New technology has lifted millions out of poverty and changed the lives of almost everyone in the world. But it has also given many more countries and individuals the potential to pose a threat to the international community. As the security challenges of the 21st century continue to evolve, NATO is adapting to continue to defend its 900 million citizens.

While conventional military aggression against the Alliance is highly improbable, many of the challenges now faced by Allies are unconventional and far removed from those originally envisioned when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949. This evolving set of challenges include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the threat of missile attack, terrorism, cyber security, energy security and piracy.

Many of these threats and challenges originate in, or spread to, the world’s most volatile areas and threaten global security and prosperity. According to NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept adopted in November 2010, “Instability or conflict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance security, including by fostering extremism, terrorism, and transnational illegal activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people.”

NATO is adapting to deal with these challenges. In order to carry out the full range of its missions as effectively and efficiently as possible, Allies will engage in a continual process of reform, modernization and transformation. In today’s interconnected world, increased cooperation with partner countries and other international organizations is an important part of this evolution. By working together, the security of citizens, territory and forces can be achieved more effectively than by working alone.
The term “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD) covers a range of threats including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and materials and their means of delivery. Technological improvements and scientific discoveries have opened the door to ever more destructive, and more available, weapons.

Both NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept and the Lisbon Summit Declaration state that “the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, threatens incalculable consequences for global stability and prosperity. During the next decade, proliferation will be most acute in some of the world’s most volatile regions.” In consequence, NATO’s strategy confirms the Alliance’s commitment to further develop its capacity to defend against the threat of CBRN weapons of mass destruction and protect its populations and territory.

The threat to NATO European populations, territory and forces posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles is increasing.

Heads of State and Government, Final Declaration, NATO Lisbon Summit, 19-20 November 2010

Preventing proliferation of WMD - NATO evaluates and supports traditional measures of proliferation prevention that can dissuade or impede proliferant states and terrorist networks.

Protecting against a WMD attack or CBRN event - The Alliance must have the capability to appropriately and effectively address the risks associated with the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. A balanced mix of forces, response capabilities and strengthened defences is needed in order to deter and defend against the use of WMD.

Recovering from a CBRN event - When efforts to prevent or defend against a WMD attack do not succeed, NATO must be fully prepared to recover from the consequences of WMD used against its populations, territory and forces.

In the Alliance’s 2010 Strategic Concept, defence and deterrence, based on an
appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, is identified as a core task of NATO and will therefore contribute to the indivisible security of the Alliance. NATO must be prepared to utilize all options at its disposal to deter a potential aggressor from employing WMD.

What is NATO doing?

More than ten years ago, NATO developed the Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative which integrated political and military aspects of the Alliance to respond to the proliferation of WMD. Later, in May 2000, the WMD Centre (now WMD Non-Proliferation Centre) was established. The Centre is embedded in the Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESC) and works to strengthen dialogue and common understanding of WMD issues among member nations of the Alliance, to enhance consultations on non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament issues, and to support defence efforts that improve the Alliance’s ability to respond to the risks posed by WMD.

NATO has also developed the Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force which was established to perform a full range of missions. This multinational defence battalion and joint assessment team is led by an individual Allied nation on a rotational basis.

Building further on this capacity, the Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence in Vyskov, the Czech Republic, was opened in July 2007. The Centre offers focused expertise to the Alliance and training in this field.

Outreach to partners, international and regional organizations will help develop a common understanding of the WMD threat. NATO is organizing an annual non-proliferation seminar involving non-member countries. The most recent event which took place in Bergen, Norway in June 2011 attracted more than 100 senior officials from NATO and partner countries as well as members of international organizations and academic institutions. Hungary will hold the next conference in Budapest in 2012.

Restructuring NATO

In August 2010, Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen established NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges (ESC) Division. This means that for the first time, NATO is systematically bringing together work on the areas that in the years ahead will increasingly affect the security of the Allies on both sides of the Atlantic.

