NON-MILITARY CO-OPERATION IN NATO

Text of the Report of the Committee of Three

The Committee of Three: from left to right, Mr Halvard Lange, Prof. Gaetano Martino, and Mr L. B. Pearson
The North Atlantic Council in Ministerial session approved the report of the Committee of three on December 13th, 1956. In the communiqué published at the end of their meeting the Council said:

"As a major forward step in the development of NATO in the non-military field, the Council approved the recommendations of the Committee of Three in their report to the Council. In doing so, the Council approved wider and more intimate consultation among the member states on political matters. The Council also approved arrangements to aid in the settlement of disputes among members and adopted measures for strengthening the organization of NATO internally and for further cooperation between members in certain economic and cultural fields."

**CONTENTS**

**CHAPTER 1. — GENERAL INTRODUCTION**  
**CHAPTER 2. — POLITICAL CO-OPERATION**  
I. INTRODUCTION  
II. CONSULTATION ON FOREIGN POLICIES  
   A. Scope and Character of Political Consultation  
   B. Annual Political Appraisal  
   C. Preparation for Political Consultation  
III. PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTER-MEMBER DISPUTES  
IV. PARLIAMENTARY ASSOCIATIONS AND THE PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE  
**CHAPTER 3. — ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION**  
I. INTRODUCTION  
II. NATO AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS  
III. CONFLICTS IN ECONOMIC POLICIES OF NATO COUNTRIES  
**CHAPTER 4. — CULTURAL CO-OPERATION**  
**CHAPTER 5. — CO-OPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD**  
**CHAPTER 6. — ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS**  
A. Meetings of the Council  
B. Strengthening of the Links Between the Council and Member Governments  
C. Preparation for Council Meetings  
D. The Secretary General and the International Staff  
**ANNEX 1.**  
Formal Record of Proceedings  
**ANNEX 2.**  
Council Resolutions on the report
CHAPTER I: GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The Committee on Non-Military Co-operation, set up by the North Atlantic Council at its session of May, 1956, was requested: “to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO cooperation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community”.

2. The Committee has interpreted these terms of reference as requiring it (1) to examine and re-define the objectives and needs of the Alliance, especially in the light of current international developments; and (2) to make recommendations for strengthening its internal solidarity, cohesion and unity.

3. The Committee hopes that the report and recommendations which it now submits will make NATO’s purely defensive and constructive purposes better understood in non-NATO countries; thereby facilitating and encouraging steps to lessen international tension. The events of the last few months have increased this tension and reduced hopes, which had been raised since Stalin’s death, of finding a secure and honourable basis for competitive and ultimately for co-operative coexistence with the Communist world. The effort to this end, however, must go on.

4. Inter-allied relations have also undergone severe strains. The substance of this report was prepared by the Committee of Three in the course of its meetings and inter-governmental consultations last September. Subsequent events have reinforced the Committee’s conviction that the Atlantic Community can develop greater unity only by working constantly to achieve common policies by full and timely consultation on issues of common concern. Unless this is done, the very framework of co-operation in NATO, which has contributed so greatly to the cause of freedom, and which is so vital to its advancement in the future, will be endangered.

5. The foundation of NATO, on which alone a strong superstructure can be built, is the political obligation that its members have taken for collective defence: to consider that an attack on one is an attack on all which will be met by the collective action of all. There is a tendency at times to over-look the far-reaching importance of this commitment; especially during those periods when the danger of having to invoke it may seem to recede.

6. With this political commitment for collective defence as the cornerstone of the foreign and defence policies of its members, NATO has a solid basis for existence. It is true, of course, that the ways and means by which the obligation is to be discharged may alter as political or strategic conditions alter; as the threat to peace changes its character or its direction. However, any variations in plans and strategic policies which may be required need not weaken NATO or the confidence of its members in NATO and in each other; providing, and the proviso is decisive, that each member retains its will and its capacity to play its full part in discharging the political commitment for collective action against aggression which it undertook when it signed the Pact; pro-

viding also — and recent events have shown that this is equally important — that any changes in national strategy or policy which affect the coalition are made only after collective consideration.

7. The first essential, then, of a healthy and developing NATO lies in the whole-hearted acceptance by all its members of the political commitment for collective defence, and in the confidence which each has in the will and ability of the others to honour that commitment if aggression should take place.

8. This is our best present deterrent against military aggression; and consequently the best assurance that the commitment undertaken will not be engaged.

9. However, this deterrent role of NATO, based on solidarity and strength, can be discharged only if the political and economic relations between its members are co-operative and close. An Alliance in which the members ignore each other’s interests or engage in political or economic conflict, or harbour suspicions of each other, cannot be effective either for deterrence or defence. Recent experience makes this clearer than ever before.

10. It is useful, in searching for ways and means of strengthening NATO unity and understanding, to recall the origin and the aims of the Organization.

11. The Treaty which was signed in Washington in 1949 was a collective response — we had learned that a purely national response was insufficient for security — to the fear of military aggression by the forces of the USSR and its allies. These forces were of overwhelming strength. The threat to Greece, the capture of Czechoslovakia, the blockade of Berlin, and the pressure against Yugoslavia showed that they were also aggressive.

12. While fear may have been the main urge for the creation of NATO, there was also the realisation — conscious or instinctive — that in a shrinking nuclear world it was wise and timely to bring about a closer association of kindred Atlantic and Western European nations for other than defence purposes alone; that a partial pooling of sovereignty for mutual protection should also promote progress and co-operation generally. There was a feeling among the governments and peoples concerned, that this closed unity was both natural and desirable; that the common cultural traditions, free institutions and democratic concepts which were being challenged, and were marked for destruction by those who challenged them, were things which should also bring the NATO nations closer together, not only for their defence but for their development. There was, in short, a sense of Atlantic Community, alongside the realisation of an immediate common danger.

13. Any such feeling was certainly not the decisive, or even the main impulse in the creation of NATO. Nevertheless, it gave birth to the hope that NATO would grow beyond and above the emergency which brought it into being.

