Negotiations of Articles I and II the NPT

SELECTED DOCUMENTS
VOLUME 1 (1961-1966)
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Fifty years since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) opened for signature, it remains the “cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime” with an “essential role in the maintenance of international peace, security and stability.” Those words come from the NATO Summit Declaration of July 2018, and show that Allies remain strongly committed to the full implementation of the Treaty.

As we approach the NPT’s 2020 Review Conference, it is worth looking back at NATO’s role in the negotiation of the Treaty - a role that is relatively unknown. Of course, the topic of safeguards (Article III) was the focus of extensive discussions and negotiations in the North Atlantic Council and various committees - especially as it related to the respective roles of the European Atomic Energy Committee and the International Atomic Energy Agency. But closer to my personal interests were the discussions at NATO Headquarters on Articles I and II (on the prevention of transfer of nuclear weapons).

Last year, I sought to illustrate the relationship between Articles I and II of the NPT and NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements in a paper published by the Institut français des relations internationals in 2017. While researching that paper, I came across a number of declassified documents from the archives of the United States, the United Nations, and NATO that were difficult to access. Together with more widely-available sources, they told a remarkable story about the negotiations of the Treaty and the close cooperation between the US and USSR in agreeing to text that would serve their interests and accommodate NATO’s arrangements.

Subsequently, I have discovered additional still-classified documents in the NATO Archives that further enrich our understanding of how NATO contributed to the Treaty. These two volumes include a number of these documents - now declassified - as well as other key pieces from the archives of the United States, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, and even the New York Times, to tell the story directly from the source documents.

I hope these two volumes will help you - whether as a policy-maker, an academic, a researcher, or a casual reader - to understand better what went on in the closed meeting rooms in Brussels, Geneva, and New York that led to agreement on Articles I and II of the NPT. And while they are intended to illustrate and illuminate, there is still more to find - and it is not all online.

I encourage you to continue seeking, to visit the libraries and archives - including NATO’s Archives here in Brussels - and get closer to the original sources. I found my journey as rewarding as my destination, and I hope you do too.

William Alberque
Director, NATO’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and WMD Non-Proliferation Centre (ACDC)
Brussels, Belgium, 19 October 2018

Article I

Each nuclear-weapons State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapons State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapons State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

2. US Memorandum of Conversation: “Nuclear Non-Proliferation,” Department of State, Washington, 12 April 1963


7. NATO Memorandum: “Record of a Private Meeting of the Council held on Wednesday 31st March, 1965, at 10.15 a.m. and 4.30 p.m.,” PR(65)14, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Paris, 7 April 1965


10. NATO Summary Record: “Summary record of a meeting of the Council, held at the Permanent Headquarters, Paris, XVIe, on Monday 26th July, 1965 at 11a.m. and 3.30 p.m., CR(65)34, NATO, Paris, 25 August 1965

11. Record of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament: “Final Verbatim Record of the Two Hundred and Twenty-Fourth Meeting,” ENDC/PV224, Geneva, 17 August 1965


14. NATO Summary Record: “Restricted Annex to summary record of a meeting of the council held on Wednesday, 8th September, 1965, at 10.15 a.m.,” Annex to C-R(65)37, NATO, Paris, 17 September 1965


16. NATO Summary Record: “Summary record of a private meeting of the Council held on Wednesday, 6th October, 1965 at 10.15 a.m.,” PR(65)47, NATO, Paris, 11 October 1965


18. NATO Memorandum: “Comparison of the US and USSR Draft Treaties on the Non-Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons,” PO/65/519/1, NATO, Paris, 19 October 1965

19. Excerpt from NATO Summary Record: “Summary record of a private meeting of the Council held on Wednesday, 6th October, 1965 at 10.15 a.m.,” PR(65)47, NATO, Paris, 11 October 1965
20. Excerpt from NATO Summary Record: “Summary record of a private meeting of the Council held on Wednesday, 20th October, 1965 at 10.15 a.m.,” PR(65)49, NATO, Paris, 28 October 1965


23. Excerpt from NATO Summary Record: “Summary record of a private meeting of the Council held on Wednesday, 6th October, 1965 at 10.15 a.m.,” PR(65)58, NATO, Paris, 13 December 1965

24. Excerpt from NATO Verbatim Record: “Verbatim Record of the Meeting of the Council held on Tuesday, 14th December, 1965 at 10.15 a.m.,” C-VR(65)50, NATO, Paris, 14 December 1965


26. Excerpt from NATO Summary Record: “Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at the Permanent Headquarters, Paris 16e., on Wednesday, 26th January, 1966 at 10.15 a.m.,” C-R(66)3, NATO, Paris, 9 February 1966

27. NATO Summary Record: “Restricted Annex to a Summary record of a meeting of the Council held on Wednesday, 16th February, 1966 at 10.15 a.m.,” C-R(66)7 Annex, NATO, Paris, 24 February 1966

28. NATO Summary Record: “Summary record of a private meeting of the Council held on Wednesday, 2nd March, 1966 at 11.00 a.m.,” PR(66)8, NATO, Paris, 8 March 1966

29. NATO Summary Record: “Restricted Annex to a summary record of a meeting of the Council held on Wednesday, 2nd March, 1966 at 10.15 a.m. and 3.00 p.m.,” C-R(66)9 Annex, NATO, Paris, 24 February 1966

30. NATO Summary Record: “Restricted Annex to a summary record of a meeting of the Council held on Wednesday, 16th March, 1966 at 10.15 a.m.,” C-R(66)11 Annex, NATO, Paris, 22 March 1966

31. NATO Summary Record: “Restricted Annex to a summary record of a meeting of the Council held on Wednesday, 6th April, 1966 at 10.15 a.m.,” C-R(66)13 Annex, NATO, Paris, 15 April 1966

32. NATO Summary Record: “Restricted Annex to a summary record of a meeting of the Council held on Wednesday, 11th May, 1966 at 10.15 a.m.,” C-R(66)17 Annex, NATO, Paris, 24 May 1966

33. NATO Summary Record: “Restricted Annex to a summary record of a meeting of the Council held on Wednesday, 6th July, 1966, at 10.15 a.m.,” C-R(66)31 Annex, NATO, Paris, 8 July 1966
UNITED NATIONS

RESOLUTIONS

adopted by the General Assembly
during its
SIXTEENTH SESSION
Volume I
19 September 1961 — 23 February 1962

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OFFICIAL RECORDS: SIXTEENTH SESSION
SUPPLEMENT No. 17 (A/5100)

New York, 1962
the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1869, the Declaration of the Brussels Conference of 1874, the Conventions of The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, and the Geneva Protocol of 1925, to which the majority of nations are still parties.

Considering that the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons would bring about indiscriminate suffering and destruction to mankind and civilization to an even greater extent than the use of those weapons declared by the aforementioned international declarations and agreements to be contrary to the laws of humanity and a crime under international law.

Believing that the use of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, is a direct negation of the high ideals and objectives which the United Nations has been established to achieve through the protection of succeeding generations from the scourge of war and through the preservation and promotion of their cultures,

1. Declares that:
   (a) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such, a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations;
   (b) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons would exceed even the scope of war and cause indiscriminate suffering and destruction to mankind and civilization and, as such, is contrary to the rules of international law and to the laws of humanity;
   (c) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is a war directed not against an enemy or enemies alone but also against mankind in general, since the peoples of the world not involved in such a war will be subjected to all the evils generated by the use of such weapons;
   (d) Any State using nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to consult the Governments of Member States to ascertain their views on the possibility of convening a special conference for signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons for war purposes and to report on the results of such consultation to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session.

1063rd plenary meeting, 24 November 1981.

1664 (XVI). Question of disarmament

The General Assembly,

Concerned that all measures should be taken that could halt further nuclear weapons tests and prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing that the countries not possessing nuclear weapons have a grave interest, and an important part to fulfil, in the preparation and implementation of such measures,

Believing that action taken by those countries will facilitate agreement by the nuclear Powers to discontinue all nuclear tests and to prevent any increase in the number of nuclear Powers,

Taking note of the suggestion that an inquiry be made into the conditions under which countries not possessing nuclear weapons might be willing to enter into specific undertakings to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring such weapons and to refuse to receive, in the future, nuclear weapons in their territories on behalf of any other country,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to make such an inquiry as soon as possible and to submit a report on its results to the Disarmament Commission not later than 1 April 1962;

2. Requests the Disarmament Commission to take such further measures as appear to be warranted in the light of that report;

3. Calls upon the nuclear Powers to extend their fullest co-operation and assistance with regard to the implementation of the present resolution.

1070th plenary meeting, 4 December 1981.

1665 (XVI). Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 1380 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 and 1576 (XV) of 20 December 1960,

Convinced that an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons is growing more imminent and threatens to extend and intensify the arms race and
to increase the difficulties of avoiding war and of establishing international peace and security based on the rule of law,

Believing in the necessity of an international agreement, subject to inspection and control, whereby the states producing nuclear weapons would refrain from relinquishing control of such weapons to any nation not possessing them and whereby states not possessing such weapons would refrain from manufacturing them,

1. Calls upon all States, and in particular upon the States at present possessing nuclear weapons, to use their best endeavours to secure the conclusion of an international agreement containing provisions under which the nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons, and provisions under which States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons;

2. Urges all States to co-operate to those ends.

1070th plenary meeting, 4 December 1951.

1721 (XVI). International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space

A

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the common interest of mankind in furthering the peaceful uses of outer space and the urgent need to strengthen international co-operation in this important field,

Believing that the exploration and use of outer space should be only for the betterment of mankind and to the benefit of States irrespective of the stage of their economic or scientific development,

1. Recommends to States for their guidance in the exploration and use of outer space the following principles:
   (a) International law, including the Charter of the United Nations, applies to outer space and celestial bodies;
   (b) Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all States in conformity with international law and are not subject to national appropriation;

2. Invites the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to study and report on the legal problems which may arise from the exploration and use of outer space.

1085th plenary meeting, 20 December 1961.

B

The General Assembly,

Believing that the United Nations should provide a focal point for international co-operation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space,

1. Calls upon States launching objects into orbit or beyond to furnish information promptly to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, through the Secretary-General, for the registration of launchings;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to maintain a public registry of the information furnished in accordance with paragraph 1 above;

3. Requests the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, in co-operation with the Secretary-General and making full use of the functions and resources of the Secretariat:
   (a) To maintain close contact with governmental and non-governmental organizations concerned with outer space matters;
   (b) To provide for the exchange of such information relating to outer space activities as Governments may supply on a voluntary basis, supplementing but not duplicating existing technical and scientific exchanges;
   (c) To assist in the study of measures for the promotion of international co-operation in outer space activities;

4. Further requests the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to report to the General Assembly on the arrangements undertaken for the performance of those functions and on such developments relating to the peaceful uses of outer space as it considers significant.

1085th plenary meeting, 20 December 1961.

C

The General Assembly,

Noting with gratification the marked progress for meteorological science and technology opened up by the advances in outer space,

Convinced of the world-wide benefits to be derived from international co-operation in weather research and analysis,

1. Recommends to all Member States and to the World Meteorological Organization and other appropriate specialized agencies the early and comprehensive study, in the light of developments in outer space, of measures:
   (a) To advance the state of atmospheric science and technology so as to provide greater knowledge of basic physical forces affecting climate and the possibility of large-scale weather modification;
   (b) To develop existing weather forecasting capabilities and to help Member States make effective use of such capabilities through regional meteorological centres;

2. Requests the World Meteorological Organization, consulting as appropriate with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and other specialized agencies and governmental and nongovernmental organizations, such as the International Council of Scientific Unions, to submit a report to the Governments of its Member States and to the Economic and Social Council at its thirty-fourth session regarding appropriate organizational and financial arrangements to achieve those ends, with a view to their further consideration by the General Assembly at its seventeenth session;

3. Requests the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, as it seems appropriate, to review that report and submit its comments and recommendations to the Economic and Social Council and to the General Assembly.

1085th plenary meeting, 20 December 1961.
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: April 12, 1963
4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Nuclear Non-proliferation

PARTICIPANTS:

US

The Secretary
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Hillenbrand

USSR

Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of USSR
Georgi N. Korniienko, Counselor, Embassy

COPIES TO:

S/S
S/P - Mr. Rostow
G - Mr. Johnson
EUR - Mr. Tyler
ACDA - Mr. Foster

S/AL - Amb. Thompson
G/M - Mr. Kitchen
White House - Mr. Bundy
Emb. Moscow - Paris
Paris - USRA

After discussing several aspects of the Berlin question with Ambassador Dobrynin (covered in separate memorandum of conversation), the Secretary said he would like to turn specifically to the question of nuclear non-proliferation. Here was a point in which a genuine common interest existed between the Soviet Union and the United States and indeed the United Kingdom and France. On purely theoretical grounds no nuclear power could be interested in any other power’s becoming a nuclear power. On purely practical grounds, looking ahead fifteen to twenty years and seeing the prospect of as many as ten to fifteen countries coming into possession of nuclear weapons, the prospect for peace was not good. An element of unpredictability would be added. We therefore have a common interest in avoiding nuclear proliferation.

It was against this background, the Secretary continued, that he had talked with Groznyko at Geneva and urged that the Soviet Union and the United States concentrate specifically on the question of non-diffusion of nuclear weapons on a national basis, that is concentrate on governments which could develop national capacities on their own. We believe that we should concentrate on this central point and not try to solve all related matters. If agreement were reached on this point, it would make further steps possible on the disarmament field. With reference to the Western Alliance, the Secretary said that he had pointed out to Groznyko that we did not have in mind the transfer of nuclear weapons directly or indirectly through this Alliance. But he had also pointed out to Groznyko that the expression “directly or indirectly through a military alliance” might lead to misunderstanding and would require further discussion. With this in mind we had drafted a

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Ambassador Dobrynin asked whether the Secretary had discussed the declaration with the French and the British and whether they had agreed to it. The Secretary said we had given them copies but that he was not acting as their agent today. He did want to say, with a full sense of responsibility, that if the Soviets felt that our paper provided a basis of negotiations, the Allies would take this as a very serious step and we could take up the subject with them. We could not commit them today, the Secretary added, but he was encouraged to find out if the Soviets did consider the paper as a basis for negotiations.

After Dobrynin had carefully read the paper which the Secretary had handed him (text attached), the Secretary observed that some of the discussion in the West over the past few years on nuclear matters, and the increase in consultation among the Western powers on this subject, was due to the change brought about in the nuclear situation when in 1956-57 the USSR had made clear that it was targeting a considerable number of nuclear weapons on Western Europe to be delivered either by bombers or by missiles. This brought the question to the forefront in the thinking of Western European governments. The Soviets had stressed the point either to visitors in Moscow or during visits of Soviet leaders to the West, emphasizing that one or more countries would be destroyed. It was only natural for the countries threatened by nuclear weapons to want to know something more about them. Thus the increase in the discussion of nuclear problems in the West was the direct result of the developments which he had mentioned in the nuclear field.

Furthermore, the Secretary went on, he sincerely asked the Soviet government to believe that we ourselves are opposed to placing nuclear weapons in the areas of national governments and national forces. This is a matter of our interest. We have pursued this policy even though some of our Allies have disagreed with it. There is nothing in the background which cuts across this most elementary policy of the US government. Although the Soviets may have expressed concern from time to time with regard to something which
which has not yet come into being, this is US government policy. What he was saying today, the Secretary pointed out, was not our answer to the recent Soviet note on the multinational force. We would deal with this in due course, but Ambassador Dobrynin would not be surprised to hear that we disagree with many points in the Soviet note. The Secretary said he did have one immediate comment. The note mentioned the multinational as well as multilateral force. The former was mainly the British V-bombers and US Polaris submarines. These were the principal elements along with the coordination with other elements which might have related missions. The multinational force does not change the existing situation as far as the spread of weapons is concerned. Our view is that this is also true of the multilateral force. The key point about the latter is that national governments will not be able to employ it on a national basis by their own decision or that of their armed forces. The main objective is to prevent the spread of national nuclear capabilities. We are not interested solely in one, two or three countries but on a world wide basis. After all, countries not allied, either with the US or the USSR may be planning to acquire nuclear capacities. Hence we think that a four-power agreement along the lines of the declaration would be great progress.

After some discussion of Berlin at this point (covered in separate memorandum of conversation), Dobrynin commented that the main point about the non-transfer declaration proposed by the US is that to which Gromyko had objected previously. Dobrynin said he had also made the same point in an earlier conversation and his government had likewise had done so in a note some months ago as well as in its recent note. This was not purely a matter of propaganda but the way the Soviet government felt. The US was actually beginning the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Chairman Khrushchev had welcomed President Kennedy's remarks regarding US policy on non-proliferation, but what has been going on since last summer is the actual proliferation of nuclear weapons. Without even speaking of Germany, a country like Italy which has not had nuclear weapons will now have them in the so-called multilateral units. The policy of the USSR is to have no nuclear weapons except in national units of the USSR. The US has had the same within the NATO framework. This the Soviet Union could accept. But when the US speaks of so-called multilateral teams made up of countries who do not now possess nuclear weapons, this is a new and dangerous step. It marks a real difference in quality. In a year or two the situation will further change and then there will be proliferation. Dobrynin repeated that the multilateral force would put the control of nuclear weapons in the hands of other countries which did not have them now. He recalled that before the Paris Agreements in 1954,
in 1954, the Western countries had claimed that they were going to prohibit the Germans from having all sorts of weapons, even heavy conventional armaments, but in a few years this was pushed aside. The Germans had complained that they were not being given equal treatment. Now, they have the biggest army in NATO, and where were the Paris Agreements? Now the first step in satisfying West German nuclear demands was to be the multilateral force. This was only the beginning, the Soviets felt. The US was on a dangerous path on which it could not stop. The Germans would always try to bring about changes. The first step would be to change the rule of unanimity to decision by majority and thus eliminate the US veto. The only solution would be for the USSR and the US to keep their monopoly. This was the basic position of the Soviet government. The US-proposed declaration, Ambassador Dobrynin continued, dealt with everything except the multilateral force or the multinational force. He could only note the reservations in the minute, and felt that the US was really proposing nuclear proliferation both quantitatively and qualitatively.

The Secretary said he would try to distinguish the two things: from the quantitative aspect, the question of disarmament applied to both sides. The USSR had built up a substantial nuclear force requiring a substantial nuclear force on our side. It appeared from a recent Khrushchev speech that important decisions had been made to allocate a considerable amount of new resources to military purposes. The question of quantity should be grappled with in the disarmament context. In this sense, quantitative proliferation needs serious attention.

On the qualitative side, we were opposed to putting other governments in a position, not merely on paper, to hold and employ nuclear weapons. We have no arrangements in mind towards this end. This was an important point which the Soviets should remember. Dobrynin commented that this was where the US and the USSR differed. The Soviets could not see how a development could be prevented over the years which would lead to real control of nuclear weapons in the hands of the members of the multilateral force. The Secretary said we were sure that this would not happen with respect to the NATO countries. But there were also other countries which would move towards possession of nuclear weapons in the next ten years or so unless there were some such agreement as we had proposed. Dobrynin said he was not so sure about the NATO countries. Unless, the Secretary continued, we can combine a NATO arrangement with a larger agreement, the question will get out of control. Dobrynin observed that the multilateral force was a process of proliferation.
proliferation. The Secretary responded that we were quite certain that this was not so as far as NATO was concerned.

Dobrynin said that when he looked at the post-war history of West Germany, recalling for example statements made by Mr. Dulles in 1954 and how the Germans now had the strongest army in NATO, he could only wonder how we could be in five years. The Secretary commented that he did not want to go over the whole history of the post-war period, but it was a fact that the West Germans had not begun to arm until after the East Germans had started. The East Germans had been permitted to begin arming one year before the West Germans over the protests of the Western powers. Dobrynin injected that he could produce a list. The Secretary observed that if the Soviets maintained twenty divisions in East Germany, we could not maintain that many in the Federal Republic. Dobrynin said the Soviets were preparing to withdraw from East Germany anytime the US was prepared to withdraw from the Federal Republic.

The Secretary stated that we would have no objections if the Soviets were to make arrangements within the Warsaw Pact similar to those we were proposing to make within NATO. Dobrynin responded that the Soviets did not want this. The Secretary said he wanted to ask the Soviet government to study the draft declaration against the background of his statement to Ambassador Dobrynin. The latter said he would of course refer the text to his government, but he was sure that it would be found unsatisfactory. He asked as to what we understood by the term “minute” to be attached to the declaration. Ambassador Thompson said it was a document intended for purposes of explanation. Referring to the text of the draft non-transfer declaration, the Secretary noted that Gromyko had raised the point about using the device of an Alliance to achieve something indirectly. The Secretary recalled that he had told him that it was not our intention to transfer nuclear weapons through a military alliance to national control. But since the expression “indirectly through a military alliance” does not carry a full explanation on its face we must be clear what it means. It would therefore be important to append a minute to avoid misunderstanding. Dobrynin said he could recall what Gromyko had said about indirect transfer. He had been against predeclaration and had been prepared to go along in connection with the multinational and multilateral forces, although what the US proposed to do had not been very clear at the time. The Secretary said the issue was the ability of national governments to use their own national forces to launch nuclear weapons. He recognized that there might be political reasons why the Soviet Union did not want other NATO countries to consider themselves part of an
of an Alliance which has nuclear weapons at its disposal. However this question of national nuclear capacity was so important that it was worth taking hold of the particular point and stepping that at least. We were prepared to enter into an agreement on this. Dobrynin said there were no specific political reasons for the Soviet position. The USSR was against proliferation in any Alliance.

The Secretary observed that President Kennedy had already clarified the point that these arrangements would be in no way separated from the responsibility of the United States. Dobrynin injected that the fact was that other countries would possess nuclear weapons. The Secretary responded that no other country would come into their possession. Dobrynin repeated that they would have possession. The US might not be in a position to be fully responsible. The USSR already felt that the West Germans were exercising a strong influence on US policy, for example in the negotiations on Berlin and German problems. This influence would increase in years to come. One read that the Germans would be paying one-third of the cost of the multilateral forces. They would try to acquire a decisive voice. The Secretary said that if he really believed this he would sign the agreement today so that in five or ten years from now the governments would be bound. What the Soviets fear would then not be possible. Dobrynin said that the fact was that through a rather complicated scheme the US was going to give other countries nuclear weapons. Who was proliferating? You or we?

The Secretary observed that the Soviets should look at the alternative. It was either this arrangement or no arrangement. The security of the Soviet Union and of the US depended on the arrangement. Dobrynin merely repeated that the Germans would be tempted to acquire nuclear weapons. The Secretary pointed out that they would sign paragraph two of the declaration. Dobrynin said that he did not know whether they would sign. The Secretary responded that he thought that they would sign. He thought that a lot of countries should sign, for example the Chinese. Dobrynin commented that the Soviet Union had no multilateral forces with the Chinese. The Secretary asked whether the Chinese would sign. Dobrynin said he did not know, but the Soviets were not proposing a multilateral forces to them. However the US was inviting the USSR to do this. If the US continued, the Soviet Union would have no alternative but to do the same for its friends.

The Secretary said he wanted to suggest that this subject was one of importance both to the US and the USSR. It should be discussed seriously on this
After a brief discussion of Berlin at this point, the Secretary and the National Security Council's statement on this question. The Secretary observed that a pertinent thing about the missile crisis was that those who criticized it in the West were those who wanted national nuclear forces that would not be placed by a signed agreement today. The multilateral forces were not really involved in the arms race, the Secretary added, despite the role of President Kennedy's central purpose on this question.
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DRAFT NON-TRANSFER DECLARATION

Desiring to promote international peace and security,

Desiring, in particular, to refrain from taking steps which will extend and intensify the arms race,

Believing that the creation of nuclear weapons forces by additional states will jeopardize those ends,

Recalling that General Assembly Resolution 1695 (XVI) urges all states to cooperate for these purposes,

Reaffirming their determination to achieve agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

1. The Governments of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics solemnly declare that they will not transfer any nuclear weapons directly, or indirectly through a military alliance, into the national control of individual states not now possessing such weapons, and that they will not assist such other states in the manufacture of such weapons;

2. The other signatory Governments solemnly declare that they will not manufacture nuclear weapons and that they will refrain from acquiring directly, or indirectly through military alliances, national control of any nuclear weapons, and that they will not seek or receive assistance from other states in the manufacture of any such weapons;

3. This declaration, which shall be deposited with the Government of ____________ shall be open to signature by all Governments. It shall remain in effect indefinitely, subject to the right of any signatory to be relieved of its terms if another signatory fails to observe them or if any other Government takes action which signatories have declared they will not take;

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this declaration.

DONE AT ____________, this ______ day of __________, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-__________

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MINUTES FOR POSSIBLE USE IN
DISCUSSION WITH DRAFT NON-
TRANSFER DECLARATION

The United States is proposing for consideration a declaration dealing with the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons. The principal operative sentence of this declaration, insofar as the nuclear powers are concerned, reads as follows:

"The Governments of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics solemnly declare that they will not transfer any nuclear weapons directly, or indirectly through a military alliance, into the national control of individual states not now possessing such weapons, and that they will not assist such other states in the manufacture of such weapons."

This language is meant to make more precise the third point in the message from the Foreign Minister of the USSR which states that:
"There should also be excluded the transfer of nuclear weapons through military alliances to those states which do not possess them, i.e., the transfer of such weapons in an indirect manner, irrespective of whether or not the national armed forces of these states are component parts of the armed forces of any military alliance."

The US draft declaration applies the following test to actions respecting the disposition of a nuclear weapon in connection with a regional arrangement: Such actions are prohibited if they would give to any state which is a member of the regional arrangement and which does not possess nuclear weapons the ability to make a determination to use these weapons on the basis of its national decision alone. A few illustrations may suffice:

1. The declaration proposed by the U.S. would prohibit the U.S. or the Soviet Union from placing nuclear weapons under the control of units of national forces of nations in the NATO or Warsaw Pact which do not now possess nuclear weapons even though those units are assigned to the

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to the NATO or Warsaw Pact command structure.

2. The declaration proposed by the United States would not prevent the United States or the Soviet Union from deploying nuclear weapons in support of the forces of member nations which are assigned to the forces of the NATO and Warsaw Pact, respectively, even though these members do not themselves have such weapons. The arrangements would be such that the U.S. and USSR, respectively, retain control over the weapons so that they could not be deployed or used solely on the basis of the national decision of any government not now possessing them.

3. The declaration proposed by the United States would not prevent the U.S. or the USSR from placing nuclear weapons in the custody of units of a multinational defense force within the framework of NATO, or Warsaw Pact defense forces, respectively, if weapons could not be deployed or used on the basis of the national decision of any government not now possessing them.

4. The declaration proposed by the U.S. would not prevent the U.S. or the Soviet Union from entering into multinational consultative procedures with respect to the deployment and use of nuclear weapons with countries not now possessing such weapons.

5. The declaration proposed by the U.S. assumes adherence to the declaration by all potential nuclear states or authorities. It would not become operative until both the United States and the USSR were satisfied that such adherence had been obtained, and until both had ratified it pursuant to their constitutional processes.
To: Permanent Representatives
From: Secretary General

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

As you are aware, I informed the Council at its meeting on 29th July of my intention to submit some short studies surveying the various problems likely to be discussed during the forthcoming East-West conversations.

Attached hereto, in the hope that they may be found useful, are papers dealing with the following topics:

1. Non-aggression pact;
2. Fixed control posts;
3. Reduction of foreign troops on German soil;
4. Freezing and reduction of military budgets;
5. Peace treaty with Germany;

(Signed) D. U. STIKKER

NATO CONFIDENTIAL
NON-DISEMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

I.

1. Principal developments during the last few years concerning the question of the non-dissimination of nuclear weapons can be summarised as follows:

(a) Already in September 1957 the Soviet Union proposed to renounce, for five years, the right to station or transfer atomic weapons abroad. This measure, while being directed also against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, aimed at the same time at decisively changing the military balance. The proposal was repeated by the Soviets in September 1958.

Also the first version of the Rapacki plan (October 1957) called, amongst others, for the prohibition of the transfer of nuclear weapons. The Soviet general disarmament plan of 2nd June, 1958, included a ban on the transfer of nuclear weapons and the transmission of nuclear information, as well as for an undertaking by the non-nuclear powers not to manufacture such weapons (Stage I, point 5). This proposal was again repeated at the 16th UNGA in Autumn 1961.

(b) At the United Nations General Assembly, the first initiative to tabe the question of non-dissimination of nuclear weapons was taken by Ireland, which in October 1958 suggested a study on the dangers inherent in a further dissimination. This initiative resulted in a series of "Irish resolutions" on the subject in 1959, 1960 and 1961.

While in the vote on the Irish resolution of 1960, ten NATO countries abstained and four member countries voted in favour, the modified resolution of 1961 (number 1565(XVI) of 4th December, 1961) was adopted by the United Nations members, including the NATO countries, without vote or opposition.

By approving this resolution, all United Nations members have, in principle, agreed that an international treaty should be concluded by which:

- the states possessing nuclear weapons would commit themselves not to relinquish control and not to transmit information necessary for the manufacture of nuclear weapons to states not possessing such weapons;

- states not possessing nuclear weapons to commit themselves not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons.
At the same time, the United Nations General Assembly also adopted the so-called "Swedish resolution" (number 1654(XI)) over which some differences of opinion arose amongst the members of the Alliance, in particular because the resolution called for an enquiry on the question under which conditions non-nuclear countries would be ready not only not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, but also to refuse to accept them on their territories on behalf of other countries (1).

At a later stage, consultations took place in the Alliance which made it possible to co-ordinate the replies of the member countries to the subsequent enquiry of the United Nations Secretary-General and most of the member countries used the arguments recommended according to C-R(62)9 of 28th February, 1962, in motivating their negative attitude towards the Swedish resolution and the enquiry of the United Nations Secretary-General (2).

(c) It will further be recalled that the recent United States disarmament proposals (September 1961 and April 1962, Stage I C1) envisage measures to prevent the creation of further national nuclear forces (c.f. Text at Annex B). The Soviet disarmament plan of March 1962 includes similar proposals (Text at Annex B). It adds that states not possessing nuclear weapons "shall refuse to admit the nuclear weapon of any other state into their territories".

(e) A major difference of opinion between East and West with regard to the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons resulted from the Soviet position that any nuclear sharing policy in NATO, as for instance the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force, would have to be considered a proliferation of nuclear weapons (c.f. C-R(62)35 of 6th August, 1962, and C-R(62)43 of 29th August, 1962, Soviet note of 8th April, 1963). It has, however, been made clear already at an early stage and has been repeated at various occasions (3) that this was not the case and that the United States had no intention of abandoning its efforts to work out multilateral NATO arrangements including the possibility of a multilateral ABM force within NATO.

(1) Ten members of the Alliance voted against the resolution and four in favour.

(2) It will be recalled that only 2 out of the United Nations member countries have replied to the United Nations enquiry, only 31 of which expressed a favourable view without any reservations. In a speech before the United Nations Political Commission on 9th November, 1962, the Soviet Foreign Minister suggested that the matter should be referred to the Geneva Disarmament Conference. No further action has been taken on this matter.

II.

Seen against this historical background, two major differences of opinion seem to arise over the following issues:

- While the West has approved the principles of the Irish resolution of 4th December, 1961 (c.f. paragraph 1(b) above) and has subsequently reiterated its approval, it has rejected any Soviet and neutral demands which would affect the right to station nuclear weapons anywhere in the treaty area.

- While the West has made it clear that it does not consider the establishment of a D.C. nuclear force as a proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Soviets have maintained that the question of the form or transition of nuclear weapons - bilateral or multilateral - is not of importance and that the establishment of a multilateral force would in fact mean a dissemination of nuclear armaments.

It will be recalled that at the Ottawa meeting in May 1963, Secretary of State, Rusk, emphasised United States interest to move ahead on the matter of an agreement on the non-transfer of nuclear weapons and specifically proposed to consider whether such an agreement is possible. Lord Home, supporting this, said that there might be a possible approach from the Soviets concerning this question when the West should not fail to recognise and study.
The Parties to the Treaty would agree to seek to prevent the creation of further national nuclear forces. To this end:

(c) Those Parties to the Treaty under whose jurisdiction a nuclear weapon had been manufactured would agree:

(1) not to transfer control over any nuclear weapons to a state under whose jurisdiction a nuclear weapon had not been manufactured at the date of the signing of the treaty;

(2) not to assist any such state in manufacturing any nuclear weapons.

(b) Those Parties to the Treaty under whose jurisdiction no nuclear weapons had been manufactured would agree:

(1) not to acquire or attempt to acquire control over any nuclear weapons;

(2) not to manufacture or attempt to manufacture any nuclear weapons.
SOVIET DISARMAMENT PLAN OF MARCH 1962

Article 16

The states, parties to the Treaty not possessing nuclear weapons, undertake to refrain from producing or otherwise obtaining nuclear weapons and shall refuse to admit the nuclear weapons of any other state into their territories.
November 20, 1964
Stenographic Protocol of the II Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party (excerpts)

Citation:

Summary:
Gomulka addresses the justification for Khrushchev's removal and describes some of the recent foreign policy problems experienced as a result of Khrushchev's actions.

Original Language:
Polish

Contents:
- English Translation
[Gomulka begins the section of his address on Khrushchev's removal by reading down a list of justifications, mainly domestic, offered by Soviet officials at the October CPSU plenum to justify Khrushchev's removal, pp. 318-21.]

... The next censure dealt with his favoring his family, which expressed itself above all else of course in his sending his son-in-law, Adzhubei, abroad for various matters. Sending him itself may not be the most important thing, but the irresponsible way in which Adzhubei behaved abroad was often simply disgraceful for the Soviet Union. We know a little bit about that, at least from his last trip, to West Germany (representatives of our press informed us about the way he acted and his statements). In a word, Cde. Khrushchev started to create around himself ... the atmosphere of a cult of personality. [pp. 324-25]

... We recognized that the change carried out in the leading positions [in the Soviet Union] is completely justified, it was carried out in full accordance with the principle of inner-party democracy, and we expressed our approval for the decisions of the Plenum of the CPSU CC, considering that they were above all else their internal matters, and we could not meddle in these matters, but we fully concur in the argumentation that the Soviet comrades put forward to us. At the same time, we presented and told them as well what we ourselves have been thinking about his [Khrushchev's] activities in those matters in which we are directly interested in some form, because they dealt with us; this had to do above all else with effects in two areas: foreign policy and in the area of our economic relations....

For the Soviet comrades, our positive stance was no surprise because they already knew about the previously-cited contentious issues between the leadership of our party and Cde. Khrushchev (or at least some of the issues). They had been informed by Cde. Khrushchev.

... As I already stated, these sometimes divergent views dealt with various aspects of foreign policy, and they arose above all else from a lack of consultation with regard to questions about the Soviet Union's foreign policy in relation to the FRG ..., [a lack of] consultation with our party and with our responsible state organs....

... It is clear that both Poland as a country and our party are not the main creative force for the foreign policy of the socialist camp, and it is unthinkable that Poland would force something in this regard or that we could conduct some sort of independent [samodzielna] foreign policy. It is also unthinkable that even when we do have reservations to the policy of the Soviet Union, that we would express them openly, that we would reveal some shades of difference in our stance, because the enemy would immediately detect it and use it.... At the same time, every one of us feels a responsibility that in certain matters in which our party, our government, our country, is deeply and directly interested, and we demand, have the right to demand, and always will demand that these matters be discussed with us and coordinated, and that, if I may say so, we also express our stance.... [pp. 322-24]

Only in the last two years did certain nuances begin to arise, differences of greater or lesser importance. They had to deal above all else with the question of German policy, but not only this. As you know, comrades, not every initiative of the Soviet Union in the German question – with regard to the solution of the German question, with regard to the peace treaty and West Berlin – had been thought out to the end. We always believed that the Soviet Union had thought through its initiatives well, that it had more trump cards in its hand, because it had all the weapons [nieci] of policy in its hand and not us, but it turned out that it did not always look that way, that it was a little bit of a [cavalry] charge – e.g., with regard to the issues of the peace treaty with Germany, we had to be a little ashamed. Cde. Khrushchev set deadlines that were not well thought through; the West stood firm, did not concede, and later he had to withdraw from these ultimative deadlines and somehow explain. But this is not yet a question of differences. Only if a person looks very insightfully and analytically at other moves does he perceive these failings.

If it has to do with the German question, Cde. Khrushchev voiced the concept of Rapallo. I will not
explicate what this means here; essentially, the concept boiled down to the idea that the FRG did not have in the long term any other way to go than to change sides and turn and to the Soviet Union, reach an understanding with the Soviet Union, and then one could talk about some resolution of the German problem. We were very skeptical about this matter; we believed that the situation here is completely different. We spoke about these questions more than once, and Cde. Khrushchev often got angry because we did not share his view of this concept.

