NATO Summit Guide
Warsaw, 8-9 July 2016

An essential Alliance in a more dangerous world

The Warsaw Summit comes at a defining moment for the security of the North Atlantic Alliance. In recent years, the world has become more volatile and dangerous with Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and destabilisation of eastern Ukraine, as well as its military build-up from the Barents Sea to the Baltic, and from the Black Sea to the eastern Mediterranean; turmoil across the Middle East and North Africa, fuelling the biggest migrant and refugee crisis in Europe since World War Two; brutal attacks by ISIL and other terrorist groups, as well as cyber attacks, nuclear proliferation and ballistic missile threats.

NATO is adapting to this changed security environment. It also remains committed to fulfilling its three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. And, in the Polish capital, the Alliance will make important decisions to boost security in and around Europe, based on two key pillars: protecting its citizens through modern deterrence and defence, and projecting stability beyond its borders.

NATO member states form a unique community of values, committed to the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. In today’s dangerous world, transatlantic cooperation is needed more than ever. NATO embodies that cooperation, bringing to bear the strength and unity of North America and Europe.

This Summit is the first to be hosted in Poland and the first to be chaired by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who took up his post in October 2014.

- Summit meetings
- Member countries
- Partners
- NATO Secretary General
I. Protecting our citizens

NATO's greatest responsibility is to protect its almost one billion citizens. NATO will take important steps to modernise collective defence and deterrence, so that it can respond to threats from any direction. NATO does not seek confrontation, but will defend Allies against any threat. Its deterrence aims not to provoke a conflict, but to prevent one. Everything NATO does is defensive, proportionate and in line with its international commitments.

- Relations with Russia
- NATO-Russia – setting the record straight
- Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
- Deterrence and defence
- NATO's nuclear deterrence policy and forces
- Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation
- NATO's role in conventional arms control
- Small arms and light weapons (SALW) and mine action (MA)

Modern challenges require a modern Alliance, with the resources and capabilities to keep Allies safe. Since the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO has taken a number of important steps to reinforce its collective defence. The NATO Response Force is now three times bigger, with a brigade-sized high-readiness spearhead force at its core; NATO has set up the first six new small headquarters in the eastern part of the Alliance, boosting its ability to plan and exercise, and to reinforce if needed; it continues to augment Turkey's air defences; it has increased the number of exercises, sped up decision-making and developed a strategy to deal with hybrid threats. The Alliance is also doing more to fight terrorism, develop ballistic missile defence and deliver other key capabilities such as Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance and Alliance Ground Surveillance, while ensuring that its nuclear deterrence remains credible and effective.

At the Warsaw Summit, NATO will enter the next phase in its adaptation. It will enhance the forward presence of NATO forces in the eastern part of the Alliance with four robust battalions in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland; it will take decisions on a tailored presence for the south-east flank and will adopt a framework for NATO's further adaptation to the challenges emanating from the south. NATO will also enhance resilience, both within Allied countries and collectively, by modernising capabilities, improving civil preparedness, strengthening cyber defences, and ensuring that the Alliance has the right mix of military and civilian capabilities to meet evolving security challenges, including hybrid warfare.

The Summit will also be an opportunity to review and reconfirm the Defence Investment Pledge Allies made in Wales. For the first time in many years, in 2015 NATO registered a small increase in defence spending among European Allies and Canada. Estimates for 2016 indicate a further increase in real terms.
II. Projecting stability

To safeguard security at home, NATO must also project stability beyond its borders. When the Alliance’s neighbours are stable, Allies are more secure.

NATO has a long history of projecting stability: through operations such as Afghanistan and the Balkans; and partnerships with over 40 different partners across the world. NATO has the experience of doing large-scale training; standing political and military structures; and staying-power, which matters for the long-term challenges Allies face.

All Allies contribute to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. NATO is looking at how it can provide direct support to the Coalition with AWACS aircraft operating in Alliance territory and international airspace. NATO’s deployment in the Aegean Sea is assisting international efforts to break the business model of human traffickers, by providing real-time information to Greece, Turkey and the European Union’s (EU) border agency Frontex. NATO can also do more to address common challenges and threats in the Mediterranean to complement and support ongoing efforts by the EU and other actors. NATO is converting Operation Active Endeavour into a broader maritime security operation, including supporting situational awareness, countering terrorism and contributing to capacity-building.

NATO has a long-term commitment to Afghanistan’s stability. It will continue the Resolute Support Mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces beyond 2016, and contribute to their funding through 2020, so they can defend their country and push back violent extremism.
NATO is stepping up its capacity-building efforts and cooperation with regional partners. In the fight against ISIL, other terrorist groups and non-state actors, and in addressing the root causes of instability, one of its most effective tools is building the defence capacity of its partners. NATO is training several hundred Iraqi officers in Jordan, and is helping to strengthen the defence sectors of Jordan and Tunisia. It also continues its preparatory work to assist Libya, if requested.

To the east, NATO will continue to boost the defence capabilities and build the resilience of its partners Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova to resist outside pressure and to advance reforms. NATO will enhance its strong political and practical support for Ukraine, including with a Comprehensive Package of Assistance. It will strengthen the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package.

NATO will continue to work closely with partners such as Finland, Sweden and Georgia, who have a significant contribution to make to security in the strategically important Baltic Sea and Black Sea regions.

Montenegro’s future membership will enhance stability in the Western Balkans. NATO’s Open Door Policy, together with EU enlargement, have helped to spread stability and prosperity. NATO’s door remains open to European states able to undertake the commitments and obligations of membership, and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area.
III. Cooperation with the European Union

Closer cooperation between NATO and the EU is key to dealing with current and emerging security challenges, from the east and the south and wherever they may arise. The two organisations are complementary. In the Aegean Sea, NATO is working with the EU closer than ever before. Both organisations continue to work together on missions in Afghanistan and Kosovo.

At the Warsaw Summit, NATO will aim for a new level of reciprocal cooperation with the EU, focusing on concrete areas, such as fighting hybrid and cyber threats, supporting partners in defence capacity-building, and increasing maritime security.

- Relations with the European Union
- A “comprehensive approach” to crises
- Assistance for the refugee and migrant crisis in the Aegean Sea
- Resilience and Article 3
- Civil preparedness
- Cyber defence

IV. An Alliance of shared values

The world is changing, and NATO is changing with it. What remains unchanged is the strength of the transatlantic bond on which NATO is founded, and the solemn commitment of each Ally to the defence of all. The Alliance exists to protect its people, project stability and promote its values.

- The founding treaty
- NATO’s purpose
- Collective defence - Article 5
- Deterrence and defence
- Resilience and Article 3
- Strategic Concepts
- The consultation process and Article 4
- Consensus decision-making at NATO
Summit meetings

NATO summit meetings provide periodic opportunities for Heads of State and Government of member countries to evaluate and provide strategic direction for Alliance activities.

**Highlights**

- Summit meetings are often held at key moments in the Alliance’s evolution – they are not regular meetings, but important junctures in the Alliance’s decision-making process.
- Summits are used, for instance, to introduce new policy, invite new members into the Alliance, launch major initiatives and reinforce partnerships.
- They are meetings of the North Atlantic Council at its highest level possible – that of Heads of State and Government.
- Since 1949, there have been 26 NATO summits. The last one took place in Newport, Wales, the United Kingdom, 4-5 September 2014 and the next one will be hosted by Poland (Warsaw) in July 2016.
- NATO summits are always held in a NATO member country and are chaired by the NATO Secretary General.

**More background information**

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**Summit meeting agendas**

NATO summit meetings are effectively meetings of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) - the Alliance’s principal political decision-making body - at its highest level, that of Heads of State and Government.
Due to the political significance of summit meetings, agenda items typically address issues of overarching political or strategic importance. Items can relate to the internal functioning of the Alliance as well as NATO’s relations with external partners.

### Major decisions

Many of NATO's summit meetings can be considered as milestones in the evolution of the Alliance. For instance, the first post-Cold War summit was held in London, in 1990, and outlined proposals for developing relations with Central and Eastern European countries. A year later, in Rome, NATO Heads of State and Government published a new Strategic Concept that reflected the new security environment. This document was issued as a public document for the first time ever. At the same summit, NATO established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council – a forum that officially brought together NATO and partner countries from Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus.

The 1997 Madrid and Paris Summits invited the first countries of the former Warsaw Pact – the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – to join NATO, and established partnerships between NATO and Russia and Ukraine, while the 2002 Prague Summit saw major commitments to improving NATO's capabilities and transformed the military command structure.

These are just a few of the many decisions that have been taken over the decades (a full summary of all NATO summit meetings can be found below under “Previous summit meetings”).

### Implementation of summit decisions

Typically, the decisions taken at a summit meeting are issued in declarations and communiqués. These are public documents that explain the Alliance's decisions and reaffirm Allies' support for aspects of NATO policies.

The decisions are then translated into action by the relevant actors, according to the area of competency and responsibility: the NAC’s subordinate committees and NATO’s command structure, which cover the whole range of the Organization's functions and activities.

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### Timing and location

#### Timing

Summits are convened upon approval by the NAC at the level of Permanent Representatives (or Ambassadors) or foreign and defence ministers. They are usually called on an ad-hoc basis, as required by the evolving political and security situation.

From the founding of NATO until the end of the Cold War – over 40 years – there were ten summit meetings. Since 1990, their frequency has increased considerably in order to address the changes brought on by the new security challenges. In total, 26 summit meetings have taken place since 1949.

#### Location

NATO summit meetings are held in one of the member countries, including Belgium, at NATO HQ. Members volunteer to host a summit meeting and, after evaluating all offers, the NAC makes the final decision concerning the location.

In recent years, summit locations have held some thematic significance. For example, the Washington Summit of 1999 commemorated the 50th anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in that city. Istanbul – which hosted a summit meeting in 2004 – connects Europe and Asia and is where the Alliance launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. This initiative is intended to foster linkages between NATO and the broader Middle East.
Previous summit meetings

The first time that Heads of State and Government from NATO countries met was at the actual signing ceremony of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949, but this was not a summit meeting. The first summit meeting was held eight years later, in Paris in 1957, and subsequent summits occurred at key junctures in the history of the Alliance.

Paris, 16-19 December 1957
Reaffirmation of the principal purposes and unity of the Atlantic alliance; Improvements in the coordination and organisation of NATO forces and in political consultation arrangements; Recognition of the need for closer economic ties and for cooperation in the spirit of Article 2 of the Treaty, designed to eliminate conflict in international policies and encourage economic collaboration (Report of the Committee of the Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO, the so-called report of the Three Wise Men).

Brussels, 26 June 1974
Signature of the Declaration on Atlantic Relations adopted by NATO foreign ministers in Ottawa on 19 June, confirming the dedication of Allies to the aims and ideals of the Treaty in the 25th anniversary of its signature; Consultations on East-West relations in preparation for US-USSR summit talks on strategic nuclear arms limitations.

Brussels, 29-30 May 1975
Affirmation of the fundamental importance of the Alliance and of Allied cohesion in the face of international economic pressures following the 1974 oil crisis; Support for successful conclusion of negotiations in the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) (to result in 1975 in the signing of the Helsinki Final Act).

London, 10-11 May 1977
Initiation of study on long-term trends in East-West relations and of a long-term defence programme (LTDP) aimed at improving the defensive capability of NATO member countries.

Washington D.C., 30-31 May 1978
Review of interim results of long-term initiatives taken at the 1977 London Summit; Confirmation of the validity of the Alliance’s complementary aims of maintaining security while pursuing East-West détente; Adoption of three per cent target for growth in defence expenditures.

Bonn, 10 June 1982
Accession of Spain; Adoption of the Bonn Declaration setting out a six-point Programme for Peace in Freedom; Publication of a statement of Alliance’s goals and policies on arms control and disarmament and a statement on integrated NATO defence.

Brussels, 21 November 1985
Special meeting of the North Atlantic Council for consultations with US President Reagan on the positive outcome of the US-USSR Geneva Summit on arms control and other areas of cooperation.

Brussels, 2-3 March 1988
Reaffirmation of the purpose and principles of the Alliance (reference to the Harmel Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance published in 1967) and of its objectives for East-West relations; Adoption of a blue print for strengthening stability in the whole of Europe through conventional arms control negotiations.

Brussels, 29-30 May 1989
Declaration commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Alliance setting out Alliance policies and security objectives for the 1990s aimed at maintaining Alliance defence, introducing new arms control initiatives, strengthening political consultation, improving East-West cooperation and meeting global challenges; Adoption of a Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament.

Brussels, 4 December 1989
Against the background of fundamental changes in Central and Eastern Europe and the prospect of the end of the division of Europe, US President Bush consults with Alliance leaders following his summit
meeting with Soviet President Gorbachev in Malta. While the NATO summit meeting is taking place, Warsaw Pact leaders denounce the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and repudiate the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty.

London, 5-6 July 1990
Publication of the London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, outlining proposals for developing cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe across a wide spectrum of political and military activities including the establishment of regular diplomatic liaison with NATO.

Rome, 7-8 November 1991
Publication of several key documents: the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept, the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation and statements on developments in the Soviet Union and the situation in Yugoslavia.

Brussels, 10-11 January 1994
Launching of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative; All North Atlantic Cooperation Council partner countries and members of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) are invited to participate; Publication of the PfP Framework Document; Endorsement of the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) and other measures to develop the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI); Reaffirmation of Alliance readiness to carry out air strikes in support of United Nations objectives in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Paris, 27 May 1997
Signing of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Founding Act states that NATO and Russia are no longer adversaries and establishes the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.

Madrid, 8-9 July 1997
Invitations to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks; Reaffirmation of NATO’s Open Door Policy; Recognition of achievement and commitments represented by the NATO-Russia Founding Act; Signature of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine; First meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) at summit level that replaces the North Atlantic Cooperation Council; An enhanced PfP; Updating of the 1991 Strategic Concept and adoption of a new defence posture; Reform of the NATO military command structure; Special Declaration on Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Washington D.C., 23-24 April 1999
Commemoration of NATO’s 50th Anniversary; Allies reiterate their determination to put an end to the repressive actions by Yugoslav President Milosevic against the local ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo; The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland participate in their first summit meeting; Adoption of the Membership Action Plan; Publication of a revised Strategic Concept; Enhancement of the European Security and Defence Identity within NATO; Launch of the Defence Capabilities Initiative; Strengthening of the PfP and the EAPC, as well as the Mediterranean Dialogue; Launch of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Initiative.

Rome, 28 May 2002
NATO Allies and the Russian Federation create the NATO-Russia Council, where they meet as equal partners, bringing a new quality to NATO-Russia relations. The NATO-Russia Council replaces the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.

Prague, 21-22 November 2002
Invitation of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to begin accession talks; Adoption of measures to improve military capabilities (The Prague Capabilities Commitment, the NATO Response Force and the streamlining of the military command structure); Adoption of a Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism; Decision to support NATO member countries in Afghanistan; Endorsement of a package of initiatives to forge new relationships with partners.
Istanbul, 28-29 June 2004
Summit held at 26, with seven new members; Expansion of NATO’s operation in Afghanistan with the establishment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams throughout the country; Agreement to assist the Iraqi Interim Government with the training of its security forces; Maintaining support for stability in the Balkans; Decision to change NATO’s defence-planning and force-generation processes, while strengthening contributions to the fight against terrorism, including WMD aspects; Strengthening cooperation with partners and launch of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative with countries from the broader Middle East region.

Brussels, 22 February 2005
Leaders reaffirm their support for building stability in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq, and commit to strengthening the partnership between NATO and the European Union.

Riga, 28-29 November 2006
Review of progress in Afghanistan in light of the expansion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the entire country and call for broader international engagement; Confirmation that the Alliance is prepared to play its part in implementing the security provisions of a settlement on the status of Kosovo; Measures adopted to further improve NATO’s military capabilities; NATO Response Force declared operational; Comprehensive Political Guidance published; Initiatives adopted to deepen and extend relations with partners; Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia invited to join PfP.

Bucharest, 2-4 April 2008
Allied leaders review the evolution of NATO’s main commitments: operations (Afghanistan and Kosovo); enlargement and the invitation of Albania and Croatia to start the accession process (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will also be invited as soon as ongoing negotiations over its name have led to an agreement); the continued development of military capabilities.

Strasbourg/ Kehl, 3-4 April 2009
Against the backdrop of NATO’s 60th anniversary, adoption of a Declaration on Alliance Security calling for a new Strategic Concept; adherence to basic principles and shared values, as well as the need for ongoing transformation; in-depth discussion on Afghanistan; welcoming of two new members: Albania and Croatia, and the pursuit of NATO’s open door policy (invitation extended to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia); France’s decision to fully participate in NATO structures and the impact of this decision on the Alliance’s relations with the European Union; NATO’s relations with Russia.

Lisbon, 19-20 November 2010
Publication of a new Strategic Concept; Transition to full Afghan security responsibility to start in 2011; Agreement on a long-term partnership with Afghanistan; Decision to develop a NATO missile defence system to protect populations and territory in Europe, in addition to deployed troops; Russia invited to cooperate as part of a “reset” of relations with NATO; Adoption of a comprehensive approach to crisis management, including a greater role in stabilisation and reconstruction and more emphasis on training and developing local forces; Continue to support arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, and maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces; Adoption of the Lisbon Capabilities Package; Agreement to develop a cyber defence policy and action plan; Reform of NATO’s military command structure and agencies; New impetus given to relations with partners and NATO’s partnership policy.

Chicago, 20-21 May 2012
NATO leaders set out a strategy to conclude the transition of security responsibility to Afghan forces by end 2014 and commit to a post-2014 mission to train, advise and assist Afghan forces; Talks on Afghanistan bring together over 60 countries and organisations in Chicago; Approval of the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review and adoption of a Defence Package and new policy guidelines on

1 Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
counter-terrorism; An Interim Ballistic Missile Capability was declared and initiatives taken in other key capability areas (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and air policing); Commitment to pursue cooperative security and engage with partners across the globe as well as countries that aspire to NATO membership.

Wales (Newport), 4-5 September 2014
Renewed commitment to the Transatlantic Bond and to a robust defence capability; Pledge to reverse defence cuts and adoption of a Readiness Action Plan, including a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force; Increased support to Ukraine in the wake of the crisis with Russia; Continued condemnation of Russia's illegal and illegitimate “annexation” of Crimea and destabilisation of eastern Ukraine; Strengthened relations with partners through the Partnership Interoperability Initiative and the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative; Reassertion of NATO's commitment to Afghanistan through the Resolute Support Mission, financial contributions to the Afghan National Security Forces, and the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership; Tribute to the Armed Forces as NATO marks its 65th anniversary and two decades of operations on land, sea and air.

Organising and holding these events
NATO summit meetings are centred on the activities of the North Atlantic Council (NAC or Council). As with all NAC meetings, the Secretary General chairs them and plays an important role in coordination and deliberations to help members reach consensus on the issues at hand.

As with meetings at the levels of Permanent Representatives and ministers, the work of the NAC is prepared by subordinate committees with responsibility for specific areas of policy. The Deputies Committee, which consists of Deputy Permanent Representatives, is responsible for drafting declarations and communiqués after meetings of heads of state and government, as well as foreign and defence ministers.

Other aspects of political work may be handled by the Political Committee and the Partnerships and Cooperative Security Committee. Depending on the topic under discussion, the respective senior committee with responsibility for the subject assumes the lead role in preparing Council meetings and following up Council decisions.

Support to the Council is provided by the Secretary of the Council, who is also Director of the ministerial and summit meeting task forces. The Secretary of the Council ensures that NAC mandates are executed and its decisions recorded and circulated. A small Council Secretariat ensures the bureaucratic and logistical aspects of the Council’s work, while the relevant divisions of the International Staff support the work of committees reporting to the NAC.

Participation
NATO summit meetings normally involve member countries only. However, on occasion, and provided Allies agree, meetings can be convened in other formats. They include, for instance, meetings of defence or foreign ministers, heads of state and government of countries belonging to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Russia Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission or the NATO-Georgia Commission. They can also include leaders from countries contributing troops to a NATO-led operation, as was the case for ISAF troop-contributing countries at the 2010 Lisbon Summit or top representatives from international organisations such as the United Nations, the European Union or the World Bank.
Member countries

At present, NATO has 28 members. In 1949, there were 12 founding members of the Alliance: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. The other member countries are: Greece and Turkey (1952), Germany (1955), Spain (1982), the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (1999), Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia (2004), and Albania and Croatia (2009).

Highlights

- Provision for enlargement is given by Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
- Article 10 states that membership is open to any "European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area".
- Any decision to invite a country to join the Alliance is taken by the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s principal political decision-making body, on the basis of consensus among all Allies.
- Currently, Montenegro has started accession talks and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹ are aspiring members.

¹ Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
## More background information

### Alphabetical list of NATO member countries

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### About member countries and their accession

#### The founding members

On 4 April 1949, the foreign ministers from 12 countries signed the North Atlantic Treaty (also known as the Washington Treaty) at the Departmental Auditorium in Washington, D.C.: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Within the following five months of the signing ceremony, the Treaty was ratified by the parliaments of the interested countries, sealing their membership.

**The 12 signatories**

Some of the foreign ministers who signed the Treaty were heavily involved in NATO’s work at a later stage in their careers:

- Belgium: M. Paul-Henri Spaak (NATO Secretary General, 1957-1961);
- Canada: Mr Lester B. Pearson (negotiated the Treaty and was one of the “Three Wise Men”, who drafted the report on non-military cooperation in NATO, published in 1956 in the wake of the Suez Crisis);
- Denmark: Mr Gustav Rasmussen;
- France: M. Robert Schuman (architect of the European institutions, who also initiated the idea of a European Defence Community);
- Iceland: Mr Bjarni Benediktsson;
- Italy: Count Carlo Sforza;
- Luxembourg: M. Joseph Bech;
- the Netherlands: Dr D.U. Stikker (NATO Secretary General, 1961-1964);
- Norway: Mr Halvard M. Lange (one of the “Three Wise Men”, who drafted the report on non-military cooperation in NATO);
- Portugal: Dr Jose Caerio da Matta;
- the United Kingdom: Mr Ernest Bevin (main drive behind the creation of NATO and as Foreign Secretary from 1945 to 1951, he attended the first formative meetings of the North Atlantic Council);
in the United States: Mr Dean Acheson (as US Secretary of State from 1949 to 1953, he attended and chaired meetings of the North Atlantic Council).

_Flexibility of NATO membership_

On signing the Treaty, countries voluntarily commit themselves to participating in the political consultations and military activities of the Organization. Although each and every signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty is subject to the obligations of the Treaty, there remains a certain degree of flexibility which allows members to choose how they participate. The memberships of Iceland and France, for instance, illustrate this point.

**Iceland**

When Iceland signed the Treaty in 1949, it did not have — and still does not have — armed forces. There is no legal impediment to forming them, but Iceland has chosen not to have any. However, Iceland has a Coast Guard, national police forces, an air defence system and a voluntary expeditionary peacekeeping force. Since 1951, Iceland has also benefitted from a long-standing bilateral defence agreement with the United States. In 2006, US forces were withdrawn but the defence agreement remains valid. Since 2008, air policing has been conducted on a periodic basis by NATO Allies.

**France**

In 1966, President Charles de Gaulle decided to withdraw France from NATO’s integrated military structure. This reflected the desire for greater military independence, particularly vis-à-vis the United States, and the refusal to integrate France’s nuclear deterrent or accept any form of control over its armed forces.

In practical terms, while France still fully participated in the political instances of the Organization, it was no longer represented on certain committees, for instance, the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group. This decision also led to the removal of French forces from NATO commands and foreign forces from French territory. The stationing of foreign weapons, including nuclear weapons, was also banned. NATO’s political headquarters (based in Paris since 1952), as well as the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe or SHAPE (in Rocquencourt since 1951) moved to Belgium.

Despite France’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military structure, two technical agreements were signed with the Alliance, setting out procedures in the event of Soviet aggression. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, France has regularly contributed troops to NATO’s military operations, making it one of the largest troop-contributing states. It is also NATO’s fourth-biggest contributor to the military budget.

From the early 1990s onwards, France distanced itself from the 1966 decision with, for instance, its participation at the meetings of defence ministers from 1994 (Seville) onwards and the presence of French officers in Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation structures from 2003. At NATO’s Strasbourg/Kehl Summit in April 2009, France officially announced its decision to fully participate in NATO structures.

**The accession of Greece and Turkey**

Three years after the signing of the Washington Treaty, on 18 February 1952, Greece and Turkey joined NATO. This enabled NATO to reinforce its “southern flank”.

At a time when there was a fear of communist expansion throughout Europe and other parts of the world (Soviet support of the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950), extending security to southeastern Europe was strategically important. Not only did NATO membership curb communist influence in Greece – a country recovering from civil war – but it also relieved Turkey from Soviet pressure for access to key strategic maritime routes.

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2 However, France has chosen not to become a member of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group.
The accession of Germany

Germany became a NATO member on 6 May 1955. This was the result of several years of deliberations among western leaders and Germany, whose population opposed any form of rearmament.

Following the end of the Second World War, ways of integrating the Federal Republic of Germany into west European defence structures was a priority. The Federal Republic of Germany - or West Germany - was created in 1949 and although the new state was anchored to the west, its potential was feared. Initially, France proposed the creation of a European Defence Community – a European solution to the German question. However, the French Senate opposed the plan and the proposal fell through leaving NATO membership as the only viable solution. Three conditions needed to be fulfilled before this could happen: post-war victors (France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union) had to end the occupation of the Federal Republic of Germany; Italy and West Germany needed to be admitted to the Western Union Defence Organisation (the military agency of the Western Union) and then there was the accession procedure itself.

When Germany joined the Western Union, the latter changed its name to become the Western European Union. This accession, together with the termination of the Federal Republic of Germany's status as an occupied country, was bringing the country closer to NATO membership. The Federal Republic of Germany officially joined the Western Union on 23 October 1954 and its status as an occupied country came to an end when the Bonn-Paris conventions came into effect on 5 May 1955. The next day, it became NATO's 15th member country.

With the reunification of Germany on 3 October 1990, the Länder of the former German Democratic Republic joined the Federal Republic of Germany in its membership of NATO.

The accession of Spain

Spain joined the Alliance on 30 May 1982 despite considerable public opposition. The end of Franco's dictatorship in 1975, the military coup in 1981 and the rise of the Socialist Party (PSOE), the leading opposition party which was initially against NATO accession, made for a difficult social and political context, both nationally and internationally.

Spain fully participated in the political instances of the Organization, but refrained from participating in the integrated military structure - a position it reaffirmed in a referendum held in 1986. With regard to the military aspects, it was present as an observer on the Nuclear Planning Group; reserved its position on participation in the integrated communication system; maintained Spanish forces under Spanish command and did not accept to have troops deployed outside of Spain for long periods of time. Nevertheless, Spanish forces would still be able to operate with other NATO forces in an emergency.

Spain's reservations gradually diminished. The Spanish Parliament endorsed the country's participation in the integrated military command structure in 1996, a decision that coincided with the nomination of Dr Javier Solana as NATO's first Spanish Secretary General (1995-1999).

The first wave of post-Cold War enlargement

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact after the end of the Cold War opened up the possibility of further NATO enlargement. Some of the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe were eager to become integrated into Euro-Atlantic institutions.

In 1995, the Alliance carried out and published the results of a Study on NATO Enlargement that considered the merits of admitting new members and how they should be brought in. It concluded that the end of the Cold War provided a unique opportunity to build improved security in the entire Euro-Atlantic area and that NATO enlargement would contribute to enhanced stability and security for all.

The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were invited to begin accession talks at the Alliance’s Madrid Summit in 1997 and on 12 March 1999 they became the first former members of the Warsaw Pact to join NATO.
Drawing heavily on the experience gained during this accession process, NATO launched the Membership Action Plan - or MAP - at the Washington Summit in April 1999. The MAP was established to help countries aspiring to NATO membership in their preparations, even if it did not pre-judge any decisions.

The second wave of post-Cold War enlargement

Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia were invited to begin accession talks at the Alliance’s Prague Summit in 2002. On 29 March 2004, they officially became members of the Alliance, making this the largest wave of enlargement in NATO history.

All seven countries had participated in the MAP before acceding to NATO.

The accession of Albania and Croatia

The most recent accessions are those of Albania and Croatia. Albania had participated in the MAP since its inception in 1999 and Croatia joined in 2002. They worked with NATO in a wide range of areas, with particular emphasis on defence and security sector reform, as well as support for wider democratic and institutional reform.

In July 2008, they both signed Accession Protocols and became official members of the Alliance on 1 April 2009.
Partners

NATO cooperates with a range of international organisations and countries in different structures. Below is a list of these partners with links to web pages on their relations with NATO as well as links to their information servers.

- **Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)**

  The EAPC consists of all NATO member countries and the following partner countries:

  ![Diagram of partner countries and structures]

  1. Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
**NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue**

The following seven countries of the Mediterranean region are currently involved:

![Diagram showing involvement of Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia.](image)

**Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)**

To date, the following four countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council have joined:

![Diagram showing involvement of Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and United Arab Emirates.](image)
**Partners across the globe**

In addition to its formal partnerships, NATO cooperates with a range of countries which are not part of these structures. Often referred to as “Partners across the globe”, these countries develop cooperation with NATO in areas of mutual interest, including emerging security challenges, and some contribute actively to NATO operations either militarily or in some other way.

**International organisations**

In addition to its partnerships with countries, NATO cooperates with a range of international organisations.

- European Union (EU) - http://europa.eu

**Legend**

- **1St**: Parliament, 1st Chamber
- **Sen**: Senate, 2nd Chamber
- **GOV**: Government
- **PM**: Prime Minister
- **MFA**: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- **MoD**: Ministry/Department of Defence
- **ML**: Military / Chief of Staff
- **DEL**: National Mission or Delegation to NATO
- **Inf**: Information Centre
NATO Secretary General

The Secretary General is the Alliance’s top international civil servant. This person is responsible for steering the process of consultation and decision-making in the Alliance and ensuring that decisions are implemented.

Highlights

- The Secretary General is NATO’s top international civil servant and has three principal roles.
- He/she chairs all major committees and is responsible for steering discussions, facilitating the decision-making process and ensuring that decisions are implemented.
- He/she is the Organization’s chief spokesperson.
- He/she is at the head of the International Staff, whose role it is to support the Secretary General directly and indirectly.
- The person is nominated by member governments for an initial period of four years, which can be extended by mutual consent.
- The post is currently held by Jens Stoltenberg, former Prime Minister of Norway, who took up his responsibilities on 1 October 2014.

Three principal responsibilities

- Chairman of the North Atlantic Council and other key bodies

First and foremost, the Secretary General chairs the North Atlantic Council - the Alliance’s principal political decision-making body - as well as other senior decision-making committees. These include the Nuclear Planning Group, the NATO-Russia Council and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Additionally, together with a Ukrainian representative, he is the chairman of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, as well as the chairman of the NATO-Georgia Commission.
Above and beyond the role of chairman, the Secretary General has the authority to propose items for discussion and use his good offices in case of disputes between member states. He acts as a decision facilitator, leading and guiding the process of consensus-building and decision-making throughout the Alliance.

He maintains direct contact with heads of state and government, foreign and defence ministers in NATO and partner countries, in order to facilitate this process. This entails regular visits to NATO and partner countries, as well as bilateral meetings with senior national officials when they visit NATO Headquarters.

Effectively, his role allows him to exert some influence on the decision-making process while respecting the fundamental principle that the authority for taking decisions is invested only in the member governments themselves.

- **Principal spokesperson**

  The Secretary General is also the principal spokesman of the Alliance and represents the Alliance in public on behalf of the member countries, reflecting their common positions on political issues.

  He also represents NATO vis-à-vis other international organisations as well as to the media and the public at large. To this end the Secretary General regularly holds press briefings and conferences as well as public lectures and speeches.

- **Head of the International Staff**

  Third and lastly, the Secretary General is the senior executive officer of the NATO International Staff, responsible for making staff appointments and overseeing its work.

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### Support to the Secretary General

In his day-to-day work, the Secretary General is directly supported by a Private Office and a Deputy Secretary General, who assists the Secretary General and replaces him in his absence. The Deputy Secretary General is also the chairman of a number of senior committees, ad hoc groups and working groups.

More generally speaking, the entire International Staff at NATO Headquarters supports the Secretary General, either directly or indirectly.

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### The selection process

The Secretary General is a senior statesman from a NATO member country, appointed by member states for a four-year term. The selection is carried through informal diplomatic consultations among member countries, which put forward candidates for the post.

No decision is confirmed until consensus is reached on one candidate. At the end of his term, the incumbent might be offered to stay on for a fifth year.

The position has traditionally been held by a European statesman.
Relations with Russia

For more than two decades, NATO has strived to build a partnership with Russia, developing dialogue and practical cooperation in areas of common interest. Cooperation has been suspended in response to Russia's military intervention in Ukraine, which the Allies condemn in the strongest terms. Political and military channels of communication remain open. NATO remains concerned by Russia's continued destabilising pattern of military activities and aggressive rhetoric, which goes well beyond Ukraine.

Highlights

- Relations started after the end of the Cold War, when Russia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1991) and the Partnership for Peace programme (1994).
- The 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act provided the formal basis for relations.
- Dialogue and cooperation were strengthened in 2002 with the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) to serve as a forum for consultation on current security issues and to direct practical cooperation in a wide range of areas.
- Russia's disproportionate military action in Georgia in August 2008 led to the suspension of formal meetings of the NRC and cooperation in some areas, until spring 2009. The Allies continue to call on Russia to reverse its recognition of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states.
- All practical civilian and military cooperation under the NRC with Russia was suspended in April 2014 in response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
At the Wales Summit in September 2014, NATO leaders condemned Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine and demanded that Russia comply with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities; end its illegal and illegitimate occupation ‘annexation’ of Crimea; refrain from aggressive actions against Ukraine; withdraw its troops; halt the flow of weapons, equipment, people and money across the border to the separatists; and stop fomenting tension along and across the Ukrainian border.

NATO is also concerned about Russia’s increasing military activities along NATO’s borders, which continues to make the Euro-Atlantic security environment less stable and predictable.

The NRC met on 20 April 2016, almost two years after its last meeting, to discuss the crisis in and around Ukraine; issues related to military activities, transparency and risk reduction, and to assess the security situation in Afghanistan.

NATO and Russia have profound and persistent disagreements; however, the Alliance does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to Russia.

More background information

Response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict

NATO followed developments in Ukraine closely from the beginning of the crisis, which has had serious implications for NATO-Russia relations.

After Russia’s illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the Alliance took immediate steps in terms of its relations with Russia. It suspended the planning for its first NATO-Russia joint mission and put the entire range of NATO-Russia cooperation under review. In April 2014, NATO foreign ministers decided to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia but to maintain political contacts at the level of ambassadors and above, to allow NATO and Russia to exchange views, first and foremost on this crisis (since the crisis began, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) has convened three times and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) twice). In June 2014, Allied ministers agreed to maintain the suspension of cooperation with Russia and this continues to today.

NATO has identified ways to transfer those cooperative projects that impact on third parties, in particular the NRC Counter-Narcotics Training Project, to other non-NRC mechanisms or structures.

At the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014, NATO leaders condemned in the strongest terms Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine and demanded that Russia stop and withdraw its forces from Ukraine and along the country’s border. NATO leaders also demanded that Russia comply with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities; end its illegitimate occupation of Crimea; refrain from aggressive actions against Ukraine; halt the flow of weapons, equipment, people and money across the border to the separatists; and stop fomenting tension along and across the Ukrainian border. They reaffirmed that NATO does not and will not recognise Russia’s illegal and illegitimate ‘annexation’ of Crimea.

At the Wales Summit in 2014, the Allies also noted that violence and insecurity in the region led to the tragic downing of Malaysia Airlines passenger flight MH17 on 17 July 2014. They said that those directly and indirectly responsible for the downing of MH17 should be held accountable and brought to justice as soon as possible.

Allies strongly support the settlement of the conflict in eastern Ukraine by diplomatic and peaceful means and welcome the ongoing diplomatic efforts in this regard. All signatories of the Minsk Agreements must comply with their commitments and ensure their full implementation. Russia has a significant responsibility in this regard.

For more than two decades, NATO has strived to build a partnership with Russia, including through the mechanism of the NRC, based upon the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and the 2002 Rome
Declaration. Russia has breached its commitments, as well as violated international law, breaking the trust at the core of its cooperation with NATO. The decisions NATO leaders took at Wales demonstrate their respect for the rules-based European security architecture.

The Allies continue to believe that a partnership between NATO and Russia, based on respect for international law, would be of strategic value. They continue to aspire to a cooperative, constructive relationship with Russia – including reciprocal confidence-building and transparency measures and increased mutual understanding of NATO’s and Russia’s non-strategic nuclear force postures in Europe – based on common security concerns and interests, in a Europe where each country freely chooses its future. They regret that the conditions for that relationship do not currently exist.

The Alliance does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to Russia, but it will not compromise on the principles on which the Alliance and security in Europe and North America rest.

At the 2014 Summit in Wales, the Alliance said that the nature of the Alliance’s relations with Russia and its aspiration for partnership will be contingent on seeing a clear, constructive change in Russia’s actions which demonstrates compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities.

Wider concerns about Russia’s behaviour

NATO’s concerns go well beyond Russia’s activities in Ukraine. Notably, Russia’s military activities particularly along NATO’s borders have increased. Russia’s behaviour continues to make the Euro-Atlantic security environment less stable and predictable, in particular its practice of calling snap exercises, deploying near NATO borders, conducting advanced training and exercises and violating Allied airspace.

Russia’s military intervention and considerable military presence in Syria have posed further risks for the Alliance. On 5 October 2015, in response to Russia’s military intervention in Syria, the Allies called on Russia to immediately cease their attacks on the Syrian opposition and civilians, to focus its efforts on fighting so-called Islamic State, and to promote a solution to the conflict through a political transition.

Allies stand united in condemning Russian violations and incursions in Turkish airspace in October and November 2015, expressing full solidarity with Turkey and support for its territorial integrity, and calling for calm and de-escalation.

The NRC met on 20 April 2016, almost two years after its last meeting in June 2014. Three important topics were discussed: 1) the crisis in and around Ukraine, including the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements; 2) issues related to military activities, transparency and risk reduction; 3) assessment of the security situation in Afghanistan, including the regional terrorist threat.

NATO and Russia have profound and persistent disagreements. NATO’s decision to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia remains in place. Political and military channels of communication, however, remain open. Dialogue is necessary among nations that share a common Euro-Atlantic space, including to reduce the risk of military incidents.

Key areas of cooperation prior to April 2014

- **Support for ISAF and the Afghan Armed Forces**

In spring 2008, Russia offered to support the NATO-led, UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan by facilitating the land transit of non-military equipment for ISAF contributors across Russian territory. Similar arrangements have been concluded with the other transit states, opening up this important supply route for ISAF. These arrangements were later amended to allow for land transit both to and from Afghanistan of non-lethal cargo (2010) and for multi-modal reverse transit, using a mix of rail and air transit (2012). These arrangements have expired with the end of the ISAF mission.
An NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund to help the Afghan Armed Forces to operate and maintain their helicopter fleet was officially launched in March 2011. It helped provide a much-needed maintenance and repair capacity, including spare parts and technical training. During the first phase of the project, financial and in-kind contributions to the project by ten NRC donor nations amounted to approximately US$23 million. Tailored training for Afghan Air Force helicopter maintenance staff started in April 2012 at the OAO Novosibirsk Aircraft Repair Plant in Russia, which served as the main training centre for Afghan maintenance personnel under the project. Some 40 Afghan helicopter maintenance staff had been trained under the project by the end of 2013.

The scope of the project was expanded with the launch of the second phase in April 2013: maintenance training, which had previously focused on the Mi-17s (medium-sized transport helicopters that can also act as gunships), was offered for Mi-35s (large helicopter gunship and attack helicopters with troop transport capability); critical spare parts were provided for the repair of seven Mi-35 helicopters that were non-operational; and new support was directed at developing the AAF’s medical evacuation capacity.

- **Counter-narcotics training of Afghan and Central Asian personnel**

The NRC Counter-Narcotics Training Project was launched in December 2005 to help address the threats posed by trafficking in Afghan narcotics. It sought to build local capacity and to promote regional networking and cooperation by sharing the combined expertise of NRC member states with mid-level officers from Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Pakistan became the seventh participating country in 2010.

The project was implemented in cooperation with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Along with the project’s seven beneficiary countries, this was a joint endeavour of 20 NRC countries as well as two non-NRC contributors (Finland, since 2007, and Ukraine, since 2012). The NRC countries participating in the project convened with representatives of Afghanistan, the Central Asian nations and Pakistan for High Level Steering Sessions, which ensured that the project continued to meet the countries’ counter-narcotics training needs.

Fixed training took place in one of four institutes either in Turkey, Russia or the United States and mobile courses were conducted in each of the seven participating countries. In 2013, the project also began work to encourage cross-border counter-narcotics training. This included supporting the UNODC’s work in establishing border liaison officers at existing border checkpoints between northern Tajikistan and southern Kyrgyzstan, and offering joint counter-narcotics training to Afghan and Pakistani officers. By July 2014, over 3,500 officers had been trained under the project.

After NATO-Russia cooperation was suspended in April 2014, NATO has begun to organise training again under a new NATO-UNODC Counter Narcotics Training Project for Central Asia, Afghan and Pakistani counter-narcotics officers.

- **Combating terrorism**

An NRC Action Plan on Terrorism was launched in December 2004 to improve overall coordination and provide strategic direction for cooperation in this area. NRC leaders underlined the continued importance of cooperation in the fight against terrorism at Lisbon in November 2010 and an updated Action Plan on Terrorism was approved in April 2011. A first NRC civil-military counter-terrorism tabletop exercise was conducted at NATO Headquarters in March 2012.

Regular exchanges of information and in-depth consultations took place within the NRC on various aspects of combating terrorism. Under the Cooperative Airspace Initiative (see also below), an information exchange system was developed to provide air traffic transparency and early notification of suspicious air activities to help prevent terrorist attacks such as the 9/11 attacks on the United States.

In the scientific and technical field, NATO and Russia worked together on the STANDEX project, a flagship initiative which aimed to develop technology that would enable the stand-off detection of explosive devices in mass transport environments. Successful live trials of the technology took place in real time in
an underground station in a major European city in June 2013, marking the completion of the development and test phase of STANDEX – the result of four years of joint work between experts from Russia and NATO countries.

Countering improvised explosive devices was another important focus of cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Events facilitating the sharing of experiences in hosting and securing high-visibility events have also been held.

Over the years, several Russian ships were deployed in support of Operation Active Endeavour, NATO’s maritime operation against terrorism in the Mediterranean.

### Cooperative Airspace Initiative

The Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI) was aimed at preventing terrorists from using aircraft to launch attacks similar to those of 9/11. The CAI enabled the reciprocal exchange of air traffic data and the early notification of suspicious air activities. This facilitated air traffic transparency, predictability and interoperability in airspace management.

A total of around €10 million was invested in the CAI project by 13 NRC nations. Based on a feasibility study completed in 2005, implementation started in 2006 and the system reached its operational capability in December 2011. The operational readiness of the CAI system was demonstrated during live flying, real-time counter-terrorism exercises in June 2011 and September 2013. A simulated computer-based exercise to test and consolidate processes, procedures and capabilities took place in November 2012.

The CAI system consisted of two coordination centres, in Moscow and in Warsaw, and local coordination sites in Russia (Murmansk, Kaliningrad, Rostov-on-Don) and in NATO member countries (Bodø, Norway; Warsaw, Poland; and Ankara, Turkey).

The NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA), formerly known as the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A), led the implementation of the NATO part of the CAI system and the software was procured from EUROCONTROL. Implementation of the Russian part of the system was led by the State Air Traffic Management Corporation, under the guidance of the Federal Air Navigation Authority. The Russian segment of the system was developed and supplied by the “Almaz-Antey” Concern.

### Theatre missile defence/ ballistic missile defence

Cooperation in the area of theatre missile defence (TMD) was underway for a number of years to address the unprecedented danger posed to deployed forces by the increasing availability of ever more accurate ballistic missiles. A study was launched in 2003 to assess the possible levels of interoperability among the theatre missile defence systems of NATO Allies and Russia.

Between 2004 and 2006, three command post exercises were held in the United States, the Netherlands and in Russia. Computer-assisted exercises took place in Germany in 2008 and 2012. Together with the interoperability study, these exercises were intended to provide the basis for future improvements to interoperability and to develop mechanisms and procedures for joint operations in the area of theatre missile defence.

In December 2009, an NRC Missile Defence Working Group was established to build on the lessons learned from previous TMD cooperation and to exchange views on possible mutually beneficial cooperation on ballistic missile defence, based on a joint assessment of missile threats.

At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NRC leaders approved the joint ballistic missile threat assessment and agreed to discuss pursuing missile defence cooperation. They decided to resume TMD cooperation, which had been suspended in August 2008, and to develop a joint analysis of the future framework for missile defence cooperation.
At the 2012 Chicago Summit, Allied leaders stressed that NATO’s planned missile defence capability is not directed against Russia, nor will it undermine Russia’s strategic deterrent. It is intended to defend against potential threats from beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. These points were reaffirmed at the 2014 Wales Summit.

- **Non-proliferation and arms control**

The NRC developed dialogue on a growing range of issues related to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This resulted in concrete recommendations to strengthen existing non-proliferation arrangements and expert discussions on possible practical cooperation in the protection against nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Work was underway to assess global trends in WMD proliferation and their means of delivery, and to review areas in which NRC nations could work together politically to promote effective multilateral arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. In December 2011, for example, a Joint NRC Statement was agreed for the 7th Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

Over the years, the NRC also provided a forum for frank discussions on issues related to conventional arms control, such as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), the Open Skies Treaty and confidence- and security-building measures. A key priority for all NRC nations was to work towards the ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty. The Allies expressed concern over Russia’s unilateral “suspension” of its participation in the treaty in December 2007. At the Lisbon Summit, NRC leaders emphasised their strong support for the revitalisation and modernisation of the conventional arms control regime in Europe and their readiness to continue dialogue on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation issues of interest to the NRC. So Allies are concerned by Russia’s subsequent decision in March 2015 to suspend participation in the joint consultative group that meets in Vienna regularly to discuss the implementation of the CFE Treaty.

Another critical issue has arisen concerning the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. In July 2014, the United States briefed the North Atlantic Council on its determination that Russia is in violation of its obligations under the Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 to 5,500 kilometres, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles. The Treaty, which entered into force in 1988, was concluded to reduce threats to security and stability in Europe, in particular the threat of short-warning attack on targets of strategic importance. It has a special place in history, as it required the verifiable elimination of an entire class of missiles possessed by the United States and the former Soviet Union.

The INF Treaty remains a key element of Euro-Atlantic security -- one that benefits the security of all parties and must be preserved. At the Wales Summit in 2014, Allied leaders underlined that Russia should work constructively to resolve this critical treaty issue and preserve the viability of the INF Treaty by returning to full compliance in a verifiable manner.

- **Nuclear weapons issues**

In the nuclear field several seminars were held over the years to discuss nuclear doctrine and strategy, lessons learned from nuclear weapons incidents and accidents, and potential responses to the detection of improvised nuclear or radiological devices.

Between 2004 and 2007, experts and representatives from NRC countries also observed four nuclear weapon accident response field exercises, which took place in Russia and each of the nuclear weapon states of NATO (France, the United Kingdom and the United States). As a follow-on to these exercises, in June 2011, NRC countries participated in a tabletop exercise dealing with emergency response to a nuclear weapon incident. Such activities increased transparency, developed common understanding of nuclear weapon accident response procedures, and built confidence that the nuclear weapon states were fully capable of responding effectively to any emergency involving nuclear weapons.
Military-to-military cooperation

Since the NRC was established, military liaison arrangements have been enhanced, at the Allied Commands for Operations and for Transformation, as well as in Moscow. A key objective of military-to-military cooperation was to build trust, confidence and transparency, and to improve the ability of NATO and Russian forces to work together in preparation for possible future joint military operations. Areas of cooperation included logistics, combating terrorism, search and rescue at sea, countering piracy, theatre missile defence/missile defence and military academic exchanges – and related military activities.

Countering piracy

Countering piracy was one of the key areas of common interest and concern identified in the Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges approved at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010. Cooperation at the tactical level developed from late 2008 between Russian vessels and Allied ships deployed as part of Operation Ocean Shield, NATO’s counter-piracy operation off the Horn of Africa. At the operational level, regular meetings between staffs sought to enhance NATO-Russia maritime cooperation. Russian ships also used the training facilities of the NATO Maritime Interdiction Training Centre in Crete, Greece, to prepare for counter-piracy missions.

Submarine crew search and rescue

Work in the area of submarine crew search and rescue at sea grew steadily following the signing of a framework agreement on cooperation in this area in February 2003. Russia participated in three NATO-led search-and-rescue exercises between 2005 and 2011. In December 2013, a sea survival course for aircrews took place in Germany.

Defence transparency, strategy and reform

Aimed at building mutual confidence and transparency, dialogue took place under the NRC on doctrinal issues, strategy and policy, including their relation to defence reform, nuclear weapons issues, force development and posture.

Past initiatives launched in the area of defence reform focused on the evolution of the military, management of human and financial resources, reform of defence industries, managing the consequences of defence reform, and defence-related aspects of combating terrorism.

From 2002 to 2008, a NATO-Russia Resettlement Centre helped facilitate the integration of former Russian military personnel into civilian life by providing information regarding job search and resettlement, professional courses for trainees, job placement services, and English-language and management courses for small and medium-sized enterprises. Initially set up in Moscow, its operations were gradually expanded into the regions. Over the project’s lifetime, around 2,820 former military personnel from the Russian armed forces were retrained and over 80 per cent found civilian employment as a result of the retraining or job placement assistance.

Defence industrial cooperation

A broad-based “Study on NATO-Russia Defence Industrial and Research and Technological Cooperation”, launched in January 2005 and completed in 2007, concluded that there was potential in combining scientific and technological capabilities to address global threats.

Logistics

Opportunities for logistics cooperation were pursued on both the civilian and military side, including areas such as air transport, air-to-air refuelling, medical services and water purification. Meetings and seminars focused on establishing a sound foundation of mutual understanding in the field of logistics by promoting information sharing in areas such as logistic policies, doctrine, structures and lessons learned.
**Civil emergencies**

NATO and Russia cooperated between 1996 and 2014 to develop a capacity for joint action in response to civil emergencies, such as earthquakes and floods, and to coordinate detection and prevention of disasters before they occur. Moreover, a Russian proposal led to the establishment in 1998 of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre, which coordinates responses to disasters among all countries of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (the 28 NATO members and 22 partner countries).

Under the NRC, an important focus of cooperation was to develop capabilities to manage the consequences of terrorist attacks. Two disaster response exercises in Russia (2002, 2004) and another in Italy (2006) resulted in concrete recommendations for consequence management. A tabletop consequence-management exercise was hosted by Norway in 2010. More recent work focused on risk reduction, capacity-building and cooperation in the area of civil preparedness and consequence management related to high-visibility events.

**Scientific cooperation**

Russia was actively engaged with the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme from 1992. The programme enables close collaboration on issues of common interest to enhance the security of NATO and partner countries. By facilitating international efforts, in particular with a regional focus, it seeks to address emerging security challenges, support NATO-led operations and advance early warning and forecast for the prevention of disasters and crises.

Scientists and experts from Russia sought to address a wide range of security issues, notably in the fields of defence against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents, mine detection and counter-terrorism (including explosives detection such as the STANDEX project mentioned above). Two important projects focused on addressing environmental and security hazards in the Baltic regions – the first aimed to develop solutions for effective oil spill management; the second sought to establish a continuous risk monitoring assessment network to observe munitions dump sites in the Baltic Sea.

**Terminology and language training**

To facilitate better understanding of terms and concepts used by NATO and Russia, glossaries were developed on the entire spectrum of NATO-Russia cooperation. Following the publication in 2011 of an NRC Consolidated Glossary of Cooperation covering some 7,000 terms, additional glossaries were developed on missile defence, nuclear doctrine and strategies, helicopter maintenance, counter-piracy, ammunition demilitarization and counter-narcotics.

Language cooperation was expanded in 2011 with the launch of a project to harmonise language training for military and selected civilian experts at the Russian Ministry of Defence.

**Raising public awareness of the NRC**

An NRC web site (http://www.nato-russia-council.info/) was launched in June 2007 to increase public awareness of NRC activities. It was suspended in April 2014.

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**Framework for cooperation**

The 28 Allies and Russia are equal partners in the NRC, which was established in 2002. Until the suspension of activities in April 2014, the NRC provided a framework for consultation on current security issues and practical cooperation in a wide range of areas of common interest. Its agenda built on the basis for bilateral cooperation that was set out in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, which provided the formal basis for relations.

Cooperation between Russia and NATO member states was directed by the NRC and developed through various subordinate working groups and committees, as agreed in annual work programmes.
The driving force behind the NRC’s cooperation was the realisation that NATO and Russia shared strategic priorities and faced common challenges. At the Lisbon Summit, the 29 NRC leaders pledged to “work towards achieving a true strategic and modernised partnership based on the principles of reciprocal confidence, transparency, and predictability, with the aim of contributing to the creation of a common space of peace, security and stability.” They endorsed a Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges, which included Afghanistan, terrorism, piracy, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, as well as natural and man-made disasters.

To facilitate regular contacts and cooperation, Russia established a diplomatic mission to NATO in 1998. NATO opened an Information Office in Moscow in 2001 and a Military Liaison Mission in 2002.

### Milestones in relations

1991: Russia joins the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (later renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council), created as a forum for consultation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe following the end of the Cold War. The Soviet Union actually dissolves at the same time as the inaugural meeting of this body takes place.

1994: Russia joins the Partnership for Peace (PfP).

1996: Russian soldiers deploy as part of the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

27 May 1997: At a summit in Paris, Russian and Allied leaders sign the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security and establish the Permanent Joint Council (PJC)

1999: Russia suspends participation in the PJC for a few months because of NATO’s Kosovo air campaign.

June 1999: Russian peacekeepers deploy as part of the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo.

May 2000: Broader cooperation in the PJC resumes, following a meeting of NATO and Russian foreign ministers in Florence.

2001: The NATO Information Office opens in Moscow.

September 2001: President Putin is the first world leader to call the US President after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which underscore the need for concerted international action to address terrorism and other new security threats. Russia opens its airspace to the international coalition’s campaign in Afghanistan and shares relevant intelligence.

March 2001: A joint NATO-Russia Resettlement Centre is officially opened to help discharged Russian military personnel return to civilian life.

May 2002: NATO opens a Military Liaison Mission in Moscow.

28 May 2002: At a summit in Rome, Russian and Allied leaders sign a declaration on “NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality” and establish the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) to replace the PJC.

September 2002: Russia hosts a multinational disaster response exercise in Noginsk.

February 2003: NATO and Russia sign an agreement on submarine crew rescue.

April 2003: Russia announces that it will withdraw its troops from the NATO-led peacekeeping forces in the Balkans.

January 2004: NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer tries out a new hotline to the Russian defence minister.

March 2004: The first NRC theatre missile defence command post exercise takes place in Colorado Springs, United States.

June 2004: Russia hosts a multinational disaster response exercise in Kaliningrad.


28 June 2004: At an NRC meeting of foreign ministers in Istanbul, Russia offers to contribute a ship to NATO’s maritime counter-terrorist operation in the Mediterranean, Operation Active Endeavour.

December 2004: In the wake of several terrorist attacks in Russia, NRC foreign ministers approve a comprehensive NRC Action Plan on Terrorism.

December 2004: NRC foreign ministers issue a common statement concerning the conduct of the Ukrainian presidential elections.

March 2005: The second NRC theatre missile defence command post exercise takes place in the Netherlands.

April 2005: Russia signs the PfP Status of Forces Agreement (later ratified by the Russian parliament in May 2007).

June 2005: NRC defence ministers endorse a “Political-Military Guidance” aimed at developing, over time, interoperability between Russian and Allied forces at the strategic, operational and tactical command levels.

June 2005: Russia takes part in a major NATO search-and-rescue at sea exercise, Sorbet Royal.

December 2005: The NRC launches a pilot project on counter-narcotics training for Afghan and Central Asian personnel.

April 2006: NRC foreign ministers meeting in Sofia agree a set of priorities and recommendations to guide the NRC’s future work.

October 2006: The third NRC theatre missile defence command post exercise takes place in Moscow.

October 2006: An NRC civil emergency exercise takes place in Montelibretti, Italy.

September 2006: The first Russian frigate deploys to the Mediterranean to support Operation Active Endeavour.

September 2007: A second Russian frigate deploys in active support of Operation Active Endeavour.

January 2008: A computer-assisted exercise takes place in Germany under the NRC theatre missile defence project.

March 2008: In support of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan, Russia offers transit to ISAF contributors.

May 2008: Russia takes part in a major NATO search-and-rescue at sea exercise, Bold Monarch.

August 2008: Following Russia’s disproportionate military action in Georgia, formal meetings of the NRC and cooperation in some areas are suspended. Cooperation continues in key areas of common interest, such as counter-narcotics and the fight against terrorism.

December 2008: NATO foreign ministers agree to pursue a phased and measured approach to re-engagement with Russia.

March 2009: NATO foreign ministers decide to resume formal meetings and practical cooperation under the NRC.

December 2009: At the first formal NRC ministerial since the Georgia crisis, foreign ministers take steps to reinvigorate NRC cooperation and agree to launch a Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges.

June 2010: The NRC meets for the first time in a political advisory format in Rome for a two-day informal, off-the-record exchange of views on how to make the NRC a more substance-based forum.

September 2010: NRC foreign ministers meet in New York to chart the way forward in relations and cooperation.
November 2010: NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen visits Russia for meetings with President Dmitry Medvedev and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to prepare for the upcoming NRC summit meeting in Lisbon.

20 November 2010: At the Lisbon Summit, NRC leaders pledge to “work towards achieving a true strategic and modernised partnership”. They endorse a Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges and agree to resume cooperation in the area of theatre missile defence as well as to develop a comprehensive joint analysis of the future framework for broader missile defence cooperation. They also agree on a number of initiatives to assist in the stabilisation of Afghanistan and the wider region.

April 2011: NRC foreign ministers meet in Berlin to discuss the situation in Libya and Afghanistan, as well as ongoing work on outlining the future framework for missile defence cooperation between Russia and NATO. They launch the NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund to support the Afghan security forces’ helicopter fleet and approve an updated NRC Action Plan on Terrorism.

June 2011: For the first time in three years, the NRC defence ministers meet in Brussels to discuss a broad range of defence issues.

June 2011: A Russian submarine takes active part in NATO exercise “Bold Monarch 2011”.

June 2011: A joint exercise, Vigilant Skies 2011, demonstrates the operational readiness of the NRC Cooperative Airspace Initiative.

June 2011: NATO and Russia participate in a tabletop exercise dealing with a nuclear weapon incident scenario.

July 2011: The NRC meets in Sochi, Russia, and also meets Russian President Medvedev. NRC Ambassadors restate their commitment to pursuing cooperation on missile defence as well as cooperation in other security areas of common interest.

December 2011: NRC foreign ministers meet in Brussels to discuss international security issues and NRC practical cooperation, including on Afghanistan, counter-piracy and counter-terrorism. They approve the NRC Work Programme 2012 and announce that the Cooperative Airspace Initiative is ready to initiate operations.

March 2012: The fifth theatre missile defence computer-assisted exercise is conducted in Germany.

April 2012: A first civilian-military NRC counter-terrorism tabletop exercise is organised at NATO Headquarters.

April 2012: The first training course for Afghan Air Force helicopter maintenance staff gets underway in Novosibirsk under the NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund project.

April 2012: NRC foreign ministers meet in Brussels to discuss NRC practical cooperation.

21 May 2012: Russia sends a special representative to participate in a meeting on Afghanistan, involving nations contributing to ISAF, at NATO’s Chicago Summit.

November 2012: A simulated computer-based exercise tests the information exchange system of the NRC’s Cooperative Airspace Initiative.

December 2012: NRC foreign ministers agree to increase cooperation in key areas under the NRC Work Programme for 2013.

February 2013: NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen meets Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at NATO Headquarters to discuss implementation of the NRC Work Programme, as well as ways to advance the NATO-Russia dialogue on missile defence.

April 2013: NRC foreign ministers agree to launch the second phase of the NRC Trust Fund project for the maintenance of helicopters in Afghanistan and discuss plans for cooperation in other areas in 2013. They also exchange views on progress in the NATO-led Afghan mission and on other regional and global security issues, including Syria, North Korea and missile defence.
June 2013: Technology for the remote, real-time detection of explosives is successfully tested live in an underground station in a major European city, marking the completion of the development and test phase of the Stand-off Detection of Explosives (STANDEX) project.

September 2013: Under the Cooperative Airspace Initiative, a live counter-terrorism exercise takes place in the skies over Poland, Russia and Turkey involving fighter aircraft, military personnel and command centres from the Arctic to the Black Sea.

October 2013: NRC defence ministers exchange views on pressing events on the international agenda, including Syria, and transparency on military exercises. They also discuss ways to widen practical cooperation including plans to work together to dispose of excess ammunition in Russia, possibly through a new NRC Trust Fund project.

2 March 2014: NATO condemns Russia’s military escalation in Crimea and expresses its grave concern regarding the authorisation by the Russian parliament for the use of Russian armed forces on the territory of Ukraine.

16 March 2014: NATO member states declare that they do not recognise the results of the so-called referendum held in Ukraine’s Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which is both illegal and illegitimate, violating the Ukrainian Constitution and international law.

1 April 2014: NATO foreign ministers urge Russia to take immediate steps to return to compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities, and to engage immediately in a genuine dialogue towards a political and diplomatic solution that respects international law and Ukraine’s internationally recognised borders. They decide to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and Russia.

24 June 2014: NATO foreign ministers agree to maintain the suspension of practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia. Any decision to resume cooperation will be conditions-based.

5 September 2014: At the Wales Summit, NATO leaders demand that Russia stop and withdraw its forces from Ukraine and along the country’s border. They express their deepest concern that the violence and insecurity in the region caused by Russia and the Russian-backed separatists are resulting in a deteriorating humanitarian situation and material destruction in eastern Ukraine. The Allies approve the NATO Readiness Action Plan – a comprehensive package of necessary measures to respond to the changes in the security environment on NATO’s borders and further afield.

16 September 2014: The NATO Secretary General states that NATO does not recognise the reported elections held on 14 September in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Ukraine, calling on Russia to reverse its illegal and illegitimate “annexation” of Crimea.

31 October 2014: NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg states that the planned ‘elections’ organised by self-appointed and armed rebel groups in parts of Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions, due to take place on 2 November, undermine efforts towards a resolution of the conflict, violating Ukrainian laws and running directly counter to the Minsk agreements co-signed among others by the two self-proclaimed ‘republics’ and by Russia.

24 November 2014: The NATO Secretary General states that NATO fully supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognised borders and that the Allies do not recognise the so-called treaty on alliance and strategic partnership signed between the Georgian region of Abkhazia and Russia.

18 March 2015: The NATO Secretary General states that NATO does not recognise the so-called treaty on alliance and integration signed between the Georgian region of South Ossetia and Russia on 18 March.
13 May 2015: NATO foreign ministers meet in Antalya, Turkey, to review the security challenges to the East and the South; the NATO Secretary General calls for the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements in Ukraine, calling on Russia to stop supporting the separatists and to withdraw all its forces from eastern Ukraine.

25 June 2015: NATO defence ministers emphasise that Russia is challenging Euro-Atlantic security through military action, coercion and intimidation of its neighbours. They express continued concern about Russia’s aggressive actions, while reaffirming strong commitment to an independent, peaceful and prosperous Ukraine and firm support to its territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders.

19 August 2015: NATO Allies express serious concern about the recent sharp escalation of violence in eastern Ukraine, stressing the need for all parties to de-escalate tensions and exercise restraint. Allies underline that the focus must be on pursuing a solution through diplomatic means, the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements being the path to peace. They emphasise that Russia has a special responsibility to find a political solution, calling any attempt by the Russian-backed separatists to take over more of Ukraine’s territory as unacceptable to the international community.

5 October 2015: The North Atlantic Council meets to hold consultations on the potential implications of the dangerous military actions of Russia in and around Syria. In a statement, Allies express their deep concern with regard to the Russian military build-up in Syria, calling on Russia to immediately cease its attacks on the Syrian opposition and civilians, to focus its efforts on fighting so-called Islamic State, and to promote a solution to the conflict through political transition. Allies strongly protest Russian violations of Turkish sovereign airspace on 3 October and 4 October and note the extreme danger of such irresponsible behaviour, calling on the Russia to cease and desist, and to immediately explain these violations.

24 November 2015: At an extraordinary North Atlantic Council meeting, NATO Ally Turkey informs Allies about the downing of a Russian Air Force plane violating Turkish airspace. The Secretary General expresses concerns about the implications of the military actions of Russia close to NATO’s borders and reiterates full solidarity with Turkey and support to its territorial integrity, calling for calm and de-escalation.

2 December 2015: After NATO foreign ministers meet, the Secretary General notes that challenges posed by Russia’s actions in the Euro-Atlantic area will be with us for a long time, adding that Allies expressed regret at the decline in military transparency in Europe over the last decade, and noting that the Allies’ priority now is to work to restore predictability in our relations. The Secretary General underlines that it is important to step up work on transparency and risk reduction, including through intensive efforts to reach agreement on a substantive update of the OSCE Vienna Document.

30 January 2016: The NATO Secretary General calls on Russia to act responsibly and fully respect NATO airspace after a Russian combat aircraft violated Turkish airspace on 29 January 2016, despite repeated warnings by the Turkish authorities. The Secretary General urges Russia to take all necessary measures to ensure that such violations do not happen again.

20 April 2016: Following the meeting of the NRC, the Secretary General emphasises the necessity and usefulness of political dialogue among nations that share the same Euro-Atlantic area, especially in times of tensions. However, he makes clear this does not constitute a return to business as usual. NRC Ambassadors discuss the crisis in and around Ukraine; issues related to military activities, transparency and risk reduction; and an assessment of the security situation in Afghanistan, including regional terrorist threats.
NATO-Russia relations: the facts

Since Russia began its illegal military intervention in Ukraine, Russian officials have accused NATO of a series of mythical provocations, threats and hostile actions stretching back over 25 years. This webpage sets out the facts.

Myths

- **NATO enlargement**
  - Claim: NATO’s Open Door policy creates new dividing lines in Europe and deepens existing ones
  - Claim: NATO invitation to Montenegro to start accession talks meets opposition in the country and is destabilizing
  - Claim: NATO enlargement in the Balkans is destabilizing
  - Claim: NATO tried to “drag” Ukraine into the Alliance
  - Claim: Russia has the right to demand a “100% guarantee” that Ukraine will not join NATO
  - Claim: NATO provoked the “Maidan” protests in Ukraine
  - Claim: NATO was planning to base ships and missiles in Crimea
  - Claim: NATO intends to set up a military base in Georgia
  - Claim: NATO has bases all around the world

- **NATO and its attitude to Russia**
  - Claim: NATO is trying to encircle Russia
  - Claim: NATO has a Cold War mentality
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  - Claim: NATO’s purpose is to contain or weaken Russia
– Claim: NATO has tried to isolate or marginalise Russia
– Claim: NATO should have been disbanded at the end of the Cold War
– Claim: NATO enlargement followed the same process as the expansion of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact

**NATO as a “threat”**
– Claim: NATO is a threat to Russia
– Claim: NATO missile defence targets Russia and the Iran agreement proves it
– Claim: The accession of new Allies to NATO threatens Russia
– Claim: NATO exercises are a provocation which threatens Russia

**Promises and pledges**
– Claim: Russia has the right to oppose NATO-supported infrastructure on the territory of member states in Central and Eastern Europe
– Claim: NATO’s response to Russia’s illegal actions in Ukraine violates the Founding Act
– Claim: NATO nuclear arrangements violate the Non-Proliferation Treaty
– Claim: NATO nuclear exercises violate the Non-Proliferation Treaty
– Claim: NATO leaders promised at the time of German reunification that the Alliance would not expand to the East

**NATO’s operations**
– Claim: NATO’s operation in Afghanistan was a failure
– Claim: The NATO-led mission in Afghanistan failed to stop the Afghan drugs trade
– Claim: NATO’s operation over Libya was illegitimate
– Claim: NATO’s operation over Kosovo was illegitimate
– Claim: The cases of Kosovo and Crimea are identical
– Claim: Russia’s annexation of Crimea was justified by the opinion of the International Court of Justice on the independence of Kosovo
– Claim: The Ukrainian authorities are illegitimate

### NATO enlargement

- **Claim: NATO’s Open Door policy creates new dividing lines in Europe and deepens existing ones**

**Fact:** NATO’s Open Door policy has helped close Cold War-era divisions in Europe. NATO enlargement has contributed to spreading democracy, security and stability further across Europe.

By choosing to adopt the standards and principles of NATO, aspirant countries gave their democracies the strongest possible anchor. And by taking the pledge to defend NATO, they received the pledge that NATO would protect them.

NATO membership is not imposed on countries. Each sovereign country has the right to choose for itself whether it joins any treaty or alliance.

This fundamental principle is enshrined in international agreements including the Helsinki Final Act which says that every state has the right “to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not
to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance. “And by signing the NATO-Russia Founding Act, Russia agreed to respect states’ “inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security.”

Over the past 65 years, 28 countries have chosen freely, and in accordance with their domestic democratic processes, to join NATO. Not one has asked to leave. This is their sovereign choice. Article 13 of the Washington Treaty specifically gives Allies the right to leave should they wish to.

- **Claim: NATO invitation to Montenegro to start accession talks meets opposition in the country and is destabilizing**

**Fact:** In December 2015 NATO Foreign Ministers invited Montenegro to begin accession talks to join the Alliance. This was a historic achievement, which will strengthen the security of Montenegro, the Western Balkans, and NATO.

Nobody forces a nation to join NATO. Membership is a national decision and free choice for sovereign countries. Candidate countries need to apply. And as always, all NATO members need to agree to it.

The question of NATO membership is an issue for Montenegro and for Montenegrins themselves. This principle also applies to national (country-specific) procedures for approving accession decisions. It is not a party political issue. It is a question of national interest.

Each country has a sovereign right to choose its own security arrangements. No third country has a right to interfere on the issue of NATO membership.

To join the Alliance nations are expected to respect the values of NATO and to meet demanding political, economic and military criteria.

Countries which joined the Alliance have been able to strengthen their democracy, boost their security and make their citizens safer. Enlargement has fostered stability and security in Europe and it has brought closer a Europe that is whole, free and at peace.

- **Claim: NATO enlargement in the Balkans is destabilizing**

**Fact:** All the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which have joined NATO over the past decade have enjoyed peace, security and cooperation with their neighbours since then.

The countries in the region which aspire to membership are conducting reforms to bring themselves closer to NATO standards. These reforms enhance democracy and security in each country.

The countries in the region have played a significant role in NATO’s operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo, providing training to the Afghan forces and helping to provide a safe and secure environment for all people in Kosovo. This is a direct contribution to stability in the broader Euro-Atlantic area.

- **Claim: NATO tried to “drag” Ukraine into the Alliance**

**Fact:** When the administrations of President Kuchma and President Yushchenko made clear their aspiration to NATO membership, the Alliance worked with them to encourage the reforms which would be needed to make that aspiration a reality.

When the administration of President Yanukovych opted for a non-bloc status, NATO respected that decision and continued to work with Ukraine on reforms, at the government’s request.

NATO respects the right of every country to choose its own security arrangements. In fact, Article 13 of the Washington Treaty specifically gives Allies the right to leave.

Over the past 65 years, 28 countries have chosen freely, and in accordance with their domestic democratic processes, to join NATO. Not one has asked to leave. This is their sovereign choice.
Claim: Russia has the right to demand a “100% guarantee” that Ukraine will not join NATO

Fact: According to Article I of the Helsinki Final Act (here) which established the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1975, every country has the right “to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance.” All the OSCE member states, including Russia, have sworn to uphold those principles.

In line with those principles, Ukraine has the right to choose for itself whether it joins any treaty of alliance, including NATO’s founding treaty.

Moreover, when Russia signed the Founding Act, it pledged to uphold “respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security”.

Thus Ukraine has the right to choose its own alliances, and Russia has, by its own repeated agreement, no right to dictate that choice.

Claim: NATO provoked the “Maidan” protests in Ukraine

Fact: The demonstrations which began in Kiev in November 2013 were born out of Ukrainians’ desire for a closer relationship with the European Union, and their frustration when former President Yanukovych halted progress toward that goal as a result of Russian pressure.

The protesters’ demands included constitutional reform, a stronger role for the parliament, the formation of a government of national unity, an end to the pervasive and endemic corruption, early presidential elections and an end to violence. There was no mention of NATO.

Ukraine began discussing the idea of abandoning its non-bloc status in September 2014, six months after the illegal and illegitimate Russian “annexation” of Crimea and the start of Russia’s aggressive actions in Eastern Ukraine. The final decision by Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada to abandon the non bloc status was taken in December 2014, over a year after the pro-EU demonstrations began.

Claim: NATO was planning to base ships and missiles in Crimea

Fact: This is fiction. The idea has never been proposed, suggested or discussed within NATO.

Claim: NATO intends to set up a military base in Georgia

Fact: NATO agreed at the Wales Summit to offer Georgia a substantial package of assistance to strengthen Georgia’s defence and interoperability capabilities with the Alliance. As agreed with Georgia, a training facility will be set up in Georgia to contribute to the training and interoperability of Georgian and Alliance personnel.

This is a training centre, not a military base.

This initiative will result in closer cooperation with Georgia’s sovereign and internationally-recognised government, and improved training and democratic control for its armed forces. As such, it will contribute to stability by making Georgia’s armed forces more professional, and by reinforcing the democratic controls over them.

Claim: NATO has bases all around the world

Fact: NATO’s military infrastructure outside the territory of Allies is limited to those areas in which the Alliance is conducting operations.

Thus the Alliance has military facilities in Afghanistan for the support of the Resolute Support mission, and in Kosovo for the KFOR mission.
NATO has civilian liaison offices in partner countries such as Georgia, Ukraine and Russia. These cannot be considered as “military bases”.

Individual Allies have overseas bases on the basis of bilateral agreements and the principle of host-nation consent, in contrast with Russian bases on the territory of Moldova (Transnistria), Ukraine (the Autonomous Republic of Crimea) and Georgia (the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia).

**NATO and its attitude to Russia**

- **Claim: NATO is trying to encircle Russia**

  **Fact:** This claim ignores the facts of geography. Russia’s land border is just over 20,000 kilometres long. Of that, 1,215 kilometres, or less than one-sixteenth, face current NATO members.

  Russia shares land borders with 14 countries (Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, China, North Korea). Only five of them are NATO members.

  Claims that NATO is building bases around Russia are similarly groundless. Outside the territory of NATO nations, NATO only maintains a significant military presence in three places: Kosovo, Afghanistan, and at sea off the Horn of Africa. All three operations are carried out under United Nations mandate, and thus carry the approval of Russia, along with all other Security Council members. Before Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine began, Russia provided logistical support to the Afghan mission, and cooperated directly with the counter-piracy operation, showing clearly that Russia viewed them as a benefit, not a threat.

  With respect to the permanent stationing of U.S. and other Allied forces on the territory of other Allies in Europe, NATO has full abided by the commitments made in the NATO-Russia Founding Act. There has been no permanent stationing of additional combat forces on the territory of other allies; and total force levels have, in fact, been substantially reduced since the end of the Cold War.

  NATO has partnership relationships with many countries in Europe and Asia, as can be seen from this interactive map. Such partnerships, which are requested by the partners in question, focus exclusively on issues agreed with them, such as disaster preparedness and relief, transparency, armed forces reform, and counter-terrorism. These partnerships cannot legitimately be considered a threat to Russia, or to any other country in the region, let alone an attempt at encirclement.

- **Claim: NATO has a Cold War mentality**

  **Fact:** The Cold War ended over 20 years ago. It was characterized by the opposition of two ideological blocs, the presence of massive standing armies in Europe, and the military, political and economic domination by the Soviet Union of almost all its European neighbours.

  The end of the Cold War was a victory for the people of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and opened the way to overcoming the division of Europe. At pathbreaking Summit meetings in the years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Russia played its part in building a new, inclusive European security architecture, including the Charter of Paris, the establishment of the OSCE, the creation of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

  Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has introduced sweeping changes to its membership and working practices – changes made clear by its adoption of new Strategic Concepts in 1999 and 2010. Accusations that NATO has retained its Cold War purpose ignore the reality of those changes.

  Over the same period, NATO reached out to Russia with a series of partnership initiatives, culminating in the foundation of the NATO-Russia Council in 2002. No other country has such a privileged relationship with NATO.
As stated by NATO heads of state and government at the Wales Summit in September 2014, “the Alliance does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to Russia. But we cannot and will not compromise on the principles on which our Alliance and security in Europe and North America rest.” (The Wales Summit Declaration can be read here).

This is NATO’s official policy, defined and expressed transparently by its highest level of leadership. As an organisation which is accountable to its member nations, NATO is bound to implement this policy.

- **Claim: NATO is a U.S. geopolitical project**

  **Fact:** NATO was founded in 1949 by twelve sovereign nations: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. It has since grown to 28 Allies who each took an individual and sovereign decision to join this Alliance.

  All decisions in NATO are taken by consensus, which means that a decision can only be taken if every single Ally accepts it.

  Equally, the decision for any country to take part in NATO-led operations falls to that country alone, according to its own legal procedures. No member of the Alliance can decide on the deployment of any other Ally’s forces.

- **Claim: NATO’s purpose is to contain or weaken Russia**

  **Fact:** NATO’s purpose is set out in the preamble to the Washington Treaty, the Alliance’s Founding document (online here).

  This states that Allies are determined “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.”

  In line with those goals, in the past two decades NATO has led missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, over Libya and off the Horn of Africa. The Alliance has conducted exercises from the Mediterranean to the North Atlantic and across Europe, and on issues ranging from counter-terrorism to submarine rescue - including with Russia itself.

  None of these activities can credibly be presented as directed against Russia.

- **Claim: NATO has tried to isolate or marginalise Russia**

  **Fact:** Since the early 1990s, the Alliance has consistently worked to build a cooperative relationship with Russia on areas of mutual interest.

  NATO began reaching out, offering dialogue in place of confrontation, at the London NATO Summit of July 1990 (declaration here). In the following years, the Alliance promoted dialogue and cooperation by creating new fora, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), open to the whole of Europe, including Russia (PfP founding documents here and here).

  After the conclusion of the Dayton Accords in 1995, Russian forces participated in the NATO-led operations to implement the peace agreement (IFOR and SFOR) and in the NATO-led operation to implement the peace in Kosovo (KFOR), under UN Security Council mandates.

  In 1997 NATO and Russia signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, creating the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. In 2002 they upgraded that relationship, creating the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). They reaffirmed their commitment to the Founding Act at NATO-Russia summits in Rome in 2002 and in Lisbon in 2010 (The Founding Act can be read here, the Rome Declaration which established the NRC here, the Lisbon NRC Summit Declaration here.)
Since the foundation of the NRC, NATO and Russia have worked together on issues ranging from counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism to submarine rescue and civil emergency planning. We set out to build a unique relationship with Russia, one built not just on mutual interests but also on cooperation and the shared objective for a Europe whole free and at peace. No other partner has been offered a comparable relationship, nor a similar comprehensive institutional framework.

**Claim: NATO should have been disbanded at the end of the Cold War**

**Fact:** At the London Summit in 1990, Allied heads of state and government agreed that “‘We need to keep standing together, to extend the long peace we have enjoyed these past four decades’. This was their sovereign choice and was fully in line with their right to collective defence under the United Nations Charter.

Since then, twelve more countries have chosen to join NATO. The Alliance has taken on new missions and adapted to new challenges, all the while sticking to its fundamental principles of security, collective defence, and decision-making by consensus.

Twice since the end of the Cold War, NATO has adopted new Strategic Concepts (in 1999 and 2010), adapting to new realities. Thus, rather than being disbanded, NATO adapted, and continues to change, to live up to the needs and expectations of Allies, and to promote their shared vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace.

**Claim: NATO enlargement followed the same process as the expansion of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact**

**Fact:** Any comparison between NATO enlargement after the end of the Cold War and the creation of the Warsaw Pact or the Soviet bloc at the end of World War II is an utter distortion of history.

The incorporation of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact after the Second World War was carried out under conditions of military occupation, one-party dictatorship and the violent suppression of dissent.

When the countries of Central and Eastern Europe applied for NATO membership after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, it was of their own free choice, through their own national democratic processes, and after conducting the required reforms.