The ESC Division deals with the growing range of non-traditional risks and security challenges such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear policy, cyber security and energy security. Along with streamlining and coordinating existing work within NATO’s International Staff, the Division also features a Strategic Analysis Capability to monitor and anticipate international events that could affect Allied security.
NATO’s core purpose is to protect its territory, populations and forces. Ballistic missiles pose an increasing threat to Allied security. Over 30 countries currently have or are acquiring ballistic missiles that could carry conventional warheads, or WMD. While the proliferation of these capabilities does not necessarily mean there is an immediate intent to attack NATO nations, it does mean the Alliance should take ballistic missile defence (BMD) into account when considering how best to defend its populations.

NATO’s work on BMD started in the early 1990s in response to the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems. The initial focus was on protecting deployed NATO troops (theatre missile defence).

At the April 2008 Bucharest Summit, the Allies agreed that ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to member states and that BMD formed a part of a broader response to this threat.

The Alliance is exploring ways to link individual national ballistic missile defence efforts with an integrated NATO consultation and command and control capability and is also developing options for a comprehensive BMD architecture.

What is NATO doing?

At the NATO Summit in Lisbon in November 2010, NATO’s leaders decided to build a ballistic missile defence capability for NATO-Europe in order to protect its populations and territory.

The Alliance is conducting three BMD related activities:

1. **Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence capability (ALTBMD)** – In early 2010, NATO acquired the first phase of an initial capability to protect Alliance forces against ballistic missile threats. When completed, the ALTBMD system will protect NATO forces against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. ALTBMD, if expanded, would provide technical support for the future NATO BMD capability aiding the protection of NATO populations and territory from ballistic missile attack.

2. **Ballistic Missile Defence for the protection of NATO territory** – After the 2002 Prague Summit, a feasibility study was initiated to examine options for pro-
tecting Allied forces, territory and populations against the full range of ballistic missile threats. The study concluded that BMD was technically feasible. The results were approved by NATO’s Conference of National Armaments Directors in April 2006. At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, the Allies agreed to acquire a territorial missile defence capability. In March 2011, Defence Ministers reviewed progress on the consultation, command and control arrangements encompassing roles and responsibilities of relevant NATO bodies during peacetime, crisis and conflict. In June 2011, Defence Ministers approved the NATO Ballistic Missile Defence Action Plan, which provides a comprehensive overview of the key actions and decisions required to implement the defence system within the next decade.

3. Ballistic Missile Defence cooperation with Russia – In 2003, under the aegis of the NATO-Russia Council and Theatre Missile Defence ad hoc Working Group, a joint study was launched to assess possible levels of interoperability among theatre missile defence systems of NATO Allies and Russia. Together with this study several computer-assisted exercises, which developed mechanisms and procedures for joint theatre missile defence operations between NATO and Russia, have been conducted. At the NATO-Russia Summit in Lisbon 2010, Russian President Medvedev accepted NATO’s invitation to extend the areas for cooperation to territorial missile defence. A comprehensive joint analysis of the future framework for broader BMD cooperation is also underway.

Key milestones in Theatre Missile Defence

- **May 2001** Two parallel feasibility studies launched for a future Alliance theatre missile defence system.
- **June 2004** At the Istanbul Summit, Allied leaders direct that work on theatre ballistic missile defence should be taken forward expeditiously.
- **March 2005** Allies approve the establishment of a Programme Management Organization under the auspices of the Conference of National Armaments Directors.
- **September 2006** First major contract for the development of a test bed for the system awarded.
- **February 2008** The test bed is opened and declared fully operational nine months ahead of schedule. Testing continues throughout the year, paving the way for potential missile procurement.
- **March 2010** Interim Capability Step 1 is fielded. NATO signs contracts for the second phase of the interim capability, which would mean the theatre missile defence could conduct a real-time defence battle.
- **June 2010** NATO Ministers of Defence agree that developing an expanded theatre missile defence programme could form the backbone of any possible future BMD capability for the Alliance.
- **December 2010** All Interim Capability Step 2 components were successfully linked, tested in an ‘ensemble’ test and handed over to NATO’s military commanders.

