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VERBATIM RECORD C-VR(90)36 PART II

VERBATIM RECORD

of the

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING WITH THE PARTICIPATION
OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT

held on

FRIDAY, 6TH JULY 1990

at

LANCASTER HOUSE LONDON

COMPTE RENDU

<u>de 1a</u>

REUNION DU CONSEIL DE l'ATLANTIQUE NORD AVEC LA PARTICIPATION DES CHEFS D'ETAT ET DE GOUVERNEMENT

tenue le

VENDREDI 6 JUILLET 1990

<u>au</u>

LANCASTER HOUSE LONDRES

NATO/OTAN, 1110 Brussels.

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SUMMIT DECLARATION

Mr.WÖRNER

Good morning, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen. Let me wish you all a very good morning, and turn to our agenda. As I told you yesterday, and you kindly agreed, we will start with the discussion and adoption of the Summit Declaration.

And so, I pass the floor to Minister Van den Broek, to report to us on the result of the deliberations by Foreign Ministers.

Hans, you have the floor.

Mr. VAN DEN BROEK

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We spent a wonderful time together as Foreign Ministers yesterday, and the Ministerial drafting Group which I had the honour of chairing concluded its work last night, and the fruits of its labours are now before you.

As you will see, Mr. Chairman, we have been working on the text of the draft that was presented to us by President Bush and we believe that, in fact, the structure and the thrust of that draft was largely maintained. Nevertheless, I also believe that we can say that all Allies have been able to bring their own viewpoints to bear on the draft, and I think we have been able to accommodate these viewpoints without losing the imagination and punch of the message which this Declaration conveys.

Well, Ministers were able to construct an almost bracketless text. You will be aware that there are three issues that are still brought before Heads of State and Government for final resolution, and they concern the paragraphs 2, 8 and 14. In paragraph 2, the short sentence "they have chosen Europe" is in doubt because in the view of many delegations the underlying thought is already contained elsewhere in the paragraph. Chairman, a good night's sleep would lead me to making a compromise proposal, here, and to read "they are choosing a Europe whole and free".

In paragraph 8, it was not possible to determine whether the liaison which the Soviet Union and countries of Central and Eastern Europe are invited to establish with NATO should be qualified by the

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Mr. VAN DEN BROEK (Cont'd)

adjective "diplomatic" and whether this should be done at Ambassadorial level. You will find these difficulties represented in the two square brackets, paragraph 8. Could I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that the Council adopt the formulation "establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO", which does not exclude, after all, Ambassadorial representation, without however predetermining that elevated level. So far for paragraph 8.

Then, maybe more difficult, is paragraph 14 that has posed difficulty, specifically to the delegation of Iceland. The Icelandic government wishes to make sure that naval arms control is not excluded from further joint arms control endeavours in the 1990s. As the notion of naval arms control gives difficulties to other delegations, I don't know how here we could really find a compromise. Maybe, Mr. Chairman, the Prime Minister of Iceland would be willing to comment somewhat on his ideas here.

Then, finally, Mr. Chairman, and maybe I should have started by that: it is not a difficult point, but it is worthwhile maybe to have a brief look at it. That is the opening line of the Declaration. And again, after a good night's sleep, I have been wondering whether it would not be-better to have ... I turn back to the first page, paragraph 1, the first line, asking myself whether it would not be appropriate to move the first two lines to paragraph 3, to begin paragraph 3 with the two first lines of paragraph 1, so that the Declaration may open with, not "Now Europe has entered a new more promising era", but with the line, paragraph 2 "Europe has entered a new promising era". That would then be the opening of the Declaration. And paragraph 1 would move to paragraph 3.

Those were my comments, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WÖRNER

First of all, let me thank you personally, Hans, and all Foreign Ministers for what I consider to be an excellent job that you have done until late last night or even the morning. My personal impression is really that we have in front of us a Declaration which matches the challenge we are confronted with. And I have to thank also those of our staffs who co-operated so well.

And now, I propose that we go through the Declaration, starting with those points still in brackets and the suggestions you made. And I have one additional point. I was told that on one occasion in the Declaration, we mentioned the nations as "our former

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Mr. WÖRNER (Cont'd)

adversaries", and there was a suggestion that we should say "the governments", because the nations as such have never been our adversaries. That's another additional remark and our Staff will look for the place where we have it.

Let me start with the first point, the suggestion by Hans Van den Broek to move the first sentence down to the beginning of number 3. Is there any objection to that? That is a good suggestion; I don't see any objection, so this is agreed.

And now, let us turn to the first bracket: first page, second paragraph. The suggestion by Hans Van den Broek is "they are choosing a Europe whole and free". Any comment?

M. Dumas?

M. DUMAS

Oui, c'était une suggestion faite par la délégation française, mais l'amendement proposé par M. Van den Broek nous convient tout à fait. Nous sommes d'accord.

