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SECRET

To: Secretary General
 c.c. Deputy Secretary General

From: Acting Executive Secretary

Summary Record of the Private Session of the
 Council held on Wednesday, 24 July 1962
 at 12.15 p.m.

REPORTS ON RECENT DISCUSSIONS ON BERLIN

The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE made statements (a) regarding:

- (a) the latest Rusk-Gromyko talks at Geneva;
- (b) the State Department evaluation of recent discussions on Berlin;

2. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that a discussion had taken place between Lord Home and Gromyko at Geneva on 23rd July, 1962. Gromyko had employed largely the same arguments as in his talks with Mr. Rusk, opposing the signature of a peace treaty and the presence of foreign troops in West Berlin. Lord Home had urged him not to concentrate attention on the latter point, since this might lead to direct confrontation between the two sides - i.e. a military clash.

3. Gromyko had made a long digression with regard to the "aggressive intentions" of the Federal Republic of Germany - a charge to which Lord Home had made an appropriate response.

4. The United Kingdom Embassy in Moscow believed that Gromyko's basic purpose in visiting Geneva was to ascertain the latest Western position on Berlin; he could not therefore be expected to reveal Soviet intentions at this stage.

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(a) See Annex to the present summary record.

5. The Embassy had recently received the conclusion that in all probability the Soviet Union had taken a definite decision with regard to the signature of a separate peace treaty, and that, although a firm timetable might not yet have been established, a general programme had possibly been drafted with this end in view. The Embassy did not however consider that the Soviet Union would attempt to break off direct contact with the West.

6. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE, after thanking the United Kingdom and United States for their statements, said that Mr. Rush was to be congratulated for the firmness and lucidity with which he had presented the Western case.

7. In his view, the indication that the Soviet Union was preparing for the signature of a separate peace treaty with East Germany called for a measure of political and agency planning on the part of the Alliance. He was convinced that the nations primarily involved in the Berlin question were already engaged on such a study.

8. He believed that the most likely of the many hypotheses to be considered was the possibility that in an attempt to promote a show-down, Mr. Khrushchev would try to bring the question of Berlin before the United Nations; the West must devise an appropriate response to this and such like measures.

9. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE confirmed that the four Western powers in Berlin were already attempting to assess the various political contingencies, and that they would inform the Council of the results of their study. He stressed that the views of the Council on this question would be of particular value to the countries principally concerned.

10. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE said that the information given by the United Kingdom and United States Representatives was in accordance with that possessed by his authorities. He believed that the Soviet Union was attempting to prolong the issue in the hope that the force of public opinion would oblige the West to accept a solution at any price.

3rd August, 1952