1. This paper is the initial document of three that have been prepared to present in brief form the various aspects of Berlin Contingency Planning. It has been prepared to summarize the historical background of Berlin Contingency Planning, including Tripartite LIVE OAK Planning, and to outline briefly the various contingency plans involved. The information contained in Part I is useful for both a rapid orientation in Berlin Contingency Planning and as background information to help in a better understanding of the problem concerning alert stages/measures in support of Berlin Contingency Planning.

2. Having regard to the requirements for security of the information contained, and yet to have documented information readily available for various purposes in a form easy to handle, the paper has been divided into three separate COSMIC TOP SECRET documents:

   a. Part I - Berlin Contingency Planning

   b. Part II - Alert Stages/Measures which Support Berlin Contingency Planning (see SGREP Misc. No. 4432)

   c. Part III - Annexes cited which support Parts I and II (see SGREP Misc. No. 4433)

3. Part I and Part II are both documents which can be used either as individual documents or in concert with each other, as needed. For additional amplifying information in conjunction with either Part I or Part II, Part III is required.

4. The information contained in Part I is factual, but should not be used as an official source of reference. The references cited therein are the only official sources for reference.

5. When this document is no longer required, it should be returned to the Registry of the Office of the Standing Group Representative for destruction. Only those persons properly cleared for the information contained herein and with an established "need-to-know" should be permitted to have access to this document.

6. This document contains 14 pages.

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1. This paper is the initial document of three documents that have been prepared to present in brief form the various aspects involved in Berlin Contingency Planning. The documents are:
   a. Part I - Berlin Contingency Planning
   b. Part II - Alert Stages/Measures in Support of Berlin Contingency Plans
   c. Part III - Annexes which support Part I and Part II

2. The following aspects of this matter are covered in Part I:
   a. Background of Berlin Contingency Planning
   b. SACEUR Berlin Contingency Plans - "BERCON"
   c. SACIAL Maritime Contingency Plans - "MARCON"
   d. Summary of "LIVE OAK"

3. The following aspects of this matter are covered in Part II:
   a. Alert Stages/Measures in Support of Berlin Contingency Plans
   b. Future Problems and Probable Actions

4. The SACEUR and SACLANT basic plans for Berlin Contingency Planning are known as "BERCON" and "MARCON", respectively. The Tripartite Berlin Contingency Plans (United States-United Kingdom-France) which are aimed solely at the problem of Soviet/GDR interference with Allied access rights to West Berlin are known as "LIVE OAK"

   BACKGROUND OF BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

5. The North Atlantic Council (C-M(61)104, 9 November 1961) instructed the Major NATO Commanders to prepare military plans covering broad land, air and naval measures to supplement the Tripartite Berlin Contingency Plans and to insure full coordination between LIVE OAK and NATO planning. These plans were to include:
   a. Appropriate alert measures for NATO forces prior to initiation of any Tripartite military measures.
   b. Expanded non-nuclear air and/or naval operations.
   c. Expanded non-nuclear ground operations with necessary air support and selective use of nuclear weapons to demonstrate the will and ability of the Alliance to use them; and
   d. The expected advantages and estimated risks for each plan.

5. In accordance with the above instructions, SACEUR and SACLANT submitted outline Berlin Contingency Plans and their assessments of advantages and risks. The SACEUR submission was contained in SHAPE 70/62 of 24 March 1962.
(with Change, 70A/62, of 10 September 1962) and the SACILANT submission was contained in Serial 3011/C-982 of 15 August 1962 (with Amendment No. 1 of 18 August 1964). CINCHAI made no submission and adopted the SACILANT plan for his command. The Standing Group made their appraisal of the above MNC plans in SGM-479-62, which was forwarded to the Council for their information. At the same time, Council had two other documents relative to Berlin Contingency Planning. These were:

a. Tripartite Paper CTS 62-2, which contained recommendations by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States concerning relationships between NATO and the Three Powers in the planning and control of Berlin Contingency Planning. The details of this paper relative to Berlin planning, operations, consultations and decisions are attached at Annex A (see Part III).

b. PO/62/593, which contained "The Preferred Sequence of Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict" as prepared by the Governments of the United States, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom.