14. The expression of this hope is found in the Preamble and in Articles 2 and 4 of the Treaty. These two Articles, limited in their terms but with at least the promise of the grand design of an Atlantic
Community, were included because of this insistent feeling that NATO must become more than a military alliance. They reflected the very real anxiety that if NATO failed to meet this test, it would disappear with the immediate crisis which produced it, even though the need for it might be as great as ever.

15. From the very beginning of NATO, then, it was recognised that while defence co-operation was the first and most urgent requirement, this was not enough. It has also become increasingly realised since the Treaty was signed that security is today far more than a military matter. The strengthening of political consultation and economic co-operation, the development of resources, progress in education and public understanding, all these can be as important, or even more important, for the protection of the security of a nation, or an alliance, as the building of a battleship or the equipping of an army.

16. These two aspects of security — civil and military — can no longer safely be considered in watertight compartments, either within or between nations. Perhaps NATO has not yet fully recognised their essential inter-relationship, or done enough to bring about that close and continuous contact between its civil and military sides which is essential if it is to be strong and enduring.

17. North Atlantic political and economic co-operation, however, let alone unity, will not be brought about in a day or by a declaration, but by creating over the years and through a whole series of national acts and policies, the habits and traditions and precedents for such co-operation and unity. The process will be a slow and gradual one at best: slower than we might wish. We can be satisfied if it is steady and sure. This will not be the case, however, unless the member governments — especially the more powerful ones — are willing to work, to a much greater extent than hitherto, with and though NATO for more than purposes of collective military defence.

18. While the members of NATO have already developed various forms of non-military co-operation between themselves and have been among the most active and constructive participants in various international organizations, NATO as such has been hesitant in entering this field, particularly in regard to economic matters. Its members have been rightly concerned to avoid duplication and to do, through other existing international organizations, the things which can best be done in that way.

19. Recently, however, the members of NATO have been examining and re-assessing the purposes and the needs of the Organization in the light of certain changes in Soviet tactics and policies which have taken place since the death of Stalin, and of the effect of the present turmoil in Eastern Europe on this development.

20. These changes have not diminished the need for collective military defence but they have faced NATO with an additional challenge in which the emphasis is largely non-military in character. NATO must recognise the real nature of the developments which have taken place. An important aspect of the new Soviet policies of competitive coexistence is an attempt to respond to positive initiatives of the Western nations aimed at improving, in an atmosphere of freedom, the lot of the economically less developed countries, and at establishing a just and mutually beneficial trading system in which all countries can prosper. The Soviet Union is now apparently veering towards policies designed to ensnare these countries by economic means and by political subversion, and to fasten on them the same shackles of Communism from which certain members of the Soviet bloc are now striving to release themselves. The members of NATO must maintain their vigilance in dealing with this form of penetration.

21. Meanwhile some of the immediate fears of large-scale all out military aggression against Western Europe have lessened. This process has been facilitated by evidence that the Soviet Government have realised that any such all out aggression would be met by a sure, swift and devastating retaliation, and that there could be no victory in a war of this kind with nuclear weapons on both sides. With an increased Soviet emphasis on non-military or para-military methods, a review is needed of NATO's ability to meet effectively the challenge of penetration under the guise of coexistence, with its emphasis on conflict without catastrophe.

22. Certain questions now take on a new urgency. Have NATO's needs and objectives changed, or should they be changed? Is the Organization operating satisfactorily in the altered circumstances of 1956? If not, what can be about it? There is the even more far-reaching question: "Can a loose association of sovereign states hold together at all without the common binding force of fear?".

23. The Committee has been examining these questions in the light of its firm conviction that the objectives which governments had in mind when the Pact was signed remain valid; that NATO is as important now to its member states as it was at that time.

24. The first of these objectives — as has already been pointed out — is security, based on collective action with adequate armed forces both for deterrence and defence.

25. Certainly NATO unity and strength in the pursuit of this objective remain as essential as they were in 1949. Soviet tactics may have changed; but Soviet armed might and ultimate objectives remain unchanged. Moreover, recent events in Eastern Europe show that the Soviet Union will not hesitate in certain circumstances to use force and the threat of force. Therefore the military strength of NATO must not be reduced, though its character and capabilities should be constantly adapted to changing circumstances. Strengthening the political and economic side of NATO is an essential complement to — not a substitute for — continuous co-operation in defence.

26. In spite of these recent events Soviet leaders may place greater emphasis on political, economic and propaganda action. There is no evidence, however, that this will be permitted to prejudice in any way the maintenance of a high level of military power in its most modern form as a base for Soviet activity in these other fields.

27. We should welcome changes in Soviet policies if they were genuinely designed to ease international tensions. But we must remember that the
weakening and eventual dissolution of NATO remains a major Communist goal. We must therefore remain
on guard so long as Soviet leaders persist in their
determination to maintain a preponderance of military
power for the achievement of their own political objec-
tives and those of their allies.

28. This brings us again to the second and
long-term aim of NATO: the development of an Atlant-
ic Community whose roots are deeper even than the
necessity for common defence. This implies nothing
less than the permanent association of the free Atlan-
tic peoples for the promotion of their greater unity
and the protection and the advancement of the interests
which, as free democracies, they have in common.

29. If we are to secure this long-term aim,
we must prevent the centrifugal forces of opposition
or indifference from weakening the Alliance. NATO
has not been destroyed, or even weakened, by the
threats or attacks of its enemies. It has faltered at
times through the lethargy or complacency of its
members; through dissension or division between
them; by putting narrow national considerations above
the collective interest. It could be destroyed by these
forces, if they were allowed to subsist. To combat
these tendencies, NATO must be used by its members,
far more than it has been used, for sincere and genuine
consultation and co-operation on questions of common
concern. For this purpose, resolution is more impor-
tant than resolutions; will than words.

30. The problem, however, goes deeper than
this. NATO countries are faced by a political as well
as a military threat. It comes from the revolutionary
doctrines of Communism which have by careful design
of the Communist leaders over many years been sowing
seeds of falsehood concerning our free and democratic
way of life. The best answer to such falsehoods is
a continuing demonstration of the superiority of our
own institutions over Communist ones. We can show
by word and deed that we welcome political progress,
economic advancement and orderly social change and
that the real responsibilities of this day are these Com-
munist regimes which, adhering to an inflexible pattern
of economic and political doctrine, have been more
successful in destroying freedom than in promoting it.