This was done through debate, in peacetime conditions, and in a transparent way.

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**NATO as a “threat”**

**Claim: NATO is a threat to Russia**

**Fact:** NATO has reached out to Russia consistently, transparently and publicly over the past 25 years.

The Alliance has created unique cooperation bodies – the Permanent Joint Council and the NATO-Russia Council – to embody its relationship with Russia. It has invited Russia to cooperate on missile defence, an invitation extended to no other partner.

In the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, agreed with Russia in 1997 and reaffirmed at NATO-Russia summits in Rome in 2002 and in Lisbon in 2010, NATO stated that “in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces”. The Alliance has fulfilled all such commitments.

NATO’s official policy towards Russia was most recently articulated by the heads of state and government of the Alliance at the Wales Summit in September 2014.
They stated that “the Alliance does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to Russia. But we cannot and will not compromise on the principles on which our Alliance and security in Europe and North America rest.” (The Wales Summit Declaration can be read here).

Thus, neither the Alliance’s policies nor its actions are a threat to Russia.

- **Claim: NATO missile defence targets Russia and the Iran agreement proves it**

**Fact:** NATO’s missile defence system is not designed or directed against Russia. It does not pose a threat to Russia’s strategic deterrent.

As already explained by NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow, geography and physics make it impossible for the NATO system to shoot down Russian intercontinental missiles from NATO sites in Romania or Poland. Their capabilities are too limited, their planned numbers too few, and their locations too far south or too close to Russia to do so.

Russian officials have confirmed that the planned NATO shield will not, in fact, undermine Russia’s deterrent. Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s missile defence envoy, said on January 26, 2015, that “neither the current, nor even the projected” missile defence system “could stop or cast doubt on Russia’s strategic missile potential.”

Finally, the Russian claim that the framework agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme obviates the need for NATO missile defence is wrong on two counts.

The Iranian agreement does not cover the proliferation of ballistic-missile technology which is an issue completely different from nuclear questions.

Furthermore, NATO has repeatedly made clear that missile defence is not about any one country, but about the threat posed by proliferation more generally. In fact, over 30 countries have obtained, or are trying to obtain, ballistic missile technology. The Iran framework agreement does not change those facts.

- **Claim: The accession of new Allies to NATO threatens Russia**

**Fact:** Every country which joins NATO undertakes to uphold the principles and policies of the Alliance, and the commitments which NATO has already made.

This includes the commitment that NATO poses no threat to Russia, as most recently stated at the Wales Summit.

Therefore, as the number of countries which join NATO grows, so does the number of countries which agree that “the Alliance does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to Russia.”

- **Claim: NATO exercises are a provocation which threatens Russia**

**Fact:** Every nation has the right to conduct exercises, as long as they do so within their international obligations, including notifying the actual numbers and providing observation opportunities when required.

In order to promote mutual trust and transparency, OSCE members are bound by the Vienna Document to inform one another in advance of exercises which include more than 9,000 troops, unless the exercises are snap tests of readiness.

NATO and Allies have consistently stood by the terms and the spirit of the Vienna Document. Those exercises which crossed the notification threshold were announced well in advance. This is why Russia could send observers to the UK-led Exercise Joint Warrior in April 2015.

Russia, on the other hand, has repeatedly called snap exercises including tens of thousands of troops, with some of them taking place close to NATO territory. This practice of calling massive exercises without
warning is a breach of the spirit of the Vienna Document, raising tension and undermining trust. This is especially the case because Russia's military takeover of Crimea was masked by exactly such a snap exercise.

It is therefore Russia's exercises, not NATO’s, which are a threat to stability.

## Promises and pledges

- **Claim: Russia has the right to oppose NATO-supported infrastructure on the territory of member states in Central and Eastern Europe**

  **Fact:** The relationship between NATO and Russia is governed by the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, agreed by NATO Allies and Russia in 1997 and reaffirmed at NATO-Russia summits in Rome in 2002, and in Lisbon in 2010. (The Founding Act can be read here.)

  In the Founding Act, the two sides agreed that: “in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces. Accordingly, it will have to rely on adequate infrastructure commensurate with the above tasks. In this context, reinforcement may take place, when necessary, in the event of defence against a threat of aggression and missions in support of peace consistent with the United Nations Charter and the OSCE governing principles, as well as for exercises consistent with the adapted CFE Treaty, the provisions of the Vienna Document 1994 and mutually agreed transparency measures. Russia will exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.”

  Therefore, both infrastructure and reinforcements are explicitly permitted by the Founding Act and therefore by Russia.

- **Claim: NATO’s response to Russia’s illegal actions in Ukraine violates the Founding Act**

  **Fact:** NATO has responded to the new strategic reality caused by Russia’s illegitimate and illegal actions in Ukraine by reinforcing the defence of Allies in Central and Eastern Europe, and by ensuring the ability to increase those reinforcements if necessary, including by upgrading infrastructure.

  All this is consistent with the Founding Act, quoted above.

  In the Founding Act, all signatories, including Russia, agreed on principles which include “refraining from the threat or use of force against each other as well as against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in any manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter and with the Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States contained in the Helsinki Final Act” and the “respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security, the inviolability of borders and peoples’ right of self-determination as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents.”

  NATO has respected those commitments faithfully. Russia, on the other hand, has declared the annexation of Crimea, supported violent separatists in the east of the country, and insisted that Ukraine be barred from joining NATO.

- **Claim: NATO nuclear arrangements violate the Non-Proliferation Treaty**

  **Fact:** The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. At the Wales Summit in September 2014, all Allies reaffirmed their full support for the treaty.

  The deployment of American nuclear weapons on the territories of NATO allies is fully consistent with the NPT. These weapons remain under the custody and control of the United States at all times.
Furthermore, NATO’s nuclear arrangements are older than the NPT, and this issue was fully addressed when the treaty was negotiated. The arrangements were made clear to delegations and were made public.

- **Claim: NATO nuclear exercises violate the Non-Proliferation Treaty**

  **Fact:** At the Wales Summit in September 2014, Allies reaffirmed their full support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). NATO’s nuclear posture is fully consistent with the treaty.

  At no point has NATO moved nuclear weapons to Eastern Europe. There have been no NATO nuclear exercises in the eastern part of the Alliance since the end of the Cold War.

  It is Russia that has started to use its nuclear weapons as a tool in its strategy of intimidation. Russia has increased nuclear rhetoric and stepped up its nuclear exercises. Russian nuclear-capable bombers are flying close to Alliance borders. Russia has also threatened to base nuclear-capable missiles in Kaliningrad and Crimea.

  This activity and this rhetoric do not contribute to transparency and predictability, particularly in the context of a changed security environment due to Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine.

- **Claim: NATO leaders promised at the time of German reunification that the Alliance would not expand to the East**

  **Fact:** No such promise was ever made, and Russia has never produced any evidence to back up its claim.

  Every formal decision which NATO takes is adopted by consensus and recorded in writing. There is no written record of any such decision having been taken by the Alliance: therefore, no such promise can have been made.

  Moreover, at the time of the alleged promise, the Warsaw Pact still existed. Its members did not agree on its dissolution until 1991. Therefore, it is not plausible to suggest that the idea of their accession to NATO was on the agenda in 1989.

  This was confirmed by former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev himself. This is what Mr Gorbachev said on 15 October 2014 in an interview with Rossiiskaya Gazeta and Russia Beyond The Headlines:

  “The topic of ‘NATO expansion’ was not discussed at all, and it wasn’t brought up in those years. I say this with full responsibility. Not a single Eastern European country raised the issue, not even after the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist in 1991. Western leaders didn’t bring it up, either.”

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**NATO’s operations**

- **Claim: NATO’s operation in Afghanistan was a failure**

  **Fact:** NATO took over the command of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan in 2003.

  Under NATO’s command, the mission progressively extended throughout Afghanistan, was joined by 22 non-NATO countries and built up from scratch an Afghan National Security Force of more than 350,000 soldiers and police.

  Threats to Afghanistan’s security continue. However, the Afghan forces are now ready to take full responsibility for security across the country, as agreed with the Afghan authorities.

  NATO is providing training, advice and assistance to the Afghan forces through the “Resolute Support” mission.
• **Claim: The NATO-led mission in Afghanistan failed to stop the Afghan drugs trade**

**Fact:** As with any sovereign country, the primary responsibility for upholding law and order in Afghanistan, including as regards the trade in narcotics, rests with the Afghan government. The international community is supporting the Afghan government to live up to this responsibility in many ways, including both through the United Nations and through the European Union. NATO is not a main actor in this area. This role has been agreed with the international community.

• **Claim: NATO’s operation over Libya was illegitimate**

The NATO-led operation was launched under the authority of two UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR), 1970 and 1973, both quoting Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and neither of which was opposed by Russia. UNSCR 1973 authorized the international community “to take all necessary measures” to “protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack”. This is what NATO did, with the political and military support of regional states and members of the Arab League. After the conflict, NATO cooperated with the UN International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, which found no breach of UNSCR 1973 or international law, concluding instead that “NATO conducted a highly precise campaign with a demonstrable determination to avoid civilian casualties.”

• **Claim: NATO’s operation over Kosovo was illegitimate**

**Fact:** The NATO operation for Kosovo followed over a year of intense efforts by the UN and the Contact Group, of which Russia was a member, to bring about a peaceful solution. The UN Security Council on several occasions branded the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and the mounting number of refugees driven from their homes as a threat to international peace and security. NATO’s Operation Allied Force was launched to prevent the large-scale and sustained violations of human rights and the killing of civilians. Following the air campaign, the subsequent NATO-led peacekeeping operation, KFOR, which initially included Russia, has been under UN mandate (UNSCR 1244), with the aim of providing a safe and secure environment in Kosovo.

• **Claim: The cases of Kosovo and Crimea are identical**

**Fact:** The Kosovo operation was conducted following exhaustive discussion involving the whole international community dealing with a long-running crisis that was recognized by the UN Security Council as a threat to international peace and security. Following the operation, the international community engaged in nearly ten years of diplomacy, under UN authority, to find a political solution and to settle Kosovo’s final status, as prescribed by UNSCR 1244. In Crimea, there was no pre-existing crisis, no attempt to discuss the situation with the Ukrainian government, no involvement of the United Nations, and no attempt at a negotiated solution. In Kosovo, international attempts to find a solution took over 3,000 days. In Crimea, Russia annexed part of Ukraine’s territory in less than 30 days. It has sought to justify its illegal and illegitimate annexation, in part, by pointing to a “referendum” that was inconsistent with Ukrainian law, held under conditions of illegal armed occupation with no freedom of expression or media access for the opposition, and without any credible international monitoring.
• Claim: Russia's annexation of Crimea was justified by the opinion of the International Court of Justice on the independence of Kosovo.

Fact: The court stated that their opinion was not a precedent. The court said they had been given a "narrow and specific" question about Kosovo’s independence which would not cover the broader legal consequences of that decision.

• Claim: The Ukrainian authorities are illegitimate

Fact: Ukraine’s President Poroshenko was elected on 25 May with a clear majority in a vote which the OSCE characterized (report here) as showing the "clear resolve of the authorities to hold what was a genuine election largely in line with international commitments and with a respect for fundamental freedoms." The only areas where serious restrictions were reported were those controlled by separatists, who undertook "increasing attempts to derail the process."

The current parliament was elected on 26 October in a vote which the OSCE characterized (report here) as "an amply contested election that offered voters real choice, and a general respect for fundamental freedoms". It again pointed out that "Electoral authorities made resolute efforts to organize elections throughout the country, but they could not be held in parts of the regions (oblasts) of Donetsk and Luhansk or on the Crimean peninsula".

Finally, Russian officials continue to allege that the Ukrainian parliament and government are dominated by "Nazis" and "fascists." However, in the parliamentary elections, the parties whom Russia labelled as "fascists" fell far short of the threshold of 5% needed to enter parliament. Ukraine’s electorate clearly voted for unity and moderation, not separatism or extremism, and the composition of the parliament reflects that.

In short, the President and parliament are legitimate, the actions of the separatists were not.
Weapons of mass destruction

The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and their delivery systems, could have incalculable consequences for global stability and prosperity. During the next decade, proliferation will be most acute in some of the world’s most volatile regions.

Highlights

- NATO Allies seek to prevent the proliferation of WMD through an active political agenda of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.
- The WMD Non-Proliferation Centre at NATO Headquarters is strengthening dialogue among Allies, assessing risks and supporting defence efforts to improve Alliance preparedness to respond to the use of WMD or chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) agents.
- NATO is strengthening its defence capabilities to defend against CBRN attacks, including terrorism.
- NATO conducts training and exercises designed to test interoperability and prepare forces to operate in a CBRN environment.

More background information

NATO’s weapons of mass destruction initiatives

NATO Allies engage actively in preventing the proliferation of WMD by state and non-state actors through an active political agenda of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as by developing
and harmonising defence capabilities and, when necessary, by employing these capabilities consistent with political decisions in support of non-proliferation objectives. Both political and defence elements are essential to a secure NATO.

NATO is prepared for recovery efforts, should the Alliance suffer a WMD attack or chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) event, through a comprehensive political, military and civilian approach. Despite significant progress, however, major challenges remain.

The Alliance stepped up its activities in this area in 1999 with the launch of the WMD Initiative. This initiative was designed to integrate political and military aspects of Alliance work in responding to the proliferation of WMD. Since then, Allies continue to intensify and expand NATO’s contribution to global non-proliferation efforts, in particular through strong support to various arms control and non-proliferation regimes and through international outreach to partners and relevant international organisations. Allies also intensify NATO’s defence response to the risk posed by WMD and continue to improve civil preparedness and consequence-management capabilities in the event of WMD use or a CBRN attack or accident.

- **Weapons of Mass Destruction Non-Proliferation Centre**

  The WMD Non-Proliferation Centre was launched in May 2000 as a result of the WMD Initiative that was approved at the April 1999 Washington Summit. It is structurally embedded in the Emerging Security Challenges (ESC) Division at NATO Headquarters and comprises national experts as well as personnel from NATO’s International Staff.

  The Centre’s core work is to strengthen dialogue on WMD issues, to enhance consultations on non-proliferation efforts, to assess risks and to support defence efforts that improve the Alliance’s preparedness to respond to the risks of WMD and their delivery systems as well as to new hybrid and non-state actors threats.

- **Improving CBRN defence capabilities**

  NATO continues to significantly improve its CBRN defence posture with the establishment of the Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force (CJ-CBRND-TF), the NATO CBRN Reachback capability, the Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence (JCBRN Defence COE), the Defence Against Terrorism COE, and other COEs and agencies that support NATO’s response to the WMD threat. Allies have invested significant resources in warning and reporting, individual protection and CBRN hazard management capabilities.

- **Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force**

  The NATO Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force is designed to perform a full range of CBRN defence missions. It comprises the multinational CBRN Defence Battalion and the Joint Assessment Team,

  The Task Force is led by an individual Ally on 12-month rotational basis. Under normal circumstances, it operates within the NATO Response Force (NRF), which is a multinational force designed to respond rapidly to emerging crises across the full spectrum of Alliance missions. However, the Task Force may operate independently of the NRF on other tasks as required, for example, helping civilian authorities in NATO member countries.

- **Joint Centre of Excellence on CBRN Defence**

  The JCBRN Defence COE in Vyskov, the Czech Republic was activated in July 2007. It is an international military organisation sponsored and manned by the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, the United Kingdom and the United States. It is also open for partners who want to become contributing nations.
The COE offers recognised expertise and experience in the field of CBRN to the benefit of the Alliance. It provides opportunities to improve interoperability and capabilities by enhancing multinational education, training and exercises; assisting in concept, doctrine, procedures and standards development; and testing and validating concepts through experimentation. It has thus supported NATO's transformation process.

The COE integrates a CBRN Reachback Element (RBE), which has reached Full Operational Capability (FOC) in January 2016. This Reachback capability provides timely and comprehensive scientific (technical) and operational CBRN expertise, assessments and advice to NATO commanders, their staff and deployed forces during planning and execution of operations. The RBE, together with its secondary network which comprises various civilian and military institutions, is able, if needed, to operate 24/7.

- **Standardization, training, research and development**

NATO creates and improves necessary standardization documents, conducts training and exercises, and develops necessary capability improvements in the field of CBRN defence through the work of many groups, bodies and institutions, including:

- CBRN Medical Working Group;
- Joint CBRN Defence Capability Development Group;
- NATO Research and Technology Organisation; and
- the Political and Partnerships Committee (taking over the task of developing and implementing science activities, which were formerly managed under the auspices of the Science for Peace and Security Committee).

The Alliance also continues to create and improve standard NATO agreements that govern Allied operations in a CBRN environment. These agreements guide all aspects of preparation, ranging from standards for disease surveillance to rules for restricting troop movements. In addition, the Organization conducts training exercises and senior-level seminars that are designed to test interoperability and prepare NATO leaders and forces for operations in a CBRN environment.

- **Building capacity and scientific collaboration**

The NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme enables collaboration between NATO and partner countries on issues of common interest to enhance their mutual security by facilitating international research efforts to meet emerging security challenges, supporting NATO-led operations and missions, and advancing early warning and forecast for the prevention of disasters and crises.

The central objective of SPS activities in WMD non-proliferation and CBRN defence is to improve the ability of NATO and its partners to protect their populations and forces from CBRN threats. The Programme supports research towards the development of CBRN defence capabilities, training activities and workshops in the following fields:

- protection against CBRN agents, as well as diagnosing their effects, detection, decontamination, destruction, disposal and containment;
- risk management and recovery strategies and technologies; and
- medical counter-measures for CBRN agents.

- **Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation**

Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation are essential tools in preventing the use of WMD and the spread of these weapons and their delivery systems. That is why Allies will continue to support numerous efforts in the fields mentioned above, always based on the principle to ensure undiminished security for all Alliance members.
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and its reliance on nuclear weapons in the NATO strategy. No NATO member country has a chemical or biological weapons programme. Additionally, Allies are committed to destroy stockpiles of chemical agents and have supported a number of partners and other countries in this work.

NATO members are resolved to seek a safer world for all and create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goal of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. That is why the Alliance will seek to create the conditions for further reductions in the future. One important step towards this goal is the implementation of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

- **Improving civil preparedness**

National authorities are primarily responsible for protecting their population and critical infrastructure against the consequences of terrorist attacks, CBRN incidents and natural disasters. Within NATO, Allies have agreed baseline requirements for national resilience and are developing guidelines to help nations achieve them. The Alliance also serves as a forum to exchange best practices and lessons learned to improve preparedness and national resilience.

A network of 380 civil experts from across the Euro-Atlantic area exists to support these efforts. Their expertise covers all civil aspects relevant to NATO planning and operations, including crisis management, consequence management and critical infrastructure protection. Drawn from government and industry, experts participate in training and exercises, and respond to requests for assistance.

Under the auspices of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), Allies have established an inventory of national civil and military capabilities that could be made available to assist stricken countries following a CBRN terrorist attack. Originally created in 1998 to coordinate responses to natural and man-made disasters, the EADRCC has since 2001 been given an additional coordinating role for responses to potential terrorist acts involving CBRN agents. It organises major international field exercises to practise responses to simulated disaster situations and consequence management.

- **Cooperating with partners**

The Alliance engages actively to enhance international security through partnership with relevant countries and other international organisations. NATO’s partnership programmes are therefore designed as a tool to provide effective frameworks for dialogue, consultation and coordination. That way, they contribute actively to NATO’s arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.

Examples of institutionalised fora of the aforementioned cooperation include the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission, the NATO-Georgia Commission, and the Mediterranean Dialogue. NATO also consults with countries in the broader Middle East region which take part in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, as well as with partners across the globe.

- **International outreach activities**

Outreach to partners, international and regional organisations helps develop a common understanding of the WMD threat and encourages participation in and compliance with international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts to which they are party. It also enhances global efforts to protect and defend against CBRN threats and improve crisis management and recovery if WMD are employed against the Alliance or its interests.

Of particular importance is NATO’s outreach to and cooperation with the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and other regional organisations and multilateral initiatives that address WMD proliferation. Continued cooperation with regional organisations such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) can contribute to efforts to encourage member states to comply with relevant international agreements.
On the practical side, NATO organises an annual non-proliferation conference involving a significant number of non-member countries from six continents. In 2015, the event was hosted for the second time by a partner country, Qatar, and was held in Doha in March. It attracted more than 150 participants, including senior officials from NATO and partner countries, as well as international organisations. This event is unique among international institutions’ activities in the non-proliferation field, as it provides a venue for informal discussions among senior national officials on all types of WMD threats, as well as potential political and diplomatic responses. The conference held another successful session in Ljubljana, Slovenia in May 2016, and it will be hosted by NATO’s partner Finland in 2017.

The Alliance also participates in relevant conferences organised by other international institutions, including the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, the EU, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the OSCE, and others.

Many of NATO’s activities under the SPS Programme focus on the civilian side of nuclear, chemical and biological technology. Scientists from NATO and partner countries are developing areas of research that impact on these areas. These include the decommissioning and disposal of WMD or their components, the safe handling of materials, techniques for arms control implementation, and the detection of CBRN agents.

### The decision-making bodies

The North Atlantic Council, NATO’s principal political decision-making body, has overall authority on Alliance policy and activity in countering WMD proliferation. The Council is supported by a number of NATO committees and groups, which provide strategic assessments and policy advice and recommendations.

The Committee on Proliferation is the senior advisory body for discussion of the Alliance’s political and defence efforts against WMD proliferation. It brings together senior national officials responsible for political and security issues related to non-proliferation with experts on military capabilities needed to discourage WMD proliferation, to deter threats and the use of such weapons and to protect NATO populations, territory and forces. The Committee on Proliferation is chaired by NATO’s International Staff when discussing politico-military aspects of proliferation, and by national co-chairs when discussing defence-related issues.

### Evolution

The use or threatened use of WMD significantly influenced the security environment of the 20th century and will also impact international security in the foreseeable future. Strides in modern technology and scientific discoveries have opened the door to even more destructive weapons.

**During the Cold War,** use of nuclear weapons was prevented by the prospect of mutually assured destruction. The nuclear arms race slowed in the early 1970s following the negotiation of the first arms control treaties.

The improved security environment of the 1990s enabled nuclear weapon states to dramatically reduce their nuclear stockpiles. However, the proliferation of knowledge and technology has enabled other countries to build their own nuclear weapons, extending the overall risks to new parts of the world.

**At the Washington Summit in 1999,** Allied leaders launched a Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative to address the risks posed by the proliferation of these weapons and their means of delivery. The initiative was designed to promote understanding of WMD issues, develop ways of responding to them, improve intelligence and information sharing, enhance existing Allied military readiness to operate in a WMD environment and counter threats posed by these weapons. Consequently, the WMD Non-Proliferation Centre was established at NATO Headquarters (Brussels, Belgium) in 2000.

**At the 2002 Prague Summit,** the Allies launched a modernisation process designed to ensure that the Alliance is able to effectively meet the new challenges of the 21st century. This included the creation of the
NATO Response Force, the streamlining of the Alliance command structure and a series of measures to protect NATO forces, population and territory from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats.

In 2003, NATO created the Multinational CBRN Defence Battalion and Joint Assessment Team, which have been part of the Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force since 2007.

At the Riga Summit in 2006, Allied leaders endorsed a Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG), that provides an analysis of the future security environment and a fundamental vision for NATO’s ongoing transformation. It explicitly mentions the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery as major security threats, which are particularly dangerous when combined with the threats of terrorism or failed states.

In July 2007, NATO activated a Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence in Vyskov, the Czech Republic. In April 2009, NATO Heads of State and Government endorsed NATO’s “Comprehensive Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of WMD and Defending against CBRN Threats”. On 31 August 2009, the North Atlantic Council decided to make this document public.

At the November 2010 Lisbon Summit, Allied leaders adopted a new Strategic Concept. They also agreed at Lisbon to establish a dedicated committee providing advice on arms control and disarmament. This committee started work in March 2011.

In May 2012 at the Chicago Summit, NATO leaders approved and made public the results of the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review. This document reiterates NATO’s commitment “to maintaining an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities for deterrence and defence to fulfil its commitments as set out in the Strategic Concept”. The Summit also reaffirmed that “arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation play an important role in the achievement of the Alliance’s security objectives” and therefore Allies will continue to support these efforts.

Allied Heads of State and Government further emphasised that “proliferation threatens our shared vision of creating the conditions necessary for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)”.

The Wales Summit Declaration of September 2014 reaffirmed the above.
NATO is a political and military alliance, whose principal task is to ensure the protection of its citizens and to promote security and stability in the North Atlantic area. As outlined in the 2010 Strategic Concept, the Alliance’s three core tasks are collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.

Today, the Alliance is faced with a security environment that is more diverse, complex, fast moving and demanding than at any time since its inception. It faces challenges and threats that originate from the east and from the south; from state and non-state actors; from military forces and from terrorist, cyber and hybrid attacks.

Russia has become more assertive with the illegal annexation of Crimea and destabilisation of eastern Ukraine, as well as its military build-up close to NATO’s borders. In parallel, to the south, the security situation in the Middle East and Africa has deteriorated due to a combination of factors that are causing loss of life, fuelling large-scale migration flows and inspiring terrorist attacks in Allied countries and elsewhere.

The Alliance must be able to address the full spectrum of current and future challenges and threats from any direction, simultaneously. It is therefore strengthening its deterrence and defence posture in view of the changed and evolving security environment.

Towards a strengthened deterrence and defence posture

The Readiness Action Plan (RAP), launched at the Wales Summit in 2014, has been a major driver for change in the Alliance’s deterrence and defence posture. The RAP was initiated to ensure the Alliance was ready to respond swiftly and firmly to new security challenges from the east and from the south. It has been the most significant reinforcement of NATO’s collective defence since the end of the Cold War.

Building on the RAP, NATO Heads of State and Government will be approving a strengthened deterrence and defence posture at the Warsaw Summit in July 2016. It will provide the Alliance with a broad range of options to be able to respond to any threats from wherever they arise to protect Alliance territory, population, airspace and sea lines of communication.

Collective defence is the Alliance’s greatest responsibility and deterrence remains a core element of NATO’s overall strategy – preventing conflict and war, protecting Allies, maintaining freedom of decision.
and action, and upholding the principles and values it stands for – individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. NATO’s capacity to deter and defend is supported by an appropriate mix of capabilities. Nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities complement each other. NATO also maintains the freedom of action and flexibility to respond to the full spectrum of challenges with an appropriate and tailored approach, at the minimum level of force.

The Alliance’s actions are defensive in nature, proportionate and in line with international commitments given the threats in the changed and evolving security environment, and the Alliance’s right to self-defence. NATO also remains fully committed to non-proliferation, disarmament, arms control and confidence- and security-building measures to increase security and reduce military tensions. For instance, Allies go beyond the letter of the Vienna Document and other transparency measures in planning and conducting NATO exercises. The Vienna Document is a politically binding agreement, initiated by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, which is designed to promote mutual trust and transparency about a state’s military forces and activities.

More specifically, NATO’s strengthened deterrence and defence posture will focus on areas such as conventional forces, forward presence, joint air power and maritime forces, as well as cyber defence, civil preparedness and countering hybrid threats, including in cooperation with the European Union.

### Projecting stability

While renewed emphasis is being placed on deterrence and collective defence, NATO also retains its ability to respond to crises beyond its borders and remain actively engaged in supporting partners and working with other international organisations, in particular the European Union. All this is part of NATO’s contribution to the international community’s efforts in projecting stability. NATO’s deterrence and defence are not pursued in isolation. They are part of a broader response of the wider transatlantic community to the changed and evolving security environment.

Projecting stability consists in strengthening NATO’s ability to train, advise and assist local forces. NATO has a long history in this area – through operations in Afghanistan and the Balkans – and capacity-building with over 40 partners worldwide. It will increase its efforts, for instance, by enhancing situational awareness, reinforcing the Alliance’s maritime dimension and developing a more strategic approach to partnerships.

In view of today’s reality and the scale and complexity of the challenges and threats around NATO’s periphery, the Alliance will continue to strengthen its role in contributing to security across its three core tasks – collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.
NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy and forces

Nuclear weapons are a core component of NATO’s overall capabilities for deterrence and defence alongside conventional and missile defence forces.

Highlights

- NATO’s nuclear policy is based on NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept and the 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review.
- The fundamental purpose of NATO’s nuclear forces is deterrence.
- Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of NATO’s overall strategy.
- Nuclear weapons are a core component of the Alliance’s overall capabilities for deterrence and defence alongside conventional and missile defence forces.
- NATO is committed to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, but as long as nuclear weapons exist, it will remain a nuclear alliance.
- The Nuclear Planning Group provides the forum for consultation on NATO’s nuclear deterrence.
More background information

NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy

NATO’s nuclear policy is based on two public documents agreed by the Heads of State and Government of all 28 Allies:

- The 2010 Strategic Concept
- The 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review

The 2010 Strategic Concept, which was adopted by Allied Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon in November 2010, sets out the Alliance’s core tasks and principles, including deterrence. The Strategic Concept commits NATO to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, but reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance:

“The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. [...] Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy. [...] As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. [...] We will ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control and consultation arrangements.”

The 2010 Lisbon Summit set in train work on a Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR), which was endorsed by the Allied Heads of State and Government at the NATO Chicago Summit in May 2012. The DDPR reviewed NATO’s overall posture in the light of the Strategic Concept:

“The review has shown that the Alliance’s nuclear force posture currently meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defence posture. While seeking to create the conditions and considering options for further reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to NATO, Allies concerned1 will ensure that all components of NATO’s nuclear deterrent remain safe, secure, and effective for as long as NATO remains a nuclear alliance. That requires sustained leadership focus and institutional excellence for the nuclear deterrence mission and planning guidance aligned with 21st century requirements.”

The fundamental purpose of Alliance nuclear forces is deterrence. This is essentially a political function. The Alliance will focus on the maintenance of effective deterrence. Political control of nuclear weapons will be maintained under all circumstances. Nuclear planning and consultation within the Alliance will be in accordance with political guidance.

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1 i.e. all members of the Nuclear Planning Group


Nuclear consultation

The key principles of NATO’s nuclear policy are established by the Heads of State and Government of all 28 members of the Alliance.

For those countries that are members, the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) provides the forum for consultation on all issues that relate to NATO nuclear deterrence. All Allies, with the exception of France, which has decided not to participate, are members of the NPG.

All NATO members, including potential new members, are members of the Alliance in all respects, including their commitment to the Alliance’s policy on nuclear weapons, and the guarantees which that policy affords to all Allies.

The role of NATO’s nuclear forces

Nuclear weapons are a core component of NATO’s overall capabilities for deterrence and defence, alongside conventional and missile defence forces.

The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote.

- **Strategic nuclear forces**

  As stated in the 2010 Strategic Concept:

  “The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.”
**Dual-capable aircraft**

A number of NATO member countries contribute a dual-capable aircraft (DCA) capability to the Alliance. These aircraft are available for nuclear roles at various levels of readiness – the highest level of readiness is measured in weeks. In their nuclear role, the aircraft are equipped to carry nuclear bombs and personnel are trained accordingly.

The United States maintains absolute control and custody of the associated nuclear weapons. Allies provide military support for the DCA mission with conventional forces and capabilities.

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**NATO’s policy on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation**

It is made clear in both the 2010 Strategic Concept and the 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review that NATO is committed to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.

The Strategic Concept states that:

“NATO seeks its security at the lowest possible level of forces. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation contribute to peace, security and stability, and should ensure undiminished security for all Alliance members.”

NATO has unilaterally reduced the size of its land-based nuclear weapons stockpile by over 95 per cent since the height of the Cold War.

As regards the reductions, the DDPR reads:

“Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has dramatically reduced the number, types, and readiness of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and its reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy.

[-] NATO is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account the greater Russian stockpiles of non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area.”

In the 2014 Wales Summit declaration, NATO’s leaders stated that:

“We continue to aspire to a cooperative, constructive relationship with Russia, including reciprocal confidence building and transparency measures and increased mutual understanding of NATO’s and Russia’s non-strategic nuclear force postures in Europe, based on our common security concerns and interests, in a Europe where each country freely chooses its future. We regret that the conditions for that relationship do not currently exist. As a result, NATO’s decision to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and Russia remains in place. Political channels of communication, however, remain open.”
Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation in NATO

NATO has a long-standing commitment to an active policy in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The Alliance continues to pursue its security objectives through these policies, while at the same time ensuring that its collective defence obligations are met and the full range of its missions fulfilled.

Highlights

- NATO seeks its security at the lowest possible level of forces.
- It actively contributes to effective and verifiable arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts through its policies, activities and its member countries. NATO itself is not party to any treaty, but it supports and facilitates dialogue among members, partners and other countries to implement their international obligations fully.
- NATO Allies are parties to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the Ottawa Convention on mine action, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other related treaties and agreements.
- In the field of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), NATO cooperates with the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), other regional organisations and multilateral initiatives to address proliferation issues.
- Nuclear weapons committed to NATO have been reduced by more than 95 per cent since the height of the Cold War.
- NATO will remain a nuclear alliance as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, but will do so at the lowest possible level and with an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces.
- NATO Allies also assist partner countries in the destruction of surplus stocks of mines, arms and munitions. In addition, former military personnel receive retraining assistance through Trust Fund defence reform projects.
Definitions

While often used together, the terms arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation do not mean the same thing. In fact, experts usually consider them to reflect associated, but different areas in the same discipline or subject.

- **Arms control**
  Arms control is the broadest of the three terms and generally refers to mutually agreed upon restraints or controls (usually between states) on the research, manufacture, or the levels of and/or locales of deployment of troops and weapons systems.

- **Disarmament**
  Disarmament, often inaccurately used as a synonym for arms control, refers to the act of eliminating or abolishing weapons (particularly offensive arms) either unilaterally (in the hope that one’s example will be followed) or reciprocally.

- **Non-proliferation**
  For the Alliance, “non-proliferation refers to all efforts to prevent proliferation from occurring, or should it occur, to reverse it by any other means than the use of military force.”\(^1\) Non-proliferation usually applies to weapons of mass destruction, which include nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

- **Weapons of mass destruction proliferation**
  Attempts made by state or non-state actors to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or devices and their means of delivery or related material, including precursors, without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the States Parties to the following agreements: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC) and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BTWC).

The ways in which NATO effectively participates

NATO contributes to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation in many ways: through its policies, its activities and through its member countries.

NATO’s policies in these fields cover consultation and practical cooperation in a wide range of areas. These include conventional arms control; nuclear policy issues; promoting mine action and combating the spread of small arms and light weapons (SALW); preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and developing and harmonising capabilities to defend against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats.

- **Conventional forces**
  Allies have reduced their conventional forces significantly from Cold War levels. Allies remain committed to the regime of the CFE Treaty. As a response to Russia’s unilateral “suspension” of its Treaty obligations in 2007, NATO CFE Allies ceased implementing certain Treaty obligations vis-à-vis Russia in November 2011, while still continuing to implement fully their obligations with respect to all other CFE States Parties.

\(^1\) According to NATO’s Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Defending Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats.
Allies stated that these decisions are fully reversible should Russia return to full implementation. At the 2012 Chicago Summit, Allies reiterated their commitment to conventional arms control and expressed their determination to preserve, strengthen and modernise the conventional arms control regime in Europe, based on key principles and commitments.

At the 2014 Wales Summit, Allies reaffirmed their long-standing commitment to conventional arms control as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security and emphasised the importance of full implementation and compliance to rebuild trust and confidence. They underscored that Russia’s unilateral military activity in and around Ukraine has undermined peace, security and stability across the region, and its selective implementation of the Vienna Document and Open Skies Treaty and long-standing non-implementation of the CFE Treaty have eroded the positive contributions of these arms control instruments. Allies called on Russia to fully adhere to its commitments.

On 11 March 2015, the Russian Federation announced that it is suspending its participation in the meetings of the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) on the CFE Treaty, which meets regularly in Vienna.

- **Nuclear forces**

NATO is committed to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons – but reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. However, it will do so at the lowest possible level and with an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces. The nuclear weapons committed to NATO have been reduced by more than 95 per cent since the height of the Cold War. NATO nuclear weapon states have also reduced their nuclear arsenals and ceased production of highly enriched uranium or plutonium for nuclear weapons. All Allies are party to the NPT and view it as an essential foundation for international peace and security.

- **Armed forces**

Through its cooperation framework with non-member countries, the Alliance supports defence and security sector reform, emphasising civilian control of the military, accountability, and restructuring of military forces to lower, affordable and usable levels.

- **Small arms and light weapons (SALW) and mine action (MA)**

Allies are working with non-member countries and other international organisations to support the full implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW in All its Aspects.

NATO also supports mine action activities. All NATO member countries, with the exception of the United States, are party to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, often referred to as the Ottawa Convention.

NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) Trust Fund Policy was initiated in 2000 to assist countries in fulfilling their Ottawa Convention obligations to dispose of stockpiles of anti-personnel landmines. The policy was later expanded to include efforts to implement the UN Programme of Action on SALW. More recently, the Trust Fund Policy has also been expanded to include projects addressing the consequences of defence reform, training and building integrity.

NATO/Partnership Trust Funds may be initiated by a NATO member or partner country to tackle specific, practical issues linked to these areas. They are funded by voluntary contributions from individual NATO Allies, partners and organisations.

- **Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)**

"With due respect to the primarily military mission of the Alliance, NATO will work actively to prevent the proliferation of WMD by State and non-State actors, to protect the Alliance from WMD threats should
prevention fail, and be prepared for recovery efforts should the Alliance suffer a WMD attack or CBRN event, within its competencies and whenever it can bring added value, through a comprehensive political, military and civilian approach.”

NATO stepped up its activities in this area in 1999 with the launch of the WMD Initiative and the establishment of a WMD Centre at NATO Headquarters the following year. NATO Allies have also taken a comprehensive set of practical initiatives to defend their populations, territory and forces against potential WMD threats. As part of NATO’s outreach to Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) partners, Mediterranean Dialogue countries, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative countries and other partner countries, the NATO Conference on WMD Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation is the only annual conference, sponsored by an international organisation, dealing with all types and aspects of weapons of mass destruction.

Of particular importance is NATO’s outreach to and cooperation with the UN, the EU, other regional organisations and multilateral initiatives that address WMD proliferation.

### The evolution of NATO’s contribution to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation

Active policies in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation have been an inseparable part of NATO’s contribution to security and stability since the Harmel Report of 1967.

- **The Harmel Report**

  This report formed the basis for NATO’s security policy. It outlined two objectives: maintaining a sufficient military capacity to act as an effective and credible deterrent against aggression and other forms of pressure while seeking to improve East-West relations. The Alliance’s objectives in arms control have been tied to the achievement of both aims. It is therefore important that defence and arms control policies remain in harmony and are mutually reinforcing.

- **The Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament**

  In May 1989, NATO adopted a Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament, which allowed the Alliance to move forward in the sphere of arms control. It addressed the role of arms control in East-West relations, the principles of Alliance security and a number of guiding principles and objectives governing Allied policy in the nuclear, conventional and chemical fields of arms control.

  It clearly set out the interrelationships between arms control and defence policies and established the overall conceptual framework within which the Alliance sought progress in each area of its arms control agenda.

- **The Alliance’s Strategic Concept**

  NATO’s continued adherence to this policy was reaffirmed in the 2010 Strategic Concept (with regard to nuclear weapons):

  “If [This Strategic Concept] commits NATO to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons – but reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance.”

2 NATO’s Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Defending Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats, Para 4.
It continues, on a more general note:

“NATO seeks its security at the lowest possible level of forces. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation contribute to peace, security and stability, and should ensure undiminished security for all Alliance members. We will continue to play our part in reinforcing arms control and in promoting disarmament of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, as well as non-proliferation efforts.”

**Deterrence and Defence Posture Review**

The NATO Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR), agreed at the Chicago Summit in 2012, addresses issues of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The DDPR document underscores: “The Alliance is resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in a way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all”. It also repeats that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.

The Special Advisory and Consultative Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Committee (ADNC) was established on the basis of DDPR agreement.

**Summit declarations**

Allied leaders have reiterated this commitment in declarations made at every summit meeting since 1999. For instance, at the Bucharest Summit in 2008, Allied leaders took note of a report on raising NATO’s profile in the fields of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. As part of a broader response to security issues, they agreed that NATO should continue to contribute to international efforts in these fields and keep these issues under active review. Subsequently, these commitments were reaffirmed in the official declarations of summits that have since taken place. Additionally, at the 2009 Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, Allied leaders endorsed NATO’s Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Defending Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats.

In the 2014 Wales Summit Declaration, the Alliance reaffirms its long-standing commitment to conventional arms control as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security and emphasises the importance of full implementation and compliance to rebuild trust and confidence. Russia’s unilateral military activity in and around Ukraine has undermined peace, security and stability across the region, and its selective implementation of the Vienna Document and Open Skies Treaty and long-standing non-implementation of the CFE Treaty have eroded the positive contributions of these arms control instruments. Allies call on Russia to fully adhere to its commitments. They are determined to preserve, strengthen and modernise conventional arms control in Europe, based on key principles and commitments, including reciprocity, transparency and host nation consent.

**NATO bodies dealing with these issues**

A number of NATO bodies oversee different aspects of Alliance activities in the fields of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Overall political guidance is provided by the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s highest political decision-making body. More detailed oversight of activities and policy in specific areas is provided by a number of bodies, including the High Level Task Force (HLTF) on Conventional Arms Control, the Special Advisory and Consultative Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Committee (ADNC), the Nuclear Planning Group High Level Group (NPG/HLG), the Verification Coordinating Committee (VCC), the Committee on Proliferation (CP) in politico-military and defence format.

Within NATO’s cooperative frameworks, the EAPC (in particular, the Ad Hoc Working Group on SALW and Mine Action) has a central role.
NATO attaches great importance to conventional arms control and provides an essential consultative and decision-making forum for its members on all aspects of arms control and disarmament.

**Highlights**

- NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept highlights the continued importance of harmonising defence and arms control policies and objectives, and the Alliance’s commitment to the development of future arms control agreements.
- The 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) is considered as a landmark arms control agreement, to which Allies have repeatedly stated their commitment.
- Russia’s selective implementation of the Vienna Document and Open Skies Treaty and long-standing non-implementation of the CFE Treaty have eroded the positive contributions of these arms control instruments. Allies have called on Russia to fully adhere to all its arms control commitments.
- NATO Allies support the implementation of various confidence- and security-building measures, which include: the Vienna Document, the Open Skies Treaty and the humanitarian demining goals of the Ottawa Convention.
- All NATO Allies are party to the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in All Its Aspects, which seeks to improve national legislation and controls over illicit small arms.
- The Arms Trade Treaty establishes common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms and came into force in December 2014. NATO stands ready to support the implementation of the treaty as appropriate.
- NATO Allies assist partner countries in the destruction of surplus stocks of mines, arms and munitions.
Conventional arms control agreements

- The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty

The 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) is referred to as a “cornerstone of European security” and imposes for the first time in European history legal and verifiable limits on the force structure of its 30 States Parties which stretch from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains.

Since the Treaty’s entry into force in 1992, the destruction of over 100,000 pieces of treaty-limited equipment (tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery, attack helicopters and combat aircraft) has been verified and almost 6,000 on-site inspections have been conducted, thereby reaching its objective of creating balance and mitigating the possibility of surprise conventional attacks within its area of application.

At the first CFE Review Conference in 1996, negotiations began to adapt the CFE Treaty to reflect the realities of the post-Cold War era. This process was completed in conjunction with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Summit in Istanbul in 1999. States Parties also agreed to additional commitments, called the Istanbul Commitments. Although the Adapted CFE (ACFE) Treaty went far in adjusting the Treaty to a new security environment, it was not ratified by Allied countries because of the failure of Russia to fully meet commitments regarding withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, on which Allies' agreement to the Adapted Treaty was based.

Since 2000 at NATO summits and ministerial meetings, the Allies have reiterated their commitment to the CFE Treaty and have reaffirmed their readiness and commitment to ratify the Adapted Treaty.

During the third CFE Review Conference in June 2006, Russia expressed its concerns regarding ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty and claimed that even the ACFE was outdated.

After the June 2007 Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the CFE Treaty, the Russian president signed legislation on 14 July 2007 to unilaterally “suspend” its legal obligations under the CFE Treaty as of 12 December 2007. In response to these events, NATO offered a set of constructive and forward-looking actions.

In 2008 and 2009, consultations were held between the United States – on behalf of the Alliance – and Russia, but with limited development. Further efforts to resolve the impasse were pursued on the basis of the United States’ initiative, which sought an agreement on a framework for negotiations on a modernised CFE Treaty, in consultations at 36 between all CFE States Parties and NATO member states not party to the CFE Treaty. The process stalled in the autumn of 2011 because of the lack of agreement among parties.

In a situation where no agreement could be reached to overcome the impasse, towards the end of November 2011, NATO CFE Allies announced their decisions to cease implementing certain CFE obligations vis-à-vis Russia, while still continuing to implement fully their obligations with respect to all other CFE States Parties. However, in the December 2011 foreign ministers’ communiqué, Allies stated that these decisions were fully reversible should the Russian Federation return to full implementation.

At the Chicago Summit in May 2012, Allies reiterated their commitment to conventional arms control and expressed determination to preserve, strengthen and modernise the conventional arms control regime in Europe, based on key principles and commitments.

At the Wales Summit in September 2014, Allies reaffirmed their long-standing commitment to conventional arms control as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security and emphasised the importance of full implementation and compliance to rebuild trust and confidence. They underscored that Russia’s unilateral military activity in and around Ukraine has undermined peace, security and stability across the region, and its selective implementation of the Vienna Document and Open Skies Treaty and long-standing non-implementation of the CFE Treaty have eroded the positive contributions of these arms control instruments. Allies called on Russia to fully adhere to its commitments. On 11 March 2015, the
Russian Federation announced that it was suspending its participation in the meetings of the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) on the CFE Treaty, which meets regularly in Vienna.

- **The Vienna Document**

  The Vienna Document (VD), that includes all European and Central Asian participating states, is a politically binding agreement designed to promote mutual trust and transparency about a state’s military forces and activities. Under the VD, thousands of inspections and evaluation visits have been conducted as well as airbase visits and visits to military facilities; also new types of armament and equipment have been demonstrated to the participating states of the VD. With an aim to reflect the contemporary security policy environment, an updated version of the VD will be approved by the OSCE in December 2016.

- **The Open Skies Treaty**

  The Open Skies Treaty is legally binding and allows for unarmed aerial observation flights over the territory of its participants. So far, more than 1,100 observation missions have been conducted since the Treaty’s entry into force in January 2002. Aerial photography and other material from observation missions provide transparency and support verification activities carried out on the ground under other treaties.

  This Treaty provides for extensive cooperation regarding the use of aircraft and their sensors, thereby adding to openness and confidence. Following long-lasting negotiations the States Parties to the Open Skies Treaty agreed, at the 2010 review conference, to allow the use of digital sensors in the future. However, these have to undergo a certification process, as foreseen by the Open Skies Treaty.

- **The UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects**

  The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) not only feeds global terrorist activities, but also encourages violence, thus affecting local populations and preventing constructive development and economic activities.

  SALW proliferation needs to be addressed as broadly as possible and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) is a well-suited framework for that. The NATO/EAPC Ad Hoc Working Group on SALW and Mine Action contributes to international efforts to address the illicit trade in SALW and encourages full implementation of international regulations and standards, including the United Nations Programme of Action (UN PoA).

  The UN PoA was adopted in July 2001 by nearly 150 countries, including all NATO member countries, and contains concrete recommendations for improving national legislation and controls over illicit small arms, fostering regional cooperation and promoting international assistance and cooperation on the issue. It was developed and agreed as a result of the growing realisation that most present-day conflicts are fought with illicit small arms and light weapons, and that their widespread availability has a negative impact on international peace and security, facilitates violations of international humanitarian law and human rights, and hampers economic and social development. It includes measures at the national, regional and global levels, in the areas of legislation, destruction of weapons that were confiscated, seized, or collected, as well as international cooperation and assistance to strengthen the ability of states in identifying and tracing illicit arms and light weapons. Every two years, the UN holds the Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the PoA, in which NATO participates. National delegations from all member states gather every six years to review the progress made in the implementation of the PoA.

- **Mine action**

  Although not all member states of the Alliance are a party to the Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel mines, they all fully support its humanitarian demining goals.
The Alliance assists partner countries in the destruction of surplus stocks of mines, arms and munitions through a NATO/Partnership Trust Fund mechanism.

The EAPC Ad Hoc Working Group on SALW and Mine Action also supports mine action efforts through these Trust Fund projects, as well as through information-sharing. In particular, its guest speaker programme provides an opportunity for mine action experts to share their expertise with the Working Group. These speakers originate from national mine action centres, non-governmental organisations and international organisations and have included high-profile experts, such as Nobel Laureate Ms Jody Williams, Director of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. The Group has broadened its focus to also incorporate issues related to explosive remnants of war and cluster munitions onto its agenda.

- **The Convention on Cluster Munitions**

The Convention on Cluster Munitions prohibits all use, stockpiling, production and transfer of cluster munitions. Separate articles in the Convention concern assistance to victims, clearance of contaminated areas and destruction of stockpiles. It became a legally binding international instrument when it entered into force on 1 August 2010. As of 19 April 2016, a total of 119 had joined the Convention (100 States Parties and 19 signatories).

- **The Arms Trade Treaty**

In July 2012, UN member states gathered in New York to negotiate an arms trade treaty that would establish high common standards for international trade in conventional arms. After two years of negotiations, the Conference reached an agreement on a treaty text. Governments signed the treaty and after ratification of 50 states it came into force in December 2014. This Treaty establishes common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms. NATO stands ready to support the Arms Trade Treaty as necessary.

- **Trust Fund projects**

The Partnership for Peace Trust Fund mechanism was originally established in 2000 to assist partner countries with the safe destruction of stocks of anti-personnel land mines. It was later extended to include the destruction of surplus munitions, unexploded ordnance and SALW, and assisting partner countries in managing the consequences of defence reform, training and building integrity. So far, NATO has contributed to the destruction of 4.8 million landmines, 41,600 tonnes of various munitions, 2 million hand grenades, 15.8 million cluster submunitions, 1,470 man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), and 626,000 SALW alongside 164 million rounds of SALW ammunition.

In addition, some 12,000 former military personnel have received retraining assistance through Trust Fund defence reform projects.

Trust Fund projects are initiated by a NATO member or partner country and funded by voluntary contributions from individual Allies, partners and organisations. A web-based information-sharing platform allows donors and recipient countries to share information about ongoing and potential projects.

### NATO bodies involved in conventional arms control

There are a number of NATO bodies that provide a forum to discuss and take forward arms control issues. Arms control policy is determined within the deliberations of the High-Level Task Force (HLTF) on Conventional Arms Control, that was established for CFE and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs).

Implementation and verification of arms control agreements fall under the purview of the Verification Coordinating Committee (VCC), including overseeing a designated CFE verification database.

Other fora include the Partnerships and Cooperative Security Committee (PCSC) and the EAPC Ad Hoc Working Group on SALW and Mine Action, in which implementing organisations like the UN, the
European Union, the OSCE, the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of SALW – or SEESAC – and the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) can share information on projects.

The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) also has a working group for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. However, work of the NRC has been suspended since spring 2014 due to Russia’s actions in Ukraine.

The NATO School in Oberammergau (Germany) conducts several courses in the fields of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. They are related to CFE, VD, Open Skies, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), SALW and Mine Action. Most of them are also open to NATO’s partners across the globe.
Small arms and light weapons (SALW) and mine action (MA)

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) affects security while anti-personnel mines and explosive remnants of war kill and maim both people and livestock long after the end of hostilities. Both can have destabilising effects on social, societal and economic development and can represent major challenges to regional and national security.

Highlights

- Landmines and explosive remnants of war are a major barrier to post-conflict recovery and development.
- As of June 2016, NATO has helped to clear 3,800 hectares of land and destroy 4,800,000 anti-personnel landmines and 2,000,000 hand grenades.
- NATO also supports the international community’s efforts to eradicate the illicit trade of conventional weapons.
- NATO has been contributing to the safety of civilian populations by focusing on weapon surplus clearance since the late 1990s.

More background information

The challenges posed by SALW and mines

The illicit proliferation of SALW can fuel and prolong armed violence and support illegal activities and the emergence of violent groups. Access to illicit SALW contributes to the development of terrorism,
organised crime, human trafficking, gender violence and piracy; and the diversion of weapons is closely linked to corruption and poor management practices. Small arms are weapons intended for use by an individual. They include pistols, rifles, submachine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns; light weapons are designed for use by two or more persons serving as a crew and include heavy machine guns, grenade launchers, mortars, anti-aircraft guns and anti-tank guns, all less than 100 mm in calibre.

Anti-personnel mines and explosive remnants of war kill and maim both people and livestock long after the cessation of hostilities and are a major barrier to post-conflict recovery and development. Beyond the human tragedy they can cause, they also overload local and national health services, reduce the available workforce and disrupt the social and societal structures. In many countries, stockpiles of weapons and ammunition are not always properly managed, allowing illicit access or accidents that may affect security personnel and nearby populations.

NATO is helping to address these issues by encouraging dialogue and cooperation among Allies and partners to seek effective solutions. It has two very effective mechanisms: the Ad Hoc Working Group on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Mine Action (AHWG SALW/MA) and the NATO/Partnership Trust Fund mechanism. NATO also supports initiatives led by other international bodies, such as the United Nations (UN) Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW in All Its Aspects (commonly known as the PoA) as well as the UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). In the area of anti-personnel mines, the Alliance and its partners also assist signatories of the “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and Their Destruction” (Ottawa Convention). Allies who are not party to this Convention facilitate efforts in the general realm of what is commonly called mine action, which includes: clearance of mine fields, providing victim assistance, raising mine risk awareness through education, and assistance in destroying mine stockpiles.

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### Tackling both issues together

In 1999, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which groups Allies and partner countries, established the AHWG on SALW. Originally, this Working Group focused only on issues related to the impact of the proliferation of SALW on Alliance’s peacekeeping operations.

In April 2004, the Working Group’s mandate was broadened to include mine action issues (therefore becoming the AHWG SALW/MA). It is one of the few forums in the world that meets on a regular basis (quarterly) to address these specific issues. The objective of the Working Group is to contribute to international efforts to reduce the impact of anti-personnel landmines, as well as the threats caused by the illicit trade of SALW.

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### An annual work programme

The Working Group organises itself around an annual work programme. In practice, it uses a four-pronged approach to accomplish its work by:

- providing a forum in which EAPC members and certain implementing organisations can share information on SALW and ammunition projects they are conducting. These organisations include but are not limited to the European Union (EU), the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) and the United Nations (UN). This exchange of information helps to improve coordination with donor countries and implementing organisations, with the aim of increasing effectiveness and avoiding duplication of work. The information is consolidated into the Project Information Matrix, a web-based information-sharing platform, which is regularly updated by the members of the AHWG SALW/MA;

- inviting speakers from non-governmental organisations (NGOs), regional and international organisations, and research institutes to share their views and recent research with delegations;
facilitating the management and creation of the Trust Fund projects. This includes updating delegations on the status of Trust Fund projects and highlighting where more effort or volunteer donations are needed;

- organising regular international workshops, seminars and conferences on topics particularly pertinent to SALW and mine action.

NATO’s International Staff (IS) functions as the Working Group’s executive agent and implements the annual work programmes of the AHWG SALW/MA and organises its quarterly meetings.

Training

NATO conducts a course related to SALW and/or mine action that is usually held at the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany. The “SALW and Mine Action Course”, aimed at mid-level management personnel, provides students with an overview of the most significant political, practical and regulatory issues needed to deal with SALW, conventional ammunition and mine action from a national, regional or global perspective. It includes cross-cutting issues, such as gender mainstreaming that will affect the various facets of issues related to SALW and mine action. The course also covers practical and technical aspects relevant for conducting site assessment visits, such as the development of appropriate standard operating procedures. The course is open to military and civilian personnel from EAPC countries.

NATO support to UN global efforts

The UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (known as the PoA) was adopted in July 2001 by nearly 150 countries, including all NATO member countries. It consists of measures at the national, regional and global levels, in the areas of legislation, destruction of weapons that were confiscated, seized or collected, as well as international cooperation and assistance to strengthen the ability of states in identifying and tracing illicit arms and light weapons. Every two years, the UN holds the “Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the PoA”. The NATO Ad Hoc Working Group supports the implementation of the PoA through its activities and will continue to support major global events of this nature.

On 1 August 2010, the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) entered into force and became a legally binding instrument. The CCM prohibits, for its signatories, all use, stockpiling, production and transfer of cluster munitions. Separate articles in the Convention concern assistance to victims, clearance of contaminated areas and the destruction of stockpiles. The NATO Working Group provides an additional forum for the discussion and facilitation of its implementation.

The landmark Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), regulating the international trade in conventional arms, from small arms to battle tanks, combat aircraft and warships, entered into force on 24 December 2014. The treaty aims to foster peace and security by interrupting the destabilising flow of arms to conflict regions. NATO supports the implementation of the ATT in particular through the activities of the Working Group on SALW and Mine Action and constitutes an additional forum for discussion and information-sharing on the issue.

Trust Funds projects

The end of the Cold War left a dangerous legacy of ageing arms, ammunition, anti-personnel mines, missiles, rocket fuel, chemicals and unexploded ordnance. In 1999, NATO established the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) Trust Fund mechanism to assist partners with these problems. The NATO PfP Trust Fund Policy was established in September 2000 in order to assist partners in meeting the Ottawa Convention obligations. The policy expanded to include disposal of conventional ammunition, small arms, defence reform, training and building integrity. Since then, Trust Fund projects have produced tangible results and, as such, represent the operational dimension of the Working Group’s efforts.

Trust Fund projects focus on the destruction of SALW, ammunition and mines, improving their physical security and stockpile management, and also address the consequences of defence reform. Allies and partners fund and execute these projects through NSPA as the main executive agent. Each project has a...
lead nation(s), which oversees the development of project proposals along with the NATO International Staff and the executive agent. This ensures a mechanism with a competitive bidding process, transparency in how funds are expended and verifiable project oversight, particularly for projects involving the destruction of munitions.

Trust Funds may be initiated by a NATO member or partner country to tackle specific, practical issues linked to the demilitarization process of a country or to the introduction of defence reform projects. They are funded by voluntary contributions from individual NATO Allies, partner countries, and more recently NGOs. They are often implemented in cooperation with other international organisations and NGOs.

As of June 2016, Allies and partners, through the Trust Fund projects, have destroyed or cleared:

- 64,000,000 rounds of ammunition
- 15,800,000 cluster sub-munitions
- 4,800,000 anti-personnel landmines
- 2,000,000 hand grenades
- 626,000 small arms and light weapons (SALW)
- 642,000 pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO)
- 41,600 tonnes of various ammunition
- 94,000 surface-to-air missiles and rockets
- 1,470 man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS)
- 3,250 tonnes of chemicals, including rocket fuel oxidiser ("mélange")
- 3,800 hectares cleared

In addition, some 12,000 former military personnel have received retraining assistance through Trust Fund defence reform projects.

The Trust Fund mechanism is open to countries participating in NATO’s PfP programme, the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and to partners from further across the globe. For instance, in 2014, NATO engaged in the improvement of safety and security of ammunition storage facilities in Mauritania and the destruction of excess ammunition in Jordan, thus enhancing safety of local communities. Trust Funds are also open to countries where NATO is leading a crisis-management operation. In 2010, NATO successfully completed a Trust Fund project in Afghanistan, achieving its aim of providing the Afghan National Army further means to manage munitions in a safe and efficient way.

Once the project proposal is agreed by the lead nation and the partner country concerned, it is presented to the Partnerships and Cooperative Security Committee (PCSC), which is the formal forum to discuss projects and attract volunteer donor support and resources. The Luxembourg-based NSPA has been selected by lead nations of most Trust Fund projects to be the executing agent, particularly for demilitarization projects. It plays a key role in the development and implementation of Trust Fund projects and offers technical advice and a range of management services.
NATO’s capabilities

NATO constantly reviews and transforms its policies, capabilities and structures to ensure that it can continue to address current and future challenges to the freedom and security of its members. Presently, Allied forces are required to carry out a wide range of missions across several continents; the Alliance needs to ensure that its armed forces remain modern, deployable, and capable of sustained operations.

Highlights

- NATO’s modern defence posture is based on an effective combination of cutting-edge capabilities and forces trained to work together seamlessly.

- The 2010 Strategic Concept identifies collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security as the essential core tasks that NATO must continue to fulfil to assure the security of its members. In the Strategic Concept, deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and ballistic missile defence capabilities, remains a core element of NATO’s overall strategy.

- Allies agreed to develop and maintain the capabilities needed to carry out all associated missions, where appropriate using multinational approaches and innovative solutions.

- At the 2012 Chicago Summit, Allied leaders confirmed that the NATO Defence Planning Process would continue to be the primary means to identify and prioritise required capabilities and to promote their development and acquisition.

- At the 2014 Wales Summit, at a time of continuing difficult global financial conditions, Allies agreed to further enhance their ability to meet these commitments and introduce a range of measures to respond to the new and emerging geo-strategic security environment.
Meeting immediate and long-term challenges

The Allies provided political guidance in 2015 to refine further the overarching aims and objectives of the 2010 Strategic Concept by establishing what they expect the Alliance to be able to do in broad quantitative and qualitative terms, especially in the prevailing geo-strategic security environment. By setting the related priorities, this guidance mandates the delivery of the required capabilities through the NATO Defence Planning Process.

The NATO Defence Planning Process

The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) aims to harmonise national and Alliance defence planning activities; it details how the aims and objectives of the Alliance as set out in the political guidance are to be met. By setting targets for implementation by Allies, either individually or together, it guides both national and collective capability development.

In the course of planning and carrying out operations, operational commands may identify capabilities that are required immediately. These urgent operational requirements are not dealt with through the NDPP, but are ‘fast-tracked’ through the Military Committee and relevant budget committees, and finally submitted for consideration by the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s principal political decision-making body.

Current objectives

With the adoption of the 2010 Strategic Concept, Alliance leaders committed to ensuring that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of Allies’ populations. Therefore the Alliance will:

- maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces;
- maintain the ability to sustain concurrent major joint operations and several smaller operations for collective defence and crisis response, including at strategic distance;
- develop and maintain robust, mobile and deployable conventional forces to carry out both its Article 5 responsibilities and expeditionary operations, including with the NATO Response Force;
- carry out the necessary training, exercises, contingency planning and information exchange for assuring its defence against the full range of conventional and emerging security challenges, and provide appropriate visible assurance and reinforcement for all Allies;
- ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control and consultation arrangements;
- develop the capability to defend NATO European populations, territories and forces against ballistic missile attack as a core element of its collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance;
- further develop its capacity to defend against the threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons;
- further develop further its ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber attacks, including by using the NATO planning process to enhance and coordinate national cyber defence capabilities, bringing all NATO bodies under centralised cyber protection, and better integrating NATO cyber awareness, warning and response with member countries;
- enhance the capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism, including through enhanced analysis of the threat, more consultations with partners, and the development of appropriate military capabilities, including to help train partner forces to fight terrorism themselves;
- develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and consultations among Allies on the basis of strategic assessments and contingency planning;

- ensure that it is at the front edge in assessing the security impact of emerging technologies, and that military planning takes the potential threats into account;

- continue to review its overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance, taking into account changes to the evolving international security environment.

#### Prioritising capabilities

Given the evolving geo-strategic environment, Alliance leaders are continuously assessing and reviewing the capabilities needed to conduct the full range of NATO missions.

At the Chicago Summit in May 2012, Alliance leaders made a pledge to improve the NATO’s planning processes and specific capabilities in pursuit of the “NATO Forces 2020” goal. The vision for NATO forces in 2020 and beyond is one of modern, tightly connected forces equipped, trained, exercised and commanded so that they can operate together and with partners in any environment. New initiatives were introduced to aid the realisation of this goal, including the delivery of required capabilities using the multinational approaches of ‘Smart Defence’ and the use of the Connected Forces Initiative to ensure that the Alliance remains well prepared to undertake the full range of its missions and address future challenges.

At the Wales Summit in September 2014, Alliance leaders reaffirmed their strong commitment to collective defence and to ensuring security and assurance for all Allies; they agreed a coherent and comprehensive package of measures – the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) – to meet the need for assurance and to adapt the Alliance’s military strategic posture to respond to changes in the geo-strategic security environment. They also pledged to reverse the trend of declining defence budgets.

**Smart Defence**

In light of growing military requirements, developing capabilities becomes more complex and therefore in many cases more expensive. As a result, multinational cooperation offers a viable solution to deliver critical capabilities in a cost-effective manner. For certain high-end key capabilities Allies may in fact only be able to obtain them if they work together to develop and acquire them. Smart Defence is NATO’s approach for bringing multinational cooperation to the forefront of Allies’ capability delivery efforts.

Developing greater European military capabilities through multinational cooperation will continue to strengthen the transatlantic link, enhance the security of all Allies and foster an equitable sharing of the burdens, benefits and responsibilities of Alliance membership. In this context, NATO works closely with the European Union, utilising agreed mechanisms, to ensure that Smart Defence and the EU’s Pooling and Sharing initiative are complementary and mutually reinforcing. Concurrently, Smart Defence also contributes toward maintaining a strong defence industry in Europe by making the fullest possible use of defence industrial cooperation across the Alliance. Moving forward NATO will continue to support Allies in their endeavour to exploit the full potential multinational capability delivery offers.

*More information*

**Connected Forces Initiative**

The Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) is essential to ensure that the Alliance remains well prepared to undertake the full range of its missions, as well as to address future challenges wherever they may arise. The implementation of CFI is one of the key means to deliver NATO Forces 2020 and to enable the training and exercise elements of the RAP.

*More information*
Framework Nations Concept

In June 2014, NATO defence ministers agreed a Framework Nations Concept, which sees groups of countries coming together for two purposes. Firstly, to maintain current capabilities and to act as a foundation for the coherent development of new capabilities in the medium to long term. This builds on the notions of multinational development of capabilities that are at the heart of Smart Defence and the ideas associated with groups of countries coming together to produce them. Secondly, as a mechanism for collective training and exercises in order to prepare groupings of forces. For example, those Allies that maintain a broad spectrum of capabilities provide a framework for other Allies to “plug” into.

Countering improvised explosive devices

As seen in Afghanistan and elsewhere, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have proven to be the weapon of choice for non-conventional adversarial forces. NATO must be prepared to counter IEDs in any land or maritime operation involving asymmetrical threats, in which force protection will remain a paramount priority. Institutionalising counter-IED lessons learned across the last two decades of operations, NATO’s ambitious Counter-IED Action Plan has increased its focus on capabilities for attacking threat networks behind these destructive devices. Although developed in the counter-IED context, such capabilities can also contribute to counter-piracy, counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism operations.

More information

Improving air- and sealift capabilities

Air- and sealift capabilities are a key enabler for operations and allow forces and equipment to be deployed quickly to wherever they are needed. While there is significant procurement nationally, many Allies have pooled resources, including with partner countries, to acquire new capacities through commercial arrangements or through purchase, to give them access to additional transport to swiftly move troops, equipment and supplies across the globe.

More information

Collective logistics contracts

To improve effectiveness, NATO is examining procedures for the development and administration of rapidly usable contracts, including for medical support, for repayment by countries when used. More broadly, collective logistics is being implemented during redeployment from theatres of operation, such as Kosovo or Afghanistan, to optimise the use of multinational capabilities. In June 2015, Exercise Capable Logistician brought together a large number of logisticians from member and partner countries to work on improving interoperability.

Missile defence

In the context of a broader response to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, NATO has been pursuing an Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence Programme since 2005. This Programme aims to protect deployed Allied forces against ballistic missile threats with ranges up to 3,000 kilometres. In 2010, it delivered an interim capability to protect troops in a specific area against short-range and some medium-range ballistic missiles.

At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO leaders decided to expand this Programme to include protection of NATO European populations and territories, and at the same time invited Russia to cooperate on missile defence and to share in its benefits. The dialogue with Russia on missile defence cooperation is currently suspended.

At the 2012 Chicago Summit, Allies declared an Interim NATO ballistic missile defence (BMD) capability as an initial step to establish NATO’s missile defence system, which will protect all NATO European populations, territory and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles.

More information
Cyber defence

Cyber threats and attacks are becoming more common, sophisticated, and damaging. The Alliance is faced with an evolving, complex threat environment. State and non-state actors can use cyber attacks in the context of military operations. In recent events, cyber attacks have been part of hybrid warfare.

NATO and its Allies rely on strong and resilient cyber defences to fulfil the Alliance’s core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.

NATO needs to be prepared to defend its networks and operations against the growing sophistication of the cyber threats and attacks it faces.

More information

Stabilisation and reconstruction

The Alliance’s experience with crisis-response operations has shown the importance of stabilisation and reconstruction – activities undertaken in fragile states or in conflict or post-conflict situations to promote security, development and good governance in key sectors. The primary responsibilities for such activities normally lie with other actors, but the Alliance has established political guidelines that will help to improve its involvement in stabilisation and reconstruction efforts. It will be important in this context for the Alliance to seek, in accordance with the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan, unity of effort with the other members of the international community, in particular its strategic partners, the United Nations and the European Union.

To this end, NATO must have the ability to plan for, employ, and coordinate civilian as well as military crisis-management capabilities that countries provide for agreed Allied missions. NATO’s defence planning therefore also includes non-military capabilities and expertise to complement the military support to stabilisation operations and reconstruction efforts. These non-military capabilities are sought from existing and planned means in national inventories of those countries that are willing to make them available.

Critical long-term enabling capabilities

Information superiority is a key enabling element in the battlespace and helps commanders at every level make the best decisions, creating the circumstances for success at less risk and greater speed. NATO will therefore continue to develop and acquire a range of networked information systems (Automated Information Systems) that support the two Strategic Commands. They cover a number of domains, including land, air, maritime, intelligence, logistics and the common operating picture, with a view to enabling more informed and effective holistic oversight, decision-making and command and control.

Federated Mission Networking

The Afghanistan Mission Network is a single federated network, which improves information-sharing by easing the information flow and creating better situational awareness among countries contributing to NATO-led efforts in Afghanistan. This is seen as the model for future multinational networking.

Taking into consideration best practices and lessons learned from its implementation, a Federated Mission Networking framework is now being developed, which will underpin the Alliance’s ability to connect its information systems and operate effectively together, including with partners, on training, exercises and operations.

More information

Air Command and Control

NATO is implementing a fully interoperable Air Command and Control System (ACCS), which will provide for the first time a fully integrated set of tools to support the conduct of all air operations in both real-time and non-real-time environments. ACCS will make available the capability to plan, direct, task, coordinate, supervise, assess and report on the operation of all allocated air assets in peace, crisis and conflict.
The system is composed of both static and deployable elements with equipment that will be used both within the NATO Command Structure and in individual Allies. With the further inclusion of command and control functionality for ballistic missile defence, a fully integrated system for air and missile defence at the tactical level will be fielded.

More information

Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

NATO needs a Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) capability to support the coordinated collection, processing, and sharing within NATO of ISR material gathered by the future Alliance Ground Surveillance system, the current NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force (NAEW&C Force) and Allies’ own ISR assets. In early 2016, NATO defence ministers declared an initial operational JISR capability centred on enhancing the situational awareness of NATO’s highest readiness forces. An enduring JISR capability is now being developed in a phased approach; ongoing work will further improve on and build synergy in the management of Allies’ diverse inputs and capabilities for NATO’s 360 degree situational awareness.

More information

Alliance Ground Surveillance

The Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system is a key element of transformation and an essential enabling capability for forces across the full spectrum of NATO’s current and future operations and missions. AGS will be an airborne, stand-off ground surveillance system that can detect and track vehicles, such as tanks, trucks or helicopters, moving on or near the ground, in all weather conditions. The AGS airborne vehicle acquisition contract was signed during the 2012 Chicago Summit; production of the first AGS aircraft began in December 2013 and its first flight was successfully conducted in December 2015.

More information

NATO Airborne Warning & Control System

As one of the most visible and tangible examples of what cooperation between Allies can achieve, the NATO Airborne Warning & Control System (AWACS) provides NATO-owned and operated airborne command and control, air and maritime surveillance, and battlespace management capability. AWACS has continuously proven itself a critical asset over Libya and Afghanistan, and most recently safeguarding the Alliance’s eastern perimeter.

More information

Other initiatives

NATO Response Force

The NATO Response Force (NRF) is a technologically advanced, multinational force made up of land, air, maritime and Special Operations Forces (SOF) components that the Alliance can deploy quickly to wherever it is needed. It has the overarching purpose of being able to provide a rapid military response to an emerging crisis, whether for collective defence purposes or for other crisis-response operations. In light of the changing security environment to the east and south of the Alliance’s borders – and following up on initiatives taken at the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014 – defence ministers decided on 5 February 2015 to enhance the NRF by creating a spearhead force within it. Known as the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), it will be able to deploy at very short notice, particularly on the periphery of NATO’s territory.

More information
Aviation modernisation programmes

The Alliance will continue to develop its capabilities in the field of air traffic management (ATM) and engage in civil aviation modernisation plans in Europe (Single European Sky ATM Research) and North America (NextGen). The aim is threefold, namely to ensure safe access to airspace, effective delivery of services and civil-military interoperability, in order to safeguard military mission effectiveness at global level and the ability to conduct the full range of NATO operations, including the airspace integration of unmanned aircraft systems.

Energy security

Allies recognise that a stable and reliable energy supply, diversification of routes, suppliers and energy resources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks remain of critical importance. While these issues are primarily the responsibility of national governments and other international organisations concerned, NATO contributes to energy security in various ways. NATO raises strategic awareness through political discussions and intelligence-sharing, further develops its competence to contribute to the protection of critical energy infrastructure, improves the energy efficiency of military forces, enhances its training and education efforts, and engages with partner countries and other international organisations.

Reforming NATO’s structures

The Alliance’s military command structure is being transformed into a leaner, more effective and affordable structure. Agencies reform aims to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of capabilities and services, to achieve greater synergies between similar functions and to increase transparency and accountability. In line with the 2010 Strategic Concept, over the last few years the Alliance has been engaged in a process of continual reform by streamlining structures, improving working methods and maximising efficiency.

The new structure reached initial operational capability in December 2013, opening the way to an entity that is more agile, flexible and better able to deploy on operations, including Article 5 contingencies.

A major reform of NATO’s agencies was conducted with a view to consolidating and rationalising various services and programmes and ensuring more effective and efficient service and capability delivery.

NATO Headquarters has also been reformed, including with regard to a smaller but more efficient International Staff, intelligence-sharing and production, and a significant reduction in the number of committees. Furthermore, the transition to the new NATO headquarters will enable further improvements to efficiency and effectiveness of the Alliance.

Resource reform in the area of programming, transparency, accountability and information management has also helped make NATO resource and financial management more efficient.

At the Wales Summit, further work was tasked in the areas of delivery of common-funded capabilities, reform governance and financial transparency and accountability.

Maritime security

Alliance maritime capabilities have an enduring value and an important cross-cutting contribution to Alliance security. In January 2011, NATO adopted the Alliance Maritime Strategy. Consistent with the 2010 Strategic Concept, the Strategy sets out ways in which NATO’s unique maritime power can be used to address critical security challenges. It sets out the four areas in which maritime forces play a key role: deterrence and collective defence; crisis management; cooperative security; and maritime security. In the current security context, the Alliance’s naval forces provide essential contributions to assurance measures and situational awareness.

The Alliance continues to implement its maritime strategy through capability development, an extensive programme of maritime exercises and training, and the enhancement of cooperation between NATO and
its partners, as well as other international actors, including the European Union. NATO’s activity in the Aegean Sea and NATO’s maritime presence in the Mediterranean more generally through Operation Active Endeavour (which will soon transition to a broader non-Article 5 Maritime Security Operation) are examples of how NATO’s naval forces contribute to helping address numerous security challenges.

More information
Readiness Action Plan

At the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO agreed the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) to ensure the Alliance is ready to respond swiftly and firmly to new security challenges. This is the most significant reinforcement of NATO’s collective defence since the end of the Cold War. The RAP addresses risks and threats from the east and the south.

Highlights

- **Due to the changed security environment on NATO’s borders, the RAP includes ‘assurance measures’ for NATO member countries in Central and Eastern Europe to reassure their populations, reinforce their defence and deter potential aggression.**

- Assurance measures comprise a series of land, sea and air activities in, on and around the NATO’s eastern flank, which are reinforced by exercises focused on collective defence and crisis management.

- The RAP also includes ‘adaptation measures’ which are longer-term changes to NATO’s forces and command structure so that the Alliance will be better able to react swiftly and decisively to sudden crises.

- Adaptation measures include tripling the strength of the NATO Response Force (NRF), creating a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) that is able to deploy at very short notice, and enhancing the Standing Naval Forces.

- To facilitate readiness and the rapid deployment of forces, the first six NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) - which are small headquarters - were inaugurated in Central and Eastern Europe. Two more NFIUs are being set up in Hungary and Slovakia. Headquarters for the Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin, Poland and the Multinational Division Southeast in Bucharest, Romania were also established. In addition, a standing joint logistics support group headquarters is being set up.
More background information

Assurance measures

The assurance measures are a series of land, sea and air activities in, on and around the territory of NATO Allies in Central and Eastern Europe, designed to reinforce their defence, reassure their populations and deter potential aggression. These are a direct result of Russia's aggressive actions to NATO's east. All 28 Allies are contributing to these measures on a rotational basis. The measures can be stepped up or reduced as necessary, depending on the security situation.

Since May 2014, NATO has increased the number of fighter jets on air-policing patrols over the Baltic States, and deployed fighter jets to Romania and Poland. In December 2015, a further package of tailored assurance measures was agreed for Turkey. The Alliance conducts regular AWACS surveillance flights over the territory of its eastern Allies, and maritime patrol aircraft flights along the eastern borders of Allied territory.

To provide assurance at sea, NATO deploys a number of multinational maritime forces such as a Standing NATO Mine Counter-Measures Group patrolling the Baltic Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, and an enlarged Standing NATO Maritime Group conducting maritime assurance measures in addition to counter-terrorism patrols.

NATO has increased the number of exercises it organises. Military exercises provide important opportunities to improve the ability of Allies and partners to work together and are a valuable demonstration of NATO’s readiness to respond to potential threats. These exercises take place on land, at sea and in the air with scenarios based on collective defence and crisis management.

Adaptation measures

Adaptation measures are longer-term changes to NATO’s forces and command structure which will make the Alliance better able to react swiftly and decisively to sudden crises.

These include the following:

- **An enhanced NATO Response Force**

  The NATO Response Force (NRF) is a highly ready and technologically advanced multinational force made up of land, air, maritime and Special Operations Forces (SOF) components that the Alliance can deploy quickly, wherever needed.

  At the 2014 Wales Summit, Allies decided to enhance the NRF to strengthen the Alliance’s collective defence and ensure that NATO has the right forces in the right place at the right time. The NRF now consists of about 40,000 personnel – a major increase from the previous level of 13,000. Its size is dependent on the task it is needed for.

  The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) has overall command of the NRF. Each year on rotation, NATO’s two Joint Force Commands (based in Brunssum, the Netherlands and Naples, Italy) have operational command of the NRF. In 2016, JFC Brunssum is commanding the NRF.

- **Very High Readiness Joint Task Force**

  The new quick-reaction Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) or “spearhead force” of around 20,000, of which about 5,000 are ground troops, is now operational and is ready to deploy within days wherever it is needed. The VJTF will be supported by air, maritime and SOF components.

  The VJTF and NRF forces will be based in their home countries, but able to deploy from there to wherever they are needed for exercises or crisis response. Leadership and membership of the VJTF and NRF will rotate on an annual basis. The VJTF participated in its first deployment exercise in Poland in June 2015 and was tested again during Trident Juncture 2015, which was conducted with over 36,000 troops mainly in Italy, Portugal and Spain.
If deployed in 2016, the VJTF will be led by Spain. Other Allies – France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Turkey and the United Kingdom – have already offered to serve as lead nation for the following years.

**NATO Force Integration Units**

First, six multinational NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) were established in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania and inaugurated in September 2015, constituting a visible and persistent NATO presence in these countries. Two more NFIUs are being set up in Hungary and Slovakia.

These NFIUs are small headquarters that will facilitate the rapid deployment of the VJTF and Allied follow-on forces units. They are being staffed by about 40 national and NATO specialists. Their task will be to improve cooperation and coordination between NATO and national forces, as well as to prepare and support exercises and any deployments needed.

