



“FORGING THE WEAPON”

THE ORIGINS OF SHAPE LA GENÈSE DU SHAPE



An exhibition celebrating
the first public disclosure
of SHAPE historical documents.

Official launch & cocktail reception

7 December 2012 at 11.45

NATO HQ Press Hall

Une exposition qui aura lieu à l'occasion
de la première mise en lecture publique
de documents historiques du SHAPE.

Ouverture officielle & réception

7 décembre 2012 à 11h45

Hall de presse de l'OTAN



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Les Archives de l'OTAN et le Bureau historique du SHAPE tiennent à exprimer toute leur reconnaissance aux Archives et au Bureau d'ordre du SHAPE, à l'équipe Impression et travaux graphiques de l'AIM de l'OTAN, aux monteurs vidéo de la PDD de l'OTAN, à l'Imperial War Museum et au service des archives de la National Geographic Society, pour leur précieuse assistance ainsi que pour le matériel mis à disposition aux fins de cette exposition.



**ALL DOCUMENTS REPRODUCED IN THIS BOOKLET
HAVE BEEN DECLASSIFIED AND PUBLICLY DISCLOSED**



Lt. Col. Roy Lamson, the first SHAPE Historian

In February 1951 Lieutenant Colonel Roy Lamson, a university history professor who had served as a military historian during World War II, was recalled to active duty at the request of SA-CEUR Dwight D. Eisenhower. When Lamson arrived in Paris to join the small multinational team that was setting up the new Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Eisenhower explained to Lamson why his new post as the first SHAPE Historian was so important:

**“If SHAPE succeeds, it will be a model for future cooperation,
and even if it fails, we should know the reasons why.”**

As we all know, SHAPE did succeed, and Colonel Lamson and his successors produced a series of SHAPE Histories to document the activities and decisions taken each year. These classified histories drew on the wide range of documents that had been collected and preserved by the SHAPE Historical Office and SHAPE Central Records. These documents were subsequently microfilmed for preservation, and the paper copies then destroyed.

The historical records dating back to the beginnings of SHAPE remained classified long past the normal 30-year period for consideration for declassification due to the difficulty of declassifying microfilm reels that contained large numbers of documents from a wide range of sources, not just SHAPE and its subordinate commands but also NATO headquarters and the member nations of NATO. With the support of the North Atlantic Council and the NATO Archives Committee, digital preservation of the microfilm reels has helped overcome these difficulties. At long last, the SHAPE Histories from the 1950s along with the large numbers of related documents can finally be disclosed to the public, offering researchers a key source of information for this important period of the Cold War.

To mark this milestone, the NATO Archives and the SHAPE Historical Office have collaborated to present this special exhibition focusing on the early formative years of SHAPE. Using a selection of the newly declassified SHAPE records and text taken directly from the SHAPE Histories, we hope that this exhibition provides an enticing sampling for further exploration into this collection, which will be made available online at the NATO Archives website (www.nato.int/archives/SHAPE).



Ineke Deserno
NATO Archivist



Gregory Pedlow
SHAPE Historian

En février 1951, le lieutenant-colonel Roy Lamson, professeur en faculté d'histoire ayant servi en tant qu'historien militaire durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, était rappelé au service actif à la demande du SACEUR, Dwight D. Eisenhower. Lorsque M. Lamson arriva à Paris où il devait rejoindre la petite équipe multinationale chargée de mettre sur pied le SHAPE, le général Eisenhower lui expliqua en quoi son poste de premier historien du SHAPE était si important.

« Si le SHAPE atteint ses objectifs, il constituera un modèle pour la coopération dans le futur ; s'il échoue, nous saurons au moins pourquoi. »

Comme chacun sait, le SHAPE a bel et bien atteint ses objectifs, et le colonel Lamson ainsi que ses successeurs ont produit une série de rétrospectives du SHAPE consignant, pour chaque année, les activités et décisions touchant à ce dernier. Ces annales classifiées étaient établies à partir d'une vaste gamme de documents réunis et conservés par le Bureau historique et les Archives centrales du SHAPE. Plus tard, ces sources ont été microfilmées pour conservation, tandis que les copies papier étaient détruites.

Les documents historiques remontant aux premières années du SHAPE sont restés classifiés bien au-delà des 30 années normalement prises en compte pour la déclassification. Il était en effet difficile de déclassifier des bobines de microfilms contenant une multiplicité de documents provenant d'un large éventail de sources, c'est-à-dire non seulement du SHAPE et de ses commandements subordonnés, mais également du siège et des pays membres de l'OTAN. La conservation numérique de ces bobines entreprise avec le soutien du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord et du Comité des archives de l'OTAN allait aider à contourner cet écueil. Aujourd'hui, les rétrospectives du SHAPE remontant jusqu'aux années 1950 ainsi que les nombreux documents connexes peuvent enfin être divulgués au public, offrant aux chercheurs une source majeure d'informations sur cette période importante de la Guerre froide.

Les Archives de l'OTAN et le Bureau historique du SHAPE ont décidé, pour marquer ce tournant, de collaborer à l'organisation de cette exposition spéciale consacrée aux premières années du SHAPE. Cette exposition fait appel à une sélection de documents d'archives récemment déclassifiés ainsi qu'à des textes extraits directement des annales du SHAPE, et nous espérons qu'elle encouragera le spectateur à pousser plus loin l'examen de cette collection, que l'on pourra retrouver sur le site web des Archives de l'OTAN à l'adresse www.nato.int/archives/SHAPE.



Ineke Deserno
Archiviste de l'OTAN



Gregory Pedlow
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Putting the “O” in NATO: The Organizational Development of the North Atlantic Alliance, 1949-1956

by

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Now that more than sixty years have passed since NATO’s founding, it is hard to imagine that the organization did not always have the complex military and political structures that have long been a key feature of Alliance decision-making. As originally created by the Washington Treaty of 4 April 1949, however, NATO possessed very little in the way of political structures and virtually no military structure. This paper will discuss the early development of the NATO organizational structure from 1949 through 1956, during which period most of the institutions we know today were put in place. I will give particular emphasis to the military structure, because reaching agreement on “dividing up the spoils” of key military appointments and the location of headquarters often proved very difficult. As an extra added attraction, I promise that at no time during this talk will I quote Lord Ismay on the purposes of NATO with regard to Germany, Russia, and the United States!¹

The first organizational structures for the Alliance were created by the Washington Treaty itself. Article 9 established a Council which became known as the North Atlantic Council (NAC). This highest decision-making body in the Alliance was further authorized to “set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary,” and Article 9 specifically instructed the Council to “establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.”²

The Defence Committee, composed of the Defence Ministers of the member nations or their representatives, came into existence at the first North Atlantic Council meeting of 17 September 1949. At that time the Council also directed the new Defence Committee to establish subordinate bodies for defence matters: a Military Committee (MC) composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the members nations; a three-nation executive body for the MC to be known as the Standing Group with representatives from France, the United Kingdom and the United States; and five Regional Planning Groups. The formal creation of these bodies followed at the first session of the Defence Committee in October. At the second Council meeting in November 1949 an additional ministerial level body was established, the Defence Financial and Economic Committee, composed of Finance Ministers. Although it and the Defence Committee were ministerial level bodies, the

1 An earlier version of this paper without detailed source notes was presented to the 41st International Conference on Military History in Potsdam, Germany, on 25 March 1999 and subsequently published in Hans-Joachim Harder (ed.), *Von Truman bis Harmel: Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Spannungsfeld von NATO und europäischer Integration* (Oldenbourg: Munich, 2000). The opinions expressed in this paper are those solely of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, the NATO Archives, or the SHAPE Historical Office.

This remark refers to the famous—but probably apocryphal—statement attributed to Lord Ismay along the lines of NATO having been created to “keep Germany down, the United States in, and Russia out,” a quote that had already been mentioned by several of the previous speakers at the 1999 conference.

2 Article 3 states that the Parties “will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack”, while Article 5 contains the famous statement that “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against the all” and in such an event, each of them will assist the Party or Parties attacked by taking “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic Area.” *NATO Basic Documents* (Brussels, 1981), pp. 10-11.

highest decision-making body in the Alliance remained the North Atlantic Council composed of the Foreign Ministers. This proliferation of ministerial level bodies was not ideal, as the defence and finance ministers resented being considered subordinates to the foreign ministers, and in May 1951 the North Atlantic Council “absorbed” the Defence Committee and Defence Financial and Economic Committee. Henceforth the Council would consist of Foreign, Defence or Finance Ministers, depending on the issues to be discussed.³

The Alliance’s initial organizational structure was very loose, with the ministerial-level bodies only obligated to meet once a year, although they could meet more frequently if so desired. During the initial period of establishing the Alliance structure, the Council actually met rather frequently – four times between September 1949 and May 1950 – but it soon became clear that some mechanism was needed for decision-making during the periods between Council meetings at the Ministerial level. As a result, on 18 May 1950 the Council created so-called “Council Deputies” with the goal of enabling the Council “to effectively carry out its responsibilities and to exercise them continuously.” This body ultimately proved unsatisfactory, however, as the Council Deputies lacked sufficient authority to commit their nations without consultation, and it was not until a major reorganization of NATO was approved at the Lisbon Conference of 1952 that a true Permanent Session of the North Atlantic Council came into existence. At the same time a Secretary General was appointed to head the new international staff for NATO and also chair the permanent sessions of the Council.⁴

As for the military side of the Alliance, the Military Committee had the same problem as the Council initially had: it only existed at a very senior level - chiefs of staff - and thus met infrequently. But at least the Military Committee had a permanent executive body - the Standing Group - to direct military planning while the MC was not in session. The very limited membership of the Standing Group – just the three main powers of the Alliance - was a major source of irritation to the other nine NATO members. Thus even at the very first NAC meeting Portugal had asked that the Standing Group be enlarged to include at least two additional members, but this request failed to gain support.⁵ Similar requests to add at least one other country to the Standing Group were made by other countries at subsequent meetings of the Council and the Defence Committee, but the attitude of the existing members was summed up in a diary entry of Colonel Charles Donnelly, Secretary to the Standing Group:

The thought of adding one or more members to the SG [Standing Group] is horrifying. During World War II the CCS [Combined Chiefs of Staff], with two members, had a difficult time coming to agreement on tough strategic decisions. With the French added, the difficulties will be substantially greater and, with each additional new member, the problems will multiply geometrically.⁶

3 Lord Ismay, *NATO: The First Five Years, 1949-1954* (Paris, 1954), pp 24-25, 41.

4 Ibid., p. 28

5 CR/1, 17 Sep 49; NATO International Staff Central Archive (NISCA) File 3/1/1. The NISCA files have become part of the NATO Archives, but I have left the document references in their original format.

6 Charles H. Donnelly Papers, Autobiography (typescript), p. 1136, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA. In his diary entry of 25 October 1950 Donnelly noted, “The thought of adding one or more members to the SG is horrifying. During World War II the CCS [Combined Chiefs of Staff], with two members, had a difficult time coming to agreement on tough strategic decisions. With the French added, the difficulties will be substantially greater and with each additional new member, the problems will multiply geometrically. This could have been avoided if the SG [Standing Group] had started on the first day

The non-Standing Group members were entitled to send “Accredited Military Representatives” to the Standing Group, but these officers were not allowed much influence on policy. The way these Allied representatives were treated by the Standing Group, in particular by the US member, helped increase the discontent of the non-members. Colonel Donnelly noted in his diary that the US representative on the Standing Group, General Willis D. Crittenger, told him that “the Accredited Military Representatives should be given the handshaking treatment and little else; the Standing Group will settle everything without their help.” Donnelly added that this had been Crittenger’s way of operating with the Latin Americans of the Inter-American Defense Board. “He would entertain representatives of the member countries with coffee and cigars, given them something which they could report back to their chiefs at home to show that they were on the job, but steer clear of any relationship which might encourage his guests to try to become active in important policy formulation.”⁷ There was not even complete equality among the members of the Standing Group itself. When the initial structure was being established in 1949, the British Chiefs of Staff had hoped that the wartime US-UK Combined Chiefs of Staff could have been carried over into NATO, but they recognized that such a move would have been unacceptable to the other members of the Alliance and therefore reluctantly agreed to the inclusion of France in the Standing Group. Nevertheless, the old habit of exclusive US-UK decision-making died hard, and as late as May 1950 Colonel Donnelly was writing in his diary:

The hottest question since the inception of the Pact has been the extent to which the French will be let in on inside matters with the former CCS members: U.S. and U.K. Will the Standing Group be in fact a three nation body or remain mostly a US-UK affair with the French being let in now and then? General Ely [the French representative to the Standing Group] indicates that he is getting tired of the run-around our military services are giving him when he asks for information which the JCS has said is permissible to give him.⁸

Pressure from the non-members of the Standing Group for more influence on military affairs during the periods when the Military Committee was not in session led to the creation of the Military Representatives Committee (MRC) on 18 December 1950. Nevertheless, the Standing Group remained the predominant body giving direction to military planning during the 1950s, as it successfully resisted a proposal by Belgium, Canada and the Netherlands in April 1951 to have the Military Representatives Committee placed in the chain of command between the Military Committee and the Standing Group.⁹

to really give the AMRs [Accredited Military Representatives from the non-Standing group nations] the information to which they were entitled and made a point of continuing to keep them informed as to what was going on.” Ibid., p. 1136.

7 Ibid, p. 1131.

8 Ibid, p. 1109. For British hopes that the US-UK Combined Chiefs of Staff could continue under NATO see the UK Chiefs of Staff Committee report “Atlantic Pact Military Organisation”, 18 March 1949, in Public Record Office of the United Kingdom (hereafter cited as PRO), DEFE 4/13, COS(49)92. The Public Record Office is now known as the National Archives of the United Kingdom but I have left the source references in their original format to avoid confusion with the National Archives of the United States.

9 Douglas L. Bland, *The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance: A Study of Structure and Strategy* (New York, 1991), p. 154.

In addition to these disputes over who would give direction to military planning in the Alliance, there was the question of who was actually carrying out the planning and who would execute the plans in wartime. As we have seen, the initial NATO military structure made no provisions for wartime command and control; it had no fixed military headquarters or commanders and instead relied upon committees with representatives from the member states. This committee system was present at all levels. Thus the only military bodies subordinate to the Military Committee and the Standing Group in 1949 and 1950 were the five committees known as Regional Planning Groups: Northern Europe, Western Europe, Southern Europe/Western Mediterranean, United States/Canada, and the North Atlantic Ocean. There was general agreement on the location for most of these bodies, either Washington or London, but in the case of the Southern European/Western Mediterranean Regional Planning Group, Italy made a strong bid for Rome as the planning group's location but lost out to Paris after the United Kingdom abandoned its advocacy of London and supported the French bid.¹⁰

None of these Regional Planning Groups was capable of providing command and control to NATO forces in wartime. During the 5 October 1949 Defence Committee discussions on the establishment of the NATO military structure, the French Defence Minister had asked if these bodies could be considered as "groups which could be used as future command groups or command organization." US Secretary of Defence Louis Johnson had replied, "These are not command groups. We are not ready for command groups. We are not contemplating command groups in this at all under the Regional Planning Groups. They are what the language says, "study and planning groups."¹¹

Europe did have one combined military headquarters in 1950, but this belonged to NATO's predecessor, the Western Union Defence Organization (WUDO), which had been created on 17 March 1948 by the Brussels Treaty, signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Although the WUDO had a military headquarters at Fontainebleau, France, the organization lacked a true command structure. The WUDO's highest military officer, Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, was chairman of a committee (the Western Union's Commanders-in-Chief Committee), not a supreme commander. Neither Montgomery nor the three subordinate commanders-in-chief of the Western Union's land, sea, and air forces had any command authority in peacetime, and Monty did not even have real authority over these three commanders, as was demonstrated by his frequent battles with the WUDO's designated ground forces commander, General Jean Marie de Lattre de Tassigny.¹² Soon after the WUDO's formation in 1948, Montgomery recognized the inadequacy of its command arrangements and wrote to the British Minister of Defence: "I have now seen something of what is required to be done. The safety of the West is at stake and a Chairman repeat Chairman would be useless. Some very firm and definite orders will have to be issued and they will have to be obeyed quickly. If we mean business in the West a Supreme Command with full powers is absolutely necessary and he will have to smack it

10 For the disagreement over the location for this Regional Planning Group see the Minutes of the Defence Committee Meeting of 5 October 1949, NISCA File 3/1/2, pages 63-66.

11 Ibid., p. 43.

12 For the conflict between Montgomery and de Lattre de Tassigny see the chapters "Bringing de Lattre de Tassigny to Heel" and "Reconciliation with de Lattre" in Nigel Hamilton, *Monty*, vol. 3: *The Field-Marshal 1944-1976* (London, 1986), pp. 730-766, and the chapter on General de Lattre de Tassigny during the Cold War in Anthony Clayton, *Three Marshals of France: Leadership After Trauma* (London, 1992), pp. 143-147.

about in no uncertain manner. Any other solution would be useless.”¹³ Montgomery’s recommendations were not followed by the WUDO or the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and in June 1950, just ten days before the outbreak of the Korean War, he warned: “As things stand today, and in any foreseeable future, there would be scenes of appalling and indescribable confusion in Western Europe if we were ever attacked by the Russians.”¹⁴

Like Field Marshal Montgomery, many European leaders believed that NATO needed a true command structure, but such a move was being resisted by the United States, which did not want to become more deeply involved in the defense of Europe. Thus at the beginning of June 1950, the U.S. delegation to the Standing Group informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the growing pressure by the European members of NATO for the creation of a command structure and ventured the opinion that “we can no longer completely avoid approaching the question of a command organization under the North Atlantic Treaty.”¹⁵ Three weeks later the United States was no longer thinking of “avoiding” the creation of a command structure but had become a strong advocate of such a move. This change resulted from the 25 June 1951 invasion of South Korea by Communist North Korea with the backing of the Soviet Union. Concerned that the Soviets might convert this war into a world-wide struggle by supporting a similar invasion in Europe, where Germany was also divided into Communist and non-Communist halves, the United States now recognized the need for additional U.S. troops in Europe and a command structure to merge the NATO members forces into a more efficient instrument¹⁶

At the next meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 16-18 September 1950 in New York, the foreign ministers of the alliance discussed the need for the “creation, in the shortest possible time, of an integrated military force adequate for the defence of freedom in Europe.” Following consultations with their governments, the ministers reconvened in New York on 26 September and announced that such an integrated force would be created “at the earliest possible date” and would be placed “under a Supreme Commander who will have sufficient delegated authority to ensure that national units allocated to his command are organized and trained into an effective, integrated force in time of peace as well as in the event of war.”¹⁷

One of the most controversial topics during these September meetings was the issue of creating German units to participate in the defense of Western Europe, an idea strongly supported by the United States but resisted by many Europeans, whose memories of the struggle against Nazi Germany just five years earlier were still very strong. The North Atlantic Council finally agreed to the principle of a German defense contribution but decided that the implementation of this principle required further study. To head off pressure for the re-creation of German armed forces under

13 Quoted by Hamilton, *Monty: The Field-Marshal, 1944-1976*, pp. 715-716.

14 Ismay, p. 30.

15 Lt. Gen. Willis D. Crittenberger to Director, Joint Staff, “Consideration of Command and Theaters of Operation within NATO,” JCS 1868/189, 1 June 1950, National Archives, Record Group 218 (Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff), Geographic File 1948-1950, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48), Section 48.

16 For the change in U.S. attitudes toward NATO as the result of the outbreak of the Korean War see Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik*, vol. 1, Roland G. Foerster, Christian Greiner, Georg Meyer, Hans-Jürgen Rautenberg, and Norbert Wiggershaus, *Von der Kapitulation bis zum Plevan-Plan* (Munich and Vienna, 1982), pp. 287-291; Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The United States and NATO: The Formative Years* (Lexington, Kentucky, 1984), pp. 145-164.

17 NATO Information Service, *Texts of Final Communiqués, 1949-1974: Issued by Ministerial Sessions of the North Atlantic Council, the Defence Planning Committee, and the Nuclear Planning Group* (Brussels, 1975), pp. 58-60.

NATO, France had proposed the formation of a European Army in which German units would be incorporated at a very low level – battalions or perhaps regimental combat teams. The United States, however, believed that to be effective, German units would have to be formed into larger units, possibly even divisions.¹⁸

The controversial issue of a German contribution to the defense of Western Europe became linked with that of the creation of an integrated command structure under a Supreme Commander, and the United States began to have second thoughts about the appointment of a Supreme Commander when he would have virtually nothing to command. The United States therefore suggested that the initial appointment should be of a Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander – the COSSAC – who would carry out the organization of a new headquarters, with the Supreme Commander only to be appointed once everything was ready. This led the UK Chiefs of Staff to wonder in September 1950 if they should push for an interim solution of Field Marshal Montgomery as Supreme Commander with an American Chief of Staff, but they noted that “the governing consideration was the importance of not losing this favourable opportunity of drawing the Americans further into Europe. The appointment of an American Supreme Commander would be the greatest single step in this direction and should therefore be welcomed.” At this meeting the UK Chiefs also agreed that “the difficulty in accepting an American Supreme Commander at once would be lessened if the Americans were to nominate General Eisenhower.”¹⁹

Allied disagreement over the issue of a German contribution continued throughout September and October of 1950, and on 31 October US Secretary of Defence George C. Marshall shocked the other members of the Defence Committee by saying that “until we know what arrangement will be agreed to by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on the contribution of Germany to the defense of Western Europe, which includes Western Germany, it is not, in our opinion, possible to give final form to the command and military structure for the integrated force.”²⁰ This deadlock led the Secretary of the Standing Group, Colonel Donnelly, to record in his diary on 18 November 1950 that he and another member of the staff were “wondering if we are engaged in the biggest flop of the century. To date we have not attained any goal of military importance --- no troops, no equipment, no overall commander, in fact no real agreement.”²¹

Exactly one month later, however, on 18 December 1950, the Alliance avoided becoming the “biggest flop of the century,” when the North Atlantic Council reached agreement on both the principle of German contribution to European defence through what was to become the European Defence Community and the establishment of an integrated military command structure with Supreme Commanders for both Europe and the Atlantic Ocean. Selection of the new Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) was easy. There was universal agreement on both sides of the Atlantic that General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had led the Allied forces to victory in Western

18 It is not possible to include here a detailed discussion of the proposed European Army, which would have merged the armed forces of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. For more information, see Edward Fursdon, *The European Defence Community: A History* (London, 1980); Hans Erich Volkmann and Walter Schwengler, eds., *Die Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft: Stand und Probleme der Forschung* (Boppard, 1985); Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik*, vol. 2, Lutz Köllner, Klaus A. Maier, Wilhelm Meier-Dörnberg, and Hans-Erich Volkmann, *Die EVG-Phase* (Munich, 1990).

19 PRO, DEFE 4/36, COS(50)148th Mtg, (1), 12 Sep 50.

20 NISCA File 3/2/5, Verbatim transcript of Defence Committee Meeting, 31 Oct 1950.

21 Donnelly Diary, p. 1143.

Europe during World War II and was now serving as president of Columbia University, was the best choice for the new post. His name had already come up in informal U.S. and Allied discussions even before NATO decided to create the post of SACEUR, and on 28 October 1950 President Harry S. Truman had asked him to consider serving as the first SACEUR. Eisenhower's official appointment as SACEUR came at the North Atlantic Council meeting of 18-19 December 1950.²²

Creating Allied Command Europe

After arriving in Europe on 1 January 1951, General Eisenhower faced the daunting task of establishing an Allied command structure that would be acceptable to all twelve NATO nations. Thus he and the members of the SHAPE Planning Group could not draw up an organization solely on the basis of military considerations. Of equal importance were questions of personalities, politics, and national prestige, and Eisenhower quickly discovered that the task of "devising an organization that satisfies the nationalistic aspirations of twelve different countries or the personal ambitions of affected individuals is a very laborious and irksome business."²³

The new command structure would replace all but one of the Regional Planning Groups, the one for Canada and the United States, which continued in existence because conflict in that region was deemed unlikely, making a more formal command structure there unnecessary. The North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group was to be replaced by a military command with the same area of responsibility (the proposed Allied Command Atlantic), and the activities of the three European planning groups would be taken over by General Eisenhower's proposed Allied Command Europe (ACE), whose headquarters would be known as the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). To avoid unnecessary duplication of Allied defence efforts, the Western Union then agreed that the role and responsibilities of the Western Union Defence Organisation would also be taken over by the new Allied Command Europe.

At the same time that General Eisenhower's appointment as the first SACEUR was announced in mid-December 1950, a small group of American officers arrived in Paris to start planning for his new headquarters. Joined by officers from seven other nations in January 1951, the "SHAPE Planning Group" quickly began to draft the new command and staff structure for Europe. The SHAPE Planning Group benefited greatly from the plans - and later the personnel - it inherited from the Western Union Defense Organization, which formally ceased to exist after SHAPE was activated on 2 April 1951. Field Marshal Montgomery also moved over to SHAPE and served as the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe for the next seven years, playing an important role in the early development of SHAPE.²⁴

22 Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance* (Boston, 1988), pp. 46-47; *NATO Final Communiqués, 1949-1974*, p. 61.

23 Eisenhower to William Averell Harriman, President Truman's Special Assistant on Foreign Affairs, 24 February 1951, in Louis Galambos, ed., *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower* (Baltimore, 1974-1989), vols. 12-13: *NATO and the Campaign of 1952*, 12:64-65 (hereafter cited as *Eisenhower Papers*).

24 Ismay, *NATO: The First Five Years*, p. 38. For details of Montgomery's activities at SHAPE see Hamilton, *Monty: The Field Marshal*, pp. 787-879.

