource Policy and Planning
Board (RPPB) is immediately consulted for the availability of funds. Effectively, this means that in the throes of a crisis, the RPPB can at times be in quasi-permanent session, as was sometimes the case for instance during the Libya operation (March-October 2011).

**The NATO Security Investment Programme**

The NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP) covers major construction and command and control system investments, which are beyond the national defence requirements of individual member countries. It supports the roles of the NATO strategic commands by providing installations and facilities such as air defence communication and information systems, military headquarters for the integrated structure and for deployed operations, and critical airfield, fuel systems and harbour facilities needed in support of deployed forces.

The NSIP is financed by the ministries of defence of each member country and is supervised by the Investment Committee. Projects are implemented either by individual host countries or by different NATO agencies and strategic commands, according to their area of expertise. The 2014 ceiling for the NSIP is €650 million.

**Joint funding**

Joint funding arrangements are structured forms of multinational funding within the terms of an agreed NATO charter. The participating countries still identify the requirements, the priorities and the funding arrangements, but NATO has visibility and provides political and financial oversight.

Joint funding arrangements typically lead to the setting-up of a management organisation within a NATO agency. NATO agency activities range from the development and production of fighter aircraft or helicopters to the provision of logistic support or air defence communication and information systems. NATO agencies also coordinate research and development activities or are active in the fields of standardization and intelligence-sharing.

Jointly funded programmes vary in the number of participating countries, cost-share arrangements and management structures.

**Other forms of funding**

In addition to common funding and joint funding, some projects can take the form of trust fund arrangements, contributions in kind, *ad hoc* sharing arrangements and donations. The most important trust fund is the one supporting the sustainment of the Afghan National Security Forces.
Management and control

Financial management within NATO is structured to ensure that the ultimate control of expenditure rests with the member countries supporting the cost of a defined activity, and is subject to consensus among them. Under the overall authority of the NAC, various bodies exercise managerial control over all four of the principal elements of the Organization's financial structure:

- the International Staff, financed by the civil budget;
- the international military structure, financed by the military budget;
- the NATO Security Investment Programme; and
- NATO agencies.

When cooperative activities do not involve all member countries, they are, for the most part, managed by NATO production and logistics programmes within NATO agencies. They have their own supervisory boards and boards of directors, as well as finance committees and distinct sources of financing within national treasuries.

Financial regulations applied at NATO provide basic unifying principles around which the overall financial structure is articulated. They are approved by the NAC and are complemented by rules and procedures adapting them to specific NATO bodies and programmes.

Financial management of the civil and military budgets

The civil and military budgets are annual, coinciding with the calendar year. Each budget is prepared under the authority of the head of the respective NATO body and is reviewed by the Budget Committee composed of representatives of contributing member countries, and approved for execution by the NAC.

Failure to achieve consensus before the start of the financial year entails non-approval of the budget and the financing of operations, under the supervision of the Budget Committee, through provisional allocations limited to the level of the budget approved for the preceding year. This regime may last for six months, after which the NAC is required to decide either to approve the budget or to authorise continuation of interim financing.

When the budget has been approved, the head of the NATO body has discretion to execute it through the commitment and expenditure of funds for the purposes authorised. This discretion is limited by different levels of constraint prescribed by the Organization's financial regulations regarding such matters as recourse to competitive

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bidding for contracts for the supply of goods and services, or transfers of credits to correct over- or under-estimates of the funding required.

**Financial management of the NATO Security Investment Programme**

Implementation of the NATO Security Investment Programme starts from capability packages. These packages identify the assets available to and required by NATO military commanders to fulfil specified tasks. They assess common-funded supplements (in terms of capital investment and recurrent operating and maintenance costs) as well as the civilian and military manpower required to accomplish the task. They are reviewed by the RPPB and then approved by the NAC.

Once they are approved, authorisation for individual projects can move forward under the responsibility of the Investment Committee. The “host nation” (a term which refers to either the country on whose territory the project is to be implemented, or a NATO agency or strategic command responsible for implementing a project) prepares an authorisation request. Once the Committee has agreed to the project, the host nation can proceed with its final design, contract award and implementation. Unless otherwise agreed by the Investment Committee, the bidding process is conducted among firms from those countries contributing to the project.

The financial management system which applies to the NSIP is based on an international financial clearing process. Host nations report on the expenditure foreseen on authorised projects within their responsibility. Following agreement of the forecasts by the Investment Committee, the International Staff calculates the amounts to be paid by each country and to be received by each host nation. Further calculations determine the payment amounts, currencies and which country or NATO agency will receive the funds.

Once a project has been completed, it is subject to a joint final acceptance inspection to ensure that the work undertaken is in accordance with the scope of work authorised. As soon as this report is accepted by the Investment Committee, it is added to the NATO inventory.

**Financial control**

With respect to the military and civil budgets, the head of the NATO body is ultimately responsible for the correct preparation and execution of the budget. The administrative support for this task is largely entrusted to the Financial Controller of the agency or NATO body.

Each Financial Controller has final recourse to the Budget Committee in the case of persistent disagreement with the head of the respective NATO body regarding an
intended transaction. The Financial Controller is charged with ensuring that all aspects of execution of the budget conform to expenditure authorisations, to any special controls imposed by the Budget Committee, and to the financial regulations and their associated implementing rules and procedures. He may also, in response to internal auditing, institute such additional controls and procedures as he deems necessary for maintaining accountability.

**The International Board of Auditors**

The independent International Board of Auditors for NATO (IBAN) is responsible for auditing the accounts of the different NATO bodies. Its principal task is to provide the NAC and member governments with the assurance that joint and common funds are properly used for the settlement of authorised expenditure and that expenditure is within the physical and financial authorisations granted.

The Board’s mandate includes not only financial but also performance audits, which extend its role beyond safeguarding accountability to the review of management practices in general. IBAN is composed of officials normally drawn from the national audit bodies of member countries. These officials are appointed by and responsible to the NAC.

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**Bodies involved**

The North Atlantic Council approves NATO budgets and investments, and exercises oversight over NATO financial management. It takes into account resource considerations in its decision-making. The RPPB advises the Council on resource policy and allocation. For example, when the Council decided to undertake the Libya operation, it did so with the benefit of a full evaluation of the costs from Allied Command Operations and the RPPB. The Budget Committee and the Investment Committee, which report to the RPPB, also review and approve planned expenditures.

The NATO Office of Resources brings together all members of the NATO International Staff working on resource issues. The office provides integrated policy and technical advice to the NAC and the Secretary General, NATO resource committees, and other NATO bodies. The office facilitates agreements on resource matters among member countries.

**The Resource Policy and Planning Board**

The Resource Policy and Planning Board (RPPB) is the senior advisory body to the NAC on the management of all NATO resources. It has responsibility for the overall management of NATO’s civil and military budgets, as well as the NATO Security Investment Programme.
(NSIP) and manpower. Both the Budget Committee and the Investment Committee report to the RPPB.

**The Budget Committee**

The Budget Committee is responsible to the Resource Policy and Planning Board for NATO's civil and military budgets. The civil budget covers all costs related to NATO's International Staff at NATO Headquarters in Brussels; the military budget covers all costs related to the International Military Staff at NATO Headquarters, the strategic commands and the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control (NAEW&C) Force.

**The Investment Committee**

The Investment Committee is responsible to the Resource Policy and Planning Board for the implementation of the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP).

The NSIP finances the provision of the installations and facilities needed to support the roles of the two strategic commands – Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation - recognised as exceeding the national defence requirements of individual member countries.
The Resource Policy and Planning Board

The Resource Policy and Planning Board (RPPB) is the senior advisory body to the North Atlantic Council on the management of all NATO resources. It has responsibility for the overall management of NATO's civil and military budgets, as well as the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP) and manpower.

The Budget Committee and the Investment Committee report to the RPPB. The Budget Committee reviews and recommends civil and military budgets, while the Investment Committee is responsible for the implementation of the NSIP, which finances the provision of the installations and facilities needed to support the roles of the two strategic commands that exceed national defence requirements of individual member countries.

Main roles and functions

The RPPB is responsible for resource policy, including eligibility and affordability, and is tasked with planning and performance assessment. The RPPB receives strategic guidance from the NAC and provides coherence and guidance to the work of resource committees. It advises Council on the resource implications of new initiatives, operations and missions, as it does the Military Committee on the cost and investment implications of any of the committee's decisions.

The RPPB was set up in July 2010 as the only financial committee reporting directly to the North Atlantic Council. It succeeded the Senior Resource Board, which was one of four financial committees (Senior Resource Board, Civil Budget Committee, Military Budget Committee and the Infrastructure Committee) reporting to the NAC. The Senior Resource Board itself was created in the 1990s in an effort to optimize the allocation of military common-funded resources and reinforce management structures. At the same time, capability packages were established to identify the assets available to and required by NATO military commanders.

These capability packages are a means to assess identified Alliance capabilities in terms of both capital investment and recurrent operating and maintenance costs as well as the civilian and military manpower required to accomplish the task.

The Board reviews these capability packages and endorses them from the point of view of their resource implications and eligibility for common funding prior to their approval by the North Atlantic Council.
Each year, the RPPB also recommends for approval by the Council a comprehensive Medium Term Resource Plan, which sets financial ceilings for the following year and planning figures for the four subsequent years. This five-year Medium Term Resource Plan sets the parameters within which the Budget and the Investment Committees oversee the preparation and execution of their respective budgets and plans.

The Board also produces an Annual Report, which allows the Council to monitor the adequacy of resource allocations in relation to requirements.

**Working mechanisms**

All NATO member countries are represented on this board, which is chaired by a national chairman selected on a rotational basis.

Besides national representatives, representatives of the International Military Staff, NATO Strategic Commanders, and Chairmen of the Budget Committee and Investment Committee also attend the Board’s meetings.

The Board is supported by the NATO Office of Resources.
International Board of Auditors for NATO (IBAN)

The International Board of Auditors for NATO (IBAN) is the independent, external audit body of NATO. Its main mandate is to provide the North Atlantic Council and the governments of NATO member countries with assurance that common funds have been properly used for the settlement of authorised expenditure.

IBAN Board Members (from left to right) Mr Jan Vylita (Czech Republic), Mr Marius Winters (The Netherlands), Dr Charilaos Charisis (Chairman, Greece), Mrs Kirsten Astrup (Norway), Mr Salih Tanrikulu (Turkey), Mr Marcus Popplewell (United Kingdom)

Guided by three core values - independence, integrity and professionalism - the IBAN strives to be the respected voice of accountability within NATO.
Tasks and responsibilities

The IBAN is responsible for auditing the expenditure incurred by NATO. The IBAN conducts several types of audits:

- Financial audits of NATO bodies result in an audit opinion on the presentation of the financial statements and on the compliance with budgetary authorisations and applicable regulations.
- Performance audits are carried out to evaluate the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the activities and operations of NATO bodies.
- NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP) audits cover the expenditure made by NATO bodies and member countries under the NISP. The audit results in the certification of the final amount charged to NATO.

Working mechanisms

The IBAN is composed of six Board Members, appointed by Council for a four-year, non-renewable term. Board Members are usually members of their respective national audit institution or government officials with audit experience. They have independent status and report only to the Council.

The Chairman of the Board is appointed by the Council for a two-year term. The Board is assisted by auditors and secretarial staff with NATO International Staff status.
NATO reform

At the Lisbon Summit, in November 2010, NATO leaders endorsed a new Strategic Concept, which states that the Alliance will “engage in a process of continual reform, to streamline structures, improve working methods and maximise efficiency.”

This process had already started in June 2010 with the internal organisation of NATO Headquarters, i.e. the NATO Committee review. In parallel, NATO also engaged in the reform of its Command Structure – the NATO Command Structure Review - and that of its Agencies – the NATO Agencies Review.

- The Committee Review has been fully implemented;
• the NATO Command Structure Review was launched at the Lisbon Summit and the approval of the model and geographical footprint was approved by defence ministers in June 2011. Its implementation was conducted over a period of one year;
• at the Lisbon Summit, Allies agreed to streamline the 14 NATO agencies into three major programmatic themes: procurement, support, and communications and information. The reform has been implemented through several phases, to incrementally achieve increased effectiveness, efficiency and cost savings, while preserving capability and service delivery.

Additionally, NATO's International Staff is being reviewed as part of this broader package of reform being undertaken within the Organization. Similarly to the other initiatives, it aims to streamline and adapt structures to today's environment.
Allied Command Operations (ACO) is responsible for the planning and execution of all Alliance operations. It consists of a small number of permanently established headquarters, each with a specific role. The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe - or SACEUR – assumes the overall command of operations at the strategic level and exercises his responsibilities from the headquarters in Mons, Belgium: the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, more commonly known as SHAPE.

ACO is one of two strategic commands at the head of NATO’s military command structure; the other is Allied Command Transformation (ACT), which as its name indicates, leads the transformation of NATO’s military structure, forces, capabilities and doctrine. Together they form what is called the NATO Command Structure (NCS), whose function is first and foremost to be able to address threats and should deterrence fail, an armed attack against the territory of any of the European¹ Allies. Ultimately, the NCS plays an essential role in preserving cohesion and
solidarity within the Alliance, maintaining and strengthening the vital transatlantic link and promoting the principle of equitable sharing among Allies of the roles, risks and responsibilities, as well as the benefits of collective defence.

ACO must ensure the ability to operate at three overlapping levels: strategic, operational and tactical, with the overarching aim of maintaining the integrity of Alliance territory, safeguarding freedom of the seas and economic lifelines, and to preserve or restore the security of NATO member countries. Moreover, in the current security environment, deploying forces further afield has become the norm.

Decisions to streamline NATO's military command structure were taken in June 2011 as part of a wider process of reform. ACO was principally affected by this reform, the full implementation of which is expected by the end of 2015, when all entities involved will reach full operational capability.

With this reform, new tasks stemming from the 2010 Strategic Concept were included and the Alliance's level of ambition maintained. Elements of ACO will gain in flexibility and provide a deployable Command and Control (C2) capability at the operational level, offering choices and options for rapid intervention that have not previously been available to the Alliance. Moreover, a Communication and Information Systems (CIS) Group has been formed as part of the military command structure to provide additional deployable communication and information systems support. Once fully implemented, the reform will lead to an estimated reduction in personnel of approximately 30 per cent (from 13,000 to 8,800). The military command structure proper has been downsized from 11 entities to seven².

Links with the NATO Force Structure will be reinforced. The Force Structure is composed of Allied national and multinational deployable forces and headquarters placed at the Alliance's disposal by member countries on a permanent or temporary basis. National contributions are made available for NATO operations at appropriate states of readiness when required. Rules of deployment and transfer of authority to NATO command can vary from country to country.

1. It is considered that whereas Article 5 applies to the entire NATO Treaty Area, the NATO Command Structure's operational area of responsibility does not include the territory of the United States or Canada. This is not meant to imply that the NATO Command Structure should not be able to support the United States and Canada should the territory of these two Allies be subject to an armed attack, but rather to acknowledge that defensive operations on the territory of these two Allies will be conducted, commanded and controlled in accordance with bilateral arrangements and not under the auspices of the NATO Command Structure.
2. These figures cover Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation.

The military command structure

As previously explained, ACO is a three-tier command with headquarters and supporting elements at the strategic, operational and tactical level. It exercises command and control of static and deployable headquarters, as well as joint and combined forces across the full range of the Alliance's military missions. Joint forces are forces from two or more military departments working under a single command and combined forces are forces from different countries working under a single command.
SHAPE, at the strategic level, is at the head of six operational commands, two of which are supported by tactical (or component) level entities.

**Allied Command Operations**

SHAPE is a strategic headquarters. Its role is to prepare, plan, conduct and execute NATO military operations, missions and tasks in order to achieve the strategic objectives of the Alliance. As such it contributes to the deterrence of aggression and the preservation of peace, security and the territorial integrity of Alliance.

ACO is headed by SACEUR, who exercises his responsibilities from SHAPE. Traditionally, he is a United States Flag or General officer. SACEUR is dual-hatted as the commander of the US European Command, which shares many of the same geographical responsibilities. SACEUR is responsible to the Military Committee, which is the senior military authority in NATO under the overall political authority of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). The Military Committee is the primary source of military advice to the NAC and NPG.

**Operational level commands: Brunssum and Naples**

The operational level consists of two standing Joint Force Commands (JFCs): one in Brunssum, the Netherlands, and one in Naples, Italy. Both have to be prepared to plan, conduct and sustain NATO operations of different size and scope. Effectively, they need to be able to manage a major joint operation either from their static location in Brunssum or Naples, or from a deployed headquarters when operating directly in a theatre of operation. In the latter case, the deployed headquarters is referred to as a Joint Task Force HQ or JTFHQ and should be able to operate for a period of up to one year.

When deployed, a Joint Force Command is only charged to command one operation at a time. However, the elements of the Joint Force Command which have not deployed can provide support to other operations and missions. When a Joint Force Command is not deployed, it can assist ACO in dealing with other headquarters which are deployed in
theatre for day-to-day matters and assist, for instance, with the training and preparation for future rotations.

The two commands at this level are also responsible for engaging with key partners and regional organisations in order to support regional NATO HQ tasks and responsibilities, as directed by SACEUR. Additionally, they support the reinforcement of cooperation with partners participating in NATO operations and help to prepare partner countries for NATO membership.

**Tactical level commands: Izmir, Northwood and Ramstein**

**Land, maritime and air commands**

The tactical (or component) level consists of what is called Single Service Commands (SSCs): land, maritime and air commands. These service-specific commands provide expertise and support to the Joint Force Commands at the operational level in Brunssum or Naples. They report directly to SHAPE and come under the command of SACEUR.

- **Land command**, Headquarters Allied Land Command (HQ LANDCOM), Izmir, Turkey: this command's role is to provide a deployable land command and control capability in support of a Joint Force Command running an operation larger than a major joint operation. It can also provide the core land capability for a joint operation (major or not) or a deployable command and control capability for a land operation. Izmir is also the principal land advisor for the Alliance and contributes to development and transformation, engagement and outreach within its area of expertise.

- **Maritime command**, Headquarters Allied Maritime Command (HQ MARCOM), Northwood, the United Kingdom: this command's role is to provide command and control for the full spectrum of joint maritime operations and tasks. From its location in Northwood, it plans, conducts and supports joint maritime operations. It is also the Alliance's principal maritime advisor and contributes to development and transformation, engagement and outreach within its area of expertise. Northwood is ready to command a small maritime joint operation or act as the maritime component in support of an operation larger than a major joint operation.

- **Air command**, Headquarters Allied Air Command (HQ AIRCOM), Ramstein, Germany: this command's role is to plan and direct the air component of Alliance operations and missions, and the execution of Alliance air and missile defence operations and missions. Ramstein is also the Alliance's principal air advisor and contributes to development and transformation, engagement and outreach within its area of expertise. Ramstein, with adequate support from within and outside the NATO Command Structure can provide command and control for a small joint air
operation from its static location, i.e., from Ramstein or can act as Air Component
Command to support an operation which is as big or bigger than a major joint
operation.

To reinforce its capability, Ramstein has additional air command and control elements
available: two Combined Air Operations Centres and a Deployable Air Command and
Control Centre. The air elements are also structured in a more flexible way to take account
of the experience gained in NATO-led operations.

**Additional air support**

To carry out its missions and tasks, HQ AIRCOM (Ramstein) is supported by Combined Air
Operations Centres (CAOC) in Torrejon, Spain and in Uedem, Germany, as well as one
Deployable Air Command and Control Centre (DACCC) in Poggio Renatico, Italy.

- **CAOCs:** both the CAOC in Spain and in Germany are composed of two parts. One
  part is a Static Air Defence Centre (SADC) responsible for air policing and the other, a
  Deployable Air Operations Centre (D-AOC), which supports operations. The D-AOC is
  an element focused on the production of combat plans and the conduct of combat
  operations. It has no territorial responsibilities assigned during peacetime, but
  supplements the HQ AIRCOM when required.

- **DACCC:** this entity based in Italy consists of three elements. Firstly, a DARS or
  Deployable Air Control Centre + Recognized Air Picture Production Centre + Sensor
  Fusion Post. The DARS is responsible for the control of air missions including
  surface-to-air missiles, air traffic management and control, area air surveillance and
  production of a recognised air picture and other tactical control functions; secondly,
  a D-AOC, which has the same role as a CAOC; and thirdly, a Deployable Sensors
  Section, which provides both air defence radar and passive electronic support
  measures tracker capabilities that are deployable.

**Communication and information systems**

Communication and information systems (CIS) have been split into two: the deployable
CIS capabilities and the static CIS capabilities.

The NATO CIS Group based in Mons, Belgium will provide deployable communications
and information systems support for ACO. The NATO CIS Group is responsible for the
provision of all deployable CIS capabilities, as well as CIS operations and exercises
planning and control. It acts as the coordinating authority for command and control
services support to operations. The provision of the static and central CIS capabilities is
the responsibility of the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA), which is not part of the NATO Command Structure.

The NATO Communication and Information Systems (CIS) Group will be supported by three NATO Signals Battalions located at Wesel, Germany, Grazzanise, Italy, and Bydgoszcz, Poland. These three will be complemented by various smaller elements (Deployable CIS modules) elsewhere.

**STRIKFORNATO, AWACS and AGS**

Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO (STRIKFORNATO), NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force (NAEW&CF) and Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) are part of the NATO Immediate Response Capability. They are multinational structures that are not part of the Command Structure, but are available for the Alliance and organized under Memorandums of Understanding and Technical Agreements (MOU/TA) signed by the respective contributing countries.

STRIKFORNATO is a rapidly deployable maritime headquarters that provides scalable command and control across the full spectrum of the Alliance's fundamental security tasks. It focuses on maritime operations and, as part of NATO reforms, has moved from Italy to Portugal. It comprises 11 participating countries and serves as a link for integrating US maritime forces into NATO operations.

Final agreement is awaited on the NATO NAEW&C Force. The Force Commander is conducting a comprehensive Force Review that will determine the size and shape of the Airborne Warning & Control System (AWACS) capability for the future and is adapting the capability to match the new manpower ceilings decided in the context of the new Command Structure. The NAEW&C Force comprises three elements: a multinational HQ (Mons) and two operational components, the multinational E-3A and the E-3D. NATO Air Base (NAB) Geilenkirchen, Germany, is home to 17 Boeing E-3A 'Sentry' AWACS aircrafts. NATO operates this fleet, which provides the Alliance with an immediately available airborne command and control (C2), air and maritime surveillance and battle-space management capability. The fleet of six Boeing E-3D aircraft based in Waddington, Lincolnshire, United Kingdom, is manned by RAF personnel only. The United Kingdom exercises limited participation, but her fleet of E-3D aircraft is an integral part of the NAEW&C Force.

NATO is acquiring an Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system that will provide SACEUR with the capabilities for near real-time, continuous information and situational awareness concerning friendly, neutral and opposing ground and surface entities. The AGS system will consist of five Global Hawk Unmanned Airborne Vehicles and the associated
command and control base stations, as well as support facilities provided by the AGS’ main operating base at Sigonella, Italy. Using advanced radar sensors, these systems will continuously detect and track moving objects and will provide radar imagery of areas of interest and stationary objects. The system will be fully trained and equipped to participate in NATO approved operations worldwide and available at graduated levels of readiness. It is expected to be available to the Alliance in the 2015-2017 timeframe.

## Evolution

The Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) was activated on 2 April 1951, in Rocquencourt, France, as part of an effort to establish an integrated and effective NATO military force. Allied Command, Atlantic, headed by Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) was activated a year later, on 10 April 1952.

In 1967, after France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military structure, SHAPE was relocated to Mons, Belgium.

The London Declaration of July 1990 was a decisive turning point in the history of the Alliance and led to the adoption of the new Alliance Strategic Concept in November 1991, reflecting a broader approach to security. This in turn led to NATO's Long Term Study to examine the Integrated Military Structure and put forward proposals for change to the Alliance's force structures, command structures and common infrastructure.

In essence, the Cold War command structure was reduced from 78 headquarters to 20 with two overarching Strategic Commanders (SC), one for the Atlantic, and one for Europe; there were three Regional Commanders under the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT) and two under the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR).

During the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO's military Command Structure was again reorganised with a focus on becoming leaner and more efficient. The former Allied Command Europe (ACE) became the Allied Command Operations (ACO). The Supreme Allied Commander Europe and his staff at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) situated in Mons, Belgium, were henceforth responsible for all Alliance operations, including those previously undertaken by SACLANT. The reform resulted in a significant reduction in headquarters and Combined Air Operations Centres – from 32 command centres down to 9 – and reflected a fundamental shift in Alliance thinking.

In 2010, the decision was taken to conduct a far-reaching reform of the NATO Command Structure as part of an overall reform of NATO. The reform was conducted with the
development of the Strategic Concept 2010 firmly in mind and has focused on ensuring that the Alliance can confront the security challenges of the 21st century effectively and efficiently. The new Command Structure is forward-looking and flexible, as well as leaner and more affordable. In comparison to the previous structures, it will provide a real deployable, multinational, command and control capability at the operational level. It also offers a more coherent structure that will be understood by other international organisations and partners.

The new Command Structure was approved by NATO defence ministers in June 2011. It transitioned to its new format (Transition Day) on 1 December 2012 and is expected to be fully implemented by the end of 2015.
Allied Command Transformation

Allied Command Transformation (ACT) leads many initiatives designed to transform NATO's military structure, forces, capabilities and doctrine. Its main responsibilities include education, training and exercises, as well as conducting experiments to assess new concepts, and promoting interoperability throughout the Alliance.

ACT is one of two strategic commands in NATO, the other being Allied Command Operations (ACO). Together they form what is called the NATO Command Structure (NCS), whose prime function is first and foremost to provide the command and control needed to address threats and, should deterrence fail, an armed attack against the territory of any of the European1 Allies. Ultimately, the NCS plays an essential role in preserving cohesion and solidarity within the Alliance, maintaining and strengthening the vital transatlantic link and promoting the principle of
equitable sharing among Allies of the roles, risks and responsibilities, as well as the benefits of collective defence.

Headquarters, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (HQ SACT), located in Norfolk, Virginia (United States) is the only NATO command in North America. It houses the command structure of ACT and directs ACT’s various subordinate commands: the Joint Warfare Centre in Norway, the Joint Force Training Centre in Poland and the Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre in Portugal. It also has strong links with the Pentagon and other US military entities, national headquarters, NATO-accredited Centres of Excellence (see below for explanations), educational and training facilities, think-tanks and with the NATO Force Structure in general.

The Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) is a four-star level flag or general officer. He is responsible to the Military Committee for the transformation and development of the Alliance to ensure it is capable of meeting the challenges of today and tomorrow. The Military Committee is the senior military authority in NATO and is under the overall political authority of the North Atlantic Council (NAC).

ACT’s role and structure

ACT was created as part of a reorganisation of the NATO Command Structure in 2002. This was the first time in NATO’s history that a strategic command was solely dedicated to “transformation”, demonstrating the importance placed by Allies on the roles of transformation and development as continuous and essential drivers for change that will ensure the relevance of the Alliance in a rapidly evolving global security environment.

ACT is organised around four principal functions:

- strategic thinking;
- the development of capabilities;
- education, training and exercises; and
- cooperation and engagement.

These functions are reflected in the composition of ACT, which is comprised of the Norfolk Headquarters and three subordinate entities: one in Norway (Joint Warfare Centre), one in Poland (Joint Force Training Centre) and one in Portugal (Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre). ACT also includes a SACT representative at NATO Headquarters in Brussels and at the Pentagon outside Washington D.C., an ACT Staff Element at the ACO Headquarters - Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe or SHAPE - and a shared Military Partnership Directorate (MPD) with ACO, also located at SHAPE.

Additionally, NATO’s other education and training facilities and nationally-run entities, which are not part of the NCS, also coordinate with ACT. This includes the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy, the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, the NATO
Communications and Information Systems School, Portugal (from 2016 or 2017 – currently located in Italy), the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre, Greece, and the nationally-run Centres of Excellence. NATO Agencies also interact with ACT on matters of common concern.

**Strategic Plans and Policy**

The main responsibility of Strategic Plans and Policy is threefold: to develop and promote issues of strategic importance to transformation; articulate policies to direct Alliance transformation efforts; and support the development of NATO strategic-level concepts which clarify how transformation may be achieved.

**Capability Development**

This is a broad area which covers the entire capability development process, i.e., from the moment a need is identified to the production phase when a new capability is actually developed for the Alliance. Moreover, Capability Development provides a major contribution to the NATO Defence Planning Process improving interoperability, deployability and sustainability of Alliance forces. The Directorate focuses on science and technology, and maintains collaboration with industry to infuse innovative ideas and transformative principles into NATO capability development processes and products. In addition, it establishes and maintains a transformation network and constitutes a hub.
within the NATO organisation and between member countries to promote continuous reform of NATO forces, structures and processes.

**Joint Force Training**

Joint Force Training (JFT) directs and co-ordinates all ACT activities that are related to the conduct of individual and collective training and exercises. The aim is to continually provide the Alliance with improved capabilities and enable its forces to undertake the full spectrum of Alliance missions.

**SACT Representative in Europe**

The SACT Representative in Europe (SACTREPEUR) is located at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. As the name indicates, the SACTREPEUR represents SACT at NATO Headquarters, acting as SACT's representative to the Military Committee and attending all relevant meetings – committee, working group or other. SACTREPEUR has the coordinating authority for all ACT engagements with NATO Headquarters and maintains strong links with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) through his counterpart - the SACEUR Representative (SACEUREP) - also based at NATO Headquarters.

**ACT Staff Element Europe**

The ACT Staff Element Europe (SEE) is co-located with ACO in Mons, Belgium. It deals primarily with defence and resource planning issues, as well as implementation. In doing so, it interacts with different NATO entities: the International Military Staff and the International Staff at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, with ACO, other NATO bodies and agencies and individual Allies.

**ACT Liaison Office to the Pentagon**

To help enhance NATO transformation, this office promotes effective links and direct coordination between ACT and the US Joint Staff and other departments in the US military headquarters (Pentagon), located outside Washington D.C. Through strong links with US military entities, the office establishes and maintains working relations with other governmental and non-governmental bodies in and around Washington D.C.

**Military Partnership Directorate**

The Military Partnership Directorate (MPD) provides direction, control, co-ordination, support and assessment of military cooperation activities across the Alliance. It directs and oversees all non-NATO country involvement in military partnership programmes, events and activities and coordinates and implements NATO plans and programmes in the
area of partnership. The MPD is shared with ACO and is located at SHAPE in Mons, Belgium with a Staff Element at HQ SACT in Norfolk, Virginia.

**Joint Warfare Centre in Stavanger, Norway**

The Joint Warfare Centre's (JWC) main task is to train NATO forces at the operational level to ensure they remain interoperable and fully integrated. Its principal mission is the training of the NATO Response Force (NRF) Headquarters’ elements and NRF Component Headquarters’ elements.

The JWC also seeks to improve NATO’s capabilities and interoperability by promoting and conducting NATO’s joint and combined experimentation, analysis and doctrine development processes. The JWC assists ACT’s work with new technologies, modelling and simulation. It also conducts training on and works at developing new concepts and doctrine for joint and combined staffs. In addition, it performs collective staff training for partner countries and new NATO members.

JWC assists ACO in evaluating joint force training and has formal links to both NATO agencies and national and multinational training centres.

**Joint Force Training Centre in Bydgoszcz, Poland**

The Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) focuses on joint and combined training of NATO forces at the tactical level. It focuses, in particular, on the conduct of tactical training to achieve joint interoperability at key interfaces - a critically important area identified during military combat in Afghanistan.

The Centre provides support and expertise in the training of Alliance and partner forces, runs courses, conducts training and provides advice to a variety of audiences. It cooperates with national training centres, including Partnership for Peace (PfP) Training Centres and Centres of Excellence to ensure the application of NATO standards and doctrine in combined and joint fields.

As a priority, JFTC provides expertise to help NRF joint and component commanders ensure that each NRF rotation achieves a high level of interoperability, flexibility and extensive training so as to be combat-ready at the beginning of a cycle of duty.

**Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre in Monsanto, Portugal**

The main role of the Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) is to reinforce the process of continuous improvement of concepts, doctrine and capabilities within NATO.
through the transformation process, based on lessons learned from operations, training, exercises and experimentation.

As such, JALLC conducts the analysis of real-world military operations, training, exercises and NATO Concept Development and Experimentation collective experiments, and is responsible for establishing and maintaining a lessons learned database. It ensures that key factors and lessons identified are characterised and appropriate action is proposed. The JALLC therefore contributes directly to improving operations through the identification of shortfalls in capabilities by delivering relevant, timely and useable lessons learned products.

ACT and other entities

There are direct linkages between ACT and entities which are not part of the NATO Command Structure such as NATO educational facilities and agencies.

**NATO’s educational and training facilities**

*The NATO Defense College*

At the political-strategic level, the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy is NATO’s foremost academic institution. It contributes to Alliance objectives by developing its role as a major centre of education, study and research on transatlantic security issues. Founded in 1951, several thousand senior officers, diplomats, and other officials have since passed through its doors.

Its main tasks are to help prepare both civilian and military leaders for senior appointments within NATO; conduct outreach activities directed at partner countries; and provide fresh perspectives to NATO decision-makers. It also provides an annual venue, through the Conference of Commandants of Defence Academies, for an exchange of views on best practices across the Alliance and beyond.

*The NATO School*

The NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany operates under the auspices of ACT, but also supplies training support to operations. It is NATO’s key operational-level training facility, providing short-term, multidisciplinary individual training tailored to military and civilian personnel from NATO, PfP, Mediterranean Dialogue and global partners. As part of its support to NATO operations, the NATO School has hosted personnel from non-NATO
countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, it serves as a facilitator for the harmonisation of programmes with the Partnership Training and Education Centres.

**The NATO Communications and Information Systems School**

Currently located in Latina, Italy (moving to Oeiras near Lisbon, Portugal in 2016 or 2017), the NATO Communications and Information Systems School (NCISS) is one of the Alliance's key training institutions. It provides advanced training to civilian and military personnel from NATO and non-NATO countries in the operation and maintenance of the Alliance's communications and information systems. Like the NATO School, NCISS falls under the guidance of ACT and provides support to NATO-led operations.

**NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre**

The NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre (NMIOTC) in Souda Bay, Greece is a multi-nationally manned facility. It conducts combined training for NATO forces to execute surface, sub-surface and aerial surveillance, and special operations activities in support of maritime interdiction operations.

**Centres of Excellence**

The role of these centres is to provide high-quality education and training to the Euro-Atlantic community.

They are accredited by NATO, but are funded nationally or multi-nationally outside of the Organization's command structure. Their relationship with NATO is formalised through memoranda of understanding.

The first Centres of Excellence to be fully accredited by NATO were the Joint Air Power Competence Centre in Germany and the Defence Against Terrorism Centre of Excellence in Turkey. Many more have been established since then.

**Evolution**

Before 2002, the two Strategic Commands were Allied Command Europe (ACE), established in 1951 and Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT), created a year later in 1952.

ACE, together with ACLANT, were streamlined at the end of the Cold War reducing the NATO Command Structure from 78 headquarters to 20. However, the two overarching Strategic Commanders (SC) were maintained, one for the Atlantic area and one for Europe.
During the 2002 Prague Summit, a decision was made to reorganise the NATO Command Structure and make it leaner and more efficient. Additionally, Alliance thinking fundamentally shifted: the NATO Command Structure was to be based on functionality rather than geography. The former Allied Command Europe (ACE) became the Allied Command Operations (ACO), responsible for all Alliance operations, including the maritime operations previously undertaken by Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT). As such, one strategic command was focused on NATO’s operations -- Allied Command Operations with its headquarters in SHAPE -- and the other on transforming NATO -- Allied Command Transformation (ACT) with its Headquarters SACT.

The NATO Command Structure was reviewed once more in June 2011 as part of a wider process of reform, not only to optimise the structure but to include new tasks derived from the 2010 Strategic Concept. The two strategic commands were maintained, as well as the Alliance's levels of ambition, which is the ability of the Alliance to manage two major joint operations and six small joint operations, if required. This reform principally affected ACO. Where ACT is concerned, apart from developing stronger links with Centres of Excellence and the NATO Force Structure, the only physical change that stemmed from the reform was the move of what was previously known as the NATO Undersea Research Centre (NURC) (now the Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation in La Spezia, Naples), to the agency structure of the Alliance as an organisational element linked to research.

Footnotes
1. It is considered that whereas Article 5 applies to the entire NATO Treaty Area, the NATO Command Structure's operational area of responsibility does not include the territory of the United States or Canada. This is not meant to imply that the NATO Command Structure should not be able to support the United States and Canada, should the territory of these two Allies be subject to an armed attack, but rather to acknowledge that defensive operations on the territory of these two Allies will be conducted, commanded and controlled in accordance with bilateral arrangements and not under the auspices of the NATO Command Structure.
2. The NATO Force Structure consists of organisational arrangements that bring together the forces placed at the Alliance's disposal by the member countries, along with their associated command and control structures. These forces are available for NATO operations in accordance with predetermined readiness criteria and with rules of deployment and transfer of authority to NATO command that can vary from country to country.
3. Joint forces are forces from two or more military departments working under a single command and combined forces are forces from different countries working under a single command.
Organisations and agencies

NATO Agencies are an essential part of NATO and constitute a vital mechanism for procuring and sustaining capabilities collectively. They are executive bodies of their respective NATO procurement, logistics or service organisations, and operate under North Atlantic Council-approved charters.

The NATO Agencies are established to meet collective requirements of some or all Allies in the field of procurement, logistics and other forms of services, support or cooperation.

Although NATO organisations and agencies are autonomous, they are required to follow the terms set out in their charters.

NATO Agencies reform
The NATO Agencies reform activity is part of an ongoing NATO reform process, which is also examining changes to the military command structure. The reform aims to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of capabilities and services, to achieve greater synergy between similar functions and to increase transparency and accountability.

At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government agreed to reform the 14 existing NATO Agencies, located in seven member countries. In particular, Allies agreed to streamline the agencies into three major programmatic themes: procurement, support and communications and information.

In July 2012, a major milestone was reached, with the creation of four new NATO Organisations, assuming the functions and responsibilities of existing agencies. The reform has been implemented through several phases, to incrementally achieve increased effectiveness, efficiency and cost savings, while preserving capability and service delivery.

**NATO Communications and Information Agency** (NCIA), with headquarters in Brussels, providing NATO-wide IT services, procurement and support in areas such as Command and Control Systems, Tactical and Strategic Communications and Cyber Defence Systems.

**NATO Support Agency** (NSPA), with headquarters in Capellen, Luxembourg, delivering in-service support, maintenance and logistics support for weapons systems, as well as operational logistics and other services for nations and the Alliance as a whole.

**NATO Procurement Organisation** (NPO) – The North Atlantic Council decided to merge the Procurement and Support Agencies early 2014, reducing the number of new Organisations initially envisaged from four to three. It has postponed the activation of the procurement entity within the NSPA to the time when programmes are actually assigned by the participating countries.

The **NATO Science and Technology Organization** (STO) is to include a Programme Office for Collaborative Science and Technology and a Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation. The STO is headed by a Chief Scientist, based in Brussels, who serves as a NATO-wide senior scientific advisor.

The **NATO Standardization Agency** (NSA) is being transferred into a NATO Standardization Office (NSO) by 1 July 2014.
NATO committees

NATO committees form an indispensable part of the Alliance’s decision-making process. They provide the framework within which member countries can exchange information on a variety of subjects, consult with each other and take decisions made on the basis of consensus and common accord.

Each member country is represented at all levels of the committee structure in the fields of NATO activity in which they participate. Every day, national experts travel to NATO Headquarters in Brussels to attend committee meetings held with delegates from the national representations based at NATO Headquarters and with staff from the International Secretariat and the International Military Staff.
NATO has an extensive network of committees, covering everything from political, to technical or operational issues. The principle of consensus decision-making is applied at each and every level of the committee structure, from the top political decision-making body to the most obscure working group.

NATO committees were reviewed in June 2010 so as to help NATO respond more effectively to security concerns and to the need for more integrated, flexible working procedures.

The principal committees

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the principal political decision-making body within NATO and the only committee that was established by the Alliance's founding Treaty. Under Article 9, the NAC is invested with the authority to set up “such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary” for the purposes of implementing the Treaty. Over the years, the Council has established a network of committees to facilitate the Alliance’s work and deal with all subjects on its agenda.

The principal NATO committees are the NAC, the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and the Military Committee. The Defence Planning Committee (DPC), which was also one of NATO’s top decision-making bodies, was dissolved under the June 2010 committee reform and its functions taken over by the NAC.

Committees reporting to the NAC

In addition to the NAC, the NPG and the Military Committee, there are a number of committees that report directly to the Council. Some of these are themselves supported by working groups, especially in areas such as defence procurement.

As part of the NATO reform process initiated in June 2010, which focused on the NATO Command Structure and NATO Agencies, NATO Committees were also reviewed. As such, committees reporting to the NAC now include the following:

- Deputies Committee
- Political and Partnerships Committee
- Defence Policy and Planning Committee
- Committee on Proliferation
- C3 Board
- Operations Policy Committee
- High Level Task Force on Conventional Arms Control
- Verification Coordinating Committee
- Conference of National Armaments Directors
- Committee for Standardization
- Logistics Committee
- Resource Policy and Planning Board
- Air and Missile Defence Committee
- NATO Air Traffic Management Committee
- Civil Emergency Planning Committee
- Committee on Public Diplomacy
- Council Operations and Exercises Committee
- Security Committee
- Civilian Intelligence Committee
- Archives Committee
Additionally, there are institutions of cooperation, partnership and dialogue that underpin relations between NATO and other countries.

- Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
- NATO-Russia Council
- NATO-Ukraine Commission
- NATO-Georgia Commission

Evolution

With the exception of the NAC, committees were gradually established after the signing of the Washington Treaty on 4 April 1949 (for further information on how the committee structure evolved, see “NATO: The first five years, 1949-1954”, by Lord Ismay).

From time to time, the NATO committee structure is reviewed and reorganised so as to make it more efficient, responsive and relevant to NATO's current priorities. This includes eliminating obsolete committees and creating new bodies.

Since its creation in 1949, the Alliance has undergone three major committee restructurings. The first took place in 1990 after the end of the Cold War, and the second in 2002, in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001. The third and most recent committee review was initiated in June 2010 as part of a broader reform effort that touched on all of the Alliance’s structures: the military command structure and its Organisations and Agencies.
International Staff

Some 1,000 civilians work within NATO's International Staff (IS) at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. The primary role of the IS is to provide advice, guidance and administrative support to the national delegations at NATO Headquarters. It helps to implement decisions taken at different committee levels and, in doing so, supports the process of consensus-building and decision-making within the Alliance.

The IS is headed by NATO's Secretary General, who from an administrative point of view, is also a member of the IS. Staff members are recruited from NATO member countries. Worldwide, some 6,000 civilians work for NATO in different agencies and strategic and regional commands.

The IS is currently being reviewed as part of a broader package of reform being undertaken within the Organization, in line with commitments made under the 2010 Strategic Concept.
Role and responsibilities

The IS is an advisory and administrative body that supports the delegations of NATO members at different committee levels and helps implement their decisions. For instance, the IS produces policy papers, background notes, reports and speeches on issues relevant to NATO's political and military agenda. It supports and advises committees, and prepares and follows up on their discussions and decisions, therefore facilitating the political consultation process. It also liaises closely with NATO's International Military Staff (IMS) located in the same building in Brussels. The IMS is the executive body of the Military Committee – NATO's senior military authority.

Members of the IS owe their allegiance to the Organization throughout the period of their appointment. They are either recruited directly by the Organization or seconded by their governments and each appointment is approved by the Secretary General.

Vacancies within the IS are announced on NATO's website and are open to member country citizens.

The structure of the International Staff

The International Staff includes the Office of the Secretary General, seven divisions, each headed by an Assistant Secretary General, and a number of independent offices headed by directors.

The Private Office

The Secretary General heads the IS and has a Private Office that includes a director and staff, the Deputy Secretary General, a Policy Planning Unit and the Council Secretariat.

Divisions

The IS fulfills a number of roles filled by different divisions:

- Political Affairs and Security Policy Division: this division provides political advice and policy guidance. It has the lead role in the political aspects of NATO's core security tasks, including regional, economic and security affairs, as well as relations with other international organisations and partner countries.
• Defence Policy and Planning Division: this division develops and implements the defence policy and planning dimension of NATO's fundamental security tasks. This includes defence planning, the Alliance's nuclear policy, defence against weapons of mass destruction and certain aspects of operational planning.