Basically, the paper sets forth the actions as follows:

(1) PHASE I - Establish the fact that the Soviet Union/GDR intends to use force to interfere with Berlin access.

(2) PHASE II - If Phase I proves the Soviet/GDR intent to use force, the Allies bring increasing pressure, short of offensive combat, in an effort to induce them to desist and reopen access.

(3) PHASE III - If, despite Allied actions in Phase II, Berlin access has not been restored, the time will have come to draw on the catalogue of plans 'from which appropriate action could be selected by political authorities in the light of circumstances and with the aim of applying increasing pressure which would present with unmistakable clarity to the Soviets the enormous risks in continued denial of access.'

(4) PHASE IV - Whenever nuclear action was taken, and whether it was demonstrative, selective, or otherwise, events would have moved into a new phase.

6. On 31 October 1962, Council (C-R(62)53, 9 November 1962):

a. took note of the Standing Group appraisal of the Berlin Contingency Plans proposed by the MNCs and agreed that these were responsive to the instructions to the NMAs conveyed in Council resolution C-M(61)104;

b. approved in principle and for planning purposes the MNCs' plans in the BERCON and MARCON series, on the basis that these represent a catalogue of plans for possible action by NATO forces in the event that the
efforts of the Three Powers to maintain access to Berlin in accordance with
the LIVE OAK plans are unsuccessful - the execution of any one of these
plans being subject to a prior political decision by member governments at
the time;

c. agreed that, should this catalogue of plans require revision
or amplification in the light of changing circumstances, any significant
amendments should be submitted to the Council by the NATO military authori-

d. noted the Tripartite paper (CTS 62-9) as a basis for further
planning with respect to the Three Power recommendations concerning rela-
tionships between NATO and the Three Powers themselves in the planning and
control of Berlin contingency operations, together with the additional
explanations and comments which have been furnished by the spokesmen of the
Three Powers; and

e. accepted the Four Power "preferred sequence" paper (PO/62/593)
as a general framework for the continuing discussion of the overall prob-
lem of coordinating actions and policies of the Allies in the event of a
worsening Berlin situation.

7. In light of the actions taken above, the Standing Group then con-
sidered it necessary to indicate to Council the importance and phasing of
alert stages/measures which should be instituted in support of the current
catalogue of Berlin Contingency Plans and to recommend a program of im-
mediate actions required to ensure timely implementation of these alert
stages/measures in order to place NATO in the best alert posture in the
event of a serious Berlin crisis. This was done in SGM-593-62(Revised),
"Study on Alert Measures in Support of Berlin Contingency Plans". On
5 December 1962, Council (C-R(62)56, Limited Distribution) addressed the
above SGM and, subject to confirmation by Greece (later given) and Turkey:
a. took note of the phasing of alert stages/measures as out-
lined in SGM-593-62(Revised) as a basis for further detailed planning;
b. invited the NATO Military Authorities, in the context of
the recently resumed bilateral negotiations with governments on Alerts, to take
into account the statements and suggestions made by Permanent Representatives,
and to report to the Council at an early date the results of these negotiations
which should deal not only with the general problem of Alerts, but also with
the particular aspect of Alert measures in support of Berlin Contingency Plans;
c. invited the national authorities concerned to implement, in so far as they are concerned, the requirements set out in paragraph 20 of SGM-593-62 (Revised);

d. agreed that they would keep their own arrangements for dealing with emergencies under constant review.

8. The SACEUR "BERCON" plans and the SACLANT "MARCON" plans have been distributed to their respective echelons of command who have prepared all the required supporting plans. In addition, CINCHAN has the SACLANT "MARCON" plan. CINCHAN edited the plan to coincide with their terminology and then distributed it to the ACCHAN MODs and sub-area commanders.

9. A memorandum of understanding (SGLP 630/62, 31 October 1962) exists to confirm and make a matter of record the arrangements between General Baker of LIVE OAK, General Stevenson of SHAPE and General Richardson of SGREP, with regard to Standard Operating Procedure on appropriate liaison between the agencies concerned during periods of tension or emergency. A copy of this SGLP is attached at Annex B (see Part III).

SHAPE BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANS
Short Title "BERCON"

10. The SHAPE Berlin Contingency Plans (BERCON) have been developed to provide a catalogue of military measures from which appropriate action could be selected in the event of serious interference with or interruption of access to Berlin. These plans are consistent with current defensive concepts of NATO strategy and have been coordinated fully with LIVE OAK plans.