In developing the new command structure, Eisenhower's greatest problem was jealousy among the NATO member states about command positions, as he wrote to President Truman's Special Assistant on Foreign Affairs, W. Averell Harriman, in February 1951:

At the end of World War II, I thought that nations and services had learned well the rudiments of the principles applicable to unified military effort among Allies and would be prepared, in the future, to act accordingly. I was wrong! All the old questions of nationality of commanders and their identification as to service are with us again.²⁵

Soon afterward, Eisenhower again complained to Harriman that:

We have allowed the populations of NATO to assume that command assignments are awards or kudos conferred upon various nationalities because of strength, wisdom, or prestige. With this latter feeling prevailing, each appointment becomes one to be struggled for jealously; therefore its influence becomes divisive.²⁶

The greatest controversy concerned a command appointment over which General Eisenhower had no control, that of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). As a second Major NATO Commander, SACLANT would be equal in status to SACEUR, not subordinate to him. In December 1950 the North Atlantic Council had decided that the United States should fill the post of SACLANT, but this decision had not yet been announced when a leak in the Danish press in February 1951 revealed that the U.S. Commander-in-chief Atlantic, Admiral William Fechteler was slated to become the first SACLANT. The news that the United States would hold both of NATO's Supreme Commander positions raised a storm of controversy in the United Kingdom, where opposition leader Winston Churchill -- Britain's famous wartime leader -- sharply criticized the government in Parliament on 22 February:

Were there no British admirals capable of discharging these functions? Does not Great Britain lie at the very key of all communications across the Atlantic with Europe? . . . How is it that with our experience, which is longer and wider than that of any other country and when we have all agreed with so much pleasure that General Eisenhower should command the armed forces on land, we should have resigned any claims we might be thought to have to the command of the Atlantic?²⁷

Immediately recognizing the seriousness of these British concerns, Eisenhower wrote to Harriman:

I have a very deep suspicion that none of us has really learned the lessons from World War II that he should have learned. Among other things the super-sensitiveness of the British public to anything and everything Naval is one of the factors that apparently we have not thought through carefully, particularly as it may have an effect on the success of NATO, in which we are investing so much.²⁸

25 Eisenhower to Harriman, 24 February 1951, Eisenhower Papers, 12:65.

26 Eisenhower to Harriman, 8 March 1951, Eisenhower Papers, 12:105.

27 Keessing's Contemporary Archives, 1951, p. 11393.

28 Eisenhower to Harriman, 2 March 1951, Eisenhower Papers, 12:88.

General Eisenhower had correctly judged the seriousness of the British public's reaction to the proposed SACLAN T appointment, for the British government soon announced that it was reconsidering its acceptance of an American in command of the North Atlantic Ocean. The United States then postponed the announcement of the SACLAN T appointment, while efforts to resolve this and other difficult command issues continued. Although the controversy over the SACLAN T appointment was not of his making, Eisenhower worked hard to smooth relations with the British by making public announcements of the appointment of British officers to senior staff positions in his headquarters (SHAPE). He also privately informed senior U.S. officials that the British should be given some sort of senior naval command position.²⁹ However, the two countries were soon very far apart in their views on command structures for the Mediterranean, which I will discuss later.

Against this backdrop of sharp Allied divisions over the appointment of the other Supreme Allied Commander (SACLAN T), General Eisenhower and the members of the SHAPE Planning Group worked to develop a command structure for their own area of responsibility. During the early months of 1951 they established a basic command philosophy which divided Allied Command Europe into three regions (as had been done in the original NATO structure with its three Regional Planning Groups for Europe). The Northern Region included Norway, Denmark, the North Sea and the Baltic; the Central Region consisted of Western Europe; and the Southern Region covered Italy and the Mediterranean (Greece and Turkey were not yet members of NATO).

The commands on the northern and southern flanks were each to receive an overall Commander-in-Chief (CINC) subordinate to the SACEUR, but in the vital Central Region, which contained the bulk of NATO's forces, such a solution initially proved elusive.³⁰

The Central Region

Although originally inclined to appoint a commander-in-chief for the Central Region to make its structure parallel those of the other two regions, General Eisenhower soon discovered the difficulty of finding an arrangement that would satisfy all three of the major powers with forces in the Center -- the United States, United Kingdom, and France. Based on geographic location and the relative size of the forces committed to the Central Region, France had the strongest claim to overall command there. Nevertheless, according to Field Marshal Montgomery, Eisenhower did not wish to appoint a French officer to such a position because he "did not know a single Frenchman fit to fight the Land/Air Battle."³¹ The key issue was not the quality of French generalship [although the UK Chiefs of Staff had their doubts about this, too] but rather their views on the use of air power. The French wanted all Allied air forces in the Central Region to be subordinate to the French overall commander.³² However, U.S. and British air doctrine conflicted sharply with that of the French,

29 On 12 March 1951 Eisenhower wrote to Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall that the announcement of the SACLAN T appointment had "created such reactions throughout the United Kingdom that some way should be found to give the British the type of command and command title that would help ameliorate their obvious resentment." Eisenhower Papers, 12:119.


30 Dwight D. Eisenhower, First Annual Report to the Standing Group, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2 April 1952, p. 14

31 Quoted in Hamilton, *Monty: The Field Marshal*, p. 782.

32 The French placed great importance on having control of the air forces because they had not forgotten May 1940, when the British withheld additional fighter support for the Allied forces in France (who had already been split apart by the German breakthrough) in order to maintain sufficient reserves for the defense of Britain. On 28 March 1951 the French Vice-Premier, René Pleven, referred to this lack of air support while expressing to Colonel A. J.

who subordinated air forces to the ground battle, so neither country was willing to place its air forces in the Central Region under French control.³³ Drawing upon his World War II experience as a Supreme Commander, Eisenhower decided to retain overall control of the most important region in ACE himself and therefore did not appoint a Commander-In-Chief Central Europe or CINCENT.³⁴ Instead the Central Region would have three separate Commanders-in-Chief or CINCs: CINC Allied Air Forces Central Europe, CINC Allied Land Forces Central Europe³⁵ and Flag Officer Central Europe, all reporting directly to the SACEUR along with the CINCs from the Northern and Southern Regions.

Table 1
Major Allied Command Europe Commanders, 1951-1952



Although not completely happy with this arrangement, the French finally accepted it because it gave them two out of the three CINC positions in the Central Region and because Eisenhower promised General Juin that “the primary mission of the central air forces would be the support of the land battle (which includes gaining air superiority), and that they could not be taken away, even temporarily, except upon my personal order.”³⁶

Eisenhower’s original “triumvirate” of three Central Region CINCs reporting directly to the SACEUR did not last long after his departure from SHAPE in May 1952. The new SACEUR, General Matthew B. Ridgway, was not happy with the command arrangements, particularly the large span of control for the SACEUR, and in December 1952 he informed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that “the organization in CENTER will impose too heavy demands on the SA-

Drexel Biddle of the SHAPE Planning Group his government’s concern that the French commander in the Central Region would not control the air forces there. Col. A. J. D. Biddle, Memorandum for Record, 29 March 1951.

33 In a diary entry of 2 March 1951, Eisenhower remarked of his proposed candidate for command of the ground forces in the Central Region, General Alphonse Juin, “I understand that I will have some difficulty with him because he will insist upon taking actual operational control of supporting air forces. But he does not see that such an organization will give both the American and British Air Forces the excuse to hold back on allocation of air units to this command.” *Eisenhower Papers*, 12:83. For British unwillingness to place their air forces in Europe under French command see Hamilton, *Monty: The Field Marshal*, p. 788.

34 Col. Andrew J. Goodpaster, one of the first members of the SHAPE Planning Group and later a SACEUR, pointed out in a 1953 interview that “the planners thought that initially he [Eisenhower] should command in theory because of the feeling of confidence which it would give to the Europeans. Also it was a useful choice politically, because it avoided difficult problems such as Juin commanding American and British air forces and allowed Montgomery to take the deputy position.” Major K. E. Collins, Assistant SHAPE Historian, Interview with Colonel Goodpaster, Officer of the Chief of Staff, on 12th October 1953.

35 Until August 1951 this headquarters was known as Allied Army Forces Central Europe. The name was changed to avoid confusion with Allied Air Forces Central Europe, which had the same acronym for message traffic (AAFCE) although a different short title (AIRCENT).

36 Letter, Eisenhower to Marshall, 12 March 1951, *Eisenhower Papers*, 12:120.

CEUR in the event of war, involving him deeply in that sector at a time when he would be subject to insistent demands from his NORTHERN and SOUTHERN flanks.”³⁷ Ridgway therefore recommended that the Central Region’s command structure should parallel that of the other regions through the establishment of a sole CINCENT with subordinate Land, Air, and Naval Commanders. This change was implemented in August 1953.

Although the creation of a CINCENT satisfied long-held French desires for centralized control of the Central Region, the change did not lead to objections from the British and American air forces, because their desires for centralized control of air power were met by another change in the command structure. When Ridgway placed the Commander of Allied Air Forces Central Europe under the new French CINCENT, he stripped the Central Region air commander’s post of much of its power by greatly enlarging the authority of the Air Deputy to SACEUR at SHAPE. In 1953 a British officer took charge of Allied Air Forces Central Europe as a commander (COMAIRCENT), not a CINC, and the former CINCAIRCENT, General Lauris Norstad, became the new Air Deputy with considerable authority over the air forces in ACE in areas such as policy, targeting, reinforcements, and operational control of theater-level air forces. However, the three regional commanders-in-chief still retained control of one or more tactical air forces (known as Allied Tactical Air Forces or ATAF), because Ridgway had rejected proposals to create an overall Air CINC, claiming that such a move would create a second Supreme Commander in Europe.³⁸ The ground forces under the command of COMLANDCENT (Commander Land Forces Central Europe) were divided into two Army Groups, NORTHAG and CENTAG (Northern Army Group and Central Army Group).


The next challenge for the Central Region was the integration of the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany after it joined the Alliance in 1955 and began to create an army, navy, and air force. This issue quickly became tied in with a boundary dispute between AFNORTH and AFCENT, because the northernmost portion of Germany (Schleswig-Holstein) had been transferred to the Northern Region during the early 1950s due to the fact that at that time the only troops stationed there were from Denmark and Norway. The new German Armed Forces objected to the boundary line running through their country, and the French CINCENT also called for Schleswig-Holstein to be returned to his command area. In 1958 CINCENT went even further, arguing that the entire Danish peninsula and its Baltic approaches were natural extensions of the Central Region and should therefore belong to AFCENT. While recognizing the military logic behind such proposals, SACEUR Lauris Norstad believed that the Scandinavian nations should not be separated, and he therefore rejected CINCENT’s requests to change the command boundary. In doing so he was not merely thinking in terms of retaining the status quo. General Norstad viewed Denmark, Schleswig-Holstein and the Baltic Straits as a strategic entity and he therefore wished to create a new, integrated command for the Baltic region. At first he called for a naval command to

37 Ridgway to Bradley, 23 December 1952, Papers of General Matthew B. Ridgway, Box 24, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pennsylvania (hereafter cited as USAMHI).

38 Robert J. Watson, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953-1954*, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5 (Washington, 1986), p. 289; George Eugene Pelletier, “Ridgway: Trying to Make Good on the Promises,” in Robert S. Jordan, ed., *Generals in International Politics: NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe* (Lexington, Kentucky), pp. 44-45. Centralized direction of Allied Command Europe’s air forces by the Air Deputy lasted only until 1956, when General Norstad became SACEUR and left his former post vacant. When the position of Air Deputy was finally filled in 1958 by a British officer, it was only an advisory position. The post of Air Deputy was finally abolished in 1969.

cover the entire Baltic area (NAVBALT), with the newly created German naval forces to be integrated under this headquarters. But when his proposal ran into political difficulties, he had to resort to an interim solution for integrating German naval units into the NATO command structure. In 1956 he therefore created two small headquarters - Allied Naval Forces Northern Area Central Europe (NAVNORCENT) and Allied Naval Forces North Sea Sub Area (NORSEACENT) - under Allied Naval Forces Central Europe to command German naval forces in the Baltic and North Seas respectively. Thereafter the Central Region remained unchanged until France's withdrawal from the integrated military command structure in 1966 (see Table 2).

Table 2
The Central Region, 1953-1966



- 1 COMLANDCENT became a German position in 1957.
- 2 COMNAVCENT was disestablished in 1962 when COMBALTAP (Commander Allied Forces Baltic Approaches) was created.
- 3 NAVNORCENT and NORSEACENT were established in 1956 and disestablished in 1962.

The Southern Region

In reviewing the creation of command structures for the three regions of Allied Command Europe, Lord Ismay, NATO's first secretary general, noted that "the problem of command in the southern area was more difficult to resolve."³⁹ This is a classic example of British understatement. Trying to devise a command structure that would satisfy the national interests of France, the United Kingdom, the United States, Italy, Greece, and Turkey proved extremely difficult, and it took two years to integrate all of these powers into a NATO command structure for the Mediterranean that made sense only if viewed in political rather than military terms.

The greatest initial difficulty in the Southern Region was reconciling the differences between the United Kingdom and the United States. British public sensitivities had already been badly bruised by the revelation in February 1951 that an American officer would command NATO's forces in the North Atlantic Ocean. With the two top NATO military positions (SACLANT and

³⁹ Ismay, *NATO: The First Five Years*, p. 73.

SACEUR) going to Americans, the United Kingdom was determined to maintain its traditional dominance in the Mediterranean. However, the British Mediterranean Fleet had by this time been eclipsed by the U.S. Sixth Fleet, and the United States was not willing to place this powerful force under the command of another nation (especially if the Sixth Fleet would ever have atomic weapons at its disposal).

SACEUR Eisenhower wanted to establish a command structure for the Southern Region that would give overall command to an American naval officer as CINCSOUTH, with subordinate land, air and naval commanders. His choice for CINCSOUTH was Admiral Robert B. Carney, senior U.S. naval officer in Europe.

The British view was that they should maintain their traditional control of Mediterranean through the establishment of a British-led Mediterranean Command that would report directly to NATO's Standing Group and thus be equal to SACEUR and the proposed Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (at that time the Channel Command did not yet exist as a third Major NATO Command). Such a proposal was unacceptable to the United States because it would divide the European theater into two separate Supreme Commands and completely undermine the authority of CINCSOUTH. Another U.S. objection to British command of the Mediterranean was that the bulk of the naval forces there would be American.

At a meeting in March 1951 with Admiral Carney and Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, General Eisenhower stated that the United States should "be generous in the matter of titles and could afford to call the British commander 'Supreme' even though our contribution was greater."⁴⁰ Carney argued strongly against dividing command in the Mediterranean. Admiral Sherman then decided to offer a three-part compromise to the British: the title of the American commander in the Atlantic would be downgraded from "Supreme Commander" to CINC, Carney would be CINC of the Southern Region under Eisenhower, and a British admiral would become Allied Naval CINC for the Mediterranean under Carney.⁴¹

Admiral Sherman's proposal proved totally unacceptable to the British, who continued to call for a British admiral as supreme commander for the Mediterranean but were willing to accept an American as CINCSOUTH as long as his command did not include the Mediterranean. As a result of this deadlock over command positions, SHAPE's public announcements of its command structure and major command appointments on 20 March 1951 contained the statement that "the command organization in Southern Europe would be made public subsequently."⁴² Similarly, there was no announcement of an appointment for the Atlantic Command.

In the months that followed, proposals and counter-proposals went back and forth between Washington and London. Some made little military sense, such as a U.S. offer to have Admiral Car-

⁴⁰ *Eisenhower Papers*, 12:90-91. Eisenhower had recognized that some of the sensitivities of the British were related to NATO titles, and he wrote to Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, "I think we are hurling the adjective 'Supreme' around rather carelessly these days. It was invented, as I understand it, to designate an Allied Commander who would necessarily control troops of all services. Soon we'll have to use 'Colossal Supreme.'" Letter, Eisenhower to Marshall, 12 March 1951, *ibid.*, 12:119.

⁴¹ Walter S. Poole, *The Joint Chiefs and National Policy, 1950-1952*, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 4 (Washington, 1988), p. 232.

⁴² *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1951, p. 11393.

ney report to both Eisenhower and a British Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean. The issue became even more confused when discussions broadened to include the possibility of extending the boundaries of the British Mediterranean Commander into the Middle East; such a “Mediterranean-Middle East” command would have extended outside NATO’s boundaries.⁴³

While the United States and the United Kingdom struggled for control of the Mediterranean, other countries in the region felt ignored. Exclusion from the Anglo-American discussions of command arrangements was especially galling to the French, who had always considered themselves a major power in the Mediterranean. Thus after French premier René Pleven learned of a meeting at Malta between Admiral Carney and senior British officials to discuss command arrangements for the Mediterranean and Middle East in January 1951, he complained to President Truman about France’s exclusion from the talks and asked that future such discussions include French representation. Truman assured Pleven that the two countries had not intended to exclude France. Then on 8 March 1951 Admiral Carney’s staff announced that new Anglo-American talks would soon be held on Malta. Despite renewed French protests, the talks remained bilateral on the grounds that they would focus on the Middle East, which was outside the NATO area.⁴⁴

It was becoming clear that a solution to the command problems of the Mediterranean would not be reached quickly, and at the beginning of June 1951 General Eisenhower sent word to the Standing Group and - indirectly - to the British government that “failure to approve our command arrangements on the southern flank is causing us acute embarrassment.” Eisenhower was not referring to the issue of a supreme commander for the Mediterranean but simply to his own desire to appoint a CINCSOUTH. He noted that “not a single individual or government seriously questions my own authority to organize my own forces or the soundness of my particular plan. The difficulty seems to be that there is a hope that the postponement of public announcement may have some effect on the negotiations involving the over-all arrangement for the Mediterranean and the Middle East.”⁴⁵ Finally on 8 June 1951, General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, met with the British Chiefs of Staff, and the two sides agreed that Eisenhower could proceed with his announcement on the understanding that overall command in the Mediterranean was still to be decided and that Greece and Turkey, who had applied for membership in NATO, would not be included in AFSOUTH. The public announcement of Admiral Carney’s appointment as CINCSOUTH followed on 18 June 1951.⁴⁶

The new Allied Forces Southern Europe initially had three subordinate headquarters: Allied Land Forces Southern Europe under an Italian general, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe under a U.S. general, and Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe, under a U.S. admiral. The naval headquarters soon had two subordinate commands. French desires for a stronger say in Mediterranean naval

43 For the discussions on command arrangements in the Mediterranean in early 1951 see *Eisenhower Papers*, 12:90-91, 96-97, 127-130, 161-163, 199, 233-238, 315-319; Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Pre-Presidential Series, Box 21, Carney (2), and Box 41, Fechteler; Poole, *Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1950-1952*, pp. 230-251.

44 *Eisenhower Papers*, 12:130. On 26 March 1951 President Truman informed Eisenhower that the latest uproar over the Malta talks had been entirely unnecessary” and that Admiral Carney should have held the meeting quietly without publicity, adding “I do everything I possibly can to prevent things of that sort from happening but when a fellow gets three stars on his shoulder he has to let people know that he wears them. Ibid, 12:199.

45 Eisenhower to Harriman, 1 June 1951, *Eisenhower Papers*, 12:316.

46 *Eisenhower Papers*, 12:377; Poole, *Joint Chiefs of Staff 1950-1952*, pp. 120-124.

affairs were met by the creation of a Western Mediterranean Command (with the French acronym MEDOC for Méditerranée Occidentale) under a French admiral in September 1951, and three months later an Italian-led Central Mediterranean Command was established. The United Kingdom's naval forces remained outside the Southern Region command structure, as Anglo-American negotiators continued their efforts to resolve the deadlock over command in the Mediterranean.

When Greece and Turkey joined NATO in February 1952, the question of how to integrate their forces into the NATO command structure arose. Although the United Kingdom had favored adding Greece and Turkey to its proposed Mediterranean or Mediterranean-Middle East Command, the North Atlantic Council decided at its meeting in Lisbon in February 1952 that the land forces of the two new NATO members would come under CINCSOUTH, while a decision on their naval forces would be deferred until the naval command arrangements for the Mediterranean had been worked out. This solution raised new difficulties, as Eisenhower informed NATO's new Secretary General, Lord Ismay:

A problem has arisen in connection with the change in the command set-up incident to the inclusion of Turkey and Greece as elements of Admiral Carney's command. Lieutenant General [Maurizio de] Castiglioni of the Italian Army at present has the title of 'Commander Land Forces South' under Carney. You will recall that at Lisbon the Greeks and Turks made a very special point that it would be most unsatisfactory to them to have their land forces under an Italian General.⁴⁷

Col. Charles H. Donnelly, Secretary to the Standing Group, was present at the Lisbon meeting and recorded in his diary on 11 February 1952 that when the Italian representative raised the issue of Greek and Turkish troops coming under the command of General Castiglione, "a chill infiltrated the room as noticeable as though some one had opened a window and let in winter air." The two countries strongly rejected the Italian demand, and Donnelly noted that "the effect of the Greek and Turkish statements on the others at the table was exceedingly clear: it would indeed be a cold day in hell before either country would put their troops under the command of a former enemy whom they despised."⁴⁸

The Greeks and Italians had also indicated their unwillingness to serve under a British commander, and traditional rivalries in the Balkans completely ruled out the possibility of Greeks serving under Turks or Turks under Greeks, so the one solution acceptable to all parties was to create a new subordinate command, Allied Land Forces Southeast (LANDSOUTHEAST), under the command of a U.S. general. The official justification for the addition of this headquarters was the geographical separation between the two new NATO members - Greece and Turkey - and the existing LANDSOUTH headquarters in Italy.⁴⁹ One year later an Allied Tactical Air Force came into

47 Eisenhower to Lord Ismay, 19 March 1952, *Eisenhower Papers*, 13:1084-1085.

48 Donnelly Diary, p. 1203. Greek and Turkish antipathy toward Italy had historical roots. Italy had wrestled control of Libya from Turkey in the Tripolitan War of 1911 and then had seized a group of Turkish islands in the Aegean known as the Dodecanese Islands in 1912. As for Greece, it had been invaded by Italy in 1940.

49 For Greek and Turkish reluctance to serve under British command see *Eisenhower Papers*, 12:844, 13:1019, 1023. Field Marshall Montgomery, the Deputy SACEUR, had suggested the creation of a new command for the Greek and Turkish sectors under a CINC reporting directly to SACEUR, but General Ridgway rejected the proposal because it would "emasculate the Southern Command." Letter, Ridgway to General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 20 June 1952, USAMHI, Ridgway Papers, Box 24. In this letter Ridgway stressed

being with its headquarters in Turkey and a smaller working party in Greece. A second Southern Region Allied Tactical Air Force for Italy followed in 1956.

Meanwhile the Anglo-American discussions on a Mediterranean command structure continued to drag on. By early 1952 this issue was no longer combined with the controversy over the SACLANT appointment, because in January 1952 the British government finally dropped its objections to an American serving in this post. The establishment of SACLANT's headquarters in the United States followed in April 1952.⁵⁰ The British decision in favor of an American SACLANT was made easier by the United States' agreement in late 1951 that the boundaries of SACLANT's command should be redrawn to exclude the British home waters, in particular the vital channel ports. In February 1952 this area became part of a third Major NATO Command, the Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN, sometimes also known as CHANCOM), under the joint command of the Commander-in-Chief Channel (CINCHAN), who was the British admiral in charge of the Home Fleet, and the CINCMAIRCHAN (Commander-in-Chief Maritime Air Channel), a Royal Air Force officer in charge of Maritime Air for the area. They reported to the Standing Group via a "Channel Committee" composed of the Chiefs of Naval Staffs of the Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. As a Major NATO Command, the Channel Command was theoretically equal in status to Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic, even though the Channel Command's forces and geographic area of responsibility were much smaller.⁵¹

With the SACLANT issue out of the way, the Anglo-American dispute over the Mediterranean had come down to an American belief that a naval command for the Mediterranean should be subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Region (CINCSOUTH), U.S. Admiral Carney, and the British insistence that their commander in the Mediterranean should be a supreme commander (SACMED – Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean) reporting directly to the Standing Group and thus equal to SACEUR and SACLANT. These conflicting demands were two levels of command apart, and the obvious compromise was to choose the level in-between, which was the agreement reached by the two sides in November 1952. By March 1953 NATO had created Allied Forces Mediterranean (AFMED) under British Admiral of the Fleet Earl Mountbatten of Burma. He was neither SACEUR's equal nor Carney's subordinate. As Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Mediterranean (CINCAFMED), Admiral Mountbatten was Admiral Carney's equal; both reported to SACEUR Ridgway (see Table 3).⁵²


the importance of selecting the right individual to be the first commander for the new LANDSOUTHEAST headquarters and noted that "all here are agreed that he must be an American Army officer." Italy was not happy with the decision to create LANDSOUTHEAST, because the Italian general serving as COMLANDSOUTH would no longer be the sole commander of ground forces in the Southern Region.

50 Robert S. Jordan, *Alliance Strategy and Navies: The Evolution and Scope of NATO's Maritime Dimension* (London, 1990), pp. 35, 38; Poole, *History of the JCS*, pp. 283-284.

51 The decision to give control of the English Channel and the southern North Sea to the British Commander-in-Chief Home Station had previously been taken by the Western Union's Chiefs of Staff. After NATO came into existence, it created the Channel Committee and began working on the command arrangements for the Channel area. By the early 1960s there were no longer two CINCs for the Channel Command; the maritime air commander had become a subordinate of CINCHAN as COMMAIRCHAN.

52 Lawrence S. Kaplan and Robert W. Clawson, "NATO and the Mediterranean Powers in Historical Perspective," in Lawrence S. Kaplan, Robert W. Clawson, and Raimondo Luraghi, eds., *NATO and the Mediterranean* (Wilmington, Del., 1985), pp. 8-9; Elena Calandri, "The Neglected Flank? NATO in the Mediterranean, 1949-1955," in Beatrice Heuser and Robert O'Neill, eds., *Securing Peace in Europe, 1945-1962: Thoughts for the Post-Cold War Era* (London,

Table 3
Major Subordinate Commanders in ACE, 1953



When AFMED came into existence, AFSOUTH's naval headquarters (NAVSOUTH) was abolished and its functions and subordinate headquarters were transferred to AFMED. However, the most powerful naval force in the Mediterranean, the U.S. Sixth Fleet, did not come under the control of the new British naval commander for the Mediterranean. To satisfy the requirement of the United States that the Sixth Fleet should remain under the command of a U.S. officer within the NATO command structure, NATO created a new Allied headquarters known as Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe (STRIKFORSOUTH). Lord Mountbatten, the CINC of AFMED, protested that Carney was setting up a rival naval headquarters for the Mediterranean but finally consented to the new headquarters on the condition that "it is quite clear that I am the sole Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean and that this new Strike Force Headquarters does not start trying to usurp my functions."⁵³


Determining AFMED's sub-commands and their boundaries to the satisfaction of all of the Southern Region nations was not an easy task, and the process of drawing boundary lines on the Mediterranean Ocean continued for the rest of the year. Two of AFMED's sub-areas, the French-commanded MEDOC Command and the Italian-led Central Mediterranean Command, had already existed under NAVSOUTH and were simply transferred over to AFMED. The remaining four sub-areas did not come into existence until 1954, following approval by the North Atlantic Council. The six sub-areas were essentially national commands with an additional NATO mission, so each of the southern Region nations commanded at least one of AFMED's sub-areas (see Table 4).⁵⁴

1992), pp. 182-185; Poole, *Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1950-1952*, pp. 310-318.

