Building Integrity in Operations

ACO Handbook

February 2020
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NATO is a political-military alliance. In a world that evolves constantly, with new challenges to face, the Organization continues to adapt to increase NATO’s readiness and its ability to deliver security to its member Nations. At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, NATO Heads of State and Government endorsed the NATO Building Integrity Policy with the purpose of reaffirming that transparent and accountable institutions under democratic control are fundamental to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and are critical for international security cooperation.

In this context Building Integrity, which includes transparency, accountability and counter corruption, contributes therefore to the success of the three Alliance core tasks and is a key element of all Alliance activities. The importance of implementing measures to improve integrity building, anti-corruption and good governance applies to NATO, Allies and partners alike. In particular the military cannot ignore the impact of corruption as a security risk and a driver for instability. Indeed, corruption is a key feature of all conflicts playing a pivotal role in the power dynamics of competing groups for resources and power. Therefore, countering corruption has to be an integrated aspect of conflict resolution, but it is often seen as a government only issue. It needs to be integrated across all NATO political, economic and military lines of activity. As host nation security forces are often better resourced than other government institutions, countering corruption and institutionalising integrity within their security force is necessary to maintain public trust and build credibility.

This ACO Building Integrity Handbook is part of an overall programme of NATO endeavours to raise awareness and create a more comprehensive appreciation, among Military and Civilian staff across the NATO Command and Force structure, of the risks and impact of corruption on a military mission. The handbook is in line with the five core values in the NATO Code of Conduct, and the principles that exemplify them guide us in keeping the professional standards of NATO and our ethical values in line with best practices. It is estimated today by independent sources that 20% of the $1.74 trillion Global Military Expenditure is lost through corruption which equates to an astounding $400 billion. The alarming financial loss to defence and the knock-on effects on security are acute and dangerous. Corruption can allow for the deployment of inappropriate equipment, reduced combat capability and a generic undermining of the trust in armed forces and governments.

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1 HMG Government Counter Fraud Profession - Issue 1 Feb 2019: The Public Sector Counter Fraud Journal - pg6 “Complacency, the enemy of Integrity”
I am therefore delighted to introduce the first ACO Building Integrity Handbook. Although the handbook has been written for NATO operational level, it is applicable to strategic and tactical levels alike. I would encourage every NATO ACO staff member to read this Handbook and embrace the lessons and values contained therein.

Finally, I would like to thank all those from across NATO who have contributed to this and to Non-NATO entities whose endeavours and collaboration is greatly appreciated.

Olivier Rittimann  
Lieutenant General, FRA A  
SHAPE Vice Chief of Staff

Disclaimer
The importance of addressing Building Integrity in NATO operations and missions has been recognized by the NATO Military Committee. Further revisions of this ACO Handbook to align it with upcoming reference documents and guidance are envisioned.

This document is compiled from a range of sources as listed in Annex A; full credit is given to the authors. Information is structured to provide awareness and to be of practical use to NATO personnel. This document will be subject to periodic review. Feedback and inputs can be reported to SHAPE BI Working Group Chairman (SHAPEPDJ9CL@shape.nato.int)
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Introduction and Overview

Aim

The purpose of this handbook is to raise awareness of the risks and impact of corruption associated with a military mission. It aims to create a better understanding of Building Integrity implications in NATO operations, missions and activities across all personnel in the NATO Command and Force Structure. This is a tool to support Building Integrity efforts including good governance, transparency, accountability and integrity across the full spectrum of operations and routine business.

How we apply our processes and everyday behaviours will improve our effectiveness in operations – application of these processes through the lens of our own moral integrity is key.

This handbook can be used to help stay out NATO Forces from exacerbating the risks of corruption in an area of operations by preventing, detecting and responding to Transparency, Accountability and Counter-Corruption (TACC) issues.

Integrity is the link between behaviour and principles. In institutional terms, integrity is directly linked to good governance. Reinforcing an organisation’s integrity requires embedding Building Integrity principles, as well as socialising these norms and values among personnel.

Target Audience

The main target audience for this handbook is at the NATO operational level, but it can also be of benefit at the strategic and tactical levels. The handbook is applicable to NATO personnel, as well as partner nation’s personnel who contribute to NATO’s operations and missions. It may also be a good source of information for other International Organisations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).

A glossary of terms and definitions is at Annex B.

What is Corruption?

"Corruption is the abuse of public resources, entrusted power or authority for private gain."

Corruption in all its forms and levels is not new - it is inherent across all elements of society and cultures. Corruption is generally associated with illegal payments, fraud and embezzlement to gain personal benefits, ranging from small- to grand-scale and ‘state capture’. Corruption also includes: redirecting

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2 There is no agreed NATO definition of corruption. The term ‘private’ includes: families; clans; communities; organisations and militias. The ‘gain’ or ‘benefit’ can be: financial; political; and many other aspects, including demanding sexual favours.

3 ‘State capture’ is a type of systemic political corruption in which private interests influence a state’s decision-making processes significantly, to their own advantage.
funds, patronage, illicit expenditures, special protection, misuse or abuse of authority, position and power for political or personal gains. For example, powerbrokers exploit the weaknesses of political and economic systems for political, territorial or factional purposes.

Levels and Forms of Corruption

There are many ways societies or situations can provide fertile ground to facilitate a culture which enables corruption to thrive. For example, societies fractured by crime, violence and conflict, weak governance and rule of law institutions and the dependence on international aid to sustain the national economy, can all increase vulnerability to corruption.

There are different levels or scales of corruption, ranging from small-scale everyday corruption to large-scale institutionalised corruption. In general we can identify the following levels of corruption:

**Petty corruption**: everyday small-scale corruption, for example for the provision of goods or services.

**Systemic corruption**: exists within a structure due to the lack of oversight or organisational and procedural weaknesses.

**Criminal corruption**: involves criminals or organisations extorting money or resources in exchange for protection or preferential access to business opportunities.

**Grand corruption**: takes place at the highest levels of government, requiring significant involvement of high-level political, legal and economic entities.

Although we can identify different levels or scales of corruption, this does not mean the different levels cannot be interconnected. Particularly in highly-corrupt environments there can be a vertical integration, connecting the highest and lowest levels of corruption.

Corruption undermines government credibility, legitimacy and accountability. In many cases, countries with a high level of corruption also show a high level of fragility, insecurity and criminal activities. Furthermore, corruption in government institutions hampers the provision of basic services and the establishment of the rule of law. To date there has only been limited success in countering high level political corruption.

Corruption was a key factor contributing to the failings of international interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the words of Ryan Croker, former United States Ambassador to Afghanistan:

“The ultimate point of failure for our efforts…wasn’t an insurgency. It was the
For countering corruption to be successful in government institutions, it requires political ownership and the will to reform. In addition to training and education, this requires a team of committed people who are willing and able to drive and promote positive changes that strengthen and reinforce ethical values and behaviours. Combined with legal guidance and assistance, this will ensure transparency, accountability and the implementation of robust procedures and reporting structures.

One of the mistakes often made in countering corruption is to focus on constraining illegal and unethical behaviour, without promoting positive developments and results. A big step towards building political credibility is the use of a clear and well-defined ethical framework for individual decision-making at all levels. This ethical framework provides guidance about what is and is not acceptable behaviour, and how to deal with moral dilemmas - this makes unethical behaviour more distinguishable.

Although there is a distinct difference between ‘corruption for need’ and ‘corruption for greed’, both undermine and disrupt societal unity and are a basis for conflict and instability. A tolerance to low level corruption can result in desensitisation and has the potential to lead to higher levels, where the opportunity arises. Corruption and fraud⁴ are often linked. The fraud triangle is a framework designed to explain the reasoning behind the decision to commit fraud, with opportunity a key aspect.

![The Fraud Triangle](image)

**Other Forms of Corruption**

**Bribery**

Bribery is offering, promising, giving, accepting or soliciting of an advantage as an inducement for an action which is illegal, unethical or a breach of trust. Inducements can take the form of gifts,

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⁴ Definition of fraud, World Bank Group (Fraud and Corruption Awareness Handbook): “A fraudulent practice is any act or omission, including a misrepresentation, that knowingly or Recklessly misleads, or attempts to mislead, a party to obtain a financial or other benefit or to avoid an obligation”
loans, fees, rewards or other advantages (taxes, services, donations)⁵. As it generally involves an individual offering, someone accepting, and potentially specialists or intermediaries acting as facilitators, it is transactional in nature and all parties will be complicit.

Theft
Theft is the action or crime of stealing and can take many forms, such as larceny, identity theft, robbery and fraud. It is important to understand the criminal laws related to this offence, within the area of operations.

Embezzlement or Misappropriation of Property
Embezzlement or misappropriation is the diversion of any property, public/private funds or securities or any other thing of value, entrusted to the public official by virtue of their position, for their benefit or for the benefit of another person or entity.

Illicit Enrichment
Illicit enrichment is a significant increase in the assets of a public official that they cannot reasonably explain in relation to their lawful income.

Abuse of Function
The abuse of function or position is the performance of or failure to perform, an act in violation of laws, by a public official in the discharge of their function, to obtain an undue advantage for them, or for another person or entity.

What is Building Integrity
Corruption can lead to instability and corrosion of the operational effectiveness of national security forces. Corruption is widespread but its impact on security and stability is often overlooked and insufficiently addressed. NATO members recognise corruption as a security risk. In 2016, at the Warsaw Summit, NATO’s Heads of State and Government endorsed the Building Integrity policy, stating that:

Corruption and poor governance are security challenges which undermine democracy, the rule of law and economic development. The importance of implementing measures to improve integrity building, anti-corruption and good governance applies to NATO, Allies and partners alike. To further our work in this area, today we endorse a new Building Integrity Policy which reaffirms our conviction that transparent, accountable defence institutions under democratic control are fundamental to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and essential to international security cooperation.

⁵ Transparency International Plain Language Guide (July 2009).

NATO Warsaw Summit Communiqué
In institutional terms, integrity is linked directly to good governance. Reinforcing NATO’s integrity is a question of institutionalising the norms and principles we want and stand for, as well as socialising these among our personnel. Transparent and accountable defence institutions, under democratic control, are fundamental to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond, and are essential for international peace, security and stability.

Building Integrity is part of NATO’s commitment and effort to strengthen integrity, transparency and accountability in the defence and related security sector. Integrity is the link between behaviour and principles.

Within the framework of its Building Integrity programme, NATO works to support Allies and partner nations to promote and implement the principles of integrity, transparency, and accountability. It does so, in accordance with international norms and good practices established for the defence and related security sector.