In this regard, Adenauer conducted a special policy through [FRG Ambassador in Moscow Hans] Kroll. Not only Adenauer in the end, but also other envoys of the FRG, simply deceived Cde. Khrushchev; they discussed various possibilities, but with a completely different goal in mind. They had the goal of negotiating concessions for the FRG from his side and the creation of some long-term prospect for opening the door to Germany’s unification. That's what it was mainly about for them. And with regard to the possibility that they would loosen their relations with NATO, or leave NATO to turn and join the Soviet Union, we absolutely did not see any grounds for this.

This already created in our discussions certain differences, especially given the sort of character Cde. Khrushchev had – a very rude one; in general, this already did not create a good climate. Very substantial matters arose between us in connection with the desire of the USA and the FRG to create so-called NATO multilateral nuclear forces [MLF], which is currently the subject of broad criticism. Cde. Khrushchev's view regarding NATO nuclear forces differed fundamentally enough from our view. Namely, Cde. Khrushchev truly believed that the creation of even NATO nuclear forces would not change the balance of forces between the socialist camp and the states of the Atlantic bloc; that these multilateral nuclear forces in a certain sense might be helpful in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in such a form that the FRG or other NATO states would come to possess their own national nuclear forces.

Various other ideas were expressed about this: that the multilateral forces were an alliance between the FRG and the USA, but that it would also bind the FRG that much more with the USA, which is not completely bad for us because first, the USA would have a restraining impact upon West Germany's various revanchist tendencies; at the same time, a French-West German alliance could be even more dangerous for peace and eventually [lead] to Germany's turning to France for atomic weapons. In fact, the whole argument boiled down to the idea that if the Germans were to bind themselves more closely to France at the cost of relations with the USA -- since they have a notably larger economic position than France, a stronger economic position -- then they would begin to impose their views upon France and lead it down their road.

Many such conceptions can be worthy of discussion; it is possible to look differently at these matters. Still, we had another view here, because the stated concepts would naturally lead to the logical conclusion that we could silently agree to the creation of the multilateral nuclear forces. These concepts led to such a conclusion. We were decidedly of another point of view in this matter. We discussed the matter in the Politburo and even expressed our stance on this matter. Nothing has changed in this regard in terms of the official policy of the Soviet Union; it is opposed, as it was before, to the multilateral nuclear forces. It maintained and still maintains that the creation of the multilateral forces constitutes a proliferation of nuclear weapons, to which we cannot agree, and if it is necessary, we will have to take steps in response… [pp. 337-39]

... We explained that we are not for the proliferation of these [i.e., nuclear] weapons, but at the same time we expressed understanding in a speech for China's aspirations to become a nuclear state. Such were the shades of difference in our stances in many cases. [p. 340]

... Cde. Khrushchev's recently planned trip to the FRG hit us particularly hard. I already spoke about this, that in these matters we are directly interested, despite the fact that we have to speak along party lines; that we wanted to know something, to consult; that we were not against a trip -- please, if you have to go, you can go -- but we should know something about what it's about, what the goal is to be, since we are also deeply interested. We received evasive replies; he did not want to consult. Often, this started to anger us, since this is no favor, it is a duty; especially since later,
after Adzhubei’s visit to the FRG, we found out from the newspapers that he [Khrushchev] was intending to go. Up to the last moment we did not know: Is he going, or isn’t he? Officially, he did not tell us, a bad situation. And so it grew, and grew, and grew. Such various matters. The question arises here: Why did he not want to speak, was it a lack of trust? No, it does not have to do here with some lack of trust. If he’s able to tell U Thant, he can tell us as well – right? Here it is some sort of personal trait, a character trait… Several comrades know, even non-members of the Politburo were witnesses to how he can react very angrily to even very innocent, often normal statements…. At Lansk this happened once, and it demonstrated the bad situation. [pp. 340-41]

… But this began most often to have an effect upon our economic relations. He began quite simply to treat us worse. For us, our trade relations with the Soviet Union are no less important than our political relations. For our economy, this is an extremely important matter. But we were shoved a little bit into last place in relation to the other European people’s democracies. The thought was, we will give it to whomever, but we cannot give it to the Poles, despite valid agreements.…. With regard to grain, for example. I spoke here on one occasion about how we received a letter from Comrade Khrushchev last year saying that we could not count on any deliveries of grain after the disaster of the drought. This letter went to all the other parties, to the GDR, to Czechoslovakia, to Hungary, to Bulgaria…. It was personally very uncomfortable for me to discuss the grain topic, especially after the drought. When we met with Cde. Khrushchev last year in Białowieża, he made accusations against us: "We do not have grain because you took it from us. We had reserves, but we had to give you the reserves, because you came to us and pleaded, and we scraped the reserves from our warehouses for your sake"….

Well, it began anew this year. The harvest is better, so other countries were given grain, even though a similar letter was written to everybody, but no grain was given to us…. Only after the removal of Cde. Khrushchev … the new leadership decided that they should nevertheless give the Poles 400 thousand tons in accordance with the signed agreement. It is the same with regard to cotton this year…. [pp. 342-43]

… We brought this up [Khrushchev’s proposed trip to Bonn] with the Soviet comrades, the new leadership, during our discussions, so that we would know also what their stance is with regard to the German question. Because [West German Chancellor Ludwig] Erhard is stating in the German press that the invitation for Khrushchev is also valid for Kosygin, we asked them: Exactly why did he [Khrushchev] want to go, and would you go there?

[Their reply:] ‘We do not know why he wanted to go to the FRG, we do not see any sense in it, and we ourselves do not intend to go, and if we had the intention to go, we would consult with you.’

We do not want anything more, that’s the normal way of putting the matter. [pp. 344-45]
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  

November 14, 1964  

SECRET  

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 318  

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  

Subject: The Future of the Nuclear Defense of the Atlantic Alliance  

1. In the next months we face highly important negotiations and decisions on this subject. These decisions relate not only to the MLF proposals now under discussion in Paris, but to the interests and concerns of the new British Government. It is also obvious that we shall have to take careful account of the interests and purposes of France.  

2. Our own interest is, as it has been, to find the most effective means of advancing the partnership of the Atlantic Community in nuclear defense as in other matters, and to do this without giving encouragement to the spread of nuclear weapons.  

3. To carry out these purposes effectively, it is essential that this Government should be united, and accordingly it is my desire that all of the activities of this Government relating to the nuclear defense of the Atlantic Alliance should be fully coordinated among the White House, the State Department and the Defense Department.  

4. More specifically, I desire that all officers of this Government who travel overseas to discuss this matter should have written instructions cleared in the White House, the State Department and the Defense Department. Such instructions, where appropriate, should also be used by other officers of this Government as guidance.

SECRET  

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NSC 77-60243  
By LBJ, NARA, Date 12/8/77  

- 30 -
5. I also desire that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense should make an explicit designation of those officers who are authorized to discuss these problems with the press, and that other officers should be instructed to refrain from such discussion during this period of critical negotiation. A parallel arrangement will be instituted in the White House. It is critically important that this Government should speak with one voice on this subject in the future.

6. Finally, I request that detailed recommendations and proposals should be worked out for my consideration by the end of this month so that there may be time for careful consideration and decision before my meeting with Prime Minister Wilson on December 7 and 8.

[Signature]

[Handwritten: Secret]
NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 322

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE
    THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Guidelines for Discussions on the Nuclear Defense of the Atlantic Alliance

We now face very important discussions with our Allies on future plans for the nuclear defense of the Atlantic Alliance. I am sending you this memorandum to establish guidelines for this discussion.

1. Unless I give specific instructions to the contrary, I do not wish any American official in any forum to press for a binding agreement at this time. I wish to maintain the position established in our talks with Prime Minister Wilson -- namely, that the U.S. is not seeking to force its own views on any European nation, but wishes rather to find a way of responding effectively to the largest possible consensus among interested European allies.

2. At the same time I expect American negotiators to maintain the position that no agreement can be made with the U.K. that does not take account of the legitimate interests of Germany, and that similarly no agreement can be made with Germany that does not take account of the legitimate interests of other European states. The American negotiators should continue to encourage direct discussion among Europeans, and in particular they should urge the U.K. to seek agreement with Germany and vice versa.

3. I wish all American negotiators to avoid public or private quarrels with France, and to maintain in public and private the following position: We are interested in reducing our differences with France; we will never support any proposal for a nuclear force which is in fact directed against
France; we will not sign any agreement which does not contain open doors for France; nor will we make any agreement until after French opinion and French desires have been carefully and responsibly explored.

4. Any agreement we support must be a reinforcement to our basic policy of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. We warmly support the inclusion in any agreement of strong undertakings to this end.

5. Our position on the American veto and on the European clause is as follows:

"The United States takes the position that any charter for an Atlantic Force must provide for United States' consent to the firing of the nuclear weapons. If, however, major nations of Europe some day achieve full political unity with a central political authority capable of making the decision to use nuclear weapons, the United States recognizes that this will create a new situation in which reconsideration of various provisions of the charter would be appropriate. In any event, revision of the charter would be possible only with the unanimous approval of the members."

6. Our present position on other issues is as stated on December 8 in the U.S. memorandum of comments (attached at A) on the U.K. proposal, omitting the names of specific countries in paragraph 9, and leaving that paragraph in abeyance for the time being.

7. In my judgment, the principal advantages of any agreement will be:

(1) that it will lead the U.K. out of the field of strategic deterrence and thus reduce by one the number of powers aiming at this kind of nuclear strength;

(2) that it will greatly reduce the danger of any separate nuclear adventure by the Germans; and

(3) that it will advance the principle and practice of collective strategic defense, as against the proliferation of separate nuclear deterrents.

SECRET
These three advantages are of great importance to the American public and to all who care for world peace in other countries, and it is essential that they be established in any agreement.

8. The provisions of NSAM 318 (attached at B) will remain in effect (except for the action in paragraph 6 which has been completed).

9. Finally, I find nothing in the position of this government or in the posture of the alliance which makes it necessary, from the point of view of the U.S. alone, that there should be final agreement or even agreement in principle within the next three months. I may take a different view on this in the light of new evidence, but this is my clear present position, and I wish all actions by American officials to be in conformity with it. If other governments for their own reasons find it important to reach early agreement, they will make their own efforts to this end, and in that case I do not desire that we on our side should drag our feet. But I do not wish anyone at any level to give the impression that we are eager to act on a short timetable, or are attempting in any way to force our own views upon Europe.
To: Secretary General

cc. Deputy Secretary General
DSG-ASG for Economics and Finance
ASG for Political Affairs

From: Executive Secretary

Record of a Private Meeting of the Council held
on Wednesday 31st March, 1955, at 10.15 a.m. and 4.30 p.m.

I. "The Middle East; Latin America; Disarmament;
South East Asia.

The following national representatives from capitals
were present:

Mr. Spaak (Belgium)
Mr. Carstens (Germany)
Mr. Lupis (Italy)
Mr. Cattani (Italy)
Mr. de Ranitz (Netherlands)
Mr. Bojesen (Norway)
Mr. Turkmen (Turkey)
Lord Chalfont (United Kingdom)
Mr. George Ball (United States)

II. THE MIDDLE EAST; LATIN AMERICA; DISARMAMENT; SOUTH EAST ASIA

2. Opening the discussion, the CHAIRMAN said it was clear
that a large part of this consultation would concern situations
in regions outside the North Atlantic area where, on a number
of occasions, the hardest strains on the cohesion of the
Alliance had so far been created. The existence of these
strains confirmed the necessity of unlimited consultation as
recommended in the report of the Committee of Three in 1956 and
constantly practised since. Events like those in Vietnam,
Indonesia or Africa today, threats like those of the persistent
Israel-Palestine tension, could not leave the Alliance indifferent.
They could not be allowed to slow down consultation, on the
contrary they should spur the allied countries to substantiate
better the scope and purpose of consultation itself, in the
desirable direction of co-ordinated, or at least non-conflicting,
policies. To this effect, a leading principle might remain
.../...
72. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said his government would be glad to note the statement of Mr. Ball and to support the procedure which he proposed regarding bilateral discussions between the United States and individual governments.

73. Mr. BALL suggested that following these bilateral discussions, the United States would report to the Council on a proposed future procedure for dealing with this question.

(iii) Arms Control and Disarmament

74. Lord CHAUFONT said that the United Kingdom Government considered it would be useful for the Council to discuss this subject for three reasons:

- firstly, when the Geneva Conference eventually resumed, he hoped to be able to report on developments;

- secondly, in view of the recent change of government in the United Kingdom, the Council might wish to know if there was any substantial change in United Kingdom policy. He assured the Council that his government took the subject of disarmament very seriously - a proof of this being the appointment of a Minister of State for Disarmament, the only one in the world.

- thirdly, the United Kingdom policy on disarmament was unchanged in the respect that whatever proposals the United Kingdom intended to make she would consult fully with her allies. He would therefore now outline the ideas of his Government to the Council.

75. The following was what the United Kingdom considered would be a practicable disarmament policy for the West. The United Kingdom still retained as a main aim the pursuit of general and complete disarmament but it was recognised that this could not be achieved quickly. Before it could be achieved it was necessary for nations to begin to behave in an entirely new way; it was therefore naive to expect that this could happen in months or even years. A difficult and long road of discussion lay ahead before one could contemplate the idea of a disarmed world and an effective international peacekeeping organization. This remained however the final objective of the United Kingdom.

76. In the meantime one should try to make the present situation less dangerous. There was an arms race, both nuclear and conventional, not only among the great powers but also among the smaller and developing countries, which were diverting much-needed resources to the acquisition of sophisticated weapons. It was therefore essential to agree on all possible partial steps of arms control which would make this situation less dangerous and reduce tensions throughout the world. The first danger was of a further spread of nuclear weapons. This had recently become much more serious because of the sudden developments in the Chinese nuclear programme. The fact of the Chinese explosion...
had caused an irreversible change in the political situation which would create pressures in South East Asia which might result in the spread of nuclear weapons. There was already pressure in India to engage on a nuclear programme, though so far the government had resisted it. If pressure became intolerable, an irreversible trend might then set in and other non-nuclear countries would follow suit.

77. There was at present no international agreement on the prevention of the dissemination of nuclear weapons. There was nothing to prevent countries acquiring nuclear technology and weapons or testing nuclear weapons underground once they had acquired them. (The Moscow Test Ban applied only to testing in the atmosphere, outer space and under water). There was therefore an urgent need for two kinds of agreement.

78. Firstly, there should be an international agreement on non-dissemination and non-acquisition i.e. an agreement to which both nuclear and non-nuclear powers would be party. This was a first priority. The difficulty was that the agreement would obviously have to include the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union refused to discuss this question so long as proposals for an allied nuclear force or multilateral force were on the table. The West argued that these proposals did not constitute dissemination, but the Russian view remained unchanged. It could be argued that this was an inevitable Russian tactical countermove and it was even argued that if the Western proposals could be convincingly explained, the Soviets would abandon this attitude.

79. Secondly, it was necessary to have an international agreement to extend the test ban to underground tests. Here there was the problem of Russian objections to on-site inspection of suspicious underground events. The Russians were unwilling to accept any inspection or verification on their soil while the Western position was that no agreement could be contemplated without appropriate inspection and verification measures.

80. The following subjects might also be envisaged for discussion at Geneva:

- the Johnson proposal for a freeze in the production of nuclear weapons. It could be argued that there were already enough nuclear weapons in the world and that an international agreement, with proper verification to see that it was being respected, could reduce tensions;

- the actual reduction in or destruction of existing delivery systems, including bombers;

- the proposals for nuclear-free zones and disengagement, especially in Central Europe. Such agreements, if achievable, would have considerable political value. However, there were difficulties as regards measures of regional arms control. For example, such measures could not, certainly in Central Europe, be isolated from an overall political solution for the area; they could not be imposed on the people of the area, but must be desired by them; some of the proposals contained military dangers in that they would be of strategic benefit to the Soviet Union; finally, it was arguable that nowadays regional arms control agreements, especially in Europe, were to some extent irrelevant bearing in mind the existence of ICBMs and IRBMs on Soviet territory;
a study might be made, as a modest beginning to arms control and a reduction of tensions, of the possibility of setting up on either side of the Iron Curtain a system of observation posts against surprise attack.

However, the whole question of regional agreement was better looked at in a broader political context.

As regards the prospects of achieving discussion on any of these subjects or even achieving a forum in which to discuss them, he recalled that whereas 1963 had been a good year for disarmament, 1964 had been less good. It now appeared unlikely that 1965 would be a good year, partly because of the temporary collapse of the United Nations Assembly over the Article 19 question and partly because of the deterioration in East/West relations. Vietnam had placed the Soviet Union in a dilemma where it could not be seen by China to be discussing any subject at all amicably with the West. This had been made clear by Mr. Gromyko on his recent visit to London.

As regards the hopes for the future, he said that the United States as co-chairman of the Geneva Disarmament Conference had recently invited the Soviet Union to resume discussions. No real reply had been received until today in spite of repeated reminders. Today, news had been received of the Soviet reaction. So far the reply seemed obscure and not spectacularly encouraging. The Soviet view was that disarmament was a question which should be discussed in a wider forum and the Soviets recommended the reconvening in April of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. The United Kingdom was studying this reply which looked as if it meant a further delay in resuming discussion at Geneva, which was the most practical forum to discuss disarmament.

Mr. BOYSEN said that his government was concerned by two problems. Firstly, as regards non-dissemination, he did not know what were the prospects of reconvening the Geneva Conference, but his government felt that the Western Powers should press for an early resumption and should then give non-dissemination high priority for discussion. It was unfortunate that the United Nations General Assembly had not held a normal working session this year, since an opportunity had perhaps been lost for making progress on non-dissemination. The difficulties might be insoluble but every month the problem became more complicated. Since time was working against a solution, it was essential to exploit all channels through which a solution might be reached, especially Geneva. The Council should discuss how this problem might be constructively approached either in Geneva or elsewhere.

Secondly, it was some six years since the Council had seriously discussed European security. He welcomed the fact that the International Staff was to prepare a paper on this subject as a basis for Council discussions; he hoped it would not only be factual but would contain imaginative proposals. It was well known that the problem of European security was intimately linked with the German question. However, the conclusion should not be drawn that the problem could not be dealt with except in conditions where there were visible signs of progress towards German reunification. He felt that there was a temptation for the West to avoid discussion on the grounds either that it would not discuss under threats or that it would not discuss because the situation was calm and it was better to leave it as it was. He thought that the West should use the present period of relative calm to examine the problem. It was important to maintain the kind of dialogue which had recently taken place between Mr. Speak
and Mr. Rapacki. To maintain a dialogue, it was necessary to have something to speak about. The Council should therefore proceed again to a serious examination of this problem aiming at cautious conclusions which might at least indicate a line on which one might envisage a step-by-step procedure by means of an informal dialogue between East and West.

86. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his authorities had much appreciated Mr. Spaak’s report on his talks with Mr. Rapacki. They indicated nothing new or encouraging, but the reference by Mr. Rapacki to certain limited verification measures might be a step forward. This emphasised the importance of not overlooking any measure which might contribute to European security, and of preparing to reply to possible Soviet proposals.

87. He agreed with Lord Chalfont on the two types of international agreement it was now urgent to reach. In this respect, the position of India was vital.

88. Lord Chalfont had suggested that there might be a preliminary procedural wrangle at Geneva. It was essential not to allow the Soviet Union to monopolise the slogan of being a peace-loving power. NATO stood for both security and peace, and the NATO member countries concerned must challenge this slogan and ensure that the talks were resumed on terms acceptable to the West.

89. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that he fully supported the views expressed by Mr. Hoyesen on the subject of the Geneva conference and the spread of nuclear weapons. As regards measures of regional arms control, he referred to the so-called Kekkonen plan on which the Danish Foreign Minister had made clear the Danish position on 30th March. The plan proposed that the Scandinavian countries should make individual statements of intent to continue the present situation, i.e. keeping Scandinavia a zone free of nuclear weapons. The Danish view was that this proposal was of no interest to Denmark unless it was connected with a general solution to European security problems.

90. The same principle applied to regional arms control or disengagement in Europe.

91. Mr. CATTANI said that the Italian authorities had urgently requested the Geneva co-chairmen to do all in their power to reconvene the conference, if possible by 26th April. He hoped that the Soviet reply to the US invitation was not merely a tactic aimed at transferring discussion on disarmament to a propaganda forum.

92. Mr. GARSTENS said that he agreed with much that Lord Chalfont had said. A distinction should be made between world-wide and regional measures. Everyone wished to see a world-wide agreement on arms control, disarmament and particularly the control of nuclear weapons. However, a world-wide agreement must include China. The prospects of reaching such an agreement were not good, though this did not mean that an effort should not be made in this direction. If China was not included, the fears of India and other Asian countries would not be allayed.

93. Everyone agreed on the need to consider arms control measures, especially in Europe, in connection with the political problems dividing Europe, above all the problem of Germany. If there was a chance of progress towards German reunification, this was perhaps the chance. An agreement might not be reached in the near future but there was no doubt that the Soviets were interested in the question of European security and that the West should therefore try to make use of this to achieve progress on Germany.
94. He hoped that the Geneva conference would resume shortly. Germany had a permanent service in the German mission in Geneva, which acted in liaison with the NATO member countries represented at the conference. He hoped that these countries would give Germany the opportunity to work closely with them.

95. Mr. de RANITZ thanked Lord Chalfont for having brought up this subject, which had not been thoroughly discussed recently in the Council for obvious reasons. The present time might be appropriate to start further discussions. He hoped that the Geneva conference would resume and produce results. It would be regrettable if this limited forum were to be replaced by the 10Q-odd members of the United Nations.

96. He said that his government was concerned at the explosion of the Chinese device and at the possibility of further tests. He did not see any way of getting China to the conference table, but thought the West should do all in its power to evolve proposals to put on the table.

97. He recalled that he had expressed the view of his government a fortnight ago on the question of regional disarmament, European security and German reunification. From Mr. Spaak's report of his talks with Mr. Rapacki it seemed that Poland was not in favour of measures of reunification in conjunction with measures of disarmament.

98. The CHAIRMAN said that the Council would note Lord Chalfont's statement and the comments made in discussion, placing this problem in its world-wide and regional contexts, and relating it to the outstanding political problems. It had been agreed that the International Staff should submit a paper on the Rapacki proposals as a basis for discussion in the Council.

The Council then adjourned agreeing to resume discussion - the next day.
RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION
AT ITS 102ND MEETING ON 15 JUNE 1965

The Disarmament Commission,

Having considered the report dated 17 September 1964 of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee submitted to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and to the nineteenth session of the General Assembly,

Reaffirming the ultimate and continuing responsibility of the United Nations for disarmament,

Noting with regret that during 1964 despite the efforts made by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee no specific agreements were reached either on general and complete disarmament or on measures aimed at the lessening of international tension, or halting and reversing the arms race,

Deploiring that, notwithstanding General Assembly resolutions 1762 (XVII) and 1910 (XVIII), nuclear weapon tests have taken place and also that no agreement has been reached on the "discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time", which is one of the stated objectives of the partial test-ban treaty,

Considering that the memorandum of 14 September 1964 submitted to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee by the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic, represents a fair and sound basis for the conduct of negotiations towards removing the remaining differences for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty,

Convinced that failure to conclude a universal treaty or agreement to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons leads to the most serious consequences,

Deeply conscious of the urgency of making early progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and of reaching agreement on measures which would facilitate the attainment of that goal,
Bearing in mind the proposals made at its present session for measures to reduce international tension and halt and reverse the arms race, and also at the meeting of the Organization of African Unity and the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries,

Recalling the principle that a substantial part of the resources that will be released through disarmament should be devoted to the economic and social development of the developing countries, thus contributing to the evolution of a safer and better world,

1. Reaffirms the call of the General Assembly upon all States to become parties to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and to abide by its spirit and provisions;

2. Recommends that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee should:
   (a) reconvene as early as possible to resume as a matter of urgency its efforts to develop a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and to consider all proposals for measures to relax international tension and halt and reverse the arms race, including those submitted to the Disarmament Commission at its present session;
   (b) consider as a matter of priority the question of extending the scope of the partial test-ban treaty to cover underground tests;
   (c) also accord special priority to the consideration of the question of a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons giving close attention to the various suggestions that agreement could be facilitated by adopting a programme of certain related measures;
   (d) keep in mind the principle of converting to programmes of economic and social development of the developing countries a substantial part of the resources gradually released by the reduction of military expenditures;

Requests the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to report to the Disarmament Commission and to the General Assembly during its twentieth session on the progress made in respect of the above recommendations.
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mac:

In my last note I indicated that I would let you have a few impressions of my trips to Europe in which over a period of six weeks I visited London, Paris, Rome, The Hague and Bonn. Let me group my observations by category:

(1) The MLF decision: It is often alleged that we abdicated our leadership position by removing the pressure for the MLF.

I believe this judgment to be mistaken. The people who were hurt by the MLF decision were a small minority mostly in the Federal Republic--and even there the MLF was not the most important factor in the relative decline of Erhard and Schroeder. Had we pressed the MLF, there would have been no country--except Germany--where a reliable majority for the MLF could have been found within the government. In every country--including Germany--the MLF would have been the subject of acrimonious partisan debate. The failure was the one-sided pressure of the months before and not the Presidential decision of last December. Most leading Europeans were relieved and not disappointed by that step.

If you look at the situation country-by-country the case becomes clearer still:

--In Britain, the majority of the Labor government was strongly opposed to the MLF. Even if we had succeeded in pressing Britain into formal acceptance, the Labor government would have spent the next months trying to scuttle the scheme by dragging their feet in its implementation.
--In Germany, if De Gaulle's recent actions could have been presented as having been provoked by the MLF, the CDU might well have been hopelessly split.

--In no other country did there exist the kind of support which could have withstood a real crisis. The Netherlands was at best lukewarm; its interest, if any, was to isolate France.

--Italy's actions would have depended entirely on domestic considerations. My conversation with Saragat left little doubt that even he--whom the State Department had always described to me as one of their staunchest allies--had little stomach for a showdown with France.

(2) The current state of the MLF/ANF Debate. It is my impression that the group which dominates the State Department's European policy is systematically blocking alternatives by carrying out the President's directives to avoid any semblance of pressure in its most literal sense. In this manner, they prevent the crystallization of any other project. After the German election, I expect them to surface a variation of the old proposal with the argument that it has now been demonstrated that there is no alternative.

Secretary McNamara's recent proposal to constitute a select committee to consult on nuclear matters is a case in point. The idea was well received in Europe. Many felt that, if anything, it did not go far enough and should have included political consultation. At the same time, senior Europeans say that they have been told by United States officials that the proposal was made without the knowledge of the State Department; that it was a minor initiative; that the MLF/ANF remains the top priority. (Of course, now that the proposal has been cold-shouldered in Paris, our official line may shift.)

I think it is a mistake to start in again where we left off last year and head once more for the same impasse. It seems to me that the McNamara proposal, carefully elaborated, would be a constructive way to get discussions started in a different framework. Even if the consultations he envisages prove unsatisfactory, their failure would be a better justification for a new nuclear structure than the obsessive reiteration of the old slogans about nuclear control. France will find it much more difficult to stay out--and if she does such a framework would create least obstacles for a post-De Gaulle government to join eventually.
De Gaulle always yielded to superior strength and that French farmers badly needed the Common Market. The fact is that De Gaulle rarely bluffs on fundamentals. The crisis which has resulted is unnecessary because it jeopardizes what has already been achieved. And the final result is likely to be closer to De Gaulle’s conception than to ours. Have we thought through this passionate commitment to supranationality? Even if it is correct, are our methods likely to further it? I am not saying that De Gaulle’s actions are the result of our provocations. My concern is that faced with a profound, philosophical challenge, too many of our officials concentrate on scoring debating points and on expedients which defeat their own purpose.

The present tendency of the State Department forces it to woo the Federal Republic in order to thwart France. This excessive obeisance to the short term swings of German opinion will conclude by alienating both Paris and Bonn. It is futile because the ultimate orientation of Germany cannot be determined by a dramatic confrontation. It is dangerous because our seeming pressure magnifies the German sense of insecurity and may produce an exaggerated impression of the options available to the Federal Republic. Beneath the seemingly placid surface of Germany, all kinds of disquieting currents are developing. It would be the gravest error to turn NATO, in effect, into a German-American alliance—as I have heard it suggested.

(4) The Role of the State Department. The group which dominates European policy in the State Department does not seem to me responsive to the real issues in Atlantic affairs. They are focusing on one problem—that of nuclear control—which is likely to prove the least significant issue. My objection to the MLF/ANF schemes is not that they are wrong, but that they are essentially irrelevant. Some of the Grand Old Men of the early days of NATO—men whom I respect greatly—compound this tendency. And the few foreign service officers with a sense of history and a feel for Europe—like Bill Tyler—have been shunted off where they cannot affect basic decisions. The result is a single-minded absorption with one particular scheme and—I regret to say—a reporting system about the reliability of which I have serious doubts. Almost all briefings which I have received about the alleged state of mind of Europeans have been one-sided or simply wrong.

Most of the premises of the dominant group in the State Department seem to me wrong. The long-term danger in Europe is not an excessive assertion of European will but the opposite—a tendency to abdicate all responsibility.
Whatever the provocations, our response tends to break the back of those elements in Europe ready to play a serious international role. The result is that we are likely to lose whether we fail or succeed. If we fail, Europe will organize itself against us. If we succeed, ten years from now Europe may have lapsed into the situation of Italy --only too eager to turn over foreign policy to us but unreliable in any period of stress. I cannot believe that it is in our interest to be the only country in the West conducting a serious foreign policy. It will, in my view, exceed our psychological resources even before it overstrains our physical strength. Even in the nuclear field, I cannot persuade myself that our non-proliferation effort should begin by pressing our oldest allies at a moment when nuclear weapons threaten to spread to much more dangerous countries.

I am not suggesting that I have a master scheme which would magically remove all difficulties. Indeed, it seems to me that we should avoid any grandiose projects for a while. What is most needed is an analysis of where our long-term interest lies, specifically what kind of structure in Europe and in the Atlantic area it is in our interest to promote, how we visualize the role of Europe in the evolution of the East-West dialogue, how Europe and the United States can share responsibilities globally. Cliches about community spirit and indivisible interests obscure the issue. If we could be precise about what we want, we might distinguish better between those aspects of French policy which are irritants and those which are dangerous and between what is significant with respect to the Federal Republic rather than what is convenient.

Reading these notes over I find that they repeat in large part what I have often said elsewhere. In all likelihood I am no more immune from finding what I expect in Europe than the people I criticize. Also, I recognize that my views are rejected by most of the established experts in the field (certainly within the government) and there is no reason why you should accept my analysis rather than that of others with stronger credentials.

With every good wish.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Henry A. Kissinger
Corrigendum to Summary Record of
Meeting of the Council held on
26th July, 1965
C-8(65)34
(dated 25th August, 1965)

Page 19, paragraph 65, lines 8 and 9:

Delete sentence beginning "Consideration of......"
and replace by:

"Consideration of the peaceful uses of atomic
nuclear energy was an important problem, but
not a problem that could be expected to be
solved at the outset."

OTAN/NATO,
Paris, XVIe.
SUMMARY RECORD
C-63(65)34
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

Summary record of a meeting of the Council, held at
the Permanent Headquarters, Paris, Avie,
on Monday, 26th July, 1965 at 11 a.m. and 3.30 p.m.

PRESENT

Chairman: Mr. Manlio Brosio

BELGIUM
Mr. A. de Staercke

CANADA
General P.L.M. Burns
Mr. F.A. Rissolette

DENMARK
Mr. O.R. Borch

FRANCE
Mr. P. de Leusse

GERMANY
Mr. W.G. Grewe
Mr. S. Schnippenkötter

GREECE
Mr. J. Pesimazoglu

ICELAND
Mr. T.A. Tomasson

ITALY
Mr. Cavalletti di Olivetto
Mr. C. Orlandi Contucci

LUXEMBOURG
Mr. A. Weisch

NETHERLANDS
Dr. H.M. Boon

HOLLAND
Mr. J. Eysesen
Mr. J. Busch

PORTUGAL
Mr. M. de Oliveira Neves

TURKEY
Mr. Nuri Birgi

UNITED KINGDOM
Lord Chalfont
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh

UNITED STATES
Mr. W. Foster
Mr. E. Durbrow

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Deputy Secretary General:
Mr. J.A. Roberts

Deputy Secretary General - Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance:
Mr. F.J. Gregh

Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs:
Mr. R.W.J. Hooper

Acting Executive Secretary:
Mr. F.C. Mann

ALSO PRESENT

Standing Group Representative: Major General W.F. Stromberg

NATO SECRET
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DISARMAMENT: NON-DISSEMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Documents: Text of Draft United Kingdom Treaty, circulated 5th July, 1965
Text of Draft Canadian Treaty, circulated 5th July, 1965

1. The CHAIRMAN said that this special meeting of the Council was to be devoted to a discussion of the general problem of disarmament and of the specific problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. At this moment, on the eve of the resumption of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva, the importance of these issues needed no emphasis. It was essential that those who bore the main responsibility on the Western side for the discussions at Geneva should inform the Council frankly of their ideas, their difficulties and their intentions. It was equally essential that they should be fully acquainted with the views and policies of the rest of the Alliance.

2. He found it, therefore, extremely gratifying that the Council's distinguished visitors - Lord Chalfont, Mr. Foster, General Burns and Mr. Cavalletti - should have been able to spare the time from their many other preoccupations to come and discuss these very important matters with the Council today. He was also glad to see Mr. Boysen of Norway and Mr. Schmepfenkötter of Germany, who had been appointed Disarmament Adviser to the Federal Government. He welcomed these visitors in the Council's name, and was confident that this would be a useful and informative session.

3. He invited Mr. Foster to open the discussion.

4. Mr. FOSTER (United States) pointed out that although it would be inopportune for the United States to make bold disarmament proposals at the Conference while it was currently evaluating the situation in Vietnam and formulating decisions in the light of recent developments, yet President Johnson was determined to achieve some progress in the field of nuclear disarmament and had entrusted Mr. Foster with a message to the Conference emphasising the urgent need for world peace.

5. The United States proposals to be presented at Geneva would not differ in substance from those made at the United Nations Disarmament Commission in New York, which, in the opinion of the United States, had been convened by the Soviet Union in a desire to prevent the resumption of discussions in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva and to achieve the passing of propaganda resolutions aimed against the West. In fact the non-aligned countries had elaborated a resolution calling for the urgent reconvening of the Conference at Geneva.
in order to discuss the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, the extension of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to all nuclear tests and other related measures. This resolution, which had been endorsed by twenty-nine nations and voted by eighty-three with sixteen abstentions, had presented the Soviet Union with the problem of evaluating the comparative disadvantages of refusing the request of so many nations or of further alienating Communist China. In the event, the Soviet Union had chosen the latter course and had agreed to the resumption of discussions at Geneva.

6. Presenting a brief appraisal of Soviet thinking on this subject as prepared by United States Intelligence, he said that the reasons for the Soviet decision to return to Geneva probably involved several elements. Disregard of the overwhelming vote in the United Nations Disarmament Commission in favour of resumption of talks at Geneva would have been contrary to the wishes of many of the very countries which the Soviet Union was attempting to win over. In addition, the Soviet Union might have desired to maintain contact with the United States and other Western powers, to demonstrate its readiness to pursue the discussion of subjects to which Communist China objected and to probe the attitudes of various Western powers on the question of non-proliferation.

7. The United States anticipated that the Eastern delegates would continue their attacks on United States policies in Vietnam and elsewhere. The Soviet Union might calculate that by emphasising that the Vietnam crisis obstructed progress on disarmament it could force the United States to modify its policies. It was also likely to continue to use discussions on non-proliferation as a pretext for attacking possible multilateral arrangements within NATO and perhaps to take the initiative to table a draft treaty and to call for a moratorium on allied negotiations concerning nuclear arrangements until after the conclusion of a non-dissemination agreement.

8. The Soviet Union might revive proposals for the non-use of nuclear weapons, including the variant of a ban on first use of these weapons by nuclear powers against non-nuclear powers, in an effort to meet the demands of countries willing to renounce acquisition of nuclear weapons in return for guarantees of their security. Such proposals regarding non-use might be linked to Vietnam or simply advocated on their own merits.

9. As regards the question of a comprehensive test ban, which had frequently been mentioned in recent conversations with the Soviet Union, there was no indication that the Soviet Union would accept any on-site inspection, but rather that it would argue that modern means of detection made such inspection less necessary than ever. Any emphasis by the Soviet Union on a comprehensive test ban would be likely to provoke sharp reactions on the part of Communist China.
10. The Soviet Union might again raise the question of military budgets and allude that the United States had violated an understanding in increasing its expenditures on account of the war in Vietnam. In his conversations with Harriman, Kosygin had mentioned the desirability of a reduction of nuclear weapons, but the United States had not recently discerned any sign of greater Soviet responsiveness to the United States approach on this subject.

