FINANCIAL CRISIS
TODAY’S FIGHT IS AGAINST...COSTS:
HOW TO KEEP SECURITY EFFICIENT
IN TOUGH TIMES

NATO AND ASIA
WHEN EAST GREETS WEST: HOW
WILL RELATIONS WITH ASIA
DEVELOP?

SOURCE OF ALL EVIL?
ORGANISED CRIME AND TERROR
FINANCING - MORE THAN A
MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE?

NOT WAVING BUT
DROWNING?
ARE WE ENTERING THE END OF
THE NAVAL ERA?

the long and winding...
Road to 21st century security
In which award winning online magazine can you find everything from videos to photostories on security issues from dirty bombs to rising food prices to organised crime?

You’re looking at it.
Security and the effects of budgetary constraints

Money is too tight not to mention, says NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, as he outlines how the financial crisis must be used as an opportunity to spend smarter, without compromising security.

Through the noise, our voice is still heard

In the midst of the millions of tweets, Facebook entries and YouTube uploads each week, it would be easy for NATO’s voice to be drowned out. But, despite not having the easiest story to tell, NATO’s message is still getting through, says Stefanie Rabet, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy.

No trainers? No transition

The emphasis in Afghanistan has been clearly laid on making sure Afghan security is dealt with completely by Afghan forces as soon as possible. But, argues Lt Gen Bill Caldwell, head of NATO training mission in Afghanistan, that will only happen if there is sufficient quantity and quality of trainers for the Afghan forces.

Facts and figures on Afghanistan’s forces

How close is the transfer to a full size, fully functioning Afghan army? Here we present the facts and figures showing how much has been done – and what remains to do.

The new killing fields?

Award winning journalist and author Gretchen Peters outlines how organised crime and insurgent groups overlap in Afghanistan and beyond. Here she argues that, for lasting security in Central Asia, it is essential to prevent funds reaching insurgents from the region’s illegal businesses - ranging from opium through to timber.

Photostory: the changing faces of security challenges

New challenges and emerging changes are many and varied. NATO’s new Strategic Concept is designed to be forward looking towards several of them. Here, we select some of the most powerful photos outlining some of the challenges already facing the world – and some that could only just be starting.

New challenges, new NATO

Shifting challenges requires changing focus and approach. Emerging threats, such as cyber attacks and energy security need to be addressed. Here, NATO Assistant Secretary General, Gábor Iklödy, outlines how changes inside NATO are being made to reflect the changes in the outside world.

Yemen: terrorism is not its only problem

Imagine a country with some of the most radical clerics in the world, in a country beset by dire poverty and internal rebellions. Add a border with the country who has the world’s largest oil reserves. And then add an al Qaida offshoot. What you now have is Yemen. Christopher Boucek outlines why the country deserves more attention than it currently gets.

Game, reset and good match?

Relations between Russia and the West have been undergoing a thaw in the last couple of years. But what do Russians actually think about moving closer together, especially with NATO? Here we present the results of an independent survey of Russian experts, outlining their opinions.

Asia NATO and its partners: complicated relationships?

The biggest armies, markets and populations in the world can be found in Asia. As NATO sets out to make more and better use of partners, Michito Tsuruoka analyses the strengths and weaknesses of NATO’s relations with its Asian partners.

NATO and the European Defence Agency—
not a zero-sum game

The financial crisis has made number crunching a global sport. One of the key conclusions is that duplication is for dummies. So how can organisations like NATO and the EU make better use of their individual skills and capabilities? Häly Laasme looks into possible solutions.

The end of the naval era?

Reports of the death of the naval era are premature, says Diego Ruiz Palmer. Despite a combination of prospective defence cuts and supposed moves towards nimbler and less expensive war craft, he argues there is more a need to refashion naval arrangements rather than disregard them.

10 years on, the promises to women need to be kept

In March 2000, a UN Security Council Resolution aimed to improve the role of women in peace and security. Ambassador Anwarul K. Chowdhury who, as the President of the UN Security Council led the initiative, argues that much remains to be done.
There has been little economic good news of late. Budgetary pressures are growing across NATO’s 28 member nations. But, as NATO governments and parliaments contemplate savings, they should keep in mind the fundamentals of our free market economy; the importance of sharing the security burden within NATO; and the many possibilities for spending smarter, including by bringing NATO and the EU closer together.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Secretary General of NATO

“The world has changed. The threats have changed. So has NATO. We need and we will have a Strategic Concept that takes account of today’s realities and tomorrow’s challenges as well.”
There is a real risk in the current crisis that countries become inward looking and put up trade barriers. Yet experience shows that such moves are counter-productive. Protectionist measures won’t save businesses that are already losing their competitive edge. Moreover, the consequences of such measures are often felt most severely in countries and regions that are already fragile. And there they may amplify some of the most serious security threats that we have already had to deal with in recent years, such as terrorism, piracy and the disruption of our energy supplies.

At the same time, our prosperity and wellbeing are not just a question of wise economic choices, they also require wise security choices. How, for example, can we protect our populations and critical infrastructure from terrorists? Or our territories from missile strikes? Or our shipping from pirates? How can we protect not only economic activity but also human life, if we don’t have the right capabilities?

By sharing the burden within NATO, individual Allies can achieve a far greater level of security than they could achieve through any national approach – and at lower costs. But this collective insurance policy requires regular premiums to be paid. All Allies, on both sides of the Atlantic, need to demonstrate the political will to continue to invest in defence, and to invest their fair share in NATO.

At the moment, all Allies have to cope with the serious effects of the economic crisis. That is a simple reality, and cuts are inevitable. However, we need to be aware of the potential long-term negative effects if we implement defence cuts that are too large and disproportionate. European Allies, in particular, must resist the temptation to disinvest too much in defence, and let the transatlantic defence spending gap widen any further.

We must ensure cohesion across the Alliance in our defence decisions. Our guiding principle should be to cut fat, and build up muscle. Rather than spending on fixed infrastructure and soldiers, who are essentially stuck in their barracks, we should re-direct our investments towards more flexible, mobile and modern armed forces – armed forces that we can actually use, against the challenges we actually face.

NATO Allies must also get a greater return from their defence euros and dollars. Through a combination of collective approaches and multinational solutions, we can deliver more and better. Through role specialisation and prioritisation, nations can focus their spending in specific areas, rather than spreading it too thin across a range of capabilities. And reorganisation and rationalisation can help to bring down the expensive fixed overheads associated with infrastructure and personnel.

But there is yet another way of delivering more with less: by building a true strategic partnership between NATO and the European Union. NATO and the EU are two of the world’s most important institutions. They share 21 members. They have complementary skills and assets. And no other strategic partnership would offer so many benefits, including operational and financial benefits.

In many cases, NATO and the EU share the same requirements for military capabilities. So let us identify priority areas and agree that, wherever possible, any capability work in one organisation shall be open to all members of the other too, making mutual cooperation the norm rather than the exception.

At a time of budgetary constraint, we must be aware of the dangers of making the wrong decisions in our defence spending. But we must also realise that we have a rare opportunity. By focussing on open market economic principles, by sharing the defence burden more equitably, and by spending smarter, we can deliver real security and an even more effective NATO at lower cost.

That is good news for Allied governments. And it is even better news for our taxpayers.

H.E. Ivo Daalder, United States Permanent Representative to NATO
Should NATO Act Outside of Europe?

The results from a recent survey carried out by the German Marshall Fund entitled Transatlantic Trends gives us a few clues. It found that majorities (59%) in 11 European countries and the United States (60%) still believe that NATO is essential for their security. The exception is Turkey where only 30% believe NATO is essential.

**Question:** how many videos do you imagine are watched on YouTube each day. A few million? A couple of hundred million?

The answer is actually 2 billion – and growing.

In 2007, Twitter saw 5,000 tweets a day. The figure today? Over 90 million.

As baseball legend Yogi Berra once said: ‘The future ain’t what it used to be’.

Nowhere is the rapid pace of change more visible than in mass communications. Thanks to digital cameras and mobile phones, photos and videos are spread within seconds across the globe, turning millions of people into information providers.

This has a number of downsides for national governments and international organisations. Put simply, it is much harder to get our messages across. The top-down communication patterns of the Cold War era are increasingly being replaced by peer-to-peer relationships and networks.

Unsurprisingly institutional communication channels rank among the least trusted. This increases the need for well-planned public diplomacy efforts. Strategic communications, place branding and public affairs are essential tools to convince audiences that a country or organisation’s values are worth supporting. Many governments have hired PR firms to improve their image.

It is difficult for countries to improve their image: it is even harder for multilateral bodies. Most people find the workings of large international organisations too complex and removed from their every day concerns.

So where does NATO fit in this? How has it fared in conveying its messages?