Key milestones in Territorial Missile Defence

- **November 2002** At the Prague Summit, Allied leaders direct that a missile defence feasibility study be launched.
- **April 2006** The study concludes that BMD is technically feasible within the limits and assumptions of the study.
- **2007** An update of a 2004 Alliance assessment of ballistic missile threat developments is completed.
- **April 2008** At the Bucharest Summit, Allied leaders agreed that planned deployment of European-based US BMD assets should be an integral part of any future NATO-wide BMD architecture. They also called for options for a comprehensive BMD architecture to extend coverage to Allied territory not otherwise covered by the US system.
- **April 2009** At the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) is tasked with presenting further architecture recommendations for consideration at the next Summit, and to identify and undertake work related to a possible expansion of the ALTBM programme.
- **November 2010** At the Lisbon Summit the Allies decided to acquire a territorial missile defence capability. The NATO-Russia Council agreed to discuss pursuing BMD cooperation.
- **June 2011** NATO defence ministers approved the NATO Ballistic Missile Defence Action Plan.
- **September 2011** Turkey announced a decision to host BMD radar as part of NATO BMD capability. Romania and the United States signed an agreement to base interceptors in Romania as part of NATO’s BMD capability, at the same time an agreement to hold interceptors in Poland came into force. The Netherlands announced plans to upgrade four air defence frigates with extended long-radar systems.
- **October 2011** Spain and the United States announced an agreement to port US Aegis ships in Rota, Spain.
Ever since the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington in 2001, the fight against terrorism has been high on the agendas of NATO and the wider international community. Both the 2010 Strategic Concept and the Lisbon Summit Declaration make clear that, “Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries... Extremist groups continue to spread to, and in, areas of strategic importance to the Alliance, and modern technology increases the threat and potential impact of terrorist attacks.”

The multifaceted nature of terrorism has required NATO to engage in a wide array of initiatives – political, operational, conceptual, military, technological, scientific and economic – to address the threat. However, NATO’s unique strength remains its role as a forum for consultations on security-related matters. Since terrorism was identified as a core element of the Alliance’s work, NATO has sought to further intensify its regular dialogues and cooperation on terrorism and related issues among its members and with its partners. Allies are also working together to develop capabilities and technologies to detect and defend against international terrorism, including through enhanced threat analysis as well as help training local forces to fight terrorism themselves.

**What is NATO doing?**

Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, NATO launched Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), its first-ever operation under Article 5 (the Alliance’s “collective defence” clause). OAE is a NATO-led maritime surveillance operation in the Mediterranean with an anti-terrorism element. As the Alliance has refined its counter-terrorism role in the intervening years, the operation’s mandate has been regularly reviewed and its remit extended. NATO forces have hailed over

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### Defence Against Terrorism Programme

NATO’s Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work is focused on ten key technological areas:

1. Reducing the vulnerability of large civilian and military aircraft against man-portable “shoulder-launched” missiles.
2. Protecting harbours and ships using sensor nets, electro-optical detectors, rapid reaction capabilities and unmanned underwater vehicles.
3. Reducing the vulnerability of helicopters to rocket-propelled grenades.
4. Countering improvised explosive devices (IEDs), such as car- and roadside bombs, by their detection and disruption or neutralization.
5. Detecting and protecting against CBRN weapons.
6. Fostering technologies for intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition.
7. Improving NATO’s technological and procedural capabilities in explosive ordnance disposal, as well as managing the consequences of an explosion.
8. Developing technologies to defend against mortar attacks.
10. Developing non-lethal capabilities.
In an interconnected world, the defeat of international terrorism – and most importantly, the prevention of these terrorist organizations from obtaining weapons of mass destruction – will require the cooperation of many nations.