Mr. WÖRNER

Merci bien.

I see no objection to it, so this is agreed and it reads now "they are choosing a Europe whole and free". Now, let me move to the next bracket which is page 4, paragraph 8. The suggestion of Minister Van den Broek is to drop the first bracket that would read "to establish regular diplomatic liaison" and then to delete "at Ambassadorial level", and replace it with "NATO", so it would read "but to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO".

May I have comments on that?

Minister Dumas:

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M. DUMAS

M. le Président,

Pour aller à l'essentiel, tous les arguments ont été échangés hier, de part et d'autre, à l'appui des deux formules qui sont entre crochets. Je n'insisterai pas outre mesure. Je pense que la suggestion faite par M. Van den Broek, qui rejoint la proposition française, c'est-à-dire maintenir l'expression "des liaisons régulières" n'exclut pas que dans ce cadre de liaisons régulières, il y ait des diplomates et éventuellement, des ambassadeurs. Ce sera à la discrétion de chaque pays. Donc, cette formule-là nous donne satisfaction, d'autant plus qu'elle était, à l'origine, une formule française.

M. WÖRNER

C'est-à-dire que si un ambassadeur est envoyé, on ne s'y opposera pas. C'est aux pays de l'Est qu'il appartient de prendre la décision. Est ce qu'il y a des contributions?

There is no request for the floor so I take it that we agree and I repeat "not just to visit, but to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO". Thank you very much and I turn now to paragraph 14, page 6, where we had in brackets, "Furthermore, we will examine the possibility of the extension of arms control measures to naval forces". There was no compromise suggestion by the Chairman of Foreign Ministers, so I open the floor. Prime Minister Hermannsson, you have the floor.

Mr. HERMANNSSON

Mr. Chairman, may I start by thanking the Foreign Ministers for an outstanding job. I think they have written a document which we can be proud of in most respects. It certainly is a message of co-operation instead of confrontation, as you suggested in your opening remarks. But it seems to us that this co-operation ends at the seas, unfortunately, and we think it is extremely important to extend such co-operation to the seas. I am certain that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was right when she told us yesterday about the continued build-up of the Soviet naval forces. We want to put those under control. We in the Atlantic are faced with growing traffic of Soviet nuclear submarines and we have had several accidents in the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea which indeed impose a threat to our surroundings, so we strongly object to

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Mr. HERMANNSSON (Cont'd)

naval systems and naval arms being excluded, specifically as paragraph 14 is written. Therefore we have suggested that a sentence be included saying, "Furthermore, we will examine the possibility of the extension of arms control measures to naval forces". We could accept some other writing of the sentence, but I would like to have it primarily as it is. I would like to suggest that if this is not acceptable at all as a compromise in the paragraph "conventional" be struck out, which actually refers to the present stage. It would be struck out in three places. The sentence would then read "We will seek through new arms control negotiations" (striking out "conventional") and the sixth line also would then read "to limit the offensive capabilities of armed forces in Europe" (strike out "conventional") and finally also the second last line "follow-on arms control talks" (strike out "conventional"). Furthermore I also suggest that the third last line would read "to prevent any nation from maintaining disproportionate military power". Strike out "on the continent", which then would be understood to also include the seas. By making such changes we are not excluding naval arms control. I repeat, we would prefer the sentence as it reads in the brackets to be included; it should be moved forward one sentence to be in the correct place, but if that is not at all acceptable I must ask our partners to delete as I have suggested by at least not excluding naval forces. We in Iceland want to take part in this co-operation and friendship so much stressed in this otherwise fine document. Thank you.

Mr. WÖRNER

Thank you. Mrs. Thatcher, please.

Mrs. THATCHER

Mr. Chairman, what the Icelandic Prime Minister has done has been to put up some quite fundamental changes suggesting that "conventional" should be deleted, which are totally unacceptable. We have nuclear. They are not in the present arms control talks and they are not going into the present arms control talks, and I submit to you first that we cannot have new proposals of that extraordinary import at present, and I could not entertain those changes. Secondly, as my name has been adduced in favour of what the Icelandic Prime Minister was saying, may I say that we could not accept his sentence, "Furthermore, we will examine the possibility of the extension of arms control measures to naval forces". We are a maritime power. The sea is our highway. It is the same as the roads and railways of the Soviet Union. They reinforce by roads and railways quickly. We have to reinforce Norway across the

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Mrs. THATCHER (Cont'd)

North Sea. We have to reinforce the mainland across the Channel. The sea to us is the same as the roads and railways to the Soviet Union. We cannot have our maritime forces restricted or brought into this negotiation in any way. Therefore I could not possibly agree to either of the proposals which the Icelandic Prime Minister has proposed, because it is far too late to produce something new which would require immense consideration and which, if you look at its meaning, would influence our nuclear weapons. That paragraph, I believe, should be left as it is and we should delete the words in square brackets.