31. We must, however, realise that false-
hoods concerning our institutions have sometimes been
accepted at face value and that there are those, even
in the non-Communist world, who under the systematic
influence of Communist propaganda, do not accept our
own analysis of NATO's aims and values. They believe
that while NATO may have served a useful defensive
and deterrent role in the Stalinist era, it is no longer
necessary, even for the security of its members; that
it is tending now to become an agency for the pooling
of the strength and resources of the "colonial" powers
in defence of imperial privileges, racial superiority, and
Atlantic hegemony under the leadership of the United
States. The fact that we know these views to be
false and unjustified does not mean that NATO and
its governments should not do everything they can
to correct and counteract them.

32. NATO should not forget that the in-
fluence and interests of its members are not confined
to the area covered by the Treaty, and that common
interests of the Atlantic Community can be seriously
affected by developments outside the Treaty area.
Therefore, while striving to improve their relations
with each other, and to strengthen and deepen their
own unity, they should also be concerned with harmo-
nising their policies in relation to other areas taking
into account the broader interests of the whole inter-
national community; particularly in working through
the United Nations and elsewhere for the maintenance
of international peace and security and for the solution
of the problems that now divide the world.

33. In following this course, NATO can show
that it is more than a defence organization acting and
reacting to the ebb and flow of the fears and dangers
arising out of Soviet policy. It can prove its desire
to co-operate fully with other members of the inter-
national community in bringing to reality the principles
of the Charter of the United Nations. It can show
that it is not merely concerned with preventing the
cold war from deteriorating into a shooting one; or
with defending itself if such a tragedy should take
place, but that it is even more concerned with seizing
the political and moral initiative to enable all countries
to develop in freedom, and to bring about a secure
peace for all nations.

34. Our cautions in accepting without ques-
tion the pacific character of any Soviet moves, our
refusal to dismantle our defences before we are con-
vinced that conditions of international confidence have
been restored, will, particularly after the events in
Hungary, be understood by all people of sincerity and
good will. What would not be understood is any un-
willingness on our part to seek ways and means of
breaking down the barriers with a view to establish-
ing such confidence.

35. The coming together of the Atlantic na-
tions for good and constructive purposes — which is
the basic principle and ideal underlying the NATO
concept — must rest on and grow from deeper and
more permanent factors than the divisions and dangers
of the last ten years. It is a historical, rather than
a contemporary, development and if it is to achieve
its real purpose, it must be considered in that light
and the necessary conclusions drawn. A short-range
view will not suffice.

36. The fundamental historical fact under-
lying development is that the nation state, by itself
and relying exclusively on national policy and national
power, is inadequate for progress or even for survival
in the nuclear age. As the founders of the North
Atlantic Treaty foresaw, the growing interdependence
of states, politically and economically as well as mili-
tarily, calls for an ever-increasing measure of inter-
national cohesion and co-operation. Some states may
be able to enjoy a degree of political and economic
independence when things are going well. No state
however powerful, can guarantee its security and its
welfare by national action alone.

37. This basic fact underlies our report and
the recommendations contained therein which appear
in the subsequent chapters.

38. It has not been difficult to make these
recommendations. It will be far more difficult for the
member governments to carry them into effect. This
will require, on their part, the firm conviction that the
transformation of the Atlantic Community into a vital and vigorous political reality is as important as any purely national purpose. It will require, above all, the will to carry this conviction into the realm of practical governmental policy.

CHAPTER 2: POLITICAL CO-OPERATION

I. INTRODUCTION

39. If there is to be vitality and growth in the concept of the Atlantic Community, the relations between the members of NATO must rest on a solid basis of confidence and understanding. Without this there cannot be constructive or solid political co-operation.

40. The deepening and strengthening of this political co-operation does not imply the weakening of the ties of NATO members with other friendly countries or with other international associations, particularly the United Nations. Adherence to NATO is not exclusive or restrictive. Nor should the evolution of the Atlantic Community through NATO prevent the formation of even closer relationships among some of its members; for instance within groups of European countries. The moves toward Atlantic co-operation and European unity should be parallel and complementary, not competitive or conflicting.

41. Effective and constructive international co-operation requires a resolve to work together for the solution of common problems. There are special ties between NATO members, special incentives and security interests, which should make this task easier than it otherwise would be. But its successful accomplishment will depend largely on the extent to which member governments, in their own policies and actions, take into consideration the interests of the Alliance. This requires not only the acceptance of the obligation of consultation and co-operation whenever necessary, but also the development of practices by which the discharge of this obligation becomes a normal part of governmental activity.

42. It is easy to profess devotion to the principle of political — or economic — consultation in NATO. It is difficult and has in fact been shown to be impossible, if the proper conviction is lacking, to convert the profession into practice. Consultation within an alliance means more than exchange of information, though that is necessary. It means more than letting the NATO Council know about national decisions that have already been taken; or trying to enlist support for those decisions. It means the discussion of problems collectively, in the early stages of policy formation, and before national positions become fixed. At best, this will result in collective decisions on matters of common interest affecting the Alliance. At the least, it will ensure that no action is taken by one member without a knowledge of the views of the others.

II. CONSULTATION ON FOREIGN POLICIES

A. Scope and Character of Political Consultation.

43. The essential role of consultation in fostering political co-operation was clearly defined by an earlier NATO Committee on the North Atlantic Community in 1951:

"...The achievement of a closer degree of co-ordination of the foreign policies of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty, through the development of the 'habit of consultation' on matters of common concern, would greatly strengthen the solidarity of the North Atlantic Community and increase the individual and collective capacity of its members to serve the peaceful purposes for which NATO was established. ... In the political field, this means that while each North Atlantic government retains full freedom of action and decision with respect to its own policy, the aim should be to achieve, through exchanging information and views, as wide an area of agreement as possible in the formulation of policies as a whole.

"Special attention must be paid, as explicitly recognised in Article 4 of the Treaty, to matters of urgent and immediate importance to the members of NATO, and to 'emergency' situations where it may be necessary to consult closely on national lines of conduct affecting the interests of members of NATO as a whole. There is a continuing need, however, for effective consultation at an early stage on current problems, in order that national policies may be developed and action taken on the basis of a full awareness of the attitudes and interests of all the members of NATO. While all members of NATO have a responsibility to consult with their partners on appropriate matters, a large share of responsibility for such consultation necessarily rests on the more powerful members of the Community."