The development of the NATO Building Integrity Policy and Action Plan provides a strategic approach to good governance in the defence and related security sector, setting out concrete steps to make Building Integrity conceptually robust and operational, across NATO’s political and military lines of effort. Based on this Action Plan, the work was directed at mainstreaming Building Integrity principles into fulfilling NATO’s three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. These efforts contribute to strengthening institutional structures and practices as well as enhancing the skills of individuals.

Building Integrity is the process of institutionalising and socialising the norms and moral principles, through processes and procedures which NATO would wish to be identified with and known for. The three focus areas for NATO Building Integrity programme are: financial and human resource management, administration and leadership.

Basically, integrity requires individuals to put institutional interests above their own, making it part of their own personal standards.

Integrity is defined as the quality of being honest and having strong moral principles, values and norms that you refuse to change - it is the link between behaviour and principles. In institutional terms, integrity is linked directly to good governance as well as transparency and accountability.

Integrity is reflected at three levels: the political level, the organisational level and the personal level. Whilst concep-
tually at different levels, they can be interrelated; for example, a lack of personal integrity can affect organisational and political integrity adversely. A pictorial representation of the levels of integrity is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Levels of integrity

Levels of integrity

Personal Code of Conduct
A Code of Conduct is a set of written rules outlining the norms, principles, values, responsibilities and proper practices of an individual within an organisation. This can be based on concepts including ethics, honour, moral codes and religious laws. In the security context this includes international law, the law of armed conflict, national law, military traditions and military ethical codes.

NATO’s five core values - integrity, impartiality, professionalism, accountability and loyalty, guide the conduct of all NATO staff, civilian and military.

These core values form the basis of the NATO Code of Conduct. It describes the skills and competencies required for all NATO staff, military and civilian, to fulfil their mission successfully. It is the framework for personal and professional conduct within NATO.

Leadership
Leadership’s commitment to Building Integrity is paramount. Leaders need to understand the impact corruption can have on their mission and how their mission can impact corruption. They
need to be able to identify, know how to counter, and guard against fuelling corruption. Commanders must track spending and spending effects on the level of corruption and how this influences the perception of the local population and political will. A lack of consideration of corruption by the military leadership will enable corruption and malign activities to flourish.

Force structures are focused on the traditional forms of combat, and some military regard corruption as a civilian governance issue only. Nevertheless, the military are normally the first and only actors that can operate in a conflict or crisis situation. The early phases of a crisis or conflict are critical to the development of corruption, setting the conditions for long-term stability. Considering their mandate and short-term military objectives, it may be unrealistic to expect a reduction in the level of corruption within the timeframe of the mission. Therefore, although civil expertise should be in the lead of the long-term solutions planning, close involvement and liaison with military expertise is required during the early stages of the planning and execution to generate military counter-corruption initiatives.

In the early phases of an operation, military leaders have to deal with local powerbrokers and armed groups as they tend to control access to vital resources, logistic lines and can provide valuable information. Over time, there should be a plan to cut off engagement with corrupt actors and a strategy developed to limit their influence and change their behaviour. Concurrently, the military must support and protect reformers, whistle-blowers and civil society organisations.

To prevent corruption hampering mission success, military leadership need to outline their intent, direction and guidance (leading by example). This can be through committed and visible engagement, clear guidance on accountability, transparency and how to report suspicion of corruption. Training and education on countering corruption, ethical standards and integrity issues should be undertaken. Accountability for one’s own forces creates a culture of transparency and demonstrates high standards of behaviour.

Military leaders need to consider possible corruption within the military mission itself. This can occur when military are directly or indirectly involved in corrupt activities. For example, when working with corrupt local actors, ignoring clear signs of corruption or failing to report it. Under these circumstances, military leadership needs to speak out and demonstrate the importance of countering corruption.

It can be difficult for the military to address corruption due to the fear of
repercussions and the sensitivity of the issue. Reluctance can be overcome by addressing the topic routinely during discussions, meetings and focused workshops whilst affirming corruption as unacceptable.

**Organisational Good Governance**

Governance is the structure of mechanisms, processes and institutions to exercise economic, political and administrative authority to manage the activities of a state, at all levels. In many cases, the root cause of conflict and crisis is a lack of good governance. Good governance helps to minimise corruption. Corrupt government officials and institutions affect the trustworthiness of a government and impede good governance. The responsibility for establishing good governance is principally a task for national government, but in fragile states, governments may need support from the international community. The style of governance is influenced strongly by national and cultural aspects. Good governance, as defined by the UN, should be participatory, consensus-oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable, inclusive and in line with the rule of law.

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**Political Rule of Law**

The rule of law is one of the basic principles of good governance. Laws must be transparent and apply equally to everyone. All persons, organisations and the state itself are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and are consistent with international human rights. Characteristics of a fragile rule of law are a weak judicial system caused by political interference not only by unclear laws and procedures, but also justice systems that are influenced by criminal actors and organisations. This can result in unequal access to justice and in extreme cases, impunity. Countering corruption is challenging without the rule of law in place. An inadequate rule of law can exist when power is concentrated in the

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“Endemic Afghan government corruption has undermined the sustainability of hard-won gains by Western forces. In rural communities where local power-holders and their militias in the guise of officialdom commonly preyed on the people, government corruption proved a major aid for insurgent recruitment. Corruption has eaten away at the Afghan security forces and undermined the operational effectiveness of the army and police”.

Theo Farrell, Unwinnable. Britain’s war in Afghanistan 2001 - 2014Political
hands of a few and where transparent decision-making is lacking.

Impunity starts at the top and influences the entire system. Laws can be in place but the implementation can be patchy, slow or even non-existent. People will lose faith in the judicial system and their government, leading to disillusionment. Ultimately, it can fuel crime and insurgency. When powerbrokers start influencing and controlling the rule of law, this can have serious consequences, leading to impunity for crimes and abuse of human rights. Where weak rule of law exists it is much easier to bribe a judge than to hire a lawyer.

The international community can act in concert with the host nation, to confront, isolate, pressure and remove funds from these powerbrokers and where appropriate, initiate their prosecution.

To develop and ensure the rule of law in a state, a number of conditions and measures need to be in-place. This includes the supremacy of law, whereby every individual and organisation is equally accountable to the law. Laws and procedures need to be clear, transparent, published, fair and evenly applied, and provide legal certainty. Participation in decision-making and a system of checks and balances, together with the separation of powers, supports the establishment of the rule of law. Effective counter-corruption laws will strengthen legitimacy and credibility of the rule of law and government institutions.

**Corruption and Operations**

Corruption can undermine and invalidate a well-planned security strategy. Corruption can be extremely complex and a risk for any military operation - ranging from combat, counter-insurgency, security force assistance to peace support operations. It can undermine the ability of the mission to achieve its objectives, including the loss of legitimacy.

Often within a security context, corruption is viewed incorrectly as a marginal issue and something civilians should deal with. The defence and security sector are not exempt from corruption, leading to waste of scarce resources, reduced operational effectiveness and erosion of public trust. There is a clear need to take a more systematic and structured approach to reducing the risks of corruption related to a military mission. This requires not only an in-depth understanding of corruption, but also the related cultural and social aspects. There will never be a ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution. Leadership must not only understand the political dynamics but also the impact of corruption, the
root causes, drivers and types of corruption, and their links to societies and institutions. The most relevant forms of corruption encountered on operations are: bribery; theft; procurement and contracting fraud; exploitation of local staff; kickbacks; nepotism; abuse of discretion; electoral fraud; improper disposal of assets; and also forms of patronage in recruitment and promotions. A commander needs to ensure that all of the staff, especially planners, logisticians, financial and intelligence personnel, are properly trained and educated to conduct corruption risk assessments. When the military deploy in a crisis or conflict area, it can have a huge impact on the local economy and resources. If the military purchases goods, services and labour locally or imports them, it will have an impact on the local economy and can be a driver of corruption; for example, when contracts are rewarded, directly or indirectly, to corrupt actors and organisations. Attention to and knowledge of, reasonable pricing of goods as well as promoting fair competition in the mission area are also factors that military contracting should consider. Conversely, purchasing from international contractors can, due to logistic difficulties, result in exploitation of the situation leading to higher prices for services and products. The withdrawal of a mission, if not properly completed, can also generate corruption. The military approach to corruption prior to, during and at the end of a deployment, is critical for mission success. Ignoring corruption carries the risk of being seen as complicit, or even as another corrupt actor contributing to the problem. Counter-corruption campaigns directed at specific individuals can be effective in responding to corrupt behaviour. However, they can also be seen as an indicator of political interference and may lead to losing sight of institutional corruption issues.

When the military are operating in a highly corrupt environment, careless engagements with corrupt actors can lead to the perception of being complicit in corruption or being seen as corrupt. **A mission can have an impact on corruption and corruption can have an impact on a mission and ultimately mission success.** When ignoring the impact of corruption, a mission can fund its own failure.

In all stages of an operation the military mind-set should be ‘do no harm’. The ‘do no harm’ principle refers to the need to identify unanticipated or unintended consequences; there is a need to look at potential second and third-order effects to all actions.

The urge to establish short-term success can lead to long-term instability if a military mission is identified by the local population as a key enabler for
local powerbrokers and a driving factor of large-scale corruption. The loss of credibility and trust for the military in the eyes of the local population will hamper the establishment of long-term mission success. Countering corruption is a long-term effort and requires a comprehensive approach by a wide range of individuals and organisations. The military should always consider their overall impact on the area of operations, and set clear and culturally-balanced conditions and integrate proven best practices.

The Afghan government cannot survive financially or militarily without continued external assistance, and with those donor funds comes the dual risk of losing money to corruption, as well as contributing to fostering corruption by distorting the economy.”

SIGAR, Inspector General John Sopko

Transparency, Accountability and Counter Corruption (TACC)

Transparency, Accountability and Counter-Corruption (TACC) are three important aspects to consider in the fight against corruption. To enforce these requires commitment of the respective actors in government, security forces, private sector and actors of the civil society. For the military, their role in the context of TACC needs to be captured in doctrine and training. It must be integrated fully by the military leadership in planning and operations, procurement, contracting and human resource management.

Transparency

Transparency is a key component to demonstrate honesty, openness and to build trust. For example, making administrative processes public i.e. recruitment, promotion, award of contracts, financial statements. Transparency enables society to be informed on the mechanics of institutional decision making. It also implies holding people, especially public and government officials, accountable for their actions.

