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NATO SECRET

To: Secretary General

c.c. Deputy Secretary General
DSG/ASG Economics and Finance ✓
ASG Political Affairs

From: Executive Secretary

Summary Record of a Private Meeting of the Council
held on Wednesday, 14th November, 1962 at 10.15 a.m.

- I. Political Aspects of Berlin Contingency Planning
- II. Multilateral ARBM Seaborne Force
- III. Cuba
- IV. Chairmanship of the Council at December Ministerial Meeting.
- V. United States Assessment of Sino-Indian Dispute.

I. POLITICAL ASPECTS OF BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Document: PO/62/641, paragraph 14.

The CHAIRMAN recalled that the object of the present meeting was to consider the political and diplomatic aspects of Berlin contingency planning. He suggested that the Council should defer for a few days its discussion of the situation arising from a satisfactory solution of the Cuban problem in order to take advantage of additional information it was hoped to receive in the near future.

2. With regard to the military plans, the TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE stated for the record that his government confirmed its approval of the decisions recorded in paragraph 14 of Annex to C-R(62)53. He undertook to forward to the Secretariat his government's comments on these decisions and also on certain legal aspects.

3. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE, speaking on behalf of the four Western powers, presented to the Council the agreed four-power plan for a Western response to a separate peace treaty (see Annex).

4. In the ensuing discussion, the following points were made.

5. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE noted that the four-power plan was designed to meet the least favourable contingency, i.e. that in which a separate peace treaty was signed. He asked whether the four powers had excluded from their study the possibility of Western action which might prevent such a fait accompli, viz. a negotiation on Berlin which would protect the three vital Western interests in the city. He recalled that Mr. Spaak had suggested to the Council in 1961 that, given the threat of a peace treaty, it might be preferable to

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have a preliminary quadripartite agreement on Berlin which could then be inserted in the peace treaty. The West should now study the possibility of replacing the existing, threatened status of Berlin by another which would be acceptable to the West; and should decide whether, in order to avoid a fait accompli, it would not be preferable now to sound Soviet intentions, and if necessary take a Western initiative. The advantages of a preliminary quadripartite agreement, to be incorporated in the peace treaty if the Russians insisted on a treaty, were that quadripartite responsibility for Berlin would be reaffirmed and the three vital Western interests safeguarded.

6. He could not agree that Western plans should be directed to only one contingency, and that the worst. The four-power paper was based on the assumption that all attempts at dissuading the Soviets from signing a peace treaty had failed; in fact, dissuasion had now enjoyed four years' success. The Council should now study every possible avenue to prevent the worst assumption from being fulfilled. An example of suggestions to be followed up were Mr. Rusk's proposal to Mr. Gromyko of 30th March, 1962 for an international arbitration authority. Ideas should come both from the four powers and from the other allies.

7. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE, replying to these comments, said that no hypothesis was excluded by the four powers, who would welcome any Soviet proposals to maintain, or improve, the present status of Berlin. This was the meaning of the reference in paragraph 5 (b) of the four-power paper to maintaining contacts with Moscow. Since 1958, it was the Soviets who had forcefully taken the initiative in asking for a change in the status of Berlin, presumably with the object of making it more favourable from their point of view. So far, they had not made any proposal which was, for the West an improvement in the existing situation. It was for them, and not the West, to take the initiative in making proposals regarding a situation which was not ideal, but which had proved acceptable over the years.

8. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE strongly supported the Belgian point of view. The Council had asked to be informed about the four powers' political planning to date. Surely, such planning should take into account recent international developments and should aim, as recommended by the Belgian Representative on 7th November, at evolving a dynamic policy for the Alliance. Recalling that Canada's acceptance of the BERCON military plans was linked to the content of the political plans, he thought that the Council should be given guidance on the kind of initiatives which the four powers considered acceptable or not, for example, those indicated in President Kennedy's letters of 27th and 28th October. The Council should not limit itself to consideration of the four-power paper, for two reasons. Firstly, the matter at present under discussion was the political aspects of BERCON planning, i.e. all political aspects; secondly, questions were being raised in Parliaments with regard to public utterances by statesmen of the four powers regarding possible western initiatives, on which consultation must take place in the Council. He had accordingly been instructed by his government to obtain a clarification of the intentions of the four powers.

9. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the Council should make a distinction between the objectives of a possible East/West negotiation on Berlin, and the consideration of political contingency planning to meet or forestall the immediate threat of a peace treaty. Obviously any Permanent Representative was free to bring up any point, but he

suggested that discussion should be carried out in the appropriate context, which for today, was Berlin contingency planning, to meet the worst contingency. A wider discussion might take place later in connection with the review of the post-Cuba situation.

10. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that he would welcome a discussion on all the political aspects envisaged in paragraph 14 of PO/62/641. He asked whether the diplomatic action envisaged in the four-power paper would be taken by the four powers or by all the allies.

11. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE thought that this would depend on the time available for consultation.

12. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE thought that the four-power paper laid a new accent on the importance of the actual signature of the peace treaty. His government considered that the importance of the signature should be played down, as a formality which the Soviets had it in their power to carry out at any time. The real danger point was where the DDR might exercise its authority to affect vital Western interests.

13. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE emphasised that the Soviets attached great importance to the signature of a peace treaty, and if they had put it off for four years it was because they were aware of the serious consequences to themselves. The Western plan was aimed at the maximum possible dissuasion by making these consequences clear to the Soviets.

14. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE thought that the Council was at present examining possible political action in the contingency that all preliminary soundings had failed. It would be useful to have ideas for further explorations as suggested by the Belgian Representative, but these lay outside the context of the present study.

15. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE thought that this was a question of timing. The Council was at present studying the most pessimistic assumption, in the light of the failure of soundings over the last six months to change the Soviet attitude, which was in fact hardening, as witness their repeated insistence on the departure of Western troops from Berlin. The first priority was contingency planning to face the worst, though this should not exclude discussion of other ideas at a later stage.

16. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE thought that the idea of a negotiated solution should not be excluded. He asked how it was envisaged, if the Council endorsed the four-power paper, that the Soviets be informed of the attitude of the Alliance.

17. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, replying to the comments by the Belgian and Canadian Representatives, said that the possibility of specific Western initiatives was inherent in the reference in the four-power paper to maintaining contacts with Moscow. He thought it was for the members of the Council to make suggestions as to what form these specific initiatives might take. As regards a possible broad East/West confrontation, there must of course be consultation in the Council. He was authorised to say that his government would like to make available Assistant Secretary William Tyler of the State Department, to discuss the results of the current United States staff work on a broad East/West confrontation. Mr. Tyler could attend a meeting of the Council on 30th November. The United States invited

All governments to send representatives at a similar level to this meeting, with a view to exchanging information on studies in the various capitals. It might be useful for the Council to prepare this meeting by an advance discussion on possible Western initiatives.

18. There was general support for this idea.
19. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he would ask Mr. Spaak to attend on 30th November.
20. The CHAIRMAN, summing up, noted that it was agreed:
- (1) the Council should use the four-power paper as a basis for further political contingency planning;
 - (2) the four powers were invited to give supplementary information on the points listed in paragraph 14 of PO/62/641.
 - (3) the Council should meet in advance of, and in preparation for the meeting proposed for 30th November by the United States. This preparatory meeting would be called by the Chairman.

II. MULTILATERAL MRBM SEABORNE FORCE

21. The CHAIRMAN said that, following on the Council agreement to re-invite the United States team to answer questions on their presentation of the concept of a multilateral MRBM seaborne force, he was informed that the team would be available, in Paris in about a fortnight's time. So far, only one delegation had sent in questions. He suggested that, as an alternative to the submission of questions in writing, delegations might appoint one or two technical experts to meet once, or oftener as necessary, in the week beginning 19th November, under the chairmanship of Mr. Gregh, in order to prepare the Council meeting with the United States team.

22. This suggestion was adopted, and delegations were invited to make arrangements with the Secretariat.

III. CUBA

23. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE communicated to the Council a recent United Kingdom assessment of the post-Cuba situation, under the following headings:

- comparative nuclear capabilities of the United States and the USSR;
- the Cuban incident considered as the greatest moral and political reverse ever felt by the Soviet régime;
- who was responsible for the Soviet decision;
- why it failed;
- internal political factors in the USSR;

- whether, for the USSR, there are any alternatives to "peaceful co-existence";
- possible Soviet action to compensate for Cuba;
- the effect on communist parties in general;
- the Soviet attitude to any Western attempt to exploit the situation;
- a fresh start to East/West relations, and if so, what?

24. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE also read a United States assessment of current Soviet intentions.

25. It was noted that, as indicated by the Chairman under Item I, more information on the post-Cuba situation might be available in the next few days.

IV. CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE COUNCIL AT DECEMBER MINISTERIAL MEETING

26. The CHAIRMAN informed the Council that Mr. Stikker had on medical advice regretfully decided to take some weeks' convalescence, and would thus be unable to chair the forthcoming Ministerial Meeting. This raised a question of protocol, on which members of the Council would no doubt wish to consult, since there was no precedent for the chair's being taken by the Deputy Secretary General.

27. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE, supported by the United States Representative, thought on the contrary that the Deputy Secretary General had full powers to deputize for the Secretary General in all his functions.

V. UNITED STATES ASSESSMENT OF SINO-INDIAN DISPUTE

28. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE gave the Council an assessment of the present state of the Sino-Indian dispute. There were few new developments, but reports had been received of a substantial Chinese build-up in the Chumbi valley. Occupation of this valley would block off the main part of India from Assam and would thus have very serious consequences.

15th November, 1962