⁵³ Philip Ziegler, *Mountbatten: The Official Biography* (London, 1985), pp. 518-519.

⁵⁴ AFMED's subcommanders were COMGIBMED (Commander Gibraltar Mediterranean, UK), COMEDEAST (Commander Eastern Mediterranean, Greek), COMEDCENT (Commander Central Mediterranean, Italian), COMEDOC (Commander Méditerranée Occidentale, France), COMEDNOREAST (Commander Northeast Mediterranean, Turkey), and COMEDSOUEAST (Commander Southeast Mediterranean, UK).

Table 4
NATO Headquarters in the Mediterranean, 1953-1966



Achieving an agreed command structure for the Southern Region had been a long and difficult process. But given the conflicting interests and traditions of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Greece, and Turkey, it is perhaps a miracle that a command structure acceptable to all parties was reached at all. The result was a temporary solution that made sense only in political, not military terms, with major problems of competing British and American-led commands with overlapping responsibilities. Despite its obvious flaws, no one wanted to disturb this laboriously-achieved solution, so it limped along until France withdrew from NATO's integrated military command structure in 1966, making a complete reorganization necessary.

The Northern Region

During initial discussions on a command structure for the Northern Region, the British government advocated a Chiefs of Staff Committee rather than a command system. This proposal did not find favor with other NATO countries, and discussions then centered on the issue of who would command in the north. Both the United States and the United Kingdom originally supported the idea of a Scandinavian commander in order to avoid becoming too heavily committed in the region and also to make the command arrangements more acceptable to Sweden, should it become interested in NATO membership. Norway favored a U.S. CINC to ensure that the United States would remain interested in the region.⁵⁵

SACEUR Eisenhower pushed for a British admiral to become the overall commander in the Northern Region because he believed that naval and air actions would predominate there and “the only disposable strength” in the area would come from the British navy. He also thought that such an appointment would strengthen Britain’s commitment to the defense of Scandinavia, informing Secretary of Defense Marshall that “I had hoped that under this arrangement [a British admiral as CINC] I could get the agreement of the British Admiralty to provide, in operational emergency, Naval strength to support Norway and Denmark, both of which I expect to develop as hedgehogs of defense.”⁵⁶

Eisenhower’s advocacy of a British CINC prevailed, and on 20 March 1951, the SHAPE Planning Group announced the appointment of Vice Admiral Sir Patrick Brind as the first CINC-NORTH (Commander-in-Chief, Northern Europe). When he stepped down in 1953, however, he was replaced by an Army officer, Lt. Gen. Sir Robert Mansergh, who had been serving as Deputy CINCNORTH since October 1951. While this succession provided continuity, it moved AFNORTH away from the emphasis on naval matters preferred by Eisenhower.⁵⁷

The remainder of the Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH) command structure consisted of four subordinate headquarters: an air, a naval, and two separate land headquarters. The decision to establish two land headquarters, one for Norway and one for Denmark, rather than an overall land headquarters for the whole Northern Region, was taken because the two countries were separated by water and thus not mutually supporting.⁵⁸ Creating two land headquarters also provided command positions for both Norway and Denmark.


55 Rolf Tamnes, “The Defence of the Northern Flank, 1949-1956,” paper presented to the conference “The North Atlantic Alliance, 1949-1956,” Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Freiburg, 11-13 September 1990, pp. 18-19.

56 Letter, Eisenhower to George C. Marshall, 12 March 1951, *Eisenhower Papers*, 12:120.

57 The need for a general rather than an admiral as CINCNORTH had long been advocated by Field Marshal Montgomery, who finally convinced SACEUR Ridgway to make the change. Hamilton, *Monty: The Field Marshal*, pp. 788, 828.

58 AFNORTH, Public Information Division, Short History of Headquarters Allied Forces Northern Europe, 15 June 1957, pp. 7-8.

Table 5
The Northern Region



A major complication in the establishment of a NATO command structure in the Northern Region was political limitations on the stationing of foreign troops. At the beginning of 1949, Norway found itself under strong pressure from the Soviet Union not to join NATO. The Norwegians resisted this pressure and did join NATO, but in order to avoid a complete break with its powerful neighbor, Norway pledged in February 1949 not to allow the establishment of foreign bases on its soil in peacetime. Denmark made no such pledge to the Soviet Union but followed a similar policy. As a result, there was a tendency in the Northern Region to rely on national headquarters that only became Allied headquarters in wartime.⁵⁹

Another significant problem faced by AFNORTH was boundary disputes with its neighboring command, AFCENT. The original boundary between the two commands had been the Danish-German border, but because Danish and Norwegian troops were stationed in the northernmost tip of Germany, Schleswig-Holstein, this area was transferred to AFNORTH in the early 1950s. This division of German territory by a major NATO boundary became controversial after the Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO in 1955 and NATO began to grapple with the issue of how to integrate the newly-created German forces into the existing command structure. The AFNORTH-AFCENT boundary would divide German naval units between two allied commands, because some German units would be based on the North Sea and others on the Baltic. Seeking to avoid such a division, the German armed forces called for the creation of a new allied naval command to cover the entire Baltic approaches.⁶⁰ This proved politically impossible, and the temporary solution was the previously-mentioned creation of two small headquarters for German naval forces under the Central Region.

Final resolution of the command problems in the northern region would require another five years of planning and delicate negotiations before an integrated NATO Command (Allied Forces Baltic Approaches) with German and Danish personnel finally came into existence in 1962.

59 SHAPE, Public Information Division, Presentation to P.I.D. Briefing Officers, Northern Command, 4 May 1959.

60 Johannes Gerber, *Die Bundeswehr im Nordatlantischen Bündnis*, Die Bundeswehr: Eine Gesamtdarstellung, 2 (Regensburg, 1985), p. 17.

Conclusions

By the end of 1956, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization bore little resemblance to the loose original structure of 1949. On the civilian side the most important reforms had taken place at Lisbon in 1952, with the creation of a Permanent Session of the North Atlantic Council, an International Staff, and a Secretary General. The key developments on the military side had begun one year earlier, following the Council's December 1950 decision to create an integrated military command structure and appoint Supreme Commanders for Europe and the Atlantic Ocean. But the actual process of creating such an integrated command structure was not always easy, due to competing national interests, old rivalries and conflicts between some of the member states, and clashes of personalities. Nevertheless, compromises were reached and consensus was ultimately achieved. Not surprisingly, the final result of this highly political process was a structure that was not the ideal military solution. But the primacy of political concerns over military factors was clearly recognized and accepted by the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who wrote at the height of the controversy surrounding the command arrangements for the Southern Region:

“The basic decision on command in this general area should be reached on a governmental level. Thereafter we will develop a structure which we will make work regardless of the apparent difficulties and national or service sentiments.”⁶¹

61 Letter, Eisenhower to Admiral Carney, 9 February 1952, *Eisenhower Papers*, 13:952.

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NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
FIFTH SESSION
New York, September, 1950

Document No. 10 (Final)
C5-D/10
26th September 1950
New York

PRESS COMMUNIQUE

Attached is the text of the press communique agreed
by the Council at the seventh meeting on 26 September,
1950 for release to the press on that day.

T. A. G. CHARLTON
SECRETARY

New York
26th September 1950

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NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
FIFTH SESSION
NEW YORK, SEPTEMBER, 1950

September 26, 1950

COMMUNIQUE

The North Atlantic Council reconvened today to resume discussions. The Council has been in recess since Monday, September 18. During the interval of this recess the Foreign Ministers have been in consultation with their governments.

The Council agreed upon the establishment at the earliest possible date of an integrated force under centralized command, which shall be adequate to deter aggression and to ensure the defense of Western Europe.

The concept of the integrated force approved by the Council is based upon the following principles:

1. The force will be organized under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and will be subject to political and strategic guidance exercised by the appropriate agencies of that organization.
2. The force will be under a Supreme Commander who will have sufficient delegated authority to ensure that national units allocated to his command are organized and trained into an effective integrated force in time of peace as well as in the event of war.
3. The Supreme Commander will be supported by an international staff representing all nations contributing to the force.
4. Pending the appointment of a Supreme Commander there is to be appointed a Chief of Staff who will have responsibility for training and organization.
5. The Standing Group of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will be responsible for higher strategic direction of the integrated force.

The finalization by the Council of the arrangements for the integrated force must await the recommendations of the Defense Committee on the following points:

The Council has requested the Defense Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to work out the organization of the integrated force and to recommend the steps necessary to bring this force into being at the earliest possible time. The Council has also requested the Defense Committee to consider changes and simplifications required in the military structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and related military organizations and to consider how best to ensure the necessary close working relationship between the Standing Group and the member governments not represented on it.

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DOCUMENT NO. 10 (Final)
C5-D/10

- 2 -

The Council agreed that in order to bring the integrated force into effective being all available manpower and productive resources should be fully utilized for the defense of Western Europe. To this end the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will consider the precise character and composition of the forces to be allocated to the integrated force by member governments. Decisions regarding the allocation of such forces will be sought from member governments at an early date.

The utilization of German manpower and resources was discussed in the light of views recently expressed by democratic leaders in Germany and elsewhere. The Council was in agreement that Germany should be enabled to contribute to the build up of the defense of Western Europe, and noting that the occupying powers were studying the matter, requested the Defense Committee to make recommendations at the earliest possible date as to the methods by which Germany could most usefully make its contribution.

In accordance with the policy of annual rotation of the Chairmanship the Foreign Minister of Belgium The Honorable Paul Van Zeeland has assumed the Chairmanship of the Council for the coming year.

In adjourning their meeting the Ministers reaffirmed the unity of the free peoples which they represent in their common determination to preserve the peace, the security and the freedom of the Atlantic community.

- END -

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NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

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DOCUMENT:
06-D/8
OR. ENG.
19th December, 1950

RESOLUTION ON THE APPOINTMENT OF A SUPREME COMMANDER

Note by the Secretary

Attached is the resolution on the appointment of a
Supreme Commander approved by the Council at their meeting on
Monday 18th December, 1950.

(Signed) T.A.G. CHARLTON

Palace of the
Provincial Government,
Brussels.

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1.

RESOLUTION ON THE APPOINTMENT OF A SUPREME COMMANDER

"The North Atlantic Council, having agreed with the recommendation of the Defence Committee that a Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, should be appointed as soon as possible as an essential action in proceeding with the prompt establishment of an effective NATO Defence Force in Europe;

Recognizing that the ultimate success of such a force lies in its sound initiation and that, for this reason, the selection of the first Supreme Commander is a question of the utmost importance;

Reposing the greatest faith in General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower as a commander of incomparable prestige, proven ability, and the highest order of leadership;

Unanimously recommends to:

the President of the United States that he designates General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower as the first Supreme Allied Commander, Europe."

1.



General Dwight D. Eisenhower



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 14, 1950

Dear General Eisenhower:

The North Atlantic Treaty Nations have agreed on the defense organization for Europe and at their request I have designated you as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. I view their request as a pledge that their support of your efforts will be complete and unequivocal.

I understand that the Standing Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will shortly issue a directive to you concerning your responsibility and authority as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

You are hereby assigned operational command, to the extent necessary for the accomplishment of your mission, of the U. S. Army Forces, Europe; U. S. Air Forces, Europe; and the U. S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.


Subject to overriding requirements of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, the missions, routine employment, training and administration of these forces will continue to be handled through command channels heretofore existing.

You are authorized to have officers and enlisted personnel of the U. S. Armed Forces, as well as civilian employees of the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, for your Staff in such numbers and grades as you consider necessary.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Secretary of State for his guidance and a copy to the Secretary of Defense for his guidance and necessary action by the Department of Defense.

You are undertaking a tremendous responsibility. As President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, I know that our entire country is wholeheartedly behind you. Indeed, you carry with you the prayers of all freedom-loving peoples. I send you my warmest personal good wishes for success in the great task which awaits you.

Very sincerely yours,



General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower,
United States Army.

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*Chapt. 4
Secur file*

NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE
COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

Standing Group

Groupe Permanent

SCM-621-50.

29 December 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

Reference: D.C. 24/3

1. The North Atlantic Council, sitting jointly with the North Atlantic Defense Committee, on 18 December 1950 at Brussels, approved the recommendation of the Defense Committee that a Supreme Allied Commander Europe should be designated and that his Terms of Reference as contained in the Appendix to D.C. 24/3 should be promulgated by the Standing Group when this designation was made.

2. The President of the United States of America having designated you and the North Atlantic Council and North Atlantic Defense Committee having appointed you as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the Terms of Reference are therefore transmitted.

For the Standing Group:

Chairman

Ted. J. K.

Enclosure:

Terms of Reference

SCM-621-50

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C O P Y:jm

TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER ATLANTIC POWERS IN EUROPE

COMMANDER

1. A Supreme Commander Atlantic Powers Europe is hereby designated. His command will be established in a Supreme Headquarters (SHAPE). The Supreme Commander shall have an integrated staff composed of appropriate officers drawn from all nations contributing to the forces in his area of command.

AREA

2. The command area of SHAPE, and his major subordinate commanders, will be defined from time to time by responsible authority. Initially the area of SHAPE is delineated as follows:

a. The European Command shall cover the area of the three European Regional Planning Groups of NATO and shall include Command responsibility over all such Army, Navy and Air Forces as may be allocated to it for the defence of Western Europe.

b. The control and the defense of the zones of the interior, including French North Africa, is the direct responsibility of the National Authorities concerned, who will grant the Allied Commanders under SHAPE all facilities necessary for the efficient conduct of operations. The Supreme Commander shall have authority to conduct such combat operations in these zones, including French North Africa, as he deems necessary for the defense of Western Europe.

The Supreme Commander is authorized to proposed to the Standing Group such modifications to the above as he may deem desirable.

POWERS IN WAR

3. The powers of the Supreme Commander in war will be as agreed by the Atlantic Council Resolution, C5 D/11(Final), "He will exercise the full powers of a Supreme Commander in the event of war". It is contemplated that these powers will be confined to operations and training. These powers will later be defined in greater detail by the Defense Committee after consulting the Military Committee.

POWERS IN PEACE

4. The main function in peacetime of the Supreme Commander is to ensure that, if an emergency comes, the NATO forces made available by nations for the defense of Western Europe will be organized, equipped, trained and ready to implement agreed war plans. Since a Supreme

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Commander's peacetime functions are in effect only a prelude to his wartime responsibility for the defense of his area of command, the Standing Group has set forth (for Military Committee approval) the necessary overall statement of his directive and responsibilities in M.C. 22/2. Based thereon, the Supreme Commander's peacetime responsibilities in brief include:

- a. The organization and training of national units allocated to his command into an effective integrated force.
 - b. The preparation of plans for the execution of his assigned missions, and their coordination with other NATO or national plans.
 - c. Recommendations, to the Standing Group, and to National Commanders on deployment of forces, infrastructure, training standards, adequacy of forces, etc., and such other military matters as will affect his ability to discharge his war, or peacetime, mission.
 - d. Proposing to the Standing Group any increase, elimination or reorganization of subordinate planning and command organizations which he considers necessary.
 - e. The establishment of an efficient organization which will be the nucleus for expansion in war for the control of the battle for the defense of Europe.
5. To execute the peacetime functions detailed above, the Supreme Commander will have:
- a. Direct control over the higher training of all national forces allocated to SHAPE in peacetime. Furthermore, he should be given facilities by Nations to inspect the training of those cadre and other forces earmarked for his command on the outbreak of war but which are not under his control in peace.
 - b. Such authority as is necessary to ensure that National forces allocated to SHAPE are properly organized and trained into one effective force. To this end he is authorized direct access to National Chiefs of Staff. Should there be any shortcomings in the efficiency or training of National forces earmarked for, but not under his command, they should be represented by him to the National Authorities with information to the Standing Group.
 - c. Authority to communicate with National Chiefs of Staff, and with their respective Defense Ministers, and Heads of Government, directly as necessary to facilitate the accomplishment of his mission.
 - d. Authority to make recommendations direct to National Chiefs of Staff on the peacetime deployment of National forces placed, or to be placed, under his control, and on logistic and administrative matters affecting the efficiency or readiness of these forces.

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It is recognized that the Supreme Commander may delegate to his major subordinate commanders, such authority as may be necessary for the discharge of his responsibilities.

6. The responsibility for logistic support to national component forces will, in general, remain with the responsible authorities of the nations concerned. The responsibility for coordination will, however, rest with the Supreme Commander, and with his major subordinate Commanders at the appropriate levels.

7. The Supreme Commander is empowered to propose to the Standing Group, for its review and further submission to the Military Committee and Defense Committee, such modification of these terms of reference as he may deem desirable.

SCM-621-50

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Appendix
Chapter 10.

12 March 1951

My dear Field Marshal:

I trust that you realize how delighted I am that the British Government has agreed to make you available for duty in SHAPE, in which you are hereby designated as the Deputy Supreme Commander. In this capacity, you will have a most important role to play in the development of an integrated force for the defense of Europe, which is our objective.

You will act, during any temporary incapacity of mine, as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, under the authority invested in me by the North Atlantic Council. Your principal normal duty will be to further the organization, equipping, training, and readiness of National Forces contemplated for later allocation to this command, and through and in cooperation with subordinate commanders, to perform a similar function for troops already allocated to SHAPE.

These duties will require your direct contact, in my name, with the several governments, military staffs and agencies of NATO nations, and with principal subordinate headquarters established by competent orders of SHAPE. I suggest that you acquaint yourself with the terms of the directive issued to me by the Standing Group, particularly those provisions that authorize direct communication between this headquarters and the several governments of NATO. For assisting you in this work, the entire SHAPE staff, through its Chief of Staff, will be at your disposal. Any executive instructions to subordinate commanders are, of course, to be issued through the staff.

Cordially,

/s/ Dwight D. Eisenhower

Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery
of Alamein
Dover House, Whitehall, S.W.1
London, England

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Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery

(1)

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE
PARIS, FRANCE

GENERAL ORDERS
NUMBER 1

2 April 1951

SECTION I - ACTIVATION

1. Allied Command Europe, consisting of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and such additional operational headquarters, organizations and military forces as may from time to time be subordinated to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, is activated at 0001 hours this date pursuant to authority vested in me by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

2. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) is activated as the headquarters of Allied Command Europe as of 0001 hours this date with temporary station at Paris, France pursuant to the authority cited above.

SECTION II - ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND

The undersigned hereby assumes command of Allied Command Europe.

Lucy D. Clayton

DISTRIBUTION:

- "A" plus
- 5 SACDUR
- 5 Chief of Staff, SHAPE
- 20 Each NATO Nation
- 10 Western Union Defense Organization
- 10 NATO Standing Group
- 2 Each individual assigned SHAPE
- 25 Central Files

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE
PARIS, FRANCE

GENERAL ORDERS
NUMBER 8

2 April 1951


ACTIVATION - HEADQUARTERS COMMAND, SHAPE

Announcement is made of the activation as of 0001 hours this date with temporary station Paris, France, of Headquarters Command, SHAPE, to consist of the Office of the Commander Headquarters Command and such other elements for the administrative support of SHAPE as may from time to time be placed under that command.

BY COMMAND OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE:

OFFICIAL:

ALFRED M. GRUENTHER
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff



HERBERT M. JONES
Colonel, U. S. Army
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

- *A" plus
- 20 Each NATO Nation
- 10 Western Union Defense Organization
- 10 NATO Standing Group
- 10 Headquarters Command
- 20 Central Files

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STRATEGIC GUIDANCE DIRECTIVE

MISSION

1. The primary objective assigned to SAC Europe is to ensure that an adequate integrated NATO force is organized, equipped, trained and ready to meet effectively any Soviet attack. In event of war his mission is to defend Western Europe.

PLAN TO MEET A SUDDEN EMERGENCY

2. Until the forces required can be provided, it will not be possible to implement in full the forward strategy necessary to achieve this objective.

3. If, therefore, the enemy should launch an attack, our minimum requirements are that we shall be capable of:

- a. Withstanding the initial shock.
- b. Holding certain key areas.
- c. Mounting with the minimum delay, a counter-offensive from these key areas.

4. These minimum requirements must derive from and form an integral part of the forward strategic concept. This concept will form the broad framework within which plans are to be developed.

5. An emergency plan capable of immediate implementation, with the forces currently available, must be developed and coordinated. This plan will require constant modification as forces increase.

STRATEGIC CONCEPT

6. The main principles on which the broad strategic concept will be based and which will govern all planning involve:

- a. Strong flanks in the North and South.
- b. A series of strongly held areas linking the North and South flanks.

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7. These principles will be met as set out below, by making the maximum use of conventional forces and all other means.

8. On the Northern Flank

The object will be to:

- a. Hold base areas in Denmark and Norway for offensive and counter-attack operations.
- b. Close the Baltic.
- c. After stabilization of any Russian attack, to destroy enemy forces in the region.

9. In the Center

The object will be to:

- a. Hold as far to the East as possible with the general line of the Elbe as the forward limit.
- b. Develop the defense of key areas along this general line which will be held at all costs, Switzerland being regarded as the Southern bastion.

10. On the Southern Flank

The object will be to:

- a. Keep open the Mediterranean and Western Mediterranean in particular.
- b. Hold the line of the Italian Alps.
- c. Stop any Russian attack through Northeast Italy, blocking the Gorizia Gap.
- d. Develop an air offensive.

TIMING AND BUILD-UP

11. Planning is to be developed within the above general framework, the aim being to:

- a. Implement this broad strategy in full by ^{3 July} December 1954.

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b. Meet the needs of a sudden emergency as outlined in paragraph 3 above, at any time from now onwards, and which must be in good shape by December 1952.

12. As Russian operations may not develop along conventional lines, plans must be flexible and our forces mobile.

CONCLUSIONS

13. Planning must start now, based on a forward strategy. This strategy involves the development of strong flanks in the North and South and a series of strongly held areas in the center, the strength of the center being built up as further resources become available.

14. Based on this strategy, it is essential to determine:

- a. Specifically where the battle will be fought.
- b. What resources are required for the battle envisaged in each sector.
- c. What nations will provide these resources.
- d. By when they are needed.

15. Action is therefore to be taken to prepare:

- a. An outline plan for the defense of Western Europe (North, Center and South Sectors) in December 1954 based on the forward strategy outlined.
- b. An emergency plan capable of full implementation by December 1952 and which will fit readily into the 1954 plan.

16. The above plans are to be prepared and submitted to SACEUR as soon as possible.

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Page 97.

16 March 1951

SHAPE Command Structure

1. General Eisenhower sent a message to the Standing Group last night on the Command Structure for SHAPE. In the message he stated that his solution to the command problem is the result of intensive study, conference and conciliation, and that it represents a practicable, workable system which is acceptable to him for the discharge of the responsibilities entrusted to him by the North Atlantic Council.

2. Turning to the command organization itself, we find, first, the arrangements desired by General Eisenhower with respect to deputies, who will be within SHAPE Headquarters itself as members of the staff.

a. Field Marshal Montgomery, British Army, is selected for the position of Deputy Supreme Allied Commander.

b. Air Chief Marshal Saunders, British Royal Air Force, is selected for the position of Air Deputy.

c. General Eisenhower may later nominate a senior naval officer as Naval Deputy, in the event the need for such a position becomes apparent.

3. Within Northern Europe the following commands are included in General Eisenhower's plans:

a. A senior flag officer of the British Royal Navy as Commander-in-Chief, Northern Europe. This officer will be directly responsible to General Eisenhower for the exercise of his responsibilities in Northern Europe. He will also act initially as the Commander of Allied Naval Forces, Northern Europe.

b. A Commander, Allied Army Forces, Norway, to be a Norwegian officer.

c. A Commander, Allied Army Forces, Denmark, a Danish officer.

d. A Commander, Allied Air Forces, Northern Europe, a U.S. Air officer.

4. Within Central Europe, General Eisenhower intends to establish the following commands:

a. Commander-in-Chief, Allied Army Forces, Central Europe. General Juin, French Army, has been selected for this post.

b. Commander-in-Chief, Allied Air Forces, Central Europe. Lieutenant General Norstad, U.S. Air Force, has been selected for this post.

c. A Naval Flag Officer, Central Europe, for which position Admiral Jaujard, French Navy, has been selected.

5. With respect to Southern Europe, General Eisenhower indicates that his views thereon will be submitted at a later date.

6. In addition to these major features of his subordinate command structure, General Eisenhower covered two corollary details:

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a. First, he will rely upon the three European Regional Planning Groups to continue work presently in process, and to undertake such additional projects as may be necessary. He will issue specific planning guidance to the Principal Staff Officers Committees in order to ensure the necessary coordination.

b. Secondly, with respect to the Western Union Defense Organization, he will request the Brussels Treaty Powers:

- (1) To terminate the exercise of those responsibilities of their Commanders-in-Chief Committee which he, himself, will now exercise on behalf of NATO, and
- (2) To place at his disposal the personnel and facilities of UNILION, UNITER, UNLAIR and UNDSER.

7. General Eisenhower ends his message to the Standing Group by stating that, because of the extreme psychological importance attending the announcement of his command structure, it is his intention to make a press release covering substantially the same material you have just been given, the time of such release to be 1400 hours, Paris time, 20 March 1951, unless the Standing Group sees overriding reasons to the contrary. Prior to that time General Eisenhower hopes to have the names of all of the Allied commanders involved.

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ference of Historian SHAPE with Chief of Staff, General Gruenther, 1d 1720 - 1815, 2 April in Chief of Staff's office - Room 101 tel Astoria.

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INTRODUCTION

As a result of my memorandum of 19 March 51, General Gruenther agreed to give me from time to time an opportunity to ask questions for the historical record. On 26 March he offered to allow me to ask questions, suggesting the development of command as first priority and sent through Col Wood the attached note. In the note he asked me to be sure that I knew the following records :

- a. Memoranda of the Record made during General Eisenhower's trip. (I had read all of these in the "Blue Book.")
- b. Records of General Eisenhower's meeting with the Standing Group and Military Representatives in late January and early February. (I obtained these records from the AG Sub-Registry.)
- c. Capt. George Anderson's (U.S.N) trip to the US, why he went, his meeting with General Eisenhower in Washington. (I read all of the messages on this and interviewed Capt Anderson on 31 March.) Statement from Capt Anderson is attached.
- d. Adm Sherman's letters and messages regarding command, and the same for Admiral Carney. (These I saw in General Gruenther's own Command Structure Folder, part of his personal file.
- e. General Eisenhower's letters to Harriman and General Marshall. (Seen in General Eisenhower's files).
- f. Record of the Copenhagen meeting and the Danish and Norwegian memoranda. I had seen these previously, sent to me from Col Wood, but they are also in General Gruenther's Command Structure file.

