

~~TOP SECRET~~

18th September, 1961

Instructions (to the Standing Group and) the Major NATO Commanders

1. The parties to the North Atlantic Treaty have in accordance with Articles 4 and 6 of the Treaty and in the light of the crisis provoked with regard to the city of Berlin consulted together to decide what steps should be taken to meet the present threat against Berlin.

2. They have agreed that the basic objectives of NATO policy in regard to Berlin are:

- (a) The maintenance of the presence and security of the three Western garrisons in West Berlin.
- (b) The maintenance of the freedom and viability of West Berlin.
- (c) The maintenance of freedom of access to West Berlin.

3. Attainment of the foregoing objectives will be sought through the application worldwide of non-military measures [and by negotiations wherever possible.]

It is however necessary to prepare for the contingency that such measures (or negotiations) may not in themselves deter the Soviet Union or the so-called "German Democratic Republic" from taking action to block Western access to Berlin or otherwise infringe on the basic rights of the West.

4. They are therefore determined to improve allied military posture as a clear indication of their capability and will to apply appropriate military measures if need be.

They have agreed to undertake individually and collectively comparable programmes to build added military strength for Europe.

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5. General Considerations:

The following considerations should underlie the preparations of plans of Supreme Allied Commanders:

- A. Military actions will have to be integrated into a general, overall strategy applicable on a worldwide scale and comprising political, diplomatic, economic, psychological, military and parliamentary measures. The selective application of these measures, both worldwide and in Europe, would contribute to our purpose of arriving at a settlement of the problem of Berlin while progressively making the Soviets aware of the danger of general war.
- B. Allied military measures to restore access to Berlin should be graduated but determined, applying increasing pressure which will present with unmistakable clarity to the Soviets the enormous risks involved in continued denial of access. At the same time, they should leave the Soviet Government as many opportunities as possible to pause and reassess the desirability of continuing on a dangerous course of action.
- C. Any military operation risks rapid escalation and/or pre-emptive enemy action. Therefore, while the immediate political objective of all actions will be to induce the Soviets to re-open access, military plans must take account of and be consistent with current defensive concepts of NATO strategy. They must, therefore, retain the survival of the Western allies as a central consideration, and they must not commit capabilities to the prejudice of the overall capacity to defend

NATO territory. The magnitude of resources which might be committed in operations at allied initiative in reaction to Soviet moves would depend on results of the Allied build-up as well as circumstances existing at the time.

D. The Alliance will stand ready for nuclear action at all times. However, planned recourse to nuclear weapons in these operations can be envisaged only under any one of the three circumstances of:-

- (1) prior use by the enemy
- (2) the necessity to avoid defeat of major military operations, or
- (3) a specific political decision to employ nuclear weapons selectively in order to demonstrate the will and ability of the Alliance to use them.⁷

PROCEDURE

6. Specific instructions for planning will be given to SACUR, SACLANC and CINCHAN individually with the request that they co-ordinate their planning.

7. All plans and studies will be submitted to NAC for general information.

All plans will have to be approved by the Standing Group and by the governments who have committed or assigned forces in the respective areas concerned and whose forces will be immediately affected by action under these plans.

The Supreme Allied Commanders will ask for governmental approval of military plans through the Permanent Representatives (and/or the National Military Representatives) of the governments concerned.

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8. Specific Instructions to General Norstad

Certain tripartite military contingency plans (Live-Oak) have been made by General Norstad as CINCEUR to enable France, the United Kingdom and the United States to carry out their special responsibilities concerning Berlin.

It is understood that these military plans contemplate, in response to Soviet Bloc interference in the Allied rights, transport and combat escort in the air corridors, probes of Soviet Bloc intentions to deny ground access, and defensive actions on the part of tripartite garrisons in Berlin. It is further understood that because of the immediate threats in recent Soviet notes as to air access, examination of plans related to interference with this access will receive priority. Since any of these actions could involve NATO security interests and eventually other NATO forces, Live-Oak planning will be modified as shall be necessary, and will be kept current and as appropriate, will be brought into general NATO planning.

Additional Military Plans

- (a) For the purpose of providing as great a choice as possible of supplementary alternatives, military plans covering broader land, air or naval measures should be prepared. In each case, the expected advantages and estimated risks should be set out in specific terms to accompany plans. It would be understood that detailed military plans would be subject to specific approval of the governments whose forces or territories were involved, through their Permanent Representatives in the North Atlantic Council. It would be further understood that the execution of any approved plans would be the subject of separate political decisions to be taken at the time.

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(b) In particular, plans to provide for the following should be studied urgently:

1. Appropriate alert measures for all NATO forces, prior to initiation of any tripartite military measures;
2. Expanded non-nuclear air operations;
3. Expanded non-nuclear ground operations with necessary air support;
4. Selective use of nuclear weapons to demonstrate the will and ability of the Alliance to use them.

