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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE
GRAND QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL DES PUISSANCES ALLIÉES EN EUROPE
PARIS, FRANCE

SHAPE/70-A/62
1200.2/20

10 Sep 1962

SUBJECT : Change #1 to SHAPE/70/62,
Berlin Contingency Planning

TO : All Holders of Basic Document

REFERENCE : SHAPE/70/62.

The attached enclosures (SHAPE/70-A/62) supersede the enclosures to SHAPE/70/62, subject: Berlin Contingency Planning, 24 March 1962. The revised enclosures should be removed and destroyed in accordance with appropriate directives. Cover letter, SHAPE/70/62, remains in effect.

FOR THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE:

F. D. Foley

3 Enclosures:

1. SHAPE Berlin Contingency Plans (3 pages)
2. Appraisal of Risks and Advantages (4 pages)
3. Alert Measures (2 pages)

F. D. FOLEY
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans and Policy

French Translation Follows.

**WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
THIS PAPER WILL BE HANDLED AS: NATO RESTRICTED**

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GW Pedlar

20 NOV 2004

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**SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE
GRAND QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL DES PUISSANCES ALLIÉES EN EUROPE**

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
BUREAU DU CHEF D'ÉTAT-MAJOR
PARIS, FRANCE

SHAPE/70/62 + SHAPE/70-A/62
1220/20

24 March 1962

SUBJECT: Berlin Contingency Planning

TO Chairman
Standing Group
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Rm 1E929, The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

1. In accordance with the instructions of the North Atlantic Council, C-M(61)104, a series of Berlin Contingency Plans (BERCON) has been prepared. The BERCON plans provide a catalog of military measures designed to demonstrate the determination of NATO and to emphasize to the Soviets the danger and consequences of escalation to general war. The salient features of each of these plans are contained in Inclosure #1. SHAPE's appraisal of the advantages and the risks involved in the execution of these plans is included in Inclosure #2. The plans have been forwarded to Major Subordinate Commanders of ACE who have been directed to draw up the necessary detailed implementing plans and to analyze further the advantages and risks involved in each.

2. Since the Soviets possess the ability to react at the highest level of military violence to the operations envisioned in the BERCON plans, it is essential that the NATO nations accept this possibility and recognize the fact that all forces and nations of NATO must be prepared for maximum action, including general war, before any of the plans are implemented.

3. In the development of these plans the capabilities of Allied Command Europe to provide support to the BERCON operations and to counter the possible Soviet reactions have been carefully examined. The foundation offered by our present force posture is not strong enough to support satisfactorily the BERCON operations. Because of deficiencies in force levels, deployments and support facilities -- deficiencies which can and must be corrected -- the

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COSMIC TOP SECRET

SHAPE/70/62

present Allied Command Europe forces would, in case of a major attack, deploy to selected defensive positions a considerable distance west of the Iron Curtain, leaving very vital and large centers of population very lightly defended. This position denies us the ability to fulfill the basic mission of this command: the defense of all of the territories and people of NATO Europe. Further, this weakness could invite a Soviet attack to seize, without substantial cost, important objectives in the forward area, thus permitting them to achieve their political objectives of battle without paying a price, possibly without being compelled to face the issue of all-out war.


4. The issue must be forced close to the Iron Curtain, certainly ahead of important population centers. Such a defense has the advantage of being able to support the execution of the BERCON plans more effectively and of placing ACE in a much improved position to meet any type of Soviet action. By confronting any potential Soviet attacker with the prospect of immediate resistance by a strong, mobile defense force, the Alliance can cause the Soviets to reveal their full intentions at an early stage -- perhaps in advance of the attack, which should be our aim. The decision as to the employment of nuclear weapons could then be made against a much clearer background. The concept of forward defense is in consonance with current strategic directives and will be implemented as soon as possible.