During the past week I studied these documents and on 2 April at 1720 General Gruenther called me from my French class and gave me a review of the whole command structure from the beginning to the present date. My notes are in "Command Structure" file on 5x8 cards.

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- 2 -

BACKGROUND

The development of command is tied up with the whole strategic and geographical position of the three main sectors of General Eisenhower's command, - the northern sector, the central sector and the southern sector. The actual territory under Gen Eisenhower's control is a kind of huge peninsula bounded on the north and south by large ocean areas. The central sector is of great strategic importance, since any potential land battle would develop there, and the northern and southern flanks are of great concern since they border on non-NATO countries.

The development of command is beset with many difficulties, but if the command is going to work it must be set up fundamentally on practical military lines. This is difficult to do, since national representation must be considered and other elements enter in, such as national pride and prestige and public opinion. The northern command is now fixed, and although the Norwegian and Danish governments are not thoroughly happy about it, they have both agreed to back it in order to move the Command Structure ahead. The command structure of the central sector has been of considerable concern to political forces of the Right and Left in France. The De Gaulle group feels that General Juin, although he is C-in-C of Group Forces in the Central Sector, has less responsibility and power than his colleague in the Northern Sector, Admiral Brind, under whom all land, sea and air forces are placed. The problem of the southern zone is the most complicated of all, and no agreements have yet been reached. (See my minutes on SG SHAPE meeting - 30 March: Item on Mediterranean Command) General Eisenhower in his Press conference of 2 April was asked about the Mediterranean Command and replied that the delay comes from the many political problems that have to be worked out. Actually the problems are not only political but military. The British are hoping for a Supreme Commander in the South, which will somehow balance the effect of Adm Wm. M. ^{At C-in-C of} ~~Seabrooke's~~ title as Supreme Commander Atlantic. U.S. thinking is for an American C-in-C of the southern zone with the British Command of Allied naval units except for the US Fast Striking Force. The problem is now so complicated that it seems to be at a standstill. Gen Eisenhower is on the verge of pushing for a decision; in this attitude is also Capt. Anderson's. Gen Gruenther's opinion is that no announcement should yet be made of the Mediterranean Command. Perhaps, even a delay of a

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month would be useful to allow the NATO Governments to understand more clearly the problems of command.

CONFERENCE.

The following paragraphs take up some points made by General Gruenther. Gen Gruenther began by pointing out that Gen Eisenhower's first view of the job to be done was to "forge the weapons." In other words, to get the nations together and get them to pledge support and strength to SHAPE. He did not consider command of first importance in his early tour and almost no reference was made to it by him. In the early conference in London (13 Jan. 1951) he more or less accepted the British concept of the northern command but really thought the command problems could be straightened out later and without the serious problems that did develop. Actually the complications began to develop during the middle of February. Gen Eisenhower was in Washington and Gen Gruenther was here in Paris. Gen Gruenther, realizing the difficulties that were to come, sent Capt Anderson on Feb 12 to see Gen Eisenhower in Washington to inform him of the state of command. The British Chiefs of Staff at this time had asked Gen Gruenther to appear before them. To Capt Anderson, Gen Eisenhower restated his basic view of the command structure which does not accept the tripartite structure proposed by the British - ie. three areas with a C-in-C in each. General Eisenhower laid down these principles. He did not accept the concept of a divided authority. He had no intention of creating a compartmented ground, naval and air staff. He strove for an integrated staff specified in his Terms of Reference. From this point on the command developments really take a major place in the activities of SHAPE. The building of the head-quarters command and the growth of the organization are, of course, of great importance too, but, as far as the historian goes, really administrative history.

The command problems still exist and they cannot be settled on purely theoretical grounds. They must be worked out in conference and studied. They have been and will be solved as a result of long hours of debate and compromise, and elements of personal and national pride and ambitions will enter in. Fortunately the northern command is settled and is acceptable to Norway and Denmark and to the British, although the British are not in sympathy with the strategic ideas involved in the command.

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The appointment of a French naval deputy on 2 April gives more to the French, but actually France is not a naval nation. Admiral Lemonnier is a very good, well informed officer and will be welcomed by the French press. In his Press conference Gen Eisenhower placed Adm Lemonnier on the par with Air Chief Marshal Saunders. Just what the British reaction to this will be is hard to say.

As far as the French are concerned the command in the south is a "hot potato". If the French do not get something, the DeGaullists may rouse opinion as Churchill did over the appointment of Admiral Pechtelier. If you look squarely at the Mediterranean problem, it does not look favorable for the French. If there should be an American C-in-C South, the British will have the Allied Naval Command except for US Fast Striking Force. In reality the British will have nothing but their own fleet. But what will the French have? *What the U.S. has then, of course.*

General Gruenther in discussing the French situation, also said that it is very difficult to inform the public about command. Only one out of a 100 might understand it, and of the newspaper men, one out of 5 can understand it.

General Gruenther pointed out that in the development of SHAPE national politics play a very large part, because the governments must make up budgets for SHAPE. The French, for example, allotted very large forces to SHAPE but provided no budget for them. Furthermore, France is a nation with a 500 to 600 billion franc debt and the big question is "who is going to pay?" *Monsieur Plevin has to fight hard and often.

General Gruenther then talked about the reactions of the DeGaullist's and some Leftist' to the appointment of Gen Juin, for example. In the National Assembly for March 21, 3rd Session (assembly records pages 2408 - 2411), the whole problem of France's place in the SHAPE command was the subject of a serious debate and also an attack from both the Left and DeGaullist Groups. The DeGaullists position is that Gen Juin is not given sufficient power and responsibility to match the French contributions and effort in the defense of Western Europe.

This reminds me of Gen. Eisenhower's remark to the S.G. meeting 5 Jan 1951 (we must) have an eye for solvency, because if countries become insolvent, (they would be) ^{they} defaulting themselves and would fall an easy prey to communism. R.L.

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(Note: Gen Gruenther's command structure file has all these papers including a memorandum from Col Biddle dated March 29).

In conclusion Gen Gruenther said that in command development no theoretical approach is possible. The work comes by conference, by debate and compromise. If the commitments made at any one time get out of line it is necessary to balance them, but in the very effort of balancing - other people's feelings get hurt.

He said further that the job of Allied historian, i.e. SHAPE historian, would be a difficult one because it would be necessary to understand the British views, the French views and others, as well as the US views which the historian most often comes up against.

PERSONAL NOTE :

In explaining the command structure General Gruenther talked like a college professor with a basic understanding of historical problems. His orientation here pulled together the work in back-ground which I had been doing during the week and brought it right down to date. He talked seated at his desk with frequent reference to the large maps on the wall at his left. I was called in quickly without having a chance to get my prepared questions, but his survey covered most of what I had intended to ask. I could not take notes, but I wrote down a series of notes right after the conference, and dictated from them the next morning.

ROY LAMSON, Jr
Lt-Col. Inf.
Historian

*Jelly good !
R.*

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TRANSCRIPT OF MINUTES OF PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY GENERAL
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, 1500 HOURS, 2 APRIL 1951

GENERAL LANHAM: Ladies and Gentlemen, let me have your attention a moment, please. We seem to have a great many people here today. We are very happy to see it. We have been hoping that we would have a press conference by the Supreme Commander for some time. As you know, he has been enormously busy and this is the first true occasion he has had to hold such a meeting. Now, I would like to tell you one or two things in order to make sure that there is a meeting of the minds as to how we are to hold this conference. In the first place, we would be most grateful to you if everyone would remain just where they are until the Supreme Commander has left the room. We hope no one will leave during the meeting. The Supreme Commander will make a statement in his own inimitable fashion and following that there will be a brief period for questions. We hope you will have your questions prepared, and that there will not be too many of them because his time is very limited. If there is any difficulty with language as far as your question is concerned, you may give it in English or in French or in Italian. We have here three young gentlemen who can handle most of these languages. They will translate for the Supreme Commander, if necessary. We would be very grateful to you if, when you have a question to ask, if you would rise, give your name and your paper or the company that you represent---that's for the record, so that you may be identified, and so the Supreme Commander will know to whom he is speaking, and also so he can recognize the person concerned. On the way out there will be a table set up here with certain announcements on it; One will be in both French and English; the other, which is a short announcement that the Supreme Commander himself will probably make, is in English. They will be available to everyone as you walk out, and we hope you will avail yourself of that. Once more, then, I would like to ask all of you to please remain where you are until General Eisenhower has left the room and we will be very grateful to you.

Would you tell the General we are ready? In the meantime, are there any questions? Good.

Ladies and gentlemen, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

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Press conference, General Eisenhower, 1500 hours, 2 April 1951-2

GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER:

Sit down, please.

I apologize, ladies and gentlemen, for a seeming plethora of red tape and formality about such a meeting as this. I expect you people to be my friends and I hope to be yours. We are certainly here on a common enterprise in which you have as much at stake as anybody else does. So, therefore, if we are not trying to work together, we are certainly making a very, very serious error, both in understanding and in practice. Now I have not the advantage that a commander usually has when he is handling operations in the field, of coming to you with some long record of a success and victory, or operations in which I can get up and make myself look good by a very long tale of how deeply responsible I was for all these nice things. Here we are talking about a job of work, it's serious work, hard work, and the only reason for my being before you today is this: this morning, at one minute after midnight, it was decided that I should take over formally and officially the responsibility of command in SHAPE---a responsibility that had been given me some weeks ago by action of the Brussels Convention and confirmed later by my own government and other governments of NATO, for command of the forces for the defense of Europe, Western Europe. Now, there has been published from time to time an outline of the command structure, an outline of the people and the principal figures that are taking over the job and so there is very little use of taking your time today in going over each of those individuals in turn. [It is enough to say that each of them on there has been selected after personal interview with myself. [They are most of them old associates of the war; they are men in whom I have the greatest confidence, and we are gradually evolving a team that I think is completely capable of discharging the responsibilities given them by our separate governments.] Those responsibilities, let me repeat over and over again, are to develop a mechanism that can preserve peace, that can make it possible for free countries to develop themselves in their social and political objectives for the betterment of all people living in those countries. As I understand it, the organization serves no class, no special purpose and no particular nation. In this Headquarters, there are representatives of all NATO nations--I believe there are exceptions to that---I believe Portugal and Iceland have no representatives with us---but here

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Press conference, General Eisenhower, 1500 hours, 2 April 1951-3

we meet and study problems of this common security together so that the particular traditions or ideas developed by Americans are tested against the ideas developed by Frenchmen, and theirs, in turn, against the ideas developed by Englishmen and members of the U.K. All the way, so, around the clock: Belgium, Holland, Norway, Italy--all of us together, in the effort to develop a composite program that will meet the requirements of overall security and peace. As of today there has been another man appointed to my headquarters. He has been made available by the French Government: Admiral Lemonnier, of the French Navy, will be my deputy, my Naval deputy, in this headquarters, to perform for me the functions that Air Marshal Saunders performs for me in the air, and so on. I am particularly delighted to get him. He is an officer, of course, of distinguished record. All of you of the French press will have known of him. I believe his latest assignment has been head of the National War College here in France. He will certainly never allow this particular headquarters to forget the interests of France in all the surrounding waters, including that of the Mediterranean.

I am moved to say just one thing about my own particular idea of these command positions. I think we too often see them spoken of in the press, and among ourselves, as evidence of the alleged importance, prestige or strength of a particular nation. To my mind, the willingness of any government to turn over one of its officers for a command position is rather evidence of its readiness to undertake very grave responsibilities, very great burdens. I see nothing particularly to be classified as a kudos in a war in the giving of a command position in an allied or coalition form of organization to any particular person of any particular nationality. I assure you, ladies and gentlemen, I am of some experience in these coalition commands, and they are accompanied by a great many more headaches than is the ordinary one to which soldiers become accustomed. In these commands people have to reach an accommodation of idea. The soldier does not put on a number of stars in order to insist upon the validity of his decisions and ideas. That kind of authority is valid only so long as he is commanding his own service in his own nation, when disobedience means court-martial. Here, disobedience would mean an argument and it is our purpose to make sure they do not occur.

Press conference, General Eisenhower, 1500 hours, 2 April 1951-4

Now, I think I have talked long enough on these two incidents -- of the assumption of command and appointment of a naval deputy. You have given me a chance to say "Hello" to you, to express the hope that we will be friends and now, for such time as I have, if I can answer any questions that may occur to you, I will certainly try.

QUESTION #1 by Mr. David Schoenbrun, CBS:

You said at one minute after midnight this morning you took over command of SHAPE. Does that mean that SHAPE became operational at one minute after midnight this morning?

GENERAL EISENHOWER: I should think that as an official thing, that is, you should state that to be true. Of course, we have been functioning here for some weeks and I don't know if there is any more validity to the instructions issued this morning than yesterday morning; but, actually and officially, we became operational this morning.

QUESTION #2 by Henri Sandberg (VRIJ NEDERLAND and HET VRIJE VOLK), Dutch newspaper:

I saw in the paper this morning that Mr. Wilson, I think, said that Western Defense now was ready to beat back an attack, I think, now with atom bombs. Do you agree?

GENERAL EISENHOWER: I couldn't quite understand the question. We were ready to what.....?

SANDBERG: We were ready to beat an eventual attack, atomic attack.

GENERAL EISENHOWER: Well, I don't know what Mr. Wilson would be saying about the atom bomb, for this reason: Mr. Wilson is in charge of production in our industrial country ---overall/production; but he is not the head of our Atomic Energy Commission. Now, of course, all information in the atomic field, or largely all information, is of a secret character. I always avoid the word, because then anything that politicians or statesmen have to say, they have their own authority, and I am not treading on their toes. But I did see a statement of Mr. Wilson's that he was very happy with the manufacturing progress made in America, and that this enormous MDA program is really up to schedule and coming along well. He went on to urge that we don't let up and keep pushing hard in order to achieve full

Press conference, General Eisenhower, 1500 hours, 2 April 1954-5

success, but I did not see where he had anything to say about atom bombs, and certainly I would not have any comment on atom bombs, because that is not my function. As a matter of fact, that gives me a chance to straighten out one little thing taken out of context. Before some secret testimony I gave some weeks ago before a committee of Congress was a statement that was interpreted to mean that I envisioned some great battleground someday in the Brest Peninsula. I assure you that I didn't come here to go back to the Brest Peninsula. I was using that merely as an illustration of a question asked me in secret session, and I assure you there is no such idea in my head and never was, nor in that of my staff.

QUESTION #3 by Mr. Walter Kerr, New York Herald Tribune:

General Eisenhower, Walter Kerr, New York Herald Tribune: I would like to know what actually happened at one minute after midnight this morning. Does that mean you are now in charge of command of the troops to be at your disposal in Germany?

GENERAL EISENHOWER: You know, sometimes I think, Mr. Kerr, that nothing happened except in conformity to tradition. Whenever a commander shows up, it is in the papers that he has come to take a job. Everyone knows what the job is. He is there, and you would assume he would go to work, but commanders are always obliged to issue an order, and that order says, "I have hereby assumed command of such-and-such troops in such-and-such areas." I don't know whether that makes it more legal or not, but that's all it is. I'm not a lawyer; so I don't know.

QUESTION #4 by Mr. Joseph Kingsbury-Smith, INS:

In connection with the production aspect, if the European troops allocated to your command arrive on time, do you think the production plans under way at present in Europe will be sufficient to equip them with necessary weapons?

GENERAL EISENHOWER: Well, I think the production plans in Europe of the overall NATO organization, in the United States, and in Europe, are calculated to make certain that the troops raised in any quarter in any nation will be properly equipped as they ought to be, and if that is not true, there has been no instance of miscalculation brought to my attention.

QUESTION # 5 by Edward Morrow of the New York Times:

What has held up the decision on the Southern command? Why is there no announcement there?

GENERAL EISENHOWER: Well, it's a bit embarrassing, although I am certain my

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Press conference, General Eisenhower, 1500 hours, 2 April 1956

questioner did not intend it to be. But there are involved along the borders of such a command as I have, the need for governments to straighten out a lot of issues that take care of every nation's interest in these border areas. It is easy for me, as the commander here, to take care of organization within the internal parts of my theater, because I don't butt up against anybody else; but when I get on the borders I would rather wait with my own arrangements until the top politicians, statesmen and governments have made basic decisions. Frankly, I am awaiting basic decisions that apply to areas outside my own area, but which because they adjoin have some influence, and that's all there is to that.

#6

QUESTION/by Mr. Tokar, of Cumhuriyet (translated "Republic"-name of newspaper), Istanbul - through interpreter:

What does the General think of the defense of the Eastern Mediterranean and what does he think concerning the participation of Greece and Turkey in the Atlantic organization?

GENERAL EISENHOWER: Will you understand English if I speak slowly?

MR. TOKAR: Yes, if you speak slowly.

(Laughing on part of members of press)

GENERAL EISENHOWER: If I don't, I give you permission to stand up and stop me. You would not want me to trespass into the political aspects of this problem; that is not my function, and I hope that I can be a true enough representative of the Western Free Powers so that I will stay always in the proper functions and position and attitude of a soldier and will not appear to be a political leader or a governmental statesman. Now, the mission given me has nothing to do with the defense of the Mid-East. The mission given me involves for the moment the defense of the nations that make up NATO, and specifically in this Western European area of the NATO missions. As a soldier, I can say to you that anyone can see that the defense of any portion of the area of the Mediterranean has an influence on the defense of all other portions. Once it is penetrated and a part of it falls to anyone inimical or hostile to us, it becomes a very serious matter for everybody else along that sea coast; so you can say this: I look with the greatest concern toward those nations, but as of this moment they are entirely outside my area. As a soldier I think I can also say that I

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Press conference, General Eisenhower, 1300 hours, 2 April 1951-7

have tremendously admired the way the Greeks stood up to their problems of the past couple of years, what they have done. I have had the most pleasant relations with many members of the Turkish staff in the past. I certainly hope to count them my personal friends, even if for the moment I cannot call them my official friends.

GENERAL LANHAM: General, may I remind you we have photographers waiting.

QUESTION #7 by Mr. Lionel Shapiro, North American Newspaper Alliance:

As of one minute after midnight, did the American, French and British divisions in Germany come under your direct command?

GENERAL EISENHOWER: Yes, under my operational command.

I move to ask why is it the Americans are so curious and ask me so many questions, and only one of some other nation represented here.

QUESTION #8 by Mr. Harvey Hudson, Associated Press:

We have heard the NATO organization was suggesting a move to Paris from London, and that you were not in favor of it, and it has finally been dropped. Can you tell us why you thought it was better for them to stay in London?

GENERAL EISENHOWER: Well, I don't know how much of all of these things have been made public or should be made public. Actually, I have insisted from the beginning that in such things my decisions or my opinions should not be decisive. I, as a soldier, can give my recommendations, as I did, to my superiors, and, while I don't want to appear coy or evasive, but until I know that these things have been talked about or announced in public, I will not feel free to reveal what I recommended or why I did it. The second I am released from secrecy, I will be glad to answer through the PIO any questions you want to put to them; but I just don't know what the status is and therefore I think for the moment I had better keep still.

QUESTION #9 by Mr. Kingsbury-Smith of International News Service:

GENERAL GRUENTHER: Another Frenchman, there.

QUESTION: What effect would a further indefinite delay of Congressional approval of the American reinforcement contribution to the Atlantic Pact have on the effort of organized forces over here and especially to encourage the will to resist aggression?

GENERAL EISENHOWER: Well, of course, Mr. Smith, I cannot answer that thing specifically. The question is, how much effect will any further delay in this Congressional action in the United States have upon the spirit and the will to resist in Western Europe. I know this only, ladies and gentlemen: this problem

Press conference, General Eisenhower, 1500 hours, 2 April 1951-8

on which we have collectively embarked is specifically one of the heart, one of confidence. There is in Western Europe and the United States and in the free world sufficient force, sufficient power, and a sufficient array of resources to take care of ourselves and make sure we are not attacked as long as we are peaceable, don't become aggressive, and as long as we are animated by some basic desire for security toward a common purpose. If we will unify ourselves in a common understanding, this thing can be done, can be done promptly. So anything that seems to me to indicate a reluctance to get into this pool of cold water clear up to our necks is something that I deplore because I believe that we must all show one to the other, the United States to France, and France to Holland, and Holland to us, and so on, that we are ready to do our part to preserve freedom. I sometimes think, ladies and gentlemen, I repeat this thing ad nauseum, you must get weary of hearing me say it, but I believe it completely, if our hearts are in this thing, it can be done. So my concern about a favorable, speedy action in any parliament on these questions is to show their full readiness to cooperate. That is all.

QUESTION #10 by Lionel Durant, Paris Presse:

I don't believe you have made any comment officially on the French proposal to form a European army. Would you care to give us your idea of that and how it would fit in your command?

GENERAL EISENHOWER: Well, of course, any such army would be made up of people and on a voluntary basis; that would make them, with proper training and organization, a very, very acceptable part of my command. Make no mistake about that. It is a proposition that is without precedent, and if the project is to succeed, there is a very great deal of preliminary political and administrative work that must precede the actual formation and development of forces. That, as I understand it, is what meetings are proceeding about, the meetings between the countries of Europe that would form this force. If it can be done, I am all for it. Make no mistake about that. There has not been brought to me any responsibility for working out the details as to how it can be done. That is going on among governments themselves.

QUESTION #11 by Louis Deroche, Agence France Presse:

What is the position of Admiral Carney in your present naval set-up, sir?

GENERAL EISENHOWER: Well, Admiral Carney has been given to me as an American

Press conference, General Eisenhower, 1500 hours, 2 April 1951-9

commander, and he is part of the forces, I mean he commands part of the forces allotted and allocated to me for the defense of Western Europe. He is actually in command of an American force that operates, or is stationed, in Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean waters. As of this moment, his specific position in my headquarters has not been determined and announced, but he has been given to me by the American government and is subordinate to me in my command.

QUESTION #12 by Mr. Grunebaum, Le Populaire:

It has been said that conversations have actually been held between France and the United States over bases in Morocco. Is this question only to the diplomatic point, or are you already interested in that?

GENERAL EISENHOWER: You mean, am I interested in Morocco as an area?

MR. GRUNEBAUM: Yes.

GENERAL EISENHOWER: Well, as I understand, these conversations have gone forward about the permanency of certain bases, the establishment of certain bases down there; to that extent, of course, I am concerned in the area. But Morocco, all of North Africa, as far as I am concerned, is just like the rest of France. The safety of each national territory, that is, administratively, is a job for the nation concerned. I don't have to bother myself about it. My job is providing the umbrella that protects them all. Each is responsible for the safety of the administrative functions within their own national territories, and so far as I am concerned that is France's responsibility as of this moment.

Ladies and gentlemen, they tell me, as usual, there are a bunch of photographers waiting to get in. Maybe they want to take your pictures, I don't know. But, in any event, I guess we had better be drawing this thing to a close and, now I will take one more question from someone and do my best with it before I face these photographers.

QUESTION #13 by Mr. Kingsbury-Smith, International News Service:

General Eisenhower, this question is probably hard to answer in a way, because it revolves on the political aspects, too. In a way, your plans must be long term. The Rose Palais conference may make political decisions. How would they affect you? How would they affect the long-term plans of SHAPE?

GENERAL EISENHOWER: Well, of course, it is possible for governments, the governments that I serve, twelve of them, to decide to do something other than they

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Press conference, General Eisenhower, 1500 hours, 2 April 1951-10

have already solemnly agreed among themselves they will do, but so far as I can see there is no possible political decision that would stand in the way of this one basic fact: the right of the free world to defend itself and to live freely: now that is all we are trying to do as I understand it. I assure you, if there was any possible aggressive idea in my head, if I were part of any nation's determination to extend its influence or its prestige, and that were all there were to it, I would not be here. I am not concerned. I am merely concerned in trying to help free peoples protect themselves and I cannot see any possibility of a political decision ever getting in the way of that.

To those who follow my particular brand of American English with some difficulty, I assure you again that at our next meeting, if I begin to go too rapidly, any one of you has a right to stand up and say "lentement," that's one word I remember. You may do it, and I will take it with great good will, because in the warmth of my beliefs, I realize that I sometimes get very rapid in my speech, but I assure you that so far as I am concerned, it means nothing but sincerity of purpose. I hope I will see you often and now, with your permission, I will face the photographers.

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COSMIC TOP SECRET

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF
PLANS, POLICY AND OPERATIONS DIVISION

Copy 2 of 3

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9/6/55

WFO 2553

Col. Shell/rdk/4195

1 October 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE CHIEF OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Command in the Mediterranean and the Middle East

REFERENCE: a. SC 83/4 (Brief to C/S 21 September 1951, Tab "A")
b. SHAPTO 25, dated 5 May 1951, establishment of European Southern Command
c. DOSHAP 33, dated 14 June 1951, Standing Group action on reference b.

h

1. After prolonged controversy and compromise in the Standing Group, as well as high governmental levels, a command plan for the Middle East and Mediterranean, to include Greece and Turkey, has been worked out by the Standing Group (reference a.) and submitted to National Chiefs of Staff for information and comment. The principles upon which the plan is based are set forth at Tab "B", and diagram at Tab "C".

2. Admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO opened the way to establish the Middle East Command, the concept of which is acceptable to the U.S., U.K., and France. However, acceptance by the French is contingent upon their demand for a principal area command in the Western Mediterranean. The French, U.K., U.S. and Standing Group positions are as follows:

a. French Requirement:- A Naval Command in the Western Mediterranean be given to a French Admiral with parallel privileges to those of the neighboring command zones with reservation of functional privileges reserved to Admiral Carney.

(It is not clear at this time, precisely what is the French requirement. In any event, there appears to be no military ground upon which to base this demand owing to the lack of French Naval Forces.)

b. U.K. Position:- Any French Naval Command so established shall have equal responsibilities to the British Naval Commander in the Eastern Mediterranean in matters pertaining to his lines of communication to the Westward.

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1 October 1951

(This would appear to be unsound on the basis that it establishes French responsibility in two directions, to CinC South and to the British Naval Commander, and thereby recognizes a third Naval Command).

c. U.S. Position

(1) There should only be two principal Allied Naval Commands in the Mediterranean, one subordinate to SACMUR and the other subordinate to SACMEX, each primarily responsible for support of his respective Supreme Commander.

(2) That all naval activities in the Mediterranean, except coastal activities, be within and subordinate to either of these two Naval Commands.

(3) That all Naval Operations in the Mediterranean be conducted by these two Commands and in those areas and tasks where responsibilities overlap, the necessary coordination of plans and operations be worked out by them or their delegated subordinates.