**High-readiness multinational headquarters**

The Multinational Corps Northeast Headquarters is being developed by Denmark, Germany and Poland to provide an additional high-readiness capability to command forces deployed to the Baltic States and Poland, if required, and to enhance its role as a hub for regional cooperation.

Romania also decided to make available a new deployable multinational divisional headquarters for the southeast, which was inaugurated in Bucharest on 1 December 2015. The new, high-readiness headquarters will be able to command forces deployed within NATO’s southeast region, supporting the defence of the Alliance. Multinational Division Southeast Headquarters is designated to have 280 personnel.

In addition, the RAP calls for a number of logistics enhancements, including the prepositioning of equipment and supplies, to enhance NATO’s readiness to respond to any challenge to Allied security. A new standing joint logistics support group headquarters will be established within the NATO Command Structure.

**Evolution**

*In September 2014,* at the NATO Wales Summit, Allied leaders approved the RAP to ensure the Alliance is ready to respond swiftly and firmly to new security challenges. The plan provides a comprehensive package of measures to respond to the changes in the security environment in and near Europe and to threats emanating from the Middle East and North Africa.

NATO defence ministers decided *on 5 February 2015* that the VJTF would consist of a land component of around 5,000 troops with appropriate air, maritime and SOF units available. France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom agreed to assume lead roles for the VJTF on a rotational basis in the coming years. Ministers also set the goal of having an operationally capable VJTF by the time of the 2016 Warsaw Summit.

*In April 2015,* more than 1,500 troops took part in exercise Noble Jump, designed to test whether troops assigned to NATO’s Interim VJTF could be ready to deploy 48 hours after receiving an order-to-move.

*On 9 June 2015,* the VJTF deployed for the first time in Poland during exercise Noble Jump, where over 2,100 troops from nine NATO nations participated.

*On 24 June 2015,* NATO defence ministers took decisions on air, maritime and SOF components of the enhanced NRF. The NRF will now consist of up to 40,000 personnel. Ministers further took measures to speed up political and military decision-making, including authority for NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe to prepare troops for action as soon as a political decision is made. Allies also approved a new advance planning tool – Graduated Response Plans – which will enable executable operations plans to be generated exceptionally quickly, commensurate with the readiness requirements of the forces. Allies also agreed on the establishment of a new standing joint logistics support group.
headquarters within the NATO Command Structure. Finally, defence ministers agreed that in October they would decide on the establishment of new NFIU HQs, in addition to the six existing multinational NFIU HQs.

*In September 2015*, NFIUs were inaugurated in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania.

*In October 2015*, NATO defence ministers gave their green light to the completed military concept for the enhanced NRF, including its command and control arrangements. They also agreed to set up two more NFIUs in Hungary and Slovakia.

*In December 2015*, NATO inaugurated the Multinational Division Southeast Headquarters in Bucharest, Romania, marking its official integration into the NATO Command Structure. The new, high-readiness headquarters will be able to command forces deployed within NATO’s southeast region, supporting the Alliance’s defence. It will also be a hub for regional cooperation among Allies. The headquarters is designated to have 280 personnel.
The NATO Response Force (NRF) is a highly ready and technologically advanced, multinational force made up of land, air, maritime and Special Operations Forces (SOF) components that the Alliance can deploy quickly, wherever needed. In addition to its operational role, the NRF can be used for greater cooperation in education and training, increased exercises and better use of technology.

**Highlights**

- Launched in 2002, the NRF consists of a highly capable joint multinational force able to react in a very short time to the full range of security challenges from crisis management to collective defence.
- NATO Allies decided to enhance the NRF in 2014 by creating a “spearhead force” within it, known as the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF).
- This enhanced NRF is one of the measures of the Readiness Action Plan (RAP), which aims to respond to the changes in the security environment and strengthen the Alliance’s collective defence.
- Overall command of the NRF belongs to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).
- The decision to deploy the NRF is taken by the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s highest political decision-making body.

**More background information**

**Purpose**

The NRF has the overarching purpose of being able to provide a rapid military response to an emerging crisis, whether for collective defence purposes or for other crisis-response operations.

The NRF gives the Alliance the means to respond swiftly to various types of crises anywhere in the world. It is also a driving engine for NATO’s military transformation.
A rotational force

The NRF is based on a rotational system where Allied nations commit land, air, maritime or Special Operations Forces (SOF) units for a period of 12 months.

The NRF is also open to partner countries, once approved by the North Atlantic Council.

Participation in the NRF is preceded by national preparation, followed by training with other participants in the multinational force. As units rotate through the NRF, the associated high standards, concepts and technologies are gradually spread throughout the Alliance, thereby fulfilling one of the key purposes of the NATO Response Force – the further transformation of Allied forces.

Operational command of the NRF alternates between Allied Joint Force Commands in Brunssum, the Netherlands and Naples, Italy. JFC Brunssum has command of the NRF for 2016.

A powerful package

NATO Allies decided at the 2014 Wales Summit to enhance the NRF by creating a “spearhead force” within it, known as the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force or VJTF. This enhanced NRF is one of the measures of the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) agreed by Allies to respond to the changes in the security environment.

The enhanced NATO Response Force has:

- a command and control element: Operational command of the NRF alternates between Allied Joint Force Commands in Brunssum and Naples;
- the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF): This new NRF element – about 20,000 strong – includes a multinational land brigade of around 5,000 troops and air, maritime and SOF components. Leading elements will be ready to move within two to three days. France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom will assume lead roles for the VJTF on a rotational basis in the coming years;
- the Initial Follow-On Forces Group (IFFG): These are high-readiness forces that can deploy quickly following the VJTF, in response to a crisis. They are made up of two multinational brigades;
- a maritime component: it is based on the Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMGs) and the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Groups (SNMCMGs);
- a combat air and air-support component;
- Special Operations Forces; and
- a chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defence task force.

Before use, the NRF will be tailored (adjusted in size and capability) to match the demands of any specific operation to which it is committed.

The VJTF and Initial Follow-on Forces are based in their home countries, but are able to deploy to wherever they are needed for exercises or crisis response. The VJTF participated in its first deployment exercise in Poland in June 2015 and again during exercise Trident Juncture 2015 when the 2016 NRF was certified.

From 2016, the VJTF brigade, led by Spain, with other Allies participating, will be available to respond rapidly to any contingency.

Altogether, the enhanced NRF will number around 40,000 troops.
Any mission, anywhere

The NRF provides a tangible demonstration of NATO’s cohesion and commitment to deterrence and collective defence. Each NRF rotation has to prepare itself for a wide range of tasks. These include contributing to the preservation of territorial integrity, making a demonstration of force, peace support operations, disaster relief, protecting critical infrastructure and security operations. Initial-entry operations are conducted jointly as part of a larger force to facilitate the arrival of follow-on troops.

Elements of the NRF helped protect the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens, Greece, and were deployed to support the Afghan presidential elections in September of the same year.

The NRF has also been used in disaster relief.

- In September and October 2005, aircraft from the NRF delivered relief supplies donated by NATO member and partner countries to the United States to assist in dealing with the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
- From October 2005 to February 2006, elements of the NRF were used in the disaster relief effort in Pakistan, following the devastating 8 October earthquake. Aircraft from the NRF were used in an air bridge that delivered almost 3,500 tons of urgently needed supplies to Pakistan, while engineers and medical personnel from the NRF were deployed to the country to assist in the relief effort.

Evolution

The NATO Response Force initiative was announced at the Prague Summit in November 2002.

In the words of General James Jones, the then NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, “... NATO will no longer have the large, massed units that were necessary for the Cold War, but will have agile and capable forces at Graduated Readiness levels that will better prepare the Alliance to meet any threat that it is likely to face in this 21st century.”

The NRF concept was approved by Allied ministers of defence in June 2003 in Brussels.

On 13 October 2004, at an informal meeting of NATO defence ministers in Poiana Brasov, Romania, the NATO Secretary General and Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) formally announced that the NRF had reached its initial operational capability and was ready to take on the full range of missions.

The capabilities of the NRF were tested in a major live exercise, Steadfast Jaguar 06, in the Cape Verde Islands in June 2006. The challenging location was specifically designed to demonstrate and prove the viability of the NRF concept. At NATO’s Riga Summit in November 2006, the NRF was declared fully ready to undertake operations.

Since then, the way the NRF is generated and composed has been adjusted twice, in 2008 and 2010. This was to provide a more flexible approach to force generation, thereby facilitating force contributions, which were being hampered by the enduring high operational tempo arising from Afghanistan, Iraq and other missions. To further support force generation, Allies have set themselves voluntary national targets for force contributions.

On 21 February 2013, NATO defence ministers agreed that the NRF would be at the core of the Connected Forces Initiative in order to maintain NATO’s readiness and combat effectiveness.

At the Wales Summit in September 2014, Allies decided to enhance the NRF and to establish the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) that will be able to deploy within a few days to respond to any challenges that may arise. Allies also agreed to hold a multinational, high-visibility exercise – “Trident Juncture 2015” – to be hosted by Italy, Portugal and Spain. In addition, a broader and more demanding exercise programme would start in 2016, with the NRF as a key element in the exercises.

NATO defence ministers decided on 5 February 2015 that the VJTF would consist of a land component of around 5,000 troops with appropriate air, maritime and SOF units available. France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom agreed to assume lead roles for the VJTF on a rotational
basis in the coming years. The VJTF was to be operationally capable by the time of the 2016 Warsaw Summit – and this has been achieved.

On 9 June 2015, the VJTF deployed for the first time in Poland during exercise Noble Jump, where over 2,100 troops from nine NATO nations participated.

On 24 June 2015, NATO defence ministers took decisions on air, maritime and SOF components of the enhanced NRF. The NRF will now consist of up to 40,000 personnel. Ministers further took measures to speed up political and military decision-making, including authority for NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe to prepare troops for action as soon as a political decision is made. Allies also approved a new advance planning tool – Graduated Response Plans – enabling executable operations plans to be generated exceptionally quickly, commensurate with the readiness requirements of the forces. Ministers also agreed on the establishment of a new standing joint logistics support group headquarters within the NATO Command Structure.

In October 2015, NATO defence ministers gave their green light to the completed military concept for the enhanced NATO Response Force, including its command and control arrangements.

During exercise Trident Juncture in late 2015, the VJTF was tested and certified for 2016. The exercise also certified the NRF headquarters for 2016: JFC Brunssum.

--- Authority ---

Any decision to use the NRF is a consensual political decision, taken on a case-by-case basis by all 28 Allies in the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s principal political decision-making body.
Rapid Deployable Corps

Commanding NATO troops on missions wherever necessary

NATO’s Rapid Deployable Corps are High Readiness Headquarters, which can be quickly dispatched to lead NATO troops on missions within or beyond the territory of NATO member states.

Highlights

- NATO’s Rapid Deployable Corps are High Readiness Headquarters, which can be quickly dispatched to lead NATO troops wherever necessary.
- The corps can be deployed for a wide range of missions: from disaster management, humanitarian assistance and peace support to counter-terrorism and high-intensity war fighting.
- There are currently nine NATO Rapid Deployable Corps, which are each capable of commanding up to 60,000 soldiers.
- The political authorisation of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO’s principal political decision-making body, is required to deploy the corps.

More background information

Mission

The Rapid Deployable Corps can be deployed for a wide range of missions: from disaster management, humanitarian assistance and peace support to counter-terrorism and high-intensity war fighting. They can command and control forces from the size of a brigade numbering thousands of troops up to a corps of tens of thousands. There are currently nine NATO Rapid Deployable Corps, which are each capable of commanding up to 60,000 soldiers.
The general requirement for High Readiness Forces Headquarters is to be ready to deploy its first elements within ten days and the entire force within two months.

- **On standby**

The corps participate in the NATO Response Force (NRF) - a highly ready and technologically advanced force made up of land, air, sea, and Special Operations Forces components that can be deployed at short notice to wherever needed. Under the NRF’s rotation system, a designated Rapid Deployable Corps assumes command of the land component of the NRF for a fixed 12-month period, during which it is on standby. This means that the headquarters must be able to deploy on short notice. Prior to this, the corps undergoes an intense six-month training programme, which tests its procedures for planning and conducting combined joint crisis-response operations.

The various corps also play a central role in NATO’s ongoing operations. The Spanish corps commanded the land elements of the NRF that were deployed to Pakistan in late 2005 as part of NATO’s disaster assistance to the country following the devastating October 2005 earthquake. In 2006, the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) commanded the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Italy, the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Turkey, Eurocorps and 1 German-Netherlands Corps have also commanded ISAF. In addition, ARRC and Eurocorps played an important role in NATO’s operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Kosovo.

- **A broad spectrum of capabilities**

The Rapid Deployable Corps possess a broad spectrum of capabilities. Each corps has undergone an intense NATO operational evaluation programme in order to qualify as a NATO Rapid Deployable Headquarters. The headquarters have all had to demonstrate their capabilities in 50 areas, both in the barracks and in the field. This includes planning, logistics, administration, and command and control.

This certification process is designed to ensure that the headquarters are capable of meeting the exacting challenges of a rapid deployment into various operational environments.

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**Participants**

The corps are multinational, but are sponsored and paid by one or more ‘framework nations’ who provide the bulk of the headquarters’ personnel, equipment and financial resources.

The United Kingdom is the framework nation of the ARRC, while France, Greece, Italy, Spain and Turkey have sponsored the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps France, Greece Italy, Spain and Turkey, respectively. Germany and the Netherlands share costs for the German-Netherlands Rapid Deployable Corps, while Denmark, Germany and Poland are the three framework nations of the Multinational Corps Northeast and Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain are the Eurocorps framework nations.

The corps are open to personnel contributions from all the other NATO nations and several nations participate within each Rapid Deployable Corps.

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**Command structure**

All Rapid Deployable Corps Headquarters, except Eurocorps, belong to NATO’s integrated military structure. This means that they operate under the direct operational command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The political authorisation of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO’s principal political decision-making body, is required to deploy the corps, and is given on a case-by-case basis as the result of a consensual decision between all of the 28 NATO nations. In addition, any commitment of the Eurocorps requires an exclusive decision of the member states Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain.

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1 Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
Evolution

The Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), originally based in Rheindalen, Germany, but now in Innsworth, United Kingdom, was the first such corps, created in 1992. Following a review of NATO force structures, four more High Readiness Force Headquarters were established in 2002 and three other were established in 2005 and 2006 reaching the total of nine High Readiness Force Headquarters.

These are: the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) in Innsworth, the United Kingdom; the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Italy (NRDC-IT) in Solbiate Olana near Milan; the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Spain (NRDC-Spain) in Valencia; the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Turkey (NRDC-T) based near Istanbul; the 1 German-Netherlands Corps based in Münster, Germany; the Rapid Reaction Corps France (RRC-FR) in Lille; the NATO Deployable Corps Greece (NRDC-GR) based in Thessaloniki; and the Multinational Corps Northeast (MNC-NE) based in Szczecin, Poland.

In addition, Eurocorps, based in Strasbourg, France, has a technical agreement with NATO since 2002 and can be used for NATO missions.
Ballistic missile defence

Proliferation of ballistic missiles poses an increasing threat to Allied populations, territory and deployed forces. Many countries have, or are trying to develop or acquire ballistic missiles. The proliferation of these capabilities does not necessarily mean there is an immediate intent to attack NATO, but it does mean that the Alliance has a responsibility to take this into account as part of its core task of collective defence.

**Highlights**

- In 2010, Allies decided to develop a territorial BMD capability to pursue NATO's core task of collective defence.
- NATO has the responsibility to protect its European populations, territory and forces in light of the increasing proliferation of ballistic missiles and against threats emanating from outside the Euro-Atlantic area.
- NATO BMD is purely defensive; it is a long-term investment to address a long-term security threat.
- In 2012, Allies declared an Interim NATO BMD Capability, as a first step towards Initial and Full Operational Capability.
- NATO BMD capability combines assets commonly funded by all Allies and voluntary contributions provided by individual Allies.
- Several Allies already offered their contributions or are undergoing development or acquisition of further BMD assets such as upgraded ships with BMD-capable radars, ground-based Air and Missile Defence systems or advanced detection and alert capability.

**More background information**

**Components**

Ballistic missile defence (BMD) forms an important part of the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATINAMDS). The Alliance is conducting the following BMD-related activities:
1. Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD)

The aim of TBMD is to protect deployed NATO forces against short- and medium-range ballistic missile threats (up to 3,000-kilometer range).

In early 2010, the first operational TBMD capability (called Interim Capability) was fielded. It provided military planners with a planning tool to build the most effective defence design for specific scenarios or real deployments. A more robust version of that capability was fielded at the end of 2010 and added shared situational awareness. The next version will be delivered in the 2016-2017 timeframe and progressively merged with the (territorial) BMD effort.

2. BMD for the protection of NATO European territory, populations and forces

At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, NATO leaders decided to develop a territorial BMD capability. In May 2012 at the Chicago Summit, NATO leaders declared the Interim NATO BMD Capability operational. It offers the maximum coverage within available means to defend NATO’s populations, territory and forces across southern Europe against a limited ballistic missile attack.

However, the final aim remains to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles. This coverage is based on the principles of indivisibility of Allied security and NATO solidarity, equitable sharing of risks and burdens, as well as reasonable challenge. It also takes into account the level of threat, affordability and technical feasibility, and is in accordance with the latest common threat assessments agreed by the Alliance. Should international efforts reduce the threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation, NATO missile defence can, and will, adapt accordingly.

As part of the US European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), Turkey is hosting a US BMD radar at Küreçik, Romania is hosting an Aegis Ashore site at Deveselu Air Base (declared operational on 12 May 2016), Germany hosts the command centre at Ramstein Air Base and Poland will be hosting another Aegis Ashore site at the Redzikowo military base (in the 2018 timeframe). Additionally, in the context of the EPAA, Spain is hosting four multi-mission BMD-capable Aegis ships at its naval base in Rota. These assets are national contributions, and are integral parts of the NATO BMD capability.

Several Allies currently offer further ground-based air and missile defence systems (such as Patriot or SAMP/T) or complementary ships as a force protection of other BMD assets. Other Allies are also developing or acquiring BMD-capable assets that could eventually be made available for NATO BMD.

In September 2011, the Netherlands announced plans to upgrade four air-defence frigates with extended long-range missile defence early-warning radars as its national contribution to NATO’s ballistic missile defence capability. A similar announcement was made in August 2014 by Denmark, which decided to acquire a frigate-based radar system to enhance NATO BMD. In November 2015, the United Kingdom announced it would invest in a ground-based BMD radar, intended to enhance the coverage and effectiveness of the NATO BMD capability.

Mechanisms

The Defence Policy and Planning Committee (Reinforced) (DPPC(R)) is the senior committee that oversees and coordinates all efforts to develop the NATO BMD capability at the political-military level, as well as providing political-military guidance and advice on all issues related to NATO BMD.

The Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) is the senior committee responsible for the BMD programme aimed at developing necessary technical functionalities for BMD planners and operators.

NATO Military Authorities are responsible for developing a military doctrinal framework for BMD and for BMD operational planning, training and execution.

The Air and Missile Defence Committee as (AMDC) is the senior committee responsible for overall policy aspects of NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD).
Several other NATO senior committees address NATO BMD in the context of broader topics, such as civil emergency planning or crisis management.

Evolution

The key policy document providing the framework for NATO’s activities in the area of BMD is NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept. In addition, BMD is an important aspect of the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review of 2012.

The Strategic Concept recognises, inter alia, that “the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, threatens incalculable consequences for global stability and prosperity. During the next decade, proliferation will be most acute in some of the world’s most volatile regions.” Therefore, NATO will “develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of our Alliance. We will actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners.” As a defensive capability, BMD will be one element of a broader response to the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles.

The Deterrence and Defence Posture Review of 2012 states that missile defence can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence; it cannot substitute for them. It is a purely defensive capability and is being established in the light of threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic area. It is expected that NATO’s missile defence capabilities would complicate an adversary’s planning, and provide damage mitigation. Effective missile defence could also provide valuable decision space in times of crisis. Like other weapons systems, missile defence capabilities cannot promise complete and enduring effectiveness. NATO missile defence capability, along with effective nuclear and conventional forces, will signal our determination to deter and defend against any threat from outside the Euro-Atlantic area to the safety and security of our populations.

At the Lisbon Summit in 2010, Allied leaders agreed to address air and missile defence in a holistic way by developing a NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATINAMDS). NATINAMDS is based on the previously existing NATO Integrated Air Defence System (NATINADS) enhanced by the new BMD elements.

Since 2003, under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), BMD-related discussions and activities were ongoing between NATO Allies and Russia. Initially, these were focused on TBMD, A study was completed to assess possible levels of interoperability among TBMD systems of Allies and Russia. Additionally, several successful computer-assisted exercises were held to provide the basis for future improvements to interoperability and to develop mechanisms and procedures for joint operations in the area of TBMD.

Since November 2010, the focus shifted towards territorial BMD. NATO and Russia examined possible areas for cooperation in this field, based on their common decision at the Lisbon Summit. They agreed on a joint ballistic missile threat assessment, and to continue dialogue in this area. In April 2012, NATO and Russia successfully conducted a computer-assisted missile defence exercise, hosted by Germany. However, in October 2013, NATO-Russia BMD-related discussions were paused by Russia, and in April 2014, NATO suspended all cooperation with Russia in response to the Ukraine crisis.

Key milestones

**Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence**

**May 2001**

NATO launches two parallel feasibility studies for a future Alliance TBMD system.

**June 2004**

At the Istanbul Summit, Allied leaders direct that work on TBMD be taken forward expeditiously.
March 2005
The Alliance approves the establishment of a Programme Management Organization under the auspices of the CNAD.

September 2006
The Alliance awards the first major contract for the development of a test bed for the system.

February 2008
The test bed is opened in the Hague and declared fully operational nine months ahead of schedule.

Throughout 2008
The system design for the NATO command and control component of the TBMD system is verified through testing with national systems and facilities via the integrated test bed; this paves the way for the procurement of the capability.

March 2010
The Interim Capability (InCa) Step 1 is fielded.

June 2010
NATO signs contracts for the second phase of the interim theatre missile defence capability, which will include the capability to conduct a real-time theatre missile defence battle.

July 2010
The more robust Interim Capability (InCa 2) passes key tests during the Dutch Air Force Joint Project Optic Windmill 2010 exercise.

December 2010
At the end of 2010, all InCa 2 components – including BMD sensors and shooters from NATO nations – are linked and successfully tested in an ‘ensemble’ test prior to handover to NATO’s military commanders. InCa 2 is subsequently delivered to the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) in Uedem, Germany.

Territorial Ballistic Missile Defence

November 2002
At the Prague Summit, Allied leaders direct that a missile defence feasibility study be launched to examine options for protecting Alliance forces, territory and populations against the full range of ballistic missile threats.

April 2006
The study concludes that ballistic missile defence is technically feasible within the limits and assumptions of the study. The results are approved by the CNAD.

2007
An update of a 2004 Alliance assessment of ballistic missile threat developments is completed.

April 2008
At the Bucharest Summit, Allied leaders agree that the planned deployment of European-based US BMD assets should be an integral part of any future NATO-wide missile defence architecture. They call for options for a comprehensive ballistic missile defence architecture to extend coverage to all Allied territory not otherwise covered by the US system to be prepared in time for NATO’s next Summit.

April 2009
At the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, Allies recognise that a future US contribution of important architectural elements could enhance NATO elaboration of the Alliance effort and judge that ballistic missile threats should be addressed in a prioritised manner that includes consideration of the level of imminence of the threat and the level of acceptable risk.

September 2009
The United States announces its plan for the US European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA).
November 2010
At the Lisbon Summit, NATO’s leaders decide to develop a BMD capability to pursue its core task of collective defence. To this end, they decide that the scope of the existing TBMD programme will be expanded beyond the capability to protect forces to also include NATO European populations and territory. In this context, the EPAA and other national contributions are welcomed as valuable to the NATO BMD architecture.

June 2011
NATO defence ministers approve the NATO BMD Action Plan.

September 2011
Turkey announces a decision to host a US-owned missile defence radar as part of the NATO BMD capability.

September 2011
Romania and the United States sign an agreement to base a US Aegis Ashore system in Romania as part of NATO’s BMD capability.

September 2011
An agreement between Poland and the United States on basing a US Aegis Ashore system in Poland enters into force.

September 2011
The Netherlands announces plans to upgrade four air-defence frigates with extended long-range radar systems as its national contribution to NATO’s BMD capability.

October 2011
Spain and the United States announce an agreement to port US Aegis ships in Rota, Spain, as part of the US contribution to NATO’s ballistic missile defence capability.

February 2012
Germany announces a decision to offer its Patriot air- and missile-defence systems as a national contribution to NATO’s BMD capability.

April 2012
NATO successfully installs and tests the command and control architecture for the Interim Capability at Allied Air Command in Ramstein, Germany.

May 2012
At the Chicago Summit, Allies declare the Interim NATO BMD Capability, which is an operationally significant first step, offering the maximum coverage within available means to defend the populations, territory and forces across southern NATO Europe against a ballistic missile attack*.

March 2013
The United States announces a revised EPAA.

October 2013
Ground-breaking ceremony for the US Aegis Ashore system in Deveselu, Romania.

February 2014
First US Aegis destroyer stationed in Rota, Spain.

June 2014
Second US Aegis destroyer stationed in Rota.

August 2014
Denmark announces the decision to acquire a frigate-based radar system for NATO BMD.

September 2014
NATO Summit in Wales. Allies reiterate basic parameters for NATO BMD and note additional contributions offered or considered by Allies.
April 2015
Third US Aegis destroyer stationed in Rota.

September 2015
Fourth US Aegis destroyer stationed in Rota.

November 2015
The United Kingdom announces it will invest in a ground-based BMD radar, which will enhance the coverage and effectiveness of the NATO BMD capability.

December 2015
Aegis Ashore site in Deveselu, Romania, technically completed and handed over to military users.

May 2016
Aegis Ashore site in Deveselu declared operational.

NATO-Russia Council Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence Cooperation
2003
A study is launched under the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) to assess possible levels of interoperability among TBMD systems of NATO Allies and Russia.

March 2004
An NRC theatre missile defence command post exercise is held in the United States.

March 2005
An NRC theatre missile defence command post exercise is held in the Netherlands.

October 2006
An NRC theatre missile defence command post exercise is held in Russia.

January 2008
An NRC theatre missile defence computer-assisted exercise takes place in Germany.

December 2010
First meeting of the NRC Missile Defence Working Group aimed at assessing decisions taken at the Lisbon Summit and exploring a possible way forward for cooperation on ballistic missile defence.

June 2011
NRC Defence Ministers take stock of the work on missile defence since the 2010 Lisbon Summit.

April 2012
Computer-assisted exercise in Ottobrunn, Germany.

October 2013
Russia unilaterally pauses the discussions on missile defence in the NRC framework.

April 2014
In response to the Ukraine crisis, NATO suspends all cooperation with Russia, including on missile defence.
Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) is vital for all military operations. It provides information and intelligence to decision-makers and action-takers, helping them make informed, timely and accurate decisions. While surveillance and reconnaissance can answer the questions “what,” “when” and “where”, the combined elements from various intelligence sources and disciplines provide the answers to “how” and “why”. When all of this is combined, you create Joint ISR.

Highlights

- NATO is establishing a permanent JISR system providing information and intelligence to key decision-makers, helping them make well-informed, timely and accurate decisions.
- JISR brings together data and information gathered through projects such as NATO’s Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system or NATO AWACS aircraft as well as a wide variety of national JISR assets from the space, air, land and maritime domains.
- Both surveillance and reconnaissance includes visual observation (from soldiers on the ground) and electronic observation (for example from satellites, unmanned aircraft systems, ground sensors and maritime vessels), which are then analysed, turning information into intelligence.
- The Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for JISR, declared in February 2016, represents a significant achievement, enabling better connectivity between NATO and Allies’ capabilities.
- IOC is only the first milestone for the JISR initiative. Further work is needed to sustain these achievements, and expand them beyond the scope of the NATO Response Force.
More background information

Components

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) provides the foundation for all military operations, and its principles have been used in warfare for centuries. The individual elements of ISR are:

- **Intelligence**: the final product derived from surveillance and reconnaissance, fused with other information;
- **Surveillance**: the persistent monitoring of a target; and
- **Reconnaissance**: information-gathering conducted to answer a specific military question.

Both surveillance and reconnaissance can include visual observation (for example soldiers on the ground covertly watching a target, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) with cameras), as well as electronic observation.

The difference between surveillance and reconnaissance has to do with time and specificity; surveillance is a more prolonged and deliberate activity, while reconnaissance missions are generally rapid and targeted to retrieve specific information.

Once surveillance and reconnaissance information has been obtained, intelligence specialists can analyse it, fuse it with other information from other data sources and produce the intelligence which is then used to inform military and civilian decision-makers, particularly for the planning and conduct of operations.

While all countries have their own sources and methods for the production of intelligence, it is not always easy for them to share their intelligence with Allies. Sometimes this is due to security concerns, sometimes to internal procedural requirements, and sometimes to technological constraints.

The objective of NATO Joint ISR is to champion the concept of "need to share" over the concept of "need to know". This does not mean that all Allies will automatically share everything, but rather that NATO can facilitate the procedures and technology to promote sharing while simultaneously providing information
assurance (i.e., the protection of data and networks). This way, Allies can have a holistic picture of whatever crisis is occurring and NATO decision-makers can make well-informed, timely and accurate decisions.

To achieve this ambition, the following must be in place:

- **Trained ISR experts**
  Having a cadre of experts within NATO who fully understand how to use ISR to support NATO’s decision-makers; and

- **Information assurance: protection of data and networks**
  Special procedures need to be in place to provide information assurance; it takes time and resources to obtain a genuinely efficient, secure, holistic and relevant Joint ISR system. In fact, it took ten years to develop the successful mission network used in Afghanistan, and NATO intends to capitalise on that effort.

### Mechanism

The experience the Alliance gained from its operations in Afghanistan and Libya has resulted in collection assets (for example information gathering equipment such as surveillance aircraft) becoming far more accessible to military personnel, even at the lowest tactical levels. Assets that would have been used only for strategic purposes at the discretion of military generals 15 years ago are now widely available and their use is decentralised. This shift occurred because NATO member countries procured significant numbers of maritime, land and airborne collection assets to help them locate adversaries, who often operate in complex environments and among civilian populations.

To enable information-gathering to take place, and to ensure that information is analysed and intelligence is produced for decision-makers, there are a number of primary actors involved, including:

- **Surveillance and reconnaissance collection assets**
  Their role is to collect information. Examples include Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS), AWACS aircraft which use radar, observation satellites, electronic assets and special ground reconnaissance troops.

- **Intelligence analysts**
  Their role is to exploit and analyse information from multiple sources. Examples include national military and civilian analysts working at the strategic level in intelligence organisations, imagery analysts at all levels, and encryption experts.

- **Decision-makers**
  Their role is to use intelligence to inform their decision-making. Examples include political leaders and military commanders.

### Evolution

Based on the experience NATO Allies gained in recent operations, the Alliance is looking to establish a permanent, effective ISR system. NATO aims to provide Allies with a mechanism which brings together data and information gathered through Smart Defence projects such as the AGS system or AWACS, as well as a wide variety of national ISR capabilities, including troops on the ground, maritime and air assets, space-based platforms such as satellites, and Special Operations Forces.

To provide a foundation for NATO’s Joint ISR ambition, the Alliance is currently developing a JISR project aimed at providing the following pillars:

- **Training and education**
  The personnel involved with the Joint ISR capability in NATO will possess expertise to guarantee the efficiency of the JISR enterprise. This area of the project examines ways to ensure that NATO personnel receive the highest standard of ISR training and education.
Doctrine and procedures

To improve interoperability, efficiency, coherence and effectiveness, Joint ISR doctrine and procedures will be continuously developed and reviewed, from strategic thinking to tactical procedures.

Networking environment

NATO communication and information systems (CIS) will guarantee efficient collaboration and sharing of ISR data, products and applications between the Allies. This is the core business of NATO's Joint ISR effort.

NATO's 2012 Chicago Summit established the objective to strengthen cooperation and ensure tighter connections between Allied forces. During the Summit, the Allied Heads of State and Government expressed the ambition to provide NATO with an enduring and permanently available JISR capability, giving the Alliance the eyes and ears it needs to achieve strategic decision advantage. At the 2014 Wales Summit, Allies reconfirmed that Joint ISR remained a high NATO priority.

Technical trials take place every two years in order to demonstrate and assess progress on the Alliance's JISR capabilities in a real-world environment. In 2015, two major exercises—Steadfast Cobalt and Trident Juncture—validated the operational effectiveness of JISR and paved the way for the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for JISR within NATO. Unified Vision 2016, scheduled for June, will provide further opportunities to enhance sharing of surveillance and reconnaissance information among Allies.

At their meeting on 10 February 2016, defence ministers declared IOC for Joint, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. It represents a significant achievement, enabling better connectivity between NATO and Allies' capabilities and enhancing situational awareness throughout the NATO Response Force (NRF).

IOC is only the first milestone for the JISR initiative. Further work is needed to sustain these achievements, and expand them beyond the scope of the NRF. An enduring JISR capability is now being developed in a phased approach; ongoing work will further improve on and build synergy in the management of Allies' diverse inputs and capabilities for NATO's 360 degree situational awareness.
Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS)

NATO is acquiring the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system that will give commanders a comprehensive picture of the situation on the ground. NATO’s past and current operations to protect civilians showed how important such a capability is. A group of Allies is acquiring five Global Hawk remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) and the associated ground command and control stations that make up the AGS system. NATO will then operate and maintain them on behalf of all 28 Allies.

Highlights

- The AGS system consists of air, ground and support segments, performing all-weather, persistent wide-area terrestrial and maritime surveillance in near real-time.
- The AGS will be able to contribute to a range of missions such as protection of ground troops and civilian populations, border control and maritime safety, the fight against terrorism, crisis management and humanitarian assistance in natural disasters.
- The AGS system also includes European-sourced ground assets that will provide in-theatre support to commanders of deployed forces.
- The AGS system is being acquired by 15 Allies and will be made available to the Alliance in the 2017-2018 timeframe.

More background information

Overview

The AGS system is being acquired by 15 Allies (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the United States), and will be made available to the Alliance in the 2017-2018 timeframe. All Allies will contribute to the development of the AGS capability through financial contributions covering the establishment of the
AGS main operating base, as well as to communications and life-cycle support of the AGS fleet. Some Allies will replace part of their financial contribution through interoperable contributions in kind (national surveillance systems that will be made available to NATO).

The NATO-owned and -operated AGS Core capability will enable the Alliance to perform persistent surveillance over wide areas from high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) aircraft, operating at considerable stand-off distances and in any weather or light condition. Using advanced radar sensors, these systems will continuously detect and track moving objects throughout observed areas and will provide radar imagery of areas of interest and stationary objects.

The Main Operating Base for AGS will be located at Sigonella Air Base in Italy, which will serve a dual purpose as a NATO Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) deployment base and data exploitation and training centre.

Just as NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control (NAEW&C) aircraft – also known as AWACS – monitor Alliance airspace, AGS will be able to observe what is happening on the earth’s surface, providing situational awareness before, during and, if needed, after NATO operations.

AGS responds to one of the major capability commitments of the 2010 Lisbon Summit.

## Components

The AGS Core will be an integrated system consisting of an air segment, a ground segment and a support segment.

The air segment consists of five RQ-4B Global Hawk Block 40 aircraft and remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) flight control element. The aircraft will be equipped with a state-of-the-art, multi-platform radar technology insertion programme (MP-RTIP) ground surveillance radar sensor, as well as an extensive suite of line-of-sight and beyond-line-of-sight, long-range, wideband data links.

The ground segment will provide an interface between the AGS Core system and a wide range of command, control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C2ISR) systems to interconnect with and provide data to multiple deployed and non-deployed operational users, including reach-back facilities remote from the surveillance area.

The ground segment consists of a number of ground stations in various configurations, such as mobile and transportable, which will provide data-link connectivity, data-processing and exploitation capabilities and interfaces for interoperability with C2ISR systems.

The AGS Core support segment will include dedicated mission support facilities at the AGS Main Operating Base (MOB) in Sigonella, Italy.

Interoperable contributions in kind, such as national surveillance systems and data / communications, will also be made available to NATO and will complement AGS with additional surveillance capabilities.

The composition of the AGS Core system and these contributions in kind will provide NATO with considerable flexibility in employing its ground surveillance capabilities.

This will be supplemented by additional interoperable national airborne surveillance systems from NATO member countries, tailored to the needs of a specific operation or mission conducted by the Alliance.

## Mechanisms

The NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance Management Organisation (NAGSMO) and its executive body - NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance Management Agency (NAGSMA) - are responsible for the acquisition of the AGS Core capability on behalf of the 15 acquiring countries. The NATO AGS Force (AGSF), activated in September 2015, with its AGS Staff Element Implementation Office (AGS-SEIO) located at
the headquarters of Allied Command Operations (SHAPE) and its Advanced Echelon (ADVON) located at Sigonella are responsible for ensuring the successful operational integration and employment of the NATO AGS Core capability.

NAGSMA, representing the 15 AGS acquisition nations, awarded the prime contract for the system to Northrop Grumman in May 2012 during the Chicago Summit. The company’s primary industrial team includes Airbus Defence and Space (Germany), Selex ES (Italy) and Kongsberg (Norway), as well as leading defence companies from all acquiring countries, which are contributing to the delivery of the AGS system.

The engagement of NATO common funds for infrastructure, communications, operation and support will follow normal funding authorisation procedures applicable within the Alliance.

By the time AGS becomes fully operational in 2018, France and the United Kingdom will sign Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), outlining the modalities for making their contributions in kind available to the Alliance.

### Supporting NATO's core tasks

The 2010 Lisbon Summit set out the vision of Allied Heads of State and Government for the evolution of NATO and the security of its member countries. This vision is based on three core tasks, which are detailed in the 2010 Strategic Concept:

- collective defence
- crisis management
- cooperative security

AGS was recognised at Lisbon as a critical capability for the Alliance and is planned to be a major contributor to NATO’s Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) ambition.

AGS will contribute to these three core tasks through using its MP-RTIP radar sensor to collect information that will provide political and military decision makers with a comprehensive picture of the situation on the ground.

### Facts and figures

General characteristics of the RQ-4B Global Hawk Block 40 remotely piloted aircraft:

- Primary function: High-altitude, long-endurance intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
- Power Plant: Rolls Royce-North American AE 3007H turbofan
- Thrust: 7,600 lbs
- Wingspan: 130.9 ft / 39.8 m
- Length: 47.6 ft / 14.5 m
- Height: 15.3 ft / 4.7 m
- Weight: 14,950 lbs / 6,781 kg
- Maximum take-off weight: 32,250 lbs / 14,628 kg
- Fuel capacity: 17,300 lbs / 7,847 kg
- Payload: 3,000 lbs / 1,360 kg
- Speed: 310 knots / 357 mph / 575 kph
- Range: 8,700 nautical miles / 10,112 miles / 16,113 km
- Ceiling: 60,000 ft / 18,288 m
Evolution

Originating from the Defence Planning Committee in 1992, the AGS programme was defined as a capability acquisition effort in 1995, when the NATO defence ministers agreed that “the Alliance should pursue work on a minimum essential NATO-owned and -operated core capability supplemented by interoperable national assets.”

The AGS programme was to provide NATO with a complete and integrated ground surveillance capability that would offer the Alliance and its member countries unrestricted and unfiltered access to ground surveillance data in near real time, and in an interoperable manner. It was to include an air segment comprising airborne radar sensors, and a ground segment comprising fixed, transportable and mobile ground stations for data exploitation and dissemination, all seamlessly interconnected linked through high-performance data links.

From the outset, the AGS capability was expected to be based on one or more types of ground surveillance assets either already existing or in development in NATO member countries, an approach that later also came to include proposed developmental systems based on US or European radars. However, all those approaches failed to obtain sufficient support by the Allies to allow their realisation. In 2001, the North Atlantic Council (Reinforced) decided to revitalise AGS through a developmental programme available to all NATO countries and a corresponding cooperative radar development effort called the Transatlantic Cooperative AGS Radar (TCAR).

In 2004, NATO decided to move ahead with what was labelled as a mixed-fleet approach. The air segment was to include Airbus A321 manned aircraft and Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), both carrying versions of the TCAR radar, while the ground segment was to comprise an extensive set of fixed and deployable ground stations.

Due to declining European defence budgets, NATO decided in 2007 to discontinue the mixed-fleet approach and instead to move forward with a simplified AGS system where the air segment was based on the off-the-shelf Global Hawk Block 40 UAV and its associated MP-RTIP sensor. The ground segment, which would largely be developed and built by European and Canadian industry, remained virtually unchanged as its functional and operational characteristics were largely independent of the actual aircraft and sensor used.

In February 2009, the NATO Allies participating in the AGS programme started the process to sign the Programme Memorandum of Understanding (PMOU). This was a significant step forward on the road towards realising an urgently required, operationally essential capability for NATO. NAGSMA was established in September 2009, after all participating countries had agreed on the PMOU. The PMOU serves as the basis for the procurement of this new NATO capability.

Another important milestone for the AGS programme was the 2010 Lisbon Summit, where the strong operational need for a NATO-owned and -operated AGS capability was reconfirmed with NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept. AGS also featured in the Lisbon Package as one of the Alliance’s most pressing capability needs.

On 3 February 2012, the North Atlantic Council decided on a way ahead to collectively cover the costs for operating AGS for the benefit of the Alliance. The decision to engage NATO common funding for infrastructure, satellite communications and operations and support paves the way for awarding the AGS acquisition contract. In addition, an agreement was reached to make the UK Sentinel system and the future French Heron TP system available as national contributions in kind, partly replacing financial contributions from those two Allies.

In the margins of the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, NATO nations took an important step towards the delivery of a NATO-owned and -operated ground surveillance and reconnaissance capability. A procurement contract for the AGS system was signed on 20 May 2012, paving the way for the delivery of a vital capability that will be made available to all NATO member nations. The AGS acquisition contract includes the purchase and initial operation and maintenance of unmanned aircraft equipped with advanced ground surveillance radar sensors.
In September 2015, NATO AGS achieved important milestones such as the first live ground testing of NATO’s first Global Hawk and the activation of NATO AGS Force, meaning Allies formally agreed the configuration (number of staff, their rank structure, etc.) of the unit responsible for operating the AGS Global Hawk aircraft from Sigonella Air Base.

Between September and December 2015, other important milestones were achieved:

- the AGS Operations Centre in Sigonella was handed over from Host Nation Italy to NATO;
- Mobile General Ground Station (MGGS) and Transportable General Ground Station (TGGS) roll-outs took place;
- the first test flight of NATO’s first Global Hawk occurred in Palmdale, California; and
- AGS successfully participated in exercise Trident Juncture 2015 from the NATO AGS Capability Testbed (NACT) in the Netherlands.

On 17 June 2016, a second test flight of the first Global Hawk took place in Palmdale, California. The first NATO Global Hawk is expected to fly from the United States to its new home in Sigonella by the end of 2016.
AWACS: NATO’s ’Eye In The Sky’

NATO operates a fleet of Boeing E-3A ‘Sentry’ Airborne Warning & Control System (AWACS) aircraft, which provide the Alliance with an immediately available airborne command and control (C2), air and maritime surveillance and battle-space management capability. NATO Air Base (NAB) Geilenkirchen, Germany, is home to 16 AWACS aircraft.

**Highlights**

- NATO operates a fleet of Boeing E-3A ‘Sentry’ Airborne Warning & Control System (AWACS) aircraft equipped with long-range radar and passive sensors capable of detecting air and surface contacts over large distances.
- The NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force (NAEW&C Force) is one of the few military assets that is actually owned and operated by NATO.
- It conducts a wide range of missions such as air policing, support to counter-terrorism, evacuation operations, embargo, initial entry and crisis response.
- Under normal circumstances, the aircraft operates for about eight hours, at 30,000 feet (9,150 metres) and covers a surveillance area of more than 120,000 square miles (310,798 square kilometres).
- AWACS played an important role in NATO operations such as in the United States after 9/11, in Libya and in Afghanistan. It also provided air support to secure NATO summits or international sporting events such as the 2004 Summer Olympics Games and the 2006 World Cup Football Championship.
- More recently, the fleet is involved in the reassurance measures following the Russia-Ukraine crisis, and in the tailored assurance measures for Turkey against the background of the Syrian crisis.

**More background information**

**Role and responsibilities**

The NE-3A is a modified Boeing 707 equipped with long-range radar and passive sensors capable of detecting air and surface contacts over large distances. Information collected by AWACS can be transmitted directly from the aircraft to other users on land, at sea or in the air.

The NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force (NAEW&C Force) is the Alliance's largest collaborative venture and is an example of what NATO member countries can achieve by pooling resources and working together in a truly multinational environment.
The NAEW&C Force performs a unique and valuable role for the Alliance by conducting a wide range of missions such as air policing, support to counter-terrorism, consequence management, non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), embargo, initial entry, crisis response and demonstrative force operations.

In recent years, the Force has been deployed on increasingly complex and demanding tactical missions, including:

- support to maritime operations;
- close air support (CAS);
- airspace management;
- combat search and rescue (CSAR);
- disaster relief; and
- counter-piracy.

**Critical asset for crisis management**

Since it commenced flight operations in 1982, the NAEW&C Force has proven to be a key asset in crisis-management and peace-support operations.

Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, aircraft from the NATO E-3A Component (NAB Geilenkirchen) deployed to eastern Turkey to help reinforce NATO’s southern flank during the war. Operation Anchor Guard included monitoring air and sea traffic in the eastern Mediterranean and providing airborne surveillance along the Iraqi-Turkish border. The mission was conducted from August 1990 to March 1991.

For most of the 1990s, aircraft from both the NATO and United Kingdom’s AEW&C fleets operated extensively in the Balkans, supporting United Nations resolutions and Alliance missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo during Operations Deliberate Force and Allied Force. AWACS aircraft from the French Air Force (Armée de l’air) and the US Air Force also helped achieve the objectives of these missions.

In early 2001, the Force also supported NATO’s defensive deployment to south-eastern Turkey during Operation Display Deterrence.

In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, NATO E-3A aircraft were deployed to the mainland US to help defend North America against further attacks during Operation Eagle Assist. This represented the first time in Alliance history that NATO assets were deployed in support of the defence of one of its member nations.

Since 2007, the NAEW&C Force has been used successfully in support of NATO’s counter-terrorism activities in the Mediterranean Sea during Operation Active Endeavour.

Since January 2011, aircraft from NAB Geilenkirchen have been deploying to Afghanistan to support the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) by providing air surveillance coverage as part of Operation Afghan Assist. In Afghanistan AWACS aircraft conducted air surveillance, tactical battle management functions such as support and control of friendly aircraft involved in close air support, battlefield air interdiction, combat search and rescue, reconnaissance, and tactical air transport.

During Operation Unified Protector, the NAEW&C Force also performed the crucial function of commanding and controlling all Alliance air assets operating over Libya. This included the issuing of real-time tactical orders and taskings to NATO fighter aircraft, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft, air-to-air refuelers or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). NATO E-3A aircraft also supported Allied ships and submarines enforcing the maritime arms embargo against Libya by providing an aerial maritime surveillance capability.
On 25 September 2014, the last NATO AWACS aircraft returned to its home base in Geilenkirchen from Mazar-e Sharif, Afghanistan. NATO had decided that AWACS aircraft would not be required for the Resolute Support Mission standing up on 1 January 2015 as the new mission focused on training, advising and assisting Afghan forces.

On 1 December 2015, NATO foreign ministers took steps to further the Alliance’s adaptation to security challenges from the south and agreed on tailored assurance measures for Turkey that are meant to contribute to de-escalation in the region. This support will include AWACS surveillance flights; increased naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean; Standing Naval Forces port calls; participation in exercises; enhanced air policing; and maritime patrol aircraft flights.

On 11 February 2016, NATO defence ministers decided in principle that NATO AWACS surveillance planes will backfill national AWACS capabilities in support of the international coalition to counter ISIL. This decision was made in response to the US request. NATO military planners are currently working out the details.

Also on 11 February 2016, a significant milestone was reached when a NATO AWACS completed the 1,000th mission in support of NATO reassurance measures. These measures are a series of land, sea and air activities in, on and around the territory of NATO Allies in Central and Eastern Europe, designed to reassure their populations and deter potential aggression. They are in response to Russia’s aggressive actions to NATO’s east.

In April 2016 the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) provided direction and guidance to NATO’s Alliance Future Surveillance and Control (AFSC) project group regarding how NATO should step into the AFSC concept stage for this potential follow-on to the AWACS capability.

As it stands, NATO’s E-3 AWACS fleet is expected to retire around 2025. A final modernisation effort is under consideration to extend the life of the E-3 fleet to approximately 2035, after which additional lifetime extensions are no longer practical. The Alliance Future Surveillance and Control (AFSC) initiative has been established by NATO to investigate possibilities for a follow-on to the E-3 AWACS fleet, with a view to avoiding a potential capability gap in 2035. The Alliance recently completed work on high-level military requirements, and, in 2017, will collectively start the next stage of defining options for future NATO surveillance and control capabilities.

- Protecting NATO populations

As a consequence of the 9/11 attacks, NATO governments requested the air surveillance and control capability offered by the NAEW&C Force to assist with security for major public occasions.

These high-visibility events have included the 2004 Summer Olympic Games in Greece, the 2006 World Cup Football Championship in Germany, the 2012 European Football Championship in Poland as well as important meetings held by other international organisations such as the 2010 Nobel Prize award ceremony in Sweden, the 2013 Dutch royal handover in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, the Netherlands.

Further, the NAEW&C fleets have consistently provided support to NATO summit meetings.

- Working Mechanism

Multinational cooperation is the key characteristic of the NAEW&C Programme Management Organisation (NAPMO). Currently, the 16 full NAPMO nations are: Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey and the United States.

The United Kingdom exercises limited participation as a NAPMO member, but its fleet of E-3D aircraft is an integral part of the NAEW&C Force. France has an observer role and maintains continual coordination to ensure its E-3F aircraft remain interoperable with the other E-3 fleets. France also often assists in coordinated operations with the NAEW&C Force.
The NAEW&C Force Headquarters is co-located with NAB Geilenkirchen and exercises operational control over the Force, consisting of two operational units:

- the E-3A Component based at NAB Geilenkirchen, which operates the 16 NATO-owned NE-3A aircraft (the squadrons are manned by integrated international crews from 15 nations); and
- the E-3D Component based at Royal Air Force (RAF) Waddington, United Kingdom, which operates its six Boeing E-3D aircraft (the component is manned by RAF personnel only).

The Force also maintains three forward-operating bases (FOBs) at Konya in Turkey, Aktion in Greece, Trapani in Italy, and a forward-operating location (FOL) at Ørland, Norway.

The AWACS programme, including execution of modernisation projects, is managed on a day-to-day basis by the NAEW&C Programme Management Agency (NAPMA), which is located in Brunssum, the Netherlands. The agency is staffed by military officers seconded to the agency and by civilian officials from the nations participating in the programme. In 2011, the NAPMA General Manager was assigned by the NAPMO nations as the Technical Airworthiness Authority (TAA) for the NE-3A fleet. Supported by a dedicated engineering office, the TAA shares responsibilities for airworthiness certification, together with the NAEW&C Force Commander, who is responsible operations and support of the fleet.

How the NAEW&C Force works

All AWACS aircraft undergo continuous modifications for modernisation and for operations and support. An NE-3A aircraft modified under the NATO Mid-Term Programme has a standard crew of 16, while the original E-3D requires a standard crew of 18. Whatever the variant, the flight and mission crews are highly-trained men and women whose expertise covers all areas of flight operations, including battle space management, weapons control, surveillance control, data link management and the technical aspects of communications, data systems and mission radar.

Under normal circumstances, the aircraft can operate for about eight hours (and longer with air-to-air refuelling) at 30,000 feet (9,150 metres).

The active surveillance sensors are located in the radar dome (“rotodome”), which makes the NE-3A such a uniquely recognisable aircraft. This structure rotates once every ten seconds and provides the NE-3A with 360-degree radar coverage that can detect aircraft out to a distance of more than 215 nautical miles (400 kilometres).

One aircraft flying at 30,000 feet has a surveillance area coverage of more than 120,000 square miles and three aircraft operating in overlapping, coordinated orbits can provide unbroken radar coverage of the whole of Central Europe.

The aircraft is able to track and identify potentially hostile aircraft operating at low altitudes, as well as provide fighter control of Allied aircraft. It can simultaneously track and identify maritime contacts, and provide coordination support to Allied surface forces.

AWACS programme overview

During the 1960s, it became clear that military aircraft could no longer fly high enough to avoid surface-to-air missiles. To survive in an increasingly lethal air defence environment, aircraft were forced down to levels little higher than tree-top. By the 1970s, the requirement to detect high-speed combat aircraft with low-level penetration capability made it necessary to augment NATO’s system of ground-based radars with new means.

The NATO military authorities determined that an Airborne Early Warning (AEW) capability would provide the key to meeting the challenge. The operational requirement for the NATO AEW system stressed the need to detect small, high-speed intruder aircraft at long range. The need to detect maritime surface targets (such as ships and boats) was also specified because of the geographical regions where the AEW aircraft would have to operate. The inherent mobility and flexibility of the system, especially for control
function, were also foreseen by NATO planners as providing air, maritime, and land force commanders with an enhanced command and control (C2) capability. The creation of a NATO AEW Force was therefore designed to make a significant contribution to the Alliance’s deterrent posture.

In December 1978, the NATO Defence Planning Committee approved the joint acquisition of 18 aircraft based on the US Air Force (USAF) Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), to be operated as an Alliance-owned Airborne Early Warning System. In addition to the delivery of the 18 E-3A aircraft between February 1982 and May 1985, the NAEW&C programme included the upgrade of 40 NATO Air Defence Ground Environment (NADGE) sites and the establishment of a main operating base (MOB) at Geilenkirchen, Germany, along with three FOBs and an FOL.

Transformation

Originally designed as an elevated radar platform, the NATO E-3A has constantly evolved to address the realities of geopolitical change and NATO’s new mission over the last 30 years. In emphasising the control aspect of the AEW&C, the NE-3A has become an essential part of air battle management and has continued to remain operationally relevant through successive modernisation programmes involving state-of-the-art engineering and manufacturing developments. From the Initial NAEW&C Acquisition Programme through the Near-Term Programme and on through the Mid-Term Programme, the NAPMO nations have collectively spent/committed, for acquisition and follow-on support, in excess of US$6.8 billion – prohibitively expensive for any single country, but realisable through the collective contribution of the NAPMO nations.

Today, NATO is moving forward with a new and improved method of planning and conducting operations. To support the dynamic NATO transformation process, NAPMO is committed to adopt new business approaches and enter into cooperative programmes. The purpose is to expedite the fielding of operational capabilities in response to emerging requirements at a cost that takes into consideration today’s economic realities. In that sense, efforts are underway for the next phase of NAEW&C enhancements, which will allow the Force to continue fulfilling its operational mandate well into the future.

To be completed by 2018, the Follow-on Upgrade Programme (FUP) primarily aims to enhance the identification system (Mode 5/Enhanced Mode S) and replace the analogue cockpit with modern, digital technology (known as a “glass” cockpit). Communication systems which use Internet Protocol (IP) are also being developed and fielded to support text communications with other command and control (C2) assets.

Possible future enhancements beyond 2018 are currently under assessment, which might culminate in a new modernisation programme.
Air policing: securing NATO airspace

NATO Air Policing is a peacetime mission which aims to preserve the security of Alliance airspace. It is a collective task and involves the continuous presence – 24 hours a day, 365 days a year – of fighter interceptor aircraft, which are ready to react quickly to airspace violations and infringements.

**Highlights**

- NATO Air Policing is a collective task and a purely defensive mission which involves the 24/7 presence of fighter interceptor aircraft, which are ready to react quickly to violations and infringements.
- NATO members assist those Allies who are without the necessary means to provide air policing of their own territory.
- The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) is responsible for the conduct of the NATO Air Policing Mission.
- Preservation of the integrity of NATO airspace is part of the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System.
- Air policing was intensified following the Russia-Ukraine crisis.

**More background information**

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**A collective security mission**

Safeguarding the integrity of Alliance members’ sovereign airspace is a peacetime task contributing to NATO’s collective defence.

The NATO Air Policing mission is carried out under the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATINAMDS). This is a sign of cohesion, shared responsibility and solidarity across the Alliance.

The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) is responsible for the conduct of the NATO Air Policing mission.
Allied Air Command (AIRCOM) headquartered at Ramstein, Germany oversees the NATO Air Policing mission with 24/7 command and control from two Combined Air Operations Centres (CAOCs); one in Torrejon, Spain, and one in Uedem, Germany. CAOC Uedem is responsible for NATO Air Policing north of the Alps and CAOC Torrejon for the south. The CAOC decides which interceptors will be scrambled (i.e. tasked to react) according to the location of the incident.

NATO member nations provide the necessary aircraft and assets for the air policing of their own airspace, under SACEUR direction. Those without the necessary means to do so (Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia) are assisted by other NATO members to preserve the integrity of their sovereign airspace in peacetime and to ensure their security.

NATO has been protecting the Baltic skies since 2004, when Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania joined the Alliance. The Baltic air policing mission started in April 2004 and has been executed continuously ever since. Slovenia’s airspace is covered by Hungary and Italy. Albania is covered by Greece and Italy.

All NATO member nations that possess an air policing capability contribute to the NATO Air Policing mission in the Baltic States and rotate this responsibility every four months. The capability for the mission in the Baltic States was established by the deployment of NATO fighter aircraft to Šiauliai Air Base in Lithuania. Since 2014, NATO has also been using Ämari Air Base in Estonia for the deployment of air policing assets.

The mission of patrolling the skies along NATO’s eastern border was intensified following the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine crisis.

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**Main components**

NATO Air Policing requires the Air Surveillance and Control System (ASACS), the Air Command and Control (Air C2) structure and Quick Reaction Alert (Interceptor) (QRA(I)) aircraft to be available on a 24/7 basis. This enables the Alliance to detect, track and identify to the greatest extent possible all aerial objects approaching or operating within NATO airspace so that violations and infringements can be recognised, and appropriate action taken.

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**History**

The term “air policing” was first used by the United Kingdom between the two World Wars to describe their mission in Mesopotamia (now part of Iraq) where aircraft were used to replace the more traditional army approach of “boots on the ground” in an effort to cut back on the large imperial army. This was the first time air power had been used for a policing task and is still considered to be the birth of the concept, even though this first initiative was policing the situation on the ground, rather than in the air.

In the 1960s, nations participating in the NATO military structure realised that individual air defence systems operating independently could not effectively protect NATO airspace, so they began working together to establish a structure to overcome this deficiency. Combining national assets supplemented as necessary by other NATO elements, an integrated air defence structure and system was established. The resulting NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATINAMDS) – previously NATINADS or NATO integrated Air Defence System – remains the cornerstone of Alliance solidarity and cohesion.

Established in 1961 during the Cold War, NATO Air Policing is an integral part of NATINADS. On duty 24/7/365, NATO Air Policing has been and still is a constant in a rapidly changing security environment, giving SACEUR the capability to preserve the integrity of Alliance airspace in peacetime.

In the early days of NATINADS, all NATO member nations (with the exception of Iceland and Luxembourg)\(^1\) provided fighter aircraft to SACEUR. Referred to as “NATO command forces”, these aircraft were put under the command of SACEUR already in peacetime. This gave him the necessary flexibility to react to any incident in NATO airspace in a timely manner.

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\(^1\) Air policing for Iceland was carried out by the United States until 2006, and for Luxembourg, by neighbouring countries.
In 2004, nine new member nations joined the Alliance. Some of them did not possess fighter aircraft and could therefore not provide the necessary means for the protection of their airspace. This responsibility was taken over by NATO member nations which possess an air policing capability. Initially, NATO only used the Šiauliai Air Base in Lithuania, but since 2014, has also been using Amari Air Base in Estonia for the deployment of air policing assets.

Also in 2004, special arrangements were established to ensure adequate air policing of Slovenia. The country’s airspace is covered by both Hungary and Italy. The Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) decides on a case-by-case basis which nation will be scrambled according to the location of the incident.

In 2006, the United States ended its permanent air policing mission over Iceland. The US mission was replaced by a system whereby Allies periodically deploy fighter aircraft to Keflavik Air Base to provide protection of Icelandic airspace. The first deployment took place in May 2008.

When Albania joined NATO in 2009, an arrangement similar to that for Slovenia was established with Greece and Italy ensuring coverage over Albania.

In 2015, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands signed an agreement to conduct joint air policing of their territories. Under the agreement, the Belgian and Dutch Air Forces will defend the Benelux airspace on a rotational basis. The joint operations are expected to start by the end of 2016.
NATO’s maritime activities

The world’s oceans are increasingly busy maritime highways. Today, 85 per cent of all international trade in raw material and manufactured goods travels by sea, and tankers carry more than half of the world’s oil. The stakes of maritime security are high, and NATO is determined to help protect its Allies from any possible threats at sea or from the sea.

Highlights

- NATO is implementing the Alliance Maritime Strategy that lays out the parameters for NATO’s maritime activities. These activities fall under the areas of collective defence, crisis management, cooperative security and maritime security.
- The Alliance has Standing Naval Forces – NATO’s highly trained maritime, immediate-response capacity.
- NATO currently has two maritime operations: Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean and Ocean Shield in the Indian Ocean. It is also providing assistance to help deal with the refugee and migrant crisis in the Aegean Sea.
- Cooperation with non-NATO partners, including other international organisations such as the European Union, is fundamental to efforts in the maritime domain.

More background information

Alliance Maritime Strategy

In full consistency with the 2010 Strategic Concept, the 2011 Alliance Maritime Strategy sets out ways in which NATO’s unique maritime power could help resolve critical security challenges.
Four pillars

There are four areas in which NATO’s maritime forces can contribute to Alliance security. The first three are the “core tasks” of NATO, as defined by the Alliance’s Strategic Concept: deterrence and collective defence; crisis management; and cooperative security. In addition, the Maritime Strategy sets out a fourth area: maritime security.

Deterrence and collective defence

NATO has significant maritime capabilities and inherently flexible maritime forces, which are key to deterring aggression. As such, maritime activities contribute to nuclear deterrence as well as to deterrence from conventional attacks. NATO will ensure it can deploy its maritime forces rapidly, control sea lines of communication, preserve freedom of navigation and conduct effective mine counter-measure activities.

Crisis management

NATO maritime forces can also play an important role in crisis management. These responsibilities can include enforcing an arms embargo, conducting maritime interdiction operations, contributing to the Alliance’s counter-terrorism efforts, and providing immediate humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of a natural disaster.

Cooperative security

NATO’s maritime forces not only contribute to ensuring Alliance security. Engagement with partners also helps to build regional security and stability, contributes to conflict prevention and facilitates dialogue. These efforts also promote cooperation and complementarity with other key actors in the maritime domain, such as the United Nations and the European Union.

Maritime security

The Alliance Maritime Strategy reiterates NATO’s commitment to helping protect vital sea lines of communication and maintain freedom of navigation. This includes surveillance, information-sharing, maritime interdiction, and contributions to energy security, including the protection of critical infrastructure.

Implementation

Maritime security is continuing to rise on NATO’s agenda and Allies are increasingly determined to implement the 2011 Alliance Maritime Strategy – an objective the Alliance set itself at the Wales Summit in September 2014. This endeavour encompasses a complete revamping of NATO’s maritime forces, an extensive multi-year programme of maritime exercises and training, and the enhancement of cooperation between NATO and its partners, as well as other international actors, in particular the European Union. NATO is therefore focusing, for instance, on reinvigorating the Standing Naval Forces so that, inter alia, they meet the requirements of NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) Maritime; improving education, training and exercises, particularly at the tactical and operational levels; improving the capacity of Allies to deploy follow-on forces; enhancing NATO-EU coordination and cooperation in the maritime domain; strengthening engagement with non-NATO member countries; reinforcing the maritime capacities of regional partners in areas of strategic importance to the Alliance as part of the defence capacity-building initiatives; focusing on the future adaptation and evolution of NATO’s current maritime operations; and providing assistance with the refugee and migrant crisis.

NATO’s Standing Naval Forces and capabilities

NATO has Standing Naval Forces (SNF) that provide the Alliance with a continuous naval presence. This multinational deterrent force constitutes an essential maritime requirement for the Alliance. It carries out a programme of scheduled exercises, manoeuvres and port visits, and can be rapidly deployed in times of crisis or tension.
NATO’s SNFs consist of four groups: the Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMGs) composed of SNMG1 and SNMG2; and the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Groups (SNMCMG1 and SNMCMG2). All four Groups are integrated into the NATO Response Force (NRF), the Alliance’s rapid-reaction force.

**SNMG1 and SNMG2**

The Standing NATO Maritime Groups are a multinational, integrated maritime force made up of vessels from various Allied countries. These vessels are permanently available to NATO to perform different tasks ranging from exercises to operational missions. They also help to establish Alliance presence, demonstrate solidarity, conduct routine diplomatic visits to different countries, support partner engagement, and provide a variety of maritime military capabilities to ongoing missions.

SNMG1 and SNMG2 function according to the operational needs of the Alliance, therefore helping to maintain optimal flexibility. Their composition varies and they are usually composed of between two and six ships from as many NATO member countries.

SNMG1 and SNMG2 fall under the authority of Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM), Northwood, United Kingdom following MARCOM’s December 2012 inauguration as the operational hub for all Alliance maritime operations. MARCOM also has two subordinate commands – Submarine Command (COMSUBNATO) and Maritime Air Command (COMMARAIR) – as well as the NATO Shipping Centre, which plays an important role in countering piracy.

**SNMCMG1 and SNMCMG2**

The Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Groups – SNMCMG1 and SNMCMG2 – are multinational forces that primarily engage in search and explosive ordnance disposal operations. SNMCMG2 also conducts historical ordnance disposal operations to minimise the threat from mines dating back to the Second World War.

Both SNMCMG groups are key assets in the NATO Response Force (NRF) and are able to fulfil a wide range of roles from humanitarian tasks to operations. They can deploy at short notice and are often the first assets to enter an operational theatre.

SNMCMG1 was formed in the Belgian port of Ostend on 11 May 1973 to ensure safety of navigation around the ports of the English Channel and northwest Europe. Originally called “Standing Naval Force Channel”, its name was changed several times to reflect its expanding area of operation. Today, the Group is capable of operating nearly anywhere in the world.

SNMCMG2 developed from an on-call force for the Mediterranean, which was created in 1969. It also evolved over time to reflect its new responsibilities.

SNMCMG2 and SNMCMG1 were both given their current names in 2006.

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**NATO’s maritime operations**

Built on the strength of its naval forces, NATO’s maritime operations have demonstrated the Alliance’s ability to achieve strategic objectives in vastly different contexts. Since October 2001, Operation Active Endeavour has been established to deter, detect, and if necessary disrupt the threat of terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea. The operation evolved out of NATO’s immediate response to the terrorist attacks against the United States of 11 September 2001. Discussions are ongoing to transform Active Endeavour into a broader maritime security operation able to perform additional tasks. Since 2009, Operation Ocean Shield has contributed to international efforts to suppress piracy and protect humanitarian aid shipments off the Horn of Africa. And in 2011, Operation Unified Protector delivered power from the sea and comprised a major maritime arms embargo on Libya.
Countering terrorism

Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity. It is a persistent global threat that knows no border, nationality or religion and is a challenge that the international community must tackle together. NATO’s work on counter-terrorism focuses on improving awareness of the threat, developing capabilities to prepare and respond, and enhancing engagement with partner countries and other international actors.

Highlights

- NATO invoked its collective defence clause (Article 5) for the first and only time in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States.
- NATO’s Counter-Terrorism Policy Guidelines focus Alliance efforts on three main areas: awareness, capabilities and engagement.
- NATO develops new capabilities and technologies to tackle the terrorist threat and to manage the consequences of a terrorist attack.
- NATO cooperates with partners and international organisations to leverage the full potential of each stakeholder engaged in the global counter-terrorism effort.

More background information

### Awareness

In support of national authorities, NATO ensures shared awareness of the terrorist threat through consultations, enhanced intelligence-sharing and continuous strategic analysis and assessment.

Intelligence-reporting at NATO is based on contributions from Allies’ intelligence services, both internal and external, civilian and military. The way NATO handles sensitive information has gradually evolved, based on successive summit decisions and continuing reform of intelligence structures since 2010. The NATO Headquarters’ Intelligence Unit now benefits from increased sharing of intelligence between member services and the Alliance and produces analytical reports relating to terrorism and its links with other transnational threats.
Intelligence-sharing between NATO and partner countries’ agencies continues through the Intelligence Liaison Unit at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, and an intelligence liaison cell at Allied Command Operations (ACO) in Mons, Belgium.

Beyond the everyday consultations within the Alliance, experts from a range of backgrounds are invited to brief Allies on specific areas of counter-terrorism. Direct accounts of the experiences and views of partner countries affected by terrorism can add greatly to reporting reaching allied nations on other channels. Likewise, discussions with international organisations, including the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), enhance Allies’ knowledge of international counter-terrorism efforts worldwide and help NATO refine the contribution that it makes to the global approach.

### Capabilities

The Alliance strives to ensure that it has adequate capabilities to prevent, protect against and respond to terrorist threats. Capability development and work on innovative technologies are part of NATO’s core business, and methods that address asymmetric threats including terrorism and the use of non-conventional weapons, are of particular relevance. Much of this work is conducted through the Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work (DAT POW), which aims to protect troops, civilians and critical infrastructure against attacks perpetrated by terrorists, such as suicide attacks, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), rocket attacks against aircraft and helicopters and attacks using chemical, biological or radiological material. NATO's Centres of Excellence are important contributors to many projects, providing expertise across a range of topics including military engineering for route clearance, countering IEDs, explosives disposal, cultural familiarisation, network analysis and modelling.

#### Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work

The DAT POW was developed by the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) in 2004. Its primary focus was on technological solutions to mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks but the programme has since widened its scope to support comprehensive capability development. It now includes exercises, trials, development of prototypes and concepts, and interoperability demonstrations. Most projects under the programme focus on finding solutions that can be fielded in the short term and that respond to the military needs of the Alliance. The DAT POW supports the implementation of NATO’s spearhead force - the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) - by developing projects to improve troop readiness and preparedness. The programme uses new or adapted technologies or methods to detect, disrupt and defeat asymmetric threats under three capability umbrellas: incident management, force protection/survivability, and network engagement.

#### Countering chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats

The spread and potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems together with the possibility that terrorists will acquire them, are acknowledged as priority threats to the Alliance. Therefore, NATO places a high priority on preventing the proliferation of WMD to state and non-state actors and defending against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats and hazards that may pose a threat to the safety and security of Allied populations. The NATO Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force is designed to respond to and manage the consequences of the use of CBRN agents both within and beyond NATO's area of responsibility and the NATO-certified Centre of Excellence on Joint CBRN Defence, in the Czech Republic, further enhances NATO’s capabilities.

#### Operations

NATO works to maintain its military capacity for crisis-management and humanitarian assistance operations. When force deployment is necessary, counter-terrorism considerations are often relevant. Lessons learned in operations, including by Special Operations Forces, must not be wasted. Interoperability is essential if members of future coalitions are to work together. Best practices are, therefore, incorporated into education, training and exercises.
The maritime operation “Active Endeavour” was launched in 2001 under Article 5 as part of NATO’s immediate response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks to deter, detect and if necessary disrupt the threat of terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea. While the operation has since evolved, no other NATO operation since has had a specific counter-terrorism related mandate. However, many other operations have had relevance to international counter-terrorism efforts. For example, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) - the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan, which came to an end in 2014 - helped the government expand its authority and implement security to prevent the country once again becoming a safe haven for international terrorism.

Crisis management

NATO’s long-standing work on civil emergency planning, critical infrastructure protection and crisis management provides a resource that may serve both Allies and partners upon request. This field can relate directly to counter-terrorism, building resilience and ensuring appropriate planning and preparation for response to and recovery from terrorist acts.

Protecting populations and critical infrastructure

National authorities are primarily responsible for protecting their population and critical infrastructure against the consequences of terrorist attacks, CBRN incidents and natural disasters. NATO can assist nations by developing non-binding advice and minimum standards and act as a forum to exchange best practices and lessons learned to improve preparedness and national resilience. NATO has developed ‘Guidelines for first response to a CBRN incident’ and organises ‘International Courses for Trainers of First Responders to CBRN Incidents’. NATO guidance can also advise national authorities on warning the general public and alerting emergency responders. NATO can call on an extensive network of civil experts, from government and industry, to help respond to requests for assistance. The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) coordinates responses to national requests for assistance following natural and man-made disasters including terrorist acts involving CBRN agents.

Engagement

As the global counter-terrorism effort requires a holistic approach, Allies have resolved to strengthen outreach to and cooperation with partner countries and international actors.

With partners

Increasingly, partners are taking advantage of partnership mechanisms for dialogue and practical cooperation relevant to counter-terrorism. Interested partners are encouraged to include a section on counter-terrorism in their individual cooperation agreements with NATO. Allies place particular emphasis on shared awareness, capacity building, civil emergency planning and crisis management to enable partners to identify and protect vulnerabilities and to prepare to fight terrorism more effectively.

Counter-terrorism is one of the five priorities of the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme. The SPS Programme enhances cooperation and dialogue between scientists and experts from Allies and partners, contributing to a better understanding of the terrorist threat, the development of detection and response measures, and fostering a network of experts. Activities include workshops, training courses and multi-year research and development projects that contribute to identifying: methods for the protection of critical infrastructure, supplies and personnel; human factors in defence against terrorism; technologies to detect explosive devices and illicit activities; and risk management, best practices, and use of new technologies in response to terrorism.

On 1 April 2014, Allied foreign ministers condemned Russia’s illegal military intervention in Ukraine and Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Ministers underlined that NATO does not recognise Russia’s illegal and illegitimate attempt to annex Crimea. As a result, ministers decided to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and Russia, including in the area of counter-terrorism, which had been among the main drivers behind the creation of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in May 2002.
This decision was reconfirmed by Allied leaders at the Wales Summit in September 2014 and to date, cooperation remains suspended.

With international actors

NATO cooperates in particular with the UN, the EU and the OSCE to ensure that views and information are shared and that appropriate action can be taken more effectively in the fight against terrorism. The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, international conventions and protocols against terrorism, together with relevant UN resolutions provide a common framework for efforts to combat terrorism.

NATO works closely with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate as well as with the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and many of its component organisations. NATO’s Centres of Excellence and education and training opportunities are often relevant to UN counter-terrorism priorities, as is the specific area of explosives management. More broadly, NATO works closely with the UN agencies that play a leading role in responding to international disasters and in consequence management, including the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the UN 1540 Committee.

NATO maintains close relations with the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department’s Action against Terrorism Unit and increasingly with field offices and the Border College in Dushanbe, which works to create secure open borders through specialised training of senior officers from national border security agencies. Relations with the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator’s office and other parts of the EU machinery help ensure mutual understanding and complementarity.

The use of civilian aircraft as a weapon on 11 September 2001 led to efforts to enhance aviation security. NATO contributed to improved civil-military coordination of air traffic control by working with EUROCONTROL, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the US Federal Aviation Administration, major national aviation and security authorities, airlines and pilot associations and the International Air Transport Association (IATA).

Education

NATO offers a range of training and education opportunities in the field of counter-terrorism to both Allies and partner countries. It can draw on a wide network that includes the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany and the Centres of Excellence (COEs) that support the NATO command structure. There are more than 20 COEs fully accredited by NATO of which several have a link to the fight against terrorism. The Centre of Excellence for Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) in Ankara, Turkey serves both as a location for meetings and a catalyst for international dialogue and discussion on terrorism and counter-terrorism. The COE-DAT reaches out to over 50 countries and 40 organisations.

Milestones in NATO’s work on counter-terrorism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>The Alliance’s 1999 Strategic Concept identifies terrorism as one of the risks affecting NATO’s security.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 September 2001</td>
<td>Four coordinated terrorist attacks are launched by the terrorist group al-Qaeda upon targets in the United States.</td>
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<td>12 September 2001</td>
<td>Less than 24 hours after the 9/11 terrorist attacks – NATO Allies and partner countries, in a meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, condemn the attacks, offering their support to the United States and pledging to “undertake all efforts to combat the scourge of terrorism”. Later that day, the Allies decide to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the Alliance’s collective defence clause for the first time in NATO’s history, if it is determined that the attack had been directed from abroad against the United States.</td>
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<tr>
<td>13-14 September 2001</td>
<td>Declarations of solidarity and support are given by Russia and Ukraine.</td>
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2 October 2001  The North Atlantic Council is briefed by a high-level US official on the results of investigations into the 9/11 attacks -- the Council determines that the attacks would be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

4 October 2001  NATO agrees on eight measures to support the United States:
- to enhance intelligence-sharing and cooperation, both bilaterally and in appropriate NATO bodies, relating to the threats posed by terrorism and the actions to be taken against it;
- to provide, individually or collectively, as appropriate and according to their capabilities, assistance to Allies and other countries which are or may be subject to increased terrorist threats as a result of their support for the campaign against terrorism;
- to take necessary measures to provide increased security for facilities of the United States and other Allies on their territory;
- to backfill selected Allied assets in NATO's area of responsibility that are required to directly support operations against terrorism;
- to provide blanket overflight clearances for the United States and other Allies' aircraft, in accordance with the necessary air traffic arrangements and national procedures, for military flights related to operations against terrorism;
- to provide access for the United States and other Allies to ports and airfields on the territory of NATO member countries for operations against terrorism, including for refuelling, in accordance with national procedures;
- that the Alliance is ready to deploy elements of its Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean in order to provide a NATO presence and demonstrate resolve;
- that the Alliance is similarly ready to deploy elements of its NATO Airborne Early Warning Force to support operations against terrorism.

Mid-October 2001  NATO launches its first-ever operation against terrorism – Operation Eagle Assist: at the request of the United States, seven NATO AWACS radar aircraft are sent to help patrol the skies over the United States (the operation runs through to mid-May 2002 during which time 830 crewmembers from 13 NATO countries fly over 360 sorties). It is the first time that NATO military assets have been deployed in support of an Article 5 operation.

26 October 2001  NATO launches its second counter-terrorism operation in response to the attacks on the United States, Operation Active Endeavour: elements of NATO's Standing Naval Forces are sent to patrol the eastern Mediterranean and monitor shipping to detect and deter terrorist activity, including illegal trafficking.

May 2002  At their Reykjavik meeting, NATO foreign ministers decide that the Alliance would operate when and where necessary to fight terrorism. This landmark declaration effectively ends the debate on what constituted NATO's area of operations and paves the way for the Alliance's future engagement with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.
November 2002

At the Prague Summit, NATO leaders express their determination to deter, defend and protect their populations, territory and forces from any armed attack from abroad, including by terrorists. To this end, they adopt a Prague package, aimed at adapting NATO to the challenge of terrorism. It comprises:

- a Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism;
- a Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T);
- five nuclear, biological and chemical defence initiatives;
- protection of civilian populations, including a Civil Emergency Planning Action Plan;
- missile defence: Allies are examining options for addressing the increasing missile threat to Alliance populations, territory and forces in an effective and efficient way through an appropriate mix of political and defence efforts, along with deterrence;
- cyber defence;
- cooperation with other international organisations; and
- improved intelligence-sharing.

In addition, they decide to create the NATO Response Force, streamline the military command structure and launch the Prague Capabilities Commitment to better prepare NATO’s military forces to face new challenges, including terrorism.

10 March 2003

Operation Active Endeavour is expanded to include escorting civilian shipping through the Strait of Gibraltar.

March 2004

As a result of the success of Active Endeavour in the Eastern Mediterranean, NATO extends its remit to the whole of the Mediterranean.

November 2006

At the Riga Summit, NATO leaders recognise that “terrorism, increasingly global in scope and lethal in results, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction are likely to be the principal threats to the Alliance over the next 10 to 15 years”.

2010

NATO’s Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, recognises that terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly. It commits Allies to enhance the capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism, including through enhanced threat analysis, more consultations with NATO’s partners, and the development of appropriate military capabilities.

May 2012

At the Chicago Summit, NATO leaders endorse new policy guidelines for Alliance work on counter-terrorism, which focus on improved threat awareness, adequate capabilities and enhanced engagement with partner countries and other international actors.
Cyber defence

Cyber threats and attacks are becoming more common, sophisticated and damaging. The Alliance is faced with an evolving complex threat environment. State and non-state actors can use cyber attacks in the context of military operations. In recent events, cyber attacks have been part of hybrid warfare. NATO and its Allies rely on strong and resilient cyber defences to fulfil the Alliance’s core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. NATO needs to be prepared to defend its networks and operations against the growing sophistication of the cyber threats and attacks it faces.