Mr. WÖRNER

Thank you. We have heard an opposite voice. Now, who wants to take the floor? President Bush.

Mr. BUSH

I had an opportunity to discuss this matter with the Prime Minister of Iceland and I want to say at the outset I understand his difficulties and his concerns here, but this is something that is very, very fundamental and it relates to not only what Prime Minister Thatcher so eloquently said but to some very serious matters between my country and the Soviet Union and we hate to be in a position of being unco-operative, but we would strongly oppose the changes that have been suggested here and I would hope that at a later time, but not certainly in this document, we can find some way to accommodate the understandable concerns of the Prime Minister, but I am not in a position to yield one inch on opening this question of naval arms control directly or indirectly and I have tried to be very frank with the delegation from Iceland, but inasmuch as it is being debated and discussed here, we must take that position and we have no flexibility on it and I think the drafters tried very hard to accommodate the interests of all and I would support the original draft without change, without the brackets obviously.

Mr. WÖRNER

Anybody else... Foreign Minister of Canada - Joe Clark.

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Mr. CLARK

I wonder if we might find some refuge in some ambiguity here. Part of what Iceland has proposed, and first of all I accept the argument, we accept the arguments put forward by the United Kingdom and the United States, but part of what was also proposed would be to remove the words "on the continent", and I think if one were to do that one would have to remove the two words earlier "in Europe". So it would then read "to limit the offensive capability of conventional armed forces so as to prevent any nation from maintaining disproportionate military power". That does not address specifically naval power, but neither does it use language which would, by clear implication exclude naval power. That may be an option that would provide some room for the Icelandic consideration.

Mr WÖRNER

If you refer to disproportionate military power and you delete "on the continent" and you include "all" that means you include, without mentioning it in express terms, you include the sea, you can ask yourself who has disproportionate military power on sea, and I go no further than that.

Mr. WÖRNER

Jim Baker.

Mr. BAKER

This would also present us, I think, with a very serious problem, I think the one thing we ought to avoid here is a studied ambiguity, our position is very clear, it's a position that we have to articulate very forcefully every time we sit down with the Soviet Union, and as I said last night, we expect to have to articulate it when we sit down with the Soviet Union, but quite frankly we hope we don't have to articulate it as forcefully when we sit down in this Alliance. We don't have, as the President indicated, any give at all on this subject and, as Prime Minister Thatcher has so aptly pointed out, this, the seas are our highways, they're our railroads, we would not have been in a position to afford the kind of support we have afforded to this Alliance were it not for our navies. Navies don't take and occupy ground, navies are not destabilizing in that sense, so I think we have heard all the arguments back and forth and we have here a basic fundamental difference of opinion.

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Mr. WÖRNER

Foreign Minister Mr. Eyskens.

M. EYSKENS

M. le Président, il ne peut pas y avoir d'hésitation sur la pertinence des arguments avancés et par le Premier ministre de Grande-Bretagne et par le Président des Etats-Unis, mais s'il faut faire un geste à l'égard de nos amis islandais, je crois que l'on pourrait prendre la dernière phrase, et j'ai ici le texte anglais devant moi : "this is an ambitious agenda but it matches our goal". On pourrait dire "this is an ambitious agenda which could be kept under review", or something like that.

Mr. WÖRNER

Hans Van den Broek.

Mr. VAN DEN BROEK

Mr. Chairman we have been working last night very co-operatively in a sense of compromise and give and take and I fully understand the remarks that have been made, not only by the Prime Minister of Iceland, but also the objections against that by the United States and the United Kingdom. I wonder, somewhat in the same spirit as Belgium is trying to do, whether or not we could substitute the line between brackets by the following line, "furthermore we will continue to explore broader arms control and confidence-building opportunities", I would repeat "furthermore we will continue to explore broader arms control and confidence-building opportunities". That can relate to intensifying endeavours in the arms control field under way and it can mean that other fields are being taken into account, but it is not explicit at all. While I repeat, so you can see what is proposed, instead of the phrase now in brackets, the Dutch Foreign Minister proposes the sentence "furthermore we will continue to explore broader arms control and confidence-building opportunities".

Mr. WÖRNER

The Prime Minister of Iceland.

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Mr. HERMANNSSON

Mr. Chairman may I say that we will accept that as a compromise, if it can be accepted here by others. But I would also like to say that we fully understand the importance of the North Atlantic link, and I think Iceland contributes to the security of that link and we would like to continue doing so. No country is more dependent on the highways of the seas than Iceland but we like to have our highways under control.

Mr. WÖRNER

Prime Minister Thatcher.

Mrs. THATCHER

Mr. Chairman I think we could accept Mr. Van den Broek's compromise on condition that it is not suggested by anyone that that means that we agree to controlling our maritime forces or putting them into arms control. I do not, I can see no possibility and so I accept that sentence on that condition.

