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NAFO SECRET

20th September, 1961

1. The parties to the North Atlantic Treaty have in accordance with Articles 4 and 6 of the Treaty and in the light of the crisis provoked with regard to the city of Berlin consulted together to decide what steps should be taken to meet the present threat against Berlin.

2. They have agreed that the basic objectives of NAFO policy in regard to Berlin are:

- (a) The maintenance of the presence and security of the three Western garrisons in West Berlin,
- (b) The maintenance of the freedom and viability of West Berlin,
- (c) The maintenance of freedom of access to West Berlin.

3. Attainment of the foregoing objectives will be sought through the application worldwide of non-military measures and by negotiations wherever possible.

It is however necessary to prepare for the contingency that such measures (or negotiations) may not in themselves deter the Soviet Union or the so-called "German Democratic Republic" from taking action to block Western access to Berlin or otherwise infringe on the basic rights of the West in Berlin.

4. They are therefore determined to improve allied military posture as a clear indication of their capability and will to apply appropriate military measures if used by.

They have agreed to undertake individually and collectively comparable programmes to build added military strength for Europe.

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5. General Considerations:

The following considerations should underlie the preparations of military plans:

- A. Military actions will have to be integrated into a general, overall strategy applicable as appropriate on a worldwide scale and including as appropriate political, diplomatic, economic, psychological, military and paramilitary measures. The selective application of these measures, agreed upon both in Europe and on a world wide basis, would contribute to the NATO purpose of arriving at a settlement of the problem of Berlin while progressively making the Soviets aware of the danger of general war.
- B. Appropriate military measures to restore access in case of interference to Berlin should if possible be graduated but fully determined, applying increasing pressure which would present with unmistakable clarity to the Soviets the enormous risks in continued denial of access. At the same time, they should leave the Soviet Government as many opportunities as possible to pause and reassess the desirability of continuing on a dangerous course of action.
- C. Any military operation risks rapid escalation and/or pre-emptive enemy actions. Therefore, while the immediate political objective of all actions will be to induce the Soviets to re-open access, military plans must take account of and be consistent with current defensive concepts of NATO strategy. They must, therefore, retain the defence of the Alliance members as a central consideration, and they must not commit capabilities to the prejudice of the overall capacity to defend

NATO territory. The magnitude of resources which might be committed in operations at the West's initiative in reaction to Soviet moves would depend on results of the NATO build-up as well as circumstances existing at the time.

D. The Alliance will stand ready for nuclear action at all times. However, planned recourse to nuclear weapons in these operations can be envisaged only under any one of the three circumstances of:-

- (1) prior use by the enemy,
- (2) the necessity to ensure the success of major military operations, or
- (3) a specific political decision to employ nuclear weapons selectively in order to demonstrate the will and ability of the Alliance to use them.

PROCEDURE

6. Specific instructions for planning will be given to SACEUR, SACLANT and CINCHAN individually with the request that they co-ordinate their planning.

7. Plans and studies will be submitted to NAC for general information.

Plans will have to be approved by the Standing Group and by the governments who have committed or assigned forces in the respective areas concerned or whose forces will be immediately affected by action under these plans.

The Supreme Allied Commanders will ask for governmental approval of military plans through the Permanent Representatives of the governments concerned.

8. Specific Instructions to General Norstad

Certain tripartite military contingency plans (Live-Oak) have been made by General Norstad as CINCEUR to enable France, the United Kingdom and the United States to carry out their special responsibilities concerning Berlin.

It is understood that these military plans contemplate, in response to Soviet Bloc interference in the Allied rights, the following:

- (1) plans for small-scale ground probes to determine Soviet intentions;
- (2) plans for more extensive use of ground forces;
- (3) plans to implement airlift operations;
- (4) plans to utilise tactical air forces to support airlift operations as appropriate; and
- (5) defensive actions on the part of tripartite garrisons in Berlin.

Because of the immediate threats in recent Soviet notes as to air access, examination of plans related to interference with this access will receive priority.

It is understood that General Norstad is prepared to explain these plans to the Council to the fullest extent which is consistent with security considerations. In order to supplement this information, ~~it is understood that~~ the Council will call on General Norstad for further information whenever it is deemed necessary and also ~~that~~ he will promptly bring any significant changes to the attention of the Council.

Since the actions contemplated under Live Oak planning could have effects which involve NATO security interests and eventually other NATO forces, there must be therefore full co-ordination between Live Oak and NATO planning. Furthermore, it is recognised that the Live Oak activity is planning only and

that these plans will be implemented only after proper consultation in the Council.

9. NATO Military Plans

- (a) For the purpose of providing as great a choice as possible of supplementary alternatives, NATO military plans covering broader land, air or naval measures should be prepared. In each case, the expected advantages and estimated risks should be set out in specific terms to accompany plans. It is understood that these plans would be subject to the procedure described above. It is further understood that the execution of any approved plans would be the subject of separate political decisions to be taken at the time.
- (b) In particular, plans to provide for the following should be studied urgently:
 - 1. Appropriate alert measures for all NATO forces, prior to initiation of any tripartite military measures;
 - 2. Expanded non-nuclear air operations;
 - 3. Expanded non-nuclear ground operations with necessary air support;
 - 4. Selective use of nuclear weapons to demonstrate the will and ability of the Alliance to use them.

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