Highlights

- Cyber defence is part of NATO’s core task of collective defence.
- NATO has affirmed that international law applies in cyberspace.
- NATO is responsible for the protection of its own networks.
- Allies are and remain responsible for the protection of their national networks, which need to be compatible with NATO’s and with each other’s.
- NATO enhances its capabilities for cyber education, training and exercises.
- Allies are committed to enhancing information-sharing and mutual assistance in preventing, mitigating and recovering from cyber attacks.
- NATO signed a Technical Arrangement on cyber defence cooperation with the European Union in February 2016.
- NATO is intensifying its cooperation with industry, via the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership.
More background information

Principal cyber defence activities

- **NATO Policy on Cyber Defence**
  
  To keep pace with the rapidly changing threat landscape and maintain a robust cyber defence, NATO adopted an enhanced policy and action plan, which was endorsed by Allies at the Wales Summit in September 2014. The policy establishes that cyber defence is part of the Alliance’s core task of collective defence, confirms that international law applies in cyberspace and intensifies NATO’s cooperation with industry. The top priority is the protection of the communications systems owned and operated by the Alliance.

  The policy also reflects Allied decisions on issues such as streamlined cyber defence governance, procedures for assistance to Allied countries, and the integration of cyber defence into operational planning (including civil emergency planning). Further, the policy defines ways to take awareness, education, training and exercise activities forward, and encourages further progress in various cooperation initiatives, including those with partner countries and international organisations. It also foresees boosting NATO’s cooperation with industry, including on information-sharing and the exchange of best practices.

  The Allies have also committed to enhancing information-sharing and mutual assistance in preventing, mitigating and recovering from cyber attacks. NATO’s cyber defence policy is complemented by an action plan with concrete objectives and implementation timelines on a range of topics from capability development, education, training and exercises, and partnerships.

- **Developing the NATO cyber defence capability**

  The NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) protects NATO’s own networks by providing centralised and round-the-clock cyber defence support to the various NATO sites. This capability is expected to evolve on a continual basis, to maintain pace with the rapidly changing threat and technology environment.

  To facilitate an Alliance-wide and common approach to cyber defence capability development, NATO also defines targets for Allied countries’ implementation of national cyber defence capabilities via the NATO Defence Planning Process. In 2017, further cyber defence capability targets will be agreed.

  Cyber defence has also been integrated into NATO’s Smart Defence initiatives. Smart Defence enables countries to work together to develop and maintain capabilities they could not afford to develop or procure alone, and to free resources for developing other capabilities. The Smart Defence projects in cyber defence, so far, include the Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP), the Smart Defence Multinational Cyber Defence Capability Development (MN CD2) project, and the Multinational Cyber Defence Education and Training (MN CD E&T) project.

  NATO is also helping member countries by sharing information and best practices, and by conducting cyber defence exercises to help develop national expertise. Similarly, individual Allied countries may, on a voluntary basis and facilitated by NATO, assist other Allies to develop their national cyber defence capabilities.

- **Increasing NATO cyber defence capacity**

  Recognising that cyber defence is as much about people as it is about technology, NATO continues to improve the state of its cyber defence education, training, exercises and evaluation.

  NATO conducts regular exercises, such as the annual Cyber Coalition Exercise, and aims to integrate cyber defence elements and considerations into the entire range of Alliance exercises, including the
annual Crisis Management Exercise (CMX). NATO is also enhancing its capabilities for cyber education, training and exercises, including the NATO Cyber Range, which is based on a facility provided by Estonia.

To enhance situational awareness, a Memorandum of Understanding on Cyber Defence was developed in 2015. The MOU will be signed between NATO and the national cyber defence authorities of each of the 28 Allies. It sets out arrangements for the exchange of a variety of cyber defence-related information and assistance to improve cyber incident prevention, resilience and response capabilities.

The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD CoE) in Tallinn, Estonia is the foremost NATO-accredited research and training facility dealing with cyber defence education, consultation, lessons learned, research and development. Although it is not part of the NATO Command Structure, the CCD CoE offers recognised expertise and experience.

The NATO Communications and Information Systems School (NCISS) in Latina, Italy provides training to personnel from Allied (as well as non-NATO) nations relating to the operation and maintenance of NATO communication and information systems. NCISS will soon relocate to Portugal, where it will provide greater emphasis on cyber defence training and education.

The NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany conducts cyber defence-related education and training to support Alliance operations, strategy, policy, doctrine and procedures. The NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy fosters strategic thinking on political-military matters, including on cyber defence issues.

- **Cooperating with partners**

Because cyber threats defy state borders and organisational boundaries, NATO engages with relevant countries and organisations to enhance international security.

Engagement with partner countries is based on shared values and common approaches to cyber defence. Requests for cooperation with the Alliance are handled on a case-by-case basis founded on mutual interest.

NATO also works with, among others, the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The Alliance’s cooperation with other international organisations is complementary and avoids unnecessary duplication of effort.

- **Cooperating with industry**

The private sector is a key player in cyberspace, and technological innovations and expertise from the private sector are crucial to enable NATO and Allied countries to mount an effective cyber defence.

Through the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership (NICP), NATO and its Allies are working to reinforce their relationships with industry. This partnership relies on existing structures and includes NATO entities, national Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and NATO member countries’ industry representatives. Information-sharing activities, exercises, training and education, and multinational Smart Defence projects are just a few examples of areas in which NATO and industry have been working together.

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**Governance**

The NATO Policy on Cyber Defence is implemented by NATO’s political, military and technical authorities, as well as by individual Allies. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) provides high-level political oversight on all aspects of implementation. The NAC is apprised of major cyber incidents and attacks, and it exercises principal authority in cyber defence-related crisis management.

The Cyber Defence Committee (formerly the Defence Policy and Planning Committee/Cyber Defence), subordinate to the NAC, is the lead committee for political governance and cyber defence policy in general, providing oversight and advice to Allied countries on NATO’s cyber defence efforts at the expert level. At the working level, the NATO Cyber Defence Management Board (CDMB) is responsible for
coordinating cyber defence throughout NATO civilian and military bodies. The CDMB comprises the leaders of the policy, military, operational and technical bodies in NATO with responsibilities for cyber defence.

The NATO Consultation, Control and Command (NC3) Board constitutes the main committee for consultation on technical and implementation aspects of cyber defence.

The NATO Military Authorities (NMA) and NCIA bear the specific responsibilities for identifying the statement of operational requirements, acquisition, implementation and operating of NATO’s cyber defence capabilities. Allied Command Transformation (ACT) is responsible for the planning and conduct of the annual Cyber Coalition Exercise.

Lastly, NCIA, through its NCIRC Technical Centre in Mons, Belgium, is responsible for the provision of technical cyber security services throughout NATO. The NCIRC Technical Centre has a key role in responding to any cyber aggression against the Alliance. It handles and reports incidents, and disseminates important incident-related information to system/security management and users.

The NCIRC Coordination Centre is a staff element responsible for the coordination of cyber defence activities within NATO and with member countries, and for staff support to the CDMB.

Evolution

Although NATO has always protected its communication and information systems, the 2002 Prague Summit first placed cyber defence on the Alliance’s political agenda. Allied leaders reiterated the need to provide additional protection to these information systems at the Riga Summit in 2006.

Following the cyber attacks against Estonia’s public and private institutions in April and May of 2007, Allied defence ministers agreed in June 2007 that urgent work was needed in this area. As a result, NATO approved its first Policy on Cyber Defence in January 2008.

In the summer of 2008, the conflict between Russia and Georgia demonstrated that cyber attacks have the potential to become a major component of conventional warfare.

NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, during which the NAC was tasked to develop an in-depth NATO cyber defence policy and to prepare an action plan for its implementation.

In June 2011, NATO defence ministers approved the second NATO Policy on Cyber Defence, which set out a vision for coordinated efforts in cyber defence throughout the Alliance within the context of the rapidly evolving threat and technology environment, and an associated action plan for its implementation.

In April 2012, the integration of cyber defence into the NATO Defence Planning Process began. Relevant cyber defence requirements are identified and prioritised through the defence planning process.

At the Chicago Summit in May 2012, Allied leaders reaffirmed their commitment to improve the Alliance’s cyber defences by bringing all of NATO’s networks under centralised protection and implementing a series of upgrades to the NCIRC.

In July 2012, as part of the reform of NATO’s agencies, NCIA was established.

In February 2014, Allied defence ministers tasked NATO to develop a new, enhanced cyber defence policy regarding collective defence, assistance to Allies, streamlined governance, legal considerations and relations with industry.

In April 2014, the NAC agreed to rename the Defence Policy and Planning Committee/ Cyber Defence as the Cyber Defence Committee.

In May 2014, the full operational capability of the NCIRC (NCIRC FOC) was achieved, providing enhanced protection to NATO networks and users.
In June 2014, NATO defence ministers endorsed the new cyber defence policy, which is currently being implemented. The policy and its implementation is under close review at both the political and technical levels within the Alliance and will be refined and updated in line with the evolving cyber threat.

At the Wales Summit in September 2014, Allies approved a new action plan which, along with the policy, contributes to the fulfilment of the Alliance’s core tasks.

On 17 September 2014, NATO launched an initiative to boost cooperation with the private sector on cyber threats and challenges. Endorsed by Allied leaders at the Wales Summit, the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership (NICP) was presented at a two-day cyber conference held in Mons, Belgium, where 1,500 industry leaders and policy makers gathered to discuss cyber collaboration. The NICP recognises the importance of working with industry partners to enable the Alliance to achieve its cyber defence policy’s objectives.

On 10 February 2016, NATO and the EU concluded a Technical Arrangement on Cyber Defence to help both organisations better prevent and respond to cyber attacks. This Technical Arrangement between NCIRC and the Computer Emergency Response Team of the EU (CERT-EU) provides a framework for exchanging information and sharing best practices between emergency response teams.

On 14 June 2016, defence ministers agreed to recognise cyberspace as a domain at the upcoming Warsaw Summit. This is an addition to the existing operational domains of air, sea and land. This recognition does not change NATO’s mission or mandate, which is defensive. As in all areas of action, NATO will exercise restraint and act in accordance with international law. The Alliance also welcomed efforts undertaken in other international fora to develop norms of responsible state behaviour and confidence-building measures to foster a more transparent and stable cyberspace for the international community. As most crises and conflicts today have a cyber dimension, treating cyberspace as a domain would enable NATO to better protect its missions and operations.
NATO’s role in energy security

The disruption of energy supply could affect the security of their societies and have an impact on NATO’s military operations. While these issues are primarily the responsibility of national governments, NATO continues to consult on energy security and further develops the capacity to contribute to energy security, concentrating on areas where it can add value. To this end, NATO seeks to enhance its strategic awareness of energy developments with security implications; develop its competence in supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure; and work towards significantly improving the energy efficiency of the military.

Highlights

- NATO’s role in energy security was first defined in 2008 at the Bucharest Summit and since been strengthened.
- Energy security is a vital element of resilience and has become more important in the past years due to the new security context.
- Energy efficiency is important not only for logistics and cost-saving in theatres of operation, but also for the environment.

Activities

Enhancing strategic awareness of the security implications of energy developments

While NATO is not an energy institution, energy developments, such as supply disruptions, affect the international security environment and can have far-reaching security implications for some Allies. As a result, NATO closely follows relevant energy trends and developments and seeks to raise its strategic awareness in this area.

This includes consultations on energy security among Allies and partner countries, intelligence-sharing, as well as organising specific events, such as workshops, table-top exercises and briefings by external experts. Of particular importance in this regard are the North Atlantic Council’s annual seminars on global energy developments, as well as the first Energy Security Strategic Awareness Course, which took place in the fall of 2015.
Supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure

All countries are increasingly reliant on vital energy infrastructure, including in the maritime domain, on which their energy security and prosperity depend. Energy infrastructure is also one of the most vulnerable assets, especially in areas of conflict. Since infrastructure networks extend beyond borders, attacks on complex energy infrastructure by hostile states, terrorists or hacktivists can have repercussions across regions. For this reason, NATO seeks to increase its competence in supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure, mainly through training and exercises.

Protecting energy infrastructure is, however, primarily a national responsibility. Hence, NATO’s contribution focuses on areas where it can add value, notably the exchange of best practices with partner countries, many of which are important energy producers or transit countries, and with other international institutions and the private sector.

By protecting important sea lanes, NATO’s counter-piracy operations also make an indirect contribution to energy security. Moreover, NATO is also supporting national authorities in enhancing their resilience against energy supply disruptions that could affect national and collective defence.

Enhancing energy efficiency in the military

Enhancing energy efficiency in the military focuses on reducing the energy consumption of military vehicles and camps, as well as on minimising the environmental footprint of military activities. Work in this area concentrates on bringing together experts to examine existing national endeavours, exchanging best practices, and proposing multinational projects. It also includes studying the behavioural aspects of saving energy in exercises and operations, as well as developing common energy-efficiency standards and procedures.

A significant step forward in this area is the adoption of NATO’s “Green Defence” framework in February 2014. It seeks to make NATO more operationally effective through changes in the use of energy, while saving resources and enhancing environmental sustainability. Finally, NATO is also instrumental in showcasing energy-efficient solutions in military exercises and exhibitions.

Evolution

At the Bucharest Summit in 2008, Allies noted a report on “NATO’s Role in Energy Security”, which identified guiding principles and outlined options and recommendations for further activities. These were reiterated at subsequent summits, while at the same time giving NATO’s role clearer focus and direction.

The 2010 Strategic Concept, the setting up of an Energy Security Section in the Emerging Security Challenges Division at NATO Headquarters that same year, and the accreditation of the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence in Lithuania in 2012 were major milestones in this process.

The decision of Allies to “integrate energy security considerations in NATO’s policies and activities” (2010 Lisbon Summit Declaration) also meant the need for NATO to reflect energy security in its education and training efforts, as well as in its exercise scenarios. Since then, several exercises have included energy-related developments, and several training courses have been stood up, both nationally and at the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany.

In the years to come, NATO will seek to further enhance the strategic dialogue, both among Allies and with partner countries, offer more education and training opportunities, and deepen its ties with other international organisations (such as the International Energy Agency), academia, and the private sector.

Work on enhancing the resilience of energy infrastructure, notably in hybrid scenarios, will be given greater attention. With increased awareness of energy risks, enhanced competence to support infrastructure protection, and enhanced energy efficiency in the military, NATO will be better prepared to respond to the emerging security challenges of the 21st century.
Resilience and Article 3

Each NATO member country needs to have the resilience to withstand shocks like natural disasters, failure of critical infrastructure and military attacks. Resilience is a society’s ability to resist and recover easily and quickly from these shocks, combining civilian, economic, commercial and military factors. In sum, resilience is the combination of civil preparedness and military capacity.

The principle of resilience is firmly anchored in Article 3 of the Alliance’s founding treaty: “In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”

The individual commitment of each and every member to maintain and strengthen its resilience reduces the vulnerability of the Organization as a whole. Members can develop resilience through the development of home defence and niche skills such as cyber defence or medical support. When Allies are well prepared, they are less likely to be attacked, making NATO as a whole stronger.

Moreover, military forces, and especially deployed troops in times of war, depend on the civilian sector for transport, communications or basic supplies such as food and water, to fulfil their missions. Military efforts to defend Alliance territory and populations therefore need to be complemented by robust civil preparedness. However, civil assets can be vulnerable to external attack and internal disruption in times of peace and of war. By reducing these vulnerabilities, NATO reduces the risk of a potential attack, reinforcing its deterrence. A high level of resilience is therefore an essential component of a credible deterrence.

The resilience of each NATO member country needs to be sufficiently robust and adaptable to support the entire spectrum of crises envisaged by the Alliance. In this context, Article 3 complements the collective defence clause set out in Article 5, which stipulates that an attack against one Ally is an attack against all. Allies need to give NATO the means to fulfil its core tasks and, in particular, those of collective defence and mutual assistance.

**Vulnerabilities in a transformed security environment**

Today’s security environment is unpredictable. Threats can come from state and non-state actors, including terrorism and other asymmetrical threats, cyber attacks and hybrid warfare, where the lines
between conventional and unconventional forms of conflict become blurred. The challenge of responding and adapting to these hazards is compounded by trends that have radically transformed the security environment.

Firstly, falling defence budgets since the end of the Cold War have gradually increased the overall reliance on civilian assets. A few figures illustrate the extent of this: in large-scale operations, around 90 per cent of military transport is chartered or requisitioned from the commercial sector; on average, over 50 per cent of satellite communications used for defence purposes are provided by the commercial sector; and roughly 75 per cent of host nation support to NATO operations is sourced from local commercial infrastructure and services.

Secondly, civil resources and critical infrastructure are now owned and operated by the private sector. Driven by the objective of making profits, the private sector has eliminated most redundancies, which are costly. However, these very redundancies are the civil assets that governments used to maintain for an emergency back-up in times of crises. During the Cold War for instance, there were territorial defence mechanisms and capabilities in place ready to support a war effort, but they no longer exist.

Over time, with the reduction in military investment and the privatisation of previously government-owned assets, a heavy reliance on civilian enablers, bound by commercial practices, has developed.

Third, with the widespread use of new technologies, our societies have become interconnected and interdependent not only in cyber space, but also economically and financially. This can be a strength, but it can also be a weakness, as the global financial crisis of 2008 showed.

**Partnering to strengthen resilience**

Within this new security environment, NATO is adapting its approach to civil preparedness, which needs to meet the requirements defined in the Alliance’s policies and long-term strategies. Cooperating with the private sector, other international organisations, in particular the European Union, as well as partner countries, will reinforce the efficiency and effectiveness of civil preparedness across the board.

**The role of civil preparedness in crisis management**

When military forces need to deploy, they rely on the civilian sector for support. In concrete terms this means that once in the field, military forces are reliant for instance on civilian transport facilities, satellite communication and power supplies, not to mention food and water supplies, to conduct their operations.

The range of functions and facilities the civilian sector covers is so broad that assessing the state of preparedness of each area of activity is very difficult. NATO has identified continuity of government, of essential services to the population and support to military operations as the three critical civilian functions that a country must be able to uphold under all circumstances. Civil preparedness is a national responsibility, but it has a huge impact on NATO.

So far, there is little data to indicate how Allies meet the requirements for resilience in the current security environment. Exercises are an effective way to conduct stress tests of national arrangements, in particular when it comes to large-scale problems such as dealing with hybrid warfare or an attack with weapons of mass destruction. However, in order to support Allies, NATO has developed guidelines and a package of tools. It has agreed seven baseline requirements for national resilience against which Allies can measure their level of preparedness:

- Assured continuity of government and critical government services: for instance the ability to make decisions, communicate them and enforce them in a crisis;
- Resilient energy supplies: back-up plans and power grids, internally and across borders;
- Ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people, and to de-conflict these movements from NATO’s military deployments;
- Resilient food and water resources: ensuring these supplies are safe from disruption or sabotage;
- Ability to deal with mass casualties: ensuring that civilian health systems can cope and that sufficient medical supplies are stocked and secure;
- Resilient civil communications systems: ensuring that telecoms and cyber networks function even under crisis conditions, with sufficient back-up capacity; and
- Resilient transport systems: ensuring that NATO forces can move across Alliance territory rapidly and that civilian services can rely on transportation networks, even in a crisis.

The vulnerabilities Allies have to contend with are numerous, complex and multidirectional. They can arise from military challenges, hybrid warfare, but also from natural disasters such as floods, fires and earthquakes. NATO’s work to improve resilience is not specific to any single vulnerability. It contributes to protecting citizens from all potential hazards.
Civil preparedness

The effective transportation of forces and military equipment relies on civil resources and infrastructure, such as railways, ports, airfields and grids. These assets are vulnerable to external attack and internal disruption. Civil preparedness means that basic government functions can continue during emergencies or disasters in peacetime or in periods of crisis. It also means that the civilian sector in Allied nations would be ready to provide support to a NATO military operation.

Highlights

- Under Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, all Allies are committed to building resilience, which is the combination of civil preparedness and military capacity.
- Allies agreed baseline resilience requirements in seven strategic sectors – continuity of government, energy, population movements, food and water resources, mass casualties, civil communications and transport systems.
- To deter or counter potential threats or disruption to the civil sector, effective action requires clear plans and response measures, defined well ahead of time and exercised regularly.
- That is why there is a need to complement military efforts to defend Alliance territory and populations with robust civil preparedness.

More background information

Strategic areas

NATO civil preparedness is primarily concerned with aspects of national planning which affect the ability to contribute to Allied efforts in continuity of government, continuity of essential services to the population and civil support to military operations.

These three critical civilian functions have been translated into seven baseline resilience requirements and agreed by NATO in February 2016. Together with a package of resilience guidelines, assessment and a tailored toolbox, their objective is to support nations in achieving national resilience and provide benchmarks against which to assess the state of civil preparedness. These are:
1. Continuity of government and critical government services;
2. Energy supplies;
3. Ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people;
4. Food and water resources;
5. Ability to deal with mass casualties;
6. Telecommunications and cyber networks;
7. Transportation systems.

These baseline resilience requirements will be further discussed by Allies in the run-up to NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016.

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**The context**

Why is civil preparedness essential to collective defence? In large operations, around 90 per cent of military transport uses civilian assets chartered or requisitioned from the commercial sector. The military medical system relies on the ability to evacuate casualties. Civilian medical infrastructure must be able to cope with both an increase in demand from civilian casualties as well as the military casualty treatment and evacuation chain.

Deployed NATO forces need access to host nations’ industrial infrastructure, access to the power grid, food, water and fuel supplies, access to civilian telecommunications infrastructure, and building materials.

They also require local civilian expertise and manpower. On average, 75 per cent of host nation support to NATO operations is sourced from local commercial infrastructure and services.

These civil assets are often highly vulnerable because they have been designed to generate maximum profit as opposed to providing redundancy and resilience in times of crisis. In addition, hybrid threats are blurring the traditional divisions of war and peace, rendering government powers based on wartime emergency legislation increasingly impractical or even obsolete. In today’s security environment, resilience to such challenges requires a full range of capabilities, military and civilian, and active cooperation across government and the private sector.

Enhancing resilience also requires continued engagement with partners and other international bodies, including the United Nations and particularly the European Union, as well as continuously updated situational awareness.

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**History**

During the Cold War, many of the civil assets, such as railways, ports, airfields, grids or airspace were in state hands and easily transferred to NATO control in a crisis or wartime situation.

Following the fall of the Berlin wall, the significantly reduced threat meant that the likelihood of a direct attack on mainland Europe diminished. Consequently, attention to and investment in civil preparedness started to decline.

As threats from international terrorism and religious extremism became more prevalent, NATO assumed an expeditionary stance which demanded different capabilities and capacities than those developed during the Cold War. During this period, outsourcing of non-combat essential military tasks, requirements and capabilities became the norm and was also embraced by new NATO member countries. Although cost-effective, the result has been an incremental increase in military dependency on civilian resources and infrastructure. For example, in large-scale operations around 90 per cent of military transport is now provided by the commercial sector, as is 40 per cent of military satellite communications, while 75 per cent of all host nation support is dependent on the use of locally procured infrastructure and services.

Recent events, particularly the conflict in eastern Ukraine, have refocused attention on challenges closer to Alliance territory. As part of its response, the Alliance agreed and is implementing a set of assurance
and adaptation measures known as the Readiness Action Plan (RAP). To be fully effective, the RAP must be complemented by civil preparedness.

Consequently, nations are re-evaluating their own vulnerabilities and preparedness to effectively deter and defend against contemporary security threats.
Exercises

Exercises are important tools through which the Alliance tests and validates its concepts, procedures, systems and tactics. More broadly, they enable militaries and civilian organisations deployed in theatres of operation to test capabilities and practise working together efficiently in a demanding crisis situation.

Highlights

- Exercises allow NATO to test and validate concepts, procedures, systems and tactics.
- They enable militaries and civilian organisations deployed on the ground to work together to identify “best practices” (what works) and “lessons learned” (what needs improving).
- Exercises also contribute to improved interoperability and defence reform.
- NATO has recently boosted its exercise programme in light of the changed security environment.
- Exercises are planned in advance and vary in scope, duration and form – ranging between live exercises in the field to computer-assisted exercises that take place in a classroom.
- To foster and support interoperability, NATO exercises are as open as possible to all formal partner countries.
- The Alliance has been conducting exercises since 1951.

More background information

The aim of NATO exercises

The rationale for planning and executing military exercises is to prepare commands and forces for operations in times of peace, crisis and conflict. Their aims and objectives must therefore mirror current operational requirements and priorities. The exercises are executed in three forms: a live exercise (LIVEX) in which forces actually participate; a command-post exercise (CPX), which is a headquarters
exercise involving commanders and their staffs, and communications within and between participating headquarters; and an exercise study, which may take the form of a map exercise, a war game, a series of lectures, a discussion group or an operational analysis. Exercises serve a number of specific purposes:

- **Training and experience**

  Exercises allow forces to build on previous training in a practical way, thereby heightening forces’ level of proficiency in a given area. Exercises have varying levels of complexity but most assume that basic training is complete and that a sufficient number of trained personnel are available.

- **Testing and validating structures**

  Exercises are designed to practise the efficiency of structures as well as personnel. This is particularly true when periodically the NATO military command structure is reformed and new headquarters need to test their ability to fulfil new responsibilities. A structure consists of many components – concepts, doctrine, procedures, systems and tactics – that must function together. Supply structures, for instance, require specialised training, equipment and operating procedures, which must be combined to effectively support a mission’s objectives. Putting these structures into practice allows them to be tested and, if need be, refined.

- **Interoperability**

  NATO-led forces must be able to work together effectively despite differences in doctrine, language, structures, tactics and training. Interoperability is built, in part, through routine inter-forces training between NATO member states and through practical cooperation between personnel from Allied and partner countries. Exercises are as open as possible to all formal partners, either as observers or as participants, and in some cases even as hosts of an exercise. Endorsement by the Military Committee and approval by the North Atlantic Council are, however, required before a partner can observe or participate in an exercise.

- **Defence reform**

  Participation in NATO exercises is one of the options available to help with defence reform. They provide the possibility for NATO member countries to test reforms implemented nationally and give partner countries the opportunity to be involved in and observe the structures and mechanisms that Alliance members have in place.

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### The making of an exercise

- **Exercise scenarios**

  During an exercise, forces are asked to respond to a fictitious scenario that resembles what might occur in real life. Exercises cover the full range of military operations, from combat to humanitarian relief and from stabilisation to reconstruction. They can last from a day to several weeks and can vary in scope from a few officers working on an isolated problem, to full-scale combat scenarios involving aircraft, navy ships, artillery pieces, armoured vehicles and thousands of troops.

  Alliance exercises are supported by NATO countries and, as appropriate, by partner countries, which provide national commitments in the form of troops, equipment or other types of support. The participating countries are normally responsible for funding any form of national contribution.

  Each exercise has pre-specified training objectives which drive the selection of activities. Objectives may be to build skills and knowledge, practise coordination mechanisms, or validate procedures.

  At the conclusion of an exercise, commanders and, in many cases, troops collectively review their performance. This process allows them to identify areas that work well (“best practices”) and areas that can be improved (“lessons learned”). In this way, exercises facilitate continuous improvement of interoperability, efficiency and performance.
Military Training and Exercise Programme

Events and activities related to NATO training and exercises are developed by NATO’s two strategic commands — Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT). This process culminates with the publication of the annual Military Training and Exercise Programme (MTEP). Since July 2012, ACO is responsible for setting the training requirements and conducting NATO’s evaluations, while ACT is responsible for managing the MTEP and executing the exercise programme.

The MTEP provides detailed information on training, exercises and related activities scheduled for the next five calendar years. The detailed specifications of an exercise are developed one or two years prior to the start of the exercise. Exercise programmes are planned for a period of up to six years.

The document is based on the priorities and intent of the Strategic Commanders. The areas typically included are current and future operations, the NATO Response Force, transformational experimentation and NATO’s military cooperation programmes.

NATO exercise requirements are coordinated during MTEP Programming Board Meetings (which are open to representatives from partner countries) starting at least 18 months before the beginning of the next cycle. Preliminary planning culminates in the NATO Training and Exercise Conference, where NATO Commands, NATO member and partner countries, and other invitees conduct final exercise coordination and provide support to the annual MTEP.

Political exercises

Exercises are organised in both the military and civilian structures of the Alliance. NATO holds exercises based on its political arrangements, concepts and procedures so as to refine consultations and decision-making architecture and capabilities. Political exercises also aim to ensure that primary advisers — non-elected senior political officials and military commanders in capitals and within the NATO structures — are provided with opportunities to maintain their awareness of how complex, multinational organisations such as NATO work. In some instances, partners engaged in NATO-led operations are able to participate in certain aspects of these exercises.

Transparency

NATO, and more specifically Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), publishes its annual exercise programme online. In the spirit of the Vienna Document on ensuring military transparency, NATO also adheres to the following rules: when an exercise exceeds 9,000 personnel, it is subject to notification; when it exceeds 13,000 personnel, observers are allowed to follow the exercise. The naming convention explained below is also a source of information and, therefore, of transparency.

Every year within the framework of the Vienna Document and as part of an important confidence- and security-building measure, officials from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) meet to exchange information on their armed forces, military organisation, manpower and major weapon and equipment systems. They also share information on their defence planning and budgets during the year.

What is in an exercise name?

At the present time, NATO exercises are identified by two words. The first letter of the first word denotes the NATO command responsible for scheduling the exercise.

S  Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
T  Allied Command Transformation
B  Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum
N  Allied Joint Force Command Naples
The first letter of the second word denotes the element(s) concerned.

A  Air
L  Land
M  Maritime
J  Joint
S  Special Operations Forces

For instance, Brilliant Jump is a joint exercise conducted by JFC Brunssum.

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### The strategic commands in the lead

ACO and ACT work closely together on NATO military exercises. Both are assisted by the Alliance’s network of education, training, and assessment institutions, as well as national structures.

Since July 2012, ACO has been given the main responsibility for setting collective training requirements and conducting the evaluation of headquarters and formations. ACT has been given the responsibility of managing collective training and exercises, based on ACO’s requirements. ACT also holds lead responsibility for NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) joint education, individual training and associated policy and doctrine development, as well as for directing NATO schools (NATO’s PfP is a major programme of bilateral cooperation with countries from Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus).

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### Exercises through time

NATO has been conducting Alliance-level exercises since 1951. In the early years of the Alliance, NATO forces conducted exercises to strengthen their ability to practise collective defence. In other words, they were conducted to ensure that forces were prepared in the case of an attack.

An integrated force under centralised command was called for in September 1950. By December 1950, the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe, US General Dwight D. Eisenhower, was appointed. Following this appointment, national forces were put under centralised command.

The Alliance’s first exercises were held in the autumn of 1951. During 1953, there were approximately 100 exercises of various kinds conducted by NATO commanders. From this point on, NATO forces were no longer a collection of national units, but were beginning to gain cohesion. A year after Allied Command Europe became operational, General Eisenhower reported that “the combat readiness of our troops has improved markedly”.

During the ’70s and the ’80s, NATO maintained a very active exercise programme to train forces in as many demanding scenarios as possible. Exercises were considered an essential part of the Alliance’s deterrence posture and helped to ensure that forces were prepared for a potential aggression throughout the Cold War.

In 1994, the Alliance launched the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative. One of the initiative’s objectives is to promote closer military cooperation and interoperability between NATO and non-NATO countries in the Euro-Atlantic area. From that time on, PfP members were able to participate in peacekeeping field exercises.

In 2002, the NATO Response Force (NRF) was created. It is a highly ready and technologically advanced multinational force that the Alliance can deploy quickly, wherever needed. The original NRF concept was revised in 2009 and since then, the emphasis has been placed on exercises conducted in support of the NRF. This training is intended to ensure that the NRF is able to deploy quickly and operate effectively in a variety of situations.
At the 2004 Istanbul Summit, Alliance leaders elevated the Mediterranean Dialogue initiative to a genuine partnership to include increased participation in exercises and individual training at NATO institutions. At the same time, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative was introduced, paving the way for cooperation between NATO and countries from the broader Middle East in areas such as education and training, and made provision for partners to engage in joint training for terrorism. Since the Lisbon Summit in November 2010 and the introduction of the 2010 Strategic Concept and the new partnerships policy, NATO exercises have been open to all partners.

At the Chicago Summit in 2012, NATO leaders started talking about “expanding education, training and exercises” and introduced the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI), which aims to ensure that the high level of interoperability Allied forces gained during their operational experience in Afghanistan, Libya, the Horn of Africa and the Balkans, is maintained. It was in February 2013 that NATO defence ministers endorsed plans to revitalise NATO’s exercise programme. These plans set the course for a more rigorous multi-year training schedule to ensure NATO and partner forces retain the ability to work efficiently together. Following Russia’s illegal “annexation” of Crimea in March 2014, the number of exercises undertaken that year was increased and at their 2014 Summit in Wales, NATO leaders made a pledge to increase the focus on collective defence scenarios.
Education and training

NATO conducts education and training to increase the effectiveness of multinational forces and their ability to work together. NATO also uses its expertise and resources in education and training to assist partner countries in their reform efforts and help bring peace and stability to crisis-hit areas.

Highlights

- NATO’s education and training programmes help to improve “interoperability” – the ability of multinational forces to work together at all levels.
- These programmes assist NATO partners in security-related areas of activity such as reforming professional military education for officers or building capacity to meet emerging security challenges.
- Education and training programmes for the police or armed forces in post-conflict areas can also serve as tools to promote peace and stability.
- Since its inception in 1949, NATO started to engage in education and training activities, which have expanded geographically and institutionally over time.
- In 2002, NATO demonstrated its resolve to boost education and training by creating Allied Command Transformation (ACT), entirely dedicated to leading the ongoing transformation of NATO’s military structure, forces, capabilities and doctrine.
- ACT has a holistic approach to education and training: it provides unity of effort and helps identify gaps and avoid duplication, while ensuring greater effectiveness and efficiency through global programming. These efforts are complementary to national programmes.

Transformation through education and training

Troops for NATO operations are drawn from many different countries. Ensuring that these multinational forces can work together effectively is one of the main objectives of NATO’s education and training
programmes. The latter are also used to assist NATO partner countries in their reform efforts, as well as to help bring peace and stability to crisis-hit areas.

Education focuses on institution building through the development of concepts, doctrines and practices. Individual training focuses on practising and applying that knowledge, which helps to assimilate the subject matter completely. Collective training aims to improve and maintain the collective performance of a headquarters and/or a formation. Exercises take training a step further by testing acquired knowledge during live or computer-assisted simulations based on a scenario and may involve a large number of participants from a broad range of countries.

Together, education and training are key agents for transformation.

● Ensuring effectiveness

Ensuring that multinational forces can work together effectively despite differences in tactics, doctrine, training, structures and language is a priority for NATO. This capacity to work together as one is reinforced by global programming – global understood as comprehensive, not worldwide: from tactical to strategic level, individual and collective training, and encompassing all education and training facilities that are willing to work with NATO.

The concentration of responsibility for education and training at Allied Command Transformation (ACT) since 1 December 2002 has created the opportunity to align education and individual training with collective training and exercises, while improving readiness and interoperability. ACT has a process in place to ensure that appropriate education and training is developed: starting from the requirements, consequent analyses identify and develop the most appropriate education and training solution for every discipline. Annual conferences then keep the disciplines aligned with the ever-evolving requirements, and guarantee responsive and flexible education and training cycles. Once the solutions are defined, delivery of courses, training and exercises is synchronised with all stakeholders.

The drivers for all education and training efforts come from the operational requirements defined in NATO's strategic documents, and global programming instigated by ACT aims to ensure cohesiveness throughout all education and training activities.

● Working with partners on defence reform

NATO members have reduced levels of military personnel, equipment and bases from Cold War levels and transformed their forces to meet different needs. Many partner countries are still going through this process, often with scarce resources and limited expertise.

NATO is using education to support institutional reform in partner countries. Its education and training programmes initially focused on increasing interoperability between NATO and partner forces; they have since been expanded to provide a means for members and partners to collaborate on how to build, develop and reform educational institutions in the security, defence and military domain.

NATO works with partners from Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Mediterranean rim, the Gulf region and individual countries from across the globe. The main frameworks for cooperation are the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

● Tailor-made defence education

Through the Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP), the Alliance advises partners on how to build, develop and reform educational institutions in the defence and military domain. DEEP provides a platform to connect experts to defence education institutions in countries that seek to become intellectually interoperable with NATO and to contribute to capacity building. Although the programme was set up to meet the requirements of partners, Allies can benefit from it too.

NATO is helping to develop teaching curricula ("what to teach") for Allies and partners in areas such as defence institution building or professional military education for officers, in collaboration with the
Partnership for Peace (PfP) Consortium. It also focuses on faculty development (“how to teach”) and, to this end, maintains an international professional network of defence and military educators from Allied and partner countries to exchange experience in teaching methodologies and help those interested in advice and assistance. This vast network of institutions and individuals support these projects on a voluntary basis. Among the institutions are: the US Army War College, the Canadian Defence Academy, the National Defence University of Poland, the National Defence University of Romania, the Czech University of Defence, the Slovak Armed Forces Academy, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, the George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany to name just a few. The NATO Defense College and the NATO School Oberammergau also support the programme.

The PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes is instrumental in helping NATO to manage the network and the DEEP projects. The functional Educational Clearing House, led by the Czech Republic, Italy, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland and the United States, also plays a critical role in coordinating NATO and national efforts in support of DEEP projects. The clearing house is supported by the PfP Consortium and ACT.

The Alliance is also the hub for a growing network of Partnership Training and Education Centres (PTECs), which brings together civilian and military institutions from Allied and partner countries. The PTECs, while being national institutions, conduct education and training activities related to NATO partnership programmes and policies.

### Courses, seminars and workshops

NATO partner countries which work with NATO are able to participate in an array of NATO education activities – courses, roundtables, seminars and workshops.

### Advice and expertise

NATO shares its expertise in the field of defence capabilities with partner countries. It does this through the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP), a mechanism that also helps to identify partner forces and capabilities that could be available to the Alliance for multinational training, exercises and operations. Countries with special relationships with NATO can have additional mechanisms for exchanging advice and expertise. For instance, the NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform provides a forum through which consultation can take place on initiatives as diverse as civil-military relations, defence planning, policy, strategy and national security concepts. Moreover, NATO-led multinational teams of experts can visit partner countries to address the education and training requirements listed in the Individual Partnership Action Plans of the countries concerned.

- **An initiative for the Mediterranean and the Middle East**

A dedicated Middle East faculty has been established at the NATO Defense College in Rome as part of the NATO Regional Cooperation Course.

- **Education and training in NATO-led operations**

NATO’s efforts to bring stability to crisis areas go beyond deploying troops to include education and training programmes that can help partners develop security institutions and provide for their own security.

### Afghanistan

NATO is currently leading Resolute Support, a non-combat mission which provides training, advice and assistance to Afghan security forces and institutions. Resolute Support was launched on 1 January 2015 and its key functions include: supporting planning, programming and budgeting; assuring transparency, accountability and oversight; supporting the adherence to the principles of rule of law and good governance; supporting the establishment and sustainment of processes such as force generation, recruiting, training, managing and development of personnel.

An important aspect of NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan is assisting the country in developing its security structures and forces. In November 2009, the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A)
was established to train and mentor Afghan National Security Forces, support the Afghan National Army’s institutional training base, and reform the Afghan National Police at the district level and below. The Alliance also deployed Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams to Afghan National Army units at various levels of command. These gradually evolved into Military Advisory Teams and Police Advisory Teams, more generally known as Security Force Assistance Teams.

In 2006, NATO signed a declaration with Afghanistan, establishing a substantial programme of long-term cooperation. This Afghan Cooperation Programme provides for further training assistance, including opening NATO courses and partnership activities to Afghan participation, providing advice and expertise on defence reform and the development of security institutions, as well as specific assistance such as language training.

Subsequently, on 20 November 2010, NATO and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan signed a Declaration on an Enduring Partnership. This Enduring Partnership is intended to provide long-term political and practical support to Afghanistan as it rebuilds its security institutions and assumes full responsibility for its own security. It includes a series of agreed programmes and activities undertaken as part of the ongoing cooperation between NATO and Afghanistan. This includes the Professional Military Education Programme for Afghanistan, which aims to further develop Afghan institutions, as well as other initiatives such as a counter-narcotics training pilot project.

### African Union

At the request of the African Union (AU), NATO has been providing subject-matter experts to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) since 2007, offering expertise in areas such as maritime planning, air movement coordination and logistics. NATO also provides expert and training support to the African Standby Force (ASF), at the AU’s request. The ASF is part of the AU’s efforts to develop long-term peacekeeping capabilities.

Previously, NATO helped strengthen the AU’s peacekeeping force in Darfur (June 2005-end December 2007) in a bid to halt the continuing violence. Initially, NATO’s support consisted in training AU troops in strategic-level planning and operational procedures. It provided training assistance in other areas such as pre-deployment certification and “lessons learned”, as well as information management.

### Iraq

On 24 September 2012, NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow and Iraqi National Security Adviser Faleh Al-Fayyadh signed the NATO-Iraq cooperation programme, marking the formal accession of Iraq to NATO’s “partnership family”. The main areas of cooperation include education and training, response to terrorism, countering improvised explosive devices, explosive ordnance disposal, defence institution building and communications strategy.

Beforehand – from 2004 to end 2011 – NATO helped Iraq provide for its own security by training Iraqi personnel and supporting the development of the country’s security institutions. NATO trained and mentored middle- and senior-level personnel from the Iraqi security forces in Iraq and outside of Iraq, at NATO schools and training centres. The Alliance also played a role in coordinating offers of equipment and training from individual NATO member and partner countries.

### Training bodies and institutions

There are a number of organisations through which NATO education and training is organised and run. Some operate under the direction of the Alliance and others are external, but complementary to Alliance structures.

- **Allied Command Transformation**

  Allied Command Transformation (ACT) was created as part of the reorganisation of NATO’s Command Structure in 2002. This strategic command in Norfolk, United States holds lead responsibility for directing NATO schools as well as for NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) joint education, individual training,
and associated policy and doctrine development. Since July 2012, ACT has also been given the responsibility of managing collective training and exercises based on Allied Command Operations' requirements.

- **NATO education and training facilities**

There are seven facilities of which the last three are under direct control of HQ SACT:

1. The NATO Defense College (NDC) in Rome, Italy is NATO’s primary strategic-level educational facility and includes areas of study such as trends in the international security environment and their potential effects on NATO countries. It provides training for senior commanders.

2. The NATO School in Oberammergau (NSO), Germany is the primary operational-level training centre for students. Operational-level training focuses on joint planning of NATO operations, logistics, communications, civil emergency planning, or civil-military cooperation.

3. The NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre (NMIOTC) in Souda Bay, Greece conducts training for NATO forces in surface, sub-surface, aerial surveillance and special operations activities. It does this through theoretical and practical training programmes, as well as through simulations.

4. The NATO Communications and Information Systems School (NCISS) in Latina, Italy provides cost-effective highly developed formal training to personnel (military and civilian) from NATO as well as non-NATO countries for the efficient operation and maintenance of those NATO communications and information systems.

5. The Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) in Stavanger, Norway provides NATO’s training focal point for full-spectrum joint operational-level warfare.

6. The Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) in Bydgoszcz, Poland supports training for NATO and partner forces to improve joint and combined tactical interoperability. The JFTC conducts joint training for tactical-level command posts and staffs in support of tactical-level commanders.

7. The Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) in Lisbon, Portugal is NATO’s lead agency for the analysis of operations, training and experiments, and for the collection and dissemination of lessons learned. The JALLC deploys project teams worldwide, delivering analysis support to NATO at the strategic and operational levels.

- **NATO-related education and training institutions**

These are entities that have a relationship with NATO, but are typically administered by sponsor countries, national authorities or civil organisations. They are open to participation by personnel from member and partner countries and may sometimes welcome individuals coming from other organisations.

**Centres of Excellence**

The principal role of these centres is to provide high-quality education and training to the Euro-Atlantic community. They complement the Alliance’s resources and cover a wide variety of areas, each one focusing on a specific field of expertise to enhance NATO capabilities.

These Centres of Excellence (COEs) are accredited by NATO and, although not part of the NATO Command Structure, are part of a wider framework supporting NATO. They are funded nationally or multinationally and their relationship with NATO is formalised through memoranda of understanding.

Courses are being offered through these COEs in an increasing number of locations to ensure all available expertise is being utilised. Courses vary in duration (from one day to several months) and are open to personnel from NATO member countries and some to personnel from partner countries. Some are also open to civilian participants.

**Partnership Training and Education Centres**

Partnership Training and Education Centres (PTECs) focus on the operational and tactical levels of a military operation. Each one has a different area of expertise and provides enhanced training and facilities...
for personnel from all partner countries. In April 2011, NATO adopted a concept for PTECs to support interested partners in developing their defence education and training capacities even further. It is based on the “Policy for a More Efficient and Flexible Partnership”, which states that, “all partners will be offered deeper political and practical engagement with the Alliance, including through support for defence education, training and capacity building, within existing resources”. With this initiative, NATO has committed itself to supporting interested partners in developing their defence education and training capacities even further.

*Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes*

The PfP Consortium - an Austrian-German-Swiss-US initiative - was established in 1999 to help promote education in security-related topics. It does this by facilitating cooperation between both civilian and military institutions in NATO and PfP countries in support of NATO priorities such as defence institution building and defence reform.

In addition to developing reference curricula, the PfP Consortium is also running an Educators’ Programme to familiarise partners with modern teaching methodologies, and supporting partners in education-related aspects of their cooperation programmes with NATO.

The PfP Consortium establishes working groups where experts, policy-makers, and defence and security practitioners pool information and develop products such as educational tools or scholarly publications. Participating organisations include universities, research institutions and training centres. The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Germany forms the Secretariat.

- **Other education and training facilities**

Organisations that are not directly related to NATO may support the Alliance in its education and training activities. These facilities can come from national, multinational and non-governmental organisations, such as military schools and universities.

- **Education and training: a key activity since 1949**

Collective education and training has been ongoing since the inception of the Alliance in 1949. Over time, it has expanded to become an integral part of NATO’s ability to provide security. It has expanded geographically, with NATO working with a larger number of countries, and institutionally, with the creation of ACT, a strategic command entirely dedicated to leading transformation throughout the Alliance.

- **Interoperability**

In the early years of the Alliance, NATO forces conducted joint training to strengthen their ability to practise collective defence. In other words, education and training was conducted to ensure that forces were prepared in the case of an attack.

*An integrated force under centralised command*

An integrated force under centralised command was called for as early as September 1950, following the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. The first Supreme Allied Commander Europe, US General Dwight D. Eisenhower, was appointed in December 1950. Following this appointment, national forces were put under centralised command.

*The Alliance’s first exercises*

The Alliance’s first exercises were held in the autumn of 1951. During 1953, there were approximately 100 exercises of various kinds conducted by NATO. From this point on, NATO forces began to gain cohesion.

*Education for individuals*
Individual education soon followed. The need for a specialised setting to explore issues unique to the Alliance was first recognised by General Eisenhower in April 1951. The NATO Defense College was inaugurated later that year, on 19 November, and was transferred from Paris, France to Rome, Italy in 1966, where it is still located.

The NATO Communications and Information Systems School was established in 1959, when a civil contractor began to train a small number of NATO personnel on what would become NATO’s “ACE HIGH Communications System”. On 2 May of the same year, the NATO Undersea Research Centre in La Spezia, Italy was commissioned. During the 2002 reform process, this centre was moved to the agency structure of the Alliance as an organisational element linked to research. In 1971, the Military Committee established the NATO Training Group. The NATO Training Group met for many years in joint session with the Euro-training sub-group, which was set up to improve multinational training arrangements between European countries (its responsibilities were passed on to NATO in 1993). The NATO Training Group was formally transferred from the Military Committee to ACT in 2004. Its principal aim is to improve interoperability among Allies and, additionally, between the forces of partner countries.

In 1975, the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany received its charter and present name. For almost 25 years, its principal focus was on issues relating to collective defence.

More recently in 2003, the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre was established in Souda Bay, Greece to conduct training for NATO forces in surface, sub-surface, aerial surveillance and special operations activities.

- **NATO training opens to partners**

  **Partnership for Peace countries**

  When NATO invited former Warsaw Pact countries, former Soviet Republics and non-member western European countries to join the PfP programme in 1994, participating countries committed themselves to increasing interoperability with NATO forces. This opened the way for joint training and marked the beginning of NATO’s support for defence reform.

  NATO training institutions soon followed suit. The first officers’ course for partner countries was conducted in October 1994 at the NATO Communications and Information Systems School. Similarly, the NATO Defense College integrated PfP issues into its Senior Course.

  **Mediterranean Dialogue countries**

  The Mediterranean Dialogue was likewise created in 1994, initially as a forum for political dialogue. In 1997, at a meeting in Sintra, Portugal, the Alliance decided to open selected military training activities to countries participating in this initiative (currently seven countries: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia).

  **Increasing cooperation with all partners**

  In 1998, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council approved the creation of the Partnership for Peace Consortium and at the 1999 Washington Summit NATO leaders approved plans for an “Enhanced and More Operational Partnership”. In addition, with the revision of the NATO Strategic Concept in 1999, the role of the NATO School was fundamentally altered to include cooperation and dialogue with civilian personnel from non-NATO countries.

  In May 2002, the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre in Monsanto (Lisbon), Portugal was established. This facility’s mission is to perform joint analysis and experimentation of operations, training and exercises – also with partners.

  In February 2005, the North Atlantic Council started developing the Education and Training for Defence Reform (EFR) initiative. EFR helps educators incorporate principles linked to defence institution building into their curricula. Since the courses are aimed at civil servants and other persons participating in defence institution building, they contribute indirectly to improving defence reform.
Education and training as transformation tools

With the creation of the two new strategic commands in 2002 and the introduction of global programming, the coordination and coherence of NATO education and training activities has been greatly increased. From 2002, ACT was able to look holistically at education and training.

New training centres

A Joint Warfare Centre in Stavanger, Norway was inaugurated on 23 October 2003. The Joint Force Training Centre in Bydgoszcz, Poland, inaugurated on 31 March 2004, supports training for both NATO and partner forces to improve joint and combined tactical interoperability.

Stepping up training and partnerships

At the 2004 Istanbul Summit, Alliance leaders elevated the Mediterranean Dialogue initiative to a genuine partnership to include increased participation in exercises and individual training at NATO institutions. At the same time, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) was introduced, which paved the way for cooperation between NATO and countries from the broader Middle East (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates) in areas such as education and training.

This Summit also made provision for partners to engage in joint training to combat terrorism and to train jointly with the NATO Response Force, NATO’s rapid-reaction force.

The Connected Forces Initiative

At the Chicago Summit in 2012, NATO leaders stressed the importance of expanding education and training, especially within the context of the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI). CFI seeks to make greater use of education, training and exercises to reinforce links between the forces of NATO member countries and maintain the level of interoperability needed for future operations. At the most basic level, this implies individuals understanding each other and, at a higher level, the use of common doctrines, concepts and procedures, as well as interoperable equipment. Forces also need to increasingly practise working together through joint and combined training and exercising, after which they need to standardize skills and make better use of technology.\(^1\)

Joint training means forces from two or more military departments working under a single command and combined forces are forces from different countries working under a single command.
The NATO Defence Planning Process

Allies undertake to provide, individually or together, the forces and capabilities needed for NATO to fulfil its security and defence objectives. The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) is the primary means to identify the required capabilities and promote their timely and coherent development and acquisition by Allies.

**Highlights**

- Through the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), NATO identifies capabilities and promotes their development and acquisition by Allies so that it can meet its security and defence objectives.
- By participating voluntarily in the NDPP, Allies can harmonise their national defence plans with those of NATO.
- The NDPP is designed to influence national defence planning efforts and prioritises NATO’s future capability requirements, apportions those requirements to each Ally as targets, facilitates their implementation and regularly assesses progress.
- NATO defence planning encompasses different domains: force, resource, armaments, logistics, C3 (consultation, command and control), civil emergency, air and missile defence, air traffic management, standardization, intelligence, military medical support, science and technology, and cyber.

An effective defence planning process is essential to deliver the collective political, military and resource advantages expected by NATO members. By participating in the NDPP, and without compromising their national sovereignty, Allies can harmonise their national defence plans with those of NATO to identify, develop and deliver a fair share of the overall forces and capabilities needed for the Alliance to be able to undertake its full range of missions.

The NDPP is designed to influence national defence planning efforts and identifies and prioritises NATO’s future capability requirements, apportions those requirements to each Ally as targets, facilitates their implementation and regularly assesses progress. It provides a framework for the harmonisation of
national and Alliance defence planning activities aimed at the timely development and delivery of all the capabilities, military and non-military, needed to meet the agreed security and defence objectives inherent to the Strategic Concept.

The Defence Policy and Planning Committee (DPPC) is responsible for the development of policy and overall coordination and direction of activities related to defence planning.

The key characteristics of the NDPP are that:

- It is a coherent and integrated process in which Allies choose to participate, on a voluntary basis, to deliver the required capabilities in the short, medium and long term.
- It supports a capability-based approach but provides sufficient detail to assist participating countries and the Alliance to develop the forces necessary to undertake the full range of NATO missions.
- It is sufficiently flexible to respond to the needs of both individual Allies and the Alliance, informs and guides national defence plans, provides transparency, promotes multinational approaches and offers opportunities to capitalise on best practices.

Efforts to enhance the NDPP, by making it more flexible and responsive, continue. The defence planning process evolves continuously; however two milestones stand out. In 2009, initiatives were taken to improve the harmonisation of the planning domains and Allies were encouraged to integrate their national defence planning activities to complement NATO efforts. Another milestone came earlier with the Alliance’s engagement in non-Article 5 operations. With collective defence war plans during the Cold War, members were expected to assign and employ the requested forces virtually without question. The non-Article 5 operations Allies have conducted since the fall of the Berlin Wall are, by agreement, on a case-by-case and the provision of national forces is discretionary. As such, the automaticity associated with force planning during the Cold War period was lost. This led to the need for “force generation conferences” to solicit the relevant forces and “operational planning” to develop the plans. Existing processes were adjusted and then reviewed on a regular basis in view of the changing security environment.

### NATO Defence Planning Process

The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) consists of five steps conducted over a period of four years.

**Step 1 - Establish political guidance**

A single, unified political guidance for defence planning sets out the overall aims and objectives to be met by the Alliance. It translates guidance from higher strategic policy documents, such as the Strategic Concept, in sufficient detail to direct the defence planning efforts of the planning domains in order to determine the capabilities required.

Political guidance aims at defining the number, scale and nature of the operations the Alliance should be able to conduct in the future (commonly referred to as NATO’s Level of Ambition). It also defines the qualitative capability requirements to support this ambition. By doing so, it steers capability development efforts within the Allies and NATO. It defines associated priorities and timelines for use by the planning domains.

Political guidance is normally reviewed every four years. The most recent was published in March 2011.

**Step 2 - Determine requirements**

NATO’s capability requirements (current and future) are consolidated into a single list called the Minimum Capability Requirements. These requirements are identified by the planning domains and the two Strategic Commands (Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT)). ACT has the lead in determining the requirements. The process is structured, comprehensive,
transparent and traceable and uses analytical tools coupled with relevant NATO expert analysis. This is done once every four years, although out-of-cycle activity for particular capabilities can be undertaken as circumstances dictate.

**Step 3 - Apportion requirements and set targets**

Target setting apportions the Minimum Capability Requirements to the Allies (either individually or as part of an agreed multinational undertaking) and NATO entities in the form of target packages. The apportionment process aims to apply the principles of fair burden-sharing and reasonable challenge.

The Strategic Commands (with ACT in the lead) develop a target package for each Ally for existing and future capabilities, with associated priorities and timelines. Targets are expressed in capability terms and are flexible enough to allow innovative solutions to be developed rather than replacing ‘like with like’.

Once each Ally has been consulted, the International Staff replaces the Strategic Commands in leading the process. Target packages are forwarded to Allies with a recommendation of which targets should be retained or removed. Allies review these packages during a series of Multilateral Examinations and agree a target package for each Ally on the basis of “consensus minus one”, meaning that a single Ally cannot veto what otherwise would be a unanimous decision on its own target package.

Agreed target packages are subsequently forwarded to Allies for submission to defence ministers for adoption. A summary report is also prepared which includes an assessment of the potential risk and possible impact caused by the removal of targets from packages on the delivery of the Alliance’s Level of Ambition.

**Step 4 - Facilitate implementation**

This step assists national measures, facilitates multinational initiatives and directs NATO efforts to satisfy agreed targets and priorities in a coherent and timely manner. Unlike other steps in the process, this step – or function - is continuous in nature.

**Step 5 - Review results**

This step seeks to examine the degree to which NATO’s political objectives, ambitions and associated targets have been met and to offer feedback and direction for the next cycle of the defence planning process. Step 5 provides an overall assessment of the degree to which the Alliance’s forces and capabilities are able to meet the political guidance, including the NATO Level of Ambition. It is carried out by a Defence Planning Capability Review which scrutinises and assesses Allies’ defence and financial plans.

Every two years, Allies complete a Defence Planning Capability Survey which seeks data on Allies’ national plans and policies, including efforts (national, multinational and collective) to address their capability targets. The survey also seeks information on the national inventory of military forces and associated capabilities, any relevant non-military capabilities potentially available for Alliance operations and national financial plans.

Assessments for each participating Ally are produced. They constitute a comprehensive analysis of national plans and capabilities, including force structures, specific circumstances and priorities. These assessments also include a statement by the Strategic Commands regarding the impact each country’s plans have on the ability of ACO to conduct missions. They may also include recommendations which seek to redirect resources from areas where the Alliance has a surplus of capability, to deficiencies areas.

The assessments are submitted for examination to the Defence Policy and Planning Committee (DPPC) for review and approval during a series of multilateral examinations. In parallel with and based on the Strategic Commands’ Suitability and Risk Assessment, the Military Committee develops a Suitability and Risk Assessment. It effectively provides a risk assessment on the military suitability of the plans and the degree of military risk associated with them in relation to political guidance for defence planning.
On the basis of this and the individual assessments, the DPPC prepares a NATO Capabilities Report, highlighting individual and collective progress on capability development as it relates to NATO’s Level of Ambition.

Support structures

The senior committee for defence planning

The DPPC is the senior committee for defence planning. It is responsible for the development of defence planning-related policy and the overall coordination and direction of NDPP activities. The DPPC is the central body that oversees the work of the NATO bodies and committees responsible for the planning domains on behalf of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). It can provide feedback and defence planning process-related direction to them. The DPPC will often meet with appropriate subject-matter experts invited to “reinforce” the regular representatives. When meeting in this format, the DPPC is referred to as the DPPC “Reinforced” or DPPC(R).

Capability Development Executive Board

The Capability Development Executive Board provides unity of oversight, policy, direction and guidance and enforces authority and accountability throughout NATO capability development. It brings together the senior leadership of the relevant civil and military capability development stakeholders in the NATO staffs and acts as a steering board to direct staff efforts associated with NATO capability development in accordance with the guidance provided by Allies through the relevant committees.

Defence Planning staff

The work of the DPPC and CDEB is supported by relevant NATO Defence Planning staff. This staff comprises civil and military expertise resident within the various NATO HQ staffs and Strategic Commands, and supports the NDPP throughout the five steps.

Planning domains and related committees

NATO Defence Planning encompasses many different domains: force, resource, armaments, logistics, C3 (consultation, command and control), civil emergency, air and missile defence, air traffic management, standardization, intelligence, military medical support and science and technology. In April 2012, the integration of cyber defence into the NDPP began. Relevant cyber defence requirements are also identified and prioritised through the defence planning process.

Force planning

Force planning aims to promote the availability of national forces and capabilities for the full range of Alliance missions. It seeks to ensure that Allies develop modern, deployable, sustainable and interoperable forces and capabilities, which can undertake demanding operations wherever required, including being able to operate abroad with limited or no support from the country of destination. The focus of force planning is on “capabilities” and how Allies should prioritise their resources to achieve these.

Resource planning

NATO resource planning focuses on the financing of capabilities that are jointly or commonly funded, where members pool resources within a NATO framework. Resource planning is closely linked to operational planning.

There is a distinction between joint funding and common funding: joint funding covers activities managed by NATO agencies, such as the NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and NATO pipelines; common funding involves three different budgets; the civil budget, the military budget, and the NATO Security Investment Programme.
These budgets are relatively small, but the specific use of each is key to ensuring the cohesion of the Alliance and the integration of capabilities.

The Resource Policy and Planning Board

The Resource Policy and Planning Board is the senior advisory body to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on the management of all NATO resources. It has responsibility for the overall management of NATO’s civil and military budgets, as well as the NATO Security Investment Programme and manpower.

- **Armaments planning**

Armaments planning focuses on the development of multinational (but not common-funded) armaments programmes. It promotes cost-effective acquisition, cooperative development and production of armaments. It also encourages interoperability, and technological and industrial cooperation among Allies and partners.

The Conference of National Armaments Directors

The Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) is the senior NATO committee responsible for Alliance armaments cooperation, material standardization and defence procurement. It brings together the top officials responsible for defence procurement in NATO member and partner countries to consider the political, economic and technical aspects of the development and procurement of equipment for NATO forces, with the aim of arriving at common solutions.

- **Logistics planning**

Logistics planning aims at ensuring responsive and usable logistics support to NATO operations. This is achieved by promoting the development of military and civil logistics capabilities and multinational logistic cooperation.

The Logistics Committee

The Logistics Committee is the senior advisory body on logistics at NATO. Its mandate is two-fold: to address consumer logistics matters to enhance the performance, efficiency, sustainability and combat effectiveness of Alliance forces; to exercise, on behalf of the NAC, a coordinating authority across the NATO logistics spectrum.

- **C3 planning**

NATO’s political and military functions require the use of NATO and national consultation, command and control (C3) systems, services and facilities, supported by personnel and NATO-agreed doctrine, organisations and procedures.

C3 systems include communications, information, navigation and identification systems as well as sensor and warning installation systems. They are designed and operated in a networked and integrated form to meet the needs of NATO. Individual C3 systems may be provided by NATO via common-funded programmes or by Allies via national, multinational or joint-funded cooperative programmes.

There is no established C3 planning cycle which allows C3 planning to be responsive. However, activities are harmonised with the cycles of the other associated planning disciplines.

The Consultation, Command and Control (C3) Board

The Consultation, Command and Control Board is a senior multinational body acting on behalf of and responsible to the NAC on all matters relating to NATO C3 issues. This includes interoperability of NATO and national C3 systems, and advising the CNAD on C3 cooperative programs.
Civil emergency planning

Civil emergency planning aims to collect, analyse and share information on national planning activity to ensure the most effective use of civil resources for use during emergency situations, in accordance with Alliance objectives. It enables Allies and partners to assist each other in preparing for and dealing with the consequences of crisis, disaster or conflict.

The Civil Emergency Planning Committee

The Civil Emergency Planning Committee is the top advisory body for the protection of civilian populations and the use of civil resources in support of NATO’s objectives.

Air and missile defence planning

Air and missile defence planning enables members to harmonise national efforts with international planning related to air command and control and air and missile defence weapons. The NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATINAMDS) comprises sensors, command and control facilities and weapons systems, such as surface-based air defence and fighter aircraft. It is a cornerstone of NATO’s air and missile defence policy, and a visible indication of cohesion, shared responsibility and solidarity across the Alliance. A NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme has been initiated to enhance the previous NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence (NATINAD) system, particularly against theatre ballistic missiles.

The Air and Missile Defence Committee

It is the senior multinational policy advisory and coordinating body regarding all elements of NATO’s integrated air and missile defence and relevant air power aspects in a joint approach. It advises the NAC and the relevant Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council bodies on all elements of air defence, including missile defence and relevant air power aspects. It promotes harmonisation of national efforts with international planning related to air command and control and air defence weapons. It reports directly to the NAC and is supported by its Panel on Air and Missile Defence.

The Military Committee Working Group (Air Defence) is responsible for reviewing, advising and making recommendations to the Military Committee on air and missile defence issues. Other groups dealing with air and missile defence-related issues include the DPPC(R) with particular responsibilities on ballistic missile defence, the Missile Defence Project Group, which oversees the BMD Programme Office, and the NATO-Russia Council Missile Defence Working Group.

Air traffic management

NATO’s role in civil-military air traffic management is to ensure, in cooperation with other international organisations, the following: safe access to airspace, effective delivery of services and civil-military interoperability for air operations conducted in support of the Alliance’s security tasks and missions. The aim is to achieve these objectives while minimising disruption to civil aviation, already constrained by the limited capacity of systems and airports, and mitigating the cost implications of new civil technologies on defence budgets.

The Air Traffic Management Committee

This committee is the senior civil-military advisory body to the NAC for airspace use and air traffic management. Its mission is to develop, represent and promote NATO’s view on matters related to safe and expeditious air operations in the airspace of NATO areas of responsibility and interest.

Standardization

At NATO, standardization is the process of developing shared concepts, doctrines, procedures and designs to achieve and maintain the most effective levels of “compatibility, interchangeability and commonality” in operations, procedures, materials, technology and administration. The primary products of this process are Standardization Agreements (STANAGS) between member countries.
The Committee for Standardization

The Committee for Standardization is the senior authority of the Alliance responsible for providing coordinated advice to the NAC on overall standardization issues.

Intelligence

Intelligence plays an important role in the defence planning process, especially with the emergence of multidirectional and multidimensional security challenges such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The Intelligence Steering Board

The Intelligence Steering Board acts as an inter-service coordination body responsible for steering intelligence activities and for providing effective support to the decision-making process at NATO Headquarters. It is tasked, among others, with developing the Strategic Intelligence Requirements from which any capability requirements are derived.

The Civilian Intelligence Committee

It is the sole body that handles civilian intelligence issues at NATO. It reports directly to the NAC and advises it on matters of espionage and terrorist or related threats, which may affect the Alliance.

The Military Intelligence Committee

It is responsible for developing a work plan in particular in the areas of NATO intelligence support to operations and oversight of policy guidance on military intelligence.

Military medical support

Military medical support is normally a national responsibility; however planning needs to be flexible to consider multinational approaches. The degree of multi-nationality varies according to the circumstances of the mission and the participation of Allies.

The Committee of the Chiefs of Military Medical Services in NATO

The Committee of the Chiefs of Military Medical Services in NATO is composed of the senior military medical authorities of member countries. It acts as the central point for the development and coordination of military medical matters and for providing medical advice to the Military Committee.

Science and technology

NATO promotes and conducts cooperative research and information exchange to support the effective use of national defence science and technology and further the military needs of the Alliance.

The NATO Science and Technology Organization

The NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO) acts as NATO’s principal organisation for science and technology research.

It is composed of a Science and Technology Board, Scientific and Technical Committees and three Executive Bodies (the Office of the Chief Scientist, the Collaboration Support Office, and the Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation).

The STO was created through the amalgamation of the Research and Technology Organization and the NATO Undersea Research Centre. These bodies were brought together following a decision at the 2010 Lisbon Summit to reform the NATO agency structure.
Information on defence expenditures

NATO publishes an annual compendium of financial, personnel and economic data for all member countries. Since 1963, this report has formed a consistent basis of comparison of the defence effort of Alliance members based on a common definition of defence expenditure. Through the links below, you can find data covering the years from 1949 to the present.

- **Working mechanism**

  The figures represent payments actually made or to be made during the course of the fiscal year. They are based on the NATO definition of defence expenditure. In view of the differences between this and national definitions, the figures shown may diverge considerably from those which are quoted by national authorities or given in national budgets.

- **Evolution**

  Each year, updated tables with nations’ defence expenditures are published on the NATO website in PDF and Excel format. The latest version of the compendium provides tables covering key indicators on the financial and economic aspects of NATO defence, including:
  - Total defence expenditures
  - Defence expenditure and GDP growth rates
  - Defence expenditures as a percentage of GDP
  - Defence expenditures and GDP per capita
  - Defence expenditures by category
  - Armed forces personnel strength

- **Archive of tables**

  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009
Funding NATO

Member countries make direct and indirect contributions to the costs of running NATO and implementing its policies and activities.

**Highlights**

- Indirect – or national – contributions are the largest and come, for instance, when a member volunteers equipment or troops to a military operation and bears the costs of the decision to do so.
- Direct contributions are made to finance requirements of the Alliance that serve the interests of all 28 members - and are not the responsibility of any single member - such as NATO-wide air defence or command and control systems. Costs are borne collectively, often using the principle of common funding.
- Within the principle of common funding, all 28 members contribute according to an agreed cost-share formula, based on Gross National Income, which represents a small percentage of each member's defence budget.
- Common funding arrangements are used to finance NATO’s principal budgets: the civil budget (NATO HQ running costs), the military budget (costs of the integrated Command Structure) and the NATO Security Investment Programme (military capabilities).
- Projects can also be jointly funded, which means that the participating countries can identify the requirements, the priorities and the funding arrangements, but NATO provides political and financial oversight. The funding process is overseen by the North Atlantic Council, managed by the Resource Policy and Planning Board, and implemented by the Budget Committee and the Investment Committee.
- In 2014, at the Wales Summit, NATO leaders tasked further work in the areas of delivery of common funded capabilities, reform governance and transparency and accountability, especially in the management of NATO’s financial resources.

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**Indirect funding of NATO**

When the NAC unanimously decides to engage in an operation, there is no obligation for each and every country to contribute to the operation unless it is an Article 5 collective defence operation, in which case expectations are different. In all cases, contributions are voluntary and vary in form and scale, from for instance a few soldiers to thousands of troops, and from armoured vehicles, naval vessels or helicopters to all forms of equipment or support, medical or other. These voluntary contributions are offered by individual Allies and are taken from their overall defence capability to form a combined Alliance capability.

**The two per cent defence investment guideline**

In 2006, NATO member countries agreed to commit a minimum of two per cent of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to spending on defence. This guideline principally served as an indicator of a country’s political will to contribute to the Alliance’s common defence efforts. Additionally, the defence capacity of each member country has an important impact on the overall perception of the Alliance’s credibility as a politico-military organisation.

The combined wealth of the non-US Allies, measured in GDP, exceeds that of the United States. However, non-US Allies together spend less than half of what the United States spends on defence. This imbalance has been a constant, with variations, throughout the history of the Alliance and more so since the tragic events of 11 September 2001, after which the United States significantly increased its defence spending. The gap between defence spending in the United States compared to Canada and European members combined has therefore increased.
Today, the volume of the US defence expenditure effectively represents 73 per cent of the defence spending of the Alliance as a whole. This does not mean that the United States covers 73 per cent of the costs involved in the operational running of NATO as an organisation, including its headquarters in Brussels and its subordinate military commands, but it does mean that there is an over-reliance by the Alliance as a whole on the United States for the provision of essential capabilities, including for instance, in regard to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; air-to-air refuelling; ballistic missile defence; and airborne electronic warfare.

The effects of the financial crisis and the declining share of resources devoted to defence in many Allied countries have exacerbated this imbalance and also revealed growing asymmetries in capability among European Allies. France, Germany and the United Kingdom together represent more than 50 per cent of the non-US Allies defence spending, which creates another kind of over-reliance within Europe on a few capable European Allies. Furthermore, their defence spending is under increasing pressure, as is that of the United States, to meet deficit and indebtedness reduction targets. At the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO leaders agreed to reverse the trend of declining defence budgets and decided:

- Allies currently meeting the two per cent guideline on defence spending will aim to continue to do so;
- Allies whose current proportion of GDP spent on defence is below this level will halt any decline; aim to increase defence expenditure as GDP grows; and will move toward the two per cent guideline within a decade.

While the two per cent of GDP guideline alone is no guarantee that money will be spent in the most effective and efficient way to acquire and deploy modern capabilities, it remains, nonetheless, an important indicator of the political resolve of individual Allies to devote to defence a relatively small, but still significant, level of resources at a time of considerable international uncertainty and economic adversity.

**The major equipment spending guideline**

National defence budgets cover essentially three categories of expenditures: personnel expenses and pensions; research, development and procurement of defence equipment; and, lastly, operations, exercises and maintenance. Budget allocation is a national, sovereign decision, but NATO Allies have agreed that at least 20 per cent of defence expenditures should be devoted to major equipment spending, perceived as a crucial indicator for the scale and pace of modernisation.

Although investment across the Alliance in the development and procurement of defence equipment rose between 2003 and 2010 as a result of increases in spending by the United States, several other Allies also increased their equipment expenditures to meet the particular modernisation requirements associated with expeditionary operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Where expenditures fail to meet the 20 per cent guideline, however, there is an increasing risk of block obsolescence of equipment, growing capability and interoperability gaps among Allies, and a weakening of Europe’s defence industrial and technological base.

In September 2014 at the Wales Summit, NATO leaders agreed that Allies who are currently spending less than 20 per cent of their annual defence spending on major equipment will aim to increase this annual investment within a decade; Allies will also ensure that their land, air and maritime forces meet NATO agreed guidelines for deployability and sustainability and other agreed metrics; and they will ensure that their armed forces can operate together effectively.

Even though all Allies may not contribute forces to an operation, Allies have agreed that the funding for the deployment of the NATO part of a NATO-led operation would be commonly funded.

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**Direct funding of NATO**

Direct financial contributions to NATO come principally in two different forms: common funding and joint funding. They can also come in the form of trust funds, contributions in kind, *ad hoc* sharing arrangements and donations.
Several factors influence the choice of funding source to address a given priority. These include the required level of integration or interoperability, affordability at the national level, the complexity of the system involved, and the potential for economies of scale. Often, a combination of funding sources is used.

- **The principle of common funding**

When a need for expenditure has been identified, countries in the RPPB discuss whether the principle of common funding should be applied — in other words whether the requirement serves the interests of all the contributing countries and should therefore be borne collectively.

The criteria for common funding are held under constant review and changes may be introduced as a result of changing circumstances, for instance, the need to support critical requirements in support of Alliance operations and missions.

Common funding arrangements principally include the NATO civil and military budgets, as well as the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP). These are the only funds where NATO authorities identify the requirements and set the priorities in line with overarching Alliance objectives and priorities.

Where military common funding is concerned — the military budget and the NATO Security Investment Programme — the guiding principle for eligibility is the “over and above” rule:

“Common funding will focus on the provision of requirements which are over and above those which could reasonably be expected to be made available from national resources.”

Member countries contribute to NATO in accordance with an agreed cost-sharing formula based on Gross National Income.

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### NATO COMMON-FUNDED BUDGETS & PROGRAMMES

**COST SHARE ARRANGEMENTS VALID FROM 1/1/2016 TO 31/12/2017**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
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<th>Military Budget</th>
<th>NSIP</th>
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<td>United States</td>
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Total: 100.0000
● **The civil budget**

The civil budget provides funds for personnel expenses, operating costs, and capital and programme expenditure of the International Staff at NATO Headquarters. It is financed from national foreign ministry budgets (in most countries), supervised by the Budget Committee and implemented by the International Staff. The civil budget for 2016 is €222 million.

The civil budget is formulated on an objective-based framework, which establishes clear links between NATO’s strategic objectives and the resources required to achieve them. There are four frontline objectives and four support objectives. The frontline objectives comprise support for: active operations; Alliance capabilities; consultation and cooperation with partners; and public relations. The four support objectives consist in: providing support to the consultation process with Allies; maintaining the facilities and site of NATO Headquarters (Headquarters operational environment); governance and regulation through the monitoring of business policies, processes and procedures; and Headquarters security.

● **The military budget**

This budget covers the operating and maintenance costs of the NATO Command Structure. It is composed of over 50 separate budgets, which are financed with contributions from Allies’ national defence budgets (in most countries) according to agreed cost-shares. It is supervised by the Budget Committee (with representatives from all NATO member countries) and implemented by the individual budget holders. In all cases, the provision of military staff remains a nationally-funded responsibility. The military budget for 2016 is €1.16 billion.

The military budget effectively provides funds for the International Military Staff, the strategic commanders, the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control (NAEW&C) Force, the common-funded portions of the Alliance’s operations and missions, and more specifically for:

- the Military Committee, the International Military Staff and military agencies;
- the two strategic commands and associated command, control and information systems;
- theatre headquarters for deployed operations;
- the NATO static and deployable Combined Air Operations Centres, deployable ARS and radar systems, and deployable HQ communication systems;
- the Joint Warfare Centre (Norway), the Joint Force Training Centre (Poland), the Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre (Portugal), the NATO Defense College (Italy) and the Communications and Information Systems School (now relocating to Portugal);
- the NATO Standardization Office, the NATO Communications and Information (NCI) Agency (Belgium) via its customers, Allied Command Transformation experimentation funds, the NATO Science and Technology Organization (Belgium) and the Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (Italy);
- limited partnership support activities and part of the Military Liaison Offices in Moscow and Kyiv.

During a crisis-management operation, when an operational decision with financial implications is taken by the NAC, the RPPB is immediately consulted for the availability of funds. Effectively, this means that in the throes of a crisis, the RPPB can at times be in quasi-permanent session, as was sometimes the case for instance during the Libya operation (March-October 2011).

● **The NATO Security Investment Programme**

The NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP) covers major construction and command and control system investments, which are beyond the national defence requirements of individual member countries. It supports the roles of the NATO strategic commands by providing installations and facilities
such as air defence communication and information systems, military headquarters for the integrated structure and for deployed operations, and critical airfield, fuel systems and harbour facilities needed in support of deployed forces.

The NSIP is financed by the ministries of defence of each member country and is supervised by the Investment Committee. Projects are implemented either by individual host countries or by different NATO agencies and strategic commands, according to their area of expertise. The 2016 ceiling for the NSIP is €690 million.

- **Joint funding**

  Joint funding arrangements are structured forms of multinational funding within the terms of an agreed NATO charter. The participating countries still identify the requirements, the priorities and the funding arrangements, but NATO has visibility and provides political and financial oversight.

  Joint funding arrangements typically lead to the setting-up of a management organisation within a NATO agency. NATO agency activities range from the development and production of fighter aircraft or helicopters to the provision of logistic support or air defence communication and information systems. NATO agencies also coordinate research and development activities or are active in the fields of standardization and intelligence-sharing.

  Jointly funded programmes vary in the number of participating countries, cost-share arrangements and management structures.

- **Other forms of funding**

  In addition to common funding and joint funding, some projects can take the form of trust fund arrangements, contributions in kind, ad hoc sharing arrangements and donations. The most important trust fund is the one supporting the sustainment of the Afghan National Army.

### Management and control

Financial management within NATO is structured to ensure that the ultimate control of expenditure rests with the member countries supporting the cost of a defined activity, and is subject to consensus among them. Under the overall authority of the NAC, various bodies exercise managerial control over all four of the principal elements of the Organization’s financial structure:

- the International Staff, financed by the civil budget;
- the international military structure, financed by the military budget;
- the NSIP; and
- NATO agencies.

When cooperative activities do not involve all member countries, they are, for the most part, managed by NATO production and logistics programmes within NATO agencies. They have their own supervisory boards and boards of directors, as well as finance committees and distinct sources of financing within national treasuries.

Financial regulations applied at NATO provide basic unifying principles around which the overall financial structure is articulated. They are approved by the NAC and are complemented by rules and procedures adapting them to specific NATO bodies and programmes. In September 2014, NATO leaders decided to, *inter alia*, reform governance, transparency and accountability, especially in the management of NATO’s financial resources. This new drive for transparency and accountability aims to improve insight into how NATO manages, spends and reports on the use of taxpayer funds.
- **Financial management of the civil and military budgets**

The civil and military budgets are annual, coinciding with the calendar year. Each budget is prepared under the authority of the head of the respective NATO body and is reviewed by the Budget Committee composed of representatives of contributing member countries, and approved for execution by the NAC.

Failure to achieve consensus before the start of the financial year entails non-approval of the budget and the financing of operations, under the supervision of the Budget Committee, through provisional allocations limited to the level of the budget approved for the preceding year. This regime may last for six months, after which the NAC is required to decide either to approve the budget or to authorise continuation of interim financing.

When the budget has been approved, the head of the NATO body has discretion to execute it through the commitment and expenditure of funds for the purposes authorised. This discretion is limited by different levels of constraint prescribed by the Organization’s financial regulations regarding such matters as recourse to competitive bidding for contracts for the supply of goods and services, or transfers of credits to correct over- or under-estimates of the funding required.

- **Financial management of the NATO Security Investment Programme**

Implementation of the NSIP starts from capability packages. These packages identify the assets available to and required by NATO military commanders to fulfil specified tasks. They assess common-funded supplements (in terms of capital investment and recurrent operating and maintenance costs) as well as the civilian and military manpower required to accomplish the task. They are reviewed by the RPPB and then approved by the NAC.