Mr. WÖRNER

Would you repeat the condition.

I think that this is a fair suggestion, can everyone around this table go along with it. President Bush, you can? May I ask the Prime Minister of Iceland.

Mr. HERMANNSSON

I did already say that I do accept it.

Mr. WÖRNER

So I take it that there is agreement, first on the sentence proposed by Foreign Minister Van den Broek and on the conditions stated by the British Prime Minister. Thank you very much, now, where is the phrase which I mentioned?

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Mr. WÖRNER (Cont'd)

It is on page 3; if you kindly turn to page 3, where you have: "The Atlantic Community must reach out to the nations of the East, which were our adversaries in the Cold War and extend to them the hand of friendship". Now, the suggestion was "the Governments", but some say that the Bonn Government.... The problem I think is clear to everybody. We do not want to create the impression that we confronted the nations as such. We confronted the régimes, O.K. but Minister Genscher, you wanted to have the floor? O.K. you have it.

Mr. GENSCHER

I would suggest: "the nations whose governments in the past were adversaries".

Mr. WÖRNER

"Whose former governments were adversaries of the Cold War". Minister Eyskens.

M. EYSKENS

Pourquoi ne pas dire carrément : "Les régimes politiques" ?

Mr. WÖRNER

"Former political régimes". I think this is a better expression than "governments". It would read now, it would read: "The Atlantic Community must reach out to the nations of the East whose former political régimes".....

Mr. KOHL

They have the same party, and they have a Party Conference even, so think this would not really be very realistic.

Mr. WÖRNER

There is another suggestion which I think could solve the problem. May I just pass it on to you. That we just delete the last part of the first half of the sentence which means "which were our adversaries in Cold War". Just delete that, so you have: "The Atlantic Community must reach out to the nations of the East and extend to them the hand of friendship". I mean, this would solve the problem.

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Mr. KOHL

It is not really so. It is a very good sentence because many people in Prague, Budapest and so on will read this sentence, only this reference to the régime is not correct. I mean we still have a Communist régime in the Soviet Union and they have the Party Conference there today and we can't say what we have here, this reference to the governments, I mean we didn't have a quarrel with the peoples of the Soviet Union or Poland. It was the governments which used to be in power so why don't we accept this proposal made by ...

Mr. WÖRNER

The proposition: "The Atlantic Community must reach out to the nations of the East whose former governments were our adversaries in the Cold War and extend to them the hand of friendship". Can you accept it? There is no ... Dutch Prime Minister, you wanted to have the floor? British Prime Minister?

Mrs. THATCHER

I think we're struggling too hard. You can't just have governments adversaries of one another. I mean there are very large parts of that nation, the military as well. I think we're struggling too hard on this. If you're going to try to eliminate the word "adversaries" in that paragraph you're going to have to do it again in paragraph 7 and we're going to strain to get a false meaning to this thing. We have been adversaries in the Cold War. If you like: "The Atlantic Community must reach out to the nations of the East who were engaged in the Cold War". It's ridiculous, I think, to say, that it was only the governments; there's the military and whole sections of those peoples who were engaged in it. I would leave it as it is, otherwise we're going again to have to address your comments to para. 7 when it says "we're no longer adversaries". Whereas in paragraph 5 we're denying that we've been adversaries, you can't say in paragraph 7 "we're no longer adversaries". I would leave it as it is. I have no objection to the present text in paragraph 5 and paragraph 7.

Mr. WÖRNER

Prime Minister Lubbers.

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Mr. LUBBERS

Mr. Chairman, I also prefer the original text because anyhow, the concept of nations today is appealing: to give that all the attention, to leave "nations" in the text and when you see that, of course for us, for the Atlantic Community, we have the problem that they were our adversaries in the Cold War, as was just said. So I do not think we clarify much when we are going to complicate the text. I think the text was excellent and it is clear for everybody that we reach out now to the nations and extend to them the hand of friendship. It's stronger to leave it like that.

M. DUMAS

M. le Président, est-ce que je pourrais faire une tentative de simplification ? Qu'est-ce que nous voulons dire de nouveau par rapport à la situation antérieure ? C'est que la Communauté atlantique offre son amitié aux pays de l'Est. Qu'ils aient éte les adversaires, que les gouvernements, les régimes l'aient été au temps de la guerre froide, on le sait bien; ce qui est important, et ce qui est nouveau, et le message est là, c'est d'offrir son amitié, et je me demande s'il ne serait pas plus simple de dire : "la Communauté atlantique doit se tourner vers les nations de l'Est, et leur offrir son amitié."

Mr. WÖRNER

C'est ce que j'avais proposé. Cela a été rejeté.

M. DUMAS

Le message essentiel y est.

Mr. WÖRNER

Minister Van den Broek.