Barack Obama
President of the United States

100,000 merchant vessels and boarded over 155 suspect ships. NATO’s presence in these waters has improved security and benefited all shipping traveling through the area.

Since August 2003, NATO has led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation, which is assisting the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to expand its authority and implement security in a region prone to terrorist activities. ISAF’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams are at the leading edge of NATO’s commitment to support reconstruction and development in Afghanistan. The teams of civilian and military personnel work together to provide security and support reconstruction work conducted by other national and international actors. ISAF is the biggest operation ever undertaken by NATO and is the Alliance’s top operational priority. In addition, many NATO Allies have forces involved in Operation Enduring Freedom, the ongoing US-led military counter-terrorism operation in Afghanistan.

NATO first deployed a peacekeeping force to the Balkans region some 15 years ago. Today, NATO peace-keeping efforts continue to help create the conditions necessary to restrict potential terrorist activities in the region. Such assistance includes support for stopping the illegal movement of people, arms and drugs that offer important sources of finance for terrorism to organizations. NATO forces also work with regional authorities on border security issues.

Under NATO’s Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work, individual Allied nations, with support and contributions from other Allies, are leading projects to develop advanced technologies which meet the most urgent security needs. The programme, which has ten areas of work (see box), was prepared by NATO’s Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) and approved by leaders at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004.

On the intelligence side, a Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit (TTIU) was set up under the NATO Office of Security at the end of 2003. Within the framework of the comprehensive intelligence reform at NATO headquarters that took place in 2010 – 2011, the TTIU’s functions were taken over by the newly created Intelligence Unit. This transformation further fostered the analytical approaches on terrorism and its links with other transnational threats. The current mechanism has also enhanced cooperation among the NATO civilian and military intelligence components.

National assistance

Since 2001, Civil Emergency Planning activities have focused on measures aimed at enhancing national capabilities in the event of possible attacks on populations or critical infrastructure using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) agents. NATO has developed a Memorandum of Understanding which aims to accelerate and simplify cross-border transportation and customs clearance for international assistance to reach an affected location as quickly as possible when required.

To support NATO’s work, a network of 380 civil experts, drawn from national government and industry, has been built based on the specific areas of expertise frequently required. Their expertise covers all civil aspects related to NATO planning and operations, including crisis management, consequence management and critical infrastructure protection.
Detecting explosives

To confront and counter the threat of attacks on mass transit and other public gathering places, NATO countries and Russia have decided to work together and share technologies and expertise in a joint endeavour. Under the NATO-Russia Council, a Stand-Off Explosives Detection Program (STANDEX) has been formed as a platform to detect and prevent potential attacks.

The launch of STANDEX in December 2009 was the culmination of several years work, initiated by the NATO-Russia Explosives Detection Expert Group, formed in 2003. It was recognized that the threat posed by suicide bombers was paramount, and investments were needed to develop techniques for stand-off detection applicable to the surveillance of large groups of people. This need has been rendered more urgent by continuing attacks in mass transit environments.

STANDEX’s core concept is to bring together and integrate various different techniques and technologies for the detection of explosives and the localization, recognition, identification and tracking of potential perpetrators of attacks. Designing and demonstrating such an integrated system is an innovative contribution to meeting the challenge of stand-off detection of explosives.

Research institutes from NATO countries and Russia are involved in development and engineering aspects. They include the Commissariat de l’Energie Atomique in France (in charge of co-ordinating the project), the Fraunhofer Institute in Germany, the Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research, the Khlopin Radium Institute in Russia, the Applied Science and Technology Organization in Russia and the ENEA, the Italian National Agency for New Technologies. The NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme is responsible for the management of STANDEX.
Strengthening cyber

The protection of NATO’s key information systems in general, and cyber defence in particular, are integral parts of the functions of the Alliance. The systems of NATO and its members come under regular attack.