Once they are approved, authorisation for individual projects can move forward under the responsibility of the Investment Committee. The “host nation” (a term which refers to either the country on whose territory the project is to be implemented, or a NATO agency or strategic command responsible for implementing a project) prepares an authorisation request. Once the Committee has agreed to the project, the host nation can proceed with its final design, contract award and implementation. Unless otherwise agreed by the Investment Committee, the bidding process is conducted among firms from those countries contributing to the project.

The financial management system which applies to the NSIP is based on an international financial clearing process. Host nations report on the expenditure foreseen on authorised projects within their responsibility. Following agreement of the forecasts by the Investment Committee, the International Staff calculates the amounts to be paid by each country and to be received by each host nation. Further calculations determine the payment amounts, currencies and which country or NATO agency will receive the funds.

Once a project has been completed, it is subject to a joint final acceptance inspection to ensure that the work undertaken is in accordance with the scope of work authorised. As soon as this report is accepted by the Investment Committee, it is added to the NATO inventory.

- **Financial control**

With respect to the military and civil budgets, the head of the NATO body is ultimately responsible for the correct preparation and execution of the budget. The administrative support for this task is largely entrusted to the Financial Controller of the agency or NATO body.

Each Financial Controller has final recourse to the Budget Committee in the case of persistent disagreement with the head of the respective NATO body regarding an intended transaction. The Financial Controller is charged with ensuring that all aspects of execution of the budget conform to expenditure authorisations, to any special controls imposed by the Budget Committee, and to the financial
regulations and their associated implementing rules and procedures. He may also, in response to internal auditing, institute such additional controls and procedures as he deems necessary for maintaining accountability.

- **The International Board of Auditors**

The independent International Board of Auditors for NATO (IBAN) is responsible for auditing the accounts of the different NATO bodies. Its principal task is to provide the NAC and member governments with the assurance that joint and common funds are properly used for the settlement of authorised expenditure and that expenditure is within the physical and financial authorisations granted.

The Board’s mandate includes not only financial but also performance audits, which extend its role beyond safeguarding accountability to the review of management practices in general. IBAN is composed of officials normally drawn from the national audit bodies of member countries. These officials are appointed by and responsible to the NAC.

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**Bodies involved**

The NAC approves NATO budgets and investments, and exercises oversight over NATO financial management. It takes into account resource considerations in its decision-making. The RPPB advises the Council on resource policy and allocation. For example, when the Council decided to undertake the Libya operation, it did so with the benefit of a full evaluation of the costs from Allied Command Operations and the RPPB. The Budget Committee and the Investment Committee, which report to the RPPB, also review and approve planned expenditures.

The NATO Office of Resources brings together all members of the NATO International Staff working on resource issues. The office provides integrated policy and technical advice to the NAC and the Secretary General, NATO resource committees, and other NATO bodies. The office facilitates agreements on resource matters among member countries.

- **The Resource Policy and Planning Board**

The Resource Policy and Planning Board (RPPB) is the senior advisory body to the NAC on the management of all NATO resources. It has responsibility for the overall management of NATO’s civil and military budgets, as well as the NSIP and manpower. Both the Budget Committee and the Investment Committee report to the RPPB.

- **The Budget Committee**

The Budget Committee is responsible to the RPPB for NATO’s civil and military budgets. The civil budget covers all costs related to NATO’s International Staff at NATO Headquarters in Brussels; the military budget covers all costs related to the International Military Staff at NATO Headquarters, the strategic commands and the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control (NAEW&C) Force.

- **The Investment Committee**

The Investment Committee is responsible to the RPPB for the implementation of the NSIP. The NSIP finances the provision of the installations and facilities needed to support the roles of the two strategic commands – Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation – recognised as exceeding the national defence requirements of individual member countries.
Operations and missions: past and present

NATO is an active and leading contributor to peace and security on the international stage. It promotes democratic values and is committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes. However, if diplomatic efforts fail, it has the military capacity needed to undertake crisis-management operations, alone or in cooperation with other countries and international organisations.

Highlights

- NATO is a crisis-management organisation that has the capacity to undertake a wide range of military operations and missions.
- Approximately 18,000 military personnel are engaged in NATO missions around the world, managing often complex ground, air and naval operations in all types of environment.
- Currently, NATO is operating in Afghanistan, Kosovo, the Mediterranean and off the Horn of Africa.
- NATO is also supporting the African Union and conducting air policing missions on the request of its Allies. Furthermore, NATO is assisting with the response to the refugee and migrant crisis in Europe and has Patriot missiles and AWACS aircraft deployed in Turkey. It also carries out disaster-relief operations and missions to protect populations against natural, technological or humanitarian disasters.
- The tempo and diversity of operations and missions in which NATO is involved have increased since the early 1990s.
Current operations and missions

NATO in Afghanistan

NATO is currently leading Resolute Support, a non-combat mission which provides training, advice and assistance to Afghan security forces and institutions. Resolute Support was launched on 1 January 2015. It includes approximately 13,000 personnel from both NATO and partner countries and operates with one hub (in Kabul/Bagram) and four spokes in Mazar-e Sharif (northern Afghanistan), Herat (western Afghanistan), Kandahar (southern Afghanistan) and Laghman (eastern Afghanistan).

Key functions include: supporting planning, programming and budgeting; assuring transparency, accountability and oversight; supporting the adherence to the principles of rule of law and good governance; supporting the establishment and sustainment of processes such as force generation, recruiting, training, managing and development of personnel.

The legal basis of the Resolute Support Mission rests on a formal invitation from the Afghan Government and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between NATO and Afghanistan, which governs the presence of Allied troops. Resolute Support is also supported by the international community at large. This is reflected in the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2189, unanimously adopted on 12 December 2014. This resolution welcomes the new Resolute Support mission and underscores the importance of continued international support for the stability of Afghanistan.

Resolute Support is a follow-on mission to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). ISAF was under NATO leadership from August 2003 to December 2014. It was established under a request for assistance by the Afghan authorities and by a UN mandate in 2001 to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a safe haven for terrorists. In addition, ISAF was tasked to develop new Afghan security forces and enable Afghan authorities to provide effective security across the country in order to create an environment conducive to the functioning of democratic institutions and the establishment of the rule of law.

The mission in Afghanistan constitutes the Alliance’s most significant operational commitment to date. Moreover, beyond Resolute Support and ISAF, Allies and partners countries are committed to the broader international community's support for the long-term financial sustainment of the Afghan security forces. NATO leaders have also reaffirmed their commitment to an enduring partnership between NATO and Afghanistan, by strengthening political consultations and practical cooperation within the framework of the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership signed in 2010.

NATO in Kosovo

While Afghanistan remains NATO’s primary operational theatre, the Alliance has not faltered on its other commitments, particularly in the Balkans. Today, approximately 4,500 Allied troops operate in Kosovo as part of NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR).

Having first entered Kosovo in June 1999 to end widespread violence and halt the humanitarian disaster, KFOR troops continue to maintain a strong presence throughout the territory.

Following Kosovo's declaration of independence in February 2008, NATO agreed it would continue to maintain its presence on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1244. It has since helped to create a professional and multi-ethnic Kosovo Security Force, which is a lightly armed force responsible for security tasks that are not appropriate for the police. Meanwhile, progress has been achieved in the European Union-sponsored dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. The normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo is key to solving the political deadlock over northern Kosovo.

Monitoring the Mediterranean Sea

NATO operations are not limited only to zones of conflict. In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO immediately began to take measures to expand the options available to counter the threat of international terrorism. In October 2001, it launched the maritime surveillance Operation Active Endeavour, focused on detecting and deterring terrorist activity in the Mediterranean.
Since April 2003, NATO has been systematically boarding suspect ships. These boardings take place with the compliance of the ships' masters and flag states and in accordance with international law.

The increased NATO presence in these waters has benefited all shipping travelling through the Straits of Gibraltar by improving perceptions of security. More generally, the operation has proved to be an effective tool both in safeguarding a strategic maritime region and in countering terrorism on and from the high seas. Additionally, the experience and partnerships developed through Active Endeavour have considerably enhanced NATO's capabilities in this increasingly vital aspect of operations. Discussions are ongoing to transform Active Endeavour into a broader maritime security operation.

Counter-piracy off the Horn of Africa

Building on previous counter-piracy missions conducted by NATO (Operation Allied Provider and Operation Allied Protector - see below), Operation Ocean Shield focuses on at-sea counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa. Approved on 17 August 2009 by the North Atlantic Council, this operation is contributing to international efforts to combat piracy in the area. It is also offering, to regional states that request it, assistance in developing their own capacity to combat piracy activities. There have been no successful piracy attacks since May 2012, but even though Somalia-based piracy has been suppressed, it has not been eliminated. During the periods without surface ships, maritime patrol aircraft continue to fly sorties, and links to situational awareness systems and counter-piracy partners remain in place. In this effort, the NATO Shipping Centre plays a key role. Ocean Shield's mandate has been extended until the end of 2016.

Supporting the African Union

Well beyond the Euro-Atlantic region, the Alliance continues to support the African Union (AU) in its peacekeeping missions on the African continent.

Since June 2007, NATO has assisted the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by providing airlift support for AU peacekeepers. Following renewed AU requests, the North Atlantic Council has agreed to extend its support on several occasions and continues to do so. NATO is also providing capacity-building support, as well as expert training support to the African Standby Force (ASF), at the AU's request. The ASF is intended to be deployed in Africa in times of crisis and is part of the AU's efforts to develop long-term peacekeeping capabilities. ASF represents the AU's vision for a continental, on-call security apparatus with some similarities to the NATO Response Force.

Air policing

Since Russia's illegal military intervention in Ukraine in 2014, NATO has been taking extra reassurance measures for its Allies. Among these is the boosting of NATO's Air Policing missions.

Air policing missions are collective peacetime missions that enable NATO to detect, track and identify all violations and infringements of its airspace and to take appropriate action. Allied fighter jets patrol the airspace of Allies who do not have fighter jets of their own. NATO has deployed additional aircraft to reinforce missions over Albania and Slovenia, as well as the Baltic region where NATO F-16s have intercepted Russian aircraft repeatedly violating Allied airspace.

This air policing capability is one of three NATO standing forces on active duty that contribute to the Alliance's collective defence efforts on a permanent basis. They also include NATO's standing maritime forces, which are ready to act when called upon, as well as an integrated air defence system to protect against air attacks, which also comprises the Alliance's ballistic missile defence system.

Terminated operations and missions

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan

Established under the request of the Afghan authorities and a UN mandate in 2001, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was led by NATO from August 2003 to December 2014.
Its mission was to develop new Afghan security forces and enable Afghan authorities to provide effective security across the country in order to create an environment conducive to the functioning of democratic institutions and the establishment of the rule of law, with the aim to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a safe haven for terrorists.

ISAF also contributed to reconstruction and development in Afghanistan. This was done primarily through multinational Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) - led by individual ISAF countries - securing areas in which reconstruction work could be conducted by national and international actors. PRTs also helped the Afghan authorities progressively strengthen the institutions required to fully establish good governance and the rule of law, as well as to promote human rights. The principal role of the PRTs in this respect was to build capacity, support the growth of governance structures and promote an environment in which governance can improve.

ISAF was one of the largest international crisis-management operations ever, bringing together contributions from up to 51 different countries. By end 2014, the process of transitioning full security responsibility from ISAF troops to the Afghan army and police forces was completed and the ISAF mission came to a close. On 1 January 2015, a new NATO-led, non-combat mission, Resolute Support, to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces and institutions was launched.

**NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

With the break-up of Yugoslavia, violent conflict started in Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1992. The Alliance responded as early as summer 1992 when it enforced the UN arms embargo on weapons in the Adriatic Sea (in cooperation with the Western European Union from 1993) and enforced a no-fly-zone declared by the UN Security Council. It was during the monitoring of the no-fly-zone that NATO engaged in the first combat operations in its history by shooting down four Bosnian Serb fighter-bombers conducting a bombing mission on 28 February 1994.

In August 1995, to compel an end to Serb-led violence in the country, UN peacekeepers requested NATO airstrikes. Operation Deadeye began on 30 August against Bosnian Serb air forces, but failed to result in Bosnian Serb compliance with the UN’s demands to withdraw. This led to Operation Deliberate Force, which targeted Bosnian Serb command and control installations and ammunition facilities. This NATO air campaign was a key factor in bringing the Serbs to the negotiating table and ending the war in Bosnia.

With the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord in December 1995, NATO immediately deployed a UN-mandated Implementation Force (IFOR) comprising some 60,000 troops. This operation (Operation Joint Endeavour) was followed in December 1996 by the deployment of a 32,000-strong Stabilisation Force (SFOR).

In light of the improved security situation, NATO brought its peace-support operation to a conclusion in December 2004 and the European Union deployed a new force called Operation Althea. The Alliance has maintained a military headquarters in the country to carry out a number of specific tasks related, in particular, to assisting the government in reforming its defence structures.

**NATO in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia**

Responding to a request from the Government in Skopje to help mitigate rising ethnic tension, NATO implemented three successive operations there from August 2001 to March 2003.

First, Operation Essential Harvest disarmed ethnic Albanian groups operating throughout the country.

The follow-on Operation Amber Fox provided protection for international monitors overseeing the implementation of the peace plan.

Finally, Operation Allied Harmony was launched in December 2002 to provide advisory elements to assist the government in ensuring stability throughout the country.

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1 Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
These operations in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia demonstrated the strong inter-institutional cooperation between NATO, the European Union and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. NATO remains committed to helping the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures. To that end, NATO Headquarters Skopje was created in April 2002 to advise on military aspects of security sector reform; it still operates today.

**NATO’s first counter-terrorism operation**

On 4 October 2001, once it had been determined that the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington DC had come from abroad, NATO agreed on a package of eight measures to support the United States. On the request of the United States, the Alliance launched its first-ever counter-terrorism operation – Operation Eagle Assist - from mid-October 2001 to mid-May 2002.

It consisted of seven NATO AWACS radar aircraft that helped patrol the skies over the United States; in total 830 crew members from 13 NATO countries flew over 360 sorties. This was the first time that NATO military assets were deployed in support of an Article 5 operation.

**The second Gulf Conflict**

During the second Gulf Conflict, NATO deployed NATO AWACS radar aircraft and air defence batteries to enhance the defence of Turkey. The operation started on 20 February, lasted until 16 April 2003 and was called Operation Display Deterrence. The AWACS aircraft flew 100 missions with a total of 950 flying hours.

**Protecting public events**

In response to a request by the Greek government, NATO provided assistance to the Olympic and Paralympic Games held in Athens with Operation Distinguished Games on 18 June – 29 September 2004. NATO provided intelligence support, provision of Chemical, Biological Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) defence assets and AWACS radar aircraft. This was the first operation in which non-Article 4 or 5 NATO assistance was provided within the borders of a member country.

In the same vein, NATO responded to a request made by the Latvian government for assistance in assuring the security of the Riga Summit in November 2006. NATO provided technical security, CBRN response capabilities, air and sea policing, improvised explosive device (IED) detections, communications and information systems and medical evacuation support.

**NATO and Iraq**

NATO conducted a relatively small but important support operation in Iraq from 2004 to 2011 that consisted of training, mentoring and assisting the Iraqi Security Forces. At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, the Allies rose above their differences and agreed to be part of the international effort to help Iraq establish effective and accountable security forces. The outcome was the creation of the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I). The NTM-I delivered its training, advice and mentoring support in a number of different settings. All NATO member countries contributed to the training effort either in or outside of Iraq, through financial contributions or donations of equipment. In parallel and reinforcing this initiative, NATO also worked with the Iraqi government on a structured cooperation framework to develop the Alliance’s long-term relationship with Iraq.

**Hurricane Katrina**

After Hurricane Katrina struck the south of the United States on 29 August 2005, causing many fatalities and widespread damage and flooding, the US government requested food, medical and logistics supplies and assistance in moving these supplies to stricken areas. On 9 September 2005, the North Atlantic Council approved a military plan to assist the United States, which consisted of helping to coordinate the movement of urgently needed material and supporting humanitarian relief operations. During the operation (9 September-2 October), nine member countries provided 189 tons of material to the United States.
Pakistan earthquake relief assistance

Just before the onset of the harsh Himalayan winter, a devastating earthquake hit Pakistan on 8 October 2005, killing an estimated 53,000 people, injuring 75,000 and making at least four million homeless. On 11 October, in response to a request from Pakistan, NATO assisted in the urgent relief effort, airlifting close to 3,500 tons of supplies and deploying engineers, medical units and specialist equipment. This was one of NATO’s largest humanitarian relief initiatives, which came to an end on 1 February 2006.

Over time, the Alliance has helped to coordinate assistance to other countries hit by natural disasters, including Turkey, Ukraine and Portugal. It does this through its Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre.

Assisting the African Union in Darfur, Sudan

The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) aimed to end violence and improve the humanitarian situation in a region that has been suffering from conflict since 2003. From June 2005 to 31 December 2007, NATO provided air transport for some 37,000 AMIS personnel, as well as trained and mentored over 250 AMIS officials. While NATO’s support to this mission ended when AMIS was succeeded by the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the Alliance immediately expressed its readiness to consider any request for support to the new peacekeeping mission.

Counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa

From October to December 2008, NATO launched Operation Allied Provider, which involved counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia. Responding to a request from UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, NATO naval forces provided escorts to UN World Food Programme (WFP) vessels transiting through the dangerous waters in the Gulf of Aden, where growing piracy has threatened to undermine international humanitarian efforts in Africa.

Concurrently, in response to an urgent request from the African Union, these same NATO naval forces escorted a vessel chartered by the AU carrying equipment for the Burundi contingent deployed to AMISOM.

From March to August 2009, NATO launched Operation Allied Protector, a counter-piracy operation, to improve the safety of commercial maritime routes and international navigation off the Horn of Africa. The force conducted surveillance tasks and provided protection to deter and suppress piracy and armed robbery, which are threatening sea lines of communication and economic interests.

NATO and Libya

Following the popular uprising against the Qadhafi regime in Benghazi, Libya, in February 2011, the UN Security Council adopted Resolutions 1970 and 1973 in support of the Libyan people, “condemning the gross and systematic violation of human rights”. The resolutions introduced active measures including a no-fly zone, an arms embargo and the authorisation for member countries, acting as appropriate through regional organisations, to take “all necessary measures” to protect Libyan civilians.

Initially, NATO enforced the no-fly zone and then, on 31 March, NATO took over sole command and control of all military operations for Libya. The NATO-led “Operation Unified Protector” had three distinct components:

- the enforcement of an arms embargo on the high seas of the Mediterranean to prevent the transfer of arms, related material and mercenaries to Libya;
- the enforcement of a no-fly-zone in order to prevent any aircraft from bombing civilian targets; and
- air and naval strikes against those military forces involved in attacks or threats to attack Libyan civilians and civilian-populated areas.

The UN mandate was carried out to the letter and the operation was terminated on 31 October 2011 after having fulfilled its objectives.
From 1949 to the early 1990s

During the Cold War

When NATO was established in 1949, one of its fundamental roles was to act as a powerful deterrent against military aggression. In this role, NATO’s success was reflected in the fact that, throughout the entire period of the Cold War, NATO forces were not involved in a single military engagement. For much of the latter half of the 20th century, NATO remained vigilant and prepared.

After the Cold War

With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s came great changes to the international security environment. The Alliance witnessed the emergence of new threats and the resurgence of old but familiar ones.

With these changing conditions came new responsibilities. From being an exclusively defensive alliance for nearly half a century, NATO began to assume an increasingly proactive role within the international community. Before engaging in its first major crisis-response operation in the Balkans, NATO conducted several other military operations:

After Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, NATO Airborne Early Warning aircraft deployed to Konya, Turkey, to monitor the crisis and provide coverage of southeastern Turkey in case of an Iraqi attack during the first Gulf Crisis/War.

In response to a Turkish request for assistance to meet the threat posed by Iraq during the first Gulf Crisis/War, NATO deployed the ACE Mobile Force (Air) and air defence packages to Turkey.

**Operation Allied Goodwill I & II**, 4-9 February & 27 February – 24 March 1992
Following the break-up of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the collapse of its centrally-controlled economic system, NATO assisted an international relief effort by flying teams of humanitarian assistance experts and medical advisors to Russia and other Commonwealth of Independent States nations using AWACS trainer cargo aircraft.

**Operation Agile Genie**, 1-19 May 1992
During a period of growing Western tension with Libya after the UN Security Council imposed sanctions designed to induce Libya to surrender suspects in the bombing of a Pan Am airliner over the town of Lockerbie in Scotland in 1988, NATO provided increased AWACS coverage of the Central Mediterranean to monitor air approach routes from the North African littoral. NATO AWACS aircraft flew a total of 36 missions with a total of 2,336 flying hours.
NATO and Afghanistan

NATO commanded the United Nations-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan from August 2003 to December 2014. Its mission was to enable the Afghan authorities to provide effective security across the country and ensure that it would never again be a safe haven for terrorists. ISAF helped build the capacity of the Afghan national security forces. As these forces grew stronger, they gradually took responsibility for security across the country before the completion of ISAF’s mission. A new NATO-led mission (called Resolute Support) to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces and institutions was launched in January 2015. NATO Allies and partners are also helping to sustain Afghan security forces and institutions financially, as part of a broader international commitment to Afghanistan. The NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership provides a framework for wider political dialogue and practical cooperation.

Highlights

- From August 2003 to December 2014, NATO led the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which conducted security operations and helped build up the Afghan security forces.
- ISAF is NATO’s longest and most challenging mission to date: at its height, the force was more than 130,000 strong with troops from 51 NATO and partner nations.
- The transition to Afghan lead for security started in 2011 and was completed in December 2014, when the ISAF operation ended and the Afghans assumed full responsibility for security.
- In January 2015, NATO launched a new non-combat Resolute Support Mission (RSM) to train, advise and assist Afghan security forces and institutions.
- In May 2016, NATO foreign ministers agreed that RSM’s presence will be sustained beyond 2016. Allied leaders are expected to take a final decision in this regard by the time of the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July.
Within and alongside RSM, NATO and Afghanistan will enhance their Enduring Partnership of political dialogue and practical cooperation. Following the end of RSM, NATO is expected to maintain a civilian-led presence in Afghanistan to continue to help Afghan security institutions to become self-sufficient.

NATO and its partners are already committed to providing financial support to sustain the Afghan forces until the end of 2017 and are currently working to ensure support until the end of 2020.

Practical cooperation in areas of mutual interest and political consultations are being strengthened through an enhanced partnership between NATO and Afghanistan, building on the Declaration on an Enduring Partnership signed at the 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon.

NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative represents the political leadership of the Alliance in Kabul, liaising with the government, civil society, representatives of the international community and neighbouring countries.

More background information

Wales Summit commitments to Afghanistan

At the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014, ISAF troop-contributing nations highlighted the progress made in Afghanistan during the period of ISAF’s deployment. They also underlined their commitment to continued support to the country after the end of ISAF’s mission in December 2014.

ISAF helped create a secure environment for improving governance and socio-economic development, which are important conditions for sustainable stability. Afghanistan has made the largest percentage gain of any country in basic health and development indicators over the past decade. Maternal mortality is going down and life expectancy is rising. There is a vibrant media scene. Millions of people have exercised their right to vote in five election cycles since 2004, most recently in the 2014 presidential and provincial council elections, which resulted in the establishment of a National Unity Government.

Afghanistan’s security is now fully in the hands of the country’s 352,000 soldiers and police, which ISAF helped train over the past years. However, while the Afghan security forces have made a lot of progress, they still need international support as they continue to develop. This support is being taken forward through three parallel, mutually reinforcing strands of activity:

- In the short term, a new NATO-led non-combat mission, Resolute Support, is providing further training, advice and assistance to the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF);
- In the medium term, continued financial support is being provided to sustain the ANDSF until the end of 2017;
- In the long term, political consultations and practical cooperation in specific areas will be strengthened within the framework of the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership, signed in 2010.

Resolute Support Mission

At the NATO Summit in Chicago in 2012, Allies and partners jointly agreed with the Afghan government to a follow-on NATO-led non-combat mission to continue supporting the development of the Afghan security forces after the end of ISAF’s mission. This commitment was reaffirmed at the Wales Summit in 2014.

Launched on 1 January 2015, the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) will provide training, advice and assistance activities at the security ministries and national institutional levels and the higher levels of army and police command across the country. It will have approximately 12,000 personnel from NATO Allies and partner countries, operating in one hub (Kabul/Bagram) and four spokes (Mazar-e Sharif in the north, Herat in the west, Kandahar in the south, and Laghman in the east).
In December 2015, at the foreign ministers’ meeting of NATO Allies and their RSM partners, it was agreed to sustain the RSM presence, including in the regions of Afghanistan, during 2016. Six months later, in May 2016, they agreed to sustain the RSM presence beyond 2016.

The agreement between NATO and Afghanistan on the establishment of the new mission was welcomed by United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2189. Unanimously adopted on 12 December 2014, it underscores the importance of continued international support for the stability of Afghanistan. (More on Resolute Support)

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**Financial sustainment of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces**

At the Wales Summit, Allied leaders and their international partners renewed the pledge made earlier at the Chicago Summit to play their part in the financial sustainment of the ANDSF after 2014. The responsibility to contribute to the financing of this effort is one for the international community as a whole.

NATO has participated in that process, by supporting development of transparent, accountable and cost-effective international funding mechanisms and expenditure arrangements for all strands of the ANDSF.

To date, Allies and partners have confirmed funding pledges of around US$450 million per year to the NATO-Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund until the end of 2017. The United States is providing approximately US$4 billion of financial assistance to the ANDSF for the year 2016, on a bilateral basis. The Afghan government itself is also expected to provide at least US$500 million per year for the sustainment of the ANDSF. (More on the ANA Trust Fund).

The ANA Trust Fund is one of three funding streams used by the international community to channel financial support to Afghanistan’s security forces and institutions. The other two are the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), administered by the United Nations Development Programme, and the United States Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). LOTFA is used to pay the salaries of police and justice personnel and to build the capacity of the ministry of interior. The ASFF is subject to a US-Afghan bilateral agreement and pays for equipping and running Afghanistan’s security forces.
In December 2015, NATO Allies and partners agreed to launch further work with the wider international community to ensure that the ANDSF can be financially sustained through 2020.

### Building the capacity of Afghan forces

Developing professional, capable and self-sustaining Afghan National Security Forces was at the centre of ISAF’s efforts and the core mission of the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A). This work was carried out in close cooperation with the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) and the Afghan Ministry of Defence. The NTM-A, which was set up in 2009, focused on training initial recruits and building the institutional training capability of the Afghan security forces, while the ISAF Joint Command was responsible for developing fielded units through advice and assistance. These combined efforts helped build up the Afghan security forces from scratch to approximately 352,000 soldiers and police officers (including the Afghan Local Police).

Since its creation in 2002, the Afghan National Army (ANA) has incrementally progressed from an infantry-centric force to an army, which is gradually developing both fighting elements and enabling capabilities – such as military police, intelligence, route clearance, combat support, medical, aviation, and logistics. The ANA currently numbers more than 175,500.

The role of the Afghan National Police (ANP) has gradually shifted from countering the insurgency to a more civilian policing role, by further developing capabilities ranging from criminal investigations to traffic control. The ANP has now reached a strength of more than 154,000.

The Afghan Air Force had steadily increased its personnel to more than 6,500 personnel including civilians as well as military aircrew and maintenance and support personnel, and its fleet of fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. Currently, the Afghan Air Force has a fleet of more than 100 fixed-wing and rotary aircraft.

Developing self-sustaining Afghan security forces continues to be priority and is an ongoing endeavour. That is why the Alliance remains committed to supporting Afghanistan following the end of ISAF’s mission.

### NATO’s Enduring Partnership with Afghanistan

NATO and Afghanistan signed a Declaration on Enduring Partnership at the 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon. The document provides a framework for long-term political consultations and practical cooperation in areas of specific interest for Afghanistan where NATO can bring its expertise.

The initial set of Enduring Partnership activities, agreed by foreign ministers in April 2011, brings together a number of previously separate initiatives. The Enduring Partnership will contribute to NATO’s evolving mission and the sustained development of Afghan institutions.

In May 2015, NATO foreign ministers approved guidelines and principles for the enhancement of the Enduring Partnership. These include a continued presence of civilian and military personnel on the ground after the current Resolute Support Mission. In the longer term, the Enduring Partnership is also intended as a bridge towards a more traditional partnership between NATO and Afghanistan in the longer term.

Cooperation within this framework currently includes:

- capacity-building efforts, such as NATO’s Building Integrity (BI) programme, which is helping to provide Afghanistan with practical tools to strengthen integrity, transparency and accountability and reduce the risk of corruption in defence and security sectors;
- professional military education programmes, such as the Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP);
- assistance in the process of further normalisation of the Afghan civil aviation sector;
the SILK-Afghanistan project, which provides affordable, high-speed Internet access via satellite and fibre optics to Afghan universities across the country and governmental institutions in Kabul;

- training in civil emergency planning and disaster preparedness;

- public diplomacy efforts to promote a better understanding of NATO and its role in Afghanistan.

### ISAF’s mission (2001 – 2014)

Deployed in 2001 – initially under the lead of individual NATO Allies on a six-month rotational basis – ISAF was tasked, on the request of the Afghan government and under a UN mandate, to assist the Afghan government in maintaining security, originally in and around Kabul exclusively. NATO agreed to take command of the force in August 2003 and the UN Security Council subsequently mandated the gradual expansion of ISAF’s operations to cover the whole country.

ISAF was one of the largest coalitions in history. It is NATO’s longest and most challenging mission to date. At its height, the force was more than 130,000 strong with troops from 51 NATO and partner nations.

As part of the international community’s overall effort, ISAF worked to create the conditions whereby the Afghan government was able to exercise its authority throughout the country, including the development of professional and capable Afghan security forces.

A gradual process of transition to full Afghan security responsibility – known as “Inteqal” in Dari and Pashtu – was launched in 2011. This process was completed on schedule in December 2014, when ISAF’s mission ended and the Afghan forces assumed full security responsibility.

(More on ISAF’s mission)

### A collective international effort

NATO’s continued commitment to Afghanistan after 2014 remains part of a collective effort by the international community. At the July 2012 Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan (Tokyo Declaration), the broader international community and the Afghan government laid the groundwork for the sustainable development of Afghanistan, taking into account the situation after 2014. At the conference, the Afghan government also made clear commitments to making progress in a number of areas, including: to hold inclusive, transparent and credible elections; to fight corruption and improve good governance; to uphold the constitution, especially human rights; and to enforce the rule of law (Tokyo Annex on mutual accountability).

Addressing Afghanistan’s challenges requires a comprehensive approach, involving civilian and military actors, aimed not only at providing security but also at promoting good governance, the rule of law and long-term development. The Alliance acts in a supporting role to the Afghan government and works in close coordination with other international partners, including the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the World Bank, the European Union and the development community.

From the start of NATO’s engagement in international efforts to help secure Afghanistan’s future, the Alliance has also worked closely with many non-member countries. ISAF troop contributors included partners from as far afield as Australia and Latin America, representing almost a quarter of UN member countries, underlining the broad international support for ISAF’s mission. Australia, Georgia and Jordan were among the top non-NATO troop-contributing nations to ISAF. Beyond troop contributors, many partners supported ISAF’s mission and the international community’s objectives in Afghanistan in other ways, such as through over-flight and transit rights, or through financial support for building the capacity of Afghan security forces and for development projects.

Partner support continues for the new Resolute Support Mission. As of January 2015, 14 partner countries have agreed to contribute forces to help train, assist and advise the Afghan security forces.
Milestones in relations

SEPTEMBER 2001 – JULY 2003

9/11 AND THE FALL OF THE TALIBAN: THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY GETS ENGAGED

11 September 2001: A series of four coordinated terrorist attacks are launched on several targets in the United States, killing almost 3,000 people.

12 September 2001: NATO Allies and partner countries condemn the attacks, offering their support to the United States. The Allies decide to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty – the Alliance’s collective defence clause – for the first time in NATO’s history, if it is determined that the attack was directed from abroad against the United States.

2 October 2001: The North Atlantic Council is briefed by a high-level US official on results of investigations into the 9/11 attacks and determines that the attacks are regarded as an action covered by Article 5.

7 October 2001: Following the Taliban’s refusal to hand over Osama Bin Laden and close down terrorist training camps, the United States launches airstrikes against Al-Qaeda and Taliban targets in Afghanistan with the support of allies. Ground forces are deployed two weeks later. This marks the start of Operation Enduring Freedom, which is supported by a coalition of allies.

13 November 2001: Taliban forces abandon Kabul, which is taken over by forces of the Northern Alliance -- a military coalition of ethnic groups opposed to the rule of the Taliban.

14 November 2001: UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1378 calls for a central role for the UN in establishing a transitional administration and invites member states to send peacekeepers to Afghanistan.

5 December 2001: At a UN-sponsored conference in Bonn, delegates of Afghan factions appoint Hamid Karzai as head of an interim government. They also sign the Bonn Agreement, which provides for an international peacekeeping force to maintain security in Afghanistan.

20 December 2001: UNSCR 1386 authorises the deployment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in and around Kabul to help stabilise Afghanistan and create the conditions for self-sustaining peace.

22 December 2001: At a ceremony in Kabul, Hamid Karzai is sworn in as head of the interim government of Afghanistan.

January 2002: The first contingent of ISAF peacekeepers arrive in Afghanistan, deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression). The United Kingdom takes on the first six-month rotation of the command of ISAF; 18 other countries deploy forces and assets.

28 March 2002: The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is established at the request of the interim government of Afghanistan to assist it and the people of Afghanistan in laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development in the country.


20 June 2002: Turkey takes on the second rotation of the command of ISAF, on the basis of UNSCR 1413.

November 2002: The US military starts setting up Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan – first in Gardez, then Bamian, Kunduz, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar and Herat – to coordinate redevelopment with UN agencies and non-governmental organisations. Some of these PRTs are later taken over by NATO member and partner countries.

21-22 November 2002: The Prague Summit paves the way for NATO to go “out-of-area”.

Archived material – Information valid up to 7 July 2016
10 February 2013: Germany and the Netherlands jointly take on the third rotation of the command of ISAF, on the basis of UNSCR 1444.

AUGUST 2003 – SPRING 2006
NATO TAKES THE LEAD OF ISAF AND EXPANDS NORTH AND WEST

August 2003: NATO takes the lead of the ISAF operation under the Command of Lieutenant General Goetz Gliemeroth, Germany.

31 December 2003: NATO-led ISAF initiates the expansion of ISAF to the north by taking over command of the German-led PRT in Kunduz.

4 January 2004: After three weeks of debate, the Loya Jirga approves a new constitution.

January 2004: Ambassador Hikmet Çetin, Turkey, takes up his post as the first NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan.

February 2004: Lieutenant General Rick Hillier, Canada, takes command of ISAF.

31 March-1 April 2004: Berlin donors’ conference on Afghanistan.

28 June 2004: At the Istanbul Summit, NATO announces that it would establish four other PRTs in the north of the country: in Mazar-e-Sharif, Meymanah, Feyzabad and Baghlan.

May-September 2004: ISAF expands to the west, first taking command of PRTs in the provinces of Herat and Farah and a Forward Support Base (a logistics base) in Herat, followed by PRTs in Chaghcharan, the capital of Ghor Province, and one in Qala-e-Naw, capital of Badghis Province. NATO-led ISAF is now providing security assistance in 50 per cent of Afghanistan’s territory.

August 2004: General Jean-Louis Py, France, takes command of ISAF.

1 October 2004: NATO-led ISAF’s expansion into Afghanistan’s nine northern provinces is completed.

9 October 2004: Hamid Karzai wins the presidential elections with 50 per cent of the vote.

29 October 2004: In a video message, Osama Bin Laden takes responsibility for the 9/11 attacks and threatens the West with further attacks.

February 2005: General Ethem Erdagi, Turkey, takes command of ISAF.

August 2005: General Mauro del Vecchio, Italy, takes command of ISAF.

September 2005: NATO temporarily deploys 2,000 additional troops to Afghanistan to support the provincial and parliamentary elections.

18 September 2005: Legislative elections are held in Afghanistan. In the lower house of parliament, 68 out of 249 seats are reserved for female members, as are 23 out of 102 seats in the upper house.

31 January 2006: At a conference in London, the Afghanistan Compact, a five-year plan of peacebuilding, is launched.

February 2006: ISAF troops adopt more robust rules of engagement.

May 2006: General David Richards, United Kingdom, takes command of ISAF.

8 June 2006: Meeting in Brussels, defence ministers from 37 NATO and partner countries that are contributing to ISAF confirm they are ready to expand ISAF’s operation to the south of Afghanistan. It is the first-ever meeting of ministers in ISAF format; after that, such meetings become a regular event.

JULY 2006 – AUGUST 2009
FROM PEACE-SUPPORT TO COMBAT: ISAF EXPANDS SOUTH AND EAST

31 July 2006: NATO-led ISAF assumes command of the southern region of Afghanistan from US-led coalition forces, expanding its area of operations to cover an additional six provinces – Daikundi,
Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Uruzgan and Zabul – and taking on command of four additional PRTs. Expanded ISAF now leads a total of 13 PRTs in the north, west and south, covering some three-quarters of Afghanistan’s territory.

24 August 2006: Ambassador Daan Everts, The Netherlands, is appointed to the position of NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan.

5 October 2006: ISAF implements the final stage of its expansion, by taking on command of the international military forces in eastern Afghanistan from the US-led coalition. In addition ISAF starts to deploy training and mentoring teams to Afghan National Army units at various levels of command.

28-29 November 2006: At the Riga Summit, NATO leaders agree to remove some of the national caveats and restrictions on how, when and where their forces can be used.

February 2007: General Dan K. McNeill, United States, takes command of ISAF.

3 April 2008: At the Bucharest Summit, ISAF troop-contributing nations set out a strategic vision for Afghanistan guided by four principles: a firm and shared long-term commitment; support for enhanced Afghan leadership and responsibility; a comprehensive approach by the international community, bringing together civilian and military efforts; and increased cooperation and engagement with Afghanistan’s neighbours, especially Pakistan.

May 2008: Ambassador Fernando Gentilini, Italy, takes up the post of NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan.

12 June 2008: A donors’ conference for Afghanistan in Paris raises US$20 billion in commitments, but diplomats harshly criticise the Afghan government’s performance in fighting corruption, tackling the drug trade and promoting reconstruction.

June 2008: General David D. McKiernan, United States, takes over as Commander of ISAF.

August 2008: Lead security responsibility for Kabul city is transferred to Afghan forces.

December 2008: ISAF Commander Gen David D. McKiernan issues guidelines ordering (ISAF or US) soldiers to use force that is proportional to the provocation and that minimises the risk of civilian casualties.

17 February 2009: New US President Barack Obama announces an additional 17,000 troops to be deployed to Afghanistan during the spring and summer to counter a resurgent Taliban and stem the flow of foreign fighters into the south of Afghanistan.

27 March 2009: President Obama announces a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. He also decides to deploy 4,000 troops to Afghanistan as trainers for the Afghan security forces.

3-4 April 2009: At the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, Allied leaders agree to send an additional 5,000 troops to train the Afghan security forces and provide security for the presidential elections in August.

May 2009: UN Special Representative to Afghanistan Kai Eide expresses serious concern over reports of as many as 100 civilians having been killed by airstrikes against Taliban fighters in the western province of Farah on 4 May. President Karzai demands the cessation of airstrikes.

June 2009: Lt Gen Stanley A. McChrystal, United States, takes command of NATO-led ISAF and of US forces in Afghanistan. This signals the adoption of a counter-insurgency strategy.

June 2009: Lt Gen McChrystal announces restrictions on the use of airstrikes in an effort to reduce civilian deaths.

20 August 2009: Presidential elections take place in Afghanistan but they are marred by widespread Taliban attacks, and lengthy vote-counting and fraud investigations leave them unresolved for a couple of months.
SEPTEMBER 2009 – FEBRUARY 2011
COUNTERING THE INSURGENCY: MORE BOOTS ON THE GROUND

20 September 2009: Lt Gen McChrystal’s report to US Defense Secretary Robert Gates, calling for more troops in Afghanistan, is made public.

2 November 2009: Hamid Karzai is declared President of Afghanistan for another five-year term following the cancellation of a second-round run-off with rival Abdullah Abdullah, who had announced his withdrawal.

19 November 2009: President Karzai expresses his ambition to see the Afghan security forces take the lead for security across Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

21 November 2009: Following decisions taken at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit in April 2009, the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan is formally activated. Its aim is to bring together efforts to train the Afghan forces.

December 2009: Following a three-month review of the military campaign, President Obama decides on a troop surge involving the deployment of a further 30,000 troops, while also promising to start drawing down US troops by summer 2011. NATO foreign ministers announce the deployment of a further 7,000 soldiers.

28 January 2010: At an international conference in London, high-level representatives from over 70 countries discuss plans to gradually hand over the lead for security operations to the Afghan security forces.

28 January 2010: Ambassador Mark Sedwill, United Kingdom, assumes the position of NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan.

23 June 2010: ISAF Commander Lt Gen McChrystal is dismissed following a controversial article in Rolling Stone magazine in which he is quoted as being critical of the US Administration. He is replaced by Gen David H. Petraeus, United States, who maintains the counter-insurgency strategy.

20 July 2010: The Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board is established as the mechanism to assess the readiness of districts and provinces to transition to Afghan lead for security.

20 July 2010: At a conference in Kabul, hosted by the Afghan government and co-chaired by the United Nations, the government makes a renewed commitment to the Afghan people, presenting an Afghan-led plan for improving development, governance and security.

September 2010: Afghan parliamentary elections take place, overshadowed by violence, fraud and delays in announcing the results.

19-20 November 2010: At the Lisbon Summit, NATO leaders agree with the Afghan government to hand over full responsibility for security in Afghanistan from ISAF to Afghan forces by end 2014. The gradual transition to Afghan security lead is set to be launched in 2011, starting in areas that are relatively stable. NATO and Afghanistan also sign a declaration on Enduring Partnership, providing a framework for long-term political and practical support, designed to continue after the ISAF mission.

MARCH 2011 – DECEMBER 2014
TRANSITION TO AFGHAN LEAD FOR SECURITY

22 March 2011: President Karzai announces the first set of Afghan provinces and districts to start transitioning towards Afghan lead for security.

April 2011: Ambassador Simon Gass, United Kingdom, takes up the post of NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan.

1 May 2011: Osama Bin Laden is killed by US Special Operations Forces in Pakistan.

22 June 2011: President Obama announces plans to withdraw 10,000 troops by end of year and the remaining 20,000 of the “surge” troops by summer 2012.
July 2011: General John R. Allen, United States, takes command of ISAF.

26 November 2011: Pakistani officials claim that NATO aircraft killed at least 25 soldiers in strikes against two military posts at the northwestern border with Afghanistan. NATO launches an investigation which later finds that poor coordination and mistakes made by both the NATO and Pakistani forces caused the incident.

27 November 2011: Announcement of the second set of Afghan provinces, districts and cities to transition to Afghan security lead.

5 December 2011: An international conference takes place in Bonn, to discuss cooperation with Afghanistan beyond the withdrawal of ISAF at the end of 2014. The Afghan president commits to strengthening the fight against corruption in exchange for continued international development aid. Pakistan boycotts the conference because of deaths caused by NATO airstrikes in November.

25 February 2012: A gunman shoots dead two senior US military officers in the Afghan interior ministry. Taliban claim responsibility. Gen John Allen, the commander of NATO and US forces, temporarily recalls all NATO personnel from Afghan ministries for force protection reasons.

1 April 2012: The Regional Police Training Centre in Mazar-e Sharif is handed over to the Afghans. It later becomes a training site for the Afghan National Civil Order Police.

13 May 2012: President Karzai announces the third set of areas to enter the transition process, covering over 75 per cent of the Afghan population.

21 May 2012: At the Chicago Summit, leaders from NATO’s 28 nations and the 22 partners in the ISAF coalition gave Afghanistan a clear, long-term commitment to continue supporting the Afghan security forces with training, advice and assistance after the NATO-led ISAF mission is completed in 2014. Over US$4 billion is pledged to sustain the Afghan forces.

8 July 2012: At the Tokyo donors’ conference on Afghanistan, the international community pledges US$16 billion in development aid through 2015 beyond the withdrawal of ISAF. But pressure is put on the government to hold inclusive, transparent and credible elections; to fight corruption and improve good governance; to uphold the constitution, especially human rights; and to enforce the rule of law.

16 July 2012: The Afghan Army Special Operations Command is stood up.

August 2012: English teaching at the Kabul Military Training Center is completely in the hands of Afghan instructors.

October 2012: Ambassador Maurits R. Jochems, The Netherlands, takes up the position of NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan.

31 December 2012: Announcement of the fourth group of Afghan provinces, cities and districts to enter the transition process. With this decision, 23 provinces out of 34 have fully entered transition and 87 per cent of the population lives in areas where Afghan forces are in the lead for security.

1 February 2013: The Afghan Ground Forces Command is established to oversee all operations in Afghanistan.

February 2013: General Joseph F. Dunford, United States, takes command of ISAF.

1 April 2013: The Afghan National Defence University is set up to train the future officers of the Afghan National Army.

18 June 2013: President Karzai announces the launch of the fifth and final tranche of transition. Once fully implemented, this brings the 11 remaining provinces into transition and puts Afghan forces in the lead for security across the whole country.

24 November 2013: The Loya Jirga votes in favour of a Bilateral Security Agreement with the United States, calling on President Hamid Karzai to sign the deal immediately. The agreement governs the
presence of US troops in Afghanistan after 2014 and is needed to enable thousands of US soldiers to stay in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of ISAF.

5 April 2014: Millions of men and women turn out in the first-round vote of the presidential election.

14 June 2014: A second-round run-off in the presidential election takes place between Dr Ashraf Ghani and Dr Abdullah Abdullah.

26 August 2014: US Army General John F. Campbell assumes duties as the Commander of ISAF (upon completion of ISAF’s operation in December 2014, he becomes the first commander of the follow-on Resolute Support Mission)

September 2014: At the NATO Summit in Wales, the leaders of ISAF troop-contributing nations underline their commitment to continue to support Afghanistan post-2014.

29 September 2014: After months of negotiations over contested election results, Ashraf Ghani is sworn in as President of Afghanistan at a ceremony in Kabul, while presidential candidate Abdullah Abdullah is appointed as Chief Executive Officer of the National Unity Government.

30 September 2014: A Status of Forces Agreement between NATO and Afghanistan is signed in Kabul. Ratified by the Afghan Parliament in November, it provides the legal framework for a new NATO-led, non-combat mission (“Resolute Support”) to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces and institutions, starting in January 2015.


28 December 2014: At a ceremony in Kabul, ISAF formally completes its mission in Afghanistan, concluding a three-year transition process whereby the lead for security was gradually transferred to the Afghans. The Afghan security forces now have full security responsibility.

JANUARY 2015 –
TRAINING, ASSISTING AND ADVISING AFGHAN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

1 January 2015: The Resolute Support Mission (RSM) is launched to continue to provide training, advice and assistance to the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF).

22 April 2015: During a three-day visit to Afghanistan, the NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security, Marriët Schuurman, meets with NATO’s Senior Civilian
Representative in Afghanistan and the Commander of RSM, as well as with First Lady Rula Ghani, an active defender and advocate of women's rights and gender equality in Afghanistan.

**13 May 2015:** NATO foreign ministers decide that the Alliance will maintain a civilian-led presence in Afghanistan after the end of RSM with the aim to continue to advise and instruct the Afghan security institutions, to help them become self-sufficient.

**25 June 2015:** NATO defence ministers and their RSM partners review the security situation and the first six months of the training mission with Afghan Acting Minister of Defence Masoom Stanekzai. While noting that “it has been a challenging time,” NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stresses that the Afghan forces “have dealt with this effectively”.

**15 October 2015:** The NATO Secretary General welcomes President Obama’s announcement that the United States will maintain its current troop levels in Afghanistan through 2016 and will retain a substantial presence beyond 2016.

**1 December 2015:** NATO foreign ministers and their RSM partners agree a plan to sustain the training mission in Afghanistan during 2016 and start work to secure funding for Afghan security forces and institutions until the end of 2020.

**May 2016:** NATO foreign ministers agree that RSM’s presence will be sustained beyond 2016.
NATO’s role in Kosovo

NATO has been leading a peace-support operation in Kosovo since June 1999 in support of wider international efforts to build peace and stability in the area.

Highlights

- NATO has been leading a peace-support operation in Kosovo – the Kosovo Force (KFOR) – since June 1999.
- KFOR was established when NATO’s 78-day air campaign against Milosevic’s regime, aimed at putting an end to violence in Kosovo, was over.
- The operation derives its mandate from UNSCR 1244 (1999) and the Military-Technical Agreement between NATO, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia.
- KFOR’s original objectives were to deter renewed hostilities, establish a secure environment and ensure public safety and order, demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army, support the international humanitarian effort and coordinate with the international civil presence.
- Today, KFOR continues to contribute towards maintaining a safe and secure environment in Kosovo and freedom of movement for all.
- NATO strongly supports the Belgrade-Pristina EU-brokered Normalisation Agreement (2013).

KFOR’s objectives

KFOR deployed into Kosovo on 12 June 1999, in the wake of a 78-day air campaign. This air campaign was launched by the Alliance in March 1999 to halt and reverse the humanitarian catastrophe that was then unfolding.
KFOR derives its mandate from United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 of 10 June 1999 and the Military-Technical Agreement between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia. KFOR operates under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and, as such, is a peace enforcement operation.

Today, KFOR consists of approximately 4,500 troops provided by 31 countries. It continues to help maintain a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement for all people and communities in Kosovo, according to its mandate, which is to:

- deter renewed hostility and threats against Kosovo by Yugoslav and Serb forces;
- establish a secure environment and ensure public safety and order;
- demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army;
- support the international humanitarian effort; and
- coordinate with, and support, the international civil presence.

Over time, as the security situation has improved, NATO has been gradually adjusting KFOR’s force posture towards a smaller and more flexible force with fewer static tasks. All adjustments to the KFOR force posture are decided by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) as the security situation on the ground evolves. KFOR is also cooperating and coordinating with the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and other international actors to support the development of a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic and peaceful Kosovo.

### KFOR’s tasks

#### Initial tasks

KFOR tasks have included assistance with the return or relocation of displaced persons and refugees; reconstruction and de-mining; medical assistance; security and public order; protection of patrimonial sites; border security; interdiction of cross-border weapons smuggling; implementation of a Kosovo-wide weapons, ammunition and explosives amnesty programme; weapons destruction; and support for the establishment of civilian institutions, law and order, the judicial and penal system, the electoral process and other aspects of the political, economic and social life of Kosovo.

Special attention continues to be paid to the protection of minorities. This includes regular patrols near minority enclaves, check points, escorts for minority groups, protection of heritage sites such as monasteries, and donations including food, clothes and school supplies.

#### Additional tasks

On 12 June 2008, NATO agreed to start implementing additional tasks in Kosovo, i.e. assist in the standing down of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and in the establishment of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF), as well as a civilian structure to oversee the KSF. The following tasks have been implemented in close coordination and consultation with the relevant local and international authorities:

- **Stand-down of the Kosovo Protection Corps**

  The KPC was conceived as a transitional post-conflict arrangement, under the responsibility of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo. Its mandate was to provide disaster-response services, perform search and rescue, provide a capacity for humanitarian assistance in isolated areas, assist de-mining and contribute to rebuilding infrastructure and communities.

  The KPC ceased its operational activities on 20 January 2009 and was formally dissolved on 14 June 2009. In parallel, the Kosovo Security Force was developed to ensure that key capabilities were available for emergency situations.
Stand-up of the Kosovo Security Force / NATO Liaison and Advisory Team

NATO has supervised the stand-up and training of a multi-ethnic, professional and civilian-controlled Kosovo Security Force. The KSF is a lightly armed volunteer force, with no heavy weapons such as tanks, heavy artillery or offensive air capability. It has primary responsibility for security tasks that are not appropriate for the police such as emergency response, explosive ordnance disposal, management of hazardous material, fire-fighting and civil protection.

The first Kosovo-wide recruitment campaign for the KSF started on 21 January 2009 and focused on encouraging all minority communities in Kosovo to apply. The recruitment process was carried out in two official languages: Albanian and Serbian. Initial operational capability was reached in mid-September 2009, with some 1,500 personnel; full operational capability was declared by the NAC on 9 July 2013, with approximately 2,200 active personnel. The KSF’s total strength is mandated to a maximum of 2,500 active personnel and 800 reservists.

In order to continue supporting the KSF, the Alliance established the NATO Liaison and Advisory Team (NLAT) in July 2013. The NLAT is distinct from KFOR and consists of approximately 35 military and civilian personnel. Based in Pristina, this body is charged with providing advice and support to the KSF at brigade level and above, focusing on staff capacity-building and training.

Establish a civilian-led body to supervise the KSF / NATO Advisory Team

NATO assisted and continues to assist in establishing a civilian-led organisation that exercises control over the KSF. Primary responsibility for this task rests with NATO Headquarters in Brussels; KFOR is tasked to support the NATO Advisory Team that has been established in Pristina.

Merger of the NATO Liaison and Advisory Team and the NATO Advisory Team

In November 2014, the NAC approved the merger of the two NATO teams. This work is ongoing with a view to establishing a new team – the NATO Liaison and Advisory Team – by the end of 2016.

Command and structure of KFOR

The Multinational Battle Groups (MNBG)

A Battle Group is a military unit at the level of a battalion, consisting of numerous companies. These companies are highly mobile, flexible and rapidly deployable to potential trouble spots all over Kosovo. There are currently two MNBGs:

- HQ MNBG East, located at Camp Bondsteel, located near Urosevac;
- HQ MNBG West, located at Camp Villagio Italia in Pec.

HQ KFOR continues to be located at Camp Film City, Pristina. In addition to the KFOR troops in Kosovo, NATO continues to maintain reserve forces ready to deploy if necessary.

KFOR comes under a single chain of command, under the authority of Commander KFOR (COMKFOR). COMKFOR reports to the Commander of Joint Force Command Naples (COM JFCN), Italy. The current COMKFOR is Maj. Gen. Guglielmo Luigi Miglietta. He assumed command of the Kosovo Force on 7 August 2015.

Former KFOR commanders

| Lt. Gen. Thorstein Skiaker, NO | 06 Apr 2001 - 03 Oct 2001 |
The evolution of NATO’s role in Kosovo

**KFOR deploys**

UNSCR 1244 was adopted on 10 June 1999, and on 12 June the first elements of the NATO-led Kosovo Force, or KFOR, entered Kosovo. By 20 June, the withdrawal of Serbian forces was complete.

KFOR was initially composed of some 50,000 men and women from NATO member countries, partner countries and other non-NATO countries under unified command and control. By early 2002, KFOR was reduced to around 39,000 troops. The improved security environment enabled NATO to reduce KFOR troop levels to 26,000 by June 2003, then to 17,500 by the end of 2003.

**An improved security situation**

In recent years, the security situation has continued to improve steadily. As a result, on 11-12 June 2009, NATO defence ministers decided to gradually adjust KFOR’s force posture towards what is called a deterrent presence. At their informal meeting in Istanbul on 3-4 February 2010, NATO defence ministers were informed by the NATO Military Authorities that KFOR had successfully achieved the so-called Gate 1 in its transition to a deterrent presence, reducing the number of troops on the ground to some 10,200. The move to Gate 2, allowing for a total of approximately 5,000 troops was recommended by the NATO Military Authorities and authorised by the North Atlantic Council on 29 October 2010. Gate 2 was declared on 28 February 2011.

Any future decision on further reducing KFOR’s footprint in Kosovo will require the approval of the North Atlantic Council. Nations have been clear that any such decision should be dictated by continued positive conditions on the ground.

In a separate development, the improved security situation on the ground in Kosovo also allowed NATO to continue with the implementation of the so-called unfixing process: the gradual transfer of security for religious and cultural heritage sites under KFOR protection to Kosovo Police responsibility. By the end of 2013, KFOR had unfixed eight properties with Designated Special Status: the Gazimestan Monument, Gracanica Monastery, Zociste Monastery, Budisavci Monastery, Gorioc Monastery, the Archangel site,
Devic Monastery, and the Pec Patriarchate. Only one designated site – the Decani Monastery – currently remains under fixed KFOR protection.

**NATO’s support to the EU-facilitated dialogue**

On 19 April 2013, Belgrade and Pristina reached an EU-facilitated First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations; an implementation plan was agreed on 22 May 2013. NATO played an important role in securing the Agreement, and Allies continue to strongly support the accord. In support of the Agreement, Belgrade and Pristina have initiated a programme of high-level talks, hosted by the European Union. This dialogue remains key to solving the political deadlock between the two parties, and has helped improve relations between them. The dialogue has also given fresh momentum to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans. In June 2013, the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Belgrade and negotiations with Pristina on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). The SAA agreement was signed on 27 October 2015 and entered into force on 1 April 2016. NATO continues to offer strong political support to the Belgrade-Pristina Agreement, and KFOR stands ready to support its implementation – by ensuring a climate of peace and security – within its current mandate.
Counter-piracy operations

Piracy in the Gulf of Aden, off the Horn of Africa and in the Indian Ocean has been undermining international humanitarian efforts in Africa and the safety of one of the busiest and most important maritime routes in the world – the gateway in and out of the Suez Canal – for a long time. NATO has been helping to deter and disrupt pirate attacks, while protecting vessels and helping to increase the general level of security in the region since 2008.

Highlights

- Since 2008, at the request of the United Nations, NATO has been supporting international efforts to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden, off the Horn of Africa and in the Indian Ocean.
- NATO is currently leading Operation Ocean Shield, which helps to deter and disrupt pirate attacks, while protecting vessels and helping to increase the general level of security in the region.
- NATO works in close cooperation with other actors in the region including the European Union’s Operation Atalanta, the US-led Combined Task Force 151 and individual country contributors.
- The very presence of this international naval force is deterring pirates from pursuing their activities and contributed to the suppression of piracy in the region. The implementation of best management practices by the shipping industry, as well as the embarkation of armed security teams on board, has also contributed to this trend.
- NATO will maintain its counter-piracy efforts at sea and ashore – by supporting countries in the region to build the capacity to fight piracy themselves – until end 2016.

Operation Ocean Shield – ongoing

There have been no successful piracy attacks since May 2012. Somalia-based piracy has been suppressed, but not eliminated. Pirates still seek, and have the capacity, to mount attacks. There is a need to address the root causes of piracy ashore in Somalia. As such, international efforts are increasingly focusing on building the capacity of the countries in the region to counter piracy on their own. NATO does not have a lead role in this regard.
Against this background, at the Wales Summit in September 2014, NATO leaders agreed to continue NATO's involvement off the coast of Somalia until end 2016, at which time the operation will be reviewed to take into account the evolving piracy situation.

- **The mission, its objectives and scope**

For a long time, piracy and armed robbery have disrupted the delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia, and threatened vital sea lines of communication (SLOC) and economic interests off the Horn of Africa, in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.

Building on the two previous counter-piracy missions conducted by NATO, Operation Ocean Shield initially focused on at-sea counter-piracy activities. NATO vessels conducted, for instance, helicopter surveillance missions to trace and identify ships in the area; they also helped to prevent and disrupt hijackings and to suppress armed robbery. NATO also agreed, at the request of the UN, to escort the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) supply vessels to the harbour entrance of Mogadishu, Somalia.

Over time, the operation has evolved to respond to new piracy tactics: the March 2012 Strategic Assessment, for instance, highlighted the need to erode the pirates' logistics and support-base by, among other things, disabling pirate vessels or skiffs, attaching tracking beacons to mother ships and allowing the use of force to disable or destroy suspected pirate or armed robber vessels. With Operation Ocean Shield, the Alliance has also broadened its approach to combating piracy by offering, within means and capabilities to regional states that request it, assistance in developing their own capacity to combat piracy. This capacity building contributes to a lasting solution to piracy and is in line with regional ownership. NATO is not a lead actor in regional capacity-building, but it provides added value in niche areas such as military training, command and control, and coordination in complex situations which can benefit countries in the region. NATO is therefore taking advantage of port visits to provide training and conduct shiprider programmes (law enforcement programmes) for the local population.

In sum, NATO’s role is to prevent and stop piracy through direct actions against pirates, by providing naval escorts and deterrence, while increasing cooperation with other counter-piracy operations in the area in order to optimise efforts and tackle the evolving pirate trends and tactics.

Operation Ocean Shield was approved by the North Atlantic Council on 17 August 2009 and the mandate has been extended until the end of 2016.

- **Composition and command of NATO’s naval support**

**The current situation**

NATO works hand in hand with the European Union’s Atalanta, the US-led Combined Task Force 151 and with independent deployers such as China, Japan and South Korea.

Since January 2015, NATO ships contribute to the counter-piracy effort through a “focused presence”, in line with the decision taken at the Wales Summit. This means that assets are primarily deployed during the inter-monsoon periods (spring or autumn) and at other times if needed. During the periods without surface ships, maritime patrol aircraft continue to fly sorties, and links to situational awareness systems and counter-piracy partners will remain in place. In this effort, the NATO Shipping Centre plays a key role.

Partner countries have also been contributing to Operation Ocean Shield. So far, NATO has welcomed support from Australia, Colombia, New Zealand and Ukraine.

Allied Maritime Command Headquarters Northwood (MARCOM), in the United Kingdom, provides command and control for the full spectrum of NATO’s joint maritime operations and tasks, Operation Ocean Shield included. From its location in Northwood, it plans, conducts and supports joint maritime operations. It is also the Alliance’s principal maritime advisor and contributes to development and transformation, engagement and outreach within its area of expertise.
**Previous rotations**

From 2009 to end 2014, Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1) and Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2) alternated between each other for the six-month rotations of Operation Ocean Shield. They otherwise functioned according to the operational needs of the Alliance, therefore helping to maintain optimal flexibility.

SNMGs are part of NATO's rapid-response capacity. However, as a principle, they will no longer be utilised for counter-piracy.

**June – December 2014 – SNMG1**
Commodore Aage Buur Jensen (Denmark)

HDMS Absalon (flagship Denmark)
ITS Mimbelli (Italy)

**January - June 2014 – SNMG2**
Rear Admiral Eugenio Diaz del Rio (Spain)

ESPS Cristobal Colon (initially ESPS Alvaro de Bazan) (flagship Spain)
TCG Gökçeada (Turkey)
HNLMS Evertsen (The Netherlands)
ITS Mimbelli (Italy)
TCG Gelibolu (Turkey)*
HMNZS Te Mana (New Zealand)*

* Ships initially assigned to the rotation.

**June - December 2013 – SNMG1**
Rear Admiral Henning Amundsen (Norway)

HNoMS Fridtjof Nansen (flagship, Norway)
FF Esben Snare (Denmark)
USS De Wert (United States)
HNLMS Van Speijk (The Netherlands)
Frigate UPS Hetman Sagaidachny (Ukraine)

**January-June 2013 - SNMG2**
Rear Admiral Antonio Natale (Italy)

ITS San Marco (flagship, Italy)*
USS Halyburton (United States)*
HMS Iver Huitfeldt (Denmark)*
USS Nicholas (United States)
HNLMS Van Speijk (The Netherlands)
TCG Gokova (Turkey)

* Ships initially assigned to the rotation.

**June- December 2012 - SNMG1**
Rear Commodore Ben Bekkering (The Netherlands)

HNLMS Evertsen (flagship. The Netherlands)
USS Taylor (United States)
HNLMS Bruinvis (submarine, The Netherlands)

**January-June 2012 - SNMG2**
Rear Admiral Sinan Tosun (Turkey)

TCG Giresun (flagship, Turkey)
HMS Absalon (Denmark)
ITS Grecale (Italy)
RFA Fort Victoria (United Kingdom)
USS De Wert (United States)
USS Carney (United States)*

* Ships initially assigned to the rotation.

**June 2011-December 2011 - SNMG1**
Rear Admiral Gualtiero Mattesi (Italy)

ITS Andrea Doria (flagship, Italy)
USS Carney (United States)
USS De Wert (United States)
NRP D. Francisco De Almeida (Portugal)
December 2010- June 2011 - SNMG2
Commodore Michiel Hijmans (The Netherlands)
HNLMS De Ruyter (flagship – The Netherlands)
HDMS Esbern Snare (Denmark)
TCG Gaziantep (Turkey)
USS Laboon (United States)

August – early December 2010 - SNMG1
Commodore Christian Rune (Denmark)
HDMS Esbern Snare (flagship, Denmark)
HMS Montrose and RFA Fort Victoria (United Kingdom)
USS Kauffman and USS Laboon (United States)
ITS Bersaglieri (Italy)
HNLMS Zeeleeuw (submarine, The Netherlands)

March-August 2010 - SNMG2
12 March-30 June:
Commodore Steve Chick (United Kingdom)
HMS Chatham (flagship, United Kingdom)
HS LIMNOS (Greece) - under national control from 30 May
ITS SCIROCCO (Italy) - under national control from 5 June
TCG Gelibolu (Turkey)
USS Cole (United States)

1st July-6 August:
Commodore Michiel Hijmans (The Netherlands)
HNLMS De Zeven Provinciën (flagship, The Netherlands)
TCG Gelibolu (Turkey)
USS Cole (United States)

November 2009-March 2010 - SNMG1
Commodore Christian Rune (succeeded Rear Admiral Jose Pereira de Cunha (Portugal) from 25 January 2010).
NRP Álvares Cabral (outgoing flagship, Portugal)
HMS Absalon (incoming flagship, Denmark)
HMS Fredericton (Canada)
USS Boone (United States)
HMS Chatham (United Kingdom)

August – November 2009 - SNMG2
Commodore Steve Chick (United Kingdom)
HS Navarinon (Greece)
ITS Libeccio (Italy)
TCG Gediz (Turkey)
HMS Cornwall (United Kingdom)
USS Donald Cook (United States)

Standing NATO Maritime Groups

Among NATO's Maritime Immediate Reaction Forces there are: the Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMGs) composed of SNMG1 and SNMG2; and the Standing NATO Mine Counter-Measure Groups (SNMCMG1 and SNMCMG2).

SNMGs are a multinational, integrated maritime force made up of vessels from various Allied countries. Their composition varies and usually comprises between six and ten ships. These vessels (including their helicopters) are permanently available to NATO to perform different tasks ranging from participating in exercises to actually intervening in operational missions. These groups provide NATO with a continuous maritime capability for operations and other activities in peacetime and in periods of crisis and conflict. They also help to establish Alliance presence, demonstrate solidarity, conduct routine diplomatic visits to different countries, support transformation and provide a variety of maritime military capabilities to ongoing missions.

SNMG1 and SNMG2 both come under the command of MARCOM, as do all Standing NATO Forces (i.e., SNMCMG1 and SNMCMG2) since the implementation of the new NATO Command Structure on 1 December 2012.

Past operations

On the request of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, in late 2008, NATO started to provide escorts to UN World Food Programme (WFP) vessels transiting through these dangerous waters under Operation Allied Provider (October-December 2008). In addition to providing close protection to WFP chartered...
ships, NATO conducted deterrence patrols and prevented, for instance, vessels from being hijacked and their crews being taken hostage during pirate attacks. This operation was succeeded by Operation Allied Protector (March-August 2009), which continued to contribute to the safety of commercial maritime routes and international navigation. It also conducted surveillance and fulfilled the tasks previously undertaken by Operation Allied Provider. This operation evolved to Operation Ocean Shield in August 2009.

- **Operation Allied Protector (March-August 2009)**

  **The mission, its objectives and scope**

  Operation Allied Protector helped to deter, defend against and disrupt pirate activities in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa.

  From 24 March until 29 June 2009, the operation was conducted by SNMG1 vessels. SNMG1 is usually employed in the Eastern Atlantic area, but it can deploy anywhere NATO requires. The first phase of Operation Allied Protector was undertaken as the force left for NATO’s first ever deployment to South East Asia. It made a short visit to Karachi (Pakistan) on 26-27 April. However, with the increase in pirate attacks, on 24 April NATO had already decided to cancel the other two port visits to Singapore and Australia. As such, the second phase of the operation, which was meant to take place as SNMG1 made its return journey towards European waters end June, was brought forward to 1 May.

  From 29 June 2009, SNMG2 took over responsibility from SNMG1. It had conducted NATO’s first counter-piracy operation – Operation Allied Provider (see below).

  **Composition and command of the naval force**

  **24 March-29 June 2009 - SNMG1**

  Rear Admiral Jose Pereira de Cunha (Portugal)

  NRP Corte Real (flagship, Portugal)
  HMCS Winnipeg (Canada)
  HNLMS De Zeven Provinciën (The Netherlands)
  SPS Blas de Lezo (Spain)
  USS Halyburton (United States)

  **29 June-August 2009 - SNMG2**

  Commodore Steve Chick (United Kingdom)

  ITS Libeccio (frigate, Italy)
  HS Navarjelon (frigate F461, Greece)
  TCG Gediz (frigate F495, Turkey)
  HMS Cornwall (frigate F99, United Kingdom)
  USS Laboon (destroyer DDG58, United States)

- **Operation Allied Provider (October-December 2008)**

  **The mission, its objectives and scope**

  Operation Allied Provider was responsible for naval escorts to World Food Programme (WFP) vessels and, more generally, patrolled the waters around Somalia. Alliance presence also helped to deter acts of piracy that threatened the region.

  While providing close protection for WFP vessels and patrolling routes most susceptible to criminal acts against merchant vessels, NATO ships could use force pursuant to the authorised Rules of Engagement and in compliance with relevant international and national law.

  Allied Provider was a temporary operation that was requested by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on 25 September 2008. NATO provided this counter-piracy capacity in support of UN Security Council Resolutions 1814, 1816 and 1838, and in coordination with other international actors, including the European Union.
NATO Defence Ministers agreed to respond positively to the UN’s request on 9 October, during an informal meeting held in Budapest, Hungary. Following this decision, planning started to redirect assets of SNMG2 to conduct counter-piracy duties.

SNMG2 was already scheduled to conduct a series of Gulf port visits in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates within the framework of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). As such, it started to transit the Suez Canal on 15 October to conduct both duties at the same time.

Composition and command of the naval force

At the time of the operation, SNMG2 comprised seven ships from Germany, Greece, Italy, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, of which three were assigned to Operation Allied Provider:

- ITS Durand de la Penne (flagship, destroyer D560, Italy);
- HS Temistokles (frigate F465, Greece);
- HMS Cumberland (frigate F85, United Kingdom).

The other four ships (FGS Karlsruhe-Germany; FGS Rhön-Germany; TCG Gokova-Turkey; and USS The Sullivans-USA) continued deployment to ICI countries. This was the first time a NATO-flagged force deployed to the Gulf.

At the time of the operation, SNMG2 was commanded by Rear Admiral Giovanni Gumiero, Italian Navy, who was appointed to this post in July 2008. He reported to the Commander of Allied Component Command Maritime (CC-Mar) Naples. CC Mar Naples was one of the three Component Commands of Allied Joint Force Command Naples.
Operation Active Endeavour

Under Operation Active Endeavour, NATO ships are patrolling the Mediterranean and monitoring shipping to help deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorist activity. The operation evolved out of NATO’s immediate response to the terrorist attacks against the United States of 11 September 2001.

Highlights

- Operation Active Endeavour helps deter terrorist activity in the Mediterranean Sea.
- By tracking and controlling ships, Active Endeavour is also helping to secure one of the busiest trade routes in the world.
- The operation has evolved from a platform-based to a network-based operation, using a mix of on-call units and surge operations instead of deployed forces. Discussions are ongoing to transform Active Endeavour into a broader maritime security operation.
- The experience accrued through Active Endeavour has given NATO unparalleled expertise in deterring maritime terrorist activity in the Mediterranean, especially with regard to the proliferation and smuggling of weapons of mass destruction and cooperation with non-NATO countries and civilian agencies.
- Initially an Article 5 operation, Active Endeavour has been benefitting from support from non-NATO countries since 2004.
- It was one of eight initiatives launched in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States.

The aim of the operation and its current functions

Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) is NATO’s only Article 5 operation on anti-terrorism. It was initiated in support of the United States immediately after 9/11. It aims to demonstrate NATO’s solidarity and resolve in the fight against terrorism and to help deter and disrupt terrorist activity in the Mediterranean.
NATO forces have hailed over 128,000 merchant vessels and boarded some 172 suspect ships. By conducting these maritime operations against terrorist activity, NATO’s presence in these waters has benefited all shipping travelling through the Straits of Gibraltar by improving perceptions of security. NATO is helping to keep seas safe, protect shipping and control suspect vessels. Moreover, this operation is also enabling NATO to strengthen its relations with partner countries, especially those participating in the Alliance’s Mediterranean Dialogue.

**Keeping seas safe and protecting shipping**

Keeping the Mediterranean’s busy trade routes open and safe is critical to NATO’s security. In terms of energy alone, some 65 per cent of the oil and natural gas consumed in Western Europe passes through the Mediterranean each year, with major pipelines connecting Libya to Italy and Morocco to Spain. For this reason, NATO ships are systematically carrying out preparatory route surveys in “choke” points as well as in important passages and harbours throughout the Mediterranean.

**Tracking and controlling suspect vessels**

Since April 2003, NATO has been systematically boarding suspect ships. These boardings take place with the compliance of the ships’ masters and flag states in accordance with international law.

What happens in practice is that merchant ships passing through the eastern Mediterranean are hailed by patrolling NATO naval units and asked to identify themselves and their activity. This information is then reported to NATO’s Maritime Commander in Northwood, the United Kingdom. If anything appears unusual or suspicious, teams of between 15 and 20 of the ships’ crew may board vessels to inspect documentation and cargo. Compliant boarding can only be conducted with the consent of the flag state and/or the ship’s master. NATO personnel may otherwise convey this information to the appropriate law enforcement agency at the vessel’s next port of call. The suspect vessel is then shadowed until action is taken by a responsible agency/authority, or until it enters a country’s territorial waters.

**Unexpected benefits**

While the mandate of OAE is limited to deterring, defending, disrupting and protecting against terrorist-related activity, the operation has had a visible effect on security and stability in the Mediterranean that is beneficial to trade and economic activity.

NATO ships and helicopters have also intervened on several occasions to rescue civilians on stricken oil rigs and sinking ships, saving the lives of several hundred people over time. The operation provided the framework for the maritime component of NATO’s assistance to the Greek government to ensure the safe conduct of the 2004 Olympic and Paralympic Games in August and September 2004. Task Force Endeavour conducted surveillance, presence and compliant boarding operations in international waters around the Greek peninsula with Standing Naval Forces surface ships, supported by maritime patrol aircraft and submarines and in coordination with the Hellenic Navy and Coast Guard.

**Closer cooperation with partners**

The increased NATO presence in the Mediterranean has also enhanced the Alliance’s security cooperation programme with seven countries in the wider Mediterranean region – Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. This programme - the Mediterranean Dialogue - was set up in 1994 to contribute to regional security and stability and to achieve better mutual understanding between NATO and its Mediterranean partners.

Mediterranean Dialogue countries are equally concerned by the threat of terrorism and have already been cooperating with NATO in OAE by providing intelligence about suspicious shipping operating in their waters.

Enhanced coordination and cooperation mechanisms are currently being developed.
Command and structure of the operation

The operation is under the overall command of, and is conducted from, Maritime Command Headquarters, Northwood, United Kingdom, through a task force deployed in the Mediterranean.

Task Force Endeavour consists of a balanced collection of surface units, submarines and maritime patrol aircraft. The operation also regularly makes use of NATO’s two high-readiness frigate forces, which are permanently ready to act and capable of conducting a wide range of maritime operations.

The current operational pattern uses surface forces as reaction units to conduct specific tasks such as locating, tracking, reporting and boarding of suspected vessels in the light of intelligence.

The NATO Standing Naval Forces rotate in providing periodic support to OAE either through “surges” (when an entire force participates) or through individual units being put on call at times when the operation has no assigned forces.

Evolution

An Article 5 deployment

The deployment was one of eight measures taken by NATO to support the United States in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, following the invocation of Article 5, NATO’s collective defence clause, for the first time in the Alliance’s history.

The deployment started on 6 October and was formally named Operation Active Endeavour on 26 October 2001. Together with the dispatch of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to the United States, it was the first time that NATO assets had been deployed in support of an Article 5 operation.

Since October 2001, NATO ships have been patrolling the Mediterranean and monitoring shipping, boarding any suspect ships. Compliant boarding operations are essential to the successful continuation of the operation. They are limited to trying to establish whether a vessel is engaged in terrorist activity.

In March 2003, OAE was expanded to provide escorts through the Straits of Gibraltar to non-military ships from Alliance member states requesting them. This extension of the mission – Task Force STROG (Straits of Gibraltar) – was designed to help prevent terrorist attacks such as those off Yemen on the USS Cole in October 2000 and on the French oil tanker Limburg two years later. The area was considered particularly vulnerable because the Straits are extremely narrow and some 3,000 commercial shipments pass through daily. In total, 488 ships took advantage of NATO escorts until this mission was suspended in May 2004. Forces remain ready to move at 30 days’ notice.

Covering the entire Mediterranean

One year later, in March 2004, as a result of the success of OAE in the Eastern Mediterranean, NATO extended its remit to the whole of the Mediterranean.

At the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, Allied leaders decided to enhance OAE. They also welcomed offers by partner countries to support the operation.

An evolving operation

In the revised Concept of Operations approved by the North Atlantic Council on 23 April 2009, the Military Committee highlighted two considerations: the need to further enhance information-sharing between NATO and other actors in the region; the fact that in some cases, the operation is hampered by the lack of consent to conduct compliant boarding of suspect vessels.

In addition, the Operational Plan approved in January 2010, shifted OAE from a platform-based to a network-based operation, using a combination of on-call units and surge operations instead of deployed forces; it also increased cooperation with non-NATO countries and international organisations in order to improve Maritime Situational Awareness. All options for future changes in the operation’s mandate are
considered on the basis of the Alliance Maritime Strategy, adopted in January 2011. OAE is fulfilling the four roles outlined in this strategy: deterrence and collective defence; crisis management; cooperative security; and maritime security.

In February 2013, as a result of the reform of the military command structure initiated in 2011, the operation changed command. Initially, OAE was under the overall command of Joint Forces Command (JFC), Naples, and was conducted from the Allied Maritime Component Command Naples, Italy (CC-MarNaples). From 22 February 2013, it came under the command of, and is conducted by, Maritime Command Headquarters (HQ MARCOM), Northwood, United Kingdom.

As the Alliance has refined its counter-terrorism role over the years, the operation’s remit has been extended and its mandate regularly reviewed. In addition to tracking and controlling suspect vessels to keep the seas safe, it now aims to build a picture of maritime activity in the Mediterranean. To do this, the ships conduct routine information approaches to various vessels in order to reassure and inform mariners on the efforts to keep the maritime community safe.

The experience that NATO has accrued in Active Endeavour has given the Alliance unparalleled expertise in the deterrence of maritime terrorist activity in the Mediterranean Sea. This expertise is relevant to wider international efforts to combat terrorism and, in particular, the proliferation and smuggling of weapons of mass destruction, as well as enhanced cooperation with non-NATO countries and civilian agencies. Discussions are ongoing to transform OAE into a broader maritime security operation able to perform additional tasks.

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**Contributing countries**

Being an Article 5 operation, Operation Active Endeavour initially involved member countries only. Some NATO members, mainly Greece, Italy, Spain and Turkey contribute directly to the operation with naval assets. Escort operations in the Straits of Gibraltar used to involve the use of fast patrol boats from northern European Allies Denmark, Germany and Norway. Spain also provides additional assets in the Straits. OAE relies heavily on the logistic support of Mediterranean NATO Allies.

From 2004, partner and non-NATO countries started offering their support.

All offers are considered on a case-by-case basis. To date, Exchanges of Letters have been signed between NATO and Israel, Morocco, Russia and Ukraine. In addition, Finland and Sweden have informally expressed their interest in contributing to the operation. Georgia and Israel have sent liaison officers to HQ MARCOM in Northwood following the signing of tactical Memoranda of Understanding with NATO on the exchange of information. Russia deployed vessels twice, in 2006 and 2007, and Ukraine a total of six times since 2007. New Zealand also deployed a vessel (April-May 2015).
Assistance to the African Union

Since 2005, at the request of the African Union (AU), NATO has been providing different forms of support to the AU. The AU is a regional organisation which brings together 54 African member states. It was established in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 2002 and requested NATO support as early as 2005 for the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in the province of Darfur.

