

NAFO SECRET

To: Secretary General
 c.c. Deputy Secretary General
 DSG/ASG Economics and Finance
 ASG Political Affairs

From: Executive Secretary

Summary Record of Private Meeting of the Council
 held on Wednesday, 3rd October, 1962 at 71 Sella.

- I. Berlin Contingency Planning
- II. Cuba
- III. Meeting between Mr. Bask and Mr. Grayko.

I. BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

The CHAIRMAN recalled that it had been agreed at the last meeting that national comments or questions on the three documents before the Council should be forwarded to the Secretariat as soon as possible, with a view to early discussion by the Council and approval by the Council of the contingency plans in the light of the other two documents.

2. The Council had also discussed the problem of alerts and the position of governments, both generally and in relation to Berlin, and had agreed to hear a briefing by the NATO military authorities. Delegations had since received copies of a memorandum by the Standing Group (SGS-528-62) which dealt with the general problem of alerts, and set out the state of negotiations with the Major NATO Commanders and the individual nations on the alert measures. The Council would also recall that, in March 1962, the Secretary General, on the basis of advance information received from the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, had written to each Permanent Representative, pointing out that all governments had not accepted all of the alert measures and singling out, with respect to each individual nation, the unaccepted measures which caused the Supreme Allied Commander the gravest concern. The Secretary General had asked Permanent Representatives to convey the gist of this letter to their respective governments, and added that he trusted they would feel able to take action in accordance with the suggestions made as soon as possible.

3. He thought it fair to say that the responses to this approach by the Secretary General had been disappointing. The present unsatisfactory position was also reflected in the memorandum by the Standing Group.

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4. There were, as he saw it, two distinct aspects of this problem. First of all, there was the problem of alerts in relation to Berlin Contingency Planning. Here the Supreme Commanders had stated the alert measures which they would require implemented before the various plans could be put into force. This aspect of alerts, which was part and parcel of the whole progressive scheme of action envisaged by the Four Powers in their paper on the "preferred sequence of action", should be considered by the Council as soon as it received a paper analysing this particular problem, which was now in preparation by the Standing Group.

5. The second aspect - the broad problem of alerts, raised the general question as to how far the Alliance was in a position to react effectively to the threat of military action by the Soviets. The fact that several governments had reserved their position on the implementation of many alert measures, the need in certain countries for parliamentary action before essential measures could be taken, and the fact that one nation had not the constitutional powers to take certain necessary actions, led to a situation where, in many cases, NATO forces could not speedily be readied for war. An examination of this broader problem would, he thought, provide an invaluable background to the Council study of the particular requirements of the Berlin situation.

6. He suggested that the Council devote the morning and, if necessary, also the afternoon of Thursday, 11th October, to a briefing by Representatives of the Standing Group and of the two Supreme Commanders on the general problem of alerts, followed by a discussion in which Permanent Representatives would be able to explain to their colleagues the position with regard to their respective nations.

7. In summary, he

- (i) invited comments or questions as soon as possible on the three reference documents;
- (ii) asked the Council to agree that the briefing on alerts should take place on 11th October, morning and afternoon if necessary;
- (iii) said that the International Staff would propose a date for Council discussion of the forthcoming Standing Group paper on the relation between alerts and contingency planning.

over.

8. In discussion, a number of speakers expressed the view that while governments might have comments or questions on contingency planning to forward in writing, the Council discussion was by no means ended. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE, supported by the CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE, repeated that his government considered two points essential:

- (i) the parallelism between military plans on the one hand and economic and political planning on the other
- (ii) the liaison to be established between the military authorities and the Council as regards close and continuing information on developments in a possible Berlin crisis.

9. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, in reply to a comment by the NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE that governments were being asked to study the documents in a very much shorter time than had been necessary for their preparation, said that too long a delay would mean the virtual withdrawal of this subject from Council consideration. He repeated his understanding that the object of the present exercise was to achieve a broad consensus of views and to demonstrate to the Soviets, as in September 1961, the solidarity of the Alliance on contingency plans. This was entirely compatible with a continuation of the discussion thereafter by the Council in order to clarify specific points.

10. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE drew attention to two tasks before the Council:

- 1) a study of the specific problem of alerts;
- 2) a study to determine whether the catalogue of plans was in conformity with the instructions given by the Council to the NATO military authorities in G-4(61)104.

11. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he could agree to continue discussion on contingency planning now. His authorities considered that the plans were in conformity with the Council instructions in G-4(61)104; and he was authorized to state their general agreement on the other two papers. He asked three questions:

- firstly, could the Council now rest assured that it would be automatically given the opportunity to discuss the situation in a crisis, thanks to an effective system of liaison with the Commanders in Berlin?
- secondly, could the NATO military authorities agree now that, as suggested in paragraph 7(c) of FO/62/581, the control of any military operation in connection with access to Berlin should be transferred to NATO?
- thirdly, approval by the Council of the plans would mean that the Council was entitled to be informed of the parallel political/economic planning by the four-Power group. Were the Four now prepared to give this information to the Council?

12. The STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVE said that he was not now in a position to reply to the second question.