Accountability

Accountability means making individuals responsible for their actions and how they perform their duties. This can be achieved through control, verification processes and sanctions against illegal or corrupt behaviour. Accountability is most effective when applied equally. Organisations and public institutions are generally viewed as more legitimate, trustworthy and respectable when they are accountable - it is one of the cornerstones for sustainable development and long-term stability.
Counter-Corruption

Transparency and accountability can require reinforcement by additional measures preventing and reducing opportunities for corruption and countering existing corruption. This may include investigating corrupt activities and actors, and an effective and independent legal and judiciary system. When countering corruption ‘money flows’ form a key element, in addition to determining the funds’ final destination. Countering corruption is used in the context of corrective measures, sanctions and deterrence. Countering corruption also relies on the effectiveness of the inplace legal and judicial systems.

Corruption Risk Awareness in Theatre of Operation

Individuals contributing to the planning and execution of a military mission should consider corruption risks at all phases and mitigate its impact on the mission. Corruption can arise in many areas in the theatre of operation.

Examples of indicators of corruption can be found at Annex C.

Cultural Context

Aversion to corruption is universal; however, different nations, societies, cultures and groups have varying views of what constitutes corruption and different tolerance levels. Opponents will also seek to expose and highlight any acceptance of corruption to support their narrative. It is important to develop a proper understanding of the environment, concurrent with the positions and relationships between the different actors and organisations involved in corruption. This reduces the detrimental effect of corruption on a mission, reduces the chance of exacerbating the problem, and assists with tackling it.

Criminal patronage networks (CPN)

Patronage networks can be a strong societal force, based on ethnicity, religion or tribe; they exist in all societies. These networks can include traditional elites, heads of political parties or powerful leaders in government, business or military. They can also be the basis of support for criminal activities, or used for illegal enhancement of political power – they can be engaged in the capture and subversion of critical state functions and institutions. This can result in diversion of revenues and humanitarian aid, as well as international economic theft. Patronage networks can also profit from illegal exploitation of national resources and narcotics. Political patronage can migrate into criminal patronage when powerbrokers control criminal enterprises and networks. CPN present the most destabilising forms of corruption, especially when it
has political protection, allowing a degree of impunity. The leaders of these networks, the powerbrokers, will seek to control key state assets and institutions to pursue their criminal and political agendas. They will provide protection and resources to individuals who support their agenda and hamper or kill those who do not. Powerbrokers do not always create stability.

CPN can be part of the host nation’s infrastructure. It is a sensitive but vital area, with possible strategic detrimental effect on mission success. It is essential to map CPN relationships and their impact on the tasks of the mission at strategic, operational and tactical level.

CPN can also undermine governments. For example, it can be difficult or almost impossible to do business or attain public services without the support of a powerbroker. Furthermore, to maintain their position, powerbrokers can have links with, and support, criminal organisations and illegal extremist groups. As a result of their huge influence on societies, powerbrokers can often be closely involved in, or awarded, contracts from international donors, further increasing their power and influence.

Factionalism
Factionalism is the process of developing a cohesive band of people within a larger group, based on mutual interests or opinions, including ethnic, cultural, tribal, political or religious aspects. Factionalism can be connected to CPN and powerbrokers. These corrupt networks provide jobs, humanitarian aid and other benefits to their group, to the exclusion of others. Furthermore, they can have their own militia to protect them against external threats. They tend to evolve into a predatory group, not only attacking external threats but also extorting their own group.

Ethnic, religious and other forms of coercion can be fuelled by corruption; this can lead to a cycle of violence and instability, and is more prevalent when post-conflict political settlements are based on factionalism. It is likely to generate a short-term struggle for power, resources and profits, hampering structural governmental and economic development. If national security forces are dominated by, for example one ethnical group, this can lead to factional-based corruption. Non-representative security forces also increase the risk of instability.

Election Fraud
Within the international community, elections are seen as essential in establishing legitimate governance, with a popular mandate, enabling sustainable development and stability. In fragile or failing states dominated by powerbrokers, biased elections can further entrench corruption. Elections can be used
by powerbrokers, through a series of political settlements, to extend their influence, corrupt structures, and impede the achievement of long-term stability.

Powerbrokers start preparing for elections well in advance. Utilising manipulation, backroom deals and violence, they strive to maintain or even extend their influence. Prior to, and during elections, voter registration can be manipulated and voters intimidated. Large-scale election fraud takes place to ensure the results of the election are aligned with the interest of the powerbrokers.

Even after an election, existing powerbrokers may use their protégées to provide a façade of regime change. They can also rotate key positions and senior posts, giving the illusion of change whilst continuing old structures in a different guise.

In the lead up to the 2009 election there were numerous reports of voter registration cards for sale on the black market; on the eve of the election, a BBC reporter was offered a thousand such voter cards for sale at $10 apiece. People were commonly registered at multiple polling centres, and men collected stacks of voting cards for female relatives who did not exist.

Theo Farrell, Unwinnable. Britain’s War in Afghanistan 2001 - 2014

Organised Crime
Organised crime encompasses criminal activities that are planned and controlled by powerful groups and carried out on a large scale. Organised crime exists in every country, with a growing trend towards transnationalism, particularly in fragile or failing states. Generally, organised crime is considered to be a law enforcement problem. However, it crosses political and military boundaries in complex security environments, where close links between insurgents, terrorists and organised crime exist.

Failure to protect the population from organised crime can lead the people to seek alternative structures for their basic services or even turn to organised crime. This can further weaken the state’s legitimacy. When government and security force officials are also involved in organised crime, a vicious circle is formed, diverting funding for equipment and salaries away from the security forces. This lowers the morale and willingness to fight, and can even turn them into criminal organisations themselves.

Narcotics
The production, smuggling and distribution of illicit drugs provide fertile ground for different forms of corruption, varying from small-scale bribery to large-scale infiltration of government institutions. Corruption facilitates the
production and trafficking, and in turn illegal drugs support and generate corruption. These funds can be used to bribe government officials and security forces, to prevent arrest and prosecution. Insurgents and terrorist groups often have symbiotic relationships with narcotics networks as a means to finance their activities.

**Exploitation of Natural Assets and Resources**

Exploitation of natural resources for personal gain can lead to instability and violence, and again forms a potential funding stream for nefarious actors and organisations. When resource management is corrupt, this can have a negative effect on the development and use of resources, and may also require militias and armed groups to protect the resources.

**Land and Title Expropriation**

As land provides a source of wealth, corrupt individuals and criminal organisations aim to exploit this. Lack of records (including land ownership deeds), weak governance and judicial structures, together with corruption can result in land ownership disputes.

**Border Control Corruption**

Border control is an important state activity carried out by security forces to ensure that only authorised and legitimate goods and people can enter or leave a state. Corruption amongst border officials can have severe implications, hampering economic development due to extra ‘fees’ or ‘taxes’ raising logistics costs. They can also facilitate transnational criminal-terrorist movement. Corrupt activities can range from ‘looking the other way’, providing classified information, hampering investigations and tampering with evidence, to full involvement in smuggling and related criminal activities.

**Misuse of Foreign Aid**

Foreign aid exploitation attracts powerbrokers, criminals and other nefarious actors aiming to benefit. High level positions and other jobs within the government and related organisations, dealing with the flow of aid and money, are the most desirable jobs, presenting opportunities not only to skim, divert or steal aid but also ensure that projects are assigned to particular organisations or individuals. Foreign aid can also be a driver of instability, providing a lucrative source of income for powerbrokers and corrupt government officials. Nefarious individuals or groups will aim to keep money and aid flowing as a consistent funding stream. Instability and crisis can generate foreign aid, and the ‘economy of instability’ will aid those who profit, whilst potentially generating grievances.

**Corrupt Security Forces and Militias**

In fragile, failing or failed states, governments have little control over the use
of force. In some cases the reach of the security forces may be limited to creating a power vacuum in ungoverned spaces. For local populations, the police are the first responders, interacting on a daily basis. However, in fragile states police may lack training, proper education and receive poor salaries. Ungoverned space can be filled by power-brokers, armed groups, insurgents and criminals, who may have the means to provide corrupt income to the police in exchange for their support. Low-level corruption supplementing income can migrate into a systemic problem, leading to the police being viewed as the problem. Additionally, powerbrokers may own their own militias but could also influence national security forces; this creates issues over allegiance.

This predatory behaviour undermines the already weak trust and credibility of government institutions and forces the population into supporting powerbrokers and nefarious actors. This can also extend to private security companies that may be militias under another name, but with some form of legal basis.

In conflict and post-conflict situations, the funding of security forces can be provided by other nations or international organisations. This inflow of foreign money provides further opportunities for large-scale corruption. Money and resources can be diverted, equipment stolen, salaries skimmed or the number of troops receiving salary inflated through creating ‘ghost soldiers’. This provides criminal organisations and extremists with further opportunities to infiltrate and influence the security forces. This can have a negative impact on the operational effectiveness and morale of the security forces and can contribute to the loss of trust and credibility of both the government and security forces.

Practices such as selling valuable fuel on the civilian black market and the embezzlement of money meant for food reduce readiness and willingness to fight. “Corruption takes more than soldiers’ food rations. It takes their dignity and self-respect as well”, an Iraqi officer explained. These units are left with a command climate where illicit payments are more important than effective operations or combat performance.

Abbas and Trombly. Quoted in Blood Year (2016)

Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
Sexual exploitation and abuse is illegal, can undermine campaign authority, and must be reported if suspected. Sexual exploitation is any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes including but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another.
From a corruption perspective, this can include trading for sex, sexual harassment or sexual extortion.

At Annex D there is an abstract of the UN Commanders’ Guide containing a list of sexual abuse and exploitation examples, and a guide on how to deal with them.

Exploitation of Local Staff
There is no universally agreed definition on the exploitation of people, but vulnerable local staff may be exploited through coercion to provide forced labour or services. Exploitation can also include corrupt recruitment, transportation, transfers, and the illegal provision of payments and benefits.

Corruption in Contracting Processes
Corruption at the highest level can manifest itself in a way that the host nation elite are able to influence and shape state decisions illicitly; this is called ‘state capture’. Corruption of this nature can occur when there is a conflict of interest; when unauthorised government officials can influence procurement and contracting for personal enrichment.

Corruption during Withdrawal of Mission
The conditions must be set for transfer of authority prior to withdrawing from a mission. This should include conducting an evaluation process that confirms the capabilities and performance of the host nation. Corruption thresholds should be established to determine if the host nation has suitable and sustainable TACC processes in-place, and that premature transition will not lead to long-term systemic problems.

Asset Disposal
The disposal of assets involves eliminating assets from accounting records and can be conducted through three processes: no proceeds, fully depreciated; loss on sale; and gain on sale. It is a key vulnerability when dealing with countering corruption and must have effective oversight.

