

25th September, 1961

Meeting held on Friday, 22nd September, 1961 at 3 p.m.

in the American Delegation Conference Room

Present: The Secretary General
The Deputy Secretary General
M. Sagne
M. Vest

The Permanent Representative and one deputy of: France,
Germany, United Kingdom and United States

Mr. Walter Stoessel (Representative of SACEUR)

Representatives of the Four-Power Steering Group:
Colonel Moody
Mr. Weiss
M. Froment-Meurice

TRIPARTITE REPORT ON LIVE OAK

M. de Lousse said that the French were ready to lift their reservation on the last sentence of paragraph 6. As for paragraph 8, last sentence, this reservation had been discussed with Couve de Murville and the French proposed alternative wording "accordingly they will be ready, time permitting, to advise and enter into consultation with the North Atlantic Council prior to implementing these plans". The French proposed alternative wording because they were not certain that the pressure of events would permit the conclusion of consultation in some instances. The United Kingdom and the United States were willing to accept the French re-wording, Mr Finletter especially saying that he thought that the French had made a commitment which was clear enough in the face of unpredictable future situations.

The Secretary General was not ready to accept the French re-phrasing. He felt that to use the phrase "will be ready" diminished the force of the sentence and was unnecessary for the reason that M. de Lousse gave because the phrase "time permitting" already took care of it. He noted that if "undertake" and "will be ready" were much the same, why had the French insisted on the change? He then put the question bluntly - Do the Three intend to voluntarily come to the Council and consult on Live-Oak; will they take the initiative in advising the Council on it? The three Ambassadors all agreed, the United States with especial forces, that they proposed to do this without reservation.

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After some discussion on the relationship of the various Live-Oak directives to Norstad, Mr. Steessel explained that once the new Live-Oak directive was issued by the Three governments General Norstad understood that the draft which came to him earlier this month would no longer be valid.

Later in the discussion the Secretary General agreed that he would not insist that the French alternative language be bracketed on his part. However if the Council questioned the language and wanted to tighten up the paper he would feel free to make known his views on it.

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NATO SECRET

II.

DRAFT INSTRUCTIONS TO NATO COMMANDERS

The Secretary General suggested that when the paper was to be brought before the Council, the Council would want General Norstad's comments and therefore he thought it important that, if there were within the body divergences of views, the General's position could be bracketed or put at the bottom of the page where all the Ambassadors would have it available. The United States and the United Kingdom agreed and thought that, in some cases, it might be useful to have the views also of the individual Four countries where there might be differences of opinion; this would give a healthier atmosphere for the discussion. The United States for example preferred General Norstad's phraseology in paragraphs 6 (b) and 6 (c).

TREATMENT IN THE COUNCIL

After extensive discussion the Secretary General made it clear that it was the Tripartite Powers who would be offering the Live-Oak paper. The second paper "Instructions to NATO Commanders" after the Four have worked it out here with himself and General Norstad and referred it once and for all back to the Four Power Steering Group, would then be submitted by him to the Council for regular Council treatment and would not be referred back again to the Steering Group. It will have then become a Council document for the consideration of the Council and governments. All though the French preferred that no brackets should appear on the paper which would be presented to the Council the Secretary General, backed by Mr. Finletter and Sir Paul said that this was a paper prepared by representatives of the Four, the International Staff and General Norstad and it was impossible that the views of all including their differences, should not be reflected in the paper.

The Group then began a paragraph by paragraph comment on the document as follows:

Paragraph 3:

The Secretary General and the United Kingdom bracketed the words: "if possible".

Paragraph 6:

The Secretary General and the United States preferred General Norstad's language and paragraphs 6(b) and 6(c).

Paragraphe 6 (d):

Mr. von Walther said that without question the phrase "to ensure success" would cause trouble in the Council. If left an impression of the offensive when the atmosphere should be kept defensive. Finletter, on a personal basis, agreed and said that to him it implied that when the Live-Oak division strength probe got in trouble on the autobahn, the Commander could then use nuclear weapons to extricate himself. He predicted this would cause an uproar in the Council. Colonel Moody said that actually the original phraseology had been intended as a restraint on the use of nuclear weapons. The group said that it had failed

definitely if that were the case. Mr. Stoessel pointed out that paragraph 6(d)(2) is not considered by Norstad to be applicable to the Live-Oak division operation but is intended for a truly major action. The Secretary General concluded that in that case there was no point in arguing further. They would have to face the Council with this language and General Norstad would have to explain it as best he could.

Paragraph 6(d)(3):

He predicted that paragraph 6(d)(3) would cause trouble in the Council as well although he did not propose to bracket it.

Paragraph 8:

The Secretary General said that he had no difficulty with the proposed version though he did have difficulty with General Norstad's version because it opened wide the question as to who indeed are the NATO Authorities. Mr. Finletter backed him up and said that since this planning involved the possible use of nuclear weapons it is far too important to take the chance of having it tied up in the Military Committee and Standing Group system. It is vital enough to go to governments. Mr. Stoessel said that General Norstad was worried that the proposed language might involve him in a requirement for unanimity in the Council. The Secretary General said that that was exactly the point. This language did not require unanimity. Each country would do what it deemed necessary under Article 5 of the Treaty. Mr. Wolf explained further that it was really a question of presentation. We seek unity in planning from as many of the countries as possible but we need to know in advance what are the possibilities. This provides information, a system of approval and at the same time preserves the individual rights of the countries in what is a matter of vital concern. De Lousse said that on a personal basis he preferred the Drafting Group's version over General Norstad's but this would have to be resolved with the French Representative in the Four Power Steering Group. All agreed that paragraph 8 and paragraph 11(c) would have to be bracketed. The session ended in general harmony with the clear recognition on all hands that the views of the Secretary General and General Norstad as well as any diversities among the Four would have to appear in the paper when it was presented to the Council.