11. While no new European regional proposals were anticipated from the Soviet Union, Poland might wish to retain the initiative by advancing some further variations, such as the inclusion of delivery vehicles as well as warheads in the Gomulka freeze proposals, or a European regional non-dissemination arrangement without a freeze on deployment although lack of support by the Soviet Bloc and unwillingness to expose its proposals to public debate might prevent Poland from taking any rapid action in this respect. In general, therefore, the United States expected the Soviet Union to continue to follow the major lines of its memorandum presented by Mr. Gromyko to the United Nations General Assembly on 7th December, 1964.

12. The United States did not itself intend to make a major issue at the Conference of the situation in Vietnam, unless and until it had been attacked in remarks by the Soviet Union, in which case the United States would deliver a vigorous response. It was also expected that the Soviet Union would attack the Western Allies, and the Federal Republic of Germany in particular, during the Conference. The United States intended to emphasise its belief in the essential need for a rapid conclusion of some agreement to limit the dissemination of nuclear weapons, thus reducing the current threat to world security.

13. There was no indication of any willingness of the Soviet Union to accept the repeated statements of the United States that proposals for sharing nuclear policy decisions within NATO did not constitute proliferation of nuclear weapons and that some agreement would be to the mutual interest of both sides.

14. It was also the intention of the United States to urge that renewed efforts be made to achieve a comprehensive nuclear test ban and although it had no specific proposals to make, the United States hoped to determine whether the Soviet position was capable of any flexibility and to demonstrate the flexibility of its own position, which would be that adopted at the Disarmament Commission in New York and would be based on its improved capabilities for the detection of nuclear explosions. This position would favour the freezing of strategic nuclear vehicles, the cut-off of production and the transfer of fissile material, but the United States would not insist on its proposals, which might appear inconsistent with the increased budget for forces and weapons shortly to be drawn up in the United States.
15. Although there was no reason to place excessive hopes in the coming meeting at Geneva, the willingness of the Soviet Union to resume discussions with the West gave grounds for a certain optimism that some constructive developments would emerge.

16. The CHAIRMAN, before inviting Lord Chalfont to speak, recalled that during previous discussions on the question of disarmament, the Council had not been in favour of releasing to the Press any details of the discussions. He had therefore suggested that the Head of the NATO Press Service should not make any Press statement after the present meeting and he hoped that delegations would follow a similar procedure.

17. Lord CHALFONT (United Kingdom) emphasised the inadvisability for the West to question the possible Soviet motives too closely prior to the actual resumption of the Conference. He hoped that in spite of the difficult problem of verification and inspection, an extension of the partial nuclear test ban to cover underground tests would be discussed at Geneva, in view of the particular importance of this collateral measure in the context of an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. The United Kingdom hoped to examine with other nations the question of a possible freeze of the production of nuclear delivery vehicles and a reduction of present nuclear delivery systems, which would be an important consideration during negotiations concerning a non-dissemination agreement; and also to discuss current plans for complete and general disarmament. Although it would be wrong to expect any immediate and spectacular progress on this question, he emphasised that complete and general disarmament remained the key to United Kingdom policy.

18. The most important problem confronting nations at the Conference was the urgent need to prevent the increasing dissemination of nuclear weapons, which, if it continued, would have serious implications not only for Europe but also for the whole world. The United Kingdom realised the need to table as soon as possible a draft non-dissemination treaty which would have the support of the Western Allies and hold the possibility of being accepted by the Soviet Bloc and by the non-aligned countries. In this respect, he wished to dispel the impression created by distorted Press reports that the United Kingdom Government had decided to table such a treaty without full consultation with its Allies. He regarded the present meeting of the Council as an important stage in this process of consultation and hoped that other nations would express their opinions on the United Kingdom draft treaty, since these would be taken into account in further discussions, and that the draft could then be tabled in Geneva, after its general lines had been approved by the Allies.
19. The basic concept underlying the United Kingdom draft treaty was that a very short and simple form of treaty would have a greater chance of rapid acceptance and that the inclusion of various incentives would not only complicate it, but also make it vulnerable to attack. Moreover, he emphasised the relationship between the draft treaty and the important question of arrangements governing nuclear control within NATO. Recognising that the effectiveness of arrangements for collective defence depended on the satisfying of the aspirations for security and equality of all members of the Alliance and implied full interdependence, including nuclear interdependence, within NATO, the United Kingdom Government had drawn up proposals for an Allied Nuclear Force with the dual purpose of increasing the cohesion and effectiveness of the Alliance and of preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons within the Alliance. He emphasised that such proposals were in no way incompatible with the United Kingdom draft treaty on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, but rather that the signing of such a treaty by all the most important countries on both sides would allow progress to be made in planning for effective nuclear control within the Alliance. In conclusion, he reiterated the urgent need to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and expressed the hope that other countries would be able to give general approval to the substance of the United Kingdom draft treaty.

20. General CUSANS (Canada) said he would confine his remarks to the Canadian draft non-dissemination treaty, which had been circulated to the Council together with the United Kingdom draft treaty. Having distributed a comparison of the two drafts which had been prepared by Canada, he said that he agreed with both preceding speakers that non-dissemination would be the most urgent and important subject to be discussed at Geneva, since it had for some time been given high priority by both sides during disarmament negotiations and since several delegations had suggested in previous discussions at Geneva that the tabling of a draft treaty would ensure better progress on this subject.

21. With this in mind, Canada had elaborated an initial draft treaty which introduced several provisions that were not included in the draft treaty drawn up by the United Kingdom. Following discussions with the United Kingdom, it had been deemed preferable not to seek to achieve an Allied United Kingdom-Canadian draft for presentation to the NATO Allies, but rather to submit both drafts for their detailed comments. Canada regarded its draft as a working paper aimed at stimulating discussion on the points of principle involved and at obtaining the views of other countries as to the best approach, and Canada recognised the relationship between the issues involved in a non-proliferation agreement and the matters currently under consideration by the Council in respect of nuclear defence problems. The need to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons had become more urgent on account of the Chinese nuclear tests and some non-nuclear states had recently shown their reluctance to enter into a non-proliferation agreement unless progress were achieved in other disarmament measures. It was hoped that when the Council had considered the principles involved, it would be possible for a single Western text to be elaborated in detail by the representatives of the NATO nations participating at Geneva.
22. Commenting on the difference between the Canadian and the United Kingdom approach to the drafting of a treaty, he said that it was the view of Canada that some inducement would be required by the non-nuclear countries, which, by entering a non-proliferation agreement, would be giving up something for the future. Those nations which had the capacity to produce nuclear weapons, but had not done so, had to consider any possible commitments in the light of their long-term security and the concern of Canada, as one of those nations, with the reactions of other similar nations had led it to include in its draft certain provisions which might meet some of the legitimate interests of non-nuclear states. As a result of discussions on this matter with allied governments and on examination of the various statements of potential nuclear states, Canada had concluded that their requirements would necessitate the inclusion in any agreement of something more than the provisions of the Irish Resolution. For example, at the United Nations Disarmament Commission the Indian Representative had proposed an integrated solution to the problem of non-proliferation which, in addition to provisions similar to those of the Irish Resolution, contained an undertaking not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear powers, an undertaking through the United Nations to safeguard the security of countries which might be threatened by powers having, or about to have, a nuclear capacity and also tangible progress towards disarmament, including a comprehensive test ban treaty, a complete freeze on the production of nuclear weapons and means of delivery and a substantial reduction in existing stocks of nuclear weapons. The Swedish Representative had also frequently reiterated that progress with regard to a comprehensive test ban and nuclear disarmament was required in parallel with a non-proliferation agreement. The Canadian draft was therefore intended to meet as far as possible the needs of neutral and non-aligned states, within which the spread of nuclear weapons was most likely to occur in the next decade.

23. Drawing the attention of the Council to the particular features of the Canadian draft, he said that in the preamble, whose wording was similar to the comparable paragraphs of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, states would proclaim their principal aim to be the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament, with particular stress on the necessity for progress on the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

24. Article III provided for the extension of safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to all non-military atomic programmes of all signatories, both nuclear and non-nuclear, the IAEA statute being the only multilaterally agreed instrument providing a means of verifying that nuclear materials and equipment were not being diverted to military purposes. Canada considered that such a treaty would require
adequate provisions for international verification to ensure that proliferation did not take place. The inclusion of such provisions was in conformity with the general policy of the West regarding disarmament and would establish an important precedent for future agreements and measures preliminary to and including disarmament. Canada felt that acceptance by all signatories of the safeguard procedures, which had been agreed to by the Soviet Union in the IAEA, over their entire non-military programmes would provide an essential element of security.

25. Article IV was intended to offer a collective security guarantee that nuclear powers would come to the assistance of non-aligned and neutral non-nuclear states subjected to nuclear attack. This guarantee would not affect nations already guaranteed through alliances or other treaty arrangements and was designed to take account of the fears of countries such as India, which was currently under considerable pressure to abandon its policy of the renunciation of nuclear weapons and for which the guarantee would have to include at least the two nuclear super-powers. The alternative would appear to be an undertaking not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear powers, as had been previously suggested by India. While recognising the various objections, Canada was of the view that some form of guarantee would be necessary, either as a provision of the treaty, or as a corollary arrangement, in order to ensure the acceptance of countries which were not, but had the capacity to become, nuclear powers.

26. Article V provided for a complaints procedure which, together with Article III, would ensure some verification of compliance by the parties with the commitment not to disseminate nuclear weapons. It would require signatories to permit and co-operate with an investigation into a complaint submitted by another state and the reprimand of such a complaint through a regional organization or through the United Nations Security Council would compel a prima facie case to be made in a suitable forum before investigation could be initiated.

27. Articles V and IX together provided procedures which, it was hoped, would dissuade states from ceasing to comply with their undertaking under the treaty. While recognising that means should be provided for states to withdraw if continued compliance would confront them with a serious and unforeseen threat to their security, Canada felt that arrangements similar to those in the Partial Test Ban Treaty, in which less countries were concerned and less verification expected, would not be desirable or adequate in any agreement not to acquire nuclear weapons and that it should not be made too easy for any nation to announce that on account of unforeseen circumstances it would no longer abide by the terms of the treaty.
28. Article VIII provided a time-limit for the treaty, at the end of which states would consider their position in the light of all factors before renewing the treaty. Its purpose was to encourage the nuclear states to make tangible progress towards nuclear disarmament within that period, lest the non-nuclear states changed their minds.

29. In conclusion, General Bums said that he would welcome comments or questions from other delegations.

30. Mr. Cavalletti (Italy) pointed out that Italy attached great importance to the resumption of the Eighteen-Power Conference at the present time. This event was significant, in that it showed that the USSR did not want to break off relations with the West. However, it was not possible for the West to gauge the USSR's intentions in returning to the Geneva conference table. Perhaps they wanted to show themselves in a favourable light to the United Nations by following the latter's recommendations, so as not to be in an awkward position at the next session of the United Nations General Assembly. Alternatively, the USSR might intend purely to exploit the meeting for propaganda purposes and try to emphasise differences of opinion amongst some Western nations.

31. It was however vital to see whether the possibility existed of reaching even a limited agreement, which would be a valuable contribution to the lessening of international tension. Such an agreement would also have far-reaching repercussions on Sino-Soviet relations, which would be in the interest of the Western Allies. Even limited progress in Geneva would cut the ground from the idea of a world disarmament conference which was favoured by the Communists and some non-aligned countries.

32. In the course of the forthcoming meeting a serious effort should be made to reach at least some rapprochement, without making any vital sacrifices, on two questions in particular: nuclear tests and non-dissemination. As regards the former, it was up to the nuclear powers, in particular the United States, to specify the guarantees which would be necessary. Italy would take a flexible attitude on inspection.

33. On the problem of non-dissemination, he agreed with the view expressed by Lord Chalfont and General Burns that it would be helpful to the West to present a draft treaty during the forthcoming Geneva negotiations. Such a move was necessary to prove the seriousness of the West's intentions, and it would give the Western Allies the advantage of having taken the initiative.
34. The text of such a draft treaty should conform to the following principles:

(i) it should be sufficiently broad and convincing, giving adequate guarantees;

(ii) it should leave the door open to possibilities for multilateral co-operation within NATO and as necessary in Europe;

(iii) it should take into consideration the requirements laid down by non-nuclear countries, such as India, the United Arab Republic and Sweden, who might wish to participate in such an agreement; no treaty could be successful unless the requests of such countries were fulfilled.

35. He did not think that this was the place for a detailed comparison of the British and Canadian texts; this should be done in Geneva. However, there were certain differences between the two drafts, and he felt that the Canadian text was better suited to the requirements he had outlined. The United Kingdom text was clear, but he wished to raise the following objections to it:

(i) the use of the wording "association of states" was equivocal and could be misinterpreted; it might infer that the Western Allies were abandoning nuclear co-operation within NATO and Europe;

(ii) the United Kingdom text did not provide any guarantees to ensure the implementation of the treaty;

(iii) consideration was not given in the United Kingdom draft to the guarantees required by some of the non-aligned countries.

36. The advantage of the Canadian text was therefore that it left open every possibility for nuclear co-operation either in NATO or in Europe; it contained clauses to safeguard the implementation of the treaty, and it partly met the demands of the non-aligned countries he had mentioned.

37. Italy therefore favoured the use of the Canadian text as the basis for a draft treaty to be presented in Geneva. It would be advisable for a single text to be presented, with the support of all Four Powers.
38. He proposed that the following two points be taken into consideration in the final draft:

(a) the non-aligned countries' request that a non-dissemination agreement should be related to concrete steps towards nuclear disarmament;

(b) controls must be established to stop proliferation amongst the nuclear countries, so that one country could not increase the nuclear power of another.

39. A final text could be prepared in Geneva, but this was a very urgent task, which should be completed as soon as possible, so that the West retained the advantage of having taken the initiative.

40. The German Representative thanked the Chairman for his kind reference to Ambassador Schnippenkötter, who was attending the present meeting of the Council since he had just been nominated as Special German Representative for Disarmament and Arms Control Measures. This nomination was intended to show the continuing interest of the Federal Republic in this subject. Mr. Schnippenkötter would contact the Western Representatives in Geneva, act as adviser to his Government and co-ordinate all the activities of the Federal Republic in this field.

41. The German Representative welcomed the very useful statements made by the four previous speakers. His Government felt that the return to Geneva was a positive development since this was a better forum than the United Nations Disarmament Commission, though in fact the last meeting in New York had turned out to be more advantageous to the West than had been expected.

42. He agreed that probably the most important subject on the Agenda at Geneva would be non-dissemination. Before commenting on this subject, he noted that Mr. Cavalletti had referred to the Yugoslav resolution recommending a disarmament conference to be attended by all countries of the world. The Twentieth Session of the General Assembly would probably discuss this as a top priority. Since it had not been possible to reach a common NATO attitude on this subject, his Authorities thought that it would be useful to discuss the subject in the Council and possibly in the Committee of Political Advisers, each country stating its rationale as regards such a conference. The Committee of Political Advisers might also discuss whether it might recommend that any such conference should study firstly the joint United States-USSR declaration drawn up by Mr. McCly and Mr. Zorin in September 1961 in New York, and secondly the question of a formula inviting countries to attend.
43. Turning to the subject of non-dissemination, he said that his Government had instructed him to outline its general attitude in the following way. The Federal Government had always regarded the dissemination of nuclear weapons as harmful and had been guided in this respect by the consideration that the probability of nuclear weapons being used would increase with the number of fingers on the trigger. Germany had therefore always been prepared, and continued to be prepared, to support all efforts likely to prevent effectively the further dissemination of nuclear weapons. Germany had in 1954 renounced the production of atomic, biological and chemical weapons on its territory and had to that extent submitted to international control, and his Authorities felt that the further spread of nuclear weapons would be considerably limited if other countries followed the German example. Unfortunately, this had not been done, and the number of nuclear powers had increased. The fact that Communist China had recently carried out nuclear tests and was consequently regarded by most countries as a nuclear power had considerably impaired prospects for the successful conclusion of a non-dissemination treaty. It was, moreover, highly unlikely that Indonesia, which had left the United Nations, could still be induced to accede to a non-dissemination agreement. Countries which decided nevertheless to sign such a treaty would therefore have to weigh very carefully the risks which this involved for their defence.

44. The Canadian Minister of External Affairs had on 16th June quite rightly emphasised in his statement to the External Affairs Committee of the Canadian House of Commons that it was really the non-nuclear powers which were being asked to give up something for the future and that, therefore, an important role had to be accorded to them in the formulation and negotiation of a non-dissemination agreement. In the course of recent discussions in the United Nations Disarmament Commission, it had been said that many non-nuclear states would not agree to renounce manufacture and acquisition of nuclear weapons until their security against nuclear threat or attack was guaranteed and until the nuclear powers contemplated restrictions in their nuclear capacities.

45. With respect to the question of restriction of the nuclear powers and their nuclear capacities, the Federal Government shared the view that simultaneously with the non-dissemination agreement an end should be put to the nuclear arms race; otherwise the non-dissemination treaty would unilaterally restrict those states which must be regarded as potential nuclear powers, while the present nuclear powers would continue to strengthen their nuclear arsenal. It would also mean that a country which had detonated a single nuclear device would still be in a position to strengthen and extend its nuclear potential. For these reasons, the Federal Government suggested that the question of a restriction of the nuclear arms race be included in the considerations.
46. With respect to the other argument put forward in the discussions of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, namely the need for guarantees against nuclear threat, blackmail and aggression, the non-nuclear powers would have to insist on some form of guarantee in exchange for the unilateral renunciation expected of them. The Federal German Government thought that this problem was closely linked with an intra-Alliance solution of the nuclear problem and was anxious that prior to the negotiation and signature of an agreement with the Soviet Union on non-dissemination, the nuclear problem should be solved within the Alliance, in order that the non-nuclear states prepared to do so could effectively participate in the responsibility for nuclear defence. This view should not be interpreted to mean that Germany desired to possess nuclear weapons if no solution of the nuclear defence problem were found within the Alliance.

On the contrary, the Federal Government had repeatedly stated that it did not desire any national control of nuclear weapons and that it did not regard the acquisition of its own national nuclear weapons as a possible solution to the problem.

47. It did, however, consider it necessary to give priority to an intra-Alliance solution of the question which would take account of European security requirements, as against a world-wide agreement on non-dissemination. In this context, the Federal Government was aware that some of its Allies thought that the problem of priorities would not arise as long as an agreement on non-dissemination permitted a solution along the lines of the ALL or ANF or similar projects, but one could not overlook the likelihood that after the entry into force of a non-dissemination treaty, the Soviet Union would increase its resistance to any multilateral solution and thus erect a new obstacle to negotiations on an intra-Alliance solution.

48. Referring to other more specific points in the United Kingdom and Canadian drafts, he said that while the United Kingdom draft considered inspection and control of the observance of the treaty provisions superfluous, the Canadian draft, in Article III, provided for security controls by the IAEA in Vienna. The Federal Government did not overlook the difficulties which would be encountered in extending the IAEA controls to apply to a non-dissemination agreement but, on the other hand, it felt that a certain amount of control was necessary in order to give the world the assurance that the treaty provisions were in fact being respected. To this extent, the Federal Government agreed with the preamble to the Irish Resolution which stated that a non-dissemination agreement should be subject to inspection and control.
49. With respect to the problem of the accession formula contained in both draft agreements which granted "all states" the possibility of signing and acceding to such an agreement, he pointed out that in the United Kingdom draft the text had been taken literally from the Moscow Test Ban Agreement, which his Government in 1963 had not found fully to their satisfaction. If it were not possible to restrict the contracting parties to members of the United Nations and its specialised agencies, Germany considered that the provision dealing with accession should contain a disclaimer clause (for instance, as proposed for the draft Agreement on Assistance to and Return of Astronauts and Objects launched into Outer Space).

50. A non-dissemination treaty would also affect the nuclear defence arrangements in Central Europe and consequently the problem of European security. The Federal Government wished to draw attention to this point and to its various implications.

51. The German Representative then reiterated the following six points to which his Government attached great importance and which had not been sufficiently taken into account in the two draft treaties:

(i) the priority of an intra-Alliance solution of the nuclear problem;

(ii) the problem of guarantees protecting the non-nuclear nations against nuclear threat and blackmail;

(iii) the restriction of the nuclear capabilities of the nuclear powers;

(iv) inspection and control of the observance of the treaty provisions;

(v) an accession clause which did not harm vital national interests;

(vi) the European security aspect of the treaty and its various implications.

This was not an exhaustive list of problems; indeed, others such as that suggested by Mr. Cavalletti of an obligation on the part of the nuclear powers to exchange nuclear information merited careful consideration.
52. Germany did not believe in the argument sometimes advanced that the Soviets had so far shown no great interest in a non-dissemination treaty and that it might deter them further if such problems were raised. On the contrary, Soviet interest in such a treaty was perhaps even greater than that of the West, as the open societies of the Western countries were more closely bound by the provisions of such a treaty than the rigid societies of the Communist countries. Mr. Kosygin had not hesitated to emphasise the top priority which the Soviet Government attached to the non-dissemination problem in his conversations with Mr. Harriman. There was therefore no reason for the West to make additional political concessions to gain such a treaty.

53. In conclusion, the German Representative made some remarks on future procedure, in view of the Resolution DC 225 adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission, inviting the Geneva Conference to give the problem of non-dissemination priority. In view of the world-wide interest in such an agreement, it might well be necessary to discuss this subject in Geneva in the very near future. Although the Federal Government would not object to such discussions being based upon formulated draft agreements, it insisted on the necessity of first negotiating and agreeing such draft agreements within the Alliance. While his Authorities agreed that it was primarily up to the four Delegations represented in Geneva to prepare plans for the timing and tabling of such a draft, its substance must be discussed and negotiated within the Alliance with the participation of all those allied governments having a vital interest in the problem. He was therefore grateful for the statements which had been made during the meeting that there would be an opportunity to have such a discussion and to reach agreement prior to the tabling of any draft in Geneva. His Government would consider any erosion of the Alliance, recently stated to be a potential result of a non-dissemination treaty, to be a catastrophe. It was therefore very important to follow a procedure in conformity with the principles and the spirit of the Alliance.

(The meeting then adjourned and resumed at 3.30 p.m.)

54. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE said he had been particularly interested to learn of the United States Intelligence reports concerning the possible motives behind the Soviet agreement to resume talks at Geneva. His Government was of the opinion that it was now appropriate for the West, after due consultation, to take the initiative in the field of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and that the draft to be presented to the Conference should take into consideration, as far as possible, the views of the non-aligned countries in order to gain their support, although Turkey entirely agreed with the general condition enumerated by Mr. Cavaletti as a necessary basis for a non-dissemination treaty. In this respect, he had noted with great interest the comments of Lord Chalfont that the United Kingdom draft was not of a nature to render impossible the realisation of the NLF or ANF.
55. Reporting the preliminary views of his Authorities on the Canadian and United Kingdom Draft treaties, he said they considered that these drafts contained very constructive points, but that it would be desirable to combine them into a single draft. As regards the entering into force of the treaty, they had a preference for Article VII of the Canadian draft, since the treaty would only be effective if all the nuclear states and those non-nuclear states having an advanced nuclear potential became parties to the treaty.

56. Moreover, the discrimination foreseen in the procedures laid down in Article IX of the Canadian draft regarding sanctions to be applied to the parties and the treaty's binding effects upon the signatories made the non-nuclear states dependent upon the attitude and decision of the nuclear states. In fact, in the event of a nuclear state ceasing to be a party to the treaty, the other nuclear states were free to remain, or to cease to be, a party to the treaty, but the non-nuclear states only had such freedom under certain conditions. His Authorities were therefore inclined to agree with the procedure laid down in Article V of the United Kingdom draft.

57. The United Kingdom draft, however, did not envisage any measures of control and verification, but, in the opinion of Turkey, effective prevention of the dissemination of nuclear weapons could not be guaranteed by any treaty which did not provide a comprehensive mechanism of control. His Authorities therefore believed that the system envisaged in Article III of the Canadian draft should be included in the draft to be presented at Geneva, but that it was imperative to ensure the efficiency of the control to be carried out by the IAEA and particularly its bona fide acceptance by the nuclear states.

58. Finally, it was unclear whether the assistance envisaged in Article IV of the Canadian draft to a non-nuclear state subjected to a nuclear attack would have to be given jointly or individually. If such assistance was foreseen, Turkey believed that such an undertaking could not easily be realised in view of the existing differences of opinion among the nuclear states on many international issues.

59. In conclusion, he said his Authorities considered that the question of non-dissemination merited careful consideration and that it would be preferable to table at Geneva a draft text on which general agreement had been reached.
60. The Belgian representative pointed to the current scientific capability to distinguish between earthquake and underground explosion, and asked Mr. Foster what were the possibilities for the inclusion of on-site inspection in the draft treaty. For fundamental and procedural reasons, however, first priority must be given to the question of non-dissemination, as had been clearly indicated by earlier speakers. Agreement should be reached on a common text drawn from the two drafts now before the Council. The United Kingdom draft treaty had the merits of simplicity and brevity but at two points its wording was less satisfactory than that of the Canadian text. What, for example, was meant by "any association of states"? It was essential that the treaty, as well as ensuring non-dissemination, allowed for nuclear co-operation within the Alliance. The meaning of the term "control" as elaborated in Article 1.1 and II.2(c) also required clarification. Member nations must know exactly what this signified since an idea of veto was implied which might be acceptable ultimately, but had not yet been agreed upon as a common principle. In particular, the acceptance of this form of control by the United States was open to question. Such a veto would deprive the majority of nations of the right to use nuclear arms.

61. The Canadian draft on the other hand seemed to avoid such difficulties by referring more broadly to "any... association under its jurisdiction"; was this in fact synonymous with "association of states" or were did the difference lie? Control of nuclear weapons was defined by Canada under Article VI(d) as "the ability to commit nuclear weapons to use". Though he was not sure what this meant, here, too, he tended to prefer the more indefinite wording of the Canadian text. In the case of guarantees for those nations relinquishing the use of nuclear arms, the Canadian draft was more explicit and more satisfactory to non-nuclear nations. Therefore, if it were necessary to choose between the two drafts, Belgium would be inclined to favour the Canadian text as meeting most satisfactorily the problems posed by this difficult question. Whilst recognising the merits of the United Kingdom draft, he suggested that its extreme brevity provided an inadequate answer.

62. Mr. Foster and Lord Chalfont had both spoken of proposals for general and complete disarmament; the Belgian Representative wondered if discussions at Geneva should be restricted simply to the nuclear problem. Would it not be wiser to extend the discussions beyond the limited field upon which the Soviets expected and wished to concentrate? In this connection it would be valuable to make a timely attempt to re-open and elaborate a consideration of the Gomulka Plan.
63. Mr. HOYSEN (Norway) said that at this critical juncture when a solution to the problems of dissemination should be of equal interest to East and West, to the United States as to the USSR, the prospect of reaching agreement on a treaty was faint, but worthy of a continued common effort. Any impression of disagreement within the NATO countries in respect of this effort would have an unfortunate effect upon public opinion, and he believed that a clear statement to the Press of common support within the Council for the principle of non-dissemination and its promotion in Geneva would be a useful clarification of Allied views.

64. There remained many unresolved problems between member nations and in these circumstances it was preferable not to establish priorities or to insist that the alternative solutions were mutually exclusive. An answer to the difficulties posed by the problem of dissemination might be found in an agreed sharing of nuclear responsibility, by some version of the MLP or ANF, or, as Norway hoped, by some new ideas emerging from the deliberations of the McNamara Select Committee. In connection with the MLP, he pointed out that under its present title such a system would continue to meet adamant opposition from the Soviets, and others, and that its purpose, the sharing of nuclear responsibility, might well be served by an organization existing under an alternative name.

65. Referring to the two texts now before the Council, he agreed that in substance the Canadian draft was more comprehensive, but suggested that its contents would raise many problems and that tactically speaking it might be more valuable to begin discussions on the basis of a simpler statement on the lines of the United Kingdom draft. The problem of guarantees for non-nuclear nations was bound to arise, as well as the responsibilities in production freezing, etc., of the nuclear signatories. Consideration of the peaceful uses of atomic nuclear energy was a secondary problem. In the first place, national commitment on principles was sought, and although this agreement was in itself insufficient, it would undoubtedly give a momentum to negotiations, whereby other problems could be elaborated as they presented themselves.

66. Norway had voted at the United Nations for a world conference as proposed by the Disarmament Commission, considering it not worthwhile voting against. It was now hoped that further consideration of this project would be postponed until after the results of the Geneva Conference were known. If considerable progress were made at Geneva, the convocation of a world disarmament conference might complicate and jeopardise that success by transforming the meeting into a forum for crude and destructive propaganda.
67. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that having repeatedly stressed the importance of the question of non-dissension both in the United Nations General Assembly and in the NATO Council, his Authorities had welcomed the Canadian and United Kingdom proposals as an effort to clarify some of the principal issues which should be constructively examined before their submission to the Geneva Conference. They believed allied consultation on this question to be all the more important since it concerned the survival of world civilisation and the character of future international relations. They did not consider it impossible to resolve the critical problem posed by the dependence of Western security on possession of the nuclear deterrent on the one hand and the desire of non-aligned nations for a guarantee of security in similar terms on the other hand. The consent of non-nuclear nations not to acquire nuclear weapons was indispensable to any agreement on non-proliferation, but would not be given unless some of their current apprehensions were met. In the present draft treaty, the nuclear powers were obliged to refrain from giving nuclear weapons to non-nuclear powers, but not from distributing them to their own allies. But in view of the great difference in capacity between the various nuclear powers, transfer of nuclear weapons from one nuclear power to another might have a greater disruptive effect on the existing balance of power than transfer to a non-nuclear power. The Council should carefully study the observations of Mr. Cavallotti and of the German Representative regarding the lack of balance in the sacrifices to be made by nuclear and non-nuclear powers and also the recent remarks of the Canadian Foreign Minister regarding the insufficiency of one-sided commitments.

68. Although they understood the preference of the neutral and non-aligned countries, as recently expressed at the United Nations Disarmament Commission, for linking a non-proliferation agreement with such measures as were listed in the Canadian draft, the Netherlands feared that the incorporation of such "integrated" measures might eventually lead to deadlock and they would prefer them to be regarded as "related" measures. The United Kingdom draft, however, made no mention of these measures and it was necessary to examine whether the requirements and conditions of these countries would be adequately met by the United Kingdom text, or would have to be satisfied in some other way.

69. Referring to the Canadian draft, he said that the Netherlands saw particular merit in the provision for a complaints procedure, especially in the event of it being impossible to provide safeguards through the IAEA, since it would prevent unwarranted withdrawals from the treaty. The withdrawal clause in the United Kingdom draft, however, seemed to be less adequate and was similar to that in the Partial Test Ban Treaty,
infraction of which could be determined by national detection instruments. The specific establishment in the Canadian draft of a limited duration for the treaty would encourage the nuclear states to make tangible progress towards nuclear disarmament. Moreover, if a permanent verification system could not be established within the near future, a system of ad hoc verification through a complaints procedure, possibly involving the IIAE, seemed very attractive. Finally, he stressed the advantages of combining the two draft texts and felt that the need for some form of assistance guarantee, as mentioned in Article IV of the Canadian draft, should be further examined.

70. Turning to the question of non-transfer and non-acquisition, he pointed out that in making the treaty also apply to "any association of states": the United Kingdom draft, unlike the Canadian draft, went beyond the Irish Resolution, which limited prohibition to transfer to nations, and he feared that the Soviet Union might not agree with the statement of Lord Chalfont that the United Kingdom draft did not exclude an AMF or MIF. However, he welcomed the proposal in the Canadian draft to bring private persons and organizations under the operation of the treaty. As regards the question of control, the definition in Article III(o) of the United Kingdom draft might have to be modified since the present wording would give the wrong meaning to Article I.4. With regard to the accession of nuclear powers, his Authorities felt that further discussion was necessary concerning the definition of a nuclear power and concerning the question as to whether the entry into force of the treaty should depend on the accession of all the present nuclear powers, as was proposed in Article VII(5) of the Canadian draft. In order to avoid jeopardising possible agreement on a treaty, it might be preferable not to be too exacting as to the number and identity of the nuclear and non-nuclear states whose participation was required, but since the association of the countries mentioned in the Canadian draft was highly desirable if the treaty was to achieve its purpose, these countries might be allowed to participate in the negotiations at the earliest possible stage.

71. In conclusion, he shared the optimistic opinion of Mr. Foster regarding the coming negotiations, but suggested that the true test of Soviet sincerity might lie in its willingness to renounce such pre-conditions to agreement as concerned the MIF or AMF or developments in other parts of the world, such as Vietnam. The West should not allow its desires to reach agreement on a non-proliferation treaty to be used as a means of pressure on such issues. The Netherlands remained convinced that a solution to the problem of nuclear sharing in NATO was as essential as an agreement on non-proliferation, but recognising the value of progress wherever possible, they were opposed to establishing priorities or to regarding the solution of one problem as a pre-condition to that of the other.
72. The French Representative said that although France had decided at a certain date not to participate in the meetings at Geneva for reasons he considered it unnecessary to recall because they were well-known, he felt it necessary to make some remarks at the present meeting since his Government thought that consultation on this matter was desirable. Having thanked the Representatives of the four Powers for their frank statements, he said that France was naturally opposed to the dissemination of nuclear weapons. There was moreover a general consensus on this subject, as witness the adoption of the Irish Resolution in 1961.

73. The problem of dissemination resulted from the very existence of nuclear weapons, and from the present inability of those powers which possessed them to agree on their interdiction.

74. This situation had not been altered by the Moscow Agreement on the banning of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater.

75. The fact that dissemination had not progressed more rapidly was due to the unwillingness of any power to delegate to another state the possession of the use of nuclear weapons, or even to assist that other state in their manufacture. France, for its part, had done nothing which could lead to a wider dissemination of nuclear weapons.

76. As regards the non-nuclear powers, the essence of the problem was to obtain an agreement to renounce nuclear weapons by those non-nuclear nations which might one day be tempted to procure them. An analysis of this question showed that it had many different facets and led one to ask whether a non-dissemination treaty could alone solve a problem whose existence was due to the fact that some countries felt themselves threatened by others and were at the same time capable of procuring nuclear weapons.

77. There was also the problem of China. No treaty could settle this problem unless China became a party to the treaty.

78. Finally, some members of the Alliance considered that a non-dissemination treaty would have repercussions on European security. This was a very delicate matter which deserved very special attention and, whatever the circumstances, the greatest degree of caution. The tactics of the Soviet Union also called for caution on the part of the West. One did not know the reasons for the sudden change of position by the Soviet Union, which doubtless had everything to gain in this matter.
79. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that his Government appreciated the presentation to the Council of the views of the four Western negotiating partners and welcomed the initiative of the United Kingdom and Canada in drawing up draft treaties. Denmark considered that the conclusion of such a treaty had become a matter of great urgency and that the present time might be propitious for action. They attached some importance to the fact that existing nuclear powers should constitute the five permanent members of the Security Council and that they made up the last easily definable line of demarcation.

80. Referring to the two draft texts, he said that the Danish Government agreed with the view that the text should be based on the Irish Resolution and that a universal agreement should be the main aim of a non-dissemination treaty. They approved the simplicity of the United Kingdom draft and its emphasis on the general political advantages of such a treaty and felt that an attempt to reach perfection might make a speedy agreement more difficult.

81. With reference to the three questions of guarantee, control and withdrawal raised in the Canadian draft, he said that his Government wished to see the Canadian proposal for a guarantee clause (Article IV) included in the text, unless some very cogent arguments were advanced that such a guarantee would complicate the matter dangerously.

82. While they found the Canadian proposal on control a good basis for discussion, they agreed with the Norwegian Foreign Minister's statement at the Nineteenth General Assembly that though control was necessary, the setting up of a control system need not go hand in hand with the signing of the treaty itself. They suggested that the proposed Canadian control system might be more easily acceptable if Article V, 2 were limited to non-nuclear states.

83. As regards withdrawal, Denmark saw a close connection between Article V of the United Kingdom draft and Article IX of the Canadian draft and the question of guarantees to non-nuclear powers. If Article IV of the Canadian draft were agreed upon in some form or another, a solution regarding withdrawal might lie in a combination of Article V of the United Kingdom draft and Article IX, (a) of the Canadian draft.

