

Draft Instructions to General Norstad

1. The basic objectives of allied policy in regard to Berlin are:

- (a) The maintenance of the presence and security of their forces in West Berlin.
- (b) The maintenance of the freedom and viability of West Berlin.
- (c) The maintenance of freedom of access to West Berlin.

2. Although attainment of the foregoing objectives will be sought through the application worldwide of non-military measures wherever possible, it is necessary to prepare for the contingency that such measures may not in themselves deter the Soviet Union or the so-called "German Democratic Republic" from taking action to block allied access to Berlin or otherwise infringe on basic allied rights. The Governments of France, the U.K. and the U.S., joined by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, are therefore determined to improve allied military posture as a clear indication of the capability and will to apply appropriate military measures if need be. The Four Powers are individually and collectively undertaking programmes to build added military strength for Europe and have requested other NATO allies to undertake comparable programmes.

3. The purpose of the following planning instructions is to modify and amplify the terms of reference given the military authorities of the Three Powers on April 4, 1969, within which tripartite planning is currently being conducted under your general supervision in your capacity as Commander-in-Chief, United States Forces, Europe.

General Considerations

1. The following considerations should underlie the preparation of plans:

- A. The military actions within the competence of SACEUR whether within the framework of Live Oak or the larger framework of the Allied Command in Europe, will have to be integrated into a general, overall strategy applicable on a worldwide scale and comprising political, diplomatic, economic, psychological, military and parliamentary measures. The selective application of these measures, both worldwide and in Europe, would contribute to our purpose of arriving at a settlement of the problem of Berlin while progressively making the Soviets aware of the danger of general war.
- B. Allied military measures to restore access to Berlin should be graduated but determined, applying increasing pressure which will present with unmistakable clarity to the Soviets the enormous risks involved in continued denial of access. At the same time, they should leave the Soviet Government as many opportunities as possible to pause and reassess the desirability of continuing on a dangerous course of action.
- C. Any military operation risks rapid escalation and/or
/pre-emptive

pre-emptive enemy action. Therefore, while the immediate political objective of all actions will be to induce the Soviets to re-open access, military plans must take account of and be consistent with current defensive concepts of NATO strategy. They must, therefore, retain the survival of the Western allies as a central consideration, and they must not commit capabilities to the prejudice of the overall capacity to defend NATO territory. The magnitude of resources which might be committed in operations at allied initiative in reaction to Soviet moves would depend on results of the Allied build-up as well as circumstances existing at the time.

D. The Alliance will stand ready for nuclear action at all times. However, planned recourse to nuclear weapons in these operations can be envisaged only under the three circumstances of

- (1) prior use by the enemy,
- (2) the necessity to avoid defeat of major military operations, and
- (3) a specific political decision to employ nuclear weapons selectively in order to demonstrate the will and ability of the Alliance to use them.
(See paragraph 6(b)(3)).

5. Revision of Present Plans - (Live Oak and Berlin Defence Plan).

A. Existing tripartite plans and agreements, which retain their present status, should be modified as necessary and kept current. These include (without prejudice to the sequence of execution) the following:

- (1) Plans for small-scale ground probes to determine Soviet intentions (Tree Style).
- (2) Plans for more extensive use of ground forces (Trade Wind).
- (3) Plans to implement airlift operations (Jack Pine I and QBAL).
- (4) Plans to utilise tactical air forces to support airlift operations as appropriate (Jack Pine II).
- (5) Berlin Defense Plan (Ops instruction No. 7 Allied Staff Berlin). This will require co-ordination between Live Oak and the three Ambassadors in Bonn.
- (6) Agreements related to the preparation and tactical control of the forces involved in these plans.

B. Because of the immediate threats that the recent Soviet Notes hold over air access, examination of plans relative to airlifts should receive priority.

6. Additional Military Plans

- (a) For the purpose of providing as great a choice as possible

SECRET

SECRET

-3-

possible of supplementary alternatives, it is requested that you should prepare and submit for Governmental approval additional military plans covering broader land, air or naval measures within the purview of your command. In each case, the expected advantages and estimated risks should be set out in specific terms to accompany plans. It would be understood that the execution of approved plans would be the subject of separate political decisions to be taken at the time.

- (b) In particular it is requested that you study urgently and submit recommended plans to provide for the following:-
 - (1) Expanded non-nuclear air operations;
 - (2) Expanded non-nuclear ground operations with necessary air support;
 - (3) The selective use of nuclear weapons to demonstrate the will and ability of the Alliance to use them.
- (c) In connexion with your naval planning you will be kept informed of studies now under way in Washington regarding worldwide blockade and lesser measures.

7. Questions of Organisation and Competence

As regards questions of organisation and of competence, the following points should be taken into consideration:-

- (a) You should make arrangements to establish permanent liaison with the Ambassadorial Group in Washington.
- (b) You should make recommendations concerning means of assuring continuity of military control during transition from tripartite Berlin measures to control by established NATO machinery.
- (c) While you may proceed forthwith to carry out these instructions, the Governments concerned will take steps to effect co-ordination with the appropriate NATO authorities regarding those provisions which fall within NATO competence.

United Kingdom Delegation to NATO,

PARIS,

September 4, 1961.

SECRET