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36 ~~COSMIC TOP SECRET~~

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COSMIC CONTROL OFFICER, NATO, SG

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
HEADQUARTERS
OF

S.G. COPY NO. 041

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER ATLANTIC
NORFOLK 11, VIRGINIA, U.S.A.

ETS 1963

Ser: 3011/C-982

5 August 1962

ETS 1963

CHEF D'ARCHIVES

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+ AMENDMENT N° 1

dated: 18.08.64.

To: Standing Group North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Subj: NATO Maritime Contingency Plan

Ref: (a) SACLANT Ser 3011/C-191 dtd 15 Feb 62
(b) STAND 4903

Encl: (1) Revised NATO Maritime Contingency Plan in the form proposed for submission to NAC from SGN

1. In accordance with reference (b), the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic has prepared a revised NATO Maritime Contingency Plan.
2. Changes to the MARCON Plan have been made as requested. The importance of timely political decision and prompt transmission of this decision to appropriate military authorities is stressed. This is particularly emphasized by MC 95 (Draft of 7 Aug 1961) on the control of nuclear weapons.
3. It is requested that this plan may supersede reference (a).
4. A French translation is being prepared and will be forwarded in the near future.

Robert L. DENNISON

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AUTHENTICATED:

J. T. Holliday

J. T. HOLLIDAY
Assistant Secretary

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NATO MARITIME CONTINGENCY PLAN

SHORT TITLE "MARCON"

1. General Situation

The Soviet Bloc having undertaken actions against the agreed status of Berlin the NATO Council has decided to implement certain military measures.

2. Intelligence

Prior to implementing any of these measures a current intelligence estimate will be provided.

3. Assumptions

a. National authorities may have imposed certain administrative non-military measures against Soviet Bloc merchant shipping such as:

- (1) Denying insurance facilities.
- (2) Denying bunkering facilities.
- (3) Denying communications facilities.
- (4) Denying port and harbor facilities.
- (5) Discontinuing chartering services.

(6) Non-delivery of hulls ordered by East German and/or Soviet Bloc interests building in NATO countries.

(7) Prohibiting use of the Panama or Kiel canals.

b. A NATO embargo of the Soviet Bloc is in effect, and NATO ships under charter to the Soviet Bloc have been repatriated.

c. National authorities may have engaged in the conduct of MARCONs ONE and TWO and prior to their execution by NATO will have agreed to effect the necessary ALERT MEASURES as contained in ANNEX B. These include:

(1) NATO maritime forces earmarked to Major NATO Commanders have been assigned and reassigned to MSCs.

(2) Full NATO and National communication facilities, including Broadcast and Ship-shore facilities have been made available to NATO commands.

d. Prior to the execution of MARCONs THREE, FOUR, FIVE or SIX, NATO has agreed to accept the risk of general war and has effected the necessary ALERT MEASURES as contained in Annex B. In addition to those in paragraph c. above these include:

(1) NATO nations have agreed to implement selected measures of naval control of Allied shipping which might eventually include some convoy measures.

(2) NATO ships are clear of Soviet Bloc ports and sea areas subject to Soviet Bloc control.

e. Permission will be sought from higher authority for use of tactical atomic weapons at sea in self defense, if circumstances indicate their use.

ENCLOSURE (1) TO SACJANT LTR
SER 3011/C-982 of 15 AUG 1962

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4. Mission

To support the aims of the North Atlantic Council by the use of selected Maritime Military Measures.

5. Concept of Operations

a. Execution

(1) The Maritime Forces of NATO will be prepared, on order, to implement any one or a combination of the following maritime military measures: (Note: Annex A contains an appraisal of risks and advantages).

MARCON ONE - To shadow designated Soviet Bloc merchant ships in specified areas.

- DISCUSSION:
1. This measure is the mildest of the series of maritime military measures.
 2. Normally it should involve neither personnel casualties nor damage to property.
 3. Shadowing in itself is not a highly significant action. However, it would demonstrate our ability to interfere seriously with Soviet Bloc shipping should we wish to do so. After this demonstration its value would diminish. Our ships could then be more profitably employed on other tasks.

MARCON TWO - To shadow Soviet Bloc warships in specified areas. (ELINT trawlers or other suspicious ships included)

- DISCUSSION:
1. This measure is designed to keep Soviet Bloc naval forces under close surveillance in the specified areas and further to enable NATO to take rapid retaliatory action against these forces should it be necessary.
 2. Normally this measure should involve neither personnel casualties nor damage to property.

MARCON THREE - To hinder and directly annoy designated Soviet Bloc ships.

- DISCUSSION:
1. This measure provides direct actions of increasing severity designed to directly hinder or annoy and may result in minor damage to designated ships.
 2. This measure is aggressive in nature but does not include the more severe measures of boarding, search, seizure, blockade, or diversion from specified areas.

MARCON FOUR - To Board and Search designated Soviet Bloc merchant ships.

- DISCUSSION:
1. This measure is aggressive in nature and may well meet resistance. Subordinates will be directed that a specific task should not be initiated if it is obvious from the outset that it cannot be successfully consummated.