5. Finally, the preparation of the BERCON plans has indicated a requirement to revise certain of our alert procedures and provisions. Inclosure #3 contains the details of this requirement. In substance, prior to the execution of major LIVE OAK actions, ACE should have initiated the provisions of a Simple Alert plus selected measures of a Reinforced Alert. Prior to execution of any of the BERCON plans a full state of Reinforced Alert is necessary and many measures presently scheduled as post M-Day would have to be completed.

FOR THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE:

3 Encl

1. SHAPE Berlin Contingency Plans (2 pages)
2. Appraisal of Risks and Advantages (3 pages)
3. Alert Measures (2 pages)


J. E. MOORE
General, USA
Chief of Staff

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SHAPE/70/62

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10 Sep 1962

SHAPE BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANS

1. The SHAPE Berlin Contingency Plans (BERCON) have been developed to provide a catalogue of military measures from which appropriate action could be selected in the event of serious interference with or interruption of access to Berlin. These plans are consistent with current defensive concepts of NATO strategy and have been coordinated fully with LIVE OAK plans.

2. The BERCON series has been developed to provide a choice of alternatives which may be implemented either singly or in combination, whichever is indicated by the circumstances. With the exception of the BERCON BRAVO Series (the nuclear demonstrations), each of these plans is predicated upon the use of conventional weapons. In addition, however, provisions have been made for the limited use of nuclear weapons as authorized or directed by political authority.

3. The following assumptions are included in each plan:

a. The execution of the plan has been approved by political authority.

b. Prior to the execution of the plan, appropriate Reinforced Alert measures have been adopted.

AIR PLANS

4. a. BERCON ALPHA ONE employs the maximum scale of fighter escort for protection of cargo and passenger planes within the Berlin air corridors. Fighter escorts will attack any Communist planes which attack Allied transports. These fighters will also attack with conventional weapons any Communist SAM batteries which are believed to have fired on these transports.

b. BERCON ALPHA ONE X-RAY, provides for a low-level sweep by fighter aircraft into East Germany to indicate Allied intentions and capability to use further force and to demonstrate that Allied air power can, despite defenses, penetrate into enemy territory.

c. BERCON ALPHA ONE YANKEE extends the air battle to include "hot pursuit" and attacking enemy aircraft and hostile SAM sites outside the Berlin air corridors. Action is restricted to East Germany and limited to those Allied aircraft providing escort within the corridors.

Enclosure #1 to SHAPE/70/62 (3 pages)

This document consists of 9 pages.

COSMIC TOP SECRET

SHAPE/70-A/62

d. BERCON ALPHA ONE ZULU plans for heavy attacks on selected airfields, SAM sites, control centers, etc., within East Germany which support Soviet/GDR participation in the air battle.

e. BERCON ALPHA TWO consists of a major air battle initiated with conventional weapons, to gain, and maintain during a critical period, local air superiority over East Germany. It includes the attack of Soviet and East German airfields and surface-to-air missile sites in East Germany and selected Communist airfields and SAM sites in the Satellite countries.

NUCLEAR DEMONSTRATION

5. BERCON BRAVO series consists of nuclear demonstrations to insure that the Communists are aware that the Alliance stands ready for nuclear action. It includes the employment of approximately five low-yield air bursts on certain type targets outlined below:

a. BERCON BRAVO ONE provides for a "no target," and to the extent possible "no damage," nuclear demonstration detonated over selected areas preferably near a military complex. The objective will be to minimize damage to persons and/or property and yet assure that the explosion is seen from the ground.

b. BERCON BRAVO TWO consists of an air burst on a military target, detonated away from population centers. These strictly military targets include, attacking aircraft, airfields, SAM sites, troop concentrations, etc.