Despite competing with millions of other messages, NATO still enjoys considerable public support in Europe and the United States argues STEFANIE BABST
Interestingly, 62% of respondents in the 11 European nations would also support a NATO role outside Europe, whereas 32% prefer NATO to focus on Europe itself. In the US support is much larger with 77% saying that NATO should act outside Europe, if need be.

Even in Russia opinions about NATO are improving. In 2009, only 24% of Russians held a positive view of NATO; currently 40% express a favorable opinion, whereas 40% still view NATO unfavourably.

But the Allies would be well advised not to take public support for NATO for granted.

The NATO-led operation (ISAF) in Afghanistan remains a case in point. More than half of West Europeans want to see their troops withdrawn from or reduced in Afghanistan with Poland being highest (77%) and Turkey lowest (with 47%). Support for NATO’s operation in Afghanistan has also started to decrease in the United States, where 41% want their troops home or numbers substantially reduced.

Against this background, NATO Allies must do a better, more coherent job to explain their strategy in Afghanistan. We must convince parliamentarians and the public why it is important to finish the job in Afghanistan.

But at the same time the Alliance needs to tackle another fundamental challenge. Bluntly, we must better explain what the Transatlantic Alliance is all about in the 21st century.

National and international surveys demonstrate clearly that the public at large, and particularly the post-Cold-War generation, has only foggy ideas of the NATO’s new missions and policies. While there is still a considerable degree of trust and confidence in the organisation as such, many people have difficulties relating NATO to new global security threats. Others, again, question the need to invest in defence after the end of the Cold War or view NATO primarily as a protector against Russia.

But these perceptions and assumptions are wrong. The sad fact is that our world has even become more fragile after the end of the Cold War.

Terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and threats posed to our energy security, information infrastructure and commercial shipping are just some of the pressing security challenges requiring urgent responses. More than ever governments and other players in the international arena need to work together to address these challenges, to find support for solutions and change.

No single government can tackle these expanding problems on its own. The Alliance remains the best and most effective transatlantic forum to do exactly this. But NATO’s role as a security provider has not been fully understood by our publics.

So how does NATO respond to this?

For sure, the Allies have come a long way in embracing a new and modern understanding of their common communication policies. Transparency, responsiveness, accuracy of information and direct engagement with people across Allied territory and beyond have become pillars of NATO’s public diplomacy.

More than ever, journalists, think tankers, decisions-makers and NGOs (non-governmental organisations) can be found in NATO’s Headquarters’ corridors or meeting with NATO civilian and military experts in public gatherings.

But NATO has also become more accessible for average citizens. Every year thousands of visitors come to the Headquarters to discuss the transatlantic security agenda with national and NATO officials and, if he is around, even with the NATO Secretary General.

NATO does not try to hide behind confidential documents, nor avoid critical questions. In recent years, we have especially reinforced our efforts to reach out to the young generation, by facilitating networks among students and young political leaders, offering summer schools and fellowships and organising seminars and workshops across NATO and partner nations.

We have also overhauled our technological capabilities, bringing the NATO website and other audiovisual tools and products up to scratch. Online lectures, videos and discussions have made NATO’s interface to the outside world more transparent and interactive. There are no taboos: topics range from the new Strategic Concept all the way to the challenging operation in Afghanistan.

When it comes to the use of new media tools, NATO’s Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, is a frontrunner. He runs his personal Facebook and Twitter profiles and responds directly to questions and comments from ordinary citizens in his digital ‘Secretary General’s Corner’.

NATO has come to understand how important a modern and responsive public diplomacy strategy is for the organisation. We have grasped that NATO’s image, for good or for worse, rests in our own hands.

Ultimately, however, a strong and positive brand can never be constructed through slogans and logos alone. It needs to be earned through convincing policies and political actions – and this is exactly what the 28 Allies are trying to achieve together on a daily basis.

The Summit in Lisbon is an excellent opportunity for the Allies to demonstrate their resolve to continue building an efficient transatlantic security partnership. We will be prepared to carry our messages loudly and clearly – whether it be through new or old communication methods - to the people. Because it is them who matter most.

Dr. Stefanie Babst is NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy. The views represented in this article are solely her own and are not NATO’s official positions.
NO TRAINERS? NO TRANSITION.

LTG BILL CALDWELL OUTLINES WHY HE SEES TRAINERS AS HOLDING THE KEY TO AFGHANISTAN’S FUTURE.

H. E. Jaak Aaviksoo,
MINISTER OF DEFENCE FOR THE REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA

“Article 5, with all new threats, but not forgetting the old ones, must remain the core objective of the Alliance.”
Recently I visited National Military Hospital in Kabul with the Chief of the Afghan General Staff. On the way there, my vehicle was stopped by a procession of civilians and Afghan soldiers…a funeral procession for an Afghan soldier.

Observing the procession and recognising Afghan soldiers at the National Military Hospital who had been injured protecting their country were stirring experiences. Although the sacrifices of the Afghan National Security Force are not much publicised in the Western media, I saw up close the toll this war is taking on its bravest citizens.

These brave men are not alone. International forces (military and civilian) work every day to support the development of their force, the systems that support and sustain them, and partner with them in the field. Our efforts have not been in vain.

In the past ten months, there has been measured progress in the Afghan National Security Force; in quality as well as quantity. Since its activation last November, NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A) has supported the Afghan Ministries of Interior and Defence to recruit, train and assign over 100,000 soldiers and police; an incredible feat.

To achieve this, the training capacity was increased, moving from under 10,000 seats for police training alone to almost 15,000.

Quality improved, as well. The instructor to trainee ratio decreased from 1:76 to 1:29, greatly increasing the ability of trainers to give attention to individuals. Improvements like this led to an improved basic rifle marksmanship rate; increasing from a woeful 35% to 97%.

To truly professionalise the force, providing the men and women with the skills to protect their country and their Security Force, will require even more attention to quality in the force. This, in turn, requires more international trainers with specialised skills.

To develop the systems and institutions that are required to continue to professionalise and grow the Afghan National Security Force, specialty training is required. Schools that teach skills like acquisitions, logistics, maintenance, intelligence, and even field artillery are needed to balance a currently infantry-centric force.

Additionally, leader development courses like the police staff college, police and army officer candidate schools, and various non-commissioned officer development courses are needed. All of these specialty courses require trainers with the requisite skills – trainers that can only be found in the international community.

Over the next ten months, our requirement for these trainers will double, with needed skill sets ranging from Mi-17 helicopter pilots and maintainers to doctors, police trainers to instructors at Army branch schools.

The impacts of not sourcing NTM-A trainer requirements are that training base expansions to increase capacity are hindered, specialty school development will be delayed, pace of enabler development will be slowed, and the professionalisation of the Afghan National Security Force will be hampered.

Essentially, the process of transition to the Afghan National Security Force will be delayed; as NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said recently, “no trainers, no transition.”

Even more importantly, the lack of trainers prevents brave Afghans like those in the Kabul Military Hospital from getting the skills necessary to protect their people, and themselves.

If we do not resource the training mission in Afghanistan, we will not be able to achieve our goals for increased quantity and improved quality.

We must not allow that to happen.

To create Afghan capacity that is enduring and self-sustaining we must professionalise the police, army, and air forces; create viable logistics and medical systems; and improve the infrastructure and the institutions that train and educate them.

Above all, we must have the trainers to develop them; the trainers that can give our Afghan partners the ability to make their brothers’ and sisters’ sacrifices worth the price.
NATO training efforts in Afghanistan focus on the need to significantly increase the capacity of Afghan forces so as to gradually hand over the lead responsibility for security to the Afghans. Since 28 August 2008, Afghan National Security Forces have gradually taken over lead responsibility for security in Kabul province. There is increased training of the police forces too. This process is led by the Afghan Ministry of Interior and supported by the Ministry of Defence and ISAF.
AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY
(SEPTEMBER 2010)
Founded: 2002

Strength: 138,200 troops (as of September 2010)
Target Strength: 171,600 (by October 2011)

Current performance levels based upon Capability Milestones (CM) (as of 11 Apr 10):

**CM-1**
Capable of planning and executing operations at Battalion level with no external support:
- 21 ANA KANDAKS (BATTALIONS)
- CORPS HEADQUARTERS
- BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS
- GARRISON SUPPORT UNITS

**CM-2**
Capable of leading operations with ISAF support:
- 48 UNITS

**CM-3**
Capable of participating in operations with ISAF lead:
- 42 UNITS

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY
AIR CORPS (ANAAC)
Founded: June 2008

Strength: 3,940 (November 2010)
Target Strength: 8,000 + personnel (by December 2016)

Capacity: Flew 90% of ANA air support missions in 2009 (compared to 10% in mid-2008).
A 2009 report for the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, American intelligence agencies continue to believe that donations from wealthy sympathisers in the Gulf make up the bulk of funding for the Taliban, al Qaeda and other extremist groups operating along the AfPak (Afghanistan/Pakistan) frontier.