(4) In view of paragraph 7 of reference b. (Tab "D") it is appropriate to recognize French and Italian Naval responsibilities in the Western Mediterranean with the understanding that these Commands will be within the Naval Command structure for CinC Southern Europe for overall command and coordination, and for assignment of tasks along either area of functional lines as necessary for the accomplishment of the primary mission of support of SACMUR's Southern Flank.

d. Standing Group proposal.

(1) The Standing Group agrees that the Naval Command in the area of the Western Mediterranean situated West of Sardinia should be exercised by a French Admiral.

(2) This Command will be within the Naval Command of SHAPE's CinC Southern Europe. The latter will retain and exercise in this area such functional responsibilities as may be necessary for the accomplishment of his missions. Overall command will be exercised by the Naval Commander under CinC Southern Europe.

(3) Subject to the foregoing, the terms of reference of the French Naval Commander will be in harmony with those of the Commanders of adjacent areas.

(This concept was agreed by the Standing Group members as being reasonably within the concept of SHAPFO 25 and to recognize the French requirements for an area command. However, it was not acceptable to France).

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3. In reference b. SACEUR made certain proposals with respect to Command arrangements in Southern Europe. In paragraph 7 of reference the responsibilities of the French and Italian Naval Commanders are outlined as follows:

"7. The French interest in effective lines of communication between European France and North Africa dictates that definite off shore responsibilities in this regard be assigned to a French Admiral with forces allocated by the French Government. Similarly Italian interest in the Adriatic and the sea approaches to Italy make it important that an Italian Admiral have specific responsibilities and command forces allocated by the Italian Government. Both forces, must, however, be available to support the defense of Southern Europe. Operational features will be coordinated with the French and Italian Authorities concerned by the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces, Southern Europe. This arrangement will be subject of course to adjustment in the light of decisions taken when an overall system of command, for the Mediterranean, is established."

The Standing Group approved the above (reference c. Tab "E") with the specific provision that CinC Southern Europe would be responsible in the Mediterranean for protection of the sea communications to SACEUR's Southern flank.

4. In view of the foregoing SACEUR's position regarding the French position should be based upon the following principles:

- a. A Southern European Command Organization based upon sound military principles in order to ensure efficient functioning of that Command and provide for the required freedom of action in the conduct of operations. Command channels must be clear of political ties.
- b. Recognition of French interest but on sound military grounds in order not to become involved with similar problems from other countries, Italy and Greece for example.

5. In keeping with the above principles the major responsibilities and functions of the Southern Command (Tab "F") as well as the following factors should be borne in mind in resolving the command relationship problems presented by the French proposal.

a. The Southern Command is now organized along functional lines namely Air, Navy and Land Forces.

b. In time of war CinC South would have the following four principal subordinate commands: (1) Allied Land Forces, (2) Allied Air Forces, (3) Allied Naval Forces, (4) Allied Forces, Greece (when entry Greece to NATO finalized). The addition of a separate Naval area command

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with the Commander reporting directly to CinC South would; create a "bastard" organization to satisfy political requirements; increase the problems of coordination within the command and with adjacent commands; and place an additional unwarranted burden on the present Southern Command combined headquarters, probably create demands for other separate area commands reporting directly to CinC South.

c. The problems of split responsibility based on the U.K. position in paragraph 2 b. above which will be involved if a principal area command in Western Mediterranean is established under CinC South.

d. The Allied Naval Forces in the Mediterranean will be comprised of the Italian Navy, French Naval Forces as allocated, Greek Navy and the U.S. 6th Fleet. The major build-up in these forces will be principally U.S.

6. From a military point of view the specific command relations involved should be related to the above factors. In this light the following solution is obvious:

a. Recognizing that the logical Naval organization for Southern Europe under CinC South, in his capacity as ComNAV South, establish three area commands and a Naval Striking Force under the Commander Allied Naval Forces, Southern Europe as follows:

- (1) An area in the Western Mediterranean (West of Sardinia) under a French Admiral.
- (2) A Sea Frontier around Italy under an Italian Admiral.
- (3) A Sea Frontier around Greece under a Greek Admiral (when Greece comes into NATO).
- (4) Naval Striking Force (to include U.S. 6th Fleet and other Allied Naval Forces as assigned) under a U.S. Admiral.


Under the above concept the Headquarters, Naval Forces Southern Europe, will be the principal planning, operating and logistic coordination headquarters responsible to work with the British CINCEM.

At present this headquarters is now a separate staff under Admiral Carney who wears two hats. In time of war, it might be necessary to appoint a separate Naval Commander.

b. Since it appears that only political issues are involved in this instance and these should be avoided, it is suggested that the solution may be made more acceptable to the French by:

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- (1) Appointing a French Admiral to Admiral Carroy as an "Assistant" to him as ComNAV South.
- (2) According proper public relations build-up and announcement to the appointment of the French Admiral who is area commander and to the assistant on the Staff.

P. L. BODET
Major General, French Air Force
Asst. CofS. PFO

Encls:

1. Tab "A" - Memo for C/S PFO G210 GR/TU
2. Tab "B" - Principles upon which to base command in Med. & Middle East.
3. Tab "C" - Diagram
4. Tab "D" - Message SH 20422 - SHAPTO 25 (w/original only)
5. Tab "E" - Message DEF 94013 - TOSHAP 33 (w/original only)
6. Tab "F" - Principal Responsibilities & Functions of the Southern Command.
7. Tab "G" - Agreement with French Relative to Naval Command Arrangements in Western Mediterranean.

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE
Paris, France

*Mr. Gonthier
(Later)*

AG 2408 SEC

10 October 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STAFF:

*— C.W. — I wonder !!
E*

HISTORY OF NEW HEADQUARTERS BUILDING, SHAPE

1. The SHAPE buildings at Marly, which provide offices for SACEUR's Staff and housing facilities for some support troops, fulfill the wish of General Eisenhower to have an integrated international staff installed adjacent to, but not in, a major city. Plans for a series of one-story buildings, located about 15 miles (24 kilometers) west of Paris on a 67-acre (27-hectare) plot made available by the President of France, were approved on 27 February 1951. Ground was broken on 12 March, and the headquarters turned over to General Eisenhower by President Auriol of France at a ceremony at the headquarters on 23 July 1951.

2. The attached historical and statistical account to 23 July 1951, prepared in the Headquarters Command by Lt. Colonel Charles E. Kabrich, U.S. Army, is circulated for the information of the SHAPE staff and that of Subordinate Commands. Colonel Kabrich and the SHAPE historian would appreciate comments, corrections, and additional information, which may be addressed to the Secretariat, attention Lt. Colonel Roy Lamson, Jr., Historian, Rm 6A5, Extension 4504.

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

1 Encl
Hist of Hqs

Robert L. Wood
ROBERT L. WOOD
Colonel, U.S. Army
Secretary

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"A" and "B"

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HISTORY

OF

NEW HEADQUARTERS BUILDINGS

FOR

SHAPE

TO 23 JULY 1951

Prepared by Lt. Col. Charles E. Kabrich, U.S. Army

I

A. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE HEADQUARTERS.

1. Requirements.

The size of the Headquarters was initially envisioned as 200 officers, 300 others, and approximately 1,800 supporting troops. It was estimated that approximately 100,000 sq. ft. of covered space would be required for office space and essential services.

2. Choice of Site.

The Supreme Commander designated France as the location of his Headquarters, and also stated that it was his desire that officers and others be accompanied by their dependents. This requirement plus the fact that Paris is the hub of signal communications in France made it mandatory that the Headquarters be located in the Paris Area. The excellent road and inter-urban railroad net west of Paris, and the numerous villas and small homes in the Versailles, St. Cloud, St. Germain areas made this area the ideal location from the Headquarters Commandant's viewpoint. The Chief Signal Officer concurred, since the Versailles cable terminals were considered advantageous for communications to the North and East. It was also determined that satisfactory buildings did not exist in this area. Therefore the Headquarters building would have to be constructed.

The French Minister of Defense concurred in this plan and locations and placed at the disposal of the Headquarters Commandant a group of officers from the Combined Staff to make the detailed reconnaissance. This team was also composed of personnel from the Domaine.

3. The plan was tentatively approved by the Chief of Staff on his arrival in Paris on 7 January 1951.

In all, five construction sites were considered and eliminated due to either the owner's objection or the difficulty in the construction of utilities. Negotiations with owners and engineer studies to determine the availability of water, sewage, and light were time consuming, and the final determination of the Site was not obtained until 20 February 1951.

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4. Concurrent with the reconnaissance for a Site, the Foreign Building Office of the American Embassy was assisting the Headquarters Commandant by preparing building plans. Time did not permit models to be made, but mass plans were prepared for each site considered. Therefore, when the final choice of site was made, it was relatively easy to prepare the detailed drawings. Six days after the final selection of the site was made, the Foreign Buildings Office turned over to the French Army Engineers detailed plans.

The building was planned for rapid construction. Therefore details had to specify materials that were most readily available.

a. Contractor

(1) Five companies pooled their resources and set up a pilot form of organization to construct the project. These were:

Genie Civil et Batiment - Pilot
Societe Dumes
Etablissements J. Zell
Societe Bureau Beroit et Cie
Enterprise Magnard

5. Methods of Contracts.

a. The contract for the project was a standard French Government contract which was handled by the French Army Engineers. Several contractors who were known to have capable organizations were invited to submit sealed bids to the Direction du Genie de Versailles. These bids were opened, tabulated, analyzed and submitted to the Chief of Engineers, French Army, who made final decision as to the acceptable bid. Thence the contract was processed through the Ministry of Defense for final approval.

b. Inspection of the work was carried out by a chief of the works and several subordinate officers placed on the job by the French Army Engineers. Capt Brunelli and Lt Michelet, French Army Engineers, were constantly on the job.

c. SHAPE appointed a liaison officer, Lt Col Charles E. Kabrich, U.S. Army, to work between headquarters and the French Army Engineers. This arrangement set up one officer through whom change orders were handled. The Liaison Officer worked under the SHAPE Headquarters Commandant, Col Robert Q. Brown, U.S. Army.

6. Problems.

a. Requirements and changes in requirements. The building was planned during the formative stage of the Headquarters. Therefore, the Headquarters Commandant did not have the advice and assistance of the Division Chiefs in designing their own space. Under such conditions changes during construction to please the expanding divisions were inevitable. In addition to these changes, new Staff divisions were added which also required major modifications.

b. Terrain.

(1) The site has an average elevation of about 175 meters (575 feet) above m.s.l. and consists of 27 hectares (67 acres), most of which was under cultivation when construction was started.

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Etablissements J. Zell
Societe Bureau Beroit et Cie
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- (2) The upper 45 cm (18 inches) of soil is very active and retained an excessive amount of water during March and April making excavation work very difficult.
- (3) Fortunately, it was possible to obtain stable foundations at depths of 60 to 90 cm (2 to 3 ft) in practically every instance.

c. Weather.

- (1) The spring of 1951 was extremely wet during the first two months of construction. There were approximately 45 days of rainfall which made a virtual quagmire of the area. Rainfall was estimated at 319.87 mm (12.60 inches) during the construction period.

d. Engineering and Construction.

- (1) Materials were available in sufficient quantities during the construction period. However, a scarcity of sand and gravel was being experienced in the Paris area toward the end of the job.
- (2) Labor, in general, was adequate except for some highly skilled workmen. Transportation and housing in the area made it difficult to procure skilled labor in some instances. Workmen held steadily to the job and no local strikes were experienced. The nineteen-day transportation strike in March had some effect on the project, but was not sufficient to create any material delay in the work.

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II

MAJOR FACILITIES OF SHAPE

As of 23 July 1951^a

- 9 Office Wings
- 1 Cafeteria
- 1 Officer's Mess
- 3 Women's Barracks
- 4 Men's Barracks
- 1 French Mess
- 1 British Mess
- 1 American Mess
- 1 Police Barracks
- 1 B.O.Q.
- 2 Boiler and Transformer Houses
- 1 Pumping Station for Sewage & Water
- 1 Signal Building
- 2 Gate Houses

Since the preparation of this account the first three wings on the north side have been extended for offices and the SHAPE library and additions have been made to the Officers' Mess Hall and the Cafeteria. A future report will deal with these additions and SHAPE Support Camp at Veluseau.

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Aerial view of SHAPE HQ Rocquencourt

APPENDIX
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Remarks by M. Vincent Auriol, President of the French Republic, on the Occasion of the Official Opening of SHAPE Headquarters at Marly, 23 July 1951.

(TRANSLATION)

Paroles de Monsieur Vincent Auriol, Président de la République Française, à l'Occasion de l'Inauguration Officielle de l'Etat-Major du SHAPE à Marly, le 23 Juillet 1951.

Mon cher Général,

Au nom du Gouvernement de la République Française, je vous remets ce terrain désormais doublement historique de Marly-Louveciennes où s'édifient les bureaux, les établissements de l'Etat-Major Général Interallié du Pacte Nord-Atlantique. C'est ici que s'établiront les bases de la sécurité collective régionale dans le cadre et l'esprit de la charte des Nations-Unies et la France est heureuse de vous recevoir. C'est un symbole émouvant que de voir que c'est sur son sol deux fois envahi, deux fois ravagé et pillé, que repose la sécurité collective alors qu'elle avait tellement souffert au début de chacune des deux guerres de la solitude. Et cette leçon elle l'a retenue; c'est ainsi qu'elle avait adhéré à la Charte des Nations-Unies qui établissait l'union entre les peuples libres du Monde, fidèles à l'indépendance nationale, à la liberté humaine, à la paix. C'est ainsi qu'aujourd'hui la sécurité collective que l'O.N.U. avait voulu établir dans son ensemble n'ayant pas abouti, elle salue la sécurité régionale dont elle est heureuse que ce soit vous, mon Général, qui en ayez tout à la fois la direction et la haute responsabilité. Je veux aujourd'hui envoyer dès maintenant une pensée émue à la mémoire d'un homme qui avait espéré aussi en cette sécurité et que la mort nous a enlevé soudainement, l'Amiral Sheerman. Je tiens à assurer la Marine des E.U. et vous-même et la Nation américaine de toute notre sympathie. Et par ailleurs, je veux vous dire que Monsieur le Ministre de la Défense Nationale qui est à mes côtés m'affirmait tout à l'heure sous sa responsabilité directe qu'à la fin de l'année, la France tenant ses engagements, mettrait à votre disposition les 10 divisions promises pour décembre 51, soit 5 divisions sur pied de guerre et 5 divisions sous l'ordre de mobilisation de trois jours. Et je regrette que vous n'ayez pu assister par suite de votre indisposition dont je suis heureux de vous voir rétabli, à la revue du 14 Juillet, car vous auriez pu voir en même temps que le redressement moral de notre peuple, la renaissance militaire de la France par l'exposition de toutes les armes nouvelles dues à nos généraux, à nos ingénieurs généraux, à nos ingénieurs, à nos ouvriers. Ainsi dans l'esprit qui est le vôtre nous voulons associer la sécurité collective sur des bases fermes nous voulons contribuer à la constitution de l'Europe et je saluai l'autre jour avec joie les nobles propos que vous avez tenus sur la nécessité d'une Europe Une au point de vue politique, économique, militaire. Ainsi nous voulons l'Europe libre, unie, donnant la main aux Etats-Unis et aux peuples libres d'Amérique, préparer la paix future qui est le plus cher de nos désirs et qui est dans le coeur de tous les peuples, la paix dans l'indépendance nationale, la paix dans la liberté et la dignité des hommes, la paix sans laquelle rien ne serait digne d'être vécu, si on n'avait pas en effet cette indépendance et cette liberté. Et c'est pourquoi nous nous don-

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nous tout à la fois à cet effort de paix et à cet effort de défense inséparable l'un de l'autre; c'est dans cet esprit, mon cher Général, que je vous ai remis ce terrain et que je forme des vœux pour vos travaux, pour vous, pour vos collaborateurs, pour le grand peuple que vous représentez, pour tous les peuples libres du monde, pour la paix.

TRANSLATION

My dear General,

In the name of the Government of the Republic of France, I hand over to you this ground, now doubly historic, of Marly-Louveciennes, where are being erected the offices and buildings of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers of the North Atlantic Pact. It is here that the foundations shall be laid for the collective security of those nations, within the framework and the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, and France is happy to be your host. It is a moving symbol to see that collective security now rests upon her soil, twice invaded, twice ravaged and pillaged, as she recalls how greatly she suffered from being alone at the beginning of those two wars. She has remembered that lesson, and that is why she has adhered to the Charter of the United Nations, which laid the basis of union among the free peoples of the world, faithful to national independence, to human liberty, and to peace. And that is why, today, when the collective security which the United Nations desired to establish throughout the world has not been achieved, France salutes this regional security, of which she is happy that it is you, General, who personify the leadership and the high responsibility.

I wish, on this day, to devote with deep emotion a thought to the memory of a man who had also placed his hopes in this security and whom death so suddenly took away from us - Admiral Sherman. I assure you that the United States Navy, yourself, and the American nation have our fullest sympathy. Moreover, I wish to tell you that the Minister of National Defense, who stands by my side, stated to me a moment ago under his direct responsibility that, by the end of the year, France, keeping her pledged word, would place at your disposal the ten divisions promised for December 1951, namely, five divisions on a war footing and five divisions subject to a three-day mobilization order. I regret that, because of your illness from which I am happy to see that you have recovered, you were unable to attend the military review of the 14th of July, for you would have seen, simultaneously with the upward surge of our people's patriotism, the military rebirth of France, expressed in the display of new weapons due to our generals, our engineers, and our workmen. In the spirit which is yours, we wish to establish collective security on firm foundations. We wish to contribute to the constitution of a Europe united politically, economically and militarily. We want Europe to be free, clasping hands with the United States and the other free peoples of the Americas. It is our wish to prepare that future peace which the dearest of our desires and which is in the heart of all peoples; peace in national independence, peace in the liberty and dignity of mankind, peace without which life would not be worth living - if it meant the loss of that independence and that liberty.

That is why we are devoting ourselves, at one and the same time, to this effort of peace and to this effort of defense, inseparable the one from the other. It is in that spirit, General, that I have handed over to you this ground and that I express my vows for your work, for yourself, for your colleagues, for the great people you represent, for all the free peoples of the world, and for peace.

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Remarks by General Eisenhower on the Occasion of the
Official Opening of the SHAPE Headquarters at Marly,
23 July 1951

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Mr. President, on behalf of the North Atlantic Treaty Nations, I thank you, your Minister of Defense, Mr. Moch, other governmental officials of France and all your people for providing this headquarters for the Allied Forces in Europe. Our special thanks to you, Sir, because of your unfailing personal cooperation and assistance, particularly in making available this beautiful spot in the Forest of Marly, for this headquarters.

In all history this is the first time that an Allied headquarters has been set up in peace to preserve the peace, and not to wage war. It is our prayer that with high courage, and with the support of our people, and the grace of God, we shall not fail in this purpose. We strive to lift from the hearts of men the fear of the cell block and the slave camp. We strive to establish a "Pax Atlantica" under which all men may push forward to new heights, to new levels of achievement. In a secure peace attained through strength is now the safety and security of the free nations. And now, Mr. President, I declare the Headquarters to be officially opened.

TRANSLATION

Réponse du Général Eisenhower à M. Vincent Auriol,
Président de la République Française, à l'occasion
de l'inauguration officielle du siège du Grand
Quartier Général des Puissances Alliées en Europe,
à Marly, le 23 Juillet 1951.

Monsieur le Président, au nom des nations signataires du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord, je vous remercie, vous-même, Monsieur le Ministre de la Défense Nationale (Monsieur Moch), les autres membres du Gouvernement Français, et votre peuple entier, d'avoir offert ce siège aux Forces Alliées en Europe. Tout spécialement à vous, Monsieur le Président, en reconnaissance de votre collaboration personnelle et de votre aide qui ne nous a jamais manqué, nous exprimons nos remerciements pour avoir mis à la disposition de notre Etat-Major ce beau site dans la Forêt de Marly.

C'est la première fois, dans toute l'histoire, qu'un Quartier Général Allié a été établi en temps de paix pour conserver la paix, et non pour la conduite d'une guerre. Nous émettons le vœu qu'avec grand courage, avec l'appui de nos peuples et l'aide de Dieu, nous ne faillirons pas dans notre tâche. Nous luttons pour enlever du cœur des hommes la peur de la cellule et du camp d'esclaves. Nous luttons pour établir une Pax Atlantica sous l'égide de laquelle l'humanité entière pourra s'élever à de nouvelles hauteurs, à des niveaux de civilisation jamais atteints. La tranquillité et la sécurité des nations libres reposent, désormais, dans une paix solide appuyée par la force.

A cette heure, Monsieur le Président, je déclare officiellement ouvert notre grand Quartier Général.

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SACEUR General Eisenhower and President of France Vincent Auriol
at the opening of SHAPE Headquarters, 23 July 1951

Evolution of the SHAPE Staff Structure, 1951-1962

This paper describes the organizational structure of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) during the 1950s, beginning with the original structure of 1951 and continuing with the major reorganization that took place in 1956 and remained in effect until 1962. All of the most senior positions – such as SACEUR and his Deputies – are shown, as are the heads of the various staff divisions.

Explanation of Symbols and Acronyms

The rank of each post is symbolized by the number of stars worn at that rank.

- ☆ Brigadier General, Commodore, Rear Admiral-Lower Half [U.S.]
- ☆ ☆ Major General, Rear Admiral
- ☆ ☆ ☆ Lieutenant General, Vice Admiral
- ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ General, Admiral
- ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ General of the Army, Field Marshal

The nation selected to fill a particular post at SHAPE is shown by its standard three-letter designation code. Nation codes used in this paper are as follows.

BEL	Belgium
CAN	Canada
DEU	Germany
DNK	Denmark
ESP	Spain
FRA	France
GRC	Greece
GBR	United Kingdom
ITA	Italy
NLD	Netherlands
NOR	Norway
POL	Poland
TUR	Turkey
USA	United States

Acronyms

The following acronyms are used in this paper, either in the text or on the charts.

ACE	Allied Command Europe
ACOS	Assistant Chief of Staff
ADP	Automated Data Processing
AIR DEF	Air Defence
BUDFIN	Budget and Finance
COS	Chief of Staff
DACOS	Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff
DCS	Deputy Chief of Staff
DSACEUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
INTEL	Intelligence
LOG	Logistics
LOG & ADMIN	Logistics and Administration
OPS	Operations
ORG & TRNG	Organisation and Training
PERS & ADMIN	Personnel and Administration
PLAN, POL & OPS	Plans, Policy and Operations
POL	Policy
PROG	Programmes
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SPEC OPS	Special Operations

The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of SHAPE or NATO.




Dr. Gregory Pedlow
SHAPE Historian

SHAPE Staff Organisation, 1951-1956

Key Features

- SACEUR had a total of three deputies: the DSACEUR (Field Marshal Montgomery), an Air Deputy, and a Naval Deputy.
- Deputy Chiefs of Staff (DCS) did not have responsibility for specific Assistant Chiefs of Staff (ACOS).




1 The first three Chiefs of Staff, Generals Gruenther, Schuyler and Moore, were assigned as Lieutenant Generals and served for a short portion of their terms in that grade before being promoted to 4-star rank.

Note: The post of Headquarters Commandant is not shown on this and the following chart because it was not a general officer post and its function lies outside the normal staff areas.


SHAPE Staff Organisation, 1956-1962

Key Features

- Deletion of the post of Air Deputy in 1956 because SACEUR was an Air Force officer.
- Unwillingness of France to fill the post of Naval Deputy after the death of Admiral Barjot in 1960. France had already begun withdrawing its naval forces from the NATO integrated military command structure in 1959.
- Creation of a third Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS) post through separation of Operations from Plans and Policy. Deputy Chiefs of Staff still did not have responsibility for specific Assistant Chiefs of Staff (ACOS), who reported directly to the Chief of Staff.
- What had already been a very large span of control for the Chief of Staff became even larger: now 9 Assistant Chiefs of Staff and two other flag officers reported to COS.
- Newest NATO member, Federal Republic of Germany (joined the Alliance in May 1955), received its first senior post at SHAPE - ACOS Logistics - in 1956. In response to a request for recognition of their increasing contribution to NATO, the Germans received a higher ranked post in 1959: the three-star position of DCS Plans & Policy. An Italian general then took over the post of ACS Logistics.



1 After Field Marshal Montgomery's retirement in 1958, the DSACEUR post was filled by a four-star officer.



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The Chairman,
The Standing Group,
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

2 April, 1952.

Dear Mr. Chairman,

One year ago today, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe assumed operational control of the forces dedicated to the defense of Western Europe. From that day onward, every member of this Headquarters has been dedicated personally to the cause of peace and security.

This anniversary provides a vantage point to review progress during the initial year of our joint enterprise, to take stock of our needs, and to present to member nations certain views that have developed in my Headquarters concerning our present security position. Though these observations reach beyond the purely geographical limits of this Command, we have found that no turbulence in the world scene fails to react directly on our common enterprise in Europe. The struggle against the threat of dictatorial aggression has no geographical bounds; it is all one.

It would be disastrous if the favorable signs and developments recorded in this report were to put any mind at ease, or to create a sense of adequate security, for there is no real security yet achieved in Europe; there is only a beginning.

Equally, it would be unfortunate if anyone were to find excuse for defeatism in the manifold difficulties and shortcomings of our joint effort to date. For we have made progress in all aspects of security. The momentum must be continued with renewed vigor, and since moral force is the genesis of all progress, especially progress toward security and peace, we must give primary attention to this vital element.

We are competing with an ideological force, Communism, which has joined with the imperialistic ambitions of a group controlling all life and resources found between the Elbe and the China Sea. Throughout this vast region, unity is achieved

by the simple techniques of the police state. In this concert of action and power lies great danger for any single nation exposed directly or indirectly to the unremitting, never-ending attacks of propaganda, subversion, force and the threat of force. If the free nations are to remain secure, our peoples must march together, agreed on common goals, and win that cooperative unity possible only in a free society.

We want peace. We want freedom, too, and the individual rights to which our whole civilization is dedicated. But to want these things is not enough. We can keep them only by work, selflessness, constancy, and sacrifice. The enormity of the present threat will never be met by halfhearted measures or by any superficial military parade. Required is the full awakening of the free world and the pursuit of energetic, far-reaching measures to insure our form of life—even our survival.

During the first fifty years of this century, the nations of the Atlantic Community have spent their strength and heritage in great conflicts which began in Europe and spread over much of the world's surface. As in all wars, a costly number of the natural leaders were killed. Destruction was widespread; public treasuries were emptied and family savings wiped out through inflation. Economic conditions inflicted such heavy punishment on the masses of citizens that social problems took on new and bitter prominence. In important areas of Africa and Asia, confidence in Western leadership was shaken.