• Operations Division: Operations provides the operational capability required to meet NATO's deterrence, defence and crisis management tasks. Responsibilities include NATO's crisis management and peacekeeping activities, and civil emergency planning and exercises.

• Defence Investment Division: this division is responsible for developing and investing in assets and capabilities aimed at enhancing the Alliance's defence capacity, including armaments planning, air defence and security investment.

• Emerging Security Challenges Division: this division was more recently created to deal with a growing range of non-traditional risks and challenges. It started its work at the beginning of August 2010 and is focusing on terrorism, nuclear issues, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber defence and energy security, as well as NATO's science programme.

• Public Diplomacy Division: communicating with the wider public is one of NATO's priorities. The Public Diplomacy Division is responsible for informing different target audiences about NATO's activities and policies through the media, the NATO website, multimedia products, seminars and conferences.

• Executive Management Division: this division manages staff, finances and security standards. It is tasked with ensuring that NATO's IS works efficiently and also provides support to all elements operating at NATO headquarters, including support and conference services, information management and NATO's human and financial resources.

**Independent offices**

Also within the IS are the NATO Office of Security and the NATO Office of Resources, both headed by a Director; the Intelligence Unit; the Office of the Legal Adviser; the Office of the Financial Controller; and an independent International Board of Auditors.

The NATO Office of Security is a distinct body responsible for coordinating, monitoring and implementing NATO's security policy, for overall security within NATO and for the NATO Headquarters Security Service.

The NATO Office of Resources was created in 2007. Under the direction of the Director, it brings together all IS members working on NATO military common-funded issues, with the aim of reinforcing military common-funded resource management at NATO HQ.
Evolution of the International Staff

The IS was created in 1951 to support the North Atlantic Council (NAC). It was made responsible for the preparation and follow-up of action in all matters of the Council. The ‘Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’ defined its status, which National Representatives and International Staff negotiated and signed in September 1951.

Throughout the years, the IS has been reorganised many times. One of the most recent restructuring exercises stemmed from the November 2002 Prague Summit, when NATO leaders approved a package of measures to enhance the Alliance's ability to meet new security threats. This included a reorganisation of NATO's IS and the implementation of modern management processes. The restructuring aimed to ensure a fairer redistribution of responsibilities among divisions, strengthen management of the staff and improve coordination on key issues and programmes.

More recently, a review of the IS has been launched as part of a larger package of reform – that of the military command structure, organisations and agencies, and NATO committees. This process forms part of NATO's commitment to “engage in a process of continual reform, to streamline structures, improve working methods and maximise efficiency”, made in the Strategic Concept endorsed at the Lisbon Summit, November 2010.
International Military Staff

The International Military Staff (IMS) is the executive body of the Military Committee (MC), NATO’s senior military authority.

It is responsible for preparing assessments, studies on NATO military issues identifying areas of strategic and operational interest and proposing courses of action. It also ensures that NATO decisions and policies on military matters are implemented by the appropriate NATO military bodies.

The IMS’ work enables the Military Representatives of the Alliance’s 28 member countries to deal with issues rapidly and effectively, ensuring that the MC provides the North Atlantic Council (NAC) with consensus-based advice on all military aspects of policy, operations, and transformation within the Alliance.
The IMS is an independent body within NATO that comprises approximately 500 dedicated military and civilian personnel from NATO’s member states, working in an international capacity for the common interest of the Alliance.

It is headed by a Director General and divided into five functional divisions and several branches and support offices. It is able to move swiftly into a 24/7 crisis mode for a limited period of time without additional personnel.

The strength of the IMS lies in exchanging information and views with the staffs of the Military Representatives, the civilian International Staff (IS), the Strategic Commanders, the multinational Working Groups, and NATO Agencies, ensuring effective and efficient staff work.

### Role and responsibilities

The International Military Staff is the essential link between the political decision-making bodies of the Alliance and NATO’s Strategic Commanders (the Supreme Allied Commander Europe – SACEUR - and the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation - SACT) and their staffs. The role of the IMS is to provide the best possible strategic military advice and staff support for the Military Committee.

### Working mechanism

The IMS is headed by a Director General, at the level of a three star general or flag officer, assisted by 12 general/flag officers who head the divisions and administrative support offices within the IMS.

Several key positions are located within or attached to the Office of the Director General of the IMS:

- the Executive Coordinator (EXCO): the incumbent manages staff activities and controls the flow of information and communication, both within the IMS as well as between the IMS and other parts of NATO Headquarters;
- the Public Affairs and Strategic Communications Advisor (PA&SCA): the incumbent advises the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the MC, and the Director General of the IMS on strategic communications and public affairs matters. The Advisor works closely with the office of the Chairman of the Military Committee, acting as military spokesperson for the Chairman, and as the main source of information for all MC matters and activities;
- the Financial Controller (FC): the incumbent advises key officials on all IMS financial and fiscal matters;
the Legal Officer (LO): this person provides guidance on all legal issues to the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the MC, the Director General of the IMS and all organisations under the authority of this office, and the MC.

the NATO Office on Gender Perspectives (NOGP): they provide advice and support to the IMS on gender issues. It is the permanent focal point for collecting, providing and sharing information regarding national programmes, policies and procedures on these issues, including the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions on women, peace and security (UNSCRs 1325 and 1820). It maintains liaison with the NATO IS and international organisations concerned with the integration of a gender perspective into military operations, as well as with gender-related issues.

The five divisions

The IMS’ key role is to support the MC, and to do this it is organised into five functional divisions responsible for the following:

- The Intelligence Division provides intelligence support to all NATO HQ elements, NATO member states and NATO Commands. The Division provides strategic warning and situation awareness to all NATO HQ elements. Its core activities are: developing a NATO Intelligence framework, architecture and intelligence capabilities; providing customer-oriented policies and NATO-Agreed Intelligence Assessments; advising on intelligence sharing matters and conducting intelligence liaison activities.

- The Operations Division closely monitors ongoing NATO operations, follows exercises and training and provides advice on all related NATO operations. It also follows the implementation of decisions taken by the MC with regard to NATO operations. The Division's core activities: crisis response planning and operations; management of contingency reactions to international crises; planning and conducting all operations of air, land and maritime matters.

- The Plans and Policy Division is involved in all policy and planning matters such as Alliance defence policy and strategic planning. This division supports and gives military advice to the Director general of the IMS (DGIMS) and the Chairman of the MC essentially on three areas: Strategic Policy and Concept; Nuclear Deterrence and Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Policy; Defence and Force Planning.

- The Cooperation and Regional Security (C&RS) Division develops military Cooperative Security Policy and is the main point of contact for NATO HQ military Cooperative Security with partners from the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and
with Partners Across the Globe. Additionally, C&RS is the main military contact with all non-NATO member states who conduct operations with the Alliance. Military advice on NATO involvement in different aspects of disarmament, arms control and cooperative security issues is also developed.

- The Logistics and Resources Division develops and defines policies and principles, plans and concepts on all matters concerning logistics, medical, armaments, research and development, and civil emergency planning. In addition, the Division is the focal point for NATO’s military manpower, financial and security investment issues.

**Additional functions and offices**

- The NATO HQ Consultation, Command and Control Staff (NHQC3S), combines the communications elements of both the IMS and the IS. This means it is an integrated staff with IMS and IS personnel that serves the NAC, the MC and the C3 Board. Two of its branches are mainly coordination branches: one is focused on overall policy and governance of the C3 domain and the other focuses on the implementation aspects. The Information Assurance and Cyber Defence Branch, the Information Communities of Interest Services Branch and the Spectrum and C3 Infrastructure Branch are subject-matter branches.

- The NATO Situation Centre (SITCEN) serves as the focal point within the Alliance for the receipt, exchange and dissemination of information. It monitors political, military and economic matters of interest to NATO and partner countries on a 24-hour basis. The SITCEN also provides facilities for the rapid expansion of consultation during periods of tension and crisis.
NATO’s relations with Ukraine

Over time, Ukraine has reinforced political dialogue and practical cooperation with NATO and, since Russia’s illegal military intervention in Crimea, NATO and Ukraine have been intensifying this cooperation. NATO supports a range of initiatives in Ukraine, while Ukraine contributes to NATO’s missions in Afghanistan and Kosovo, and in 2013 became the first partner country to contribute to the NATO-led counter-piracy operation Ocean Shield. The formal basis for NATO-Ukraine relations is the 1997 Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, which established the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC), and the Declaration to Complement the Charter, signed in 2009.
Following recent developments in Crimea, NATO Allies reiterated their full support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders. Echoing a fundamental point made in the 1997 Charter, it stated that “a sovereign, independent and stable Ukraine, firmly committed to democracy and the rule of law, is key to Euro-Atlantic security.” The Alliance is also intensifying its partnership with Ukraine and strengthening cooperation to support democratic reforms and defence capacity building, complementing international efforts to support the people of Ukraine as they shape their future.

At the Chicago Summit in May 2012, NATO leaders marked the 15th anniversary of the 1997 Charter and welcomed Ukraine's commitment to enhancing political dialogue and interoperability with NATO, as well as its contributions to NATO-led operations. They also declared that NATO was ready to continue to develop its cooperation with Ukraine and assist with the implementation of reforms in the framework of the NATO-Ukraine Commission and the Annual National Programme. This continued support was reiterated by NATO Defence and Foreign Ministers at their 2014 gatherings.

Dialogue and cooperation between NATO and Ukraine has become well-established in a wide range of areas. In particular, Ukraine has proved to be an important contributor to Euro-Atlantic security in the framework of NATO-led operations. Another important aspect of relations is the support given by NATO and individual Allies for Ukraine's ongoing reform efforts, particularly in the defence and security sector. These reforms are vital for the country's democratic development and for strengthening Ukraine's ability to defend itself.

Framework for cooperation

The 1997 Charter on a Distinctive Partnership remains the basic foundation underpinning NATO-Ukraine relations. The NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) directs cooperative activities and provides a forum for consultation between the Allies and Ukraine on security issues of common concern.

Joint working groups have been set up under the auspices of the NUC, to take work forward in specific areas. Of particular importance are the Political and Partnerships Committee in NUC format, which takes the leading role in developing annual national programmes and preparing high-level meetings of the NUC; and the Joint Working Group on Defence Reform, which facilitates consultation and practical cooperation in the priority area of defence and security sector reform.

Two NATO offices in Kyiv support cooperation on the ground in key areas. The NATO Information and Documentation Centre, established in 1997, supports efforts to inform the public about NATO's activities and the benefits of NATO-Ukraine cooperation. The NATO Liaison Office, established in 1999, facilitates Ukraine's participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace programme and supports its reform efforts, by liaising with the Ministry of Defence and other Ukrainian agencies.
**Annual National Programme**

In 2009, an Annual National Programme (ANP) replaced the previous Annual Target Plans, which implemented the long-term objectives set out in the 2002 NATO-Ukraine Action Plan. It is composed of five chapters focusing on: political and economic issues; defence and military issues; resources; security issues; and legal issues.

The NUC assesses progress under the ANP annually.

The responsibility for implementation falls primarily on Ukraine, which is being urged to take the reform process forward vigorously in order to strengthen democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the market economy. Helping Ukraine achieve a far-reaching transformation of the defence and security sector is a key priority of NATO-Ukraine cooperation.

In 2010, Ukraine established a high-level commission that would act as a coordination mechanism for cooperation with NATO. The commission includes National Coordinators for each of the five areas covered in the ANP.

**Key areas of NATO-Ukraine cooperation**

Consultations and cooperation between NATO and Ukraine cover a wide range of areas identified in the 1997 Charter and the 2002 Action Plan. These include peace-support operations, defence and security sector reform, military-to-military cooperation, armaments, civil emergency planning, science and environment, and public information. Cooperation in all areas is currently being intensified to enhance Ukraine's ability to provide for its own security. For instance, NATO is looking at new Trust Funds to support defence capacity building in critical areas such as logistics, command and control, cyber defence and military career transition management.

**Peace-support operations**

Ukraine has a proven track record of actively contributing to Euro-Atlantic security by deploying troops to work together with peacekeepers from NATO and partner countries. It is the only partner country that has contributed, at one stage or other, to all ongoing NATO-led operations.

Deployments to the NATO-led operation in Kosovo have included a helicopter squadron, infantry companies, headquarters personnel and support staff. Currently, Ukraine
contributes approximately 160 personnel to the KFOR mission as part of the joint Polish-Ukrainian battalion, in the Multinational Task Force “East.”

The country is further contributing to international stability and the fight against terrorism by providing over-flight clearance for forces deployed in Afghanistan as part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), or as part of the coalition forces under the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom. A transit agreement for the supply of ISAF was signed by Ukraine in April 2009. Ukrainian medical personnel supported the Polish Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) from 2010 and the Lithuanian-led PRT in Afghanistan from 2007, until both shut down. Currently, Ukraine provides just over two dozen military personnel to ISAF, including instructors to the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A). It has also indicated its willingness to participate in the post-2014 follow-on mission to train, advise and assist Afghan security forces. From March 2005, Ukraine also contributed officers to the NATO Training Mission in Iraq, which terminated in December 2011.

Moreover, Ukraine has supported Operation Active Endeavour, NATO’s maritime operation in the Mediterranean aimed at helping deter, disrupt and protect against terrorism. Ukraine has contributed naval assets to the operation six times since 2007, most recently in November 2010. End 2013, it also contributed a frigate to NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield, which fights piracy off the coast of Somalia.

Ukraine is also the first partner country to contribute to the NATO Response Force (NRF). In 2010, Ukraine contributed a platoon specialised in nuclear, biological and chemical threats to the NRF. In 2011, Ukraine provided strategic airlift capabilities with their Antonov aircraft.

**Defence and security sector reform**

Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO in the area of defence and security sector reform is crucial to the ongoing transformation of Ukraine’s security posture and remains an essential part of its democratic transition.

Ukraine has sought NATO’s support in efforts to transform its Cold War legacy of massive conscript forces into smaller, professional and more mobile armed forces, able to meet the country’s security needs and to contribute actively to stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. Another overarching objective of NATO-Ukraine cooperation in this area is to strengthen democratic and civil control of Ukraine’s armed forces and security institutions.

NATO supports Ukraine’s defence and related security sector reform through the Joint Working Group on Defence Reform (JWGDR) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Planning
and Review Process (PARP) mechanism. It assists Ukraine in the modernisation of its force structure, command and control arrangements, defence capabilities and plans and procedures. Allies also contribute to the transformation of Ukraine’s defence and related security institutions into modern and effective organisations under civil and democratic control, able to provide a credible deterrence to aggression and defence against military threats.

- **Capacity building and civil control**

In addition to the support provided to Ukraine through the JWGDR and the PARP mechanism, other NATO programmes and initiatives contribute to specific aspects of strengthening civil control over defence and related security institutions, including in the intelligence sector. Improving the capacity of these institutions is of fundamental importance for Ukraine’s development as a democratic country.

As part of wider cooperation in this area, a number of specific initiatives have been taken:

- a JWGDR Professional Development Programme for civilians working in Ukraine’s defence and security institutions was launched in October 2005;
- a NATO-Ukraine Working Group on Civil and Democratic Control of the Intelligence Sector was established in 2006;
- a Partnership Network for Civil Society Expertise Development was launched in 2006 to promote the sharing of experience on the role of civil society in defence and security affairs among civil society groups and security practitioners in NATO member countries and Ukraine;
- Since 2009, Ukraine has participated in the NATO Building Integrity Programme. Civilian and military officers have participated in the relevant education and training activities to strengthen their capabilities and learn best practices of embedding transparency, integrity and accountability in the defence and security sector;
- expert talks with security sector institutions in the area of cyber defence, with the aim of enhancing inter-agency cooperation and coordination, as well as supporting the development of Ukraine’s national cyber security strategy.

- **Retraining and resettling former military personnel**

Various initiatives are underway to help Ukraine retrain and resettle former military personnel made redundant as a result of the progressive downsizing of the Ukrainian armed forces. For instance, expert help is being given to help Ukraine develop a
comprehensive resettlement programme. By implementing these programmes, NATO is assisting Ukraine in the management of the socio-economic consequences of defence reform. By the end of 2013, NATO programmes had retrained close to 7,000 officers. Of these, 75 per cent are on average employed within six months after the completion of the retraining course.

- *Destroying stockpiles of weapons and munitions*

Individual Allies are also supporting the destruction of Ukraine’s stockpiles of anti-personnel mines, munitions and small arms and light weapons through PfP Trust Fund projects.

The first project involved the safe destruction of 400,000 landmines at a chemical plant in Donetsk, over a 15-month period in 2002-2003. It was the first step in destroying Ukraine’s stockpile of almost seven million anti-personnel mines.

A second project to destroy 133,000 tons of conventional munitions, 1.5 million small arms and 1000 man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) was launched in 2005. With projected costs of some €25 million, the project is to be carried out over an estimated 12 years. It is the largest demilitarization project of its kind ever to be undertaken, and will permanently increase Ukraine’s capacity to destroy surplus munitions.

- *Economic aspects of defence*

Dialogue and exchanges of experience with experts also take place with Ukraine on the economic aspects of defence. Issues covered include security aspects of economic development and economic matters related to Euro-Atlantic integration, as well as topics specifically related to defence economics such as defence budgets, the management of defence resources and restructuring in the defence sector. Courses are also organised for Ukrainian staff, covering the whole budgetary process from financial planning to financial control.

**Military-to-military cooperation**

Helping Ukraine implement its defence reform objectives is also a key focus of military-to-military cooperation, complementing the work carried out under the JWGDR with military expertise.

Another important objective is to develop interoperability through a wide range of PfP activities and military exercises, sometimes hosted by Ukraine, which allow military personnel to train for peace-support operations and gain hands-on experience of working
with forces from NATO countries and other partners. For example, Ukrainian forces took part in NATO’s exercise Steadfast Jazz in November 2013.

Senior Ukrainian officers also regularly participate in courses at the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy, and the NATO School at Oberammergau, Germany. Contacts with these establishments have been instrumental in setting up a new multinational faculty at the Ukrainian Defence Academy.

The military side has also taken the lead in developing a legal framework to enable NATO and Ukraine to further develop operational cooperation:

- a PfP Status of Forces Agreement facilitates participation in PfP military exercises by exempting participants from passport and visa regulations and immigration inspection on entering or leaving the territory of the country hosting the event (entered into force in May 2000);
- a Host Nation Support agreement addresses issues related to the provision of civil and military assistance to Allied forces located on, or in transit through, Ukrainian territory in peacetime, crisis or war (ratified in March 2004);
- a Strategic Airlift agreement enables Ukraine to make a substantial contribution to NATO’s capability to move outsized cargo by leasing Antonov aircraft to Allied armed forces – an arrangement which also brings economic benefits to Ukraine (ratified in October 2006);
- the Defence Education Enhancement Programme set up with NATO in 2013 provides six defence institutions in Kyiv, Lviv and Kharkiv with expertise on how to improve the professional military education they have to offer and build the capacity of Ukrainian teaching staff.

**Armaments**

Technical cooperation between Ukraine and NATO in the field of armaments focuses on enhancing interoperability between defence systems to facilitate Ukrainian contributions to joint peace-support operations.

Cooperation in this area started when Ukraine joined the PfP programme and began participating in an increasing number of the armaments groups which meet under the auspices of the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) – a NATO senior body which identifies opportunities for cooperation between nations in defence equipment procurement processes, focusing in particular on technical standards.

A Joint Working Group on Armaments, which met for the first time in March 2004, is working toward increased cooperation in this area.
Civil emergency planning

NATO and Ukraine have developed practical cooperation on civil emergency planning and disaster preparedness, since the signing of a memorandum of understanding in 1997.

Ukraine's western regions are prone to heavy flooding and NATO countries and other partners have provided assistance after severe floods in 1995, 1998 and 2001. A key focus of cooperation has therefore been to help Ukraine prepare better for such emergencies and manage their consequences more effectively.

PfP exercises also help develop plans and effective disaster-response capabilities to deal with other natural emergencies such as avalanches and earthquakes, or man-made accidents or terrorist attacks involving toxic spills or chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear agents – Ukraine hosted one such exercise in 2005. In 2010, Ukraine also sent a mobile rescue centre to Poland as part of an aid effort following flooding in the country.

Science and environment

Ukraine’s participation in NATO science programmes began in 1991 and intensified following an exchange of letters on cooperation in the area of science and the environment in 1999. Over the years, Ukraine has been among the biggest recipients of NATO grants for scientific collaboration.

In addition to applying science to defence against terrorism and new threats, Ukraine’s priority areas for cooperation include information technologies, cell biology and biotechnology, new materials, the rational use of natural resources and cooperation focused on defence-related environmental problems.

NATO has also sponsored several projects to provide basic infrastructure for computer networking among Ukrainian research communities and to facilitate their access to the internet. Although the focus of past collaboration has been in the area of physical sciences, project proposals are now also being considered which deal with security issues from a social science perspective. For example, a new Trust Fund is being considered that will help remove and decontaminate military sites with stored radioactive waste.

A Joint Working Group on Scientific and Environmental Cooperation is supporting the further development of cooperation in this area.

Public information

It is important for the Ukrainian administration to inform the Ukrainian people about NATO-Ukraine relations and the benefits of cooperation in terms of Ukraine’s own reform programme. Many people in Ukraine still lack information regarding the role, activities
and goals of the Alliance, and outdated Cold War stereotypes remain strong in the minds of some.

The Allies have offered to cooperate with the Ukrainian authorities in raising awareness about what NATO is today, and in better explaining the NATO-Ukraine relationship.

The NATO Information and Documentation Centre, based in Kyiv, is NATO's principal public information facility, offering seminars and talks, as well as coordinating visits by NATO officials to Ukraine and representatives of Ukrainian civil society to NATO Headquarters in order to better illustrate the mechanisms behind the partnership.

Evolution of relations

NATO-Ukraine relations were formally launched in 1991, when Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (succeeded by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997), immediately upon achieving independence with the break-up of the Soviet Union.

A few years later, in 1994, Ukraine became the first of the Commonwealth of Independent States to join the Partnership for Peace. The country soon demonstrated its commitment to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security in its support for the NATO-led peacekeeping operations in the Balkans during the 1990s.

The 1997 Charter on a Distinctive Partnership recognised the importance of an independent, stable and democratic Ukraine to European stability. The Charter set out principles and arrangements for the further development of NATO-Ukraine relations and identified areas for consultation and cooperation, establishing the NATO-Ukraine Commission to take work forward.

Steps were taken to deepen and broaden the NATO-Ukraine relationship with the adoption of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan in November 2002, which supported Ukraine's reform efforts on the road towards Euro-Atlantic integration.

In the wake of the "Orange Revolution", newly elected President Viktor Yushchenko was invited to a summit meeting at NATO Headquarters in February 2005. NATO leaders expressed support for the new President's ambitious reform plans for Ukraine and agreed to sharpen and refocus NATO-Ukraine cooperation in line with the new government's priorities.

Two months later, at the NUC meeting of foreign ministers in Vilnius, Lithuania, in April 2005, the Allies and Ukraine launched an Intensified Dialogue on Ukraine's aspirations to
NATO membership. They also announced a package of short-term actions designed to enhance NATO-Ukraine cooperation in key reform areas.

At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, Allied leaders agreed that Ukraine may become a NATO member in future.

In August 2009, a “Declaration to Complement the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine” was signed. It gives the NUC a central role in deepening political dialogue and cooperation, and in underpinning Ukraine's reform efforts pertaining to its membership aspirations.

In 2010, the newly elected government of President Viktor Yanukovych made it clear that while it was not presently pursuing NATO membership, it wished to maintain the existing level of cooperation with the Alliance and to fulfill existing agreements. Continued political and military dialogue for regional stability, practical support for NATO-led operations and defence reform were identified as the main tasks for NATO-Ukraine cooperation. Ukraine issued a Presidential Decree (1039/2010) establishing a high-level Commission for Ukraine’s Partnership with NATO. This coordination mechanism will assist in the implementation of Ukraine’s Annual National Programme, and other areas of practical cooperation with NATO.

Following political developments early 2014, NATO’s Secretary General condemned Russia’s moves to incorporate Crimea into the Russian Federation. The Alliance expressed its concern regarding the authorisation by the Russian Parliament to use the armed forces of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine. It stated that “NATO Allies will continue to support Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, and the principle of inviolability of frontiers, as key factors of stability and security in Central and Eastern Europe, and on the continent as a whole”. Moreover, at a meeting of the NUC at the level of foreign ministers early April, NATO and Ukraine agreed to implement immediate and longer-term measures in order to strengthen Ukraine’s ability to provide for its own security.

**Milestones**

1991 乌克兰加入北约合作委员会（后更名为欧洲大西洋伙伴关系委员会）。
1994 乌克兰加入北约伙伴关系计划（PfP）。
1996 乌克兰士兵作为北约主导的维和部队的一员部署至波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那。
1997 北约信息与文献中心在基辅成立。
In July, at a summit meeting in Madrid, Spain, the Allies and Ukraine formally sign the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, establishing the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC).

Ukraine establishes a diplomatic mission to NATO.

1998
The NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform is established.

1999
The NATO Liaison Office opens in Kyiv.
The Polish-Ukrainian battalion deploys as part of the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo.

2000
In May, the Ukrainian parliament ratifies the PfP Status of Forces Agreement.

In September, Ukraine hosts a multinational disaster-response exercise, Trans-Carpathia 2000.

2002
In May, President Leonid Kuchma announces Ukraine's goal of eventual NATO membership. At a NUC meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, foreign ministers underline their desire to take their relationship forward to a qualitatively new level.

In July, a PfP Trust Fund project for the safe destruction of 400 000 landmines is inaugurated in Donetsk.

The NATO-Ukraine Action Plan is adopted at a NUC meeting of foreign ministers in November in Prague, the Czech Republic.

2004
In March, the Ukrainian parliament ratifies an agreement with NATO on Host Nation Support.

Ukraine signs an agreement with NATO on Strategic Airlift.

In the autumn, the Allies closely follow political developments surrounding the presidential elections in Ukraine and the "Orange Revolution". They stress the importance of respect for free and fair elections and postpone a NUC ministerial-level meeting scheduled for December.

2005
In February, the Allies invite newly-elected President Viktor Yushchenko to a summit meeting at NATO Headquarters. They express support for his ambitious reform plans and agree to refocus NATO-Ukraine cooperation in line with the new government's priorities.

A PfP Trust Fund project is launched with Ukraine to destroy 133 000 tons of conventional munitions, 1.5 million small arms and 1000 man-portable air defence systems over an estimated 12 years.

In April, at the NUC meeting of foreign ministers in Vilnius, Lithuania, the Allies and Ukraine launch an Intensified Dialogue on Ukraine's aspirations to NATO membership and a package of short-term actions to strengthen support for key reforms.
An exchange of letters between NATO and Ukraine agrees procedures to prepare the way for Ukraine's support to Operation Active Endeavour. In September, a series of staff-level expert discussions is initiated under the Intensified Dialogue. In October, Ukraine hosts a multinational disaster-response exercise, Joint Assistance 2005. In October, the North Atlantic Council visits Kyiv to discuss the Intensified Dialogue with Ukraine's foreign and defence ministers.

2006

In February, a Resettlement and Retraining Centre is inaugurated in Khmelnytskyi. In March, NATO's Secretary General welcomes the conduct of free and fair parliamentary elections as contributing to the consolidation of democracy in Ukraine. In September, during a visit to NATO, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych reassures Allies of Ukraine's commitment to ongoing cooperation with NATO but says the Ukrainian people are not yet ready to consider possible NATO membership. In October, the Ukrainian parliament ratifies the agreement on Strategic Airlift.

2007

The first Ukrainian ship, the corvette URS Ternopil, deploys in support of Operation Active Endeavour (June), followed by the corvette URS Lutsk (autumn). Ukraine sends medical personnel to support a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan. 10th anniversary of the NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership.

2008

At the Bucharest Summit in April, Allied leaders agree that Ukraine will become a NATO member in future. Ukraine deploys two vessels in support of Operation Active Endeavour: the frigate URS Sagaidachnyi (summer) and the corvette URS Ternopil (November). In December, NATO Foreign Ministers agree to enhance opportunities for assisting Ukraine in its efforts to meet membership requirements, making use of the existing framework of the NATO-Ukraine Commission and the development of an Annual National Programme (ANP).

2009

Ukraine signs land transit agreement for the supply of ISAF (April). A “Declaration to Complement the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine” is signed on 21 August to reflect decisions
taken at the Bucharest Summit and December 2008 foreign ministers’ meeting.

In November, the URS Ternopil deploys for the third time (the fifth for a Ukrainian ship) as part of Operation Active Endeavour.

2010

In February, the new Ukrainian government under President Viktor Yanukovych decides to continue present cooperation with NATO, but takes Alliance membership for the country off the agenda.

In February, the first NATO-Ukraine Expert Staff Talks on Cyber Defence in Kyiv are organised under the auspices of the NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform.

In May, Ukraine and Turkey (as the facilitating NATO member) sign a memorandum of understanding on "Air Situation Data Exchange", which aims to reduce airspace conflicts by minimising potential cross-border incidents and optimising responses to renegade situations with civil airplanes.

In November, for the sixth time, Ukraine deploys a ship to the Mediterranean to assist NATO's Operation Active Endeavour.

2011

In April, at their meeting in Berlin, NUC Foreign Ministers issue a joint statement reaffirming their distinct partnership and agreeing to take forward practical cooperation activities.

2012

In May, President Yanukovych attends NATO's Summit in Chicago to participate in a meeting with counterparts from countries that are supporting the NATO-led stabilisation mission in Afghanistan.

9 July marks the 15th anniversary of the signing of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine in 1997.

In July, General Sir Richard Shirreff, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, visits Ukraine for discussions on operational cooperation and support for defence reform.

In September, General Knud Bartels, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, visits Ukraine for a series of high-level talks on defence reform and operational cooperation.

2013

In February, NUC Defence Ministers agree to reinforce NATO-Ukraine cooperation: agreement is reached on a set of priorities to guide cooperation over the next five years, including in training and exercises; a project for the retraining of former military officers in Ukraine is extended; progress is made on plans for a new project to support the neutralisation of radioactive sources from former Soviet military sites; and Ukraine becomes
the first partner country to contribute to NATO’s counter-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia (frigate UPD Hetman Sagaidachny).

In March, NATO calls on Russia to de-escalate tensions as a so-called referendum is held in Crimea and armed forces of the Russian Federation are used on the territory of Ukraine.

In April and June, NATO agrees on concrete support measures for Ukraine to strengthen its ability to provide for its own security. Measures include a number of immediate and short-term actions to help Ukraine cope with the current crisis, and longer-term measures geared towards capacity building, capability development, and a deep reform of the armed forces and the security sector. NATO will also look at additional measures, including the creation of new Trust Funds.
NATO’s relations with Russia

On 1 April 2014, NATO Foreign Ministers condemned Russia’s illegal military intervention in Ukraine and Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. NATO does not recognise Russia’s illegal and illegitimate attempt to annex Crimea. NATO continues to call on Russia to return to compliance with international law and its international obligations, to take genuine and effective measures to stop destabilising Ukraine, and to end its support for armed separatist groups, including by stopping the flow of weapons and fighters across its borders. The crisis between Ukraine and Russia will be a key topic on the agenda for NATO Heads of State and Government when they meet in Wales in September.
NATO has followed developments closely from the very beginning of the crisis. On 2 March, the North Atlantic Council condemned the Russian Federation's military escalation in Crimea and expressed its grave concern regarding the authorisation by the Russian Parliament to use the armed forces of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine.

On 16 March, the North Atlantic Council said that it considered the so-called referendum, held on the same day, in Ukraine's Autonomous Republic of Crimea to be both illegal and illegitimate. The referendum violated the Ukrainian Constitution and international law, and Allies do not recognise its results.

The crisis has had serious implications for NATO-Russia relations.

Over the past twenty years, NATO has consistently worked for closer cooperation and trust with Russia. However, Russia has violated international law and has acted in contradiction with the principles and commitments in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Basic Document, the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and the Rome Declaration. It has gravely breached the trust upon which NATO-Russia cooperation must be based. As a result, from the beginning of the crisis NATO has taken immediate steps in terms of its relations with Russia. The Alliance suspended the planning for its first NATO-Russia joint mission and put the entire range of NATO-Russia cooperation under review by NATO Foreign Ministers. Then in April, NATO Foreign Ministers decided to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and Russia. In June, NATO Foreign Ministers agreed to maintain the suspension of practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia. Any decision to resume cooperation will be conditions-based.

NATO is currently identifying ways to transfer those cooperative projects that impact on third parties – in particular the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) Counter-Narcotics Training Project and the NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund - to other non-NRC mechanisms or structures. Political dialogue in the NRC can continue, as necessary, at the Ambassadorial level and above, to allow the exchange of views, first and foremost on this crisis. Since the crisis began, the NRC has convened twice.

Framework for cooperation

The 28 Allies and Russia are equal partners in the NRC, which was established in 2002. The NRC provides a framework for consultation on current security issues and practical cooperation in a wide range of areas of common interest. Its agenda builds on the basis for bilateral cooperation that was set out in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, which provided the formal basis for relations.

Cooperation between Russia and NATO member states that took place prior to 1 April 2014 was directed by the NRC and developed through various subordinate working groups and committees. Every year under the NRC procedures, NRC member countries should agree on an annual work programme.

The driving force behind the NRC's cooperation to date has been the realisation that NATO and Russia share strategic priorities and face common challenges. At the Lisbon
Summit, the 29 NRC leaders pledged to “work towards achieving a true strategic and modernised partnership based on the principles of reciprocal confidence, transparency, and predictability, with the aim of contributing to the creation of a common space of peace, security and stability”. They endorsed a Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges, which include Afghanistan, terrorism, piracy, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, as well as natural and man-made disasters.

Up to 1 April 2014, key areas of cooperation included the fight against terrorism, defence reform, military-to-military cooperation, counter-narcotics training of Afghan, Central Asian and Pakistani personnel, theatre missile defence/missile defence, counter-piracy, crisis management, non-proliferation, airspace management, civil emergency planning, scientific cooperation and environmental security.

The NRC has also provided a forum for the development of a continuous political dialogue on current security issues, which has expanded steadily to include frank and constructive exchanges on topical and sometimes controversial issues. Discussions have been held on subjects such as the situation in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus, Central Asia, the Middle East, Iraq, Libya, Syria and North Korea, as well as exchanges on issues such as NATO’s transformation, energy security, missile defence and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Dialogue also generates ideas for practical cooperation to help address shared security challenges.

To facilitate cooperation, Russia has established a diplomatic mission to NATO and Russian Military Branch Offices have been set up at NATO’s two top military command headquarters. In Moscow, a NATO Information Office seeks to explain NATO and promote the benefits of the NATO-Russia partnership, and a Military Liaison Mission is helping improve transparency and coordination on the military side.

Key areas of cooperation prior to 1 April 2014

**Support for ISAF and the Afghan Armed Forces**

In spring 2008, Russia offered to support the NATO-led, UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan by facilitating the land transit of non-military equipment for ISAF contributors across Russian territory. Similar arrangements have been concluded with the other transit states, opening up this important supply route for ISAF in 2010. At the Lisbon Summit, NRC leaders agreed amendments to the arrangements agreed in 2008 to allow land transit both to and from Afghanistan of non-lethal cargo. An agreement allowing for multi-modal reverse transit, using a mix of rail and
air transit, for ISAF equipment through Russian territory was signed in July 2012. The arrangements, which make use of the Ulyanovsk airport, were employed for the first time in December 2012 for the transit of a cargo for the British contingent in ISAF.

NRC leaders agreed at Lisbon to establish an NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund to help the Afghan Armed Forces to operate and maintain their helicopter fleet. The project was officially launched in March 2011, aimed at providing a much-needed maintenance and repair capacity, including spare parts and technical training. Germany is acting as the lead nation for the project and the NATO Support Agency (NSPA, formerly NAMSA) serving as executing agent. During the first phase of the project, financial and in-kind contributions to the project by ten donor nations – Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Russia, Turkey and the United States – amounted to approximately $23 million. Tailored training for Afghan Air Force (AAF) helicopter maintenance staff started in April 2012 at the OAO Novosibirsk Aircraft Repair Plant in Russia, which is serving as the main training centre for Afghan maintenance personnel under the project. By the end of 2013, 40 Afghan helicopter maintenance staff were trained by the project, and selected personnel are due to participate in a train-the-trainer course provided by the Croatian Air Force.

With the launch of the second phase of the project, agreed by NRC Foreign Ministers in April 2013, the scope of the project was expanded: maintenance training, which had previously focused on the Mi-17s (medium-sized transport helicopters that can also act as gunships), would be offered for Mi-35s (large helicopter gunship and attack helicopters with troop transport capability); critical spare parts required to repair seven Mi-35 helicopters, which are currently non-operational, would also be provided; and new support would be directed at developing the AAF’s medical evacuation capacity.

**Counter-narcotics training of Afghan and Central Asian personnel**

The NRC Counter-Narcotics Training Project was launched by NRC Foreign Ministers in December 2005 to help address the threats posed by the trafficking in Afghan narcotics. It sought to build local capacity and to promote regional networking and cooperation by sharing the combined expertise of NRC member states with mid-level officers from Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Pakistan became the seventh participating country in 2010.

The project was being implemented in cooperation with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Along with the project’s seven beneficiary countries, this was a joint endeavour of many NRC nations – Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United...
States – as well as two non-NRC contributors (Finland, since 2007, and Ukraine, since 2012).

Fixed training takes place in one of four institutes either in Turkey, Russia or the United States and mobile courses were conducted in each of the seven participating countries. In 2013, the project also began work to encourage cross-border counter-narcotics training. This includes supporting the UNODC’s work in establishing border liaison officers at existing border checkpoints between northern Tajikistan and southern Kyrgyzstan, and offering joint counter-narcotics training to Afghan and Pakistani officers.

The NRC countries participating in the project convened with representatives of Afghanistan, the Central Asian nations and Pakistan for High Level Steering Sessions, which ensured that the project continued to meet the countries’ counter-narcotics training needs.

By the end of 2013, over 3,000 officers had been trained under the project. The impact is also being seen through the requests for more specialised training in areas such as clandestine laboratories and forensic investigations for counter-narcotics officers, now that basic training has been widely achieved.

**Combating terrorism**

An NRC Action Plan on Terrorism was launched by NRC Foreign Ministers in December 2004 to improve overall coordination and provide strategic direction for cooperation in this area. NRC leaders underlined the continued importance of cooperation in the fight against terrorism at Lisbon in November 2010 and an updated Action Plan on Terrorism was approved by NRC Foreign Ministers at their meeting in April 2011 in Berlin. A first civil-military counter-terrorism tabletop exercise was conducted in the framework of the NRC at NATO Headquarters in March 2012.

Regular exchanges of information and in-depth consultations normally take place within the NRC on various aspects of combating terrorism. Under the Cooperative Airspace Initiative, an information exchange system has been developed to provide air traffic transparency and early notification of suspicious air activities to help prevent terrorist attacks such as the 9/11 attacks on the United States.

In the scientific and technical field, NATO and Russia worked together on the STANDEX project – a flagship initiative of the NATO-Russia Council – which aims to develop technology that will enable the stand-off detection of explosive devices in mass transport environments. Successful live trials of the technology took place in real time in an underground station in a major European city in June 2013, marking the completion of the development and test phase of STANDEX – the result of four years of joint work between
experts from Russia and NATO countries. Countering improvised explosive devices was another important focus of cooperation. Events facilitating the sharing of experiences in hosting and securing high-visibility events have also been held.

Over the years, several Russian ships have been deployed in support of Operation Active Endeavour, NATO’s maritime operation against terrorism in the Mediterranean.

**Cooperative Airspace Initiative**

The Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI) was aimed at preventing terrorists from using aircraft to launch attacks similar to those of 9/11. The CAI information exchange provided air traffic transparency and early notification of suspicious air activities. This facilitates transparency, predictability and interoperability in airspace management.

Based on a feasibility study completed in 2005, detailed system requirements and a project plan were agreed for the system to enable the reciprocal exchange of air traffic data between centres in NATO countries and in Russia. Implementation started in 2006 and the system reached its operational capability in December 2011.

The operational readiness of the CAI system was demonstrated during the first live-flying, real-time counter-terrorism exercise, “Vigilant Skies 2011”, which took place in June 2011. A simulated computer-based exercise to test and consolidate processes, procedures and capabilities took place in November 2012. Another live exercise took place in September 2013.

A total of around €10 million have been invested in the CAI project. Nations that have contributed financially include Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Russia, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The system was open for participation by other nations.

The NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA), formerly known as the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A), led the implementation of the NATO part of the CAI system, and the software was procured from EUROCONTROL. Implementation of the Russian part of the system was led by the State Air Traffic Management Corporation, under the guidance of the Federal Air Navigation Authority. The Russian segment of the system was developed and supplied by the “Almaz-Antey” Concern.

The CAI system consists of two coordination centres, in Moscow and in Warsaw, and local coordination sites in Russia (Murmansk, Kaliningrad, Rostov-on-Don) and in NATO member countries (Bodø, Norway; Warsaw, Poland; and Ankara, Turkey).
Theatre missile defence/ ballistic missile defence

Cooperation in the area of theatre missile defence (TMD) was underway for a number of years to address the unprecedented danger posed to deployed forces by the increasing availability of ever more accurate ballistic missiles. A study was launched in 2003 to assess the possible levels of interoperability among the theatre missile defence systems of NATO Allies and Russia.

Three command post exercises were held – the first in the United States in March 2004, the second in the Netherlands in March 2005, and the third in Russia in October 2006. Computer-assisted exercises have taken place in Germany in January 2008 and March 2012. Together with the interoperability study, these exercises are intended to provide the basis for future improvements to interoperability and to develop mechanisms and procedures for joint operations in the area of theatre missile defence.

In December 2009, an NRC Missile Defence Working Group was established. It was tasked to build on the lessons learned from the previous TMD cooperation and to exchange views on possible mutually beneficial cooperation on ballistic missile defence, based on a joint assessment of missile threats.

At the Lisbon Summit, NRC leaders approved the joint ballistic missile threat assessment and agreed to discuss pursuing missile defence cooperation. They decided to resume TMD cooperation, which had been suspended in August 2008, and to develop a joint analysis of the future framework for missile defence cooperation.

At the 2012 Chicago Summit, NATO leaders stressed that NATO's planned missile defence capability is not directed against Russia, nor will it undermine Russia's strategic deterrent. It is intended to defend against potential threats from beyond the Euro-Atlantic area.
Non-proliferation and arms control

Dialogue on a growing range of issues related to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has developed under the NRC. Concrete recommendations have been made to strengthen existing non-proliferation arrangements. A number of in-depth discussions and expert seminars have been held to explore opportunities for practical cooperation in the protection against nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Since under the NRC, work was underway to assess global trends in WMD proliferation and their means of delivery, and to review areas in which NRC nations could work together politically to promote effective multilateral arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

The NRC has also provided a forum for frank discussions on issues related to conventional arms control, such as the CFE Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty and confidence- and security-building measures. A key priority for all NRC nations is to work towards the ratification of the Adapted Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. The Allies have expressed concern over Russia’s unilateral “suspension” of its participation in the treaty in December 2007. While differences remain on this issue, the Allies remain committed to ratifying the Adapted Treaty. At the Lisbon Summit, NRC leaders emphasised their strong support for the revitalisation and modernisation of the conventional arms control regime in Europe and their readiness to continue dialogue on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation issues of interest to the NRC. A Joint NRC Statement was agreed for the 7th Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in December 2011.

In July 2014, the United States briefed the North Atlantic Council on its determination that the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 to 5,500 kilometres, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.

The INF Treaty, which entered into force in 1988, was concluded to reduce threats to security and stability in Europe, in particular the threat of short-warning attack on targets of strategic importance.

The Treaty has a special place in history, as it required the verifiable elimination of an entire class of missiles possessed by the United States and the former Soviet Union. It remains a key element of Euro-Atlantic security -- one that benefits the security of all parties and must be preserved.
Russia should work constructively to resolve this critical treaty issue and preserve the viability of the INF Treaty by returning to full compliance in a verifiable manner. Continuing to uphold the Treaty strengthens the security of all, including Russia.

**Nuclear weapons issues**

In the nuclear field, experts have developed a glossary of terms and definitions and organised exchanges on nuclear doctrines and strategy. Seminars were held to discuss nuclear doctrine and strategy in 2005, 2009 and 2011, lessons learned from nuclear weapons incidents and accidents (2007) and potential responses to the detection of improvised nuclear or radiological devices (2010).