84. While emphasis had been placed in the meeting on restrictions on the nuclear powers and while he would be in favour of considerable freeze and reductions on the part of the nuclear powers, he stressed the need to distinguish between the essential and the desirable. Although transfer between nuclear powers might be an essential question, consideration as a major problem of the question as to how the nuclear powers developed their nuclear weapons would render impossible the signature of any non-dissemination treaty, since no means could be envisaged of limiting the endeavours of Communist China to refine its nuclear weapons.
85. In conclusion, he stressed the desire of his Government that discussions in the Council and between the four Western negotiating powers should reach an early conclusion and result in the tabling of a combined text at Geneva which, it was hoped, might lead to the conclusion of a treaty.

86. The Greek Representative said that his country was always in favour of all efforts to limit arms since the arms race could only end in annihilation. Only the previous day, the world had learnt of a new announcement in which President Soekarno of Indonesia had declared that he contemplated the manufacture of a nuclear weapon. Greece had been among the very first countries to sign the Moscow Treaty and would support any proposals for non-proliferation.

87. The expositions by Mr. Foster, Lord Chalfont, General Burns and Ambassador Cavellochi were certainly worthy to be studied as an instrument for discussion in the Eighteen-Nation Conference at Geneva. The Council should adopt a common NATO policy of solidarity in opposition to the position which would be set up from the other side. It was essential to find a compromise on the proposals that would show this common NATO policy.

88. The Portuguese Representative wished to thank members of the Council for their constructive comments on the United Kingdom and Canadian draft non-dissemination treaties. He expressed his Authorities' support for non-dissemination.

89. Lord Chalfont expressed his gratitude for the comments and constructive suggestions that had been made both on the general approach and on the two draft non-dissemination treaties that had been circulated to the Council. He wished to dismiss any thought in the minds of members that there was a need to choose between the two drafts: it was not in that spirit that they had been put forward. The Canadian and United Kingdom Governments had provided working papers that they thought would be useful for discussion. The United Kingdom Government intended still to go forward with the matter and was prepared to take full account of all that General Burns had said and of all the comments that had been put forward in the Council that day. He desired to return to one point that had been brought up again and again in the course of discussion: that governments had to be able to table some sort of Western proposal in Geneva. While non-dissemination was in itself one of the most urgent problems that the world faced, there were a number of additional expedient aspects to the matter. Some sort of constructive advance at Geneva might be necessary to uphold the prestige of the Eighteen-Nation Conference as Ambassador Cavallotti had pointed out. The West should make its position quite clear and table it before being thrown on the defensive by a Russian advance in that field.
90. On the important matter of nuclear capability among associations of states, the Belgian Representative had said that the Canadian draft had got round the problem of associations by not mentioning it. It might be easy to get round the problem by begging the question, but the Council would be mistaken if they thought that by doing so they would make sure that the Russians ignored the problem too. It would be disingenuous in the extreme to put forward a treaty that ignored this problem.

91. Many differences of approach had been apparent in discussion, but none of these were insuperable. We wished to underline the difficulties that would arise from packing too much into the treaty and from, as had been suggested, striving for perfection.

92. It would be useful to refer to some of the points put forward by the German Representative. The first of these points was the question of priorities. The question had been raised of whether the treaty should be negotiated and tabled before the problem of nuclear sharing within the Alliance had been settled. The German Representative had suggested the question of nuclear sharing should be decided first. The United Kingdom Government had not renounced the possibility that if the nuclear sharing situation was settled within the Alliance, the USSR might accept the position and go forward in negotiation from that point. He wished, however, to return to the theme that a non-proliferation treaty was an urgent matter. It was not a question that concerned Europe alone, but was a world-wide problem. As Mr. Foster pointed out, if the West concluded an agreement with the Soviet Union, it might convince the Soviet Union that any subsequent nuclear agreement in the Alliance would not constitute proliferation. While the United Kingdom Government realised on the one hand that nuclear sharing should be considered, on the other hand it was very anxious to see a non-proliferation treaty tabled in the international forum. They proposed an advance on both fronts, leaving events to decide which matter was concluded first.

93. On the second point, regarding guarantees, it was obvious that the Council was going to have to take into consideration the worries of potential nuclear powers for their own security. It was now perhaps a more powerful form of political aggression to threaten the acquisition of nuclear weapons than actually to possess them. The question of guarantees was an extraordinarily complicated matter. It was when points were raised, such as who was guaranteed, by whom, and against what, that the immense complications became apparent. The framework of a non-proliferation treaty was not the place to ask these questions.
94. Another point was how to help non-nuclear nations to resist the temptation of becoming nuclear powers. Ambassador Cavallotti had raised the possibility of restriction on the existing nuclear powers; in the non-dissemination context, non-dissemination between nuclear powers should be considered. Lord Chalfont agreed with the remark by the Danish Representative that it was sometimes difficult to assess how nuclear capability affected the attitude of other powers, but thought that the Council should look at the possibility of the nuclear powers themselves reducing their capability. This was another question that should be investigated simultaneously with the tabling of the non-dissemination treaty.

95. The fourth German point, regarding inspection and control, was a related difficulty. He noted there was considerable agreement that a non-dissemination treaty should contain provision for this question. It entailed, however, terrible difficulties. The International Atomic Energy Agency was proposed as a centre of a control system, but certain countries had expressed considerable opposition to the examination of their civil establishments by the IAEA. The Council should be prepared to face considerable difficulty on this point.

96. He asked to be excused for not commenting in detail on the German remarks on a disclaimer clause as he had already made comments on the matter and the question of disclaimers could be covered outside the treaty. The sixth point, regarding the political context of the non-dissemination treaty was important. Arms control and security could not be considered separately from this matter but it was essential that they should not be too closely tied to the European political situation.

97. The treaty should stick closely to a simple proposal. A variety of people might be satisfied by the inclusion of a large number of clauses, but this would make final agreement more difficult. He thought that the United Kingdom and Canada should now try to bring the texts of the two draft treaties together in order to present a firm proposal at Geneva.

98. He then referred to the remark by Mr. Boyesen that no-one in the Council had made any sign that he was not in favour of a non-dissemination treaty. Differences had emerged on tactics and priorities, but he thought that there had been unanimity on aims. He suggested that it would not be amiss, if it was intended to say anything to the Press in public, that this should be the principal statement.
99. While the Council had discussed the technical and tactical aspects of the agreement and the way it should be handled in Geneva, he wished to return to the extreme urgency of doing something about the problem. He recalled the words of President Kennedy to the effect that if the world allowed itself to get into the state of permitting the nuclear spread to continue, there would be no peace, no security and no prospect of disarmament. If proliferation continued and twelve or more nations in ten years' time developed nuclear capability, it would be extremely difficult to negotiate at all.

100. France had asked what use a treaty would serve to which China was not a signatory. It was important to go ahead with those who would sign first, and let other powers sign later. The difficulty of China did not absolve the Council of responsibility. Both the nuclear and non-nuclear powers had to take risks. The former should take the risk of doing things that would encourage the others to remain non-nuclear, and the latter, that of not becoming nuclear.

101. General BURNS (Canada) was in agreement with Lord Chalfont that the United Kingdom and Canadian treaties should not be considered as competitive, but only as attempts by the two Governments to suggest means of dealing with the problem. He also agreed with Lord Chalfont's final remarks on the importance of non-dissemination in order to avoid the establishment of further independent nuclear powers.

102. Referring to a comment on Article 1(e) of the Canadian draft non-dissemination treaty which included the phrase "any association under its jurisdiction", he said that this was merely to provide for the possibility that in the future some commercial company or government corporation might be in a position where, in promoting civil nuclear installations, it would be passing on information that might be useful in the construction of a nuclear weapon. The point of this was that not only should the state not pass on such information, but it should prohibit other agencies from doing so.

103. Referring to Article VI(d) in the Canadian draft on the control of the use of nuclear weapons, he said that his Government also was not happy with the definition of "control". What was meant by the term in the text was the ability to commit nuclear weapons to use without asking any other country's permission.

104. It was true that a simple text was more easily negotiated than a complex one, and no-one desired anything more complex than was necessary to secure agreement. But everyone knew that any agreement or treaty about security or military matters tended to be rather complicated in order to take all views on account. The complications in the Canadian draft were because of the need first to secure the control provisions, and secondly, to satisfy non-nuclear states that they were getting something under which their future security would be maintained.
105. It was only necessary to establish what was possible and how much would be acceptable in negotiation. The views expressed in the Council would certainly be taken into account in any future deliberations on the non-dissemination treaty.

106. The Deputy Foreign Minister of Norway had proposed that the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards might be introduced at a later stage than the original draft treaty. But if no such provisions were introduced in the original draft, it would be difficult to introduce them at a later stage.

107. The Netherlands Representative, referring to the points relating to guarantees, had said that similar integrated measures had been proposed by India at the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Any guarantees and safeguards that might be required could be introduced separately from a non-dissemination treaty, but Canada had included such provisions more to draw attention to their necessity than to establish a final clause.

108. On the point made in Article IX of the Canadian draft, the matter would need very careful consideration where withdrawal seemed to include discrimination between nuclear and non-nuclear states.

109. He thanked the Council for their proposals and suggestions on the Canadian draft. The review of the United Kingdom and Canadian texts should be done with complete consultation among all countries that had made suggestions.

110. Mr. CAVALLETI (Italy) thought that there was a general agreement that it was desirable to prevent the other side from taking the initiative, and that prudent action was called for. A number of speakers had underlined the urgency of the problem, in particular Lord Chalfont, with whose views he agreed fully. It should be borne in mind that, following previous practice, it was probable that the next session of the Geneva Disarmament Conference might be fairly short, adjourning before the meeting of the General Assembly in September.

111. Italy thought that it was essential that there should be continuous contact on a basis of confidence between the Four Western Powers and the Council, the former providing information and the latter their suggestions. Provided the Four Powers followed the guiding lines agreed in the Council, they should be allowed some essential freedom of action in Geneva. He welcomed the fact that the Federal Republic had appointed an observer to Geneva. The Italian Delegation in Geneva would maintain and intensify as necessary the existing contact with the German Mission in Geneva.
112. In conclusion, he said that his Authorities would bear in mind the comments which had been made today, in particular the need to increase Western security while improving the international situation by a reduction of tension.

113. Mr. FOSTER (United States) said that his comments would be brief since much of the ground had been covered already. In reply to the question by the Belgian Representative on whether, in the light of recent scientific developments, on-site inspections might now be considered unnecessary, he said that the basic fact was that there was still a belief in the United States that a certain number of on-site inspections was required. Until the Soviets indicated some willingness to move from their present position that no inspection was necessary, he thought that little progress was possible.

114. On the subject of non-proliferation, he had been deeply interested in Lord Chalfont's argument on the need to present a treaty at this session. He did not agree with Mr. Cavalletti that the session would necessarily be short, since the resolution put forward by the non-aligned countries recommended that the Geneva Conference should report to the United Nations General Assembly during its next session. It was however important to submit a treaty at an early date since it was useful to keep the Western initiative and to minimise the possible harmful effect of a specious Soviet draft.

115. It had repeatedly been stated today, and the United States fully agreed, that any draft treaty presented in Geneva must keep the Alliance together. The United States had some difficulties with both of the two drafts now before the Council, but today's discussion would provide a suitable basis on which to build a draft which would keep the Alliance together.

116. He could not share the concern of the Federal Republic regarding priorities. Every effort must be made to restrain dissemination of nuclear weapons while ensuring in parallel the protection of allied interests.

117. It was clear from the discussion that the Council believed that non-proliferation would be an important contribution to stopping the nuclear arms race. This must be brought about in a way which would not be divisive of the Alliance. The Western Powers must bear this in mind in working towards an equitable solution. Full consultation among the Allies should take place both in Geneva and in NATO, and particular attention should be paid to the views of the Federal Republic. In this connection he said that it was his intention to have almost daily contacts with Mr. Schmittenhöller.
118. The German Representative said that he thought it necessary, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, to interpret briefly some of the comments he had made. He was in agreement with Lord Chalfont, as regards Press arrangements, that one might indicate to the Press that there had been a consensus in the Council in favour of the principle of non-dissemination. On the question of priorities, he thought that it was not the position of his Authorities that no discussions or negotiations should take place in Geneva on non-dissemination before an agreement on NATO nuclear arrangements. The aim of his Authorities was that the signature of any non-dissemination treaty should not precede agreement on NATO nuclear arrangements. His Authorities did not share the view that a treaty was of such over-riding importance that other points might be set aside, such as European security and German national interests. A simple text could be an advantage in negotiations, but it had no absolute value in itself and was dangerous when it was reached at the expense of other interests. As pointed out in today's discussion, India, Sweden and other countries had raised certain problems; if these were ignored in the first Western draft text, the result might be precisely what the West feared, i.e. the appearance of counter-proposals from the third side. He therefore thought it essential that even in a first draft, certain problems should be taken into account.

119. As regards procedure for consultation, he had suggested that the preparation of a final Western draft should be discussed in the Council or some other NATO body. He asked whether the absence of comment on this proposal meant that other NATO member countries had different suggestions to make and, if so, what these suggestions were. He thought that today's discussion had shown clearly that the consultation provided for in Geneva, and through the fortnightly briefings to the Council, was inadequate. For example, in the time available it had been impossible for him to go into details such as the reasons why his Government thought that a disclaimer clause was necessary. It was therefore essential to evolve a more appropriate procedure for consultation.

120. The Chairman, summing up the discussion, recalled that at the outset of the meeting he had said that he was confident that this would be a useful and informative session. He believed that hope had been abundantly fulfilled. It could not have been expected that agreement could be reached today on a draft treaty of non-proliferation or that a decision could be taken about the opportunity of tabling a draft now in Geneva. However, an extended analysis and comparison had been developed which would certainly prove very useful for the further thinking, discussions and orientation of the Four Allied Powers in the Geneva Conference and for the Alliance as a whole.
121. He then made four points. Firstly, in general terms, it was obvious that what was going to be discussed at Geneva was more than ever of concern to the member states of the Alliance and to the Alliance as a whole. The solidarity and cohesion of the Alliance were its strongest asset in negotiation with the Soviet Union. It was, therefore, obviously their first priority target. On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that nuclear problems were already being discussed in the West itself, either in general terms or in the context of such specific plans as the MLF, the ANF or Mr. MacNamara's proposal for a Special Committee. Any conclusions the Council might reach in the context of disarmament should be, and he was confident would be, compatible with the decisions reached in the nuclear context.

122. Secondly, the Four Western Powers did not, in his opinion, go to Geneva from this meeting armed with any sort of instructions or mandate from the rest of NATO. In his mind, this had been not a briefing meeting but an exchange of views and a consultation. The Four would act at Geneva, as they had done so far, on their own responsibility. However, he knew that the Four Powers could be trusted to make no move which would endanger Atlantic cohesion and solidarity. In that spirit they would take full account of the opinions, reservations or qualifications, such as those expressed by the German and other Representatives.

123. In this respect, it seemed to him from what had been said by several delegations that there was still some doubt on whether it was really feasible to table a non-proliferation treaty in Geneva immediately. The questions of urgency and of priority had also been raised from different points of view. He was confident that the Four Powers would keep these particular views in mind before deciding on any action; and he had personally taken note with pleasure of what Lord Chalfont had had to say on this.

124. Thirdly, it might be that the Soviet Union - as Mr. Foster, Lord Chalfont and others had mentioned - would decide to take the initiative and table a non-proliferation treaty themselves. This might be undesirable in some respects, but it might on the other hand give some idea of the kind of treaty they might be likely in the long run to accept and of whether it would be consistent with vital Western interests. It would, moreover, give the West time for consideration and reflection.
125. Fourthly, he thought that the main practical problem for the moment was to fit these general, and, he believed, generally acceptable principles into the further proceedings of the Council. To this end, he did not think the Council need contemplate holding another full discussion at any specific time. On the other hand, he thought it of the greatest importance that the Four Powers taking part in the Geneva discussions should keep in close touch with the rest of the Alliance, as recommended by Mr. Cavalletti. For this purpose, the Council already had an established procedure which he hoped would be continued and improved. Under this procedure, the Four Powers provided, in alternate weeks while the Geneva Conference was in session, written briefings one week and oral briefings the next, by a nominated representative of one of the Four. This procedure would not, of course, preclude more comprehensive discussions on the lines of the present meetings if at any time these were thought necessary. He hoped also that it would be possible for Mr. Foster, as the Western Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference, to keep in touch with him and exchange information whenever necessary. All this seemed to him flexible and comprehensive enough to allow of a full degree of consultation and discussion in which every country might convey its own point of view. That, he believed, was what really mattered.

126. Finally, as regards Press arrangements, he recalled that he had said that the NATO spokesman would make no statement whatsoever to the Press about what had been discussed at this meeting - which was subject to the normal rules of secrecy governing Council procedures - and that delegation spokesmen would, he hoped, feel able to follow a similar line. Certainly there was general agreement on the desirability of non-proliferation according to the well-known Irish Resolution, but not on the conditions of a specific non-proliferation treaty at this time. But what concerned the Council at present was not so much a general agreement on the desirability of non-proliferation, but the readiness to table a treaty and the conditions under which the allied non-nuclear powers were ready to renounce their right to acquire nuclear weapons. To announce the first without qualifying it with the second one might create a misleading impression of full agreement on the whole subject, which in reality did not yet exist. To detail the contrary such conditions would mean revealing the Council discussions, thus not only infringing the Council rule of secrecy and preventing any uninhibited discussions at these meetings, but also running the risk of making the negotiations in Geneva more difficult. Much as he appreciated the point of view of Mr. Boyesch, he would prefer to keep to the rules, unless of course there was a clear Council decision to the contrary.
127. Lord CHALFONT said that he was persuaded by the Chairman's arguments and would therefore not press the suggestion of a communiqué.

128. The CHAIRMAN, in adjourning the meeting, repeated his sincere satisfaction at the very useful exchange of views which had taken place.

CTAN/NATO,
Paris, XVie.
FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FOURTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 17 August 1965, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: U. SAIL BWA (Bursa)
PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brasil:
Mr. A. CORDELA de LAGO
Mr. D. SILVIAI da MOTA

Bulgaria:
Mr. C. LUKANCHEV
Mr. Y. GOLEKANCHEV
Mr. D. KOSTOV
Mr. G. YASIKOV

Burma:
U SAIN BWAN
U MAUNG MAUNG SYL

Canada:
Mr. J.I.A. BROWN
Mr. J.A. DONELLY
Mr. G.J. MARSHALL
Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:
Mr. Z. CERNIK
Mr. V. VAJNA
Mr. R. KLEIS
Mr. F. DOMAS

Ethiopia:
Mr. A. ELLIEK
Mr. T. BEKELE

India:
Mr. V.C. TRIKUMB
Mr. K.P. LUKOSE

Italy:
Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. E. SCHIOTTI
Mr. S. AVERTA
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI
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<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>Mr. S. IBRAHIM</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Lord CHALFONT</td>
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<td>Sir Harold BEELEY</td>
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<td>Miss E.J.M. RICHARDSON</td>
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PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER
Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE
Mr. J.S. WARD
Mr. P.S. BRIDGES

Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH
It is in this spirit that I have the pleasure today of offering for discussion and negotiation in this Committee a draft treaty (ENDC/152) to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. This draft is the product of close collaboration among the NATO countries represented here. It embodies important contributions from Canada, Italy and the United Kingdom. Although the United States has the privilege and responsibility of sponsorship, our allies fully share our earnest desire that this text should be received by the Committee as a sincere and constructive basis for negotiation.

In the course of their intensive consultations the four Western delegations were motivated by the single desire to come to grips once and for all with the deadly peril of nuclear anarchy. We have been inspired by the spirit of General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI) whose unanimous call for an international agreement to bar the spread of nuclear weapons has gone too long unanswered. We have sought to respond as faithfully and as fully as now seems possible to the recommendation contained in document 26/225 of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (ENDC/149), a resolution which enjoyed the support of the overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations. Finally, we have sought to accommodate the differing and sometimes conflicting preoccupations of various governments in a manner which, while sensitive to their desires, gives the necessary emphasis to the need to halt proliferation.

Let me now offer a brief explanation of the provisions of the draft treaty.

Under article 1 countries having nuclear weapons would have the following obligations. First, they could not transfer nuclear weapons into the national control of any country not having nuclear weapons. They could not do this either directly, or indirectly through a military alliance. Second, they could not assist any such country in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Thirdly, they could not take any other action to increase the number of nuclear Powers in the world. By "nuclear Powers" I mean any entity having independent power to use nuclear weapons, whether it be a State, a régime or some other kind of organization. As we all know, power to use nuclear weapons now rests only in national hands.
Article II of the treaty would impose corresponding obligations upon the countries not having nuclear weapons. First, these countries could not seek or receive the transfer of nuclear weapons into their national control. They could not do this either directly, or indirectly through a military alliance. Secondly, they could not manufacture nuclear weapons or seek, receive or grant assistance in such manufacture. Thirdly, they could not take any other action which would cause an increase in the number of nuclear entities in the world above the existing number. This simple draft would thus prevent any increase in the number of nuclear Powers. You will all remember President Kennedy's fear that there would be no rest for anyone, no stability, no real security and no chance for disarmament in a world with a growing number of nuclear powers. This draft would ensure that there would be no increase in the number, even by one.

Under article III all parties would undertake to co-operate in facilitating the application to their peaceful nuclear activities of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards or their equivalent. Unlike other provisions of this draft, this article does not set forth a precise or completely-formulated obligation; but it does clearly indicate a line of policy which all parties undertake to implement: namely, that they will help to bring about the application of such safeguards to their own peaceful nuclear activities and to those of other countries. It is implicit in their undertaking that they would work to see that this is done as rapidly as possible. A number of countries have begun to accept safeguards on their own peaceful reactors. We hope that this process can be expedited.

Moreover, countries which supply uranium and reactors can co-operate in facilitating the application of safeguards in other countries by insisting that this be done with respect to any material or equipment which they supply. I shall want to speak at greater length on this important question in a later intervention; but let me say now that the United States regards this as one of the key provisions which enunciates an important policy. And the application of adequate international safeguards to peaceful nuclear activities is not a matter which is of interest to the nuclear Powers alone. On the contrary, it is the non-nuclear Powers which should be especially interested in a system of safeguards to help assure each of them that their neighbours and others are in fact complying with the treaty.
We have drafted the provision in its present form to take account of the views of all countries, including those which are not prepared at this time to commit themselves to accept IAEA safeguards in all applicable circumstances. The United States will be especially interested to receive suggestions from the non-nuclear members of this Committee on means of strengthening this provision.

The next article, article IV, contains an important definition. It says that by using the phrase "nuclear State" in this draft treaty we mean a State possessing independent power to use nuclear weapons as of a particular date. Our view is that that date should be the day when the treaty is opened for signature. Our hope, of course, is that this would be very soon.

Article V is an accession clause quite similar to that in the limited nuclear test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1). It provides that the treaty will be open to all States for signature. We have suggested this clause because of our belief that the treaty should have world-wide application. The clause would not of course affect the recognition or status of any unrecognized regime or entity which might decide to file an instrument of accession to the treaty.

Under international law and practice recognition of a government or acknowledgement of the existence of a State is brought about as the result of a deliberate decision and course of conduct on the part of a government intending to accord recognition. Recognition of a régime or acknowledgement of an entity cannot be inferred from signature or ratification of or accession to a multilateral agreement. We believe this viewpoint is generally accepted, and it is on that basis that we have suggested this clause.

One important change in this draft from the limited test-ban Treaty language is that paragraph 3 of article V explicitly recognizes the importance of obtaining wide adherence to the treaty if it is to be effective in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. It does this by requiring adherence by a certain number of governments before the treaty goes into effect. We have left a blank for that number. In our view the number should be sufficiently high so that the treaty will be a significant anti-proliferation measure, but not so high as unduly to delay its entry into force.
Article VI is a withdrawal clause fashioned after the provision in the limited test-ban Treaty. It contains two important additions to that provision. First, a party wishing to withdraw under the limited conditions set forth must give notice three months in advance to the Security Council of the United Nations as well as to other parties to and signatories of the treaty. This notice must include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. These requirements have been added because they provide an additional brake on hasty withdrawal action without limiting the basic right of withdrawal. In addition, Security Council notification and explanation are clearly appropriate in view of the serious security ramifications of withdrawal.

The second addition to the limited test-ban Treaty formula is a provision calling for review of the treaty, after a specified period, with the agreement of two-thirds of the parties. This was included in part because of the wide concern recently expressed by many participants in the discussions here and in the Disarmament Commission that a treaty such as this should be accompanied by progress to halt and reduce rising nuclear stocks. One of the preamble paragraphs explicitly recognizes this concern. It calls attention to the desire of all of us --

"... to achieve effective agreements to halt the nuclear arms race, and to reduce armaments, including particularly nuclear arsenals".

The United States has proposed a number of measures to stop the build-up of and to reduce nuclear stockpiles. We are prepared to agree to them even before a treaty such as we have tabled today is signed. But we do not believe they should wait on this treaty or that this treaty should wait on them. Let us proceed on all such proposals at the same time, making progress wherever we can.

The last article of the draft treaty, article VII, deals with the problem of authentic texts. It adds Chinese, French and Spanish to the languages set forth in the corresponding clause of the limited test-ban Treaty. This change has been made to signify once again our desire for world-wide adherence.

The draft treaty I have just described may not be a perfect instrument, nor is it necessarily complete in its coverage of pertinent issues. We earnestly hope, however, that our discussion will focus on such improvements as can be agreed upon and that we shall not be urged to incorporate elements which, however desirable in
Mr. Porter, United States

Thence, are not new obstacles. Insistence on such an approach would be a sure way to prevent agreement. It also hopes that our discussions will not be rendered pointless by the imposition of unnecessary conditions or demands from any quarter.

As I said in an earlier intervention, the danger of proliferation is world-wide. It is not the special concern of any one country; nor can it be averted by concentrating our attention on any one country. Let us examine this drift, therefore, from the standpoint of our common goal. If our common goal is to halt the spread of nuclear weapons as a means of enhancing the security of all nations, then that and that alone must govern our arguments. Any other approach would be a monumental folly for which we and future generations would pay dearly and for which we should deserve the condemnation of mankind.

Mr. SUMMERGUE (Panama) (translation from Spanish): We have listened with all due attention to the statements made this morning and at previous meetings, and my delegation intends to study them carefully.

At this stage in our work the Panamanian delegation wishes only to outline its position of principle. In regard to the problems we are called upon to examine, these problems -- and it seems advisable to make this clear from the start, since certain differences of opinion have become apparent in this respect -- must all be in line with the essential work which has been entrusted to our Committee: namely, the preparation of a disarmament treaty.

I wish particularly to recall this, since the work of this session has brought out in a very striking manner the need for all States to promote the cause of disarmament. It goes without saying that this imposes on all of us an obligation to refrain from anything that might be detrimental to that cause and to the negotiations relating thereto, an obligation not to undertake any action that might advance or worsen international relations or increase international tension -- in a word, make disarmament negotiations more difficult.

It was quite right, of course, during the previous sessions to dwell on the more favourable conditions for the conduct of our negotiations here in this Committee, around this table, which has been appropriately compared to a seismograph extremely sensitive to everything that happens in the world. If my memory serves me well, all...
The Soviet Union attaches great importance to the problem of the non-
dissemination of nuclear weapons, since a proper solution of this problem can help
towards a definite limitation of the possibility of a nuclear missile war breaking
out. It goes without saying that this can be achieved only if in the very near
future a stop is put to access to nuclear weapons in any form, whether direct,
that is through national ownership, national control or disposal, or indirect,
that is access by non-nuclear States to nuclear weapons in one form or another
within the framework of the NATO military bloc.

In this connexion we should like to have a clear reply from the United
States representative to the question: does the draft treaty tabled today by the
United States representative (DNDC/152) provide for the complete and unconditional
prohibition of access to nuclear weapons, whether in a direct way, that is through
national ownership, control or disposal, or in an indirect way, that is access
to nuclear weapons through a so-called NATO multilateral force and such like?
In other words, are we to understand the United States draft as precluding any
possibility of the establishment of a NATO multilateral or similar force with the
participation, in one form or another, of military or other personnel of the
Federal Republic of Germany?

A clear reply by the United States representative to this question will enable
us to understand in the proper light the proposal which he has tabled today.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Sation Committee on Disarmament
today held its 224th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
under the chairmanship of U. Kain Bua, representative of Burma.

Statements were made by the representatives of the United Arab
Republic, Brazil, the United States, Romania, Mexico and the Soviet
Union.

"The delegation of the United States of America tabled a Draft
Treaty to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons.†

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday,
19 August 1965, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.

†/ Circulated as document DNDC/152.
CONFERENC OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Draft Treaty to prevent the spread of Nuclear Weapons

The Parties to this Treaty,
Desiring to promote international peace and security,
Desiring in particular to refrain from taking steps which will extend and intensify the arms race,
Believing that the further spread of nuclear weapons will jeopardize these ends,
Recalling that Resolution 1665 (XVI) of the General Assembly of the United Nations urges all States to cooperate for these purposes,
Desiring to achieve effective agreements to halt the nuclear arms race, and to reduce armaments, including particularly nuclear arsenals,
Reaffirming their determination to achieve agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control,
Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. Each of the nuclear States Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer any nuclear weapons into the national control of any non-nuclear State, either directly, or indirectly through a military alliance, and each undertakes not to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons.

2. Each of the nuclear States Party to this Treaty undertakes not to assist any non-nuclear State in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

ARTICLE II

1. Each of the non-nuclear States Party to this Treaty undertakes not to manufacture nuclear weapons; each undertakes not to seek or to receive the transfer of such weapons into its national control, either directly, or indirectly through a military alliance; and each undertakes not to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons.

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2. Each of the non-nuclear States Party to this Treaty undertakes not to seek or to receive assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, or itself to grant such assistance.

ARTICLE III

Each of the States Party to this Treaty undertakes to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent international safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities.

ARTICLE IV

In this Treaty

(a) "nuclear State" means a State possessing independent power to use nuclear weapons as of __________ (date).

(b) "non-nuclear State" means any State which is not a nuclear State.

ARTICLE V

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force on the deposit of instruments of ratification by __________ (a certain number of) governments, including those of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States of America.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession to this Treaty, and the date of its entry into force.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLES VI

1. This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely subject to the right of any Party to the Treaty to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other signatory and acceding States and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. ________ years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of parties may be held at a date and place to be fixed by agreement of two-thirds of the parties in order to review the operation of the Treaty.

ARTICLE VII

This Treaty, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate at the city of ____________, the ________ day of ________________ , one thousand nine hundred and sixty five.
Saudi Arabian Amendments to the Nonaligned Draft Resolution on a World Disarmament Conference, November 19, 1965

1. Insert a new second operative paragraph to read as follows:

2. Invites the five major nuclear Powers to meet, formally or informally, within the next nine months at any place convenient to them in order to explore possible areas of agreement on world disarmament questions, as a prelude to convening a world disarmament conference;

2. Change the present operative paragraph 2 as follows:

3. Urges after due consultations among all States that a standing committee be established for the twofold purpose of (a) acting as a liaison between the said five nuclear Powers and lending its good offices to them when required; and (b) taking such steps as may be appropriate, in the event these Powers concur, for convening a world disarmament conference not later than 1967.

General Assembly Resolution 2028 (XX): Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, November 19, 1965

The General Assembly,

Conscious of its responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for disarmament and the consolidation of peace,

Mindful of its responsibility in accordance with Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Charter, which stipulates that the General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both

Recalling its resolutions 1665 (XVI) of 4 December 1961 and 1908 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963,

Recognizing the urgency and great importance of the question of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Noting with satisfaction the efforts of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic to achieve the
solution of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as contained in their joint memorandum of 15 September 1965,¹

Convinced that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would endanger the security of all States and make more difficult the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Noting the declaration adopted by the Summit Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first regular session, held at Cairo in July 1964,² and the Declaration entitled "Programme for Peace and International Co-operation" adopted by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo in October 1964,³

Noting also the draft treaties to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons submitted by the United States of America⁴ and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,⁵ respectively,

Noting further that a draft unilateral non-acquisition declaration has been submitted by Italy,⁶

Convinced that General Assembly resolutions 1652 (XVI) of 24 November 1961 and 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963 aim at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Believing that it is imperative to exert further efforts to conclude a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

1. Urges all States to take all steps necessary for the early conclusion of a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

2. Calls upon the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to give urgent consideration to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and, to that end, to reconvene as early as possible with a view to negotiating an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, based on the following main principles:

(a) The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form;

(b) The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers;

(c) The treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament;

³ Ibid., pp. 443 ff.
⁴ Ante, pp. 347–349.
⁵ Ante, pp. 443–446.
(d) There should be acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty;

(e) Nothing in the treaty should adversely affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories;

3. Transmits the records of the First Committee relating to the discussion of the item entitled "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", together with all other relevant documents, to the Eighteen-Nation Committee for its consideration;

4. Requests the Eighteen-Nation Committee to submit to the General Assembly at an early date a report on the results of its work on a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

White House Statement on Nuclear Warheads for NATO Allies, November 22, 1965

1. As has often been stated we have made nuclear warheads available to our NATO allies but custody of all such warheads remains with the United States.

2. President Johnson is, and as Vice President was, fully aware of specific arrangements made by the Department of Defense with our NATO allies.

3. As has often been stated, no nuclear warheads on U.S. weapons or held in U.S. custody for our NATO allies can be used without specific authorization of the President of the United States.

Revised Saudi Arabian Amendments to the Nonaligned Resolution on a World Disarmament Conference, November 22, 1965

1. Insert a new second operative paragraph to read as follows:

2. Appeals to the major nuclear Powers to meet informally within the next nine months at any place convenient to them in order to explore possible areas of agreement on world disarmament questions, as a prelude to convening a world disarmament conference;

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1 Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 13, 1965, p. 939. The statement was made by Presidential Press Secretary Moyers.

2 A/C.1/L.344/Rev.1, Nov. 22, 1965. The original Saudi Arabian amendments appear ante, p. 532. For the nonaligned draft resolution, see ante, pp. 526-527. The Saudi Arabian amendments were not voted on.
Restricted Annex to summary record of a meeting of the Council held on Wednesday, 8th September, 1965, at 10.15 a.m.

DISARMAMENT

Reference: C-R(65)36, Item III

1. The CHAIRMAN, on behalf of the Council, extended a welcome to General Burns. Before inviting him to report on developments in Geneva, he drew the attention of Permanent Representatives to the intended Council discussion of United Nations General Assembly matters which, he suggested, should take place on Friday, 17th September. As the Council was already aware, the probability of a conclusion of the NDC Conference in the course of the next week might possibly lead on 17th September to yet another welcome meeting of the Council with the Head of the four Western powers (General Burns, Mr. Cavallotti, Lord Chalfont and Mr. Foster) similar to the one on 26th July. He invited the four powers to confirm whether this was the case.

2. He then gave the floor to General Burns.

3. General BURNS confirmed that provided there was no change in the planned date of 16th September for the adjournment of the Geneva Conference, it was the intention of the Heads of the four Western Delegations to attend the Council meeting on 17th September.

4. He then made the following statement:

5. "Mr. Chairman, may I first say how pleased I am to have the opportunity to make a brief report to you on the current session of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee. As you will have seen the fortnightly reports which cover our meetings up until the end of last week, I shall try not to duplicate their contents. I hope rather to give you a few impressions of how the Conference has been moving in the six weeks since it resumed."
6. "Although the Conference resumed at a time when the international situation was more disturbed than at any point during our meetings last year, the atmosphere has remained reasonably good. The USSR Delegate has spoken infrequently, and while not putting forward any new proposals himself, or giving any hope of readiness to move forward on Western proposals, he has not taken so hostile a stand as might have been expected. Our meetings have been somewhat shorter than those of previous sessions, but have been marked by a number of important and constructive statements by non-aligned delegations, to which I shall refer later on. Most of the eight non-aligned delegations have attained a good understanding of the complexities of disarmament and related matters. This is an advantage when disarmament is discussed in the United Nations. The advice of the eight Geneva non-aligned exercises a moderating effect. This was demonstrated in the May-June meetings of the UNDC, where Soviet Union propagandistic and impracticable proposals won far less support than they formerly did.

7. "In the absence of an agreed Agenda, delegations have been free to choose their own subjects for discussion. Most representatives have followed the recommendations of the UN Disarmament Commission Resolution No. 225, which requested the UNDC to give priority to the questions of a comprehensive test ban and non-dissemination. The West has constantly reminded the Committee that this is what we should do at this session.