44. These words were written five years ago. They hold true now more than ever before. If we can say that they have not been ignored by NATO we must also recognise that the practice of consulting has not so developed in the NATO Council as to meet the demands of political changes and world trends. The present need, therefore, is more than simply broadening the scope and deepening the character of consultation. There is a pressing requirement for all members to make consultation in NATO an integral part of the making of national policy. Without this the very existence of the North Atlantic Community may be in jeopardy.

45. It should, however, be remembered that collective discussion is not an end in itself, but a means to the end of harmonising policies. Where common interests of the Atlantic Community are at stake consultation should always seek to arrive at timely agreement on common lines of policy and action.

46. Such agreement, even with the closest possible co-operation and consultation, is not easy to secure. But it is essential to the Atlantic Alliance that a steady and continuous effort be made to bring
it about. There cannot be unity in défence and dis-
unity in foreign policy.

47. There are, of course, certain practical
limitations to consultation in this fields. They are
sufficiently obvious in fact to make it unnecessary to
emphasise them in words. Indeed the danger is less
that they will be minimised or evaded than that they
will be exaggerated and used to justify practices which
unnecessarily ignore the common interest.

48. One of these limitation is the hard fact
that ultimate responsibility for decision and action
still rests on national governments. It is conceivable
that a situation of extreme emergency may arise when
action must be taken by one government before consul-
tation is possible with the others.

49. Another limitation is the difficulty, and
indeed the unwisdom, of trying to specify in advance
all the subjects and all the situations where consult-
ation is necessary; to separate by area or by subject
the matters of NATO concern from those of purely
national concern; to define in the obligations and duties
of consultation. These things have to work them-
seves out in practice. In this process, experience is a
better guide than dogma.

50. The essential thing is that on all occasions
and in all circumstances member governments, before
acting or even before pronouncing, should keep the
interests and the requirements of the Alliance in mind.
If they have not the desire and the will to do this,
no resolutions or recommendations or declarations by
the Council or any Committee of the Council will be
of any great value.

51. On the assumption, however, that this
will and this desire do exist, the following principles
and practices in the field of political consultation are
recommended:

(a) members should inform the Council of
any development which significantly affects the Allian-
ce. They should do this, not merely as a formality
but as a preliminary to effective political consultation;

(b) both individual member governments and
the Secretary General should have the right to raise
for discussion in the Council any subject which is of
common NATO interest and not of a purely domestic
character;

(c) a member government should not, without
adequate advance consultation, adopt firm policies or
make major political pronouncements on matters which
significantly affect the Alliance or any of its members,
unless circumstances make such prior consultation
obviously and demonstrably impossible;

(d) in developing their national policies, mem-
ers should take into consideration the interests and
views of other governments, particularly those most
directly concerned, as expressed in NATO consulta-
tion, even where no community of view of consensus has
been reached in the Council;

(e) where a consensus has been reached, it
should be reflected in the formation of national policies.
When for national reasons the consensus is not follow-
ed, the government concerned should offer an expla-
nation to the Council. It is even more important that
where an agreed and formal recommendation has
emerged from the Council discussions, governments
should give it full weight in any national actions or
policies related to the subject of that recommendation.

B. Annual Political Appraisal.

52. To strengthen the process of consultation,
it is recommended that Foreign Ministers, at each
Spring meeting, should make an appraisal of the poli-
tical progress of the Alliance and consider the lines
along which it should advance.

53. To prepare for this discussion, the Secre-
tary General should submit an annual report:

(a) analysing the major political problems of
the Alliance;

(b) reviewing the extent to which member
governments have consulted and co-operated on such
problems;

(c) indicating the problems and possible deve-
lopments which may requirest future consultation,
so that difficulties might be resolved and positive and
constructive initiative taken.

54. Member governments, through their
Permanent Representatives, should give the Secretary
General such information and assistance, including
that of technical experts, as he may require in pre-
paring his report.

C. Preparation for Political Consultation.

55. Effective consultation also requires care-
ful planning and preparation of the agenda for meet-
ings of the Council both in Ministerial and permanent
session. Political questions coming up for discussion
in the Council should so far as practicable be previous-
ly reviewed and discussed, so that representatives may
have background information on the thinking both of
their own and of other governments. When appro-
priate, drafts of resolutions should be prepared in
advance as a basis for discussion. Additional prepar-
atory work will also be required for the annual poli-
tical appraisal referred to in the preceding section.

56. To assist the Permanent Representatives
and the Secretary General in discharging their respon-
sibilities for political consultation, there should be
constituted under the Council a Committee of Political
Advisers from each delegation, aided when necessary
by specialists from the capitals. It would meet under
the chairmanship of a member of the International
Staff appointed by the Secretary General, and would
include among its responsibilities current studies such
as those on trends of Soviet policy.

III. PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTER-
MEMBER DISPUTES

57. In the development of effective political
collaboration in NATO, it is of crucial importance to
avoid serious inter-member disputes and to settle them
quickly and satisfactorily when they occur. The settle-
ment of such disputes is in the first place the direct
responsibility of the member governments concerned, under both the Charter of the United Nations (Article 33) and the North Atlantic Treaty (Article 1). To clarify NATO's responsibilities in dealing with disputes which have not proved capable of settlement directly and to enable NATO, if necessary, to help in the settlement of such disputes, the Committee recommends that the Council adopt a resolution under Article 1 of the Treaty on the following lines:

(a) reaffirming the obligation of members to settle by peaceful means any disputes between themselves;

(b) declaring their intention to submit any such disputes, which have not proved capable of settlement directly, to good offices procedures within the NATO framework before resorting to any other international agency; except for disputes of a legal character appropriate for submission to a judicial tribunal, and those disputes of an economic character for which attempts at settlement might best be made initially in the appropriate specialised economic organization;

(c) recognising the right and duty of member governments and of the Secretary General to bring to the attention of the Council matters which in their opinion may threaten the solidarity or effectiveness of the Alliance;

(d) empowering the Secretary General to offer his good offices informally at any time to the parties in dispute, and with their consent to initiate or facilitate procedures of enquiry, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration; and

(e) empowering the Secretary General, where he deems it appropriate for the purpose outlined in (d) above, to use the assistance of not more than three Permanent Representatives chosen by him in each instance.