As we look back over these developments, it seems almost as if the nations of the West have been, for decades, blindly enacting parts in a drama that could have been written by Lenin, prophet of militant Communistic expansion. This pattern of events, which points so surely to ultimate disaster, can be changed only if the peoples of the West have the wisdom to make a complete break with many things of the past and show a willingness to do something new and challenging. NATO itself is a significant step to meet both the present danger of aggression and the tragic struggles and dissensions that have divided our peoples in the past. But NATO's development is not automatic; action is the test.

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To advance this great effort, unified action is required, not only among but within our nations. Yet, it has seemed more than once within our countries that political factions hold their own immediate gain higher than the fate of their nation or even that of civilization itself. Then there are elements striving to hold back the hands of the clock, and apparently placing profits above patriotism. At the same time, there are workers in our member countries still suffering the delusion that their interests are served by association with Communist-led labor groups. It is nightmarish that any free worker of the West could respond voluntarily to the same Kremlin voices that have dictated the elimination of free labor unions in Russia and satellite countries. In the free system, labor is a full-fledged partner and must share in responsibility as equally as it must share in productivity. We can thrive mightily in an era of good feeling. It can be brought into being by vibrant, selfless leadership at all levels of society.

The unity of NATO must rest ultimately on one thing—the enlightened self-interest of each participating nation. The United States, for example, is furnishing much of the material resources of this project during the current year because it believes that America's enlightened self-interest is served thereby. Most American people agree as to the wisdom and necessity of this course. But they will continue to believe their own security interests are being served only as other participants show cooperation and enterprise in improving their own defenses.

Consequently, it would be fatuous for anyone to assume that the taxpayers of America will continue to pour money and resources into Europe unless encouraged by steady progress toward mutual cooperation and full effectiveness. To be sure, the citizens of all NATO countries are carrying heavy tax burdens, but even if these are at optimum levels, there still are many steps possible in Europe which would cost little and yet bring rich returns through increased strength.

Fundamentally, and on a long-term basis, each important geographical area must be defended primarily by the people of that region. The average citizen must therefore feel that he has

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a vital stake in the fight for freedom, not that he is a bystander or a pawn in a struggle for power.

There is so much talk of national and international arrangements and interests that basic issues are often obscured from view. Fundamentally, we are fighting the battle of individual freedom for all. Before all men and before the world, our policies must be such as to inspire confidence in our strength and determination, and trust in our fairness. This is the moral foundation without which any military effort, any expenditure in lives and treasure, is fruitless.

By our actions, too, we must demonstrate in convincing form that we are masters of our own destiny. Within the Atlantic Community and in Europe, we have the opportunity to build a bulwark of peace—a central position of unity and strength for the free world. This, then, must be a first and fundamental consideration.

SITUATION ONE YEAR AGO

On 21st February, 1951, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe was physically established in temporary facilities at the Astoria Hotel in Paris. This step followed a period of preparatory actions, including a personal survey trip touching the capitals of the twelve nations then participating in NATO. As early as October, 1950, I had been advised by the President of the United States that he might find it necessary to return me to an active duty status to assume an Allied Command in Europe. While this information was not definite or official, it was sufficient for me to begin a study of all aspects of the military situation then existing.

From all information presented, it was clear that the difficulties facing the new enterprise were manifold. Problems and the doubt they bred were on every side. It is common knowledge that peacetime conditions throughout history have been weak and notoriously inefficient. Sovereign nations have always found it difficult to discover common ground on which they

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could stand together for any length of time. Nevertheless, we were expecting NATO members not only to agree on common objectives but to work and sacrifice together, over an indefinite period, in order to achieve common security.

The United States, aided by other members of the United Nations, was already heavily engaged in combat operations in Korea which were taking a severe toll in manpower and military supplies. Moreover, strong voices could be heard in America, disputing the NATO concept of collective security and opposing further U.S. reinforcement of the European area. France was engaged against aggression in Indochina in a bitter struggle that absorbed a large portion of her regular military establishment. This campaign in Southeast Asia was already draining off a significant share of the money and resources that the French Government could allocate to military purposes, even though the United States was providing assistance in the form of aircraft, tanks, and heavy equipment. In Malaya, British forces, equivalent to more than two divisions, were engaged against guerrilla activities inspired by Communist agents.

There was serious question as to the state of public morale among the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They were living daily under the shadow of a powerful Soviet striking force, stationed in Eastern Germany and Poland, and possessing the obvious capability of overrunning much of Europe. It was extremely difficult for the average European to see any future in an attempt to build defensive forces which might offset this real and formidable threat. There seemed to be too much of a lead to be overtaken. The doubts of the European peoples gave birth to the false but glittering doctrine of neutralism, through which they hoped to preserve the things they had always held dear. Their fears were stimulated by ugly overtones of threat from Communist propaganda organs, and from traitorous outsiders already in their own midst. Beyond all this, the cumulative effects of repeated failure to make any headway in conferences with the Soviets produced an intellectual defeatism, in some quarters bordering upon despair.

These were only a few of the obvious obstacles in the road leading to the collective security of the still free world. For my

part, the effect of the negative factors was largely cancelled by a stern fact which denied reticulation: the job had to be done. For my own country as for every other nation joined in NATO, there was no acceptable alternative. Otherwise, nation after nation, beginning with the weaker and the more exposed, would be infiltrated, harassed, and browbeaten into submission. The threat of force is no less terrifying to the weak than force itself. Finally, as successive States were chipped away, Europe would indeed become indefensible. This key area would be doomed to regimented service for the advancement of Communist imperialism. With Europe would go its skilled and productive population, its industrial resources, and also its traditional influence and relationships with other parts of the world. The transfer of this strength from the assets of the free world into Soviet resources would be a fearful blow.

Modern civilization creates more and more interdependence among nations. This is obvious in the case of all those which cannot produce the necessary foodstuffs for their own existence. But consider the United States—more fortunate, perhaps, than any other nation in the abundance, variety, and accessibility of her resources. The basic index of American industrial power is steel production. Currently, the United States produces almost one-half of the world total and, through such industrial strength, has been able to assist in arming the free world with heavy military equipment. Yet General Collins, Chief of Staff, United States Army, has reported that each new medium tank requires:

1915 pounds of chromium of which 99 per cent of the ore is imported.

650 pounds of manganese of which 92 per cent is imported.

520 pounds of nickel of which 92 per cent is imported.

100 pounds of tin of which 73 per cent is imported.

6,512 pounds of bauxite (the ore of aluminum) of which 65 per cent is imported.

1,481 pounds of copper of which 29 per cent is imported.

The critical materials required in the production of a tank are needed not only for the weapons of defense but in the vast array of utensils, equipment, tools, and machines of modern life.

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These things have become essential to the full productivity and well-being of an industrial nation.

If the continued advance of the Iron Curtain could eventually damage the economic and therefore the political system of America, how much more critical was the position of practically every other nation exposed to the threat. Truly there could be no question on the part of any member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as to the overriding need for joint and vigorous defense action. Without it there was, in long-term sense, hope for none. For the continental nations, there was only the specter of a godless tyranny that would stamp out freedom with machine-like efficiency. The heritage of the past and the hope of the future would alike be hurled under a monolithic mass of totalitarianism. For Britain, there was the prospect of a new enemy across the Dover Cliffs, an enemy who could bring back the rockets, submarines, and bombardment on an intensive scale. For the United States and Canada, the future could promise ever-greater danger of attack, requiring endless sacrifices and defense costs which would ultimately break their economies.

With these thoughts and convictions, I joined the first members of our international staff then gathering in Paris. Though new to each other and speaking six different tongues, we were united to a man in this belief: there could be no peace and security for any of our peoples without unity in purpose and action throughout the Atlantic Community.

THE MILITARY PROBLEM

Beyond the Iron Curtain, deployed from the Arctic Ocean to the Adriatic Sea, the forces menacing the free world were formidable. Just beyond the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe lay thirty divisions with their supporting squadrons of aircraft. These were only a fraction of available Soviet strength; yet their employment was significant of the whole Communistic philosophy of force. While the Western Powers reduced their active forces to small occupation units which were concerning themselves with peacetime training, and becoming identified more and more

with the communities where they dwell, the numbers and the status of the soldiers of the Soviet had remained unchanged since shortly after the end of the war. They were still confined in sullen isolation within their barracks and compounds; they were still deployed and poised as for war.

Under duress, the satellite countries had been obliged to follow the policy of Soviet Russia. Their foreign masters had set them to work immediately to train for war and had merged their economy with that of Russia. By the beginning of 1951, these nations had been forced to produce, between them, a total of some sixty divisions, while their air forces were also under development. In Eastern Germany, in defiance of her obligations, Russia had organized a para-military force, the *Bereitschaften*.

Each side, the West and the East, possessed outposts beyond the frontiers of the other. Albania remained in the Soviet orbit, though isolated from it by the regained sovereignty of Yugoslavia. West Berlin and Vienna, with their devoted populations and garrisons of French, British and Americans, were still impervious to Soviet threats and blandishments alike. Apart from these exceptions, the Iron Curtain divided the continent into regimented and free Europe. East of it were 175 Soviet line divisions, one-third of which were either mechanized or armored, and an Air Force of 20,000 aircraft. The Navy at the same time stood at twenty cruisers and some 300 submarines. Behind all this was a vast, sprawling economy, still largely harnessed to war. Though inefficient by Western technical standards, Soviet industry had already demonstrated that it was producing atomic weapons.

Obviously, the problem of defending Western Europe was much greater than the mere tactical problem of how to counter the threat of the thirty divisions and their supporting air regiments which were displayed in the shopwindow set in the Iron Curtain itself. It was clear that these forces alone were strong enough to try, with a fair prospect of success, to thrust far into the weaker West. But the array of additional strength was indeed vast, even after subtracting the forces stationed in the Far East, or in and near the Caucasus, and those which the Soviet

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Government was bound to retain in disaffected areas within its own borders.

To know that the aggregate capacity of the West, actual and potential, was greater than that of the Soviets in all these respects, was some comfort. At the moment, however, in Western Europe there were fewer than fifteen NATO divisions adequately trained and equipped for war. National Service programs, existing in all European member countries, had trained, or partially trained, a reservoir of manpower since the end of the war. Unfortunately, equipment was inadequate to convert this pool into effective reserve divisions. In the air the situation was no better, perhaps worse. We had fewer than 1,000 operational aircraft available in all Western Europe, and many of these were of obsolescent types. From the naval viewpoint we were much better off, although a tremendous effort would be required to offset the threat of submarine attack on vital sea routes. Naval carrier strength, as represented by the U. S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, could help the over-all air picture to some extent by providing highly mobile air strength to a threatened area.

The greatest concentration of Western air and ground strength was in Germany. Organized within American, British and French zones, the forces were deployed for the purpose for which they were designed—occupation and police duties. Their deployment had no relationship to what would be suitable in resisting attack. Airfields were crowded up in the forward areas, in some cases East of the ground troops that must cover them. Supply lines for British and American forces, almost parallel to the front, ran to the North German ports of Hamburg and Bremerhaven, instead of rearward through France and the Low Countries. We know that before any division would be engaged more than forty-eight hours, it would require supply shipments of upwards to five hundred tons a day. For air units, the supply load was comparably heavy: the jet airplane burns more than a ton of fuel per hour. Obviously, a tremendous amount of depot and airfield construction would be required before our forces in this vital area were astride adequate communication routes.

To all these problems we now had to turn our minds. On

the one hand, there was the problem of how to persuade the nations of the free West to allocate afresh their resources in production and manpower, so as to build between themselves and the East the required shield. On the other hand was the strategic organization of the huge region, stretching from the Arctic Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea, which the forces of the West must defend. It is with the latter problem that I shall deal first.

Western Europe, from North Cape to Sicily, had to be surveyed as a whole. There is the main land mass, stretching from the Baltic to the Adriatic—a peninsula, when viewed in perspective, of that greatest of all land masses, which is Europe and Asia combined. On the flanks of this long peninsula we have two main outcrops—apart from the Iberian Peninsula and the British Isles. The one is Denmark, almost touching the tip of Scandinavia, whose Western half, Norway, is among our brotherhood of nations sworn to defend freedom. The Southern outcrop is Italy, projecting into the Mediterranean, and affording us a strong position for flanking forces with valuable air and sea bases.

We therefore conceived of Western Europe as an ultimate stronghold flanked by two defended regions: one comprising Denmark and Norway, and the other comprising Italy. All three of these countries are blessed by certain dispensations in the way of natural defensive advantages. Norway has its rugged coast and hinterland; Denmark its many internal water-obstacles; Italy her mountains with the narrow passes on the North and the Adriatic to the East. It seemed sound to divide the command of Western Europe into three main sectors: Norway and Denmark as the one buttress, Italy and adjacent waters as the other, and the central mass as the main structure.

Along these lines, the SHAPE command structure was fashioned. The bulk of ground and air strength would of necessity be in the center and a smaller number of land and air forces, together with naval support, would defend the Northern and Southern flanks. Accordingly, in the spring of 1951, there was announced the formation of a Northern Allied Command under Admiral Sir Patrick Brind, with Major General Robert Taylor

as his Air Commander, Lieutenant General Wilhelm Hansteen Commanding Allied Land Forces Norway, and Lieutenant General Ebbe Gørtz (later Lieutenant General Erik Möller) Commanding Allied Land Forces Denmark.

In the center, General Alphonse P. Juin was chosen to command Land Forces, with Lieutenant General Lauris Norstad in command of Air Forces. To insure the coordination of naval units operating in support of the center, Vice-Admiral Robert Jaujard was appointed, Flag Officer, Central Europe. These officers had the responsible duty of forging into single and redoubtable weapons the forces of the national contingents unified under their commands. There were to be units from France, Great Britain, the United States, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg. The air forces of the center were to be so developed and placed that they could operate with the Central Land Forces and also be able to undertake any needed action on the flanks with the least possible delay.

At the time of activation of the Central Headquarters, the organization for the command of the Southern flank was still not designated. Our immediate need was the protection of this flank with land and air forces and an effective naval force, including carrier-based aircraft. This need was intertwined with the problems of defense in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, which made for complexities that would take time to solve.

The solution to the military problem was no more than begun with the development of the command structure and the various headquarters. The big task of «forging the weapon» remained—that is, the recruiting, training, and equipping of the standing forces and reserves, and of providing their support in the war of airfields, signal communications, and supply lines. All these necessary elements in men and equipment, the North Atlantic Treaty nations were called upon to contribute to the common defense.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS

The organizational framework of SHAPE was virtually completed in June, when Admiral Robert B. Carney was appointed

to command Allied Forces Southern Europe. Under him, Lieutenant General M. L. de Castiglioni was named Commander Land Forces South, and Major General David Schlatter assumed command of Air Forces. Subsequently, two sea area commands were organized by Admiral Carney, one under Vice-Admiral Leon Sala, and the other under Vice-Admiral Massimo Ghosi.

Now, detailed planning could go forward in all sectors to measure ultimate defense requirements and to ensure efficient use, in an emergency, of forces already available. At SHAPE, planning was vigorously pursued by our international staff under the direction of General Alfred M. Gruenther. In this task, our officers profited greatly from previous work done by Field Marshal Montgomery and his associates in the Western Union Defense Organization and by the various Regional Planning Groups of NATO.

Very quickly after the establishment of the command structure we began to see definite improvement in the morale and readiness of troops. But first and foremost was the need for more forces. The United States and Great Britain alone possessed previously formed and disposable reserves, and they proceeded to deploy additional strength in Germany—four divisions from America and two from the United Kingdom. France already had the equivalent of four divisions in Germany. Air reinforcement, although sorely needed, had to await the accomplishment of major programs for air crew training, production of aircraft, and construction of additional airfields.

The timely strengthening of Allied Ground forces beyond the Rhine had a good effect on morale in Europe and on public confidence in the vitality of our joint effort. Yet the situation demanded far greater strength in being, not only in the center but on the vital flanks, North and South. This strength had to come largely from the continental Allies; they were on the ground and they had the manpower.

Building combat-worthy forces in Europe was certain to take considerable time. All seven of the continental members of SHAPE had been overrun in the war and occupied for long periods. Their military formations had been disbanded, and

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the supporting industrial and organizational network, essential to military establishments, had partially disintegrated. Actually, several of the countries had never possessed a modern military establishment. With these, everything had to be built from the ground up.

My personal efforts, therefore, and those of my Deputy, Field Marshal Montgomery, and members of the SHIAPE staff, were directed at the basic problem of getting more men under arms and under training in Europe. We made constant visits to military installations and to every capital, studying schedules and means for training and equipping field forces. Our aim was to insure a larger ready force and, additionally, to see a broader base established for the expanding programs for training and equipment planned for 1952 and subsequent years. The problem of greater forces could not be solved by mere extension of national military service in the various countries. There was an urgent need to enlist more career servicemen who could form the professional core for citizen levies and who would also fill the insuperable need for skilled leaders, specialists, pilots, and technicians. During his period of compulsory service, the European citizen gave his time to the nation, receiving a mere allowance as monthly pay. Improved pay scales and conditions of service were obviously needed to attract more men into the professional ranks.

Everywhere we turned, we ran into political and economic factors. One thing was clear: nothing would be gained and much lost through any substantial lowering of the already low standard of living in Europe. Our central problem was one of morale—the spirit of man. All human progress in the military or other fields has its source in the heart. No man will fight unless he feels he has something worth fighting for. Next, then, is the factor of the strength of the supporting economy. Unless the economy can safely carry the military establishment, whatever force of this nature a nation might create is worse than useless in a crisis. Since behind it there is nothing, it will only disintegrate.

In the general rehabilitation of European economy, the

Marshall Plan had achieved remarkable success in the years 1917-1950. The measure of its contribution to the well-being and stability of Europe could be fully appreciated only by one who had seen the situation there before and after. Nevertheless, the starting point had been so close to rock bottom that only a minimum level of economic strength had been regained. The Soviets, who wanted no recovery in Western Europe, had screamed that the Marshall Plan was a war measure, even though its terms offered economic assistance to the U.S.S.R. and its satellites on the same basis as that accepted by the free nations. In concept and application, the program was political and economic: to repair the chaos of war, to start industry on the road to health, and to raise production to a level consistent with minimum civil needs.

To assist free nations, in Europe and elsewhere, to build their own defenses against the persistent threat of aggression, the United States inaugurated the Mutual Defense Assistance Program late in 1949. The purpose of this program was to furnish items of military equipment which the other countries could not produce, and to assist in the training required for the effective use of these weapons. In the European area, the program also provided the countries some of the machine tools, materials, and various components needed to get the production of munitions started. The flow of material to Europe was under way during 1951, consisting for the most part of tanks, vehicles, aircraft, and guns from existing stocks. A number of light naval vessels of combat and support types were also transferred to European navies. For their part, recipient nations were to raise and maintain the forces and furnish the balance of equipment they needed. In addition, they were to prepare to cope with maintenance and replacement programs of the heavy equipment at the earliest practicable date. The United Kingdom, with her greater industrial capacity, was in the best position to furnish the bulk of her own needs in tanks, aircraft and communications equipment.

Despite this extensive aid, the rearmament program meant heavy budget increases in all European countries. Larger permanent establishments were required, and more extensive train-

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ing programs. Facilities had to be created for new forces—airfields, depots, and all the requirements peculiar to military forces. Of these needs, airfields were by far the most critical and expensive category. For the 1952 airfield program then being planned, real estate and construction costs amounted to the equivalent of one-half billion dollars.

The effect of defense spending on national economies was greatly magnified by sharp worldwide increases in the cost of raw materials. Food, coal, and other basic necessities soared to new heights, kindling antagonism against governmental defense programs and the whole rearmament effort. In the village where I live not far from Paris, ordinary laborers averaged the equivalent of seventy dollars a month; yet coal for their cook-stoves ranged up to fifty dollars a ton. For the price of a pair of shoes, the average man in Italy was already working eight times as long as the American worker; for a pound of butter, the French worker toiled five times as long as his American counterpart.

It is recognized, of course, that such comparisons reflect many factors, including resources, management, tools, and efficiency. Nevertheless, they show that, heavy as defense costs were to the American taxpayer, far lesser burdens could be felt seriously by the average European. Understandably, European governments were inclined to move carefully in such a political climate. As a consequence, all recommendations for augmenting forces, building airfields, or increasing budget items were closely examined and frequently subject to lengthy negotiation within the various parliamentary factions. However, the concerted effort toward greater strength made progress throughout the spring and summer months. The attitude of the governments was cooperative, but there did exist a general feeling that an accurate yardstick was needed within NATO to measure the scale and intensity of national effort. Obviously, this was an extremely complicated problem in view of the differences in natural resources, financial position, industrial potential, and standards of living of various nations. Yet, failure to meet the situation would eventually lead to dissatisfaction and friction among our membership.

There were other problems as well. Our planning estimates of SHAPE forces to be created over the next few years had been prepared largely from the standpoint of military requirements. These programs now needed a feasibility test to insure that they were within the economic capabilities of member countries. However, no one knew the price tags. Presumably, some program would in time be evolved to coordinate NATO-wide production. But aside from the equipment pledged by the United States, no country knew at the moment what weapons it should plan on making for itself, what specialties it might make for other allied nations, or what it should procure from others.

Concern was felt in many quarters over the apparent failure to put to full use existing production facilities of Europe. There had always been large munitions industries in France and Belgium; the Netherlands possessed unused capacity in the electrical and other technical fields; several large aircraft factories were idle in Italy. The Defense Production Board of NATO had made extensive surveys of European production capabilities and had verified that considerable additional military production was possible. Nevertheless, financial limitations and the lack of firm national programs prolonged this distressing waste of facilities.

Recognition of the specific problems impeding progress led to the appointment of the Temporary Council Committee at the NATO meeting in Ottawa during September of 1951. Headed by Mr. W. Averell Harrison of the United States, this Committee served NATO as an advisory group but nevertheless had power to investigate the broad military effort and the potential of each of the member nations. The primary task of the T.C.C. was to develop a plan of action reconciling the issues arising from an acceptable military program with the actual capabilities of the member countries. It also considered ways and means of reducing the cost of building effective defensive forces. In the process, the Committee surveyed the political and economic capabilities of each NATO country, as well as problems requiring attention in order to develop these capabilities.

The efforts of the T.C.C. represent a monumental achieve-

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ment—an achievement which could only have been accomplished with the thoroughgoing cooperation of the member nations. SIIAPE was a principal beneficiary of its labors. The operation of the Committee was truly an innovation in that sovereign nations permitted an international group to examine their defense programs and their capacity—financial, economic and military—of supporting heavier burdens. As a result, the true dimensions of the rearmament task could be seen for the first time in terms of an integrated military, economic, and financial effort. For the first time, positive recommendations could be made for a more efficient pooling of production facilities and for a more equitable sharing of the burdens incident to the defense program. The recommendations of the T.C.C. were detailed and far-going. They were not all acceptable to the governments of the participating nations, but in large part they were. The final report of the T.C.C. was approved at Lisbon and represented one of the great advances made at that meeting.

A NEW SOURCE OF STRENGTH

Even with the maximum potential realized through the collective efforts of member nations, there is little hope for the economical long-term attainment of security and stability in Europe unless Western Germany can be counted on the side of the free nations. Here in the heart of Europe is an area of roughly 100,000 square miles, populated by nearly 50,000,000 industrious and highly skilled people. Rich in natural resources and production facilities, Western Germany alone produces one-half as much steel annually as the rest of Western Europe combined. The coal of the Ruhr, along with the industrial sinews it feeds, is a prime economic fact in Europe.

As the geographic center of Europe, Western Germany is of great strategic importance in the defense of the continent. The Northern plain of Germany, with its extensive network of modern roads and railroads, offers the best route of advance from the East. As of today, our forces could not offer prolonged resistance East of the Rhine barrier. Thus we might lose, by default, the considerable resources of Germany and suffer, at the same

time, direct exposure of Denmark and the Netherlands. With Western Germany in our orbit, NATO forces would form a strong and unbroken line in central Europe from the Baltic to the Alps. Depth is always a desirable element in defense; in the restricted area of Western Europe, it is mandatory. Defensive depth is indispensable in countering the striking power of mechanized armies, and the speed and range of modern aircraft.

At first glance, a military alliance between Germany and the European nations of NATO would seem to lose sight of history. Too recently has Germany been the destroyer of peace in the Western world. Under evil leadership, a strong and able people succumbed to the doctrine that the arbitrary exercise of force was their privilege, and early military successes gave their leaders proud hopes of becoming world conquerors. The thought of a renewed Germany is a matter of grave concern to the nations of Western Europe, who have suffered much from the misuse of German power. Certainly, their anxiety is understandable.

However, the people of Western Germany have made substantial progress toward understanding and achieving self-government. This development should be further encouraged by bringing them into closer association with the freedoms of the West. Thus their contributions to the common defense must be made on the one possible basis, a voluntary one, with equality of treatment for all.

Surely, it would be foolhardy to assume that a great country like Germany could long remain a vacuum. Unless Germany becomes a partner of the West, we might, eventually, see a repetition of the disaster of Czechoslovakia. Consider the glittering blandishments held out to the Germans by Moscow during recent months—promises of German unity, renewal of her old trade with Eastern Europe, a German National Army, removal of occupation forces and restrictions. The sturdy determination of the German Federal Republic to ally itself with the freedoms of the West has been manifested by its refusal to be blinded by such tactics. For the good of the German people, this is certainly the only course. For them the choice is starkly clear—freedom or subjection.

Recognizing the importance of German participation, the

United States proposed to the North Atlantic Council in the fall of 1960 that a plan be devised to obtain a German contribution to Western European defense within the framework of NATO. At Brussels in December, 1960, the various aspects of this proposal were studied by members of the Council, who then invited the United States, the United Kingdom and France to discuss the matter with the German Federal Republic.

Meanwhile, the French Government proposed an appealing innovation: why not, they said, bring the Germans in as part of a unified European Defense Force? For several years, France had been a leader in promoting unity in Europe and was, at the time, negotiating the Schuman Plan, a major expression of economic unity. It was felt that German participation within the framework of a European defense community would not only provide the safeguards desired by Germany's neighbors of the West, but would represent also a major step towards European federation. In this spirit, France met with Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Western Germany to evolve an acceptable formula for German participation. From these meetings the concept of a European Defense Force emerged.