Experts and representatives from Russia and NATO member countries have also observed four nuclear-weapon-accident-response field exercises in Russia in 2004, the United Kingdom in 2005, the United States in 2006, and France in 2007. As a follow-on to these four exercises, in June 2011, Russia and NATO member countries also participated in a table top exercise dealing with emergency response to a nuclear weapon incident. Inviting experts to attend such exercises increases transparency, develops common understanding of nuclear-weapon-accident-response procedures, and builds full confidence that the nuclear weapon states of NATO (France, the United Kingdom and United States) and Russia are fully capable to respond effectively to any emergency involving nuclear weapons.

**Military-to-military cooperation**

Since the NRC was established, military liaison arrangements have been enhanced, at the Allied Commands for Operations and for Transformation, as well as in Moscow. A key objective of military-to-military cooperation is to build trust, confidence and transparency, and to improve the ability of NATO and Russian forces to work together in preparation for possible future joint military operations. It can focus on areas of cooperation such as logistics, combating terrorism, search-and-rescue at sea, countering piracy, theatre missile defence/missile defence and military academic exchanges – and related military activities.

However, on 1 April 2014, NATO Foreign Ministers decided to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and Russia.

**Countering piracy**

Countering piracy was one of the key areas of common interest and concern identified in the Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges approved at Lisbon in November 2010. Cooperation at the tactical level has been developing since late 2008 between Russian vessels and Allied ships deployed as part of NATO’s counter-piracy operation off the Horn of Africa, Ocean Shield. At the operational level, regular meetings
between staffs sought to enhance NATO-Russia maritime cooperation. Russian ships have also used the training facilities of the NATO Maritime Interdiction Training Centre in Crete, Greece, to prepare for counter-piracy missions.

**Submarine-crew search and rescue**

Work in the area of submarine-crew search and rescue at sea intensified following the signing of a framework agreement on cooperation in this area in February 2003.

A Russian navy submarine was fully integrated into a NATO-led exercise for the first time during search-and-rescue exercise “Bold Monarch 2011” off the coast of southern Spain, in June 2011. Prior to this, Russia took part in NATO's exercise “Sorbet Royal”, in June 2005. The experience and networks developed during the exercise contributed to the success of an actual rescue operation in August 2005 off the coast of Russian Kamchatka peninsula. Russia also participated in exercise “Bold Monarch 2008”.

In December 2013, a sea survival course for aircrews took place in Germany.

**Defence transparency, strategy and reform**

With a view to building mutual confidence and transparency, prior to 1 April 2014 dialogue was ongoing on doctrinal issues, strategy and policy, including their relation to defence reform, nuclear weapons issues, force development and posture.

Past initiatives launched in the area of defence reform have focused on the evolution of the military, management of human and financial resources, reform of defence industries, managing the consequences of defence reform, and defence-related aspects of combating terrorism. NATO and Russian linguists have also produced a terminological glossary to support practical cooperation and contribute to understanding within the NRC, which was completed in 2011.

From 2002 to 2008, a NATO-Russia Resettlement Centre helped facilitate the integration of former Russian military personnel into civilian life by providing information regarding job-search and resettlement, professional courses for trainees, job-placement services, and English-language and management courses for small and medium-sized enterprises. Set up in Moscow in July 2002, its operations were gradually expanded into the regions. Over the project’s lifetime, around 2820 former military personnel from the Russian armed forces were retrained and over 80 per cent found civilian employment as a result of the retraining or the help of the Centre’s job placement unit.

**Defence industrial cooperation**
A broad-based “Study on NATO-Russia Defence Industrial and Research and Technological Cooperation”, launched in January 2005 and completed in 2007, concluded that there was potential in combining scientific and technological capabilities to address global threats.

**Logistics**

Logistics form the backbone of any military operation and in today's security environment, the need for more mobile forces and multinational operations calls for improved coordination and the pooling of resources, wherever possible.

Before the suspension of practical cooperation with Russia, opportunities for logistics cooperation were pursued on both the civilian and military side, including areas such as air transport, air-to-air refueling, medical services and water purification. Meetings and seminars focused on establishing a sound foundation of mutual understanding in the field of logistics by promoting information sharing in areas such as logistic policies, doctrine, structures and lessons learned.

**Civil emergencies**

NATO and Russia cooperated between 1996 and 2014 to develop a capacity for joint action in response to civil emergencies, such as earthquakes and floods, and to coordinate detection and prevention of disasters before they occur. Moreover, it was a Russian proposal that led to the establishment in 1998 of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre, which coordinates responses to disasters among all countries of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (the 28 NATO members and 22 partner countries).

Under the NRC, a key focus of cooperation in this area was to develop capabilities to manage the consequences of terrorist attacks. Two disaster-response exercises held in Russia (Bogorodsk, 2002, and Kaliningrad, 2004) and another in Italy, in 2006, have resulted in concrete recommendations for consequence management. Another table top consequence-management exercise was hosted by Norway in 2010. More recent work focused on risk reduction, capacity building and cooperation in the area of civil preparedness and consequence management related to high visibility events.

**Scientific cooperation**

Russia was actively engaged within the framework of the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme from 1992. The SPS Programme enables close collaboration on issues of common interest to enhance the security of NATO and partner countries. By facilitating international efforts, in particular with a regional focus, the Programme seeks to address emerging security challenges, support NATO-led operations and advance early warning and forecast for the prevention of disasters and crises.
Scientists and experts from Russia sought to address a wide range of security issues, notably in the fields of defence against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents, mine detection and counter-terrorism (including explosives detection such as the STANDEX project mentioned above). Areas for cooperation are identified in the NRC and a concrete Action Plan developed to carry out activities. One activity included a project to develop solutions for effective oil spill management in the southeastern Baltic. An SPS multi-year research initiative was launched in June 2013 to establish a continuous risk monitoring assessment network that will observe munitions dump sites in the Baltic Sea (MODUM). Such sites represent a major environmental and security hazard in the region.

On 1 April 2014, NATO Foreign Ministers decided to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and Russia. However, SPS projects currently underway with Russian participation can end according to schedule but no new projects with Russian participation will be launched.

**Terminology and language training**

To facilitate better understanding of terms and concepts used by NATO and Russia, glossaries have been developed on the entire spectrum of NATO-Russia cooperation. Following the publication in 2011 of an NRC Consolidated Glossary of Cooperation covering some 7,000 terms, additional glossaries have been developed on missile defence, nuclear doctrine and strategies, helicopter maintenance, counter-piracy, ammunition demilitarization and counter-narcotics.

Language cooperation was expanded in 2011 with the launch of a project to harmonise language training for military and civilian experts at the Russian Ministry of Defence, who were engaged in cooperation with NATO, aligning training with NATO standards.

**Raising public awareness of the NRC**

An NRC web site ([http://www.nato-russia-council.info/](http://www.nato-russia-council.info/)) was launched in June 2007 to increase public awareness of NRC activities.

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**Milestones in relations**

1991 Russia joins the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (later renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council), created as a forum for consultation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe following the end of the Cold War; the Soviet Union actually dissolves during the inaugural meeting of this body.

1994 Russia joins the Partnership for Peace (PfP).
1996  Russian soldiers deploy as part of the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Memorandum of understanding on civil emergency cooperation is signed.

1997  At a summit in Paris, Russian and Allied leaders sign the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security and establish the Permanent Joint Council (PJC).

1998  Russia establishes a diplomatic mission to NATO. Memorandum of understanding on scientific and technological cooperation is signed.

1999  Russia suspends participation in the PJC for a few months because of NATO's Kosovo air campaign. Russian peacekeepers deploy as part of the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo.

2000  Vladimir Putin becomes President of Russia and says he will work to rebuild relations with NATO in a "spirit of pragmatism". Broader cooperation in the PJC resumes, following a meeting of NATO and Russian Foreign Ministers in Florence. The nuclear submarine Kursk sinks, highlighting the need for cooperation between NATO and Russia.

2001  The NATO Information Office opens in Moscow. President Putin is the first world leader to call the US President after the September 11 terrorist attacks, which underscore the need for concerted international action to address terrorism and other new security threats. Russia opens its airspace to the international coalition's campaign in Afghanistan and shares relevant intelligence.

2002  First high-level conference on the role of the military in combating terrorism is held in Rome. NATO opens a Military Liaison Mission in Moscow. At a summit in Rome, Russian and Allied leaders sign a declaration on "NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality" and establish the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) to replace the PJC. A joint NATO-Russia Resettlement Centre opens to help discharged Russian military personnel return to civilian life. Russia hosts a multinational disaster-response exercise in Noginsk. Second high-level conference on the role of the military in combating terrorism is held in Moscow.

2003  NATO and Russia sign an agreement on submarine-crew rescue. An NRC meeting is held in Moscow for the first time.
Russian troops withdraw from the NATO-led peacekeeping forces in the Balkans.

2004
The NATO Secretary General tries out a new hotline to the Russian defence minister.
The first NRC theatre missile defence command post exercise takes place in Colorado Springs, United States.
Agreements establish Russian military liaison offices to NATO's strategic command headquarters
Russia hosts a multinational disaster-response exercise in Kaliningrad.
At an NRC meeting of foreign ministers in Istanbul, Russia offers to contribute a ship to NATO's maritime counter-terrorist operation in the Mediterranean, Operation Active Endeavour.
Observers from NRC countries are invited to observe a Russian nuclear-weapons-accident-response field exercise near Murmansk.
The first NATO interoperability courses are held in Moscow military academies.
In the wake of several terrorist attacks in Russia, NRC Foreign Ministers approve a comprehensive NRC Action Plan on Terrorism.
NATO and Russia exchange letters, agreeing procedures to prepare the way for Russia's support for Operation Active Endeavour.
NRC Foreign Ministers issue a common statement concerning the conduct of the Ukrainian presidential elections.

2005
The second NRC theatre missile defence command post exercise takes place in the Netherlands.
Russia signs the PfP Status of Forces Agreement.
NRC Defence Ministers endorse a "Political-Military Guidance" aimed at developing, over time, interoperability between Russian and Allied forces at the strategic, operational and tactical command levels.
Russia takes part in a major NATO search-and-rescue-at-sea exercise, Sorbet Royal.
A UK team helps rescue Russian sailors trapped in a submarine off the Kamchatka shore.
Observers from NRC countries are invited to observe a UK nuclear-weapons-response field exercise in Edinburgh.
Russian teachers and instructors from the General Staff Academy give the first interoperability courses at the NATO School in Oberammergau.
The NRC launches a pilot project on counter-narcotics training for Afghan and Central Asian personnel.
NRC Foreign Ministers meeting in Sofia agree a set of priorities and
recommendations to guide the NRC’s future work.
Observers from NRC countries are invited to observe a US nuclear-weapons-
response field exercise in Wyoming.
The third NRC theatre missile defence command post exercise takes place in
Moscow.
An NRC civil emergency exercise takes place in Montelibretti, Italy.
The first Russian frigate deploys to the Mediterranean to support Operation
Active Endeavour.

Observers from NRC countries are invited to observe a French nuclear-
weapons-response field exercise.
Russian parliament ratifies the PfP Status of Forces Agreement.
10th anniversary of the Founding Act and 5th anniversary of the NRC.
A second Russian frigate deploys in active support of Operation Active
Endeavour.

A computer-assisted exercise takes place in Germany under the NRC theatre
missile defence project.
In support of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
operation in Afghanistan, Russia offers transit to ISAF contributors. Russia
takes part in a major NATO search-and-rescue-at-sea exercise, Bold
Monarch.
Following Russia’s disproportionate military action in Georgia in early August
2008, formal meetings of the NRC and cooperation in some areas are
suspended. Cooperation continues in key areas of common interest, such as
counter-narcotics and the fight against terrorism.
NATO Foreign Ministers, meeting in December, agree to pursue a phased
and measured approach to re-engagement with Russia.

NATO Foreign Ministers, meeting in March, decide to resume formal
meetings and practical cooperation under the NRC.
In December, at the first formal NRC ministerial since the Georgia crisis,
foreign ministers take steps to reinvigorate NRC cooperation and agree to

In June, the NRC meets for the first time in a political advisory format in
Rome for a two-day informal, off-the-record exchange of views on how to
make the NRC a more substance-based forum.
In July, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Admiral Giampaolo Di
Paola, visits Moscow to discuss the implementation of NRC military-to-
military cooperation with the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, Army General Nikolay Makarov, and his staff. In September, the NRC Foreign Ministers meet in New York to chart the way forward in relations and cooperation.

In early November, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen visits Russia for meetings with President Dmitry Medvedev and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to prepare for the upcoming NRC summit meeting in Lisbon. At the Lisbon Summit, NRC leaders pledge to “work towards achieving a true strategic and modernised partnership”. They endorse a Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges and agree to resume cooperation in the area of theatre missile defence as well as to develop a comprehensive joint analysis of the future framework for broader missile defence cooperation. They also agree on a number of initiatives to assist in the stabilisation of Afghanistan and the wider region.

2011

In April, NRC Foreign Ministers meet in Berlin to discuss the situation in Libya and Afghanistan, as well as ongoing work on outlining the future framework for missile defence cooperation between Russia and NATO. They launch the NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund to support the Afghan security forces' helicopter fleet, and also approve an updated NRC Action Plan on Terrorism.

In May, a NATO-Russia Council Consolidated Glossary of Cooperation (NRC-CGC) is launched, containing over 7,000 agreed terms in Russian and English and covers almost all key areas of NATO-Russia political and military cooperation.

In June, for the first time in three years, the NRC Defence Ministers meet in Brussels to discuss a broad range of defence issues; a Russian submarine takes active part in NATO exercise "Bold Monarch 2011"; joint exercise "Vigilant Skies 2011" demonstrates the operational readiness of the NRC Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI); an NRC conference on the protection of critical infrastructure takes place in Turkey; NATO and Russia participate in a table top exercise dealing with a nuclear weapon incident scenario.

In July, the NRC meets in Sochi, Russia, at the invitation of the Russian authorities, and also meets Russian President Medvedev. NRC ambassadors restate their commitment to pursuing cooperation on missile defence as well as cooperation in other security areas of common interest.

In October, a seminar on national nuclear doctrines and strategies takes place in Germany.
In December, NRC Foreign Ministers meet in Brussels to discuss international security issues and NRC practical cooperation, including on Afghanistan, counter-piracy and counter-terrorism. They approve the NRC Work Programme 2012 and announce that the Cooperative Airspace Initiative is ready to initiate operations.

2012

In January, General Nikolai Makarov, the Russian Chief of General Staff, visits Allied Command Operations in Mons, Belgium.

In March, the fifth theatre missile defence (TMD) computer-assisted exercise is conducted in Germany; a first civilian-military NRC counter-terrorism table top exercise is organised at NATO Headquarters.

In April, the first training course for Afghan Air Force helicopter maintenance staff gets underway in Novosibirsk under the NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund Project; NRC Foreign Ministers meet in Brussels to discuss NRC practical cooperation.

In May, NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Alexander Vershbow attends a conference on missile defence organised by Russia's Ministry of Defence.

Russia sends a special representative to participate in the expanded ISAF meeting at the Chicago Summit.

May marks the 15th anniversary of the Founding Act and 10th anniversary of the NRC.

In June, high-level representatives from countries involved in the NRC counter-narcotics training initiative gather in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, to chart the future course of the project.

In November, a simulated computer-based exercise tests the NRC's Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI) Information Exchange System (IES).

In December, NRC Foreign Ministers agree to increase cooperation in key areas under the NRC Work Programme for 2013. Also, the Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, General Knud Bartels, visits Russia to boost military-to-military cooperation and develop a common understanding on issues of strategic interest with Colonel General Valeriy Gerasimov, Russia's Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.

2013

In February, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen meets Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at NATO Headquarters to discuss implementation of the NRC Work Programme, as well as ways to advance the NATO-Russia dialogue on missile defence.

In April, NRC Foreign Ministers agree to launch the second phase of the NRC Trust Fund project for the maintenance of helicopters in Afghanistan and
discuss plans for cooperation in other areas in 2013; they also exchange views on progress in the NATO-led Afghan mission and on other regional and global security issues, including Syria, North Korea and missile defence. In June, technology for the remote, real-time detection of explosives is successfully tested live in an underground station in a major European city, marking the completion of the development and test phase of the Stand-off Detection of Explosives (STANDEX) project. In September, under the Cooperative Airspace Initiative, a live counter-terrorism exercise takes place in the skies over Poland, Russia and Turkey involving fighter aircraft, military personnel and command centres from the Arctic to the Black Sea.

In October, NRC Defence Ministers exchange views on pressing events on the international agenda, including Syria, transparency on military exercises and discuss ways to widen practical cooperation including plans to work together to dispose of excess ammunition in Russia, possibly through a new NRC Trust Fund project.

Earlier that month, ships of the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group visit the port of St Petersburg – the programme includes a ship tour and press conference for Russian journalists, a friendly football match with Russian sailors and the opening of the Polish and Estonian ships to the general public.

In March, NATO condemns the Russian Federation's military escalation in Crimea and expresses its grave concern regarding the authorisation by the Russian Parliament to use the armed forces of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine.

In March, NATO states that the so-called referendum held on 16 March in Ukraine's Autonomous Republic of Crimea to be both illegal and illegitimate. The referendum violated the Ukrainian Constitution and international law, and Allies do not recognise its results.

In April, NATO Foreign Ministers urge Russia to take immediate steps to return to compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities, and to engage immediately in a genuine dialogue towards a political and diplomatic solution that respects international law and Ukraine's internationally recognised borders.

In April, NATO Foreign Ministers decide to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and Russia. In June, NATO Foreign Ministers agree to maintain the suspension of practical civilian and military
cooperation with Russia. Any decision to resume cooperation will be conditions-based.
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has led to Russia’s international isolation, including NATO’s suspension of all practical cooperation with Russia. To divert attention away from its actions, Russia has levelled a series of accusations against NATO which are based on misrepresentations of the facts and ignore the sustained effort that NATO has put into building a partnership with Russia. Russia has also made baseless attacks on the legitimacy of the Ukrainian authorities and has used force to seize part of Ukraine’s territory. This document sets the record straight.

Russian claims that the Ukrainian authorities are illegitimate

Ukraine’s President Poroshenko was elected on 25 May with a clear majority in a vote which the OSCE characterized (report here) as showing the “clear resolve of the authorities to hold what
was a genuine election largely in line with international commitments and with a respect for fundamental freedoms. “The only areas where serious restrictions were reported were those controlled by separatists, who undertook “increasing attempts to derail the process.”

In other words, the President is legitimate, the actions of the separatists were not.

The current Ukrainian government was approved by an overwhelming majority in the Ukrainian parliament (371 votes out of 417 registered) on 27 February 2014, including members of the Party of Regions.

That parliament was elected on 28 October 2012. The Russian Foreign Ministry at the time declared that the elections were held “peacefully, without any excesses and in line with generally-accepted standards” and “confirmed Ukraine’s commitment to democracy and the rule of law.” The statement can be read in Russian here. The parliament which Russia called legitimate then can hardly be called illegitimate now.

Finally, Russian officials continue to allege that the Ukrainian parliament and government are dominated by “Nazis” and “fascists.” However, in the presidential elections on May 25, the candidates whom Russia labelled as “fascists” received barely 1% of the votes. Ukraine's electorate clearly voted for unity and moderation, not separatism or extremism.

**Russian claims that NATO's response is escalatory**

Russian officials accuse NATO of escalating the crisis in Ukraine by reinforcing the defence of Allies in Eastern Europe. This is a striking display of double standards. It is Russia which is destabilising Europe – not NATO.

Firstly, NATO's actions throughout the crisis have been proportionate to the situation, and defensive in nature. The Alliance has deployed additional aircraft to reinforce air policing missions, additional ships to the Baltic, Mediterranean and Black Seas, and additional troops to exercises on the territory of Eastern Allies.

All of these deployments are limited in scale and designed to reinforce defence. They have been prompted by the instability and unpredictability Russia has generated on our borders by its illegal invasion of a sovereign European country. NATO's actions cannot be presented as a potential offensive force. To describe them as such shows either ignorance or dishonesty. They are in line with NATO's international commitments, including the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

In the NATO-Russia Founding Act (available here), NATO reiterates that “in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces. Accordingly, it will have to rely on adequate infrastructure commensurate with the above tasks. In this context, reinforcement may take place, when necessary, in the event of defence against a threat of aggression and missions in support of peace consistent with the United Nations Charter and the OSCE governing principles, as well as for exercises consistent with the adapted CFE Treaty, the provisions of the Vienna Document 1994 and mutually agreed transparency measures. Russia will exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.”

Russia, on the other hand, has broken its international commitments, including basic principles in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, such as “refraining from the threat or use of force against each other as well as against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in
any manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter and with the Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States contained in the Helsinki Final Act“ and the “respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security, the inviolability of borders and peoples’ right of self-determination as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents.”

Between March and May 2014, Russia had massed around 40,000 troops on Ukraine’s border and threatened to invade Ukraine. As of 11 July 2014, Russia still has around 12,000 troops, tanks and, artillery close to the Ukrainian border. Over the past months, Russia has also embarked on an unprecedented schedule of no-notice military exercises involving massive numbers of troops and heavy equipment. Russia should explain what its military plans are before it starts accusing others of posing a threat.

Secondly, all of NATO’s deployments have taken place on NATO territory, with the intention to deter threats to NATO territory.

Russia, on the other hand, has illegally annexed Crimea, allowed mercenaries and heavy weapons to flow across its border into Ukraine, and refused to condemn the aggressive and illegal actions of armed separatists in Ukraine, as it committed to do in Geneva in April. Recruiting efforts for separatist fighters are also expanding inside Russia.

NATO is showing strict respect of international borders and international commitments. Russia should do the same.

**Russian claims that the so-called referendum in Crimea was legal**

Russian officials claim that the so-called referendum in Crimea on 16 March was legal.

The referendum was illegal according to the Ukrainian constitution (available in Ukrainian here, Russian here, English here), which states that questions “of altering the territory of Ukraine are resolved exclusively by an All-Ukrainian referendum“. Crimea, as part of Ukraine, has the status of an autonomous republic, but any issues about its authority have to be resolved by the Ukrainian parliament (article 134) and its constitution has to be approved by the Ukrainian parliament (article 135).

The UN General Assembly on 27 March 2014 passed a non-binding resolution declaring the so-called referendum invalid (available here). The European Union also does not recognise the alleged outcome.

Additionally, the so-called referendum was organized in a matter of weeks by a self-proclaimed Crimean leadership that was installed by armed Russian military personnel after seizing government buildings. Obviously, any such fake referenda organised by self-appointed authorities who lack all democratic legitimacy are illegal and illegitimate.

It should be noted that Moscow never lodged a single complaint with any international body about the alleged discrimination of Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine.

**Russian claim NATO’s continuation and enlargement threatens Russia**

Russian officials say that NATO should have been disbanded at the end of the Cold War, and that the accession of new Allies from Central and Eastern Europe undermines Russia’s security.
NATO was not disbanded after the Cold War because its members wanted to retain the insurance policy that had guaranteed security and stability in the transatlantic area and beyond. As the London Declaration of 1990 (available here) makes clear: “We need to keep standing together, to extend the long peace we have enjoyed these past four decades”. Upholding the values that have always guided it, NATO became more than a powerful military Alliance: it became a political forum for dialogue and cooperation.

NATO has fulfilled the terms of Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty (available here) which states that Allies “may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.”

On six occasions, between 1952 and 2009, European countries made the choice to apply for membership based on a democratic process and respect for the rule of law. NATO Allies made the unanimous choice to accept them.

NATO and EU enlargement has helped the nations of Central and Eastern Europe to tackle difficult reforms, which were required prior to accession. It has helped their citizens enjoy the benefits of democratic choice, the rule of law, and substantial economic growth. These efforts have moved Europe closer to being whole, free, and at peace than at any other time in history.

Russia also subscribed to this vision in the Founding Act as well as other documents. It committed to “creating in Europe a common space of security and stability, without dividing lines or spheres of influence,” and to “respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security.”

Contrary to those commitments, Russia now appears to be attempting to recreate a sphere of influence by seizing a part of Ukraine, maintaining thousands of forces on its borders, and demanding, as Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has stated, that “Ukraine cannot be part of any bloc.”

**On the claim that NATO wants to ‘drag’ Ukraine into NATO**

NATO does not ‘drag’ countries into the Alliance. NATO respects the right of every country to choose its own security arrangements. In fact, the Washington Treaty specifically gives Allies the right to leave. Over the past 65 years, 28 countries have chosen freely to join NATO. Not one has asked to leave. This is not dragging, it's sovereign choice.

NATO’s Open Door policy has been, and will always be, based on the free choice of European democracies. When in 2002 under President Kuchma Ukraine decided to pursue NATO membership, the Alliance took steps to help fulfill Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic aspirations. When in 2010 Ukraine decided to pursue a “non-bloc policy”, NATO fully respected that choice. Russia's long-time assertion that NATO tried to force Ukraine into its ranks was, and remains, completely false.

Any decision for Ukraine to apply for membership would have to be taken by Ukraine, in line with its democratic rules. When Foreign Minister Klimkin was in Brussels in July 2014 he made clear that NATO membership is not on the agenda. The government and people of Ukraine have other priorities. We respect their choices, Russia should do the same.

**Claim that Russia had to act to stop NATO from basing missiles and ships in Sevastopol.**

This is total fantasy.
NATO had no intention of deploying forces to Sevastopol. This was never discussed and there
have never been any plans for that. The only one who talked about this ludicrous claim was
President Putin.

In fact, before the Ukraine crisis, the only NATO forces routinely present on the territory of
Eastern European Allies were the NATO jets used in the Baltic States for the air policing mission.

On the contrary, the only country which had ships and troops in Sevastopol was Russia, under its
agreement with Ukraine. And after the illegal takeover of Crimea, Russia stole most of the ships
of the Ukrainian navy and installed additional anti-ship and anti-aircraft batteries to expand its
military presence in the region.

**Russian claims that NATO promised not to enlarge or build infrastructure in Eastern Europe**

Russian officials claim that US and German officials promised in 1990 that NATO would not
expand into Eastern and Central Europe, build military infrastructure near Russia's borders or
permanently deploy troops there. No such pledge was made, and no evidence to back up
Russia's claims has ever been produced.

Should such a promise have been made by NATO as such, it would have to have been as a
formal, written decision by all NATO Allies. Furthermore, the consideration of enlarging NATO
came years after German reunification. This issue was not yet on the agenda when Russia
claims these promises were made. The key question Russia should answer is why so many
countries, particularly those on its periphery, continue to aspire to join NATO.

Allegations about NATO pledging not to build infrastructure close to Russia are equally
inaccurate. As noted above, in the Founding Act, NATO stressed that “in the current and
foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defence and other missions
by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by
additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces. Accordingly, it will have to rely on
adequate infrastructure commensurate with the above tasks.”

NATO has indeed supported the upgrading of military infrastructure, such as air bases, in the
countries which have joined the Alliance, commensurate with the requirements for
reinforcement and exercises. The process was transparent to all, including Russia. However, the
only combat forces permanently stationed on the territory of the new members are their own
armed forces.

Even before the Ukraine crisis, the only routinely visible sign of Alliance forces on the territory of
new members were the NATO jets used in the Baltic States for the air policing mission. These
minimal defensive assets cannot be described as substantial combat forces in the meaning of
the Founding Act. By contrast, in 2007, Russia unilaterally suspended its compliance with and
later on withdrew from the only comprehensive and verifiable arms control regime in Europe,
the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

Since the crisis, NATO has taken steps to increase situational awareness and bolster the
defences of our Eastern members. This, too, is entirely consistent with the Founding Act and is a
direct result of Russia's destabilizing military actions.
Finally, the Act also states, “Russia will exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.” Russia's aggression against Ukraine is a flagrant breach of this commitment.

**Russian claims that NATO Missile Defence is a threat to Russia**

Russia's arguments that NATO missile defence could undermine Russia's strategic deterrent are baseless. NATO's missile defense is neither designed nor directed against Russia. It is designed and located to defend NATO population and territories against threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic area.

Moreover, the Alliance has consistently sought cooperation with Russia on missile defence. At the Lisbon Summit of 2010, NATO Heads of State and Government “decided to develop a missile defence capability to protect all NATO European populations, territory and forces, and invited Russia to cooperate with us” (declaration here).

This was reiterated at the Chicago Summit in May 2012 (here), where leaders underlined that NATO “remains committed to cooperation on missile defence in a spirit of mutual trust and reciprocity”, and stated explicitly that NATO missile defence “will not undermine Russia's strategic deterrence capabilities”. NATO also proposed a transparency regime including the creation of two NATO-Russia joint missile-defence centres. Russia has declined these offers.

These Summit declarations are more than political promises: they define NATO's policies. Rather than taking NATO up on cooperation, Russia has advanced arguments that ignore laws of physics as well as NATO's expressed policies. Independent Russian military experts have made clear that NATO's missile defence programme could not pose any threat to Russia or degrade the effectiveness of its strategic deterrent forces. The Russian government has used missile defence as an excuse for accusations rather than an opportunity for partnership.

**Russian claims that the U.S. is disinterested in Europe and that the Alliance is not united**

Russian officials claim that the United States is no longer interested in the security of Europe. This is simply false. Every single Ally is interested in Europe's security, and every single Ally is contributing.

Since the crisis began, U.S. soldiers have deployed to the Baltic States - alongside European troops. U.S. ships have sailed in the Baltic, Mediterranean and Black Seas, alongside European and Canadian vessels. U.S. aircraft have policed the skies of Eastern Europe, alongside European and Canadian planes. President Obama's announcement of a European Reassurance Initiative of up to 1 billion dollars to further reinforce NATO's collective defence underscores the United States' unwavering commitment to NATO.

The Alliance is also looking into long-term measures to enhance the security of all member states in view of Russia's actions. Every single member of NATO is contributing to the Alliance's response to this crisis. There is no stronger proof of the unity of NATO - and the inaccuracy of Russia's claims.

**NATO - Russia relations**

Russia claims that NATO has spent years trying to marginalise it internationally.

Since the early 1990s the Alliance has consistently worked to build a cooperative relationship with Russia on areas of mutual interest, and striven towards a strategic partnership.
Before the fall of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, NATO began reaching out, offering dialogue in place of confrontation, as the London NATO Summit of July 1990 made clear (declaration [here](#)). In the following years, the Alliance promoted dialogue and cooperation by creating new fora, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), open to the whole of Europe, including Russia (PfP founding documents [here](#) and [here](#)).

As a sign of Russia’s unique role in Euro-Atlantic security, in 1997 NATO and Russia signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, creating the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. In 2002 they upgraded that relationship, creating the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). (The Founding Act can be read [here](#), the Rome Declaration which established the NRC [here](#).)

Since the foundation of the NRC, NATO and Russia have worked together on issues ranging from counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism to submarine rescue and civil emergency planning. No other partner has been offered a comparable relationship, nor a similar comprehensive institutional framework. Far from marginalising Russia, NATO has treated it as a privileged partner. By contrast, Russia has referred to NATO as a threat in its strategic documents.

**Russian criticism of the legitimacy of NATO military actions – Kosovo**

The NATO operation for Kosovo followed over a year of intense efforts by the UN and the Contact Group, of which Russia was a member, to bring about a peaceful solution. The UN Security Council on several occasions branded the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and the mounting number of refugees driven from their homes as a threat to international peace and security. NATO’s Operation Allied Force was launched to prevent the large-scale and sustained violations of human rights and the killing of civilians.

Following the air campaign, the subsequent NATO-led peacekeeping operation, KFOR, which initially included Russia, has been under UN mandate (UNSCR1244), with the aim of providing a safe and secure environment in Kosovo. This led to nearly ten years of diplomacy, under UN authority, to find a political solution and to settle Kosovo’s final status, as prescribed by UNSCR 1244.

The Kosovo operation was conducted following exhaustive discussion involving the whole international community dealing with a long-running crisis. In Crimea, with no evidence of a crisis and no attempt to negotiate any form of solution, Russia bypassed the whole international community, including the UN, and simply occupied a part of another country’s territory.

**Russian claims that the annexation of Crimea was justified by the opinion of the International Court of Justice on the independence of Kosovo**

Russian leaders claim that the precedent for the so-called declaration of independence of Crimea was the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the independence of Kosovo (online [here](#)).

However, the court stated clearly that their opinion was not a precedent. The court said they had been given a “narrow and specific” question about Kosovo’s independence which would not cover the broader legal consequences of that decision.

The court highlighted circumstances in which claims for independence would be illegal. This would include if “they were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful use of force”. An example of “an unlawful use of force” would be an invasion and occupation by a neighbouring country – which is exactly what Russia has done.
Furthermore, the process leading to Kosovo’s declaration of independence spanned years and included an extensive process led by the United Nations. Russian claims ignore all of these facts.

**Russian criticism of the legitimacy of NATO military actions – Libya**

In seeking to defend its illegal actions in Crimea, Russia has attacked the legitimacy of some of NATO’s operations.

This includes the NATO-led operation of 2011 to protect civilians in Libya. The NATO-led operation was launched under the authority of two UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR), UNSCRs 1970 & 1973, both quoting Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and neither of which was opposed by Russia. President Putin recently accused NATO of violating the resolutions by bombing Libya. This is entirely inaccurate.

UNSCR 1973 authorized NATO “to take all necessary measures” to “protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack”, which is what NATO did, with the political and military support of regional states and members of the Arab League.

After the conflict, NATO cooperated with the UN International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, which found no breach of UNSCR 1973 or international law, concluding instead that “NATO conducted a highly precise campaign with a demonstrable determination to avoid civilian casualties.”
Partnerships: a cooperative approach to security

Over the past two decades, the Alliance has developed a network of structured partnerships with countries from the Euro-Atlantic area, the Mediterranean and the Gulf region, as well as individual relationships with other partners across the globe. Today, NATO pursues dialogue and practical cooperation with 41 partner countries and engages actively with other international actors and organisations on a wide range of political and security-related issues.

NATO's Strategic Concept identifies “cooperative security” as one of NATO's three essential core tasks. It states that the promotion of Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through a wide network of partner relationships with countries and organisations around the globe. These partnerships make a concrete and valued contribution to the success of NATO's fundamental tasks. Many of NATO's formal partners as well as other non-member countries offer substantial capabilities and political support for Alliance missions. As of March 2014, over two dozen non-NATO countries were contributing approximately 4,000 troops to NATO-led operations.
A focused effort to reform NATO's partnerships policy was launched at the Lisbon Summit to make dialogue and cooperation more inclusive, flexible, meaningful and strategically oriented. This resulted in a new partnership policy, which was endorsed by NATO Foreign Ministers at their meeting in Berlin in April 2011.

The new policy concerns not only partnerships with non-member countries but also NATO's cooperation with other international actors and organisations. The complexity of today's peace-support and stabilisation operations and the multifaceted nature of 21st century security challenges call for a comprehensive approach that effectively combines political, civilian and military instruments.

### Highlights
- NATO works with partners from Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Mediterranean rim, the Gulf region and individual countries from across the globe.
- NATO's partners also comprise other international organisations, including the UN and the EU, as well as other actors such as the International Committee of the Red Cross.
- Partners cooperate with NATO in a very broad range of security-related areas and, when taking part in a NATO cooperation programme, can participate in over 1,000 activities offered in the Partnership Cooperation Menu.
- Partners contribute in many ways to shaping discussions and debates in the Alliance.

#### A network of partnerships with non-member countries

**Dialogue and cooperation with partners can make a concrete contribution to enhance international security, to defend** the values on which the Alliance is based, to NATO's operations, and to prepare interested nations for membership.

In both regional frameworks and on a bilateral level, NATO develops relations based on common values, reciprocity, mutual benefit and mutual respect.

In the Euro-Atlantic area, the 28 Allies engage in relations with 22 partner countries through the **Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council** and the **Partnership for Peace** - a major programme of bilateral cooperation with individual Euro-Atlantic partners. Among these partners, NATO has developed specific structures for its relationships with Russia, Ukraine and Georgia.

NATO is developing relations with the seven countries on the southern Mediterranean rim through the **Mediterranean Dialogue**, as well as with four countries from the Gulf region through the **Istanbul Cooperation Initiative**.
NATO also cooperates with a range of countries which are not part of these partnership frameworks. Referred to as “partners across the globe”, they include Afghanistan, Australia, Iraq, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand and Pakistan.

Active engagement with other international organizations

Since the 1990s, NATO has developed close working relations with the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). This is an integral part of the Alliance’s ongoing transformation to address effectively the complex challenges of crisis management, as well as terrorism and emerging security challenges.

The Alliance is also developing cooperation in specific areas with a number of other international and non-governmental organisations, including the African Union, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Organization for Migration, the World Bank, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

The Alliance seeks to enhance its relations with other relevant international organisations. Key objectives guiding this cooperation are, as appropriate:

- To play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security;
- To engage actively before, during and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis, planning and conduct of activities on the ground, in order to maximise the coherence and effectiveness of the overall international effort;
- To increase support for training and regional capacity-building.

Strategic objectives for partnership

Under the new partnership policy, the strategic objectives of NATO’s partner relations are to:

- Enhance Euro-Atlantic and international security, peace and stability;
- Promote regional security and cooperation;
Facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation on issues of common interest, including international efforts to meet emerging security challenges;
Prepare interested eligible nations for NATO membership;
Promote democratic values and reforms;
Enhance support for NATO-led operations and missions;
Enhance awareness of security developments including through early warning, with a view to preventing crises;
Build confidence and achieve better mutual understanding, including about NATO’s role and activities, in particular through enhanced public diplomacy.

Priority areas for dialogue, consultation and cooperation

Within these strategic objectives for partnership, dialogue, consultation and cooperation will be prioritised in the following areas, as appropriate:

- Political consultations on security developments, as appropriate, including regional issues, in particular with a view to preventing crises and contributing to their management;
- Cooperation in NATO-led operations and missions;
- Defence reform, capability- and capacity-building, education and training;
- Interoperability;
- Counter-terrorism;
- Counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;
- Emerging security challenges, including those related to cyber defence, energy security and maritime security, including counter-piracy;
- Civil emergency planning.

Towards a more efficient and flexible partnership

NATO’s new partnership policy, which was endorsed in April 2011 aims to reinforce existing partnerships by strengthening consultation mechanisms and by facilitating more substance-driven cooperation. In addition, the new policy outlines a “toolbox” of
mechanisms and activities, simplifying the way that NATO develops cooperation offers to partners.

In line with the new Strategic Concept, NATO is offering its partners “more political engagement with the Alliance, and a substantial role in shaping strategy and decisions on NATO-led operations to which they contribute.” At their meeting in Berlin in 2011, NATO Foreign Ministers endorsed proposals for the establishment of a more structured role for NATO’s operational partners in shaping the strategy of NATO-led operations to which they contribute. The Political-Military Framework, which governs the way NATO involves partners in political consultation and the decision-making process for operations and missions to which they contribute, was reviewed in 2011, without however giving partners the same decision-making authority as member countries.

Existing partnership frameworks will preserve their specificity and be further developed. However, the new partnership policy offers all partners more cooperation and more dialogue. All partners which have an Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP) or other programme agreed with NATO have access to the same Partnership Cooperation Menu, comprising more than a thousand activities. IPCPs are programmes that form the basis of a partner’s cooperation with NATO. A myriad of other tools are available to partners, according to the specific areas of cooperation they wish to develop with the Alliance.

NATO is also seeking to develop political dialogue and practical cooperation with key global actors and other new interlocutors across the globe which share the Allies’ interest in peaceful international relations but have no individual programme of cooperation with NATO. Contacts will be developed based on a decision of the North Atlantic Council and in a flexible and pragmatic manner.

NATO will further develop more flexible formats for meetings and, as appropriate, activities which will bring NATO Allies and partners together, across and beyond existing frameworks, using the so-called “28 Allies + n” formula. Such meetings are thematic or event-driven and are used, on a case-by-case basis, to enhance consultation on security issues of common concern and cooperation in priority policy areas, such as counter-piracy, counter-narcotics in Afghanistan, and cyber defence.
NATO has developed a number of partnership tools and mechanisms to support cooperation with partner countries through a mix of policies, programmes, action plans and other arrangements. Many tools are focused on the important priorities of building capabilities and interoperability, and supporting defence and security-related reform.

Most of these partnership tools were originally developed in the framework of NATO’s cooperation with Euro-Atlantic partners through the Partnership for Peace (PfP). However, with the reform of NATO’s partnerships policy in April 2011, steps were taken to open the “toolbox” to all partners, across and beyond existing regional partnership frameworks.
From 2012 onwards, all partners have access to a new Partnership Cooperation Menu, which comprises some 1,400 activities. An Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP) is jointly developed and agreed between NATO and each partner country that requests one. These two-year programmes are drawn upon, among other things, the activities in the extensive Partnership Cooperation Menu, according to each country's specific interests and needs. IPCPs form the basis of a partner's cooperation with NATO. In addition, a myriad of other tools are available to partners, according to the specific areas of cooperation they wish to develop with the Alliance.

Building capabilities and interoperability

Partner countries have made and continue to make significant contributions to the Alliance's operations and missions, whether it be supporting peace in the Western Balkans and Afghanistan, training national security forces in Iraq, monitoring maritime activity in the Mediterranean Sea, or helping protect civilians in Libya.

A number of tools have been developed to ensure that partner forces are capable of participating actively in NATO-led operations. They include the following:

The Planning and Review Process (PARP) helps develop the interoperability and capabilities of forces which might be made available for NATO training, exercises and operations. It also provides a framework to assist partners to develop effective, affordable and sustainable armed forces as well as promoting wider defence and security-sector transformation and reform efforts. PARP is open to Euro-Atlantic partners on a voluntary basis and is open to other partner countries on a case-by-case basis, upon approval of the North Atlantic Council. Under PARP, planning targets are negotiated with each country and regular reviews measure progress. PARP is conducted by Allies and participating partners together.

The Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) Evaluation and Feedback Programme is used to develop and train partner land, maritime, air or special operations forces that are declared available for NATO-led operations and the NATO Response Force, so that they meet NATO standards. This can often take a few years, but it ensures that partner forces are effective and interoperable with Allied forces once deployed. Some partners use the OCC as a strategic tool to transform their defence forces. The OCC has contributed significantly to the increasing number of partner forces participating in NATO-led operations and the NATO Response Force.

The Political-Military Framework (PMF) sets out principles, modalities and guidelines for the involvement of all partner countries in political consultations and decision-shaping, in operational planning and in command arrangements for operations to which they
contribute. A review of the Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP operations was launched at the 2010 Lisbon Summit to update the way NATO works together with partner countries and shapes decisions on the operations and missions to which they contribute. This review was conducted, in consultation with partners, in 2011.

The **Defence Education Enhancement Programmes (DEEPs)** are tailored programmes through which the Alliance advises partners on how to build, develop and reform educational institutions in the security, defence and military domain. DEEPs focus on faculty building or so-called “educate the educators” programmes. They can cover areas such as how to teach leadership and critical thinking. DEEPs are open to all NATO partners. The **Military Training and Exercise Programme (MTEP)** allows partners to take part in exercises to promote interoperability. Through the MTEP, a five-year planning horizon provides a starting point for exercise planning and the allocation of resources. The Bi-Strategic Command Military Cooperation Division, which is principally located at SHAPE in Mons, Belgium, is responsible for supporting partner involvement in exercises. In addition, and on a case-by-case basis, Allies may invite partners to take part in **North Atlantic Council-level crisis-management exercises** that engage ministries in participating capitals, and national political and military representation at NATO Headquarters, in consultations on the strategic management of crises during an exercise.

The **Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism (PAP-T)** is a framework through which Allies and partner countries work to improve cooperation in the fight against terrorism, through political consultation and a range of practical measures. It facilitates consultation and cooperation in areas such as intelligence-sharing, terrorism-related training and exercises, and the development of capabilities for defence against terrorist attack or for dealing with the consequences of such an attack. Other areas of cooperation include border management and security, air defence and air-traffic management. Defence against terrorism is also the first of three key priorities of the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme, which over time has initiated a broad range of activities in topical areas related to the defence against terrorism. PAP-T was launched at the Prague Summit in 2002 and continues to evolve in line with the joint aims and efforts of Allies and partners.