Mr. VAN DEN BROEK

One simple proposal, Chairman, could we not change "countries" and "nations" in the two first lines, to say (in the first line on page 3, English translation): "but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War".

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Mr. WÖRNER

I had the time idea ... could solve the problem.

I repeat the proposition of the Dutch Foreign Minister: "but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries of the Cold War." I mean, in my eyes, that solves the problem.

M. le Premier Ministre belge

M. MARTENS

Je trouve, M. le Président, qu'en français en tout cas, la phrase dirait : "la Communauté atlantique doit se tourner vers les nations de l'Est, dont les anciens gouvernements du temps de la guerre froide étaient nos adversaires, et leur offrir son amitié."

Mr. WÖRNER

Well, we have tried this formula, it didn't meet the agreement of all, so let me try it again with the last formula. You cannot accept it? Really it damages nothing, I think. Can we replace "countries" by "states"? ".... to the States, to the states of the East". That is more restrictive than "countries". Now we have a new proposal. We say not "nations" but we say "States of the East". I think, looking around this table, may I just try it on my own. Looking around this table, seeing the reactions to all these proposals, I think we all mean the same.

For me, it would be a little bit astonishing that we concentrate on this too much and I must say that I have raised the issue myself, so really I think we could all live with and accept the formula proposed by the Dutch Foreign Minister which really does not do any harm to anybody, which means that in the first line on page 3, "to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe", there you have the nations as such. It's clear now. The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of these. Well, that is not making them former enemies, the nations. Country can mean a lot of things. So I very strongly plead that we accept this. May I take it. Thank you very much. Then Foreign Minister Genscher.

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Mr. GENSCHER

Mr. Chairman, I believe in paragraph 14 there is an error which slipped in somewhere. There is a reference made in the sixth line, actually, in the English version "to limit the offensive capability of conventional armed forces in Europe". What we have in mind is a reduction or elimination so what I would suggest is that we say to "reduce" or to "eliminate" offensive capability.

Mr. WÖRNER

You have heard the proposal. It was to replace the word in the sixth line on number 14 of page five, to replace "limit" by "reduce" or "eliminate". Prime Minister Hurd.

Mr. HURD

Secretary General, we did discuss this at some length yesterday and I expressed why we were unhappy with the phrase which was in the original draft about far-reaching reductions, and there was a discussion and we reached a compromise which was not what I had suggested but it represents change, i.e. by introducing the word "limit" rather than "reduce". That was the nature of the discussion we had and the nature of the compromise which we reached, so I don't think there is a mistake in the drafting.

Mr. WÖRNER

Well, then, I really suggest to drop it because we cannot go again in a drafting exercise; this has been done by Foreign Ministers yesterday. O.K. may I then put the question to you, if you agree with the declaration as such, with the corrections which we have made. So, I take it that you agree to the declaration. M. le Ministre des affaires étrangères.

M. DUMAS

Si j'ai bien compris, vous demandez un accord sur l'ensemble du texte ?

M. WÖRNER

Oui

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M. DUMAS

Alors, j'avais une observation de rédaction à formuler à l'article 21, à la troisième ligne. Vous avez observé que dans tout le texte, chaque fois que la position de la France est réaffirmée, il est indiqué la formule "les Etats membres concernés", et là, par une sorte de lapsus de plume, on a mentionné les "Etats membres intéressés". Alors, comme il peut y avoir une difficulté d'interprétation à partir du moment où l'on change un mot, je préférerais "les Etats membres concernés" et que l'on supprime "notre Organisation", puisque c'est en contradiction. Alors, "les Etats membres concernés élaboreront une nouvelle stratégie militaire". C'est simplement de la mise en forme.

M. WÖRNER

D'abord dans le texte français, et je répète cela plus tard en anglais. Dans le texte français, ce serait "sur les avis des autorités militaires de l'OTAN et de tous les Etats membres concernés élaboreront une nouvelle stratégie."

M. DUMAS

Si vous permettez, la phrase se lirait de la façon suivante : "sur les avis des autorités militaires de l'OTAN, tous les Etats membres concernés élaboreront une nouvelle stratégie militaire".

M. WÖRNER

Alors, je répète cela en français : "A partir des plans de défense, et en se fondant sur les avis des autorités militaires de l'OTAN, tous les Etats membres concernés élaboreront une nouvelle stratégie militaire alliée".

M. DUMAS

Parfait.

Mr. WÖRNER

Now let's translate that in English and I give it to you in English now. It would read in paragraph 21 "in the context of these revised plans etc. etc. and with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, all member states concerned will prepare a new Allied military strategy". Prime Minister Lubbers.

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Mr. LUBBERS

I don't object to force against the changing the word "interested" to member states "concerned" because we did it everywhere in the text. But I have an objection to deleting the word "NATO". I mean, I accept that in the military strategy, France is not involved because it is not a member of that part of NATO. But the others are NATO together. So I strongly advise you to accept the first amendment, because that is reasonable, but to leave NATO as it is in the text. Why not?