Key Functions and Activities Susceptible To or Impacting On Corruption
There are a number of key functions and activities in the planning and execution of the mission that are particularly susceptible to or impact on corruption. Once established, corruption is more difficult to eliminate. Countering corruption must be considered at the outset and requires long-term effort, often without obvious short-term results. It requires careful management of internal and external expectations of success. A roadmap with a specific timeframe, including key milestones, can be used to visualise and manage these expectations. A corruption checklist

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7 Commanders’ guide on measures to combat Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations military, 2017
Assessment is at Annex E providing a useful guide to understanding Building Integrity issues in the efforts to counter corruption.

Analysis, assessment, planning, education, human resource management, finance and contracting, strategic communications, provost marshal are integral areas where effective early measures should be taken, to minimise opportunities for corruption.

Analysis and Assessment

Social, economic knowledge assessment is required to develop an understanding of the roots and drivers of corruption, and local trends. Independent sources of information should be used to prevent manipulation by corrupt actors to cover their activities.

The impact of corruption needs to be assessed from the outset of an operation. Situational awareness and understanding needs to be developed to ascertain the possible impact of corruption, whilst an in-depth understanding of the operational environment is critical to mitigate the corruption risks. Host nation intelligence services could be involved on corrupted behaviours, by willingness or because of their access to vital economic and political information which makes them an attractive target for corrupt actors, particularly in post-conflict situations.

Planning Process Considerations

Throughout the planning process, operational challenges need to be considered through the prism of potential corruption. Consider the impact of actions on corruption and how they could be exploited for illegal gain or used by opponents; do the actions support or hamper countering corruption. How will they be perceived by the local population, should also be considered.

At the earliest opportunity there must be a common understanding of the possible relationships between corruption and the causes and drivers of the crisis. Based on this, the risks of corruption can be defined and measures to counter corruption can be developed and implemented. This starts during the knowledge development process and continues throughout the Comprehensive Preparation of the Operational Environment. It requires a broad approach including non-military views. Planners should not only pay attention to the national political dynamics but also consider local governance, power structures, cultural traditions and historic rivalries. Of note, an international mission can shift the political balance in a country.

An in-depth assessment of possible forms and levels of corruption and
corrupt actors provides a better understanding and supports decision-making and planning. Consideration of corruption is an essential part of the overall assessment process, providing insight into how corruption can impact the mission and what impact the mission can have on corruption. Consider who are the key actors and stakeholders, which networks and organisations are involved in corruption, and how to mitigate negative aspects, whilst identifying and exploiting opportunities.

In the planning phase should be moreover considered the existence in some NATO Member State of specific forces (polices with military status) performing on a daily basis specific tasks that are strictly related with B.I., as well as fight against domestic corruption, money laundering and tracking of cash flows, and therefore able to assist/mentor the local law enforcement agencies in the same kind of activities.

**Corruption Risk Analysis**

A corruption risk analysis should be divided into three levels; individual, process and organisation. Within these three levels, there must be an understanding about networks and how they interact, the role that belief and culture plays and how this can be used to counter corruption. Additionally, there needs to be a clear understanding about the implications of corruption on the population and the security forces. Effective analysis is subject to the ability to collect, assess and validate information. This information needs to be shared as far as possible with other actors involved in countering corruption. This will enable better coordination of initiatives and activities and develop unity of effort.

**Development of Response Options**

As early as possible in the development of a mission plan, an assessment mechanism needs to be established to monitor and mitigate corruption. The focus should be on mitigating corruption, existing and potential, related to the military mission’s presence.

The mechanism must define a method to manage expectations of the effects. Ideally, the immediate, first, second and third order effects need to be lasting and beneficial. It is important to exploit the positive and mitigate the negative effects, subject to limitations of influencing behaviour.

**Development of a Plan**

Within the Operational Plan (OPLAN), the responsibility for Building Integrity and transparency, accountability and countering corruption are contained as appendixes to the OPLAN Annexes or, if circumstances justify, as a separate Annex to the OPLAN. The appendix or annex needs to include: an assessment of the situations and risks of corruption; potential engagements with host
nation; civil society and other organisations; and the cross-divisional implications. The cross-cutting approach to countering corruption means that annexes for logistics, Security Force Assistance (SFA) or others can also contain aspects directly related to countering corruption. During the mission itself, the development and risks related to corruption should be addressed in the periodic mission review and the strategic assessment.

**Measurement of Progress**

Military leaders need data to measure the progress of the mission. There must be a mechanism to measure progress and results. Measuring the level and impact of corruption provides the commander with actionable indicators on public perception and exposure to corruption. This mechanism should be in place from the outset of the mission and cover aspects such as: local perception levels, status, pathways, and progress to countering corruption. Corruption is complex and often hidden. Therefore it is difficult to assess and measure at multiple levels, particularly as there is no single tool to measure corruption.

Before collecting information on corruption, the factors that cause corruption should be identified, to determine if it is attributable to structural factors, the degree of secrecy or the phase of development of the country. In most cases, it could be a mix of one or more of these factors.

There are different options to gather information correctly and consistently. This can be completed through regular public surveys, information from independent external agencies and organisations, media analysis or the utilisation of existing resources. In general, there are two basic forms of survey - perception and experience-based surveys. Surveys need to be representative of the local demographic and tailored to the audience. Respondents must be protected from retribution by anonymity.

Although surveys can be helpful tools to gain better understanding, there is always the risk that external factors can influence the outcome. Avoid overreliance on statistics. Attributing a specific effect identified in a survey to a counter-corruption activity can also be difficult.

Independent audits are the best way to identify bureaucratic corruption. For example, diversion of salaries, and misuse of assets and funds. The outcome of these audits can be linked with average indicators from the national Chamber of Commerce or other existing national surveys. Development agencies can often also provide useful information about the level and forms of corruption in a country.
Education and Training

The effects of corruption on a mission need to be addressed through a comprehensive programme of Building Integrity training and education. This also promotes transparency, accountability and integrity. In NATO, training is a national responsibility, but nations need to provide all personnel with a basic understanding of the impact of corruption. Nations and NATO also need to develop subject matter expertise on countering corruption. Staff involved in activities at risk of corruption, should increase their individual awareness of “corruption risk”, through activities such as:

- Courses on ethics and conduct;
- Information on corruption strictly related to their specific functions;
- Specific training on information security management; and,
- Reporting and complaint processes.

8 Nations, when necessary, could be asked if they could assure the availability of specific assets already prepared to offer specialized knowledge in the typical field of action of B.I.

Human Resource Management

A transparent human resource management system is required to establish and maintain the moral and ethical behaviour of troops, officers and officials. A strong ethical culture, in combination with adherence to clear policies, procedures and guidelines, can prevent corruption. Examples include skimming of salaries, ‘ghost soldiers’, and secret payrolls.

Although many forms of corruption are detrimental to soldiers, some create mutually beneficial arrangements. Higher-ranking officers often keep absent soldiers on the payroll, offering soldiers the opportunity to leave or never even report for duty in exchange for pocketing a portion of their salaries. Consequently, many estimates of Iraqi force strength include these absent soldiers, dubbed ‘aliens’, a problem soldiers in 2nd Division attested they were familiar with. Not only do these practices reduce manpower, they also undermine the unit cohesion of soldiers still on the battlefield. Knowing that their fellow soldiers are still receiving some pay after effectively deserting, units lose – or fail to develop – an esprit de corps necessary to sustain strenuous operations.

Abbas and Trombly. Quoted in Blood Year (2016) Finance and Contracting
**Finance and Contracting**

Finance and contracting staff deployed on a mission may be operating in an unfamiliar environment, leading to increased risk of fraud and corruption in the contractual process.

Of all the military processes, procurement and contracting have the highest risk of corruption; with vulnerabilities in every step of the process. Procurement is a complex process that can involve high value contracts, competition, confidentiality and security restrictions. Procurement is a professional skill and should not be conducted by untrained individuals on an ad-hoc basis; a trained, well-educated central procurement group reduces the risks of corruption.

A procurement process must be based on clear and robust policies, which should include the level and scope of authority. Policies, transparent processes and procedures should be developed and implemented. These should mitigate the risk of corruption. Commanders and all staff involved in contracting need to be trained before deployment as they need to have a common view on the risks of corruption and know how to prevent and deal with it.

Different types of contracts have varying corruption risks and various routes to procurement fraud. Single source procurement is of particular risk as only one supplier is engaged. It is important to affirm that single source is really necessary and offers good value for money. One of the most vulnerable areas for corruption are contracts for commodities especially food, fuel and equipment. Controls may be in place but they can be weak and insufficient. To minimise the risk of corruption, measures should be developed to track these goods, during procurement, transport, in stock, during use and maintenance and ultimately disposal. Monitoring of the local and black markets can determine if stolen goods are being sold. The prices of the commodities on the local market can also be a prime indicator of the scale of corruption, particularly when prices fluctuate or are inflated in order to increase profits.

Contracting staff need to be focused on protection measures for example, phased payments, sharing contract specification and sharing information on contractors with other organisations. This can include the development of a ‘black list’ of corrupt actors and organisations, as well as a ‘white list’ of actors and organisations. A shared contractor database should be established and maintained, to ensure an overview of all contractors, their relationships and performance. Independent oversight and audits, for example by a reliable local
NGO, can offer more credibility to the procurement process.

To improve transparency and accountability and to manage the expectations on outcomes and timelines, there is a need to be transparent to the local population regarding contracting. The local population and communities could assist with specific projects, including defining specifications and providing a monitoring and assurance mechanism, as well as a ‘whistle blowing’ system. Although contracting locally can have a positive effect on the local economy and employment, it can also generate corruption or result in loss of oversight, especially in the case of subcontracting.

One of the biggest consequences of high-level corruption in the defence and security institutions is that high quality suppliers may avoid doing business. This should be a clear signal to governments to put more emphasis on countering corruption. This can be achieved through effective counter corruption legislation, including a code of conduct and ethical standards. Regular meetings with relevant contractors, representatives from industry, and government officials can emphasise the importance of the code of conduct and standards.

One of the most common schemes of high-level corruption (not specifically limited to missions), is the creation of specific requirements without a real need; the procurement process is legal and correct however, the basis for the procurement is corrupt. To hide these corrupt decisions and illicit enrichment, procurement processes may be manipulated or overcomplicated.