NATO SECRET

16th September, 1961

Instructions (to the Standing Group and) the Major NATO Commanders**REVISED TEXT**

1. The parties to the North Atlantic Treaty have in accordance with Articles 4 and 6 of the Treaty and in the light of the crisis provoked with regard to the city of Berlin consulted together to decide what steps should be taken to meet the present threat against Berlin.

2. They have agreed that the basic objectives of NATO policy in regard to Berlin are:

- (a) The maintenance of the presence and security of the three Western garrisons in West Berlin.
- (b) The maintenance of the freedom and viability of West Berlin.
- (c) The maintenance of freedom of access to West Berlin.

3. Attainment of the foregoing objectives will be sought through the application worldwide of non-military measures [and by negotiations wherever possible.]

It is however necessary to prepare for the contingency that such measures may not in themselves deter the Soviet Union or the so-called "German Democratic Republic" from taking action to block allied access to Berlin or otherwise infringe on basic allied rights.

4. They are therefore determined to improve allied military posture as a clear indication of their capability and will to apply appropriate military measures if need be.

They have agreed to undertake individually and collectively comparable programmes to build added military strength for Europe.

.. / ...

5. Certain tripartite military contingency plans (Live-Oak) have been made by General Horsted as CINCEUR to enable France, the United Kingdom and the United States to carry out their special responsibilities concerning Berlin.

It is understood that these military plans contemplate, in response to Soviet Bloc interference in the Allied rights, transport and combat escort in the air corridors, probes of Soviet Bloc intentions to deny ground access, and defensive actions on the part of tripartite garrisons in Berlin. It is further understood that because of the immediate threats in recent Soviet notes as to air access, examination of plans related to interference with this access will receive priority. Since any of these actions could involve NATO security interests and eventually other NATO forces, Live-Oak planning will be modified as shall be necessary, and will be kept current and as appropriate, will be brought into general NATO planning. The North Atlantic Council will be informed of these plans and of their possible development.

6. The purpose of these instructions is to initiate the preparation of those military plans necessary to support the basic objectives of the Alliance and to protect the security interests of the Alliance in any situation which may result from aggressive action by the Soviet Bloc in a Berlin crisis.

7. General Considerations

The following considerations should underlie the preparations of these plans:

a. The military actions should be in such a way that they could be integrated together and into a general overall strategy applicable as appropriate on a worldwide scale and including as appropriate political, diplomatic, economic, psychological, military and paramilitary measures. The selective application

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of measures agreed upon both in Europe and on a worldwide basis, would contribute to the NATO purpose of arriving at a settlement of the problem of Berlin while progressively making the Soviets aware of the danger of general war.

b. Appropriate military measures to restore access in case of interference to Berlin should be graduated but determined, applying increasing pressure which would present with unmistakable clarity to the Soviets the enormous risks in continued denial of access. At the same time, they should leave the Soviet Government as many opportunities as possible to pause and re-assess the desirability of continuing on a dangerous course of action.

c. Any military operation risks rapid escalation and/or pre-emptive enemy action. Therefore, while the immediate political objective of all actions will be to induce the Soviets to re-open access, military plans must take account of and be consistent with current defensive concepts of NATO strategy. They must therefore retain the defence of the Alliance members as a central consideration and they must not commit capabilities to the prejudice of the overall capacity to defend NATO territory. The magnitude of resources which might be committed in operations at the West's initiative in reaction to Soviet moves would depend on results of the NATO build-up, as well as ^{.../...} circumstances existing at the time.

d. If necessary, recourse will be had to nuclear action. However, planned recourse to nuclear weapons in these operations should be envisaged only under any one of the three circumstances of (1) prior use by the enemy, (2) the necessity to avoid defeat of major military operations, and (3) a specific political decision to employ nuclear weapons selectively in order to demonstrate the will and ability of the Alliance to use them.

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8. Additional Military Plans

- (a) For the purpose of providing as great a choice as possible of supplementary alternatives, military plans covering broader land, air or naval measures should be prepared. In each case, the expected advantages and estimated risks should be set out in specific terms to accompany plans. It would be understood that detailed military plans would be subject to specific approval of the governments whose forces or territories were involved, through their Permanent Representatives in the North Atlantic Council. It would be further understood that the execution of any approved plans would be the subject of separate political decisions to be taken at the time.
- (b) In particular, plans to provide for the following should be studied urgently:
1. [Appropriate alert measures for all NATO forces, prior to initiation of any tripartite military measures;]
 2. Expanded non-nuclear air operations;
 3. Expanded non-nuclear ground operations with necessary air support;
 4. Selective use of nuclear weapons to demonstrate the will and ability of the Alliance to use them.
9. All plans and studies will be submitted to NAC for general information.
10. More specific instructions to:
- a. SACEUR
 - b. SACLANC
 - c. CINCHAN