Opportunities for cooperation between NATO and partners in the areas of **armaments, air defence, and airspace and air traffic management** are provided through the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD), the Air Defence Committee (ADC) and the Air Traffic Management Committee (ATMC).
Several tools have been developed to provide assistance to partner countries in their own efforts to transform defence and security-related structures and policies, and to manage the economic and social consequences of reforms. An important priority is to promote the development of effective defence institutions that are under civil and democratic control.

Some of the main tools supporting transformation include the following:

**Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs)** offer partners the opportunity to deepen their cooperation with NATO and sharpen the focus on domestic reform efforts. Developed on a two-year basis, these plans include a wide range of objectives and targets for reforms on political issues as well as security and defence issues. They are designed to bring together all the various cooperation mechanisms through which a partner country interacts with the Alliance. Since the launch of the IPAP in 2002, five countries have chosen to develop IPAPs with NATO. The development of IPAPs is open to all partners, on a case-by-case basis, upon approval of the North Atlantic Council.

The **Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB)** aims to reinforce efforts by partner countries to reform and restructure their defence institutions to meet domestic needs as well as international commitments. Launched in 2004, the PAP-DIB defines common objectives, encourages exchange of relevant experience and helps tailor and focus bilateral defence and security assistance programmes for partner countries to support them in conducting these reforms. The objectives of the Action Plan include, for instance, effective and transparent arrangements for the democratic control of defence activities, civilian participation in developing defence and security policy, compliance with international norms and practices in the defence sector and effective management of defence spending. The Planning and Review Process (PARP) mechanism serves as a key instrument for implementing the Action Plan’s objectives.

**Education and training** in a number of areas is offered to decision-makers, military forces, civil servants and representatives of civil society through institutions such as the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany; the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy; and some 20 national Partnership Training and Education Centres. Moreover, the **Education and Training for Defence Reform initiative** supports the education of civilian and military personnel in efficient and effective management of national defence institutions under civil and democratic control.

In addition, a **Professional Development Programme** can be launched for the civilian personnel of defence and security establishments to strengthen the capacity for democratic management and oversight. Training provided under such a programme is closely aligned to the partner country’s overall defence and security-sector reform
objectives and harmonised and de-conflicted with the bilateral efforts of individual Allies and other programmes.

Through the Partnership Trust Fund policy, individual Allies and partners support practical demilitarization projects and defence transformation projects in partner countries through individual Trust Funds.

The Building Integrity Initiative is aimed at promoting good practice, strengthening transparency, accountability and integrity to reduce the risk of corruption in the defence establishments of Allies and partners alike. This includes developing a tailored programme to support the Afghan National Security Forces as well as supporting good practice in contracting and implementation of the NATO Afghan First Policy.

Wider cooperation

The NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) programme promotes joint cooperative projects between Allies and partners in the field of security-related civil science and technology. Funding applications should address SPS key priorities -- these are linked to NATO's strategic objectives and focus on projects in direct support to NATO's operations, as well as projects that enhance defence against terrorism and address other security threats.

Disaster response and preparedness is also an important area of cooperation with partners. The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) is a “24/7” focal point for coordinating disaster-relief efforts among NATO and partner countries. The Centre has guided consequence-management efforts in more than 45 emergencies, including fighting floods and forest fires, and dealing with the aftermath of earthquakes. Partners are represented on many of the Alliance's civil emergency planning groups and are also involved in education and training in this area.

Women, peace and security and the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 have been the subject of a policy developed and approved by Allies and partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). This UN resolution reaffirms the role of women in conflict and post-conflict situations and encourages greater participation of women and the incorporation of gender perspectives in peace and security efforts. The “NATO/EAPC policy for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and related issues” was first issued in December 2007 and has since been reviewed. It is supported by an Action Plan, which mainstreams related issues into NATO's operations
and policies. Many partner countries have been associating themselves with this policy including all 22 Partnership for Peace ( PfP ) countries, as well as partners Afghanistan, Australia, Japan, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates.
Partnership Trust Funds

Through NATO, individual Allies and partners develop Trust Funds to implement practical demilitarizations and defence transformation projects in non-NATO countries.

Trust Fund projects assist principally with the safe destruction of stockpiles of surplus and obsolete landmines, weapons and munitions. Another priority is to help manage the consequences of defence transformation through initiatives such as the retraining of former military personnel and converting military bases to civilian use. Projects include activities promoting transparency, accountability and gender mainstreaming.
The Trust Fund policy is an integral part of NATO's policy of developing practical security cooperation with partners. Any partner country with an individual programme of partnership and cooperation with NATO may request assistance. A specific Trust Fund is then established to allow individual NATO and partner countries to provide financial support on a voluntary basis.

Originally, Trust Funds were developed in the framework of NATO's Partnership for Peace programme – NATO's programme of practical bilateral cooperation with non-member countries in Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. However, over the years, use of Trust Funds has been extended to countries of the Mediterranean and broader Middle East region, which participate in NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, as well as to Afghanistan. More recently, with the launch of NATO's new partnership policy at the April 2011 meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Berlin, the Trust Fund mechanism was also opened to NATO's other partners across the globe.

By early 2014, Trust Fund projects across 12 countries have helped to destroy:

- 162 million rounds of small arms ammunition;
- 4.5 million landmines;
- 2 million hand grenades;
- 625,000 pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO);
- 615,000 small arms and light weapons;
- 31,000 tonnes of various munitions, including 8,300 tonnes of cluster sub-munitions (15.5 million sub-munitions);
- 10,000 rockets and missiles;
- 2,620 tonnes of chemicals, including rocket fuel oxidiser (melange);
- more than 1,470 man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS).

In addition, some 11,800 former military personnel in three countries have received retraining assistance through Trust Fund defence transformation projects.

The destruction of surplus stockpiles of arms and munitions reduces the threat to individual partner countries as well as the wider region. It also ensures that such materials are put beyond the reach of terrorists and criminals.

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**Highlights**

- Trust Funds promote the safe destruction of surplus and obsolete landmines, weapons and munitions
- They contribute to capacity-building in areas such as demining and munitions stockpile management
- They also support the retraining and transition to civilian life of former military personnel
- Specific Trust Funds are established for each project to allow individual NATO and partner countries to provide financial support on a voluntary basis
- Projects are open to all NATO partner countries

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▲ Project development
Projects may be initiated by either NATO member states or partner countries. Each project is led on a voluntary basis by a lead nation, which is responsible for gathering political and financial support for the project as well as selecting the executing agent for the project. There can be several lead nations, and a partner country can also take that role. The beneficiary host nation is expected to provide maximum support to the project within its means.

Informal discussions with the NATO International Staff help determine the scope of the project. Project proposals set out in detail the work to be undertaken, the costs involved and the implementation schedule. The formal launch of a project is the trigger to start raising funds. Subject to completion of formal legal agreements, work can start once sufficient funds have been received.

Trust Fund projects seek to ensure adherence to the highest environmental, health and safety standards, and recycling of materials is an integral part of many projects. Local facilities and resources are used to implement projects, where possible, so as to build local capacity in the partner countries concerned, ensuring sustainability.

NATO cooperates actively with other international organisations and other relevant actors on Trust Fund projects to ensure coherence and effectiveness, as well as to avoid duplication of efforts. For example, NATO has cooperated with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which was, for instance, the executing agent for the retraining Trust Fund projects in the Balkans; the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which also implemented a NATO-initiated Trust Fund in Tajikistan; the European Commission (EC); and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

Project oversight and implementation

The NATO Support Agency (NSPA) – formerly the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) – plays an essential role in the development and implementation of Trust Fund projects. It offers technical advice and a range of management services and has often been appointed to act as the executing agent for demilitarization projects by lead nations. This involves overseeing the development of project proposals as well as the competitive bidding process to ensure transparency and value for money in the execution of projects.
Once the project proposal is agreed by the lead nation and the host nation, it is presented to the Political and Partnerships Committee in EAPC (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council) format. This body serves as a formal forum to discuss the project and attract potential support and resources.

Evolution of Trust Fund policy

The Trust Fund policy was established in September 2000 to assist Euro-Atlantic partner countries in the safe destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel landmines. It provided the Alliance with a practical mechanism to assist partners to meet their obligations under the Ottawa Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and their destruction.

Initial success in the safe destruction of anti-personnel landmines led to an extension of the policy to include conventional munitions, as well as small arms and light weapons. In recent years, the scope of the Trust Fund policy has been further expanded to support wider defence transformation initiatives. It has also been extended geographically and is now open to all partner countries participating in NATO's structured partnership frameworks – Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council/Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative – as well as partners across the globe.

The implementation of the Trust Fund policy includes measures and activities related to the adoption of best practices, and to the commitment of promoting transparency and good governance. In this context, NATO strives to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on gender mainstreaming in its projects.
Building Integrity (BI) Programme

The Building Integrity (BI) Programme provides practical tools to help participating countries strengthen integrity, transparency and accountability and reduce the risk of corruption in the defence and security sectors. It promotes good practice, processes and methodologies, and provides countries with tailored support to make defence and security institutions more effective.

The BI Programme is tailored to meet national needs and requirements. It is demand-driven and participation is on a voluntary basis. It is open to all NATO Allies and partners (members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and partners across the globe). Requests from other countries are reviewed by NATO on a case-by-case basis. As of April 2014, 16 countries are engaged in the Self-Assessment Questionnaire and Peer Review Process: Afghanistan, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Colombia, Croatia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Norway, Poland, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹ and Ukraine.

The BI Programme supports the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and related resolutions, and has integrated a gender perspective into its methodology and practical tools.

The programme was established by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in November 2007 in the framework of the Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB), which helps partners to develop effective and efficient defence institutions under civilian and democratic control. At the Chicago Summit in 2012, NATO Heads of State and Government established BI as a NATO discipline and agreed the development of a BI Education and Training Plan. In December 2013, when NATO Foreign Ministers identified defence capacity-building support to partners and, potentially non-partner countries as a key objective, BI was earmarked as an instrument to help promote democratic values and human rights, contribute more generally to security and stability, and to help develop or enhance interoperability.

1. Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

The Building Integrity toolkit
The BI Programme focuses on developing practical tools to help participants strengthen integrity, transparency, accountability and reduce the risk of corruption in the defence and security sector. The toolkit includes:

- The BI Self-Assessment Questionnaire and Peer Review Process;
- Tailored Programmes;
- Education and training activities;
- Publications.

**The BI Self-Assessment Questionnaire and Peer Review Process**

The BI Programme includes a set of tools available to help countries assess the risk of corruption in their ministries and strengthen good governance. Participation is on a voluntary basis and BI support is tailor-made to meet national needs and requirements. Completing the Self-Assessment Questionnaire (SAQ) is the first step in the process. Participating countries that decide to take part in the BI programme can, on a voluntary basis, fill it in to get a snapshot of their existing procedures and practices. This diagnostic tool addresses current business practice in the defence and security sector, including:

- Democratic control and engagement;
- National anti-corruption laws and policy;
- Anti-corruption policy in the defence and security sector;
- Personnel code of conduct, policy, training and discipline;
- Planning and budgeting;
- Operations;
- Procurement;
- Engagement with defence companies and suppliers.

While primarily intended for ministries of defence, some participating countries have applied the SAQ to other ministries in the defence and security sector.

The completed SAQ is forwarded to the International Staff at NATO Headquarters, responsible for conducting the Peer Review and in-country consultations. A NATO-led expert review team puts forward recommendations, which are coordinated with the country in question (as is the composition of the review team). The completed SAQ is reviewed with government representatives in order to understand the current situation, exchange views on best practices and on practical steps to strengthen the transparency, accountability and integrity of the defence and security sector. It is strongly recommended that the SAQ and peer reviews be developed with contributions from parliamentarians and the civil society including NGOs, media and academics.
A Peer Review Report is then prepared on the basis of the completed SAQ and consultations in capitals. The report identifies good practices as well as recommendations for improvement and action. This is intended to help countries develop a BI Action Plan should they wish to so, making use of existing BI and other NATO mechanisms. They are also encouraged to take advantage of expertise from within their own countries so as to promote transparency and build local capacity.

Where possible, the BI programme is integrated and aligned with national processes as well as NATO partnership mechanisms, including the Individual Partnership Cooperation Programme, the Membership Action Plan, the Partnership Planning and Review Process, and for Afghanistan, the Enduring Partnership. This also includes identifying opportunities to link with other ongoing programmes such as the Professional Development Programme for Georgia and Ukraine.

Countries can request BI support without ever being obliged to implement the next phase. The whole process can be conducted on a one-off basis or as part of a repeated cycle.

**Tailored programmes**

Two tailored programmes aiming to meet the specific needs and requirements of the countries concerned were developed by BI: the Tailored BI Programme on South Eastern Europe (SEE) under the auspices of the South Eastern Europe Defence Ministerial process and the Tailored BI Programme for Building Integrity and Reducing the Risk of Corruption in the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

**Education and training**

Education and training are key to making and sustaining change and to producing long-term benefits. A large spectrum of tailored educational activities addressing subjects such as NATO’s operations and missions and ongoing efforts to contribute to good governance in the defence and security sector can be offered to assist participating countries. These include residence, online and mobile courses; activities organised periodically and others on demand to address special needs, pre-deployment and professional development training; and “train-the-trainers “events. They are aimed at personnel in the defence and security sector (civilian and military) and can be held in different languages. Some courses are organised directly by the Alliance and others by the NATO BI implementing partners.

The BI Education and Training Plan is developed in cooperation with the NATO Military Authorities and agreed by the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s top political decision-making body.
Working in cooperation with Allied Command Transformation, the NATO International Staff defines the required capabilities and performance competencies to be developed through the education and training activities. The Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector (CIDS, Norway) is responsible of translating operational requirements into education and training objectives with a subject, programme, module and/or course (a NATO BI Programme of Instruction certificated by ACT).

Publications

Publications are regularly produced and distributed by NATO and implementing partners to support the entire process. For instance, Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption in Defence: a Compendium of Best Practices provides a strategic approach to reducing corruption risks. It focuses on practicalities of designing and implementing integrity-building programmes in defence, while taking into account the cultural specifics of defence organisations. Building Integrity in Defence Establishment: a Ukrainian Case Study offers the final results of a BI project in the form of a policy paper with practical recommendations for the Ukrainian government on the ways of decreasing the risk of corruption.

Implementation

The BI Programme is developed and managed by the NATO International Staff (IS), in close cooperation with NATO Military Authorities, including the NATO Military Staff as well as Allied Command Transformation, Allied Command Operations and subordinated commands. They meet regularly in the framework of a task force meeting led by NATO IS.

A network of implementing partners drawn from NATO and non-NATO countries, civil society and other international organisations also contribute to the BI initiative. They provide expert advice, host events and conduct research and analysis.

- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC, Vienna)
- Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector (CIDS, Norway)
- Defence Resources Management Institute (DRMI, USA)
- EUPOL Mission to Afghanistan
- Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF, Switzerland)
- Ministry of Defence, Bulgaria
- Ministry of Defence, Norway
- NATO School Oberammergau (NSO, Germany)
- Naval Postgraduate School (NPS, USA)
- Norwegian Agency for Public Management and Government
- PfP Training Centre for Governance and Leadership (UK)
- Turkish PfP Training Centre
- Peace Support Operations Training Centre (PSOTC, Bosnia and Herzegovina)
- Swedish National Defence College
- Transparency International UK Chapter (TI, United Kingdom)

The NATO International Staff also work closely with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the World Bank (Kabul Office) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB, Kabul Office). Subject matter experts (SMEs) drawn from national civilian and defence ministries, international organisations and civil society also provide advice and take an active role in the development and implementation of all aspects of the BI Programme.

The BI Programme is supported by voluntary contributions to a Trust Fund, which is managed by the IS at NATO Headquarters and led by Belgium, Bulgaria, Norway, Poland, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

2. Contributions to the BI Trust Fund are used for capacity building within ministries and, according to principles of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), are considered as Official Development Assistance.
Democratic, institutional and defence reforms are a key focus of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s cooperation with NATO. The country joined the Partnership for Peace in 2006 and has been engaged in an Intensified Dialogue with NATO on its membership aspirations and related reforms since 2008. In April 2010, the Allies formally invited the country to join the Membership Action Plan (MAP) with one important condition: the first Annual National Programme under the MAP will only be accepted by NATO once a key remaining issue concerning immovable defence property has been resolved.
Effectively, all immovable defence properties in the country need to be registered as state property, for use by the country’s defence ministry. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Presidency members were unanimous about the decision to apply to join the MAP, the fulfillment of this condition has not yet been met.

The Allies are committed to keeping NATO's door open to Western Balkan partners that wish to join the Alliance. The Membership Action Plan (MAP) is a NATO programme of advice, assistance and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance. Participation in the MAP does not prejudge any decision by the Alliance on future membership.

The Alliance has been committed to building long-term peace and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the wider Western Balkans since it started supporting the international community's efforts to end the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995). NATO played a key role in implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement (formally, the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or GFAP) and in securing this peace through peacekeeping deployments over a nine-year period from December 1995 to December 2004. In December 2004, primary responsibility for military aspects of GFAP was handed over to the European Union.

NATO retains a military headquarters in Sarajevo with the primary mission of assisting the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina with reforms and commitments related to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and closer integration with NATO, and the secondary mission of providing logistic and other support to the European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as supporting the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia on a case-by-case basis.

Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to continue pursuing democratic and defence reforms to fulfill its NATO and European Union aspirations and to become a fully functioning independent democratic state. Beyond supporting reform, another key objective of NATO's cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina is to develop the ability of the country's forces to work together with forces from NATO countries and other partners, especially in peacekeeping and crisis-management operations.

Key areas of cooperation

Key priorities for cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina include strengthening cooperation with European and Euro-Atlantic structures, the rule of law, democratic control of the armed forces and intelligence security system, defence reform, defence planning and budgeting, military interoperability, human resource management, crisis management and civil emergency planning, security system and protection of data, and public diplomacy. NATO also supports the wider democratic, institutional, and judicial reform process underway in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Security cooperation
Since 2009, Bosnia and Herzegovina has contributed officers to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan as part of the Danish and German contingents. More recently, it has committed itself to contributing to NATO's post-2014 mission in Afghanistan. Although not part of a NATO operation, the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina deployed an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) platoon to Iraq from 2005 to 2008 and an infantry platoon during 2008, under the multinational coalition's operation.

The authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina have signed and ratified the PfP Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the Allies, in accordance with its national legislation. The PfP SOFA is a multilateral agreement between NATO member and partner countries, which deals with the status of foreign forces while present on the territory of another state. This agreement facilitates Bosnia and Herzegovina's military-to-military cooperation and other practical cooperation with NATO member states and other partner countries.

NATO and Bosnia and Herzegovina have started to improve the exchange of information on combating terrorism. The Allies are assisting the country in establishing a relevant counter-terrorist capability and providing advice on improving the existing national apparatus.

Bosnia and Herzegovina has declared a number of forces and assets as potentially available for PfP activities, including for NATO-led crisis-response operations. Engineering (explosive ordnance disposal) capabilities and related equipment as well as other units could be available.

The country has also made a number of training facilities available, including a Combat Training Centre at Manjača and a Peace Support Operations Training Centre at Butmir, which is the only certified PfP Training Centre in the region. A Professional Development Centre in Travnik has also been established that would be available within the PfP framework.

**Defence and security sector reform**

Defence and security sector reforms are core elements of cooperation. The Alliance as a whole and individual Allies have considerable expertise which Bosnia and Herzegovina can draw upon in this area. A key priority is working together to establish affordable and sustainable defence structures, which would reflect the security needs of the country and be able to provide usable military capabilities that are interoperable with those of the Alliance.

A key aspect of the work of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina up to 2004 concerned reform of the country's defence structures, which were
divided into three separate structures for each of the country’s main ethnic groups. Within the framework of a Defence Reform Commission (2003-2005), SFOR and NATO helped the country build a unified command and control structure, and develop joint doctrine and standards for training and equipment that are compatible with NATO standards. In March 2004, a newly established state-level defence ministry brought the country’s separate armies under a single command structure.

Subsequent to SFOR, NATO’s military headquarters in Sarajevo took a leading role in the Defence Reform Commission during 2005, leading the effort that resulted in the complete merger of the entity armies into a single military force on 1 January 2006, and continues to work with Bosnia and Herzegovina on defence reform to this day. NATO’s Secretary General has also appointed the Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning as his Senior Representative for defence reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The country is working to develop fully professional armed forces that are interoperable with NATO forces and are manned by volunteers who meet high professional standards. The process of restructuring and reorganisation of the armed forces in order to reach these goals is ongoing. A key instrument for supporting such military and defence reforms is the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP).

The implementation of a NATO/Partnership Trust Fund project for assistance to redundant defence personnel has helped the country downsize its armed forces. This Trust Fund supported the reintegration of approximately 3,000 released personnel, whose contracts with the Bosnian Armed Forces ended between 2010 and 2012. A similar Trust Fund was conducted a few years earlier.

**Civil emergency planning**

NATO and Bosnia and Herzegovina carry out cooperation in the field of civil emergency planning. The country is developing its national civil emergency and disaster-management capabilities. In consultation with the Allies, the country has developed the legal framework for coping with civil emergencies, and is working to establish a civil crisis-information system to coordinate activities in the event of an emergency.

In May 2014, Bosnia and Herzegovina requested assistance from NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre following devastating floods that hit the country. NATO coordinated emergency assistance from Allied and partner countries, sending for instance helicopters, boats, drinking water, food, shelter and funds.

**Public information**
Bosnia and Herzegovina and NATO aim to improve public access to information on the benefits of cooperation and Bosnia and Herzegovina's possible membership in the Alliance. To this end, a national NATO communications strategy is in place. Particular emphasis is placed on activities that entail sustainability and that link key stakeholders: government, civil society, and media. Regional exchange of best practices is an important element.

NATO's Public Diplomacy Division closely cooperates with a number of partners including NATO's military headquarters in Sarajevo, non-governmental organisations, Allied embassies and others in the planning and implementation of public diplomacy activities to increase public awareness about cooperation with NATO and MAP.

In every partner country an embassy of one of the NATO member states serves as a contact point and operates as a channel for disseminating information about the role and policies of the Alliance. The current NATO Contact Point Embassy in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the Embassy of the Republic of Turkey.

Science and environment

Under the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme, Bosnia and Herzegovina has received grant awards for a number of cooperative projects, including seismic risk hazard reduction studies and legal aspects of countering terrorism. The aim is to increase scientific cooperation, such as in areas relevant to regional security issues and environmental initiatives.

Framework for cooperation

The country's cooperation with NATO is set out in an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). The first IPAP was agreed with the Alliance in September 2008 and an updated version was agreed in February 2011. These plans are designed to bring together all the various cooperation mechanisms through which the country interacts with the Alliance, sharpening the focus of activities to better support domestic reform efforts.

Once the invitation to join the MAP is fully implemented, cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina and support for reform will be set out in an Annual National Programme under the MAP, replacing and building upon the IPAP. This programme will outline preparations for possible future membership, including political, economic, defence, resource, security and legal aspects.
The IPAP is underpinned by practical cooperation in a range of other areas under the Individual Partnership Programme (IPP), which the country has developed with NATO since it first joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

Bosnia and Herzegovina has also been participating in the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) since May 2007. The role of the PARP is to provide a structured basis for identifying forces and capabilities that could be available to the Alliance for multinational training, exercises and operations. It also serves as the principal mechanism used to guide and measure defence and military reform progress. A biennial process, the PARP is open to all partners on a voluntary basis.

To facilitate cooperation, Bosnia and Herzegovina has a diplomatic mission at NATO Headquarters as well as a liaison office at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE, Belgium) and an officer at Allied Joint Force Command Naples.

Milestones in relations

1993 In April, NATO begins Operation Deny Flight to prevent aerial intrusion over Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).

1995 The Dayton Peace Agreement is signed on 14 December.

The 60,000-strong NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) deploys to implement the military aspects of the peace agreement. IFOR is NATO's first peacekeeping operation.

1996 In September, the first elections are held in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the Allies agree to maintain a security presence in the country to facilitate the country's reconstruction.

The Stabilisation Force (SFOR) replaces IFOR in December.

2003 Establishment of a state-level command structure over the two entity armies in December.
2004 In December, the European Union peacekeeping force (EUFOR) takes over responsibility for maintaining security in Bosnia and Herzegovina. NATO supports the operation through the Berlin Plus arrangements, and establishes a military headquarters to administer this support while carrying out its primary mission of supporting the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina with defence reforms and anticipated PfP commitments.

2005 Agreement to merge the two entity armies into a single military force, the Armed Forces of BiH, on 1 January 2006

2006 Bosnia and Herzegovina joins the PfP and agrees its first Individual Partnership Programme (IPP).

2007 Bosnia and Herzegovina joins the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP).

2008 In April, the country is invited by NATO to begin an Intensified Dialogue on the full range of political, military, financial, and security issues relating to its aspirations to membership. In September, Bosnia and Herzegovina agrees its first Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO.

2009 Bosnia and Herzegovina deploys officers to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan

2010 In April, Bosnia and Herzegovina is invited to join the Membership Action Plan, pending the resolution of a key issue concerning immovable defence property.

2011 In February, Bosnia and Herzegovina agrees its second IPAP with NATO

2012 In May, at NATO’s Chicago Summit, Allied leaders welcome the political agreement reached in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 9 March 2012 on the registration of immovable defence property as state property. They urge political leaders to implement the agreement without delay to allow the country to start participation in the Membership Action Plan.

In July, NATO’s Deputy Secretary General visits Bosnia and Herzegovina and other countries in the region aspiring to NATO membership.
2013  The NATO Secretary General visits Sarajevo in February.

2014  The IPAP Assessment of Bosnia and Herzegovina for 2013 is agreed in February.

On 18 March, Mr Željko Komšić, member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, visits NATO Headquarters for talks with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and to attend a meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

21 May, the NATO Secretary General meets government officials in Sarajevo and reiterates NATO's support to the membership aspirations of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
NATO’s relations with Georgia

Georgia is an aspirant for NATO membership, actively contributes to NATO-led operations and cooperates with the Allies and other partner countries in many other areas. The NATO-Georgia Commission provides a unique framework through which NATO and Georgia pursue active political dialogue and practical cooperation in support of Georgia’s reform efforts and its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

In September 2008, NATO and Georgia established the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) to oversee NATO’s assistance to Georgia following the conflict with Russia and to play a central role in supervising the process set in hand at the Bucharest Summit where NATO leaders agreed that Georgia will become a member of NATO. In December 2008, Allied Foreign Ministers agreed that Georgia should develop an Annual National Programme under the auspices of the NGC. In this
framework, the Alliance is maximising its advice, assistance and support for Georgia's reform efforts, in particular in the field of democratic, institutional and defence reforms.

At the 2012 Chicago Summit, Allied leaders reaffirmed all elements of their decision made at the Bucharest Summit, and welcomed Georgia's progress since then to meet its Euro-Atlantic aspirations through reforms, implementation of its Annual National Programme and active political engagement with the Alliance within the NGC. Since then, Georgia's conduct of transparent and peaceful parliamentary and presidential elections, in October 2012 and October 2013 respectively, has been welcomed as another concrete step towards meeting Euro-Atlantic standards.

Another important area of cooperation is Georgia's support for NATO-led operations. Georgia is currently the largest non-NATO troop contributor to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and continues to serve as a transit country for ISAF supplies. The country has also indicated its willingness to participate in the post-2014 follow-on mission – Resolute Support - to train and assist Afghan security forces, after the transition to Afghan full security responsibility is completed at the end of 2014, when ISAF's mission will end. Georgia also supports Operation Active Endeavour, NATO's counter-terrorist maritime surveillance operation in the Mediterranean.

Georgia has offered to participate in the NATO Response Force and is expected to contribute to the NRF in 2015.

Framework for cooperation

The NGC provides the framework for cooperation between NATO and Georgia. Created in September 2008, it serves as a forum for both political consultations and practical cooperation to help Georgia advance its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Existing cooperation programmes, such as the Planning and Review Process (PARP), continue to take place within the framework of the NGC. A NATO Liaison Office was established in Georgia in 2010 to assist and support the country's reform efforts.

In December 2008, NATO Foreign Ministers decided to further enhance the NGC through the development of an Annual National Programme (ANP). The ANP, the first of which was finalised in spring 2009, replaced the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), which has guided NATO-Georgia cooperation since 2004.

In addition to Georgia's contributions to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, key areas of cooperation under the ANP include political, military and security-sector reforms. NATO agrees to support Georgia in these reforms by providing focused and comprehensive advice and activities in several frameworks (both civilian and military) towards its reform goals. Current priorities for Georgia include transforming its public and private sectors in order to promote democracy, good governance, the rule of law and sustainable social and
economic development, as well as reforming the defence and security sector, in particular the revision of Georgia’s national security plans.

Georgia also cooperates with NATO and other partner countries in a wide range of other areas through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

In parallel with the establishment of the NGC, the Military Committee with Georgia was also created as a format for meetings focused on military cooperation. The principal aim of NATO-Georgia military cooperation is to assist Georgia with the implementation of military and defence-related issues of the ANP, strategic planning, defence reforms and to increase interoperability in support of Georgia’s contributions to NATO-led operations. The Military Committee with Georgia Work Plan defines key areas and objectives for military cooperation between NATO and the Georgian Armed Forces. The Work Plan comprises activities that help achieve the goals set in the ANP and PARP.

Key areas of cooperation

Security cooperation

Thanks to regular participation in PfP training and exercises, Georgia has been able to contribute actively to Euro-Atlantic security by supporting NATO-led operations. Georgian troops worked alongside NATO troops in the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo from 1999 to 2008, providing a company-sized unit as part of the German brigade there and an infantry platoon within a Turkish battalion task force.

Georgia is currently providing two infantry battalions serving with US forces in Helmand Province, an infantry platoon serving with the US contingent in Kabul, and a number of staff officers serving at various locations. With over 1,500 military personnel, Georgia is currently the largest contributor to ISAF among NATO’s partner countries. Furthermore, Georgia is ready to continue to serve as a transit country for ISAF supplies.

Georgia has also indicated its willingness to participate in the post-2014 NATO-led mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan forces, which will be deployed once the transition to Afghan security lead has been completed and ISAF’s operation is terminated. The Georgian government has also pledged financial support for the future development of the Afghan National Security Forces.

Georgia participates in NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour, a counter-terrorist maritime surveillance operation in the Mediterranean, primarily through intelligence exchange. It
also has a mountain training site, which is accredited as a Partnership Training and Education Centre and offers courses and training to Allies and other partner countries.

**Defence and security sector reform**

NATO is supportive of the wide-ranging democratic and institutional reform process underway in Georgia, as outlined in its ANP. Particularly in the area of defence and security sector reform, NATO and individual Allies have considerable expertise upon which Georgia can draw.

Georgia's participation in the PARP since 1999 has helped develop the ability of its forces to work with NATO and is also providing planning targets that are key to security reform objectives in several areas. NATO support has, for example, helped Georgia build deployable units according to NATO standards and interoperable with Allied forces. Georgia's defence reform objectives within the PARP have facilitated improved financial management in the Ministry of Defence, assisted in reforming the intelligence structure of the armed forces and ensured that a credible Strategic Defence Review was conducted.

A key priority for Georgia is to ensure democratic control of the armed forces, including effective judicial oversight and appropriate defence command and control arrangements through a range of measurable objectives within the ANP.

Education and training are also key objectives of Georgia’s ANP and reform efforts. NATO is leading a tailored programme for Georgia – the Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP) – with the support of the PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes, the Partnerships Training and Education Centres and Allied defence institutions.

Following Georgia’s request in 2008, NATO and Georgia launched a Professional Development Programme for Civilian Personnel in the Ministry of Defence and other Security Institutions in 2009. The programme provides training with the aim of strengthening the capacity for democratic management and oversight in the Ministry of Defence, as well as other security sector institutions. Training and education provided in the framework of this programme is closely aligned to Georgia's defence and security sector reform objectives outlined in both the ANP and PARP. Current priorities are to support Georgia's civil service reform and enhance Georgia's own capacity for providing training to security sector civilian personnel.

Another priority in the area of defence and security sector reform has been to support demilitarization projects in Georgia through the NATO/PfP Trust Fund mechanism which allows individual Allies and partner countries to provide financial support to key projects on a voluntary basis. Over the years, a number of Trust Fund projects have helped to
address problems posed by stockpiles of surplus and obsolete weapons and munitions, and promoted their safe disposal.

**Civil emergency planning**

Georgia is enhancing its national civil emergency and disaster-management capabilities in cooperation with NATO and through participation in activities organised by the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC). The Centre helped coordinate the delivery of hundreds of tonnes of relief items to Georgia in the wake of the August 2008 conflict. It also coordinated assistance to Georgia in 2005 when the country experienced some of the worst flooding in its history, in 2006 when forest fires broke out in southern Georgia, and after a major earthquake in 2009.

Georgia itself hosted a major EADRCC consequence-management field exercise in the town of Rustavi in September 2012. Some 1,000 people from 35 countries participated in the exercise, which was organised in cooperation with the Emergency Management Department of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs.

**Science and environment**

Georgia has been actively engaged within the framework of the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme since 1994. The SPS Programme enables close collaboration on issues of common interest to enhance the security of NATO and Partner countries. By facilitating international efforts, in particular with a regional focus, the Programme seeks to address emerging security challenges, support NATO-led operations and advance early warning and forecast for the prevention of disasters and crises.

Today, scientists and experts from Georgia are working to address a wide range of security issues, notably in the fields of environmental security, cyber defence, advanced technology (including nanotechnology) and disaster forecast and prevention of natural catastrophes. Most recently, Georgian experts contributed to a hands-on cyber defence training course based on their national experience and expertise. Other projects include collaboration on improving trans-boundary water management and mitigating the risks posed by earthquakes in the South Caucasus.

**Public information**

Increasing the public awareness of NATO and its relations with Georgia is also a key area of cooperation. Since 2002, in cooperation with local non-governmental organisations and state authorities, NATO, through its Liaison Office in Tbilisi, has been organising numerous activities to this end, including seminars, conferences and workshops. “NATO Weeks” and summer schools are organised on an annual basis to reach out to youth audiences.
Groups of opinion leaders from Georgia are regularly invited to visit NATO Headquarters and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) for briefings about the Alliance, and NATO officials regularly travel to Georgia to speak at public events. Senior NATO officials – including the Secretary General and the Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia – also regularly visit the country for high-level consultations. The North Atlantic Council, NATO's highest political decision-making body, paid a two-day visit to the country in September 2008, in the immediate aftermath of the Georgia crisis. The Council paid a second visit in November 2011 and another in June 2013.

In every partner country an embassy of one of the NATO member states serves as a contact point and operates as a channel for disseminating information about the role and policies of the Alliance. The current NATO Contact Point Embassy in Georgia is the embassy of Romania.

The Office of the State Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration has established an Information Center on NATO, which has its main office in Tbilisi and branches in Kutaisi and Zugdidi. Working in close cooperation with NATO's Public Diplomacy Division and with the NATO Liaison Office in Georgia, it is an important tool in raising public awareness about the Alliance in the country.

Response to the Georgian crisis

At an emergency meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 19 August 2008, Allied Foreign Ministers called for a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict based on respect for Georgia's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

Allied Foreign Ministers deplored the use of force in the conflict, which is inconsistent with the commitments to the peaceful resolution of conflicts that both Georgia and Russia have made under the Partnership for Peace as well as other international agreements. They expressed particular concern over Russia's disproportionate military action which is incompatible with Russia's peacekeeping role in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Allies also called on Russia to take immediate action to withdraw its troops from the areas it must leave under the terms of the six-point agreement brokered by the European Union.

The Allies agreed to support Georgia, upon its request, in a number of areas. These include assessing the damage to civil infrastructure and the state of the ministry of
defence and armed forces; supporting the re-establishment of the air traffic system; and
advising on cyber defence issues.

On 27 August 2008, the North Atlantic Council condemned the decision by the Russian
Federation to extend recognition to the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia,
and called on Russia to reverse its decision.

NATO continues to support Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty within its
internationally recognised borders as reiterated at meetings of Allied Heads of State and
Government and in the Secretary General's statements. The Secretary General has issued
statements underlining that NATO does not recognise elections that have since taken
place in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and that the holding of such elections does not
contribute to a peaceful and lasting settlement.

The Allies welcome the declaration by the Georgian President – endorsed by the Georgian
Parliament in a unanimously adopted resolution on Georgia's foreign policy objectives – to
seek a resolution to the crises with the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia
through peaceful means. They strongly support Georgia's current strategy of engagement
with the two breakaway regions, which envisions a constructive way forward through
fostering economic ties and people-to-people contacts to build confidence.

The Allies also welcome the steps Georgia has taken unilaterally towards Russia in recent
years, including the removal of visa requirements for Russian citizens, the agreement on
Russia's membership of the World Trade Organization; as well as the direct dialogue that
has been initiated with the Russian government by the Georgian government, which came
into power in October 2012.

Milestones in relations

1992  Georgia joins the newly created North Atlantic Cooperation Council (succeeded by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997).

1994  Georgia joins the Partnership for Peace (PfP), a programme aimed at increasing security and defence cooperation between NATO and individual partner countries.

1995  Georgia signs the PfP Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the NATO and partner countries
1997  
Georgian Parliament ratifies the SOFA agreement

1999  
Georgia joins the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP).
Georgia starts contributing peacekeepers to the Kosovo Force (KFOR).

2001  
Georgia hosts a multinational PfP military training exercise "Cooperative Partner 2001"

2002  
Georgia is connected to the Virtual Silk Highway.
Georgia hosts a multinational PfP military training exercise "Cooperative Best Effort 2002".
Georgia declares its aspirations to NATO membership and its intention to develop an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO

2003  
A NATO/PfP Trust Fund project is launched with Georgia to support the demilitarization of ground-to-air defence missiles
Georgia participates in ISAF's election security force in Afghanistan.
At the Istanbul Summit, Allied leaders place special focus on the Caucasus – a special NATO representative and a liaison officer are assigned to the region.

2004  
Georgia becomes the first country to agree an IPAP with NATO.

2005  
NATO and Georgia sign a transit agreement allowing the Alliance and other ISAF troop-contributing nations to send supplies for their forces in Afghanistan through Georgia.
Georgia opens an information centre on NATO with the support of NATO's Public Diplomacy Division.

2006  
NATO offers an Intensified Dialogue to Georgia.
2007 Georgia hosts a NATO/PfP air exercise, "Cooperative Archer 2007".

2008 At their Summit in Bucharest, NATO leaders agree Georgia will become a member of NATO.

In August, Allies express deep concern over the armed conflict between Georgia and Russia, calling for a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict based on respect for Georgia’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. They agree to support Georgia's recovery in a number of areas and also propose the establishment of a NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) to supervise the process set at hand at the Bucharest Summit and to oversee the implementation of support measures.

In September, the North Atlantic Council pays a two-day visit to Georgia. The Framework Document establishing the NATO-Georgia Commission is signed and the inaugural meeting takes place in Tbilisi. In December, Allied Foreign Ministers agree to the development of an Annual National Programme (ANP) under the auspices of the NGC.

2009 On 4 February, the Georgian foreign minister, vice prime minister and defence minister visit NATO for the first meeting of the NGC in 2009.

On 20 February, Allied and Georgian defence ministers discuss Georgia’s progress in defence reform and its priorities.

On 5 March, the NGC meets in Brussels for the second time at the level of foreign ministers to discuss a range of issues of common interest.

Mid-March 2009, a NATO-led team of experts visits Georgia to address a Georgian request to review the existing military education and training system, and develop a plan of action for reform.

May 2009, the first Steering Committee meeting for the NATO-Georgia Professional Development Programme for Civilian Personnel of Georgian MOD and Other Security Institutions takes place at NATO HQ, Brussels.
Following elections on 31 May in the South Ossetia region of Georgia, NATO's Secretary General issues a statement saying that NATO does not recognise the elections and that the holding of such elections does not contribute to a peaceful and lasting settlement of the situation in Georgia.

On 3 December, the NGC meets to discuss the course of Georgia's Euro-Atlantic integration and process of reform.

2010

On 12 March, key agreements are signed to begin a Trust Fund project that will help Georgia safely dispose of explosive remnants of war.

In March, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili visits NATO Headquarters to meet NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen.

In April, Georgia signs an agreement with NATO to contribute to Operation Active Endeavour, NATO's maritime counter-terrorist operation in the Mediterranean.

In May, Georgian Foreign Ministry hosts a seminar on "Energy Security and Critical Energy Infrastructure" in Tbilisi.

In May, Allies and Georgia Chiefs of Defence meet in the Military Committee to discuss and support the transformation process of the Georgian Armed Forces.

In August, the North Atlantic Council decides to enhance NATO-Georgia relations through effective military cooperation (this leads to the development and implementation of the first annual, Military Committee with the Georgia Work Plan in 2011).

In October, NATO Liaison Office is inaugurated during the NATO Secretary General's visit to Georgia, where he meets the Georgian President, Prime Minister and senior ministers.

At the Lisbon Summit, Allied leaders recall their agreement that Georgia will become a member of NATO and reaffirm all elements of their decision made at the Bucharest Summit in 2008, declaring their active support for Georgia's
continued implementation of all necessary reforms. They reiterate their continued support for Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty within its internationally recognised borders.

In February, the Director General of the International Military Staff of NATO visits Georgia to discuss the status and prospect of NATO-Georgia military to military cooperation.

2011

In April, NGC Foreign Ministers meet in Berlin and adopt, for the first time, a joint statement which reaffirms the basic principles of NATO-Georgia cooperation. NATO ministers express strong appreciation for Georgia's substantial contribution to Euro-Atlantic security and the overall positive dynamic in Georgia's democratic development.

In June, the Chairman of the Parliament of Georgia visits NATO HQ for a meeting of the NGC and informs Allies about key democratic reforms in his country.

In May, the Military Committee with Georgia meets at the level of Chief of Defence to discuss Georgia's contributions to operations and the status of the implementation of defence reforms derived from the strategic defence review.

In July, the Georgian Foreign Ministry hosts a conference on emerging security challenges with the support of the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme.

In August, SACEUR visits Georgia to discuss Georgia's current and future contribution to operations.

Following so-called presidential elections on 26 August in the Abkhazia region of Georgia, NATO's Secretary General states that NATO does not recognise the elections and that the holding of such elections does not contribute to a peaceful and lasting settlement of the situation in Georgia.

In November, the North Atlantic Council pays a visit to Tbilisi and Batumi and meets the President, the Chairman of the Parliament, the Prime
Minister and other high-level officials of the country, as well as representatives of civil society, media and the opposition. The NGC agrees to pursue further work on concrete measures to enhance Georgia’s relations with NATO.

Following so-called presidential elections on 13 November in the South Ossetia region of Georgia, NATO’s Secretary General issues a statement saying that NATO does not recognize the elections and that the holding of such elections does not contribute to a peaceful and lasting settlement of the situation in Georgia. As a follow-up to the North Atlantic Council’s visit to Georgia, the NGC adopts a set of concrete measures to enhance Georgia’s connectivity with NATO. These measures support reforms, increase the ability of NATO and Georgia to operate together, and strengthen the capacity of the Georgian institutions as the country continues on its path towards Euro-Atlantic integration.

**2012**

As a follow-up to the North Atlantic Council’s visit to Georgia, the NGC adopts a set of concrete measures to enhance Georgia’s connectivity with NATO. These measures support reforms, increase the ability of NATO and Georgia to operate together, and strengthen the capacity of the Georgian institutions as the country continues on its path towards Euro-Atlantic integration.

In April 2012, President Saakashvili visits NATO Headquarters to meet the Secretary General and attend a meeting of the NGC Ambassadors.

In May, Georgia takes part in three important meetings involving partners at the Chicago Summit: President Mikheil Saakashvili joins counterparts from countries that are supporting the NATO-led stabilisation mission in Afghanistan. He also attends a meeting of the 28 Allies with 13 countries from Europe, the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region that have made exceptional contributions to the Alliance’s agenda in the last few years. And Georgian Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze joins fellow foreign ministers from the three other countries that are aspiring to NATO membership.

In September, NATO Secretary General visits Georgia.
In October, Georgia doubles its contribution to ISAF, making the country one of the largest non-NATO troop contributor nations.

In November, the Secretary General meets with President Saakashvili in Prague on the occasion of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and with Prime Minister Ivanishvili at NATO Headquarters.

In December, during an NGC meeting of foreign ministers, the Allies encourage all parties in Georgia to keep up the momentum of the recent elections and to consolidate democratic progress; they also thank Georgia for its substantial contribution to NATO's mission in Afghanistan.