11. The BERCON series has been developed to provide a choice of alternatives which may be implemented either singly or in combination, whichever is indicated by the circumstances. With the exception of the BERCON BRAVO Series (the nuclear demonstrations), each of these plans is predicated upon the use of conventional weapons. In addition, however, provisions have been made for the limited use of nuclear weapons as authorized or directed by political authority.

12. The following assumptions are included in each plan:

a. The execution of the plan has been approved by political authority.

b. Prior to the execution of the plan, appropriate Reinforced Alert measures have been adopted.
AIR PLANS

13. a. BERCON ALPHA ONE employs the maximum scale of fighter escort for protection of cargo and passenger planes within the Berlin air corridors. Fighter escorts will attack any Communist planes which attack Allied transports. These fighters will also attack with conventional weapons any Communist SAM batteries which are believed to have fired on these transports.

b. BERCON ALPHA ONE X-RAY provides for a low-level sweep by fighter aircraft into East Germany to indicate Allied intentions and capability to use further force and to demonstrate that Allied air power can, despite defenses, penetrate into enemy territory.

c. BERCON ALPHA ONE YANKEE extends the air battle to include "hot pursuit" and attacking enemy aircraft and hostile SAM sites outside the Berlin air corridors. Action is restricted to East Germany and limited to those Allied aircraft providing escort within the corridors.

d. BERCON ALPHA ONE ZULU plans for heavy attacks on selected airfields, SAM sites, control centers, etc., within East Germany which support Soviet/GDR participation in the air battle.

e. BERCON ALPHA TWO consists of a major air battle initiated with conventional weapons, to gain, and maintain during a critical period, local air superiority over East Germany. It includes the attack of Soviet and East German airfields and surface-to-air missile sites in East Germany and selected Communist airfields and SAM sites in the Satellite countries.

NUCLEAR DEMONSTRATION

14. BERCON BRAVO series consists of nuclear demonstrations to insure that the Communists are aware that the Alliance stands ready for nuclear action. It includes the employment of approximately five low-yield air bursts on certain type targets outlined below:

a. BERCON BRAVO ONE provides for a "no target", and to the extent possible "no damage", nuclear demonstration detonated over selected areas preferably near a military complex. The objective will be to minimize damage to persons and/or property and yet assure that the explosion is seen from the ground.

b. BERCON BRAVO TWO consists of an air burst on a military target, detonated away from population centers. These strictly military targets include attacking aircraft, airfields, SAM sites, troop concentrations, etc.
15. a. **BERCON CHARLIE ONE** consists of the employment of forces of the order of a reinforced division supported by tactical air, to conduct non-nuclear offensive action into East Germany along the axis Helmstedt-Berlin. In principle, forces assembled under LIVE OAK plan JUNEBALL will carry out **BERCON CHARLIE ONE**. In consideration of possible political effects, this force when deployed will not involve German command organization and German troops. The selection of tactical objectives will be determined by the Commander of Northern Army Group/European Army Group depending on the mission given him by higher NATO or Tripartite authority. **BERCON CHARLIE THREE** corps will be held in readiness to support or reinforce this division, if necessary.

    b. **BERCON CHARLIE TWO** plans a two-division attack to pinch off and hold the salient East of Kassel up to the general line Duderstadt-Borbis-Wanfried.

    c. **BERCON CHARLIE THREE** consists of a corps attack of up to four divisions along the Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn to seize and hold a salient into East Germany up to the line Mittelland Canal - Elbe River. This corps will be held in readiness to support or reinforce **BERCON CHARLIE ONE**, if necessary.

    d. **BERCON CHARLIE FOUR** plans an attack by a corps of up to four divisions to seize and hold the high ground areas of the Thuringer-Wald.

**NAVAL PLANS**

16. **BERCON DELTA**. This plan includes the employment of naval forces for surveillance of Soviet bloc warships and merchant shipping, hindrance of Soviet bloc ship activity, board and search measures, seizure of Soviet bloc merchant ships, and excluding or diverting Soviet bloc ships from or the blockade of, specific areas. Each of these measures will be specifically ordered executed; therefore, this single plan actually is several plans consolidated into one. To further provide flexibility, the plan includes the "Rules of Conduct" which provide for the selection of the specific types of forces to be used in the execution of each of the directed objectives. This plan has been coordinated in detail with SACIANT and CINCHAN to insure that all naval forces will be operating under the same directives.