8. "The Communist Delegations in their early speeches (and in some later ones) attacked the policies and actions of the USA in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic; with a few shots at other members of the Alliance. The USSR and its allies tried to persuade the Conference that events in Vietnam and other parts of the world showed that it should concentrate its attention on the Soviet Union's long-time favourite proposal for the evacuation of all bases in foreign territory, and the repatriation of all military forces stationed abroad; and their other favourite proposal for a world conference to produce a convention to ban the bomb, with an Addendum that pending this, the nuclear powers should each make a declaration that they would not be the first to make use of the nuclear weapons. The most effective argument used by the North Atlantic Delegations in dealing with this Communist line was to point out that the Soviet Union had withdrawn its draft resolutions on these two proposals in the UNDC, because they knew that the proposals would not win wide acceptance. Instead the firm recommendation of the UNDC was to give prior attention to the comprehensive test ban and non-dissemination. Non-aligned delegations generally confined themselves to expressing regret over the situations in Vietnam and elsewhere, and showed no signs of wanting to deal with the collateral measures which the USSR favoured."
9. "The major event of this session was the tabling on 17th August of the text of the USA draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The members of this Council have been kept informed of this matter. Insofar as the ENDC is concerned, it represented an important step forward by the West, and has been welcomed by representatives of the non-aligned nations who have spoken after the tabling. It indicated that the West is prepared to negotiate seriously on this vital subject.

10. "However, the Soviet Union response has been negative. Mr. Tselapkin, the USSR Representative, said at our meeting of 31st August: 'The discussion which has taken place so far, both in the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament and outside it, on the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons points to the fact that, as yet, we have no common basis for agreement on this matter,' He also said, and I quote his words as set down in the official record of the meeting, so that you may judge their significance for yourselves: 'We should like to stress that the proper solution to the problem of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, the correct solution, calls for an end to be put to the spread of nuclear weapons in any form, either through national ownership or indirectly, through participation in so-called multilateral nuclear forces of NATO or similar organizations. National ownership and indirect access are but two phases of the same process so dangerous to peace, the trend to the dissemination of nuclear weapons - a trend that we wish to put a stop to. Both these forms of the spread of nuclear weapons should be blocked. No other approach could give us an acceptable solution to the problem. This aspect of principle should not be ignored by the Western powers if they are sincere in saying they wish to reach a solution to this problem.' He reaffirmed this position in even stronger terms yesterday.

11. "I shall quote also another passage from an earlier part of his speech, as it gives the Soviet Union programme for action in what they call measures for reducing international tension and limiting the arms race. He said: 'The Soviet Union urgently calls on the States to agree on banning the use of nuclear weapons. If implemented such a measure - together with the renunciation by the Western powers of plans to create a NATO multilateral nuclear force, the withdrawal of foreign troops and the liquidation of foreign bases, and a declaration of the establishment in Central Europe, and in other regions of the world, of nuclear-free zones - would completely respond to the needs of maintaining universal peace and security.'

12. "Taking the above statements at their face value, you will probably conclude that the Western representatives at Geneva are faced by a blank wall of negativism. However, experience has shown that the Soviet Union can change its position without any preliminary indications that it will do so, and can, when it has concluded that
it is in its interest, come to an agreement. We hope that this sort of performance may be repeated in the negotiations for a non-

dissemination treaty, and accordingly we shall continue to try to persuade the USSR Delegation of the reasonableness of the Western position, and to persuade them to join in the effort to produce a text for a treaty which will be generally acceptable.

13. "Of course it is not only the views of the USSR and its allies on this subject that have to be considered. Those of the non-aligned states, especially those which have the capacity to produce nuclear weapons, have to be taken into account. Only the Nigerian and Ethiopian Representatives have spoken in the plenary since the USA draft treaty was tabled. Both welcomed the production of the draft treaty (as many other non-aligned representatives have in informal conversations), but neither discussed the substance of the essential provisions, presumably because they had not yet had time to receive instructions from their governments in this regard.

14. "It is of interest to note points on the general subject of non-dissemination made by some non-aligned representatives. India insists that the nuclear powers must effect some measures leading towards nuclear disarmament before there can be an agreement by non-nuclear states not to acquire nuclear weapons. The Indian Representative has suggested a two-stage plan to cover this. His point of view does not appear to be shared by any other delegation at the Conference, although many non-aligned have stressed that a non-dissemination agreement should not be an isolated measure, but should be accompanied by others, such as the stopping of production of fissile material for explosives, a freeze on the production of nuclear weapons, a declaration against first use of nuclear weapons, etc.

15. "The Swedish Representative has stated that her country would prefer early agreement on a comprehensive test ban to a non-dissemination convention. Not only would the test ban act as a check on disarmament but it would also call for some sacrifice on the part of nuclear powers. While no other non-aligned representative has gone as far as the Swedes in public, most have indicated they feel that a comprehensive test ban is at present the most urgent issue and that they hope early progress can be made towards agreement.

16. "Representatives will recall that in his statement to the ENDC on 29th July (FV/219) the Foreign Minister of Italy, Signor Fanfani, suggested that non-nuclear states accept a voluntary moratorium of limited duration on the acquisition of nuclear weapons. He explained that the time limit was included in order that non-nuclear states could at its conclusion take into account such progress as had been made toward disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament. Signor Fanfani's proposal has not come in for much detailed comment as yet though a number of non-

aligned delegations have expressed interest. It is understood the Italian Government is considering in consultation with its allies what further initiative could be taken in this matter.
Test Ban

17. "In Resolution 225 the UN Disarmament Commission urged the Eighteen Nation Committee to give first priority to considering extending the Moscow Test Ban to the fourth environment. As I have already mentioned, all non-aligned representatives have in their statements treated this subject as the most important item before the ENDC. Many non-aligned have referred to some of their earlier suggestions for making progress, for example the extension of the partial test ban to include a ban on underground tests above a certain seismic threshold, which could be controlled by national means alone, or spreading of the quota of on-site inspections over several years instead of setting a yearly quota. Some of the non-aligned have also supported a moratorium on underground nuclear testing pending agreement on a treaty.

18. "The Soviet Union position appears to be the same as ever, viz., on-site inspections are quite unnecessary, and since the West continues to insist on them, there is no basis for agreement. Communist representatives have spoken relatively little on this subject, although Mr. Tsarapkin has rejected again the suggestions of many Western and non-aligned delegates that there should be an exchange of scientific data on the detection and identification of underground nuclear tests. Several non-aligned delegations have suggested to the USSR that if they really want a test ban treaty they should be prepared to accept such risks as might be involved in technical talks, particularly in view of their oft-repeated argument that the West should take some risks on the more substantive aspects of the question.

19. "Mr. Foster put before the Committee on 2nd September a very valuable and detailed account of the present state of the technique of detecting and identifying underground nuclear tests. He concluded that if the new system of extensive arrays of seismometers in favourable geographic locations could be built up, it would be possible to determine the nature of a substantially greater proportion of seismic events than at present. However, 20 per cent of underground events in the range of above a few kilotons could not be identified by seismographic instruments alone, and some on-site inspections would therefore still be required. Other Western delegations plan to give in some detail their views on the question of nuclear tests before the end of this session.

20. "The suggestion that a "detection club" be established, advanced by the Swedish Delegation appears to have some promise. The general idea is that the club would be for the purpose of detecting, but not specifically for identifying, underground events, and would be composed of a number of countries in which seismological science and installations have reached an adequate standard. The data obtained from each station would be fed into a common pool. Each country could analyse the pooled data and draw conclusions. There is a suggestion for a central organ to co-ordinate this work, but no details are given. It seems that the idea should be well worth studying, and that technical talks among the interested nations might be a beginning.
General and Complete Disarmament

21. "Perhaps because of the recommendation of the UNDC already referred to, perhaps because it was realised that this session of the UNDC was bound to be relatively short, delegates have devoted little time and attention to this subject. Western delegates - in view of the above considerations - have focused attention on non-proliferation and the comprehensive test ban. Some non-aligned delegations have referred to proposals to establish a working group to deal with the question of reducing the numbers of nuclear weapon vehicles. Communist representatives have asserted that because the West has devoted its attention to collateral measures, this shows the insincerity of our acceptance of eventual general and complete disarmament. Western representatives have confirmed that we adhere to the goal of GCD, but that in present circumstances it is more realistic to discuss partial measures.

Soviet Collateral Measures

22. "I shall not weary the Council by going over once again the only too familiar arguments the Soviets use in support of their proposals on withdrawal of foreign troops from foreign territories, elimination of foreign bases, prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and prohibition of its first use. It is enough to say that these arguments have been repeated again at considerable length at this session.

23. "As for Polish proposals, we have heard rather generalised references to the Rapacki and Gomulka plans without any reference to more recent revisions of the latter. There has been no firm suggestion that the UNDC actively should consider these questions. The Poles have also mentioned their proposal for a conference on European security consisting of the European states plus the USA.

World Disarmament Conference

24. "This question has not been discussed in the Conference, although a number of non-aligned speakers have referred with approval to UNDC Resolution No. 224 which, you will recall, urged the General Assembly to give the question urgent consideration. As the Political Advisers' Committee is already seized of the subject, I shall not say anything more about it. However, if any representatives have questions on this point, I shall be happy to try to answer them.

Conclusion

25. "While the Conference still has at least three more meetings before it goes into recess, it seems that, regrettably, we shall not be able to report to the General Assembly that any agreements have been reached. However, this does not mean that nothing.
has occurred in this session to encourage hopes for future progress. The USA draft non-dissemination treaty is on the table; further clarification of the present state of the nuclear test detection technique has been provided, and there is some prospect of the establishment of a nuclear test "detection club". The increasing value of the contributions of the non-aligned delegations is a plus factor in assessing the results of the session. Finally, we can take some comfort from the attitude of the Communist Delegations, who, while adhering to unacceptable proposals put forward in the past, have not put forward worse ones. They have, it should be remembered, sat down to talk with us about disarmament and measures for lessening international tensions in spite of the situation in Vietnam which causes them certain embarrassment in talking to the West, and there are indications that they will be prepared to continue meeting in the ENDC after the forthcoming UNGA.

26. "No doubt this Council will be considering how best to co-ordinate policies of all member countries in regard to disarmament and related questions which may come up in the 20th UN General Assembly. All NATO countries participating in the Geneva negotiations are fully aware of the necessity of keeping the Council fully informed of developments in the disarmament field. However, I think I may say that experience has shown that when disarmament questions are under discussion in the General Assembly, co-ordination is best effected in New York, where information on the situation is up to date."

27. General Burns then commented on paragraph 2 of the Joint Report on the Geneva Conference to the Council by the Delegations of Canada, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States for the period 24th August to 4th September, 1965. In this paragraph it was stated that: "(General Burns) commented that the concern of the USSR and its allies that there should be no dissemination of nuclear weapons to the non-nuclear nations of NATO was not going to be settled by deciding on a particular form of words in Articles I and II of the Treaty, or any corresponding articles that may be devised. This question would have to be settled by negotiations between the nuclear powers represented at the ENDC". It seemed that this statement had given rise to a misunderstanding in the Federal Republic of Germany. He accordingly read out to the Council the following text of a statement issued by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in Ottawa on 31st August:

"On 24th August, General Burns restated before the ENDC some well-known Canadian positions relating to disarmament. The statement appears to have given rise to some misunderstanding in the Federal Republic of Germany. I would like to make clear that the statement did not constitute a new Canadian proposal or initiative and should not be interpreted as such. We do not think there should be restricted negotiations between the nuclear powers..."
represented at the ENDC about Western security arrangements. Our statement in the ENDC was intended to support the Western proposals for non-dissemination and to convince the USSR and its allies that these proposals would not permit the spread of nuclear weapons. The Representatives of the Federal German Republic have been informed of these views both in Geneva and in Ottawa."

28. In closing, he mentioned that several of the countries represented in NATO had been keeping closely in touch with the progress of events in the ENDC through special representatives or members of their permanent delegations to the United Nations European Office. Canada felt that this was a very helpful arrangement and was always glad to provide information and discuss points of special interest.

29. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that Belgium was one of the countries which had set up a special office to remain in contact with developments in Geneva. He asked two questions which he thought might be discussed at the Council meeting of 17th September:

(i) What had been the interest in tabling a draft non-dissemination treaty in Geneva? Had it not been obvious from the outset that it would be rejected by the Soviets, while its presentation had stirred up discussion among the allies? What were the advantages of an initiative which seemed doomed to failure? Was it considered that the Soviets might accept the draft as a basis of discussion? Were there reasons to think that the advantages of having it tabled outweighed the disadvantages of a Soviet rejection? What was to be gained by this tactic?

(ii) He would welcome a clarification of the proposal by Mr. Faniani for a voluntary moratorium. Would such a moratorium replace a non-dissemination treaty, which would then no longer be discussed, or would it constitute a temporary situation, pending a successful discussion of a non-dissemination treaty?

30. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE welcomed General Burns' reference to Mr. Martin's statement on 31st August, since his Authorities felt that the Soviets might also misunderstand this matter. Mr. Foster had explained to the Soviet Delegation that there was no question of negotiating in Geneva on Western internal security arrangements.
31. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he was not now in a position to reply to the second of the two questions raised by the Belgian Representative. He did not think, however, that Mr. Fanfani’s proposal was intended to replace a non-dissemination treaty. His Authorities were working on a text of the proposal, which he hoped to have available for the members of the Council before the Council met on 17th September.

32. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE, speaking personally in reply to the first question raised by the Belgian Representative, recalled that his Government considered that non-dissemination was a most important subject. It had been anxious to table a United Kingdom draft treaty, though in fact it had not done so because of the difficulties which had been raised for some allies. However, the United Kingdom had supported the tabling of the United States draft instead. This was an important action with worldwide repercussions. The problem of non-dissemination was far from being an exclusively European one; it loomed large in the minds of the non-committed countries, and this gesture would show that the West took it seriously. He did not think that it was true that the gesture was doomed to failure from the outset; the draft had not been wholly rejected but remained tabled for discussion, and it did not necessarily lead to divisions in the Alliance when its implications were properly understood. Generally speaking, therefore, he thought that this was a positive action.

33. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE recalled that he had stated the German position on 26th July on the more important aspects of disarmament. He was without any new instructions today. He welcomed General Burns’ reference to Mr. Martin’s clarification of the Canadian proposal. He would participate in the Council discussion to take place on 17th September, and his silence today should not be interpreted as implying any positive or negative judgment on developments in Geneva.

34. The CHAIRMAN, summing up, thought that this had been a useful preliminary discussion to the meeting on 17th September. The questions raised by the Belgian Representative might provide a good start to discussion, and all the Western powers at Geneva might wish to speak on them.

35. He suggested, and it was agreed, that while the morning of 17th September might be reserved for disarmament questions, the afternoon could be devoted to the other questions relating to the forthcoming meeting of the United Nations General Assembly.

36. The COUNCIL:

agreed to continue discussion on Friday, 17th September.

OTAN/NATO,
Paris, 16th.
REQUEST FOR THE INCLUSION OF AN ADDITIONAL ITEM
IN THE AGENDA OF THE TWENTIETH SESSION

NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Letter dated 24 September 1965 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President
of the General Assembly

On the instructions of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, I hereby request the inclusion of an item entitled "Non-proliferation
of nuclear weapons" in the agenda of the twentieth session of the United Nations
General Assembly as an important and urgent question.

I enclose an explanatory memorandum, in accordance with rule 20 of the rules
of procedure, and a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(Signed) A. GRISHKO
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

1. Ever since nuclear weapons first appeared, the Soviet Union has supported, as it now supports, their unconditional prohibition and the destruction of all stockpiles of such weapons accumulated by States. The complete elimination of nuclear weapons and of their means of delivery is the core of the plan for general and complete disarmament put forward by the Soviet Government, which represents a dependable guarantee of world peace.

2. Inasmuch as no agreement has yet been reached on general and complete disarmament, it is of special importance to take measures as soon as possible to limit the arms race, and in particular the nuclear arms race. The achievement of agreement on prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons must occupy an important place among such measures.

3. At its fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth sessions, the General Assembly considered the problem of preventing the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons; the question was brought before the nineteenth session as well, but was not discussed for reasons which are well known. In the resolutions adopted on this question, the General Assembly expressed the conviction that an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons was growing more imminent and threatened not only to extend and intensify the arms race but also to increase the difficulties of avoiding war and of establishing international peace and security. The Assembly expressed the view that it was necessary to conclude an international agreement to prevent the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons and called upon all States - nuclear States as well as those not possessing nuclear weapons - to direct their efforts to that end.

4. The Soviet Government, in common with the Governments of many other States, is concerned at the danger inherent in the proliferation of nuclear weapons and attaches great importance to measures to limit such proliferation. The growing capacity of a considerable number of States to manufacture nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons makes it increasingly important to take measures along those lines.

5. At the present time, the greatest danger as regards the proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented by the plans for the creation of a NATO multilateral or Atlantic nuclear force, within the framework of which it is intended to give access to nuclear weapons to the Federal Republic of Germany - a State which is
demanding the revision of European frontiers established as a result of the Second World War. The Soviet Union and the other States members of the Warsaw Treaty, as was stated in the communiqué of the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of 20 January 1965, consider that the plans for the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force, the formation of which is being urged by certain circles in the United States and West Germany, are a serious threat to the cause of peace in Europe and throughout the world. The creation of such a force would increase imperialist and neo-colonialist pressure on the liberated countries and on the countries which are fighting for their independence. //

6. If, in the present circumstances, other States besides the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and China, which already possess nuclear weapons and are permanent members of the Security Council, set about making their own nuclear weapons or acquire the means of owning, controlling and using such weapons, it will no longer be possible to halt their further spread.

7. In view of the dangerous consequences of any further spread of nuclear weapons, including their dissemination through the NATO multilateral or Atlantic nuclear force, the Soviet Government proposes the conclusion of an international agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which would completely deny to non-nuclear States both direct and indirect access to such weapons - in their own right or through military alliances. The attached draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons answers this purpose. The achievement of effective agreement on preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons would be in the interests of all States, both nuclear and non-nuclear, which seek to maintain and strengthen peace.

The Soviet Government hopes that the General Assembly will again consider the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. By calling for the earliest possible conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Assembly would be taking a major step towards a practical solution of the important and urgent question of measures to combat the further spread of nuclear weapons. The vital interests of all peoples demand that agreement should be reached on this problem.

/...
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as "the Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

In conformity with the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Desiring the earliest possible attainment of agreement on the complete prohibition and elimination of all types of nuclear weapons within the framework of general and complete disarmament under strict international control,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States, thus facilitating the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Parties to the Treaty possessing nuclear weapons undertake not to transfer such weapons in any form—directly or indirectly, through third States or groups of States—to the ownership or control of States or groups of States not possessing nuclear weapons and not to accord to such States or groups of States the right to participate in the ownership, control or use of nuclear weapons.

The said Parties to the Treaty shall not transfer nuclear weapons, or control over them or over their deployment and use, to units of the armed forces or military personnel of States not possessing nuclear weapons, even if such units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance.

2. Parties to the Treaty possessing nuclear weapons undertake not to provide assistance—directly or indirectly, through third States or groups of States—to States not at present possessing nuclear weapons in the manufacture, in preparation for the manufacture or in the testing of such weapons and not to transmit to them any kind of manufacturing, research or other information or documentation which can be employed for purposes of the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons.
Article II

1. Parties to the Treaty not possessing nuclear weapons undertake not to create, manufacture or prepare for the manufacture of nuclear weapons either independently or together with other States, in their own territory or in the territory of other States. They also undertake to refrain from obtaining nuclear weapons in any form—directly or indirectly, through third States or groups of States—for purposes of ownership, control or use and shall not participate in the ownership, control or use of such weapons or in testing them.

The said Parties to the Treaty shall not seek to acquire control over nuclear weapons or over their emplacement and use for units of their armed forces or personnel thereof, even if such units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance.

2. Parties to the Treaty not possessing nuclear weapons undertake not to obtain or seek to obtain, from States possessing nuclear weapons, assistance in the manufacture of such weapons or relevant manufacturing, research or other information or documentation which can be employed for purposes of the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons.

Article III

The Parties to this Treaty shall refrain from offering any support, encouragement or inducement to States seeking to own, manufacture or exercise control over nuclear weapons.

Article IV

1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments, which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one third or more of the Parties, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all Parties possessing nuclear weapons. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all Parties possessing nuclear weapons.
Article V

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of . . . . . . . , which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all Parties possessing nuclear weapons and the deposit of their instruments of ratification.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article VI

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three months in advance.

Article VII

This Treaty, the Russian, English, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty. Done in ... copies at the city of . . . . . on the . . . day of . . . . . .
To: Secretary General

cc: Deputy Secretary General
    DSG/ASC for Economics and Finance
    ASG for Political Affairs

From: Executive Secretary

Summary record of a private meeting of the Council held on Wednesday, 6th October, 1965 at 10.15 a.m.

I. Rusk - Gronyko conversations.
II. Indonesia.
III. Kashmir
IV. Disarmament

X. RUSK - GRONYKO CONVERSATIONS

The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE gave the Council an account of the conversations held between Mr. Rusk and Mr. Gronyko on 28th September and 1st October, each of which had lasted for three hours including dinner. To sum up briefly, he said that the atmosphere was good but that there had been no signs of change in basic Soviet positions. The talks had covered disarmament questions, including non-proliferation and nuclear-free zones; the Indo-Pakistani conflict; and matters relating to Germany and European security.

2. On the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Mr. Rusk, referring to the draft treaty recently tabled by the Soviet Union, suggested that an attempt should be made initially to study the minor differences between the Soviet and United States drafts with a view to eliminating them if possible.

3. On the subject of nuclear arrangements in NATO, Mr. Gronyko had said that Soviet opposition to the United States draft was based only on the desire to prevent proliferation and not on a desire to impair NATO cohesion. The Soviet Union would therefore be prepared to sign a treaty if the MLF and ANF concepts were abandoned. Mr. Rusk had replied that if the problem was only one of non-proliferation, then a solution could be worked out and a treaty agreed.

4. Mr. Gronyko was not very favourably inclined to the Fanfani proposal and thought there were little prospects of its acceptance.
5. Mr. Gromyko, referring to the United States suggestion that a start to extending the Moscow Treaty might be made by banning tests down to those of magnitude 4.75, said that this was not acceptable because this threshold could not be separated from a moratorium on other tests.

6. Mr. Gromyko said that the US proposal for the transfer of fissionable material to peaceful uses was unacceptable because of the problems of inspection. Mr. Rusk had urged the Soviets to give serious consideration on how to provide assurances that any disarmament measures agreed were carried out.

7. Commenting on the Soviet Union's attitude to a world disarmament conference, Mr. Rusk had said that he doubted the value of such a conference and thought one should not jeopardize progress on disarmament by creating what would be simply a new debating forum.

8. Mr. Gromyko had said that there was no change in the position of Cuba and the USSR regarding nuclear-free zones. He had urged the concept of a Central European nuclear-free zone. Mr. Rusk had replied that since Central Europe was only a few minutes away from the Soviet Union launch sites, this concept was meaningless.

9. Mr. Gromyko had expressed concern at the arms race in the Middle East, and referred to the General Assembly's resolution on a nuclear-free Africa, to which he said one should try to give juridical force. He had raised the question of European security and said that even if the situation in Europe was quiet, it was not normal. Mr. Rusk had replied that the United States recognized that a settlement must be reached but that the key thereto, as also to any major disarmament agreements, was German reunification. Mr. Gromyko had said that reunification was a matter for the two Germanies to negotiate; he claimed that the policies of the Federal Republic widened the gap between the two Germanies.

10. Mr. Rusk had replied that the United States and the Soviet Union might differ on the approach to reunification but that they should work towards it, and that East Germany should be allowed to express its free choice.

11. It had been agreed that, in general, the Soviet and US positions coincided on the Indo-Pakistan conflict, but Mr. Gromyko was opposed to converting the UN observer force into a peace-keeping force.

12. Mr. Gromyko had said that he was willing to renew discussion of the current US-Soviet exchange agreement.

13. The Netherlands Representative said that he had received a preliminary analysis by his authorities of the recent developments in Indonesia. He hoped that other governments would also contribute information.

14. As a first conclusion, it seemed that the coup of 30th September had failed. It was clear that the so-called anti-communist elements of the army were in control in Djakarta and in
a large part of Java, which contained over half the population of Indonesia. As to the reasons why the revolt had broken out, and at this time, it was unlikely that the communist party was responsible. Sukarno's policy had been to keep a balance of power between the communists and the army, but developments in recent years had strengthened the position of the communists, so that it would not have been in their interest to stage a revolt now.

15. It seemed that the coup might have been triggered off by reports of Sukarno's health, a highly speculative subject. The Vienna doctors had indicated that, in the absence of an operation, which he had refused, he had no more than a year to live. His death would naturally cause a struggle for power in which timing would be important. It seemed the most likely explanation that Lt. Colonel Untung, of the palace guard, had triggered off the rebellion on his own initiative. If this was correct, it must have created an unpleasant problem for the communists by forcing them either to support the movement or to dissociate themselves from it. In fact they had done neither; they had kept silent and seemed to be in hiding. The conclusion to be drawn, therefore, seemed to be that this was a premature revolt by dissatisfied army officers, unsupported by the communists.

16. There were, however, elements in the picture which gave food for thought for the future. After the coup, the whole Cabinet had disappeared for several days. It was only now, on 8th October, that it was learnt that they had met in Bogor and sent a congratulatory cable to Peking on the anniversary of the Chinese revolution. Some members of the Cabinet had been absent at the time of the coup, for example Vice-Premier Subandrio, who was in Sumatra, and who was suspected of sympathy with the communists. He was now back at his post.

17. Sukarno had been captured and transported to an airbase near Djakarta, where his private plane was kept permanently against an emergency. Whether he was now free or a prisoner was unclear. It was unlikely that he was killed of his own free will because he was waiting to see how events would turn out. On the other hand, if his health was failing, this might prevent him from taking an active part in developments.

18. The Army Chief of Staff and a group of generals had been killed in the early hours of the revolt. On 5th October they had been given a state funeral, attended by Subandrio and the Defence Minister, Naution, who was anti-communist.

19. The officer put in charge by Sukarno to clean up the army was General Sujarto, who had commanded military activities against the Netherlands in Netherlands New Guinea and, later, operations against Malaysia. He was therefore not a communist. Fighting was continuing in Java, but the anti-communist elements seemed to be in control.

20. One should beware of the idea that an anti-communist movement meant a more pro-Western attitude. One should take into account, firstly, the disdain of soldiers for civilian underground agitation, and secondly, the fact that the army could not afford to be too anti-communist, since its equipment was supplied entirely
by Russia and China, on whom the army therefore depended for future supplies. There had been large Western deliveries of arms in the past, but these had now been stopped.

21. What might happen in the future would depend largely on whether Sukarno was still able to wield effective power. If he was, it seemed most likely that he would aim at a political compromise restoring the former balance of power. However, even if real power now remained with the army, it seemed that it was in the general interest to have some sort of reconciliation in order to avoid civil war. It seemed that the prestige of both the communist party and Sukarno had been affected, and that the army was now in a better position than before.

22. It appeared doubtful that Indonesian foreign policy would be affected. The Netherlands considered that the policy of the last few years was so firmly anchored that a change was unlikely in the near future, except, of course, to the extent that the energy expended in internal political convulsions could not be directed abroad.

23. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that he had received a considerable amount of information which bore out much of the Netherlands' conclusions. It was probable that the coup had been brought about by Jintung and a group of military adventurers, perhaps used by the communists at a certain stage, but unsupported by them thereafter.

24. It seemed that Sukarno was now in Bogor, surrounded by his presidential guard and Suharto's troops. He had made no public appearance or statement since 3rd October, which suggested that the troops had prevented him from doing so. The question now was whether these generals would take action against the communists, or be persuaded by Sukarno to resume the former balance between the two groups. There was a likelihood that, incensed at the assassination of their brother officers, they might decide to act on their own initiative; they might have reason to think that Sukarno had been privy to the original coup.

25. Nasution and Suharto seemed firmly in command in Djakarta, where the communist-infiltrated official news agency had been closed down. Outside Djakarta, the situation was obscure.

26. It was difficult to judge the morale and the state of loyalty of the lower officers. While probably shocked by the assassinations, they were unlikely to go against Sukarno's appeal for unity in the army. The other ranks might be expected to obey orders, at least initially. There was, however, a great split in the air force.

27. It could not be expected that these events necessarily meant a turn in Indonesian foreign policy which would be favourable to the West. All parties were anti-Western and in favour of the Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation. There was no doubt, of course, that the present confusion would diminish the effectiveness of the confrontation campaign.

28. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he had received information from the German Embassy in Djakarta despatched on 27th September, i.e. before the revolution. The report stated that Sukarno's behaviour showed an exaggerated messianic self-confidence and belief in the rôle of Indonesia, coupled with a
disrespect for inter-governmental relations. He made flamboyant public statements, for example that "until a short time ago the fate of humanity was decided in Washington and Moscow, but it was now decided in Washington, Moscow, Peking and Djakarta". These gestures should be seen against the background of a factional state facing great economic difficulties. Sukarno did not accept any international standards of behaviour or agreements with whose drawing-up Indonesia had not been associated. The only norm he admitted was the "law of the Indonesian revolution", a revolution which he claimed far surpassed the importance of the French and Russian revolutions. This idea was the basis for a most distorted concept of law and justice.

29. While past experience showed that Sukarno was capable of operating skilfully in a dangerous situation, his wild lack of restraint was the hallmark of declining rule. It seemed that this was a transitional phase in Indonesia, governed by extremes, and that the West must do what it could to maintain its position.

30. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that his authorities had received a considerable amount of material on the situation, which was both obscure and constantly changing. He thought that it might be difficult for Sukarno to reinstate the uneasy balance between the communists and the army, one reason being that it was the army which had the weapons. He thought that this was not inconsistent with the analysis of the situation presented by the Netherlands Representative.

31. The CHAIRMAN said that he assured the Council would wish to come back to this subject at a later date.

III. KASHMIR

32. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that he had received material on the current state of Indo-Pakistani relations and the problem of aid.

33. The United Nations, as was well-known, was finding it very difficult to maintain the cease-fire. India was conscious that she had emerged as the stronger power. President Ayub was in an awkward position, under strong pressure to continue the struggle. The United States thought that his decision to accept the cease-fire had been reached only by a narrow margin. Pakistan felt that she had received inadequate United Nations assurances on Kashmir, and there was heavy emotional pressure on President Ayub to continue fighting; this would constitute a test for his leadership. President Ayub was aware that Pakistan could not secure Kashmir militarily, and that he could reach no more than a stalemate, at a great cost to his economic development goals. It was estimated that these goals might have been set back for two or four years as a result of the conflict so far. President Ayub might also feel that there would be an effort to reach a settlement through the United Nations. His reputation was staked on the achievement of a negotiated settlement. It would be noted that he was doing his utmost to maintain his position and also to secure lines of retreat as necessary (for example by his effective thanks to China). The room he had for manoeuvre was considerably narrowed. There was evidence of dissatisfaction among the military, and there would be heavy pressure to replenish the equipment lost so far. The situation in Pakistan was thus very difficult, and the West should avoid any steps which might tighten Pakistan's ties with China.

..../..
34. It was against this background that one should consider any question of aid. He was speaking of economic aid in the first place, since such aid was relevant to the prospects of a settlement. The United States had had to show great caution on forward aid commitments and to make it clear that neither side should take it for granted. The United States was concerned at Pakistani moves to co-operate with China, since they threatened the security of the sub-continent and necessitated a re-assessment of aid policies. United States military aid was still suspended. The government had told Congress that it would be consulted regarding the situation in the sub-continent on any new proposals for economic aid; in the meantime, food and other shipments were continuing under existing agreements.

35. There were questions which must be answered urgently now. The West must be reasonably assured that India and Pakistan would not use any aid to resume the fighting. There must also be a military disengagement and a lessening of tension. Developments in the sub-continent called for a serious assessment by the United States of its aid policy. He thought that all the NATO allies would agree that the Security Council resolution of 20th September provided the best guidance for the future in this connection.

36. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that, over the years, Italy had sent observers to the original cease-fire line. U Thant had now invited Italy to send new observers. The first group had been despatched on 26th September and a second group on 5th October.

37. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that Belgium also had provided military observers since 1948. To a request by U Thant for further observers, Belgium had replied in principle that she was prepared to send ten more. It appeared that their departure had been delayed, but purely for UN financial considerations.

38. He agreed with the United States Representative that the major question of continuing aid called for consideration by the allies.

39. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that his country had also been invited to send ten observers, of which three had already left. He agreed with the United States Representative that the Council should study the question of aid.

40. Referring to Mr. Gromyko's comment that the United Nations should go no further than send observers, he thought that in view of the precarious nature of the cease-fire it was obvious that the United Nations should envisage sending an effective peace-keeping force. He asked whether Mr. Rusk and Mr. Gromyko had talked of the possibility of using economic aid to bring pressure to bear on India and Pakistan.

41. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that he had no information on this subject.

IV. DISARMAMENT

42. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE, referring to the draft non-proliferation treaty tabled in Geneva at the end of September by the Soviet Delegation, thought that it would be desirable for the Council to discuss this draft. He recalled that the German Representative had invited in previous Council discussions the desire of his government that all matters bearing on European security should be
discussed in NATO. He suggested that, possibly at the initiative of one of the four Western countries represented in Geneva, the Council might study in what way the tabling of the Soviet draft treaty was likely to affect the disarmament discussions.

43. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that he would be glad to see the Soviet draft studied in NATO, and suggested that it might be referred, in the first place, to the Committee of Political Advisers.

44. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE also supported the proposal by the Belgian Representative. Referring to Mr. Gromyko's comment that his opposition to the US draft was based only on the desire to prevent proliferation, and was not directed against the cohesion of the Alliance, he suggested that the Council should study the relationship between a non-proliferation treaty and nuclear arrangements in the Alliance.

45. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his authorities had begun to analyze the Soviet draft. He thought that it would be valuable to have an analysis of the differences between this draft and the draft treaties discussed in the Council. He suggested that the Committee of Political Advisers might prepare such an analysis, and said that Canada would be glad to contribute.

46. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that he assumed his authorities would agree to the proposal by the Belgian Representative. Referring to Mr. Gromyko's comments on non-proliferation, he said that it was clear that the Soviet draft had other targets than the MLF and ANF concepts, and that the Soviets were opposed to any participation by the non-nuclear NATO allies in the nuclear defence of the Alliance.

47. The CHAIRMAN, summing up, noted that it was agreed that the Committee of Political Advisers should, as a matter of urgency, study the possible repercussions for the disarmament discussions of the tabling of the Soviet draft non-proliferation treaty; that it should analyse the differences between the various draft treaties; and that its Chairman should report to the Council at the earliest possible date.
To: Permanent Representatives
From: Secretary General

COMPARISON OF THE US AND USSR DRAFT TREATIES ON THE NON-DISSEMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

As you know, the Committee of Political Advisers, in compliance with the Council's request, carried out, at its meeting on 12th October, a preliminary comparison and discussion of the two US and USSR draft treaties on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

2. Since the problem of non-proliferation is shortly to be examined in the United Nations, the Council had requested the Acting Chairman of the Committee of Political Advisers to submit to the Council without delay a preliminary report prepared on his own responsibility.

3. Attached hereto is the document in question. I should add that I wish to bring up this question in the Council at the next meeting on Wednesday, 20th October.

4. Needless to say, the forthcoming discussions on the same subject to be held by the Committee of Political Advisers at its meeting on 19th October will be the subject of a further report.

(Signed) Manlio BROSIO
DRAFT TREATY ON THE NON-DISSEMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Report by the Acting Chairman of the Committee of Political Advisers

I.

ANALYSIS OF THE TEXTS

From an analysis of the texts, the main differences between the United States and Soviet drafts can be grouped under the following six headings:

1. Obligations which would be assumed by the nuclear powers:

   There is general agreement on the fact that the most difficult problems facing the Alliance arise out of Articles I and II of the Soviet draft.

   After calling in the Preamble for "the complete prohibition and elimination of all types of nuclear weapons within the framework of general and complete disarmament" (Preamble, paragraph 4), which would tip the balance of forces in their favour, the Russians endeavour to prevent the fulfilment of plans to create multilateral nuclear forces of the MLE-ALF type, to which they deny the right to "possess" nuclear weapons.

   Other provisions of Articles I and II seem, despite the vagueness of the terminology, to cover certain aspects of the defence arrangements already in existence (such as inter-allied agreements on the double-key system of stationing US nuclear weapons on foreign territory) - or proposed for adoption such as the "Select Committee", in which certain non-nuclear powers would definitely be expected to deal with the questions relating to the "use" of atomic weapons.