13. The CHAIRMAN noted that there was agreement that discussion should continue, and that the Standing Group and the four Powers should be invited either in writing or in the course of the discussion to answer specific questions. He repeated that the Council was now invited to state at an early date whether it considered the catalogue of plans to be in conformity with its instructions, i.e. to approve the catalogue. The other two documents were supporting papers to be used as a basis for discussion. He noted that it was agreed to have a briefing on alerts from the NATO military authorities on 11th October; and to have a discussion later on the forthcoming Standing Group paper. The subject of the parallelism between political/economic and military

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question of the four Powers providing information. He suggested that the Council continue discussion on Wednesday, 10th October.

14. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE emphasized that Western firmness should be accompanied by an awareness of the need to allow the Soviets the possibility to withdraw without loss of face. Recent speeches by Mr. McNamara, Mr. Averoff and Mr. Spaak recognized this need.

15. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE thought that the recent statements in the United Nations on East/West relations by Lord Home, Mr. Averoff and Mr. Spaak were of the type which should be reflected in Council discussions on Berlin.

16. It was agreed to continue discussion on Wednesday, 10th October at 10.15 a.m.

II. CUBA

17. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE made the following statements:

"My authorities have instructed me to inform the Council that next week the United States Government will take the following actions with respect to the problem of shipping to Cuba:

1. The United States will close all U.S. ports to all ships of any country if any ship under the flag of that country hereafter carries arms to Cuba.

2. We will direct that no government cargo shall be carried on a foreign flag ship if any ship of the same owners is used hereafter in bloc-Cuba trade.

3. We will direct that no United States flag ship and no United States owned ship shall carry goods to or from Cuba.

4. We will close all United States ports to any ship that on the same continuous voyage was used or is being used in bloc-Cuba trade.

In my statements to the Council on September 5 and 12, I stressed the great seriousness with which the United States Government and the American people view the problem of Cuba in general, and the problem of free world shipping to that country in particular. The proposed actions which I have just outlined for you reflect our Government's and people's view of the gravity of the shipping problem, and it will be clear from these actions that we intend to make the Soviet build-up in Cuba just as difficult and expensive as possible.

I think we have demonstrated over the course of the last six months, and particularly within the last month, that we wish to take full account of the views of our Allies on the problem of Cuba. With respect to the problem of shipping, we consider that positive steps are now required. Secretary Rusk is

Organization of American States now meeting in Washington.

We recognize that these contemplated actions which the United States Government will take may cause some problems for shipping companies in certain NATO countries. But we hope that NATO member governments, through consultation with these companies, will be able to persuade them to make the necessary adjustments. In this connection, steps which we are planning to carry out in point two above will take into account existing charter arrangements, and there will be some administrative "phasing in" on other points."

18. The DANISH and GREEK REPRESENTATIVES said that since the last Council discussion, their governments had warned shipowners of the consequences they might have to face in continuing deliveries to Cuba.

19. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that there was no difficulty as regards the first measure cited by the United States Representative, but that the remaining decisions were grave ones on which he assumed the Allies would have an opportunity to state their views. Problems would arise for shipping companies; but more serious still was the general problem which would arise throughout the world of the relation between shipping and political conflicts. He reserved the right to comment on this at a later date.

III. MEETING BETWEEN MR. RUSK AND MR. GROMYKO

20. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE made the following statement:

"Secretary Rusk met with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on September 25 to discuss the situation in Laos. The Secretary raised the problem of lack of cooperation by the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao with the ICG and the Royal Lao Government regarding withdrawal of foreign military personnel under the Geneva agreement. He made it clear that he was not at this time ascribing bad faith to the UGHR or any other party but pointed out that even members of the Coalition Royal Lao Government could not ascertain the facts of Souphavong's unwillingness to admit them to territory under Pathet Lao control. He stated that whatever supplies were being sent by the U.S. to Laos were shipped with full knowledge of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and were directed, at the latter's request, to tribes subject to Pathet Lao attacks. He pointed out that Soviet air lifts to Laos, as well as the shipment of supplies by land from North Vietnam, were continuing.

Gromyko took the line that the Soviet Government, North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao intended to see the Geneva agreement fulfilled. He contended that the U.S. and other SEATO members were still shipping military equipment and providing military personnel to Phoumi and that this could lead to collapse of the Geneva agreement. He asserted that no North Vietnamese "units" were located in Laos. The Secretary expressed surprise at this claim since Soviet representatives

in previous conversations had never made such a claim. Gromyko observed that, if the U.S. regarded several specialists as constituting military units, then the Soviet Government and the U.S. Government had a different appraisal of this matter. He drew the analogy in this connection of not being able to see the forest for the trees. The Secretary responded that he wanted to make sure that a situation would not be created where one U.S. military personnel was regarded as a forest whereas several thousands of North Vietnamese personnel would be regarded as a tree.

At the end of the conversation, Gromyko protested the seizure in Puerto Rico of a sugar cargo on route to the USSR from Cuba. The Secretary pointed out that this was a situation where well established law applied.

Noting that many U.S. citizens had claims against Cuba, he stated that Cuban property could be seized if it entered the territory of U.S. jurisdiction.

He observed, however, that in this case a U.S. court had first dismissed the claim and that a further hearing of the case was to take place in Puerto Rico. He said further that if Soviet ownership of the cargo was established, as he expected it to be, the law would take place. He rejected Gromyko's remarks regarding depredation and economic war.

The subject of Berlin was not discussed at this meeting.*

For the Executive Secretary:

5th October, 1962