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~~NATO SECRET~~

EF/PDP.61/400

22nd September 1961

Note for the Secretary General

Subject : The urgent need for increased external aid to help implement to the fullest possible extent SACEUR's plan of action for Berlin.

1. One of the main conclusions arising from SACEUR's comments contained in document SHAPE 188/61⁽¹⁾ (dated 15 September 1961 and dealing with national responses to the "Plan of Action NATO Europe") is that there is an urgent need for increased external aid deliveries of U.S. (or Canadian) origin - whether reimbursable or not - if SACEUR's equipment requirements are to be met within the very short time available.

2. In their reply to SACEUR's plan of action, this fact is clearly underlined by several countries - Germany, Italy, Greece and Norway. Some announce that they have taken steps in the right directions : for example, Norway and Denmark will allot additional funds for the purchase of new equipment (\$ 11 million dollars by Denmark, \$ 3 million dollars by Norway). Belgium is studying the possibility of increasing funds for equipment procurement by \$ 10 million. There is also the possibility that some countries are reallocating funds within their present defence budget, e.g. when they announce that they are ready to improve the equipment situation, but do not indicate how they will fund this improvement.

3. But even taking into account this financial effort, it appears impossible, for production and technical reasons alone, for almost all European countries to meet within 3 to 15 months (i.e. by 1961 or end 1962) the requests SACEUR has made.

study

4. A careful study has been undertaken, in close cooperation with the Production and Logistics Division, both of the shortfalls and of the industrial capacity of

(1) The overall comments of the International Staff on this document are contained in note EF/PDP.61/401 which will shortly be sent to the Secretary General.

the countries concerned for the items of major equipment⁽¹⁾ which furnish the most striking examples of urgent needs for aid. The results of this study by service and by country are annexed. The main conclusions arising are the following :

- A) In general, additional production possibilities for delivery in 1962 in Europe as a whole are limited. Production needs time and entails large requirements in raw material, manpower, etc. This means transferring other economic activities to defence production, since the majority of NATO European countries are fully utilising both their manpower and their industrial capacity. Many countries are only beginning to plan the production of new types of equipment and in some cases have not yet chosen it. In others, contracts for production spread over the next four to six years have already been placed; this was in line with the Commanders' 1962-66 requirements, but is no longer in accordance with the present requests for urgency. Under these circumstances, accelerating the programmes is easier said than done. A solution might be to place new orders for existing equipment, but countries may hesitate to do so, not only because in some instances lines of production have been closed, but because in doing so, they may jeopardize to a certain extent their longer term programming.
- B) Considering only some of the most important shortfalls of essential equipment, it appears that :
1. Army : As shown in Annex I⁽²⁾ taking the 1962 requirements for combat vehicles which include self propelled artillery, armoured personnel carriers and light and medium tanks : - to fulfil the remaining requirements of first TO&E (i.e. basic load of the units) to 90%; secondly, 30 days reserves to about 40%; and thirdly, mechanisation requirements to about 25% - would mean a total of 12,380 additional combat vehicles to be procured within the next 15 months. This is a rough estimate which gives an order of magnitude of 1962 requirements. It is based on standards either used by countries (for TO&E and reserves) or as defined by SHAPE during the preparation of the 1962-66 requirements.

(1) A detailed study has been made in respect of Army major items of equipment (see Table B of Annex I). However, due to the lack of time conclusions drawn as regards Navy and Air Force equipment could only be based on a general survey.
(2) Table A

In regard to these requirements⁽¹⁾ the situation can be estimated as follows :

- Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal and Turkey need 2,480 combat vehicles in 1962, but they are not producing countries.
- Among the producing countries, Germany, Netherlands and Canada will only start production of their new types of combat vehicles in 1963.
- There remains France, the U.K. and the U.S. with available production capacity who might be able to finance and to set up special lines of production.

Thus, the only possible solution to meet the short term requirements of combat vehicles for 1962 seems to be to draw on U.S. stocks. This might be done

- through normal mutual aid,
- through reimbursable aid, or
- through any other financial formula acceptable to the U.S. and to the interested countries.

But if there is no fresh initiative to bring about either one or the other of these alternatives, there is no likelihood that results will be achieved.