Highlights

- NATO started assisting the African Union (AU) in 2005, when it provided support to AMIS – the AU mission in Darfur, Sudan – the first NATO mission on the African continent.
- AMIS transferred to the UN/AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) end 2007 and NATO’s support was no longer required.
- NATO is currently supporting the AU Mission in Somalia – AMISOM – through strategic air- and sealift.
- The AU is developing a long-term peacekeeping capability – the African Standby Force – to which NATO is also providing capacity-building support.
- NATO is coordinating the work it does with the AU, with bilateral partners and other international organisations including the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU).

Assisting the African Union in Somalia

Since 2007, NATO has accepted to assist the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by providing strategic airlift and sealift support to AU member states willing to deploy in Somalia under AMISOM. NATO has, for instance, put into practice airlift support from Burundi to Mogadishu and has escorted an AU ship that carried Burundian military equipment for one of the battalions that it had airlifted into Mogadishu.
NATO has also provided subject-matter experts for the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD). The PSOD is responsible for the planning, conduct and management of AU operations and missions, including AMISOM. NATO experts, working side by side with AU counterparts, offered expertise in specific areas for a period of six to twelve months, renewable at the AU’s request.

In addition to this logistical and planning support, NATO was also a member of the International Contact Group on Somalia.

**Strategic airlift**

The AU made a general request to all partners, including NATO, on 17 January 2007 for financial and logistical support to AMISOM. It later made a more specific request to NATO on 22 May 2007, requesting strategic airlift support for AU member states willing to deploy in Somalia under AMISOM.

On 7 June, the NAC agreed, in principle, to support this request. NATO’s support was initially authorised until 21 August 2007 and has since been renewed for periods of six months and, more recently, for one year, following AU requests. The latest to be agreed by the NAC runs until January 2017.

**Strategic sealift**

Strategic sealift support was requested at a later stage and agreed in principle by the NAC on 15 September 2009. Support is also authorised for set periods of time and is currently running until January 2017.

**Subject-matter experts**

NATO has provided subject-matter experts for the AU PSOD that supports AMISOM. These experts shared their knowledge in areas such as maritime planning, strategic planning, financial planning and monitoring, procurement planning, air movement coordination, communications, IT, logistics, human resources, military manpower management and contingency planning.
Training

NATO has been offering AU students the possibility of attending courses at the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany in areas such as crisis-management exercises. Other appropriate training facilities are being identified, based on AU requirements. Since early 2015 and in response to an AU request, NATO started delivering dedicated training in Addis Ababa through the Mobile Education and Training Team concept. The objective is to reach a wider audience of African Union staff, including the Regional Economic Communities, through the delivery of one to two-week training modules on pre-identified themes such as operational and exercises planning.

Working with other international organisations

In addition to logistical and planning support, NATO is also a member of the International Contact Group on Somalia. It was first invited to attend these meetings in June 2009 and has participated in subsequent meetings.

The bodies involved in decision making and implementation

Based on advice from NATO’s military authorities, the NAC is the body that agrees to provide support to the AU.

The Norwegian Embassy in Addis Ababa provides diplomatic resources in support of NATO’s activities in Africa. Requests are communicated via a Note Verbale from the AU to the Norwegian Embassy, then via Joint Force Command (JFC) Naples and SHAPE to NATO HQ to consider the requests and take action as necessary. AU requests are considered on a case-by-case basis.

The NATO Senior Military Liaison Officer (SMLO) is the primary point of contact for the Alliance’s activities with the AU. An SMLO is deployed on a permanent six-month rotational basis in Addis Ababa and is supported by a deputy and an administrative assistant. More specifically, with regard to NATO’s support to the AU mission in Somalia, JFC Naples – under the overall command of Allied Command Operations - is responsible for the SMLO team operating out of the Ethiopian capital.

This team not only conducts NATO’s day-to-day activities, but also serves as the NATO military point of contact with partner countries and regional organisations. It served the same function for the representatives of troop-contributing countries for the AMISON operation, the representatives of the donor nations pledging support to the AU, the UN, the EU and various embassies.

Contributing to the establishment of an African Standby Force

NATO has been providing expert and training support to the African Standby Force (ASF) at the AU’s request. The ASF is intended to be deployed in Africa in times of crisis. It is part of the AU’s efforts to develop long-term peacekeeping capabilities. ASF represents the AU’s vision for a continental, on-call security apparatus with some similarities to the NATO Response Force.

The Alliance offers capacity-building support through courses and training events and organises different forms of support to help make the ASF operational, all at the AU’s request. NATO is, inter alia, assisting the AU with the evaluation and assessment processes linked to the operational readiness of the ASF brigades. This continental force is being operationalised and could be seen as an African contribution to wider international efforts to preserve peace and security.

Expert support

On 5 September 2007, as part of NATO’s capacity-building support to the AU, the NAC agreed to provide assistance to the AU with a study on the assessment of the operational readiness of the ASF brigades.
Training support

NATO has also provided targeted training packages to the ASF. Since 2009, the NATO School in Oberammergau has been hosting AU staff officers, who attend various courses, including operational planning discipline.

JFC Naples - the designated NATO HQ to implement the Alliance’s practical cooperation with the AU – has also organised certification/evaluation training programmes for AU staff. For instance, it has trained AU officials participating in military exercises and provided military experts to assist in the evaluation and lessons learned procedures of an exercise. NATO has also participated and supported various ASF preparatory workshops designed to develop ASF-related concepts.

NATO experts provided support for the preparation phases of Exercise Amani Africa II (October-November 2015) in South Africa, and also played an active role in the execution phase. This was the first field training exercise for the ASF which brought together regional standby brigades from across the continent. African military, police and civilians participated in testing the ASF’s Rapid Deployment Capability and the ASF’s level of readiness for full operational capability.

Assisting the African Union in Darfur, Sudan

The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) aimed to end violence and improve the humanitarian situation in a region that has been suffering from conflict since 2003.

From June 2005 to 31 December 2007, NATO helped the AU expand its peacekeeping mission in Darfur by providing airlift for the transport of additional peacekeepers into the region and by training AU personnel. NATO support did not include the provision of combat troops.

Alliance support ended on 31 December 2007 when AMIS was transferred to the United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The Alliance has expressed its readiness to consider providing support to the UN-AU hybrid peacekeeping force made up of peacekeepers and civilian police officers, if requested.
Airlifting AU peacekeepers and civilian police

Between 1 July 2005 and October 2005, NATO coordinated the strategic airlift for peacekeepers from African troop-contributing countries moving into Darfur, helping to transport almost 5,000 troops. This boosted the number of troops on the ground to 8,000.

In August 2005, on the request of the AU, the NAC agreed to assist in the transportation of civilian police. NATO coordinated the airlift of some 50 AMIS civilian police between August and October 2005.

Additionally, from September 2005, NATO provided the coordination of strategic airlift for the rotation of troops, transporting them in and out of the region.

Overall, NATO-EU Air Movement Coordinators harmonised the airlift of some 37,500 troops, civilian police and military observers in and out of the Sudanese region. NATO alone coordinated the airlift of over 31,500 AMIS troops and personnel.

NATO’s airlift was managed from Europe. A special AU Air Movement Cell at the AU’s headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, coordinated the movement of incoming troops and personnel on the ground. Both the EU and NATO provided staff to support the cell, but the AU had the lead.

Training AU personnel

For the duration of the mission, NATO also provided training assistance to AMIS in a variety of disciplines.

- Strategic-level and operational planning: training in this area focused on technologies and techniques to create an overall analysis and understanding of Darfur, and to identify the areas where the application of AU assets could best influence the operating environment and deter crises. A total of 184 AU officers benefited from this training. They were based at two different AMIS headquarters: the Darfur Integrated Task Force Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and the AMIS Force Headquarters (FHQ) in El Fasher, Sudan.

- Training on “lessons learned”: on 8 June 2006, the NAC agreed to the AU request for training assistance in the fields of pre-deployment certification and lessons learned. Following a further AU request on 19 September of the same year, NATO provided mentoring and training on how to establish a tailored “lessons learned” process for the AU. Seventy-five AMIS officers from three different headquarters (the Darfur Integrated Task Force Headquarters, the AMIS Force Headquarters and the AU Mission Headquarters in Khartoum, Sudan) were trained through these courses.

In this area, NATO was working in full complementarity with the European Union, which also provided substantive input to the process.

- Training in information management: following a Note Verbale sent by the African Union on 25 August 2006, NATO provided temporary training and mentoring on managing information to six AU officers in the Information Assessment Cell of the Darfur Integrated Task Force.

The bodies involved in decision making and implementation

Based on advice from NATO’s military authorities, the NAC agrees to provide support to the AU. With regard to NATO’s support to the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS), the then Joint Force Command Lisbon – under the overall command of Allied Command Operations - had the responsibility for the NATO Senior Military Liaison Officer (SMLO) team operating out of Addis Ababa. The SMLO team was NATO’s single
military point of contact in Addis Ababa with the AU. In addition, it was the NATO military point of contact with the representatives of the countries contributing troops to the AMIS operation, the representatives of the donor nations pledging support to the AU, the UN, the EU and various embassies.

- **The evolution of NATO’s assistance to AMIS**

On 26 April 2005, the AU asked NATO by letter to consider the possibility of providing logistical support to help expand its peace-support mission in Darfur. In May 2005, the Chairman of the AU Commission, Mr Alpha Oumar Konaré, visited NATO Headquarters to provide details of the assistance request. The next day, the NAC tasked the Alliance’s military authorities to provide, as a matter of urgency, advice on possible NATO support.

Following further consultations with the AU, the European Union and the United Nations, in June 2005, NATO formally agreed to provide airlift support as well as training. The first planes carrying AU peacekeepers took off on 1 July of the same year. Training of AU officers started on 1 August and, a few days later, the NAC agreed to assist in the transport of police to Darfur.

**Key milestones – Darfur, Sudan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26 April 2005</td>
<td>The AU requests NATO assistance in the expansion of its peacekeeping mission in Darfur.</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 May 2005</td>
<td>The Chairman of the AU Commission, Mr Alpha Oumar Konaré, is the first AU official to visit NATO Headquarters in Brussels.</td>
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<td>18 May 2005</td>
<td>The NAC agrees to task the Alliance’s military authorities to provide advice on possible NATO assistance.</td>
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<td>24 May 2005</td>
<td>The NAC agrees on initial military options for possible NATO support.</td>
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<td>26 May 2005</td>
<td>NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer participates in a meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on international support to the AU’s mission.</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 June 2005</td>
<td>Alliance Defence Ministers announce the decision to assist the AU peace-support operation in Darfur with the coordination of strategic airlift and staff capacity-building.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 July 2005</td>
<td>The NATO airlift begins.</td>
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<td>1 August 2005</td>
<td>NATO training of AU officers begins.</td>
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<td>5 August 2005</td>
<td>On the request of the AU, the NAC agrees to assist in the transport of civilian police to Darfur.</td>
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<tr>
<td>21 September 2005</td>
<td>The NAC agrees to extend the duration of NATO’s airlift support for the remaining peacekeeping reinforcements until 31 October 2005.</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 November 2005</td>
<td>The NAC agrees to extend NATO’s coordination of strategic airlift by two months, until end May 2006, in view of the AU’s troop rotation schedule.</td>
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<td>29 March 2006</td>
<td>Following a phone call from UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on 27 March, the NAC announces its readiness to continue NATO’s current mission. The NAC tasks NATO military authorities to offer advice for possible NATO support to an anticipated follow-on UN mission in Darfur.</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 April 2006</td>
<td>The NAC announces its readiness to continue NATO’s current mission until 30 September.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 May 2006</td>
<td>Two parties sign the Darfur Peace Agreement.</td>
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30 May 2006  UN Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, Mr Jan Egeland, visits NATO HQ to discuss Darfur and the role of the military in disaster relief.

2 June 2006  The Chairman of the AU Commission, Mr Alpha Oumar Konaré, requests the extension of NATO’s airlift and training support, as well as additional forms of assistance.

8 June 2006  Defence Ministers state NATO’s willingness to expand its training assistance to AMIS and the Alliance’s willingness to consider support to an anticipated follow-on UN mission. The coordination of strategic airlift is extended until the end of 2006.

16 November 2006  The Addis Ababa meeting introduces the notion of an AU-UN hybrid peacekeeping mission.

28-29 November 2006  At the Riga Summit, NATO reaffirms its support to the AU and its willingness to broaden this support. It also reiterates its commitment to coordinating with other international actors.

14 December 2006  NATO decides to extend its support mission for six additional months.

15 December 2006  US Special Envoy to Darfur, Ambassador Andrew Natsios, meets NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at NATO Headquarters, Brussels.

15 January 2007  NATO agrees to provide staff capacity-training at the AU Mission HQ in Khartoum, in addition to training provided in El Fasher and Addis Ababa.

14 June 2007  NATO Defence Ministers reiterate the Alliance’s commitment to Darfur and welcome the agreement of the Sudanese Government to a UN-AU hybrid mission in Darfur.

6-7 December 2007  NATO Foreign Ministers express readiness to continue Alliance support to the AU in Darfur, in agreement with the UN and the AU.

2-4 April 2008  At the Bucharest Summit, NATO states its concern for the situation in Darfur and its readiness to support AU peacekeeping efforts in the region.

3-4 April 2009  At the Strasbourg/ Kehl Summit, NATO reiterates its concern over Darfur and, more generally, Sudan. Stressing the principle of African ownership, NATO states that it is ready to consider further requests for support from the AU, including regional capacity-building.
Assistance for the refugee and migrant crisis in the Aegean Sea

As Europe faces the greatest refugee and migrant crisis since the end of the Second World War, NATO is providing support to assist with the consequences of this humanitarian crisis.

Highlights

- The current refugee and migrant crisis, caused by conflict and instability on NATO’s southern borders, is being fuelled by human trafficking and criminal networks.
- In February 2016, on the request of Germany, Greece and Turkey, NATO decided to join international efforts in dealing with this crisis.
- NATO is contributing to international efforts to stem illegal trafficking and illegal migration in the Aegean Sea, through intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in the Aegean Sea and at the Turkish-Syrian border.
- To this end, NATO is cooperating with the European Union’s border management agency Frontex, in full compliance with international law and the law of the sea.

More background information

NATO’s role and contribution

Following a request from Germany, Greece and Turkey, NATO defence ministers decided on 11 February 2016 to assist with the growing refugee and migrant crisis in Europe. NATO has deployed a maritime force in the Aegean Sea to conduct reconnaissance, monitoring and surveillance of illegal crossings, in support of Turkish and Greek authorities and the EU’s Frontex agency.

NATO maritime forces are deployed in the Aegean Sea to contribute critical, real-time information to Greece and Turkey, as well as to Frontex, in light of the ongoing humanitarian crisis.
NATO’s Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2) is conducting reconnaissance, monitoring and surveillance of illegal crossings in the territorial waters of Greece and Turkey, as well as in international waters with its maritime and air assets. It is sharing whatever relevant information it finds with the Greek and Turkish coast guards and authorities. Greece and Turkey will only be operating in their own territorial waters and airspace. NATO is also sharing this information in real-time with Frontex so that it can take even more effective action. Since NATO’s ships are larger than Frontex vessels, NATO sensors and radars have a broader reach and complement Frontex assets.

The purpose of NATO’s deployment is to assist Allies and Frontex in carrying out their duties in the face of the crisis. In accordance with international law, all ships that sail, including NATO ships, have to rescue people in distress at sea. Allied vessels will live up to their national responsibility to assist. Finer details of the mission itself, including its timeframe, are currently being finalised.

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**Composition and command of the deployments**

SNMG2 is currently led by a German flagship and is composed of just over half a dozen vessels. A number of Allies have announced that they will be reinforcing this Group so the mission and its configuration is reviewed on a regular basis.

SNMG2 is one of two Standing NATO Maritime Groups – SNMG1 and SNMG2. SNMGs fall under the authority of Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM), Northwood, United Kingdom, the commander of which is Vice Admiral Clive Johnstone, UK Navy. These are multinational, integrated maritime forces made up of vessels from various Allied countries. These vessels are permanently available to NATO to perform different tasks ranging from exercises to operational missions. They function according to the operational needs of the Alliance, therefore helping to maintain optimal flexibility. Their composition varies and they are usually composed of between two and six ships from as many NATO member countries.

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**NATO-EU cooperation**

The refugee and migrant crisis is the worst humanitarian crisis Europe has witnessed since 1945. NATO has established arrangements enabling direct links with Frontex at the operational and tactical levels. This will allow the exchange of liaison officers and the sharing of information in real time so that Frontex can take even more effective action. In April 2016, a Frontex liaison officer first embarked on the flagship.

Since February 2016, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has held discussions on the refugee and migrant crisis with several EU counterparts including the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, the EU High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission, Federica Mogherini, and the European Commissioner for Migration, Dimitris Avramopoulos.
A ”comprehensive approach” to crises

Lessons learned from NATO operations show that addressing crisis situations calls for a comprehensive approach combining political, civilian and military instruments. Building on its unique capabilities and operational experience, NATO can contribute to the efforts of the international community for maintaining peace, security and stability, in full coordination with other actors. Military means, although essential, are not enough on their own to meet the many complex challenges to our security. The effective implementation of a comprehensive approach to crisis situations requires nations, international organisations and non-governmental organisations to contribute in a concerted effort.

**Highlights**

- Different actors contribute to a comprehensive approach based on a shared sense of responsibility, openness and determination, taking into account their respective strengths, mandates and roles, as well as their decision-making autonomy.
- In March 2011, NATO updated the list of tasks of its Comprehensive Approach Action Plan.
- These tasks are being implemented by a dedicated civilian-military task force that involves all relevant NATO bodies and commands.
- This implementation is a permanent mindset of the Alliance’s internal and external strands of work.
- Four key areas: planning and conduct of operations; lessons learned, training, education and exercises; cooperation with external actors; and strategic communication.

**More background information**

**Planning and conduct of operations**

NATO takes full account of all military and non-military aspects of crisis management, and is working to improve practical cooperation at all levels with all relevant organisations and actors in the planning and conduct of operations. The Alliance promotes the clear definition of strategies and objectives among all relevant actors before launching an operation, as well as enhanced cooperative planning.

The Allies agree that, as a general rule, elements of stabilisation and reconstruction are best undertaken by those actors and organisations that have the relevant expertise, mandate and competence. However, there can be circumstances which may hamper other actors from undertaking these tasks, or undertaking them without support from NATO.

To improve NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach and its ability to contribute, when required, to stabilisation and reconstruction, Allies agreed to form an appropriate but modest civilian capability to interact more effectively with other actors and conduct appropriate planning in crisis management. Moreover, a Comprehensive Approach Specialist Support (COMPASS) programme was set up in 2009 to build up a database of national civil experts in three main fields – political, stabilisation and reconstruction, and media – to be drawn upon for advice at the strategic, operational and theatre levels.

**Lessons learned, training, education and exercises**

Applying a comprehensive approach means a change of mindset. The Alliance is therefore emphasising joint training of civilian and military personnel. This promotes the sharing of lessons learned and also helps build trust and confidence between NATO, its partners and other international and local actors, which in turn encourages better coordination. In some cases, lessons learned are being developed at staff level with the United Nations (UN), for example, related to Libya and Kosovo.
NATO also regularly invites international organisations to participate in NATO exercises to share knowledge about Alliance procedures for crisis response, as well as share views and perspectives.

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Enhancing cooperation with external actors

NATO is actively building closer links with other organisations and actors on a regular basis while respecting the autonomy of decision-making of each organisation.

Cooperation has become well established with the UN, UN agencies, the European Union and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, in particular, as well as with the World Bank, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Organization for Migration, the African Union, INTERPOL and the League of Arab States. This takes the form of staff talks, staff-to-staff contacts at various levels, high-level exchanges, ‘NATO education days’ and workshops. At the Wales Summit in September 2014, for instance, NATO foreign ministers held for the first time a meeting with the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to discuss closer cooperation and issues of common concern.

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Strategic communication

To be effective, a comprehensive approach to crisis management must be complemented by sustained and coherent public messages. NATO’s information campaigns are substantiated by systematic and updated information, documenting progress in relevant areas. Efforts are also being made to share communication strategies with international actors and to coordinate communications in theatre.
Troop contributions

When a NATO operation or mission is deemed necessary, NATO member and partner countries volunteer personnel, equipment and resources for the mission. These national contributions operate under the aegis of the Alliance.

Highlights

- An alliance of 28 sovereign countries, NATO relies on the military forces of its member countries to carry out an operation or mission because it does not possess military forces of its own.
- Personnel serving in a NATO operation are referred to as “NATO forces”, but are actually multinational forces from NATO countries and, in some cases, partner or other troop-contributing countries.
- “Force generation” is the procedure by which Allies (and partner countries) resource the personnel and equipment needed to carry out North Atlantic Council-approved operations and missions.
- National capitals take the final decision on whether to contribute to a NATO-led operation or mission.
- Allied Command Operations (ACO), commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), is responsible for executing all NATO operations and missions, and the Deputy SACEUR coordinates troop contributions.

More background information

Obtaining troop contributions

When the North Atlantic Council consents to an operation or mission, NATO’s military authorities draft a concept of operations – referred to as CONOPS – which outlines the minimum military requirements that are needed. Force generation is the procedure in which those required resources are obtained from Allies.
(and partners) to provide the Operational Commander with the necessary capabilities at the right scale and readiness to accomplish the mission. Force generation applies to all current NATO-led operations and missions.

**The force generation process**

The force generation process follows a standard procedure and is handled by the Allied Command Operations (ACO) Force Generation Branch and National Military Representatives (NMRs). For a given operation or mission, the Operational Commander sends his requirements in terms of equipment, manpower and resources (referred to as the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements) to ACO. It is then passed to NATO member countries and, in some cases, partner countries. While the Force Generation Branch at ACO is responsible for resourcing the required capabilities, the final decision on contributions is taken by national capitals.

At the subsequent Force Generation Conference, NATO and partner countries then make formal offers of personnel and equipment to support the operation or mission. Since 2003, a Global Force Generation Conference has been held as required to discuss all NATO-led operations and missions.

These contributions may be subject to some national limitations (known as “caveats”) such as rules of engagement. These restrictions influence NATO’s operational planning. Therefore, the Alliance seeks national contributions with as few caveats as possible.

The force generation process is complete when nations reply with a Force Preparation (FORCEPREP) message, which provides the details of the national contributions as well as any caveats on the employment of forces.

Countries that provide leadership for an entire operation or mission, or take responsibility for central elements such as the land brigade in the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), are identified as “framework nations.” They typically provide the command element and a significant part of the forces, and will coordinate with other Allies to fill the remainder of the force required.

Although NATO as an alliance does own and maintain some specialised equipment, such as the AWACS aircraft and strategic communications equipment, troop-contributing countries generally commit the equipment necessary to support their personnel in pursuit of operational objectives.

**Coordinating troop contributions for non-NATO operations**

Over the years, the Alliance has developed significant expertise in coordinating troop contributions for multinational operations and has offered this expertise in support of non-NATO operations.

Under the Berlin Plus agreement, the Alliance cooperates closely with the European Union (EU) in the resourcing of selected operations. When requested by the EU, NATO’s Deputy SACEUR and his staff provide support in coordinating member countries’ troop contributions. For example, the Deputy SACEUR was identified as operational commander for Operation Althea, the EU-led operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and was responsible for force generation.

NATO also provided force generation support to Germany and the Netherlands, during their leadership of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2003 in Afghanistan, prior to its conversion into a NATO-led operation.

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**Force generation through time**

For much of NATO’s history, the Alliance’s primary operational commitment was focused on the former border between East and West Germany. For over 40 years, NATO strategists spoke of medium- and long-term “force plans” because during that time, the Alliance maintained static, “conventional” forces in former West Germany, poised for an attack from the former Soviet Union. Beginning in 1986, conventional forces were reduced and bases of individual NATO countries in Germany were largely dismantled or converted to other use after the Cold War.
NATO’s first major land expeditionary operation took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a result of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. The NATO force generation process, which is still in use today, was developed during the NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and later in Kosovo.

**Transforming to meet operational needs**

While the core procedures for contributing troops and equipment remain the same, the force generation process has been refined to reflect changes in the types of operations and missions that NATO conducts.

For example, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) established in Afghanistan under the NATO-led ISAF operation, were comprised of a unique combination of military and civilian personnel who worked to extend the authority of the central Afghan government in remote areas, and to facilitate development and reconstruction. NATO was involved in generating forces for the military component of a PRT, while it was the responsibility of the contributing country to staff the civilian components. As a result, PRTs were a hybrid of personnel who fell under either NATO or national chains of command. Although PRTs were gradually phased out by end 2014 in agreement with the Afghan authorities, they illustrate the need for great flexibility in force generation processes in order to achieve operational objectives.

Today, NATO military planners are looking beyond immediate needs, allowing both the Alliance and troop-contributing countries to plan their resources better. The goal is to understand the relationships at play in order to achieve fair and realistic burden-sharing during NATO-led operations and missions.
Partnerships: building security through cooperation

Many of the challenges NATO faces require cooperation with other stakeholders in the international community. Over the past 25 years, the Alliance has developed a network of regional partnership frameworks with 41 partner countries from the Euro-Atlantic area, the Mediterranean and the Gulf region, as well as individual relationships with other partners across the globe. NATO pursues dialogue and practical cooperation with these nations on a wide range of political and security-related issues. NATO’s partnerships are beneficial to all involved and contribute to improved security for the broader international community.

Highlights

- Partners are part of many of NATO’s core activities, from shaping policy to building defence capacity, developing interoperability and managing crises.
- NATO’s programmes also help partner nations to develop their own defence and security institutions and forces.
- In partnering with NATO, partners can:
  - share insights on areas of common interest or concern through political consultations and intelligence-sharing;
  - participate in a rich menu of education, training and consultation events (over 1,200 events a year are open to partners through a Partnership Cooperation Menu);
  - prepare together for future operations and missions by participating in exercises and training;
  - contribute to current NATO-led operations and missions;
  - share lessons learned from past operations and develop policy for the future;
  - work together with Allies on research and capability development.
- Through partnership, NATO and partners also pursue a broad vision of security:
  - integrating gender perspectives into security and defence;
  - fighting against corruption in the defence sector;
  - enhancing efforts to control or destroy arms, ammunition and unexploded ordnance;
  - advancing joint scientific projects.
- Partnership has evolved over the years, to encompass more nations, more flexible instruments, and new forms of cooperation and consultation.
More background information

A flexible network of partnerships with non-member countries

Dialogue and cooperation with partners can make a concrete contribution to enhance international security, to defend the values on which the Alliance is based, to NATO’s operations, and to prepare interested nations for membership.

In both regional frameworks and on a bilateral level, NATO develops relations based on common values, reciprocity, mutual benefit and mutual respect.

In the Euro-Atlantic area, the 28 Allies engage in relations with 22 partner countries through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace – a major programme of bilateral cooperation with individual Euro-Atlantic partners. Among these partners, NATO has developed specific structures for its relationships with Russia\(^1\), Ukraine and Georgia.

NATO is developing relations with the seven countries on the southern Mediterranean rim through the Mediterranean Dialogue, as well as with four countries from the Gulf region through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

NATO also cooperates with a range of countries which are not part of these regional partnership frameworks. Referred to as “partners across the globe”, they include Afghanistan, Australia, Iraq, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand and Pakistan.

NATO has also developed flexible means of cooperation with partners, across different regions. NATO can work with so-called “28+n” groups of partners, where partners are chosen based on a common interest or theme. At the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO introduced the possibility of “enhanced opportunities” for certain partners to build a deeper, more tailor-made bilateral relationship with NATO. At the same time, Allied leaders launched the “Interoperability Platform”, a permanent format for cooperation with partners on the interoperability needed for future crisis management and operations.

Key objectives of NATO’s partnerships

Under NATO’s partnership policies, the strategic objectives of NATO’s partner relations are to:

- Enhance Euro-Atlantic and international security, peace and stability;
- Promote regional security and cooperation;
- Facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation on issues of common interest, including international efforts to meet emerging security challenges;
- Prepare interested eligible nations for NATO membership;
- Promote democratic values and reforms;
- Enhance support for NATO-led operations and missions;
- Enhance awareness of security developments including through early warning, with a view to preventing crises;
- Build confidence and achieve better mutual understanding, including about NATO’s role and activities, in particular through enhanced public diplomacy.

\(^1\) In April 2014, NATO foreign ministers decided to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia but to maintain political contacts at the level of ambassadors and above.
That said, each partner determines—with NATO—the pace, scope, intensity and focus of their partnership with NATO, as well as individual objectives. This is often captured in a document setting goals for the relationship, which can be regularly reviewed. However, many of NATO’s partnership activities involve more than one partner at a time.

**Partnership in practice: how NATO works with partners**

In practice, NATO’s partnership objectives are taken forward through a broad variety of means. Broadly speaking, NATO opens up parts of its processes, procedures and structures to the participation of partners, allowing partners to make concrete contributions through these. In some cases, special programmes have been created to assist and engage partners on their specific needs. Key areas for cooperation are set out below:

**Consultation** is key to the work of NATO as an alliance and is central to partnerships. Political consultations can help understand security developments, including regional issues, and shape common approaches to preventing crises or tackling a security challenge. NATO’s many committees and bodies often meet in formations with partners to shape cooperation in specific areas. NATO Allies meet with partners (individually or in groups) on a broad variety of subjects and at a variety of levels every day.

**Interoperability** is the ability to operate together using harmonized standards, doctrines, procedures and equipment. It is essential to the work of an alliance of multiple countries with national defence forces, and is equally important for working together with partners that wish to contribute in supporting the Alliance in achieving its tactical, operational and strategic objectives. Much of day-to-day cooperation in NATO—including with partners—is focused on achieving this interoperability. In 2014, recognising the importance of maintaining interoperability with partners for future crisis management, NATO launched the Partnership Interoperability Initiative, which inter alia launched mechanisms for enhanced cooperation with nations that wished to maintain deeper interoperability with NATO.

Partners contribute to NATO-led operations and missions, whether through supporting peace by training security forces in the Western Balkans and Afghanistan or monitoring maritime activity in the Mediterranean Sea or off the Horn of Africa. As contributors to those missions, partners are invited to shape policy and decisions that affect those missions, alongside Allies. A number of tools have been created to assist partners in developing their ability to participate in NATO-led operations, and be interoperable with Allies’ forces.

For many years, NATO has worked with partners on defence reform, capability and capacity-building, including through education and training. Such work can go from strategic objective setting and joint reviews, to expert assistance and advice, as well as targeted education and training. In 2014, at the Wales Summit, NATO adopted the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative (see more below). The Initiative builds on NATO’s extensive track record and expertise in supporting, advising, assisting, training and mentoring countries requiring capacity building support of the Alliance.

NATO also engages with partners in a broad variety of other areas where it has developed expertise and programmes. These include:

- Counter-terrorism;
- Counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;
- Emerging security challenges, such as those related to cyber defence, energy security and maritime security, including counter-piracy;
- Civil emergency planning.
Towards more flexibility: evolutions in NATO’s partnerships

NATO’s partnerships began in 1990, when, at the London Summit, NATO pledged to “extend... the hand of friendship” to its former adversaries in the Cold War. This soon led to the creation of cooperation structures, such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1991. In January 1994, the Partnership for Peace was launched, NATO’s first formal partnership programme, focused on NATO’s neighbours in Europe and the former Soviet Union. The same year, Allies launched the Mediterranean Dialogue for its Mediterranean neighbours. In 2004, Allies launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative for Gulf countries, and over the years, through cooperation in NATO missions and operations, NATO developed and built relations with partners further across the globe.

Reflecting the significant evolutions in NATO’s partnerships policy, in line with the new Strategic Concept adopted in 2010, a focused effort to reform NATO’s partnerships policy was launched at the 2010 Lisbon Summit to make dialogue and cooperation more inclusive, flexible, meaningful and strategically oriented. This resulted in a new partnership policy, which was endorsed by NATO foreign ministers at their meeting in Berlin in April 2011.

The new policy aimed to reinforce existing partnerships by strengthening consultation mechanisms and by facilitating more substance-driven cooperation. In addition, the new policy outlined a “toolbox” of mechanisms and activities for cooperation with partners.

In line with the Strategic Concept, NATO is offering its partners “more political engagement with the Alliance, and a substantial role in shaping strategy and decisions on NATO-led operations to which they contribute”. The Political-Military Framework, which governs the way NATO involves partners in political consultation and the decision-making process for operations and missions to which they contribute, was updated, giving contributing partners decision-shaping authority but not the same decision-making authority as member countries.

The Berlin policy also took steps to broaden and streamline tools across all regional frameworks. A baseline tool for bilateral cooperation was introduced – the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP) – while access to the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) and the Planning and Review Process (PARP) was widened beyond the PfP countries. All partners were given access to a single Partnership Cooperation Menu (PCM), comprising more than a thousand activities which could be chosen to advance the objectives for cooperation. Many other tools were made available to other partners, according to the specific areas of cooperation they wish to develop with the Alliance.

The Berlin policy decisions opened up the possibility for new forms of political dialogue with partners, including through more flexible “28+n” formats (thematic or event-driven), and are used, on a case-by-case basis, to enhance consultation on security issues of common concern and cooperation in priority policy areas, such as counter-piracy, counter-narcotics in Afghanistan, and cyber defence. The 2011 policy also opened up the possibility of developing deeper relations with partners across the globe as well as key global actors and other new interlocutors across the globe which share the Allies’ interest in peaceful international relations but have no individual programme of cooperation with NATO.

At the Wales Summit in September 2014, NATO leaders endorsed two important initiatives to reinforce the Alliance’s commitment to the core task of cooperative security: the Partnership Interoperability Initiative and the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative. The first initiative was designed to reinforce NATO’s ability to provide security with partners in future, through interoperability; while the second was more focused on helping partners provide for their own security, by strengthening their defence and related security capacity.

The Partnership Interoperability Initiative provides measures designed to ensure that the deep connections built between NATO and partner forces over years of operations will be maintained and deepened so that partners can contribute to future NATO-led operations and, where applicable, to the NATO Response Force. The Partnership Interoperability Initiative has introduced a number of innovations, including the possibility of granting specific partners enhanced opportunities for deeper
cooperation. Five partners (Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan and Sweden) currently have access to this enhanced cooperation, which includes easing the process for these nations to participate in exercises and enabling regular consultation on security matters.

Another innovation concerns the establishment of the Interoperability Platform, a standing forum for meetings with 25 partners that have contributed to NATO operations or have taken concrete steps to deepen their interoperability with NATO. In this format, Allies and partners discuss projects and issues that affect interoperability, such as education, training, exercises, evaluation, capability development, command and control systems, and logistics.

The Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative builds on NATO's extensive track record and expertise in supporting, advising, assisting, training and mentoring countries requiring capacity building support of the Alliance. It aims to reinforce NATO's commitment to partner nations and help the Alliance to project stability without deploying large combat forces, as part of the Alliance's overall contribution to international security, stability and conflict prevention. The programme is demand-driven, and Allies have agreed to offer DCB packages to Georgia, Iraq, Jordan and the Republic of Moldova, following their requests.
Partnership Interoperability Initiative

The Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII) was launched at the Wales Summit in 2014 to ensure that the deep connections built up between NATO and partner forces over years of operations will be maintained and deepened. In this way, partners can contribute to future crisis management, including NATO-led operations and, where applicable, to the NATO Response Force.

Highlights

- NATO partners contribute to NATO-led operations and missions, as well as exercises, often significantly.
- Partner forces need to be interoperable – able to operate together with NATO forces according to NATO standards, rules, procedures and using similar equipment.
- At the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO launched the Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII) to maintain and deepen the interoperability that has been developed with partners during NATO-led operations and missions over the last decades.
- The PII underlined the importance of interoperability for all its partnerships and proposed new means to deepen cooperation with those partners that wished to be more interoperable with NATO.
- As a result of the PII, NATO granted tailor-made “enhanced opportunities” for deeper cooperation with five partners: Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan and Sweden.
- The PII also launched the “Interoperability Platform” (IP) to provide a wider group of partners with deeper access to cooperation on interoperability issues – currently 25 selected partners, who are interested and committed to deepening interoperability for future crises, participate in meetings of a number of NATO committees and bodies held in the IP format.

A focus on interoperability

Partners can contribute to NATO-led operations and missions – whether through supporting peace by training security forces in the Western Balkans and Afghanistan, or monitoring maritime activity in the Mediterranean Sea or off the Horn of Africa – as well as NATO exercises. To be able to contribute effectively, partners need to be interoperable with NATO.
Interoperability is the ability to operate together using harmonised standards, doctrines, procedures and equipment. It is essential to the work of an alliance of multiple countries with national defence forces, and is equally important for working together with partners that wish to contribute in supporting NATO in achieving its tactical, operational and strategic objectives. Much of day-to-day cooperation in NATO – including with partners – is focused on achieving this interoperability.

**The Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII)**

In 2014, Allied leaders responded to the need to maintain and enhance interoperability built up with partners during years of operations (including in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans), recognising the importance of maintaining interoperability with partners for future crisis management. NATO launched the Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII), which aims to:

- re-emphasise the importance of developing interoperability with and for all partners, and of ensuring that all existing partnership interoperability programmes are used to their full potential;
- enhance support for those partners that wish to maintain and enhance their interoperability, including through deeper cooperation and dialogue;
- offer enhanced opportunities for cooperation to those partners that provide sustained and significant force, capability or other contributions to the Alliance;
- underline that interoperability also needs to be a priority for NATO’s relations with other international organisations with a role in international crisis management.

**More tailor-made cooperation: ”Enhanced Opportunities Partners”**

The PII recognised that deeper interoperability underpins and complements closer relations between NATO and partners. As partner nations’ contributions to NATO missions and operations as well as force pools became more ambitious and complex, they would benefit from a more tailor-made relationship to help sustain such contributions, based on specific “enhanced opportunities” for cooperation, including:

- regular, political consultations on security matters, including possibly at ministerial level;
- enhanced access to interoperability programmes and exercises;
- sharing information, including on lessons learned;
- closer association of such partners in times of crisis and the preparation of operations.

Shortly after the 2014 Wales Summit, five partners were granted these “enhanced opportunities”: Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, and Sweden. Since then, each “Enhanced Opportunities Partner” (EOP) has taken forward this programme of cooperation with NATO in a tailor-made manner, in areas of mutual interest for NATO and the partner concerned.

**A standing format for cooperation on interoperability issues: the Interoperability Platform**

Interoperability for current and future military cooperation to tackle security challenges is a key focus of day-to-day work at NATO, including in a broad range of committees, working groups and expert communities. The PII recognised that if partners are to be interoperable to manage crises with NATO tomorrow, they need to work with NATO on interoperability issues today – and be part of those discussions.

This is why the PII launched a standing format for NATO-partner cooperation on interoperability and related issues: the Interoperability Platform (IP). The format cuts across traditional, geographical frameworks for cooperation, and brings together all partners that have contributed to NATO operations or have taken concrete steps to deepen their interoperability with NATO. Participation in these programmes...
and activities changes, so the North Atlantic Council – the Alliance’s highest political decision-making body – adjusts participation every year. As of 2016, 25 partners are members of the IP.

In this format, Allies and partners discuss projects and issues that affect interoperability for future crisis management, such as command and control systems, education and training, exercises or logistics.

Recognising the breadth and depth of work needed on interoperability, any NATO committee or body can meet in IP format, at different levels. It was launched by a meeting of defence ministers in IP format at the Wales Summit, and since then has met in a number of configurations at NATO Headquarters, including at the level of the North Atlantic Council, the Military Committee, the Partnerships and Cooperative Security Committee, the Operations Policy Committee, and technical groups such as the Conference of National Armaments Directors, the Command, Control and Consultation Board, the Civil Emergency Planning Committee and others. At the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, the defence ministers of the IP nations will meet with their NATO counterparts to review progress since Wales.

The following 25 partners are part of the IP as of 2016:

Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, New Zealand, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\(^1\), Tunisia, Ukraine, and the United Arab Emirates.

\(^1\) Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative

The Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative reinforces NATO’s commitment to partners and helps project stability by providing support to nations requesting defence capacity assistance from NATO. It can include various types of support, ranging from strategic advice on defence and security sector reform and institution building, to development of local forces through education and training, or advice and assistance in specialised areas such as logistics or cyber defence.

**Highlights**

- The DCB Initiative was launched in September 2014 at the NATO Summit in Wales.
- The initiative is demand driven and tailored to the needs of the recipient nation by providing support which reinforces and exceeds what is offered through other existing programmes.
- Specialised support can be provided in areas where NATO adds particular value thanks to its extensive track record and expertise in advising, assisting, training and mentoring countries that require capacity building support.
- DCB packages have been launched for Georgia, Iraq, Jordan and the Republic of Moldova, and NATO stands ready to provide advisory support to Libya should a request be made.
- The packages are implemented thanks to the generous contributions of Allies and partners, who have provided advisors, trainers and coordinators to work with the recipient countries, and funded projects. A DCB Trust Fund is in place for this purpose.
- DCB is one of NATO’s key tools to contribute to the international community’s efforts to project stability beyond the territory of NATO. “Projecting stability” will be one of the themes of the Warsaw Summit in July 2016.
More background information

Cooperation with DCB partners

NATO has been providing capacity building through a number of partnership programmes and also as part of its operations and missions. The DCB Initiative enhances this role by allowing NATO to undertake DCB activities in support of partner nations, other non-member nations or other international organisations. Any NATO assistance is provided following a specific request by the recipient country, which is then thoroughly assessed and considered by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), and relies on mutual political commitment and local ownership. If existing programmes cannot accommodate the request, then the Alliance may consider offering a tailored set of assistance measures – a specific “DCB package”. Four DCB packages have been launched thus far.

- Georgia

The DCB package for Georgia was agreed in September 2014 at the Wales Summit.

It is provided through the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP) and includes: establishing a Joint Training and Evaluation Centre, a Defence Institution Building School and a Logistics Capability, as well as providing expert advice in the areas of acquisition, strategic and operational plans, Special Operations Forces, military police, cyber defence, maritime security, aviation, air defence and strategic communications. The package also includes support and contributions to NATO exercises in Georgia that are open to partners.

Since December 2014, several projects and advisory activities have been launched and the SNGP Core Team has been established in Tbilisi to coordinate the implementation of the package. One of the highlights was the inauguration of the NATO-Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Centre in August 2015 by Georgian leaders and the NATO Secretary General. The centre is tasked with strengthening the capacities of the Georgian Armed Forces, as well as improving the interoperability of Georgian and Allied forces and contributing to regional security cooperation.

The next steps forward will focus on providing experts and developing projects as needed to meet the commitments from Wales. In addition, NATO and Georgia are exploring new ways to deepen their cooperation.

- Iraq

The DCB package for Iraq was agreed in July 2015 following a request from the Iraqi prime minister.

The package includes: assistance in the areas of counter-IED, explosive ordnance disposal and demining; military medicine and medical assistance; advice on security sector reform; civil-military planning support to operations; civil emergency planning and civil preparedness; cyber defence; and military training.

Implementation of the DCB package has started in all seven areas. Training of Iraqi forces in the immediate priority areas began in April 2016 in Jordan and further sessions are scheduled over the next several months. In this context, NATO has approved a multi-year project in the area of counter-IED, explosive ordnance disposal and demining under the framework of NATO’s Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme.

One of the key principles of NATO’s DCB efforts is to avoid duplication and develop synergies with other international actors. As such, NATO works closely with the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, the European Union, the United Nations and individual nations providing support to Iraq. At the Warsaw Summit, the Alliance may consider recommendations for NATO training and capacity building in Iraq.
• **Jordan**

Agreed in September 2014 at the Wales Summit, the DCB package for Jordan builds upon the already extensive level of cooperation between NATO and Jordan through various partnership tools.

The package focuses on the areas of: information protection, cyber defence, military exercises, counter-IED, communications, command and control, harbour protection and defence-related border security.

Activities have been launched on all elements of the package, ranging from courses for Jordanian personnel on counter-IED to advice on strategy and capability development in other areas. The support provided on counter-IED, cyber defence and exercises has been particularly fruitful. Jordan will host the NATO Regional Exercise 2017 (REGEX 2017), the first NATO exercise to be held in a Mediterranean Dialogue country, and it is expected that Jordan will continue to participate in future NATO exercises as applicable.

• **Republic of Moldova**

Following the commitment made at the Wales Summit, the DCB package for Moldova was launched in June 2015.

The package will be delivered in two phases. In phase one, which is currently underway, NATO is advising and assisting in the establishment of a national security strategy, defence plans, force structures and capability requirements. NATO brings experts to Moldova on a frequent basis to assist Moldovan authorities as they develop key political and strategic level direction and guidance for the defence sector and the development of the armed forces. In parallel to the defence sector reform, NATO has been providing support to Moldova in several specific areas, such as cyber security, defence education and building integrity.

In phase two, NATO will continue to provide advice and will assist with specific elements of the transformation of Moldova's armed forces and relevant institutions.
Partnership tools

NATO has developed a number of partnership tools and mechanisms to support cooperation with partner countries through a mix of policies, programmes, action plans and other arrangements. Many tools are focused on the important priorities of interoperability and building capabilities, and supporting defence and security-related reform.

Highlights

- A Partnership Cooperation Menu comprising approximately 1,400 activities is accessible to all NATO partners.
- Several initiatives are open to all partners that allow them to cooperate with NATO mainly focusing on interoperability and building capacity, and supporting defence and security-related reform.
- Partnership tools for deeper bilateral cooperation with individual partners in specific areas include, for instance, the Planning and Review Process, the Operational Capabilities Concept and the Individual Partnership Action Plans.

Setting objectives for cooperation

Each partner determines the pace, scope, intensity and focus of their partnership with NATO, as well as individual objectives. Bilateral (NATO-partner) cooperation documents set out the main objectives and goals of that partner’s cooperation with NATO. There are three main types of bilateral partnership documents, set out below. Broadly speaking, the type of document chosen reflects the different nature and emphasis of the relationship.

The **Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP)** is the standard document, developed usually every two years by the partner in close consultation with NATO staffs, and then
approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the partner. It is open to all partners, and is modular in structure, adaptable to the interests and objectives of the partner and NATO.

The Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), which partners can take up instead of IPCPs, offer partners the opportunity to deepen their cooperation with NATO and sharpen the focus on domestic reform efforts. Developed on a two-year basis, these plans include a wide range of jointly agreed objectives and targets for reforms on political issues as well as security and defence issues. IPAP prioritises and coordinates all aspects of the NATO-partner relationship, provides for an enhanced political dialogue and systematic support to democratic and defence and related security sector reform, including through an annual Allied assessment of progress in reforms undertaken by each participating partner.

The Annual National Programme (ANP) is the most demanding document, focused on comprehensive democratic, security and defence reforms, developed annually by the partner in consultation with NATO. The ANP is open to Membership Action Plan (MAP) nations, to track progress on the road to NATO membership; Georgia in the context of the NATO-Georgia Commission; and Ukraine in the context of the NATO-Ukraine Commission. Unlike the IPCP or IPAP, the ANP is a nationally owned document and is not agreed by the NAC. However, an annual assessment of progress in reforms is conducted by NATO staffs, agreed by the Allies, and discussed with each participating partner at NAC level.

Building capabilities and interoperability

Partner countries have made and continue to make significant contributions to the Alliance’s operations and missions, whether it be supporting peace in the Western Balkans and Afghanistan, training national security forces in Iraq, monitoring maritime activity in the Mediterranean Sea, or helping protect civilians in Libya.

At the Wales Summit in September 2014, NATO leaders endorsed two important initiatives to reinforce the Alliance’s commitment to the core task of cooperative security: the Partnership Interoperability Initiative and the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative. The first initiative was designed to reinforce NATO’s ability to provide security with partners in future, through interoperability; while the second was more focused on helping partners provide for their own security, by strengthening their defence and related security capacity. A number of tools have been developed to assist partners in developing their own defence capacities and defence institutions, ensuring that partner forces are able to provide for their own security, capable of participating in NATO-led operations, and interoperable with Allies’ forces.

They include the following:

The Planning and Review Process (PARP) helps develop the interoperability and capabilities of forces which might be made available for NATO training, exercises and operations. Under PARP, Allies and partners, together negotiate and set planning targets with a partner country. Regular reviews measure progress. In addition, PARP also provides a framework to assist partners to develop effective, affordable and sustainable armed forces as well as to promote wider defence and security sector transformation and reform efforts. It is the main instrument used to assess the implementation of defence-related objectives and targets defined under IPAPs. PARP is open to Euro-Atlantic partners on a voluntary basis and is open to other partner countries on a case-by-case basis, upon approval of the NAC.

The Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) Evaluation and Feedback Programme is used to develop and train partner land, maritime, air or Special Operations Forces that seek to meet NATO standards. This rigorous process can often take a few years, but it ensures that partner forces are ready to work with Allied forces once deployed. Some partners use the OCC as a strategic tool to transform their defence forces. The OCC has contributed significantly to the increasing number of partner forces participating in NATO-led operations and the NATO Response Force.

Exercising is key for maintaining, testing and evaluating readiness and interoperability, also for partners. NATO offers partners a chance to participate in the Military Training and Exercise Programme
(MTEP) to promote their interoperability. Through the MTEP, a five-year planning horizon provides a starting point for exercise planning and the allocation of resources.

In addition, and on a case-by-case basis, Allies may invite partners to take part in crisis-management exercises that engage the NAC and ministries in participating capitals, and national political and military representation at NATO Headquarters, in consultations on the strategic management of crises during an exercise.

Once a partner wishes to join a NATO-led operation, the Political-Military Framework (PMF) sets out principles and guidelines for the involvement of all partner countries in political consultations and decision-shaping, in operational planning and in command arrangements for operations to which they contribute.

Several tools and programmes have been developed to provide assistance to partner countries in their own efforts to transform defence and security-related structures and policies, and to manage the economic and social consequences of reforms. An important priority is to promote the development of effective defence institutions that are under civil and democratic control.

In particular, since 2014, the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative reinforces NATO’s commitment to partners and helps project stability by providing support to nations requesting defence capacity assistance from NATO. It can include various types of support, ranging from strategic advice on defence and security sector reform and institution building, to development of local forces through education and training, or advice and assistance in specialised areas such as logistics or cyber defence.

The Building Integrity Initiative is aimed at promoting good practice, strengthening transparency, accountability and integrity to reduce the risk of corruption in the defence establishments of Allies and partners alike.

In addition, a Professional Development Programme can be launched for the civilian personnel of defence and security establishments to strengthen the capacity for democratic management and oversight.

Through the Partnership Trust Fund policy, individual Allies and partners support practical demilitarization projects and defence transformation projects in partner countries through individual Trust Funds.

### Supporting transformation through education, training and exercises

NATO offers different means to access education, training and exercises, which can help partners to train and test personnel in the various areas relevant to their NATO partnerships.

**Education and training** in various areas is offered to decision-makers, military forces, civil servants and representatives of civil society through institutions such as the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany; the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy; and some 30 national Partnership Training and Education Centres.

NATO offers partners a Partnership Cooperation Menu (PCM) – an annual catalogue which comprises, on average, some 1,400 education, training and other events for partners across 37 disciplines, held in more than 50 countries, which cater to the needs of around 10,000 participants from partner countries. In addition to NATO bodies, Allies and partners can offer contributions to the PCM.

To support education and training for defence reform, the Defence Education Enhancement Programmes (DEEPs) are tailored programmes through which the Alliance advises partners on how to build, develop and reform educational institutions in the security, defence and military domain.
Wider cooperation

The NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme promotes joint cooperative projects between Allies and partners in the field of security-related civil science and technology. Funding applications should address SPS key priorities -- these are linked to NATO’s strategic objectives and focus on projects in direct support to NATO’s operations, as well as projects that enhance defenc capacity building and address other security threats.

Disaster response and preparedness is also an important area of cooperation with partners. The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) is a 24/7 focal point for coordinating disaster-relief and consequence management efforts among NATO and partner countries, and has guided consequence-management efforts in more than 45 emergencies, including fighting floods and forest fires, and dealing with the aftermath of earthquakes.

The principles of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and related Resolutions – that form the Women, Peace and Security agenda – were first developed into a NATO policy approved by Allies and partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 2007. The Resolutions reaffirm the role of women in conflict and post-conflict situations and encourage greater participation of women and the incorporation of gender perspectives in peace and security efforts. Over the years, the policy has been updated, related action plans have been strengthened and more partner countries from across the globe have become associated with these efforts. Currently NATO’s UNSCR 1325 coalition is the largest worldwide with 55 nations associated to the Action Plan. In practice, NATO has made significant progress in embedding gender perspectives within education, training and exercises, as well as the planning and execution of missions and operations, policies and guidelines.
Relations with Ukraine

A sovereign, independent and stable Ukraine, firmly committed to democracy and the rule of law, is key to Euro-Atlantic security. Relations between NATO and Ukraine date back to the early 1990s and have since developed into one of the most substantial of NATO's partnerships. Since 2014, in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, cooperation has been intensified in critical areas.

**Highlights**

- Dialogue and cooperation started after the end of the Cold War, when newly independent Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1991) and the Partnership for Peace programme (1994).
- Relations were strengthened with the signing of the 1997 Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, which established the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) to take cooperation forward.
- Cooperation has deepened over time and is mutually beneficial with Ukraine being the only partner to have contributed actively to all NATO-led operations and missions.
- Priority is given to support for comprehensive reform in the security and defence sector, which is vital for Ukraine's democratic development and for strengthening its ability to defend itself.
- In response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, NATO has reinforced its support for capability development and capacity building in Ukraine.

**More background information**

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**Response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict**

From the very beginning of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, NATO has adopted a firm position in support of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, condemning Russia's illegal and illegitimate “annexation” of Crimea and the violence and insecurity in eastern Ukraine caused by Russia and Russian-backed separatists, expressing its full support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders.
Extensive recourse was made throughout the crisis to the NATO-Ukraine Commission to consult in view of the direct threats faced by Ukraine to its territorial integrity, political independence and security. NATO developed its response to the conflict based on strong political and practical support measures.

Following the illegal and illegitimate “annexation” of Crimea by Russia, NATO foreign ministers met with their Ukrainian counterpart on 1 April 2014, condemning Russia’s illegal military intervention in Ukraine and its violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and agreeing on measures to enhance Ukraine’s ability to provide for its own security. They further decided to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia, while leaving political and military channels of communication open.

At NATO’s Summit in Wales in September 2014, Allied leaders met with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko in the NATO-Ukraine Commission. In a joint statement, they condemned Russia’s “annexation” of Crimea and its continued and deliberate destabilisation of eastern Ukraine in violation of international law. The Allies pledged to support the efforts of the Ukrainian government to pursue a political path that meets the aspirations of the people in all regions of Ukraine without external interference. They also decided to further enhance their practical support to Ukraine, based on a significant enhancement of existing cooperation programmes as well as the development of substantial new programmes.

NATO has strongly supported the settlement of the conflict in eastern Ukraine by diplomatic means and dialogue. It has supported the Minsk agreements of September 2014 and welcomed the adoption of the Package of Measures for their implementation in February 2015. Allies have underlined that all signatories to the Minsk Agreements bear responsibility to comply with the commitments they signed up, and that Russia’s responsibility is significant, as it must stop its deliberate destabilisation of eastern Ukraine through its political, military and financial support for militants, withdraw its forces and military equipment from Ukrainian territory and fully support a political solution of the conflict. On 20 April 2016, during the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council, Allied Ambassadors reiterated NATO’s firm position on Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.

The development of practical support measures to enhance Ukraine’s ability to provide for its own security began against the background of Russia’s military escalation in Crimea with a focus on strengthening existing programmes on defence education, professional development, security sector governance and security-related scientific cooperation with Ukraine. At the NATO Summit in Wales, Allies pledged to launch substantial new programmes, with the help of Trust Funds – a mechanism which allows individual Allies and partner countries to provide financial support on a voluntary basis. Five Trust Funds were set up in critical areas of reform and capability development of the Ukrainian security and defence sector, including Command, control, communications and computers (C4); logistics and standardization; cyber defence; military career transition; and medical rehabilitation (see “Key areas of cooperation” for more details).

NATO is also providing advisory and financial support in the area of public diplomacy, media relations and strategic communications.

Moreover, the Allies have reinforced their advisory presence at the NATO Representation in Kyiv. Advisors have been seconded by Allied nations to work with their Ukrainian counterparts on key areas of security and defence sector reform and the implementation of Trust Funds and support programmes.

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**Key areas of cooperation**

Consultations and cooperation between NATO and Ukraine cover a wide range of areas including peace-support operations, defence and security sector reform, military-to-military cooperation, armaments, civil emergency planning, science and environment, and public diplomacy. Cooperation in many areas is being intensified to enhance Ukraine’s ability to provide for its own security in the wake of the conflict with Russia.
Peace-support operations

Ukraine has long been an active contributor to Euro-Atlantic security by deploying troops that work with peacekeepers from NATO and other partner countries. It is the only partner country that has contributed, at one stage or other, to all ongoing NATO-led operations and missions.

Ukraine has supported NATO-led peace-support operations in the Balkans – both Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. Ukraine continues to contribute to the Kosovo Force (KFOR), currently with a heavy engineering unit with counter-improvised explosive devices capabilities.

The country supported the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, with over-flight clearance, and allowed for the transit of supplies for forces deployed there. Ukraine also contributed medical personnel to support Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and instructors to the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan. Following the completion of ISAF’s mission at the end of 2014, Ukraine is currently supporting the NATO-led mission to train, advise and assist Afghan security forces, known as the Resolute Support mission.

From March 2005, Ukraine contributed officers to the NATO Training Mission in Iraq, which terminated in December 2011.

Ukraine has deployed ships in support of Operation Active Endeavour – NATO’s maritime operation in the Mediterranean aiming to helping deter, disrupt and protect against terrorism – six times since 2007, most recently in November 2010. At the end of 2013, it also contributed a frigate to NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield, which fights piracy off the coast of Somalia.

Ukraine is also the first partner country to have contributed to the NATO Response Force (NRF), contributing a platoon specialised in nuclear, biological and chemical threats in 2011 and strategic airlift capabilities in 2011. In 2015, Ukraine contributed the strategic airlift, naval and medical capabilities. Such contribution remains valid in 2016.

Defence and security sector reform

Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO in the area of defence and security sector reform is crucial to the ongoing transformation of Ukraine’s security posture and remains an essential part of its democratic transition.

Ukraine has sought NATO’s support in efforts to transform its Cold War legacy of massive conscript forces into smaller, professional and more mobile armed forces, able to meet the country’s security needs and to contribute actively to stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. In conclusion of the comprehensive review launched in 2014, Ukraine’s new security strategy provides for the reform of the country’s security and defence sector according to NATO standards.

NATO supports Ukraine’s defence and related security sector reform through the Joint Working Group on Defence Reform (JWGDR), and the Planning and Review Process (PARP) mechanism and the advisory mission at the NATO Representation in Kyiv. A key overarching objective of cooperation in this area is to strengthen democratic and civil control of Ukraine’s armed forces and security institutions. Allies contribute to the transformation of Ukraine’s defence and security institutions into modern and effective organisations under civil and democratic control, able to provide a credible deterrent to aggression and defence against military threats. NATO assists Ukraine in the modernisation of its force structure, command and control arrangements, the reform of its logistics system, defence capabilities, and plans and procedures.

In June 2015, NATO welcomed Ukraine’s intention to resume the PARP. NATO International Staff, International Military Staff and Strategic Command staff have worked with the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Finance, the General Staff, the Security Service of Ukraine and State Border Guard Service, the National Guard and the State Emergency Services to discuss new Partnership Goals aiming to support the achievement of strategic structural reforms and incorporate appropriate NATO standards. On 25 April 2016, a new Partnership Goal package was agreed by Allies and Ukraine which focuses on strategic reforms and institution building for the defence and security sector organisations.
Ukraine considers the PARP a fundamental mechanism to set realistic objectives and improve its defence and security forces to be able to operate alongside Allies in crisis-response operations and other activities to promote security and stability. It also considers PARP an essential tool to promote transformation and reform in the defence and related security sector. The PARP for Ukraine was relaunched in June 2015 after Ukraine ceased its participation early in 2014 due to the crisis. The new 2016 Partnership Goals package will support Ukraine reforms mandated in its 2015 National Security Strategy, and the Military Security Strategy for the security and defence sector.

Capacity-building and civil control

NATO programmes and initiatives contribute to specific aspects of strengthening civil control over defence and related security institutions, including in the intelligence sector. Improving the capacity of these institutions is of fundamental importance for Ukraine’s development as a democratic country. As part of wider cooperation in this area, a number of specific initiatives have been taken:

- A JWGDR Professional Development Programme (PDP) for civilians working in Ukraine’s defence and security institutions was launched in October 2005. The budget for this programme was doubled in 2014, with a focus on supporting transformation and reform processes by introducing NATO standards and best practices to defence and security sector, building Ukraine’s own self-sustained capacity for professional development, and improving inter-agency cooperation and information-sharing.

- A Partnership Network for Civil Society Expertise Development was launched in 2006 to promote the sharing of experience on the role of civil society in defence and security affairs among civil society groups and security practitioners in NATO member countries and Ukraine.

- In 2007, Ukraine joined the NATO Building Integrity (BI) Programme. In 2013, based on the new completion of the NATO Building Integrity Self-Assessment and Peer Review Process, a set of tailored recommendations was offered to strengthen integrity, transparency, accountability, and improve good governance and anti-corruption in the defence and related security sector. On this basis, an annual tailored programme of activities which provides two levels of assistance – specific expertise to the institutions to enhance the good governance and management of defence resources (financial, human and material), and education and training activities to develop individual capacities – is developed and reviewed annually. Since 2015, professional development Building Integrity activities are offered to the students and teaching staff of the military and related security institutions of Lviv, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Odessa and Zhitomir, as well as the National Defence University of Kyiv to further raise awareness on corruption risks and embed Building Integrity principles in existing programmes of instruction. In 2016, these educational activities are continuing in addition to the development of specific educational materials and professional trainings for the defence establishments.

- Expert talks with security sector institutions have been launched in the area of cyber defence, with the aim of enhancing inter-agency cooperation and coordination, as well as supporting the development of Ukraine’s national cyber security strategy.

Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP)

NATO developed a DEEP programme with Ukraine in response to a request from the Ukrainian Defence Minister in 2012. The programme is the biggest of its kind with any of NATO’s partner countries. It is designed to help improve and restructure the military education and professional training systems, with specific focus on eight main defence education institutions in Kyiv, Lviv, Kharkiv, Odessa and Zhitomir. The programme has two main elements: the development of teaching methods (“faculty development” for teaching staff) and curriculum development. Additionally, a high-level advisory team is supporting the Defence Ministry’s efforts to reform the military educational system. Training and professionalisation of Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) enlisted soldiers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) is critically important for the success of overall reform in the UAF and DEEP identified four gap areas in which it now facilitates Allied bilateral support: a) basic combat training programme; b) train the trainers for UAF instructors; c) development of a professional NCO career system; and d) creation of a professional military education for NCOs.
Military career transition and resettling of former military personnel

NATO supports the reintegration of former military personnel into civilian life through a wide range of projects, adjusted to the new challenges brought up by the Russia-Ukraine conflict. NATO provides concrete assistance in the form of professional retraining and provides psychological rehabilitation services to mitigate post-traumatic stress syndrome among demobilised conscripts. Additionally, NATO supports reforms of the defence and security sector for the set-up of an integrated, comprehensive military career transition system through one of the Trust Funds (see below).

Destroying stockpiles of weapons and munitions

Individual Allies are supporting the destruction of Ukraine’s stockpiles of anti-personnel mines, munitions and small arms and light weapons through Partnership Trust Fund projects. A first project involved the safe destruction of 400,000 landmines at a chemical plant in Donetsk in 2002-2003. A second project to destroy 133,000 tons of conventional munitions, 1.5 million small arms and 1000 man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) was launched in 2005. With projected costs of some €25 million, the project is to be carried out over an estimated 12 years. It is the largest demilitarization project of its kind ever to be undertaken, and will permanently increase Ukraine’s capacity to destroy surplus munitions. Another Trust Fund supports the disposal of radioactive waste from former Soviet military sites in Ukraine.

Air Situation Data Exchange (ASDE)

Ukraine joined the ASDE programme in July 2006. Through the exchange of filtered air situation information it reduces the risk of potential cross-border incidents and optimises responses to terrorist attacks using civil airplanes. Connections between NATO and Ukraine have been in operation via Hungary since end 2008 and via Turkey since mid-2011. Following the Russia-Ukraine crisis, air data information provided by NATO has been extended to cover a larger area.

Economic aspects of defence

Dialogue and exchanges of experience with experts take place with Ukraine on the economic aspects of defence. Issues covered include security aspects of economic development and economic matters, as well as topics specifically related to defence economics such as defence budgets, the management of defence resources and restructuring in the defence sector. Courses are also organised for Ukrainian staff, covering the whole budgetary process from financial planning to financial control.

Trust Funds promoting security and defence sector reform and capability development

At the Wales Summit in 2014, Allies decided to launch substantial new programmes to enhance NATO’s assistance to capability development and sustainable capacity-building in Ukraine’s security and defence sector. Five Trust Funds were set up, making use of a mechanism which allows individual Allies and partner countries to provide financial support on a voluntary basis. Subsequently, all Allies have contributed in one way or the other to the development of these Trust Funds. They include:

- Trust Fund on Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4)
The C4 Trust Fund assists Ukraine in reorganising and modernising its C4 structures and capabilities, facilitates their interoperability with NATO to contribute to NATO-led exercises and operations, and enhances Ukraine’s ability to provide for its own defence and security.

The Trust Fund is led by Canada, Germany and the United Kingdom, with the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) as executing agent. NATO is conducting an ongoing assessment of Ukraine’s capabilities and needs as well as fact-finding trips to Ukraine to identify priority C4 requirements through consultations with Ukrainian authorities. A final report on recommendations for reform, reorganisation and modernisation of Ukraine’s Armed Forces and capabilities in the C4 area will be finalised in July 2016.

Based on project recommendations to date, the C4 Trust Fund Lead Nations have approved two initial projects, which are currently underway:

- the Regional Airspace Security Programme (RASP), to promote regional airspace security cooperation and interoperability with NATO, improve Ukraine’s internal civil-military airspace cooperation, and to establish cross-border coordination capability with Allies for better handling of air security incidents;
– the Secure Tactical Communications Project, to assist Allies in supporting the provision of secure communications equipment to enhance Ukraine’s capabilities for secure Command and Control and Situational Awareness for its Armed Forces.

The Lead Nations are also considering approval and implementation of two additional longer-term projects: first, Knowledge Sharing – to provide NATO subject-matter expertise, training, standards, best practices, mentoring and advice to C4 project teams and subject-matter experts in Ukraine; and second, Situational Awareness (SA) – to assist Ukraine’s Armed Forces in the development and establishment of a modern, secure SA Centre and mission networking capability using NATO standards, software tools, procedures and training.

© Trust Fund on Logistics and Standardization

The logistics and standardization Trust Fund aims to support the ongoing reform of Ukraine’s logistics and standardization systems for the Ukrainian Armed Forces as well as other national military formations, including the National Guard and the State Border Security Service as appropriate.

The Trust Fund is led by the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Poland. The project builds on the findings of a Strategy Level Gap Analysis conducted in the course of 2015. It complements and is aligned with other NATO activities performed in these areas such as those under the PARP and JWGD.

Over the course of three years, the project aims will be achieved through the implementation of three capability-driven initiatives in support of long-term developments, with a focus on National Codification Capability Enhancement, Supply Chain Management Capability Improvement, and Standardization Management Capability Improvement.

© Trust Fund on Cyber Defence

The Trust Fund on Cyber Defence for Ukraine aims to help Ukraine develop strictly defensive, technical capabilities to counter cyber threats.

The Trust Fund is led by Romania. Assistance will include the establishment of an incident management centre for monitoring cyber security incidents and laboratories to investigate cyber security incidents.

The project also has a training and advisory dimension with an adaptive approach. This is based on the interests of both Allies and Ukraine and derived from the requirements of Ukraine’s security and defence sector institutions. This approach ensures concrete and relevant results in the short term while remaining scalable according to the availability of funds. It is also flexible to enable adaptation to relevant lessons identified in the course of the Trust Fund’s implementation.

© Trust Fund on Medical Rehabilitation

The project aims to ensure that the patients – active and discharged Ukrainian servicemen and women and civilian personnel from the defence and security sector – have rapid access to medical rehabilitation care as well as to longer-term medical services when needed.

Facilitating greater access to rehabilitation through sport is a key part of this, with over 300 people with disabilities set to benefit from a programme supported by the Trust Fund. The project also supports two sportsmen competing to participate in world-level sport event in 2016-2017. Furthermore, the project aims to ensure that the medical rehabilitation system in Ukraine has the means to provide long-term sustainable services.

The project, led by Bulgaria and executed by the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA), runs over 24 months in at least five locations (Kharkiv, Kyiv, Llubin, Lviv, Novi Shandzari). It follows another NATO project, which in 2015 initiated support for 12 servicemen, several experts visits and conferences attended by over 1,000 Ukrainian health officials, as well as support for the change of law to recognise physiotherapist, orthotherapist, orthotist and prosthetist as an official profession in Ukraine.
Trust Fund on Military Career Transition

The military career transition Trust Fund, led by Norway, assists Ukraine in developing and implementing a sustainable, effective and integrated approach of resettlement of military personnel embedded in the Armed Forces’ personnel management function.

The project increases Ukrainian officials’ understanding of the main organisational and managerial concepts of social adaptation systems, develop their professional skills, define parameters for the assistance for resettlement within the Ukrainian Armed Forces through a combination of seminars, workshops, study tours and analytical surveys.

Military-to-military cooperation

Helping Ukraine implement its defence reform objectives is also a key focus of military-to-military cooperation, complementing the work carried out under the JWGDR with military expertise.

Another important objective is to develop operational capabilities and interoperability with NATO forces through a wide range of activities and military exercises organised under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme and sometimes hosted by Ukraine. These exercises allow military personnel to train for peace-support operations and gain hands-on experience of working with forces from NATO countries and other partners. Ukraine also recently joined a new initiative – the Partnership Interoperability Initiative – launched at the 2014 Wales Summit. It aims to maintain the levels of interoperability developed by international forces during the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan, which completed its mission in December 2014.

Senior Ukrainian officers also regularly participate in courses at the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy and the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany. Contacts with these establishments have been instrumental in setting up a new multinational faculty at the Ukrainian Defence Academy.

Ukraine’s active participation in the NATO Operational Capabilities Concept Evaluation and Feedback Programme is providing its benefits for improvement of the interoperability of Ukrainian Armed Forces, reinforcement of its operational capabilities and enabling the Alliance to put together tailored force packages in support of NATO-led crisis-response operations as well as any other NATO-led operation and mission.

The military side has also taken the lead in developing a legal framework to enable NATO and Ukraine to further develop operational cooperation:

- A PfP Status of Forces Agreement facilitates participation in PfP military exercises by exempting participants from passport and visa regulations and immigration inspection on entering or leaving the territory of the country hosting the event (entered into force in May 2000).
- A Host Nation Support Agreement addresses issues related to the provision of civil and military assistance to Allied forces located on, or in transit through, Ukrainian territory in peacetime, crisis or war (ratified in March 2004).
- A Strategic Airlift Agreement enables Ukraine to make a substantial contribution to NATO’s capability to move outsized cargo by leasing Antonov aircraft to Allied armed forces – an arrangement which also brings economic benefits to Ukraine (ratified in October 2006).

Defence technical cooperation

Defence technical cooperation between Ukraine and NATO focuses on enhancing interoperability of Ukrainian contributions to international operations with the forces of NATO nations.

Cooperation in this area began with the entry of Ukraine to the Partnership for Peace and, in particular, their participation in a number of groups that meet under the auspices of the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) – the senior NATO body responsible for promoting cooperation between
Allies and partners in the armaments field. The CNAD identifies opportunities for cooperation between nations in capability development, defence equipment procurement processes, and the development of technical standards.

The Joint Working Group on Defence Technical Cooperation, which met for the first time in March 2004, works toward increased cooperation in this area between NATO and Ukraine. Current priorities include:

- Standardization and codification as a means for increasing interoperability of the Ukrainian armed forces with Allied forces.
- Implementation of the Trust Fund projects on command, control, communications and computers (C4) and demilitarization of expired ammunition and excess small arms and light weapons (see above, Defence and security sector reform).
- Cooperation in the framework of the CNAD and with the NATO Science and Technology Organization.
- Ukraine’s participation in NATO’s Smart Defence projects, with the country having joined two projects in 2014 – on harbour protection and promotion of female leaders in security and defence.
- Implementation of the Air Situation Data Exchange (ASDE) programme (see above).

Civil emergency planning

NATO and Ukraine have developed practical cooperation in the field of civil emergency planning (CEP) and disaster preparedness, since the signing of a memorandum of understanding in 1997.

A Joint NATO-Ukraine Group on Civil Emergency Planning made up of representatives of NATO staff and Ukraine’s State Emergency Services meets on a yearly basis to oversee cooperation in the area of CEP.

Ukraine’s western regions are prone to heavy flooding and NATO countries and other partners have provided assistance after severe floods in 1995, 1998 and 2001. A key focus of cooperation has therefore been to help Ukraine better prepare for such emergencies and manage their consequences more effectively. Using some of this expertise, Ukraine sent a mobile rescue centre to Poland as part of an aid effort following flooding in the country in 2010.

PfP exercises also help develop plans and effective disaster-response capabilities to deal with other natural emergencies such as avalanches and earthquakes, or man-made accidents or terrorist attacks involving toxic spills or chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) agents. Ukraine has hosted such exercises in 2000, 2005 and, most recently, in September 2015.

Since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine crisis (see above), NATO has consistently shown its solidarity with Ukraine through CEP activities.

Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme

Active engagement between Ukraine and the SPS Programme dates back to 1991. A Joint Working Group on Scientific and Environmental Cooperation oversees cooperation in this area. In April 2014, in response to the crisis in Ukraine and following the ministerial guidance, practical cooperation with Ukraine in the field of security-related civil science and technology has been further enhanced.

SPS activities in Ukraine address a wide variety of emerging security challenges such as counter-terrorism, advanced technologies, cyber defence energy security, and defence against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents. Many of the SPS activities currently ongoing help Ukraine to deal with the negative effects of the crisis. In this regard, the SPS Programme plays an important role by engaging Allied and Ukrainian scientists and experts in meaningful, practical cooperation, forging networks and supporting capacity-building in the country.

Since 2014, a total of 49 SPS activities with Ukraine were launched making it the largest beneficiary of the SPS Programme. These include 40 multi-year research projects, seven advanced research workshops and two advanced training courses. New flagship projects in Ukraine’s priority areas of cooperation have been developed and launched, and further ideas for potential cooperation are being explored.
Top-down flagship SPS projects include:

- a multinational telemedicine system;
- support to humanitarian demining in Ukraine;
- remediation of a fuel-polluted military site in Kyiv;
- development of an advanced X-ray generator.

An SPS Information Day in Ukraine in May 2016 served to take stock of this comprehensive cooperation. As part of the programme, more than 75 SPS experts and scientists from Ukraine and NATO countries presented these and other successful projects and showcased examples of their SPS-supported research.

(More on Ukraine's ongoing cooperation under the SPS Programme.)

Public information/strategic communications

It is important for the Ukrainian administration and for the Alliance to inform its people about NATO-Ukraine relations and the benefits of cooperation in terms of the country’s reform programme. The Allies cooperate with the national authorities of Ukraine in raising awareness about what NATO is today, and in better explaining the NATO-Ukraine relationship.

The NATO Information and Documentation Centre, based in Kyiv, is NATO’s principal public information facility organising seminars, round tables and other communications projects as well as coordinating visits by NATO officials to Ukraine and representatives of Ukrainian civil society to NATO Headquarters in Belgium to help better illustrate the mechanisms behind the partnership. NATO also provides advisory and funding support to Ukraine on public diplomacy, media relations and strategic communications capacity-building to the Ukrainian authorities.

In particular, NATO has supported the Ukraine Crisis Media Centre and the Kyiv Post newspaper in their efforts to provide an accurate and factual coverage of events occurred in the occupied Crimea peninsula as well as in eastern Ukraine.

On 22 September 2015, the Strategic Communications Partnership Roadmap was signed by the Secretary of the Ukrainian National Security and Defence Council, Oleksandr Turchynov, and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. The objective is to provide the Ukrainian authorities with a more structured and long-term advice, training support and expertise in the area of strategic communications.

In every partner country, an embassy of one of the NATO member states serves as a contact point and operates as a channel for disseminating information about the role and policies of the Alliance. The current NATO Contact Point Embassy in Ukraine is the embassy of Lithuania.

Framework for cooperation

The 1997 Charter on a Distinctive Partnership remains the basic foundation underpinning NATO-Ukraine relations. The NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) directs cooperative activities and provides a forum for consultation between the Allies and Ukraine on security issues of common concern. The Declaration to Complement the Charter, signed in 2009, gave the NUC a central role in deepening political dialogue and cooperation to underpin Ukraine’s reform efforts. The principal tool to support this process is the Annual National Programme (ANP), which reflects Ukraine’s national reform objectives and annual implementation plans. The ANP is composed of five chapters focusing on: political and economic issues; defence and military issues; resources; security issues; and legal issues.

Allies assess progress under the ANP annually and the results of the assessment are presented to the NUC. The responsibility for the ANP implementation falls primarily on Ukraine. Through the ANP process, Allies encourage Ukraine to take the reform process forward vigorously in order to strengthen democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the market economy. Helping Ukraine achieve a far-reaching transformation of the defence and security sector is another priority.
Joint working groups have been set up under the auspices of the NUC, to take work forward in specific areas. Two are of particular importance: the Partnerships and Cooperative Security Committee in NUC format, which takes the leading role in developing Annual National Programmes and preparing high-level meetings of the NUC, and the Joint Working Group on Defence Reform, which facilitates consultation and practical cooperation in the priority area of defence and security sector reform.

In February 2014, Ukraine established a new Commission for NATO-Ukraine cooperation chaired by the Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine.

The NATO Representation to Ukraine supports cooperation on the ground. It consists of the NATO Information and Documentation Centre, established in 1997 to support efforts to inform the public about NATO’s activities and the benefits of NATO-Ukraine cooperation, and the NATO Liaison Office, established in 1999 to facilitate Ukraine’s participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme and to support its defence and security sector reform efforts by liaising with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, National Security and Defence Council, and other Ukrainian agencies.

## Milestones in relations

**1991:** Immediately upon achieving independence with the break-up of the Soviet Union, Ukraine joins the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (the NACC was replaced in 1997 by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council).

**1994:** Ukraine joins the Partnership for Peace (PIP), becoming the first of the Commonwealth of Independent States to do so.

**1996:** Ukrainian soldiers deploy as part of the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

**May 1997:** The NATO Information and Documentation Centre opens in Kyiv.

**July 1997:** At a summit meeting in Madrid, Spain, the Allies and Ukraine sign the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, which sets out principles and arrangements for the further development of NATO-Ukraine relations and identifies areas for consultation and cooperation, establishing the NATO-Ukraine Commission to take work forward.

**1997:** Ukraine establishes a diplomatic mission to NATO.

**1998:** The NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform is established.

**1999:** The NATO Liaison Office opens in Kyiv.

**1999:** The Polish-Ukrainian Battalion deploys as part of the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo.

**May 2000:** The Ukrainian parliament ratifies the PIP Status of Forces Agreement.

**September 2000:** Ukraine hosts a multinational disaster-response exercise, Trans-Carpathia 2000.

**May 2002:** President Leonid Kuchma announces Ukraine’s goal of eventual NATO membership and at a NUC meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, foreign ministers underline their desire to take the relationship forward to a qualitatively new level.

**July 2002:** A project for the safe destruction of 400,000 landmines is inaugurated in Donetsk.

**November 2002:** The NATO-Ukraine Action Plan is adopted at a NUC meeting of foreign ministers in November in Prague, the Czech Republic. The Action Plan aims to deepen and broaden the NATO-Ukraine relationship and to support Ukraine’s reform efforts on the road towards Euro-Atlantic integration.

**March 2004:** The Ukrainian parliament ratifies the Host Nation Support Agreement with NATO.

**June 2004:** Ukraine signs a Strategic Airlift Agreement with NATO.
Autumn 2004: The Allies closely follow political developments surrounding the presidential elections in Ukraine and the “Orange Revolution”. They stress the importance of respect for free and fair elections and postpone a NUC ministerial-level meeting scheduled for December.

February 2005: The Allies invite newly-elected President Viktor Yushchenko to a summit meeting at NATO Headquarters. They express support for his ambitious reform plans and agree to refocus NATO-Ukraine cooperation in line with the new government’s priorities.

April 2005: NUC foreign ministers meeting in Vilnius, Lithuania, launch an Intensified Dialogue on Ukraine’s aspirations to NATO membership and a package of short-term actions to strengthen support for key reforms.