GROUND PLANS

6. a. BERCON CHARLIE ONE consists of the employment of forces of the order of a reinforced division supported by tactical air, to conduct non-nuclear offensive action into East Germany along the axis Helmstadt-Berlin. In principle, forces assembled under LIVE OAK plan JUNEBALL will carry out BERCON CHARLIE ONE. In consideration of possible political effects, this force when deployed will not involve German command organization and German troops. The selection of tactical objectives will be determined by the Commander of Northern Army Group/BAOR depending on the mission given him by higher NATO or Tripartite authority. BERCON CHARLIE THREE corps will be held in readiness to support or reinforce this division, if necessary.

b. BERCON CHARLIE TWO plans a two-division

SHAPE/70-A/62

attack to pinch off and hold the salient East of Kassel up to the general line Duderstadt-Borbis-Wanfried.

c. BERCON CHARLIE THREE consists of a corps attack of up to four divisions along the Helmstadt-Berlin autobahn to seize and hold a salient into East Germany up to the line Mittelland Canal - Elbe River. This corps will be held in readiness to support or reinforce BERCON CHARLIE ONE, if necessary.

d. BERCON CHARLIE FOUR plans an attack by a corps of up to four divisions to seize and hold the high ground areas of the Thuringer-Wald.

NAVAL PLANS

7. BERCON DELTA. This plan includes the employment of naval forces for surveillance of Soviet bloc warships and merchant shipping, hindrance of Soviet bloc ship activity, board and search measures, seizure of Soviet bloc merchant ships, and excluding or diverting Soviet bloc ships from or the blockade of, specific areas. Each of these measures will be specifically ordered executed; therefore, this single plan actually is several plans consolidated into one. To further provide flexibility, the plan includes the "Rules of Conduct" which provide for the selection of the specific types of forces to be used in the execution of each of the directed objectives. This plan has been co-ordinated in detail with SACLANT and CINCHAN to insure that all naval forces will be operating under the same directives.

8. When the decision is taken to execute those naval plans which involve a high risk of reprisal action, authority should simultaneously be delegated to the major commanders concerned to use tactical nuclear weapons at sea in defense against direct and immediate hostile acts of serious proportions.

SHAPE/70-A/62

APPRAISAL OF RISKS AND ADVANTAGESA. GENERAL.

1. The defense of the nations of the Alliance has been a basic consideration in the preparation of the BERCON plans. In their development the current defensive concepts of Allied Command Europe have been taken into account. Since the execution of any of the plans risks rapid escalation and/or pre-emptive enemy action, it is essential that ACE initiate in advance, appropriate Reinforced Alert measures.

2. Whether or not the BERCON operations in themselves would result in influencing the Soviets to reopen access to Berlin, the very execution of these plans would indicate to the Soviets/GDR that NATO is in fact determined to support the freedom of Berlin and Allied access thereto using such military force as may be required.

3. Expected reaction of the population during military operations on territory controlled by the Soviet Union requires continuing appraisal to determine possibilities and/or extent of refugee movements, uprisings, revolts, etc. These appraisals will have a significant effect on the selection and execution of plans.

4. The advantages of BERCON ALPHA TWO (air superiority) and BERCON CHARLIE FOUR (Thuringer-Wald) deserve special comment. If successfully executed, the former would provide a major military advantage in that a significant portion of the total Soviet/GDR air capability would be destroyed and NATO forces would then hold local air superiority during a short but critical period. Of all BERCON plans, only ALPHA TWO (air superiority) promises to reduce significantly the capability of Communist forces to initiate an offensive against Western Europe with either nuclear or conventional forces. Plan BERCON CHARLIE FOUR (Thuringer-Wald), if successful, would provide ACE with control of a key terrain feature in Central Europe (the high ground of the Thuringer-Wald) and thus permit a better ground defense of Western Europe.

5. The following are major risks common to the execution of any of the BERCON plans:

a. A special risk lies in the possibility that in response to any NATO action on land, at sea, or in the air, Soviet forces may seize West Berlin.

Enclosure #2 to SHAPE/70/62 (4 pages)

SHAPE/70-A/62

b. The operations contemplated in these contingency plans, except those in BERCON ALPHA TWO (air superiority) can and probably would be met by superior Communist forces very soon after their initiation. Accordingly, a risk exists that Western military forces would not succeed in accomplishing their missions by use of conventional arms.

c. A risk exists that the Communists may initiate aggressive military action in other areas, such as attacks designed to seize Hamburg and Munich. The adoption of a forward defense posture along the Iron Curtain would significantly reduce the magnitude of this risk.