2. Navy

Annex II shows the different items of equipment which should come from external aid in 1962. As for the Army, the study has been based on a comparizon of shortfall of materiel or equipment with the present production capacity of the countries concerned. The problem - which involves 48 ships of different types (of which 17 of destroyer type) 32 maritime aircraft, ammunition and heavy equipment - is at least as difficult for the Navy since the construction of ships, maritime aircraft, and some heavy equipment cannot be achieved in a very short period of time. Recourse to existing U.S. stocks (occurred) is thus the only solution.

(1) See Table B of Annex I.

3. Air Force

Annex III shows, on the same basis, the items of equipment which should be provided by external aid for the Air Forces of NATO European countries. This amounts to a total of 86 aircraft by end 1961 and 90 by end 62, to which are to be added quantities of spare parts, ammunition and special equipment.

- C) Special mention must be made of the spare parts problem. In theory many of the spare parts required should come through the NMSSA. However, there is almost unanimous criticism by countries, in their replies either to the Interim Review 1961 Questionnaire or to SACEUR's plan of action, of the effectiveness of this agency. It thus seems inadvisable on the basis of these facts to rely on the NMSSA for quick results, unless extraordinary action by the Agency is decided on and can be implemented very quickly.
- D) The conclusions have seemed important enough to be brought to the special attention of the Secretary General, before the Council next considers SACEUR's document 188/61.

The efforts - some of which are certainly commendable - made by European NATO countries in the face of the Berlin crisis would be seriously jeopardized if the U.S. authorities were not able to consider favourably these urgent needs for external aid, and could not tell their partners that they were ready to help them in this field to the maximum extent possible, a statement which - at least officially, - has not yet been made.

Although during his recent visit to Washington the Secretary General has already called the attention of the U.S. authorities to some of these points, it seems now that in order to maximise the usefulness of the discussion by the Council of SACEUR's comments on the countries' replies to his Plan of Action, it would be most useful if, in advance, he were to have a personal talk with Mr. Finletter and perhaps hand him the Annexes to the present note.

F.D. Gregh

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ANNEX 1

TABLE A

ARMY REQUIREMENTS FOR COMBAT VEHICLES IN 1962

TOTAL NATO-EUROPE

To fill remaining requirement for	at approx.	105 SP.	155 SP.	A.P.C.	Light Tank	Medium Tank	Total
TO&E	30%	-	20	5,010	310	500	5,840
30 days reserves	40%	50	10	360	270	840	1,530
Mechanisation & replacement	25%	300	110	2,980	710	910	5,010
TOTAL NATO-EUROPE:	40%	350	140	8,350	1,290	2,250	12,380 ^(a)

Note : (a) The requirement for 1963 will be in the order of magnitude of 10,000, filling TO&E, 30 days of reserves and about 50% of the modernisation required. For 1964-1966 another 9,000.

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Probable P in 1962	Additional requirements not covered	Remarks
-	220	Not a producing country. Orders placed in France and U.S.A.
53	427	Not a producing country.
-	2,495	Actual production 600 p.a. An acceleration of the production is announced in the reply to AR (61). Production might, on short term, be increased to 1,800 p.a.
-	2,015	The order, which is not yet completely firm, will come from the USA production. In Germany new types at the prototype stage. Delivery after 1962 only.
59	496	Not a producing country.
180	1,500	From French production. In the context of a new procurement plan, national production is studied. Delivery after 1962 only.
-	10	Not a producing country.
-	1,022	Partly from French, partly from own production. New orders with increased delivery in 1963 under study. National production of wheeled armoured personnel carriers now pre-series. Delivery final item not before 1963.
-	530	Not a producing country.
-	80	Not a producing country
39	626	Not a producing country.
-	670	Data about present production capability of combat vehicles are not available. It is known however that new types are being developed, which will be in production only after 1962.
331 ^(b)	10,091 ^(c)	

ARMY REQUIREMENTS FOR COMBAT VEHICLES IN 1962 BY COUNTRY

Country	TO&E	Reserves	Moderni- sation	Total	Reported procuremt. plans	Assumed delivery in 1962
BELGIUM	230	200	90	520	575	300
DENMARK	70	90	320	480	-	-
FRANCE	915	255	1,895	3,065	570	570
GERMANY	2,500	205	340	3,045	1,030	1,030
GREECE	500	10	45	555	-	-
ITALY	1,080	550	50	1,680	-	-
LUXEMBOURG	-	-	10	10	-	-
NETHERLANDS	220	40	820	1,080	524	58
NORWAY	25	45	460	530	-	-
PORTUGAL	-	-	80	80	-	-
TURKEY	300	135	230	665	-	-
UNITED KINGDOM	-	-	670	670	-	-
Additional requirement for 1962 NATO-EUROPE	5,840	1,530	5,010	12,380	2,699	1,958 ^(b)

Notes: (b) Of which 1,057 from French production and 1,232 from USA production.