**2013**

In June, NGC Defence Ministers discuss Georgia's reform plans and further opportunities for cooperation. Ministers also thanked Georgia, the biggest non-NATO contributor to ISAF, for the significant contribution to NATO-led operations.

From 26-27 June, the North Atlantic Council visits Georgia to assess the progress the country has made towards Euro-Atlantic integration. In October, NATO's Secretary General expresses concern about Russia's continued activity in erecting fences and other obstacles along administrative boundary lines within Georgia, which is in contradiction with international commitments. Later that month, he congratulates the Georgian people on holding transparent and peaceful presidential elections in which fundamental freedoms of expression, movement, and assembly were respected.
NATO’s relations with Montenegro

Democratic, institutional, security sector and defence reforms are a key focus of NATO’s cooperation with Montenegro. Shortly after regaining its independence in June 2006, the country joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in December 2006. Montenegro is working to draw closer to Euro-Atlantic standards and institutions, with the aim of joining the Alliance. It was invited to join the Membership Action Plan in December 2009. Following the June 2014 NATO Foreign Ministers meeting, the Secretary General announced that NATO will open intensified and focused talks with Montenegro and will assess at the latest by the end of 2015 whether to invite Montenegro to join the Alliance.
The Membership Action Plan (MAP) is a NATO programme of advice, assistance and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance. Participation in the MAP does not prejudge any decision by the Alliance on future membership. Montenegro began its first MAP cycle in the autumn of 2010 with the submission of its first Annual National Programme. It has identified key challenges that will need to be addressed, including reinforcing the rule of law, meeting NATO standards in security sector reforms and fighting corruption and organised crime.

“NATO is committed to the future of the Western Balkans as a natural part of the Euro-Atlantic family. So I look forward to seeing Montenegro join the Euro-Atlantic family as soon as you are ready,” said NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen during his visit to the country in May 2014. The Allies are committed to keeping NATO's door open to Western Balkan partners that wish to join the Alliance, share its values and are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership. Euro-Atlantic integration is seen as the best way to ensure long-term, self-sustaining security and stability in the region.

Beyond supporting reform, another key objective of NATO's cooperation with Montenegro is to develop the ability of the country's forces to work together with forces from NATO countries and other partners, especially in peacekeeping and crisis-management operations. Since 2010, the country has contributed to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. It has also indicated its willingness to participate in the post-2014 NATO-led mission to train and assist Afghan security forces, after ISAF's mission has ended.

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Key areas of cooperation

**Security cooperation**

In support of NATO's efforts to equip and train the Afghan National Army, Montenegro offered a donation which included 1,600 weapons and 250,000 rounds of ammunition. In February 2010, Montenegro decided to contribute troops to ISAF in Afghanistan, which were deployed there together with a Croatian unit.

Montenegro has indicated its willingness to participate in the post-2014 NATO-led mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan forces, which will be deployed once the transition to Afghan security lead has been completed and ISAF's operation is terminated. The government has also pledged financial support for the future development of the Afghan National Security Forces.

Participation in joint planning, training and military exercises is a significant element of cooperation within the PfP.

**Defence and security sector reform**

Defence and security sector reforms continue to be key elements of cooperation. The Alliance as a whole and individual Allies have considerable expertise that the country can draw upon in this area. The Allies also support the wider democratic, institutional and judicial reform process underway in Montenegro.
In 2013, Montenegro conducted a new Strategic Defence Review and produced a long-term development plan for its army. These documents have provided a basis for a comprehensive reform of the country's defence system.

The country's participation in the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) helps to develop forces that will be fully capable of conducting peacekeeping and relief operations with NATO and partner forces.

Montenegro is also working with NATO to promote the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, which recognises the disproportionate impact that war and conflicts have on women and children. UNSCR 1325 calls for full and equal participation of women at all levels in issues ranging from early conflict prevention to post-conflict reconstruction, peace and security. In September 2013 for instance, Montenegro hosted a high-level seminar on the role of women in building integrity and promoting good practices in the defence and security sector.

Montenegro is interested in participating in cyber defence initiatives. It is also contributing to NATO’s Building Integrity Programme to strengthen good governance in the defence and security sector. This Programme seeks to raise awareness, promote good practice and provide practical tools to help countries enhance integrity and reduce risks of corruption in the security sector by strengthening transparency and accountability.

Surplus and obsolete armaments and ammunition remain a significant issue for Montenegro in terms of both security and environmental concerns. NATO Allies have previously supported NATO/PfP Trust Fund work in this area, including a project in both Serbia and Montenegro to remove anti-personnel landmines. Further Trust Fund activities with Montenegro are now being developed.

**Civil emergency planning**

In cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), Montenegro intends to take the necessary steps to establish a national early warning system, build a national crisis situation centre and develop its emergency response capabilities.

**Science and environment**

Montenegro has been actively engaged within the framework of the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme since 2006. The SPS Programme enables close collaboration on issues of common interest to enhance the security of NATO and partner countries. By facilitating international efforts, in particular with a regional focus, the
Programme seeks to address emerging security challenges, support NATO-led operations and advance early warning and forecast for the prevention of disasters and crises.

Today, scientists and experts from Montenegro are working to address a range of security issues, notably in the fields of environmental security and disaster forecast and prevention of natural catastrophes.

**Public information**

Montenegro’s participation in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) requires good public access to information on the benefits of cooperation and membership with NATO. NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division cooperates actively with the Montenegrin authorities as well as with a wide range of civil society partners, media representatives, members of parliament, local municipalities, etc. Public diplomacy programmes, such as visits to NATO Headquarters, seminars, speaking tours and educational youth programmes, aim to raise public awareness about NATO and the membership process.

In every partner country an embassy of one of the NATO member states serves as a contact point and operates as a channel for disseminating information about the role and policies of the Alliance. The current NATO Contact Point Embassy in Montenegro is the embassy of Slovenia.

**Framework for cooperation**

Since regaining its independence in 2006, Montenegro has been undertaking a wide-ranging programme of structural and institutional reforms. The instruments available within the Partnership for Peace (PfP) can greatly assist in this process. Initially the country chose to strengthen the reform focus of cooperation by developing an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO in 2008. It moved through a successful IPAP cycle from 2008 to 2010, before shifting in the autumn of 2010 to an Annual National Programme within the Membership Action Plan framework.

Montenegro has also been participating in the PARP since 2006. The role of the PARP is to provide a structured basis for identifying forces and capabilities that could be available to the Alliance for multinational training, exercises and operations. It also serves as the principal mechanism used to guide and measure defence and military reform progress. A biennial process, the PARP is open to all partners on a voluntary basis.
To facilitate cooperation, Montenegro has established a mission to NATO as well as a liaison office at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).

Milestones in the evolution of relations

The NATO Allies recognised Montenegro's independence very shortly after it was declared in June 2006 and invited the country to join the Partnership for Peace (PfP) at the November 2006 Riga Summit. The country formally joined the Partnership in December of that same year and increased the focus on reform by developing an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) in 2008. This IPAP focused on the full range of political, military, financial, and security issues relating to its aspirations to membership. Montenegro received an invitation from the Allies to join the Membership Action Plan (MAP) in December 2009. NATO Allies are committed to supporting the country on its path to Euro-Atlantic integration. However, the key reforms and political decisions needed to achieve the standards of NATO membership must be taken by the leaders of Montenegro themselves.

Key milestones

2003 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is replaced by a looser state union named Serbia and Montenegro.

2006 Montenegro votes for independence on 21 May and the parliament formally declares independence on 3 June.

The country joins the Partnership for Peace in December.

2007 In support of NATO's efforts to equip and train the Afghan National Army, Montenegro donates weapons and ammunition.


2009 First IPAP assessment.
In December, NATO Foreign Ministers invite Montenegro to join the Membership Action Plan.

2010

In February, Montenegro decides to contribute to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

Summer 2010, Montenegro leaves the IPAP process and, in the autumn, submits its first Annual National Programme, under the Membership Action Plan.

2011

In June, the NATO Secretary General attends an Adriatic Charter meeting and delivers a major speech “NATO and the Western Balkans” in Montenegro.

2012

Prime Minister Luksić addresses the North Atlantic Council on 21 March.

2013

On 16 October, President Filip Vujanović comes to NATO Headquarters, Brussels.

2014

Prime Minister Milo Đukanović holds talks with the NATO Secretary General and addresses the North Atlantic Council at NATO Headquarters.

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen holds talks with top officials in Podgorica.

Following the June 2014 NATO Foreign Ministers meeting, the Secretary General announces that NATO will open intensified and focused talks with Montenegro and will assess at the latest by the end of 2015 whether to invite Montenegro to join the Alliance.
NATO’s relations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹

Cooperation between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹ and NATO takes place across a wide range of areas: operationally in Afghanistan and in support of KFOR, practically with a particular emphasis on defence and security sector reform. The country joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 1995 and aspires to become a NATO member. It joined the Membership Action Plan in 1999, a programme of advice, assistance and practical support tailored to the needs of countries wishing to join NATO.

At the April 2008 Bucharest Summit, Allies agreed that an invitation to join the Alliance will be extended to the country as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the issue over its name has
been reached with Greece. This agreement has been consistently reiterated at subsequent Summits.

The Allies are committed to keeping NATO’s door open to Western Balkan partners that wish to join the Alliance, share its values and are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership. Euro-Atlantic integration is seen as the best way to ensure long-term, self-sustaining security and stability in the region.

NATO also remains committed to the long-term peace and stability of the region. At Skopje’s request, the Alliance engaged in operations Essential Harvest, Allied Harmony and Amber Fox (2001-2003), with the aim of creating a safe and secure environment and reducing tension between the country’s ethnic Albanian minority and national security forces. A NATO military headquarters created in Skopje during the operational period has since been downsized and transformed into a Liaison Office which assists with security sector reform and host nation support to the Kosovo Force (KFOR).

Beyond the ongoing work on reform, another important area of cooperation is the country’s support for NATO-led operations. For many years, it has been providing valuable support to KFOR troops transiting the country. It also contributes to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and has indicated its willingness to participate in the post-2014 follow-on mission to train and assist Afghan security forces, after ISAF’s mission has ended.

Key areas of cooperation

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was a key partner in supporting NATO-led stabilisation operations in Kosovo in 1999 and NATO forces were deployed to the country to halt the spread of the conflict as well as to provide logistical support to KFOR. The Allies also provided humanitarian assistance as refugees from Kosovo fled into the country. The country continues to provide valuable host nation support to KFOR troops transiting its territory.

NATO came to the assistance of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, when violence between ethnic Albanian insurgents and security forces broke out in the west of the country in February 2001. The insurgents had taken control of a number of towns near the border with Kosovo, bringing the country to the brink of a civil war. NATO facilitated the negotiation of a ceasefire in June of that same year, which paved the way for a political settlement – the Ohrid Framework Agreement – in August 2001. In support of the settlement, NATO deployed a task force, “Essential Harvest”, to collect weapons handed over by the insurgents, as they prepared to disband. The NATO-led international monitoring mission continued to operate in support of the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement until 31 March 2003, when the European Union assumed the lead.

A key objective of cooperation is to develop the ability of the country’s armed forces to work alongside Allied forces in peace-support and crisis-management operations.
Participation in NATO’s PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) has provided a framework for cooperation in this area.

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been supporting ISAF in Afghanistan since 2002; it currently contributes some 150 troops. The country has also indicated its willingness to participate in the post-2014 NATO-led mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan forces, which will be deployed once the transition to Afghan security lead has been completed and ISAF’s operation is terminated.

**Defence and security sector reform**

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has initiated wide-ranging reforms that NATO is supporting. In the areas of defence and security sector reform, NATO and individual Allies have considerable expertise that the country can draw upon. In consultation with the Allies, the country continues to implement a wide range of reforms in line with its Strategic Defence Review. The country’s participation in the PARP has facilitated cooperation in the area of defence reform.

The Allies have assisted in the development of a transformation plan for the country’s armed forces. The plan includes detailed programmes covering logistics, personnel, equipment, training and a timetable for the restructuring of key military units. Other key objectives include improving ethnic minority representation in civil/military defence structures and judicial and police reform.

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia joined the Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) in 2005. The OCC is a mechanism through which units available for PfP operations can be evaluated and better integrated with NATO forces to increase operational effectiveness.

The country is working with NATO to promote the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, which recognises the disproportionate impact that war and conflicts have on women and children. UNSCR 1325 calls for full and equal participation of women at all levels in issues ranging from early conflict prevention to post-conflict reconstruction, peace and security.

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is also working to strengthen good governance in the defence and security sector through participation in the Building Integrity Programme. This Programme seeks to raise awareness, promote good practice and provide practical tools to help nations enhance integrity and reduce risks of corruption in the security sector by strengthening transparency and accountability.
Training is an important part of security cooperation with the country and its personnel regularly participate in activities organised under the PfP programme. Moreover, the country's Public Affairs Regional Centre in Skopje was recognised as a Partnership Training and Education Centre in 2013, opening its activities to Allies and partners.

**Civil emergency planning**

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is enhancing its national civil emergency and disaster-management capabilities in cooperation with NATO and through participation in activities organised by the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre. In consultation with NATO, a national crisis-management system has been established to ensure that the structures in place serve effectively and efficiently in the case of a national crisis.

**Science and environment**

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been actively engaged within the framework of the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme since 1998. The SPS Programme enables close collaboration on issues of common interest to enhance the security of NATO and partner countries. By facilitating international efforts, in particular with a regional focus, the Programme seeks to address emerging security challenges, support NATO-led operations and advance early warning and forecast for the prevention of disasters and crises.

Today, scientists and experts from the country are working to address a wide range of security issues, notably in the fields of cyber defence, defence against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents, environmental security and disaster forecast and prevention of natural catastrophes. A hands-on cyber defence training course took place in April 2013. The aim of the training course was to create institutional capability and increase awareness on cyber threats with a view to enhancing the resiliency of national IT infrastructures. Future areas for concrete cooperation were discussed by national government officials, scientists and experts at an SPS ‘Information Day’ held in Skopje in June 2013.

**Public information**

Given that the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia aims to join NATO, it is important to continue to ensure public awareness of how NATO works and of the rights and obligations which membership brings. Public diplomacy activities also aim to develop and maintain links with civil society actors and to facilitate security-related activities and programmes in the country. NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division plays a key role in this area, as do individual Allies and partner countries. In every partner country an embassy of one
of the NATO member states serves as a contact point and operates as a channel for disseminating information about the role and policies of the Alliance. The Embassy of Turkey in Skopje acts as a Contact Point Embassy (CPE) for NATO.

Framework for cooperation

The country cooperates with NATO and other partners in a wide range of areas through the Partnership for Peace ( PfP) programme and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). In the Membership Action Plan (MAP) framework, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia sets out its reform plans and timelines in its Annual National Programme (ANP). Key areas include political, military and security sector reforms. Important priorities are efforts to meet democratic standards and ensure free and fair elections, as well as support for reducing corruption and fighting organised crime, judicial reform, improving public administration and promoting good neighbourly relations. NATO Allies provide feedback on the envisaged reforms and evaluate their implementation.

More specific and technical reforms in the defence area are developed through the Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP), which the country joined in 1999. The role of the PARP is to provide a structured basis for identifying forces and capabilities that could be available to the Alliance for multinational training, exercises and operations. It also serves as the principal mechanism used to guide and measure defence and military reform progress. A biennial process, the PARP is open to all partners on a voluntary basis.

The NATO Liaison Office, Skopje, plays a role in assisting the implementation of the defence reform plans, including through its NATO Advisory Team, which is located within the country's defence ministry.

Milestones in relations

1995 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia joins the Partnership for Peace ( PfP).

1996 The country hosts its first PfP training exercise “Rescuer”. 
1997 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia becomes a member of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

1999 The country plays a key role in supporting NATO operations in Kosovo, and the Allies provide assistance to ease the humanitarian crisis as refugees from Kosovo flood into the country. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia joins NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP) and the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP).

2001 Violence flares up in the west of the country. NATO plays a key role in facilitating negotiations on a cease-fire reached in June. NATO Allies deploy a task force to collect arms from former combatants (Operation Essential Harvest) and support the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Subsequently, they deploy a mission to protect international monitors (Operation Amber Fox), which is extended until December 2002.

2002 The country deploys personnel in support of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. NATO HQ Skopje is created, in April, to advise on military aspects of security sector reform.

2003 The NATO-led peace-monitoring mission (Operation Allied Harmony) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is handed over to the European Union.

2005 A combined medical team of the three MAP countries joins NATO-led forces in Afghanistan in August.

2007 The country hosts the EAPC Security Forum in Ohrid.

2008 In April, Allies agree that the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will be invited to start accession talks as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the issue over the country's name has been reached.
2010  The Secretary General visits Skopje in June 2010.


President Gjorge Ivanov attends a meeting at NATO's Summit, joining counterparts from countries that are supporting the NATO-led stabilisation mission in Afghanistan. Also, Foreign Minister Nikola Poposki joins fellow foreign ministers from the three other countries that are aspiring to NATO membership in a meeting chaired by NATO's Deputy Secretary General.

During a visit to NATO Headquarters of President Gjorge Ivanov on 4 September, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen welcomes Skopje's commitment to continuing reforms and expresses his strong hope that a mutually acceptable solution to the issue of the country's name could be reached as soon as possible within the framework of the United Nations.

2013  In June, the North Atlantic Council accepts the country's offer to make its Public Affairs Regional Centre in Skopje a Partnership Training and Education Centre, opening its activities to Allies and partners.

2014  In February, Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski visits NATO Headquarters in Brussels and in May, the NATO Secretary General visits Skopje.

1. Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
NATO enlargement

NATO’s door remains open to any European country in a position to undertake the commitments and obligations of membership, and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Since 1949, NATO’s membership has increased from 12 to 28 countries through six rounds of enlargement. Albania and Croatia were invited to join NATO at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008 and formally became members when the accession process was completed on 1 April 2009. Currently there are four partner countries that aspire for NATO membership: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹ and Montenegro.

The foreign ministers of four aspirant countries – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹ – meet NATO foreign ministers at the Chicago Summit in May 2012.
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹ has, like Albania and Croatia, been participating in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for a number of years to prepare for possible membership. At Bucharest, Allied leaders agreed to invite the country to become a member as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the issue over the country's name has been reached with Greece. They also invited Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro to start Intensified Dialogues on their membership aspirations and related reforms. Furthermore, Allied leaders agreed that Georgia and Ukraine – which were already engaged in an Intensified Dialogue with NATO – will become members of NATO. In December 2008, Georgia and Ukraine were invited to develop Annual National Programmes (ANPs). Georgia did so under the auspices of the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC), which was established in September 2008 to oversee NATO's assistance to Georgia following the conflict with Russia and to play a central role in supervising the process set in hand at the Bucharest Summit. Georgia and Ukraine both submitted their first ANPs in 2009.

In terms of Ukraine, while no longer pursuing NATO membership since 2010, Ukraine has maintained the existing level of cooperation with the Alliance and has fulfilled the existing agreements. Ukraine has continued to participate actively in the ANP process which plays a key role in determining Allied support for Ukraine's domestic reform process.

In December 2009, Montenegro was invited to join the MAP, as was Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 2010. However, the latter's first Annual National Programme will only be accepted by the North Atlantic Council, NATO's principal decision-making body, when the immovable property issue has been resolved.

NATO's “open door policy” is based on Article 10 of its founding treaty. Any decision to invite a country to join the Alliance is taken by the North Atlantic Council on the basis of consensus among all Allies. No third country has a say in such deliberations.

NATO's ongoing enlargement process poses no threat to any country. It is aimed at promoting stability and cooperation, at building a Europe whole and free, united in peace, democracy and common values.

▲ Aspirant countries

Countries that have declared an interest in joining the Alliance are initially invited to engage in an Intensified Dialogue with NATO about their membership aspirations and related reforms.

Aspirant countries may then be invited to participate in the MAP to prepare for potential membership and demonstrate their ability to meet the obligations and commitments of possible future membership. Participation in the MAP does not guarantee membership, but it constitutes a key preparation mechanism.

Countries aspiring to join NATO have to demonstrate that they are in a position to further the principles of the 1949 Washington Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. They are also expected to meet certain political, economic and military criteria, which are laid out in the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement.
1995 Study on Enlargement

In 1995, the Alliance published the results of a Study on NATO Enlargement that considered the merits of admitting new members and how they should be brought in. It concluded that the end of the Cold War provided a unique opportunity to build improved security in the entire Euro-Atlantic area and that NATO enlargement would contribute to enhanced stability and security for all. It would do so, the Study further concluded, by encouraging and supporting democratic reforms, including the establishment of civilian and democratic control over military forces; fostering patterns and habits of cooperation, consultation and consensus-building characteristic of relations among members of the Alliance; and promoting good-neighbourly relations.

It would increase transparency in defence planning and military budgets, thereby reinforcing confidence among states, and would reinforce the overall tendency toward closer integration and cooperation in Europe. The Study also concluded that enlargement would strengthen the Alliance's ability to contribute to European and international security and strengthen and broaden the transatlantic partnership.

According to the Study, countries seeking NATO membership would have to be able to demonstrate that they have fulfilled certain requirements. These include:

- a functioning democratic political system based on a market economy;
- the fair treatment of minority populations;
- a commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflicts;
- the ability and willingness to make a military contribution to NATO operations; and
- a commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutional structures.

Once admitted, new members would enjoy all the rights and assume all the obligations of membership. This would include acceptance at the time that they join of all the principles, policies and procedures previously adopted by Alliance members.

Accession process

Once the Allies have decided to invite a country to become a member of NATO, they officially invite the country to begin accession talks with the Alliance. This is the first step in
the accession process on the way to formal membership. The major steps in the process are:

1. **Accession talks with a NATO team**

These talks take place at NATO Headquarters in Brussels and bring together teams of NATO experts and representatives of the individual invitees. Their aim is to obtain formal confirmation from the invitees of their willingness and ability to meet the political, legal and military obligations and commitments of NATO membership, as laid out in the Washington Treaty and in the Study on NATO Enlargement.

The talks take place in two sessions with each invitee. In the first session, political and defence or military issues are discussed, essentially providing the opportunity to establish that the preconditions for membership have been met. The second session is more technical and includes discussion of resources, security, and legal issues as well as the contribution of each new member country to NATO's common budget. This is determined on a proportional basis, according to the size of their economies in relation to those of other Alliance member countries.

Invitees are also required to implement measures to ensure the protection of NATO classified information, and prepare their security and intelligence services to work with the NATO Office of Security.

The end product of these discussions is a timetable to be submitted by each invitee for the completion of necessary reforms, which may continue even after these countries have become NATO members.

2. **Invitees send letters of intent to NATO, along with timetables for completion of reforms**

In the second step of the accession process, each invitee country provides confirmation of its acceptance of the obligations and commitments of membership in the form of a letter of intent from each foreign minister addressed to the NATO Secretary General. Together with this letter they also formally submit their individual reform timetables.

3. **Accession protocols are signed by NATO countries**

NATO then prepares Accession Protocols to the Washington Treaty for each invitee. These protocols are in effect amendments or additions to the Treaty, which once signed and ratified by Allies, become an integral part of the Treaty itself and permit the invited countries to become parties to the Treaty.

4. **Accession protocols are ratified by NATO countries**
The governments of NATO member states ratify the protocols, according to their national requirements and procedures. The ratification procedure varies from country to country. For example, the United States requires a two-thirds majority to pass the required legislation in the Senate. Elsewhere, for example in the United Kingdom, no formal parliamentary vote is required.

5. The Secretary General invites the potential new members to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty

Once all NATO member countries notify the Government of the United States of America, the depository of the Washington Treaty, of their acceptance of the protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of the potential new members, the Secretary General invites the new countries to accede to the Treaty.

6. Invitees accede to the North Atlantic Treaty in accordance with their national procedures

7. Upon depositing their instruments of accession with the US State Department, invitees formally become NATO members

Evolution of NATO’s “open door policy”

NATO’s “open door policy” is based upon Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, which states that membership is open to any “European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area”.

The enlargement of the Alliance is an ongoing and dynamic process. Since the Alliance was created in 1949, its membership has grown from the 12 founding members to today's 28 members through six rounds of enlargement in 1952, 1955, 1982, 1999, 2004 and 2009.

The first three rounds of enlargement – which brought in Greece and Turkey (1952), West Germany (1955) and Spain (1982) – took place during the Cold War, when strategic considerations were at the forefront of decision-making.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 signalled the end of the Cold War and was followed by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the breakup of the Soviet Union. The reunification of Germany in October 1990 brought the territory of the former East Germany into the Alliance. The new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe were eager to guarantee their freedom by becoming integrated into Euro-Atlantic institutions.

NATO enlargement was the subject of lively debate in the early 1990s. Many political analysts were unsure of the benefits that enlargement would bring. Some were concerned about the possible impact on Alliance cohesion and solidarity, as well as on relations with
other states, notably Russia. It is in this context that the Alliance carried out a Study on NATO Enlargement in 1995 (see above).

**Post-Cold War enlargement**

Based on the findings of the Study on Enlargement, the Alliance invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks at the Alliance's Madrid Summit in 1997. These three countries became the first former members of the Warsaw Pact to join NATO in 1999.

At the 1999 Washington Summit, the Membership Action Plan was launched to help other aspirant countries prepare for possible membership.

Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia were invited to begin accession talks at the Alliance's Prague Summit in 2002 and joined NATO in 2004. All seven countries had participated in the MAP.

**Bucharest Summit decisions**

At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, Allied leaders took a number of steps related to the future enlargement of the Alliance.

Several decisions concerned countries in the Western Balkans. The Allies see the closer integration of Western Balkan countries into Euro-Atlantic institutions as essential to ensuring long-term self-sustaining stability in this region, where NATO has been heavily engaged in peace-support operations since the mid 1990s.

- Albania and Croatia were invited to start accession talks to join the Alliance and joined NATO in April 2009.
- The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\(^1\) was assured that it will also be invited to join the Alliance as soon as a solution to the issue of the country's name has been reached with Greece.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro were invited to start Intensified Dialogues on their membership aspirations and related reforms (Montenegro was invited to join MAP in December 2009 and Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 2010; MAP will be fully activated for the latter once the Tallinn condition on the registration of immovable defence property has been met).
- Allied leaders also agreed at Bucharest that Georgia and Ukraine, which were already engaged in Intensified Dialogues with NATO, will one day become members. In December 2008, Allied foreign ministers decided to enhance opportunities for assisting the two countries in efforts to meet membership requirements by making use of the framework of the existing NATO-Ukraine Commission and NATO-Georgia
Commission – without prejudice to further decisions which may be taken about their applications to join the MAP.

4 April 1949  Signature of the North Atlantic Treaty by 12 founding members: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. Article 10 of the Treaty provides the basis for NATO’s “open door policy”.

18 February 1952  Accession of Greece and Turkey.


30 May 1982  Spain joins the Alliance (and the integrated military structure in 1998).

October 1990  With the reunification of Germany, the new German Länder in the East become part of NATO.

January 1994  At the Brussels Summit, Allied leaders reaffirm that NATO remains open to the membership of other European countries.

28 September 1995  Publication of NATO Study on Enlargement.

8-9 July 1997  At the Madrid Summit, three partner countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – are invited to start accession talks.

12 March 1999  Accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, bringing the Alliance to 19 members.

23-25 April 1999  Launch of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the Washington Summit. (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia join the MAP.)

14 May 2002
NATO Foreign Ministers officially announce the participation of Croatia in the MAP at their meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland.

May 2002  
President Leonid Kuchma announces Ukraine's goal of eventual NATO membership.

21-22 November 2002  
At the Prague Summit, seven partner countries – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia – are invited to start accession talks.

26 March 2003  
Signing ceremony of the Accession Protocols of the seven invitees.

29 March 2004  
Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

21 April 2005  
Launch of the Intensified Dialogue on Ukraine's aspirations to NATO membership and related reforms, at an informal meeting of foreign ministers in Vilnius, Lithuania.

21 September 2006  
NATO Foreign Ministers in New York announce the decision to offer an Intensified Dialogue to Georgia.

28-29 November 2006  
At the Riga Summit, Allied leaders state that invitations will be extended to MAP countries that fulfil certain conditions.

2-4 April 2008  
At the Bucharest Summit, Allied leaders invite Albania and Croatia to start accession talks; assure the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹ that it will be invited once a solution to the issue of the country's name has been reached with Greece; invite Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro to start Intensified Dialogues; and agree that Georgia and Ukraine will become members in future.

9 July 2008 December 2008  
Accession Protocols for Albania and Croatia are signed. Allied Foreign Ministers agree that Georgia should develop an Annual
National Programme under the auspices of the NATO-Georgia Commission.

1 April 2009  Accession of Albania and Croatia.

4 December 2009  NATO Foreign Ministers invite Montenegro to join the MAP.

22 April 2010  NATO Foreign Ministers invite Bosnia and Herzegovina to join the MAP, authorising the North Atlantic Council to accept the country's first Annual National Programme only when the immovable property issue has been resolved.

1. Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
Membership Action Plan (MAP)

The Membership Action Plan (MAP) is a NATO programme of advice, assistance and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance. Participation in the MAP does not prejudge any decision by the Alliance on future membership.

Current participants in the MAP are the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which has been participating in the MAP since 1999, and Montenegro, which was invited to join in December 2009. Welcoming progress made in its reform efforts, in April 2010, the Allies formally invited Bosnia and Herzegovina to join the MAP, pending the resolution of a key issue concerning immovable defence property.

Countries participating in the MAP submit individual annual national programmes on their preparations for possible future membership. These cover political, economic, defence, resource, security and legal aspects.

The MAP process

The MAP process provides a focused and candid feedback mechanism on aspirant countries' progress on their programmes. This includes both political and technical advice, as well as annual meetings between all NATO members and individual aspirants at the level of the North Atlantic Council to assess progress, on the basis of an annual progress report. A key element is the defence planning approach for aspirants, which includes elaboration and review of agreed planning targets.

Throughout the year, meetings and workshops with NATO civilian and military experts in various fields allow for discussion of the entire spectrum of issues relevant to membership.

The MAP was launched in April 1999 at the Alliance's Washington Summit to help countries aspiring to NATO membership in their preparations. The process drew heavily on the experience gained during the accession process of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, which became members in the Alliance's first post-Cold War round of enlargement in 1999.

Participation in the MAP

Participation in the MAP helped prepare the seven countries that joined NATO in the second post-Cold War round of enlargement in 2004 (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) as well as Albania and Croatia, which joined in April 2009.
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continues to participate in the MAP – Allied leaders have agreed to invite the country to become a member as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the issue over the country's name has been reached with Greece.

When NATO Foreign Ministers invited Montenegro to join the MAP in December 2009, they also assured Bosnia and Herzegovina that it will be able to join once it has achieved the necessary progress in its reform efforts.

In April 2010, NATO Foreign Ministers at their meeting in Tallinn, reviewed progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina's reform efforts and invited the country to join the Membership Action Plan. However, the North Atlantic Council will only accept the country's first Annual National Programme when the immovable property issue has been resolved.

1. Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name
NATO Mediterranean Dialogue

NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue was initiated in 1994 by the North Atlantic Council. It currently involves seven non-NATO countries of the Mediterranean region: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.

Origins and Objectives

The Dialogue reflects the Alliance’s view that security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. It is an integral part of NATO's adaptation to the post-Cold War security environment, as well as an important component of the Alliance's policy of outreach and cooperation.
The Mediterranean Dialogue's overall aim is to:

- contribute to regional security and stability
- achieve better mutual understanding
- dispel any misconceptions about NATO among Dialogue countries

Key Principles

The successful launch of the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and its subsequent development has been based upon a number of principles:

- **Non discrimination**: all Mediterranean partners are offered the same basis for their cooperation with NATO.

- **Self-differentiation**, allowing a tailored approach to the specific needs of each of our MD partner countries. Particularly Individual Cooperation Programmes (ICP) allow interested MD countries and NATO to frame their practical cooperation in a more prospective and focused way, enabling interested countries to outline the main short and long-term objectives of their cooperation with the Alliance, in accordance with NATO's objectives and policies for the Mediterranean Dialogue.

- **Inclusiveness**: all MD countries should see themselves as shareholders of the same cooperative effort.

- **Two-way engagement**: the MD is a “two-way partnership”, in which NATO seeks partners' contribution for its success, through a regular consultation process; special emphasis is placed on practical cooperation.

- **Non imposition**: MD partners are free to choose the pace and extent of their cooperation with the Alliance; NATO has no wish to impose anything upon them.

- **Complementarity and mutual reinforcement**: efforts of the MD and other international institutions for the region are complementary and mutually reinforcing in nature; such as, for example, those of the EU's “Union For the Mediterranean”, the OSCE's “Mediterranean Initiative”, or the “Five plus Five”.

- **Diversity**: the MD respects and takes into account the specific regional, cultural and political contexts of the respective partners.

Moreover, the MD is progressive in terms of participation and substance. Such flexibility has allowed the number of Dialogue partners to grow - witness the inclusion of Jordan in
November 1995 and Algeria in March 2000 - and the content of the Dialogue to evolve over time.

The Dialogue is primarily bilateral in structure (NATO+1). Despite the predominantly bilateral character, the Dialogue nevertheless allows for multilateral meetings on a regular basis (NATO+7).

In principle, activities within the Mediterranean Dialogue take place on a self-funding basis. However, Allies agreed to consider requests for financial assistance in support of Mediterranean partners' participation in the Dialogue. A number of measures have recently been taken to facilitate cooperation, notably the revision of the Dialogue's funding policy to allow funding up to 100 percent of the participation costs in Dialogue's activities and the extension of the NATO/PfP Trust Fund mechanisms to MD countries.

The political dimension

The Mediterranean Dialogue is based upon the twin pillars of political dialogue and practical cooperation.

The Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG), established at the Madrid Summit in July 1997 under the supervision of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), had the overall responsibility for the Mediterranean Dialogue, until it was replaced in 2011 by the Political and Partnerships Committee, which is responsible for all partnerships. The Committee meets at the level of Political Counsellors on a regular basis to discuss all matters related to the Dialogue including its further development.

Political consultations in the NATO+1 format are held on a regular basis both at Ambassadorial and working level. These discussions provide an opportunity for sharing views on a range of issues relevant to the security situation in the Mediterranean, as well as on the further development of the political and practical cooperation dimensions of the Dialogue.

Meetings in the NATO+7 format, including NAC+7 meetings, are also held on a regular basis, in particular following the NATO Summit and Ministerial meetings, Chiefs-of-Defence meetings, and other major NATO events. These meetings represent an opportunity for two-way political consultations between NATO and MD partners.

At the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO's Heads of State and Government elevated the MD to a genuine partnership through the establishment of a more ambitious and
expanded framework, which considerably enhanced both the MD’s political and practical cooperation dimensions.

Since then, the constant increase in the number and quality of the NATO-MD political dialogue has recently reached a sustainable level. Consultations of the 28 Allies and seven MD countries take place on a regular basis on a bilateral and multilateral level, at Ministerial, Ambassadorial and working level formats. That has also included three meetings of the NATO and MD Foreign Ministers in December 2004, 2007 and 2008 in Brussels. Two meetings of NATO and MD Defense Ministers in 2006 and 2007 in Taormina, Italy and Seville, Spain. Ten meetings of the Chief of Defense of NATO and MD countries have also take place so far. The first ever NAC+7 meeting took place in Rabat, Morocco, in 2006 and, more recently, the first MD Policy Advisory Group meeting with all seven MD partners took place in San Remo, Italy, on 15-16 September 2011.

The political dimension also includes visits by NATO Senior Officials, including the Secretary General and the Deputy Secretary General, to Mediterranean Dialogue countries. The main purpose of these visits is to conduct high-level political consultations with the relevant host authorities on the way forward in NATO’s political and practical cooperation under the Mediterranean Dialogue.

The new Strategic Concept, which was adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2011, identifies cooperative security as one of three key priorities for the Alliance, and constitutes an opportunity to move partnerships to the next generation. Mediterranean Dialogue partners were actively involved in the debate leading to its adoption.

The Strategic Concept refers specifically to the MD, stating that: “We are firmly committed to the development of friendly and cooperative relations with all countries of the Mediterranean, and we intend to further develop the Mediterranean Dialogue in the coming years. We will aim to deepen the cooperation with current members of the Mediterranean Dialogue and be open to the inclusion in the Mediterranean Dialogue of other countries of the region.”

MD partners have reiterated their support for enhanced political consultations to better tailor the MD to their specific interests and to maintain the distinctive cooperation framework of the MD.

The practical dimension

NATO 2014 Wales Summit Guide

Archived material - Information valid up to 3 September 2014
Measures of practical cooperation between NATO and Mediterranean Dialogue countries are laid down in an annual Work Programme which aims at enhancing our partnership through cooperation in security-related issues.

The annual Work Programme includes seminars, workshops and other practical activities in the fields of modernisation of the armed forces, civil emergency planning, crisis management, border security, small arms & light weapons, public diplomacy, scientific and environmental cooperation, as well as consultations on terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

There is also a military dimension to the annual Work Programme which includes invitations to Dialogue countries to observe - and in some cases participate - in NATO/PfP military exercises, attend courses and other academic activities at the NATO School (SHAPE) in Oberammergau (Germany) and the NATO Defense College in Rome (Italy), and visit NATO military bodies.

The military programme also includes port visits by NATO’s Standing Naval Forces, on-site train-the-trainers sessions by Mobile Training Teams, and visits by NATO experts to assess the possibilities for further cooperation in the military field.

Furthermore, NATO+7 consultation meetings on the military programme involving military representatives from NATO and the seven Mediterranean Dialogue countries are held twice a year.

State of play

At their Summit meeting in Istanbul in June 2004, NATO’s HOSG invited Mediterranean partners to establish a more ambitious and expanded framework for the Mediterranean Dialogue, guided by the principle of joint ownership and taking into consideration their particular interests and needs. The aim is to contribute towards regional security and stability through stronger practical cooperation, including by enhancing the existing political dialogue, achieving interoperability, developing defence reform and contributing to the fight against terrorism.

Since the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, an annual Mediterranean Dialogue Work Programme (MDWP) focusing on agreed priority areas has been the main cooperation instrument available and has been expanded progressively in more than 30 areas of cooperation, going from about 100 activities in 2004, to over 700 activities and events in 2011.
While the MDWP is essentially military (85 percent of the activities), it comprises activities in a wide range of areas of cooperation including Military Education, Training and Doctrine, Defence Policy and Strategy, Defence Investment, Civil Emergency Planning, Public Diplomacy, Crisis Management, Armaments and Intelligence related activities.

At their Berlin meeting in April 2011, NATO Foreign Ministers endorsed the establishment of a single Partnership Cooperation Menu (PCM) for all partners. As of 1 January 2012, the single partnership menu will be effective, thus dramatically expanding the number of activities accessible to MD countries.

A number of cooperation tools have also been progressively opened to MD countries, such as:

- The e-Prime database which provides electronic access to the MDWP allowing close monitoring of cooperation activities;
- The full package of Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) to improve partners’ capacity to contribute effectively to NATO-led Crisis Response Operations through achieving interoperability;
- The Trust Fund mechanism that currently includes ongoing substantial projects with MD countries such as Jordan and Mauritania;
- The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC) aims at improving partners’ capacity in supporting NATO’s response to crises;
- The Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism (PAP-T) aims at strengthening NATO’s ability to work effectively with MD partners in the fight against terrorism;
- The Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) action plan aims at improving the civil preparedness against CBRN attacks on populations and critical infrastructures.

The NATO Training Cooperation Initiative (NTCI), launched at the 2007 Riga Summit, aims at complementing existing cooperation activities developed in the MD framework through: the establishment of a “NATO Regional Cooperation Course” at the NATO Defence College (NDC) in Rome, which consists in a ten-week strategic level course also focusing on current security challenges in the Middle East.

**Individual Partnership Cooperation Programmes**

The Individual and Partnership Cooperation Programme (IPCP), which replaces the previous Individual Cooperation Programme (ICP) framework document, aims at enhancing bilateral political dialogue as well as at tailoring the cooperation with NATO according to key national security needs, framing NATO cooperation with MD partner countries in a more strategic way. Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia
have all agreed tailored Individual Cooperation Programmes with NATO. This is the main instrument of focused cooperation between NATO and MD countries.

Taking into account changes in the Middle East and North Africa, NATO stands ready to support and assist those Mediterranean Dialogue countries undergoing transition, if they so request. Drawing on in-house experience and expertise, through Individual Partnership Cooperation Programmes the Alliance could provide assistance in the areas of security institutions building, defence transformation, modernisation and capacity development, civil-military relations, and defence-related aspects of the transformation and reform of the security sector.
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)

NATO's Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, launched at the Alliance's Summit in the Turkish city in June 2004, aims to contribute to long-term global and regional security by offering countries of the broader Middle East region practical bilateral security cooperation with NATO.

ICI focuses on practical cooperation in areas where NATO can add value, notably in the security field. Six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council were initially invited to participate. To date, four of these -- Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates -- have joined. Saudi Arabia and Oman have also shown an interest in the Initiative.

Based on the principle of inclusiveness, the Initiative is, however, open to all interested countries of the broader Middle East region who subscribe to its aims and content, including the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Each interested country will be considered by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis and on its own merit. Participation of countries in the region in the Initiative as well as the pace and extent of their cooperation with NATO will depend in large measure on their individual response and level of interest.

What key principles is the Initiative based on?

The ICI is based on a number of important principles, including:

- **Non discrimination**: all ICI partners are offered the same basis for their cooperation with NATO.
- **Self-differentiation**: a tailored approach to the specific needs of each of our ICI partner countries. Particularly Individual Partnership Cooperation Programmes (IPCP), allow interested ICI countries and NATO to frame their practical cooperation in a more prospective and focused way, enabling interested countries to outline the main short and long-term objectives of their cooperation with the Alliance, in accordance with NATO’s objectives and policies for the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.
- **Inclusiveness**: all ICI countries should see themselves as stakeholders of the same cooperative effort.
- **Two-way engagement**: the ICI is a “two-way” partnership, in which NATO seeks partners’ contribution for its success, through a regular consultation process; special emphasis is placed on practical cooperation.
- **Non imposition**: ICI partners are free to choose the pace and extent of their cooperation with the Alliance; NATO has no wish to impose anything upon them.
- **Complementarity and mutual reinforcement**: efforts of the ICI and other international institutions for the region are complementary and mutually reinforcing in nature.
- **Diversity**: the ICI respects and takes into account the specific regional, cultural and political contexts of the respective partners.

What does this mean in practice?

The Initiative offers a 'menu' of bilateral activities that countries can choose from, which comprises a range of cooperation areas, including:
1. tailored advice on defence transformation, defence budgeting, defence planning and civil-military relations;
2. military-to-military cooperation to contribute to interoperability through participation in selected military exercises and related education and training activities that could improve the ability of participating countries' forces to operate with those of the Alliance; and through participation in selected NATO and PfP exercises and in NATO-led operation on a case-by-case basis;
3. cooperation in the fight against terrorism, including through intelligence-sharing;
4. cooperation in the Alliance’s work on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;
5. cooperation regarding border security in connection with terrorism, small arms and light weapons and the fight against illegal trafficking;
6. civil emergency planning, including participating in training courses and exercises on disaster assistance.

Individual and Partnership Cooperation Programme (IPCP) allow interested ICI countries and NATO to frame their practical cooperation in a more prospective and focused way, enabling interested countries to outline the main short and long-term objectives of their cooperation with the Alliance.

How did the Initiative evolve?

NATO recognizes that dealing with today's complex new threats requires wide international cooperation and collective effort. That is why NATO has developed, and continues to develop, a network of partnerships in the security field.

The Initiative was preceded by a series of high level consultations conducted by the then Deputy Secretary General of NATO, Ambassador Minuto Rizzo, with six countries of the region in May, September and December 2004. These were: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. During these consultations all of the countries expressed their interest in the Initiative.

ICI was launched at the Summit meeting of NATO Heads of State and Government in Istanbul, 28 June 2004. Following the Summit, from September to December 2004, the Deputy Secretary General of NATO paid a second round of visits to the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, to discuss the way ahead.
In the first three months of 2005, three countries: Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar formally joined the ICI. In June 2005, the United Arab Emirates joined the Initiative.

The ICI has since developed both in the political and in the practical dimensions. While the political dialogue has evolved to include high-level meetings, the practical dimension was progressively enhanced through the opening of new partnership tools and activities as well as through the contribution of these countries to NATO-led operations. The multilateral dimension of the partnership also developed, with the first NAC+4 meeting held in November 2008, followed by two other such meetings in 2009 and 2010.

