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DELEGATION OF CANADA
TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL



DELEGATION DU CANADA
AU CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE-NORD

PARIS, April 27, 1962.

SECRET

Dear Lord Coleridge,

NATO PLANS - RELATIONSHIP WITH BERLIN
CONTINGENCY PLANS.

It was agreed at a private meeting of the Council on April 16 that further discussion of the subject noted above be postponed until after the Athens ministerial meeting. It was suggested that if in the meantime there were points which were still not completely clarified as a result of the statements already made, it might be preferable to submit such questions in writing to the Secretariat.

I should be grateful, therefore, if you could take into consideration the comments of my authorities which are set out in the attachment to this letter.

Yours sincerely,


J. S. McCarole.

Lord Coleridge,
Executive Secretary,
The International Staff,
OTAN/NATO.

The statement made by the United States Permanent Representative at Council's meeting on April 11 has served to remove some of the uncertainties which existed concerning the three-power paper given to the Council on February 23. There are still, however, a number of questions which occur to us.

There may have been some misinterpretation of the intent of our question concerning the meshing of NATO and tripartite planning at an earlier stage than seemed to be contemplated in the three-power paper. Political escalation should, of course, be avoided. However, our question was concerned primarily with planning to ensure that if any tripartite force is actually engaged in hostilities, NATO control mechanisms should be able to take over at any time rather than await the outcome of that engagement. Secondly, we wonder how realistic it would be to set as the point at which the transfer from tripartite to NATO mechanisms would take place the need for reinforcements "when a tripartite force of battalion or greater size has been subjected to attack".

We would welcome further clarification concerning the significance of the phrase, "of greater size" in paragraph 5(b)3(a). It is still not clear what size force would have to require reinforcement before operational control would cease to be tripartite and would become NATO control. What distinction would be made, for example, between forces introduced for "support of initial probes" and as "reinforcements".