IV. PARLIAMENTARY ASSOCIATIONS AND THE PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE

58. Among the best supporters of NATO and its purposes are those Members of Parliament who have had a chance at first hand to see some of its activities and to learn of its problems, and to exchange views with their colleagues from other parliaments. In particular, the formation of national Parliamentary Associations and the activities of the Conference of Members of Parliament from NATO countries have contributed to the development of public support for NATO and solidarity among its members.

59. In order to maintain a close relationship of Parliamentarians with NATO, the following arrangements are recommended:

(a) that the Secretary General continue to place the facilities of NATO headquarters at the disposal of Parliamentary Conferences and give all possible help with arrangements for their meetings;

(b) that invited representatives of member governments and the Secretary General and other senior NATO civil and military officers attend certain of these meetings. In this way the parliamentarians would be informed on the state of the Alliance and the problems before it, and the value of their discussions would be increased;

CHAPTER 3: ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

I. INTRODUCTION

60. Political co-operation and economic conflict are not reconcilable. Therefore, in the economic as well as in the political field there must be a genuine desire among the members to work together and a readiness to consult on questions of common concern based on the recognition of common interests.

61. These common economic interests shared by the members of NATO call for:

(a) co-operative and national action to achieve healthy and expanding economies, both to promote the well-being and self-confidence of the Atlantic peoples and to serve as the essential support for an adequate defence effort;

(b) the greatest possible freedom in trade and payments and in the movement of manpower and long-term capital;

(c) assistance to economically underdeveloped areas for reasons of enlightened self-interest and to promote better relations among peoples; and

(d) policies which will demonstrate, under conditions of competitive coexistence, the superiority of free institutions in promoting human welfare and economic progress.

62. A recognition of these common NATO interests, and collective and individual effort to promote them, need not in any way prejudice close economic relations with non-NATO countries. Economic, like political co-operation, is and must remain wider than NATO. At the same time, the NATO countries have an interest in any arrangements for especially close economic co-operation among groups of European member nations. It should be possible — as it is desirable — for such special arrangements to promote rather than conflict with the wider objectives of Article 2 of our Treaty, which are of basic importance to the stability and well-being, not only of the North Atlantic area, but of the whole non-Communist world.

II. NATO AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

63. While the purposes and principles of Articles 2 are of vital importance, it is not necessary that member countries pursue them only through action in NATO itself. It would not serve the interests
of the Atlantic Community for NATO to duplicate the operating functions of other international organizations designed for various forms of economic cooperation (1). NATO members play a major part in all these agencies, whose membership is generally well adapted to the purposes they serve.

64. Nor do there now appear to be significant new areas for collective economic action requiring execution by NATO itself. In fact, the common economic concern of the member nations will often best be fostered by continued and increased collaboration both bilaterally and through organizations other than NATO. This collaboration should be reinforced, however, by NATO consultation whenever economic issues of special interest to the Alliance are involved; particularly those which have political or defence implications or affect the economic health of the Atlantic Community as a whole. This, in turn, requires a substantial expansion of exchange of information and views in NATO in the economic as well as in the political field. Such economic consultation should seek to secure a common approach on the part of member governments where the questions are clearly related to the political and security interests of the Alliance. Action resulting from such a common approach, however, should normally be taken by governments either directly or through other international organizations.

65. NATO, as such, should not seek to establish formal relations with these other organizations, and the harmonising of attitudes and actions should be left to the representatives of the NATO governments therein. Nor is it necessary or desirable for NATO members to form a “bloc” in such organizations. This would only alienate other friendly governments. There should, however, be consultation in NATO when economic issues of special political or strategic importance to NATO arise in other organizations and in particular before meetings at which there may be attempts to divide or weaken the Atlantic Alliance, or prejudice its interests.

III. CONFLICTS IN ECONOMIC POLICIES OF NATO COUNTRIES

66. NATO has a positive interest in the resolution of economic disputes which may have political or strategic repercussions damaging to the Alliance. These are to be distinguished from disagreements on economic policy which are normally dealt with through direct negotiations or by multilateral discussions in other organizations. Nothing would be gained by merely having repeated in NATO the same arguments made in other and more technically qualified organizations. It should, however, be open to any member or to the Secretary General to raise in NATO issues on which they feel that consideration elsewhere is not making adequate progress and that NATO consultation might facilitate solutions contributing to the objectives of the Atlantic Community. The procedures for peaceful settlement of political disputes discussed in the previous chapter should also be available for major disputes of an economic character which are appropriate for NATO consideration.

IV. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

67. One area of special importance to the Atlantic Community is that of science and technology. During the last decade, it has become ever clearer that progress in this field can be decisive in determining the security of nations and their position in world affairs. Such progress is also vital if the Western world is to play its proper role in relation to economically underdeveloped areas.

68. Within the general field of science and technology, there is an especially urgent need to improve the quality and to increase the supply of scientists, engineers and technicians. Responsibility for recruitment, training and utilisation of scientific and technical personnel is primarily a national rather than an international matter. Nor is it a responsibility solely of national governments. In the member countries with federal systems, state and provincial governments play the major part, and many of the universities and institutes of higher learning in the Atlantic area are independent institutions free from direct control by governments. At the same time, properly designed measures of international co-operation could stimulate individual member countries to adopt more positive policies and, in some cases, help guide them in the most constructive directions.

69. Certain activities in this connection are already being carried out by other organizations. Progress in this field, however, is so crucial to the future of the Atlantic Community that NATO members should ensure that every possibility of fruitful co-operation is examined. As a first concrete step, therefore, it is recommended that a conference be convened composed of one or at the most two outstanding authorities, private or governmental from each country in order:

(a) to exchange information and views concerning the most urgent problems in the recruitment, training and utilisation of scientists, engineers and technicians, and the best means, both long-term and short-term, of solving those problems;

(1) The outstanding instances are the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) (which includes all NATO countries as full or associate members and four others); the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); the International Finance Corporation (IFC); and the various other United Nations agencies including the Economic Commission for Europe. Several NATO members participate actively in the Colombo Plan for promoting economic development in Asia. Most members are taking an active part in technical assistance programmes and are also participating in discussions of proposals for the creation of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED).
to foster closer relations among the participants with a view to continued interchange of experience and stimulation of constructive work in member countries; and

to propose specific measures for future international co-operation in this field, through NATO or other international organizations.