   However, one delegation pointed out that, in Geneva, the Russians have always refrained from criticising the McNamara Committee and that a literal interpretation of their Article I does not rule out the idea of a Council at the Defense Ministers level. Their goal, according to this delegation, is believed to be the maintenance of the status quo which, for the Alliance, would consist in the observance of two rules: equality of rights in deliberations within the Council; the veto of the nuclear powers through the "double-key" system.
2. **Obligations which would devolve upon the non-nuclear countries:**

The Soviets would like the non-nuclear countries to give an undertaking - which does not appear in the United States draft - not to "prepare for the manufacture" of atomic weapons. This is probably an attempt to prevent the non-nuclear countries from pursuing their research in this field far enough to become capable of acquiring an arsenal of atomic weapons without delay, in case of need.

Furthermore, the Soviet draft categorically forbids the participation of non-nuclear countries in the testing of nuclear weapons, whereas this possibility is only indirectly implied by the United States draft.

3. **Control:**

While the Soviet draft does not make any provision for control, the great advantage of the United States text is that it provides for guarantees by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

4. **Entry into force:**

Article 1, paragraph 3, of both treaties concerns the entry into force of the Treaty. In the United States draft, the entry into force of the Treaty depends on ratification by a number of atomic powers not yet specified, but necessarily including the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR. On the other hand, the Soviet draft Treaty would only enter into force "after its ratification by all Parties possessing nuclear weapons".

However, as it will be impossible to know the identity of these "Parties" until they have themselves acceded to the Treaty, it is clear that the Soviet position on this point has not yet been revealed.

5. **Review procedure:**

The review procedure provided for in the Soviet draft (Article IV, paragraph 2) is more complicated than the one provided for in the United States draft (Article VI, paragraph 2) and, in effect, vests the right of veto in the nuclear powers signatory to the Treaty.

A special status would, therefore, be conferred on the major powers, which would thus be assured that no amendment in the texts would disturb the present world-wide balance of power.
6. Definition:

The Soviet draft distinguishes between States which possess nuclear weapons and those which do not possess them, but it refrains from defining them.

On the other hand, the United States draft contains, in Article IV, a definition of the nuclear States described as those "possessing independent power to use nuclear weapons".

II.

TENTATIVE INTERPRETATION

The members of the Alliance were struck, generally speaking, by the severity of the Soviet text which seems at first sight to rule out, not only the nuclear arrangements considered within NATO, but also certain forms of bilateral military co-operation already in force, as well as the communication of information for the peaceful use of atomic energy, and even the possibility that a politically united Europe might accede "by inheritance" to nuclear status. One is therefore given cause to wonder whether the aim of the Soviet Authorities is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons or to weaken the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance. One delegation expressed the view that a draft Treaty of this kind was not even acceptable as a basis for discussion.

On the other hand, several delegations expressed the opinion that, although the present text is unacceptable, this does not mean that the Russians have set their face against any real discussion, but that, on the contrary, they are establishing a negotiating position. In order to discover their true aims, it will be necessary to obtain clarification of several paragraphs couched in, no doubt deliberately obscure terms, and accordingly to probe further into their intentions. The United States Secretary of State has, in this regard, already informed his Soviet colleague that a comparison of the texts could be made with a view to identifying such points of agreement as may exist.

III.

PROCEDURE

While generally acknowledging the value of the arguments in favour of an exhaustive study of the Soviet draft and the need to keep open the channels of discussion with the USSR, the members of the Committee of Political Advisers have not yet expressed an opinion on the procedural problems, that is to say, on the question of how far and in what way the submission of the draft Soviet Treaty is likely to affect the disarmament discussions.

(Signed) P. CERLE

NATO CONFIDENTIAL
To: Permanent Representatives
From: Secretary General

COMPARISON OF THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET DRAFT TREATIES ON
NON-DISSEMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

As mentioned in my PO/65/519 of 18th October, 1965
the Committee of Political Advisers has continued its
discussion of the subject at its meeting of today.

2. I have the honour to circulate to you a report of
this further discussion.

(Signed) Maxllo BROSIO
DRAFT TREATY ON NON-DISSEMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Report of the Acting Chairman of the Committee of Political Advisers

In the further discussion on the draft treaties on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, the Committee of Political Advisers had on 19th October, the following additional points were made:

1. Emphasis was given, during this discussion as at the previous one, to the importance of keeping the dialogue open with the Soviet Union on non-dissemination. It was stressed that, while the Alliance should seek to obtain agreement on non-proliferation as quickly as possible, no undue concessions should be made beforehand that might tend to weaken the Alliance.

2. With regard to the position of non-nuclear states, one delegation emphasised that the Soviet treaty as a whole was keyed to the needs of the nuclear powers and ignored the wishes and needs of the non-nuclear powers. In this connection the absence of guarantees (e.g. by means of IAEA controls) in the Soviet draft was stressed in particular.

3. The view was also expressed that too great importance should not be attached to the presence of a withdrawal clause in the Soviet draft. In this opinion, such clause would be a normal part of any treaty that the Soviet Union would be prepared to sign. It was added that the Soviet objection to the United States draft treaty at Geneva was not directed specifically against the withdrawal clause, but against the treaty as a whole, particularly the fact that in the Soviet view it would permit nuclear sharing arrangements in the Alliance which the Soviets would not accept.

(Signed) P. CORLES

NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ORGANISATION DU TRAITÉ DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

To: Secretary General
cc: Deputy Secretary General
      DG/ASG for Economics and Finance
      ASG for Political Affairs

From: Executive Secretary

Summary record of a private meeting of the Council held on Wednesday, 26th October 1955 at 10.15 a.m.

I. Non-Proliferation in the framework of Disarmament.
II. Danish Prime Minister's visit to the USSR.
IV. Rhodesia

I. NON-PROLIFERATION IN THE FRAMWORK OF DISARMAMENT

Reference: FO/65/137
Documents: FO/65/519
        FO/65/519/1

The CHAIRMAN recalled the Belgian proposal of the 6th October, in which the Council had concurred, that an analysis of the Soviet and American draft treaties on non-proliferation be prepared by the Committee of Political Advisers and furnished to the Council.

2. He believed that the Council should approach the problem of non-proliferation in the framework of disarmament, using as a basis for discussion the draft treaty presented by the Soviet Union (FO/65/437). It was this draft that would be discussed at the United Nations, in all probability, and it seemed expedient that the Council base itself on the same text.

3. The Council had before it the reports of the Chairman of the Committee of Political Advisers analysing the Soviet text, and indicating the positions taken by several delegations during the discussion on the draft treaty presented by the United States. He concluded, from these reports, that there was no unanimity of views, particularly as far as the interpretation to be given to Soviet motives was concerned.

4. It went without saying that the different positions all merited careful study. In his opinion, however, the Council should...
give its principal attention to the consequences that such a non-proliferation agreement could have for the defensive capacity of the Alliance and the maintenance of a unity of position and purpose among the allied countries. Certainly one must never miss the opportunity to improve relations with the Soviet bloc, but in his opinion the requirements of Alliance security and political unity should come first.

5. He was fully aware that the discussion of these problems in this Council might have its delicate aspects, which, however, was normal in any examination of political questions of the first importance. He was nevertheless convinced that this discussion would be fruitful and that the Council could come to an understanding on the essential points which would be discussed in the forum of the United Nations.

6. He did not believe, in any case, that this discussion could be finished today. He would even say that he would not consider it closed, and that, on the contrary, the discussion should remain open. He believed that the Council should continue its discussion in parallel with that in the United Nations, as it had done so far, and that it should devote its full attention, in the future, to the discussions at Geneva.

7. He invited comments.

8. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE agreed with the Chairman that discussion on this subject should remain open. As he had not had time to read the documents just produced by the Committee of Political Advisers and was without instructions, he reserved the right to state the position of his authorities at a later date.

9. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE thought that the discussion of this very important point was only now beginning. The discussions in the Political Advisers' Committee had been useful in revealing that while there were certain differences of emphasis, there were also certain common threads. He made four points: Firstly, the subject of non-proliferation brought out different political attitudes among the Allies and also raised the problem of the essential nature of the Alliance. One must therefore be highly wary in any approach to the Russians, in ensuring that the security and solidarity of the Alliance were preserved. Secondly, he emphasised that the Council was certainly well-advised to deal with every subject which concerned the security of the Alliance. Thirdly, as regards the reports by the Committee of Political Advisers, he thought that a distinction should be drawn between the Soviet draft treaty and Soviet intentions. It would be most difficult to accept the draft, even as a basis for discussion, because its implications could eventually lead to the destruction of the Alliance. However, there were certain affirmations in the draft which it was worthwhile clarifying. Different views had been expressed in the Committee of Political Advisers on Soviet intentions, for example as regards the possibility of a hold-up committee and whether the Russians wished to rule out the continuance of the present nuclear arrangements in NATO. Russian intentions should be clarified in the light of Mr. Gromyko's statement to Mr. Rusk that Soviet opposition to the US proposal was not based on a desire to weaken the Alliance. Fourthly, it was important to continue the dialogue with the Soviets on these lines, i.e., a search for clarification of the Soviet intentions underlining the Soviet draft.
10. The question of non-proliferation should be discussed both in the Council and eventually in other forums. He thought that there was a limit to such a discussion, this limit being set by the fact that the West could not take up a position which would result in the destruction of the Alliance. However, the fact that the Alliance was not negotiable was not an argument against continuing discussions with the Soviets, which he thought would be fruitful.

11. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE thought that, in the light of the comments by the Belgian Representative, there was little difference of view among the allies on the approach to the Soviet draft. This text raised questions of central interest to the security of the Alliance. As General Burns had emphasized, Western criticism was directed at Articles I and II. He hoped that these Articles represented a Soviet negotiating position, and not simply a determination to undermine both present and any possible future NATO nuclear arrangements. General Burns had made it clear that the abolition of the present nuclear arrangements in NATO would result in a one-sided advantage to the Soviet Union and would thus contravene the agreed US-USSR principle for disarmament negotiations that no measure of disarmament should confer an advantage on one country or group of countries. The Soviet draft was therefore not a suitable basis for negotiation. He thought that the four Western powers in Geneva were in agreement on this, and that they would remain closely in touch on the question of tactics.

12. He considered that there must be parallel consultation in the Council as developments took place in the United Nations.

13. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that Italy fully supported the US draft and that he agreed with the written comments by the Canadian Representative which had been circulated to Permanent Representatives. Articles I and II of the Soviet draft were among the most important; the draft was not clear, and his authorities would welcome further discussions to clarify it. Referring to the reiterated Communist attacks against the Federal Republic and the danger that the Soviets might bring into question the existing nuclear arrangements in NATO, he expressed the hope that one day a united Europe would exist on the political plane, and that the West would not compromise in advance the nuclear possibilities which might be available to it.

14. Both Mr. Foster and Mr. Thent had shown great understanding of the Italian position, and had quoted the Fanfani proposal. Mr. Foster had also spoken of the need to give guarantees to countries renouncing nuclear weapons, which Italy supported.

15. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that the preliminary views of his government on the Soviet draft coincided largely with those of Belgium. The draft was not encouraging, but his authorities felt that one should not concentrate on the text as such. As long as Soviet intentions were uncertain, the West should exploit the opportunity to continue the dialogue with a view to finding out these intentions. He hoped that the Council would be kept continually informed of talks between Eastern and Western Ministers.
16. The NATO attitude would weigh heavily with the non-committed countries. The views of the allies on the Soviet draft should be expressed in such a way as to make it impossible to argue that the West had fully accepted it.

17. The recent talks between the Danish Prime Minister and his staff and leaders in the Soviet Union had not helped to make Russian thinking any clearer. The Soviet leaders had confined themselves to reference to the text of their draft and to their view that Germany should be prevented from obtaining access to nuclear weapons.

18. The United States Representative thought that the discussion had shown the usefulness of the careful preparatory work by the Political Advisers Committee. It seemed that the Soviets had made the problem easier for NATO by, as usual, over-playing their hand. If the Soviets had concentrated on a specific proposal for nuclear sharing in the Alliance, their tactics might have produced better results, but as it was, the language of their draft might exclude even the present nuclear arrangements in NATO, and was in that case quite unacceptable.

19. However, this over-playing of the Soviet hand did not help much towards reaching an agreement on non-proliferation.

20. As regards the tactical position in the United Nations and United States tactics in New York in the near future, the United States essential objective was to achieve a procedural outcome in the United Nations, i.e., an urgent referral of the question back to Geneva, rather than a special General Assembly resolution which would be harmful to NATO and to the achievement of non-proliferation itself. This would require much hard work in New York.

21. The United States aim was to reach early agreement on an effective non-proliferation treaty which would safeguard NATO nuclear arrangements. The United States Delegation would therefore concentrate on:

(i) emphasizing the good points of the US draft;
(ii) obtaining some clarification of the Soviet draft, and preventing any hardening of the Soviet position if possible;
(iii) showing up the weaknesses in the Soviet approach;
(iv) avoiding as far as possible any discussion of the texts themselves in the General Assembly or the First Committee, and obtaining their referral to the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC).

22. The United States would urge that the ENDC should give priority to reaching agreement on a non-proliferation treaty, that it should reconvene as soon as possible; and that it should submit at an early date to the General Assembly an interim report on progress.
23. On tactics, the United States would try to avoid any public discussion of the text of the Soviet treaty unless forced into it, except on the key MFF issue. In the private bilateral talks between the Soviets and the United States, which had been agreed on but not yet begun, the United States would seek a clarification as to the implications of the Soviet text for the NATO and Warsaw Pact nuclear arrangements, and the proposed NATO Special Committee of Defence Ministers, and resolution of issues and textual differences in articles other that Articles 7 and 11. He would keep the Council informed of developments in these bilateral talks.

24. As regards the MFF and NFF proposals, since the Soviet charges forced the United States to discuss them in public, the United States would emphasise that Western Europe was a target for Soviet missiles; that the MFF and NFF were fully consistent with non-proliferation; and that the United States purpose in the discussions was to deal with the world-wide threat posed by proliferation, whereas the Soviets were thinking of advancing their political objectives in Europe. The United States would make it clear that it sought no arrangement in NATO which could result in proliferation; would emphasise the need for International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, and also the need to make concurrent progress in reducing existing nuclear arsenals; and would explain the significance for non-nuclear countries of the review clause in the United States draft.

25. In public and private discussions with the Soviets, his government had already urged, that this question be referred back at an early date to Geneva. The United States had a resolution prepared which might be tabled in New York this week.

26. At the most recent talk between Mr. Foster and Mr. Tsarevkin there had been an indication that the Soviets were interested in the suggestion in the Rusk-Gromyko conversations that parallel to the discussion in the UN First Committee, the Soviet draft might be discussed bilaterally with a view to clarification.

27. On the situation as a whole, he recalled that ever since, some twenty years ago, the United States and offered to turn over its monopoly of nuclear weapons to an International control organization under the United Nations, the US had been searching for a safe and agreed way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Little progress had been made, and more informed people than ever before were worried about this problem. And with good reason since it seemed that the world was coming to a referendum. In the hands of two or three countries the possession of nuclear weapons had made for some kind of stability. But the developments of the "little" nuclear weapons now potentially available in situations short of war, together with the appearance of France and China on the nuclear scene, had brought the world to the point where there was a number of countries, not referred to as the "nih" countries; who were considering whether they could afford to become nuclear powers. The expense would be a disproportionate burden on their economy but they were without doubt considering it.

28. It seemed that the danger of nuclear spread was primarily a problem of what countries other than the United States and the Soviet Union would decide to do. It would be good to have a Soviet assurance that they were not going to give other nations nuclear weapons or the means and know-how to make them. They had helped
the Chinese to start on the road to a bomb, but had stopped helping them in 1959. At the moment they showed little sign of interest in spreading their nuclear know-how, there were not even indications that they worked as closely with their allies in planning for the use, if necessary, of nuclear weapons as the United States had done with their Atlantic partners.

30. Accordingly, the question was not primarily whether the Soviets would sign a non-proliferation treaty but whether the "nth" countries would sign, and mean to observe, this self-denying ordinance. The practical approach therefore was how to find ways of calming the fears and satisfying the legitimate ambitions of the "nth" countries who could, if they wished, exercise their sovereignty by making nuclear warheads. Unless these ways were found, there was bound to be an enormous increase in the instability of world politics.

31. The United States considered that the world was now very close to the point of no return. It might shortly be necessary to consider, instead of means to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons, possible security systems for a world containing several nuclear powers. Nuclear arrangements in NATO should therefore be viewed as a sub-head of the general problem of non-proliferation which covered, for example, the problems of India, the Middle East, Germany and other industrialised countries, and the specific arrangements which would make it unnecessary and undesirable for the United States to devote their resources to becoming nuclear powers. It was this which had led the United States to seek agreement on joint targeting and proposals such as the NAM and ANP. This was the European part of the non-proliferation problem. If the problem of non-proliferation could not be solved, then one would be deciding that it was impossible to contain the dynamic technology of war and this decision would mean adding greatly to the dangers of this century.

32. The Norwegian representative welcomed this discussion and considered it appropriate that it should take place in NATO. He agreed fully with the Belgian representative on the United States' competence and responsibility in this matter. From the reports by the Committee of Political Advisers it seemed that there was little ground for optimism about reaching agreement on a non-proliferation treaty in the near future. However, Norway considered that there was one advantage which was that the United States had not simply rejected the United States draft but had presented a counter-proposal. This might mean that they were willing to undertake real negotiations. Norway hoped that this was the case. Given the common interest in non-proliferation there was no reason to believe that progress could not be made if both sides studied the question thoroughly.

33. Some paragraphs of the Soviet draft seemed incompatible with existing NATO nuclear arrangements, but he hoped that the hints given by Soviet leaders that their objections to the US draft were not based on a desire to weaken NATO cohesion, might show practical results. The Western countries must insist that any treaty should be compatible with the existing nuclear arrangements in NATO and allow for future consultation on nuclear strategy. At the same time, the talks on NATO nuclear arrangements should not be allowed to block the way to a treaty. The Western powers should continue to make it clear to the Russians that NATO had no plans which were inconsistent with non-proliferation.
35. While an East-West agreement on a non-proliferation treaty would not necessarily bring about universal adherence, it would provide an impetus towards a universal treaty. Norway would welcome early negotiations on the US and Soviet drafts aiming at agreement on a treaty as soon as possible.

36. The Netherlands Representative said that his authorities agreed with the conclusions in paragraphs 1 and 2 of PA/57/519/1.

37. The reports by the Committee of Political Advisers showed that there was largely unanimous agreement among the Allies in assessing the text of the Soviet draft. It was in the analysis of Soviet intentions that divergencies arose. It was clear that the Soviets were opposed to the NF and ANF proposals, but it appeared that they might not object to much of the Netherlands' Committee, and might perhaps admit the continuation of existing NATO nuclear arrangements, though this was highly uncertain. If Mr. Gromyko had meant what he said to Mr. Puskin about the Soviets not objecting to the NATO Alliance as such, the Soviets had surely come a long way in six years.

38. East-West negotiations on non-proliferation might touch on the essence of the NATO Alliance. The main question before the Council was whether, in the attempt to continue the dialogue, the West should make certain moves which might accommodate the Russians. He doubted whether it would be good policy in dealing with the Russians to answer their attacks on what was the strongest point of the Alliance by stating publicly that the West was willing to make concessions of a kind which should, in fact, be discussed privately in the Council. He urged the Council that any attempt to reach agreement on a treaty by considering concessions which would weaken the Alliance would be a fatal mistake, and would only encourage the Russians to ask for further concessions.

39. The German Representative thought that the real problem had been stated by the United States Representative when he described the situation as a whole. He thought that the Council should discuss this further. The position of the Federal Republic in all this was well-known. The Soviet side had greatly increased the scepticism of his authorities. Germany was not convinced of the wisdom of trying at all costs to obtain the Soviet signature to a non-proliferation treaty. He agreed with the United States Representative that it was unlikely that the Soviets would provide nuclear military information to other countries, whether a treaty existed or not. There was therefore no reason to aim at an agreement which might be very costly to the West.

40. He thought that the Soviet draft was not a serious basis for discussion either in New York or in Geneva. Soviet intentions on all the main points could be squared out on the basis of the US draft. In the opinion of his authorities, the West should avoid any formal acceptance of the Soviet draft for future negotiations.
39. He expressed the regret that the Council had not had more time to study the United States draft in advance, since he thought that it would have been more valuable for the Council to make a detailed study of the US draft rather than the Soviet one. However, it was useful for the Council to assess the trends of Soviet policy and for individual allies to warn the smaller countries about the dangers of the Soviet draft. In this connection, he referred to an article by J. Reston in the "New York Times" of 16th October.

40. The United Kingdom Representative agreed that the Council should continue to keep this question under review. He suggested and it was agreed, that for the purposes of future discussion, the United States Representative should circulate the text of his statement on the situation as a whole.

41. A distinction should be made between the Soviet draft and Soviet intentions, and the allies should continue to probe the latter in New York. The language of the draft was vague and obscure but it seemed to be inconsistent with existing NATO nuclear arrangements, and perhaps also with the creation of a special committee. The four Western powers in Geneva agreed that Articles I and II could not be reconciled with the security needs of the Alliance. He agreed with the Belgian Representative that there should be no question of endangering the Alliance or its right to approve its mission and efficiency.

42. He thought that if the Russians tried to obtain a General Assembly resolution in favour of their text, the West should aim at having the two drafts referred back to Geneva, i.e. they should avoid an elaborate discussion in New York.

43. The United Kingdom objectives were both a non-proliferation treaty and nuclear sharing arrangements in NATO which should go as far as possible as was consistent with non-proliferation, to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the non-nuclear powers to have a say in the nuclear councils of the Alliance. His government hoped that both these aims could be reached in harmony. It looked forward to discussing these matters with the new German Government. Briefly, there was no change in UK policy.

44. The French Representative thought that this was a highly important exchange of views which his authorities would study carefully. The French position in this matter was well-known. France did however consider that the Council was a perfectly suitable forum for the discussion of such questions.

45. The Chairman, summing up, noted that this had been a very fruitful discussion. In reply to the concern by the German Representative, he said that he had invited the Council today to concentrate on the Soviet draft mainly for the reason that the US draft had already been discussed and widely approved. He noted that general agreement had been reached today on the following points:

(3) The Soviet draft as such was unacceptable even as a basis for discussion, but it was agreed that the dialogue should be continued with a view to exploring Soviet intentions;

(4) In the Council, certain differences of approach had appeared. While it was agreed that non-proliferation and nuclear sharing in the Alliance were compatible, some allies preferred to subordinate the former aim to the latter, or otherwise. It thought that the approach here should be pragmatic rather than doctrinal.
(iii) the whole question remained open in NATO and would be further discussed;

(iv) he thought that there was agreement on the United States' suggestion that the best tactics in the United Nations would be to aim at avoiding a discussion of the Soviet text and to have the question referred back to Geneva as soon as possible;

(v) the Council would wish to discuss further the US statement on the situation as a whole. While there were doubts as to the value of a Soviet signature to a treaty, the importance of a treaty should be considered in relation to the "nth" countries;

(vi) the German Representative had referred to the German position stated in earlier discussions. Here, there was general problem of how to create international security systems which would dissuade the "nth" countries from becoming nuclear powers; and there was also the specific problem of the security of Europe. The latter was concerned with the problem of Germany, which could not be separated from the problem of non-proliferation. The Council should examine this problem further;

(vii) it was agreed that the West must not make concessions to the Russians which would impair the strength and cohesion of the Alliance.

46. In conclusion, he suggested that the Council should resume discussion in the light of developments in the United Nations.

II. VISIT OF DANISH PRIME MINISTER TO USSR

47. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE made the following statement:

"As may be known to the Council, Mr. Krag paid a visit to the Soviet Union from the 7th-17th of this month. It is only a short time ago the Council had the privilege of being informed by Dr. Sahm about the impression which Mr. Carsten's had from his talks in Moscow, and I shall therefore confine myself to mentioning some salient points of the information which I have received about my Prime Minister's conversations.

"Mr. Krag had talks with Kosygin, Brezhnev and other leading Soviet statesmen, including Mikoyan.

"Both Mr. Kosygin and Mr. Breznev underlined strongly the importance of maintaining peace. What the Soviet Union wanted was not victory, they said, but peace. The Soviet policy vis-à-vis other countries was unchanged, regardless of their political systems. 'We may have become more quiet, but don't you believe that we have become weaker', Mr. Breznev had put it.

"During the discussions on disarmament matters Mr. Kosygin referred to the Soviet points of view as they had been outlined in Geneva. Only the United States..."
"and the Soviet Union were decisive with regard to disarmament measures on a worldwide scale. In this
respect the position of the small countries was less
interesting. Disarmament presupposed mutual confidence.
Mr. Kosygin said that twice there had been unofficial
agreement between the Soviet Union and the United
States on certain disarmament measures, but in both
cases the agreement had been broken by the United
States - he did not specify which cases. He had in
mind.

"The Soviet Union supported a non-dissemination
treaty, not because the Soviets wanted a monopoly, but
because they were against a nuclear war.

"The Soviet Union was against the NPT plan.
Germany exploited NATO co-operation in order to achieve
nuclear weapons and to further research. If Western
Europe joined forces with the United States, the Soviet
Union would also have to increase its military efforts,
and the result would be increased tension.

"Mr. Krag mentioned that the Danish Government
was considering the establishment of seismographic
stations in Greenland as a contribution to solving the
control problem. Mr. Krag's remarks in this respect
provoked no reaction from Soviet side.

"Mr. Krag suggested that a world disarmament
conference be prepared by preceding talks between
representatives from the five nuclear powers. Mr. Kosygin
answered that he had nothing against this suggestion.
In his opinion, however, the idea was not a realistic one.

"On Vietnam Mr. Kosygin said that it was no
secret that the relations between the Soviet Union and
the United States had deteriorated lately on account of
the United States' war in Vietnam. He stressed this point.
Naturally, such deterioration made it more difficult to
reach any agreement on the main political issues.

"Mr. Krag said that North Vietnam ought to accept
the United States' offer for negotiations without pre-
conditions. Mr. Kosygin disagreed and said that it was
a fact that the United States had made an aggression -
an intervention in Vietnam.

"As to China Mr. Breznev said that it was difficult
to understand the policy of that country, especially with
a European line of thought. Mr. Breznev found the recent
provoking statement by the Chinese Foreign Minister about
a war with the United States and about China's possibilities
in such a war a terrible one.

"Mr. Krag asked Mr. Kosygin whether he was of
the opinion that the relations with China had improved after
the fall of Mr. Khroushchev. Mr. Kosygin's answer was a
clear no. The disagreement with China was so fundamental
that a change of person did not affect it. He found that
the Western countries did not appreciate the Sino-Soviet
disagreement correctly. He said that the voice of Asia
speaks through Chinese communism; this should not be
"Forgotten. It was the impression of Mr. Krag that Mr. Kosygin was thinking of several things including the Vietnam conflict and perhaps wanted to express the thought that the Western, especially the United States, Vietnam policy might force the whole of Asia into the arms of China."

"The question of German reunification was only discussed in informal talks, and there was no change in the position of the Soviet leaders."

"Mr. Krag said several times that neither Mr. Erhardt nor Mr. Brandt, both of whom he knew very well, stood for revanchism. Mr. Kosygin said that he did not share that view on the Federal Republic. He asked how it would then be explained that the Federal Republic demanded nuclear weapons and wanted an army of half a million men."

"Regarding the United Nations both Mr. Kosygin and Mr. Brezhnev said that the Soviet Union endeavours to strengthen the organization in order to give it the possibility of working for peace. In spite of its shortcomings, the United Nations was a useful forum for an exchange of views. The Soviet Union therefore did not share the point of view of Indonesia. However, Mr. Kosygin was of the opinion that the United Nations' importance was declining on account of the lack of interest shown by the governments. He underlined that this applied to all governments, including his own."

"Mr. Kosygin spoke about the British Labour Party in a very negative way. He found that Mr. Wilson was 'more American than the Americans'."

"The talks with Mr. Kosygin and Mr. Brezhnev left an impression of collective leadership. Both Mr. Kosygin and Mr. Brezhnev seemed very preoccupied with the economic problems of their country, and it seemed clear that the tense international situation constituted an obstacle to their efforts to solve the problems."

"The talks took place in an almost cordial atmosphere. The Danish membership of NATO and military co-operation with Germany and other controversial subjects were mentioned by the Soviets, but there was no real criticism of the positions taken by Denmark."

"In the province of bilateral arrangements some results were obtained; among other things the Soviet leaders promised to consider favourably applications for permission to enter or leave the Soviet Union in connection with family visits."

18. The Canadian Representative said that the Canadian Ambassador in Moscow had been very much impressed by Mr. Krag's courteous but firm defence of his allies.

19. The United States Representative, referring to Mr. Kosygin's view that the importance of the United Nations was declining on account of the lack of interest shown by member..."
governmenta, including the USSR, said he thought that this view was hard to ascertain from the Soviet performance in New York.

50. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE, commenting on Sino-Soviet relations, recalled that immediately after the fall of Khrushchev, the impression had been received that he had been made a scapegoat because the Chinese leaders disliked him. It seemed that the Russians were now discussing quite openly with Western statesmen their differences with China. There were fundamental differences and it was encouraging that they admitted them.
RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

On the report of the First Committee (A/6097 and Corr.1)/

2028 (XX). Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

Twentieth session
Agenda item 106

The General Assembly,

Conscious of its responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for disarmament and the consolidation of peace,

Mindful of its responsibility in accordance with Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Charter, which stipulates that the General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both,

Recalling its resolutions 1665 (XVI) of 4 December 1961 and 1906 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963,

Recognizing the urgency and great importance of the question of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Noting with satisfaction the efforts of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic to achieve the solution of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as contained in their joint memorandum of 15 September 1965,1/
Convinced that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would endanger the security of all States and make more difficult the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Noting the declaration adopted by the Summit Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first regular session, held at Cairo in July 1964, and the Declaration entitled "Programme for Peace and International Co-operation" adopted by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo in October 1964,

Noting also the draft treaties to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons submitted by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, respectively,

Noting further that a draft unilateral non-acquisition declaration has been submitted by Italy,

Convinced that General Assembly resolutions 1652 (XVI) of 24 November 1961 and 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963 aim at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Believing that it is imperative to exert further efforts to conclude a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

1. Urge all States to take all steps necessary for the early conclusion of a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

2. Calls upon the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to give urgent consideration to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and, to that end, to reconvene as early as possible with a view to negotiating an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, based on the following main principles:

(a) The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form;

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2/ See the resolution entitled "Denuclearization of Africa" adopted by the Summit Conference of Heads of State and Government.

3/ See A/5763.

½/ See A/5986, annex I.

5/ See A/5976.

6/ See A/5986, annex I.
(b) The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers;

(c) The treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament;

(d) There should be acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty;

(e) Nothing in the treaty should adversely affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories;

3. Transmit the records of the First Committee relating to the discussion of the item entitled "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", together with all other relevant documents, to the Eighteen-Nation Committee for its consideration;

4. Requests the Eighteen-Nation Committee to submit to the General Assembly at an early date a report on the results of its work on a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

1382nd plenary meeting,
19 November 1965.
December 6, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Growing Shadow of a European Nuclear Force

As we approach the Wilson-Erhard talks, it may be well to bear in mind the latent question of a European Nuclear Force, its relation to our own interests, and its impact on the Wilson and Erhard talks.

I. The Problem

1. The surge of Europeanism in the French election campaign. This campaign accurately reflected, I believe, where France will go post-de Gaulle: It will substantially transfer French nationalism to a Europe with some degree of independence of the U.S. Recent European visitors to Washington have suggested that the "European" sentiment evident in this campaign probably portends a French willingness to "Europeanize" (or "Continentalize," if the UK abstains) the force de frappe, post de Gaulle.

2. The New York Times of December 3 reported that Strauss is strongly urging Erhard to leave open the possibility of a European nuclear force. We know this is an important strand in German thought, since it minimizes conflict with Paris and holds out a vision of a larger German finger (on a smaller trigger) than does a German role in an Atlantic arrangement. Earlier this year Barzel, Dufhues, and Gerstenmaier all spoke rather favorably of this course.

3. The British
CONFIDENTIAL

3. The British Conservatives would be tempted, post de Gaulle, by a deal to subsume the UK's nuclear capability in a European arrangement, in exchange for entrance into the Common Market. On the other hand, the deeper interest of the UK is to maintain an Atlantic military framework for any European nuclear force. Only an Atlantic framework can guarantee the presence of U.S. power in Europe as a deterrent and prevent German power from getting out of hand.

II. The U.S. Interest

What is the U.S. interest as these impulses take shape?

1. A joint Atlantic nuclear force is better politically and militarily for us than a nuclear dumbbell arrangement -- with a European force claiming an independent right to fire. Our chances of controlling military and political policy in Europe are maximized in an Atlantic framework.

2. We could live with a distinctive European component within a joint Atlantic force, so long as the joint force cannot be fired without our assent.

3. A loose European coalition of national nuclear forces which was dubbed a "European" force would be dangerous to us -- and to Europe -- since it could lead to a quasi-independent German nuclear role: precisely what Strauss and Guttenberg may have in mind. And yet this kind of loose arrangement is one which powerful groups in both the UK and France would find congenial, in maintaining some national freedom of action as they moved toward a European solution.

III. Conclusion

If correctly defined, these interests have short-run and longer-run implications.

1. In the short run, it is our interest to get agreement in principle on a joint Atlantic force, which can absorb the UK deterrent, as a result of the Wilson-Erhard talks. This may well be the last chance to commit ourselves, the Germans, and the UK to a solution of the nuclear issue in an Atlantic framework.
framework. If this can be done, there will be a better chance of channeling the post-de Gaulle resurgence of Europeanism into an Atlantic framework. That framework, now created, however, should be one in which the Europeans could take part as a collective entity, and which would provide for renegotiation in the event of effective European political unity; we cannot afford to put our position directly at thwart the continuing movement towards European integration.

2. For the long run, we should turn our thoughts to how such a renegotiation might go: how the French and British nuclear establishments (including productive facilities) might be absorbed into an integrated European nuclear system on terms compatible with our interests and as part of an over-all deal which included UK entrance into the Common Market.

3. In the meanwhile, it may be important to make clear:
   - to Wilson, that we regard the creation of a strong and binding Atlantic nuclear framework as urgent, given the widespread and potentially dangerous impulses for a detached European nuclear system;
   - to Erhard, that while we are prepared for an integrated European nuclear role within an Atlantic arrangement, a distinct European nuclear establishment, claiming a right to fire independently of the U.S., might -- depending on how it was put together -- put in jeopardy our present total commitment to the defense of Europe. Our saying this will stiffen his back in dealing with Strauss, et al., who have tended to assume casually that the U.S. commitment could be had no matter what kind of nuclear arrangements Europeans made.

Walt Rostow
To: Secretary General

cc: Deputy Secretary General
    DSG/ASG for Economics and Finance
    ASG for Political Affairs

From: Executive Secretary

Summary record of a private meeting of the Council held on Wednesday, 8th December 1965, at 10.15 a.m.

I. 5th Report by the Paris Working Group.

II. Discussions between Mr. Foster and Mr. Tsarapkin.

III. Rhodesia.

IV. Implications for the Alliance of some recent developments in the Third World.

V. Draft Agenda for the December Ministerial Meeting (2nd Revisio).

I. 5th REPORT BY THE PARIS WORKING GROUP

The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE said that it was his turn to report to the Council on the activities of the Working Group. In order to save time he would circulate the text of his report without reading it.

2. The text of the report was as follows:

"It has been the practice of the Paris Working Group examining common nuclear Force proposals to report periodically to the Council in order to keep all members of the Alliance informed. Last year, at this time, Ambassador Alessandrini, as the then current chairman of the Working Group, gave the Council a progress report. This year I have been requested by the Working Group to provide the Council with another such report.

"In May, 1965, the Governments represented in the Paris Working Group decided to carry forward the discussions on the multilateral organization of nuclear forces within the Alliance in the light both of work already done in Paris and of the British proposal for an Atlantic Nuclear Force which had been subsequently made. It was also reaffirmed that participation in the Paris Working Group
"would remain open to all interested NATO countries; that it would be open to any proposals or comments that any participant might wish to make; and that participation in discussions would not commit any member to participate in any Force or Forces that might be established as a result of such discussions.

"Following a general discussion on the proposed Atlantic Nuclear Force, the Paris Working Group decided to re-examine its Work Program in order to include all the suggestions made.

"After finding that current proposals allowed for the possibility of including various components and that no one in principle excluded mixed-manning in any weapon system, the Paris Working Group gave new instructions to its Military Sub-Group, and this body reconvened in September. The Military Sub-Group was instructed to examine and report its findings and recommendations on the military-technical aspects of a common nuclear Force; it was directed to examine specifically questions arising from the concept of a Force with varied components and to consider various Force mixes.