After Estonia experienced a series of major cyber attacks in April and May 2007, NATO revisited its own cyber defences and produced a report for Ministers in October 2007. Prior to this, NATO’s cyber defence efforts were primarily concentrated on protecting the communication systems owned and operated by the Alliance. As a result of the attacks on Estonia, which were directed against public services and carried out via the Internet, NATO’s focus has been broadened to help bolster the cyber security of individual Allied nations. Since then, NATO has been continuously developing and enhancing the protection of its communication and information systems against attacks or illegal access.

The 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon placed cyber security at the forefront of the new security challenges that NATO will have to deal with in the years ahead. According to NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept: “Cyber attacks are becoming more frequent, more organised and more costly in the damage that they inflict on government administrations, businesses, economies and potentially also transportation and supply networks and other critical infrastructure; they can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability.” Both the 2010 Strategic Concept and the 2010 Lisbon Summit Declaration make clear that the rapid evolution and growing sophistication of cyber attacks

‘Cyber attacks that may constitute a national security threat are not a science-fiction thing anymore.’

Jaak Aaviksoo, Former Estonian Defence Minister
make the protection of Allies' information and communications systems an urgent task for the Alliance on which its future security depends. On June 2011, NATO Defence Ministers approved a revised NATO policy on cyber defence – a policy that sets out a clear vision for future efforts in cyber defence throughout the Alliance.

What is NATO doing?

The Alliance recognizes that its computer systems comprise vital infrastructure, and has therefore put a number of measures in place to protect them. A three-phase Cyber Defence Programme, approved in mid-2002, set out a plan to improve the Alliance's cyber defence capabilities. At the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO leaders paved the way for the organization's Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) as the first phase of the programme. This will become fully operational by 2012, signalling the completion of phase two. Phase three identifies further requirements to eliminate or mitigate future attacks. Phase two and three are being processed in parallel.

The NCIRC has a key role in responding to any cyber aggression against the Alliance. It provides a means for handling and reporting incidents and disseminating important incident-related information to security management and users.

NATO's newly revised cyber defence policy offers a coordinated approach to cyber defence across the Alliance with a focus on preventing cyber attacks and building resilience. All NATO structures will be brought under centralized protection and new cyber defence requirements will be applied. The policy also sets the framework for how NATO will assist Allies, upon request, in their own cyber defence efforts. In parallel an Action Plan was adopted to ensure the policy's timely and effective implementation.

The Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia, was accredited as a NATO Centre of Excellence in 2008. It conducts research and training in cyber defence.

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### Cyber statistics

- The Pentagon's computer systems are probed 250,000 times an hour, up to six million times per day. (US Cyber Command, 2010)
- In September 2010, the government/public sector was the most targeted industry for malware with one out of every 35.8 emails blocked as malicious. (Symantec, September 2010)
- More than half of mid-sized companies have seen more security incidents in the last year. Some 40 per cent have had data breaches, and 75 per cent believe a serious data breach could put them out of business. (McAfee, October 2010)
- ‘Stuxnet’ is the first-known worm designed to destroy and not simply disrupt real-world infrastructure such as power stations, water plants and industrial units. (BBC, September 2010)
- NATO deals with hundreds of malicious cyber events on a daily basis. (NATO, 2011)
During the last few years, international trends and a number of international disputes have further contributed to the Alliance's concerns over resource security. During the Cold War, in the NATO context, resource security referred to ensuring the supply of fuel to Allied forces. To this end, the NATO Pipeline System was set up. While the pipeline system is still in use, in the light of shifting global political and strategic realities, the concept of energy security is changing. Discussions are ongoing to define NATO's role in this area, with an emphasis on protecting critical infrastructure and transit routes.

NATO leaders have recognized that a disruption to the flow of vital resources could adversely affect Alliance security interests. In the 2010 Strategic Concept, Allies agreed that all countries are increasingly reliant on the vital communication, transport and transit routes on which international trade, energy security and prosperity depend. Greater international efforts are therefore required to ensure these routes are resilient against attack or disruption.