An examination of their day-to-day activities at the ground level suggests otherwise however. Whether protecting the opium trade, engaging in kidnapping, bank robbery, gunrunning, extortion or human trafficking, takfiri groups on both sides of the frontier today behave more like Mafiosi than mujahidin.

It’s hard to make generalisations about the wider AfPak insurgency because there are so many different anti-state groups operating on both sides of the Durrand Line, and they do not always behave the same way. There continue to be reports of extremist leaders asking for – and receiving – cash donations from sympathetic members of the community.

But increasingly, AfPak anti-state groups appear to expend a significant amount of their daily energy engaging in criminal fundraising techniques, and this involvement in crime is changing both their battlefield strategy and the fundamental nature of the wider insurgency.

The morphing of the AfPak insurgents is neither new nor unique: throughout history and around the world insurgents and terror groups have repeatedly turned to crime to support their activities. And over time criminal earnings have corrupted levels of dedication to the original ideology. The FARC, the IRA and Hezbollah have undergone similar metamorphoses, and perhaps the most famous case from history is the Sicilian Mafia, which got it start much like the Taliban – protecting an ethnic community from the excesses of local rulers.

In southern and southwestern Afghanistan, where the Taliban protect and tax the multi-billion-dollar opium market, insurgents have deepened their involvement in the trade since 2001.

Initially, Taliban commanders mainly confined themselves to taxing drug shipments that moved through their control zones, and later began providing protection for opium shipments and heroin refineries. It’s now common to hear of Taliban commanders running their own refineries, which have exploded in number inside insurgent-held territory.

There is also increased evidence that some Afghan Taliban commanders continue to control drug shipments as they leave Afghan territory, indicating the movement is widening its sphere of criminal influence.

Although Taliban commanders have integrated their activities throughout the opium trade, it’s still not accurate to suggest the Taliban control the drug market. Drug cartels, which are mainly based in Pakistan and dependent on ties both to anti-state and state actors, remain the key decision-makers and earn the greatest profits.

And while it’s clear that growing numbers of Taliban commanders are in it mainly for the money, it would also be wrong to conclude...
that the movement as a whole has abandoned its goal of driving Western forces out of Afghanistan. Rather it is more accurate to say a small core of true believers still command the Afghan Taliban, and there is scant evidence those leaders live lavishly off the profits they earn from protecting and taxing the drugs trade.

A key question western intelligence forces need to be asking is what the Taliban leadership intends to do with the vast profits it earns from the drugs trade and other crime – which I estimate to value as much as half a billion dollars annually.

These vast criminal profits don’t only come from drugs. Since 2001 insurgent and takfiri groups on both sides of the Durrand Line have broadened their involvement in a wide range of criminal activities. Kidnapping has become a growth industry, in which criminal gangs and insurgent groups collaborate to snatch wealthy businessmen and then sell them back to their families.

In the past, kidnap victims were often beheaded on camera to make a political statement, most famously the Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. The more recent abduction of New York Times correspondent David Rohde was illustrative of the fact that profit is now the central motive. Insurgents who held Mr Rohde initially were asking $28 million for his release, according to tribal sources in the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan).

In other parts of the war theatre, insurgents engage in timber smuggling, human trafficking and selling emeralds on the black market. In some cases, insurgents have resorted to bank robbery; fighters loyal to the late Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, for example, recently robbed a money changer in the southern port city Karachi and then smuggled the money all the way to the FATA.

The way the various groups interact is similar to the way Mafia crime families relate to each other. Sometimes they collaborate, and sometimes they fight each other, including the recent power struggle in South Waziristan that followed Mr Mehsud’s killing.

In many cases where insurgent and takfiri factions fight amongst themselves or when there are battles between the factions, money is at the centre of the struggle. To head off this problem, there are routine high-level meetings between the various groups to decide who has rights to earn in what territory.

When the various groups collaborate, earning money is usually the goal. There are reports that the Pakistani Taliban’s push into the northwest parts of that country has been financed in part by other branches of the wider insurgency. One of my researchers recently interviewed low-level operatives in Bajaur who told him that Uzbek and Afghan fighters have begun arriving with suitcases full of cash, apparently to help pay for operations in Swat and Buner.

There are similar reports from Kunduz province in northern Afghanistan, which has seen an explosion in Taliban activity in recent months. One of my researchers got word from local authorities that Uzbek fighters had been advising the Afghan Taliban as they pushed back into the province.

US officials tracking the HIG (Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin) group in eastern Afghanistan have come across evidence that foreign fighters operating in that region funnel funds to insurgents in Chechnya and Central Asia. And perhaps more worrisome still are growing indications that some fighters in Afghanistan have links to criminal street gangs in the West.

The recent report for the US Senate also indicates that American intelligence officials continue to believe al Qaida plays no role – and earns no profits from – the Afghan drug trade and other criminal activity. I believe that is incorrect.

Throughout my research for Seeds of Terror, I found evidence that al Qaida leaders and foreign fighters closely allied to them, in particular the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, played a coordinating role. I never found much evidence of al Qaida’s engagement in the operational side of the drug trade – such as coordinating drug shipments or running heroin labs. However it was clear that senior al Qaida officials made contacts and facilitated relationships that made major drug transactions possible across tribal lines, district and national borders.
Cybercrime is attractive for both terrorists and organised crime. It is an easy way to make money, through activities like fake accounts and cards. Even secure locations are attacked - the Pentagon’s computers are probed six million times a day.

Piracy is one of the oldest methods of theft - but the spike in the key waters off the coast of Somalia has left many worried. The numbers have risen sharply since 2004, as has the range of attacks, which previously were largely limited to about 50 nautical miles from the shore. © Reuters/Ho New

The International Chamber of Commerce estimates that trade in counterfeit goods totals around $650 billion each year. Most countries in the world have a GDP smaller than this figure. © Reuters/Bogdan Cristel

“...The one issue the Strategic Concept must deal with is... “The first one is the proper balance between the operations, and second, the proper balance in views among the bigger and smaller countries to make sure that this is our Strategic Concept, that each member state can identify itself with this document. That’s very important.”
Riots in Haiti and Cameroon, violent protests in Ivory Coast, and heated demonstrations in Mauritania, Mozambique, Senegal, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Bolivia, Indonesia and other countries have shown the instability rising food prices causes. 13 per cent of the world’s population is undernourished due to extreme poverty, while up to 2 billion people lack food security intermittently. (source: United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization)

© AP / Reporters

The trail of funding for terrorists often leads back to drugs. And the trail of drugs often leads back to Afghanistan. The country provides 90 per cent of the world’s opium. About 10 kilos of opium can make one kilo of heroin. The street value of a kilo of heroin in London is around 75,000 euros. In 2007, about half of Afghanistan’s opium produced 666 tonnes of heroin or morphine export. © Reuters/Goran Tomasevic

…… The one issue the Strategic Concept must deal with is……

“Well, not so much what must be changed, but what must be retained. Let’s not forget that the current Strategic Concept has a lot of merit in it. I don’t think that it should be changed for the sake of change.”

H. E. Imants Lieģis,
Minister of Defence for the Republic of Latvia
Rising powers, rising tensions?
On 29th January 2010, a proposed $6 billion arms sale to Taiwan caused a diplomatic row between the US and China. China threatened to suspend military exchanges with the US. © Reuters

Climate change has already influenced conflicts around the Earth, prompting migrations in the horn of Africa. And it is affecting the military too. Last year, the new 844-ft. USS Makin Island made its maiden voyage - noteworthy because it is powered in a 'hybrid' manner (using electrical motors for slower travel). © Reuters

A view from behind a burkha. This is what virtually every woman saw in Afghanistan until 2001. Though the practice continues in patches, it is no longer brutally enforced by the Taliban, thereby liberating millions of Afghan women. And they are free to see a wider range of images now too © Reporters / Associated Press

"You know, NATO has always been a forum for dialogue. And I think, the more the dialogue happens, the more we understand each other, each of our different cultures, each of our different countries."
There are worries that the financial crisis could increase national protectionism. Here, American workers protest at a march in Lansing, Michigan after General Motors bankruptcy filing became the third-largest in U.S. history and the largest ever in U.S. manufacturing.

Global nuclear zero? ‘Today, I state clearly and with conviction, America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons’, President Barack Obama, Prague, April 5, 2009 © Reuters / Jason Reed

There are worries that the financial crisis could increase national protectionism.

The Honorable Madeleine K. Albright,
Chair of the Group of Experts appointed by NATO Secretary General to lay the groundwork for the new Strategic Concept, and a former US Secretary of State

“NATO is a brilliant Alliance started in 1949 that has over the years adjusted its mandate and its mission to suit what is happening, and it certainly makes sense that in the 21st century, we should be looking forward with a new Strategic Concept.”
IN EARLY AUGUST, A NEW DIVISION STARTED ITS WORK IN NATO’S INTERNATIONAL STAFF. IN ITSELF, THIS MAY NOT APPEAR PARTICULARLY NOTEWORTHY. LARGE BUREAUCRACIES RE-SHUFFLING THEIR OUTFIT FROM TIME TO TIME IS NOT EXACTLY HEADLINE-GRABBING STUFF.