Host nation defence and security institutions are particularly vulnerable to corruption. A culture of secrecy can be used as a way to mask corruption. The absence of external auditing combined with poor accounting systems can easily conceal irregularities or prevent corrupt actors being identified. Most of the time, secrecy is not necessary. In some cases, laws exempt defence institutions of transparency on the basis of national security provisions. It is estimated that in many cases, this strict form of confidentiality is not required. The organisational mind-set, ‘confidential unless’ should therefore change to ‘transparent unless’.

**Strategic Communications**

In NATO, strategic communications is an overarching, coordinating and directing function to align words and actions at all levels; to protect the trust and credibility of NATO by preventing a so called ‘say-do’ gap. NATO strategic communications is defined as: the integration of communications capabilities and information staff function, with other military activities in order to understand and
shape the Information Environment, in support of NATO aims and objectives.

Communications capabilities are primarily psychological operations and military public affairs, and the information function is Information Operations. The key task of Information Operations is to analyse, plan, assess and integrate Information Activities to create desired effects in support of the aims and objectives within the context of the NATO narrative. Countering corruption may be one of these objectives.

Corruption can feed an opposing narrative so strategic communications need to coordinate and direct the Information Activities to counter this narrative. For example, by consistent messaging and overtly demonstrating accountability, when interacting with the host nation and other actors. Through engaging with trusted third parties and civil society, messaging can contribute to the credibility of the mission. Failure to address corruption at any stage can be seen as acceptance of corruption, or even direct implication.

 Provost Marshal

The Provost Marshal has primary responsibility for investigating, identifying and countering corruption at the operational level. This includes assessing risks and vulnerabilities to mitigate and prevent corruption. The Provost Marshal contributes to the development and review of countering corruption directives and procedures.

Comprehensive Approach to Tackling Corruption

Successful capacity building including the rule of law, good governance and countering corruption, requires a comprehensive approach of all political, civilian, economic, social and security elements - this provides a common, multi-disciplinary and multi-organisational approach to problem-solving.

Corruption cuts across organisational and functional boundaries. Building Integrity requires active involvement and information sharing between diverse actors with widely disparate experiences, resources, mandates and capabilities. Strong relationships are built through cooperation, collaboration and coordination with the various organisations and agencies involved.

International Community

The international community can play a vital role in capacity building, stabilisation and reconstruction of a failing or fragile state, providing targeted, coordinated, balanced funding and aid, in-line with identified needs. This requires an in-depth understanding of the social, cultural and political dynamics in a
state, with the international community setting an example and supporting the state in countering corruption.

Unbalanced and unmonitored funding by the international community can have a negative impact on both the receiving nation and the international community. Funds can be diverted to hostile actors, further fuelling instability and conflict, resulting in potential mission failure. Furthermore, it undermines credibility and trust; it is almost impossible to restore this, once the population has lost confidence.

**Civil Society**

Civil society organisations are commonly defined as non-state, not-for-profit, voluntary entities and include non-governmental organisations, community-based groups, labour unions, indigenous groups but also professional associations and foundations. If present in conflict and crisis situations, these individuals and organisations could monitor criminal networks and help in countering corruption, if empowered and protected. They can inspire reforms through identifying and highlighting instances of corruption, acting as a counterbalance. Corrupt actors can target civil society through direct attacks or by the misuse of administrative and legal procedures.

A good relationship between civil society and defence and security forces is to be considered to countering corruption. The involvement of civil society in the development or reestablishment of local security forces after a crisis or conflict, can lead to more effective, trustworthy and credible forces.

It is vital to empower and support leaders and individuals who are able to transcend ethnic loyalties and are willing to work on behalf of the larger national good. This will offer the population an alternative to corrupt powerbrokers. Local elite and powerbrokers can have an impact on the forms and level of corruption of a state. Therefore, it is vital to develop in-depth understanding of the elite and powerbrokers including their relationships, structures and means of influence.

**Reporting**

Reporting corruption is key to addressing the problem. Reporting mechanisms can create a better understanding of the problem, the people and organisations involved, and the specific issues that need to be addressed at different levels. This information can be shared with other organisations that may have better ways, means and authority than the military, to address the problem. It also provides a good opportunity to highlight/involve those individuals, organisations and government structures that have a positive impact in countering corruption.
Reporting can be carried out at various levels and through different channels and differing periods; daily, weekly, monthly or periodic reporting. Special consideration should be given to the classification of sensitive information when shared with other organisations.

**Whistle-blower Procedure and Protection**
People are willing to speak out against corruption and other forms of abuse of power but are often afraid of the consequences for them, and their families. Studies show that many corruption cases are uncovered via whistle-blowers. Therefore, a system enabling and protecting whistle-blowers can be an invaluable tool to counter corruption, whilst ensuring the right processes exist to avoid risks related with unfair or malign reporting. One method is through the establishment of an anonymous counter-corruption hotline. Consideration also needs to be given to protecting the whistle-blower against reprisal and retaliation, as people are then more willing to report corruption. Although NATO does not have a whistle-blower policy, it is possible for it to be considered within the legal framework of each mission mandate. Whatever the route, protection and support should also be given to informants who are seeking a change for the better. These people and organisations can counter-balance the influence of spoilers and corrupt actors.

**Capturing and Sharing Building Integrity Lessons Identified**
Capturing lessons identified and best practices is vital, particularly in an environment with high rotation of personnel. This is exacerbated in theatre with rotation of six months or less. The existing NATO lessons learnt process should be used to analyse and assess Building Integrity observations. Building integrity observations that may have associated legal, privacy or investigative issues should be dealt with separately by the appropriate authorities.

**Complementary Topics to Building Integrity**

**Cross-Cutting Topics**
Cross-cutting-topics (CCTs) are a range of subjects which could affect the mission but may not be viewed as a primary focus for the mission. NATO’s approach to CCTs is based on legal and political initiatives. Different military disciplines, branches and command levels may have to consider and deal with a variety of CCTs. CCTs overlap and can have far reaching effects in different areas of civil society, requiring them to be considered throughout the planning and operation phases.

Building Integrity is one of the five current NATO cross-cutting-topics. The other four are:
Protection of Civilians;
Children And Armed Conflict;
Women, Peace and Security; and,
Cultural Property Protection

Protection of Civilians
NATO is committed to the Protection of Civilians (PoC) in the planning and conduct of operations, missions and other Council-mandated activities. The Protection of Civilians (persons, objects and services) is a cross-cutting concept relevant to all three core tasks of NATO. Furthermore, the PoC policy complements existing efforts in the areas such as children and armed conflict, women, peace and security and cultural property protection; all to be discussed below. NATO recognises that all feasible measures must be taken to avoid, minimise and mitigate harm to civilians.

Planned solutions to protect civilians should address the root causes of the violence. As such, protection is often achieved through a combination of: political process, physical protection, and establishing institutions to deliver long term protection.

Civilians should also be protected against Conflict Related Sexual and Gender-Based Violence. Sexual and gender-based violence refers to any act that is perpetrated against a person’s will and is based on gender norms and an unequal power relationship. The military needs to be aware of the risks to civilians from sexual and gender-based violence and require clear direction and guidance on how to act when confronted with this.

To be successful in protecting civilians, close interaction and a comprehensive approach with all relevant actors, local, national and international, is required. The threat from powerbrokers and corrupt government officials also needs to be considered. Corrupt, predatory powerbrokers and government officials can be an even greater threat to civilians than an adversary.

Children and Armed Conflict
NATO is committed to the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1612 and related resolutions on the protection of children affected by armed conflict. The pattern of armed conflict has led to an increased risk for civilians, especially children.

The UN Security Council has identified ‘six grave violations’ against children during armed conflict:

1. Killing or maiming
2. Recruitment or use of child soldiers
3. Rape and other forms of sexual violence
4. Abduction
5. Attacks against schools or hospitals
6. Denial of humanitarian access
Weak rule of law, and corrupt officials and judges, create a domain of impunity, making it possible for these violations to be committed and to go unpunished.

► Women, Peace and Security
NATO and its partners recognise the disproportionate impact that conflict and post-conflict situations have on women and girls. The women peace and security agenda\(^9\) aims to increase women’s active and meaningful participation in decision-making, enhance women’s rights and protect women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence in conflict situations.

Women are affected disproportionately by corruption through being excluded from decision-making, subject to violence and criminal activities and facing a lack of equal opportunities for personal development. Women often experience conflict differently than men and can offer valuable insight and input in conflict prevention, peace-building and post-conflict decision-making.

► Cultural Property Protection
Culture plays an essential role in modern day conflict as the identity of a group of people is often connected to symbols reflected in buildings, monuments and artefacts. Damage, destroying or plundering cultural heritage undermines a community’s social, ethnic or religious identity, cohesion and resilience. Because of the importance of cultural property (CP), not only to the local community but to mankind in general, it needs to be protected. Cultural property protection (CPP) has mission relevance and there is a role for the military as stipulated in international and nation law.

Cultural property is defined as: movable (artefacts) or immovable (buildings and sites) property of great importance to the cultural heritage of all populations. Cultural property is particularly vulnerable in times of conflict; it can be destroyed or damaged intentionally or unintentionally. Damaging, destroying or plundering cultural heritage undermines a community’s social, ethnic or religious identity, cohesion and resilience.

Crisis and conflict, in combination with weak security forces, can enable criminals and insurgent groups to steal and profit from the sale of cultural property. Corrupt government officials facilitate this by creating the conditions to allow, or support, the illegal trade of stolen artefacts.

Counter-Insurgency\(^{10}\)
Countering corruption is an important aspect of a counter-insurgency campaign. There are four preconditions required to prevent corruption in a counter-insurgency environment:

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\(^{9}\) UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions.
\(^{10}\) For more detail see AJP-3.4.4 Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Edition A Version 1 (July 2016).
• security of the population;
• political willingness;
• broad public support; and,
• in-depth understanding of the problem and risks of corruption.

Security Force Assistance

Security Force Assistance (SFA) includes all NATO activities that develop and improve, or directly support the development of local forces and their associated institutions in crisis zones. Local forces comprise indigenous, non-NATO military security forces and will be defined by the North Atlantic Council (NAC)\(^\text{11}\).

When training local security forces, awareness of the impact of corruption, especially within the security forces, needs to be clearly addressed. Corrupt security forces are not able to provide proper protection to civilians and can even turn into a threat for the civil population. Host nation defence, security forces and institutions can in exceptional cases play an important role in the establishment of a comprehensive approach required for countering corruption. They can even lead this approach, starting with addressing corruption within their own institutions through the hierarchical structure and the ‘getting-things-done’ culture. Security forces can set a good example by maintaining and demonstrating high standards.