Since the Istanbul Summit in 2004, an annual Menu of Practical Activities focusing on agreed priority areas has been opened to ICI countries and has been gradually enhanced. Whereas in 2007, the offer of cooperation to ICI countries included 328 activities/events, the 2011 Menu of Practical Activities now contains about 500 activities.

The NATO Training Cooperation Initiative (NTCI), launched at the 2007 Riga Summit, aims at complementing existing cooperation activities developed in the ICI framework through the establishment of a “NATO Regional Cooperation Course” at the NATO Defence College (NDC) in Rome, which consists in a ten-week strategic level course also focusing on current security challenges in the Middle East. ICI partners, as well as Saudi Arabia, actively participate in these courses.

The importance of public diplomacy has been underlined by ICI nations. High visibility events gave way to informal discussions on security related issues of common interest. The ICI Ambassadorial Conferences in Kuwait (2006), Bahrain (2008) and the United Arab Emirates (2009), which were attended by the Secretary General, the Deputy Secretary General and the 28 NATO Permanent Representatives, as well as by high-ranking officials, policymakers and opinion leaders from ICI countries, focused on discussing and addressing the perception of NATO in the Gulf, as well as ways to develop NATO-ICI partnership in its two dimensions. The fourth ICI Ambassadorial Conference took place in Qatar in February 2011 and focused on deepening NATO-ICI partnership.

The new Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, identifies cooperative security as one of three core tasks for the Alliance. It refers specifically to the ICI, and states: “We attach great importance to peace and stability in the Gulf region, and we intend to strengthen our cooperation in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. We will aim to develop a deeper security partnership with our Gulf partners and remain ready to welcome new partners in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.”

With the approval of the new partnership policy at the meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Berlin in April 2011, all NATO partners will have access in principle to the same range
and number of activities. This will dramatically expand the number of activities accessible to ICI countries.

ICI partners have also increasingly demonstrated their readiness to participate in NATO-led operations, acting as security providers. Today, several ICI partners actively contribute to the NATO ISAF operation in Afghanistan. Following the launch of Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates promptly provided air assets to the operation and were recognised as contributing nations, playing a key role in the success of the operation.

Which NATO bodies have a central role?

Following the launch of the ICI, NATO countries decided to establish the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Group, composed of political counsellors from the 28 delegations of member countries to NATO, which was replaced in 2011 by the Political and Partnerships Committee, which responsible for all partnerships.

The Committee is in charge of defining the procedures for the development of a menu of practical activities with interested countries and ensuring its successful implementation. It also reports to the Council or to NATO’s Senior Political Committee and prepares the ground for the decisions to be adopted by the North Atlantic Council on ICI.

In addition, the Committee engages countries participating in the Initiative on a ‘28+1’ basis for the development of individual workplans and follows up on their implementation.
NATO’s relations with partners across the globe

NATO cooperates on an individual basis with a number of countries which are not actually part of its formal partnership frameworks\(^1\). Referred to as “partners across the globe” or simply “global partners”, they include Afghanistan, Australia, Iraq, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand and Pakistan.
These countries develop cooperation with NATO in areas of mutual interest and actively contribute to NATO operations. Individual global partners choose the areas where they wish to engage in and cooperate with NATO in a spirit of mutual benefit and reciprocity.

Over recent years, NATO has developed bilateral relations with each of these countries. Global partners now have the same access to partnership activities as those in formal partnership frameworks. Activities range from joint exercises and operations, to strategic-level training on issues of intelligence, information and technology. The importance of reaching out to countries and organisations across the globe was underlined in the Strategic Concept adopted at the November 2010 Lisbon Summit. At Lisbon, Allied leaders declared their intention, as part of a focused effort to reform NATO’s partnerships policy, to better engage with global partners, contributing significantly to international security. Following up on the Lisbon decisions, Allied foreign ministers approved a new partnerships policy at their meeting in Berlin in April 2011.

In line with the new policy, all partners will be treated in the same way, offering them the same basis of cooperation and dialogue. Moreover, there are now more opportunities for meetings in flexible formats, bringing together NATO members and partners with other countries, which NATO may have no bilateral programme of cooperation. These include China, India, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Colombia. Such meetings have taken place to consult partners on different issues, such as counter piracy and countering narcotics in Afghanistan.

1. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

**Highlights**
- Partners across the globe, or global partners, work with NATO on an individual basis, outside of the Alliance’s traditional partnership frameworks.
- Global partners have the same access to all of NATO’s partnership activities.
- Currently, NATO’s global partners include Afghanistan, Australia, Iraq, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand and Pakistan.

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**Support for NATO-led operations**

The contributions from global partners and other countries to NATO-led operations have a direct, advantageous impact for international peace and security.

In the Balkans, Argentinean and Chilean forces have worked alongside NATO Allies to ensure security in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Kosovo, Argentina has helped NATO personnel provide medical and social assistance to the local population and cooperated on peace agreement implementation since 1999.

In Afghanistan, a number of global partners such as Australia, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand, work alongside the Allies as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Other countries, such as Japan, support ISAF efforts of stabilisation in
Afghanistan without being involved in combat, by funding a large number of development projects and dispatching liaison officers.

Pakistan's support for the efforts of NATO and the international community in Afghanistan remains crucial to the success of the Alliance's mission, despite past differences. NATO remains committed to engaging with Pakistan in an effort to enlist support to stabilise Afghanistan.

The participation of partners in NATO-led peace-support operations is guided by the Political-Military Framework (PMF), which was developed for NATO-led operations. This framework provides for the involvement of contributing states in the planning and force generation processes through the International Coordination Centre at SHAPE. Building on lessons learned and reinforcing the habit of cooperation established through KFOR and ISAF, NATO Allies decided at the 2010 Lisbon Summit to review the PMF in order to update how NATO shapes decisions and works with partner countries on the operations and missions to which they contribute.

Typically, partner military forces are incorporated into operations on the same basis as are forces from NATO member countries. This implies that they are involved in the decision-making process through their association to the work of NATO committees, and through the posting of liaison officers in the operational headquarters or to SHAPE. They operate under the direct command of the Operational Commander through multinational divisional headquarters. Regular meetings of the North Atlantic Council, the Alliance's principal political decision-making body, with ambassadors, ministers and heads of state and government are held to discuss and review the operations.

Evolution of relations

NATO has maintained a dialogue with countries that are not part of its partnership frameworks, on an ad-hoc basis, since the 1990s. However, NATO's involvement in areas outside of its immediate region – including Afghanistan and Libya – has increased the need and opportunities for enhanced global interaction. Clearly, the emergence of global threats requires the cooperation of a wider range of countries to successfully tackle challenges such as terrorism, proliferation, piracy or cyber attacks. Dialogue with these countries can also help NATO avert crises and, when needed, manage an operation throughout all phases.
Since 1998, NATO has invited countries across the globe to participate in its activities, workshops, exercises, and conferences. This decision marked a policy shift for the Alliance, allowing these countries to have access, through the case-by-case approval of the North Atlantic Council, to activities offered under NATO’s structured partnerships. These countries were known as “Contact Countries”.

Significant steps were taken at the 2006 Riga Summit to increase the operational relevance of NATO’s cooperation with countries that are part of its structured partnership frameworks as well as other countries around the world. These steps, reinforced by decisions at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, defined a set of objectives for these relationships and created avenues for enhanced political dialogue, including meetings of the North Atlantic Council with ministers of the countries concerned, high-level talks, and meetings with ambassadors. In addition, annual work programmes (then referred to as Individual Tailored Cooperation Packages of Activities) were further developed.

At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, Allies agreed to develop a more efficient and flexible partnership policy, in time for the meeting of Allied foreign ministers in Berlin in April 2011. To this end, they decided to:

- streamline NATO’s partnership tools in order to open all cooperative activities and exercises to partners and to harmonise partnership programmes;
- better engage with partners across the globe who contribute significantly to security and reach out to relevant partners to build trust, increase transparency and develop practical cooperation;
- develop flexible formats to discuss security challenges with partners and enhance existing fora for political dialogue; and
- build on improvements in NATO’s training mechanisms and consider methods to enhance individual partners’ ability to build capacity.
A "comprehensive approach" to crises

NATO's Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, underlines that lessons learned from NATO operations show that effective crisis management calls for a comprehensive approach involving political, civilian and military instruments. Military means, although essential, are not enough on their own to meet the many complex challenges to Euro-Atlantic and international security. Allied leaders agreed at Lisbon to enhance NATO's contribution to a comprehensive approach to crisis management as part of the international community's effort and to improve NATO's ability to contribute to stabilisation and reconstruction. At the Chicago Summit (May 2012), Allies agreed to establish “an appropriate but modest” civilian crisis-management capability at NATO Headquarters and within Allied Command Operations (SHAPE).
“The comprehensive approach not only makes sense – it is necessary,” says NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen. “NATO needs to work more closely with our civilian partners on the ground, and at a political level – especially the European Union and the United Nations.”

The effective implementation of a comprehensive approach requires all actors to contribute in a concerted effort, based on a shared sense of responsibility, openness and determination, taking into account their respective strengths, mandates and roles, as well as their decision-making autonomy.

NATO is improving its own crisis-management instruments and it has reached out to strengthen its ability to work with partner countries, international organisations, non-governmental organisations and local authorities. In particular, NATO is building closer partnerships with actors that have experience and skills in areas such as institution building, development, governance, the judiciary and the police. These actors include the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the African Union (AU), the World Bank and some non-governmental organisations.

In March 2011, NATO agreed on an updated list of tasks to update its Comprehensive Approach Action Plan. These tasks are being implemented by a dedicated civilian-military task force that involves all relevant NATO bodies and commands. Building on experiences from the Western Balkans, Afghanistan and Libya, NATO’s working methods (both internal and those used to work with external partners) are being adapted across all NATO activities to meet the requirements of a comprehensive approach to crisis situations.

**Highlights**

- NATO is contributing to a comprehensive approach of the international community in operations and crisis-management situations
- Political, civilian and military instruments need to be involved in the planning and conduct of operations
- Cooperation with partner countries, international organisations, non-governmental organisations and local authorities is being strengthened
- This work builds on NATO’s experiences in operations in the Western Balkans, Libya and Afghanistan
- Institutional partners include primarily the UN, the EU, the OSCE, as well as the African Union, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Organization for Migration

▲ Four key areas of work

The implementation of NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach is a permanent feature of the Alliance’s work. NATO is working to make improvements in several key
areas of work including the planning and conduct of operations; lessons learned, training, education and exercises; cooperation with external actors; and public messaging.

**Planning and conduct of operations**

NATO takes full account of all military and non-military aspects of crisis management, and is working to improve practical cooperation at all levels with all relevant organisations and actors in the planning and conduct of operations. The Alliance promotes the clear definition of strategies and objectives among all relevant actors before launching an operation, as well as enhanced cooperative planning.

The Allies agree that, as a general rule, elements of stabilisation and reconstruction are best undertaken by those actors and organisations that have the relevant expertise, mandate and competence. However, there can be circumstances which may hamper other actors from undertaking these tasks, or undertaking them without support from NATO.

To improve NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach and its ability to contribute, when required, to stabilisation and reconstruction, Allies agreed to form an appropriate but modest civilian capability to interface more effectively with other actors and conduct appropriate planning in crisis management. Moreover, a Comprehensive Approach Specialist Support (COMPASS) programme was set up in 2009 to build up a database of national civil experts in three main fields – political, stabilisation and reconstruction, and media – to be drawn upon for advice at the strategic, operational and theatre levels.

**Lessons learned, training, education and exercises**

Applying a comprehensive approach means a change of mindset. The Alliance is therefore emphasising joint training of civilian and military personnel. This promotes the sharing of lessons learned and also helps build trust and confidence between NATO, its partners and other international and local actors, which in turn encourages better coordination. In some cases, lessons learned are being developed at staff level with the UN, for example, related to Libya and Kosovo.

NATO also regularly invites international organisations to participate in NATO exercises to share knowledge about Alliance procedures for crisis response as well as share views and perspectives.

**Enhancing cooperation with external actors**

Achieving lasting mutual understanding, trust, confidence and respect among the relevant organisations and actors will make their respective efforts more effective. Therefore,
NATO is actively building closer links and liaison with them on a regular basis while respecting the autonomy of decision making of each organisation.

Cooperation has become well established with the UN, UN agencies, the EU and the OSCE, in particular, as well as with the World Bank, the ICRC, the International Organization for Migration, the AU and the League of Arab States. This takes the form of staff talks, staff-to-staff contacts at various levels, high-level exchanges, ‘NATO education days’ and workshops.

**Public messaging**

To be effective, a comprehensive approach to crisis management must be complemented by sustained and coherent public messages. NATO’s information campaigns are substantiated by systematic and updated information, documenting progress in relevant areas. Efforts are also being made to share communication strategies with international actors and to coordinate communications in theatre.
NATO’s relations with the United Nations

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NATO and the United Nations (UN) share a commitment to maintaining international peace and security. The two organisations have been cooperating in this area since the early 1990s.

NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept commits the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilise post-conflict situations, including by working more closely with NATO’s international partners, most importantly the UN and the European Union.

UN Security Council Resolutions have provided the mandate for NATO’s operations in the Western Balkans, Afghanistan and Libya. They have also provided the framework for NATO’s training mission in Iraq. NATO has also provided support to UN-sponsored operations, including
logistical assistance to the African Union’s UN-endorsed peacekeeping operations in Darfur, Sudan, and in Somalia; support for UN disaster-relief operations in Pakistan, following the massive earthquake in 2005; and escorting merchant ships carrying World Food Programme humanitarian supplies off the coast of Somalia.

Over the years, NATO-UN cooperation has been extended beyond operations to include consultations between NATO and UN specialised bodies and agencies on issues such as crisis assessment and management, civil-military cooperation, training and education, logistics, combating human trafficking, mine action, civilian capabilities, women, peace and security, arms control and non-proliferation, and the fight against terrorism.

The complexity of today’s security challenges has required a broader dialogue between NATO and the UN. In 2010, following the signing of the 2008 UN-NATO declaration on cooperation, NATO reinforced its liaison arrangements by establishing the post of NATO Civilian Liaison Officer to the United Nations, in addition to that of a Military Liaison Officer, established in 1999. This enhanced cooperation is an integral part of NATO’s contribution to a Comprehensive Approach to crisis management and operations.

Framework for cooperation

In September 2008, building on the experience of over a decade of working together, the Secretaries General of the two organisations agreed to establish a framework for expanded consultation and cooperation.

Cooperation is being further developed on issues of common interest, including in communication and information-sharing; capacity-building, training and exercises; lessons learned, planning and support for contingencies; and operational coordination and support.

Cooperation continues to develop in a practical way, taking into account each organisation’s specific mandate, expertise, procedures and capabilities. There are regular exchanges and dialogue at senior and working levels on political and operational issues. NATO’s Secretary General reports regularly to the UN Secretary-General on progress in UN-mandated NATO-led operations and on other key decisions of the North Atlantic Council in the area of crisis management and in the fight against terrorism. In recent years, staff-level meetings and high-level visits have become more frequent. The UN is frequently invited to attend NATO ministerial meetings and summits, the NATO Secretary General participates in the UN General Assembly, and staff level meetings take place on an annual basis between the Secretariats of NATO and the UN. Similar meetings also take place with other UN organisations, such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and NATO experts participate in events organised by other UN bodies.
As detailed below, NATO contributes to the work of a number of UN committees and bodies set up to address the challenges of terrorism; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; promoting the rights and role of women in conflict; the protection of civilians, including protection of children affected by armed conflict; the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons; and disaster relief.

Key areas of cooperation

**Counter-terrorism**

NATO contributes actively to the work of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (UN CTC) – established in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373 in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States – and participates in special meetings of the Committee bringing together international, regional and sub-regional organisations involved in this process. NATO and the UN conduct reciprocal briefings on progress in the area of counter-terrorism, in their respective committees. NATO is also committed to supporting the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

**Non-proliferation**

NATO contributes to the work of the UN Security Council Committee established following the adoption of UNSCR 1540 (2004), which addresses the threat to international peace and security posed by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery. In this context, since 2004 the Alliance has been organising a string of international non-proliferation seminars with the active participation of partner countries and international organisations. In addition, NATO addresses the implementation of UNSCR 1540 at regional and sub-regional levels in order to better identify the real needs of countries for assistance.

**Women, peace and security**

NATO remains committed to the full implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and related Resolutions, which are aimed at protecting and promoting women's rights, role and participation in preventing and ending conflict. In line with the NATO/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Policy, the Alliance has together with its partners made significant progress in implementing the goals set out in these Resolutions. In this regard, NATO has endorsed a Strategic Progress Report on mainstreaming UNSCR 1325 and related Resolutions into NATO-led operations and missions. Furthermore, in August 2012, the NATO Secretary General appointed a NATO Special Representative for these
issues. In this context and to further advance this work, the Allies have tasked the North Atlantic Council to continue implementing the Policy and the Action Plan; undertake a review of the practical implications of UNSCR 1325 for the conduct of NATO operations and missions; and further integrate gender perspectives into Alliance activities.

Protecting children in armed conflict

NATO also remains committed to the implementation of UNSCR 1612 and related Resolutions on the protection of children affected by armed conflict. At the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, NATO leaders expressed their concern at the growing range of threats to children in armed conflict and strongly condemned that they are increasingly subject to recruitment, sexual violence and targeted attacks. NATO-led operations, such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, are taking an active role in preventing, monitoring and responding to violations against children, including through pre-deployment training and a violations alert mechanism. This approach, based on practical field-oriented measures, demonstrates NATO's firm commitment on this issue, as does the recent appointment of a NATO Focal Point for Children and Armed Conflict in charge of maintaining a close dialogue with the UN. NATO-UN cooperation in this field is creating a set of good practices to be integrated in NATO training modules and taken into account in possible future operations.

Small arms and light weapons

NATO also contributes to the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in All its Aspects, adopted in July 2001 by nearly 150 countries, including all NATO member states. It consists of measures at the national, regional and global levels in the areas of legislation, destruction of weapons that have been confiscated, seized or collected, as well as international cooperation and assistance to strengthen the ability of states in identifying and tracing illicit arms and light weapons. Every two years, the UN holds the Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action. Through the Ad Hoc Working Group on SALW, established in 1999 within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, NATO supports the implementation of the Programme of Action with outreach activities, including at regional and sub-regional level.

Disaster relief

NATO also cooperates with the UN in support of disaster-relief operations. Through the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), NATO coordinates consequence-management efforts with UN and other bodies and shares information on disaster assistance. All the EADRCC’s tasks are performed in close cooperation with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), which
retains the primary role in the coordination of international disaster-relief operations. The EADRCC is a regional coordination mechanism, supporting and complementing the UN efforts. In the case of a disaster requiring international assistance, it is up to individual NATO member states and partner countries to decide whether to provide assistance, based on information received from the EADRCC.

Evolution of NATO-UN cooperation in the field

Working relations between the United Nations and the Alliance were limited during the Cold War. This changed in 1992, against the background of growing conflict in the Western Balkans, where their respective roles in crisis management led to an intensification of practical cooperation in the field.

Bringing peace to the former Yugoslavia

In July 1992, NATO ships belonging to the Alliance's Standing Naval Force Mediterranean, assisted by NATO Maritime Patrol Aircraft, began monitoring operations in the Adriatic in support of a UN arms embargo against all republics of the former Yugoslavia. A few months later, in November 1992, NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) began enforcement operations in support of UN Security Council Resolutions aimed at preventing the escalation of the conflict.

The readiness of the Alliance to support peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council was formally stated by NATO Foreign Ministers in December 1992. A number of measures were subsequently taken, including joint maritime operations under the authority of the NATO and WEU Councils: NATO air operations; close air support for the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR); air strikes to protect UN "Safe Areas"; and contingency planning for other options which the United Nations might take.

Following the signature of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Agreement) on 14 December 1995, NATO was given a mandate by the United Nations, on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1031, to implement the military aspects of the peace agreement. NATO's first peacekeeping operation, the Implementation Force (IFOR), began operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina to fulfill this mandate in December 1995. One year later, it was replaced by a NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR). Throughout their mandates both multinational forces worked closely with other international organisations and humanitarian agencies on the ground, including UN
agencies such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF).

From the onset of the conflict in Kosovo in 1998 and throughout the crisis, close contacts were maintained between the UN Secretary-General and NATO’s Secretary General. Actions were taken by the Alliance in support of UN Security Council Resolutions both during and after the conflict. The Kosovo Force (KFOR) was deployed on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 12 June 1999 to provide an international security presence as the prerequisite for peace and reconstruction of Kosovo. Throughout its deployment, KFOR has worked closely with the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) as well as with other international and local stakeholders.

In 2000 and 2001, NATO and the United Nations also cooperated successfully in containing major ethnic discord in southern Serbia and preventing a full-blown civil war in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹.

**Afghanistan**

Cooperation between NATO and the UN is playing a key role in Afghanistan. The Alliance formally took over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a UN-mandated force, in August 2003. Originally tasked with helping to provide security in and around Kabul, ISAF was subsequently authorised by a series of UN Security Council Resolutions to expand its presence into other regions of the country to extend the authority of the central government and to facilitate development and reconstruction.

NATO and ISAF work closely with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and other international actors that are supporting governance, reconstruction and development. The close cooperation takes place in various settings, in Afghanistan as well as in UN and NATO capitals. It includes co-membership of the Joint Co-ordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) overseeing the implementation of the internationally endorsed Afghanistan Compact, co-chairmanship together with the Afghan Government of the Executive Steering Committee for Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and other joint Afghan-international community bodies.

NATO and the UN are also consulting closely on their respective postures in Afghanistan. NATO is keeping the UN well informed of the planning for the NATO-led train, advise, and assist mission that is set to begin in January 2015.

**Iraq**
Under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1546 and at the request of the Iraqi Interim Government, NATO provided assistance in training and equipping Iraqi security forces through the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) from 2004 to end 2011.

**Supporting African Union missions**

In June 2005, following a request from the African Union (AU) and in close coordination with the United Nations and the European Union, NATO agreed to support the African Union’s Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which is trying to end the continuing violence in the Darfur region. NATO assisted by airlifting peacekeepers from African troop-contributing countries to the region and also helped train AU troops in how to run a multinational military headquarters and how to manage intelligence.

Following a request from the African Union in 2007, NATO accepted to assist the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by providing airlift support to AU member states willing to deploy on this mission. NATO is also providing capacity-building assistance for the African Union via a Senior Military Liaison Office in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Alliance also protects UN shipping in support of AMISOM.

**Deterring piracy**

In October 2008, NATO agreed to a request from the UN Secretary-General to deploy ships off the coast of Somalia to deter piracy and escort merchant ships carrying World Food Programme cargo.

**Libya**

On 27 March, NATO Allies decided to take on the whole military operation in Libya under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. The purpose of Operation Unified Protector was to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of attack. NATO implemented all military aspects of the UN Resolution. Allies moved swiftly and decisively to enforce the arms embargo and no-fly zone called for in the resolution, and to take further measures to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas from attack. Operation Unified Protector was concluded on 31 October 2011.

1. Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

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**The North Atlantic Treaty and the UN Charter**

The Charter of the United Nations, signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945, establishes the overall responsibility of the UN Security Council for international peace and security.
NATO’s North Atlantic Treaty signed four years later, on 4 April 1949, makes clear that the UN Charter is the framework within which the Alliance operates. In the Treaty, Allies reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter and commit themselves to the peaceful resolution of conflicts. They also commit themselves to the principle of collective defence, in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter which establishes the inherent right of individual or collective defence of all UN member countries. Collective defence is central to NATO's founding treaty and commits Allies to protect each other, setting a spirit of solidarity within the Alliance.
NATO-EU: a strategic partnership

Sharing strategic interests, NATO and the European Union cooperate on issues of common interest and are working side by side in crisis management, capability development and political consultations. The European Union is a unique and essential partner for NATO. The two organisations share a majority of members (22), and all members of both organisations share common values.

Institutionalised relations between NATO and the European Union (EU) were launched in 2001, building on steps taken during the 1990s to promote greater European responsibility in defence matters (NATO-Western European Union cooperation¹). The political principles underlying the
relationship were set out in the December 2002 NATO-EU Declaration on a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The declaration also reaffirmed EU assured access to NATO's planning capabilities for the EU's own military operations. Later, the so-called “Berlin Plus” arrangements set the basis for the Alliance to support EU-led operations in which NATO as a whole is not engaged.

With the enlargement of both organisations in 2004 followed by the accession of Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia to the EU, NATO and the European Union now have 22 member countries in common.  

At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, the Allies underlined their determination to improve the NATO-EU strategic partnership. This was reinforced by NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept which commits the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilise post-conflict situations, including by working more closely with NATO's international partners, most importantly the United Nations and its strategic partner - the EU.

NATO's Strategic Concept clearly states that an active and effective EU contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The European Union's Lisbon Treaty (in force end 2009) provides a framework for strengthening the EU's capacities to address common security challenges. Non-EU European Allies make a significant contribution to these efforts. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, their fullest involvement in these efforts is essential.

NATO and the EU can and should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security. The Allies are determined to make their contribution to create more favourable circumstances through which they will:

- fully strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU, in the spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity and respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of both organisations;
- enhance practical cooperation in operations throughout the crisis spectrum, from coordinated planning to mutual support in the field;
- broaden political consultations to include all issues of common concern, in order to share assessments and perspectives;
- cooperate more fully in capability development, to minimise duplication and maximise cost-effectiveness.

Close cooperation between NATO and the EU is an important element in the development of an international "Comprehensive Approach" to crisis management and operations, which requires the effective application of both military and civilian means. The Chicago Summit in May 2012 reiterated these principles by underlining that NATO and the EU share common values and strategic interests. Fully strengthening this strategic partnership is particularly important in the current environment of austerity. In this context, the NATO Secretary General engages actively with his EU counterparts and has addressed the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee in joint session with the sub-committee on Security and Defence on numerous occasions.

1. At that time, the Western European Union (WEU) was acting for the European Union in the area of security and defence (1992 Maastricht Treaty). The WEU's crisis-management role was transferred to the European Union in 1999.
2. 28 NATO member countries: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. 28 EU member countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom.

Framework for cooperation

An exchange of letters between the NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency in January 2001 defined the scope of cooperation and modalities of consultation on security issues between the two organisations. Cooperation further developed with the signing of the NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP in December 2002 and the agreement, in March 2003, of a framework for cooperation.

NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP: The NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP, agreed on 16 December 2002, reaffirmed the EU assured access to NATO's planning capabilities for its own military operations and reiterated the political principles of the strategic partnership: effective mutual consultation; equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy of the European Union and NATO; respect for the interests of EU and NATO members states; respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; and coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the military capability requirements common to the two organisations.

The “Berlin Plus” arrangements: As part of the framework for cooperation adopted on 17 March 2003, the so-called “Berlin Plus” arrangements provide the basis for NATO-EU cooperation in crisis management in the context of EU-led operations that make use of NATO's collective assets and capabilities, including command arrangements and assistance in operational planning. In effect, they allow the Alliance to support EU-led operations in which NATO as a whole is not engaged.

NATO and the EU meet on a regular basis to discuss issues of common interest. Meetings take place at different levels including at the level of foreign ministers, ambassadors, military representatives and defence advisors. There are regular staff-to-staff talks at all levels between NATO's International Staff and International Military Staff, and their respective EU interlocutors (the European External Action Service, the European Defence Agency, the Commission and the European Parliament).

Permanent military liaison arrangements have been established to facilitate cooperation at the operational level. A NATO Permanent Liaison Team has been operating at the EU
Military Staff since November 2005 and an EU Cell was set up at SHAPE (NATO's strategic command for operations in Mons, Belgium) in March 2006.

Cooperation in the field

The Western Balkans

In July 2003, the EU and NATO published a "Concerted Approach for the Western Balkans". Jointly drafted, it outlines core areas of cooperation and emphasises the common vision and determination both organisations share to bring stability to the region.

- The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

  On 31 March 2003, the EU-led Operation Concordia took over the responsibilities of the NATO-led mission, Operation Allied Harmony, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This mission, which ended in December 2003, was the first "Berlin Plus" operation in which NATO assets were made available to the European Union.

- Bosnia and Herzegovina

  Building on the results of Concordia and following the conclusion of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Union deployed a new mission called Operation Althea on 2 December 2004. The EU Force (EUFOR) operates under the "Berlin Plus" arrangements, drawing on NATO planning expertise and on other Alliance's assets and capabilities. The NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe is the Commander of Operation Althea. The EU Operation Headquarters (OHQ) is located at SHAPE.

- Kosovo

  NATO has been leading a peacekeeping force in Kosovo (KFOR) since 1999. The European Union has contributed civil assets to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) for years and agreed to take over the police component of the UN Mission. The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), which deployed in December 2008, is the largest civilian mission ever launched under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The central aim is to assist and support the Kosovo authorities in the rule of law area, specifically in the police, judiciary and customs areas. EULEX works closely with KFOR in the field.

Cooperation in other regions

- Afghanistan

  NATO and the EU are playing key roles in bringing peace and stability to Afghanistan, within the international community's broader efforts to implement a comprehensive
approach in their efforts to assist the country. The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force helps create a stable and secure environment in which the Afghan government as well as other international actors can build democratic institutions, extend the rule of law and reconstruct the country. NATO welcomed the EU’s launch of a CSDP Rule of Law Mission (EUPOL) in June 2007. The European Union has also initiated a programme for justice reform and is helping to fund civilian projects in NATO-run Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that are led by an EU member country.

- **Darfur**
  Both NATO and the EU supported the African Union’s mission in Darfur, Sudan, in particular with regard to airlift rotations.

- **Piracy**
  Since September 2008, NATO and EU naval forces are deployed side by side (respectively Ocean Shield and EUNAVFOR Atalanta), with other actors, off the coast of Somalia for anti-piracy missions.

3. Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

### Other areas of cooperation

#### Political consultation

The range of subjects discussed between NATO and the EU has expanded considerably over the past two years, particularly on security issues within the European space or its immediate vicinity. Since the crisis in Ukraine, both organisations have regularly exchanged views on their respective decisions, especially with regard to Russia, to ensure that their messages and actions complement each other. Consultations have also covered developments in the Western Balkans, Libya and the Middle East.

#### Capabilities

Together with operations, capability development is an area where cooperation is essential and where there is potential for further growth. The NATO-EU Capability Group was established in May 2003 to ensure the coherence and mutual reinforcement of NATO and EU capability development efforts.

Following the creation, in July 2004, of the European Defence Agency (EDA) to coordinate work within the European Union on the development of defence capabilities, armaments cooperation, acquisition and research, EDA experts contribute to the work of the Capability Group.
Among other issues, the Capability Group has addressed common capability shortfalls in areas such as countering improvised explosive devices and medical support. The Group is also playing an important role in ensuring transparency and complementarity between NATO’s work on “Smart Defence” and the EU’s Pooling and Sharing initiative.

**Terrorism and WMD proliferation**

Both NATO and the European Union are committed to combat terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). They have exchanged information on their activities in the field of protection of civilian populations against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) attacks. The two organisations also cooperate in the field of civil emergency planning by exchanging inventories of measures taken in this area.

**New areas of cooperation**

Since the adoption of NATO’s new Strategic Concept at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, which identifies the need for the Alliance to address emerging security challenges, several new areas of cooperation with the EU are taking place, in particular energy security issues and cyber defence. In this context, NATO and EU staffs have been holding consultations in order to identify the specific areas in which the two organisations could enhance their cooperation in these fields.

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**Participation**

The organisations have 22 member countries in common. Albania, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, and the United States, which are members of NATO but not of the EU, participate in all NATO-EU meetings. So do Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and since 2008, Malta, which are members of the EU and of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme.

However, Cyprus which is not a PfP member and does not have a security agreement with NATO on the exchange of classified documents, cannot participate in official NATO-EU meetings. This is a consequence of decisions taken by NATO in December 2002. Informal meetings including Cyprus take place occasionally at different levels.

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**Key milestones**
Feb 1992  
The EU adopts the Maastricht Treaty, which envisages an intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the eventual framing of a common defence policy (ESDP), with the WEU as the EU's defence component.  

Close cooperation established between NATO and the WEU.

June 1992  
In Oslo, NATO Foreign Ministers support the objective of developing the WEU as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance and as the defence component of the EU, that would also cover the “Petersberg tasks” (humanitarian search and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, crisis-management tasks including peace enforcement and environmental protection).

Jan 1994  
Allied leaders agree to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy. NATO endorses the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces, which provides for “separable but not separate” deployable headquarters that could be used for European-led operations and is the conceptual basis for future operations involving NATO and other non-NATO countries.

June 1996  
In Berlin, NATO Foreign Ministers agree for the first time to build up a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO, with the aim of rebalancing roles and responsibilities between Europe and North America. An essential part of this initiative was to improve European capabilities. They also decide to make Alliance assets available for WEU-led crisis-management operations. These decisions lead to the introduction of the term "Berlin Plus".

Dec 1998  
At a summit in St Malo, France and the United Kingdom make a joint statement affirming the EU's determination to establish a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

April 1999
At the Washington Summit, Heads of State and Government decide to develop the "Berlin Plus" arrangements.

**June 1999**
European Council meeting in Cologne decides "to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence".

**Dec 1999**
At the Helsinki Council meeting, EU members establish military "headline goals" to allow the EU, by 2003, to deploy up to 60,000 troops for 'Petersberg tasks'. EU members also create political and military structures including a Political and Security Committee, a Military Committee and a Military Staff. The crisis-management role of the WEU is transferred to the EU. The WEU retains residual tasks.

**Sep 2000**
The North Atlantic Council and the interim Political and Security Committee of the European Union meet for the first time to take stock of progress in NATO-EU relations.

**Dec 2000**
Signature of the EU's Treaty of Nice containing amendments reflecting the operative developments of the ESDP as an independent EU policy (entry into force February 2003).

**Jan 2001**
Beginning of institutionalised relations between NATO and the EU with the establishment of joint meetings, including at the level of foreign ministers and ambassadors. Exchange of letters between the NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency on the scope of cooperation and modalities for consultation.

**May 2001**
First formal NATO-EU meeting at the level of foreign ministers in Budapest. The NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency issue a joint statement on the Western Balkans.

**Nov 2002**
At the Prague Summit, NATO members declare their readiness to give the EU access to NATO assets and capabilities for operations in which the Alliance is not engaged militarily.
Dec 2002    EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP.

March 2003   Agreement on the framework for cooperation. Entry into force of a NATO-EU security of information agreement. Transition from the NATO-led Operation Allied Harmony to the EU-led Operation Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

May 2003     First meeting of the NATO-EU Capability Group.

July 2003    Development of a common strategy for the Western Balkans.

Nov 2003     First joint NATO-EU crisis-management exercise.

Feb 2004     France, Germany and the United Kingdom launch the idea of EU rapid-reaction units composed of joint battle groups.

Dec 2004     Beginning of the EU-led Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Sep 2005     Transatlantic (NATO-EU) informal ministerial dinner (New York).

Oct 2005     Agreement on Military Permanent Arrangements establishing a NATO Permanent Liaison Team at EUMS and an EU cell at SHAPE.

Nov 2005     NATO Permanent Liaison Team set up at the EU Military Staff.

March 2006   EU cell set up at SHAPE.

April 2006   Transatlantic informal ministerial dinner gathering NATO and EU Foreign Affairs ministers (Sofia)

Sep 2006     Transatlantic informal ministerial dinner gathering NATO and EU Foreign Affairs ministers (New York)

Jan 2007     Transatlantic informal ministerial dinner gathering NATO and EU Foreign Affairs ministers (Brussels)
April 2007  Transatlantic informal ministerial dinner gathering NATO and EU Foreign Affairs ministers (Oslo)

Sep 2007  Transatlantic informal ministerial dinner gathering NATO and EU Foreign Affairs ministers (New York)

Dec 2007  Transatlantic informal ministerial dinner gathering NATO and EU Foreign Affairs ministers (Brussels)

Sep 2008  Transatlantic informal ministerial dinner gathering NATO and EU Foreign Affairs ministers (New York)

Dec 2008  Transatlantic informal ministerial dinner gathering NATO and EU Foreign Affairs ministers (Brussels)

March 2009  Transatlantic informal ministerial dinner gathering NATO and EU Foreign Affairs ministers (Brussels)

Sep 2010  Transatlantic informal ministerial dinner gathering NATO and EU Foreign Affairs ministers (New York)

Dec 2010  At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, the Allies underline their determination to improve the NATO-EU strategic partnership and welcome recent initiatives from several Allies and ideas proposed by the Secretary General to enhance the NATO-EU cooperation.

Sep 2011  Transatlantic informal ministerial dinner gathering NATO and EU Foreign Affairs ministers (New York)

Sep 2012  Transatlantic informal ministerial dinner gathering NATO and EU Foreign Affairs ministers (New York)

Feb 2013  On 11 February, the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, visits NATO Headquarters.

May 2013
The NATO Secretary General addresses the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs and Subcommittee on Security and Defence.

**June 2013**
The NATO Secretary General participates in an informal meeting of EU Foreign Ministers.

**Dec 2013**
The Secretary General addresses the European Council in Brussels.

**March 2014**
On 5 March, NATO and EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) Ambassadors hold informal talks on Ukraine.

**June 2014**
On 10 June, NATO and EU PSC Ambassadors hold more informal talks on Ukraine.

3. Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
NATO’s relations with the OSCE

NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) work together to build security and promote stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. They cooperate at both the political and the operational level in areas such as conflict prevention and resolution, post-conflict rehabilitation, crisis management, as well as in addressing new security challenges.

At the political level, NATO and the OSCE consult each other on thematic and regional security issues of common interest such as border security and disarmament. At the operational level, cooperation in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation has been particularly active in the Western Balkans.

The two organisations complement each other’s efforts on the ground. NATO initiatives to support defence reform, including arms control, mine clearance and the destruction of
stockpiles of arms and munitions, dovetail with OSCE efforts aimed at preventing conflict and 
restoring stability after conflict. Close cooperation between NATO and the OSCE is an important 
element in the development of an international “Comprehensive Approach” to crisis 
management, which requires the effective application of both military and civilian means. At the 
Lisbon Summit in 2010, the Allies decided to enhance NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive 
approach to crisis management as part of the international community’s effort and to improve 
NATO’s ability to deliver stabilisation and reconstruction effects.

At recent summits, the Allies have reiterated the importance of the OSCE’s role in regional 
security and as a forum for dialogue on issues relevant to Euro-Atlantic security. Encompassing 
the political/ military, economic/ environmental and human dimensions, the OSCE plays an 
important role in promoting security and cooperation. The Allies aim to further enhance NATO’s 
cooperation with the OSCE.

▲ Political dialogue

NATO and the OSCE regularly exchange views and information on key security-related 
issues such as border security, disarmament, arms control (in particular, controlling the 
spread of small arms and light weapons), energy security and terrorism. The two 
organisations also cooperate on environmental issues that are a threat to security, 
stability and peace through the Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC)¹.

In recent years, dialogue has expanded to include terrorism and other emerging security 
challenges, which are among the priority areas for each of the two organisations. 
Following the Prague Summit in 2002 – when NATO Allies expressed their desire to exploit 
the complementarity of international efforts aimed at reinforcing stability in the 
Mediterranean region – NATO and the OSCE began developing closer contacts regarding 
their respective dialogues with countries in the region.

Political relations between NATO and the OSCE are governed today by the “Platform for 
Co-operative Security”, which was launched by the OSCE in 1999 at the NATO Istanbul 
Summit. Via the Platform, the OSCE called upon the international organisations whose 
members adhere to its principles and commitments, to reinforce their cooperation and to 
draw upon the resources of the international community in order to restore democracy, 
prosperity and stability in Europe and beyond.

Since the Platform was adopted, experts from both NATO and the OSCE have met 
regularly to discuss operational and political issues of common interest in the areas of 
conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction operations. 
Moreover, in December 2003, the OSCE’s "Strategy to Address Threats to Security and 
Stability in the 21st Century" recalls the need – in a constantly changing security
environment – to interact with other organisations and institutions taking advantage of the assets and strengths of each other.

Dialogue also takes place at a higher political level. The NATO Secretary General is occasionally invited to speak at the OSCE Annual Security Review Conference. The OSCE Secretary General addressed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) Ambassadors meeting in 2007 and 2008. NATO regularly participates in the annual meetings of the OSCE Ministerial Council, as an observer. The OSCE Chairperson-in-Office is also invited to some of the meetings held at NATO Headquarters in Brussels.

1. The NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme is associated with the ENVSEC, which brings together NATO, the OSCE, the Regional Environmental Center, the United Nations (UN) Development Programme, the UN Economic Commission for Europe and the UN Environment Programme.

Cooperation in the Western Balkans

Practical cooperation between the OSCE and NATO is best exemplified by the complementary missions that have been undertaken by both organisations in the Western Balkans.

Within the framework of operations conducted in the Western Balkans region, representatives from both organisations in the field have met regularly to share information and discuss various aspects of their cooperation.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

In 1996, further to the Dayton Agreements and the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1031 in December 1995, NATO and the OSCE developed a joint action programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and its successor the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) have provided vital support for implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace agreements.

NATO assisted the OSCE in its work in the area of arms control and confidence and security-building measures in the country. By providing security for OSCE personnel and humanitarian assistance, NATO has, *inter alia*, contributed to the proper conduct of elections under OSCE auspices.

**Kosovo**
Between January 1998 and March 1999, the OSCE mounted a Kosovo Verification Mission to monitor compliance on the ground with the Holbrooke-Milosevic cease-fire agreement. NATO conducted a parallel aerial surveillance mission. Following a deterioration in security conditions, the verification mission was forced to withdraw in March 1999.

Since the adoption of UNSCR 1244 in June 1999, a new OSCE Mission in Kosovo was established as part of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). It is tasked, among other things, with supervising the progress of democratisation, building of institutions, and the protection of human rights. The mission - the largest of the OSCE's field operations - has been maintaining close relations with the Kosovo Force (KFOR), which has a mandate from the United Nations to guarantee a safe environment for the work of the international community.

**The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia**

NATO also had close cooperation with the OSCE in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, where a NATO Task Force provided additional security for international monitors in early 2000. Today, the NATO Liaison Office in Skopje continues to exchange information with the OSCE Mission to Skopje.

**Border security**

NATO and the OSCE also cooperated in the management and securing of borders in the Western Balkans. At a high-level conference held in Ohrid in May 2003, five Western Balkans countries endorsed a Common Platform developed by the European Union, NATO, the OSCE and the then Stability Pact for South-East Europe aimed at enhancing border security in the region. Each organisation supported those players, involved in the areas within its jurisdiction. Cooperation in the area of border security has now been extended to Central Asia, where the two organisations carry out complementary projects and programmes.

2. Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
NATO's primary objective in Afghanistan is to enable the Afghan authorities to provide effective security across the country and ensure that the country can never again be a safe haven for terrorists. Since August 2003, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been conducting security operations, while also training and developing the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). ISAF was established on the basis of a request for assistance by the Afghan authorities and under a United Nations (UN) mandate.

In 2011, as agreed with the Afghan authorities, a process of transition of full security responsibility to the Afghan security forces and institutions was launched. That process has been implemented as scheduled and is due to be completed at the end of 2014, when ISAF's mission will end. As also agreed with the Afghan authorities, NATO plans to lead a follow-on non-combat mission (called “Resolute Support”) to train, advise and assist the ANSF after 2014, and to continue to contribute to the long-term financial sustainment of those forces.
Wider cooperation and political consultation will also continue within the framework of the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership, signed in 2010 at NATO's Lisbon Summit. NATO's Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan carries forward the Alliance's political-military objectives there, liaising with the Afghan government, civil society, and representatives of the international community and neighbouring countries.

ISAF's mission

Deployed in 2001 – initially under the lead of individual NATO Allies on a six-month rotational basis – ISAF was tasked, on the request of the Afghan government and under a UN mandate, to assist the Afghan government in maintaining security, originally in and around Kabul exclusively. NATO agreed to take command of the force in August 2003 and the UN Security Council subsequently mandated the gradual expansion of ISAF's operations to cover the whole country by October 2006. ISAF is in Afghanistan at the express wish of the democratically elected government of Afghanistan.

As of April 2014, 48 nations are contributing troops to the mission, including 21 non-NATO partners. (For more information on contributing nations and troop numbers, see ISAF "placemat" in margin.)

