

Draft Note for the DSB

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

1. PC/62/591, paragraph 7 suggested what action was required by the Council in connection with Berlin contingency planning. The situation has not been fundamentally changed by the discussions which took place on September 18 on the basis of the 4 Power paper on the "preferred sequence of action" (PC/62/593), but it has to some extent been amplified.

2. The main issues now before the Council may be summarized as follows:-

(a) Is the Council ready to approve the Supreme Commanders' HERCON and MARCON contingency plans in response to Council Resolution C-M(61)10; as a basis for possible action by NATO forces in the light of the explanations given in the "preferred sequence of action" paper and the subsequent discussion on September 18? (The exact wording of the Council's approval will be very delicate: it would probably be wise to introduce the notion of a catalogue of possible plans.)

(b) Is the Council ready to approve the 3 Power paper on NATO Tripartite Relationships in the amended version circulated to delegations on 17th September 1962, in the light of the replies given to the questions raised by the Canadian and Italian delegations (also circulated on 17 September).

3. Before the Council can be asked formally to give approval in the sense indicated above, Permanent Representatives should be asked whether they require any further clarification either of the military plans themselves or of the NATO tripartite relationship paper, or of the "preferred sequence of action". On the first point it will doubtless be for the Standing Group Representative to reply; on the second too, a spokesman of the 4 Powers. It should be noted that the 4 Powers do not ask for agreement in a formal sense on their "preferred sequence of action" paper; they are merely seeking the views of member governments and hoping to establish that it represents a consensus of opinion. (as a follow up of

The question of the 4 Powers to the 19th September

4. In the event that the Council requires amendments in the military contingency plans or in the tripartite NATO relationship paper, it may be desirable to secure approval of all parts of the paper other than those on which amendment is necessary.

5. Arising out of the meeting of September 18 there will be the following additional questions to be pursued in the Council :-

(a) The Alert problem: A number of countries appear highly sensitive on this question. Discussion in the Council revealed that many member governments are unwilling to accept the general proposition that certain measures of alert (simple alert or reinforced alert) proposed by SACZUR should be applied automatically or "across the board" at any given stage in developments over Berlin. Moreover, as we already know, the means do not exist in some countries for giving effect to certain of the alert measures. Mr. Nitsa suggested that "the Council should now give prompt and thorough consideration to the whole question of alerts, the powers of governments, their responsibilities to Parliaments and whether their possibilities of action corresponded to SACZUR's requirements". The Secretary General said that "he might bring up at a later date the possibility of setting up a joint military-civilian working group on alerts". A report by the Standing Group analysing the present situation and the NATO alert system generally has just been received and is being circulated to delegations. This draws to what extent the Supreme Commanders are inhibited in carrying out their responsibilities by the failure of countries either to delegate to them the necessary powers or to pass the necessary legislation.

The DSG may wish to make a firm proposal to the Council that a working group should be set up to examine the status of the alert system as a whole and in particular the need for the introduction of alert measures at different stages in a possible Berlin crisis. The purpose would be to establish what alert measures were necessary, and whether in the various ^{sectors} circumstances indicated in the "preferred sequence of action" paper, with a view to establishing a "catalogue" as in the case of military plans. (This proposal may well encounter resistance from some delegations, e.g. Germany.) The working group should be composed of equal numbers of military and civilian representatives.

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(k) The 4 Powers are examining the situation which will arise in the event of interference with Seymour access to Berlin (vias, Customs etc.). They have undertaken to refer the result of their examination to the Council in due course for discussion.

(l) The 4 Powers have stated that they are re-examining plans to deal with the contingency of a separate peace treaty between the Soviet Union and the GDR. Mr. Nitze stated that these would be brought before long for discussion in the Council (para 17 of record). (Mr. de Starecke was very insistent on the need for planning in anticipation of a separate peace treaty; more particularly he asked for a list of political plans for discussion by the Council. The Secretary General in summing up on 16 September said that this was a problem for the Alliance and that the Council should not wait to discuss it until the 4 Power plans for this contingency were available.)

(m) Mr. Nitze stated that plans were under preparation for dealing with the possibility of action in the Security Council under Phase II. The 4 Powers hoped to bring the matter of tactics in the U.S. to the Council for discussion. (Mr. de Starecke expressed special interest in this, but wanted to know on what basis the 4 Powers proposed that the Western position should be defended.)

(n) It was stated that national or tripartite naval resources in Phase II are under examination. These would complement MARCON plans. They would be referred to the Council "in the near future".

(o) The Secretary General and certain Permanent Representatives drew attention to the need to provide for regular information reaching the Council on the Berlin situation in the event of any deterioration. This was accepted by the 4 Powers. While no special action seems to be required at the present stage, this point should perhaps be regarded as a Council decision.

(c) Legal implications. A study has now been prepared by the Legal Adviser to the International Staff. This ^{will be} has been circulated to delegations for comment under cover of a letter from the Secretary General. It is not suggested that the Council would wish to discuss the legal problems at this stage, but it may be necessary when countries' reactions have been received, to examine the possible need for a possible working group.

(d) Business of maritime shipping organizations. This problem, which is brought out in the Standing Group's appreciation, should perhaps be dealt with in the context of any study of the alerts problem.

General

The main themes underlying the discussion on September 12 may be summed up as follows:

- (a) Anxiety of governments to be kept fully informed and up-to-date on developments in Berlin.
- (b) The desire of governments to be brought in to the "political" contingency planning.
- (c) The preoccupation with the need to ensure that contingency plans, whether military or civil, are unmistakably related to the problem of restoring access to Berlin. Fear of misinterpretation of Western motives by the Soviets, of escalation, and of unnecessary building up political tension (e.g. by mobilisation) was very strong.
- (d) Some Permanent Representatives do not seem convinced that the USSR and Soviet Union can be treated as one in terms of contingency planning.