The Alliance has also recognized that increasing energy needs, along with environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change and water scarcity, will further shape the security environment of the future in areas of concern for the Alliance. This has the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations. NATO is working with partners to develop capacity in order to contribute to energy security, concentrating on the five key areas agreed at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, where the Alliance can add value.

These areas include:
- information and intelligence fusion and sharing;
- projecting stability;
- advancing international and regional cooperation;
- supporting consequence management; and
- supporting the protection of critical infrastructure.

What is NATO doing?

The Alliance has unique characteristics – in particular, consultation, intelligence shar-
ing and planning capacities – that can be brought to bear on energy security. NATO is also bringing together experts from Allied and partner countries to discuss a wide range of energy security issues and exchange best practices in the protection of critical infrastructure.

NATO operations, especially in the maritime environment, can prevent or deter hostile actions that could affect energy security. Under Operation Active Endeavour, NATO-led naval forces have been maintaining security since 2001 for key resource routes in the Mediterranean. Some 65 per cent of the oil and natural gas consumed in Western Europe passes through the Mediterranean Sea each year. A disruption to these transit routes could cause significant problems for both civilians and the military.

NATO is cooperating with partners through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). These forums bring together energy producers, transit countries and energy consumers in a dialogue on issues of mutual concern.

NATO’s Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme is also holding workshops which bring policy-makers and experts together to discuss Euro-Atlantic energy security and supply. In addition, the SPS Programme has initiated multi-year projects aimed at working with partners to develop cutting-edge technology in the Sahara and Southern Caucasus.

Wind energy in the desert

Scientists from six countries (France, Germany, Mauritania, Morocco, Turkey and the United States) are cooperating on the ‘Sahara Trade Winds to Hydrogen’ project in an effort to develop cutting-edge hydrogen technology. By utilizing the prevailing trade winds which blow over the Sahara Desert, scientists hope to produce hydrogen for sustainable energy systems. The trade winds are a significant natural resource that has yet to be exploited for regional development.

The project involves building two research platforms at the main research centres in Morocco and Mauritania. Energy produced by the project will be used to upgrade the electrical grid infrastructure of the Saharan/Sahel region. Climate change, environmental degradation and excessive desertification continue to put pressure on the agricultural-based communities of Morocco and Mauritania, which in turn leads to economic distress and mass migration. The initiative will later be extended to other countries in the region which suffer from limited electrical production capacities.
It might be a crime that is as old as history, but incidents of modern piracy have been increasing in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa. The attacks are threatening to undermine international humanitarian efforts in Africa, as well as the safety of crucial commercial sea routes and navigation. NATO is acting to increase security by conducting at-sea counter-piracy operations in the area.

What is NATO doing?

Following a request from the United Nations in late 2008, NATO launched Operation Allied Provider to escort UN World Food Programme (WFP) vessels travelling around the Horn of Africa. This operation was succeeded by Operation Allied Protector in March 2009, which in August of the same year became Operation Ocean Shield (OOS). Today, vessels under OOS command patrol the waters of the region and escort UN supply ships in and out of Mogadishu, Somalia. Unlike previous operations, OOS also offers maritime development training to regional countries to help them build up their own capacities to combat piracy.

Although NATO’s main counter-piracy operation takes place off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Aden, the Alliance also plays an important role in the Mediterranean. Launched in 2001, Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), a NATO-led maritime surveillance operation, continues to monitor ships travelling in the area. Anti-terrorism patrolling is an important part of OAE, as is escorting and the compliant boarding of vessels in the Mediterranean.

A helping hand

In 2008, vessels from Italy, Greece and the United Kingdom were the first to act as naval escorts to UN World Food Programme ships loaded with lifesaving aid for war-ravaged Somalia.