In a normal, stable situation, national security forces are responsible for the security and stability of a state. The stability of this state is in danger when the moral and trustworthiness of these security forces is low, due to corruption and weak leadership. It can influence the population’s acceptance and the credibility of the forces adversely. Security forces can be influenced by power-brokers involved in illegal activities or secretly funded by neighbouring states or criminal organisations. This is often the case in conflict or crisis situations. SFA can restore the trustworthiness and effectiveness of the forces. Therefore, countering corruption needs to be one of the key aspects of SFA.

The effect of corruption on security forces can manifest itself through the illegal sale of weapons, equipment, fuel, ammunition, but also through ‘ghost soldiers’. These aspects can have a devastating effect on operational effectiveness and the willingness to fight. Ineffective security forces also hamper the ability of the government to provide basic services to the population.


In Iraq, corruption in army recruitment and promotions, the existence of ghost soldiers, and theft of weapons and supplies rendered the army – superior on paper – ill-armed, under-manned and ultimately unable to halt the rise of
To stop the jihadi fighters, international troops had to return to Iraq a couple of years after the previous training mission was concluded.

Corruption and conflict: hand in glove. NATO Review (6 December 2018)

To counter corruption in security forces, solid policies, procedures and an adequate legal framework, with clear structures needs to be in place. All personnel, including those from supporting institutions, need appropriate education and training to institutionalise the importance of countering corruption.

The long-term goal must be to embed the required processes and infrastructure. This will establish integrity in the organisation, with the ultimate objective of developing a sustainable host nation training capability. This requires that personnel assigned to SFA tasks need the right knowledge, skills and competence to undertake these tasks and objectives. One of the many key aspects for trainers and advisors is the requirement to ‘follow the money’; the ability to determine the flow of funding to prevent opportunities for corruption.

Special attention needs to be given to the contracting requirements related to SFA. The fragile security environment, together with the urgency to start the assistance mission, creates a situation vulnerable to fraud, waste and abuse.

### Stability Policing

Stability Policing (SP) is a NATO agreed term: “Police-related activities intended to reinforce or temporarily replace the indigenous police in order to contribute to the restoration and/or upholding of the public order and security, rule of law, and protection of human rights”.

SP focuses on the needs of civil populace through supporting and, when necessary, temporary replacing the indigenous police forces, when the latter are either unable or unwilling to perform the function themselves. SP includes a wide set of police related activities. Yet, it cannot be compressed within the limits of civil policing since it potentially embraces such a wide variety of activities that have connections with other agencies or services are most likely to occur.

The aim of SP is to establish a safe and secure environment (SASE), restore public order and security and contribute to create the conditions for effective governance. Throughout the spectrum of the conflict, the initial goal of SP is to re-establish and maintain sufficient security for the local populace, afterwards, to re-establish law and order and to enforce the law and, eventually, to reinforce the local security institutions.\(^{12}\)

The actors of SP, considering SP focused on the civil population, are notably the Gendarmerie Type Forces (police forc-
es with military status), which have full civil police capabilities, and the Military Polices forces, but other forces can contribute with their specialized capabilities. As previously stated, corruption undermines government credibility, legitimacy and accountability, and has been a key factor contributing to the failings of international interventions and a source of resentment for the population. The value given by SP assets constitutes an important way to prevent the instability also by means of the fight against corruption in a pure police perspective (as well as done by performing normal police tasks in the respective Homelands), especially during a military mission, in the overall effort for the re-establishment of the rule of law, and particularly when a deep pre-deployment B.I. training has been provided to the SP troops themselves.

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Annex B: Glossary of Terms and Definitions

- **Accountability**: being responsible for what you do and able to give a satisfactory reason for it, or the degree to which this happens.\(^{(1)}\)
- **Analyse**: the study of a whole by examining its parts and their interactions. In the military context, the hierarchical relationship in logical sequence is: assessment, analysis, evaluation, validation and certification.\(^{(2)}\)
- **Anti-corruption**: approach that limits the opportunity for corruption like, transparency and accountability and other actions that can influence an individual’s behaviour.
- **Assessment**: the process of estimating the capabilities and performance of organisations, individuals, materiel or systems.\(^{(2)}\)
- **Asset**: something valuable belonging to a person or organisation that can be used for the payment of debts.\(^{(1)}\)
- **Assist**: to take action to help someone or support something.\(^{(1)}\)
- **Black market**: illegal trading of goods that are not allowed to be bought and sold, or that there are scarce resources for everyone who wants them.\(^{(1)}\)
- **Building Integrity (BI)**: a NATO-led capacity building programme providing practical tools to help nations strengthen integrity, transparency and accountability and reduce the risk of corruption in the defence and security sector.\(^{(4)}\)
- **Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC)**: a joint function comprising of a set of capabilities integral to supporting the achievement of mission objectives and enabling NATO commanders to participate effectively in a broad spectrum of civil military interaction with diverse non-military actors.
- **Civil Military Interaction (CMI)**: a group of activities, founded on communication, planning and coordination, that all NATO military bodies share and conduct with international and local non-military actors, both during NATO operations and in preparation for them, thereby mutually increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of their respective actions in response to crises.
- **Civil society**: usually independent structures of individuals or organisations that participate in public live with a particular interest based on ethical, cultural, social, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations
- **Code of Conduct (CoC)**: a set of rules about how to behave and do business with other people.\(^{(1)}\)
- **Comprehensive Approach (CA)**: working in a complete way and including everything that is necessary.\(^{(1)}\)
- **Contraband**: goods that are brought into or taken out of the country secretly and illegally.\(^{(1)}\)
- **Corruption**: the abuse of entrusted power, public resources or public authority for personal or group gain.\(^{(3)}\)
- **Counter-insurgency (COIN):** Comprehensive civilian and military efforts made to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances.\(^{(2)}\)

- **Countering corruption:** approach based on corrective measures, sanctions and deterrence that rely strongly on the effectiveness of the legal and judicial system.

- **Credibility:** the fact that someone can be believed or trusted.\(^{(1)}\)

- **Criminal patronage network (CPN):** a group of interconnected people involved or committing crimes.

- **Cross-cutting topic:** linking traditionally separate or independent parties or interests.

- **Cultural property:** movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people. Buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit movable cultural property. Centres containing a large amount of cultural property and places of worship which constitute spiritual or cultural heritage.\(^{(5)}\)

- **Department Head (DH):** the institution responsible for the translation of the requirements into solutions for the education and training spectrum and for the coordination of the solutions. The DH will maintain a discipline programme and strive to ensure that solutions are delivered in the most effective, efficient and affordable manner through NATO, allies, partners and non-NATO entities.\(^{(14)}\)

- **Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR):** a process of removing weapons from the hands of members of armed groups, taking these combatants out of their groups and helping them to reintegrate as civilians into society. It seeks to support ex-combatants and those associated with armed groups, so that they can become active participants in the peace process.\(^{(7)}\)

- **Diversion:** something being sent somewhere different from where it was originally intended to go.\(^{(1)}\)

- **Drawback:** a disadvantage or the negative part of a situation.\(^{(1)}\)

- **Embezzlement:** to secretly take money that is in your care or that belongs to an organisation or business you work for.\(^{(1)}\)

- **Emergency aid:** Emergency aid is rapid assistance given to people in immediate distress by individuals, organisations, or governments to relieve suffering, during and after man-made emergencies and natural disasters.\(^{(6)}\)

- **Enrichment:** the act of making someone richer, or of becoming richer themselves.\(^{(1)}\)

- **Eradication:** to get rid of something completely or destroy something bad.\(^{(1)}\)

- **Ethics:** the study of what is morally right and wrong, or a set of beliefs about what is morally right and wrong.\(^{(1)}\)

- **Expropriation:** to take away money or property especially for public use without payment to the owner, or for personal use illegally.\(^{(1)}\)

- **Extortion:** activities to get something by force or threats, or with difficulty.\(^{(1)}\)

- **Favouritism:** unfair support shown to one person or group, especially by someone in authority.\(^{(1)}\)

- **Fraud:** the crime of getting money by deceiving people.\(^{(1)}\)
• **Ghost soldier**: the situation where high-level military use the identities of military that don't exist or use multiple identities of military to pocket these salaries.

• **Human trafficking**: the crime of buying and selling people, or making money from work they are forced to do, such as sex work.\(^1\)

• **Impunity**: freedom from punishment or from the unpleasant results of something that has been done.\(^1\)

• **Information Environment** (IE): an environment comprised of the information itself; the individuals, organisations and systems that receive, process and convey the information and the cognitive, virtual and physical space in which this occurs.\(^8\)

• **Institutions**: a large and important organisation that exists to serve a public purpose or support for people.\(^1\)

• **Insurgency**: actions of an organized, often ideologically motivated, group or movement that seeks to affect or prevent political change or to overthrow a governing authority within a country or a region, focused on persuading or coercing the population through the use of violence and subversion.\(^2\)

• **Integrity**: the quality of being honest and having strong moral principles that you refuse to change.

• **International Community** (IC): political phrase used to describe all or several countries or their governments that are considered or acting together as a group.\(^1\)

• **Key Leader Engagement** (KLE): engagements between NATO military leaders and the key decision-makers of approved audiences that have a defined goal.\(^15\)

• **Kickback**: an amount of money that is paid to someone illegally in exchange for secret help or work.\(^1\)

• **Kleptocracy**: a society whose leaders make themselves rich and powerful by stealing from the rest of the people.\(^1\)

• **Land mafia**: municipal or other government officials, elected politicians, judicial and law enforcement officials, acquire, develop and sell land in illegal ways for profit.\(^9\)

• **Loyalty**: your feelings of support or duty towards someone or something.\(^1\)

• **Manipulation**: controlling someone or something to your own advantage, often unfairly or dishonestly.\(^1\)

• **Mentor**: an experienced and trusted person who gives another person advice and help over a period of time.\(^1\)

• **Money laundering**: the crime of moving money that has been obtained illegally through banks and other businesses to make it seem as if the money has been obtained legally.\(^1\)

• **Monitor**: to watch and check a situation carefully for a period of time in order to discover something about it or noticing particular things.\(^1\)

• **Narrative**: a concise but comprehensive written statement of an organisation's situation and purpose, which can stand on its own as the principle context to strategic planning directives or be used to support the creation of individual culturally attuned stories that will resonate with particular audiences and foster cohesion within the organisation.\(^10\)
• **Natural resources**: things such as oil, minerals, forests, coal, etc. that exist in a place and can be used by people and that have economic value to a country. (1)

• **Nepotism**: the activity of using your power or influence to get good jobs or unfair advantages for members of your own family. (1)

• **Norm**: an accepted standard or a way of behaving or doing things, in a certain situation, that most people agree with and is expected and considered as typical. (1)

• **Offset**: a payment that is used to reduce the effect of another payment. (1)

• **Organised Crime (OC)**: complex of highly centralised enterprises set up for the purpose of engaging in illegal activities. (11)

• **Partisanship**: the quality or action of strongly supporting a person, principle, or political party, often without considering or judging the matter very carefully. (1)

• **Powerbrokers**: someone who has a big influence on decisions about who should have political power. (1)

• **Private Security Companies (PSC)**: independent corporations that offers military services to national governments, international organisations and sub-state actors and specialized in providing combat and protection forces. (11)

• **Procurement**: the process by which an organisation buys the products or services it needs from other organisations or parts of their own organisation. (1)

• **Public resources**: valuable and useful possession or quality of a country available for the population in general rather than limited to a particular group of people. (1)

• **Reformer**: someone who tries to change and improve or support political, social or religious changes of a system, laws, organisations to make it more modern and effective. (1)

• **Rent-seeking**: the tendency of people and organisations to collect the profits from natural resources for themselves and their social structure and not sharing them with others outside their social structure.

