

PERSONAL

To: Secretary General

cc. Deputy Secretary General  
DSG-ASG for Economics and Finance  
Standing Group Representative

From: Executive Secretary

MEASURES IN RELATION TO BERCON PLANS

In their appraisal of the Berlin Contingency Plans<sup>(1)</sup> the Standing Group points out that no military measures, in themselves, are likely to succeed in reopening Western access to Berlin by force should the Soviets choose adequately to oppose them; that the success of any of the plans depends on whether or not the Soviet Union correctly interprets and responds to the message which the actions are meant to convey; and that no military operations would appear convincing to the Soviets unless preceded or accompanied by NATO action in implementing Alert Measures leading to full readiness for general war. The Standing Group therefore urges that NATO and national efforts should be intensified to resolve the problems which now restrict adequate implementation of the Alert Measures which are the essential basis for the execution of the BERCON plans.

2. SACUR believes that any test of strength carries with it a danger of escalation, which may be rapid, and that, therefore, before any action is taken by the West, the appropriate state of readiness must be initiated. He believes also that the state of readiness adopted must be such as to convince the Soviets that we are not bluffing.

3. Even before undertaking major LIVE OAK operations, SACUR would require, in addition to the implementation of the full range of Simple Alert measures, a number of measures from the Reinforced Alert. He considers also that before any of the BERCON Series operations can be considered feasible, a full state of Reinforced Alert is necessary.

(1) EGM-479-62 ✓

2005

2007

COSMIC BOX SECRET

2000

1999

1998

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
EDC/62/401

4. Since it is NATO which will be initiating action, the declarations of alerts will presumably be governed by those provisions of AG 67/1 which deal with the methods of declaring alerts other than in urgent situations. SACUR requires both the Simple and Reinforced Alerts to be declared (and implemented) prior to the initiating of any BERCON plan. These would presumably therefore be declared by Major NATO Commanders "after obtaining approval of governments through their Permanent Representatives on the NATO Council".
5. The first step, therefore, in implementing any BERCON plan would be for the Council to approve the declaration of the Simple and Reinforced Alerts. Even when this difficult decision had been taken, the action which would, in practice, flow from it is presently limited by reservations placed by some governments on the automatic implementation of many of the alert measures. Let us take for example the case of Germany.
6. You wrote to the German Permanent Representative, among others, in March of this year drawing his attention to the fact that with regard to the Formal Alert measures, Germany had reserved, or partly reserved, on 52 measures out of a total of 91. You referred to certain of these measures which General Horstad regarded as of the highest importance. In his reply to you dated 29th March, Dr. von Walther stated that reservations made by the Federal Government in regard to the alert measures continued to be necessary as the legislative basis for lifting these measures did not yet exist. A great number of these legislative steps were under way, but a forecast as to their entry into force was not possible as it was not known how long the discussions in the legislative bodies would take.
7. If, therefore, it is accepted that the successful implementation of any BERCON plans depends on NATO's willingness and ability to implement the Simple and Reinforced Alerts before these plans are put into operation, the acceptance by the Council at the present time of the proposed BERCON plans is of little value since, for example, in the case of Germany, though the Government might, in the event, be willing to agree to the declaration of the alerts, it does not in fact possess the legal powers to implement many of them.
8. The Standing Group sent you privately in June a copy of their report on the Current Status of Negotiations on Alert Measures, which they were preparing at your request. Though this gave a factual and statistical picture of the situation, it did not assess in simple terms the extent to which the state of affairs revealed by the report adversely affects SACUR and SACLAN's ability to ready their forces for battle. You agreed that such an assessment would be of value to you in putting pressure on nations who were not as forthcoming as they might be, and you authorised me to speak to the Standing Group Representative and suggest that he should invite the Standing Group to bear these points in mind when drafting their final report.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL - SECRET~~  
~~RESTRICTED~~  
RDC/62/401

9. Lastly, as I pointed out in my note of 6th September<sup>(1)</sup>, there are a large number of Civil Precautionary Measures which should be put into effect nationally and internationally in advance of the implementation of any of the BERGON plans and in parallel with the implementation of the Alert Measures. Action in the Diplomatic, Economic and Psychological fields would also presumably have been taken.

10. In the light of the considerations set out above, may I have your instructions as to:

- (a) whether you would wish me to prepare a brief for your use when BERGON plans are first discussed by the Council, reminding them of the problems referred to above; and
- (b) whether you would wish the Standing Group Representative to be invited to expedite the preparation and despatch of the report on the Current Status of Negotiations on Alert Measures, and to remind the Standing Group of the importance you attach to this report containing a simple and clear assessment of the extent to which the state of affairs revealed adversely affects SACHUR's ability to bring his forces to a state of readiness to enable them to carry out BERGON plans, to be ready to meet the risk of escalation and to convince the Soviets that the West is now bluffing.

0108

0000

*fbkdp*

0108

11th September, 1962

<sup>(1)</sup> RDC/62/388 ✓

~~CONFIDENTIAL - SECRET~~  
~~RESTRICTED~~