M. WÖRNER

La France accepte de répéter cela en français d'abord? Cela se lit.

M. DUMAS

Je vous donne mon accord sur l'expression "l'OTAN", plutôt que l'"Organisation" et, dans l'explication finale, nous dirons le sens que nous donnons à cette variante.

M. WÖRNER

"Tous les Etats membres concernés" au lieu de "tous les Etats membres intéressés".

M. DUMAS

Bon. Et au lieu de "l'Organisation", on met "l'OTAN".

M. WÖRNER

Voilà. Très bien.

So that reads in English "With the advice of NATO Military Authorities, all Member States concerned, NATO will prepare ...". By the way, in the English text I find "NATO". So then it's clear. "With the advice NATO Military Authorities, all Member States concerned, NATO will prepare...".

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Mrs. THATCHER

"And", Mr. Chairman, otherwise you are altering the meaning. It is "With the advice of NATO Military Authorities and all Member States...".

Mr. WÖRNER

I read it this way. "...and all Member States concerned...".

Mrs. THATCHER

Yes, it's the "and" got lost.

Mr. WORNER

I am sorry. That must be my pronunciation. Thanks. So this is accepted? Thank you very much. Now I come back to my final question. Let me ask if there is any other suggestion or change? That is not the case, so may I take that you are ...

M. DUMAS

Une toute petite chose, purement esthétique. Il a été décidé qu'en français nous dirions "Déclaration de Londres sur une Alliance de l'Atlantique Nord rénovée". On a pensé que c'était une meilleure traduction de l'anglais en français, et tous les anglophones de cette assemblée en étaient d'accord, et les francophones aussi.

M. WÖRNER

Si c'est le cas - je vous demande si c'est le cas -,on change la version française, et seulement la version française, et on dit "Alliance de l'Atlantique Nord rénovée" au lieu de "transformée".

Just in the French words. We change the French version because it's a better translation. You agree? OK, so now I come back to my final question. May I take it that all Allies agree on the text of our declaration, on the amended text of our declaration, as of now?

Thank you so much.

I think ... Président Mitterrand.

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M. MITTERRAND

En faisant mes observations pour répondre à la question que vous venez de poser, j'engagerai, en même temps, la discussion finale. Je veux dire, d'abord, que l'esprit de ce texte me paraît très heureux. Il marque une rénovation, une ouverture-ouverture sur les anciens pays adversaires du temps de la guerre froide. Il est plus politique, plus psychologique, plus humain et moins directement militaire, tout en restant, bien entendu, la marque d'une alliance militaire qui reste sur ses gardes. Et de ce point de vue, je ne peux qu'approuver l'orientation générale de ce texte. Je ferai maintenant des réserves sur certains aspects du contenu, qui n'enlèvent rien à l'approbation de l'esprit qui inspire le texte.

Ma première observation sera de caractère tout à fait classique, car les membres de l'OTAN savent depuis l'origine que la France se tient a l'écart du Commandement intégré et des conséquences qu'il implique quant à la stratégie, la définition stratégique, et quant à un certain nombre de domaines d'application. Cette absence de la France dans le Commandement intégré ne nous empêche pas de travailler ensemble; c'est d'ailleurs pourquoi nous sommes là, ce qui n'a pas toujours été le cas naguère. Nous entendons coopèrer, collaborer, travailler et marquer notre solidarité, qui, en fait, existe chaque jour, en de multiples manifestations, liaisons et décisions prises en commun.

Mais c'est vrai que nous n'approuvons pas plus la stratégie de l'OTAN aujourd'hui que nous ne l'approuvions hier. Comme nous ne sommes pas partie prenante à cette stratégie, je ne veux pas être désagréable et, en somme, sembler me mêler de ce qui ne me regarde pas : vous dire à la fois, nous n'en sommes pas, mais, d'autre part, vous avez tort de faire ce que vous faites. Donc, prenez mes propos avec les nuances désirables. Mais, au moins, il faut que vous compreniez pourquoi, pays détenteur de l'arme atomique, nous n'entendons pas nous trouver, pour une question de vie ou de mort, dans le quart d'heure - c'est ça la loi de l'armement nucléaire - soumis à des décisions qui viendraient d'ailleurs.

Et d'autre part, nous avons la conviction - je vois qu'elle n'a pas fait beaucoup de progrès dans les autres esprits - nous avons la conviction que la dissuasion n'a de sens qu'immédiate, quasiment automatique, et donc préalable à toute autre action militaire. Pour nous, l'arme atomique n'est pas le dernier degré de l'artillerie; ce n'est pas la disposition terminale d'une guerre classique, qui soudain

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ne devient plus classique. C'est autre chose. C'est d'une autre nature. L'objet de notre démarche n'est pas de gagner une guerre, il est de l'empêcher. Nous pouvons nous tromper, mais selon nous, la seule façon d'empêcher une guerre, c'est que l'adversaire éventuel sâche à quoi il s'expose, c'est-à-dire, sans délai, à une guerre atomique. Et, toujours selon nous, nous pensons que nul n'osera s'engager dans une guerre.