BUT THIS TIME, THINGS ARE DIFFERENT.

The creation of an “Emerging Security Challenges Division” (ESCD) by Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen is not just an internal exercise, but also a strong political message. For the first time, NATO is systematically bringing together work on the areas that will increasingly affect the security of the Allies on both sides of the Atlantic: terrorism, cyber attacks, threats to energy supply, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

At first glance it may appear as if these challenges have little in common. However, a closer look reveals why they belong together conceptually. These challenges not only share certain common characteristics, but addressing them also requires NATO to change the way it thinks about Alliance solidarity and how it interacts with the broader international community, notably with civilian actors and the private sector.
The first common characteristic of these challenges is that they do not necessarily affect all Allies in the same way. A terrorist attack on a single Ally may generate collective concern, yet it may not automatically be regarded as an attack against the Alliance as a whole. The same holds true for a cyber attack on the banking system or an attack on the energy supply of an individual Ally. The decision about if and how to respond lies first and foremost with an individual Ally. The decision about if and how to respond lies first and foremost with an individual Ally.

In contrast to the Cold War, when a Warsaw Pact attack on one NATO Ally would have triggered a collective response by the other Allies, today’s challenges do not necessarily lend themselves to such a quasi-automatic response. Consequently, NATO Allies need to re-define the way in which Alliance solidarity will be expressed in a range of entirely new scenarios.

A second common characteristic of the new challenges is the fact that they do not necessarily require a military response. A well-orchestrated cyber attack can paralyse a country in ways that in the past could only have been achieved by a foreign invasion; yet if the attackers were an NGO, for example, NATO would hardly be able to threaten military retaliation.

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The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in turn, may well require new military means of protection, such as missile defences. However, dampening proliferation incentives by resolving regional security problems and applying diplomatic and economic “sticks” and “carrots” will remain the preferred approach. In short, while transatlantic cooperation remains indispensable to cope with the new security challenges, NATO’s military “toolbox” no longer suffices.

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This leads to the third common characteristic of the new challenges: since they are both foreign and domestic, as well as military and economic, they require a holistic approach. In concrete terms, they require NATO to build structured relations with a range of civilian actors.

This applies not only to the other major international organisations, such as the United Nations and the European Union, but also to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as well as the private sector, for example the energy and information technology sectors. All these actors become partners in the attempt to cope with the security challenges that are thrown up by globalisation. Given the vast differences in their goals, mandates and working methods, building trusting and effective relationships between them will be an arduous process. Yet NATO must not shy away from this challenge.

If the Alliance wants to remain an effective security provider for its members, it must become a team player. NATO has only just begun to embark on this journey – and it is going to be a difficult one.

Some Allies may hesitate to grant NATO a stronger role in areas such as energy security or addressing nuclear proliferation, arguing against unduly militarising a range of issues that for good reasons should remain political. Others might be concerned that dealing with these new security challenges will divert NATO’s attention away from its core task of collective defence. Such concerns can only be addressed – and, hopefully, dispelled – if Allies devote more time to discussing emerging challenges. Over the past years, managing NATO’s operations, such as those in Afghanistan and Kosovo, has taken up most of the Allies’ time and focus, at the expense of discussing future challenges.

What is therefore needed is a new balance between the present and the future: NATO must develop a culture of political discussion which is not confined to issues that directly involve NATO militarily, but which also includes issues that may have “only” political relevance. As long as every debate in NATO is viewed as preparing military operations, a forward-looking, enlightened debate about emerging 21st century challenges will remain elusive. The Emerging Security Challenges Division will play its part in contributing to such a new culture of debate. Its Strategic Analysis Capability will scan the strategic horizon for challenges that may affect Allied security. This will help stimulate the debate among Allies and reinforce NATO’s unique value as a key forum for security consultation between Europe and North America, the world’s strongest community of like-minded nations.

A new Division in NATO’s International Staff, stronger ties with other actors, and a more forward-looking debate among Allies: these are the elements that will shape NATO’s approach towards emerging security challenges. To make this approach truly effective requires profound changes in NATO’s structure and policy.

But NATO is ready to embrace these changes. Because Allies have understood that only by embracing change will the Atlantic Alliance be able to live up to its role as an anchor of security in a globalised world.
Yemen: Terrorism is not its only problem

Since its emergence in January 2009, Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has developed into an agile and internationally lethal organisation. But it thrives in Yemen because the country has so many other problems, says Chris Boucek.

Al Qaida and the organisations it inspires are finding safe haven in Yemen’s under-governed areas. The deteriorating security situation offers terror organisations a nearly perfect environment to operate in and mount operations in and out of the country.

Yemen is a country of critical concern for the United States, the North Atlantic allies, and the wider international community. Here’s why:

- the country is faced with a daunting list of converging crises, including a looming economic collapse, weak governance, and internal instability
- the government in Sana’a doesn’t enjoy full control over its territory
- and a civil war in the North is jeopardising the country’s legitimacy and stability, along with the deepening secessionist movement in the South, and a resurgent al Qaida organisation.

It is this last challenge - the presence of al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) - that has refocused global attention on Yemen.

Yemen rose to the top of the international headlines following the attempted terrorist attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 bound for Detroit on December 25 last year. With responsibility claimed by AQAP, US security officials are seriously worried about the deteriorating situation in the country. For the past 12 months, Yemen has been a security concern for the American administration second only to Afghanistan and Pakistan (or AfPak as the region has been dubbed).

Separately, American officials have recently stated to both the New York Times and the Washington Post that Yemen-based AQAP may be a greater threat to international security than al Qaida central, believed to be hiding in Pakistan.

Yemen-based AQAP may be a greater threat to international security than ‘al Qaida central’, believed to be hiding in Pakistan

Despite initial counter-terrorism successes made against al Qaida in Yemen following the September 11th attacks, the organisation has surged back. Analysts have noted several factors which have contributed to this, including:

- difficulties and distrust in the bilateral US-Yemeni relationship,
- a generational split amongst Islamist militants,
- and the radicalising effects of the Afghan and Iraq wars.

The situation has been compounded by deteriorating economic and social conditions in Yemen, as well as the domestic perception of diminished Yemeni government legitimacy due to its counter-terrorism cooperation with the United States.

In recent years, there has been a significant upick in attacks within Yemen. A July 2007 car bomb killed eight Spanish tourists and their local driver at an archeological site in Marib. In January 2008 two Belgian tourists were shot and killed in Hadramout in eastern Yemen.

Later that spring there were several attacks inside the capital Sana’a, including mortar attacks on the US embassy, a western housing compound, the Italian embassy and the Yemeni Customs Authority. During this same period there were also reported attacks in Sana’a against the offices of a western oil company and a restaurant frequented by westerners.

In September 2008, the US embassy in Sana’a was attacked again, this time by two car bombs. Ten people were killed, including six Yemeni security officers, although the attackers failed to breach the embassy’s outer perimeter. The shift of violence to the capital marked a significant deterioration. Previously it was though that Sana’a’s security levels would preclude such operations.

In 2008, as the security situation in Saudi Arabia improved, al Qaida advised its operatives in the kingdom to seek refuge in Yemen. In January 2009, a video was released announcing the merger of the Saudi and Yemeni affiliates of al Qaida. The newly christened al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula was comprised of Yemeni nationals as well as a significant number of wanted Saudi extremists. At the time of the merger, it was believed that roughly 30 per cent of Saudi Arabia’s most wanted terrorists were in Yemen, including 11 returnees from Guantanamo Bay (four Guantanamo returnees have since been killed or captured).

Throughout 2009 the pace of attacks intensified. Four South Korean tourists were killed in a suicide bombing in Hadramout in February and another suicide bombing in Sana’a targeted the South Korean motorcade of the victim’s family members as they headed to the airport. In April, Saudi authorities announced the capture of 11 fighters who had crossed into Saudi Arabia from Yemen. The group allegedly possessed

In 2008, as the security situation in Saudi Arabia improved, al Qaida advised its operatives in the kingdom to seek refuge in Yemen

If you say, we will take care of all major security situations in the world and that’s our vocation, then let’s from the very beginning decide what will be the resource.”

Igor Yurgens,
Advisor to Russian President H. E. Dmitry Medvedev and Chairman of the Management Board of the Institute of Contemporary Development
components for more than 30 suicide vests. This was the first concrete indication of Yemeni instability threatening Saudi security.

Shortly after this attack AQAP boldly stated that they had mastered a new explosive compound which could not be detected, and that they would use it again soon. On Christmas Day the same chemical explosive and attack profile was used in the operation on Northwest Flight 253. AQAP claimed responsibility for the attack.

