

NATO SECRET

PLAN FOR A WESTERN RESPONSE TO A SEPARATE PEACE TREATY

Although it is much more difficult to prepare a political-diplomatic plan than a military plan on the Berlin crisis, the Ambassadorial Group has endeavored, in view of the repeated threat of the Soviets to sign a separate treaty with East Germany if no agreement with the West can be obtained, to envisage the broad lines of various possible actions by the Allies.

1. The Allied objective should be to dissuade the USSR from carrying out its threat, that is to say, from signing a separate peace treaty purporting to make a "free city of West Berlin with all its consequences." Allied deterrent action must be taken against that threat as a whole for the two following fundamental reasons:
  - (a) The signing of a separate treaty with East Germany is a violation of the 1945 four-power agreements, for such an act would be an attempt to give a unilateral solution to the German problem;
  - (b) Making West Berlin a free city "with all its consequences" directly threatens the Allies' vital interests.
2. Such Allied action should be carried out on a continuing basis in order to confront the USSR with the following choices: To postpone once more the signing of the treaty; or to sign the treaty without drawing from it "the full consequences" with respect to West Berlin, or to sign the treaty and run the risk of drawing from it "the full consequences" with respect to West Berlin.
3. The Allied deterrent action may be carried out as the crisis develops, that is to say, from the present moment until the time when the consequences the Soviets intend to derive from the treaty become clear, by the following means:

Diplomatic actions;  
Preparatory military measures;  
Economic and other non-military measures.
4. A detailed and progressive planning of the Allied action has become particularly difficult because in that period, which extends up to the possible closing of the access routes, the principal initiative necessarily rests with the USSR.

The USSR may act suddenly or gradually; it may, for example, "spread out" over quite a long period its preparations to conclude a separate treaty, by calling for a peace conference endeavoring to have states other than those of the Warsaw Pact participate, agreeing to the discussion of possible counter-proposals, and causing the signing, ratification, and entry into force to be dragged out. Or, on the contrary, it may bring the talks with the West to an end suddenly and announce almost simultaneously that the treaty has been signed by the Warsaw Pact States and even that it is entering into force immediately.

Consequently, Allied reactions will be based largely on the pace and apparent intent of Soviet action.

5. "Diplomatic actions."

The diplomatic actions that can be contemplated should meet the following objectives:

- (a) Warn the USSR of the consequences of any unilateral action by it: (This would include warnings to the Warsaw Pact Countries);
- (b) Maintain contacts with Moscow;
- (c) Dissuade any states other than those of the Warsaw Pact from signing a separate treaty if the USSR should invite them to do so.

(a) The warnings should apply to the points mentioned in paragraph 1(a) and (b). They would be based on the following themes:

Any Soviet (or East German) action attempting to provide a unilateral solution to the German problem or unilaterally attempting to alter the status quo in West Berlin will be considered by the Allies to be a hostile act, and they will reserve the right to draw the necessary consequences from it, in their political, economic, cultural, and other relations with the USSR and its Allies; moreover, any action likely to obstruct freedom of the city may lead to war since the Allies are steadfastly resolved to maintain such liberties.

(b) It is desirable that contacts be maintained with Moscow throughout the crisis, on the one hand, in order to issue the warnings analyzed in paragraph (a) above, and, on the other hand, in order to inform the USSR that if it changes the immediate orientation of its policy regarding Germany and Berlin, it will always find the Allies willing to resume the course of the interrupted negotiations.

(c) In the event the Soviet Government should invite states other than the Warsaw Pact States to sign the peace treaty, either by participating in the "peace conference" or by adhering subsequently to the already signed treaty the Allies should exercise all their influence with such states in order to dissuade them from accepting the Soviet proposal.

6. "Preparatory military measures"

If the Soviet action so warrants, it would be desirable for the Allies, as soon as the Soviets appear to enter upon a course of unilateral action (for example, by convening a peace conference), to take discreet preparatory military measures that could be interpreted by the USSR as a sign of Allied determination to cope with a crisis.

In the event that the Soviet action should start suddenly, the Allies should immediately reply by readiness measures in compliance with, or in preparation for, the military measures contained in the agreed planning.

7. "Economic and other non-military measures"

It is desirable that among the warnings mentioned in paragraph 5(a) above there be a reference to the consequences that hostile action on the part of the USSR would have on the economic, cultural and technical relations and,

contacts  
in general, on the /between East and West. The possibility of a precise reference to an embargo should also be considered at the time.

The question also arises whether, before the signing of the peace treaty, the Allies should take specific measures along this line. Here too the reply depends largely on the tactics followed by the USSR. Should such tactics warrant, it might be advantageous at that time to take measures that would be considered less as reprisals than as warnings intended to make not only the governments of the Eastern Bloc countries, but public opinion in those countries understand that the Allies are ready to meet a serious crisis and that the latter will seriously affect exchanges between East and West.

8. Should the Soviet Union, despite the Allied warnings, decide to sign the separate treaty, Allied action would depend to a large extent on the terms of the treaty, particularly as regards the status of West Berlin and the access routes to the city.

If on these two essential points the treaty does not entail any change, the Allies, having obtained a significant victory, would not need to seek to minimize the treaty; it will minimize itself.

In any case, the Allies should at that time emphasize that they continue to hold the USSR responsible, warn it against any unilateral action, and remind it that they are still willing to settle the German problem peacefully.

Certain military measures should be taken at that time. But their nature and extent would obviously depend on the measures taken by the Soviets as regards Berlin and the access routes.

The same would apply with respect to the non-military measures. If it appeared that the Soviets really intend to draw consequences from the treaty insofar as the access routes are concerned, contingency plans would enter into force.

U.S. Delegation

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