No one has attempted to minimize the difficulty of the new and complex problems implicit in such a plan. On the contrary, the doubters and the critical have magnified these in the hope of halting progress. Partial loss of sovereignty, complexity in administration and maintenance, destruction of patriotic impulse, and dozens of other valid and invalid objections have been pleaded as establishing the futility of the proposal. Here, as in so many others of the arguments developing around NATO the answer is found in a simple test. It is: « If this plan is not adopted, what is the inevitable result on the peace and the security we seek to preserve? »

A year's preliminary work spent in refining the original concept has brought negotiations to an advanced stage with six governments participating, the Netherlands in addition to the five original nations. At the Lisbon conference in February, the plan received the endorsement and support of all other NATO powers.

As presently conceived, the European Defense Force calls for

the pooling of forces into a common military organization for the defense of all. Initially the forces to be unified would be those allocated by the participating nations to the defense of Europe. Troops required to meet commitments outside of Europe proper would be retained under national control. The direction, support, and administration of the unified defense forces would be vested in a European Defense Community, including a European Assembly, a Council, a Court of Justice, and an Executive Group, along with agencies for military supply, procurement, and budget. Such integration of military forces, and particularly the integration of their supply and supporting agencies, would prevent any participating nation from embarking on a separate course of aggression.

The European Defense Force would include land, air and naval units and their supporting elements. Basic ground units would be called *groupements*, of about 12,500 men. The Air would be organized into Wing-size units. At this level, troops would not be mixed as to nationality, thus preserving the language, customs and esprit of the home peoples. These basic units would be combined in larger military formations such as army corps, made up of elements of different national origin. The practicality of such integration was proved many times during the last war and is currently being demonstrated by our U.N. troops in Korea.

When formed, the European Defense Force would be integrated under SHAPE in the same manner as purely national forces from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and other countries not members of the European Defense Community. The new grouping would not modify, conflict with, or in any way supersede the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The concept of a European Defense Force is the consolidation of military elements of five nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with forces from still another nation, Western Germany. It cannot fail to increase greatly the effectiveness of our collective security and to facilitate the achievement of NATO aims.

Success would be a long step also toward the unification of Europe. This is the central goal and the only possible way of

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creating reasonable security, and insuring, at the same time, the improvement in living standards that characterizes Western civilization. Therein lies the real answer to the threat of Communist inundation. It is not enough to know that our combined resources outweigh those of the Soviet dictators. What matters is our ability to use them in the best possible way for our security and well-being.

Such efficiency demands the closest kind of political and economic cooperation, particularly in the area of Western Europe. For if the free nations of this region were really a unit, tremendous benefits would accrue to them individually and to NATO. Few Europeans would quarrel with this concept; political and economic unity is a popular theme to millions who have suffered from past differences. Yet progress toward full cooperation has been limited by the intricate and artificial maze of national obstacles erected by man himself. Customs barriers, conflicting economic structures, currency regulations, and countless other road blocks curtail drastically the movement of men, manufactured products, raw materials, and money upon which Europe's economic life depends. They are expensive and wasteful encumbrances, pyramiding the cost of production with tariffs, overhead, taxes, and middlemen. In the political field, these barriers compound inefficiency with distrust and suspicion.

The advantages of political and economic unity can be demonstrated by such practical examples as the European Defense Force and the Schuman Plan, which embrace the same six countries. The Schuman Plan calls for the pooling and production of steel and coal—vital commodities of life and defense. The aim is to provide common objectives and common markets, to eliminate unreasonable customs barriers, to make the European economy more flexible and productive. To me this plan to work together in steel and coal is, with the European Defense Community, a premise of greater economic, military, and moral strength in Western Europe. It is tangible evidence of the desire to eliminate the weaknesses of separate little economies, which make it hard for Europe to arm for defense. In my opinion, the two plans, the Schuman Plan and the European Defense Community, mark historic advances in European cooperation. If these could be

supplemented by a Schuman Plan for electric power and for agriculture, along with a system for standardizing money values, the benefits would be profound and far-reaching. These joint efforts would serve as practical laboratories for the development of that full political and economic unity which alone can make Europe self-sustaining and secure. Indeed, until this hope becomes an accomplished fact, or some miracle brings about a disappearance of the Soviet threat, there will be no confident peace and enlarging prosperity for any part of the free world.

SITUATION IN EUROPE TODAY

Although it is my conviction that a unified Europe offers the best hope for permanent stability in this critical area, respectable strength can nevertheless be achieved within NATO by wholehearted effort and cooperation. Much has been done towards that end in the past twelve months. Viewed separately, as military, economic, and political achievements, these gains may not be spectacular; but taken as a whole, they have created a profound change in morale, the basic factor of all.

Already our active forces have increased to a point where they could give a vigorous account of themselves, should an attack be launched against us. In terms of army divisions whether in service or quickly mobilizable, our forces in Western Europe have nearly doubled in numbers. The national units pledged to this command a year ago were for the most part poorly equipped, inadequately trained, and lacking essential support in both supplies and installations. Because of their weakness on all fronts, and the absence of central direction, they could have offered little more than token resistance to attack. Today, the combat readiness of our troops has improved markedly. Readjustments in their deployment have enhanced their potential effectiveness against the threat from the East. Behind them is a steadily expanding supply system, and a command organization to plan and direct their coordinated efforts. Still far—disappointingly far—from sufficient for a determined defense, they nevertheless represent a fighting force

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in whose spirit and increasing fitness our nations can take considerable pride.

Pursuant to the recommendations of the Temporary Council Committee, our member countries have pledged to produce this year fifty divisions for European Defense, exclusive of those to be provided by the two new NATO nations, Greece and Turkey. Roughly, one-half of the fifty divisions will be standing forces; the remainder are planned as reserve divisions available for employment at periods varying from three to thirty days.

The number of divisions pledged does not fully represent the magnitude of the effort required from the various member nations. Along with the divisions furnished, each nation must produce a variety of combat and service support elements, such as engineers, heavy artillery, communications, and transport, supply and maintenance units, to maintain these divisions in the field. When combined with other needs such as anti-aircraft defenses, these requirements raise manpower and equipment totals to twice or three times those represented within the combat divisions.

The building of these priority reserve divisions and similar forces to follow them represents one of the most difficult and urgent problems now before us. The nations of Western Europe will never be able to maintain under arms in peacetime the regular forces necessary to meet a Soviet invasion, to hold it, and to throw it back. It would entail permanent peacetime forces of a size they cannot afford. The defense of the West must necessarily be based on highly trained covering forces, backed by reserve units which can be brought into action immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. Admittedly, this is the only system of defense which can be adopted without excessive cost or crippling damage to national economies. But to make the system work will demand far more attention than is now being given to the organization and readying of reserve forces on the continent.

Each nation must now organize its reservists so as to produce trained formations which will be fit to fight without a long period of training after mobilization. This means that the reserve

forces will have to receive field training as divisions and similar formations in peacetime. Moreover, adequate equipment must constantly be in the hands of these units, and strong permanent cadres assigned to provide the professional core essential to combat-worthy efficiency.

Air power is the dominant factor in war today. It cannot win a war alone, but without it, no war can be won. Our goal is to create air strength capable of answering immediately the onslaught of an aggressor and covering, at the same time, the mobilization of reserve forces. Since we cannot predict when an attack might be launched, air forces must be operationally ready at all times to rise to the defense of Western Europe.

Our air arm has gradually progressed in strength and effectiveness during the past year. But the development of air power is a long and complex process. It takes time to produce the aircraft, the fields from which they fly, and the skilled crews who operate and maintain them. The articulation of these various programs at the SHAPE level has been a primary concern of my Air Deputy, Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Saunders.

There is still a long way to go in developing air strength in Western Europe. A major task has been and continues to be the provision of adequate air bases and communications to link them. The airfield problem stems largely from the fact that jet fighters require runways substantially longer than those in current use for even the largest commercial aircraft. During the past year, some thirty airfields have been put into use, but these were largely an inheritance from previous European construction programs and involved improvements on fields already in existence. A vast amount of new construction is needed to accommodate the air power necessary to the defense of the West.

One of the most heartening achievements of the Lisbon Conference was the approval by member nations of a cost sharing scheme to build a large number of additional airfields in Europe. Action was also taken to provide headquarters sites and communication facilities for the common use of NATO forces. Without agreement on the fundamental and complex question of costs,

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one whole defense project would have been crippled by the continued lack of adequate air facilities.

As presently scheduled, NATO's European air arm will include by the end of 1962 some 4,000 operational aircraft, a significant proportion of which will be modern jet fighters. When realized, this air strength will amount to a greatly improved situation over what we faced a year ago, but it will still be far from our ultimate requirements. Moreover, the operational value of the forces will depend in large measure on progress made in developing the Aircraft Warning System and the supply and maintenance organizations for air forces.

The naval equation in Western European waters is still weighted strongly in our favor. Deficiencies exist in mine sweepers, anti-submarine craft, and harbor defense installations, but efforts are being made toward filling these needs. The main advance on the naval side has been realized in the excellent coordination and common procedures evolved by Allied navies in European waters.

These developments will bring to all European defense problems—sea, air and land—the effective application of modern sea power and the wide range of weapons which its arsenal contains. This capability is of particular importance in the Northern and Southern regions of my command. With the extension of the Southern defense area some 1,400 miles eastward, a broad flanking position will be organized under Admiral Carney, combining SIFAP's forces in Italy and the Central Mediterranean with those of Greece and Turkey. The essential role of sea power here is to link and support the defense forces of these countries while working in close cooperation with other Allied forces in the Mediterranean area.

Recently I have had the stimulating experience of visiting our two new NATO members, Greece and Turkey. Knowing the courage they have shown in the face of direct Communist pressure, we are proud at SIFAP to welcome them as allies. With their resolute, hardy peoples, these nations are a significant addition to European defense. They include between them an

army strength of more than twenty-five divisions, backed by efficient but relatively smaller air and naval forces.

The growth of military strength reported during the past year has derived from various sources. Certainly, it could not have been achieved without the arrival in increasing numbers of tanks, aircraft, and heavy equipment from the United States and Canada. But arms are useless without trained manpower, and during the past eighteen months every Western European nation represented in SHAPE has increased the length of its conscription period. Defense budgets were also raised, and among these continental members, military expenditures now average over twice the pre-Korean level.

A wide range of activities has been undertaken to bring the forces of the Western powers to a greater degree of effectiveness. Thousands of reservists have been called up for refresher training in the units to which they would be assigned in an emergency. It is expected that this practice will be greatly extended during 1952 and become standard practice in the future. Preparations are now in progress for a coordinated set of maneuvers during the coming year to weld standing and reserve forces into integrated battle-worthy commands.

Extensive field exercises, with air forces and ground troops representing eight nations, took place in Western Germany last fall. Naval exercises and operations have been conducted by Allied fleets in the Mediterranean, the Channel, and Northern waters. With soldiers, sailors, and airmen from many nations working together, the sense of comradeship, unity and common destiny has been strengthened. The merging of diverse procedures and many tongues is not an easy task; but techniques have been designed to overcome the difficulties, and Allied commanders have been able not only to test them but also to practice with valuable results the handling of international forces.

At this time, the forces assigned to SHAPE are not of themselves sufficient to stay the hand of an aggressor. Of some comfort in this bleak realization is the existence of other military forces of the NATO countries in adjacent areas. At sea, there are the fleets directed by Admiral McCormick, Supreme Allied

Commander Atlantic ; there is the British Home Fleet, and other Allied naval forces in the Mediterranean and European coastal waters. From its bases in the United Kingdom, the RAF Fighter Command could contribute greatly in the air battle against Soviet attack. The U.S. Strategic Air Command, with bases in the United Kingdom and North Africa, possesses tremendous capability, acting both independently and in support of European defense forces. The resources of the British Bomber Command would also be of great value in war. These forces together not only add much to overall Allied strength but must certainly give food for thought to a potential enemy. Yet they can be used to the full only so long as continental bases remain securely in our hands.

Military strength is of little worth unless backed by healthy, expanding economies. In this truth is found the source of many of our bitterest problems. Yet from the very beginning of our endeavor, we have been able to draw some confidence from the knowledge that NATO's economic potential is superior to that of the East. This potential springs from the productive peoples of the Atlantic Community who hold in their grasp the greatest economic production, the most advanced technology the world has yet seen. The task is to convert this potential into actuality, to organize and produce all that our situation now demands. Despite stresses and strains, shortages, delays and some outright failures, there has been a sustained rise in the production of goods for defense and non-defense purposes alike. But there is no lack of problems yet to be faced and mastered.

The shortage of coal has been one of the most serious weaknesses in Europe, imposing severe limitations on economic and military production alike. Steel is the very bedrock of our Western industrial machine and of modern military power ; coal is indispensable to its manufacture. The production of coal lagged behind the general level of industrial activity with the result that Europe is actually importing large quantities from the United States. Carrying American coal to Europe enters into the other vital dollar imports upon which the industrial life of Europe depends.

The process of channeling economic output into military ends,

though rarely easy, has seemed particularly hard in the present circumstances. Scarcity in Europe has been prolonged and severe. To deny even a part of the increased production to civil demands has been difficult; to make such decisions effective has been burdensome. The changes in established patterns of consumption and distribution, of trade and income, brought on by expanded military requirements, have encountered resistance of many kinds. Governmental decisions in this part of the world must be made in an atmosphere of extreme financial stringency and under heavy pressure from various groups who feel acutely the impact of new taxes, controls, and higher prices.

Increasing defense budgets have posed real problems of fiscal and financial management. Hanging over the NATO defense effort has been the menace of inflation which, if unchecked, could wipe out all gains. The picture is by no means bright, and we are far from being able to regard the success of the military budgetary programs as already assured. In some countries the pressure of inflation has been effectively checked. In others, inflation is surging upwards and endangering the whole defense program.

From relatively small beginnings, European production of the equipment and supplies for modern armies, navies, and air forces has increased during the past year, and further increases will be undertaken. A significant and growing proportion of the military equipment being provided by the United States to its NATO partners is soon to be produced in European factories. The rate of production of equipment, such as aircraft engines, guns, ammunition, and radio sets, is rising and will continue to rise, with the object of re-establishing in Europe a level of production capable of satisfying future military requirements. Jet fighters, tanks, military vehicles and similar heavy equipment are now produced, on a small scale, in regions where, for several years, all such production had ceased.

After necessary initial armaments have been produced, Europe must become self-sustaining in military manufactures at the earliest possible date. The United States is currently making a tremendous effort to furnish a great portion of the capital

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outlay in military equipment. Without this, there could be no effective forces on the continent within the next four or five years. That America cannot continue to be the primary source of munitions for the entire free world. To do so would be militarily unsound. Moreover, the United States cannot long continue such expenditures without endangering her own economic structure. The soundness of that structure is of vital concern to the entire free world for its collapse would be a world-shaking tragedy.

Within NATO, our joint enterprise, we have seen progress toward increased strength and cohesion. Member nations are progressively adjusting their internal processes both to support and to benefit from NATO operations. Since the founding of NATO almost three years ago, its activities gradually have changed from planning to implementation. This operational characteristic and the broadening scope of NATO activities are reflected in the recent reorganization which provides a permanent body of NATO representatives and an Executive Group under General Lord Ismay, Secretary General. Because of their immediate availability and powers of decision, these new agencies will be a great help to the work in SHAPE and other NATO commands.

There is no precedent in peacetime for the NATO concept. At SHAPE, the basic relationships and the sweep of interest of a peacetime international command have evolved from day to day. I can state accurately that a great many of the problems referred to me, and often the most difficult, have been economic, political, and psychological rather than purely military. But even in the military field we have seen considerable change in the specific responsibilities and activities of this Command. SHAPE is an operational rather than an administrative headquarters; all the matters of pay, internal management, and supply of the various forces are the direct concern of the countries contributing them. Yet, in the light of a year's experience, it has been necessary for the North Atlantic Council to increase the authority and responsibility of this Headquarters with respect to logistics—the field of supply, construction, maintenance and

transport. This will mean a sizeable increase in staff but should insure better coordination and fewer delays in making vital supplies and services available to our forces.

As NATO develops, it is of the greatest importance to reconcile the need for flexibility with the need for firm plans. Master plans for the coordination of many related activities provide fundamental guidance and are an essential basis of confidence and economy. Yet where full effort is required, as in our case at present, that effort should be measured not against plans and predictions which have become frozen in documents, but against day-to-day possibilities and needs, and the determination of people to achieve their defense, together, as rapidly and effectively as possible.

The military forces we are building must be continually modified to keep pace with new weapons. To this end an annual review of the full nature and composition of our military programs should be accomplished. We are at the very point, for example, of seeing a whole sequence of fundamental changes made in response to development of new types of arms. The tendency in recent decades to produce weapons of greater range, penetrating power and destructiveness is accelerating. As a result, the balance between men and materiel is bound to shift, probably reducing the concentration of manpower on the battlefield, increasing the ratio of materiel to men, increasing the complexity of equipment—as the price of its power. There will be more and more demand for the highly skilled and specialized men in which our democracies excel. Military forces in the field may become lighter, faster and harder hitting, but the support which gives them these very qualities will become more elaborate and more costly.

This brings to both national and combined staffs the great responsibility of eliminating every trace of luxury in organization and in size and design of equipment. Utility, emphasized to the point of austerity, is the only guide to produce the required items at reasonable cost. We must be careful that we do not prove that free countries can be defended only at the cost of bankruptcy.

Should the tragedy of another war occur, the sweep of combat will be over broader and deeper areas. Thus the zone of battle, in its three dimensions will tend to expand, and every element contributing directly to the conduct or support of military operations will become a target for enemy action. The concept of the maintenance of national military forces by states of small geographical extent has already become outdated. The logic of larger groups and association is becoming increasingly compelling. In the NATO nations, especially, the resultant task is to reconcile the demands for association into larger groupings with the deep and spiritual ties to nationhood and sovereignty. It is problems of this sort, inherent in our union, that are now being studied at the NATO Defense College organized in Paris during the last year by my Naval Deputy, Vice-Admiral André G. Lemonnier. I look to this group—the officers of fourteen Allied nations—to find the right answers to many questions that today are unanswerable.

As months have passed, confidence has grown throughout the NATO community from the existence of greater and more effective forces and an organization to direct and support them. However, we have not yet succeeded in bringing the full force, the full moral potential of our freedom-loving peoples into the stark struggle for survival of priceless values. Our goals are simple; they are honorable; they can be achieved. Why, therefore, should there be confusion in the minds of millions of our own peoples as to the basic aims of our defense program, the necessity for it, and the urgent demand for their own individual efforts? Once these facts are established in the minds of our Atlantic peoples, there will be less hickering in our councils, and it will become progressively more difficult for self-seeking individuals to delay our progress by exploiting internal national divisions or minor grievances between our members. Once the truth is understood, once the critical dangers present in the world situation are really known, there will be less complacency concerning our present military situation and the harmful effects of delay will be clearly seen.

The Soviet Army casts its shadow over the length and breadth of Europe. The satellite countries have increased the size and

combat effectiveness of their armed forces. Reports from behind the Iron Curtain indicate that the readiness of these captive peoples has led to even tighter, tougher, more brutal measures of state control. The familiar technique of the purge, deliberate terror, and intimidation has forced a measure of unity—however unhappy—in this area.

The Soviet Air Force in Eastern Germany is currently replacing obsolescent aircraft with jet planes. Work on airfields, communications, and supply installations is being vigorously pursued in Eastern Europe. By the prolongation of the war in Korea and Indochina, by the constant attempts at erosion and subversion of effective government in the Far East and Middle East, heavy drains have been imposed upon the Western powers, which reduce the resources available to establish a balance in Europe.

Nevertheless, the tide has begun to flow our way and the situation of the free world is brighter than it was a year ago. At Lisbon, our member nations made great headway on issues vital to our continued progress. They strengthened our Eastern flank by bringing into NATO the stout-hearted peoples of Greece and Turkey. They agreed to the concept of a European Defense Community and a close relationship with the German Federal Republic. They approved a program to establish this year a force of fifty standing and reserve divisions and 5,000 aircraft. When combined with the ready strength available in Greece and Turkey, this force—if properly armed and trained—should produce an encouraging degree of security. Considering training, organization, materiel, vital installations, and all the various factors which go to make up military proficiency, I personally would look upon completion of this program as clear material evidence that the basic goals of our combined enterprise are going to be achieved. Now our governments must convert the Lisbon program into actuality. It demands full and unstinting support, for only through positive action by all our nations can we ever achieve tranquility and security.

As we work together in the coming year, we are carrying out our pledge to each other. We are reaffirming our true beliefs in the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the

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rule of law. We are one in our desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. But we are steadfast in our determination to safeguard the freedom, the common heritage, and the civilization of our member nations.

This is a great task—a noble charge. In a world where powerful forces are working tirelessly to destroy the freedom, individual liberty, and dignity of man, we cannot for one moment delay our advance toward security. The task will require constant watchfulness, hard work, cooperation, and sacrifice, but what we do now can grant us peace for generations.

It can be done, given the will to do it. There is power in our union—and resourcefulness on land, sea and air. Visible and within grasp we have the capability of building such military, economic, and moral strength as the Communist world would never dare to challenge. When that point is reached, the Iron Curtain rulers may finally be willing to participate seriously in disarmament negotiations. Then, we may see fulfilled the universal hope expressed in the United Nations Charter to reduce « the diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources ». Then the Atlantic Community will have proved worthy of its history and its God-given endowments. We shall have proved our union the world's most potent influence toward peace among men—the final security goal of humanity.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

SHAPE
PARIS.



General Matthew B. Ridgway

~~2070~~
2071 *Beckwith*


SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE
PARIS, FRANCE

GENERAL ORDERS
NUMBER 6

30 May 1952

ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND

Having reported for duty pursuant to authority vested in me by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, I hereby assume command of Allied Command Europe.


M. M. REILLY
General, United States Army

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER
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SHAPE PARIS
30 MAY 1953

10 JUN 1953

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ANNUAL REPORT
to
THE STANDING GROUP
NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY ORGANIZATION

from
General MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Printed in Paris

**SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED POWERS EUROPE**

Paris, France

30 May 1953

SUBJECT : *Report on ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE, May 1952 -
May 1953.*

TO : *The Standing Group.*

PURPOSE

1. This Report concerns ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE from 30 May 1952, when I became Supreme Allied Commander Europe, to date.

2. The purpose of this Report, the second emanating from Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, is to provide an assessment of the current and prospective capability for discharging assigned defense responsibilities. It includes a brief summary of the situation one year ago; an examination of the changes which have since occurred; an appraisal of their effects upon the capability of this Command for carrying out its assigned defense mission; a resurvey of its military requirements; and an indication of the areas of existing major deficiencies. The Report is purposely couched in somewhat general terms for security reasons. Precise figures on present stocks of ammunition, on fuel for aircraft, tanks and trucks, and on the effect-

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iveness of our radar to give us timely warning of a possible enemy air attack, obviously should not be made public. All matters of substance in this Report have been included in classified reports previously made to proper authority. They have been covered in adequate detail and supported by appropriate recommendations.

3. Notwithstanding this unquestioned need for withholding certain information from publication, I wish to emphasize at the outset of this Report the importance, in fact I believe the crucial importance, of making known to our NATO peoples the main facts of the military situation in which they are so deeply concerned. In no other way can they be convinced of the need for the heavy burdens they are asked to carry. If unconvinced, they cannot be expected to support NATO programs, even on the minimum scale essential to collective security. With an unshakable belief in our concept of democracy, I concur wholeheartedly with my predecessor, General Eisenhower, who a year ago questioned why there should be a confusion in the minds of millions of our own peoples as to the basic aims of our defense program, the necessity for it, and the urgent demand for their own individual efforts. Once the truth is understood, he stated, once the critical dangers present in the world situation are really known, there will be less complacency concerning our present military situation and the harmful effects of delay will be clearly seen. »

4. It has been my constant conviction since I assumed command that public understanding is indispensable to progress towards the minimum military security for which NATO has been established. To create this understanding, NATO and the national authorities must present the facts of our security situation through a coordinated and sustained information program. I have previously submitted recommendations concerning such action.

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GENERAL

5. The search for solutions to the many major problems encountered in the effort to become secure gives rise to serious political, economic, financial and social difficulties to which I am acutely alive. Yet early solutions must be found if the basic objectives which brought NATO into being are to be reasonably attainable within the near future.

6. The assessments which follow constitute a military estimate. In preparing it, I have drawn heavily upon the advice and assistance of the officers assigned to this Command. Of all services, and from all the countries represented in this Command, they are men of high-principled integrity and demonstrated professional competence, in whom their countries may have real pride and confidence. This Report is based on their honest and objective analysis and reflects the rigid standards of austere economy consistent with minimum acceptable efficiency which are our common aim. These men are deeply aware of the waste of human life, of spiritual values, and of material treasures which past wars have entailed; they are dedicated to the effort to forestall the catastrophic destruction which future wars could bring.

THE SITUATION IN MAY 1952

7. I turn now to the situation of a year ago, the time at which the first Annual Report of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe was issued. The military mission entrusted to the European Allied Command then as now was:

a. *To war to defend NATO's European territories.*
This mission was not qualified in either space or time. It

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was not merely to defend certain parts of the NATO European area and their peoples. Nor was the responsibility only to become effective in some future year when means might be available. The task was to defend all, at any time, if war should occur.

b. *In peacetime to develop an integrated, effective force capable of accomplishing the wartime mission if required.* But the underlying and fundamental purpose was the preservation of peace through the deterrent effect on potential aggressors of a strong, balanced, combat-ready force, capable of challenging aggression, or at least of rendering its success doubtful. Already, the great progress that had been made in the build-up from the exposed and almost defenseless condition which existed in 1950 at the time of the Communist attack on South Korea had made a major contribution toward this end.

8. The next basic consideration, giving concrete dimensions to the tasks involved in accomplishing the assigned mission, was the Soviet threat — its nature and magnitude. There were two particular points to be stressed in this connection. First, our task as military men was to concern ourselves with Soviet capabilities. Military planning and recommendations could not be based upon speculative estimates of a potential aggressor's intentions. If the mission assigned to this Command was to be discharged, our forces had to be prepared to meet an aggressor's forces as they actually existed and could be brought into battle. We had to reckon with military realities. We could not rely on attempts to fathom the minds of the men in the Kremlin nor to follow their frequent reversals of tactics. Second, it was necessary to react effectively to Soviet actions within whatever period of warning might be provided. Of all the basic principles of war, none could have more devastating effect in this area than that of *TURPISSE*. The impor-

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tance of Soviet *CAPABILITY* and of *TIME* as two factors of fundamental significance could scarcely be exaggerated.