V. CONSULTATION ON ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

70. It is agreed that the Atlantic Community has a positive concern with healthy and accelerated development in economically underdeveloped areas, both inside and outside the NATO area. The Committee feels, however, that NATO is not an appropriate agency for administering programmes of assistance for economic development, or even for systematically concentrating the relevant policies of member nations. What member countries can and should do is to keep each other and the Organization informed of their programmes and policies in this field. When required NATO should review the adequacy of existing action in relation to the interests of the Alliance.

71. The economic interests of the Atlantic Community cannot be considered in isolation from the activities and policies of the Soviet bloc. The Soviets are resorting all too often to the use of economic measures designed to weaken the Western Alliance, or to create in other areas a high degree of dependence on the Soviet world. In this situation it is more than ever important that NATO countries actively develop their own constructive commercial and financial policies. In particular, they should avoid creating situations of which the Soviet bloc countries might take advantage to the detriment of the Atlantic Community and of other non-Communist countries. In this whole field of competitive economic coexistence member countries should consult together more fully in order to determine their course deliberately and with the fullest possible knowledge.

72. There has been a considerable evolution in NATO’s arrangements for regular economic consultation. In addition, a number of economic matters have been brought before the Council for consideration on an ad hoc basis. No substantial new machinery in this field is called for. However, in view of the extended range of topics for regular exchange of information and consultation described above, there should be established under the Council a Committee of Economic Advisers. This group should be entrusted with preliminary discussion, on a systematic basis, of the matters outlined above, together with such tasks as may be assigned by the Council or approved by the Council at the Committee’s request. It would absorb any continuing function of the Committee of Technical Advisers. Since its duties would not be full-time, member governments could be represented normally by officials mainly concerned with the work of other international economic organizations. Membership, however, should be flexible, the Committee being composed, when appropriate, of specialists from the capitals on particular topics under consideration.

CHAPTER 4: CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

73. A sense of community must bind the people as well as the institutions of the Atlantic nations. This will exist only to the extent that there is a realisation of their common cultural heritage and of the values of their free way of life and thought. It is important, therefore, for the NATO countries to promote cultural co-operation among their people by all practical means in order to strengthen their unity and develop maximum support for the Alliance. It is particularly important that this cultural co-operation should be wider than continental. This however, does not preclude particular governments from acting on a more limited multilateral or even bilateral basis to strengthen their own cultural relations within the broader Atlantic framework. The Committee welcomes the measures for cultural co-operation within the Atlantic Community which have been initiated by private individuals and non-governmental groups. These should be encouraged and increased.

74. To further cultural collaboration, the Committee suggests that member governments be guided by the following general principles;

(a) government activities in this field should not duplicate but should support and supplement private efforts;

(b) member governments should give priority to those projects which require joint NATO action, and thus contribute to a developing sense of community;

(c) in developing new activities in the cultural field, NATO can most fruitfully place the main emphasis on inspiring and promoting transatlantic contacts;

(d) there should be a realistic appreciation of the financial implications of cultural projects.

75. In order to develop public awareness and understanding of NATO and the Atlantic Community, the Council should work out arrangements for NATO courses and seminars for teachers.

76. NATO and its member governments should broaden their support of other educational and related activities such as the NATO Fellowship and Scholarship Programme; creation of university chairs of Atlantic studies; visiting professorships; government-sponsored programmes for the exchange of persons, especially on a transatlantic basis; use of NATO information materials in schools; and establishment of special NATO awards for students.

77. Governments should actively promote closer relations between NATO and youth organizations and a specialist should be added to the International Staff in this connection. Conferences under NATO auspices of representatives of youth organizations such as that of July 1956 should be held from time to time.
78. In the interests of promoting easier and more frequent contacts among the NATO peoples, governments should review and, if possible, revise their foreign exchange and other policies which restrict travel.

79. In view of the importance of promoting better understanding and goodwill between NATO service personnel, it would be desirable, in co-operation with the military authorities, to extend exchanges of such personnel beyond the limits of normal training programmes. Such exchanges might, as a first step, be developed by governments on a bilateral basis. In addition, member governments should seek the assistance of the Atlantic Treaty Association and other voluntary organizations in the further development of such exchanges.

80. Cultural projects which have a common benefit should be commonly financed. Agreed cultural projects initiated by a single member government or a private organization, such as the recent seminar held at Oxford or the Study Conference sponsored by the Atlantic Treaty Association on "The rôle of the School in the Atlantic Community", should receive financial support from NATO where that is necessary to supplement national resources.

CHAPTER 5: CO-OPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

81. The people of the member countries must know about NATO if they are to support it. Therefore they must be informed not only of NATO's aspirations, but of its achievements. There must be substance for an effective NATO information programme and resources to carry it out. The public should be informed to the greatest possible extent of significant results achieved through NATO consultation.

82. NATO information activities should be directed primarily to public opinion in the NATO area. At the same time an understanding outside the NATO area of the objectives and accomplishments of the Organization is necessary if it is to be viewed sympathetically, and if its activities are not to be misinterpreted.

83. The important task of explaining and reporting NATO activities rests primarily on national information services. They cannot discharge this task if member governments do not make adequate provisions in their national programmes for that purpose. It is essential, therefore, that such provision be made. NATO can and should assist national governments in this work. The promotion of information about and public understanding of NATO and the Atlantic Community should, in fact, be a joint endeavour by the Organization and its members.

84. One of NATO's functions should be to co-ordinate the work of national information services in fields of common interest. Governments should pool their experiences and views in NATO to avoid differences in evaluation and emphasis. This is particularly important in the dissemination of information about NATO to other countries. Co-ordinated policy should underline the defensive character of our Alliance and the importance of its non-military aspects. It should cover also replies to anti-NATO propaganda and the analysis of Communist moves and statements which affect NATO.