(c) Production capacity in North America:

Canada: An armoured vehicle, Bobcat, is in prototype stage.
Delivery of final item not before 1962.

U.S.A.: Actual capacity for APC's only reported as 2,400 per year.
Increase on short term is considered possible. The
International Staff has no further data about the production
capacity of combat vehicles.

NAVY

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ANNEX II

Items of equipment which should be provided by MAP

Notes: The asterisk indicates that an item is already programmed by MAP or requested by the nation concerned, without taking into account possible reimbursement, cost-sharing, etc.

A. SACEUR

EQUIPMENT	Denmark	Germany	Greece	Italy	Norway	Turkey	TOTAL	REMARKS
	(During and if possible early 1962)							
1) <u>Ships</u>								
Destroyers (DD)	2*		2*			2	6	
Escorts (DE)					2		2	
PC craft (3c)						4	4	
Submarine (SS)			2*			1*	3	
Coastal M/S (MSC)			8			8	16	
Fast patrol boat (FPB)						8*	8	programmed but phased over several years.
2) <u>Aircraft</u>								
A/S aircraft S2F1				20*			20	programmed for 8
A/S helicopters (HPS)				6*			6	programmed for 3
3) <u>Ammunition</u>								
1"2 prof. charge MKV			500				500	
Depth charges MK6 & 9			4000				4000	
A/S torpedoes	30	100		80			210	
A/S SS LI	120						120	for sea defence craft (closing of Baltic strait)
4) <u>End-items of equipment</u>								
Torpedoe launching system MK 32 (US)	8*							
Radars and sonars	*			for 3* new DE				
Guided missiles syst.								
* <u>Initial outfit</u>								
Terrier				2*			2	
Tartar				2*			2	
	*				*			* acceleration of building cost-sharing programme now under progress

B. SACLANT AND CINCHAN

EQUIPMENT	BELGIUM	NETHERLANDS	PORTUGAL	TOTAL	REMARKS
		(During and if possible early 1962)			
1) <u>Ships</u>					
Escort (DE)		6 (b)	3 (a)	9	(a) On temporary loan in addition to the current shipbuilding cost-sharing programme for 3 DE. (b) Needed to meet Cinchan's goals but largely beyond Netherlands capabilities.
2) <u>Aircraft</u>					
Minesweeping helicopters (HPM)		6		6	
3) <u>Main equipment</u>					
Asdic 193	2	6		8	For conversion of MSC into MHC.

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AIR FORCEItems of equipment which should be
provided by MAP1. BELGIUM

In 1961:

- (a) Six RF 84 F aircraft or substitute (F 84 F + camera pods)
- (b) 2"75 air-to-air rockets: 7,450 each (U.S.A. or Canada).

2. DENMARK

25 F.100 aircraft (in 1962).

3. FRANCE

- (a) In 1961, about 2,500 VY fuzes
- (b) In 1962, 25 F.100 aircraft.

4. GREECE

- (a) In 1961 - expedite delivery of 3 C-91 Strike aircraft.
152 SIDEWINDER missiles and 2,700 droppable fuel tanks for
F 86 E.
- (b) In 1962 - expedite delivery of 9 RF.104 G aircraft.

5. ITALY

; In 1961, expedite delivery of spare parts for aircraft and
electronic equipment.

6. NORWAY

Additional aircraft requirements through MAP are stressed by
SACEUR in his comments.

Requirements up to end-1962

	<u>in 1961</u>	<u>in 1962</u>
F 86 F aircraft	11	5
RF 84 F aircraft	3	1
F 86 K aircraft	6	3
F 86 F aircraft	1	1
C 11 G aircraft	8	-

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7. TURKEY

To maintain squadron strength up to end-1962:

	<u>in 1961</u>	<u>in 1962</u>
F 86 E aircraft (Canada)	13	6
F.100 aircraft	23	5
F 84 F aircraft	4	4
RF 84 F aircraft	4	3
F 84 Q aircraft	4	3

In 1961: 1,000 rounds 20 m/m
16,800 rockets air-air 2"75 FFAR
1,400 450 gallon droppable fuel tanks
1,800 275 gallon droppable fuel tanks
3,800 200 gallon droppable fuel tanks