9. The Soviet bloc had over 5 1/2 million men under arms, roughly 4 1/2 million belonging to the Soviet Union itself. The USSR mounted 175 line divisions. Satellite strength was growing. The Soviet air force totaled just over 20,000 front-line aircraft, with a large aircraft reserve. The Navy had more than 300 submarines, including a number of the latest type. The Soviet forces were capable of rapid expansion in case of war. Trained reserve manpower and reserves of equipment were immediately available. Some 30 divisions were located in occupied Europe, of which the 22 in East Germany constituted an ever present threat to our forces. The combat effectiveness of the ground forces was rated high and their equipment good — in some types superior. The combat efficiency of the air force, while rated below NATO standards, was improving, particularly with the replacement of piston-type with modern jet aircraft. The Soviets' well-known disregard for their own casualties further increased their offensive *CAPABILITY*.

10. The balance-sheet of NATO security in Western Europe, as I evaluated it in May 1952, showed major assets and major liabilities. The military assets, such as the multiple elements of command structure and leadership, plans and directives, organized combat units, and provision for their support, had already begun to give the basis for hope of future security.

11. In concrete terms of combat units in being, the divisions, air squadrons, and combat vessels, the defense force which then existed had already become sufficient to deny unopposed conquest to the Soviets, although there could have been no serious claim of capability to hold a predetermined line if the Soviets had launched a full-scale

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offensive. The Allied Command provided command and control machinery for coordinated employment of such units as were available, to the full measure of their limited capability. An initial structure had been brought into being and was steadily being strengthened.

12. A start, but only a start, had been made in the provision of supporting elements for the combat units. These included the logistical organizations, depots and airfields, combat support units, and all the rest of the complex supporting establishment needed to give modern fighting forces a capability for sustained combat.

13. In morale and in the determination to gain the military strength needed for security, the alliance had already demonstrated its essential soundness. In the all-important element of leadership, rapid progress was being made through growing experience in the handling of units in the field, through the integration of diverse national elements, through the training of additional junior leaders, and through the infusion of common objectives and doctrines at all levels of command.

14. Underlying all these factors, there had been truly remarkable progress in the basic decisions on national and international policies, and in plans and programs for the creation of additional units, for the improvement and expansion of support elements, and for the more effective coordination and employment of existing forces. There was a recognition, basic to all these efforts, of the necessity for a common defense to meet a common peril.

15. Against these assets were ranged grave liabilities. In May 1952, security in Western Europe was still heavily overshadowed by the enormous preponderance of combat-ready Soviet military power poised behind the Iron Curtain. Furthermore, there were grave deficiencies in Allied

preparedness to meet a Soviet attack had it come. The total fighting strength of the Allies formed but a small fraction of the Soviet Forces deployed in forward areas. Land forces and naval strength assigned to Allied Command Europe were entirely insufficient.

16. The inadequacy of the Air Forces was particularly acute. Many units were deployed in exposed areas east of the Rhine, with no prepared re-deployment sites. Command, control and warning arrangements were fragmentary in the extreme. A large number of our aircraft were of obsolescent piston-engine type.

17. The principal subordinate commands were still in a formative state. The headquarters would not have been equal to the demands of active operations. Signal communications were seriously inadequate for continued effective control of the fighting elements.

18. Particularly in the status of supporting elements, the deficiencies would have weighed heavily against effectiveness in combat. Stocks of ammunition were extremely low, logistical and maintenance systems inadequate, and re-supply plans and assignments of responsibilities were still under discussion and proving extremely difficult. Supply lines ran parallel to the front and were operationally unbalanced.

19. Shortages of specialists, career personnel, and experienced leaders were severe in many units and would have had a substantial adverse effect on combat operations. Many reserve elements lacked the degree of organization and training required for combat. Finally, although expansion goals and commitments for 1952 had been undertaken at Lisbon, it was increasingly apparent that the requisite steps in manning, training, and equipping were not being taken in full and on time.

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CHANGES, MAY 1952 TO MAY 1953

20. a. Before turning to an examination of the changes which have occurred in the past year, I should like to make clear the main factors which have guided me during my year of command. The overall objectives I have already discussed, but they cannot be stated too often. They are, first, to attain sufficient strength to deter potential aggressors from breaking the peace, and second, to defend ourselves successfully if the peace is broken. Together with the threat, these are the true determinants of military requirements.

b. Within the NATO structure it is my duty to assess these requirements in terms of land, sea, and air forces and their required support, and to report that assessment to higher authority with adequate supporting detail. It is my further duty to take all measures within my power toward meeting the requirements of defense, and to make specific recommendations to higher authority in such matters as the build-up of forces, command structure, supporting establishments, airfields and other facilities.

c. It then devolves upon the civil authorities, with their wider responsibilities and within their ultimate authority, to determine to what extent these requirements and recommendations can and will be met and on what time schedule.

d. With the aid of my subordinate commanders, I then prepare and submit periodic assessments of the military capability for defense based on the military forces and supporting establishments the civil governments have undertaken to provide. These reports also indicate predicted and actual deficiencies. At the same time we are making the most of what is actually provided, through maintaining a high state of operational readiness and through advising as to what composition of armed strength

and what use of resources will give maximum military return.

21. During the past year much has been done to increase our defense forces and to make them more effective. Measured against the Soviet capability, our progress is insufficient to give us acceptable prospect of success, if attacked. We are still far short of the minimum requirements. We lack essential supply and support. But a series of actions have been taken which have strengthened our command structure, augmented our operational plans and directives, and materially increased our land, air, and naval forces. Examination in more detail of major changes follows.

DEVELOPMENT OF COMMAND STRUCTURE

22. By August 1952 arrangements for coordinating the operations of the forces of Greece and Turkey with those of the remainder of my command had been established. Headquarters Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe, with Lieutenant General Willard C. Wyman, U.S. Army, in command, were established in Larnir directly subordinate to Admiral Carney, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe. In December 1952 Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma, Royal Navy, was appointed Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Mediterranean. In March 1953 he took over his Allied (NATO) Command which in wartime would include units of the British Mediterranean Fleet plus naval forces from other NATO nations. The United States Sixth Fleet, with a striking force mission, remains assigned to the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe. Thus there now exists a command structure to control our united forces along a 4000-mile front extending from northern Norway to the Caucasus.

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BUILD-UP OF FORCES

23. At Lisbon in February 1952 the nations had set for themselves, for the first time, firm goals for the build-up of their forces in 1952 and tentative goals for 1953 and 1954. As 1952 ended, the goals were in large part met numerically for air forces, naval forces, and for active army divisions, although there was a substantial shortfall in planned combat effectiveness. During the last twelve months progress in the build-up of forces has been steady. Throughout the command the strength of units has increased, additional major items of equipment have been provided and training advanced. In addition, a substantial number of new units have been organized. Nevertheless, for all services there are still major deficiencies in support units, in logistical establishments and in stocks of ammunition and other supplies. I would add parenthetically at this point that our reporting and evaluating system has been considerably strengthened throughout this period. We can provide more definitive information of actual conditions than formerly was possible. Thus it is now possible to evaluate combat-effective units with much greater confidence. We now have a much more reliable knowledge of just where we stand.

24. A year ago the outstanding deficiency was in the tactical air forces. There was a shortage of aircraft, of crews, of supply and support. A considerable increase during the year in the number of combat aircraft, mainly from deliveries under the U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Program, has since bettered our position. Not only have the numbers of combat aircraft increased, but their combat capability has improved. The increase in the number of pilots and technicians for these aircraft, together with some small improvement in aircraft control, warning and reporting systems, have been encouraging. Our network

of airfields has been enlarged and made more efficient. Our various exercises, which posed difficult problems in coordination and communications, demonstrated the ability of national forces assigned to SHAPE to work together as a team. In supply, and in the development of the system for distributing fuel, we have improved our status over the past year. Nevertheless, our air power is still today the weakest link in our defense. In spite of our progress, our air forces could not adequately carry out their tasks. The increase of air power must receive far greater attention by the NATO nations.

25. During the past year great efforts have been made to improve training of regular forces and at the same time to achieve better training and mobilization procedures for reserve forces, on whom so much of our defensive strength depends. Lack of proper training facilities and areas has hampered this effort, but good leadership can do much to offset the deficiency. Accordingly, SHAPE has strongly emphasized the need for leadership at all echelons. Various national forces have organized additional schools for junior and non-commissioned officers, and study periods for senior officers. Mobilization and training exercises have been conducted with encouraging results. Problems in training both active and reserve forces, like most of our large problems, are now becoming more clearly defined, and some NATO nations are requesting and using training and advisory missions organized by SHAPE. Such missions are now operating in the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Portugal. Another important development has been the recent establishment of atomic indoctrination courses for key NATO commanders and staff officers. The courses, which are designed to acquaint officers with the use of atomic weapons in tactical situations, will enable NATO military staffs to consider the implications of

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atomic warfare in the defense of Western Europe. With all this, there is still an urgent need for all countries to re-examine critically their mobilization systems and to insure that they are adequate to provide, in the time required, forces sufficiently well-trained to perform their duties.

SUPPORT OF ARMED FORCES

26. The growth of land forces during the past year, while not satisfactory, has been encouraging. This situation, however, is not true of the arrangements for the supply and support of those forces. The initial emphasis which had been given to the creation of front-line troops resulted in a grave shortage of the operational reserves, of certain critical supplies, and of service troops, without which a modern army cannot maintain itself effectively in the field.

27. In an international command, the problem of providing the overall logistic support is unusually complicated, because each nation is responsible for the support of its own forces. This arrangement results in a lack of flexibility in the supply system. In an attempt to make the system less rigid, SHAPE, in October 1952, after discussion with the nations concerned, submitted to the Standing Group specific proposals which, if adopted, should in time remedy the main faults in the organization of our supply. But merely improving our supply organization does not make good the present lack of operational reserve stocks. The nations are all agreed that they should hold stocks sufficient for several months, a period based on an estimate of the time to begin the replenishment of stocks in Europe after the outbreak of war. Mainly

for financial reasons, however, their stocks have not been built up to the needed level.

28. On the other hand, progress has been good on the third part of the program of infrastructure, that is, of fixed military installations including airfields, signal communications, and command headquarters. More than half of the 125 airfields approved have been completed to the point where they could be used in an emergency, and construction is proceeding well on all but a few of the remainder. Our fixed communications net is beginning to take form.

29. The fourth part of the infrastructure program was approved by the Council in December 1952, but only about one-half of it was financed at that time. Additional airfields, headquarters, signal communications, jet-fuel storage tanks and distribution pipelines to airfields were among that portion of the program which was agreed on. The remainder, financed in April 1953, included additional airfields and items such as naval bases, radar installations, radio-navigational aids, and training installations. In April 1953, the Council also approved the financing of a long-range infrastructure program for 1954, 1955 and 1956, covering the additional NATO military installations required to be built during this three-year period. This far-sighted departure from previous year-by-year financial approval represents a long step forward. It will enable us to improve greatly the planning for construction by placing it on a firm long-range basis.

30. The organization of the civilian bodies of NATO has been progressively strengthened during the past year as a result of the creation of the position of Secretary General as a focal point of civilian leadership. Under Lord Ismay, the work of building a more cohesive structure

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has gone forward. The North Atlantic Council, since the decision in early 1952 that it function in permanent session through the appointment of Permanent Representatives, has provided increasingly firm top-level direction to NATO, on a continuous basis. Under Lord Ismay, the International Staff has been developed to assist and advise in the discharge of complex civilian responsibilities. The result has been to delineate both those and the military responsibilities more clearly, to facilitate policy decisions, to strengthen defense production, and to provide more effective review of performance in meeting accepted goals. The military echelon of NATO now has authoritative civilian guidance and direction available on a permanent basis. The political aspects of NATO military exercises, the assessments of the security threat, the administrative and budgetary supervision of NATO airfield and other infrastructure programs, and the complex tasks of setting annual goals for the build-up of military forces are matters on which this type of guidance has been received.

THE NATO ANNUAL REVIEW

31. In the NATO Annual Review during 1952, the Council and the International Staff have had a most important role. Within NATO there has been the responsibility for determining the level of defense effort for each country. In their work they have had available a statement of overall requirements in the European area reported by my Command, together with my detailed recommendations as to the composition of military programs and the balance of air, ground and naval forces. Their work was confirmed in the decisions of the Ministerial Session of the Council in April 1953, which set up firm force goals for 1953 and provisional goals for 1954

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for army, air, and navy units, together with appropriate recommendations on NATO defense production.

THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY

32. During my year of command I have followed closely the plans for the European Defense Community. The benefits which the early ratification of the Treaty would have brought to our efforts and to European unity included the contribution of West Germany, which I consider indispensable to our defense system. SHAPE has maintained constant liaison with the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community and has observed and assisted in its planning. Its plans are workable and sufficiently advanced to avoid delay in developing a German contribution.

SHIFT OF NATIONAL EMPHASIS

33. Throughout many of the NATO nations the growth of defensive power has reduced the sense of fear and urgency under which they lived in the preceding twelve months. Nations are beginning to change their planned military programs from rapid rearmament to a longer-term policy. Although this change may be dictated by the economic situation, we must not forget that any real slackening of the defense effort may itself open the way to aggression.

APPRAISAL OF THE EFFECTS OF CHANGES

34. Much then has been added to the defense structure as it existed a year ago. Much that is highly encouraging has been accomplished. If we maintain momentum, our

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objectives can be attained within the near future and within the economic capabilities of NATO. Yet while the situation has altered during this past year, the significance of this change should be sought in the extent to which the power ratio of Soviet offensive capability to NATO defensive strength has changed for or against us.

35. Moreover, we are interested, not in the mere relative alteration in this power ratio, but in the remaining disparity of military potential. This is the only true criterion by which to measure our military risk and therefore to gauge the magnitude and urgency of the further efforts required. Let us examine the Soviet potential.

36. During the past twelve months the USSR has systematically strengthened its armed forces and those of its European satellites. The highly mechanized group of Soviet armies stationed in East Germany has been kept at a high level of training; its equipment has been increased and its vehicles modernized. Many Russian air squadrons have been re-equipped with jet aircraft. A huge program of airfield construction has been nearly completed throughout Eastern Europe. The Soviet naval ship-building program is continuing steadily and now includes construction of new improved ocean patrol submarines. The military strength of the satellite countries has been increased considerably. Since January 1952, when these forces numbered approximately 1,000,000 men organized into 65 divisions, they have increased to more than 1,300,000 men organized into 70-odd divisions. This total does not count East Germany, where various units of the police have been converted into the nucleus of a German army which now numbers about 100,000. East Germany is also forming an air force and a naval force. The foregoing summary relates to the strengthening of Soviet conventional forces. It must

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not be forgotten, however, that Soviet effort in the atomic field has also continued.

37. These are the facts about the increasing strength of the Soviet bloc. Since Stalin's death there has been much conjecture about possible changes of policy by the rulers of the Soviet Union. These are matters beyond my purview. Moreover, as a soldier I cannot afford to deal with conjecture. I feel it my duty to state that I know of no facts which would lead me to conclude that the military danger from the East has lessened. This view coincides with the official communique issued by the North Atlantic Council at the conclusion of its Ministerial session, 25 April 1953. Although the North Atlantic Council firmly restated the policy of Member Governments to seek every opportunity for world peace, it reported:

Nevertheless, the Council found that there had not yet in fact been any change in the fundamental threat to the security of free peoples. The most striking evidence of this continuing threat is the huge and constantly strengthened military force maintained by those nations whose policies have been responsible for the present tensions, and who are still promoting aggressive war in several parts of the world.

38. An appraisal of the present power ratio goes far beyond the military field. It embraces every aspect of our political, economic, financial and social systems. All but the military aspects are beyond both my competence and responsibility. Yet within the strictly military field, I find the disparity between our available forces and those which the Soviet rulers could bring against us so great as to warrant no other conclusion than that a full-scale Soviet attack within the near future would find Allied Command Europe critically weak to accomplish its present mission.

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The potential aggressor retains the initiative. He can exercise his offensive capability at will, and choose the time, place, weight, and direction of attack. To allow the NATO nations to maintain their status as free nations, we should have the means which can be committed to action within a short time and which can give us the capability of withstanding an initial attack and gaining time to gather our strength. To do otherwise, we would risk needlessly heavy sacrifice of life and great loss of critical equipment. We need not only the physical means but the driving force of dynamic leadership sustained by a high morale throughout the civilian population as well as among our fighting forces.

RE-SURVEY OF MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

39. Concurrently with the developments cited, the military requirements of Allied Command Europe have been re-surveyed and submitted to the North Atlantic Military Committee. Through the Council's action on the 1962 Annual Review, completed in April 1963, agreed goals for NATO nations for future years have been approved.

40. The results are best stated in the words of the Council's final communiqué of 25 April 1963:

The Council agreed on short and long-term programs for NATO. They established a firm military program for 1963 and a provisional program for 1964. In addition to the forces which Greece and Turkey are contributing, there will be a notable increase in the size of the forces assigned to NATO Supreme Commanders and a considerable improvement in their effectiveness. Training is being greatly improved at all levels.

The series of large scale maneuvers held during the last

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year has appreciably raised the standard of cooperation of the forces of the member countries; units are being better equipped and the organization of support forces is developing. The NATO military authorities consider that the attainment of the force goals in 1963, and the combined influence of these various factors, will add materially to the defensive strength of NATO during 1963.

Agreement was reached not only on the common financing of the second part (\$187,600,000) of the Fourth SLEW of the Infrastructure Program (the first part to the amount of about \$224,000,000 having been allotted at a Ministerial Meeting in December), but also on a cost-sharing formula which would cover future programs to be submitted by the Supreme Commander for the three-year period beginning in 1964, involving expenditure of up to \$700,000,000, subject to the approval of Parliaments. These programs will include a wide range of projects such as airfields, telecommunications, naval bases and port facilities, pipelines and radar installations. The military authorities of NATO now have a financial planning figure to which they can work for over three years. In addition, an improved system is ready to be put into operation to ensure closer financial supervision over the expenditure of common infrastructure funds.

AREAS OF MAJOR DEFICIENCIES, THE TASKS AHEAD, AND CONCLUSIONS

41. Now, in May 1963, the NATO nations, which were almost defenseless in 1950, can be justifiably proud in looking at their increased strength. They can be buoyed up by their accomplishments, not weighed down by their fears. The result should be an improvement in the morale of their peoples. Their seriousness of purpose and their

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strength of will should have been made clear to the world.

42. Yet pride in achievement must not blind us to the magnitude of the tasks ahead, nor hide our true military position today. The achievements during the past year have been considerable. They reflect great credit on the fourteen NATO nations, but the efforts of the last two years could all be wasted were we to relax now. There are still many gaps in our defense system which must be filled without delay if our homelands are to have that reasonable minimum of security which it has been NATO's primary purpose to achieve.

43. My predecessor reported in May 1962: "There is no real security yet achieved in Europe; there is only a beginning." Knowledge of the military situation today gives no grounds for believing that this security has been achieved, that the beginning, made a year ago, has now come so near to a successful ending that our efforts can be relaxed.

44. Northern Europe still lacks within its own resources the minimum forces required to give adequate chances of success against a major attack. The nations in that area will have to receive external assistance, and this is contemplated in our plans. The continuing magnitude of Soviet offensive capabilities in Northern Europe, and the special requirements for coordinating the military measures taken by the nations of that area with the contributions of other NATO partners to defense create a problem of unusual complexity and difficulty. The pattern of solution through collective action is being gradually clarified. Further efforts by all concerned are, however, required.

45. In Central Europe, we have made material progress. It is clear that the basic elements of strength to attain a capability for defense of that area can be found. What is required is the continued will and effort to convert this

potential into reality. If such effort is forthcoming, and especially if an early German contribution is provided, we can look forward to the day in the near future, when if attacked we could conduct a successful defense in that area.

46. Likewise in Southern Europe, the land forces are steadily improving and a successful defense appears attainable in the foreseeable future. There continues to exist a serious lack of support troops. This weakness must be remedied. Powerful naval forces could make a contribution of the greatest value, but the air forces here, as in other areas, are still dangerously short.

47. There are many measures that apply generally throughout the whole Western European area. Active land forces must be further increased. Those already in being must be better trained and backed by proper support troops, at present lacking. The system of training and mobilizing our reserve forces must insure that they are ready to face a professional enemy on equal terms. The naval forces must receive the escort vessels and minesweepers which will be vital for defense against a potential enemy strong in submarines and minelaying capability.

48. Our greatest weakness, however, is in the air. For the next year, at least, higher priority should be given to the air forces. Not only do we lack the number of modern aircraft indispensable for our defensive tasks, but in some countries, the development of an effective air warning and control system is only just beginning.

49. To establish a workable supply system the nations should plan to meet the requirements for their forces both from home production and through negotiation with other governments. National stocks, particularly of ammunition, should be increased from their present low level.

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50. The deficiencies I have noted are correctible, provided that timely action is taken and sustained. If this is done, this Command could be capable, within the near future, of effectively defending Western Europe against full-scale Soviet aggression. If these deficiencies remain substantially uncorrected, these requirements substantially unfulfilled, then Allied Command Europe will continue to be critically weak in its capability of accomplishing its present mission; the NATO nations of Europe will remain exposed to the peril of decisive military defeat with all its catastrophic consequences to them and to Western civilization.

51. Our present difficulties would be lessened through greater unity of effort. In the economic field, this would help solve the problems of military supply and equipment. In the political field, it would facilitate our efforts to mobilize all our available military resources.

52. In four years the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has demonstrated that free nations, working earnestly together, can achieve collective security. We have become seriously aware of the heavy sacrifices demanded to arm nations for defense. Today we are far from the plateau of security. We have merely gained the foothills leading to that plateau. A levelling off now, when we are far below minimum force requirements, may return our European peoples to that grim feeling of military weakness and futility of effort, only recently left behind.

53. During the last two years we have overcome the natural inertia which besets all human endeavors. We have imparted to the huge and complicated machinery of defense a momentum of incalculable power, the results of faith and growing strength. We must not lose that momentum. To do so would be to nullify all our labor and

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sacrifice, to repudiate our principles, and to perpetuate our peril. Were the momentum once lost, the efforts to restore it would be many times those we have so far made.

54. The most precious assets of our nations are their spiritual values and their youth. The most sacred obligations of governments are to nurture and preserve those values, and to assure that those lives shall not be hazarded through failure to recognize the depth of the threat ranged against us.

55. In his "First Annual Report, Supreme Allied Commander Europe," General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote: "In a world where powerful forces are working tirelessly to destroy the freedom, individual liberty, and dignity of man, we cannot for one moment delay our advance toward security." The powerful forces to which he referred were those controlled and directed by the Kremlin. "The Soviet Army," he wrote, "casts its shadow over the length and breadth of Europe."

56. The North Atlantic Council finds that this threat remains without fundamental change. In the light of these considerations, there cannot be, therefore, any valid military reason to justify a levelling-off of effort until we have progressed at least well beyond the goals now set for 1954.

57. With these conclusions, I believe all my Commanders-in-Chief and the senior members of the splendid international staff of Allied Command Europe will be found to concur. I wish to record that these officers are men of integrity, loyalty, professional competence and devotion to duty unsurpassed by any comparable group it has been my good fortune to know in my nearly forty years in the military service of the United States, and those forty years have been enriched by the privilege of heavy respon-

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

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
sibilities and by association with the military leaders of many nations.


58. Joined in devotion to the cause of peace and security of all we prize, convinced of the aim and the urgency of our individual efforts, we have now to sustain the momentum that has brought us thus far and to maintain our faith in the values we strive to defend.



M. B. RIDGWAY,
General, United States Army
Supreme Allied Commander Europe.







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DEFINITIONS

ASSIGNED FORCES

Forces in being which have been placed under the operational command of SACEMR.

MARKED FOR ASSIGNMENT

Forces which Nations have decided to assign to the operational command of a NATO commander at some future date in peace or automatically in the event of war.

MARKED FOR ASSIGNMENT ON MOBILIZATION

Forces specifically designated by Nations for assignment to a NATO commander in the event of mobilization or of war. In designating such forces Nations should specify how many days after "M" or "D" Day they will be available.

LEGEND

ASSIGNED
FORCES

MARKED
FORCES

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
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
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

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



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PRINCIPAL HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE








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2ND ALLIED TACTICAL AIR FORCE

1 SEPTEMBER 1953



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
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
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
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2ND ATAF

PART III OF III PARTS

1 SEPTEMBER 1953



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
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
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4TH ATAF PART I OF III PARTS

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
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4TH ATAF PART II OF II PARTS

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
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4TH ATAF

PART III OF II PARTS

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
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1 SEPTEMBER 1953



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
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ALLIED LAND FORCES SOUTHEAST EUROPE

GREEK ARMY

1 SEPTEMBER 1953




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FIRST TURKISH ARMY




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

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SECOND TURKISH ARMY



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


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ALLIED AIR FORCES SOUTHERN EUROPE

1 SEPTEMBER 1953



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
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NAVAL STRIKING FORCES SOUTHERN EUROPE

1 SEPTEMBER 1953



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General Alfred M. Greunther

33a

SHAPE'S HEADQUARTERS ALLIED FORCES EUROPE
PARIS, FRANCE

GENERAL ORDERS
NUMBER 1


11 July 1953

ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND

Pursuant to authority vested in me by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, I hereby assume command of Allied Command Europe.

Charles M. Twiss
ARTHUR M. TWISS
General, United States Army

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5 SACCHS.



General Lauris Norstad

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE
PARIS, FRANCE


AO 2071

20 November 1956

GENERAL ORDERS
NUMBER 12

ASSIGNMENT OF COMMAND

Pursuant to authority vested in me by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, I hereby assume command of Allied Command Europe, effective this date.


LAURIS NORSTAD
General, USAF

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE
PARIS, FRANCE


20 November 1956

TO : All Members of Allied Command Europe

In assuming command of Allied Command Europe, I am grateful for, and impressed with, the great opportunity it offers me to continue to work with you in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in whose cause I have implicit faith.

This Alliance, dedicated as it is to peace and the prevention of war, is unparalleled in history. Allied Command Europe has, by the superb efforts of past Supreme Commanders and those who have served under their command, become a vital instrument of the Free World for peace.

I pledge that I will do my utmost to live up to their example, and do so in full confidence that you will do likewise.


LAURIS NORSTAD
General, USAF

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The short film ALLIANCE FOR PEACE (1953)
and rare film footage chronicling the historical events related to the creation of SHAPE

Le court-métrage ALLIANCE FOR PEACE (1953)
et des séquences rares qui relatent les événements historiques concernant la genèse de SHAPE.