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2. This measure provides actions of increasing severity which may be employed in boarding and searching.

MARCON FIVE - To seize designated Soviet Bloc merchant ships.

DISCUSSION: 1. This measure is deliberately aggressive in nature and it may well meet resistance.

2. The objective of the task is to take these ships to a designated NATO nation controlled port without damage and with minimum use of force. The measure provides actions of increasing severity to ensure accomplishment of the task.

MARCON SIX - To blockade or enforce diversion and exclusion of Soviet Bloc ships from specified areas.

DISCUSSION: 1. This measure is deliberately aggressive in nature and may well meet with resistance.

2. The objective of this task is to prevent Soviet Bloc ships from entering specified ports or to divert and deny them access to or passage through specified areas.
3. This measure provides actions of increasing severity.
4. Blockade and forced diversion are even more severe acts which normally are only undertaken in or immediately prior to war and would lead to Soviet reprisals. However the function of the Soviet fishing fleet can be neutralized by merely preventing the fleet from using the fishing areas. No seizure of trawlers is necessary.

(2) "Rules of Conduct" which give explicit guidance to unit commanders as to the degree of force and the manner of its application in the various Maritime Military Measures will be provided to the Major Subordinate Commanders.

(3) When any one or combination of the above maritime military measures are ordered, a politico/military decision will specify the following:

- (a) The area limits of the task.
- (b) The duration of the task.
- (c) The type and nationality of Soviet Bloc ships e.g. destroyers, ELINT trawlers, tankers.
- (d) The applicable rule of conduct e.g. use of armament, boarding parties, communications, and movements.

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b. Operational Limitations - In order not to commit capabilities to the prejudice of the overall capacity to execute promptly the EDP and NSP in the defense of N.A.T.O the following considerations apply:

(1) The STRIKFLT and CVS Groups will only be employed in specific support roles and within the close vicinity of their EDP deployment.

(2) Maritime measures will be directed on a highly selective basis as to the type and nationality of Soviet Bloc ships.

(3) Maritime measures will be directed on a highly limited basis as to the area limits of the task; e.g., confined to focal areas or within 100-150 miles of the Baltic exits.

(4) All units, aircraft and ships, will be employed on tasks at the normal peacetime utilization rates unless otherwise directed or specifically requested to exceed these rates by a Major Subordinate Commander in order to successfully consummate a task.

c. Scope of Operations

The scope of operations for a particular task assignment in accordance with paragraph 5a(3) above can only be provided by a politico/military estimate of the conditions prevailing at the time it is being considered.

d. Common Tasks - All Major Subordinate Commands will:

(1) Maintain the necessary alert posture with all forces.

(2) Be prepared to defeat enemy hostile reactions.

(3) Be prepared, on order, to execute the EDP and NSP.

(4) Provide the necessary defense and safeguarding of nuclear capabilities.

(5) Be prepared, on order, to use nuclear weapons.

6. Coordination

This plan has been coordinated with the Major N.A.T.O Commanders.

7. Command Relationships

Operational command over assigned forces will be exercised by established N.A.T.O Command procedures.

Annex (A) - Appraisal of Risks and Advantages

Annex (B) - Alert Measures

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APPRAISAL OF RISKS AND ADVANTAGES
(SACLANT)

1. The following comments apply to individual Maritime Measures:

a. MARCON ONE - Track designated Soviet Bloc merchant ships in specific areas.

(1) Advantages.

(a) Primary advantage would lie in determining Soviet Bloc measures to counter such Alert Measures as have been implemented. Shadowing unit would be in a position to implement sterner measures if directed.

(b) Would serve to build up an intelligence picture on the precise location of designated Soviet Bloc ships. This would save considerable effort if "search and seizure" measures were adopted later.

(2) Disadvantages.

(a) An unprofitable task in view of measures previously taken by nationals.

(b) May disperse forces in some areas depending on the extent of the task ordered.

(c) Would have little likelihood of influencing events elsewhere (e.g. Berlin).

(3) Risks.

(a) It is considered that little or no risk would accompany the simple shadowing of merchant ships unless in waters contiguous to the Soviet Bloc.

(b) Some risk of more severe retaliatory measures by the Soviets against NATO shipping in international waters.

(c) Risk of war considered to be very slight. A sustained effort would use up useful flying hours which could more profitably be used on reconnaissance operations in sensitive areas and thus reduce the overall effectiveness of our intelligence plot.

b. MARCON TWO - Track Soviet Bloc warships in specified areas.

(1) Advantages - Same as in MARCON ONE plus:

(a) Knowledge of the positions of these ships could be used to reduce the risk to the SACLANT sea lines of communications.

(2) Disadvantages

(a) A maximum, continuous effort over a long period could reduce existing war stocks and exhaust the ships and aircraft.

(b) Would have little likelihood of influencing events elsewhere (e.g. Berlin).

(3) Risks.

(a) There would exist the risk of premeditated acts by the Soviet Bloc, such as deliberate collision, designed for propaganda purposes as well as military purposes.

ANNEX A TO ENCL (1) TO
SACLANT SER 3011/C-082
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c. MARCON THREE - Hinder and annoy designated Soviet Bloc ships.