B. SPECIFIC ADVANTAGES AND RISKS.

6. In the following paragraphs specific advantages and risks of each BERCON plan are compared with the advantages and risks of other BERCON plans.

7. BERCON ALPHA PLANS.

a. BERCON ALPHA ONE (fighter escort). Compared with BERCON ALPHA TWO this plan requires less force to execute and has a lesser probability of causing an escalation to general war, although air actions by their nature can more quickly get out of control. On the other hand, the operation of this plan must be executed in air space essentially controlled by Communist air forces. It can only achieve its aim if the Soviets do not choose to commit sufficient force to defeat it.

b. BERCON ALPHA ONE Options X, Y, Z. Varying levels of air effort are possible through these options. Because air action offers a better opportunity to disengage and because the destruction of personnel and equipment and installations on the ground need not be involved, this series may, under certain circumstances, minimize the risk of escalation to general war. The low-level sweep (X-RAY) being of short duration and difficult to intercept should not involve unacceptable losses nor impose the most serious risk of escalation. It might create an impressive psychological impact on the population under Soviet control. The option of "hot pursuit" (YANKEE) places on the Soviets the onus of raising the level of escalation to general war. This option is a distinct expansion of operations above the ALPHA ONE level. The principal risk of this series is that once the Allies begin operations outside the air corridors, the Soviets will increase their efforts to maintain air superiority; further, their defenses being alerted, the Allies will lose the benefit of surprise in event it is decided to execute ALFA TWO.

SHAPE/70-A/62

c. BERCON ALPHA TWO (air superiority). This plan has a chance of achieving its military objective (local air superiority), at least for a limited period of time depending on the degree of surprise attained. In so doing, a significant degree of damage will probably be inflicted on Communist air forces outside the USSR. The USSR, however, does have the means to rebuild quickly its air strength in Europe and thus to reassert its challenge to our air superiority and its threat to our overall military position, particularly to our nuclear capability. The principal risk of this plan is that the magnitude of force used has a dangerously high probability of precipitating major Soviet reaction up to nuclear general war.

8. BERCON BRAVO series, (nuclear demonstration). BRAVO ONE will achieve no military advantage. Whether or not either of the BRAVO plans will achieve the political objective is questionable. They may provide an "excuse" for the Soviets to retaliate with a much greater nuclear response which could achieve a significant military advantage for the Soviets.

9. BERCON CHARLIE PLANS (ground plans). There are two risks common to all of the CHARLIE plans. One is the difficulty in achieving surprise. It may be possible to gain some surprise by the development of cover plans involving false maneuvers and other troop movements. The risk will be considerably reduced by the adoption of the forward deployment. The second risk consists of the difficulty in providing air cover over a limited geographical area against enemy forces operating from bases well outside the area of ground operations. This risk could be eliminated by the execution of BERCON ALPHA TWO simultaneously with any of the CHARLIE plans.

a. BERCON CHARLIE ONE (one-division attack) has the comparative advantage of employing a smaller force and consequently, from the standpoint of logistics, it can be more easily supported. Operations in the Helmstadt area may be more justified in world opinion since this has been the customary ground access route to West Berlin. All plans executed in this geographical area (Helmstadt-Berlin autobahn) have the risk of initiating ground combat forward of defensive positions, and are consequently difficult to support logistically and are difficult to reinforce. This risk could be reduced by a forward deployment.

b. BERCON CHARLIE TWO (two-division attack). Militarily, an attack to seize the Kassel salient, is a straight-forward operation and the probability of initial success is quite high. In the event reinforcement is desired or required,

SHAPE/70-A/62

forces are available. The attainment of the objective in this area would have less political effect than will CHARLIE THREE or FOUR.

c. BERCON CHARLIE THREE (corps attack - auto-bahn) has the same advantages and risks of CHARLIE ONE except that it has a greater capability to penetrate into East Germany and can cope with greater Soviet/GDR opposition. On the other hand, the loss of a part of this force to Soviet/GDR action would reduce ACE capability to execute its primary mission.

d. BERCON CHARLIE FOUR (corps attack - Thuringer-Wald). Successful accomplishment of the military objective in this plan will gain the high ground in the Thuringer-Wald thus making possible a stronger and more forward defense. This area has greater military value than the Kassel salient or the Helmstadt area; however, because it does not relate directly to the auto-bahn, it may be more difficult politically to justify an attack.