85. In its turn, the NATO Information Division must be given the resources by governments as well as their support, without which it could not discharge these new tasks—and should not be asked to do so.

86. In order to facilitate co-operation between the NATO Information Division and national information services, the following specific measures are recommended:

(a) an Officer should be designated by each national information service to maintain liaison with NATO and to be responsible for the dissemination of NATO information material;

(b) governments should submit to NATO the relevant information programmes which they plan to implement, for discussion in the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations. Representatives of national information services should take part in these discussions;

(c) within the NATO Information Division budget, provision should be made for a translation fund so that NATO information material can be translated into the non-official languages of the Alliance, according to reasonable requirements of the member governments;

(d) NATO should, on request, provide national services with special studies on matters of common interest.

87. The journalists' tours sponsored by NATO should be broadened to include others in a position to influence public opinion, such as trade union and youth leaders, teachers and lecturers. Closer relations between private organizations supporting NATO and the NATO Information Division should also be encouraged.

CHAPTER 6: ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

88. The Committee considers that NATO in its present form is capable of discharging the non-military functions required of it. Structural changes are not needed. The machine is basically satisfactory. It is for governments to make use of it.

89. At the same time, certain improvements in the procedures and functioning of the Organization will be required if the recommendations of this report are to be fully implemented. The proposals in this Chapter are submitted for this purpose.
A. Meetings of the Council.

90. More time should be allowed for Ministerial Meetings. Experience has shown that, without more time, important issues on the agenda cannot be adequately considered. Decisions concerning some of them will not be reached at all, or will be reached only in an unclear form.

91. Efforts should be made to encourage discussion rather than simply declarations of policy prepared in advance. Arrangements for meetings should be made with this aim in view. For most sessions, the numbers present should be sharply restricted. In order to facilitate free discussion, when Ministers wish to speak in a language other than French or English, consecutive translation into one of these official languages should be provided by interpreters from their own delegations.

92. Meetings of Foreign Ministers should be held whenever required, and occasionally in locations other than NATO Headquarters. Ministers might also participate more frequently in regular Council meetings, even though not all of them may find it possible to attend such meetings at the same time. The Council of Permanent Representatives has powers of effective decision: in other words, the authority of the Council as such is the same whether governments are represented by Ministers or by their Permanent Representatives. Thus there should be no firm or formal line between Ministerial and other meetings of the Council.

B. Strengthening the Links Between the Council and Member Governments.

93. It is indispensable to the kind of consultations envisaged in this report that Permanent Representatives should be in a position to speak authoritatively and to reflect the current thinking of their governments. Differences in location and in constitutional organization make impossible any uniform arrangements in all member governments. In some cases it might be desirable to designate a high official in the national capital to be concerned primarily with NATO affairs. The purpose would be to help both in fostering NATO consultations whenever national policies impinge on the common interest of the Atlantic Community, and in translating the results of such consultation into effective action within the national governments.

94. To ensure the closest possible connection between current thinking in the governments and consultations in the Council, there might be occasional Council meetings with the participation of specially designated officials or the permanent heads of foreign ministries.

C. Preparation for Council Meetings.

95. Items on the agenda of Ministerial Meetings should be thoroughly examined by Permanent Representatives and relevant proposals prepared before Ministers meet. For this purpose it may be found desirable for governments to send senior experts to consult on agenda items before the meetings take place.

96. The preparation of questions for discussion in the Council should be assisted by appropriate use of the Council’s Committees of Political and Economic Advisers. (Recommendations on the establishment of these Committees are set forth in Chapter 2, paragraph 56, and Chapter 3, paragraph 72).

97. In the case of consultations on special subjects, more use should be made of senior experts from national capitals to assist permanent delegations by calling them, on an ad hoc basis, to do preparatory work. Informal discussions among specialists with corresponding responsibilities are a particularly valuable means of concerted governmental attitudes in the early stages of policy formation.

98. Member governments should make available to one another through NATO “basic position material” for background information. This would help the Alliance as a whole in the consideration of problems of common concern and would assist individual governments to understand more fully the reasons for the position adopted by any member country on a particular issue which might be its special concern, but which might also affect in varying degrees other members of NATO.

D. The Secretary General and the International Staff.

99. To enable the Organization to make its full contribution, the rôle of the Secretary General and the International Staff needs to be enhanced.

100. It is recommended that the Secretary General preside over meetings of the Council in Ministerial, as he does now in other sessions. Such a change with respect to the conduct of the Council’s business would follow naturally from the new responsibilities of the Secretary General, arising out of the recommendations of this report. It is also warranted by the Secretary General’s unique opportunities for becoming familiar with the problems and the activities of the Alliance as a whole.

101. It would, however, still be desirable to have one Minister chosen each year as President of the Council in accordance with the present practice of alphabetical rotation. This Minister, as President, would continue to have especially close contact with the Secretary General during and between Ministerial Meetings, and would, as at present, act as the spokesman of the Council on all formal occasions. He would also preside at the formal opening and closing of Ministerial sessions of the Council.

102. In addition:

(a) the Secretary General should be encouraged to propose items for NATO consultation in the fields covered by this report and should be responsible for promoting and directing the process of consultation;
(b) in view of these responsibilities member governments should undertake to keep the Secretary General fully and currently informed through their permanent delegations of their governments' thinking on questions of common concern to the Alliance;

(c) attention is also called to the additional responsibilities of the Secretary General, recommended in connection with the annual political appraisal (Chapter 2, paragraph 52), and the peaceful settlement of disputes (Chapter 2, paragraph 57).

103. The effective functioning of NATO depends in large measure on the efficiency, devotion and morale of its Secretariat. Acceptance of the recommendations in this report would impose on the Secretariat new duties and responsibilities. Governments must, therefore, be prepared to give the International Staff all necessary support, both in finance and personnel. If this is not done, the recommendations of the report, even if accepted by governments, will not be satisfactorily carried out.

ANNEX I

COMMITTEE OF THREE: FORMAL RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

The Committee of Three, consisting of Dr. Gaetano Martino (Italy), Mr. Halvard Lange (Norway), and Mr. Lester B. Pearson (Canada), was established by the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session on 5th May, 1956, with the following terms of reference:

"...to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community."