The failed Northwest bombing is significant: it is al Qaida’s first operation against an American domestic target not conceived in South Asia. It also further marked Yemen as an emerging safe haven for al-Qaida aligned and affiliated extremists to plot, plan, train, and launch operations within Yemen, regionally, and internationally.

Throughout 2010, violence has continued. According to one recently produced timeline, there have been over 30 AQAP-related attacks through August, including the April attempted assassination in Sana’a of the British ambassador en route to the embassy. Since May, some 38 Yemeni intelligence and security officers have been killed in what some observers are beginning to call a coordinated campaign.

AQAP’s trajectory plainly shows that it’s an organisation increasingly capable of mounting deadly operations inside Yemen, regionally directed at Saudi Arabia, and internationally against the United States and its European allies. For the past several years AQAP has clearly stated what it has intended to do, and has sought to follow through on its threats. The organisation has learned from its mistakes in Saudi Arabia, and has consistently sought to increase its viability within Yemen by avoiding large scale mass casualty attacks. Its primary targets continue to be foreigners and tourists, energy infrastructure, and the government security services that are pursuing it.

Without a doubt there is an immediate counter-terrorism imperative in Yemen. However, this approach must be broader than simply kill or capture operations. The lack of security and counter-terrorism aren’t the biggest threats to Yemeni stability; they are the international community’s greatest concerns, but AQAP will not lead to state collapse in Yemen.

While short-term security and immediate counterterrorism operations are important, long-term development assistance cannot be ignored. The root causes of the instability, including corruption and poor governance, are what threaten to overwhelm the Yemeni government. Focusing too narrowly on fighting terrorism will only further inflame other grievances that give rise to militancy. And, without strong pressure and support from the international community, it is unlikely that the Yemeni government will address the systemic challenges facing the country.

Christopher Boucek is an associate in the Middle East Programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and editor of the book, Yemen on the Brink, September 2010.

North West Airlines flight 253 - the plane that the ‘underpants’ bomber tried to blow up over Detroit. He had been trained in Yemen.

© Reuters/Rebecca Cook
In April 2010, The Atlantic Initiative conducted an expert survey to gauge the path of the NATO-Russia relationship. The survey engaged respondents across Russia, experts in policy analysis who are employed by the country’s most influential think tanks, universities, scholarly journals and newspapers.

Some 47 experts, including prestigious participants such as Dr. Panov of the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Prof. Dr. Zapesotsky of the St. Petersburg University of Humanities and Social Sciences, participated in the NATO-sponsored survey.

The results indicate that Russia’s strategic community favours increased cooperation between NATO and Russia and is largely optimistic that a deepening of relations between NATO and Russia can be realised.

Over half of the experts believe that Russia’s long-term strategic interests would best be served by cooperating with NATO at the highest possible level as a primary partner. One in five experts even advocate NATO membership.

What is the most important confidence-building measure that NATO and Russia should undertake?

- **Improving dialogue within the NATO-Russia Council**: 40%
- **Arms Control**: 19%
- **Joint military exercises**: 13%
- **Counter-Narcotic training in Afghanistan and Central-Asia**: 11%
- **The fight against terrorism**: 9%
- **Increased joint anti-piracy efforts**: 4%
- **Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction**: 2%
- **I don’t know**: 2%
- **Do not know**: 2%

Do you expect that a joint assessment of Russian and NATO common threats and challenges will improve relations between the two?

- **Yes**: 77%
- **No**: 0%
- **Maybe**: 23%
- **I don’t know**: 0%

Game, reset and good match?

RESULTS OF RUSSIAN EXPERTS SURVEY

by Joerg Wolf

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF ATLANTIC-COMMUNITY.ORG
THE ATLANTIC INITIATIVE’S OPEN THINK TANK FOR TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS WITH 5,000 MEMBERS FROM AROUND THE WORLD.
Two-thirds of respondents feel that improved ties between NATO and Russia are contingent upon further development of President Medvedev’s proposal for a new European security architecture.

Three out of four respondents expect that a joint assessment of Russian and NATO common threats and challenges would lead to an improvement in relations. Only one-quarter of experts are sceptical on this point.

Four out of 10 experts believe that improving the dialogue within the NATO-Russia Council is the most important confidence-building measure to improve relations. A fifth list cooperation in arms control as the first priority.

The most popular suggestion provided by the experts to make the NATO-Russia Council more effective is to reduce the Council’s agenda and focus to a greater extent on practical concerns.

Experts are evenly split on NATO’s new Strategic Concept between those who consider NATO to be open to Russian commentary - and those who consider it closed. Most respondents, however, do not have a strong opinion or say they lack sufficient information on this issue.

When asked what NATO should consider when drafting its new Strategic Concept, more than a third of experts emphasise that Russia’s interests must be taken into account more. An equal number of respondents say NATO must realise that security threats are no longer traditional and adapt its strategies accordingly. New challenges include threats posed by international terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, cyber attacks and drug trafficking. These new challenges provide common ground on which NATO can cooperate with Russia.

In response to the question of how Russia can be reassured that NATO is no longer directed against it, nearly half of respondents advocate a halt in NATO enlargement. Many experts chose to express disapproval of NATO’s ‘eastward expansion’ in their responses to various questions, even though this topic was not part of the survey.

Is an improved Russia-NATO relationship dependent upon developing President Medvedev’s proposals for a new Security Treaty?

NATO has begun drafting a new Strategic Concept in an open process that will offer the chance for the Russian strategic community to make its voice heard. In your view, how receptive is NATO to Russian commentary so far?

Source: Atlantic Initiative
Asia, NATO and its partners:
COMPPLICATED RELATIONSHIPS?

MANY OF NATO’S NEW PARTNERS COME FROM IN OR AROUND ASIA. HOW DOES EACH SIDE SEE EACH OTHER – AND WHAT’S THE WAY TO ENSURE BOTH BENEFIT FROM WORKING TOGETHER?
MICHITO TSURUOKA LOOKS INTO THIS FROM AN ASIAN STANDPOINT.

NATO’s relationships with the countries outside the Euro-Atlantic region have developed rapidly in the last few years. Cooperation in Afghanistan has driven the development. Countries like Australia, New Zealand and Singapore are now troop contributors to the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan. Others, like Japan and South Korea, are making direct and indirect contributions to the Alliance’s effort there. These countries are now called “other partners across the globe.”

While countries like Australia and Japan are often seen as objects of the Alliance’s partnership policy, it is NATO who is the partner from those countries’ perspective. This article will examine how NATO is perceived as a partner by the Alliance’s new “partners across the globe.”

Why have those countries strengthened relations with NATO? What kind of partner is NATO in the eyes of those countries? And what do they expect from NATO?

NATO as a political Partner

To begin with, each country has a different set of motivations regarding its relationship with the Alliance. When Japan made an overtue to NATO in 2006 and 2007, it was predominantly a diplomatic move. It is true both then Foreign Minister Taro Aso and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe mentioned the possibility of operational cooperation between Japan and NATO during their respective addresses to the NAC (North Atlantic Council). It should be remembered, however, that both men spent much time there explaining the Asian security situation, including China and North Korea. Abe even directly “requested” the Allies “to urge North Korea to take sincere steps towards the resolution” of the issue of abduction of Japanese citizens by the North Korean authorities.

It is Japan’s intention to use NATO as an additional venue to raise international, particularly European, awareness of the Asian security situation. That is why Tokyo appreciated the NAC statements condemning the North Korean missile launch in July 2006 and the nuclear test in October the same year. Despite highly bellicose languages from Pyongyang, dealing with the country remains a diplomatic game, where international solidarity matters a lot.

NATO may not be a political actor in its own right. But as the world’s biggest and most capable political-military Alliance, it carries a certain—both intended and unintended—weight in international security affairs. This also explains why those who are sceptical about NATO, not least those who do not share values with NATO, fear the expansion of the Alliance’s area of activities and influence. NATO’s image in the outside world as an influential security actor is arguably stronger than NATO itself recognises. But precisely because of this, Japan sees NATO as an important new political partner. Other partners may follow suit.

NATO in operational cooperation

Australia’s and New Zealand’s relationships with NATO have developed largely based on their troop contribution to ISAF. As a result, operational cooperation is the main pillar of Australia-NATO and NZ-NATO relations, unlike Japan-NATO. These countries use NATO as an international framework too. Without NATO, Australia and New Zealand would not have been able participate in international military efforts in Afghanistan. NATO has enabled these countries’ contributions to international efforts there. Once in the ISAF, it is legitimate that Australia and other contributors demand more information-sharing and more involvement in policy-shaping and eventually decision-making. Australia, a country which has more than 1,000 troops in the South of Afghanistan engaged in combat missions, has been the most vocal partner in making these cases, which NATO has tried hard to accommodate.