As part of the international community's overall effort, ISAF is working to create the conditions whereby the Afghan government is able to exercise its authority throughout the country, including the development of professional and capable Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). In so doing, ISAF helps create a secure environment for improving governance and socio-economic development and creating sustainable stability across Afghanistan.

The transition to Afghan lead for security and beyond

By the end of 2014, Afghan National Security Forces will assume full security responsibility for their people and country, and ISAF's mission will end. The process of transition to full Afghan security responsibility – known as “Inteqal” in Dari and Pashtu – was launched in 2011 and is well underway. Following the launch of the fifth and final tranche of the transition process in June 2013, Afghan forces are in the lead for security across the whole country.
Increasing ANSF capacity and leadership has allowed the ISAF mission to evolve, shifting progressively from a combat-centric role to a more enabling role focusing on training, advising and assisting the ANSF to ensure that they are able to assume their full security responsibilities by the end of transition. ISAF continues to provide combat support, as necessary, while pursuing a measured redeployment in a coordinated and coherent manner, until the scheduled completion of transition at the end of 2014.

NATO’s commitment to Afghanistan after the completion of the transition process stands firm. At NATO’s Summit in Chicago in May 2012, Allies agreed to a follow-on NATO-led non-combat mission to continue supporting the development of the Afghan security forces post-2014. The NATO-led post-2014 mission will not be a combat mission. It will be a mission to provide training, advice and assistance activities at the security ministries and national institutional levels and the higher levels of army and police command across the country. Resolute Support will initially have approximately 12,000 personnel from NATO Allies and partner countries. It will operate with one hub (Kabul/Bagram) and four spokes (Mazar-e Sharif, Herat, Kandahar and Jalalabad). The detailed operational plan for Resolute Support was approved by the foreign ministers of NATO member and partner countries at the end of June 2014. This is an important step in finalising the necessary preparations to establish this new, NATO-led mission. However, Resolute Support will only be launched if the necessary legal framework is in place.

At the Chicago Summit, Allied leaders and their partners committed to play their part in the financial sustainment of the ANSF after 2014. The responsibility to contribute to the financing of this effort is one for the international community as a whole. NATO has participated in that process, by supporting development of appropriate, coherent and effective funding mechanisms and expenditure arrangements for all strands of the ANSF.

Wider cooperation and political consultation between NATO and Afghanistan beyond 2014 is also being developed within the framework of the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership, whose declaration was signed by NATO and the Afghan government at NATO’s Lisbon Summit in 2010 (see below).

NATO’s continued commitment to Afghanistan after 2014 will remain part of a collective effort by the international community. At the July 2012 Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan (Tokyo Declaration), the broader international community and the Afghan government laid the groundwork for the sustainable development of Afghanistan, taking into account the situation after 2014. At the conference, the Afghan government also made clear commitments to making progress in a number of areas, including: to hold inclusive, transparent and credible elections; to fight corruption and improve good governance; to
uphold the constitution, especially human rights; and to enforce the rule of law. (Tokyo Annex on mutual accountability).

Building the capacity of Afghan National Security Forces

Developing professional, capable and self-sustaining Afghan National Security Forces has been at the centre of ISAF’s efforts and the core mission of the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A). This enables implementation of the transition process until end 2014 and will also guide NATO’s commitment to Afghanistan over the long term. ISAF has helped build up the ANSF from scratch to approximately 350,000 soldiers and police officers. Since its creation in 2002, the Afghan National Army (ANA) has been progressively moving from an infantry-centric force to a fully-fledged army to comprise both fighting elements and enabling capabilities - such as military police, intelligence, route clearance, combat support, medical, aviation, and logistics. The role of the Afghan National Police (ANP) is shifting from countering the insurgency to a more civilian policing role, by further developing capabilities ranging from criminal investigations to traffic control. The Afghan Air Force has been steadily increasing its personnel, including aircrew and maintenance and support personnel, and its fleet of fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft.

Today, the ANSF conduct 95 per cent of conventional operations and 98 per cent of Special Forces operations.

NATO’s training, mentoring and advising role in Afghanistan

NATO’s Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) was established on 21 November 2009, bringing together NATO and national training efforts under one umbrella. It has worked in close partnership with the Afghan Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior, as well as the European Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL).

Upon its creation, NTM-A’s key tasks included the provision of training and mentoring to the ANSF, support to the ANA’s institutional training base, and the ANP reform at the district level and below. It also aimed to address the ANA enabling capability shortfalls (including close air support, medical evacuation and intelligence) through ‘train the trainer’ programmes.

NTM-A’s efforts have been complemented by those of ISAF’s Joint Command (IJC), which is responsible for developing fielded ANSF units through advising and assisting teams. Originally, these teams were the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and the Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (POMLTs). These have gradually
evolved into Military Advisory Teams (MATs) and Police Advisory Teams (PATs), respectively. All these teams are now more generically called Security Force Assistance Teams (SFATs).

As the ANSF grew in size and capacity, NTM-A has been reorganised and its functions are now performed under IJC command. With most training now being performed by the Afghan security forces themselves, capacity building efforts are now focused on providing advice at the ministerial level.

NATO’s Enduring Partnership with Afghanistan

At the 2010 Summit, NATO and Afghanistan reaffirmed their long-term ties with the signing of a Declaration on Enduring Partnership. The document provides a framework for long-term political consultations and practical cooperation between NATO and Afghanistan after 2014. The initial set of Enduring Partnership activities, agreed by foreign ministers in April 2011, brings together a number of previously separate initiatives. Over time, the Enduring Partnership will evolve to reflect the changing nature of NATO’s mission and its relationship with Afghanistan.

Cooperation within the framework of the Enduring Partnership currently includes:

- Capacity-building efforts, such as professional military education programmes;
- the Building Integrity Programme, which provides tools to help strengthen integrity, transparency and accountability and reduce the risk of corruption in defence and security sectors assisting in the process of further normalisation of the Afghan civil aviation sector;
- the SILK-Afghanistan project which provides affordable, high-speed Internet access via satellite and fibre optics to Afghan universities and governmental institutions in Kabul;
- training in civil emergency planning and disaster preparedness;
- and public diplomacy efforts to promote a better understanding of NATO and its role in Afghanistan.

Working with partners
Addressing Afghanistan's challenges requires a comprehensive approach, involving civilian and military actors, aimed not only at providing security but also at promoting good governance, the rule of law and long-term development. The Alliance acts in a supporting role to the Afghan government and works in close coordination with other international partners, including the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, the World Bank, the European Union and the development community.

The Alliance also works closely with many non-member countries to help secure Afghanistan's future. Currently, ISAF troop contributors include 21 partners from as far afield as Australia and Latin America. Altogether, they represent almost a quarter of all the member countries of the United Nations, underlining the broad international support for ISAF's mission. Over the years, Australia, Georgia and Jordan have been among the top non-NATO troop-contributing nations.

Beyond troop contributors, many partners are supporting ISAF's mission and the international community's objectives in Afghanistan in other ways, such as through over-flight and transit rights, or through financial support for building ANSF capacity and for development projects.
ISAF's mission in Afghanistan

NATO's primary objective in Afghanistan is to enable the Afghan government to provide effective security across the country and develop new Afghan security forces to ensure Afghanistan can never again become a safe haven for terrorists. The 48 nations which make up the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are supporting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in the conduct of security operations throughout the country. Since 2011, responsibility for security has gradually been transitioned to the Afghans and ISAF's mission has shifted from a combat-centric role to a more enabling role focusing on training, advising and assisting. With the launch of the final stage of the transition process in June 2013, the Afghan forces have taken the lead for security across the whole country.
ISAF’s priorities

In support of the Afghan government, ISAF is helping the ANSF to reduce the capability and the will of the insurgency and to progressively increase the ANSF capacity and capability. ISAF is also helping to create the space and lay the foundations for improvements in governance and socio-economic development to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability.

ISAF provides support to the government and international community in security sector reform, including mentoring, training and operational support to the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). The aim is to build professional, independent and sustainable ANA and ANP forces that are able to provide security and law enforcement to the Afghan people throughout the country. This work is carried out jointly by the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) and ISAF’s Joint Command (IJC), together with the European Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) and other important national actors. NTM-A focuses on training initial recruits and building the institutional training capability of the ANSF, while the IJC is responsible for developing fielded ANSF units through advice and assistance.

ISAF has also contributed to reconstruction and development in Afghanistan through multinational Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) - led by individual ISAF nations - securing areas in which reconstruction work is conducted by national and international actors. Where appropriate – and in close coordination and cooperation with the Afghan government and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) – ISAF has provided practical support for reconstruction and development efforts as well as support for humanitarian assistance efforts conducted by other actors.

PRTs have also helped the Afghan authorities strengthen the institutions required to fully establish good governance and the rule of law, as well as to promote human rights. The principal role of the PRTs in this respect has been to build capacity, support the growth of governance structures and promote an environment in which governance can improve.

By the time transition to Afghan full security responsibility is completed at the end of 2014, all PRTs will have been phased out and their functions handed over to the Afghan government, traditional development actors, non-governmental organisations and the private sector.

ISAF Mission Evolution
Transition to full Afghan security responsibility started in July 2011 and is well underway. The ANSF are growing stronger and more capable. As a result, ISAF's role has changed from leading operations to enabling the Afghan security forces to conduct independent operations themselves.

This means that ISAF's mission has evolved from one focused primarily on combat to an enabling Security Force Assistance (SFA) role, which centres on training, advising and assisting its Afghan partners. The aim of this evolution is to ensure that ISAF continues to support the development of ANSF operational effectiveness, so that they are able to fully assume their security responsibilities by the completion of the transition to full Afghan security responsibility at the end of 2014.

As the ANSF progress towards that goal, the ISAF forces are gradually stepping back and starting to redeploy to their home countries. This drawdown is taking place in a coordinated, measured and gradual way in line with the ANSF's capacity to manage the security situation.

An important milestone was reached on 18 June 2013, when the fifth and last tranche of transition areas was announced by the Afghan government. With that, the ANSF took the lead for security across the country. This was a critical step in the transition towards full Afghan security responsibility by end 2014, which was agreed with the Afghan government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon in 2010 and reaffirmed at the NATO Summit in Chicago in 2012. (More on ISAF mission evolution)

ISAF's mission in Afghanistan will cease at the end of 2014. However, as agreed by Allied leaders and their ISAF partners with the Afghan government at the Chicago Summit in May 2012, NATO will lead a new mission to continue training, advising and assisting the Afghan National Security Forces after 2014. The post-2014 mission will be called “Resolute Support” and will not be a combat mission. It will be smaller in size and will focus on the security ministries and national institutional levels and on the higher levels of army and police commands. Resolute Support will initially have approximately 12,000 personnel from NATO Allies and partner countries. It will operate with one hub (Kabul/Bagram) and four spokes (Mazar-e Sharif, Herat, Kandahar and Jalalabad). The operational plan for Resolute Support has been finalised. The mission will only be launched if the required legal framework is in place.
ISAF's mandate

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been deployed since 2001 on the basis of a request for assistance by the Afghan authorities and a UN Security Council mandate, which authorised the establishment of the force to assist the Afghan government in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas – in particular to enable the Afghan authorities as well as UN personnel to operate in a secure environment.

At that time, the operation was limited to the Kabul area, and its command was assumed by ISAF nations on a rotational basis.

In August 2003, on the request of the UN and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, NATO took command of ISAF. Soon after, the UN mandated ISAF's gradual expansion outside of Kabul.

While not technically a UN force, ISAF is a UN-mandated international force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Eighteen UN Security Council Resolutions relate to ISAF, namely: 1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 1707, 1776, 1817, 1833, 1890, 1917, 1943, 2011, 2069, 2096, 2120, and 2145.

A detailed Military Technical Agreement agreed between the ISAF Commander and the Afghan Transitional Authority in January 2002 provides additional guidance for ISAF operations.

History of ISAF

Origin of ISAF

ISAF was created in accordance with the Bonn Conference in December 2001. Afghan opposition leaders attending the conference began the process of reconstructing their country by setting up a new government structure, namely the Afghan Transitional Authority. The concept of a UN-mandated international force to assist the newly established Afghan Transitional Authority was also launched on this occasion to create a secure environment in and around Kabul and support the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

These agreements paved the way for the creation of a three-way partnership between the Afghan Transitional Authority, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and ISAF.
**NATO takes on ISAF command**

On 11 August 2003, NATO assumed leadership of the ISAF operation, bringing the six-month national rotations to an end. The Alliance became responsible for the command, coordination and planning of the force, including the provision of a force commander and headquarters on the ground in Afghanistan.

This new leadership overcame the problem of a continual search to find new nations to lead the mission and the difficulties of setting up a new headquarters every six months in a complex environment. A continuing NATO headquarters also enables small countries, less able to take over leadership responsibility, to play a strong role within a multinational headquarters.

**Expansion of ISAF’s presence in Afghanistan**

ISAF’s mandate was initially limited to providing security in and around Kabul. In October 2003, the United Nations extended ISAF’s mandate to cover the whole of Afghanistan (UNSCR 1510), paving the way for an expansion of the mission across the country.

- **Stage 1: to the north**

  In December 2003, the North Atlantic Council authorised the then Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General James Jones, to initiate the expansion of ISAF by taking over command of the German-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kunduz. The other eight PRTs operating in Afghanistan in 2003 remained under the command of Operation Enduring Freedom, the continuing US-led military operation in Afghanistan.

  On 31 December 2003, the military component of the Kunduz PRT was placed under ISAF command as a pilot project and first step in the expansion of the mission.

  Six months later, on 28 June 2004, at the Summit meeting of the NATO Heads of State and Government in Istanbul, NATO announced that it would establish four other PRTs in the north of the country: in Mazar-e Sharif, Meymaneh, Feyzabad and Baghlan.

  This process was completed on 1 October 2004, marking the completion of the first phase of ISAF’s expansion. ISAF’s area of operations then covered some 3,600 square kilometres in the north and the mission was able to influence security in nine northern provinces of the country.

- **Stage 2: to the west**

  On 10 February 2005, NATO announced that ISAF would be further expanded, into the west of Afghanistan.
This process began on 31 May 2006, when ISAF took on command of two additional PRTs, in the provinces of Herat and Farah and of a Forward Support Base (a logistic base) in Herat.

At the beginning of September, two further ISAF-led PRTs in the west became operational, one in Chaghcharan, capital of Ghor Province, and one in Qala-e-Naw, capital of Badghis Province, completing ISAF’s expansion into the west.

The extended ISAF mission led a total of nine PRTs, in the north and the west, providing security assistance in 50 per cent of Afghanistan’s territory. The Alliance continued to make preparations to further expand ISAF, to the south of the country.

In September 2005, the Alliance also temporarily deployed 2,000 additional troops to Afghanistan to support the 18 September provincial and parliamentary elections.

- **Stage 3: to the south**

plan that paved the way for an expanded ISAF role and presence in Afghanistan.

The first element of this plan was the expansion of ISAF to the south in 2006, also known as Stage 3.

This was implemented on 31 July 2006, when ISAF assumed command of the southern region of Afghanistan from the US-led coalition forces, expanding its area of operations to cover an additional six provinces – Daykundi, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimruz, Uruzgan and Zabul – and taking on command of four additional PRTs.

The expanded ISAF led a total of 13 PRTs in the north, west and south, covering some three-quarters of Afghanistan’s territory.

The number of ISAF forces in the country also increased significantly, from about 10,000 prior to the expansion to about 20,000 after.

- **Stage 4: ISAF expands to the east, takes responsibility for entire country**

On 5 October 2006, ISAF implemented the final stage of its expansion, by taking on command of the international military forces in eastern Afghanistan from the US-led coalition.

In addition to expanding the Alliance’s area of operations, the revised operational plan also paved the way for a greater ISAF role in the country. This includes the deployment of
ISAF training and mentoring teams to Afghan National Army units at various levels of command.
Inteqal: Transition to Afghan lead

Inteqal – the Dari and Pashtu word for transition – is the process by which the lead responsibility for security in Afghanistan is gradually being transitioned from the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the Afghan National Security Forces. The aim is for Afghan forces to have full responsibility for security across the country by the end of 2014. This target was set at the 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon and confirmed by Allied leaders at the Chicago Summit in May 2012.

Transition Tranches
Transition Tranche 1

On 22 March 2011, President Karzai announced the first set of Afghan provinces and districts to start transition. This decision was based upon operational, political and economic considerations, drawing on the assessment and recommendations of the Afghan government and NATO/ISAF through the Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board (JANIB).

Transition Tranche 2

On 27 November 2011, following the decision-making process above, President Karzai announced the second set of Afghan provinces, districts and cities for transition implementation.

Transition Tranche 3

On 13 May 2012, President Karzai announced the third set of areas to enter the transition process, covering over 75 per cent of the Afghan population. This decision marked the beginning of transition in every one of the 34 provinces of Afghanistan, including every provincial capital, covering almost two-thirds of the country's districts.

Transition Tranche 4

On 31 December 2012, President Karzai announced the fourth group of Afghan provinces, cities and districts to enter the transition process. With this decision, 23 provinces out of 34 have fully entered transition and 87 per cent of the
population now lives in areas where ANSF is in the lead for security.

**Transition Tranche 5**

On 18 June 2013, President Karzai announced the launch of the fifth and final tranche of transition. Once this decision has been fully implemented, the 11 remaining provinces will fully enter into transition and Afghan forces will be in the lead for security across the whole country.

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### Transition Process explained

Transition draws on the JANIB's recommendations, which are based on a thorough assessment of the security, governance and development situation on the ground.

The following elements are taken into consideration as part of the decision-making process:

- the capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to shoulder additional security tasks with less assistance from ISAF;
- the level of security allowing the population to pursue routine daily activities;
- the degree of development of local governance, so that security will not be undermined as ISAF assistance is reduced; and
- whether ISAF force level and posture are readjusted as ANSF capabilities increase and threat levels diminish.

For transition to be successful, the Afghan National Security Forces, under effective Afghan civilian control, need to assume their security responsibility on a sustainable and irreversible basis – albeit with some level of continued support from ISAF.

The transition implementation can take up to 18 months for each area, depending on conditions on the ground.

**ISAF principles for transition**
At the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010, ISAF Heads of State and Government agreed a list of principles which guide ISAF’s gradual shift from a combat to an increasingly supporting role.

These principles, which have since been fully incorporated in the transition implementation process, include:

- ensuring a better alignment of NATO/ISAF assistance with Afghan national priority programmes;
- working through increasingly capable Afghan institutions;
- adjusting ISAF’s troop profile and configuration by reinvesting some of the transition dividend, where appropriate, to meet critical security, training and mentoring needs;
- further strengthening Afghan National Security Forces capacity; and
- supporting the evolution of the international civilian effort, including that of the ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), to enable greater Afghan capacity and leadership.

**Evolution of Provincial Reconstruction Teams**

In June 2011, Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) nations agreed a set of principles for the evolution and ultimate dissolution of their PRTs. PRTs have evolved, shifting their efforts from direct delivery to providing technical assistance and building the capacity of provincial and district governments to provide essential services to the Afghan people. By the time transition is completed, all PRTs will have handed over their functions to the Afghan government, traditional development actors, non-governmental organisations and the private sector, and will have phased out.

**Key Dates**

- **28 August 2008** Lead security responsibility for Kabul city transferred to Afghan forces.
- **19 November 2009** President Karzai, having won a second presidential term, expresses his ambition to see the Afghan National Security Forces take the lead security responsibility across Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
- **20 July 2010**
Kabul Conference; the Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board (JANIB) is established as the mechanism to assess districts and provinces for transition.

20 November 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit; the Inteqal process is agreed between the Afghan government and NATO.

22 March 2011 Afghan New Year; President Karzai announces the first set of Afghan provinces and districts to start the transition process.

17 July 2011 First transition ceremony takes place in Bamiyan Province.

27 November 2011 President Karzai announces the second set of Afghan provinces, districts and cities to start the transition process.

13 May 2012 President Karzai announces the third tranche of transition.

31 December 2012 President Karzai announces the fourth set of Afghan provinces, districts and cities to start the transition process.

18 June 2013 Official ceremony during which President Karzai announces the fifth and final tranche of transition.

Video

Archived material - Information valid up to 3 September 2014
NATO operations and missions

NATO is an active and leading contributor to peace and security on the international stage. Through its crisis-management operations, the Alliance demonstrates both its willingness to act as a positive force for change and its capacity to meet the security challenges of the 21st century.

Since its first major peace-support operation in the Balkans in the early 1990s, the tempo and diversity of NATO operations have increased. NATO has been engaged in missions that cover the full spectrum of crisis-management operations – from combat and peacekeeping, to training and logistics support, to surveillance and humanitarian relief. Today, approximately 55,000 military personnel are engaged in NATO missions around the world, successfully managing complex ground, air and naval operations in all types of environment. These forces are currently operating in Afghanistan, Kosovo, the Mediterranean, off the Horn of Africa and in Somalia.
Current operations and missions

**NATO in Afghanistan**

Afghanistan constitutes the Alliance’s most significant operational commitment to date. Established by United Nations (UN) mandate in 2001, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been under NATO leadership since August 2003.

ISAF currently comprises approximately 50,000 troops from 48 different countries deployed throughout Afghanistan. Its mission is to extend the authority of the Afghan central government in order to create an environment conducive to the functioning of democratic institutions and the establishment of the rule of law. It also aims to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a safe haven for terrorists.

In addition to its reconstruction role, a major component of ISAF is the establishment of professional Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to enable Afghans to assume responsibility for the security of their country.

By end 2014, gradual transition of security responsibility from ISAF troops to the Afghan army and police forces will be fully implemented and the ISAF mission will come to a close. During that period, ISAF will increasingly shift to a training and advising role, but will continue to support combat operations alongside Afghan forces, as necessary. Beyond 2014, NATO has stated its commitment to supporting Afghanistan, namely with the sustainment of the ANSF. This will include training, advising, assisting and contributing funds to sustain the ANSF.

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**NATO in Kosovo**

While Afghanistan remains NATO’s primary operational theatre, the Alliance has not faltered on its other commitments, particularly in the Balkans. Today, just under 5,000 Allied troops operate in Kosovo as part of NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR).
Having first entered Kosovo in June 1999 to end widespread violence and halt the humanitarian disaster, KFOR troops continue to maintain a strong presence throughout the territory, preserving the peace that was imposed by NATO fifteen years ago.

Following Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008, NATO agreed it would continue to maintain its presence on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1244. It has since helped to create a professional and multi-ethnic Kosovo Security Force, which is a lightly armed force responsible for security tasks that are not appropriate for the police. Meanwhile, progress has been achieved in the European Union-sponsored dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. The normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo is key to solving the political deadlock over northern Kosovo.

**Monitoring the Mediterranean Sea**

NATO operations are not limited only to zones of conflict. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, NATO immediately began to take measures to expand the options available to counter the threat of international terrorism. In October 2001, it launched the maritime surveillance operation Active Endeavour, focused on detecting and deterring terrorist activity in the Mediterranean.

Since April 2003, NATO has been systematically boarding suspect ships. These boardings take place with the compliance of the ships’ masters and flag states and in accordance with international law.

The increased NATO presence in these waters has benefited all shipping travelling through the Straits of Gibraltar by improving perceptions of security. More generally, the operation has proved to be an effective tool both in safeguarding a strategic maritime region and in countering terrorism on and from the high seas. Additionally, the experience and partnerships developed through Operation Active Endeavour have considerably enhanced NATO’s capabilities in this increasingly vital aspect of operations.

**Counter-piracy off the Horn of Africa**

Building on previous counter-piracy missions conducted by NATO (Operation Allied Provider and Operation Allied Protector - see below), Operation Ocean Shield is focusing on at-sea counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa. Approved on 17 August 2009 by the North Atlantic Council, this operation is contributing to international efforts to combat piracy in the area. It is also offering, to regional states that request it, assistance in developing their own capacity to combat piracy activities.

**Supporting the African Union**
Well beyond the Euro-Atlantic region, the Alliance continues to support the African Union (AU) in its peacekeeping missions on the African continent.

Since June 2007, NATO has assisted the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by providing airlift support for AU peacekeepers. Following renewed AU requests, the North Atlantic Council has agreed to extend its support on several occasions and continues to do so. NATO is also working with the AU in identifying further areas where it could support the African Standby Force.

### Terminated operations and missions

**NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

With the break-up of Yugoslavia, violent conflict started in Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1992. The Alliance responded as early as summer 1992 when it enforced the UN arms embargo on weapons in the Adriatic Sea (in cooperation with the Western European Union from 1993) and enforced a no-fly-zone declared by the UN Security Council. It was during the monitoring of the no-fly-zone that NATO engaged in the first combat operations in its history by shooting down four Bosnian Serb fighter-bombers conducting a bombing mission on 28 February 1994.

In August 1995, to compel an end to Serb-led violence in the country, UN peacekeepers requested NATO airstrikes. Operation Deadeye began on 30 August against Bosnian Serb air forces, but failed to result in Bosnian Serb compliance with the UN’s demands to withdraw. This led to Operation Deliberate Force, which targeted Bosnian Serb command and control installations and ammunition facilities. This NATO air campaign was a key factor in bringing the Serbs to the negotiating table and ending the war in Bosnia.

With the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord in December 1995, NATO immediately deployed a UN-mandated Implementation Force (IFOR) comprising some 60,000 troops. This operation (Operation Joint Endeavour) was followed in December 1996 by the deployment of a 32,000-strong Stabilisation Force (SFOR).

In light of the improved security situation, NATO brought its peace-support operation to a conclusion in December 2004 and the European Union deployed a new force called Operation Althea. The Alliance has maintained a military headquarters in the country to carry out a number of specific tasks related, in particular, to assisting the government in reforming its defence structures.

**NATO in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹**
Responding to a request from the Government in Skopje to help mitigate rising ethnic tension, NATO implemented three successive operations there from August 2001 to March 2003.

First, Operation Essential Harvest disarmed ethnic Albanian groups operating throughout the country.

The follow-on Operation Amber Fox provided protection for international monitors overseeing the implementation of the peace plan.

Finally, Operation Allied Harmony was launched in December 2002 to provide advisory elements to assist the government in ensuring stability throughout the country.

These operations in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia demonstrated the strong inter-institutional cooperation between NATO, the European Union and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. NATO remains committed to helping the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures. To that end, NATO Headquarters Skopje was created in April 2002 to advise on military aspects of security sector reform; it still operates today.

**NATO's first counter-terrorism operation**

On 4 October 2001, once it had been determined that the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. had come from abroad, NATO agreed on a package of eight measures to support the United States. On the request of the United States, the Alliance launched its first-ever counter-terrorism operation – Operation Eagle Assist - from mid-October 2001 to mid-May 2002.

It consisted of seven NATO AWACS radar aircraft that helped patrol the skies over the United States; in total 830 crew members from 13 NATO countries flew over 360 sorties. This was the first time that NATO military assets were deployed in support of an Article 5 operation.

**The second Gulf Conflict**

During the second Gulf Conflict, NATO deployed NATO AWACS radar aircraft and air defence batteries to enhance the defence of Turkey. The operation started on 20 February, lasted until 16 April 2003 and was called Operation Display Deterrence. The AWACS aircraft flew 100 missions with a total of 950 flying hours.

**Protecting public events**

In response to a request by the Greek government, NATO provided assistance to the Olympic and Paralympic Games held in Athens with Operation Distinguished Games on 18
June – 29 September 2004. NATO provided intelligence support, provision of Chemical, Biological Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) defence assets and AWACS radar aircraft. This was the first operation in which non-Article 4 or 5 NATO assistance was provided within the borders of a member country.

In the same vein, NATO responded to a request made by the Latvian government for assistance in assuring the security of the Riga Summit in November 2006. NATO provided technical security, CBRN response capabilities, air and sea policing, improvised explosive device (IED) detections, communications and information systems and medical evacuation support.

**NATO and Iraq**

NATO conducted a relatively small but important support operation in Iraq from 2004 to 2011 that consisted of training, mentoring and assisting the Iraqi Security Forces. At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, the Allies rose above their differences and agreed to be part of the international effort to help Iraq establish effective and accountable security forces. The outcome was the creation of the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I). The NTM-I delivered its training, advice and mentoring support in a number of different settings. All NATO member countries contributed to the training effort either in or outside of Iraq, through financial contributions or donations of equipment. In parallel and reinforcing this initiative, NATO also worked with the Iraqi government on a structured cooperation framework to develop the Alliance's long-term relationship with Iraq.

**Hurricane Katrina**

After Hurricane Katrina struck the south of the United States on 29 August 2005, causing many fatalities and widespread damage and flooding, the US government requested food, medical and logistics supplies and assistance in moving these supplies to stricken areas. On 9 September 2005, the North Atlantic Council approved a military plan to assist the United States, which consisted of helping to coordinate the movement of urgently needed material and supporting humanitarian relief operations. During the operation (9 September-2 October), nine member countries provided 189 tons of material to the United States.

**Pakistan earthquake relief assistance**

Just before the onset of the harsh Himalayan winter, a devastating earthquake hit Pakistan on 8 October 2005, killing an estimated 53,000 people, injuring 75,000 and making at least four million homeless. On 11 October, in response to a request from Pakistan, NATO assisted in the urgent relief effort, airlifting close to 3,500 tons of supplies
and deploying engineers, medical units and specialist equipment. This was one of NATO’s largest humanitarian relief initiatives, which came to an end on 1 February 2006.

Over time, the Alliance has helped to coordinate assistance to other countries hit by natural disasters, including Turkey, Ukraine and Portugal. It does this through its Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre.

**Assisting the African Union in Darfur, Sudan**

The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) aimed to end violence and improve the humanitarian situation in a region that has been suffering from conflict since 2003. From June 2005 to 31 December 2007, NATO provided air transport for some 37,000 AMIS personnel, as well as trained and mentored over 250 AMIS officials. While NATO’s support to this mission ended when AMIS was succeeded by the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the Alliance immediately expressed its readiness to consider any request for support to the new peacekeeping mission.

**Counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa**

From October to December 2008, NATO launched Operation Allied Provider, which involved counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia. Responding to a request from UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, NATO naval forces provided escorts to UN World Food Programme (WFP) vessels transiting through the dangerous waters in the Gulf of Aden, where growing piracy has threatened to undermine international humanitarian efforts in Africa.

Concurrently, in response to an urgent request from the African Union, these same NATO naval forces escorted a vessel chartered by the AU carrying equipment for the Burundi contingent deployed to AMISOM.

From March to August 2009, NATO launched Operation Allied Protector, a counter-piracy operation, to improve the safety of commercial maritime routes and international navigation off the Horn of Africa. The force conducted surveillance tasks and provided protection to deter and suppress piracy and armed robbery, which are threatening sea lines of communication and economic interests.

**NATO and Libya**

Following the popular uprising against the Qadhafi regime in Benghazi, Libya, in February 2011, the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted Resolutions 1970 and 1973 in support of the Libyan people, “condemning the gross and systematic violation of human rights”. The resolutions introduced active measures including a no-fly-zone, an arms
embargo and the authorisation for member countries, acting as appropriate through regional organisations, to take “all necessary measures” to protect Libyan civilians.

Initially, NATO enforced the no-fly-zone and then, on 31 March, NATO took over sole command and control of all military operations for Libya. The NATO-led “Operation Unified Protector” had three distinct components:

- the enforcement of an arms embargo on the high seas of the Mediterranean to prevent the transfer of arms, related material and mercenaries to Libya;
- the enforcement of a no-fly-zone in order to prevent any aircraft from bombing civilian targets; and
- air and naval strikes against those military forces involved in attacks or threats to attack Libyan civilians and civilian-populated areas.

The UN mandate was carried out to the letter and the operation was terminated on 31 October 2011 after having fulfilled its objectives.

From 1949 to the early 1990s

During the Cold War

When NATO was established in 1949, one of its fundamental roles was to act as a powerful deterrent against military aggression. In this role, NATO’s success was reflected in the fact that, throughout the entire period of the Cold War, NATO forces were not involved in a single military engagement. For much of the latter half of the 20th century, NATO remained vigilant and prepared.

After the Cold War

With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s came great changes to the international security environment. The Alliance witnessed the emergence of new threats and the resurgence of old but familiar ones.

With these changing conditions came new responsibilities. From being an exclusively defensive alliance for nearly half a century, NATO began to assume an increasingly proactive role within the international community. Before engaging in its first major crisis-response operation in the Balkans, NATO conducted several other military operations:

Operation Anchor Guard, 10 August 1990 – 9 March 1991

After Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, NATO Airborne Early Warning aircraft
deployed to Konya, Turkey, to monitor the crisis and provide coverage of southeastern Turkey in case of an Iraqi attack during the first Gulf Crisis/War.

In response to a Turkish request for assistance to meet the threat posed by Iraq during the first Gulf Crisis/War, NATO deployed the ACE Mobile Force (Air) and air defence packages to Turkey.

**Operation Allied Goodwill I & II**, 4-9 February & 27 February – 24 March 1992
Following the break-up of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the collapse of its centrally-controlled economic system, NATO assisted an international relief effort by flying teams of humanitarian assistance experts and medical advisors to Russia and other Commonwealth of Independent States nations using AWACS trainer cargo aircraft.

**Operation Agile Genie**, 1-19 May 1992
During a period of growing Western tension with Libya after the UN Security Council imposed sanctions designed to induce Libya to surrender suspects in the bombing of a Pan Am airliner over the town of Lockerbie in Scotland in 1988, NATO provided increased AWACS coverage of the Central Mediterranean to monitor air approach routes from the North African littoral. NATO AWACS aircraft flew a total of 36 missions with a total of 2,336 flying hours.
NATO's role in Kosovo

NATO has been leading a peace-support operation in Kosovo since June 1999 in support of wider international efforts to build peace and stability in the area.

Today, just under 5,000 troops from the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), provided by 31 countries continue to work towards maintaining a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement for all citizens and communities in Kosovo.

Throughout Kosovo, KFOR is cooperating and coordinating with the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and other international actors to support the development of a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic and peaceful Kosovo. In April 2013, Belgrade and Pristina reached an Agreement on Normalisation, which is helping to improve relations between both parties while
giving new momentum to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans. NATO and KFOR stand ready to support the implementation of this agreement within its means and capabilities.

Over time, as the security situation has improved, NATO has been gradually adjusting KFOR's force posture towards a smaller and more flexible force with fewer static tasks. All adjustments to force posture are decided by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) as the security situation on the ground evolves.

### KFOR's objectives

KFOR deployed into Kosovo on 12 June 1999, in the wake of a 78-day air campaign. This air campaign was launched by the Alliance in March 1999 to halt and reverse the humanitarian catastrophe that was then unfolding.

KFOR derives its mandate from United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 of 10 June 1999 and the Military-Technical Agreement between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia. KFOR operates under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and, as such, is a peace enforcement operation.

Today, KFOR continues to help maintain a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement for all people in Kosovo, according to its mandate, which is to:

- deter renewed hostility and threats against Kosovo by Yugoslav and Serb forces;
- establish a secure environment and ensure public safety and order;
- demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army;
- support the international humanitarian effort; and
- coordinate with, and support, the international civil presence.

### KFOR's tasks

**Initial tasks**

KFOR tasks have included assistance with the return or relocation of displaced persons and refugees; reconstruction and de-mining; medical assistance; security and public order; protection of patrimonial sites; border security; interdiction of cross-border weapons smuggling; implementation of a Kosovo-wide weapons, ammunition and explosives amnesty programme; weapons destruction; and support for the establishment of civilian institutions, law and order, the judicial and penal system, the electoral process and other aspects of the political, economic and social life of Kosovo.
Special attention continues to be paid to the protection of minorities. This includes regular patrols near minority enclaves, check points, escorts for minority groups, protection of heritage sites such as monasteries, and donations including food, clothes and school supplies.

**Additional tasks**

On 12 June 2008, NATO agreed to start implementing additional tasks in Kosovo, i.e. assist in the standing down of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and in the establishment of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF), as well as a civilian structure to oversee the KSF. The following tasks have been implemented in close coordination and consultation with the relevant local and international authorities:

- **Stand-down of the Kosovo Protection Corps**

  The KPC was conceived as a transitional post-conflict arrangement, under the responsibility of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo. Its mandate was to provide disaster-response services, perform search and rescue, provide a capacity for humanitarian assistance in isolated areas, assist de-mining and contribute to rebuilding infrastructure and communities.

  The KPC ceased its operational activities on 20 January 2009 and was formally dissolved on 14 June 2009. In parallel, the Kosovo Security Force was developed to ensure that key capabilities were available for emergency situations.

- **Stand-up of the Kosovo Security Force / NATO Liaison and Advisory Team**

  NATO has supervised the stand-up and training of a multi-ethnic, professional and civilian-controlled Kosovo Security Force. The KSF is a lightly armed volunteer force, with no heavy weapons such as tanks, heavy artillery or offensive air capability. It has primary responsibility for security tasks that are not appropriate for the police such as emergency response, explosive ordnance disposal, management of hazardous material, fire fighting and civil protection.

  The first Kosovo-wide recruitment campaign for the KSF started on 21 January 2009 and focused on encouraging all minority communities in Kosovo to apply. The recruitment process was carried out in two official languages: Albanian and Serbian. Initial operational capability was reached in mid-September 2009, with some 1,500 personnel; full operational capability was declared by the North Atlantic Council on 9 July 2013, with approximately 2,200 active personnel. The KSF’s total strength is mandated to a maximum of 2,500 active personnel and 800 reservists.
In order to continue supporting the KSF, the Alliance established the NATO Liaison and Advisory Team (NLAT) in July 2013. The NLAT is distinct from KFOR and consists of approximately 35 military and civilian personnel. Based in Pristina, this body is charged with providing advice and support to the KSF at brigade level and above, focusing on staff capacity-building and training.

- **Establish a civilian-led body to supervise the KSF / NATO Advisory Team**

NATO assisted and continues to assist in establishing a civilian-led organisation that exercises control over the KSF. Primary responsibility for this task rests with NATO Headquarters in Brussels; KFOR is tasked to support the NATO Advisory Team that has been established in Pristina.

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### Command and structure of KFOR

**The Multinational Battle Groups (MNBG)**

A Battle Group is a military unit at the level of a battalion, consisting of numerous companies. These companies are highly mobile, flexible and rapidly deployable to potential trouble spots all over Kosovo. There are currently two MNBGs:

- HQ MNBG East, located at Camp Bondsteel, located near Urosevac;
- HQ MNBG West, located at Camp Villagio Italia in Pec.

HQ KFOR continues to be located at Camp Film City, Pristina. In addition to the KFOR troops in Kosovo, NATO continues to maintain reserve forces ready to deploy if necessary.

KFOR comes under a single chain of command, under the authority of Commander KFOR (COMKFOR). COMKFOR reports to the Commander of Joint Force Command Naples (COM JFCN), Italy. The current COMKFOR is Major General Francesco Paolo Figliuolo. He assumed command of the Kosovo Force on 3 September 2014.

**Former KFOR commanders**

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<td>Francesco Paolo</td>
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The evolution of NATO’s role in Kosovo

KFOR deploys
UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 was adopted on 10 June 1999 and on 12 June, the first elements of the NATO-led Kosovo Force, or KFOR, entered Kosovo. By 20 June, the withdrawal of Serbian forces was complete.

KFOR was initially composed of some 50,000 men and women from NATO member countries, partner countries and other non-NATO countries under unified command and control. By early 2002, KFOR was reduced to around 39,000 troops. The improved security environment enabled NATO to reduce KFOR troop levels to 26,000 by June 2003, then to 17,500 by the end of 2003.

**An improved security situation**

In recent years, the security situation has continued to improve steadily. As a result, on 11-12 June 2009, NATO Defence Ministers decided to gradually adjust KFOR's force posture towards what is called a deterrent presence. At their informal meeting in Istanbul on 3-4 February 2010, NATO Defence Ministers were informed by the NATO Military Authorities that KFOR had successfully achieved the so-called Gate 1 in its transition to a deterrent presence, reducing the number of troops on the ground to some 10,200. The move to Gate 2, allowing for a total of approximately 5,000 troops was recommended by the NATO Military Authorities and authorised by the North Atlantic Council on 29 October 2010. Gate 2 was declared on 28 February 2011.

Any future decision on further reducing KFOR's footprint in Kosovo will require the approval of the North Atlantic Council. Nations have been clear that any such decision should be dictated by continued positive conditions on the ground.

In a separate development, the improved security situation on the ground in Kosovo also allowed NATO to continue with the implementation of the so-called unfixing process: the gradual transfer of security for religious and cultural heritage sites under KFOR protection to Kosovo Police responsibility. By the end of 2013, KFOR had unfixed eight properties with Designated Special Status: the Gazimestan Monument, Gracanica Monastery, Zociste Monastery, Budisavci Monastery, Gorioc Monastery, the Archangel site, Devic Monastery, and the Pec Patriarchate. Only one designated site – the Decani Monastery – currently remains under fixed KFOR protection.

**NATO's support to the EU-facilitated dialogue**

On 19 April 2013, Belgrade and Pristina reached an EU-facilitated First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations; an implementation plan was agreed on 22 May 2013. NATO played an important role in securing the Agreement, and Allies continue to strongly support the accord. In support of the Agreement, Belgrade and Pristina have initiated a programme of high-level talks, hosted by the European Union.
This dialogue remains key to solving the political deadlock between the two parties, and has helped improve relations between them. The dialogue has also given fresh momentum to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans. In June 2013, the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Belgrade and negotiations with Pristina on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement; both processes are currently underway.

NATO continues to offer strong political support to the Belgrade-Pristina Agreement, and KFOR stands ready to support its implementation – by ensuring a climate of peace and security – within its current mandate.
Piracy in the Gulf of Aden, off the Horn of Africa and in the Indian Ocean is undermining international humanitarian efforts in Africa and the safety of one of the busiest and most important maritime routes in the world – the gateway in and out of the Suez Canal. NATO has been helping to deter and disrupt pirate attacks, while protecting vessels and helping to increase the general level of security in the region since 2008.

On the request of United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, in late 2008, NATO started to provide escorts to UN World Food Programme (WFP) vessels transiting through these dangerous waters under Operation Allied Provider (October-December 2008). In addition to providing close protection to WFP chartered ships, NATO conducted deterrence patrols and prevented, for instance, vessels from being hijacked and their crews being taken hostage during pirate attacks. This operation was succeeded by Operation Allied Protector (March-August 2009), which continued to contribute to the safety of commercial maritime routes and international
navigation. It also conducted surveillance and fulfilled the tasks previously undertaken by Operation Allied Provider. This operation evolved in August 2009 in Operation Ocean Shield.

Operation Ocean Shield also contributes to providing maritime security in the region and is helping to reduce the overall pirate attack success rate. The latter has been significantly reduced since multinational operations began. In order to respond to new piracy tactics, NATO has created greater synergies with other initiatives, recognised the continued need for regional capacity-building, within means and capabilities, and focused on areas where it provides added value. The March 2012 Strategic Assessment highlighted the need to erode the pirates' logistics and support base by, among other things, disabling pirate vessels or skiffs, attaching tracking beacons to mother ships and allowing the use of force to disable or destroy suspected pirate or armed robber vessels.

NATO is conducting counter-piracy activities in full complementarity with the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and with actions against piracy initiated by other actors, such as the European Union.

Operation Ocean Shield – ongoing

The mission, its objectives and scope
Piracy and armed robbery are disrupting the delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia, as well as threatening vital sea lines of communication (SLOC) and economic interests off the Horn of Africa, in the Gulf of Aden and in the Indian Ocean.

Building on the two previous counter-piracy missions conducted by NATO, Operation Ocean Shield principally focuses on at-sea counter-piracy operations. NATO vessels conduct, for instance, helicopter surveillance missions to trace and identify ships in the area, they help to prevent and disrupt hijackings and to suppress armed robbery. NATO has also agreed, at the request of the UN, to escort the UNSOA - United Nations Support Office for AMISOM - supply vessels to the harbour entrance of Mogadishu. The Alliance has broadened its approach to combating piracy by offering, within means and capabilities to regional states that request it, assistance in developing their own capacity to combat piracy activities. More recently, NATO has also taken on measures aimed at eroding the pirates' logistics and support bases.

In sum, NATO's role is to prevent and stop piracy through direct actions against the pirates, as well as provide naval escorts and deterrence, while increasing cooperation with other counter-piracy operations in the area in order to optimise efforts and tackle the evolving pirate trends and tactics.

This operation was approved by the North Atlantic Council on 17 August 2009 and the mandate has been extended until the end of 2016.