September 2005: A series of staff-level expert discussions is initiated under the Intensified Dialogue.


October 2005: The North Atlantic Council visits Kyiv to discuss the Intensified Dialogue with Ukraine’s foreign and defence ministers.

February 2006: A Resettlement and Retraining Centre is inaugurated in Khmelnytskyi.

March 2006: NATO’s Secretary General welcomes the conduct of free and fair parliamentary elections as contributing to the consolidation of democracy in Ukraine.

June 2006: A contract is signed for the launch of a project with Ukraine to destroy 133,000 tons of conventional munitions, 1.5 million small arms and 1,000 man-portable air defence systems over an estimated 12 years.

September 2006: During a visit to NATO, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych reassures Allies of Ukraine’s commitment to ongoing cooperation with NATO. However, he says the Ukrainian people are not yet ready to consider possible NATO membership.

October 2006: The Ukrainian parliament ratifies the Strategic Airlift Agreement.

June 2007: Ukraine deploys a ship for the first time in support of Operation Active Endeavour, NATO’s maritime counter-terrorist operation in the Mediterranean. This is followed by a second deployment in the autumn.

2007: Ukraine sends medical personnel to support a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan.

April 2008: At the Bucharest Summit, Allied leaders agree that Ukraine will become a NATO member in future.

2008: Ukraine deploys two vessels in support of Operation Active Endeavour: one in summer, another in autumn.

December 2008: NUC foreign ministers agree to enhance opportunities for assisting Ukraine in its efforts to meet membership requirements and to develop an Annual National Programme (ANP).


21 August 2009: A “Declaration to Complement the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine” is signed to reflect decisions taken at the Bucharest Summit and the December foreign ministers’ meeting in 2008.

February 2010: The new Ukrainian government under President Viktor Yanukovych decides to continue present cooperation with NATO. However, he takes Alliance membership for the country off the agenda.

May 2010: A memorandum of understanding on “Air Situation Data Exchange” is signed, which aims to reduce airspace conflicts by minimising potential cross-border incidents and optimising responses to renegade situations with civil airplanes.
November 2010: Ukraine deploys a ship in support of Operation Active Endeavour.

April 2011: At their meeting in Berlin, NUC foreign ministers reaffirm their distinct partnership and agree to take forward practical cooperation activities.

May 2012: President Yanukovych attends NATO’s Summit in Chicago to participate in a meeting with counterparts from countries that are contributing troops to ISAF.

November 2012: NATO initiates the Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP) with Ukraine in response to a request from the Ukrainian Defence Minister.

February 2013: NUC defence ministers agree to reinforce NATO-Ukraine cooperation: agreement is reached on a set of priorities to guide cooperation over the next five years, including in training and exercises; a project for the retraining of former military officers in Ukraine is extended; plans are discussed for a new project to support the neutralisation of radioactive sources from former Soviet military sites; and Ukraine becomes the first partner country to contribute to NATO’s counter-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia, Operation Ocean Shield.

March 2014: NATO calls on Russia to de-escalate tensions as a so-called referendum is held in Crimea and Russian armed forces are used on the territory of Ukraine. With its independence and territorial integrity under threat, Ukraine invokes a provision of the 2009 Declaration to Complement the NATO-Ukraine Charter and requests a meeting of the NUC. The Allies state that they do not and will not recognise Russia’s illegal and illegitimate “annexation” of Crimea.

April and June 2014: At ministerial meetings in spring and summer, NATO agrees on concrete support measures for Ukraine to strengthen its ability to provide for its own security. Measures include a number of immediate and short-term actions to help Ukraine cope with the current conflict, and longer-term measures geared towards capacity-building, capability development, and deep reform of the armed forces and the security sector.

3 September 2014: A NATO-sponsored conference on Ukraine’s defence industry takes place at the International Defence Industry Exhibition in Kielce, Poland.

4-5 September 2014: At the Wales Summit, Allied leaders meet Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, reaffirming their support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and reiterating their condemnation of Russia’s actions; they pledge to step up strategic consultations in the NUC and to further reinforce support for Ukraine.

2 December 2014: NUC foreign ministers meet to discuss the developments in Ukraine and to review progress made in joint work since the Wales Summit.

15 December 2014: Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk visits NATO Headquarters to discuss the Alliance’s efforts to support Ukraine’s government with NATO’s Secretary General. Jens Stoltenberg underlines that NATO will stand by the country as it works towards the goal of a sovereign and stable Ukraine, firmly committed to democracy and the rule of law.

29 December 2014: Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko signs into law a bill to cancel the non-bloc status of Ukraine and announces that Ukraine will start a process to achieve the criteria needed for NATO membership and also integrate into the Euro-Atlantic security space. He also indicated that a referendum would be held if his country were to apply for NATO membership.

January 2015: Following the completion of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan in December 2014, Ukraine starts contributing to the follow-on NATO-led mission (“Resolute Support”) to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces and institutions.

29 January 2015: In talks with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg expresses concern about the recent escalation of violence in the country and says that NATO will continue its strong political and practical support for Ukraine.
24 April 2015: The NATO Communications and Information Agency and Ukraine sign an agreement to facilitate implementation of the Trust Fund project on Command, Control, Communications and Computers, which is part of the NATO support package to Ukraine in response to the crisis with Russia. Once ratified, the agreement will also allow for the further development of technical cooperation.

28 April 2015: The NATO Support and Procurement Agency signs an agreement with Ukraine, establishing a formal framework for the implementation of two Trust Fund projects, which focus on Logistics and Standardization and on Medical Rehabilitation.

13 May 2015: In Antalya, Turkey, NUC foreign ministers reaffirm their firm support to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, call on Russia to reverse the illegal and illegitimate “annexation” of Crimea, welcome the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements signed on 12 February 2015, and encourage Ukraine to continue reform efforts.

21-25 September 2015: Ukraine hosts a major consequence-management field exercise near Lviv, jointly organised by NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre and Ukraine’s State Emergency Service. NATO’s Secretary General and the Ukrainian President attend the opening ceremony.

22 September 2015: During a visit to Kyiv, NATO’s Secretary General addresses the National Security and Defence Council and has meetings with key members of the government and the speaker of the parliament. Agreements are signed to formalise the diplomatic status of NATO’s Representation in Ukraine, to support Ukraine on strategic communications, and to strengthen technical cooperation on defence.

2 December 2015: NATO foreign ministers meet their Ukrainian counterpart, Pavlo Klimkin, to review NATO’s assistance to Ukraine as well as the current security situation in the country. The Secretary General stresses that NATO is committed to supporting a peaceful, diplomatic end to the conflict in eastern Ukraine. He cautions that while there has been some progress “there is a real risk of a resumption of violence,” noting that Russian-backed separatists have yet to withdraw their troops and equipment, and that Ukraine has not been able to re-establish control over its border.

17 December 2015: Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko visits NATO Headquarters for a bilateral meeting with Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to discuss the outlook for NATO-Ukraine cooperation in 2016.

8 March 2016: Defence Minister Stepan Poltorak briefs the NATO-Ukraine Commission in Brussels on progress with the defence reform in Ukraine.

15 June 2016: Defence ministers agree to boost NATO’s support for Ukraine with a Comprehensive Package of Assistance, which aims to help Ukraine strengthen its defences by building stronger security structures. They also exchange views with Ukrainian Defence Minister Stepan Poltorak on the current security situation in eastern Ukraine and the progress of government reforms.
Relations with Finland

NATO and Finland actively cooperate on peace and security operations and have developed practical cooperation in many other areas, including education and training, and the development of military capabilities.

Highlights

- Finnish cooperation with NATO is based on its longstanding policy of military non-alignment and a firm national political consensus.
- Cooperation has been reinforced over the years since Finland joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 1994 and became a member of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997.
- Finland is one of NATO’s most active partners and a valued contributor to NATO-led operations and missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan – it is one of five countries that has enhanced opportunities for dialogue and cooperation with NATO.
- An important priority for cooperation is to develop capabilities and maintain the ability of the Finnish armed forces to work with those of NATO and other partner countries in multinational peace-support operations.
- In the current security context with heightened concerns about Russian military activities, NATO is stepping up cooperation with Finland and Sweden in the Baltic region.
- Finland’s role in training the forces of NATO partner countries is greatly valued as is its support for several NATO-led Trust Fund projects aimed at promoting defence and security reform in partner countries.
- Finland actively supports the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.
More background information

Key areas of cooperation

- **Security cooperation**

Finland is one of five countries (known as ‘Enhanced Opportunities Partners’) that make particularly significant contributions to NATO operations and other Alliance objectives. As such, the country has enhanced opportunities for dialogue and cooperation with the Allies.

In the current security context with heightened concerns about Russian military activities, NATO is stepping up cooperation with Finland and Sweden. This means expanding exchanges of information on hybrid warfare, coordinating training and exercises, and developing better joint situational awareness to address common threats and develop joint actions, if needed. Also underway are talks on how to include the two partners in the enhanced NATO Response Force (NRF) and regular consultations on security in the Baltic Sea region.

Moreover, at NATO’s Wales Summit in September 2014, Finland and Sweden signed a memorandum of understanding on Host Nation Support, which addresses issues related to the provision of civil and military assistance to Allied forces located on, or in transit through, their territory in peacetime, crisis or war. The agreement was ratified by the Finnish parliament in 2015.

Since 2002, Finnish soldiers have been working alongside Allied forces in Afghanistan – first, as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) which completed its mission at the end of 2014, and currently as part of the follow-on mission (known as Resolute Support) to further train, assist and advise the Afghan security forces and institutions. Since 2007, Finland has contributed over USD 9.4 million to the Afghan National Army Trust Fund. Finland also contributed to a project aimed at training counter-narcotics personnel from Afghanistan and other Central Asian partner countries, which was conducted under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Council.

Finnish forces have played significant roles in securing peace in the former Yugoslavia. Finnish soldiers are currently operating with the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) and, in the past, Finland contributed a battalion to the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Finland started participating in the NRF in 2012 and took part in Exercise Steadfast Jazz in November 2013, an exercise which *inter alia* was designed to test the different components of the next NRF rotation. Specific participation or involvement in any particular NRF operation requires a sovereign decision by Finland.

Finland’s role in training the forces of partner countries, particularly in peacekeeping, is greatly valued by the Allies. In July 2001, NATO formally recognised the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT) in Tuusula as a Partnership for Peace (PFP) Training Centre. This Centre provides training on military crisis management for staff employed by international organisations such as NATO, the United Nations and the European Union (EU).

Finland also regularly participates in NATO and PFP exercises. Among other forces, Finland has declared one mechanised infantry battalion group and one combat engineer unit, a coastal mine hunter and a small number of fixed-wing aircraft as potentially available for exercises and operations.

Finland plays an active part in a number of multinational projects for the development of capabilities. It has joined the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) programme, participating along with Sweden and several NATO Allies in the operation of three C-17 transport aircraft based in Hungary. A related initiative, the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) leases Russian and Ukrainian Antonov transport aircraft.

The country is also working on a multinational cyber defence capability development project with NATO, which will improve the means of sharing technical information and promote awareness of threats and attacks. It is also participating in the establishment of a multinational joint headquarters in Germany, a harbour protection system and a deployable system for the surveillance of chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear agents. Finland is a member of the Movement Coordination Centre Europe and
is participating in the Air Transport, Air-to-Air Refuelling and other Exchange of Services (ATARES), as well
as the Air Situation Data Exchange.

Finland’s close ties with its neighbours Norway, Denmark and Sweden have resulted in Nordic Defence
Cooperation (NORDEFCO), a further practical and efficient way for like-minded states to contribute to
regional and international security. In Finland’s case, this activity is pursued alongside the Nordic
Battlegroup.

● **Defence and security sector reform**

Finland has participated in the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) since 1995, which – along with
participating in the Operational Capabilities Concept – influences Finnish planning and activities.
Cooperation in these frameworks is aimed at enhancing the country’s ability to take part in peace-support
operations, as well as allowing Allies and other partners to benefit from Finnish expertise.

Finland has developed a new military crisis-management concept as the basis for a revised national pool
of forces for crisis-management operations. All of these forces should be evaluated under the Operational
Capabilities Concept Evaluation and Feedback Programme by the end of 2016.

The country is contributing to the development of the EU Battlegroup concept. It is cooperating with
Estonia, Norway and Sweden, among other countries, in the development of a multinational
rapid-reaction force for EU-led peace-support operations.

Finland is an active supporter of Trust Fund projects in other partner countries and has contributed to
nearly a dozen so far. Currently, it is supporting a project for the repacking, centralising and destruction of
chemicals in the Republic of Moldova; ammunition stockpile management in Tajikistan; the Building
Integrity Programme; and a project focused on increasing opportunities for women to work in the
Jordanian Armed Forces.

● **Civil emergency planning**

Civil emergency planning is a major area of bilateral cooperation. The aim is for Finland to be able to
cooperate with NATO Allies in providing mutual support in dealing with the consequences of a major
accident or disaster in the Euro-Atlantic area. This could include dealing with the consequences of
incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear agents, as well as humanitarian
disaster-relief operations. In line with this, Finnish civil resources have been listed with the Euro-Atlantic
Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC). Finland has also provided valuable civil emergency
training to Allies and partners.

● **Science and environment**

Under the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme, scientists from Finland have participated in
numerous advanced research workshops and seminars on a range of topics. Topics have included border
security and the fight against terrorism, environmental security in harbours and coastal areas, and
bioremediation of contaminated soils.

### Framework for cooperation

An Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP), which is jointly agreed for a two-year
period, lays out the programme of cooperation between Finland and NATO. Key areas include security
and peacekeeping cooperation, crisis management and civil emergency planning.

An important objective in Finland’s participation in the PIP programme is to develop and enhance
interoperability between NATO and partner forces through a variety of PIP instruments and mechanisms.
Finland joined the PIP programme at its inception in 1994.
Milestones in relations

1994: Finland joins the Partnership for Peace (PfP).
1996: Finland contributes forces to the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
1997: Finland joins the newly created Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.
1999: Finnish forces participate in the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo, KFOR.
2008: Finland hosts the June 2008 Uusimaa civil crisis-management exercise.
2009: Finland and the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NATO C3 Agency) – currently known as the NATO Communications and Information Agency or NCI Agency – sign a memorandum of understanding on mutual cooperation in key defence technology areas.
2011: Following the signature of an agreement in October, senior Finnish officials visit the NATO C3 Agency (currently known as NCI Agency) in November to discuss the details of a multi-year programme of work for cooperation on advanced technology.
March 2012: Finnish fighter jets take part in a NATO exercise over the Baltic region aimed at practising air policing skills.
November 2012: Finland takes part in Exercise Steadfast Juncture, an exercise organised at Amari Air Base, Estonia, focused on the command and control of a fictitious crisis-response operation involving the NATO Response Force; and the Cyber Coalition procedural exercise, focused on cyber defence capabilities.
15 November 2012: NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen visits Helsinki.
November 2013: Finland takes part in Exercise Steadfast Jazz.
February 2014: Finland and Sweden participate in Iceland Air Meet 2014 under the command of Norway, which had deployed to Iceland to conduct NATO’s mission to provide airborne surveillance and interception capabilities to meet Iceland’s peacetime preparedness needs.
September 2014: At the Wales Summit, Finland is identified as one of five countries that make particularly significant contributions to NATO operations and other Alliance objectives, which will have enhanced opportunities for dialogue and cooperation with the Allies. Along with Sweden, Finland signs a memorandum of understanding on Host Nation Support, which addresses issues related to the provision of civil and military assistance to Allied forces located on, or in transit through, their territory in peacetime, crisis or war.
January 2015: Following the completion of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan in December 2014, Finland starts contributing to the follow-on NATO-led mission (“Resolute Support”) to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces and institutions.
February 2015: NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg meets Finnish President Sauli Niinistö in the margins of the Munich Security Conference.
5 March 2015: NATO’s Secretary General visits Finland for meetings with Prime Minister Alexander Stubb, Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja and Defence Minister Carl Haglund, as well as the Speaker of the Parliament, Eero Heinäläuma.
1 December 2015: The Secretary General has talks with Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström, along with Finnish Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Timo Soini, on the margins of NATO’s
meetings of foreign ministers in Brussels. They discuss ongoing work to expand exchanges of information, including on hybrid warfare, coordinating training and exercises, and developing better joint situational awareness to help NATO, Finland and Sweden more effectively to address common threats and develop joint actions, if needed. Also underway are talks on how to include the two partners in the enhanced NATO Response Force and regular consultations on security in the Baltic Sea region.

**20 April 2016:** Finland participates in two days of air exercises in the Baltic region alongside NATO and partner air forces, practising emergency responses and sharpening cooperation.

**25-26 April 2016:** The Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, General Petr Pavel, visits Finland for discussions with the President, Foreign Minister, Defence Minister and the Chief of Defence about regional security and NATO-Finnish military cooperation and interoperability.

**19-20 May 2016:** The Finnish foreign minister participates in a meeting with NATO foreign ministers devoted to NATO-EU cooperation.
Relations with Georgia

Georgia aspires to join the Alliance. The country actively contributes to NATO-led operations and cooperates with the Allies and other partner countries in many other areas. Support for Georgia’s reform efforts and its goal of integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions is a priority for cooperation.

During a visit to Georgia in August 2015, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg inaugurates the NATO-Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Centre at the Krtsanisi Military Facility

Highlights

- Relations started shortly after Georgia regained independence in 1991, when Georgia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1992) and the Partnership for Peace (1994).
- Dialogue and cooperation deepened after the “Rose Revolution” in 2003, when the new government pushed for more ambitious reforms.
- Allied leaders agreed at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Georgia will become a NATO member, provided it meets all necessary requirements – this decision was reconfirmed at NATO Summits in 2009, 2010, 2012 and 2014.
- Following the crisis with Russia in August 2008, the Allies continue to support Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty within its internationally recognised borders and call on Russia to reverse its recognition of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states.
- The NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) provides the framework for close political dialogue and cooperation in support of the country’s reform efforts and its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
- At the Wales Summit in September 2014, a substantial package of measures was launched to strengthen Georgia’s ability to defend itself and advance its preparations for membership.
- Georgia has provided valued support for NATO-led operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, and the counter-terrorist maritime surveillance operation in the Mediterranean.
More background information

Key areas of cooperation

- Security cooperation

Thanks to regular participation in Partnership for Peace (PfP) training and exercises, Georgia has been able to contribute actively to Euro-Atlantic security by supporting NATO-led operations.

Georgian troops worked alongside NATO troops in the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo (KFOR) from 1999 to 2008, providing a company-sized unit as part of the German brigade there and an infantry platoon within a Turkish battalion task force.

Georgia was one of the largest non-NATO troop contributors to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which completed its mission in Afghanistan in December 2014. It is currently one of the top overall contributors to “Resolute Support” – the follow-on NATO-led mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan forces. Moreover, Georgia continues to provide transit for supplies destined for forces deployed in Afghanistan. The Georgian government has also pledged financial support for the further development of the Afghan National Security Forces.

Georgia participates in NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour, a counter-terrorist maritime surveillance operation in the Mediterranean, primarily through intelligence exchange.

Moreover, Georgia is participating in the 2015 rotation of the NATO Response Force (NRF) and is expected to continue to contribute to the NRF in subsequent years.

The country also has a mountain training site, which is accredited as a Partnership Training and Education Centre and offers courses and training to Allies and other partner countries.

At the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO adopted a Partnership Interoperability Initiative to ensure that the experience gained by Allies and partners from over a decade of working together in Afghanistan is maintained and further developed. As part of this initiative, Georgia has been invited to participate in the Interoperability Platform that brings Allies together with 24 partners that are active contributors to NATO’s operations. Georgia has also been identified as one of five countries that make particularly significant contributions to NATO operations and other Alliance objectives, which will have enhanced opportunities for dialogue and cooperation with the Allies.

- Defence and security sector reform

NATO supports the wide-ranging democratic and institutional reform process underway in Georgia. Particularly in the area of defence and security sector reform, NATO and individual Allies have considerable expertise upon which Georgia can draw.

Cooperation in this area was given a significant boost at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, where NATO leaders endorsed a substantial package for Georgia, including defence capacity-building, training, exercises, strengthened liaison, and opportunities to develop interoperability with Allied forces. These measures aim to strengthen Georgia’s ability to defend itself as well as to advance its preparations towards NATO membership.

As part of this package, more strategic-level advice is being provided to the Georgian defence ministry and general staff. A core team of advisors is embedded in the defence ministry and complemented by experts in over a dozen specific areas of work. Moreover, a Joint Training and Evaluation Centre has been established together with Georgia to host live and simulated training and certification for military units from Allied and partner countries. NATO exercises open to partners will be conducted in Georgia periodically. A defence institution building school will be established to make benefit of Georgia’s experience in reforms.
Georgia’s participation in the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) since 1999 has helped its forces develop the ability to work with NATO and is also providing planning targets that are key to security reform objectives in several areas. NATO support has, for example, helped Georgia build deployable units (according to NATO standards) that are interoperable with Allied forces. Georgia’s defence reform objectives within the PARP have facilitated improved financial management in the Ministry of Defence, assisted in reforming the intelligence structure of the armed forces and ensured that a credible Strategic Defence Review was conducted.

An important priority for Georgia is to ensure democratic control of the armed forces, including effective judicial oversight and appropriate defence command and control arrangements.

Improved education and training are also essential for Georgia’s reform efforts. NATO is leading a tailored programme for Georgia – the Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP) – with the support of the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, the Partnership Training and Education Centres and Allied defence institutions.

NATO and Georgia launched a Professional Development Programme (PDP) for Civilian Personnel in the Ministry of Defence and other Security Institutions in 2009. The PDP provides training with the aim of strengthening the capacity for democratic management and oversight in the Ministry of Defence, as well as other security sector institutions. Training and education provided in the framework of the PDP are closely aligned to Georgia’s defence and security sector reform objectives. Current priorities are to support Georgia’s civil service reform and enhance Georgia’s own capacity for providing training to security sector civilian personnel.

Georgia also participates in the Building Integrity programme, which provides practical assistance and advice for strengthening integrity, accountability and transparency in the defence and security sector.

Another important focus of cooperation has been to support demilitarization projects in Georgia through the Partnership Trust Fund mechanism, which allows individual Allies and partner countries to provide financial support to key projects on a voluntary basis. Over the years, a number of such projects have helped to address problems posed by stockpiles of surplus and obsolete weapons and munitions, and promoted their safe disposal. An ongoing project is helping to clear mines and unexploded munitions from the ammunitions depot at Skra.

- **Civil emergency planning**

Georgia is enhancing its national civil emergency and disaster-management capabilities in cooperation with NATO and through participation in activities organised by the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC). The Centre helped coordinate the delivery of hundreds of tonnes of relief items to Georgia in the wake of the August 2008 conflict. It also coordinated assistance to Georgia in 2005 when the country experienced some of the worst flooding in its history, in 2006 when forest fires broke out in southern Georgia, and after a major earthquake in 2009.

Georgia itself hosted a major EADRCC consequence-management field exercise in the town of Rustavi in September 2012, which was organised in cooperation with the Emergency Management Department of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs.

- **Security-related scientific cooperation**

Georgia has been actively engaged within the framework of the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme since 1994. The SPS Programme enables close collaboration on issues of common interest to enhance the security of NATO and partner countries. By facilitating international efforts, in particular with a regional focus, the programme seeks to address emerging security challenges, support NATO-led operations and advance early warning and forecast for the prevention of disasters and crises.

Today, scientists and experts from Georgia are working to address a wide range of security issues, notably in the fields of energy security, cyber defence, support to NATO-led operations and advanced technology (including nanotechnology). A recently approved SPS multi-year project looks for example at...
the risks to the Enguri Energy Infrastructure in Georgia and Georgian experts have contributed to a hands-on cyber defence training course based on their national experience and expertise. The SPS Programme is also promoting regional synergies and during 2015 Georgia hosted a training course on “Cooperative Solutions to Critical Security Issues in the Black Sea Region”. (More on Georgia’s ongoing cooperation under the SPS Programme)

Public information

The NATO Liaison Office conducts public diplomacy programmes in Georgia in support of the Georgian government’s efforts to inform the public on NATO and in cooperation with local non-governmental organisations and state authorities. Activities include seminars, conferences and workshops. “NATO Weeks” and summer schools are organised on an annual basis to reach out to youth audiences.

Groups of opinion leaders from Georgia are regularly invited to visit NATO Headquarters and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) for briefings about the Alliance, and NATO officials regularly travel to Georgia to speak at public events. Senior NATO officials – including the Secretary General and the Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia – also regularly visit the country for high-level consultations. The Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s principal political decision-making body, paid a visit to the country in September 2008 (in the immediate aftermath of the Georgia crisis), in November 2011 and again in June 2013.

In every partner country, an embassy of one of the NATO member states serves as a contact point and operates as a channel for disseminating information about the role and policies of the Alliance. The current NATO Contact Point Embassy in Georgia is the embassy of Romania.

The Office of the State Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration has established an Information Center on NATO, which has its main office in Tbilisi and various branches. Working in close cooperation with NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division and with the NATO Liaison Office in Georgia, it is an important tool in raising public awareness about the Alliance in the country.

Response to the Georgian crisis

At an emergency meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 19 August 2008, NATO foreign ministers called for a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict based on respect for Georgia’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. They deplored the use of force, which is inconsistent with the commitments to the peaceful resolution of conflicts that both Georgia and Russia have made under the Partnership for Peace as well as other international agreements. The Allies expressed particular concern over Russia’s disproportionate military action, which is incompatible with Russia’s peacekeeping role in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and called for the immediate withdrawal of its troops from the areas it was required to leave under the terms of the six-point agreement brokered by the European Union.

At Georgia’s request, the Allies agreed to provide support in a number of areas: assessing the damage to civil infrastructure and the state of the ministry of defence and armed forces; supporting the re-establishment of the air traffic system; and advising on cyber defence issues.

On 27 August 2008, the North Atlantic Council condemned and called for the reversal of Russia’s decision to extend recognition to the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia as independent states. The Allies continue to support Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty within its internationally recognised borders. NATO does not recognise elections that have since taken place in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and has stated that the holding of such elections does not contribute to a peaceful and lasting settlement. NATO equally does not recognise the signature of so-called treaties between Russia and the breakaway regions.

The Allies welcome Georgia’s efforts to seek a resolution to the crises with South Ossetia and Abkhazia through peaceful means. They strongly support Georgia’s current strategy of engagement with the two
breakaway regions, which envisions a constructive way forward through fostering economic ties and people-to-people contacts to build confidence.

The Allies also welcome the steps Georgia has taken unilaterally towards Russia in recent years, including the removal of visa requirements for Russian citizens, the agreement on Russia’s membership of the World Trade Organization; as well as the direct dialogue that has been initiated with the Russian government by the Georgian government.

### Framework for cooperation

Created in September 2008 in the wake of Georgia’s crisis with Russia, the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) provides the framework for cooperation, serving as a forum for both political consultations and practical cooperation to help Georgia advance its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Since December 2008, the work of the NGC is taken forward through the development of an Annual National Programme (ANP). The ANP lays out Georgia’s concrete reform objectives and includes specific timelines and benchmarks.

In addition to Georgia’s contributions to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, key areas of cooperation under the ANP include political, military and security-sector reforms. Priorities for Georgia include transforming its public and private sectors in order to promote democracy, good governance, the rule of law and sustainable social and economic development, as well as reforming the defence and security sector. NATO agrees to support Georgia in these reforms by providing focused and comprehensive advice and activities in several frameworks (both civilian and military) towards its reform goals.

In parallel with the establishment of the NGC, the Military Committee with Georgia was created as a format for meetings focused on military cooperation. The principal aim of NATO-Georgia military cooperation is to assist Georgia with the implementation of military and defence-related issues of the ANP, strategic planning and defence reforms, and to increase interoperability in support of Georgia’s contributions to NATO-led operations. The Military Committee with Georgia Work Plan defines key areas and objectives for military cooperation between NATO and the Georgian Armed Forces. The Work Plan comprises activities that help achieve the goals set in the ANP and PARP.

A NATO Liaison Office was established in Georgia in 2010 to support the country’s reform efforts and its programme of cooperation with NATO.

Georgia also cooperates with NATO and other partner countries in a wide range of other areas through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

### Milestones in relations

- **1992**: Georgia joins the newly created North Atlantic Cooperation Council (succeeded by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997).
- **1994**: Georgia joins the Partnership for Peace (PfP), a programme aiming to increase security and defence cooperation between NATO and individual partner countries.
- **1995**: Georgia signs the PfP Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between NATO and partner countries – it addresses the status of foreign forces while present on the territory of another state in the context of cooperation and exercises under the PfP programme.
- **1999**: Georgia joins the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) to help its forces develop the ability to work with NATO and to improve defence planning.
- **1999**: Georgia starts contributing peacekeepers to the Kosovo Force (KFOR).
- **2001**: Georgia hosts a multinational PfP military training exercise “Cooperative Partner”.
- **2002**: Georgia is connected to the Virtual Silk Highway, which provides high-speed internet access (via satellite) to academic establishments.
2002: Georgia hosts a multinational PfP military training exercise “Cooperative Best Effort”.

2002: Georgia declares its aspirations to NATO membership and its intention to develop an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO to sharpen the focus of cooperation on reform efforts.

2003: Georgia participates in ISAF’s election security force in Afghanistan.

June 2004: At the Istanbul Summit, Allied leaders place special focus on the Caucasus – a special representative and a liaison officer are assigned to the region.

2004: Georgia becomes the first country to agree an IPAP with NATO.

2005: NATO and Georgia sign a transit agreement allowing the Alliance and other ISAF troop-contributing nations to send supplies for their forces in Afghanistan through Georgia.

2006: NATO offers an Intensified Dialogue to Georgia on its aspirations to join the Alliance.

2007: Georgia hosts a NATO/PfP air exercise, “Cooperative Archer 2007”.

April 2008: At the Bucharest Summit, NATO leaders agree Georgia will become a member of NATO, provided that it meets all the necessary requirements.

August 2008: Allies express deep concern over the armed conflict between Georgia and Russia, calling for a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict based on respect for Georgia’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. They agree to support Georgia’s recovery in a number of areas and also propose the establishment of a NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) to oversee the implementation of support as well as supervise the integration process set at hand at the Bucharest Summit.

September 2008: The North Atlantic Council pays a two-day visit to Georgia. The Framework Document establishing the NATO-Georgia Commission is signed and the inaugural meeting takes place in Tbilisi. In December, NATO foreign ministers agree to develop an Annual National Programme (ANP) under the auspices of the NGC.

20 February 2009: Allied and Georgian defence ministers discuss Georgia’s progress in defence reform and its priorities.

5 March 2009: The NGC meets in Brussels for the second time at the level of foreign ministers to discuss a range of issues of common interest.

3 December 2009: The NGC meets at the level of foreign ministers to discuss the course of Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration and process of reform.

12 March 2010: Agreements are signed to launch a new project that will help Georgia safely dispose of explosive remnants of war.

March 2010: Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili visits NATO Headquarters to meet NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen.

April 2010: Georgia signs an agreement with NATO to contribute to Operation Active Endeavour, NATO’s maritime counter-terrorism operation in the Mediterranean.

August 2010: The North Atlantic Council decides to enhance NATO-Georgia relations through effective military cooperation (this leads to the development and implementation of the first annual Military Committee with Georgia Work Plan in 2011).

October 2010: The NATO Liaison Office is inaugurated in Tbilisi during the NATO Secretary General’s visit to Georgia, where he meets the Georgian president, prime minister and senior ministers.

April 2011: NGC foreign ministers meet in Berlin and adopt, for the first time, a joint statement which reaffirms the basic principles of NATO-Georgia cooperation.

November 2011: The North Atlantic Council pays a visit to Tbilisi and Batumi.
April 2012: President Saakashvili visits NATO Headquarters to meet the Secretary General and attend a meeting of the NGC Ambassadors.

September 2012: NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen pays a visit to Georgia.

October 2012: Georgia doubles its contribution to ISAF, making the country one of the largest non-NATO troop contributor nations.


September 2014: Georgian President Giorgi Margvelashvili attends the Wales Summit in September, where NATO leaders endorse the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package to help Georgia in its efforts to improve its defence capabilities and to achieve its goal of NATO membership. Georgia is invited to participate in the Interoperability Platform, under the Partnership Interoperability Initiative, as well as the Defence and Related Security Capacity-Building Initiative, launched during the Summit.

24 November 2014: In a statement, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg underlines that the Allies do not recognise the so-called treaty on alliance and strategic partnership signed between the Georgian region of Abkhazia and Russia. He reiterates the Allies’ call for Russia to reverse its recognition of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia as independent states and to withdraw its forces from Georgia.

January 2015: Following the completion of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan in December 2014, Georgia starts contributing to the follow-on NATO-led mission (“Resolute Support”) to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces and institutions.

5 February 2015: NGC defence ministers meet in Brussels to take stock of the implementation of the package of measures launched at the Wales Summit to improve its defence capabilities.

18 March 2015: The Secretary General states that NATO does not recognise the so-called treaty on alliance and integration signed between the South Ossetia region of Georgia and Russia on 18 March.


27 August 2015: During his first visit to Tbilisi, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg inaugurates the NATO-Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Centre at the Krtsanisi Military Facility.

2 December 2015: In a statement on NATO’s “open door” policy, NATO foreign ministers meeting in Brussels reiterate their decision at Bucharest and subsequent decisions concerning Georgia. They welcome the progress the country has made in coming closer to the Alliance and express their determination to intensify support for Georgia.

8 June 2016: During the visit of Georgian President Giorgi Margvelashvili to NATO Headquarters, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg welcomes Georgia’s continuing reform efforts and highlights that NATO will continue to support Georgia in moving closer to the Alliance.
Relations with Iraq

NATO and Iraq are engaged in political dialogue and practical cooperation aimed at developing the capacity of Iraq’s security forces, its defence and security institutions, and its national defence academies.

Highlights

- Iraq is one of a range of countries beyond the Euro-Atlantic area – often referred to as “partners across the globe” – with which NATO is developing relations.
- Relations build on cooperation that developed through the NATO Training Mission in Iraq from 2004 to 2011, during which 15,000 Iraqi officers were trained.
- In September 2012, a jointly agreed Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme was signed to provide a framework for political dialogue and tailored cooperation.
- At the request of the Iraqi government, NATO agreed in July 2015 on a package of defence capacity building measures to provide assistance in a number of priority areas, including: countering improvised explosive devices, explosive ordnance disposal and demining, security sector reform, military medicine and civil military planning.
- The first phase of training was launched in April 2016, with a ‘train-the-trainers’ course provided to 350 Iraqi officers in Jordan.
- NATO Allies are currently considering a training and capacity building effort inside Iraq, alongside the ongoing training in Jordan.
More background information

Practical cooperation

Cooperation between NATO and Iraq is based on principles of respect for sovereignty, international law, joint ownership and mutual benefit. The partnership serves to anchor and bolster Iraq’s capacity to contribute constructively to regional security. It reflects NATO’s long-standing commitment to the development of Iraq’s capabilities to address shared challenges and threats.

Through a jointly agreed Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme, NATO and Iraq are undertaking further efforts to develop the capacity of Iraq’s security and defence institutions. This programme provides a framework for political dialogue and for training cooperation in areas such as counter-terrorism, crisis management and critical energy infrastructure protection.

At the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014, Allied leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the NATO-Iraq partnership and expressed readiness to consider measures in the framework of NATO’s Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative. This initiative was launched to strengthen the Alliance’s contribution to international security, stability and conflict prevention. It is demand-driven and offers partners – at their request – assistance beyond what is available under existing programmes, building on NATO’s extensive expertise in providing advice, assistance, support, training, education and mentoring activities in the defence and related security sector.

Following a request from Prime Minister Al-Abadi, a DCB package for Iraq was agreed by Allies in July 2015. It includes assistance measures in the areas of countering improvised explosive devices (C-IED), explosive ordnance disposal and demining; military medicine and medical assistance; advice on security sector reform; civil-military planning support to operations; civil emergency planning and preparedness; cyber defence; and military training.

Training is currently being provided at the King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center in Jordan in the most immediate priority areas of C-IED, military medicine and civil-military planning. NATO is currently assessing the possibility of conducting training and capacity building inside Iraq, alongside the ongoing training in Jordan.

Prior to the closure of the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) in December 2011, NTM-I staff played a major role in enabling the partnership between NATO and Iraq, matching requests from Iraqi ministries with areas of cooperation open to NATO partners, and coordinating the participation of some 500 Iraqi officers and officials in out-of-country courses each year.

Milestones in relations

2004: The NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) is established, at the request of the Iraqi interim government and in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546, to help Iraq create effective armed forces by providing training and mentoring, and donating equipment.

2011: The NTM-I is discontinued due to the lack of an agreement on the legal status of NATO troops operating in the country.

June 2012: A temporary one-year NATO Transition Cell opens in Baghdad to ensure a smooth transition from the NTM-I to a regular partnership programme and to helping the Iraqi government to develop an inter-agency mechanism to determine what capabilities the country needs to develop.

24 September 2012: The NATO-Iraq Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme is signed, focusing mainly on education and training, response to terrorism, countering improvised explosive devices, explosive ordnance disposal, and defence institution building.

31 July 2015: Following a request of the Iraqi government for assistance through the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative, NATO Allies agree on a DCB package, on the basis of Iraqi requirements.
April 2016: Training for Iraqi security forces under the DCB Initiative is launched in Jordan, with 350 officers being trained between April and November 2016.

19 May 2016: NATO foreign ministers agree that NATO should do more to project stability beyond the Alliance’s borders by training up local forces to build their capacity to secure their own territory and push back against extremist groups.
Relations with the Republic of Moldova

Moldova contributes to the NATO-led operation in Kosovo and cooperates with the Allies and other partner countries in many other areas. Support for the country’s reform efforts and for capacity-building in the defence and security sector is a priority.

Highlights

- Moldova is constitutionally neutral but seeks to draw closer to Euro-Atlantic standards and institutions.
- Relations with NATO started when Moldova joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1992) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme (1994).
- The country’s programme of cooperation with NATO is set out in an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), which is agreed every two years.
- At the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014, Allied leaders offered to strengthen support, advice and assistance to Moldova through the new Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative.
- Moldova has contributed troops to the Kosovo Force (KFOR) since March 2014.

More background information

Key areas of cooperation

- Security cooperation

Through participation in Partnership for Peace (PfP) training and exercises, Moldova is developing the ability of the 22nd Peacekeeping Battalion’s forces to work together with forces from other countries, especially in crisis management and peacekeeping operations. These units could be made available for
NATO peace support operations. In March 2014, over 40 Moldovan troops were deployed in support of the NATO-led peace-support operation in Kosovo, comprising an infantry manoeuvre platoon and an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team.

Moldova contributes to the fight against terrorism through cooperation with the Allies on enhancing national counter-terrorist training capabilities and improving border and infrastructure security.

NATO has no direct role in the conflict resolution process in the region of Transnistria. However, NATO closely follows developments in the region and the Alliance fully expects Russia to abide by its international obligations, including respecting the territorial integrity and political freedom of neighbouring countries.

**Defence and security sector reform**

Defence and security sector reforms are core areas of cooperation in which NATO and individual Allies have considerable expertise that Moldova can draw upon. The Allies also support the wider democratic, institutional and judicial reform process underway in the country.

At the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, Moldova was invited to take part in the newly launched Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative, which offers expert advice and assistance to interested partners. The DCB Initiative aims to reinforce support for partners in the current security environment, helping the Alliance to project stability without deploying large combat forces, as part of NATO’s overall contribution to international security and stability, and conflict prevention. Based on the request received from the Moldovan authorities, a tailored package of measures was endorsed by NATO defence ministers in June 2015 to assist in strengthening and modernising the country’s armed forces and reforming its national security structures.

NATO and individual Allies continue to assist Moldova in creating modern, mobile, high-readiness, well-equipped and cost-effective forces that are interoperable with those of other countries. The country’s participation in the PIP Planning and Review Process (PARP) since 1997 is instrumental in this process. Key reform projects include improving command and control structures, military logistics, personnel management, training and strengthening Moldova’s border patrol capabilities.

Moldova’s participation in the Operational Capabilities Concept also supports the country’s objective to train and develop designated units to achieve full interoperability.

Work on enhancing military education and training in Moldova is focused on the Military Academy and its Continuous Training Centre – an accredited Partnership Training and Education Centre – both of which are working closely with NATO experts. Moldova has received advice on how to build, develop and reform educational institutions in the security, defence and military domain through NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme.

Moldova is also participating in the Building Integrity (BI) Programme. The defence ministry completed the NATO BI Self-Assessment and Peer Review Process in January 2016. The ministry receives tailor-made assistance and advice for strengthening integrity, accountability, transparency and good governance in the defence and security sector.

The country is also working with NATO to promote the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, which recognises the disproportionate impact that war and conflicts have on women and children. UNSCR 1325 calls for full and equal participation of women at all levels in issues ranging from early conflict prevention to post-conflict reconstruction, peace and security.

**Trust Fund for the destruction and storage of pesticides**

A NATO Trust Fund mechanism was set up in Moldova in 2007 to channel funding and support to a project aimed at the destruction and proper storage of surplus stocks of old pesticides and dangerous chemicals, which are buried or scattered around the country and pose increasingly high risks to the population and the environment. The Trust Fund aims to dispose of 1,269 tonnes of pesticides and dangerous chemicals,
which were repacked and centralised under previous projects. By the summer of 2016, 635 tonnes of pesticides have been destroyed and nine of 15 regional central storages have been cleaned.

- **Civil emergency planning**

For Moldova, civil emergency planning is a priority area for cooperation. Through participation in activities organised by NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), Moldova is developing its national civil emergency and disaster management capabilities. In consultation with the Allies, the country is also working on enhancing the legal framework for coping with such emergencies and on establishing a civil crisis information system to coordinate activities in the event of an emergency.

- **Science for Peace and Security Programme**

Moldova is an active participant in the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme. Current cooperation focuses in particular on defence against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents, and also includes activities on cyber defence, counter-terrorism and border security. As part of the Defence Capacity Building Initiative, the SPS Programme is supporting a project to provide Moldova with a cyber laboratory that will later serve as a training centre mainly for the civil servants of relevant defence and security institutions. Another major SPS project focuses on developing a capability to counter threats posed by biological agents, such as anthrax. The project includes training components, the set-up of a mobile laboratory, statistical sampling and mapping, as well as the remediation of a selected pilot area. In addition, Moldovan experts are co-leading in workshops on the threats of foreign fighters and border security challenges in Eastern Europe.

- **Public information**

Moldova and NATO aim to improve public awareness of and access to information on NATO and the benefits of cooperation with the Alliance. NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division supports the activities of the Information and Documentation Centre (IDC) on NATO. NATO also supports Moldova in improving the training of public information specialists within the country’s armed forces.

In every partner country an embassy of one of the NATO member states serves as a contact point and operates as a channel for disseminating information about the role and policies of the Alliance. The current NATO Contact Point Embassy in Moldova is the embassy of Poland.

### Framework for cooperation

Areas of cooperation, reform plans and political dialogue processes are detailed in the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), which is jointly agreed with NATO for a two-year period. Key areas of cooperation include support for wide-ranging reforms, assistance with the preparation of strategic documents, defence planning and budgeting, developing the interoperability of elements of the armed forces, and enhancing military education and training in Moldova.

Moldova also cooperates with NATO and other partner countries in a wide range of other areas through the PfP programme and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

### Milestones in relations

**1992:** Moldova joins the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (later succeeded by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997).

**1994:** Moldova joins the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme.

**1997:** Moldova joins the PIP Planning and Review Process (PARP).

**May 2006:** Moldova agrees its first Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO.
September 2006: Moldova hosts the PfP training exercises Cooperative Longbow and Cooperative Lancer.

31 January 2007: Foreign Minister Andrei Stratan and Defence Minister Valeriu Plesca brief the North Atlantic Council on the reform process in their country during a visit to NATO.

July 2007: Phase I of a project for the destruction of pesticides and other dangerous chemicals is completed, centralising stocks in regional central storages.

October 2007: The Information and Documentation Centre on NATO is inaugurated.

31 July 2008: The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) receives an urgent request from Moldova and Ukraine to help them cope with major floods.

30 October 2008: The NATO Secretary General visits Moldova for talks with President Vladimir Voronin and key ministers, as well as to give a speech at and visit the Information and Documentation Centre on NATO at Chisinau State University.

2010: Phase II of a project for the destruction of pesticides and other dangerous chemicals is completed, resulting in the set-up of a lab to analyse the chemical stockpiles.

10 February 2010: Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration Iurie Leanca and Defence Minister Vitalie Marinuta address the North Atlantic Council.

20 August 2010: A new IPAP is agreed, which the Moldovan authorities subsequently decide to release to the public for the first time.

July 2011: Defence Minister Vitalie Marinuta and Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Popov address the North Atlantic Council.

August 2011: Moldova hosts the EADRCC exercise Codrii 2011.

27 March 2012: Prime Minister Filat visits NATO Headquarters and meets the Secretary General and the North Atlantic Council.

July 2013: Phase III of the project for the destruction of pesticides and other dangerous chemicals is launched, aiming to destroy 950 tonnes of chemicals.

10 February 2014: NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen welcomes Moldova’s commitment to increase political dialogue and practical cooperation with the Alliance, in talks with Foreign Minister Natalia Gherman at NATO Headquarters.

May 2014: NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Alexander Vershbow pays a three-day visit to Moldova.

September 2014: At the Wales Summit, Moldova is invited to take part in the newly launched Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative, which offers expert advice and assistance to interested partners.

16 March 2015: Prime Minister Chiril Gaburici visits NATO for talks with Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on strengthening the partnership.

June 2015: The NATO Partnership and Cooperative Security Committee pays a two-day visit to Moldova for talks on deepening cooperation and dialogue.

24 June 2015: NATO defence ministers endorse a package of measures under the DCB Initiative to help Moldova enhance its defence and security institutions.
Relations with Montenegro

Montenegro is in the process of joining NATO. In December 2015, the Allies have invited the country to begin accession talks which then took place in early 2016. On 19 May 2016, Allied foreign ministers signed the Accession Protocol for Montenegro. Following the signature of the Protocol, Montenegro has ‘Invitee’ status, allowing its representatives to participate as observers in Allied meetings. Once all 28 Allies have ratified the Accession Protocol, Montenegro can then accede to the Washington Treaty and become a full member of the Alliance, which will also confer upon Montenegro the same decision-making powers as all other Allies. Montenegro actively supports the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan and works with the Allies and other partner countries in many other areas.

Highlights

- Shortly after regaining its independence in June 2006, Montenegro joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in December 2006.
- The country was invited to join the Membership Action Plan in December 2009.
- At a meeting of NATO foreign ministers on 2 December 2015, the Allies invited the country to start accession talks to join the Alliance.
- Allied ministers signed the Accession Protocol on 19 May 2016, following which Montenegro has ‘Invitee’ status and starts attending North Atlantic Council and other NATO meetings.
- Montenegro actively supported the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan from 2010 to end 2014 and is now supporting the follow-on mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces.

More background information

The road to integration

The Allies are committed to keeping NATO’s door open to Western Balkan partners that wish to join the Alliance, share its values and are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership. Euro-Atlantic integration is seen as the best way to ensure long-term, self-sustaining security and stability in the region.
The Membership Action Plan (MAP) is a NATO programme of advice, assistance and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance. Participation in the MAP does not prejudge any decision by the Alliance on future membership.

Montenegro began its first MAP cycle in the autumn of 2010 with the submission of its first Annual National Programme. This process allowed the country to identify key challenges that needed to be addressed, including reinforcing the rule of law, meeting NATO standards in security sector reforms and fighting corruption and organised crime.

The Allies decided in December 2015 to invite the country to being accession talks to join the Alliance. They stated that they expect further progress on reforms, especially in the area of rule of law and that NATO will continue to provide support and assistance though the MAP.

On 19 May 2016, Allied foreign ministers signed the Accession Protocol for Montenegro. Following the signature of the Protocol, Montenegro has ‘Invitee’ status, allowing its representatives to participate as observers in Allied meetings. Once all 28 Allies have ratified the Accession Protocol, Montenegro can then accede to the Washington Treaty and become a full member of the Alliance.

### Key areas of cooperation

**Security cooperation**

An important focus of NATO’s cooperation with Montenegro is to develop the ability of the country’s forces to work together with forces from NATO countries and other partners, especially in peacekeeping and crisis-management operations. Participation in joint planning, training and military exercises within the framework of the PfP programme is essential in this regard.

In February 2010, Montenegro decided to contribute troops to the NATO-led International Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, which were deployed there together with a Croatian unit. Following the completion of ISAF’s operation at the end of 2014, Montenegro is currently supporting the follow-on mission (‘Resolute Support’) to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces. In support of past efforts to equip and train the Afghan National Army, Montenegro donated more than 1,600 weapons and 250,000 rounds of ammunition. The government has also pledged financial support for the future development of the Afghan National Security Forces.

**Defence and security sector reform**

Defence and security sector reforms continue to be key elements of cooperation. The Alliance as a whole and individual Allies have considerable expertise that the country can draw upon in this area. The Allies also support the wider democratic, institutional and judicial reform process underway in Montenegro.

In 2013, Montenegro conducted a new Strategic Defence Review and produced a long-term development plan for its army. These documents have provided a basis for a comprehensive reform of the country’s defence system.

The country’s participation in the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) helps to develop forces that will be fully capable of conducting peacekeeping and relief operations with NATO and partner forces.

Montenegro is also participating in NATO’s Building Integrity Programme to strengthen good governance in the defence and security sector. This Programme seeks to raise awareness, promote good practice and provide practical tools to help countries enhance integrity and reduce risks of corruption in the security sector by strengthening transparency and accountability.

The country is also working with NATO to promote the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, which recognises the disproportionate impact that war and conflicts have on women and children. UNSCR 1325 calls for full and equal participation of women at all levels in issues ranging from early conflict prevention to post-conflict reconstruction, peace and security.
Montenegro is participating in various cyber defence initiatives.

Surplus and obsolete armaments and ammunition remain a significant issue for Montenegro in terms of both security and environmental concerns. NATO Allies have previously supported NATO/PfP Trust Fund work in this area, including a project in both Serbia and Montenegro to remove anti-personnel landmines. Further Trust Fund activities with Montenegro are expected to be launched in 2016, aimed at supporting the safe demilitarization of about 416 tonnes of ammunition.

- **Civil emergency planning**
  
  In cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), Montenegro is establishing a national early warning system, building a national crisis situation centre and developing its emergency response capabilities.

- **Security-related scientific cooperation**
  
  Montenegro has been actively engaged within the framework of the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme since 2006. The SPS Programme enables close collaboration on issues of common interest to enhance the security of NATO and partner countries. By facilitating international efforts, in particular with a regional focus, the Programme seeks to address emerging security challenges, support NATO-led operations and advance early warning and forecast for the prevention of disasters and crises.

  Today, scientists and experts from Montenegro are working to address a range of security issues, notably in the fields of environmental security and disaster forecast and prevention of natural catastrophes.

- **Public information**
  
  Montenegro’s journey to NATO membership requires good public access to information on the benefits of cooperation and membership with NATO. NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division cooperates actively with the Montenegrin authorities as well as with a wide range of civil society partners, media representatives, members of parliament, local municipalities, etc. Public diplomacy programmes, such as visits to NATO Headquarters, seminars, speaking tours and educational youth programmes, aim to raise public awareness about NATO and the membership process.

  In every partner country an embassy of one of the NATO member states serves as a contact point and operates as a channel for disseminating information about the role and policies of the Alliance. The current NATO Contact Point Embassy in Montenegro is the embassy of Hungary.

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**Framework for cooperation**

Since regaining its independence in 2006, Montenegro has been undertaking a wide-ranging programme of structural and institutional reforms. The instruments available within the PfP greatly assist in this process. Initially the country chose to strengthen the reform focus of cooperation by developing an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO in 2008. It moved through a successful IPAP cycle from 2008 to 2010, before shifting in the autumn of 2010 to an Annual National Programme within the MAP framework.

Montenegro has also been participating in the PfP Planning and Review Process PARP since 2006. The role of the PARP is to provide a structured basis for identifying forces and capabilities that could be available to the Alliance for multinational training, exercises and operations. It also serves as the principal mechanism used to guide and measure defence and military reform progress. A biennial process, the PARP is open to all partners on a voluntary basis.

To facilitate cooperation, Montenegro has established a mission to NATO as well as a liaison office at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).
**Milestones in relations**

**February 2003:** The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is replaced by a looser state union named Serbia and Montenegro.

**3 June 2006:** Following a vote for independence on 21 May, the Montenegrin parliament formally declares independence.

**November 2006:** The NATO Allies invite Montenegro to join the Partnership for Peace (PfP) at the Riga Summit.

**December 2006:** Montenegro joins the Partnership for Peace.

**2007:** In support of NATO’s efforts to equip and train the Afghan National Army, Montenegro donates weapons and ammunition.

**April 2008:** At the Bucharest Summit, Allied leaders agree to start an Intensified Dialogue with Montenegro on its membership aspirations and related reforms.

**July 2008:** Montenegro agrees an Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO, which focuses on the full range of political, military, financial, and security issues relating to its aspirations to membership.

**December 2009:** NATO foreign ministers invite Montenegro to join the Membership Action Plan.

**February 2010:** Montenegro decides to contribute to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

**Autumn 2010:** Montenegro submits its first Annual National Programme under the Membership Action Plan.

**29 June 2011:** The NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen visits Budva, Montenegro, where he meets President Filip Vujanović and Prime Minister Igor Lukšić. During his trip, he delivers a major speech on “NATO and the Western Balkans” at a meeting of the Adriatic Charter.

**21 March 2012:** Prime Minister Luksić addresses the North Atlantic Council.

**27 June 2012:** The Secretary General praises Montenegro’s commitment to implement the needed reforms to meet NATO membership standards, after talks at NATO Headquarters with the country’s Foreign Minister Milan Ročen and Defence Minister Milica Pejanović-Durišić.

**26 March 2013:** Prime Minister of Montenegro Milo Dukanović visits NATO Headquarters for meetings with the Secretary General and the North Atlantic Council.

**16 October 2013:** President Filip Vujanović visits NATO Headquarters for a meeting with the Secretary General to discuss progress in Montenegro’s reform agenda and growing cooperation.

**March 2014:** Prime Minister Milo Đukanović holds talks with the NATO Secretary General and addresses the North Atlantic Council at NATO Headquarters.

**May 2014:** NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen visits Podgorica for talks with President Filip Vujanović, Prime Minister Milo Đukanović, Foreign Affairs Minister Igor Lukšić and President of the Parliament Ranko Krivokapić.

**June 2014:** Following a meeting of NATO foreign ministers, the Secretary General announces that NATO will open intensified and focused talks with Montenegro and will assess at the latest by the end of 2015 whether to invite Montenegro to join the Alliance.

**September 2015:** At the Wales Summit, NATO leaders endorse the decisions taken by foreign ministers in June and invite Montenegro in the meantime to continue its efforts to address the remaining challenges for NATO membership.

**15 April 2015:** Prime Minister of Montenegro Milo Đukanović visits NATO Headquarters to meet NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the North Atlantic Council.
14-15 October 2015: The NATO Secretary General and the Ambassadors of the North Atlantic Council pay a two-day visit to Montenegro to assess the country’s progress on reforms and its perspectives for membership in the Alliance.

2 December 2015: NATO foreign ministers meeting in Brussels invite Montenegro to start accession talks to join the Alliance, while encouraging further progress on reforms, especially in the area of rule of law.

February 2016: Montenegrin representatives conduct Accession Talks with the NATO International Staff at NATO Headquarters.

19 May 2016: Allied foreign ministers sign the Accession Protocol, which gives Montenegro ‘Invitee’ status and starts the ratification process in Allied capitals.
Relations with Sweden

NATO and Sweden actively cooperate in peace and security operations and have developed practical cooperation in many other areas including education and training, and defence reform.

Swedish Defence Minister Peter Hultqvist and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg (Nov. 2014)

Highlights

- Swedish cooperation with NATO is based on a longstanding policy of military non-alignment and a firm national consensus, and focuses on areas that match joint objectives.
- Cooperation has been reinforced over the years since Sweden joined NATO's Partnership for Peace in 1994 and became a member of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997.
- Sweden is one of NATO’s most active partners and a valued contributor to NATO-led operations and missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan – it is one of five countries that has enhanced opportunities for dialogue and cooperation with NATO.
- An important priority for cooperation is to develop capabilities and maintain the ability of the Swedish armed forces to work with those of NATO and other partner countries in multinational peace-support operations.
- In the current security context with heightened concerns about Russian military activities, NATO is stepping up cooperation with Sweden and Finland in the Baltic region.
- Sweden actively supports the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, hosting the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations at the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre.
- Sweden’s role in training the forces of NATO partner countries is greatly valued, as is its support for a number of Trust Fund projects in other partner countries focused on issues related to demilitarization and defence transformation.
More background information

Key areas of cooperation

- Security cooperation

Sweden is one of five countries (known as ‘Enhanced Opportunities Partners’) that make particularly significant contributions to NATO operations and other Alliance objectives. As such, the country has enhanced opportunities for dialogue and cooperation with the Allies.

In the current security context with heightened concerns about Russian military activities, NATO is stepping up cooperation with Sweden and Finland. This means expanding exchanges of information on hybrid warfare, coordinating training and exercises, and developing better joint situational awareness to address common threats and develop joint actions, if needed. Also underway are talks on how to include the two partners in the enhanced NATO Response Force (NRF) and regular consultations on security in the Baltic Sea region.

Moreover, at NATO’s Wales Summit in September 2014, Sweden and Finland signed a memorandum of understanding on Host Nation Support, which addresses issues related to the provision of civil and military assistance to Allied forces located on, or in transit through, their territory in peacetime, crisis or war. The agreement was ratified by the Swedish parliament on 1 June 2016.

Sweden is an active contributor to NATO-led operations. Its first contribution dates back to 1995 when it sent a battalion to the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since 1999, Sweden has supported the peacekeeping force in Kosovo (KFOR).

Swedish personnel worked alongside Allied forces as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan from 2003 to the completion of ISAF’s mission in 2014. They provided specialist units and logistical support and led the multinational Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Mazar-e Sharif from 2006. Sweden is currently supporting the follow-on mission (known as Resolute Support) to further train, assist and advise the Afghan security forces and institutions. Sweden has also contributed over USD 11 million to the Afghan National Army Trust Fund.

In April 2011, Sweden contributed to Operation Unified Protector (OUP), NATO’s military operation in Libya under United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973. The Swedish Air Force deployed eight JAS Gripen aircraft to the Sigonella airbase in Sicily, Italy to enforce the no-fly zone over Libya, supported by an air-to-air refuelling capable C-130.

The country participates in numerous Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercises. It makes a number of units available, on a case-by-case basis, for multinational operations, training and exercises, including those led by the European Union (EU) and NATO. The Swedish Armed Forces aim to be able to sustain up to 2,000 personnel continuously deployed on operations, either nationally or internationally. This pool of forces includes significant land, maritime and air assets, including mechanised and armoured units, submarine, corvettes, combat and transport aircraft with a deployable airbase unit, combat and combat service support elements, as well as specialist support.

In 2013, Sweden joined the NRF, alongside Finland and Ukraine, and it participated in Exercise Steadfast Jazz, which served to certify the NRF rotation for 2014.

Sweden’s close ties with its neighbours – Denmark, Finland and Norway – are reflected in its participation in Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), a further practical and efficient way for like-minded states to contribute to regional and international security and to practise cooperation, including pooling and sharing of capabilities. In Sweden’s case, this activity is pursued alongside the Nordic Battlegroup and cooperation with countries around the Baltic Sea and in northern Europe.

Sweden, along with Finland, regularly take part in consultations with the Allies on security in the Baltic Sea region.
The country participates in the Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC), which uses an evaluation and feedback programme to develop and train partner land, maritime, air or Special Operations Forces units that seek to meet NATO standards. Since 2011, Sweden has participated regularly in the Baltic Region Training Event – a series of planning, training and execution events for enhancing interoperability and building capabilities in the Baltic States, which is conducted by Allied Air Command Ramstein, Germany.

**Defence and security sector reform**

Participating in peacekeeping and peace-support operations alongside NATO Allies has complemented Sweden’s own process of military transformation. Participation in the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) influences Swedish planning and activities, aimed at developing the capabilities and enhancing the interoperability of the Swedish Armed Forces.

Sweden is contributing to the development of the EU Battlegroup concept. It is cooperating with Estonia, Finland and Norway, among other countries, in the development of a multinational rapid-reaction force for EU-led peace-support operations. During periods that the Swedish parts of the force are not on stand-by for EU needs, they will be available for operations led by both the UN and NATO.

Sweden joined the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) in March 2006 and is also participating in the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) initiative. Designed to meet the strategic airlift requirements of SAC member nations for national missions, SAC resources can be used for NATO, UN, EU or other international missions.

Sweden’s role in training the forces of NATO partner countries is greatly valued by the Allies. In April 1999, NATO formally recognised the military training centre in Almnäs as a PIP Training Centre. In 2004, the Centre moved to new premises in Kungsängen, north of Stockholm. The activities of the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre (SWEDINT) include exercises and training, with a focus on humanitarian assistance, rescue services, peace-support operations, civil emergency planning and the democratic control of the armed forces. The Centre regularly organises courses and training exercises within the PfP. In January 2012 – in support of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and related Resolutions on strengthening the role of women in peace and security – the Nordic countries established a Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations, to make sure that gender perspectives continue to be integrated into military operations.

Sweden has also supported a number of Trust Fund projects conducted in other partner countries which were focused on areas such as the retraining and reintegration of military personnel, stockpile management and the destruction of surplus weapons.

**Civil emergency planning**

Civil emergency planning is a major area of bilateral cooperation. The aim is for Sweden to be able to cooperate with NATO Allies in providing mutual support in dealing with the consequences of a major accident or disaster in the Euro-Atlantic area. In line with this, Sweden has participated in numerous NATO crisis management exercises, in addition to several maritime exercises. Additionally, Swedish civil resources have been listed with the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC). Units include search and rescue teams, medical experts and protection and decontamination units.

In April 2011, Sweden conducted a joint civil-military-police exercise, Viking 11, which took place in six different countries simultaneously with Sweden as the lead nation and with participants from the UN, a wide range of non-governmental organisations and agencies, armed forces from about 25 countries and civilians and police from various countries and organisations.

**Science and environment**

Under the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme, scientists from Sweden have participated in numerous advanced research workshops and seminars on a range of topics. Topics have included

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information security, mesoscopic physics, the environmental role of wetlands, the protection of civilian infrastructure against terrorism, and human trafficking.

Framework for cooperation

NATO and Sweden detail areas of cooperation and timelines in Sweden’s Individual Partnership Cooperation Programme (IPCP), which is jointly agreed for a two-year period. Key areas include security and peacekeeping cooperation, crisis management and civil emergency planning.

Participation in the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) helps develop the interoperability and capabilities of Swedish forces, which may be made available for NATO training, exercises and multinational crisis management and peace-support operations.

Since joining PfP, Sweden has played an active role and offers expertise to other partners and Allies, with a special focus on peacekeeping, civil emergency planning and civil-military cooperation.

Milestones in relations

1994: Sweden joins the Partnership for Peace (PfP).
1996: Sweden contributes forces to the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
1997: Sweden joins the newly created Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.
1999: Swedish forces participate in the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo.

SWEDINT, the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre, is designated a PfP Training Centre.
2000: Swedish forces join NATO-led forces in Afghanistan.
2008: Sweden hosts a live demonstration, involving NATO Allies and Swedish civilian and military forces, to test new ways of effectively sharing critical information in emergency situations (Exercise Viking 2008).
September 2008: Sweden conducts a joint exercise with NATO in Enköping designed to enhance civil-military cooperation during civil emergency.
March 2010: Sweden co-hosts a seminar “NATO’s New Strategic Concept – Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management” with Finland.
April 2010: Sweden participates in a NATO Response Force (NRF) maritime exercise (Brilliant Mariner).
May 2010: Sweden participates in an international cyber defence exercise (Baltic Cyber Shield) organised by several Swedish governmental institutions and the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence.
2011: Sweden conducts multinational Exercise Viking 2011 with international organisations and NGOs participating in the operations.
January 2012: A Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations is established, hosted by the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre.
January 2013: NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen visits Sweden to discuss how to further strengthen cooperation.
2013: Sweden contributes to the NATO Response Force and participates in Exercise Steadfast Jazz, which served to certify the NRF rotation for 2014.
January 2014: NATO’s Secretary General visits Sweden to discuss further potential for the relationship.
February 2014: Sweden and Finland participate in Iceland Air Meet 2014 under the command of Norway, which had deployed to Iceland to provide airborne surveillance and interception capabilities as part of NATO’s mission to meet Iceland’s peacetime preparedness needs.

September 2014: At the Wales Summit, Sweden is identified as one of five countries that make particularly significant contributions to NATO operations and other Alliance objectives, which will have enhanced opportunities for dialogue and cooperation with the Allies. Along with Finland, Sweden signs a memorandum of understanding on Host Nation Support, which addresses issues related to the provision of civil and military assistance to Allied forces located on, or in transit through, their territory in peacetime, crisis or war.

January 2015: Following the completion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan in December 2014, Sweden starts contributing to the follow-on NATO-led mission (“Resolute Support”) to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces and institutions.

9-10 June 2015: The Director General of the NATO International Military Staff, Air Marshal Sir Christopher Harper, visits Ronneby air base and Stockholm, where he meets the Chief of Defence Staff of the Swedish Armed Forces, Lt Gen Gyllensporre. He commends Sweden for being a pro-active and effective contributor to international security.

12 June 2015: NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow visits Stockholm, where he welcomes the country’s deep partnership with the Alliance in a speech to the “Folk och Försvar” (People and Defence) forum. He also meets Foreign Minister Margot Wallström and Defence Minister Peter Hultqvist.

10 November 2015: NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg welcomes efforts to strengthen defence cooperation among Nordic Allies and partners during talks with Nordic Defence Ministers in Stockholm. During his visit, the Secretary General also meets with Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven, Foreign Minister Margot Wallström and members of the Swedish Parliamentary Committees on Defence and Foreign Affairs.

1 December 2015: The Secretary General has talks with Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström, along with Finnish Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Timo Soini, on the margins of NATO’s meetings of foreign ministers in Brussels. They discuss ongoing work to expand exchanges of information, including on hybrid warfare, coordinating training and exercises, and developing better joint situational awareness to help NATO, Finland and Sweden more effectively to address common threats and develop joint actions, if needed. Also underway are talks on how to include the two partners in the enhanced NATO Response Force and regular consultations on security in the Baltic Sea region.

20 April 2016: Sweden participates in two days of air exercises in the Baltic region alongside NATO and partner air forces, practising emergency responses and sharpening cooperation.

27-28 April 2016: NATO’s Chairman of the Military Committee, General Petr Pavel, visits Sweden for discussions with met with the Defence Minister and the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces to discuss regional security challenges and opportunities for enhanced military cooperation.

19-20 May 2016: The Swedish foreign minister participates in a meeting with NATO foreign ministers devoted to NATO-EU cooperation.
Mediterranean Dialogue

NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue was initiated in 1994 by the North Atlantic Council. It currently involves seven non-NATO countries of the Mediterranean region: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.

Origins and Objectives

The Dialogue reflects the Alliance’s view that security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. It is an integral part of NATO’s adaptation to the post-Cold War security environment, as well as an important component of the Alliance’s policy of outreach and cooperation.

The Mediterranean Dialogue’s overall aim is to:

- contribute to regional security and stability
- achieve better mutual understanding
- dispel any misconceptions about NATO among Dialogue countries

Key Principles

The successful launch of the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and its subsequent development has been based upon a number of principles:

- **Non discrimination**: all Mediterranean partners are offered the same basis for their cooperation with NATO.

- **Self-differentiation**, allowing a tailored approach to the specific needs of each of our MD partner countries. Particularly Individual Cooperation Programmes (ICP) allow interested MD countries and NATO to frame their practical cooperation in a more prospective and focused way, enabling interested countries to outline the main short and long-term objectives of their cooperation with the Alliance, in accordance with NATO’s objectives and policies for the Mediterranean Dialogue.

- **Inclusiveness**: all MD countries should see themselves as share holders of the same cooperative effort.
Two-way engagement: the MD is a “two-way partnership”, in which NATO seeks partners’ contribution for its success, through a regular consultation process; special emphasis is placed on practical cooperation.

Non imposition: MD partners are free to choose the pace and extent of their cooperation with the Alliance; NATO has no wish to impose anything upon them.

Complementarity and mutual reinforcement: efforts of the MD and other international institutions for the region are complementary and mutually reinforcing in nature; such as, for example, those of the EU’s “Union For the Mediterranean”, the OSCE’s “Mediterranean Initiative”, or the “Five plus Five”.

Diversity: the MD respects and takes into account the specific regional, cultural and political contexts of the respective partners.

Moreover, the MD is progressive in terms of participation and substance. Such flexibility has allowed the number of Dialogue partners to grow - witness the inclusion of Jordan in November 1995 and Algeria in March 2000 - and the content of the Dialogue to evolve over time.

The Dialogue is primarily bilateral in structure (NATO+1). Despite the predominantly bilateral character, the Dialogue nevertheless allows for multilateral meetings on a regular basis (NATO+7).

In principle, activities within the Mediterranean Dialogue take place on a self-funding basis. However, Allies agreed to consider requests for financial assistance in support of Mediterranean partners’ participation in the Dialogue. A number of measures have recently been taken to facilitate cooperation, notably the revision of the Dialogue’s funding policy to allow funding up to 100 percent of the participation costs in Dialogue’s activities and the extension of the NATO/PfP Trust Fund mechanisms to MD countries.

The political dimension

The Mediterranean Dialogue is based upon the twin pillars of political dialogue and practical cooperation.

The Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG), established at the Madrid Summit in July 1997 under the supervision of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), had the overall responsibility for the Mediterranean Dialogue, until it was replaced in 2011 by the Political and Partnerships Committee, which is responsible for all partnerships. The Committee meets at the level of Political Counsellors on a regular basis to discuss all matters related to the Dialogue including its further development.

Political consultations in the NATO+1 format are held on a regular basis both at Ambassadorial and working level. These discussions provide an opportunity for sharing views on a range of issues relevant to the security situation in the Mediterranean, as well as on the further development of the political and practical cooperation dimensions of the Dialogue.

Meetings in the NATO+7 format, including NAC+7 meetings, are also held on a regular basis, in particular following the NATO Summit and Ministerial meetings, Chiefs-of-Defence meetings, and other major NATO events. These meetings represent an opportunity for two-way political consultations between NATO and MD partners.

At the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO’s Heads of State and Government elevated the MD to a genuine partnership through the establishment of a more ambitious and expanded framework, which considerably enhanced both the MD’s political and practical cooperation dimensions.

Since then, the constant increase in the number and quality of the NATO-MD political dialogue has recently reached a sustainable level. Consultations of the 28 Allies and seven MD countries take place on a regular basis on a bilateral and multilateral level, at Ministerial, Ambassadorial and working level formats. That has also included three meetings of the NATO and MD Foreign Ministers in December 2004, 2007 and 2008 in Brussels. Two meetings of NATO and MD Defense Ministers in 2006 and 2007 in Taormina, Italy and Seville, Spain. Ten meetings of the Chief of Defense of NATO and MD countries have
also take place so far. The first ever NAC+7 meeting took place in Rabat, Morocco, in 2006 and, more recently, the first MD Policy Advisory Group meeting with all seven MD partners took place in San Remo, Italy, on 15-16 September 2011.

The political dimension also includes visits by NATO Senior Officials, including the Secretary General and the Deputy Secretary General, to Mediterranean Dialogue countries. The main purpose of these visits is to conduct high-level political consultations with the relevant host authorities on the way forward in NATO’s political and practical cooperation under the Mediterranean Dialogue.

The new Strategic Concept, which was adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2011, identifies cooperative security as one of three key priorities for the Alliance, and constitutes an opportunity to move partnerships to the next generation. Mediterranean Dialogue partners were actively involved in the debate leading to its adoption.

The Strategic Concept refers specifically to the MD, stating that: “We are firmly committed to the development of friendly and cooperative relations with all countries of the Mediterranean, and we intend to further develop the Mediterranean Dialogue in the coming years. We will aim to deepen the cooperation with current members of the Mediterranean Dialogue and be open to the inclusion in the Mediterranean Dialogue of other countries of the region.”

MD partners have reiterated their support for enhanced political consultations to better tailor the MD to their specific interests and to maintain the distinctive cooperation framework of the MD.

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### The practical dimension

Measures of practical cooperation between NATO and Mediterranean Dialogue countries are laid down in an annual Work Programme which aims at enhancing our partnership through cooperation in security-related issues.

The annual Work Programme includes seminars, workshops and other practical activities in the fields of modernisation of the armed forces, civil emergency planning, crisis management, border security, small arms & light weapons, public diplomacy, scientific and environmental cooperation, as well as consultations on terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

There is also a military dimension to the annual Work Programme which includes invitations to Dialogue countries to observe - and in some cases participate - in NATO/PIP military exercises, attend courses and other academic activities at the NATO School (SHAPE) in Oberammergau (Germany) and the NATO Defense College in Rome (Italy), and visit NATO military bodies.

The military programme also includes port visits by NATO’s Standing Naval Forces, on-site train-the-trainers sessions by Mobile Training Teams, and visits by NATO experts to assess the possibilities for further cooperation in the military field.

Furthermore, NATO+7 consultation meetings on the military programme involving military representatives from NATO and the seven Mediterranean Dialogue countries are held twice a year.

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### State of play

At their Summit meeting in Istanbul in June 2004, NATO’s HOSG invited Mediterranean partners to establish a more ambitious and expanded framework for the Mediterranean Dialogue, guided by the principle of joint ownership and taking into consideration their particular interests and needs. The aim is to contribute towards regional security and stability through stronger practical cooperation, including by enhancing the existing political dialogue, achieving interoperability, developing defence reform and contributing to the fight against terrorism.

Since the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, an annual Mediterranean Dialogue Work Programme (MDWP) focusing on agreed priority areas has been the main cooperation instrument available and has been
expanded progressively in more than 30 areas of cooperation, going from about 100 activities in 2004, to over 700 activities and events in 2011.

While the MDWP is essentially military (85 percent of the activities), it comprises activities in a wide range of areas of cooperation including Military Education, Training and Doctrine, Defence Policy and Strategy, Defence Investment, Civil Emergency Planning, Public Diplomacy, Crisis Management, Armaments and Intelligence related activities.

At their Berlin meeting in April 2011, NATO Foreign Ministers endorsed the establishment of a single Partnership Cooperation Menu (PCM) for all partners. As of 1 January 2012, the single partnership menu will be effective, thus dramatically expanding the number of activities accessible to MD countries.

A number of cooperation tools have also been progressively opened to MD countries, such as:

- The e-Prime database which provides electronic access to the MDWP allowing close monitoring of cooperation activities;
- The full package of Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) to improve partners’ capacity to contribute effectively to NATO-led Crisis Response Operations through achieving interoperability;
- The Trust Fund mechanism that currently includes ongoing substantial projects with MD countries such as Jordan and Mauritania;
- The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC) aims at improving partners’ capacity in supporting NATO’s response to crises;
- The Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism (PAP-T) aims at strengthening NATO’s ability to work effectively with MD partners in the fight against terrorism;
- The Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) action plan aims at improving the civil preparedness against CBRN attacks on populations and critical infrastructures.

The NATO Training Cooperation Initiative (NTCI), launched at the 2007 Riga Summit, aims at complementing existing cooperation activities developed in the MD framework through: the establishment of a “NATO Regional Cooperation Course” at the NATO Defence College (NDC) in Rome, which consists in a ten-week strategic level course also focusing on current security challenges in the Middle East.

- **Individual Partnership Cooperation Programmes**

The Individual and Partnership Cooperation Programme (IPCP), which replaces the previous Individual Cooperation Programme (ICP) framework document, aims at enhancing bilateral political dialogue as well as at tailoring the cooperation with NATO according to key national security needs, framing NATO cooperation with MD partner countries in a more strategic way. Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia have all agreed tailored Individual Cooperation Programmes with NATO. This is the main instrument of focused cooperation between NATO and MD countries.

Taking into account changes in the Middle East and North Africa, NATO stands ready to support and assist those Mediterranean Dialogue countries undergoing transition, if they so request. Drawing on in-house experience and expertise, through Individual Partnership Cooperation Programmes the Alliance could provide assistance in the areas of security institutions building, defence transformation, modernisation and capacity development, civil-military relations, and defence-related aspects of the transformation and reform of the security sector.
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)

NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, launched at the Alliance’s Summit in the Turkish city in June 2004, aims to contribute to long-term global and regional security by offering countries of the broader Middle East region practical bilateral security cooperation with NATO.

ICI focuses on practical cooperation in areas where NATO can add value, notably in the security field. Six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council were initially invited to participate. To date, four of these -- Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates -- have joined. Saudia Arabia and Oman have also shown an interest in the Initiative.

Based on the principle of inclusiveness, the Initiative is, however, open to all interested countries of the broader Middle East region who subscribe to its aims and content, including the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Each interested country will be considered by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis and on its own merit. Participation of countries in the region in the Initiative as well as the pace and extent of their cooperation with NATO will depend in large measure on their individual response and level of interest.

What key principles is the Initiative based on?

The ICI is based on a number of important principles, including:

- **Non discrimination**: all ICI partners are offered the same basis for their cooperation with NATO.

- **Self-differentiation**: a tailored approach to the specific needs of each of our ICI partner countries. Particularly Individual Partnership Cooperation Programmes (IPCP), allow interested ICI countries and NATO to frame their practical cooperation in a more prospective and focused way, enabling interested countries to outline the main short and long-term objectives of their cooperation with the Alliance, in accordance with NATO’s objectives and policies for the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

- **Inclusiveness**: all ICI countries should see themselves as stakeholders of the same cooperative effort.
Two-way engagement: the ICI is a "two-way" partnership, in which NATO seeks partners’ contribution for its success, through a regular consultation process; special emphasis is placed on practical cooperation.

Non imposition: ICI partners are free to choose the pace and extent of their cooperation with the Alliance; NATO has no wish to impose anything upon them.

Complementarity and mutual reinforcement: efforts of the ICI and other international institutions for the region are complementary and mutually reinforcing in nature.

Diversity: the ICI respects and takes into account the specific regional, cultural and political contexts of the respective partners.

What does this mean in practice?

The Initiative offers a ‘menu’ of bilateral activities that countries can choose from, which comprises a range of cooperation areas, including:

1. tailored advice on defence transformation, defence budgeting, defence planning and civil-military relations;
2. military-to-military cooperation to contribute to interoperability through participation in selected military exercises and related education and training activities that could improve the ability of participating countries’ forces to operate with those of the Alliance; and through participation in selected NATO and PfP exercises and in NATO-led operation on a case-by-case basis;
3. cooperation in the fight against terrorism, including through intelligence-sharing;
4. cooperation in the Alliance’s work on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;
5. cooperation regarding border security in connection with terrorism, small arms and light weapons and the fight against illegal trafficking;
6. civil emergency planning, including participating in training courses and exercises on disaster assistance.

Individual and Partnership Cooperation Programme (IPCP) allow interested ICI countries and NATO to frame their practical cooperation in a more prospective and focused way, enabling interested countries to outline the main short and long-term objectives of their cooperation with the Alliance.

How did the Initiative evolve?

NATO recognizes that dealing with today’s complex new threats requires wide international cooperation and collective effort. That is why NATO has developed, and continues to develop, a network of partnerships in the security field.

The Initiative was preceded by a series of high level consultations conducted by the then Deputy Secretary General of NATO, Ambassador Minuto Rizzo, with six countries of the region in May, September and December 2004.

These were: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. During these consultations all of the countries expressed their interest in the Initiative.

ICI was launched at the Summit meeting of NATO Heads of State and Government in Istanbul, 28 June 2004. Following the Summit, from September to December 2004, the Deputy Secretary General of NATO paid a second round of visits to the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, to discuss the way ahead.

In the first three months of 2005, three countries: Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar formally joined the ICI. In June 2005, the United Arab Emirates joined the Initiative.
The ICI has since developed both in the political and in the practical dimensions. While the political dialogue has evolved to include high-level meetings, the practical dimension was progressively enhanced through the opening of new partnership tools and activities as well as through the contribution of these countries to NATO-led operations. The multilateral dimension of the partnership also developed, with the first NAC+4 meeting held in November 2008, followed by two other such meetings in 2009 and 2010.