• **Requirements Authority (RA)**: the authority responsible for identifying, collecting and managing the specific NATO education and training requirements associated with a discipline. The RA is an operational expert in the discipline and represents the end user of educated and trained personnel and forces. The RA will normally be at the ACOS/DCOS level, or the civilian equivalent, within the NATO structure. (14)

• **Revenues**: the income that a government receives on a regular base like from taxes and selling goods or services. (1)

• **Sectarianism**: very strong support for the religious or political group that you are a member of, which can cause problems between different groups (1)

• **Security Force Assistance (SFA)**: includes all NATO activities that develop and improve, or directly support, the development of local forces and their associated institutions in crisis zones. (16)

• **Security Sector Reform (SSR)**: The political and technical process of improving state and human security by making security provision, management, and oversight more effective and more accountable, within a framework of democratic civilian control, rule of law, and respect for human rights. (13)
• **Skimming**: the practice of stealing money from an account, budget, etc. over a period of time in amounts that cannot be easily noticed.\(^1\)

• **Soldier Level Engagement (SLE)**: the interactions that generally take place between military and the local population on a daily basis and aren’t always planned or coordinated.

• **Stability Policing (SP)**: Police-related activities intended to reinforce or temporarily replace the indigenous police in order to contribute to the restoration and/or upholding of the public order and security, rule of law, and protection of human rights. \(^{17}\) \(^{18}\)

• **Strategic Communications (StratCom)**: in the context of the NATO military, is the integration of communication capabilities and information staff function with other military activities, in order to understand and shape the Information Environment (IE), in support of NATO aims and objectives. \(^{12}\)

• **Subcontracting**: the act of paying an outside person or organisation to do work that might normally be done within or by an organisation. \(^1\)

• **Subversion**: an attempt of trying, to destroy or damage or to change, weaken or remove a government from power, by working secretly within it. \(^1\)

• **Survey**: asking people questions in order to find out about their opinions or behaviour. \(^1\)

• **Terrorism**: the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence, instilling fear and terror, against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, or to gain control over a population, to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives. \(^2\)

• **Training**: Individual Training: the development of skills and knowledge necessary to perform specific duties and tasks. It is a learned response to a predictable situation (skills). Collective training: procedural drills and practical application of doctrine, plans, and procedures to acquire and maintain collective tactical, operational and strategic capabilities to predictable situations. \(^1\)

• **Transparency**: a situation in which business and financial activities are done in an open way without secrets, so that people can trust that they are fair and honest. \(^1\)

• **Warlord**: a (military) leader who controls a country or, more frequently, an area within a country, especially when the central government is not in control. \(^1\)

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Annex C: Indicators of Corruption

Corruption can manifest itself in various forms and at different levels within a society. This presents difficulty in providing clear indicators of corruption. The indicators for grand corruption can differ from the indicators for petty corruption. However, there can also be a close relationship between these different indicators. High levels of instability and insecurity are the two basic conditions for corruption to flourish, but there are others, these include:

At government level:

- weak government structure, together with decreasing public trust in the government;
- strong dependence on international aid for economic survival, combined with an absence of functioning government institutions, processes and independent oversight;
- weak rule of law due to ineffective regulations and biased judicial system, leading to impunity;
- lack of basic services, forcing people into seeking alternative systems and structures;
- large-scale electoral fraud combined with ongoing manipulation, with reappearing key actors or new faces as proxies for known powerbrokers;
- registration of voters is manipulated or intimidated in a way that hampers free elections;
- strong resistance against transparency and countering corruption activities, funding and resources are cut, laws arbitrarily changed and people threatened;
- decentralised and poor administration of resources;
- parallel illegal financial flows of money combined with large-scale money laundering; strong relationship between certain government officials, warlords and powerbrokers;
- government positions directly related to donor funding, or within national organisations working for donors, are dominated by one ethical group;
- strong pressure on donors to provide their funding through specific channels;
- low level of transparency and accountability of government institutions together with reluctance to disclose private assets and wealth of government officials;
- unexplainable lifestyle or wealth of government officials;
- government officials requesting single source procurement when not necessary;
- poor documentation of government officials’ expenses; and,
- corrupt actors in charge of organisations to frustrate counter-corruption activities.

At host nation security forces level:

- eroding public trust in the security forces;
- declining operational effectiveness, morals and performance;
- lack of resources and equipment due to these being sold on the ‘black market’;
- strong resistance to transparency and counter-corruption activities;
- close relationships between security forces and militia and private security companies; overrepresentation of one ethical group in the security forces;
- high levels of violence related to the utilisation of natural resources linked to the presence of militia, hampering the population and media access and information regarding their use;
- absent or inadequate administration and transparency of the resources and revenues, in combination with attacks on exploration sites and pipelines;
- large-scale border disputes and cross-border smuggling with the involvement of militias and criminal actors working together, condoned by security forces;
- reluctance of government officials to allow independent oversight or NATO military to partner and monitor, combined with a lack of willingness to investigate and arrest corrupt and criminal actors;
- physical area under control of the security forces is limited, leaving other areas of the country uncontrolled;
- low level of training, education and professionalism in law enforcement and security forces;
- unexplainable lifestyle or wealth of high-level security forces personnel;
- significant number of ‘ghost soldiers’ and a long salary chain;
- high-level security forces’ officials engaged in legal or illegal businesses;
- infiltration of, and threats against, law enforcement, security forces and the judicial system, thus hampering the execution of efficient rule of law;
- willingness of security forces to disobey laws and regulations; and,
- high-level security forces and government officials providing job opportunities to each other.

At local population level:
- growing influence of organised crime and extremist groups;
- large groups of labourers travelling around to support the harvesting of raw products for narcotics, often getting paid in a share of the product itself;
- humanitarian aid being diverted by power-brokers to one specific ethnic, tribal or religious group, to the exclusion of other groups;
- abuse on social media, launching false and unsubstantiated information favouring one group and publishing false accusations about another group;
- a fractured and weak civil society;
- a corrupt employment system;
- natural resources that only benefit one ethnic group, excluding others;
- large-scale smuggling and human trafficking, fraud and money laundering;
- law enforcement and judicial system that refuses to act against certain ethical groups in society;
- absence of land ownership records together with the presence of so-called land mafia;
- powerbrokers that are involved in the distribution of aid and the spending of development funding;
- unclear or questionable legal constructions, combined with corrupt judicial systems and law enforcement officials preventing in-
vestigation, arrest and prosecution of corrupt government officials and powerbrokers;

- growing number of private security companies with declining standards of integrity generating tension among the local populations;

- opponents and adversaries are using corruption as a counter narrative and driver for their recruitment;

- poor civil service accounting systems that can be manipulated;

- smuggling and illegal selling of artefacts, mostly to foreign buyers;

- contractors that do not disclose the ownership of a company;

- poor quality or overcharging for products and services provided;

- unauthorised government officials interfering with law enforcement and judicial cases; leading the local population to have a poor perception of government performance;

- protests and complains about corruption from the population or a specific group within the local population; and,

- reports of unexplained air, ground or sea movements;

**At individual level:**

- employees who arrive early, stay late and do not take normal leave;

- demands for bribes at check points by security forces, legal and illegal groups;

- one person of an ethical group acts as a ‘gate keeper’ for jobs, hampering others;

- people using cultural norms as a way to gain approval for their misconduct;

- incompetent government officials appointed;

- significant shortage of personnel in government positions able to provide public services;

- reports of abuse of civil population without punishment;

- production of raw products for narcotics play an important role in the everyday life of the people; and,

- overly complex regulations and unclear fees at border crossings.

**Annex D: Abstract from Commanders’ guide on measures to combat Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations military, 2017**

Acts of sexual exploitation and abuse include the following:

- Physical violence of a sexual nature, abusive or non-consensual sex (sexual assault, rape);

- Having sex or any sexual activity with children (anyone under the age of 18) will always be considered to be sexual abuse. Mistaken belief in the age of a child is not a valid defence/excuse;

- Providing assistance or aid of any kind, including food, clothing or lodging, in exchange for sexual favours;

- Buying sex from sex workers, even if prostitution/sex work is legal in the host country;

- Threatening to withhold assistance or aid of any kind in exchange for sexual favours; and,
- Procuring transactional sex for others.

The instances set out above are not intended to be an exhaustive list. Other types of sexually exploitive or sexually abusive behaviour may be grounds for in administrative, disciplinary or judicial action.

The following is a list of risk factors associated with Sexual Exploitation and Abuse that may involve NATO personnel:

- Failure of commanders to be fully aware of the operational environment and factors that contribute to the risk of sexual exploitation and abuse;

- Insufficient pre-deployment and in-mission training on the general awareness of sexual exploitation and abuse, including consequences of such acts;

- Inadequate compliance with the requirements of the zero tolerance policy;

- Lack of accountability for failures in command responsibilities;

- Non-adherence by commanders and contingent members to existing reporting procedures;

- Lack of vigilance by commanders in monitoring the routine activities of their troops

- Commanders tolerating conditions that could contribute to sexual exploitation and abuse (such as not taking appropriate measures against offenders);

- Failure to report acts of sexual exploitation and abuse or discouraging others from reporting; and,

- Arranging, negotiating and encouraging informal settlements of sexual exploitation and abuse cases, including of a financial nature.

A key component of enforcement is a well-functioning complaint reception mechanism. It is important that both NATO personnel and the host population know how to report wrongdoing by NATO personnel.

All allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse (and other misconduct) are to be treated with the highest degree of confidentiality to ensure that the identity of victims, complainants, witnesses, representatives and subjects are protected during the handling of the matter.