2. The Committee held its first meetings 20th to 22nd June, 1956, at NATO Headquarters in Paris. During these discussions, the procedure to be followed by the Committee was established, and it was decided to send a Questionnaire to each NATO member government in order to obtain its views on a number of specific problems with respect to co-operation in the political, economic, cultural and information fields and regarding the organization and functions of NATO. In addition, the Committee issued a memorandum containing explanatory notes and guidance to assist countries in the preparation of their replies to the Questionnaire. The Questionnaire was circulated on 28th June, 1956, and governments were requested to submit their replies by 20th August.

3. The Committee reassembled in Paris on 10th September, 1956, and held a series of meetings lasting until the 22nd of that month. After having examined and analysed the replies to the Questionnaire, the Committee held consultations with each member country individually. The purpose of these consultations was to clarify, where necessary, the position taken by governments in their replies, and to discuss with the representatives of other governments in a preliminary way certain views of the Committee.

4. The consultations took place in the following order:

Wednesday, 12th September:

a.m. Iceland (represented by Mr. H.G. Andersen, Permanent Representative of Iceland to the North Atlantic Council).

p.m. Turkey (represented by Mr. N. Birги, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Thursday, 13th September:

a.m. The Netherlands (represented by Mr. J.W. Beyen, Minister for Foreign Affairs).

p.m. Greece (represented by Mr. E. Averof, Minister for Foreign Affairs).

Friday, 14th September:

a.m. Belgium (represented by Mr. P.H. Spaak, Minister for Foreign Affairs).

p.m. Germany (represented by Professor Hallstein, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs).

Monday, 17th September:

a.m. Luxembourg (represented by Mr. M.J. Bech, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs).

a.m. France (represented by Mr. C. Pineau, Minister for Foreign Affairs).

p.m. United States (represented by Senator George, special representative of President Eisenhower).

p.m. Portugal (represented by Mr. P. Cunha, Minister for Foreign Affairs).

Tuesday, 18th September:

a.m. Denmark (represented by Mr. Ernst Christiansen, Deputy Foreign Minister).

p.m. United Kingdom (represented by Mr. Anthony Nutting, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs).

5. In addition the Committee met the following groups:
(a) On Wednesday, 12th September, meeting with the Standing Committee of the Conference of Members of Parliament from NATO countries, consisting of the following persons:

Belgium: Mr. Frans Van Cauwelaert.
Mr. A. de Meeler.

Canada: Senator, The Hon. Wishart McI. Roberston, P.C.

France: Mr. Maurice Schumann.

Germany: Herr F. Berendsen.
Dr. Richard Jeager.

Netherlands: Mr. J.J. Fens.
Mr. J.L. Kranenburg.
Mr. E.A. Vermeer.

Turkey: Colonel Seyfi Kurtbeck.

United Kingdom: Colonel Walter Elliott, C.H., M.C., M.P.

United States: Congressman Wayne L. Hays, M.C.

(b) On Saturday, 15th September, meeting with the Atlantic Treaty Association, represented by:

Count Morra, Chairman;
Dr. Nord, Vice-Chairman;
Dr. Flynt, Vice-Chairman, and
Mr. John Eppstein, Secretary General.

and a number of delegates from national member organizations.

(c) On Tuesday, 18th September, meeting with General Billotte and Mr. Barton, representing the Signatories of the Declaration of Atlantic Unity.

6. As a result of these consultations a draft report to the Council was prepared. In this work the Committee benefited from the expert advice of three special consultants. They were Professor Lincoln Gordon (Harvard University), Professor Guido Carli (Rome) and Mr. Robert Major (Oslo).

7. The Committee met again in New York on 14th November and re-examined the report in the light of the important world events which occurred in the interval since its September meeting. The Committee, after approving the report, furnished the other Foreign Ministers with an advance copy, preparatory to consideration of the report by the North Atlantic Council.

ANNEX 2
COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

I. RESOLUTION ON THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

WHEREAS the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, under Article 1 of that treaty, have undertaken “to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered”;

WHEREAS the parties have further undertaken to seek to eliminate conflicts in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them;

WHEREAS NATO unity and strength in the pursuit of these objectives remain essential for continuous co-operation in military and non-military fields;

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL:

REAFFIRMS the obligations of all its members, under Article I of the Treaty, to settle by peaceful means any dispute between themselves;

DECIDES that such disputes which have not proved capable of settlement directly be submitted to good offices procedures within the NATO framework before member governments resort to any other international agency except for disputes of a legal character appropriate for submission to a judicial tribunal and those disputes of an economic character for which attempts at settlement might best be made initially in the appropriate specialised economic organizations;

RECOGNISES the right and duty of member governments and of the Secretary General to bring to its attention matters which in their opinion may threaten the solidarity or effectiveness of the Alliance;

EMPowers the Secretary General to offer his good offices informally at any time to member governments involved in a dispute and with their consent to initiate or facilitate procedures of inquiry, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration;

AUTHORISES the Secretary General where he deems it appropriate for the purpose outlined in the preceding paragraph to use the assistance of not more than three permanent representatives chosen by him in each instance.
2. RESOLUTION ON THE REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE OF THREE ON NON-
MILITARY CO-OPERATION IN NATO

WHEREAS the North Atlantic Council at its
meeting in Paris on 5th May established a Committee
composed of the foreign ministers of Italy, Canada and
Norway to advise the Council on ways and means to
improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-mili-
tary fields and to develop greater unity within the
Atlantic Community;

WHEREAS the Committee of Three has now
reported on the task assigned to it and has submitted
to the Council a number of recommendations on such
ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-
operation in non-military fields;

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL:

TAKE NOTE of the Report of the Committee
of Three and

APPROVE its recommendations; and

INVITE the Council in Permanent Session
to implement in the light of the comments made by
governments the principles and recommendations con-
tained in the Report; and.

INVITE the Secretary General to draw up
for consideration by the Council such further specific
proposals as may be required for the implementation
of these recommendations and to report periodically
on the compliance with these recommendations by gov-
ernments.

AUTHORISE the Committee of Three to
publish their report.