Both at the political and strategic level and the theatre level, the level of information-sharing and involvement seems to have improved substantially in the past year. Ministerial (mainly Defence Ministers’) meetings in the ISAF format have become a regular event and working level troop contributors meetings such as in the PCG (Policy Coordination Group) framework serves as the venue for more substantial consultation.

However, the question of to what extent NATO is prepared to involve non-NATO contributors in the Alliance’s internal processes will not be solved in a clear fashion in the foreseeable future. For NATO, to accommodate the partners’ demands and satisfy them is necessary to secure their continued contribution. The principle of “no taxation without representation” holds true here.

NATO as a means of cooperation with the US

When countries such as Australia and New Zealand decided to send troops to Afghanistan, the partner they chose did not have to be NATO. In fact, when NZ deployed troops to Afghanistan for the first time, it was done under the framework of the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in close bilateral cooperation with the US. There was no secret that it was a decision to support specifically the US and to show solidarity with the country in the wake of the 9/11, which had nothing to do with NZ-NATO cooperation at that time. As a result of the geographical expansion of the ISAF in late 2006, the NZ troops stationed in Bamiyan province had to move from the OEF command to the ISAF. From NZ’s point of view, the resultant cooperation with NATO was largely an unintended by-product of what it had been doing regardless of ISAF.

This clearly shows another critical value that NATO has as a framework to cooperate in international peace operations and other areas. It is that NATO offers an additional route to cooperate with the US. Cooperation with NATO, including troop contribution to NATO-led missions and operations, can take place in the context of cooperation with the US. This should not be a surprising element given that even among the Allies, contributions to the ISAF and other NATO-led activities are often seen as a way to ensure positive relations with the US. “Partners across the globe” are not an exception here.

It is certainly no coincidence that so far, most of the Alliance’s new partners beyond the Euro-Atlantic region are in fact US allies, such as Australia and Japan. Australia-NATO and Japan-NATO cooperation are new faces of these countries’ bilateral security relations with the US. A Joint Statement of the US-Japan 2+2 (Security Consultative Committee: SCC) of May 2007 placed Japan-NATO cooperation in the context of “common strategic objectives” of the two allies.

NATO as a multilateral school

Cooperation in Afghanistan is one thing, but it needs to be remembered that it is not the whole story about the relationships
Asia, NATO and its partners: RELATIONS between NATO and the partners across the globe. In the first place, conducting operations like ISAF is still a new business for NATO and the Alliance has many other things to do. In such fields as interoperability, standardisation, joint procurement, research and development, multilateral planning and defence planning, NATO has an unparalleled unique set of expertise and experience. These are the areas, in fact, where the partners can benefit most from cooperation with NATO.

The key is NATO’s multilateral nature. Countries outside the Euro-Atlantic area generally lack multilateral experience in security and defence. For example, in the Asia-Pacific region, where most of NATO’s new partners are situated, multilateral security cooperation is still weak if not totally absent. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) only conducted the first ever real joint exercise on civil emergency (disaster relief) in May 2009. Multilateral planning and operation is still a new idea in the region and the militaries in the countries of the region have limited multilateral experiences.

In this context, practical cooperation with NATO—participating in NATO’s exercise and seminars—provides a good opportunity for the partners to become familiar with multilateral ways of planning and operations. Also, in this globalised world and during a period of limited resources for the military, research and development and procurement of defence equipment need to be approached multilaterally, in cooperation with other countries. NATO’s history in this regard is far from perfect. But still, it provides a useful platform to advance a multilateral approach to security, which the partners can take part in.

Challenges ahead for NATO

NATO’s new partners outside the Euro-Atlantic region see NATO very differently from the Alliance’s traditional partners in the PFP (Partnership for Peace) framework. New partners do not seek membership. They are not countries in transition from communism either. They do not need NATO’s advice on how to ensure the democratic control of armed forces, etc. NATO has been successful in assisting partners aspiring to become a member of the Alliance. However, it is still a new business for NATO to cooperate with non-European advanced democracies.

On NATO’s side, there is still no consensus on what way NATO should go in terms of relationships with its new partners outside the Euro-Atlantic region. Getting more help, both military and civilian, to ISAF and other NATO-led missions and operations from those countries is one thing. Given the diverse nature of motivations those countries have in moving closer to the Alliance, however, it is now evident that NATO needs a clearer idea of what it wants to achieve through the development of the new partnerships. Its new Strategic Concept in 2010 provides an opportunity.

At the very least, NATO needs to think through how it can respond to the partners’ expectations toward the Alliance. A window of opportunity is now open for NATO to take part in shaping a new international security network. It is up to NATO whether it will seize it.

Michito Tsuruoka is a Research Fellow of the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), Ministry of Defense, Japan. At the time of writing, he was a Resident Fellow of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). Tsuruoka also served a Special Adviser for NATO at the Embassy of Japan in Belgium from 2005 to 2008. The views expressed in the article are author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of Japanese Government or the GMF.
THE MANTRA OF ‘TOGETHER, WE’RE STRONGER’ IS BEING USED EVEN MORE IN THESE TAXING TIMES. BUT TWO MAJOR SECURITY ORGANISATIONS ARE ALREADY FINDING THAT ALTHOUGH THE PHRASE MAY BE A CLICHE, IT’S ALSO TRUE.

NATO and the European Defence Agency

NOT A ZERO-SUM GAME

If you want to get your message out successfully, you need to listen.”

Dr Stefanie Babst,
Acting Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, NATO
In May 2010, the Group of Experts, who made recommendations for NATO’s new Strategic Concept, said NATO’s transformation towards dynamic military and political capabilities requires a firm commitment on more efficient budgeting. NATO, like other international organisations, has to confront the budgetary constraints of its member states. Collaborating in defence projects and streamlining capabilities duplication are crucial for NATO’s future success. One key area of improved collaboration could be with the European Union (EU).

Some 75 per cent of the Alliance’s members are also bound by the Treaty of Lisbon and constitute a majority of the EU. All EU member states (except Denmark) and including Norway (through administrative arrangements) actively collaborate and support projects and programmes in the European Defence Agency (EDA).

Even though the Agency was only established in July 2004, it has already realised that cooperation with NATO in capabilities development is vital for its participating member states. These are, after all, the countries that have to stretch their budgets for the Agency alongside their obligations to the transatlantic coalition.

Fragmentation of defence budgets of agencies and programmes can dangerously undermine countries’ security objectives. Fortunately, there seems to be an implicit understanding between NATO and the EDA that advancing defence capabilities cannot be considered a zero-sum game. They realised that collaboration would maximise payoffs for both of them.

Within the NATO-EU Agreed Framework, the Coherent Capability Development mechanism was agreed to enhance cooperation between the two organisations. Therefore, even the fiercest budgetary critics have to admit that the two entities are at least seeking opportunities to find value for money together.

Comparing apples and pears

One of the key aims of the two organisations is to enhance interoperability even further. So their interests often coincide in advancing capabilities like airlift, counter-improved explosive device (C-IED), and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) capabilities.

The EDA doesn’t seek to reinvent the wheel if the Alliance has applicable military standards and concepts that are transferable. For example, in defence material standardisation practices, the EDA advocates the use of NATO’s Allied Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for environmental testing.

However, the EDA and the NATO should be cautious about underestimating the risks emanating from more joint standardisation. While defence procurement provides economies of scale, it can also be counterproductive. Why? Because if left unfettered, this process could lead to oligopoly or even monopoly on the market instead of competition, - and therefore less competition - and higher prices.

In addition, excessive standardisation and harmonisation can harm innovation and increase the probability of a ‘single point of failure’. So identifying the right balance is more important in the defence and security domain than in any other sphere.

Fortunately, NATO and EDA capabilities development often complement each other.

For example, to address the mutual helicopter availability problems the two organisations are harmonising their work with member states by developing additional airlift capabilities for future missions.

The EDA assisted the Czech Republic’s Mi-crews advance their skills for more challenging terrains by conducting tactical training lessons for the helicopter crews. The EDA’s ‘Gap 09: Multinational Mountain Exercise,’ which included experts from the

Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC/NATO), balanced NATO’s ‘HIP Helicopter Task Force’ Initiative.

The multinational NATO project led by Czech Republic is expected to increase coalition airlifting capabilities during in-theatre deployments, by sharing helicopter resources with countries that don’t possess them.

Better together

When the EDA was established some wondered whether another security bureaucracy was needed. They asked whether it might have been more efficient to use NATO for realising the EU’s strategic objectives.

But NATO and the EDA have managed to develop a joined-up approach in several areas. For example, in protecting against CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) threats - where the Agency concentrates more on biological threats and NATO more on chemical threats.

If these two organisations accomplish longer term synergy, they might become a great example of constructively shared public resources.