Since the Istanbul Summit in 2004, an annual Menu of Practical Activities focusing on agreed priority areas has been opened to ICI countries and has been gradually enhanced. Whereas in 2007, the offer of cooperation to ICI countries included 328 activities/events, the 2011 Menu of Practical Activities now contains about 500 activities.

The NATO Training Cooperation Initiative (NTCI), launched at the 2007 Riga Summit, aims at complementing existing cooperation activities developed in the ICI framework through the establishment of a “NATO Regional Cooperation Course” at the NATO Defence College (NDC) in Rome, which consists in a ten-week strategic level course also focusing on current security challenges in the Middle East. ICI partners, as well as Saudi Arabia, actively participate in these courses.

The importance of public diplomacy has been underlined by ICI nations. High visibility events gave way to informal discussions on security related issues of common interest. The ICI Ambassadorial Conferences in Kuwait (2006), Bahrain (2008) and the United Arab Emirates (2009), which were attended by the Secretary General, the Deputy Secretary General and the 28 NATO Permanent Representatives, as well as by high-ranking officials, policymakers and opinion leaders from ICI countries, focused on discussing and addressing the perception of NATO in the Gulf, as well as ways to develop NATO-ICI partnership in its two dimensions. The fourth ICI Ambassadorial Conference took place in Qatar in February 2011 and focused on deepening NATO-ICI partnership.

The new Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, identifies cooperative security as one of three core tasks for the Alliance. It refers specifically to the ICI, and states: “We attach great importance to peace and stability in the Gulf region, and we intend to strengthen our cooperation in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. We will aim to develop a deeper security partnership with our Gulf partners and remain ready to welcome new partners in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.”

With the approval of the new partnership policy at the meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Berlin in April 2011, all NATO partners will have access in principle to the same range and number of activities. This will dramatically expand the number of activities accessible to ICI countries.

ICI partners have also increasingly demonstrated their readiness to participate in NATO-led operations, acting as security providers. Today, several ICI partners actively contribute to the NATO ISAF operation in Afghanistan. Following the launch of Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates promptly provided air assets to the operation and were recognised as contributing nations, playing a key role in the success of the operation.

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**Which NATO bodies have a central role?**

Following the launch of the ICI, NATO countries decided to establish the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Group, composed of political counsellors from the 28 delegations of member countries to NATO, which was replaced in 2011 by the Political and Partnerships Committee, which responsible for all partnerships.

The Committee is in charge of defining the procedures for the development of a menu of practical activities with interested countries and ensuring its successful implementation. It also reports to the Council or to NATO’s Senior Political Committee and prepares the ground for the decisions to be adopted by the North Atlantic Council on ICI.

In addition, the Committee engages countries participating in the Initiative on a ‘28+1’ basis for the development of individual workplans and follows up on their implementation.
Enlargement

NATO’s door remains open to any European country in a position to undertake the commitments and obligations of membership, and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Since 1949, NATO’s membership has increased from 12 to 28 countries through six rounds of enlargement. Currently, four partner countries have declared their aspirations to NATO membership: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹.

The foreign ministers of four aspirant countries – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹ – meet NATO foreign ministers at the Chicago Summit in May 2012.

Highlights

- NATO’s “open door policy” is based on Article 10 of its founding treaty. Any decision to invite a country to join the Alliance is taken by the North Atlantic Council on the basis of consensus among all Allies. No third country has a say in such deliberations.
- NATO’s ongoing enlargement process poses no threat to any country. It is aimed at promoting stability and cooperation, at building a Europe whole and free, united in peace, democracy and common values.
- Montenegro was invited to start accession talks join the Alliance at a meeting of NATO foreign ministers on 2 December 2015, while encouraged to make further progress on reforms.
- The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹ has been assured that it will be invited to become a member as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the issue over the country’s name has been reached with Greece.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina was invited to join the Membership Action Plan (MAP) in April 2010 but its participation is pending the resolution of a key issue concerning immovable defence property.
- At the 2008 Bucharest Summit, the Allies agreed that Georgia and Ukraine will become members of NATO in future (since 2010, Ukraine has not been formally pursuing membership).

¹ Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
More background information

Aspirant countries

Countries that have declared an interest in joining the Alliance are initially invited to engage in an Intensified Dialogue with NATO about their membership aspirations and related reforms.

Aspirant countries may then be invited to participate in the MAP to prepare for potential membership and demonstrate their ability to meet the obligations and commitments of possible future membership. Participation in the MAP does not guarantee membership, but it constitutes a key preparation mechanism.

Countries aspiring to join NATO have to demonstrate that they are in a position to further the principles of the 1949 Washington Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. They are also expected to meet certain political, economic and military criteria, which are laid out in the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement.

1995 Study on Enlargement

In 1995, the Alliance published the results of a Study on NATO Enlargement that considered the merits of admitting new members and how they should be brought in. It concluded that the end of the Cold War provided a unique opportunity to build improved security in the entire Euro-Atlantic area and that NATO enlargement would contribute to enhanced stability and security for all. It would do so, the Study further concluded, by encouraging and supporting democratic reforms, including the establishment of civilian and democratic control over military forces; fostering patterns and habits of cooperation, consultation and consensus-building characteristic of relations among members of the Alliance; and promoting good-neighbourly relations.

It would increase transparency in defence planning and military budgets, thereby reinforcing confidence among states, and would reinforce the overall tendency toward closer integration and cooperation in Europe. The Study also concluded that enlargement would strengthen the Alliance’s ability to contribute to European and international security and strengthen and broaden the transatlantic partnership.

According to the Study, countries seeking NATO membership would have to be able to demonstrate that they have fulfilled certain requirements. These include:

- a functioning democratic political system based on a market economy;
- the fair treatment of minority populations;
- a commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflicts;
- the ability and willingness to make a military contribution to NATO operations; and
- a commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutional structures.

Once admitted, new members would enjoy all the rights and assume all the obligations of membership. This would include acceptance at the time that they join of all the principles, policies and procedures previously adopted by Alliance members.

Accession process

Once the Allies have decided to invite a country to become a member of NATO, they officially invite the country to begin accession talks with the Alliance. This is the first step in the accession process on the way to formal membership. The major steps in the process are:
1. Accession talks with a NATO team

These talks take place at NATO Headquarters in Brussels and bring together teams of NATO experts and representatives of the individual invitees. Their aim is to obtain formal confirmation from the invitees of their willingness and ability to meet the political, legal and military obligations and commitments of NATO membership, as laid out in the Washington Treaty and in the Study on NATO Enlargement.

The talks take place in two sessions with each invitee. In the first session, political and defence or military issues are discussed, essentially providing the opportunity to establish that the preconditions for membership have been met. The second session is more technical and includes discussion of resources, security, and legal issues as well as the contribution of each new member country to NATO’s common budget. This is determined on a proportional basis, according to the size of their economies in relation to those of other Alliance member countries.

Invitees are also required to implement measures to ensure the protection of NATO classified information, and prepare their security and intelligence services to work with the NATO Office of Security.

The end product of these discussions is a timetable to be submitted by each invitee for the completion of necessary reforms, which may continue even after these countries have become NATO members.

2. Invitees send letters of intent to NATO, along with timetables for completion of reforms

In the second step of the accession process, each invitee country provides confirmation of its acceptance of the obligations and commitments of membership in the form of a letter of intent from each foreign minister addressed to the NATO Secretary General. Together with this letter they also formally submit their individual reform timetables.

3. Accession protocols are signed by NATO countries

NATO then prepares Accession Protocols to the Washington Treaty for each invitee. These protocols are in effect amendments or additions to the Treaty, which once signed and ratified by Allies, become an integral part of the Treaty itself and permit the invited countries to become parties to the Treaty.

4. Accession protocols are ratified by NATO countries

The governments of NATO member states ratify the protocols, according to their national requirements and procedures. The ratification procedure varies from country to country. For example, the United States requires a two-thirds majority to pass the required legislation in the Senate. Elsewhere, for example in the United Kingdom, no formal parliamentary vote is required.

5. The Secretary General invites the potential new members to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty

Once all NATO member countries notify the Government of the United States of America, the depository of the Washington Treaty, of their acceptance of the protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of the potential new members, the Secretary General invites the new countries to accede to the Treaty.

6. Invitees accede to the North Atlantic Treaty in accordance with their national procedures

7. Upon depositing their instruments of accession with the US State Department, invitees formally become NATO members
Evolution of NATO’s “open door policy”

NATO’s “open door policy” is based upon Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, which states that membership is open to any “European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area”.

The enlargement of the Alliance is an ongoing and dynamic process. Since the Alliance was created in 1949, its membership has grown from the 12 founding members to today’s 28 members through six rounds of enlargement in 1952, 1955, 1982, 1999, 2004 and 2009.

The first three rounds of enlargement – which brought in Greece and Turkey (1952), West Germany (1955) and Spain (1982) – took place during the Cold War, when strategic considerations were at the forefront of decision-making.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 signalled the end of the Cold War and was followed by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the breakup of the Soviet Union. The reunification of Germany in October 1990 brought the territory of the former East Germany into the Alliance. The new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe were eager to guarantee their freedom by becoming integrated into Euro-Atlantic institutions.

NATO enlargement was the subject of lively debate in the early 1990s. Many political analysts were unsure of the benefits that enlargement would bring. Some were concerned about the possible impact on Alliance cohesion and solidarity, as well as on relations with other states, notably Russia. It is in this context that the Alliance carried out a Study on NATO Enlargement in 1995 (see above).

• Post-Cold War enlargement

Based on the findings of the Study on Enlargement, the Alliance invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks at the Alliance’s Madrid Summit in 1997. These three countries became the first former members of the Warsaw Pact to join NATO in 1999.

At the 1999 Washington Summit, the Membership Action Plan was launched to help other aspirant countries prepare for possible membership.

Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia were invited to begin accession talks at the Alliance’s Prague Summit in 2002 and joined NATO in 2004. All seven countries had participated in the MAP.

At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, Allied leaders took a number of steps related to the future enlargement of the Alliance. Several decisions concerned countries in the Western Balkans (see Milestones below). The Allies see the closer integration of Western Balkan countries into Euro-Atlantic institutions as essential to ensuring long-term self-sustaining stability in this region, where NATO has been heavily engaged in peace-support operations since the mid 1990s. Allied leaders also agreed at Bucharest that Georgia and Ukraine, which were already engaged in Intensified Dialogues with NATO, will one day become members. In December 2008, Allied foreign ministers decided to enhance opportunities for assisting the two countries in efforts to meet membership requirements by making use of the framework of the existing NATO-Ukraine Commission and NATO-Georgia Commission – without prejudice to further decisions which may be taken about their applications to join the MAP. (Ukraine has not been formally pursuing NATO membership since 2010, while pursuing a high level of cooperation with NATO in particular in the area of defence reform and capacity building.)
Milestones

**4 April 1949:** Signature of the North Atlantic Treaty by 12 founding members: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. Article 10 of the Treaty provides the basis for NATO’s “open door policy”.

**18 February 1952:** Accession of Greece and Turkey.

**6 May 1955:** Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany.

**30 May 1982:** Spain joins the Alliance (and the integrated military structure in 1998).

**October 1990:** With the reunification of Germany, the new German Länder in the East become part of NATO.

**January 1994:** At the Brussels Summit, Allied leaders reaffirm that NATO remains open to the membership of other European countries.

**28 September 1995:** Publication of NATO Study on Enlargement.

**8-9 July 1997:** At the Madrid Summit, three partner countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – are invited to start accession talks.

**12 March 1999:** Accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, bringing the Alliance to 19 members.

**23-25 April 1999:** Launch of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the Washington Summit. (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia join the MAP.)

**14 May 2002:** NATO foreign ministers officially announce the participation of Croatia in the MAP at their meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland.

**21-22 November 2002:** At the Prague Summit, seven partner countries – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia – are invited to start accession talks.

**26 March 2003:** Signing ceremony of the Accession Protocols of the seven invitees.

**29 March 2004:** Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

**21 April 2005:** Launch of the Intensified Dialogue on Ukraine’s aspirations to NATO membership and related reforms, at an informal meeting of foreign ministers in Vilnius, Lithuania.

**21 September 2006:** NATO foreign ministers in New York announce the decision to offer an Intensified Dialogue to Georgia.

**28-29 November 2006:** At the Riga Summit, Allied leaders state that invatations will be extended to MAP countries that fulfill certain conditions.

**2-4 April 2008:** At the Bucharest Summit, Allied leaders invite Albania and Croatia to start accession talks; assure the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹ that it will be invited once a solution to the issue of the country’s name has been reached with Greece; invite Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro to start Intensified Dialogues; and agree that Georgia and Ukraine will become members in future.

**9 July 2008 December 2008:** Accession Protocols for Albania and Croatia are signed. Allied foreign ministers agree that Georgia should develop an Annual National Programme under the auspices of the NATO-Georgia Commission.

**1 April 2009:** Accession of Albania and Croatia.

**4 December 2009:** NATO foreign ministers invite Montenegro to join the MAP.
22 April 2010: NATO foreign ministers invite Bosnia and Herzegovina to join the MAP, authorising the North Atlantic Council to accept the country’s first Annual National Programme only when the immovable property issue has been resolved.

2 December 2015: NATO foreign ministers meeting in Brussels invite Montenegro to start accession talks to join the Alliance, while encouraging further progress on reforms, especially in the area of rule of law. In a statement on NATO’s “open door” policy, ministers reiterate decisions made at the 2008 Bucharest Summit concerning the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and encourage Bosnia and Herzegovina to undertake the reforms necessary for the country to realise its Euro-Atlantic aspirations and to activate its participation in MAP. Ministers also reiterate their decisions at Bucharest and subsequent decisions concerning Georgia, welcoming the progress the country has made in coming closer to the Alliance and expressing their determination to intensify support for Georgia.

19 May 2016: Allied ministers sign the Accession Protocol, following which Montenegro has ‘Invitee’ status and starts attending North Atlantic Council and other NATO meetings.
Relations with the European Union

Sharing strategic interests and facing the same challenges, NATO and the European Union (EU) cooperate on issues of common interest and are working side by side in crisis management, capability development and political consultations. The EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. The two organisations share a majority of members and have common values.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg meets with the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk on 3 Dec. 2014

Highlights

- Institutionalised relations between NATO and the EU were launched in 2001, building on steps taken during the 1990s to promote greater European responsibility in defence matters (NATO-Western European Union cooperation).
- The 2002 NATO-EU Declaration on a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) set out the political principles underlying the relationship and reaffirmed EU assured access to NATO’s planning capabilities for the EU’s own military operations.
- In 2003, the so-called “Berlin Plus” arrangements set the basis for the Alliance to support EU-led operations in which NATO as a whole is not engaged.
- NATO and the EU currently have 22 member countries in common.

1 At that time, the Western European Union (WEU) was acting for the European Union in the area of security and defence (1992 Maastricht Treaty). The WEU’s crisis-management role was transferred to the European Union in 1999.
2 28 NATO member countries: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. 28 EU member countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom.
At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, the Allies underlined their determination to improve the NATO-EU strategic partnership and the 2010 Strategic Concept committed the Alliance to work more closely with other international organisations to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilise post-conflict situations.

Close cooperation between NATO and the EU is an important element in the development of an international “comprehensive approach” to crisis management and operations, which requires the effective application of both military and civilian means.

Towards a more strategic partnership

NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept clearly states that an active and effective EU contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The EU’s Lisbon Treaty (in force since end 2009) provides a framework for strengthening the EU’s capacities to address common security challenges.

Non-EU European Allies make a significant contribution to these efforts. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, their fullest involvement in these efforts is essential.

NATO and the EU can and should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security. The Allies are determined to make their contribution to create more favourable circumstances through which they will:

- fully strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU, in the spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity and respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of both organisations;
- enhance practical cooperation in operations throughout the crisis spectrum, from coordinated planning to mutual support in the field;
- broaden political consultations to include all issues of common concern, in order to share assessments and perspectives;
- cooperate more fully in capability development, to minimise duplication and maximise cost-effectiveness.

Fully strengthening this strategic partnership is particularly important in the current security environment, in which NATO and the EU are facing the same challenges to the east and south.

Cooperation in the field

The Western Balkans

In July 2003, the EU and NATO published a “Concerted Approach for the Western Balkans”. Jointly drafted, it outlines core areas of cooperation and emphasises the common vision and determination both organisations share to bring stability to the region.

- The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
  On 31 March 2003, the EU-led Operation Concordia took over the responsibilities of the NATO-led mission, Operation Allied Harmony, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This mission, which ended in December 2003, was the first “Berlin Plus” operation in which NATO assets were made available to the EU.

- Bosnia and Herzegovina
  Building on the results of Concordia and following the conclusion of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU deployed a new mission called Operation Althea on 2 December 2004. The EU Force (EUFOR) operates under the “Berlin Plus” arrangements, drawing on

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3 Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
NATO planning expertise and on other Alliance's assets and capabilities. The NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe is the Commander of Operation Althea. The EU Operation Headquarters (OHQ) is located at SHAPE.

- **Kosovo**
  NATO has been leading a peacekeeping force in Kosovo (KFOR) since 1999. The EU has contributed civil assets to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) for years and agreed to take over the police component of the UN Mission. The European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo, which deployed in December 2008, is the largest civilian mission ever launched under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The central aim is to assist and support the Kosovo authorities in the rule of law area, specifically in the police, judiciary and customs areas. EULEX works closely with KFOR in the field.

**Cooperation in other regions**

- **Afghanistan**
  Over the past decade, NATO and the EU have played key roles in bringing peace and stability to Afghanistan, as part of the international community’s broader efforts to implement a comprehensive approach to assist the country. The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) helped create a stable and secure environment in which the Afghan government as well as other international actors could build democratic institutions, extend the rule of law and reconstruct the country. NATO welcomed the EU’s launch of a CSDP Police (EUPOL) in June 2007. The EU also initiated a programme for justice reform and helped to fund civilian projects in NATO-run Provincial Reconstruction Teams that were led by an EU member country. Cooperation continues following the completion of ISAF’s mission in December 2014 and the launch of a follow-on, NATO-led mission to train, assist and advice the Afghan forces and defence and security institutions. EUPOL Advisers at the Afghan Ministry of Interior and the Afghan National Police are supporting the reform of the ministry and the development of civilian policing. The EUPOL mission’s mandate runs until the end of 2016.

- **Darfur**
  Both NATO and the EU supported the African Union’s mission in Darfur, Sudan in particular with regard to airlift rotations.

- **Piracy**
  Since September 2008, NATO and EU naval forces are deployed side by side (respectively Ocean Shield and EUNAVFOR Atalanta), with other actors, off the coast of Somalia for anti-piracy missions.

- **Illegal human trafficking and migration**
  Since February 2016, at the request of Germany, Greece and Turkey, NATO has contributed to international efforts to stem illegal trafficking and illegal migration in the Aegean Sea, through intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in the Aegean and at the Turkish-Syrian border. NATO is cooperating with the EU’s border management agency, Frontex, in full compliance with international law and the law of the sea. By April, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees indicated that average daily arrivals were down 90 per cent from the month before. Discussions are underway to explore what more the Alliance could do in the central Mediterranean in cooperation with the EU.

**Other areas of cooperation**

**Political consultation**

The range of subjects discussed between NATO and the EU has expanded considerably over the past two years, particularly on security issues within the European space or its immediate vicinity. Since the crisis in Ukraine, both organisations have regularly exchanged views on their respective decisions, especially with regard to Russia, to ensure that their messages and actions complement each other. Consultations have also covered developments in the Western Balkans, Libya and the Middle East.
Capabilities
Together with operations, capability development is an area where cooperation is essential and where there is potential for further growth. The NATO-EU Capability Group was established in May 2003 to ensure the coherence and mutual reinforcement of NATO and EU capability development efforts.

Following the creation, in July 2004, of the European Defence Agency (EDA) to coordinate work within the EU on the development of defence capabilities, armaments cooperation, acquisition and research, EDA experts contribute to the work of the Capability Group.

Among other issues, the Capability Group has addressed common capability shortfalls in areas such as countering improvised explosive devices and medical support. The Group is also playing an important role in ensuring transparency and complementarity between NATO’s work on Smart Defence and the EU’s Pooling and Sharing initiative.

Terrorism and WMD proliferation
Both NATO and the EU are committed to combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). They have exchanged information on their activities in the field of protection of civilian populations against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks. The two organisations also cooperate in the field of civil emergency planning by exchanging inventories of measures taken in this area.

New areas of cooperation
NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept identified the need for the Alliance to address emerging security challenges. This led to new areas of cooperation with the EU, including energy security issues and cyber defence. More recently, confronted with shared challenges to the east and the south, NATO and EU staffs are consulting each other on further specific areas in which the two organisations could enhance cooperation, including fighting hybrid threats, supporting partners in defence capacity building, increasing maritime security and improving readiness by exercising together.

Participation
With the enlargement of both organisations in 2004, followed by the accession of Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia to the EU, the two organisations have 22 member countries in common. Albania, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey and the United States, which are members of NATO but not of the EU, participate in all NATO-EU meetings. So do Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and since 2008, Malta, which are members of the EU and of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PIP) programme.

However, Cyprus, which is not a PIP member and does not have a security agreement with NATO on the exchange of classified documents, cannot participate in official NATO-EU meetings. This is a consequence of decisions taken by NATO in December 2002. Informal meetings including Cyprus take place occasionally at different levels.

Framework for cooperation
An exchange of letters between the NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency in January 2001 defined the scope of cooperation and modalities of consultation on security issues between the two organisations. Cooperation further developed with the signing of the NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP in December 2002 and the agreement, in March 2003, of a framework for cooperation.

NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP: The NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP, agreed on 16 December 2002, reaffirmed the EU assured access to NATO’s planning capabilities for its own military operations and reiterated the political principles of the strategic partnership: effective mutual consultation; equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy of the EU and NATO; respect for the interests of EU and
NATO member states; respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; and coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the military capability requirements common to the two organisations.

The “Berlin Plus” arrangements: As part of the framework for cooperation adopted on 17 March 2003, the so-called “Berlin Plus” arrangements provide the basis for NATO-EU cooperation in crisis management in the context of EU-led operations that make use of NATO’s collective assets and capabilities, including command arrangements and assistance in operational planning. In effect, they allow the Alliance to support EU-led operations in which NATO as a whole is not engaged.

NATO and the EU meet on a regular basis to discuss issues of common interest. Meetings take place at different levels including at the level of foreign ministers, ambassadors, military representatives and defence advisors. There are regular staff-to-staff talks at all levels between NATO’s International Staff and International Military Staff, and their respective EU interlocutors (the European External Action Service, the European Defence Agency, the European Commission and the European Parliament).

Permanent military liaison arrangements have been established to facilitate cooperation at the operational level. A NATO Permanent Liaison Team has been operating at the EU Military Staff since November 2005 and an EU Cell was set up at SHAPE (NATO’s strategic command for operations in Mons, Belgium) in March 2006.

Key milestones

**February 1992**: The EU adopts the Maastricht Treaty, which envisages an intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the eventual framing of a common defence policy (ESDP) with the WEU as the EU’s defence component. Close cooperation is established between NATO and the WEU.

**June 1992**: In Oslo, NATO foreign ministers support the objective of developing the WEU as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance and as the defence component of the EU, that would also cover the “Petersberg tasks” (humanitarian search and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, crisis-management tasks including peace enforcement and environmental protection).

**January 1994**: Allied leaders agree to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their CFSP. NATO endorses the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces, which provides for “separable but not separate” deployable headquarters that could be used for European-led operations and is the conceptual basis for future operations involving NATO and other non-NATO countries.

**June 1996**: In Berlin, NATO foreign ministers agree for the first time to build up a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO, with the aim of rebalancing roles and responsibilities between Europe and North America. An essential part of this initiative was to improve European capabilities. They also decide to make Alliance assets available for WEU-led crisis-management operations. These decisions lead to the introduction of the term “Berlin Plus”.

**December 1998**: At a summit in St Malo, France and the United Kingdom make a joint statement affirming the EU’s determination to establish a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

**April 1999**: At the Washington Summit, Heads of State and Government decide to develop the “Berlin Plus” arrangements.

**June 1999**: A European Council meeting in Cologne, Germany decides “to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence”.

**December 1999**: At the Helsinki Council meeting, EU members establish military “headline goals” to allow the EU to deploy up to 60,000 troops by 2003 for ‘Petersberg tasks’. EU members also create
political and military structures including a Political and Security Committee, a Military Committee and a Military Staff. The crisis-management role of the WEU is transferred to the EU. The WEU retains residual tasks.

**September 2000:** The North Atlantic Council and the EU’s interim Political and Security Committee meet for the first time to take stock of progress in NATO-EU relations.

**December 2000:** Signature of the EU’s Treaty of Nice containing amendments reflecting the operative developments of the ESDP as an independent EU policy (entry into force February 2003).

**January 2001:** Beginning of institutionalised relations between NATO and the EU with the establishment of joint meetings, including at the level of foreign ministers and ambassadors. Exchange of letters between the NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency on the scope of cooperation and modalities for consultation.

**May 2001:** First formal NATO-EU meeting at the level of foreign ministers in Budapest. The NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency issue a joint statement on the Western Balkans.

**November 2002:** At the Prague Summit, NATO members declare their readiness to give the EU access to NATO assets and capabilities for operations in which the Alliance is not engaged militarily.

**December 2002:** EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP.

**March 2003:** Agreement on the framework for cooperation. Entry into force of a NATO-EU security of information agreement. Transition from the NATO-led Operation Allied Harmony to the EU-led Operation Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

**May 2003:** First meeting of the NATO-EU Capability Group.

**July 2003:** Development of a common strategy for the Western Balkans.

**November 2003:** First joint NATO-EU crisis-management exercise.

**February 2004:** France, Germany and the United Kingdom launch the idea of EU rapid-reaction units composed of joint battle groups.

**December 2004:** Beginning of the EU-led Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

**September 2005:** Transatlantic informal NATO-EU ministerial dinner, New York.

**October 2005:** Agreement on Military Permanent Arrangements establishing a NATO Permanent Liaison Team at the EU Military Staff and an EU cell at SHAPE.

**November 2005:** NATO Permanent Liaison Team set up at the EU Military Staff.

**March 2006:** EU cell set up at SHAPE.

**April 2006:** Transatlantic informal NATO-EU ministerial dinner, Sofia

**September 2006:** Transatlantic informal NATO-EU ministerial dinner, New York

**January 2007:** Transatlantic informal NATO-EU ministerial dinner, Brussels

**April 2007:** Transatlantic informal NATO-EU ministerial dinner, Oslo

**September 2007:** Transatlantic informal NATO-EU ministerial dinner, New York

**December 2007:** Transatlantic informal NATO-EU ministerial dinner, Brussels

**September 2008:** Transatlantic informal NATO-EU ministerial dinner, New York

**December 2008:** Transatlantic informal NATO-EU ministerial dinner, Brussels

**March 2009:** Transatlantic informal NATO-EU ministerial dinner, Brussels

**September 2010:** Transatlantic informal NATO-EU ministerial dinner, New York
November 2010: At the Lisbon Summit, the Allies underline their determination to improve the NATO-EU strategic partnership and welcome recent initiatives from several Allies and ideas proposed by the Secretary General in this regard.

September 2011: Transatlantic informal NATO-EU ministerial dinner, New York

September 2012: Transatlantic informal NATO-EU ministerial dinner, New York

11 February 2013: President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso visits NATO Headquarters.

May 2013: The NATO Secretary General addresses the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs and Subcommittee on Security and Defence.

June 2013: The NATO Secretary General participates in an informal meeting of EU foreign ministers.

December 2013: The NATO Secretary General addresses the European Council in Brussels.

5 March 2014: NATO and EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) ambassadors hold informal talks on Ukraine.

10 June 2014: NATO and EU PSC ambassadors hold more informal talks on Ukraine.

10 February 2016: A Technical Arrangement on Cyber Defence was concluded between the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) and the Computer Emergency Response Team of the European Union (CERT-EU), providing a framework for exchanging information and sharing best practices between emergency response teams.

11 February 2016: At the request of Germany, Greece and Turkey, NATO defence ministers agree that the Alliance should join international efforts to stem illegal trafficking and illegal migration in the Aegean Sea, cooperating with the European Union’s border management agency, Frontex.

10 March 2016: Visiting the European Commission to meet Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stresses the vital importance of the NATO-EU relationship and welcomes the organisations’ deepening ties.

12-13 May 2016: An informal EU-NATO Directors General Conference takes place at NATO Headquarters to enhance staff-to-staff interaction between the organisations’ respective military staffs on topics of current relevance and common interest related to security and defence.

20 May 2016: High Representative Federica Mogherini visits NATO Headquarters for a meeting with NATO foreign ministers to discuss areas for expanded NATO-EU cooperation ahead of upcoming EU and NATO summit meetings.

24 June 2016: In a statement on the outcome of the British referendum on membership of the EU, the NATO Secretary General underlines his confidence that the United Kingdom’s position in NATO will remain unchanged and that the country – a strong and committed NATO Ally – will continue to play its leading role in the Alliance.
The founding treaty

The foundations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were officially laid down on 4 April 1949 with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, more popularly known as the Washington Treaty.

Highlights

- The Treaty was signed in Washington D.C. on 4 April 1949 by 12 founding members.
- The Treaty derives its authority from Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which reaffirms the inherent right of independent states to individual or collective defence.
- Collective defence is at the heart of the Treaty and is enshrined in Article 5. It commits members to protect each other and sets a spirit of solidarity within the Alliance.
- The Treaty is short – containing only 14 articles – and provides for in-built flexibility on all fronts.
- Despite the changing security environment, the original Treaty has never had to be modified and each Ally has the possibility to implement the text in accordance with its capabilities and circumstances.

More background information

The Treaty and its fundamental values and principles

Only 14 articles long, the Treaty is one of the shortest documents of its kind. The carefully crafted articles were the subject of several months of discussion and negotiations before the Treaty could actually be signed.
However, once Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States had discussed these issues, they agreed on a document that would establish the North Atlantic Alliance.

On 4 April 1949, the 12 countries signed the North Atlantic Treaty at the Departmental Auditorium in Washington D.C., the city which lends its name to the Treaty.

The Treaty committed each member to share the risk, responsibilities and benefits of collective defence – a concept at the very heart of the Alliance. In 1949, the primary aim of the Treaty was to create a pact of mutual assistance to counter the risk that the Soviet Union would seek to extend its control of Eastern Europe to other parts of the continent. The Treaty also required members not to enter into any international commitments that conflicted with the Treaty and committed them to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations (UN). Moreover, it stated that NATO members formed a unique community of values committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

In addition to collective defence and key values, the principle of consensus decision-making and the importance of consultation define the spirit of the Organization, together with its defensive nature and its flexibility.

The signing of the Treaty led to the creation of the Alliance and, only later, did a fully-fledged organisation develop. Strictly speaking, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) provides the structure which enables the goals of the Alliance to be implemented. To date, those goals have not fundamentally changed nor the Treaty been rewritten. The only so-called “amendments” made so far stem from the series of accession protocols which have been added as new members join, illustrating the foresight of its drafters and their ability to marry international concerns and objectives with national interests.

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**Political context of the Alliance’s birth**

The hostilities that had characterised relations between Soviet and Western powers since 1917 gradually re-emerged at the end of the Second World War. This “East-West” divide was fuelled by conflicting interests and political ideologies. There were clashes over peace agreements and reparations, and tensions were exacerbated by events such as the Berlin blockade in April 1948, the June 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia and direct threats to the sovereignty of Norway, Greece and Turkey.

As the power of the Soviet Union spread to several Eastern European countries, there was concern among Western European countries that Moscow would impose its ideology and authority across Europe. From the end of the Second World War in 1945, Western governments started reducing their defence establishments and demobilising their forces. In January 1948, however, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin spoke of the need for a “treaty of alliance and mutual assistance”, a defensive alliance and a regional grouping within the framework of the UN Charter.

The United States would only agree to provide military support for Europe if it were united. In response, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom signed the Brussels Treaty in March 1948, creating the Western Union. Designed to strengthen ties between the signatories while providing for a common defence system, the Brussels Treaty ultimately became the basis for the Washington Treaty.

In the meantime, the US Senate adopted the Vandenberg Resolution – a resolution that would change the course of American foreign policy since it allowed the United States to constitutionally participate in a mutual defence system in times of peace.

The ground was set for negotiations to start on a transatlantic treaty.

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**Negotiating and drafting the Treaty**

The talks on what would become the Washington Treaty took place between the powers of the Brussels Treaty (except Luxembourg, which was represented by Belgium) plus the United States and Canada.
Representatives from Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States constituted the core drafting team, but participants from other countries also contributed to the initial discussions, with the assistance of a working group. What has been coined as the “six-power talks” gave birth to the Washington Paper, issued on 9 September 1948, which contained an outline of possible future articles for the Treaty.

Formal public treaty negotiations began on 10 December 1948 with the Ambassadors Committee in Washington, D.C. For these talks, Luxembourg sent its own representative. Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal were later invited to the final sessions of negotiations, which began on 8 March 1949. Although the participating countries agreed that collective defence would be at the heart of the new Alliance, several other issues were still not resolved and needed to be worked out before the formation of the Alliance could become a reality.

**Collective defence**

Views on the implementation of Article 5 differed. The United States had previously taken a stance of officially avoiding foreign entanglements. Because of this, it was concerned that Article 5 would draw the country into a conflict through treaty obligations. Something had to be put in place to allow for the US to send aid to attacked countries without having to declare war.

The European countries, on the other hand, wanted to ensure that the United States would come to their aid if one of the signatories came under attack. The United States refused to make this pledge and believed US public opinion would not follow so they proposed an option that would allow each country to assist other signatories “as it deems necessary”. In other words, there would be no automatic declaration of war or obligation to commit militarily on the part of member countries; the action to be taken would be up to each individual member country. Ultimately, the American viewpoint on collective defence won out.

**Political and military cooperation**

Some drafters wanted more than just military cooperation between signatories. They wanted to expand cooperation to social and economic cooperation, but there were differing views on how to treat non-military issues. Ultimately, Article 2 went through, and now forms the basis of the Alliance’s political and non-military work.

Article 2 is reinforced by Article 4, which encourages the Allies to “consult together” whenever they consider it necessary, therefore facilitating consensus-building. The practice of regularly exchanging information and consulting together strengthens the links between governments and knowledge of their respective preoccupations so that they can agree on common policies or take action more easily.

**Geographical scope of the Alliance**

The geographical scope of the Alliance in terms of area of responsibility was yet another topic on which the negotiators had a difference of opinion. The United States and the United Kingdom saw NATO as a regional organisation while other countries, such as France, felt it should take on a more global role.

Article 6 of the Washington Treaty details what is understood by the North Atlantic area, along with the caveat that in certain conditions the Alliance’s responsibility could be extended as far south as the Tropic of Cancer to encompass any islands, vessels or aircraft attacked in that area.¹

However, according to one of the original drafters, Theodore C. Achilles, there was no doubt in anybody’s minds that NATO operations could also be conducted south of the Tropic of Cancer and basically, worldwide. This interpretation of the Treaty was reaffirmed by NATO foreign ministers in Reykjavik in May 2002 in the context of the fight against terrorism: “To carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives.”

¹ Article 6, as drafted at the signing of the Treaty in 1949, was modified by Article II of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey in 1952.
Membership of the Alliance

In terms of whom to invite to join the Alliance, again the drafters held diverging views. The United Kingdom wanted to keep the Alliance small and strong, avoiding commitments to peripheral countries, while the United States advocated inviting weaker countries or countries that were more likely to fall to Soviet aggression. France, on the other hand, was mainly concerned with protecting its colonial territories. Of concern to all three countries was Germany, whose membership was not immediately considered due to the complexity of its situation.

The drafters also discussed inviting Italy, Greece, Turkey, Portugal, Iceland and the Scandinavian countries, essentially for their strategic value. Italy, Portugal and Iceland were among the founding members and ultimately Greece and Turkey joined the Alliance in 1952. Iceland linked its membership to that of Denmark and Norway, which were also among the founding members in 1949; Sweden, on the other hand, categorically refused to have any links with NATO because of its strong commitment to neutrality.

Consideration was also given to offering membership to Ireland, Iran, Austria and Spain, but the idea was dropped largely due to internal conditions in each country.

Colonial territories

The status of colonial territories was one of the biggest bones of contention in the drafting of the Washington Treaty. France insisted on including Algeria, while Belgium requested the Congo’s inclusion. However, the United States and Canada wanted to exclude all colonial territory, the main concern being that NATO would end up having to resolve problems stemming from the native population of overseas territories.

Ultimately, the drafters granted France’s request to include Algeria\(^2\), which had been fully integrated into the French political and administrative organisation as a French department, but rejected Belgium’s request regarding the Congo.

Duration of the Treaty

The negotiating countries disagreed on how long the Treaty should last. Some countries favoured a long-term agreement that would set the initial duration at 20 years, while others feared that anything beyond 10 years would be seen as an unnecessary extension of the war effort. Finally, at the insistence of Portugal, the Treaty was made valid for a 10-year period, after which the Treaty could be reviewed (Article 12); and only after the Treaty had been in force for 20 years could a member withdraw from the Organization (Article 13). To date, these two provisions have never been used, i.e., the Treaty has never been reviewed nor a member withdrawn from the Organization.

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\(^2\) The Article dealing with French Algeria no longer became applicable from 3 July 1962, following the independence of Algeria.
NATO’s purpose

NATO’s essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Collective defence is at the heart of the Alliance and creates a spirit of solidarity and cohesion among its members.

NATO strives to secure a lasting peace in Europe, based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Since the outbreak of crises and conflicts beyond the borders of NATO member countries can jeopardize this objective, the Alliance also contributes to peace and stability through crisis management operations and partnerships. Essentially, NATO not only helps to defend the territory of its members, but engages where possible and when necessary to project its values further afield, prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction.

NATO also embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is tied to the security of Europe. It is an intergovernmental organization which provides a forum where members can consult together on any issues they may choose to raise and take decisions on political and military matters affecting their security. No single member country is forced to rely solely on its national capabilities to meet its essential national security objectives. The resulting sense of shared security among members contributes to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

NATO’s fundamental security tasks are laid down in the Washington Treaty. They are sufficiently general to withstand the test of time and are translated into more detail in strategic concepts. Strategic concepts are the authoritative statement of the Alliance’s objectives and provide the highest level of guidance on the political and military means to be used in achieving these goals; they remain the basis for the implementation of Alliance policy as a whole.

During the Cold War, NATO focused on collective defence and the protection of its members from potential threats emanating from the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, along with the rise of non-state actors affecting international security, many new security threats emerged. NATO now focuses on countering these threats by utilizing collective defence, managing crisis situations and encouraging cooperative security, as outlined in the 2010 Strategic Concept.
Collective defence - Article 5

The principle of collective defence is at the very heart of NATO’s founding treaty. It remains a unique and enduring principle that binds its members together, committing them to protect each other and setting a spirit of solidarity within the Alliance.

Highlights

- Collective defence means that an attack against one Ally is considered as an attack against all Allies.
- The principle of collective defence is enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.
- NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States.
- NATO has taken collective defence measures on several occasions, for instance in response to the situation in Syria and in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine crisis.
- NATO has standing forces on active duty that contribute to the Alliance’s collective defence efforts on a permanent basis.

A cornerstone of the Alliance

- Article 5

In 1949, the primary aim of the North Atlantic Treaty was to create a pact of mutual assistance to counter the risk that the Soviet Union would seek to extend its control of Eastern Europe to other parts of the continent.

Every participating country agreed that this form of solidarity was at the heart of the Treaty, effectively making Article 5 on collective defence a key component of the Alliance.
Article 5 provides that if a NATO Ally is the victim of an armed attack, each and every other member of the Alliance will consider this act of violence as an armed attack against all members and will take the actions it deems necessary to assist the Ally attacked.

**Article 5**

“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”

- **The “out-of-area” debate**

This article is complemented by Article 6, which stipulates:

**Article 6**

“For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

- on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;

- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.”

According to one of the drafters of the Treaty, Theodore C. Achilles, there was no doubt in anybody’s mind that NATO operations could also be conducted south of the Tropic of Cancer. This was confirmed by NATO foreign ministers in Reykjavik in May 2002 in the context of the fight against terrorism: “To carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives”. (Extract from the Reykjavik communiqué).

- **The principle of providing assistance**

With the invocation of Article 5, Allies can provide any form of assistance they deem necessary to respond to a situation. This is an individual obligation on each Ally and each Ally is responsible for determining what it deems necessary in the particular circumstances.

This assistance is taken forward in concert with other Allies. It is not necessarily military and depends on the material resources of each country. It is therefore left to the judgment of each individual member country to determine how it will contribute. Each country will consult with the other members, bearing in mind that the ultimate aim is to “to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”.

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1 Article 6 has been modified by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey.
2 On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council modified this Treaty in its decision C-R(63)2, point V, on the independence of the Algerian departments of France.
3 Documents on Canadian External Relations, Vol. 15, Ch. IV.
At the drafting of Article 5 in the late 1940s, there was consensus on the principle of mutual assistance, but fundamental disagreement on the modalities of implementing this commitment. The European participants wanted to ensure that the United States would automatically come to their assistance should one of the signatories come under attack; the United States did not want to make such a pledge and obtained that this be reflected in the wording of Article 5.

### Invocation of Article 5

- **The 9/11 terrorist attacks**

  The United States was the object of brutal terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. The Alliance’s 1999 Strategic Concept had already identified terrorism as one of the risks affecting NATO’s security. The Alliance’s response to 9/11, however, saw NATO engage actively in the fight against terrorism, launch its first operations outside the Euro-Atlantic area and begin a far-reaching transformation of its capabilities. Moreover, it led NATO to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the very first time in its history.

- **An act of solidarity**

  On the evening of 12 September 2001, less than 24 hours after the attacks, and for the first time in NATO’s history, the Allies invoked the principle of Article 5. Then NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson subsequently informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the Alliance’s decision.

  The North Atlantic Council – NATO’s principal political decision-making body – agreed that if it determined that the attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it would be regarded as an action covered by Article 5. On 2 October, once the Council had been briefed on the results of investigations into the 9/11 attacks, it determined that they were regarded as an action covered by Article 5.

  By invoking Article 5, NATO members showed their solidarity toward the United States and condemned, in the strongest possible way, the terrorist attacks against the United States.

- **Taking action**

  After 9/11, there were consultations among the Allies and collective action was decided by the Council. The United States could also carry out independent actions, consistent with its rights and obligations under the United Nations Charter.

  On 4 October, once it had been determined that the attacks came from abroad, NATO agreed on a package of eight measures to support the United States. On the request of the United States, it launched its first ever anti-terror operation – Eagle Assist – from mid-October 2001 to mid-May 2002. It consisted in seven NATO AWACS radar aircraft that helped patrol the skies over the United States; in total 830 crew members from 13 NATO countries flew over 360 sorties. This was the first time that NATO military assets were deployed in support of an Article 5 operation.

  On 26 October, the Alliance launched its second counter-terrorism operation in response to the attacks on the United States, Active Endeavour. Elements of NATO’s Standing Naval Forces were sent to patrol the Eastern Mediterranean and monitor shipping to detect and deter terrorist activity, including illegal trafficking. In March 2004, the operation was expanded to include the entire Mediterranean.

  The eight measures to support the United States, as agreed by NATO were:

  - to enhance intelligence-sharing and cooperation, both bilaterally and in appropriate NATO bodies, relating to the threats posed by terrorism and the actions to be taken against it;

    - to provide, individually or collectively, as appropriate and according to their capabilities, assistance to Allies and other countries which are or may be subject to increased terrorist threats as a result of their support for the campaign against terrorism;
to take necessary measures to provide increased security for facilities of the United States and other
Allies on their territory;

to backfill selected Allied assets in NATO's area of responsibility that are required to directly support
operations against terrorism;

to provide blanket overflight clearances for the United States and other Allies' aircraft, in accordance
with the necessary air traffic arrangements and national procedures, for military flights related to
operations against terrorism;

to provide access for the United States and other Allies to ports and airfields on the territory of NATO
member countries for operations against terrorism, including for refuelling, in accordance with national
procedures;

that the Alliance is ready to deploy elements of its Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean
in order to provide a NATO presence and demonstrate resolve;

that the Alliance is similarly ready to deploy elements of its NATO Airborne Early Warning Force to
support operations against terrorism.

Enhanced collective defence measures

On the request of Turkey, on three occasions, NATO has put collective defence measures in place: in
1991 with the deployment of Patriot missiles during the Gulf War, in 2003 with the agreement on a
package of defensive measures and conduct of Operation Display Deterrence during the crisis in Iraq,
and in 2012 in response to the situation in Syria with the deployment of Patriot missiles.

The Alliance has also taken steps to enhance the defence of Allies following Russia's illegal military
intervention in Ukraine.

Russia's actions have raised justified concerns among its neighbours, including those who are NATO
members. That is why NATO foreign ministers, on 1 April 2014, directed Allied military authorities to
develop extra measures to strengthen collective defence.

As part of the measures, NATO has deployed AWACS planes over Poland and Romania, sent ships on
patrol to the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas, and deployed additional fighter jets to police the airspace
over the Baltics. NATO is also conducting additional exercises to test the readiness of NATO forces to
defend Allies, including in an Article 5 context. In light of the new security situation, NATO has also decided
to review and update defence plans.

In December 2015, NATO foreign ministers decided to take additional collective defence measures,
especially for Turkey, in light of the Alliance's adaptation to security challenges from the south. They
reviewed the progress of the coalition against ISIL, measures taken since the terrorist attacks in Paris,
and the Vienna talks to find a political solution to the conflict in Syria.

Standing forces

Collective defence measures are not solely event-driven. NATO has a number of standing forces on
active duty that contribute to the Alliance's collective defence efforts on a permanent basis. These include
NATO's standing maritime forces, which are ready to act when called upon. They perform different tasks
ranging from exercises to operational missions, in peacetime and in periods of crisis and conflict.

Additionally, NATO has an integrated air defence system to protect against air attacks, which also
comprises the Alliance's ballistic missile defence system. NATO also conducts several air policing
missions, which are collective peacetime missions that enable NATO to detect, track and identify all
violations and infringements of its airspace and to take appropriate action. As part of such missions, Allied
fighter jets patrol the airspace of Allies who do not have fighter jets of their own. They run on a 24/7 basis,
365 days a year.
Strategic Concepts

The Strategic Concept is an official document that outlines NATO’s enduring purpose and nature and its fundamental security tasks. It also identifies the central features of the new security environment, specifies the elements of the Alliance’s approach to security and provides guidelines for the adaptation of its military forces.

Highlights

- Strategic Concepts outline NATO’s purpose, nature and fundamental security tasks, identify the central features of the security environment and provide guidelines for the adaptation of its military forces.
- Strategic Concepts are reviewed to take account of changes to the global security environment to ensure the Alliance is properly prepared to execute its core tasks.
- They equip the Alliance for security challenges and guide its future political and military development.
- The current Strategic Concept outlines three essential core tasks – collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.

In sum, it equips the Alliance for security challenges and guides its future political and military development. A new Strategic Concept was published at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, reflecting a transformed security environment and a transformed Alliance. New and emerging security threats, especially since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO’s crisis management experience in the Balkans and Afghanistan, and the value and importance of working with partners from across the globe, all drove NATO to reassess and review its strategic posture.

Transformation in the broad sense of the term is a permanent feature of the Organization. Since its inception, NATO has regularly reviewed its tasks and objectives in view of the evolution of the strategic environment. Preparations for the very first Strategic Concept – “The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area” - started in October 1949. In the course of more than half a century, both the Alliance and the wider world have developed in ways that NATO’s founders could not have envisaged. Such changes have been in each and every strategic document that NATO has produced since then.
The 2010 Strategic Concept “Active Engagement, Modern Defence” is a very clear and resolute statement on NATO’s core tasks and principles, its values, the evolving security environment and the Alliance’s strategic objectives for the next decade.

After having described NATO as “a unique community of values committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law”, it presents NATO’s three essential core tasks - collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. It also emphasizes Alliance solidarity, the importance of transatlantic consultation and the need to engage in a continuous process of reform.

The document then describes the current security environment and identifies the capabilities and policies it will put into place to ensure that NATO’s defence and deterrence, as well as crisis management abilities are sufficiently well equipped to face today’s threats. These threats include for instance the proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, terrorism, cyber attacks and fundamental environmental problems. The Strategic Concept also affirms how NATO aims to promote international security through cooperation. It will do this by reinforcing arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, emphasizing NATO’s open door policy for all European countries and significantly enhancing its partnerships in the broad sense of the term. Additionally, NATO will continue its reform and transformation process.

- **NATO’s essential core tasks and principles**

  After having reiterated NATO’s enduring purpose and key values and principles, the Strategic Concept highlights the Organization’s core tasks.

  “The modern security environment contains a broad and evolving set of challenges to the security of NATO’s territory and populations. In order to assure their security, the Alliance must and will continue fulfilling effectively three essential core tasks, all of which contribute to safeguarding Alliance members, and always in accordance with international law:

  - **Collective defence.** NATO members will always assist each other against attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That commitment remains firm and binding. NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole.
  
  - **Crisis Management.** NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises – before, during and after conflicts. NATO will actively employ an appropriate
mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security.

- **Cooperative security.** The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organisations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door of membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO’s standards.

**Defence and deterrence**

The 2010 Strategic Concept states that collective defence is the Alliance’s greatest responsibility and “deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element” of NATO’s overall strategy. While stressing that the Alliance does not consider any country to be its adversary, it provides a comprehensive list of capabilities the Alliance aims to maintain and develop to counter existing and emerging threats. These threats include the proliferation of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; terrorism, cyber attacks and key environmental and resource constraints.

**Crisis management**

NATO is adopting a holistic approach to crisis management, envisaging NATO involvement at all stages of a crisis: “NATO will therefore engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction.” It is encouraging a greater number of actors to participate and coordinate their efforts and is considering a broader range of tools to be more effective across the crisis management spectrum. This comprehensive, all-encompassing approach to crises, together with greater emphasis on training and developing local forces goes hand-in-hand with efforts to enhance civil-military planning and interaction.

**Cooperative security**

The final part of the 2010 Strategic Concept focuses on promoting international security through cooperation. At the root of this cooperation is the principle of seeking security “at the lowest possible level of forces” by supporting arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. NATO states that it will continue to help reinforce efforts in these areas and cites a number of related initiatives. It then recommits to NATO enlargement as the best way of achieving “our goal of a Europe whole and free, and sharing common values”.

A fundamental component of its cooperative approach to security is partnership, understood between NATO and non-NATO countries, as well as with other international organizations and actors. The Strategic Concept depicts a more inclusive, flexible and open relationship with the Alliance’s partners across the globe and stresses its desire to strengthen cooperation with the United Nations and the European Union. It also seeks “a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia” and reiterates its commitment to develop relations with countries of the Mediterranean and the Gulf region.

Finally, the Strategic Concept describes the means NATO will use to maximise efficiency, improve working methods and spend its resources more wisely in view of the priorities indentified in this concept.

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**The drafters and decision-makers behind the strategies**

Over time and since 1949, the decision-making process with regard to the Strategic Concept has evolved, but ultimately it is the North Atlantic Council (NAC) that adopts the Alliance’s strategic documents. Of the seven Strategic Concepts issued by NATO since 1949, all were approved by the NAC, with the exception of MC 14/3.
Issued in 1968, MC 14/3 was adopted by the then Defence Planning Committee (DPC), which had the same authority as the NAC in its area of responsibility. After the withdrawal of France from the integrated military structure in 1966, it was decided that responsibility for all defence matters in which France did not participate was given to the DPC, of which France was not a member. However, shortly after France decided to fully participate in NATO’s military structures (April 2009), the DPC was dissolved during a major overhaul of NATO committees, June 2010, which aimed to introduce more flexibility and efficiency into working procedures.

Before reaching the NAC, there are many stages of discussion, negotiating and drafting that take place. Interestingly, during the Cold War, strategic concepts were principally drawn up by the military for approval by the political authorities of the Alliance. They were classified documents with military references (MC), which are now accessible to the public. Since the end of the Cold War, the drafting has clearly been led by political authorities, who have been advised by the military. This reversal stems from the fact that since 1999, NATO has adopted a far broader definition of security, where dialogue and cooperation are an integral part of NATO’s strategic thinking. In addition, the 1991, 1999 and the 2010 Strategic Concepts were conceived and written to be issued as unclassified documents and released to the public.

The added novelty of the 2010 Strategic Concept was the importance given to the process of producing the document. The process of reflection, consultations and drafting of the Strategic Concept was perceived as an opportunity to build understanding and support across numerous constituencies and stakeholders so as to re-engage and re-commit NATO Allies to the renewed core principles, roles and policies of the Alliance. In addition, the debate was broadened to invite the interested public, as well as experts, to contribute.

Furthermore, it was the first time that a NATO Secretary General initiated and steered the debate. He designated a group of high-level experts who were at the core of the reflection and produced a report “NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement” that guided the debate, before eventually consulting with member country representatives and drafting the document. Final negotiations took place before the document was officially adopted by the NAC meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government at the 2010 summit in Portugal.

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**NATO’s strategic documents since 1949**

Generally speaking, since the birth of NATO, there have been three distinct periods within which NATO’s strategic thinking has evolved:

- the Cold War period;
- the immediate post-Cold War period; and
- the security environment since 9/11.

One could say that from 1949 to 1991, NATO’s strategy was principally characterized by defence and deterrence, although with growing attention to dialogue and détente for the last two decades of this period. From 1991 a broader approach was adopted where the notions of cooperation and security complemented the basic concepts of deterrence and defence.

- From 1949 until the end of the Cold War, there were four Strategic Concepts, accompanied by documents that laid out the measures for the military to implement the Strategic Concept (Strategic Guidance; The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years; Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept);
- In the post-Cold War period, three unclassified Strategic Concepts have been issued, complemented by classified military documents (MC Directive for Military Implementation of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept; MC Guidance for the Military Implementation of the Alliance Strategy; and MC Guidance for the Military Implementation of NATO’s Strategic Concept)
Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, NATO’s military thinking, resources and energy have given greater attention to the fight against terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction; NATO has committed troops beyond the Euro-Atlantic area and reached a membership of 28; new threats have emerged such as energy security and cyber-attacks. These are among the factors that brought Allied leaders to produce a new Strategic Concept in 2010.

- **From 1949 until the end of the Cold War**

  From 1949 to 1991, international relations were dominated by bipolar confrontation between East and West. The emphasis was more on mutual tension and confrontation than it was on dialogue and cooperation. This led to an often dangerous and expensive arms race.

  As mentioned above, four Strategic Concepts were issued during this period. In addition, two key reports were also published during those four decades: the Report of the Committee of Three (December 1956) and the Harmel Report (December 1967). Both documents placed the Strategic Concepts in a wider framework by stressing issues that had an impact on the environment within which the Strategic Concepts were interpreted.

  **NATO’s first Strategic Concept**

  NATO started producing strategic documents as early as October 1949. But the first NATO strategy document to be approved by the NAC was “The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic area (DC 6/1), 6 January 1950 - the Alliance’s first strategic concept.

  DC 6/1 provided an overall strategic concept for the Alliance. The document stated that the primary function of NATO was to deter aggression and that NATO forces would only be engaged if this primary...
function failed and an attack was launched. Complementarity between members and standardization were also key elements of this draft. Each member’s contribution to defence should be in proportion to its capacity – economic, industrial, geographical, military – and cooperative measures were to be put into place by NATO to ensure optimal use of resources. Numerical inferiority in terms of military resources vis-à-vis the USSR was emphasized, as well as the reliance on US nuclear capabilities. DC 6/1 stated that the Alliance should “insure the ability to carry out strategic bombing promptly by all means possible with all types of weapons, without exception”.

Although DC 6/1 was quite detailed, more guidance was needed for use by the five Regional Planning Groups that existed at the time. As a consequence, the Strategic Guidance paper (SG 13/16) was sent to the Regional Planning Groups on 6 January 1950. Entitled “Strategic Guidance for North Atlantic Regional Planning”, SG 13/16 was formally approved by the Military Committee on 28 March 1950 as MC 14.

MC 14 enabled Regional Planning Groups to develop detailed defence plans to meet contingencies up to July 1954, a date by which the Alliance aimed to have a credible defence force in place. Its key objectives were to “convince the USSR that war does not pay, and should war occur, to ensure a successful defence” of the NATO area.

In parallel, SG 13/16 was also being used by the Regional Planning Groups as the basis for further, more comprehensive defence plans. These plans were consolidated into “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Medium Term Plan” (DC 13), which was approved by the Defence Committee on 1 April 1950, just one year after the signing of the Washington Treaty.

NATO’s strategy was effectively contained in three basis documents:

- DC 6/1 which set forth the overall strategic concept;
- MC 14/1 which provided more specific strategic guidance for use in defence planning; and
- DC 13 which included both of these aspects as well as considerable detailed regional planning.

## The Korean War and NATO’s second Strategic Concept

The invasion of South Korea by North Korean divisions on 25 June 1950 had an immediate impact on NATO and its strategic thinking. It brought home the realization that NATO needed to urgently address two fundamental issues: the effectiveness of NATO’s military structures and the strength of NATO forces.

On 26 September 1950, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved the establishment of an integrated military force under centralized command; on 19 December 1950, the NAC requested the nomination of General Dwight D. Eisenhower as NATO’s first Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR); in January 1951, from Hotel Astoria in Paris, Allies were already working to get the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Forces, Europe (SHAPE) into place and on 2 April 1951, the new SHAPE HQ was activated. Other structural changes were implemented, including the abolition of the three European Regional Planning Groups, and the replacement in 1952 of the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group by Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT), leaving only the Canada-US Regional Planning Group in existence.

These structural changes, together with the accession of Greece and Turkey, needed to be reflected in the Strategic Concept. This led to the drafting of NATO’s second Strategic Concept: “The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area”, which was approved by the NAC on 3 December 1952 (MC 3/5(Final)). The new Strategic Concept respected the core principles outlined in DC 6/1 and, in this sense, did not differ fundamentally from this document.

Consequently, the strategic guidance also needed updating. MC 14 was thoroughly revised and reviewed so as to include the information that had been previously contained in DC 13. MC 14 and DC 13 became one document: “Strategic Guidance” (MC 14/1) approved by the NAC at the 15-18 December 1952 Ministerial Meeting in Paris. It was a comprehensive document, which stated that NATO’s overall strategic aim was “to ensure the defense of the NATO area and to destroy the will and capability of the Soviet Union
and her satellites to wage war...”. NATO would do this by initially conducting an air offensive and, in parallel, conducting air, ground and sea operations. The Allied air attacks would use “all types of weapons”.

There was another issue which the Korean invasion raised, but was only addressed years later: the need for NATO to engage in a “forward strategy”, which meant that NATO wanted to place its defences as far east in Europe as possible, as close to the Iron Curtain as it could. This immediately raised the delicate issue of Germany’s role in such a commitment. This issue was not resolved until 1954 when NATO invited the Federal Republic of Germany to become a member, which it effectively did on 6 May 1955.

### The “New Look”

In the meantime, while structural issues had moved forward, the strength of NATO forces remained a problem. At its meeting in Lisbon, in February 1952, the NAC set very ambitious force goals that proved to be financially and politically unrealistic. As a consequence, the United States, under the leadership of NATO’s former SACEUR, Dwight D. Eisenhower, decided to shift the emphasis of their defence policy to greater dependency on the use of nuclear weapons. This “New Look” policy offered greater military effectiveness without having to spend more on defence (NSC 162/2, 30 October 1953).

However, although alluded to in the strategic documents, nuclear weapons had not yet been integrated into NATO’s strategy. SACEUR Matthew B. Ridgway stated in a report that this integration would imply increases instead of decreases in force levels. His successor, General Alfred Gruenther, established a “New Approach Group” at SHAPE in August 1953 to examine this question. In the meantime, the United States, together with a number of European members, called for the complete integration of nuclear policy into NATO strategy.

### Massive retaliation and NATO’s third Strategic Concept

The work of the “New Approach Group”, combined with other submissions gave birth to “The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Five Years” (MC 48), approved by the Military Committee on 22 November 1954 and by the NAC on 17 December 1954. It provided strategic guidance pending the review of MC 14/1 and contained concepts and assumptions that were later included in NATO’s third strategic concept.

MC 48 was the first official NATO document to explicitly discuss the use of nuclear weapons. It introduced the concept of massive retaliation, which is normally associated with MC 14/2 – NATO’s third Strategic Concept.

An additional report entitled “The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years – Report 2” was issued, 14 November 1955. It did not supersede MC 14/1 but added that NATO was still committed to its “forward strategy” even if there were delays in German contributions that would push the implementation of the “forward strategy” to 1959 at the earliest.

After considerable discussion, MC 14/2, “Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO Area” was issued in its final form on 23 May 1957 and was accompanied by MC 48/2, “Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept”, on the same day.

MC 14/2 was the Alliance’s first Strategic Concept which advocated “massive retaliation” as a key element of NATO’s new strategy.

While some Allies strongly advocated massive retaliation since it had the advantage of helping to reduce force requirements and, therefore, defence expenditures, not all member countries wanted to go so far. A degree of flexibility was introduced in the sense that recourse to conventional weapons was envisaged to deal with certain, smaller forms of aggression, “without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons.” This was also reflected in the accompanying strategic guidance. Despite this flexibility, it was nonetheless stated that NATO did not accept the concept of limited war with the USSR: “If the Soviets were involved in a hostile local action and sought to broaden the scope of such an incident or prolong it,
the situation would call for the utilization of all weapons and forces at NATO’s disposal, since in no case is there a concept of limited war with the Soviets."

In addition to including the doctrine of “massive retaliation”, MC 14/2 and MC 48/2 reflected other concerns including the effects on the Alliance of Soviet political and economic activities outside the NATO area. This was particularly relevant in the context of the Suez crisis and the crushing of the Hungarian uprising by the Soviet Union in 1956. The importance of out-of-area events was reflected in a political directive, CM(56)138, given from the NAC to NATO’s Military Authorities, 13 December 1956: “Although NATO defence planning is limited to the defence of the Treaty area, it is necessary to take account of the dangers which may arise for NATO because of developments outside that area.”

The Report of the Three Wise Men

While NATO was hardening its military and strategic stance, in parallel, it decided to reinforce the political role of the Alliance. A few months before the adoption of MC 14/2, in December 1956, it published the Report of the Committee of Three or Report on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO.

This report, drafted by three NATO foreign ministers – Lester Pearson (Canada), Gaetano Martino (Italy) and Halvard Lange (Norway) - gave new impetus to political consultation between member countries on all aspects of relations between the East and West.

The Report was adopted in the midst of the Suez Crisis, when internal consultation on security matters affecting the Alliance was particularly low, jeopardizing Alliance solidarity. This was the first time since the signing of the Washington Treaty that NATO had officially recognized the need to reinforce its political role. The Report put forward several recommendations, including the peaceful settlement of inter-member disputes, economic cooperation, scientific and technical cooperation, cultural cooperation and cooperation in the information field.

Similarly to the Harmel Report, published in 1967, the Report of the Three Wise Men contributed to broadening the strategic framework within which the Alliance operated. Both reports could be perceived as NATO’s first steps toward a more cooperative approach to security issues.

Massive retaliation put into question

As soon as NATO’s third Strategic Concept was adopted, a series of international developments occurred that put into question the Alliance’s strategy of massive retaliation.

This strategy relied heavily on the United States’ nuclear capability and its will to defend European territory in the case of a Soviet nuclear attack. Firstly, Europeans started to doubt whether a US President would sacrifice an American city for a European city; secondly, the USSR had developed intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities and, more generally, its nuclear capability. As the USSR’s nuclear potential increased, NATO’s competitive advantage in nuclear deterrence diminished. Terms such as “Mutually Assured Destruction or MAD” started to be used.

The outbreak of the second Berlin crisis (1958-1962), provoked by the Soviet Union, reinforced these doubts: how should NATO react to threats that were below the level of an all-out attack? NATO’s nuclear deterrent had not stopped the Soviets from threatening the position of Western Allies in Berlin. So what should be done?

In 1961, J.F. Kennedy arrived at the White House. He was concerned by the issue of limited warfare and the notion that a nuclear exchange could be started by accident or miscalculation. In the meantime, the Berlin crisis intensified, leading to the construction of the Berlin Wall, and in October 1962, the Cold War peaked with the Cuban missile crisis.

The United States started advocating a stronger non-nuclear posture for NATO and the need for a strategy of “flexible response”. Initial discussions on a change of strategy were launched among NATO member countries, but there was no consensus.
The Athens Guidelines

NATO Secretary General Dirk Stikker presented a special report on NATO Defence Policy (CM(62)48), 17 April 1962, on the issue of the political control of nuclear weapons. It was basically NATO’s first attempt to temper its policy of massive retaliation by submitting the use of nuclear weapons to consultation under varying circumstances.

Other attempts at introducing greater flexibility followed, but these caused resistance from several member countries. This internal resistance combined with the fact that the US Administration had been shaken by the assassination of Kennedy and was increasingly concerned by US military involvement in Vietnam, momentarily froze all discussions on a revised Strategic Concept for NATO.

NATO’s fourth Strategic Concept and the doctrine of flexible response

NATO’s fourth Strategic Concept – Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area (MC 14/3) – was adopted by the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) on 12 December 1967 and the final version issued on 16 January 1968. It was drafted after the withdrawal of France from NATO’s integrated military structure in 1966.

There were two key features to the new strategy: flexibility and escalation. “The deterrent concept of the Alliance is based on a flexibility that will prevent the potential aggressor from predicting with confidence NATO’s specific response to aggression and which will lead him to conclude that an unacceptable degree of risk would be involved regardless of the nature of his attack”. It identified three types of military responses against aggression to NATO:

- Direct defence: the aim was to defeat the aggression on the level at which the enemy chose to fight.
- Deliberate escalation: this added a series of possible steps to defeat aggression by progressively raising the threat of using nuclear power as the crisis escalated.
- General nuclear response, seen as the ultimate deterrent.

The companion document, “Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO Area (MC 48/3) was approved by the DPC on 4 December 1969 and issued in final form on 8 December 1969.

Both MC 14/3 and MC 48/3 were so inherently flexible, in substance and interpretation, that they remained valid until the end of the Cold War.

The Harmel Report

As NATO was setting its strategic objectives for the next 20 years, it also decided to draw up a report that provided a dual-track approach to security: political and military. In the context of the questioning, by some, of the relevancy of NATO, the “Harmel Report” or the “Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance” was drawn up.

It provided a broad analysis of the security environment since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 and advocated the need to maintain adequate defence while seeking a relaxation of tensions in East-West relations and working towards solutions to the underlying political problems dividing Europe.

It defined two specific tasks: political and military; political, with the formulation of proposals for balanced force reductions in the East and West; military, with the defence of exposed areas, especially the Mediterranean.

The Harmel Report, drafted during a moment of relative détente, introduced the notion of deterrence and dialogue. In that respect, as already stated in the context of the Report of the Three Wise Men, it set the tone for NATO’s first steps toward a more cooperative approach to security issues that would emerge in 1991.
However, between 1967 and 1991, there were still moments of great tension between the two blocs, as there were instances that gave rise to hope of a less turbulent relationship.

Tensions increased with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles to which NATO reacted by initiating its Double-Track Decision, December 1979: it offered the Warsaw Pact a mutual limitation of medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles and, failing a positive reaction from Moscow, threatened to deploy Pershing and cruise missiles, which it eventually did.

Détente increased with the signing of the US-Soviet agreements on Strategic Arms Limitations (SALT I) and anti-ballistic missile systems, and SALT II (although not ratified), as well as the signing of US-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

By the mid- to late 80s, both blocs moved to confidence-building. However, mutual distrust still characterized East-West relations and it was not until the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the break-up of the Soviet Union that relations could start on a new basis.

The immediate post-Cold War period

In 1991, a new era commenced. The formidable enemy that the Soviet Union had once been was dissolved and Russia, together with other former adversaries, became NATO partners and, in some case, NATO members. For the Alliance, the period was characterized by dialogue and cooperation, as well as other new ways of contributing to peace and stability such as multinational crisis management operations.

During the immediate post-Cold War period, NATO issued two unclassified Strategic Concepts that advocated a broader approach to security than before:

- The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, November 1991;
- The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, April 1999.

Both of these were accompanied by a classified military document: respectively MC 400 and MC 400/2.

NATO’s first unclassified Strategic Concept

The 1991 Strategic Concept differed dramatically from preceding strategic documents. Firstly, it was a non-confrontational document that was released to the public; and secondly, while maintaining the security of its members as its fundamental purpose (i.e., collective defence), it sought to improve and expand security for Europe as a whole through partnership and cooperation with former adversaries. It also reduced the use of nuclear forces to a minimum level, sufficient to preserve peace and stability:

“This Strategic Concept reaffirms the defensive nature of the Alliance and the resolve of its members to safeguard their security, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Alliance’s security policy is based on dialogue; co-operation; and effective collective defence as mutually reinforcing instruments for preserving the peace. Making full use of the new opportunities available, the Alliance will maintain security at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the requirements of defence. In this way, the Alliance is making an essential contribution to promoting a lasting peaceful order.”

The 1991’s Strategic Concept’s accompanying document was - and still is - classified. It is entitled: “MC Directive for Military Implementation of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept (MC 400), 12 December 1991.

NATO’s second unclassified Strategic Concept

In 1999, the year of NATO’s 50th anniversary, Allied leaders adopted a new Strategic Concept that committed members to common defence and peace and stability of the wider Euro-Atlantic area. It was based on a broad definition of security which recognized the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the defence dimension. It identified the new risks that had emerged
since the end of the Cold War, which included terrorism, ethnic conflict, human rights abuses, political instability, economic fragility, and the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery.

The document stated that the Alliance’s fundamental tasks were security, consultation, and deterrence and defence, adding that crisis management and partnership were also essential to enhancing security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. It noted that NATO had managed to adapt and play an important role in the post-Cold War environment, and established guidelines for the Alliance’s forces, translating the purposes and tasks of the preceding sections into practical instructions for NATO force and operational planners. The strategy called for the continued development of the military capabilities needed for the full range of the Alliance’s missions, from collective defence to peace support and other crisis-response operations. It also stipulated that the Alliance would maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces.

The 1999 Strategic Concept was complemented by a strategic guidance document that remains classified: “MC Guidance for the Military Implementation of the Alliance Strategy” (MC 400/2), 12 February 2003.

**The security environment since 9/11**

The 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States brought the threat of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction to the fore. NATO needed to protect its populations both at home and abroad. It therefore underwent major internal reforms to adapt military structures and capabilities to equip members for new tasks, such as leading the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

NATO also proceeded to deepen and extend its partnerships and, essentially, accelerate its transformation to develop new political relationships and stronger operational capabilities to respond to an increasingly global and more challenging world.

These radical changes need to be reflected in NATO’s strategic documents.

A first step in that direction was taken in November 2006 when NATO leaders endorsed the “Comprehensive Political Guidance”. This is a major policy document that sets out the framework and priorities for all Alliance capability issues, planning disciplines and intelligence for the next 10 to 15 years. It analyses the probable future security environment and acknowledges the possibility of unpredictable events. Against that analysis, it sets out the kinds of operations the Alliance must be able to perform in light of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept and the kinds of capabilities the Alliance will need.

Later, at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit in April 2009, NATO leaders endorsed the “Declaration on Alliance Security” which, inter alia, called for a new Strategic Concept. This provoked a thorough debate and analysis of NATO issues and, together with the economic context, has presented an opportunity for rethinking, reprioritising and reforming NATO. The 2010 Strategic Concept was issued in Lisbon and is accompanied by the Military Committee Guidance MC 400/3, March 2012.
The consultation process and Article 4

All NATO decisions are made by consensus, after discussion and consultation among member countries. Consultation between member states is therefore at the heart of NATO since Allies are able to exchange views and information, and discuss issues prior to reaching agreement and taking action.

Highlights

- Consultation is a key part of NATO’s decision-making process since all decisions are made by consensus.
- It takes place on all subjects of interest to the Alliance, including NATO’s day-to-day business, its core objectives and fundamental role.
- Consultation reinforces NATO’s political dimension by giving members the opportunity to voice opinions and official positions. It also gives NATO an active role in preventive diplomacy by providing the means to help avoid military conflict.
- In Article 4 of NATO’s founding treaty, members can bring any issue of concern, especially related to the security of a member country, to the table for discussion within the North Atlantic Council.
- Since the Alliance’s creation in 1949, Article 4 has been invoked several times, for instance by Turkey.

Different forms of consultation

Consultation takes many forms. At its most basic level it involves simply the exchange of information and opinions. At another level it covers the communication of actions or decisions, which governments have already taken or may be about to take. Finally, it can encompass discussion with the aim of reaching a consensus on policies to be adopted or actions to be taken.

In sum, consultation is continuous and takes place both on a formal and informal basis. It can happen quickly due to the fact that all member states have permanent delegations at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Governments can come together at short notice whenever necessary, often with prior knowledge of their respective national preoccupations, in order to agree on common policies or take
action on the basis of consensus. NATO’s network of committees facilitates consultation by enabling

government officials, experts and administrators to come together on a daily basis to discuss a broad
range issues.

The principle of consensus decision-making is applied throughout NATO, which means that all “NATO
decisions” are the expression of the collective will of all sovereign states that are members of this
inter-governmental organisation. While consensus decision-making can help a member country preserve
national sovereignty in the area of defence and security, Article 4 can be an invitation for member
countries to concede this right to the group or it can simply lead to a request for NATO support.

**Article 4**

Under Article 4 of NATO’s founding treaty, member countries can bring an issue to the attention of the
North Atlantic Council (Council or NAC – NATO’s principal political decision-making body) and discuss it
with Allies. The article states:

> “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political
independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”

Any member country can formally invoke Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. As soon as it is invoked, the
issue is discussed and can potentially lead to some form of joint decision or action on behalf of the
Alliance. Whatever the scenario, fellow members sitting around the Council table are encouraged to react
to a situation brought to their attention by a member country.

Since the Alliance’s creation in 1949, Article 4 has been invoked several times. On 26 July 2015, Turkey
requested that the NAC convene under Article 4 in view of the seriousness of the situation following
heinous terrorist attacks, and to inform Allies of the measures it is taking. Poland invoked Article 4 on 3
March 2014 following increasing tensions in neighbouring Ukraine. On two occasions in 2012, Turkey
requested a NAC meeting under Article 4: once on 22 June after one of its fighter jets was shot down by
Syrian air defence forces and the second time on 3 October when five Turkish civilians were killed by
Syrian shells. Following these incidents, on 21 November, Turkey requested the deployment of Patriot
missiles. NATO agreed to this defensive measure so as to help Turkey defend its population and territory,
and help de-escalate the crisis along the border.

Previously, on 10 February 2003, Turkey formally invoked Article 4, asking for consultations in the NAC on
defensive assistance from NATO in the event of a threat to its population or territory resulting from armed
conflict in neighbouring Iraq. NATO agreed a package of defensive measures and conducted Operation
Display Deterrence from end February to early May 2003.

**The political dimension of NATO**

Encouraging members of an inter-governmental organisation who have not given up their right of free and
independent judgment in international affairs to consult more systematically on an issue is a challenge –
be it today or in the 1950s.

In the early 1950s, the NAC recognised NATO’s consultative deficiency on international issues and
recommended that measures be taken to improve the process. In April 1954, a resolution on political
consultation was adopted:

> “… all member governments should bear constantly in mind the desirability of bringing to the attention of
the Council information on international political developments whenever they are of concern to other
members of the Council or to the Organization as a whole; and (...) the Council in permanent session
should from time to time consider what specific subject might be suitable for political consultation at one
of its subsequent meetings when its members should be in a position to express the views of their
governments on the subject.” C-M(54)38.

The resolution, which was put forward by Canada and immediately approved, provoked nonetheless a
reaction from the American representative:
“Mr. Dulles (United States) supported the Canadian resolution on the understanding that consultation would be limited within the bounds of common sense. Countries like his own with world-wide interests might find it difficult to consult other NATO governments in every case. For a sudden emergency, it was more important to take action than to discuss the emergency. In other words, consultation should be regarded as a means to an end, rather than an end in itself.” (C-R(54)18).

The reservations made by the United States, which no doubt were shared by other member countries, could still be voiced today. Building on this resolution, on 8 March 1956, the then Secretary General of NATO, Lord Ismay, made a statement which widened the debate by explaining the consequences of systemising political consultation within the Alliance:

“A direct method of bringing home to public opinion the importance of the habit of political consultation within NATO may be summed up in the proposition “NATO is a political as well as a military alliance”. The habitual use of this phraseology would be preferable to the current tendency to refer to NATO as a (purely) military alliance. It is also more accurate. To refer to NATO as a political alliance in no sense denies, depreciates or deprecates the fact that the alliance is also military.” (C-M(56)25-1956).

The same year, the “Three Wise Men” produced their report, which inter alia sought to improve consultation within the Alliance on issues of common concern (“Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO”). However, ironically it was published as the Suez crisis emerged. Suez severely divided the leading founding members of the Organization (France, the United Kingdom and the United States). The Suez crisis acted as a catalyst for NATO, leading it to put into practice something it knew was of vital importance for the unity and solidarity of the Alliance – political consultation.

“Animus in consulendo liber”

For its anecdotal value, it is worth noting that when NATO moved to its headquarters at the Porte Dauphine in Paris, in December 1959, the then Secretary General, M. Paul-Henri Spaak, enlisted the help of the Dean of the Council in finding a suitable Latin maxim which would capture the spirit of consultation between Allies to which he attached so much importance. The Dean, Belgian Ambassador André de Staercke, recalled a visit he had made to the Tuscan town of San Gimignano. There, in the Palazzo del Podestà, engraved on the back of the seat reserved for the man who presided over the destinies of the city, he had seen the motto: Animus in consulendo liber.

It seems that an entirely satisfactory translation of the phrase cannot be found, although a French version “l'esprit libre dans la consultation” comes close. Renderings in English have ranged from the cryptic “in discussion a free mind” to the more complex “Man’s mind ranges unrestrained in counsel”.

The motto adorned the conference area at the Porte de Dauphine for several years and, in 1967, was moved to NATO’s new home in Brussels, where it has since graced the wall of the Council room.

Setting up a consultation system

As explained above, consultation and consensus were accepted as the basis for all NATO decisions when the Alliance was created in 1949.

However, it was only gradually that NATO set up a consultation system. In broad terms, this was done in three stages:

- 1949-1952: at the signing of the Treaty, NATO introduced the consultation process as a key principle in its working mechanisms. This was reinforced at the Lisbon Conference (1952) where the contours of today’s NATO were put into place: the NAC was made permanent and the position of Secretary General was created, together with an international staff that would support Council decisions on a permanent basis;

- 1952-1956: between 1952 and the publishing of the Committee of Three report on non-military cooperation, attempts had been made to encourage political consultation beyond the geographical limitations defined in the founding treaty, i.e, beyond the defined NATO area.
From 1956: the principles of the Report of the Committee of Three were further developed and implemented. The Committee recommended measures in the area of political cooperation with regard to foreign policies, the peaceful settlement of inter-member disputes, economic cooperation, scientific and technical cooperation, cultural cooperation and cooperation in the information field.

The Committee of Three left a lasting legacy by encouraging NATO members to reconcile differences within the Organization through productive consultation on matters of common concern, including issues outside the defined NATO area. The Suez crisis provided a first-hand example of why close political consultation and non-military cooperation are necessary.

### The fora for political consultation

The principal forum for political consultation is the North Atlantic Council. The NAC is NATO’s principal political decision-making committee. The Secretary General, by virtue of his chairmanship, plays an essential part in this process. Consultation also takes place on a regular basis in other fora, including NATO committees and working groups. All of these bodies derive their authority from the Council.
Consensus decision-making at NATO

All NATO decisions are made by consensus, after discussion and consultation among member countries.

**Highlights**

- A decision reached by consensus is an agreement reached by common consent.
- When a "NATO decision" is announced, it is therefore the expression of the collective will of all the sovereign states that are members of the Alliance.
- This principle of consensus is applied at every committee level, which implies that all NATO decisions are collective decisions made by its member countries.

**More background information**

**Applying the principle of consensus decision-making**

Consensus decision-making is a fundamental principle which has been accepted as the sole basis for decision-making in NATO since the creation of the Alliance in 1949.

Consensus decision-making means that there is no voting at NATO. Consultations take place until a decision that is acceptable to all is reached. Sometimes member countries agree to disagree on an issue. In general, this negotiation process is rapid since members consult each other on a regular basis and therefore often know and understand each other’s positions in advance.

Facilitating the process of consultation and consensus decision-making is one of the NATO Secretary General’s main tasks.

The principle of consensus decision-making applies throughout NATO.