17. When the decision is taken to execute those naval plans which involve a high risk of reprisal action, authority should simultaneously be delegated to the major commanders concerned to use tactical nuclear weapons at sea in defense against direct and immediate hostile acts of serious proportions.
The Maritime Forces of NATO will be prepared, on order, to implement any one or a combination of the following maritime military measures:

a. MARCON ONE - To shadow designated Soviet Bloc merchant ships in specified areas.

This measure is the mildest of the series of maritime military measures. Normally it should involve neither personnel casualties nor damage to property. Shadowing in itself is not a highly significant action. However, it would demonstrate our ability to interfere seriously with Soviet Bloc shipping should we wish to do so. After this demonstration its value would diminish. Our ships could then be more profitably employed on other tasks.

b. MARCON TWO - To shadow Soviet Bloc warships in specified areas. (ELINT trawlers or other suspicious ships included)

This measure is designed to keep Soviet Bloc naval forces under close surveillance in specified areas and further to enable NATO to take rapid retaliatory action against these forces should it be necessary. Normally, this measure should involve neither personnel casualties nor damage to property.

c. MARCON THREE - To hinder and directly annoy designated Soviet Bloc ships.

This measure provides direct actions of increasing severity designed to directly hinder or annoy and may result in minor damage to designated ships. This measure is aggressive in nature, but does not include the more severe measures of boarding, searching, seizure, blockade, or diversion from specified areas.

d. MARCON FOUR - To Board and Search designated Soviet Bloc merchant ships.

This measure is aggressive in nature and may well meet resistance. Subordinates will be directed that a specific task should not be initiated if it is obvious from the outset that it cannot be successfully consummated. This measure provides actions of increasing severity which may be employed in boarding and searching.

e. MARCON FIVE - To seize designated SovietBloc merchant ships.

This measure is deliberately aggressive in nature and it may well meet resistance. The objective of the task is to take these ships to a designated NATO nation controlled port without damage and with minimum use of force. The measure provides actions of increasing severity to ensure accomplishment of the task.
MARCON SIX - To Blockade or enforce diversion and exclusion of Soviet Bloc ships from specified areas.

This measure is deliberately aggressive in nature and may well meet with resistance. The objective of this task is to prevent Soviet Bloc ships from entering specified ports or to divert and deny them access to or passage through specified areas. This measure provides actions of increasing severity. Blockade and forced diversion are even more severe acts which normally are only undertaken in or immediately prior to war and would lead to Soviet reprisals. However, the function of the Soviet fishing fleet can be neutralized by merely preventing the fleet from using the fishing areas. No seizure of trawlers is necessary.

"Rules of Conduct" which give explicit guidance to unit commanders as to the degree of force and the manner of its application in the various Maritime Military Measures will be provided to the Major Subordinate Commanders.

When any one or combination of the above maritime military measures is ordered, a politico/military decision will specify the following:

a. The area limits of the task.
b. The duration of the task.
c. The type and nationality of Soviet Bloc ships (e.g., destroyers, ELINT trawlers, tankers).
d. The applicable rule of conduct (e.g., use of armament, boarding parties, communications, and movements).

Operational Limitations

In order not to commit naval capabilities to the prejudice of the overall capacity to execute promptly the EDP and NSP in the defense of NATO, the following considerations apply:

a. The STRIKFLOT and CVS Groups will only be employed in specific support roles and within the close vicinity of their EDP deployment.
b. Maritime measures will be directed on a highly selective basis as to the type and nationality of Soviet Bloc ships.
c. Maritime measures will be directed on a highly limited basis as to the area limits of the task (e.g., confined to focal areas or within 100-150 miles of the Baltic exits).
d. All units, aircraft and ships will be employed on tasks at the normal peacetime utilization rates unless otherwise directed or specifically requested to exceed these rates by a Major Subordinate Commander in order to successfully consummate a task.
22. Introduction
a. In November 1958, Premier Khrushchev made his initial threat to the Western Powers that the Soviets would sign a separate peace treaty with the so-called Government of East Germany. In answer to this threat, the Tripartite Powers (US, UK, Fr) established the LIVE OAK organization. The Basic Paper and Directive for LIVE OAK was issued on 4 April 1959.