On receiving an allegation or complaint of sexual exploitation or abuse, everyone role is to ensure that it is appropriately reported immediately. If, given the circumstances in which the allegation or complaint is made, the authority to which you would report is not present and you are required to take information from the complainant so that the allegation can be properly reported to the appropriate authorities, you must bear in mind the following guidance:

- React calmly and without prejudice.

- Avoid too many questions and do not attempt to become the investigator. Allow expert investigator(s) to perform the questioning/follow-up.

- Assure the complainant of your keen interest in the matter and readiness to assist.

- Ensure that complaint reporting mechanisms are effective and that complaints are promptly reported to the appropriate estab-
- Maintain confidentiality on all sexual exploitation and abuse reports.
- Consider the removal of alleged perpetrator(s) away from vicinity of complainants.
- Remember to treat any individual that approaches you with respect and dignity, regardless of your assessment of their credibility.
- Never tamper with evidence.

Annex E: Corruption Checklist Assessment

Personnel:
- Are there requests to employ particular people, like family and friends or people with the same ethnical background, together with bypassing the official employment process?
- Do the people, especially high-level personnel and already employed, have the correct expertise and are they properly qualified for their job?
- Is there sufficient diversity in personnel with the required qualification, participating in courses and training?
- Are the qualifications and expertise as presented during the recruitment process verifiable and reliable?
- How well and detailed are personnel expenses like travel costs documented?
- Is their one person or a specific group of persons that act as a caretaker for jobs for a specific group of people?
- Are there clear criteria for recruitment and promotions and how well are these applied during the recruitment process?
- Are there people or individuals that have a strong influence on recruitment, training, stationing, promotions and participation in courses?
- How is accountability for personal behaviour organized and structured, are people and groups of people hold responsible for their personal behaviour?
- How social diverse is the organisation; are there certain groups of people over or underrepresented and if so, which group of people does it concern?
- How reliable and accurate are security forces troop numbers, is there a big difference between reported and the actual number. If there are significant differences, are these differences locally or widely spread along the host nation?
- What is the actual manning of the security forces combat units, checkpoints and other units? Are the right number and the right people present at these locations?
- Is there clarity about the process and who is actually responsible for the timely and accurate payment of salaries to security forces personnel? How do the security forces salaries compare with equivalent civilian positions?
- Are there any reports of violence and abuses committed by security force personnel at checkpoints or during operations? If so, who is involved in these incidents and who is responsible?
- Are there cases of unexplained wealth among high level security forces personnel?
Contracting:

- Is there sufficient clarity about the true identity of the company owners and main staff officials of the contractors and subcontractors?
- How realistic and logical are the project plan and decisions made concerning the proposed use of materials, feasibility and timelines of the project?
- Is there a real willingness from the side of the contractor to have written agreements and specification? Is there information about requests for modifications from the contractor after the bidding process?
- What is the overall expertise, experience, reputation and social conduct of a contractor or subcontractor? Is there information available about complaints, allegations and investigations against the contractor or contracted personnel?
- Are there reports of improper conduct by the contractor or contracted personnel like the use of low quality products, adjustment of specifications or violation of laws?
- Does the contractor or subcontractor have a large stock of unused or outdated material and products and could these be illicitly used for the project?
- Is the contractor listed on a national or international blacklist? If so, for what reason and by whom and when is the contractor placed on this list?
- Is there a relationship between the contractor or the main staff of the company with specific public officials or social engaged with specific suppliers? If so; what is the nature of this relationship and how can it influence the contract?
- What is the life style of the contractor and the main staff and are there any reports about unexplained wealth or ownership of assets by them or their close relatives?
- Are there records of regular contributions to political entities? If so, who is contributing to whom, when and how much? Are there official records about these donations?
- How do the different bids, especially the cost estimates, compare to each other; are there huge, unrealistic differences or only marginal differences? In case of unrealistic differences, is there a pattern or similarity in the bidding?
- Are there regular complaints from losing bidders? If so, what are they complaining about and are these complaints realistic and verifiable?
- Are the losing bidders, especially those with unrealistic bids, approached by the winner to act as subcontractor? Is there information about earlier cases where the contractor, contracted losing bidders as a subcontractor?
- Are there subcontractors involved in the project after signing the contract? What’s their relationship with the contractor and is this aligned with their line of business?
- What is generally known about the use of shell companies and subcontracting constructions in the host nation and more specifically in the local area?
- Is the bidding process restricted towards specific bidders? If so, what is the reason for this and is this reason valid or influenced by high level officials?
- How and by whom are the payments of a contract, including advance and additional
payments, travel and other expenses, requested and arranged? Is this a common procedure?

- Are intermediates and agents paid and by whom? If so, how much do they receive and could they be running a shell company to cover for illegal activities?

- How reliable, detailed, documented and accurate are invoices? Are terms used like: miscellaneous, urgent, and exceptional; are there signs of changing items?

- Is the contractor reluctant to accept independent audit or verification and what is the basic reaction of the contractor when the project isn’t delivered according to the specifications or timeline? Is there a willingness to deliver or ignorance using vague excuses and explanations?

- Is there a proper documentation and payment procedure for the project available and agreed with the contractor, especially regarding possible modifications and additional payments?

- Are there unnecessary, too narrow or vague specifications and criteria in the contract? If so, how is this possible and who is responsible for this?

- Is the monitoring and evaluation process including the criteria to use clear? Is the contractor really willing or ignoring to cooperate?

- Is there in a specific economic area or industry one dominant actor? What is the reason for this and how is this perceived and dealt with by competitors?

- Are the prices for products and services offered reasonable and in line with local prices? If there is a significant difference, can this be explained properly?

- Is there a request for urgent and direct payment in cash, to one person or to offshore companies, before or after the signing of a contract? If so, what is the reason for this?

- Are there companies and contractors that only win bids or that don’t provide a bid in a certain geographic area although that would be normal for them to do? If so, what is this reason for this?

- Are one or more companies or contractors providing a large number of unrealistic bids? What is the reason for this?

- What is the nature of the relationship between the contractor and one or more possible subcontractors? Is the subcontractor actually a different company or is their one owner acting as contractor and subcontractor?

- Are different bid documents containing the same errors, handwriting or use the same address or contact information? If so, what is the reason for this?

- Are there specific items grossly over or undervalued in an otherwise realistic bid? If so, what is the actual reason for this?

- What is the level of compliance and willingness to a proposed countering corruption training program for the contractor and subcontractors?

Institutions:

- What is the level of popular support for the legitimate government in relation to the level of support for criminal patronage and corrupt networks?
• Is the level of popular support for the government related to the level of violence and insecurity in the country?

• What is the overall perception of the population about the effectiveness of the government in countering corruption and how accurate is this perception?

• What is the form and level of influence, spoilers and reformers have on host nation development and security objectives?

• To what level and how successful are opponents and adversaries in using corruption to discredit the legitimate government or as a driver for their recruitment?

• Is there strong evidence or are there strong rumours about high-level political involvement in hampering investigation and prosecution of corrupt actors and criminal networks?

• Are there strong rumours or even evidence of high-level political involvement in corruption networks and criminal activities?

• Are the people in powerful institutional positions part of the same economic, ethical or social network and if so, what is the effect of this on other groups in society?

• What kind of support do people in powerful institutional positions receive from regional, national and international corrupt or criminal actors and groups?

• Are valuable government contracts awarded to government officials, their family members or members of the same social or ethical network?

• How strong and effective is the legal framework to counter corruption in the host nation and are these laws and regulations properly enforced?

• Is there a strong resistance at high political level against judicial reform to counter corruption and investigate and prosecute corrupt actors?

• Are there key and religious leaders and reformers speaking out about corruption that can make a difference; if so, are there ways to support these people in countering corruption?

• Are local media and journalists influenced or threatened when reporting about corruption? If so, what is it they want to report and who is threatening them?

• Is there an effective and institutionalised code of conduct in place at institutional level, together with training and education on integrity?

• Are there reports or rumours of host nation security forces protecting certain high level political entities or specific ethical groups, not aligned with their main tasks and responsibilities?

• Is there evidence of high level government officials involved in commercial activities? If so, what are these activities and how open are these officials about their commercial activities?

• Looking to governmental institutions, how timely, transparent and accessible are their budgets and audits?

• Are there high and mid-level political and criminal actors or networks that want to have an illegal influence on the election process? Are they trying to arrange an outcome that is favourable for them personally or their network?
Intelligence:

- How effective and reliable is the information from local sources and in what way can this information be beneficial to these sources? What is the relationship between these sources and the local population?
- How is the information already available on a specific issue related to the information received from the different sources? What is the focus and relevance of the information received from these sources?
- Is there information available about the level of demands for bribery? If so, by whom are they demanded and for what reason?
- Is there information indicating the popular perception about the different forms and levels of corruption?
- Is there information available from donors and the broader international community about the different level and forms of corruption in the host nation?
- Can information provided by the different sources be properly verified and are there reports of abuses or threats against sources?

Crime and Illegal Activities:

- Are there reports or information of criminal activities, illegal trade and smuggling including possible involvement of government officials?
- Are government and military resources used without clear reasons or authorisation?
- Are there reports of contraband within or outside the region?
- Is there violence or hostile activity taking place that can’t be explained by normal analysis or taking place in the area of borders, stockpiles and natural resources?
- Are there reports of high and middle level government or security forces officials living beyond their means? What are the sources of income they use to be able to do this?
- Are their reports about own equipment and weapons in the hands of the criminal organisations and how is this possible? Are there actors with special interest in obtaining (redundant) military equipment and weapons?
- Are there certain areas where criminal organisations and opponents have freedom of movement, for example near borders? If so, what is the level and subject of cross border activities?
- Are there unreported and unscheduled flights, sea or land movements taking place and who is organising them?
- Are members of the host nation security forces engaged in private protection of people, resources or movements?

Resources:

- Are there effective and efficient host nation resources?
- How is the location, distribution, use and maintenance of equipment and resources monitored and audited?
- Are military resources illegally available online, on the local or black markets?
- Are donated or host nation resources used by opponents or adversaries? If so, how is this possible and who is responsible for this?
- Are there specific host nation requests for resources or equipment and how realistic and relevant are these requests?
• What is the relationship between the reported level and status of supplies and the actual supplies at the tactical level? Are all resources used as planned and required?

• Are incidents and violent activities concentrated in certain area, for example in the area of natural resources or storage facilities? How and by whom are or should these resources and facilities be secured?
Integrity

Transparency

Accountability

Building Integrity in Operations

ACO Handbook

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