9. BERCON DELTA (naval plan) has the disadvantage of not being particularly related to access to West Berlin. It should be executed only in conjunction with one or more other plans of the BERCON series and/or similar plans of CINCHAN and SAC-LANT. It may precipitate a large-scale Soviet submarine attack against Allied shipping world wide. The danger of escalation by execution of any of the parts of the DELTA plan is relatively low in comparison with large-scale air and ground operations, although the attainment of specific results toward the reopening of access to West Berlin is questionable.

SHAPE/70-A/62

ALERT MEASURES

1. The capability of quick response to any interference with Western rights of access to Berlin by the Soviets or East Germans is of the highest importance, and LIVE OAK plans are based upon this concept. Since any test of strength carries with it a danger of escalation, which may be very rapid, appropriate states of readiness must be initiated before any action is taken by the West. Where the risk of escalation is high, it may be possible even to delay action until the minimum acceptable state of readiness is achieved.

2. The state of readiness adopted must, additionally, convince the Soviets that we are not bluffing.

3. It will be necessary for the activating machinery - both political and military - to be geared to reduce the delay to a minimum. In particular, the following require urgent re-examination:

a. The removal of all possible national reservations to the existing Alert System - particularly in the cases of France, Germany and Denmark.

b. The machinery within the NATO Council for obtaining Governmental approval for measures which remain "reserved."

c. Selected measures from the state of Reinforced Alert - which can be delegated to SACEUR without removing the overall reservations on that state of readiness - and implemented in addition to his full range of Simple Alert measures. At Appendix A is the list of those measures which it is considered should be introduced in conjunction with major LIVE OAK operations.

4. Before any of the "expanded" military operations (BERCON Series) can be considered feasible, an appropriate status of alert must be achieved. It is desirable, in some cases necessary, that we complete prior to launching of the operation some of the measures which are now scheduled for implementation on a post-M-Day basis.

1 Enclosure:

Appendix 1 - Selected Reinforced Alert Measures Required for LIVE OAK in addition to Simple Alert.

Enclosure #3 to SHAPE/70/62 (2 pages)

COSMIC TOP SECRET

SHAPE/70-A/62

SELECTED REINFORCED ALERT MEASURES
REQUIRED FOR LIVE OAK IN ADDITION TO
SIMPLE ALERT

RAH	Move of additional Signal Troops
RAP	Preparations for the evacuation of inhabitants of certain operational areas
RAV	Manning of NATO Headquarters
RCP	Increase of communications facilities
RIF	Application of censorship to private communications
RIK	Cooperation with the police or control of its activities by military authorities
RLI	Request for implementation of requisitioning procedures and of mutual support agreements
RLK	Preparation for national control of water and air transport
RLU	Activation of bases and other logistic support facilities
RMD	Mobilization and assignment to SACEUR of certain earmarked units
ROB	Assumption of operational command by SACEUR and Major Subordinate Commanders
ROD	Deployment of assigned and earmarked forces and of certain Home Defense Units
ROH	Assumption of Operational Control of US forces manning SAS sites by the NATO commanders
ROK	Reconnaissance of border and sea areas
ROL	Recommendation for diversion of allied and friendly shipping from certain areas
RWL	Implementation of plans for the deployment of personnel; preparations for the activation of an alternate meteorological communications center; meteorological reconnaissance over non-enemy territory.

Appendix 1 to Enclosure 3 to SHAPE/70/62

9
COSMIC TOP SECRET