In 2007, there were 263 incidents involving pirates worldwide, with some of the attacks being on WFP ships in the Gulf of Aden. NATO-led Operation Allied Provider prevented attacks on WFP vessels, and helped to protect others in the area, despite an increase in pirate attacks in 2008. There were 263, 293 and 406 attacks during 2007, 2008 and 2009 respectively.

Nearly 20,000 ships sail through the Gulf of Aden each year heading for the Suez Canal, making it one of the world’s busiest shipping routes. According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy Reporting Centre, in 2010 some 445 pirate attacks took place worldwide.

The total number of attacks attributed to Somali pirates in 2010 is 53, with 638 crew members taken hostage, says the IMB. Under Operation Ocean Shield, NATO maintains three vessels patrolling the area along with ships from other international organizations and non-NATO countries.
It is vital that NATO continues to strengthen its cooperation with other international organizations to offer the most effective response to new security challenges. Both the Alliance and other actors can benefit from consultations, the exchange of experience and collaboration.

International organizations

NATO contributes actively to the work of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee – established in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1373 in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States – and participates in special meetings of the Committee bringing together international, regional and sub-regional organizations involved in this process. The Alliance and the UN conduct reciprocal briefings on progress in the area of counter-terrorism, in their respective committees. NATO is also committed to supporting the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

Relations between NATO and the European Union (EU) were institutionalized in 2001. Both NATO and the EU are committed to combat terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They have exchanged information on their activities in the field of protection of civilian populations against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks and also consult in the field of civil emergency planning.

The Alliance also works with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In recent years, dialogue has expanded to include terrorism. The OSCE’s ‘Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the 21st Century’, adopted in December 2003, recalls the need – in a constantly changing security environment – to interact with other organizations and institutions taking advantage of the assets and strengths of each.

Partner countries

The Alliance is also working more closely than ever before with partner countries. In accordance with the Council Guidelines for Cooperation on Cyber Defence, NATO is developing practical cooperation on the issue with partners and other international organizations.

Combating terrorism was among the main drivers behind the creation of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in May 2002. The common fight against terrorism remains a key aspect of NATO’s dialogue with Russia, as well as a focus of the NRC’s practical cooperation activities. Active discussion continues between the Alliance and Russia on theatre missile defence and on non-proliferation.

On the practical side, NATO organizes an annual non-proliferation seminar involving non-member countries. In June 2011 the event took place in Bergen, Norway and attracted more than 100 senior officials from NATO and partner countries, as well as a number of international organizations and academic institutions. This seminar is unique in the non-proliferation field in that it provides a forum for informal discussions on all types of WMD threats as well as the political and diplomatic responses to them.

The Science for Peace and Security Programme, which promotes collaboration between scientists in NATO and Partner countries, has identified key areas for cooperation on terrorism: rapid detection of and physical protection against CBRN agents and weapons; medical counter-measures; decontamination and destruction of CBRN agents; cyber security; food security; and eco-terrorism counter-measures.

In addition, NATO and its partners are working together under the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T). This includes cooperation in securing airspace and exchanging data. Under the PAP-T, three working groups have also been set up to address the issues of securing energy infrastructure, securing borders, and the financial aspects of terrorism.

At the 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative to reach out to countries in the broader Middle East region, widening NATO’s network of partnerships in order to facilitate the fight against terrorism through political dialogue and practical cooperation. The Centre of Excellence, Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey, has worked to establish links with over 50 countries and 40 organizations to enhance the international community’s expertise on combating terrorism.

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NATO and the fight against terrorism
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48801.htm

NATO’s Defence Against Terrorism programme
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50313.htm

NATO and weapons of mass destruction
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50325.htm

NATO and missile defence
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49635.htm

NATO and cyber security
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49193.htm

NATO’s role in energy security
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49208.htm

NATO’s counter-piracy operations
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48815.htm

NATO’s relations with non-member countries
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51103.htm

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