Although the financial crisis may be the root cause, there does appear now to be a perception of defence and security capabilities as collective goods - where a non-zero-sum game has become the dominant strategy.

Häly Laasme is a policy analyst from Estonia. She graduated from Columbia University with high honours and has conducted policy research for various Washington think tanks, including a panoptic research of the European Defence Agency.

H.E. Ivo Daalder, United States Permanent Representative to NATO

“One of the reasons why we need to do more within this Alliance, is that everyone can invest a little, so that the collective effort is more. At a time when defence budgets go down, we should do more in NATO, not less. That is the fundamental purpose of why we have an Alliance in the first place.”
THE END OF THE “naval era”?
DIEGO RUIZ PALMER LOOKS INTO THE ISSUES.

Some observers of the maritime scene have recently declared the rise of the “post-naval era”, one devoid of any prospect of the traditional, large fleet engagements last seen during the Second World War or that had been predicted between NATO maritime forces and the Soviet Navy had the Cold War turned hot. In this post-naval age, it is claimed, there is no need for navies built around the “capital ships” of our time – large aircraft-carriers with “arrested recovery” of their aircraft and high-end cruisers. Accordingly, navies – the United States Navy, first and foremost – should reorient their operational centre of gravity and their ship-building programmes away from blue-water operations on the high seas towards capabilities optimised for green and brown-water littoral and constabulary missions.

If this perspective is correct, and if we are indeed witnessing a genuine “revolution in maritime affairs”, this view is seemingly not yet shared by the world’s leading trading nations and naval powers. Despite being confronted with enduring defence spending constraints and large fleet recapitalisation challenges, most of them continue to invest in ocean-capable navies: witness the sustained efforts by Brazil, France, India, Italy, Russia, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States to maintain, develop further or restore a carrier capability under one guise or another or, in the case of China, to acquire one, or the steady growth world-wide in the number and capability of helicopter-carriers and amphibious ships optimised for sea-control, power-projection, humanitarian assistance and forward presence (Australia, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, The Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States).

Surely, the strategic myopia that in this post-naval age such ship-building programmes would seemingly convey cannot be ascribed solely to the bureaucratic skills of admiralties or the successful lobbying of ship-builders the world over. Yet, few would dispute that, 20 years after the end of the Cold War, globalisation and the remaking of the world’s geo-economic map requires that a fresh look be taken at the contribution which capable maritime forces can and, indeed, already make to a range of missions, from deterrence and crisis-response to forward engagement and the maintenance of a secure, safe and ecologically-protected maritime environment.

Such an assessment should help guide security policy, as well as naval planning and ship-building programming, and the conduct of joint and maritime operations. NATO is in the midst of such an effort and its outcome will have implications for how the Alliance wishes to contribute collectively, and with what mix of multinational capabilities, to maritime defence and security in the decades ahead [box 1].

The world’s maritime commons: a legacy of peace and security
The world’s maritime commons have been, with a few exceptions of time and place, a “zone of peace” and a highway to prosperity for all mankind for over six decades. Seaborne commerce has more than quadrupled in volume over the last half-century. It now stands at over 90 per cent of world trade and includes 60 per cent of all petroleum exports. These seaborne trade flows are sustained by a fleet of some 50,000 major merchant vessels of various types and sizes, including a new generation of super tankers and container ships, as well as large cruise ships.

The enduring prosperity of the world’s industrialised democracies, despite successive economic down-turns, as well as the steady rise of new economic powers, such as Brazil, China and India, owes much to the fact that, since the end of World War Two, the world’s maritime spaces, which cover over 70 percent of the Earth’s surface, have been, by and large, a secure and safe domain for commerce.

Freedom of navigation is a principle embraced by all nations, irrespective of size, geographic location, political system, economic wealth or military capability. This is an important, positive legacy of the second half of the 20th century, which too often is unappreciated. Some observers refer to this attitude of benign neglect towards maritime issues as “sea-blindness”, at a time when there is mounting evidence that ensuring a steady state of maritime security in the decades ahead, as seaborne trade continues to expand, will require an expanding commitment of resources and capabilities and ever higher levels of international cooperation.

Potential challenges to security in the maritime environment
The maritime environment that is emerging in this second decade of the 21st century may, indeed, not be as peaceful and “user-friendly” as it once was. The explosion of seaborne trade and the resulting crowding of well-travelled sea routes, choke-points and harbours, together with the rise of illicit activities at sea, from human trafficking and piracy to terrorism and the covert transport of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery means, require fresh thinking regarding the connections between these diverse geographic locales...
and risk factors, and a new, broad-based approach to maritime security and defence. Rising concerns over marine environmental degradation and resource depletion are an additional consideration.

This changing environment presents the international community with three main challenges: a rising tide of diffuse, multi-faceted lawlessness at sea; the risk of strategic naval competitions, possibly leading to the temptation to employ maritime means for the purpose of political intimidation or military coercion, short of outright aggression, or even to big power conflict; and the potentially adverse impact of climate change on maritime security. Assessments of these dangers share a considerable degree of uncertainty regarding the exact scope of their prospects, interactions and implications.

Left unchecked, expanded lawlessness could have a steadily growing adverse impact on seaborne trade and travel, as well as on the reliability of energy supply, leading to an erosion of trade and trust among nations and declining prosperity for all. Ungoverned maritime spaces could become a vast refuge for non-state criminal groups of all sorts, but also, potentially, for nation-states that may sponsor illicit activities, such as terrorism or WMD proliferation. Exceptionally new seaborne risks may involve the striking of naval vessels, such as in the case of the terrorist assault against the US Navy destroyer USS Cole in Yemen in 2000 or the missile attack of an Israeli warship off the coast of Lebanon by the Hizbollah group in 2006. Piracy off the coast of Somalia is a concrete illustration of an old, but now resurgent problem.

At the other end of the risk spectrum, the naval ship-building programmes of major powers in Asia ostensibly aim at acquiring an addition to the combined strength of the alliance’s navies, NATO’s vast maritime capacity is composed of a constellation of discreet operational capabilities and technical skills resident in various bodies and staffs: the two allied maritime commands at Naples, Italy, and Northwood, United Kingdom, and the allied submarine command at Norfolk, Virginia, reaching back to a wider joint command structure; four standing multinational maritime surface groups, two of which are specialised in mine counter-measures, permanently subordinated to Naples and Northwood; four on-call multinational task forces led by France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, and an additional one with an expanded task force capacity led by the United States, all available on rotation for operations by the NATO Response Force; the NATO Shipping Centre at Northwood; the Planning Board for Ocean Shipping; the NATO Naval Armaments Group; the Naval Board of the NATO Standardisation Agency; the Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence at Norfolk; and the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operations Training Centre on the island of Crete, Greece.

Admiral James Stavridis, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) of NATO forces

….what is the need for a new Strategic Concept?……

"It’s getting the balance right between reassurance to our partners who are concerned about conventional threats, and looking to the emerging threats, cyber and terrorism, narcotics…. the unconventional threats.”
indigenous capacity to patrol and protect the sea lines of communications which underpin their newly acquired major trading partner status, making them welcome stake-holders in the pursuit of enhanced maritime security. International counter-piracy operations in the western Indian Ocean, as well as multinational maritime exercises involving an expanding number of Pacific basin nations, are compelling illustrations of this positive trend. But these programmes may also carry with them an embedded sea-denial capability that could be a source of mutual suspicion, as well as of concern to other major trading nations.

Naval competitions may have more immediate implications for regions of the world other than the North Atlantic Treaty area, yet given the world-wide trading interests of all Allies, and their shared strategic interest in preserving international peace and security, NATO is unlikely to wish or be able to remain indifferent to any adverse developments resulting from unchecked naval races. Here, an ocean-going forward presence and deterrence capability could make a disproportionately beneficial contribution to conflict prevention efforts. At the same time, the experience of the Cold War suggests that nuclear powers are very unlikely to allow naval competitions or isolated maritime incidents to escalate into full-scale confrontations. Furthermore, the steady rise of seaborne trade and travel represents a formidable global bulwark against attempts to place this achievement at risk.

Climate change is likely a more distant but, potentially, no less formidable source of danger for security in the maritime commons, as well as for the safety and welfare of populations living in coastal areas, than the risks outlined above. Resource depletion, environmental degradation and more severe weather patterns, on land and at sea, could combine into a “perfect storm” with identifiable, potentially catastrophic consequences but still uncertain prospects.

**Implications for naval planning and ship-building programming**

In this complex, and potentially dangerous, geo-strategic and maritime environment, prudence should not play second fiddle to audacity or austerity in the determination of future fleet requirements. This is why the on-going debate over whether the US Navy is correctly structured for the emerging security environment is, in many ways, misplaced, and this for three reasons. Firstly, for decades to come the centre of gravity of the US Navy will continue to be its carrier battle groups and other expeditionary strike and amphibious groups, even if it were to forego the building of a follow-on class of large aircraft-carriers. The US Navy inherited from World War Two an operational experience and a technical know-how in the planning, procurement and operation of a carrier-centred fleet that is unique and unrivalled, and which the United States has maintained over more than six decades at considerable cost and with admirable resolve. This is not a strategic capability that the United States should consider shedding, at least not until the more salient features of the 21st century security environment become more firmly established and suggest that such a capability will become redundant.