b. The Tripartite organization for Berlin Contingency Planning consists of three basic parts:
   (1) A Tripartite Ambassadorial Group in Washington for the purpose of coordinating Berlin Contingency Planning. In 1961, the Ambassador of Germany was added to this Group.
   (2) The three embassies (Fr, UK, US) in Bonn with responsibilities for air, autobahn and rail planning in regard to Berlin and motor vehicle identification. The FRG also became a member of this Group in 1961.
   (3) The military organization, LIVE OAK, which is responsible for military plans in event Allied access is interfered with by the Soviets/GDR and to assist the embassies at Bonn in Berlin air planning.

c. Militarily, today LIVE OAK is the responsibility of General Lemnitzer (SACEUR/USCINCER). At inception, LIVE OAK was the responsibility of General Norstad. The basic tasks of LIVE OAK are to develop and to execute:
   (1) Quiet precautionary military pressures.
   (2) Initial probes.
   (3) More elaborate military measures.

d. Military planning in LIVE OAK consists of:
   (1) Probes. The initial probes are designed to determine the intentions of the Soviets/GDR when they interfere with Allied access rights to Berlin by resisting the movement of traffic along the autobahn or the rail lines of communication.
   (2) More Elaborate Force. This is used when the Soviet intention to deny Allied access to Berlin is clear as a result of the use of initial probes. It consists of a more extensive use of ground forces, up to divisional strength, with appropriate air support for the purposes of:
      (a) further developing the extent of force which the Soviets/GDR are willing to employ to deny access, or
(b) creating circumstances favorable for negotiations,
or failing that,
(c) making the Soviets/GDR progressively face the imminence
of general war should they persist by force and firepower in denying access to
West Berlin.

23. Probes

Initial probes on the autobahn may be initiated either from Helmstedt
or Berlin. The initial probe could be a small non-combat element which would
accept any obstacle to travel and then withdraw. The next larger size of a
probe would have a small amount of firepower and could take defensive action -
"fire if fired on". It would also accept obstacles and withdraw. The largest
size probe would consist of a convoy of about 150 men and approximately 35
vehicles. It would have additional capabilities in defensive firepower and equip­
ment to clear some small obstacles. It would fire only when fired on and would
accept large obstacles and withdraw. A rail probe is planned only from Helm­
stedt to Berlin. Such a probe, however, is most ambiguous and limited. The
train cannot move if the signals do not indicate a clear track. Additionally,
when trains go through East Germany, an East German "pilot" is required.
Thus the Soviets/GDR can easily, by administrative means, make a rail probe
meaningless.

24. More Elaborate Force

The more extensive use of force would consist of a battalion combat
team (BCT) up to a division in strength. In each case the force has a mission.
The BCT force could be used from either Helmstedt area or Berlin. If from
Helmstedt, it would consist of about 1300 men, and if from Berlin only 1000
men. In either case, it would be equipped with an air control team and have
a mission to take a sector of about 7,000 yards in East Germany. At the
division level, the force would assemble under the LIVE OAK plan JUNE BALL
and carry out, from Helmstedt only, BERCON CHARLIE ONE - non-nuclear of­
fensive action into East Germany along the axis Helmstedt-Berlin. Basically,
the division size force consists of 13,000 men under the command of Com­
mander PAOR (2 UK Bde Grp, US BCT (Reinforced), Fr Bde Grp, and Division Trps).

25. Employment Time

The times to initiate action by a LIVE OAK ground plan are approx­
imately as follows:

a. Helmstedt probe - about 48 hours
b. Berlin probe - about 29 hours
c. Helmstedt BCT - about 8 days
d. Berlin BCT - about 57 hours

e. JUNE BALL - unknown - optimum at reinforced alert may be 14 days

26. **LIVE OAK Authority Concerning Ground Plans**

For LIVE OAK, General Lemnitzer, has the authority to train the Helmstedt probe, assemble the Helmstedt probe, train the Helmstedt BCT and to designate the Single Commander Berlin (U.S. Commandant). He must, however, request and be given authority from the Four Powers to assemble the Helmstedt BCT, assemble and train the Berlin probe and BCT, and assemble and train JUNE BALL forces.