"You will recall that in the summer of 1964 we began a Demonstration of mixed-manning in a Guided Missile Destroyer, the USS KIDD. In accordance with the original plan for conducting the Demonstration, the exercise terminated on December 1 of this year, and the officers and sailors who took part have been returned to their parent Navies. The Demonstration has been a success; it has identified problems that would arise with the mixed-manning of units of a common Force, and has pointed to practical ways for their solution.

"The Working Group is continuing with its task."

3. The CHAIRMAN noted that there would be an opportunity for comment at a later meeting when Permanent Representatives had studied this report.

III. DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN MR. FOSTER AND MR. TSARAPKIN

4. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE made the following statement:

"I thought it would be useful in this last Council before the Ministerial Meeting to review for you the discussions this fall in New York between Mr. Foster and Mr. Tsarapkin covering two points related to disarmament matters. Some of this will not be entirely NEW, but with the ENDC scheduled to resume its meetings in January, I think it takes on some significance.

"With regard to the draft non-proliferation treaties, Mr. Foster tried to explore the basic reasons why the Soviets believe an arrangement such as the MLF or the ANF would allow to the Federal Republic access to U.S. nuclear weapons. Mr. Foster gave a general outline..."
"of the arrangements for military and political control of these weapons, as well as the final release arrangements. Although this was discussed at some length, Tsarapkin still insisted that the U.S. draft treaty would undoubtedly allow access to weapons by Germany, with the ultimate probability of Germany achieving national control over their use.

"In subsequent conversations Tsarapkin warned Foster that it was futile for the U.S. to try to persuade the Soviets that the U.S. draft treaty would not allow unacceptable access by Germany to American weapons. Tsarapkin further stated that this is the only Soviet objection; otherwise they would be prepared to join with us in promoting a treaty along the lines of the Soviet draft.

"In still later discussions, Tsarapkin also questioned whether even the Special Committee concept might not allow Germany access to weapons.

"Mr. Foster also discussed the possibility of a U.N. resolution on assurances to non-nuclear nations. Pointing out to Tsarapkin that such a resolution might encourage broader acceptance of any non-proliferation treaty by non-nuclear states if supported by both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., Mr. Foster suggested a resolution along the following lines:

'The General Assembly might welcome the intention signified by member states approving the resolution that they would provide or support immediate assistance to any state not possessing nuclear weapons that was the victim of an act of aggression in which nuclear weapons were used, and might call upon all other states to associate themselves with the objectives of the resolution.'

"In a later meeting Tsarapkin said his government found the question of assurances premature, and the U.S. suggestion too broad and complicated. He implied that the matter might be reconsidered after conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty, but even then the U.S. approach would raise a number of difficult questions. Mr. Foster had the impression that while the Soviets were cool to the idea in general, and clearly unwilling to move now, they might be persuaded to reconsider the matter following a non-proliferation treaty."

5. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE, referring to reports in the press of an increase of 5% in the Soviet military budget, suggested that the Council might at a later date discuss the reasons behind, and implications of this increase.

6. The CHAIRMAN, supporting this proposal, said that the International Staff would study this matter.

7. The BELGISCH REPRESENTATIVE suggested that the intelligence appreciation to be presented by the Chairman of the Standing Group at the forthcoming Ministerial meeting might refer, at least briefly, to this increase and comment on its significance.
8. The STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVE said that the Standing Group was at present preparing the final text of the intelligence appreciation. He would transmit this request and thought that the Standing Group would do all in their power to take account of it.

9. The CHAIRMAN suggested that he raise this question at his meeting next day with the Military Committee.

10. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE, asking what was the date of the Foster-Tsarevkin talks, said that Mr. Stewart would report to Ministers at their forthcoming meeting on his recent visit to Moscow.

11. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that the talks had taken place before Mr. Stewart's visit to Moscow.

12. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE, supporting the suggestions by the Belgian and Italian Representatives, said that his authorities warmly supported the request made by the United States Representative on 24th November on the subject of the Standing Group intelligence appreciation. If this request could not be met in 1965, he hoped that it would be possible to meet it in 1966.

13. The STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVE said that the Chairman of the Standing Group had prepared a written intelligence briefing which had been submitted to Ministries of Defence on 1st December. Following on the request by the United States Representative, a new oral brief was now being co-ordinated with the French and United Kingdom members of the Standing Group. He thought that it would be possible to take into account the suggestion by the Belgian Representative.

III: RHODESIA

14. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE made the following statement:

"My colleagues will be generally aware of the economic and financial measures taken by Her Majesty's Government against the illegal regime in Rhodesia. They have, I believe, been fully explained in the capitals. In order not to make this statement too long, I am circulating separately a note of these measures (see Annex). These vigorous measures, many of which are damaging to our own interests, are designed to destroy support in Rhodesia for the Smith regime and to create conditions in which a change of Government is possible.

"Her Majesty's Government recognise that the responsibility for finding a solution to the Rhodesian problem is theirs. Indeed, their purpose in raising this matter in the Security Council was to make this point and to secure United Nations endorsement of it, because we think this is the best way of retaining control of the situation. The Security Council Resolution of 20 November did in fact accept this point.

"This does not mean, however, that the problem is one which affects only the United Kingdom and Rhodesia. The effort to impose economic sanctions on Rhodesia will be burdensome to us all and may last many months. There is also the risk of mounting pressure for sanctions against South Africa. And behind it all is the grave danger of racial war in Africa. We are all deeply concerned
VERBATIM RECORD
of the
MEETING OF THE COUNCIL
held on
TUESDAY, 11th DECEMBER, 1965, at 10.15 a.m.
at
NATO HEADQUARTERS
PORTE DAUPHINE, PARIS XVIe.

COMPTÉ RENDU
de la
SÉANCE DU CONSEIL
tenu le
MARDI 14 DÉCMBRE 1965 à 10h15
au
SIEGE DE L'OTAN
PORTE DAUPHINE, PARIS XVIe.
Mr. Dean Rusk (Contd)

I am quite sure we should not expose the present leadership of the Soviet Union to further temptations and so we must give attention to the minimum defence requirements of NATO and find ways to make our defences entirely credible to the other side. We have welcomed the Special Committee of Defence Ministers and believe that the discussions in that Committee and its sub-committees will be extremely valuable for the Alliance.

On nuclear matters in the Alliance, I will not go into detail but would simply suggest that we must be careful about giving a veto to the Soviet Union on such arrangements. We know around this table they were not talking about the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We know around this table that the nuclear powers of NATO are utterly opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We also know that the Soviet Union would like to divide and weaken NATO. They would like to prevent anything which draws the United States and Western Europe, Canada, closer together in defence matters. So I think we must be very careful not to accept the choice between NATO nuclear arrangements and proliferation arrangements as, somehow, some alternative, as though the two ideas were competing with each other, because the choice is a false one. If we are not careful, we will invite the Soviet Union to sit at this table as a member of NATO and to dispose of the arrangements which we make in NATO to defend ourselves against the Soviet Union and that will be a very strange development indeed.

Secretary McNamara will be commenting further on the mobile force. We feel that we should prosecute that idea vigorously. We're concerned about defence aid for Greece and Turkey. We believe that we, in NATO, should address ourselves seriously and vigorously to that problem, to see whether we cannot be of assistance in strengthening the southern flank of NATO.

I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that developments in the Communist bloc have become much more complex than formerly. It would be extremely useful if the Council in Permanent Session could undertake, at whatever level is necessary, a reappraisal of the policy and attitudes of the Soviet Union and of the policies and attitudes of Peking, in order that we might ourselves all try to form some conclusions about whether recent events have, in any way, affected or changed our traditional understanding of those issues.

Well, Gentlemen, I am not able to send you away with any lack of concern. You should be concerned; in our judgement we should all be concerned; there are dangers in this present situation; there are burdens to be borne, as always, by those who value freedom and who would like to organize a decent world order and establish peace.
Mr. Dean RUSK (Contd)

You will see in the turn of the year, when the President makes his presentations to Congress, that those burdens, as far as the United States are concerned, have been growing rapidly. There will be major additions to our defense budget, specifically because of South Vietnam. We do not intend to allow that to degrade our commitments to and participation in this Alliance and our full attachment to those commitments, including the Athens guidelines with respect both to conventional and nuclear weapons. We shall continue to be, in every way, a full and loyal member of our common defense, here in this Alliance. But, nevertheless, the burdens are going to be very heavy and the American people will be called upon to bear heavy burdens. Our friends in many parts of the world pay us the supreme compliment in supposing that there is never any problem about the morale of the American people. Well, I can report to you that the morale of the American people is high and we shall bear those burdens and we would very much hope that all others who can, will try. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BROSTO

Thank you very much Mr. Dean Rusk.

Mr. PICCIONI

Monsieur le Président,

d'avec le plus grand intérêt que j'ai suivi l'exposé des orateurs qui m'ont précédé.

Nous sommes réunis ici en une heure agitée de la vie internationale, qui ne peut nous laisser indifférents et nous impose d'apporter notre contribution, selon les possibilités de chacun d'idées et d'actes au progrès difficile des événements politiques et humains.

Je crois que nous devrions envisager les rapports Est-Ouest pour 1966, leurs perspectives et ce qu'ils impliquent pour la politique de l'OTAN, en tenant compte de l'orientation de la politique soviétique, telle qu'elle s'est manifestée pendant cette dernière année.

L'année 1965 a confirmé, en effet, que le monde soviétique traverse une période de transition, dont l'ère de Khrouchtchev n'a été que la première phase. Ce monde s'efforce de trouver un nouvel équilibre, grâce à des formules nouvelles. Du point de vue intérieur, ces formules devraient permettre de faire une large part au pragmatisme économique, sans toutefois sacrifier la doctrine. Du point de vue extérieur, elles tendent à promouvoir une expansion active du communisme, mais dans les limites de la prudence imposées par le risque nucléaire. Enfin sur le plan du parti, elles ont pour but de concilier le facteur national et les aspirations universelles du communisme.
MLF: An Obituary

Idea of Mixed-Manned Nuclear Fleet Dies Quietly After 5 Years of Debate

By MAX FRANKEL

WASHINGTON, Dec. 23 — The multilateral nuclear force (MLF), a daring diplomatic idea that remained resilient and worldwide famous, died quietly last night at the age of 5.

Although ailing for a year, the force had shown itself to possess nine lives, at least, and its friends and champions were hoping to the end for another recovery. Death finally came when a President of the United States and a Chancellor of West Germany, representing the only Governments ever seriously interested in the venture, issued a communiqué that did not even mention it.

Mr. Johnson and Dr. Ludwig Erhard butted it by ignoring it. While it lived, however, volumes were written about the idea. It was a rarity because it was a policy pursued by the State Department's policy planners. It was a novelty because it was advocated by the Department with uncommon zeal, first through the United States Government and then in allied capitals. It was a celebrity because it was deeply feared and vigorously denounced in the Communist world.

Conceived as a diplomatic necessity, the MLF quickly grew into a military mammoth—a proposal to float a $5 billion fleet of 25 surface ships bearing 200 Polaris missiles, to be jointly financed by four or more Western allies and manned by mixed crews of military officers and men from the national navies of the co-owners.

Under a system that was still to be devised, the nuclear weapons were to be fired only upon order from the President of the United States and two or more other participating commanders-in-chief.

Purpose of the Plan

The original purpose of the force was disarmingly simple. The United States wished to preserve its virtual nuclear monopoly in the West while devising some way of letting its European allies share in the management, operation, control and diplomacy of the principal weapons of collective defense.

In December, 1960, at the end of the Eisenhower Administration, the idea was formally placed before the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Joint financing, it was said, would spread the burden and sense of ownership. Mixed-manning would prevent the withdrawal or unilateral use of the force. Putting it out to sea would spare every member the embarrassment and political pressure that came with nuclear bases on land.

Washington also liked the idea because it hoped, through the force, to keep the French from building their own nuclear force and eventually to persuade the British to surrender theirs. And by slowly straining these two national forces, it was thought, no German Government would ever be tempted to acquire its own.

President Kennedy liked the idea, too, less for its military merits than as a talking point by which to rally and democratize the alliances and to dampen the suspicions that the United States might not in every case risk its own destruction for the defense of Europe.

In a tense debate with Vice Adm. Hyman G. Rickover, Mr. Kennedy was finally persuaded not to invite foreign crews aboard American nuclear submarines, whereupon the President got the Navy to discover that a surface fleet would actually be better than an underwater force.

The planning limped along, however, until in 1962 the British nuclear air force was suddenly threatened with obsolescence by the Pentagon's cancelation of the promised air-to-ground Skybolt missile. In return for American help in building their own nuclear navy, the British were pressed to concede the desirability of an allied navy.

Germans Were Enthusiastic

The mixed-manned force got an even bigger boost early in January, 1963, when Britain was locked out of the Common Market by a France that simultaneously signed a treaty of cooperation with West Germany. This set off fears that Paris and Bonn might now secretly cooperate on atomic weapons and Washington responded with a vigorous campaign to woo the Germans to its side instead. MLF became the bait and the Germans bit.

They bit so hard—offering to go 50-50 with the United States in paying for 80 per cent of the proposed fleet—that many of the other allies and all the Communist nations drew back in alarm. Many became convinced that it would be only the first step toward West German control of nuclear weapons. None of the protests to the contrary sufficed.

The advocates of a united Europe, such as Jean Monnet, saw yet another benefit in the nuclear fleet: its eventual transformation into a European force.

But the very thought of eventually abolishing the American veto aroused even greater fear.

The Russians denounced the plan as inconsistent not only with East-West arms control measures but also with their own existence itself and, with some effect, threatened unspecified countermeasures.

When the Germans began to talk last year of "going it alone" with the United States while the British grew ever more vociferous in opposition, President Johnson finally drew in the reins on the force's backers here and proposed a delay that was nearly fatal. He would not press a project of unity to the point where it caused only division and acrimony.

Now the opponents rallied their forces among the guardians of atomic secrecy on Capitol Hill, the unimpressed military men at the Pentagon and the advocates of arms control and East-West harmony everywhere.

The State Department held on doggedly for fear of creating a new crisis in West Germany, where politicians two months ago were still calling MLF the best available answer to their quest for nuclear "equality."

Finally, however, even many Germans gave up. They insisted that the conditions that had spawned the idea for a mixed-manned force still had to be faced somehow, but they let Dr. Erhard enter the House and dutifully sign the certificate of death.
Te: Secretary General

cc. Deputy Secretary General
    DSG-ASG for Economics and Finance
    ASG for Political Affairs

From: Executive Secretary

Record of a Private Meeting of the Council
held on Wednesday, 12th January, 1966
at 10.15 a.m.

I. Financing of the Military Budgets and
   Infrastructure Programme
II. Proposal by the United Kingdom Chancellor
    of the Exchequer for a Burden-sharing Study
III. Non-Proliferation
IV. United States Proposal for a Study of
    Soviet Policy.

I. FINANCING OF THE MILITARY BUDGETS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAMME

   Document: PO/66/3

The CHAIRMAN drew the Council's attention to the
fact that he had not as yet received from most delegations
the information requested in PO/66/3, i.e. confirmation of
the date 20th January as acceptable for the proposed meeting,
and the names of those who would attend. He emphasised that
representatives should be plenipotentiaries, in a position to
reach agreement at that meeting.

2. Today he would meet representatives of the four
countries in order to explore the problem in a preliminary
way and if possible eliminate obstacles in preparation of
the meeting of 20th January.

II. PROPOSAL BY THE UNITED KINGDOM CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER
    FOR A BURDEN-SHARING STUDY

3. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE recalled that at
   the Ministerial Meeting in December 1965 the Chancellor of
   the Exchequer, Mr. Gallya, had proposed that a study should
   be carried out to show the relative burdens of each member
country over the whole field of defence expenditure. The
31. As regards terms of reference, he had been instructed to invite members of the Council to forward the United Kingdom draft to governments in the hope that it would be accepted. He therefore requested Permanent Representatives to obtain instructions on this draft if possible for the next meeting.

32. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE expressed a preference for obtaining instructions on the terms of reference in their present form and expected an exchange of views at the next meeting.

33. The CHAIRMAN said that he had wished to avoid a discussion which might lead to a stiffening of positions, and a less positive result. He would however defer to the United Kingdom request, setting aside for the future the possibility of assistance by the International Staff in connection with the terms of reference.

34. In conclusion, he noted that it was agreed that Permanent Representatives should obtain instructions with a view to agreement, at the next meeting if possible, on the proposed terms of reference, and in any case, on the principle of a study as proposed by the United Kingdom.

III. NON-PROLIFERATION

35. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE recalled that on the 8th December Mr. Cleveland had reviewed for the Council the discussions which had taken place during the autumn between Mr. Foster and Mr. Tsarapkin. He was now able to notify the Council of further discussions which had taken place between officials on the subject of non-proliferation. These discussions had shown no change in the United States position, and no apparent change in the Soviet position. Both sides had agreed that under a non-proliferation treaty the non-nuclear states should not acquire control of power to fire or technical knowledge to manufacture nuclear arms. The United States had made it clear that if Soviet objections to the United States proposal for a non-proliferation treaty were based only on a dislike of NATO, the United States could do nothing to help this. The Soviets had repeated that any agreement in the Western camp allowing the Federal Republic access to nuclear weapons, including what they called "political" access, would make a treaty impossible. In answer to United States questions, the Soviets had said that present NATO arrangements, which it was assumed meant the Special Committee, were unacceptable, on the grounds that participation by the Federal Republic, even in planning for nuclear strategy, would be the equivalent to access to nuclear weapons. The United States had said that the Soviet position on "political" access to nuclear weapons had serious repercussions for countries such as India. The Soviets had not replied except to say that this was an unrelated question.

36. In summary therefore, there was no progress, though at least the Soviets were willing to continue the discussions. It was also interesting to note that an article in Pravda of 10th January showed a realisation of some of the broader implications of proliferation, of which some awareness had been indicated by Soviet speakers during the talks. The article stated that the problem was broader than a purely German one, involving such countries as India, Sweden and Indonesia. It concluded that the West must choose between nuclear-sharing plans and a non-proliferation agreement, and recognised that there was a need for a joint agreement with the Soviet Union.
CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at the
Permanent Headquarters, Paris Inc., on Wednesday,
26th January, 1966 at 10.12 a.m.

PRESENT

Chairman: Mr. Marcel Brozic

BELGIUM
Mr. A. de Staercke

GREECE
Mr. Christian X. Palamas

NORWAY
Mr. G. Kristiansen

CANADA
Mr. G. Ignatieff
Gen. E.L.M. Burns

ICELAND
Mr. H. Sv. Björnsson

PORTUGAL
Mr. V. da Cunha

DENMARK
Dr. E. Schram-Mielsen

ITALY
Mr. A. Alessandrini
Mr. Cavalletti di Olivatto

TURKEY
Mr. Faik Melek

FRANCE
Mr. P. de Lesse

LUXEMBOURG
Mr. P. Reuter

UNITED KINGDOM
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Lord Chalfont

GERMANY
Mr. W.G. Grewe

NETHERLANDS
Dr. H.N. Been

UNITED STATES
Mr. Harlan Cleveland
Mr. W. Foster

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Deputy Secretary General: Mr. J.A. Roberts
Deputy Secretary General - Assistant
Secretary General for Economics
and Finance: Mr. F.D. Groga
Assistant Secretary General for
Political Affairs: Mr. R.W.J. Hooper
Assistant Secretary General for
Production, Logistics and
Infrastructure: Mr. J. Beith
Executive Secretary: The Lord Coleridge

ALSO PRESENT


NATO SECRET
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I. DISARMAMENT

1. The CHAIRMAN welcomed the Representatives of the Four Western Powers in Geneva on the eve of the resumption of the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference. Close contacts between these Representatives and the Council were important for the co-ordination of allied policies in the field of disarmament, and he hoped they would continue as in the past.

2. Mr. FOSTER (United States) said that he would comment on how his Authorities saw the next round of discussions in Geneva. Firstly, as regards the impact of the Vietnam war on the discussions, the United States was determined to continue its effort towards achieving a stable peace in Vietnam despite the increasing cost in men and matériel. The West had a common interest with the Communists in preventing nuclear spread, limiting nuclear arms, and preventing a nuclear holocaust. He recalled the United States position on the need to resist aggression in Vietnam. The United States was present in Vietnam for the same reasons as it had intervened in Greece and South Korea. The lessons of the '30s, and the failure to resist aggression in for example Manchuria, Ethiopia and the Rhineland, showed that it was essential to check aggression before it gathered momentum.

3. As regards the United States analysis of expected Soviet attitudes in Geneva, it was obvious that the Vietnam crisis had caused considerable difficulties to the Soviets and was likely to remain a serious barrier to negotiations. The Soviet Union did however seem interested in keeping open channels of communication, if only in order to be able to attack nuclear-sharing arrangements in the NATO Alliance. The recent announcement of the increase in the Soviet budget, which had proved to be less than originally expected, seemed to be a political signal of a certain willingness to continue discussing disarmament. There had however also been recent contradictory indications concerning the Soviet attitude. For example, Mr. Tserapkin had said on 25th January that progress was possible in the field of non-proliferation; at the same time, the Soviet attitude on the substance of the problem had seemed to become more rigid. Mr. Gromyko had condemned all NATO nuclear arrangements, including both present and future ones. It was possible however, that the current Soviet posture might at some time in the future be reinterpreted.

4. Possible Soviet initiatives in Geneva might be related to proposals for a European nuclear-free zone and for a declaration of non-intervention in other countries' internal affairs.
5. The United States had tabled a draft text of a non-proliferation treaty in the summer of 1965. The Soviet Union had introduced their draft in the autumn, in the United Nations General Assembly. This draft clearly barred the arrangements for nuclear-sharing being discussed in NATO, and raised questions on existing arrangements. The Soviets had since then made it clear that they objected to consultation in NATO on nuclear arrangements. If the Soviets continued to press this line there was not much chance of reaching agreement on a treaty. They had, however, common interest with the West in preventing countries such as India, Israel and Sweden from becoming nuclear powers.

6. The United States would continue to aim at agreement on a treaty and would encourage non-nuclear powers not to take any action with regard to acquiring nuclear status before the negotiations for a treaty had been concluded. His Authorities were trying to improve their presentation of their draft text while maintaining the United States position, which was opposition to nuclear proliferation, but not to nuclear-sharing arrangements in NATO. The United States Delegation in Geneva would continue on the lines agreed by Mr. Rusk and Mr. Gromyko, i.e. to attempt to clear away minor difficulties.

7. The United States considered that an extension of the Moscow test ban treaty could be helpful. It would continue to insist at Geneva only on the degree of on-site inspection which was technically necessary; but was opposed to an unexpected moratorium. His Delegation would state the technical reasons for which inspections continued to be necessary. It would support the Scandinavian suggestion for an international seismic reporting system. He doubted, however, whether any progress could be made, since the Soviets still opposed on-site inspections.

8. As regards collateral measures, he recalled that the United States had proposed in 1956 a verifiable cut-off of the production of fissile material. The Soviets had rejected the proposal on the grounds that it constituted espionage and would not be disarmament, since no nuclear weapons would actually be destroyed. In the autumn of 1965 the United States Ambassador to the United Nations had proposed to the General Assembly a transfer, from weapons to be destroyed, of uranium to peaceful uses (60,000 kilogrammes for the United States and 40,000 kilogrammes for the Soviet Union). The United States would elaborate on this proposal in Geneva. The United States would be willing to permit international inspection of the facilities thus shut down, if the Soviet Union was prepared to do the same.

9. President Johnson had proposed a freeze on numbers and kinds of nuclear delivery vehicles. The Soviets had rejected this proposal, claiming that it required too much inspection and was again not a measure of disarmament since no arms would be destroyed. Mr. Goldberg had said to the General Assembly that if progress could be made on this proposal the United States was also willing to explore the possibility of a significant cut-down in the numbers of delivery vehicles. The United States was ready to discuss in Geneva the military and technical issues involved.
10. One new suggestion which the United States would make was a proposal to explore ways of limiting arms races in developing areas, primarily Latin America and Africa south of the Sahara, where certain countries were at present diverting their scarce resources to the acquisition of sophisticated weapons. The United States would try to channel discussion into the most promising areas, working on the following guide lines:

(i) the initiative should come from the countries in the region concerned;

(ii) these countries should undertake not to acquire costly military equipment;

(iii) any agreement should include all the important States in the region;

(iv) it should be respected by potential suppliers;

(v) it should contribute to the security of the region;

(vi) provision should be made for adequate verification that the agreement was being respected.

11. As regards the proposed world disarmament conference, the United States maintained its reservations on the utility of such a conference. His Authorities thought that it would be useful for a small exploratory group to consider what were the possibilities of organizing such a conference. The Group might be composed of five nuclear powers, some non-nuclear powers and some of the original sponsors of the proposal. He thought that discussion of this proposal would take place informally in Geneva rather than in formal discussion.

12. Mr. CAVALLIPPI (Italy) said that the Four Western Powers attached great importance to their collaboration with the Council. He thought that their efforts in Geneva would be of little use, and perhaps even harmful, without such co-ordination. His country would give full support to the United States view.

13. He then gave the Council a brief account of the discussions on disarmament which had taken place during the 20th session of the General Assembly, of which the Geneva Conference, when it resumed, would be, as it were, a continuation. Discussions in the General Assembly had been fairly satisfactory. The six disarmament items had resulted in five resolutions which had generally been voted unanimously, with some abstentions or one vote against. It was remarkable that the Western Powers and the Soviet Union had almost always voted the same way, their only difference in voting being on nuclear tests. Three of these resolutions directly concerned the agenda for Geneva. On one subject there had been no resolution since the proposal made by Ethiopia for an international commission to ban the use of the atomic bomb had been withdrawn by that country.
14. The most important resolution concerned non-dissemination. It had been preceded by four weeks' debate and was voted unanimously, except for six abstentions. The key phrase in it referred to the need to ban in any future treaty on the subject any proliferation, direct or indirect, avoiding any loophole. This phrase could be misinterpreted as meaning that the West had agreed to limit the possibility of nuclear co-operation in NATO. As indicated, however, by Mr. Foster, the United States had made it clear that the United States policy on nuclear co-operation in NATO remained unchanged. The resolution adopted represented in fact an agreement more on form than on substance, and the difficulties between East and West still existed. The Soviet Union had presented the text of a draft treaty on non-proliferation which had been studied in the summer. Unfortunately, its language was most negativistic and restrictive, and seemed to suggest opposition even to existing nuclear arrangements in NATO. It would come up again for discussion in Geneva. For tactical reasons, in fact, the Western Powers had avoided flatly rejecting this draft text in the General Assembly.

15. The second resolution was that on nuclear tests, which was important since some delegations considered that it was a condition of reaching an agreement on non-dissemination. The Soviet Union had abstained from voting on it.

16. The third resolution, on general and complete disarmament, had been adopted after a comparatively brief discussion and was purely procedural, referring the subject back to Geneva. The Soviet Delegation had insisted less than in the past on general and complete disarmament, as if it felt that this argument had now lost its edge as a propaganda weapon.

17. All the above three resolutions insisted on the need to resume the Geneva negotiations. There had been less criticism this time than in previous sessions of the lack of results in Geneva, and it was clear that all countries, including the Soviet Union, wished the Geneva Conference to continue as an important element in the international situation. This held good in spite of the Soviet support for the world disarmament conference proposal.

18. The eight non-aligned Geneva countries had shown a very useful attitude in the General Assembly, and one which was favourable to the West. They had taken the initiative in elaborating two of the most important resolutions and had guided other delegations by explaining the difficulties involved.

19. As regards the Soviet attitude, it seemed that the Soviet Union was still interested in disarmament, or at least in a resumption of negotiations in Geneva. Several Communist delegations had also seemed very much in favour of continuing East/West talks in Geneva.
20. The role of the Geneva Conference was now, as a result of the discussions in the General Assembly, better defined and less academic. Its objectives were now more realistic. It was clear that all countries now considered that non-dissemination was the main question before the Conference. Here two serious problems arose; firstly, the question of Atlantic nuclear co-operation (on which some of the non-aligned delegations did not always understand the Western position); and secondly, the position of some of the non-aligned, non-nuclear countries regarding a possible treaty. Since these countries would be asked to make sacrifices, they thought that the nuclear countries should do the same, and that a treaty should not be an isolated agreement but should represent a first step towards nuclear disarmament, committing the nuclear countries to this goal. The non-nuclear and non-aligned countries had, however, shown a fairly conciliatory position on this subject. He personally thought that if agreement between East and West could be reached on a treaty, most of the non-aligned countries would finally accept it.

21. The two remaining resolutions adopted by the General Assembly were not directly concerned with the Geneva negotiations. The first was on a proposal for the demilitarisation of Africa. The second was on a proposal for a disarmament conference, where the initiative had been taken in particular by Yugoslavia and the UAR. The Soviet Union had supported the proposal but in a limited way. The Soviet delegation had said, after Peking's negative reaction on the subject, that it did not understand the Chinese attitude. It seemed that the Soviet delegation had abandoned its proposal of May 1965 for a meeting of the five nuclear powers, as also the idea that China would take part in disarmament discussions only if she was already a member of the United Nations. The Yugoslavian proposal was aimed at taking account of the Chinese position and at setting aside the role of the United Nations; the West considered that to set aside the United Nations would be highly dangerous, since this would mean dropping the principle approved by it of balanced and controlled disarmament. Since, however, there had been great support for this resolution and resistance would have been useless, the Western Powers had voted for it, while achieving some improvements in the text. The discussions on the proposal for a world disarmament conference had shown that the Geneva Conference was still alive and active. In view of the difficulties in the way of convening a world conference, he thought it should be left to the non-aligned countries to press the proposal.
22. In the United Nations, apart from France, whose position was a special one, the Four Western Powers had all voted together, and there was close co-operation among the Four and the other Western Delegations.

23. Italy had put forward in the General Assembly, on the same lines as in the NATO Council and in Geneva, the Italian proposal for a controlled moratorium. It would be a possible partial interim solution, only in the case where it seemed that no agreement was possible on non-proliferation. As a subsidiary proposal on these lines it had obtained a favourable reception, and was among the proposals which would be brought up in Geneva. The Italian Delegation had made the proposal in Geneva at the time when the Soviet Union had rejected the United States draft treaty. The Soviets had since presented their draft treaty, which the Western Powers were studying. The question therefore remained completely open. Italy would of course aim at agreement on a treaty, since this was a matter of primordial importance. The Italian Delegation would however keep its proposal in reserve; if after a certain time no progress seemed to be made towards a treaty, Italy would consult the Western allies in Geneva on how to proceed with its proposal.

24. General BURNS (Canada) said that he would limit his comments to the points to which Canada attached particular importance. Firstly, Canada was anxious to reach agreement on a non-proliferation treaty. It was clear that no final agreement was possible before the question was settled of how the NATO Allies should share their nuclear responsibilities. He therefore hoped that a decision would be taken on this subject without undue delay. In the long run, no true security was possible for Europe, by which he meant the European Continent west of the Urals, unless there was agreement on disarmament which would maintain the existing balance of deterrence and be properly inspected.

25. Secondly, Canada felt that in parallel with efforts to remove differences on non-proliferation, an attempt should be made to make progress on banning underground tests. Here the differences in position were well known. The Western Powers in Geneva agreed with the United States that even with present techniques for detecting seismic events it was not possible to dispense with some on-site inspections. The Western Delegations had for years been pressing the Soviet Union to agree to a meeting of Soviet and Western scientists, with scientists from non-aligned countries, at which the Soviet scientists would explain why they considered that detection inside national frontiers was adequate. The Soviet Union had always refused. Canada felt that one possibility of progress was to follow up the Swedish proposal for a "detection club". This would be primarily an organization of non-nuclear nations who would initiate a systematic exchange of seismological data which would help to decide what degree of inspection was necessary. Canada felt the role of some neutral countries in such an organization would be essential, and hoped that all Western countries would help to promote the idea.
26. Lord CHALFONT (United Kingdom) said that his authorities looked forward to the discussions by disarmament experts to be held in NATO, which should provide a useful forum for exchanging information on the technical problems underlying the political issues.

27. Following on his recent visit to Moscow, which had allowed him to assess the Soviet attitude to disarmament, he agreed entirely with the United States view that while the political situation in Asia remained the same, the possibility of major agreements with the Soviet Union was very remote. However, a non-proliferation treaty was not ruled out. The principal obstacle for the Soviet Union was nuclear-sharing in NATO. On this the Soviets had taken a very hard line, arguing that any change affecting the control of nuclear weapons would be incompatible with a non-proliferation treaty. It was thus predictable that this would be the opening Soviet position in Geneva. Provided the arrangements in NATO were of a truly non-disseminatory nature, he thought that the Soviet Union would eventually accept them and be prepared to negotiate a treaty. The United Kingdom position on nuclear arrangements in NATO was well known.

28. The Western position on most matters of substance concerning disarmament was certainly a common one. There were, however, some points of special interest to the United Kingdom, on which there were perhaps differences of emphasis. He agreed with General Burns that no progress could be made on a non-proliferation treaty until the problem of nuclear-sharing in NATO had been solved, or some considerable progress made on this subject. He hoped, therefore, that there would be early agreement on NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements but with a live appreciation of the effects it might have on a wider disarmament agreement.

29. At present there were two draft non-proliferation treaties, each unacceptable to the other side. The aim in Geneva must be to try to bring these texts closer together. Here he welcomed the United States belief that it was possible to present the United States text in a flexible way.

30. As regards a comprehensive test ban, he agreed that there was a clear need for effective verification. Future discussions should, however, take full account of various proposals made since the adjournment of the Geneva Conference, for example the Scandinavian proposal for a "detection club", the UAR suggestion for some form of a threshold test ban (though an un inspected moratorium was unacceptable) and proposals for on-site inspection. The West must also press the Soviet Union for an exchange of scientific information on detection techniques as a background against which political decisions might be taken.
31. He had little to add to the United States proposals for collateral measures, except that the proposed reduction in the number of nuclear delivery vehicles was important in relation to an agreement on non-proliferation.

32. It would be valuable to discuss in Geneva a possible limitation of conventional arms traffic, though the difficulty should be noted that any proposal made by supplying countries might be interpreted as meaning that they were proposing to interfere in the affairs of smaller countries.

33. As concerned the proposed world disarmament conference, the United Kingdom was prepared to take part, aware of the motive behind the proposal, though not seeing any great advantage in discussing a complex subject like disarmament in a forum containing more than 120 countries. It would be very difficult to organize such a conference, and above all it must not detract from the authority of the United Nations or the Geneva Conference. If it were too much connected with the United Nations this would make it difficult for China to attend, but on the other hand if one tried to facilitate the Chinese position it was likely that other Powers might refuse to attend. Any such conference would need the most careful preparation. He supported the suggestion that a preparatory committee should be set up to study the obstacles in the way of holding such a conference. The best tactics at present was to leave it to the sponsoring countries to press the proposal.

34. There was no doubt that the subject of general and complete disarmament would come up again in Geneva, and that the West must show an interest in it, regardless of the improbability of any immediate results. The eight non-aligned countries were now playing an important role and would expect the Great Powers to show an interest in this basic problem. The Great Powers should show an interest, though not at the expense of more urgent and practical measures of arms control.

35. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE thought that the present consultation was most valuable. He agreed with the four previous speakers on the need to pursue discussions at Geneva, expressed the hope that they might produce results and agreed on the proposals made for subjects for discussion and the manner in which they should be handled. While there might be minor differences of views among the Allies on disarmament questions, he thought that these differences might help in the end to reach a solution on problems such as, for example, a comprehensive test ban. He recalled that the Belgian Delegation had always in the Council supported the United Kingdom approach in favour of taking a limited risk in order to reach agreement, rather than running the risk involved in the failure to reach any agreement at all.
36. On the subject of non-dissemination, he thought that there should be further discussion of the views of the Four Western Powers. The only Western treaty at present on the table was the United States one. Mr. Foster had said that any treaty should make provision for existing and potential NATO nuclear arrangements. As regards potential arrangements, he asked what exactly was envisaged. He recalled that there had been a United Kingdom draft treaty which had not been tabled, and which had been much more limited than the United States text. He was not suggesting that the Council should aim at defining a common Western position, but he asked if the Four Western Powers were fully aware of the differences of approach among themselves. In this connection he welcomed the Italian proposal for a moratorium, since if it was first necessary to reach agreement on nuclear arrangements in NATO before making progress on a treaty, it would always be possible to fall back temporarily on the Italian proposal.