Secondly, it is unlikely to be advantageous for the international community in general, and for NATO in particular, to see the US Navy exchange its ocean-going fleet for a more littoral-oriented maritime capability -- even if a rebalancing in favour of corvettes...
and green-water patrol crafts is desirable for operational, as well as budgetary reasons -- for an overriding reason: maritime security operations, which inherently have a geographically localised focus, even if they address ubiquitous risks, can only be truly effective if they take place under the "umbrella" of a broader, trans-oceanic maritime capability, with its global reach and world-wide information superiority.

For the foreseeable future, only the US Navy will be able to provide the backbone of that strategic, "over-the-horizon" capability, which acts as an enabler for more littoral-oriented, tactical maritime security operations and regional capacity-building activities, with the navies of France and the United Kingdom making a smaller but distinct and notable contribution to such a capability. Lastly, at a time when the United States has been promoting a broad-based, inclusive international approach to maritime governance and security, built upon an expanded network of partnerships between the US maritime services (Navy; Marine Corps; and Coast Guard), it would be paradoxical and misguided to see the US Navy attempt to fill requirements and build capabilities for littoral operations that the navies of many allied and friendly nations could address more easily, quickly, and often with greater skill, because of their particular experience and expertise in, as well as tailored capabilities for, such operations.

Instead, the rise of global maritime partnerships is an opportunity to explore a more concerted international approach among like-minded nations towards the apportionment of missions on a regional basis, the sharing of tasks and best practices, the provision of mutual operational and logistic support, the exchange of information in support of law enforcement at sea, and the conduct of combined training and exercising. Both as a military hub for operational cooperation and as a political forum for consultation on maritime matters, NATO can be an important actor and enabler in this endeavour.

**NATO’s distinct role and contribution**

As an Alliance composed of many nations with proud seafaring traditions, global trading interests, and extensive naval capabilities, the maritime dimension of security has been of central importance to NATO since its inception and is today at the heart of NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach towards maritime security. In many ways, NATO is, at its core, a maritime Alliance. The Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean, Baltic and Black Seas unite, geographically and strategically, the Allies. They are an essential part of their common heritage and shared destiny.

NATO’s maritime forces perform enduring deterrence, reassurance and defence missions, as well as newer tasks in support of crisis-management and maritime security which often involve forward engagement with non-NATO partners, such as Australia, Finland, Japan and Ukraine, the world over. At any one time, Allied vessels and supporting assets may be engaged in Operation Ocean Shield – NATO’s contribution to determined international counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean – or participating in NATO’s counter-terrorism maritime operation in the Mediterranean Sea – Operation Active Endeavour – or exercising with the navies of the nations of NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative – Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates – or with a Partnership for Peace country like Sweden in the context of the NATO Response Force.

Through their embedded ocean surveillance capabilities and routine presence and engagement activities, Allied navies and their counterparts from NATO’s partner nations, contribute, in cooperation with civil law-enforcement agencies, to the generation of an authoritative representation of all maritime traffic extending eastward and westward from Europe. In all cases, interoperability and operational effectiveness are assured through reliance, in a collaborative environment, on common NATO tactics, techniques and procedures, backed-up by an extended constellation of knowledge hubs and other maritime-oriented capacities [see box 2]. NATO is truly a maritime Alliance in action.

As the Alliance contemplates the completion of a new Strategic Concept at the summit meeting in Lisbon, NATO’s maritime dimension is at the top of the Alliance’s agenda. The naval era is not gone, but a new maritime age is arising.

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**The Honorable Madeleine K. Albright,**

Chair of the Group of Experts appointed by NATO Secretary General to lay the groundwork for the new Strategic Concept, and a former US Secretary of State

""What we've really done is to make sure that the people understand the problem. And as we put this concept together, what we've done is to provide a platform for the Secretary General to write the Strategic Concept.""
10 years on,

THE PROMISES TO WOMEN NEED TO BE KEPT

© Reuters/Zohra Bensemra
International Women's Day in 2000 was a special day for me and for women. That day, I had the honour, on behalf of the UN Security Council as its President, of issuing a statement that formally brought to global attention the unrecognised, under-utilised and under-valued contribution women have been making to preventing war, building peace and engaging people to live in harmony.

The members of the Security Council recognised in that statement that peace is inextricably linked with equality between women and men. They affirmed equal access and full participation of women in power structures and their full involvement in all efforts for peace and security.

It was unfortunate that the intrinsic role of women in peace and security had remained unrecognised since the creation of the United Nations. For a long time, there has been an impression of women as helpless victims of wars and conflicts. Women’s role in fostering peace in their communities and beyond has often been overlooked. But on 8th of March 2000, that inexplicable silence of 55 long years was broken for the first time. The seed for Security Council resolution 1325 was sown. Adoption of 1325 opened a much-awaited door of opportunity for women, who have shown time and again that they bring a qualitative improvement in structuring peace and in the post-conflict architecture.

The main question is not to make war safe for women, but to structure the peace in a way that there is no recurrence of war and conflict. That is why women need to be at the peace tables, involved in the decision-making and in peace-keeping teams. They need to be there particularly as civilians, to make a real difference in transitioning from the cult of war to the culture of peace. 1325 marked the first time that such a proposition was recognised as an objective of the Council. As such, its implementation places a unique and all-embracing responsibility on the international community - particularly the United Nations.

When I first brought up the issue of women, peace and security into the Security Council, wide-ranging disinterest - even indifference - was expressed by some of my colleagues. Some said that the President was diluting the Council’s mandate by trying to bring a “soft issue” onto its agenda. But I believe that the passage of 1325 is an impressive step forward for women’s equality agenda in contemporary security politics.

However, the resolution’s value as the first international policy mechanism explicitly recognising the gendered nature of war and peace processes has been undercut by the disappointing record of its implementation. The complicity of the Security Council in international practices that make women insecure, basically as a result of its support of the existing militarised inter-state security arrangements, is disappointing. Also, we should keep in mind that the Security Council itself is yet to internalise gender considerations into its operational behaviour.

The role of the UN Secretariat, and the Secretary-General in particular, leaves much to be desired. Undoubtedly there is a clear need for his genuinely active and dedicated engagement in using the moral authority of the United Nations and the high office he occupies for the effective implementation of 1325.

As a start, even after ten years, the leadership of the Secretary-General should be manifested at least in four areas.

First, the Secretary-General should give top priority to energising and supporting UN member states to prepare 1325 National Action Plans. Of 192 countries, only 20 have prepared such Plans so far – a meagre one-third of which are by developing countries. He should personally write to heads of state and governments suggesting a timeframe to have their Plans ready and get the UN Resident Coordinators to follow that up.

Second, the area that deserves special attention is the need for awareness, sensitivity and training of senior officials within the United Nations system as a whole with regard to 1325.
Third, urgent attention should be given to stopping altogether sexual violence and the abuses which take place in the name of peacekeeping and have been ignored, tolerated and left unpunished for years by the UN. There should be no impunity whatsoever by invoking national sovereignty.

Fourth, the Secretary-General needs to take the lead in setting up a six-monthly inclusive consultative process for 1325 implementation with civil society organisations at all levels, involving the relevant UN entities. He should encourage a similar consultative process with non-governmental organisations at country level.

Organisations like NATO and the African Union, that are engaged in peace operations, should internalise 1325 in real terms, both from the women’s victims and participation perspectives in their work.

As has been said often, “1325 is not an end, but the beginning of the processes that will gradually help reduce the gap in inequalities.” In peace and security context, women are not just a vulnerable group, they are empowering as well.

As we have seen, when women have been included in peace negotiations, their contribution and perspective have often ensured that peace accords address demands for gender equality in new constitutional, judicial and electoral structures. Calling upon warring parties to adopt “a gender perspective” on peace negotiations and “gender mainstreaming” in all UN peacekeeping missions would be hollow and meaningless unless we build women’s capacity and provide real opportunity and support women to get political and economic empowerment, a place at the peace negotiating table and represented equally at all levels of decision-making.

As my personal contribution to the effective implementation of 1325, I launched my own proposal entitled “Doable First-Track Indicators for Realising the 1325 Promise into Reality” in July at a Working Meeting on 1325 at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington DC. This outlines measures that could be initiated without further delays and without prolonging the international community’s agony and frustration after ten years of wait in expectation.

Finally, we should not forget that when women are marginalised and ignored, there is little chance for the world to get sustainable peace in the real sense.
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