Composition and command of the naval force
The current rotation
The Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1) is currently conducting Operation Ocean Shield under the command of Commodore (Royal Danish Navy) Aage Buur Jensen. Throughout his six-month command, the Danish flagship HDMS Absalon will be supported by ITS Mimbelli (Italy). Commodore Jensen is under the overall command of Vice Admiral Peter D. Hudson, Allied Maritime Command Headquarters Northwood (MARCOM), in the United Kingdom, which provides command and control for the full spectrum of joint maritime operations and tasks. From its location in Northwood, it plans, conducts and supports joint maritime operations. It is also the Alliance's principal maritime advisor and contributes to development and transformation, engagement and outreach within its area of expertise.

**Previous rotations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>January - June 2014 – SNMG2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rear Admiral Eugenio Diaz del Rio (Spain)</td>
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<th>June - Dec. 2013 – SNMG1</th>
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<tr>
<td>Rear Admiral Henning Amundsen (Norway)</td>
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<th>January-June 2013 - SNMG2</th>
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<tr>
<td>Rear Admiral Antonio Natale (Italy)</td>
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<th>June- Dec. 2012 - SNMG1</th>
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Archived material - Information valid up to 3 September 2014
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<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Flagship</th>
<th>Additional Ships</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January-June 2012 - SNMG2</td>
<td>Rear Commodore Ben Bekkering (Dutch Navy)</td>
<td>HNLMS Evertsen (Flagship – The Netherlands)</td>
<td>USS Taylor (United States); HNLMS Bruinvis (NL submarine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2011-Dec. 2011 - SNMG1</td>
<td>Rear Admiral Sinan Tosun (Turkish Navy)</td>
<td>TCG Giresun (Flagship – Turkey); HDMS Absalon (Denmark); ITS Grecale (Italy); RFA Fort Victoria (United Kingdom); USS De Wert (United States); USS Carney (United States).*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 2010- June 2011 - SNMG2</td>
<td>Commodore Michiel Hijmans (Royal Netherlands Navy)</td>
<td>HNLMS De Ruyter (Flagship – The Netherlands); HDMS Esbern Snare (Denmark); TCG Gaziantep (Turkey); and USS Laboon (United States).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. – early Dec. 2010 - SNMG1</td>
<td>Commodore Christian Rune (Denmark)</td>
<td>HDMS Esbern Snare (Flagship, Denmark); HMS Montrose and RFA Fort Victoria (United Kingdom); USS Kauffman and USS Laboon (United States); ITS Bersagliere (Italy); and HNLMS Zeeleeuw (NL submarine).</td>
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<tr>
<td>March-August 2010 - SNMG2</td>
<td>12 March-30 June: Commodore Steve Chick (UK)</td>
<td>HMS Chatham (Flagship, United Kingdom); HS LIMNOS (Greece) - under national control from 30 May</td>
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* Ships initially assigned to the rotation.
ITS SCIROCCO (Italy) - under national control from 5 June
TCG Gelibolu (Turkey)
USS Cole (United States)

1st July-6 August:
Commodore Michiel Hijmans (Royal Netherlands Navy)
HNLMS De Zeven Provinciën (Flagship, The Netherlands)
TCG Gelibolu (Turkey)
USS Cole (United States)

Nov. 2009-March 2010 - SNMG1
Commodore Christian Rune (succeeded Rear Admiral Jose Pereira de Cunha (PO) from 25 January 2010).
NRP Álvares Cabral (outgoing flagship, Portugal)
HDMS Absalon (incoming flagship, Denmark)
HMS Fredericton (Canada)
USS Boone (United States)
HMS Chatham (United Kingdom)

Aug. – Nov. 2009 - SNMG2
Commodore Steve Chick (UK)
HS Navarinon (Greece)
ITS Libeccio (Italy)
TCG Gediz (Turkey)
HMS Cornwall (United Kingdom)
USS Donald Cook (United States)

SNMG1 and SNMG 2
NATO has two Immediate Reaction Forces: the Standing NATO Maritime Groups composed of the SNMG1 and the SNMG2; and the Standing NATO Maritime Mine Countermeasure Groups (SNMCMG1 and SNMCMG2).

The Standing NATO Maritime Groups are a multinational, integrated maritime force made up of vessels from various allied countries. These vessels (including their helicopters) are permanently available to NATO to perform different tasks ranging from participating in exercises to actually intervening in operational missions. These groups provide NATO with a continuous maritime capability for operations and other activities in peacetime and in periods of crisis and conflict. They also help to establish Alliance presence, demonstrate solidarity, conduct routine diplomatic visits to different countries, support transformation and provide a variety of maritime military capabilities to ongoing missions.
SNMG1 and SNMG2 alternate between each other for the six-month rotations of Operation Ocean Shield and otherwise function according to the operational needs of the Alliance, therefore helping to maintain optimal flexibility. Their composition varies and they are usually composed of between six and ten ships from as many NATO member countries.

SNMG1 and SNMG2 both come under the command of MARCOM, as do all Standing NATO Forces i.e., SNMCMG1 and SNMCMG2 since the implementation of the new NATO Command Structure, 1 December 2012.

Past operations

Operation Allied Protector (March-August 2009)
The mission, its objectives and scope

Operation Allied Protector helped to deter, defend against and disrupt pirate activities in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa.

From 24 March until 29 June 2009, the operation was conducted by SNMG1 vessels. As previously indicated, SNMG1 is usually employed in the Eastern Atlantic area, but it can deploy anywhere NATO requires. The first phase of Operation Allied Protector was undertaken as the force left for NATO’s first ever deployment to South East Asia. It made a short visit to Karachi (Pakistan) on 26-27 April. However, with the increase in pirate attacks, on 24 April NATO had already decided to cancel the other two port visits planned to Singapore and Australia. As such, the second phase of the operation, which was meant to take place as SNMG1 made its return journey towards European waters end June, was brought forward to 1 May.

From 29 June 2009, the Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2) took over responsibility from SNMG1. It had conducted NATO’s first counter-piracy operation – Operation Allied Provider (see below).

Composition and command of the naval force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>24 March-29 June 2009</th>
<th>SNMG1</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rear Admiral Jose Pereira de Cunha (PO)</td>
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SPS Blas de Lezo (Spain)
USS Halyburton (United States)

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<tr>
<th>29 June-August 2009 SNMG2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commodore Steve Chick (UK)</td>
<td>TS Libeccio (frigate, Italy)</td>
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<td>HS Navarino (frigate F461, Greece)</td>
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<td>TCG Gediz (frigate F495, Turkey)</td>
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<td>HMS Cornwall (frigate F99, United Kingdom)</td>
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<td>USS Laboon (destroyer DDG58, United States)</td>
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**Operation Allied Provider (October-December 2008)
The mission, its objectives and scope**

Allied Operation Allied Provider was responsible for naval escorts to World Food Program (WFP) vessels and, more generally, patrolled the waters around Somalia. Alliance presence also helped to deter acts of piracy that threatened the region.

While providing close protection for WFP vessels and patrolling routes most susceptible to criminal acts against merchant vessels, NATO ships could use force pursuant to the authorized Rules of Engagement and in compliance with relevant international and national law.

Allied Provider was a temporary operation that was requested by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, on 25 September 2008. NATO provided this counter-piracy capacity in support of UNSC Resolutions 1814, 1816 and 1838, and in coordination with other international actors, including the European Union.

NATO Defence Ministers agreed to respond positively to the UN's request on 9 October, during an informal meeting held in Budapest, Hungary. Following this decision, planning started to redirect assets of SNMG2 to conduct anti-piracy duties.

SNMG2 was already scheduled to conduct a series of Gulf port visits in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates within the framework of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). As such, it started to transit the Suez Canal on 15 October to conduct both duties at the same time.

**Composition and command of the naval force**

At the time of the operation, SNMG2 comprised seven ships from Germany, Greece, Italy, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, of which three were assigned to Operation Allied Provider:

- ITS Durand de la Penne (flagship, destroyer D560, Italy);
- HS Temistokles (frigate F465, Greece);
- HMS Cumberland (frigate F85, United Kingdom).

The other four ships (FGS Karlsruhe-Germany; FGS Rhön-Germany; TCG Gokova-Turkey; and USS The Sullivans-USA) continued deployment to ICI countries. This was the first time a NATO-flagged force deployed to the Gulf.

At the time of the operation, SNMG2 was commanded by Rear Admiral Giovanni Gumiero, Italian Navy, who was appointed to this post in July 2008. He reported to the Commander of Allied Component Command Maritime (CC-Mar) Naples. CC Mar Naples was one of the three Component Commands of Allied Joint Force Command Naples.
Operation Active Endeavour

Under Operation Active Endeavour, NATO ships are patrolling the Mediterranean and monitoring shipping to help deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorist activity. The operation evolved out of NATO’s immediate response to the terrorist attacks against the United States of 11 September 2001 and, in view of its success, is being continued.

As the Alliance has refined its counter-terrorism role over the years, the operation’s remit has been extended and its mandate regularly reviewed. In addition to tracking and controlling suspect vessels to keep the seas safe, it now aims to build a picture of maritime activity in the Mediterranean. To do this, the ships conduct routine information approaches to various vessels in order to reassure and inform mariners on the efforts to keep the maritime community safe.
The experience that NATO has accrued in Active Endeavour has given the Alliance unparalleled expertise in the deterrence of maritime terrorist activity in the Mediterranean Sea. This expertise is relevant to wider international efforts to combat terrorism and, in particular, the proliferation and smuggling of weapons of mass destruction, as well as enhanced cooperation with non-NATO countries and civilian agencies.

The aim of the operation and its current functions

Operation Active Endeavour is NATO’s only Article 5 operation on anti-terrorism. It was initiated in support of the United States immediately after 9/11. It aims to demonstrate NATO’s solidarity and resolve in the fight against terrorism and to help deter and disrupt terrorist activity in the Mediterranean.

NATO forces have hailed over 122,000 merchant vessels and boarded some 166 suspect ships. By conducting these maritime operations against terrorist activity, NATO’s presence in these waters has benefited all shipping travelling through the Straits of Gibraltar by improving perceptions of security. NATO is helping to keep seas safe, protect shipping and control suspect vessels. Moreover, this operation is also enabling NATO to strengthen its relations with partner countries, especially those participating in the Alliance’s Mediterranean Dialogue.

Keeping seas safe and protecting shipping

Keeping the Mediterranean’s busy trade routes open and safe is critical to NATO’s security. In terms of energy alone, some 65 per cent of the oil and natural gas consumed in Western Europe pass through the Mediterranean each year, with major pipelines connecting Libya to Italy and Morocco to Spain. For this reason, NATO ships are systematically carrying out preparatory route surveys in “choke” points as well as in important passages and harbours throughout the Mediterranean.

Tracking and controlling suspect vessels

Since April 2003, NATO has been systematically boarding suspect ships. These boardings take place with the compliance of the ships’ masters and flag states in accordance with international law.

What happens in practice is that merchant ships passing through the eastern Mediterranean are hailed by patrolling NATO naval units and asked to identify themselves and their activity. This information is then reported to NATO’s Maritime Commander in Northwood, the United Kingdom. If anything appears unusual or suspicious, teams of between 15 and 20 of the ships’ crew may board vessels to inspect documentation and cargo. Compliant boarding can only be conducted with the consent of the flag state
and/or the ship's master. NATO personnel may otherwise convey this information to the appropriate law enforcement agency at the vessel's next port of call. The suspect vessel is then shadowed until action is taken by a responsible agency/authority, or until it enters a country's territorial waters.

**Unexpected benefits**

While the mandate of Active Endeavour is limited to deterring, defending, disrupting and protecting against terrorist-related activity, the operation has had a visible effect on security and stability in the Mediterranean that is beneficial to trade and economic activity.

NATO ships and helicopters have also intervened on several occasions to rescue civilians on stricken oil rigs and sinking ships, saving the lives of several hundred people over time. Operation Active Endeavour provided the framework for the maritime component of NATO's assistance to the Greek government to ensure the safe conduct of the 2004 Olympic and Paralympic Games in August and September 2004. Task Force Endeavour conducted surveillance, presence and compliant boarding operations in international waters around the Greek peninsula with Standing Naval Forces surface ships, supported by maritime patrol aircraft and submarines and in coordination with the Hellenic Navy and Coast Guard.

**Closer cooperation with partners**

The increased NATO presence in the Mediterranean has also enhanced the Alliance's security cooperation programme with seven countries in the wider Mediterranean region – Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. This programme - the Mediterranean Dialogue - was set up in 1994 to contribute to regional security and stability and to achieve better mutual understanding between NATO and its Mediterranean Partners.

Mediterranean Dialogue countries are equally concerned by the threat of terrorism and have already been cooperating with NATO in Active Endeavour by providing intelligence about suspicious shipping operating in their waters.

Enhanced coordination and cooperation mechanisms are currently being developed.
The operation is under the overall command of, and is conducted from, Maritime Command Headquarters, Northwood (United Kingdom) through a task force deployed in the Mediterranean.

Task Force Endeavour consists of a balanced collection of surface units, submarines and maritime patrol aircraft. The operation also regularly makes use of NATO's two high-readiness frigate forces, which are permanently ready to act and capable of conducting a wide range of maritime operations.

The current operational pattern uses surface forces as reaction units to conduct specific tasks such as locating, tracking, reporting and boarding of suspected vessels in the light of intelligence.

The NATO Standing Naval Forces rotate in providing periodic support to Operation Active Endeavour either through “surges” (when an entire force participates) or through individual units being put on call when the operation has no regularly assigned forces.

### Evolution

**An Article 5 deployment**

The deployment was one of eight measures taken by NATO to support the United States in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, following the invocation of Article 5, NATO's collective defence clause, for the first time in the Alliance's history.

The deployment started on 6 October and was formally named Operation Active Endeavour on 26 October 2001. Together with the dispatch of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to the United States, it was the first time that NATO assets had been deployed in support of an Article 5 operation.

Since October 2001, NATO ships have been patrolling the Mediterranean and monitoring shipping, boarding any suspect ships. Compliant boarding operations are essential to the successful continuation of the operation. They are limited to trying to establish whether a vessel is engaged in terrorist activity.

Moreover, in March 2003, Active Endeavour was expanded to provide escorts through the Straits of Gibraltar to non-military ships from Alliance member states requesting them. This extension of the mission was designed to help prevent terrorist attacks such as those off Yemen on the *USS Cole* in October 2000 and on the French oil tanker *Limburg* two years later. The area was considered particularly vulnerable because the Straits are extremely...
narrow and some 3,000 commercial shipments pass through daily. In total, 488 ships took advantage of NATO escorts until Task Force STROG (Straits of Gibraltar) was suspended in May 2004. Forces remain ready to move at 30-days notice.

Covering the entire Mediterranean

One year later, in March 2004, as a result of the success of Active Endeavour in the Eastern Mediterranean, NATO extended its remit to the whole of the Mediterranean.

At the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, Allied leaders decided to enhance Operation Active Endeavour (OAE). They also welcomed offers by Russia and Ukraine to support the operation.

An evolving operation

In the revised Concept of Operations approved by the North Atlantic Council on 23 April 2009, the Military Committee highlighted two considerations: the need to further enhance information-sharing between NATO and other actors in the region; the fact that in some cases, the operation is hampered by the lack of consent to conduct compliant boarding of suspect vessels.

In addition, the Operational Plan approved in January 2010, is shifting Operation Active Endeavour from a platform-based to a network-based operation, using a combination of on-call units and surge operations instead of deployed forces; it is also seeking to enhance cooperation with non-NATO countries and international organisations in order to improve Maritime Situational Awareness. All options for future changes in the Operation's mandate are considered on the basis of the Alliance Maritime Strategy, adopted in January 2011. Operation Active Endeavour is fulfilling the four roles outlined in this strategy: deterrence and collective defence; crisis management; cooperative security; and maritime security.

In February 2013, as a result of the reform of the military command structure initiated in 2011, the operation changed command. Initially, OAE was under the overall command of Joint Forces Command (JFC), Naples, and was conducted from the Allied Maritime Component Command Naples, Italy (CC-Mar Naples). From 22 February 2013, it came under the command of, and is conducted by, Maritime Command Headquarters, Northwood (United Kingdom).

Contributing countries
Being an Article 5 operation, Operation Active Endeavour initially involved member countries only.

Some NATO members, mainly Greece, Italy, Spain and Turkey contribute directly to the operation with naval assets. Escort operations in the Straits of Gibraltar used to involve the use of fast patrol boats from northern European Allies Denmark, Germany and Norway. Spain also provides additional assets in the Straits. Operation Active Endeavour relies heavily on the logistic support of Mediterranean NATO Allies.

From 2004, partner and non-NATO countries started offering their support.

All offers are considered on a case-by-case basis. To date, Exchanges of Letters have been signed between NATO and Israel, Morocco, Russia and Ukraine. In addition, Finland and Sweden have informally expressed their interest in contributing to the operation. Georgia has sent a liaison officer to Naples following the signing of a tactical Memorandum of Understanding with NATO in 2010 on the exchange of information. Russia deployed vessels twice, in 2006 and 2007, and Ukraine a total of six times since 2007.
NATO assistance to the African Union

Since 2005, at the request of the African Union (AU), NATO has been providing different forms of support to the AU. The AU is a regional organisation which brings together 54 African member states. It was established in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 2002 and requested NATO support as early as 2005 for the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in the province of Darfur.
This was the Alliance’s first mission on the African continent and as such represented a landmark decision by the North Atlantic Council (NAC). It was terminated on 31 December 2007 when AMIS was completed and succeeded (on 1 January 2008) by the UN-AU hybrid mission in Darfur (UNAMID).

NATO has since been assisting the AU with other missions and objectives. These include support to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by providing planning and strategic air- and sealift, and assistance to the AU in developing long-term peacekeeping capabilities, in particular the African Standby Force (ASF) brigades.

To ensure maximum synergy, effectiveness and transparency, NATO’s assistance is coordinated closely with other international organisations – principally the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) – as well as with bilateral partners.

Through this increased assistance, the Alliance and the AU are deepening collaboration and developing a long-term relationship, which is constantly evolving, as illustrated by the repeated AU requests for NATO assistance in a wide range of areas.

Assisting the African Union in Somalia

Since 2007, NATO has accepted to assist the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by providing strategic airlift and sealift support to AU member states willing to deploy in Somalia under AMISOM. NATO has, for instance, put into practice airlift support from Burundi to Mogadishu and has escorted an AU ship that carried Burundian military equipment for one of the battalions that it had airlifted into Mogadishu.

NATO has also been providing subject-matter experts for the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) of the AU that supports AMISOM. These experts offer expertise in specific areas for a period of six months, renewable at the AU’s request.

In addition to this logistical and planning support, NATO is also a member of the International Contact Group on Somalia.

**Strategic airlift**

The AU made a general request to all partners, including NATO, on 17 January 2007 for financial and logistical support to AMISOM. It later made a more specific request to NATO on 22 May 2007, requesting strategic airlift support for AU member states willing to deploy in Somalia under AMISOM.

On 7 June, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) agreed, in principle, to support this request. NATO’s support was initially authorised until 21 August 2007 and has since been renewed for periods of six months and, more recently, for one year, following AU requests. The latest to be agreed by the NAC runs until January 2015.
Strategic sealift

Strategic sealift support was requested at a later stage and agreed in principle by the NAC on 15 September 2009. Support is also authorised for set periods of time and is currently running until January 2015.

Subject-matter experts

NATO provides subject-matter experts for the AU PSOD that supports AMISOM. These experts share their knowledge in areas such as maritime planning, strategic planning, financial planning and monitoring, procurement planning, air movement coordination, communications, IT, logistics, human resources, military manpower management and contingency planning.

Training

NATO has been offering AU students the possibility of attending courses at the NATO School Oberammergau in areas such as crisis-management exercises. Other appropriate training facilities are being identified, based on AU requirements.

Working with other international organisations

In addition to logistical and planning support, NATO is also a member of the International Contact Group on Somalia. It was first invited to attend these meetings in June 2009 and has participated in subsequent meetings.

The bodies involved in decision making and implementation

Based on advice from NATO's military authorities, the NAC is the body that agrees to provide support to the AU.

The Norwegian Embassy in Addis Ababa provides diplomatic resources in support of NATO's activities in Africa. Requests are communicated via a Note Verbale from the AU to the Norwegian Embassy, then via Joint Force Command (JFC) Naples and SHAPE to NATO HQ to consider the requests and take action as necessary. AU requests are considered on a case-by-case basis.

The NATO Senior Military Liaison Officer (SMLO) is the primary point of contact for the Alliance's activities with the AU. An SMLO is deployed on a permanent six-month rotational basis in Addis Ababa and is supported by a deputy and an administrative assistant. More specifically, with regard to NATO's support to the AU mission in Somalia, JFC Naples – under the overall command of Allied Command Operations - is responsible for the SMLO team operating out of the Ethiopian capital.
This team not only conducts NATO’s day-to-day activities, but also serves as the NATO military point of contact with partner countries and regional organisations. It served the same function for the representatives of troop-contributing countries for the AMISON operation, the representatives of the donor nations pledging support to the AU, the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and various embassies.

▲ Contributing to the establishment of an African Standby Force

NATO has been providing expert and training support to the African Standby Force (ASF) at the AU’s request. The ASF is intended to be deployed in Africa in times of crisis. It is part of the AU’s efforts to develop long-term peacekeeping capabilities. ASF represents the AU’s vision for a continental, on-call security apparatus with some similarities to the NATO Response Force.

The Alliance offers capacity-building support through courses and training events and organises different forms of support to help make the ASF operational, all at the AU’s request. NATO is, inter alia, assisting the AU with the evaluation and assessment processes linked to the operational readiness of the ASF brigades. This continental force is being operationalised and could be seen as an African contribution to wider international efforts to preserve peace and security.

**Expert support**

On 5 September 2007, as part of NATO’s capacity-building support to the AU, the NAC agreed to provide assistance to the AU with a study on the assessment of the operational readiness of the ASF brigades.

**Training support**

NATO has also provided targeted training packages to the ASF. Since 2009, the NATO School in Oberammergau has been hosting AU staff officers, who attend various courses, including operational planning discipline.

JFC Naples - the designated NATO HQ to implement the Alliance’s practical cooperation with the AU – has also organised certification/evaluation training programmes for AU staff. For instance, it has trained AU officials participating in military exercises and provided military experts to assist in the evaluation and lessons learned procedures of an exercise. NATO has also participated and supported various ASF preparatory workshops designed to develop ASF-related concepts.
Assisting the African Union in Darfur, Sudan

The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) aimed to end violence and improve the humanitarian situation in a region that has been suffering from conflict since 2003.

From June 2005 to 31 December 2007, NATO helped the AU expand its peacekeeping mission in Darfur by providing airlift for the transport of additional peacekeepers into the region and by training AU personnel. NATO support did not include the provision of combat troops.

Alliance support ended on 31 December 2007 when AMIS was transferred to the United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The Alliance has expressed its readiness to consider providing support to the UN-AU hybrid peacekeeping force made up of peacekeepers and civilian police officers, if requested.

**Airlifting AU peacekeepers and civilian police**

Between 1 July 2005 and October 2005, NATO coordinated the strategic airlift for peacekeepers from African troop-contributing countries moving into Darfur, helping to transport almost 5,000 troops. This boosted the number of troops on the ground to 8,000.

In August 2005, on the request of the AU, the NAC agreed to assist in the transportation of civilian police. NATO coordinated the airlift of some 50 AMIS civilian police between August and October 2005.

Additionally, from September 2005, NATO provided the coordination of strategic airlift for the rotation of troops, transporting them in and out of the region.

Overall, NATO-EU Air Movement Coordinators harmonised the airlift of some 37,500 troops, civilian police and military observers in and out of the Sudanese region. NATO alone coordinated the airlift of over 31,500 AMIS troops and personnel.

NATO’s airlift was managed from Europe. A special AU Air Movement Cell at the AU's headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, coordinated the movement of incoming troops.
and personnel on the ground. Both the EU and NATO provided staff to support the cell, but the AU had the lead.

**Training AU personnel**

For the duration of the mission, NATO also provided training assistance to AMIS in a variety of disciplines.

- Strategic-level and operational planning: training in this area focused on technologies and techniques to create an overall analysis and understanding of Darfur, and to identify the areas where the application of AU assets could best influence the operating environment and deter crises. A total of 184 AU officers benefited from this training. They were based at two different AMIS headquarters: the Darfur Integrated Task Force Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and the AMIS Force Headquarters (FHQ) in El Fasher, Sudan.

On 2 June 2006, the AU requested NATO support for the establishment of an AMIS Joint Operations Centre (JOC), which the Alliance agreed to provide six days later.

Two months later, in August 2006, NATO also contributed to a UN-led mapping exercise. The aim of the exercise was to help AU personnel understand and operate effectively in the theatre of operations, as well as to build their capacity to manage strategic operations. NATO provided 14 officers, including exercise writers and tactical-level controllers.

- Training on “lessons learned”: on 8 June 2006, the NAC agreed to the AU request for training assistance in the fields of pre-deployment certification and lessons learned. Following a further AU request on 19 September of the same year, NATO provided mentoring and training on how to establish a tailored “lessons learned” process for the AU. Seventy-five AMIS officers from three different headquarters (the Darfur Integrated Task Force Headquarters, the AMIS Force Headquarters and the AU Mission Headquarters in Khartoum, Sudan) were trained through these courses.

In this area, NATO was working in full complementarity with the European Union, which also provided substantive input to the process.

- Training in information management: following a *Note Verbale* sent by the African Union on 25 August 2006, NATO provided temporary training and mentoring on managing information to six AU officers in the Information Assessment Cell of the Darfur Integrated Task Force.

**The bodies involved in decision making and implementation**
Based on advice from NATO’s military authorities, the NAC agrees to provide support to the AU. With regard to NATO’s support to the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS), the then Joint Force Command Lisbon – under the overall command of Allied Command Operations - had the responsibility for the NATO Senior Military Liaison Officer (SMLO) team operating out of Addis Ababa. The SMLO team was NATO’s single military point of contact in Addis Ababa with the AU. In addition, it was the NATO military point of contact with the representatives of the countries contributing troops to the AMIS operation, the representatives of the donor nations pledging support to the AU, the UN, the EU and various embassies.

**The evolution of NATO’s assistance to AMIS**

On 26 April 2005, the AU asked NATO by letter to consider the possibility of providing logistical support to help expand its peace-support mission in Darfur. In May 2005, the Chairman of the AU Commission, Mr Alpha Oumar Konaré, visited NATO Headquarters to provide details of the assistance request. The next day, the NAC tasked the Alliance’s military authorities to provide, as a matter of urgency, advice on possible NATO support.

Following further consultations with the AU, the European Union and the United Nations, in June 2005, NATO formally agreed to provide airlift support as well as training. The first planes carrying AU peacekeepers took off on 1 July of the same year. Training of AU officers started on 1 August and, a few days later, the NAC agreed to assist in the transport of police to Darfur.

**Key milestones – Darfur, Sudan**

- **26 April 2005** The AU requests NATO assistance in the expansion of its peacekeeping mission in Darfur.

- **17 May 2005** The Chairman of the AU Commission, Mr Alpha Oumar Konaré, is the first AU official to visit NATO Headquarters in Brussels.

- **18 May 2005** The NAC agrees to task the Alliance’s military authorities to provide advice on possible NATO assistance.

- **24 May 2005** The NAC agrees on initial military options for possible NATO support.

- **26 May 2005** NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer participates in a meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on international support to the AU’s mission.
9 June 2005  Alliance Defence Ministers announce the decision to assist the AU peace-support operation in Darfur with the coordination of strategic airlift and staff capacity-building.

1 July 2005  The NATO airlift begins.

1 August 2005  NATO training of AU officers begins.

5 August 2005  On the request of the AU, the NAC agrees to assist in the transport of civilian police to Darfur.

21 September 2005  The NAC agrees to extend the duration of NATO’s airlift support for the remaining peacekeeping reinforcements until 31 October 2005.

9 November 2005  The NAC agrees to extend NATO's coordination of strategic airlift by two months, until end May 2006, in view of the AU's troop rotation schedule.

29 March 2006  Following a phone call from UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on 27 March, the NAC announces its readiness to continue NATO’s current mission. The NAC tasks NATO military authorities to offer advice for possible NATO support to an anticipated follow-on UN mission in Darfur.

13 April 2006  The NAC announces its readiness to continue NATO's current mission until 30 September.

5 May 2006  Two parties sign the Darfur Peace Agreement.

30 May 2006  UN Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, Mr Jan Egeland, visits NATO HQ to discuss Darfur and the role of the military in disaster relief.

2 June 2006  The Chairman of the AU Commission, Mr Alpha Oumar Konaré, requests the extension of NATO's airlift and training support, as well as additional forms of assistance.
8 June 2006  Defence Ministers state NATO’s willingness to expand its training assistance to AMIS and the Alliance’s willingness to consider support to an anticipated follow-on UN mission. The coordination of strategic airlift is extended until the end of 2006.

16 November 2006  The Addis Ababa meeting introduces the notion of an AU-UN hybrid peacekeeping mission.

28-29 November 2006  At the Riga Summit, NATO reaffirms its support to the AU and its willingness to broaden this support. It also reiterates its commitment to coordinating with other international actors.

14 December 2006  NATO decides to extend its support mission for six additional months.

15 December 2006  US Special Envoy to Darfur, Ambassador Andrew Natsios, meets NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at NATO Headquarters, Brussels.

15 January 2007  NATO agrees to provide staff capacity-training at the AU Mission HQ in Khartoum, in addition to training provided in El Fasher and Addis Ababa.

14 June 2007  NATO Defence Ministers reiterate the Alliance’s commitment to Darfur and welcome the agreement of the Sudanese Government to a UN-AU hybrid mission in Darfur.

6-7 December 2007  NATO Foreign Ministers express readiness to continue Alliance support to the AU in Darfur, in agreement with the UN and the AU.

2-4 April 2008  At the Bucharest Summit, NATO states its concern for the situation in Darfur and its readiness to support AU peacekeeping efforts in the region.

3-4 April 2009  At the Strasbourg/ Kehl Summit, NATO reiterates its concern over Darfur and, more generally, Sudan. Stressing the principle of African
ownership, NATO states that it is ready to consider further requests for support from the AU, including regional capacity-building.
Commitment to operations and missions

NATO nations contribute forces and capacities in several operations and to standby forces under NATO and other auspices. The following table provides details related to individual national commitments.

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Troop contributions

When a NATO operation or mission is deemed necessary, NATO member and partner countries volunteer personnel, equipment, and resources for the mission. These national contributions operate under the aegis of the Alliance.

NATO is an alliance of 28 sovereign countries, which does not possess military forces of its own. While personnel serving in a NATO operation are often referred to collectively as “NATO forces”, they are actually multinational forces composed of individuals, formations and equipment drawn from NATO member countries and, in some cases, partner countries or other troop-contributing countries.

The procedure for staffing an operation or mission is often referred to as “force generation”. This procedure ensures that Alliance operations or missions have the manpower and materials required to achieve set objectives.
Highlights
- NATO is an alliance of 28 sovereign countries which does not possess military forces of its own.
- Personnel serving in a NATO operation are referred to as "NATO forces", but are multinational forces from NATO countries and, in some cases, partner or other troop-contributing countries.
- "Force generation" is the procedure that ensures NATO operations or missions have the manpower and materials required to achieve set objectives.
- National capitals take the final decision on whether to contribute to a NATO-led operation or mission.
- Allied Command Operations, commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), is responsible for executing all NATO operations and missions, and the Deputy SACEUR coordinates troop contributions.

Obtaining troop contributions for operations and missions

The final decision on whether to contribute troops and equipment to a NATO-led operation or mission is taken by national capitals, which communicate continuously with NATO through their permanent diplomatic missions, national military representation, or partnership liaison teams.

Force generation

When a NATO operation or mission is deemed necessary, NATO's military authorities draft a concept of operations – referred to as a CONOPS – which outlines the troop and equipment requirements necessary to meet the operations' or mission's objectives. Upon approval of the concept of operations and the release of a “Force Activation Directive” by the North Atlantic Council, Allied Command Operations (ACO), led by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, initiates the force generation and activation process.

In general, the force generation process follows a standard procedure. For a given operation or mission, a list of personnel and equipment requirements (the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements), is produced by ACO and sent to NATO member countries and, in some cases, partner countries.

National offers to provide personnel are addressed during conferences attended by representatives from NATO and partner countries. These conferences take place on an ad hoc basis as required. For example, a force generation conference will take place prior to the start of a new operation or mission, or if there are significant changes in an ongoing operation. In addition to these conferences, an annual conference is held for all operations and missions, the Global Force Generation Conference.
Contributions by individual countries, both NATO members and partners, are subject to their overall national capacity, taking into account prior commitments, force size, structure, and activity level. Every contribution, whether big or small, is valuable and contributes to the success of the operation or mission.

In many cases, NATO or partner countries will commit complete or formed units to operations or missions. A country may volunteer to send a complete battle group, which – in the case of ground forces – could include infantry personnel, an armoured reconnaissance element, an artillery battery to provide fire support, and service support personnel.

Countries that provide leadership for an entire operation or mission, or take responsibility for central elements, are identified as “lead.” For example, the lead country for a given operation or mission might provide the command element and a significant part of the forces, and will also be responsible for filling the remainder of the force required.

Although NATO as an Alliance does own and maintain some specialised equipment, such as the AWACS aircraft and strategic communications equipment, troop-contributing countries generally commit the equipment necessary to support their personnel in pursuit of operational objectives.

**Caveats**

It is during the force generation process that caveats are stated. While national contributions to NATO operations are expected to operate under the Alliance’s chain of command, the provision of forces by NATO and partner countries is sometimes conditional on factors such as geography, logistics, time, rules of engagement, or command status. Known as “caveats”, these conditions can restrict NATO commanders by limiting their flexibility to respond to situations on the ground. For this reason, the Alliance seeks national contributions with as few caveats as possible.

**Provincial Reconstruction Teams**

The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) established in Afghanistan under the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), constitute an exception to the normal force generation process. These formations, which in agreement with the Afghan authorities will have all been gradually closed by the end of 2014, were interdisciplinary in contrast to traditional military operations. That is, they were comprised of development workers, military forces, diplomats and civilian police, who worked to extend the authority of the central Afghan government in remote areas, and to facilitate development and reconstruction.
Because of the unique combination of personnel, NATO was involved in generating forces for the military component of a PRT, while it was the responsibility of the contributing country to staff the civilian components. As a result, PRTs were a hybrid of personnel who fell under either NATO or national chains of command.

**Coordinating troop contributions for non-NATO operations**

Over the years, the Alliance has developed significant expertise in coordinating troop contributions for multinational operations. In the past, it has offered this expertise in support of non-NATO operations.

Under the Berlin Plus agreement, the Alliance cooperates closely with the European Union (EU) in the resourcing of selected operations. When requested by the EU, NATO's Deputy SACEUR and his staff provide support in coordinating member countries' troop contributions. For example, the Deputy SACEUR was identified as operational commander for Operation Althea, the EU-led operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and was responsible for force generation.

NATO also provided force generation support to Germany and the Netherlands, during their leadership of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force in 2003 in Afghanistan, prior to its conversion into a NATO-led operation.

**Who decides?**

In determining troop contributions, ACO engages with the Military Committee, the North Atlantic Council, and individual countries, all of which have critical roles to play in bringing Alliance operations and missions to reality.

ACO, commanded by SACEUR, is responsible for executing all Alliance operations and missions. The Deputy SACEUR and his staff coordinate troop contributions.

**Force generation through time**

For much of NATO's history, the Alliance's primary operational commitment was focused on the former border between East and West Germany. For over 40 years, NATO strategists spoke of medium and long-term “force plans” rather than “force generation” for specific operations. This was because during that time, the Alliance maintained static,
“conventional” forces in former West Germany, poised for an attack from the former Soviet Union.

Beginning 1986, conventional forces were reduced and, following the end of the Cold War, bases of individual NATO countries in Germany were largely dismantled or converted to other use, although some remain functional to this day.

NATO's first major land expeditionary operation took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a result of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. The NATO force generation process, which is still in use today, was developed during the NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and later in Kosovo.

**Transforming to meet operational needs**

While the core procedures for contributing troops and equipment remain valid, the process has been refined in tandem with NATO's transformation. At their May 2002 meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, NATO foreign ministers decided that: "To carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives."

NATO's engagement in Afghanistan in 2003 posed a number of new problems for force generation. It soon became apparent that the nature of the mission was different from previous tasks. Greater flexibility was needed in types and numbers of forces, from rotation to rotation, and from area to area. In addition, with many countries moving to smaller, more highly trained and highly equipped forces, it became unrealistic to expect large standing commitments from individual countries.

The procedure for staffing an operation or mission was made more responsive to operational requirements. Communication between NATO commanders and member/partner countries was improved, allowing potential troop-contributing countries to be better informed about evolving operational requirements.

The first Global Force Generation Conference was held in November 2003; Prior to this, force generation meetings had been called on an ad hoc basis as required. During this annual conference, troop and resource requirements for all NATO-led operations and missions are addressed at the same time.

While ad hoc meetings are still necessary to address immediate needs, rolling numerous meetings into one facilitates improved coordination between and within troop-contributing countries and NATO military authorities.

Lastly, NATO military planners are taking a longer view of force generation. While developments in operations, as well as political developments within troop-contributing
countries, prohibit definitive troop and material commitments far into the future, NATO military planners are looking beyond immediate needs, which allows both the Alliance and troop-contributing countries to plan their resources better.
Women, peace and security

NATO and its partners are taking action to support the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325. This Resolution recognises the disproportionate impact that war and conflicts have on women and children, and highlights the fact that women have been historically left out of peace processes and stabilisation efforts. Adopted in October 2000, UNSCR 1325 was followed by six additional Resolutions (1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106 and 2122). These Resolutions call for full and equal participation of women at all levels in issues ranging from early conflict prevention to post-conflict reconstruction, peace and security. Together, they frame the Women, Peace and Security agenda.

According to the United Nations, before the Second World War, 90 per cent of casualties in conflicts were combatants. Today, the majority of casualties are civilians, especially women and children. The continued under-representation of women in peace processes, the lack of institutional arrangements to protect women and the widespread use of conflict-related sexual-
and gender-based violence as a tactic of war, remain major impediments to building sustainable peace.

NATO Allies working with their partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) responded to UNSCR 1325 by adopting their first policy in 2007. The document has been reviewed every two years, and in April 2014 an updated overarching policy was adopted.

On the 10th anniversary of UNSCR 1325 in 2010, NATO leaders adopted an action plan for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and related Resolutions in NATO-led operations and missions at the Lisbon Summit. This document was replaced in June 2014 with an overarching action plan aimed at implementing the most recent policy on Women, Peace and Security.

Ms. Mari Skåre has been the NATO Secretary General's Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security at NATO Headquarters in Brussels since August 2012. This was the first time NATO had appointed a special representative for these issues, following an offer made by the Norwegian government. The Special Representative helps reinforce and promote the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and related Resolutions, supporting the Alliance in continuing to advance the Women, Peace and Security agenda at every level though its policies and activities. Work is also done to make greater use of the potential that women offer in the political and military ranks, as well as to improve cooperation with partner countries and other international organisations, including the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU).

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**NATO’s Overarching Policy**

NATO and its partners’ active commitment to UNSCR 1325 and related Resolutions resulted in a formal NATO/EAPC Policy on implementing the Resolutions, first issued in December 2007. The Policy was reviewed every two years and the Secretary General issued annual reports on its implementation.

**The basis of the policy: UNSCR 1325 and the Strategic Concept**

The Policy is based on the key pillars of UNSCR 1325: participation of women in conflict prevention, management and resolution; women's participation in peace-building; protection of women's and girls' rights; and prevention of conflict-related sexual- and gender-based violence. The policy draws on both internal and external NATO resources for implementation.

Based on NATO's fundamental and enduring purpose to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means, the Policy aims to ensure that a gender perspective is mainstreamed into policies, activities and efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts. Due regard will be given to the social role of both men and women and how this may lead to different risks and security needs. And attention will be paid to how these roles may translate into different contributions to conflict prevention and resolutions. In accordance with NATO's Strategic Concept, this will be done through its
essential core tasks, and therefore the Policy focuses especially on cooperative security, crisis management and NATO-led operations and missions, and national contributions.

Other cross-cutting aspects, such as human resources policies, education, training and exercises and public diplomacy are also addressed and play an important role in enhancing the Policy’s implementation within the Alliance.

**Working with partners**

The adoption of the updated overarching policy on 1 April 2014 by NATO and its EAPC partners opened the way for more practical cooperation with NATO’s broad partnership network. For the first time, Afghanistan, Australia, Japan, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates participated actively in the development of the Policy. New Zealand later associated itself with this effort too.

Work with partner countries focuses on reinforcing political dialogue and practical cooperation in the security and defence fields. To this end – in the context of their various partnership programmes with NATO – partners are encouraged to adopt specific goals related to UNSCR 1325 and related Resolutions. They are also encouraged to make use of the training and education activities developed by Allied Command Transformation (ACO), which has ensured that a gender perspective is included in the curriculum of NATO Training Centres, Centres of Excellence and in pre-deployment training.

Though the Alliance has no influence on measures or policies taken at national levels, it is required that personnel deployed in NATO-led operations and missions and serving within NATO structures are appropriately trained and meet required standards of behaviour. Several countries have initiated gender-related training for subject matter experts and raised general awareness on UNSCR 1325 and related Resolutions ahead of national force deployments.

Women, peace and security issues are also regularly raised during staff talks between NATO and the UN, the OSCE, the EU as well as the African Union.

**Gender perspective in operations**

UNSCR 1325 and related Resolutions are also being implemented in crisis management and in NATO-led operations and missions. The Alliance nominated gender advisers at both Strategic Commands – ACO and Allied Command Transformation - as well as in Afghanistan and Kosovo. They advise commanders on how best to conduct operations so as to limit their impact on women and girls.

Along with having more female personnel on the ground, these measures have had a positive effect on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in theatres of operation. For
instance, in Afghanistan, female soldiers are able to connect with members of the population otherwise closed off from their male colleagues. Gender advisers have also sought to promote public awareness and ensure that the gender perspective has been incorporated in operational planning documents throughout the chain of command, as well as in documents outlining NATO’s current and future partnership with Afghanistan.

In addition, NATO’s next Crisis Management Exercise in 2015 will include – for the first time ever – a gender perspective as one of its objectives. These annual exercises are designed to practice the Alliance’s crisis management procedures at the strategic political level, and involve civilian and military staffs in Allied capitals, at NATO Headquarters, and in both Strategic Commands.

The NATO Action Plan

A first NATO Action Plan to mainstream UNSCR 1325 and related Resolutions into NATO-led operations and missions was endorsed at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010 on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of UNSCR 1325.

Following the adoption of NATO’s revised policy in April 2014, a new overarching action plan for supporting the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and related Resolutions was endorsed in June 2014. Like the policy, the action plan was developed by Allies together with their EAPC partners, plus Afghanistan, Australia, Japan, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and New Zealand. It also focuses on the same areas of intervention, namely cooperative security, crisis management and NATO-led operations and missions, and national contributions. It is structured into 14 outcomes and several actions, whose implementation and responsibility are shared between NATO International Staff, NATO Military Authorities and relevant national authorities.

This Action Plan covers a two-year period and will therefore be revised in June 2016.

Implementing UNSCR 1325 and related Resolutions

The implementation of UNSCR 1325 and related Resolutions cuts across various divisions and governing bodies within NATO Headquarters, as well as in the Strategic Commands. All these entities together are responsible for monitoring and reporting the progress made by the Alliance. For this purpose, a Women, Peace and Security Task Force was
established under the guidance and responsibility of the Special Representative for
Women, Peace and Security, who represents the highest focal point for the
implementation of this agenda within the Alliance. A specific body was also set up to
advise the Military Committee.

In sum, the mechanisms at NATO’s disposal to implement the UNSC Resolutions are:

◦ The Secretary General’s Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security at
  NATO Headquarters;
◦ A task force bringing together civilian and military staff across the Headquarters;
◦ A gender office (NATO Office on Gender Perspectives) and an advisory committee of
  experts (NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives) on the military side, tasked with
  promoting gender mainstreaming as a means of making the concerns and
  experiences of women and men alike an integral dimension of the design and
  implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies, programmes and military
  operations;
◦ A working group led by ACO to assess means to further incorporate UNSCR 1325 and
  related Resolutions into operational planning and execution;
◦ Gender advisers deployed at different levels of NATO’s military command structure,
  including operational headquarters;
◦ A number of relevant committees that develop and review specific and overall policy.