27. **Air Planning**

- The 1945 Potsdam Agreement gave rights to the US, UK, France and USSR to use the three air corridors from FRG to Berlin. To coordinate Allied/Soviet traffic in the corridors, a Berlin Air Safety Center was established with four controllers (US, UK, Fr, USSR) in Berlin. Basically, the Western controllers simply apprise the Soviets of their air traffic. The principal difficulties in use of the air corridors by the West have been:
  1. The threat by the Soviets to turn their air traffic control over to the GDR;
  2. The physical harassment of Western flights by Soviet/GDR aircraft;
  3. The usurpation of air space by Soviets as in 1962;
  4. The insistence by the Tripartite Powers on the right to originate outside FRG flights landing in Berlin.
  5. The use of helicopters.

- Western air traffic within the corridors at present is mainly that of commercial aircraft (Pan American, BEA and Air France). This traffic is conducted under 10,000 feet which creates a safety of flight problem, particularly with jet aircraft. Military aircraft (small portion of the total) also are flying under 10,000 feet at the present time, although the Western Powers maintain the principle that they have the right to fly at all altitudes. The last time this right was exercised was in 1959, when a military aircraft was flown at 20,000 feet altitude.

- **Air Plans**
  1. Airlift operations consist of plans to use transport aircraft to probe Soviet intentions, to supply the garrisons, to substitute military pilots for civil pilots in civil aircraft, to substitute military...
transport for civil air carriers, to evacuate dependents and to air supply West Berlin.

(2) Tactical support air operations support air transport operations, as appropriate. Such support is furnished by 25 aircraft stationed by the Tripartite Powers in West Germany. This support can be either indirect support (e.g., increased alert, closer deployment to air corridor or orbiting west of corridors) or direct support into the corridors only if a transport aircraft is lost, shot down, etc. Any further air operations would be in support of ground forces, as in the one Tripartite case of JUNE BELL.

d. In 1962 LIVE OAK, General Lemnitzer, was delegated the authority to alert transport and tactical aircraft for the above air plans, conduct a military air transport probe, control Civil Air Transport and inaugurate military-sponsored air service. However, he has no authority to attack ground targets by aircraft under these air plans.

28. Naval Participation

a. In December 1962, a naval section was added to Tripartite planning. This was done because certain advantages were seen in having minor maritime harassments added to the list of Tripartite actions with respect to interference with access to Berlin; as the possibility was foreseen that such naval actions would possess a certain character of non-escalation. However, naval participation is not a LIVE OAK participation. It is entirely a national endeavor (US, UK, Fr). Each national military authority prepares his own plans, conducts his own operations and makes his own intelligence and operational reports. Most important is the fact that German naval forces are not to be used initially, and will be used only at a time when all facts concerning the situation are known and acceptable for a German contribution.

b. For naval participation, a Naval Committee (DEEP SEA) has been established under the Tripartite Ambassadorial Group in Washington - but it has no command authority. Under this committee is a Coordination Center which receives inputs from LIVE OAK and the Atlantic Naval Body known as SEA SPRAY. USCINCLANT (SACLANT) is both the head of SEA SPRAY and the Chairman of the Naval Committee. Through this means, naval counter-measures to be used by the national authorities are conceived to assist LIVE OAK plans.
c. As of January 1965, the status of naval countermeasures was as follows:

(1) In-port Harassment - A national administrative action with individual national plans existing.
(2) Encumber Kiel/Panama Canals - A national administrative action with appropriate national plans existing.
(3) ASW Surveillance - National military plans approved.
(4) Intensify Exercises - National military plans approved.
(5) Augment Naval Forces - Not approved as yet.
(6) Survey and Harass Ships at Sea - National military plans not approved because of UK reserving on this measure for merchant ships.
(7) Shadow Warships - National military plans approved.
(8) Board and Search - War measure, not approved.
(9) Embargo - War measure, not approved.
(10) Exclude Ships from an Area - War measure, not approved.
(11) Seize Soviet Bloc Merchant Ships - War measure not approved.