

NATO SECRET

4.8.62

DRAFT PO/BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANS

In the course of the last few days delegations have received copies of the major NATO Commanders' contingency plans for Berlin together with an appraisal of these plans by the Standing Group under reference SGM-479-62 of the 28th August. The submission of these plans to the Council is in accordance with paragraph 7 of the Council's Resolution C-M(61)104 of 25th October 1961, which read as follows :-

2. We are indebted to the Standing Group for the clarity of their appraisal. The brief summary description of the major Commanders' various contingency plans contained in Enclosure 1 to SGM-479-62 should enable the Council to centre its discussion on the Standing Group document while keeping the detailed plans ready at hand for the purposes of reference when any specific point requires closer examination.

3. While appreciating the very considerable labour and the many consultations which have gone into the formation<sup>ul</sup> of these plans, it gives pause for reflection that nearly twelve months should have been required to bring them before the Council for consideration. In many ways we have been fortunate to have had so long a breathing space, but with a fresh deterioration in the Berlin situation in the offing, I am convinced that we must accelerate our methods and endeavour to reach agreement in the Council with the least possible delay<sup>x</sup>.

4. I would recall that in their instructions to the NATO military authorities, C-M(61)104, the Council gave a number of

directives to guide the military authorities in the drawing up of these plans. The Standing Group paper makes clear that the NATO military authorities have followed these instructions to the best of their ability, and in order to see the plans in true perspective I must take the liberty of urging Permanent Representatives to re-read with care the relevant paragraphs of C-M(61)104. I would draw particular attention to two fundamental considerations which are written in to C-M(61)104. First, that any possible military action should be integrated into an overall strategy including political and other non-military measures. In other terms, that these actions are in no sense <sup>an end</sup> ~~a means~~ in themselves but should be designed to contribute to the purpose of arriving at a settlement of the problem of Berlin. Second, that what the NATO military authorities have been asked to prepare is a series of alternative plans which might be applied according to the dictates of the situation, and that the execution of any particular plan or part of it would be the subject of decisions by governments at the time.

5. Among other points to which the Council might direct its attention in considering the plans which have been presented in the Standing Group's appraisal, are the following.

(a) Alert Measures

Paragraph 10(a) of C-M(61)104 provided that plans should be studied urgently for "appropriate alert measures for NATO forces prior to initiation of any tripartite military measures." The Standing Group in paragraph 6 of SGM-479-62 <sup>express</sup> ~~states~~ <sup>view</sup> the point which in my judgment is entirely valid - that no NATO military operations undertaken in connection with Berlin would appear convincing to the Soviets unless preceded or accompanied by action in implementing alert measures. The results of the initiative which I took earlier this year in asking governments to re-examine arrangements for delegation of powers to major NATO Commanders under the NATO alert system tend to bear out the contention that the Alliance as a whole is still very far from having satisfactory, let alone homogeneous, arrangements in

<sup>with field</sup> this ~~commitment~~. I would invite member governments once again to examine urgently<sup>1</sup> the possibility of lifting some of the existing restrictions or, where this is wholly impossible, at least to ensure that the necessary legal and administrative means exist to enable powers to be taken quickly enough to avoid compromising the ability of the Alliance to put into operation any of the Berlin contingency plans <sup>showing the need for</sup> ~~following a Council decision~~.

(b) The Standing Group draw attention in paragraph 11 of their appraisal to the possibility that certain of the naval contingency plans may have implications <sup>in turn</sup> ~~arising~~ out of international law. While the extent of such legal implication need not necessarily invalidate the plans themselves, they could in certain circumstances influence Council decisions. The Council may accordingly wish to have the legal aspects examined and I have instructed our Legal Adviser to study the question with a view to preparing a paper for consideration by the Council. The Legal Adviser would be assisted in his task if there were any material already available in capitals of member countries as a result of any studies which may have been undertaken by nationals' legal experts.

(c) Forward Defence Posture

Paragraph 17 of SGM-479-62 draws attention to the increased risks which would be involved in implementing any of the BERCON plans arising from deficiencies in the present forces in Germany and the <sup>obstacles</sup> ~~consequent~~ <sup>which these weaknesses present to the adoption of</sup> ~~difficulty of implementing~~ a true forward defensive disposition. The attainment of full MC 26/4 force goals and the ~~completion~~ <sup>no doubt</sup> of major equipment deficiencies is clearly something which cannot be achieved overnight. The member governments concerned will <sup>no doubt</sup> take the Standing Group's appraisal fully into consideration when reviewing their force contributions to NATO between now and the adoption of the Triennial Review force goals at the December Ministerial meeting. At the same time the Standing Group point to certain improvements which should in their view be initiated immediately. These measures depend initially on the major NATO Commanders themselves, but they also clearly involve



~~by the three major member governments~~, since they necessarily <sup>involve</sup> decisions of a financial or political nature without which a re-disposition of forces could not in practice be put into effect.

#### Wartime Shipping Organisation

(4) Paragraph 14(c) draws attention to the possible need for activating some of the wartime organisations for SHAPE in the event that it were decided to implement certain of the maritime naval contingency plans. The Council may wish to instruct the Committees concerned to re-examine existing arrangements with a view to ensuring that the relevant organisations could be set up rapidly in an emergency. It may be found necessary to establish Berlin contingency plans for these organisations themselves.

#### Relationship between Tripartite and NATO Planning

It will be recalled that when the Council last discussed on April 11th the Three Power paper concerning relationships between NATO and the Three Powers in the planning and control of Berlin contingency operations, a number of points were raised by delegations on which further clarification was sought of the Three Powers. It was subsequently agreed that further discussion of the <sup>problem</sup> relationships could be held over until the Council had received the Berlin contingency plans through the Standing Group, which at that time were expected shortly after the Athens meeting. I understand that the Three Powers are now in a position to offer comments in reply to the questions raised on April 11th. I believe that it would be most useful if they could do so on the occasion of the Council's of the Standing Group appraisal and the NATO Commanders' plans ~~forthcoming discussion~~, since the significance of the Three Powers' proposals can I believe only be fully comprehended in the context of NATO contingency the/plans themselves. The passage of responsibility from the Three Powers to NATO, which might in turn necessitate a decision by the Council to execute one or more of the NATO contingency plans, is of course a matter of vital interest to all members of the Alliance. It therefore seems important that when the Council is ready to approve the NATO contingency plans, it should at the same time be in a position to endorse the Three Powers' proposals.

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course of  
the LIVE  
OAK plans  
on which  
BACEUR  
briefed  
the Council  
on 23 Feb.)