(1) Advantages.

(a) Would disrupt and possibly force the Soviet fishing fleets to abandon important fishing areas.

(2) Disadvantages.

(a) Same as for MARCON's ONE and TWO.

(3) Risks.

(a) Aggressive action during a period of tension could be interpreted as a hostile act. The reaction to our acts could accrue to the advantage of the Soviet Bloc. This is particularly so unless our ships have authorization to implement sterner measures.

d. MARCON FOUR - Board and search.

(1) Advantages.

(a) Indicates a firm intention to take stern measures at sea and will increase the pressure on the Soviets.

(b) Will hinder and delay the movement of Soviet Bloc cargoes.

(c) The determination of the type of cargo could be of military and political interest.

(2) Disadvantages.

(a) In order to board a vessel it would have to be stopped. This in itself might entail warning shots which could result in a local action between the units involved.

(b) Requires a greater effort on the part of NATO Forces.

(c) May require greater dispersal of forces.

(3) Risks.

(a) The amount of force required to carry out this measure might result in damage and casualties.

(b) There is a risk of damaging propaganda against NATO.

(c) Soviet Bloc retaliation can be expected to be quick and severe.

e. MARCON FIVE - Seize designated Bloc merchant ships.

(1) Advantages.

(a) As in MARCON FOUR with the added advantage of denying Soviet Bloc support to the country or area to which the cargo was consigned, to the degree the MARCON is prosecuted.

(2) Disadvantages.

(a) Will require a greater effort on the part of NATO forces.

ANNEX A TO ENCL (1) TO
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(3) Risks.

- (a) Damage and casualties must be expected.
- (b) Forces a strong sovereign nation to resist or to be humiliated.
- (c) An all-out maritime war must be expected.

f. MARCON SIX - Blockade or enforced diversion.

(1) Advantages.

- (a) Seakeeping endurance of Soviet naval units would be reduced by denying them resupply bases.
- (b) Would keep certain defense areas clear of Soviet merchant ships.
- (c) It would reduce Soviet seaborne traffic and result in limited economic deterioration within the Soviet Bloc.

(2) Disadvantages.

- (a) Requires extraordinary effort on the part of NATO maritime forces.

(3) Risks.

- (a) An overt act of war. Escalation is most likely.

g. GENERAL. The execution of these measures has the disadvantages of not being particularly related to access to West Berlin. They should be executed only in conjunction with one or more of the land/air measures of the SACEUR series, and, in addition, with corresponding naval measures of Major NATO Commanders. The danger of escalation by execution of any of the Maritime Measures is relatively low in comparison with that of the large scale land or air measures in Europe. However, the measures of seizure and blockade or forced diversion are more serious measures. These are normally taken only in, or just prior to war. These measures, therefore, do contain a very definite degree of danger of escalation. They may precipitate a large scale Soviet submarine attack against Allied shipping world-wide.

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NATO MARITIME CONTINGENCY PLAN

ALERT MEASURESAlert Measures to be Implemented

1. Prior to the initiation of the MARITIME CONTINGENCY PLAN MEASURES, it is necessary that certain steps of preparedness be completed in order that the NATO Commands are prepared militarily to undertake such operations and further, be prepared to meet any possible Soviet retaliatory action.

2. These preparatory steps, taken from the SACLANT ALERT SYSTEM consist of the following individual Alert Measures which should be implemented to meet the requirements of the above paragraph.

a. For MARCON ONE and TWO:

All measures of STATE OF MILITARY VIGILANCE.

All measures of SIMPLE ALERT with the exception of SOG (Preparation for the laying of defensive naval minefields)

The following REINFORCED ALERT measures:

RAA - Manning of NATO Headquarters.

RCA - Increase of communications facilities.

RLA - Activation of bases and other logistic support facilities

ROG - Assignment of all category A, B and C Forces to Major NATO Commanders and consequent assumption of operational command and/or operational control of these forces by Major NATO Commanders and their subordinate commanders.

ROM - Reconnaissance of land and sea areas.

ROW - Protective measures to provide security of forces.

RWA - Final preparation for full implementation of meteorological war plans.

b. For MARCON THREE:

All measures outlined in paragraph 2a above, and

The following additional REINFORCED ALERT measures:

RSA - Recommendation for diversion of allied and friendly shipping from certain areas.

RSC - Assumption of control of fishing vessels.

AMENDMENT NO 1
ANNEX B to ENCLOSURE (1)
TO SACLANT SER: 3011/C-982

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c. For MARCON FOUR, FIVE and SIX:

All measures outlined in paragraph 2a (including SCG - Preparation for the laying of defensive naval minefields) and 2b above, and

The following additional REINFORCED ALERT measures:

RCB - Preparation for control of electromagnetic radiations.

RCC - Preparation for electronic counter measures.

ROE - Final preparation for the laying of offensive naval minefields.

3. In addition to the above Alert Measures SACLANNT would employ assigned submarines to increase the level of effort for surveillance and reconnaissance of the northeastern approaches to the Atlantic during the implementation of any of the MARCONs.

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