Donc, voilà, je vous ai dit ce que j'en pensais. Je ne prétends pas vous convaincre, mais je veux au moins expliquer nos raisons.

Donc, la notion de dernier recours, de défense flexible, bref, toute idée qui tend à signifier que l'on attendra une future échéance avant de savoir, en cas de guerre, si l'on utilisera l'arme atomique, c'est autant d'occasions perdues de dire clairement à l'adversaire ce qui se passera s'il ose risquer la guerre.

Voilà, j'en ai fini avec cela, ce qui veut dire - traduction tout à fait évidente - que tous les articles qui touchent au Commandement intégré et à ses modalités d'exécution ne concernent pas la France. On doit considérer, dès lors, que nous nous abstenons de prendre part au vote sur ces articles-là, même si nous approuvons l'ensemble du dispositif. Nous ne sommes pas partie prenante. Cela ne nous empêche pas de constater les grands progrès du texte actuel, progrès à mon avis plus politiques que militaires. C'est très important, très audacieux et très courageux de la part des initiateurs de ce texte que d'offrir ainsi aux pays de l'Europe centrale et orientale, et notamment à l'Union soviétique, une chance considérable d'ouvrir le dialogue, d'organiser des liaisons, d'accepter des structures, notamment celles de la CSCE, auxquelles, le texte le dit, on réserve un rôle plus marqué que par le passé. Et de ce point de vue, je tiens à remercier ceux qui ont pris cette initiative.

Il faut éviter toute ambigüité dans ce texte. J'ai recommandé au ministre français des Affaires étrangères de ne pas faire - il en était d'accord à l'avance - de juridisme, donc de ne pas batailler sur chaque formule, ce qui aurait retardé inutilement cette séance et créé un climat que nous voulons, nous, excellent entre nous. Il en reste une cependant, du moins dans mon esprit, c'est celle qui tend à dire, dans la dernière page du texte, que l'"organe parlementaire - l'Assemblée de l'Europe - à établir ... avec représentation de tous les Etats membres", ce qui est très souhaitable - nous sommes tout à fait pour - et à faire dans le texte, une référence à "l'actuelle assemblée parlementaire du

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Conseil de l'Europe à Strasbourg". Alors, "sur la base de", est-ce que cela veut dire que l'on s'adresse au Conseil européen, de l'Europe, à élargir, ou est-ce que cela veut dire qu'on fait quelque chose "à l'instar de", sur la base structurelle, en faisant quelque chose qui ressemble, mais ailleurs, et autrement. J'ai l'impression que c'est cette deuxième interprétation qui est la bonne, mais je tenais quand même à le préciser, car il s'agit d'une assemblée nouvelle, différente, sans quoi nous allons créer des ambigüités et des contradictions entre la CSCE et les autres assemblées existantes.

Voilà, je n'ai pas d'autre observation à faire, et je tiens à remercier tous les membres ici présents de leur esprit de coopération.

M. WÖRNER

Je vous remercie, M. le Président. Vous avez ouvert le débat libre, et je vous invite tous à y participer. Je crois qu'il nous reste une demi-heure pour cette discussion. Quelqu'un désire-t-il la parole ?

May I encourage the American President?

I take it from your reactions that you are all fully satisfied with our work done with the declaration, but I want to mention especially the spirit of our meeting which has been exceptional in my eyes. Now the Prime Minister of Norway, Mr. Syse.

MR. SYSE

Mr. Chairman, we can indeed say that the meeting has given an historical result. A result which will send important signals to the Soviets and the East Europeans, but also to the neutral and non-aligned countries of Europe. We have achieved what we came here to achieve.

I should also like to thank the Foreign Ministers, and to congratulate the Foreign Ministers for their splendid work. It was the way it turned out that they didn't have to be heroic; they were bold. Now I understand that it only took them until one o'clock to achieve boldness, and they didn't even have time for dinner in-between so perhaps we should have certain ambitions: aim even higher and aim at terrorism. At least it was possible to include a reference to environmental challenge. I think it is important that as we develop the CSCE and strengthen the political dialogue among the 35, those ministers should be brought into our work. Regular meetings of ministers of the environment would be a useful step.

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Mr. SYSE (Cont'd)

Mr. Chairman, the Soviets wish to drop their blocade of We strongly welcome that development. Over the last month we have seen a considerable number of delegations from the Baltic States, as I am sure many of you have. We have made a point of always saying that yes, you are welcome. I think that has been the right The discussions have, I believe, served to promote moderation on both sides of the conflict. The discussions have served a useful purpose and been a contribution to stability. This is a lesson we should keep in mind for the future. Mr. Chairman, more alliance control has been a difficult item during this meeting. It is a difficult issue for us too. We are, in Norway, squeezed between two considerations. On the one hand, we decide to reduce our naval power in our vicinity. On the other hand, we need to maintain on the right lines a reinforcement and the capacity to carry out such reinforcements. Reduction of conventional armed forces will also have an impact on the naval side. The importance of the transatlantic sea alliance will grow and not diminish. The more conventional forces are reduced, the more important will the mobility of these forces be. In this context, our naval capabilities will be a decisive element. We are pleased that a compromise was found for the purpose of our statement but the discussion result has been ... that more work could be done in this particular field to ensure that we have a common position also in the future.

Prime Minister, Chairman, you mentioned the need to keep each other informed about defence planning. I couldn't agree more. There will be an increase in pressure for taking out the peace dividend and we will, each of us, in our parliaments, be confronted with what other allies are doing to reduce budgets and adjust commitments. So I join you, Mr. Chairman, in your appeal to keep each other as fully informed as possible and to take our common defence planning procedure very seriously in the future. Thank you.

MR. WÖRNER

Thank you. Since I have no more requests for the floor, let me turn to one more small item before concluding.

My visit to Moscow has now been fixed for July 14 to July 16. I will be flying to Moscow on the 13th and hold my official discussions on the 14th. With specific reference to today's declaration, I will obviously need to explain what we mean by the invitation to Gorbachev. I think it is clear we leave it to him to say when he wants to come. Is this the understanding I can take with me? That's the guidance I need from you. We just offer him to come and address the Council but leave the date to him when he thinks it appropriate.

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Mrs. THATCHER

You have invited our views. I think the best time would be after the CFE Agreement has been signed, when one can genuinely talk on the new period. That would be my instinctive reaction, if you are seeking our views.

Mr. WÖRNER

Of course, we will not have to decide it now. There is another question also on the level which needs no decision - at which level he addresses the Council. But I think that can be dealt with later on. I do not think that this needs any decision now. So, if there is no more contribution, let me ask you if there is any other business? If not ...

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Mrs. THATCHER

Mr. Chairman, we would like to thank you for the way in which you have conducted our deliberations, for the efficiency of your staff and for managing everything so well, and to say that if you need another NATO meeting quickly, we could have you in London again.

Mr. WÖRNER

Thank you very much, Prime Minister. You have been very kind.

Mr. MULRONEY

May I, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of all Heads of Government, express very genuine thanks to Mrs. Thatcher and members of her Government for the quite sparkling hospitality. We thank her very, very much for the excellent arrangements.

Mr. WÖRNER

Thank you for doing what I intended to do just now. M. Dumas.

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M. DUMAS

Je voudrais aussi, M. le Président, vous adresser des remerciements pour le travail que vous avez accompli, et, si vous m'y autorisez, dire aussi des compliments et des remerciements à notre ami Van den Broek, qui a présidé le Conseil des Ministres pendant toute la nuit, jusqu'à une heure raisonnable cependant, et qui a su allier la gentillesse et la fermeté pour nous amener à une conclusion. Alors, il faudrait le lui dire, en notre nom à tous, les Ministres des affaires étrangères de l'Alliance atlantique.

M. WÖRNER

Je m'y joins de tout mon coeur, mais si vous continuez comme cela, je n'ai rien de plus à dire. C'est un danger éminent!

Well, to conclude, I think on behalf of all of you I really have to thank Prime Minister Thatcher once more for the excellent arrangements you and your Government have provided for this meeting and the warm hospitality we could all feel during those days. I would especially like to thank the UK Summit Task Force headed by Ambassador Oliver Miles for their very good arrangements and also to your police, the Metropolitan Police, for the way they have implemented their comprehensive security arrangements. I can only tell you, having had the duty to arrange some such meetings in Brussels, I know what it means for a start, for a nation - and to do it during Wimbledon with all the necessary arrangements and so on - and to do it in such a perfect way, I think that requires and deserves our appreciation. Our staffs - the British staff but also the International staff - have worked until half past three in the morning to bring out all these things. I want especially to mention the contribution of Ambassador Wegener to my left and his people. I want to mention Chris Prebensen and his people, and I want to, this time, mention my Private Office and Jim Cunningham. Please forgive me for doing so. Once more, my heartfelt thanks to Hans Van den Broek, to the Foreign Ministers.

I think we can all reflect on a most difficult task well done, and the no less difficult tasks that lie ahead. Acting on our decisions today, we can now make an even greater impact on the new direction of East-West relations. So, I can only thank you all. That concludes our meeting. One final announcement - we need forty-five minutes to print and distribute the text of our declaration, so my press conference will be one hour from now, 11.45. Thank you very much.