37. Mr. FOSTER (United States) said that the United States Delegation was not claiming any authority regarding potential NATO nuclear arrangements. When he had first tried to probe the Soviet attitude on this subject in New York it had seemed that the Soviets were not concerned with existing NATO arrangements for the control and stationing in Europe, etc. of nuclear weapons. They had said that they were interested only in any changes in these arrangements. Since September 1965, however, it seemed that the Soviet attitude had changed and that they were now concerned about the numbers and types of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe; and that they claimed that the present arrangements should be modified before any serious consideration of a non-proliferation agreement. The United Kingdom, however, as also the United States, considered this Soviet position to be negotiable and that the Soviets would finally be willing to accept existing NATO nuclear arrangements. If on the other hand NATO altered these arrangements to permit of closer access to nuclear weapons by powers other than the present nuclear powers, it seemed that this would constitute a Soviet objection to a non-proliferation treaty.

38. He did not of course know what would be the final form of any new arrangements in NATO since these were at present under discussion.

39. Lord CHALFONT (United Kingdom) thought that there was no doubt that the Four Powers were in agreement on the form of a treaty which would leave open the possibility to NATO of completing the NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements. The United Kingdom draft treaty had been superseded by the agreed Western draft which had been submitted by the United States. It had contained nothing which would limit the existing arrangements any further than the United States text. The United States text did leave open the
possibility of what the United Kingdom considered might be dissemination. This was therefore the only point on which the United States and the United Kingdom differed. The United Kingdom did not wish to have a treaty which would close the door to an arrangement in NATO which would be non-discriminatory. He thought that NATO could conclude these nuclear arrangements before agreement was reached on a treaty.

40. He agreed with the Belgian Representative that the Italian proposal for a moratorium was interesting, though he thought that it might simply postpone discussion of the basic issues.

41. Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy), replying to the Belgian Representative, said that it was within the competence of the Western Delegations in Geneva only to avoid blocking any possibility of agreement in NATO on Atlantic nuclear collaboration; and to assure the Soviet Union that any agreement in NATO would be non-discriminatory. The responsibility of deciding the kind of collaboration lay with the Council. He expressed the hope that the Council would reach an early decision on this subject.

42. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE welcomed this opportunity to be informed of the intentions of the Four Western Powers. He had three points to raise. Firstly, as regards possible restrictions to conventional arms deliveries to Latin American and African countries, a problem which was of great interest to Germany, he asked whether there was any intention to make concrete proposals in Geneva. Were the Four Western Powers prepared themselves to stop arms deliveries, completely or partially, and to submit to the necessary inspection?

43. Secondly, as regards the possibility of a discussion in Geneva on a denuclearised zone in Europe, his Government considered that it would be a mistake to agree to hold such a discussion in the Geneva conference. This conference was not competent to discuss the problem of European security, which could only be solved in connection with the political problems of Europe and with the participation of the countries concerned.

44. Thirdly, he was in general agreement with the views of the Four Powers as regards the prospects for a non-proliferation treaty in the near future. There was little likelihood of success as long as there were no results in the NATO Alliance regarding nuclear-sharing arrangements. This was a judgement not only of fact but also on the desirability of such results. He noted that there was an intention of modifying the United States draft treaty. While minor changes were always unexceptionable, it was sometimes difficult to distinguish drafting changes from those of substance. Without a full knowledge of the text he could not take a position on this subject. He hoped that the Allies would receive full information and that discussion on any changes would take place in the Council, or any other appropriate forum, before the new text was tabled.
45. The German Government considered all the proposals to be discussed in Geneva as being of great importance and requiring equally careful consideration.

46. Mr. FOSTER (United States) replying to the question by the German Representative on proposed restrictions on arms deliveries, said that his Government considered that this would be a useful idea to suggest, but that as he had indicated, the initiative should lie with the regions concerned. For years it seemed to have been taken for granted that only the great powers should be expected to disarm. It would be very useful for certain small countries to take self-denying action in this respect, thus stopping the drain on their limited resources and reducing the risk of conflict in their area. The United States would discuss this problem with the Four Western Powers in Geneva and in the Council before making a proposal in Geneva.

47. Lord CHALFONT (United Kingdom) commenting on the second point raised by the German Representative, said that the United Kingdom had not yet seen an acceptable proposal for demilitarised zones in Europe. He thought, however, it was too much to expect that the Four Powers should inhibit themselves from discussing this question in Geneva. The Geneva Conference was the proper forum for any discussion on disarmament, whether partial or complete. He noted that it was usually the Polish Delegation which brought up this particular proposal. The United Kingdom would certainly not be prepared to discuss military schemes for demilitarised zones in Europe if they were not put forward in the context of a political solution, and such proposals should only be discussed in full consultation with all the NATO Allies.

48. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his Authorities felt strongly as regards a discussion of the substance of this problem in the Geneva Conference, which was not the appropriate forum. While it might be raised by a non-Western Delegation and it was probably impossible to remain silent on it, he urged the Four Powers to consider carefully whether they should agree to a discussion of substance.

49. Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) pointed out that there already existed an agenda for the Geneva Conference which included this particular subject. There was no possibility of preventing an Eastern delegation from raising it and bringing about a discussion. The Four Western Powers were fully aware of their responsibilities regarding the Allies and would reply on the lines already settled in the Council.
50. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE said that the position of his Government regarding the problem of demilitarised zones in Europe was similar to that of Germany. There were frequent Communist proposals for a demilitarised zone in the Balkans, which Greece considered could only be examined in a wider context. While he noted that it was impossible to prevent a discussion of this question in Geneva, he hoped that the Council would be informed when such a discussion was likely to take place in order that the Allies would have an opportunity to express their views.

51. Lord CHALFONT (United Kingdom), said that he wished to make clear the view of his Government that dissemination consisted in the transfer of control, and not only in the transfer of control to single states.

52. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that the Netherlands position on this subject was that dissemination would occur in the case of transfer of control to a group of nations in which none of the present nuclear powers was taking part and by which in fact a new entity of nuclear control would be created.

53. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that this was also the position of his Government.

54. The CHAIRMAN thanked the four representatives of the NATO Powers at Geneva for their clear and comprehensive statements. He could agree with those who had felt that all the subjects referred to were of almost equal importance, although the emphasis might change according to developments. He would like to emphasise two points today. Firstly, with regard to non-proliferation, a study of the matter implied a delicate balance between work in NATO and work elsewhere, specially on the Four Power Groups in Geneva. The need to speed up the discussions in NATO in relation to allied participation in nuclear planning had been stressed. However, speed was not always compatible with a satisfactory solution. It had been stated that the principle of non-proliferation could be maintained provided that there were no arrangements within NATO which would result in transfer of the control of nuclear weapons to any non-nuclear nation. The International Staff should study and clarify these points. Secondly, with regard to demilitarised zones there were differences of opinion. Some delegations had pointed out that this matter did not, in their view, lie within the competence of the Geneva Conference. Others had pointed out that it would be impossible to prevent this matter being raised by the non-NATO powers and this fact should be faced. Indeed, the Soviets had already raised the question at Geneva. It should
be agreed that no advances could be made on the substance of this matter without consultation in NATO and the participation of those nations most directly concerned. In the meantime, studies should be made in order to determine the limits of the Western position at Geneva and how to reconcile this position with the results of consultation in the North Atlantic Council. He and the International Staff would do what they could to help in this regard.

55. In conclusion he felt that a very useful exchange of views had taken place which would greatly contribute to the understanding of these many complex problems. He hoped that the Western Four at Geneva would continue to make their most valuable reports to the Council, orally and in writing, on alternate weeks.

56. In reply to Lord Chalfont's definition of the United Kingdom view on dissemination the CHAIRMAN remarked that as this was the view of the United Kingdom Government, it constituted an important element to be taken into account.

57. In conclusion, the COUNCIL:

(1) noted the statements made in discussion;

(2) requested the Four Western Powers in Geneva to resume their established system of weekly briefings to the Council, the next one to be given orally by Mr. Cavalletti on 9th February, subject to confirmation.

OTAN/NATO,
Paris, (16e).

NATO SECRET
CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

24th February, 1966

Restricted Annex to Summary record of a meeting of the Council held on Wednesday, 16th February, 1966, at 10.15 a.m.

DISARMAMENT

1. Mr. CAVALLETTI said that since the first meeting of the new session of the Geneva Disarmament Conference held on 27th January to date, six plenary sessions had taken place. All the delegates of the Communist and Western countries had spoken, but among the non-aligned countries there had been speeches only by the United Arab Republic, Nigeria and India. The Swedish silence should be noted, in spite of the encouragement shown by the West for the proposal for a "detection club".

2. As regards procedure, it had been agreed to begin by a general debate and then pass on to a debate on non-dissemination followed by other subjects. On 15th February the two co-Presidents had agreed that the general debate should continue on 15th and 17th February, and that when there were no more speakers, the Conference would pass on to non-dissemination. Procedure was, however, always flexible and any delegation might return to the general debate.

3. While the climate was polemical, it was basically relaxed and the traditional attacks on United States policy in Vietnam and the Federal Republic of Germany, which the West always contested, had remained within reasonable limits.

4. Messages had been received at the beginning from the Pope, U Thant and the leaders of the three nuclear powers represented at the Conference. President Johnson's message had contained seven points, firstly a detailed presentation of the United States view on non-dissemination; secondly, the inspection procedures which would have to be applied by the International Atomic Agency to ensure the peaceful use of atomic energy; thirdly, the guarantees which nuclear powers should give to non-nuclear powers who agreed to a non-dissemination treaty (here there was a parallel with Mr. Kosygin's message, to be commented on below);
12. Certain proposals had been made for the organization of future work, but discussion thereon had been inconclusive. Discussion would probably continue next week on non-dissemination. Mr. Tsarapkin would probably comment on Mr. Kosygin's message, and the United States would propose gradually, in batches, the drafting amendments to the United States treaty. A first reading of the two draft treaties might then take place, to be followed probably by a suspension of the debate on that subject and continuation of the debate on other collateral measures.

13. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE made the following statement, which he subsequently circulated:

"I should like to record the lively appreciation of my Delegation for the timely and interesting report by Ambassador Cavalletti. We are indebted to him. I should like to add a few comments, for we especially want to solicit the views of our allies on the Kosygin proposal on which we would hope we can develop a NATO consensus. To anticipate a question which has been asked me several recent occasions, this is a consultation - and we look forward to your best advice.

Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to sound a pessimistic note. But I do wish to sound a warning note and it is this: we do not yet have an agreement - indeed we seem to be far from an agreement - with the Soviet Union on the very meaning of "nuclear proliferation".

On our side we are very clear about this. If any non-nuclear nation acquires its own national capability or its own right to fire nuclear weapons independently - whether by making its own nuclear weapons or by acquiring them from others - that adds to the total number of independent nuclear states or entities and that constitutes nuclear proliferation. This is what we mean by the term - and what we always have meant by the term. And this is what we believe any nation seriously interested in the subject means by nuclear proliferation.

My government, for one, is seriously interested in this subject; indeed we accord it a very high priority of importance and of urgency. President Johnson made this the first point of the seven-point programme contained in his message to the Disarmament Conference when it reconvened in Geneva on 27th January. He instructed the United States Delegation to urge the Conference to seek a non-proliferation treaty which, in the words of the United Nations General Assembly, is "void of any loopholes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form".
This is why we have been pursuing a non-proliferation agreement among the present nuclear powers—and if not all of them at least among the major nuclear powers. Such an agreement would not go beyond the present policies of the present nuclear powers—none of whom is presently disposed to transfer nuclear capability. But at least it would provide an international commitment not to proliferate nuclear weapon capabilities by transferring weapons or know-how from one state to another independent entity—which is one way that proliferation could occur.

This also is why we have been exploring some acceptable way to guarantee non-nuclear states against the threat of unfriendly neighbours with nuclear arms—so non-nuclear states are not driven to develop their own nuclear arms in self-defence—which is another way that nuclear proliferation could occur.

And this is why we are searching, with our allies in NATO, how to share more fully in responsibility for the nuclear component of our common deterrent. With many hundreds of nuclear warheads now aimed at European targets, our allies have every right to share responsibility for the state of NATO's nuclear defences. But none of the arrangements under discussion among us would involve relinquishment of nuclear weapons into the national control of a non-nuclear country, now or at any time in the future; nor would any such arrangements assist any non-nuclear state in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

These are merely three steps toward the same goal of bringing a halt to the proliferation of nuclear weapons: a non-proliferation agreement among present nuclear powers; an arrangement for broader participation in the nuclear defence of western Europe; and some form of guarantees for other non-nuclear states against unfriendly nuclear neighbours. They are in no sense contradictory. They are entirely consistent. Each is an essential step toward non-proliferation. And there is no particular need to establish any particular order of priority among them.

But unfortunately we have been unable to agree with the Soviet Union on what does and what does not constitute proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Soviets have indeed been stressing that a non-proliferation agreement should effectively ban "access" to nuclear weapons by non-nuclear powers. But the meaning of "access" has been left vague. Last year, the Soviets maintained that the only obstacle to a non-proliferation agreement was the MLF/ANF proposal—because this, they maintained, would provide "access" by the participating allies to nuclear weapons. Now they apparently define "access" as applying to the Special Committee of Defence Ministers and even to existing arrangements within the Alliance.
On the question of guarantees, one can welcome—and we certainly do—the fact that in Mr. Kosygin's letter to the opening session of the ENDC, the Soviets, for the first time, were willing even to discuss the subject of guarantees to non-nuclear states. But Mr. Kosygin's proposal is not parallel to the third point of President Johnson's programme in which he called for the strengthening of the United Nations and other international security arrangements so that "those who foreswear nuclear weapons may forever refrain without fear". So far, the Soviets have talked in such very narrow terms about the subject that their specific suggestions are no real help to any of the non-nuclear countries in question.

I am sure we all appreciate Ambassador Cavallotti's frank appraisal of the appeal of the Soviet proposal. It will appeal, no doubt, to those countries in Africa and Latin America who do not sense a nuclear threat against them. It is an inexpensive gesture, a meaningless offer of support. On the other hand, however, our proposal will appeal to those who recognise a real Chinese or Soviet nuclear threat: India, other countries of Asia, and the countries of Europe.

For one thing, the Kosygin letter does not indicate that the Soviet Union would be willing to come to the aid of a non-nuclear country threatened or blackmail by a nuclear neighbour. To take, as an example, the most likely contingency and area of the most pressing danger of proliferation, India would at best have no assurance except a unilateral Chinese Communist word—and the Chinese Communists are not even expected to adhere to the Treaty. There is in the Soviet proposal no assurance, no pledge for India, or any other country, of assistance by the United States or the USSR or anyone else against nuclear blackmail or attacks by Communist China.

Mr. Kosygin merely hinted that the Soviet Union, as a nuclear power, might sign an agreement promising not to attack non-nuclear powers—a promise which would not, of course, go significantly beyond the commitment they have already taken by signing the UN Charter.

But in the Kosygin view, the countries to be thus saved from nuclear attack would only be those which have no nuclear weapons deployed on their territory. This would appear to penalise nations which have freely entered into mutual defence arrangements involving the presence of United States nuclear weapons on their territories. The implication of this is that our European allies would be fair game for nuclear blackmail.
So the specific Kosygin proposal doesn't help very much at all. It seems to establish a discriminatory category of non-nuclear states having nuclear weapons on their territory - thus penalising nations which have freely entered into mutual defence arrangements involving the presence of United States nuclear weapons within their borders.

The Soviet proposal would seem to require disclosure of where nuclear weapons are deployed. This would raise some obvious difficulties for some members of this Alliance. And given the Soviet attitude toward compliance procedures and inspection proposals, it seems unlikely that we would have any real opportunity to determine whether nuclear weapons are present in Eastern and Central Europe.

In exchange for these disadvantages to the West, the Soviet Union would in fact make no sacrifice and incur no significant obligation. The question of assurances would be diverted from providing guarantees to non-nuclear states, to restrictive obligations on non-nuclear states not to permit nuclear weapons to be stationed on their territory in their own defense.

But there is some nourishment in the fact that they have voluntarily raised the subject for discussion. So it will certainly be worth exploring the matter further with them to see whether the narrow frame of the Kosygin proposal is a rigid Soviet position or is, from their point of view, the beginning of a long and difficult bargaining process.

It may be that further negotiations and new discussions on the guarantees part of the problem opened up by Mr. Kosygin's letter will bring us closer to agreement. We hope so; and we shall work actively to bring it about.

We do not rule out the idea that a non-proliferation treaty might include some assurances - hopefully more meaningful than the Kosygin formulation - on the part of nuclear powers in regard to non-nuclear states.

But we think it is both substantively and tactically important not to confuse the Kosygin proposal with effective steps toward non-proliferation of nuclear weapons - nor to be diverted by it from the search for agreements that will deal with the real problems of guarantees for non-nuclear states.
Record of a Private Meeting of the Council held on

Wednesday, 2nd March, 1954, at 11.00 a.m.

REPORT BY LORD CHALFONT ON THE VISIT BY THE UNITED

KINGDOM PRIME MINISTER AND HIMSELF TO MOSCOW

LORD CHALFONT said that the visit to Moscow had fallen
into two phases, firstly his own contact with the North Vietnam
Chargé d'Affaires and secondly the contacts between the two heads
of government, which had been largely about disarmament and arms
control.

2. As regards the possibility of getting any negotiations
going on the situation in Vietnam, the Soviets had shown a complete
lack of interest and a resolute refusal to have anything to do
with the question. They claimed that this was a matter which should
be settled directly among the United States, the North Vietnam
Government and the National Liberation Front; and that keeping the
doors open for negotiation was no concern of the Soviet Government.
Thus there was virtually no hope of any movement by the Soviet
Co-Chairman of the 1954 conference.

3. A meeting had been arranged between himself and the
North Vietnam Chargé d'Affaires in order that the United Kingdom
might elucidate the North Vietnam attitude to the four points as
a requisite pre-condition, and to the letter by President Ho Chi
Minh to a number of heads of state and government. At the meeting
he, Lord Chalfont, had put the United Kingdom view and asked for
a number of clarifications either directly from the Chargé d'Affaires
or after transmission to Hanoi. One of his questions was intended
to clarify what Hanoi meant by its condition of the withdrawal of
United States troops, i.e. whether this was a pre-condition for any
negotiations whatsoever, or a possible element in negotiations.
On his side he made it clear that the United States was unlikely to
consider the first of these two alternatives, and that the United
Kingdom would not propose it to the United States. Another question
he had asked was what was the North Vietnam position regarding the claim that the National Liberation Front should be considered the sole representative of South Vietnam. He had made it clear that the United Kingdom found this unacceptable.

4. In reply to these and other questions, the Chargé d'Affaires had read a long prepared statement containing a classic though unusually polemical attack on the United States. The Chargé d'Affaires had been most unaccommodating and inflexible, and said that this was entirely a matter of United States aggression against a sovereign state; there was no question of negotiations and the United States should withdraw. When he, Lord Chalfont, said that the United States was prepared to fight on if necessary, the Chargé d'Affaires said that North Vietnam was also prepared to fight on for years and would in the end succeed in defeating the aggressors, as they had done in the past. There was therefore no need for North Vietnam to concede anything.

5. He had also said that there was no need to answer Lord Chalfont's questions, since the four points and the Ho Chi Minh letter were perfectly clear. He did, however, finally give some kind of clarification by suggesting that North Vietnam did not hold firmly that the Vietcong should be the sole representatives of South Vietnam in any negotiations. Lord Chalfont's impression was that North Vietnam was trying to argue that the Vietcong were in fact the sole representatives, and that in any negotiations they should have a decisive voice.

6. He had asked the Chargé d'Affaires to transmit his questions to Hanoi in the hope of an answer, and under pressure the Chargé d'Affaires had agreed to send a record of the meeting.

7. The meeting thus gave no cause for optimism. The Chargé d'Affaires had been most impressive, and seemed in complete mastery of his brief.

8. The rest of the visit to Moscow, apart from a discussion of certain trade and bilateral agreements, was concerned with disarmament, especially non-proliferation, the possibility of extending the test ban treaty and other matters such as the United States proposal for a freeze of and reduction in nuclear vehicles, proposals for nuclear-free zones, a world disarmament conference, and Communist proposals for the withdrawal of foreign troops and bases. The atmosphere of the talks had been very friendly and relaxed, but the Soviet position was very hard on practically everything.

9. On a non-proliferation treaty, Mr. Kosygin made it clear that there was still one insuperable obstacle for an East/West agreement, even before non-aligned countries could be persuaded to sign a treaty: this obstacle was the whole complex of NATO nuclear sharing problems. Mr. Kosygin put the Soviet case in a more unambiguous way than before. It was difficult to say whether this represented a hardening in the Soviet position, or was due to Mr. Kosygin's precise manner of argument. Mr. Kosygin said that so long as the Alliance continued to contemplate any arrangements which would bring Germany into closer association with nuclear weapons, no idea of a treaty was possible. There was therefore little room for discussion.

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10. The United Kingdom Delegation had set out the United
Kingdom view that nothing contemplated in the Alliance involved
dissemination and that therefore there was no conflict with a treaty.
The Soviets flatly rejected this argument, and said that the West
was trying to bring Germany into closer association with nuclear
weapons; that this was a form of "political proliferation", and
thus totally incompatible with a treaty. They argued that even
consultative arrangements of the kind associated with Mr. McNamara
would also constitute proliferation.

11. It has been most depressing to hear these arguments,
since the United Kingdom wished to reach agreement on a treaty
urgently. It remained for the West to assess whether this Soviet
position was a negotiating one or a final one.

12. The Soviets had indicated a similar blanket refusal to
discuss in any acceptable way, proposals for an extended test ban.
The United Kingdom had said it favoured extension, but that with
existing detection techniques it would still be necessary to police
a ban by a small number of on-site inspections. The United Kingdom
delegation had made a vague suggestion that the number of
inspections might be a subject for discussion. The Soviets had
replied that they wished to extend the treaty to cover underground
tests, but that this could be done without international inspection
and that there was no hope of discussing any arrangements which
involved inspection. They had shown no interest whatsoever when
they referred to various vague proposals such as that for a threshold
test ban and inspection by challenge.

13. A discussion had taken place of the proposal for a freeze
of and reduction in nuclear delivery vehicles. The Soviets had
argued that a freeze would not be disarmament, and that the United
States proposal would simply mean inspection without disarmament;
also that the only safe way to reduce the level of nuclear weapons
was to abolish them entirely. This seemed a regression from the
Gromyko umbrella proposal, but it was perhaps a philosophical
position. A brief discussion had also taken place on the proposal
for a world disarmament conference.

14. The substantive Soviet position throughout the visit had
thus been very inflexible and discouraging. There had been the
usual three-fold reactions to the visit: firstly, the social
atmosphere, which had been very friendly and relaxed; secondly,
articles in the press and television programmes during the visit,
which took the usual hard line on United States policy and NATO,
(some of the television programmes had been, he was informed, very
offensive, at least as regards timing); thirdly, the atmosphere of
the discussion table, which had been very hard indeed.

15. As regards personalities, the United Kingdom Delegation
had met all the important people. He had thought Mr. Kosygin
dominant throughout, a very impressive figure with a highly
organised intellect and complete mastery of the intellectual content
of the discussion. Mr. Brezhnev seemed to be of much lesser calibre
and to carry less political weight than Mr. Kosygin. President
Podgorny had been friendly but not very impressive and Mr. Gromyko
had been, as usual, ubiquitous.
16. The visit had contained little surprise for him personally, and he thought that its main value was the meeting between two heads of government who held such divergent positions.

17. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE noted that the Soviet Union was arguing that any nuclear arrangements in the Alliance, even the association of Germany with nuclear weapons, were unacceptable. He asked what was the conclusion to be drawn. Was the Soviet position in Moscow different from that in Geneva? Was there any impression that they were negotiating, or were they simply stating a position from which they would not move?

18. LORD CHALFONT said that he would comment on this later when he came to speak to the Council on disarmament. One could only try to assess oneself whether the Soviets were prepared to negotiate on this point. Personally he thought that they were prepared to negotiate. They wanted a non-proliferation agreement but saw in the negotiations for it an opportunity to make as much trouble as possible for NATO. They hoped to disrupt the Alliance by playing on allied differences of view. It was therefore essential for the Allies to make it clear that Alliance arrangements were their own business so long as they did not involve dissemination. On that basis he thought that the Soviets would be prepared to agree to a treaty.

19. In answer to a question by the Norwegian Representative, Lord Chalfont said that there had not been much discussion on nuclear-free zones. The main area of contention was any form of nuclear-free zone or military disengagement in Central Europe. The United Kingdom Delegation had said that this could not be contemplated outside the problem of an overall political settlement, i.e., the reunification of Germany after free elections, to which the United Kingdom was committed.

20. In other parts of the world, for example, Latin America and Africa, both sides had agreed that nuclear-free zones might be a useful step towards more universal arms control agreements.

21. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that his authorities welcomed the continued United Kingdom efforts to probe for the possibility of negotiations on Vietnam, and hoped that the United Kingdom would continue to use its influence with Hanoi and exercise its responsibility as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference. Many governments, allied, neutral, and Communist, had tried to get through to Hanoi with the object of bringing about negotiations, but all had found the same refusal. It was very clear that Hanoi at present did not want peace and that the Soviet Union did not intend to help. The United States would nevertheless continue to seek every conceivable opportunity and channel for a negotiated settlement. The United States offer of beginning negotiations without prior conditions remained open.

22. As regards non-proliferation, it seemed that the Soviet Union was presenting as a moving target what it was they actually objected to. At one stage it had been nuclear sharing in the sense of ownership; later it was access to nuclear weapons; now it was association with nuclear weapons, which included the Special Committee of Defence Ministers. He asked whether there was any further clarification of the Soviet attitude to existing NATO nuclear arrangements in Europe, which their draft treaty language seemed to exclude.
23. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE thought that all visitors to Moscow were always struck by Soviet intransigence, and that this was perhaps particularly the case with Mr. Kosygin. He thought that it was too much to hope for any flexibility in Moscow; the forum for negotiations was Geneva, whereas in Moscow the Soviets merely defined their position. He personally had not abandoned all hope that the Eastern and Western positions on non-proliferation could be reconciled.

24. The Soviets were now talking about "political proliferation", and were opposed to any form of association of non-nuclear states with nuclear weapons. The NATO allies could however argue that the Special Committee had been set up with the object of clarifying in detail the present NATO nuclear arrangements. He asked whether Soviet opposition extended to these arrangements, or whether the clarification might proceed unopposed. He also asked whether Mr. Kosygin had commented on his proposal for a guarantee.

25. LORD CHALFONT said that he would reserve the main part of his reply for the discussion on disarmament which was to follow. Generally, it was his impression that the Soviets did not wish to attack existing NATO nuclear arrangements, but this point had not been made clear since naturally the United Kingdom had been careful not to raise it.

26. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE asked who it was who had first used the new expression "political proliferation".

27. LORD CHALFONT said that it was Mr. Gromyko who had used in discussion with him the phrase "political forms of proliferation". He thought that this represented a definite trend in Soviet thinking.

(For the discussion on disarmament, see limited distribution Annex to C-R(66)9).
CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH  
10th March, 1966  

NATO SECRET  
ANNEX to  
C-N(65)9  
(limited distribution)

Restricted Annex to summary record of a meeting of the Council  
held on Wednesday, 24th March, 1966 at 10.15 a.m. and 3.00 p.m.

DISARMAMENT

1. LORD CHALFONT said that before passing on to non-
proliferation he would comment briefly on the other questions which 
had been discussed in the Geneva Disarmament Conference. As regards 
an extension of the nuclear test ban, he saw little hope of early 
progress in Geneva. The Soviet position during his visit to Moscow, 
on which he had just reported to the Council in private session, 
had been reflected without any deviation in Geneva. So long as the 
West continued to be committed to international inspection no 
progress was likely in the near future.

2. The possibility of progress was a little more hopeful as 
regards the complex of United States proposals for the reduction of 
eexisting nuclear armouries. These proposals were closely related 
to a non-proliferation treaty. Here it should be noted that some 
of the neutral countries were now insisting more firmly on nuclear 
 disarmament as the price of their participation in any non-
proliferation treaty. The United States proposals provided room 
for valuable discussion in Geneva.

3. The Eastern and Western proposals for general and complete 
disarmament remained on the table. It would be necessary to 
discover to what extent the new Soviet line on the need to abolish 
all nuclear weapons would affect the Soviet concept of general and 
complete disarmament, especially their idea of a nuclear umbrella 
in the first stage.

4. The main debate in Geneva had been on the subject of 
non-proliferation. The basic difference between East and West was 
simply the question of nuclear sharing in NATO i.e., from the 
Communist standpoint, the position of the Federal Republic. The 
speech by the Polish Representative on 1st March had been 
particularly striking. The Polish Representative had unexpectedly 
outlined Polish objections to NATO nuclear sharing arrangements as 
being an objection to any increased influence in the Western 
Alliance by the Federal Republic; in other words, a specific 
objection to any increased influence by the Federal Republic in the

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a final attitude had been adopted in the NATO Alliance. He therefore thought that the proposal should be referred back to the Council, or discussed in Geneva with the representatives of all the Allies. Denmark was obviously in a particular position in this matter, and some of the arguments put forward by the Federal Republic also applied to Denmark, for example the distinction between non-nuclear countries who were members of an alliance and those who were not members of an alliance.

36. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that his Authorities were grateful for Lord Chalfont’s frank and lucid statement. This extremely useful exchange constituted the NATO consultation process at its best. It illustrated the value of the presence of Ministers in the Council from time to time. It illustrated also the rightness of a close relationship between disarmament and the NATO Alliance, that is to say the two sides of the coin of disarmament – arms control and NATO force planning. One could say that non-proliferation and security assurances were the other side of the coin of nuclear arrangements within the Alliance. He deliberately used the word “arrangements” since it was one which the Soviets had not yet objected to.

37. He must confess to some nostalgia for the simple days when non-proliferation meant merely that nations did not acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons, days before the Soviets complicated this matter by using non-proliferation to forward their European policy, and days before the non-aligned countries – on the principle that one always talked about somebody else’s disarmament – hardened their attitude and now called for sacrifices on the part of the nuclear powers before they were willing to act.

38. The absence of an agreed definition of proliferation was still the key. And the task of defining it would be more complicated, if the Soviets really intended to pursue the extraordinary lengths indicated by the words “political proliferation”. This could be anything the Soviets happened to disagree with. The United States was ready to approach discussions of a treaty from any angle holding the faintest prospect of progress – hopefully beginning at the beginning with Articles 1 and 2. But unless and until there could be an understanding as to what did and what did not constitute nuclear proliferation, it was difficult to see how much progress could be made on the terms of a treaty the very title of which remained undefined.

39. He had little to add to what he had said two weeks ago about the Kosygin proposal. He simply reminded the Council of the following points. The proposal was a self-denying ordinance less comprehensive than the United Nations Charter. It was of no assistance against third parties. It used the “assurance” issue, too, as an instrument of Soviet European policy. And it could cause even more trouble outside of Europe in view of the global security arrangements which the United States was obliged to maintain in support of Free World institutions.
40. The United States remained prepared, of course, to explore the question of whether the Kosygin position on so-called guarantees was merely a negotiating position which might, in the course of discussions, be converted into something sensible and workable. Lord Chalfont had said that prospects of a non-proliferation treaty were not bright. The possibility of negotiating assurances in that context were even less bright. In the meantime, as he had reported to the Council two weeks ago, his Government still tended to feel that the most promising way to approach the complex problem of giving assurances to the non-nuclear countries against nuclear attack or blackmail was through a Resolution by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

41. The United States had tried a preliminary draft to illustrate the kind of Resolution envisaged to follow up President Johnson’s statements on this matter and Ambassador Goldberg’s references to it at the United Nations. He had asked that copies of this tentative draft be distributed to members of the Council to give them a more specific idea of what the United States had in mind.

42. But as a tactical matter his authorities did not think it advisable to present such a Resolution to the E.N.D.C. at this time. To do so would focus attention on the question of assurances at a time when one had yet to agree on the basic elements of the treaty. His authorities planned accordingly, when appropriate, to state their position on the Kosygin proposal in the E.N.D.C. along the lines of his earlier remarks and then make clear that they would be ready to consider constructive approaches to the problem of assurances when more progress had been made in resolving key issues under the treaty.

43. In view of what Lord Chalfont as well as other speakers had said about Soviet mischief-making motives, he asked this question: How did Lord Chalfont explain why the Soviets did not offer to sign the United States treaty forthwith and thereby create great trouble and soul-searching for our German friends, and also for the Indians, Japanese, Swedes and others who were making it clear that non-proliferation commitments by them required corresponding gestures by the nuclear powers?

44. It might well turn out that the Soviet leaders would continue to stall on a non-proliferation treaty until they saw what came out of the present consultations on procedures for the management of the NATO nuclear deterrent. His Authorities were sure meanwhile, that the members of the Alliance would not be misled or seduced by the Soviet pretension that the sharing of nuclear responsibility within the Alliance was incompatible with non-proliferation. Nor should the Council be stampeded into premature conclusions on the management of the nuclear deterrent. This was too serious, too complex, and too important an enterprise to permit the Soviet Union either to apply for a seat at the Council table or to establish a time-table for decision-making in the Alliance’s affairs.

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45. He agreed that one should not hurry into an agreed final
Allied position. But it was important to point out soon in Geneva
the unsatisfactory nature of the Kosygin proposal, so as not to
leave the field open for Soviet exploitation. The Council would
watch with political and professional interest from Paris while
discussions were on in Geneva. And, meanwhile, it would keep
working at those aspects of this tangled problem which related to
Western security - which were the business of this Council - and
not the business of the Soviets.

46. LORD CHALFONT said that he considered this had been a
valuable discussion for the reason that he could report back to the
Four Western Powers in Geneva the General Council reaction to a
number of problems, in particular the Kosygin proposal. He hoped
that he had not conveyed the impression that there was any undue
optimism in the Four Powers' approach to these problems in Geneva.
He repeated that one's view of the likelihood of a non-proliferation
treaty was conditioned by one's assessment of the Soviet position.

47. Replying to the question raised by the Canadian
Representative, he agreed that the object of repeating the Kosygin
proposal to the Four Western Geneva Powers was to take account of
the views of the non-aligned and non-nuclear countries in Geneva.
The Four Powers were fully aware of the special position of certain
countries, such as Norway and Denmark, and would take good care
that the proposal had been fully discussed by all 15 Allies before
the Four Powers reached a negotiating position.

48. Replying to Mr. Schnippenkötter's reference to the
difficulties of verifying whether nuclear weapons were or were not
stationed in non-nuclear countries, he said that the Four Powers in
Geneva had in mind the possibility of using this argument as one of
the tactical ripostes to the Kosygin proposal.

49. He thought it worthwhile again mentioning the Soviet
attitude to present NATO nuclear arrangements. His impression was
that the Soviets were not interested in attacking these arrangements.
It seemed that they wished to give the impression of attacking them,
but if they really objected to political consultation in the NATO
Alliance, this was an inconsistent position since it meant objecting
to something which had been going on since 1949. It might be a
defensible position in terms of the foreign policy of the Warsaw
Pact countries, but it had nothing to do with non-proliferation.
The West must try to reach some understanding with the Soviets as to
the definition of non-proliferation. One could not accept that
political consultation in an Alliance with nuclear members
constituted proliferation.
50. Replying to the Italian Representative on the Italian proposal for a voluntary moratorium by the non-nuclear countries on acquiring a nuclear capability, he said that it seemed that the non-aligned countries were already demanding such a price for a universal non-proliferation treaty, that they would consider a moratorium even less attractive.

51. Replying to the United States Representative, he said that he thought the Soviets would be prepared to sign a non-proliferation treaty tomorrow provided it was their draft which was accepted. This draft, if literally interpreted, would inhibit any new NATO nuclear arrangements and make many existing arrangements suspect. The Soviets were not prepared to sign the United States draft because it would leave the Alliance free to make the arrangements it saw fit. He thought that the Soviets had therefore decided that the best way to make trouble for the Allies was to ask the extreme price for a treaty, i.e. a restriction on NATO nuclear arrangements. He thought that they were waiting to see what happened in NATO and that if NATO reached a final agreement on nuclear sharing, they would then be prepared to proceed to a treaty.

52. He strongly endorsed the United States view that defence planning and arms control were two sides of the same coin. For this reason the debates in Geneva and in the Council could not be separated.

53. The CHAIRMAN, summing up, said that from personal experience of the Russians as hard bargainers, he had been struck by the fact that the Soviet technique continued to be the same and that the Soviets continued to hold negotiating positions as if they were non-negotiable. They obviously wished to sell their point of view at the highest price, and hoped to find any weakness or division in the Alliance which they might exploit. The statement by the Polish Representative at Geneva was significant since it showed that the former satellites, who remained satellites in the field of disarmament, were trying to gain ground whenever any uncertainty was visible on the Western side. The fact that they dared to question political consultation in NATO showed that the Communists were hard bargainers indeed.

54. This did not mean however that the Communists would not agree to a non-proliferation treaty once they saw their opportunity. There might be an unexpected Soviet change of attitude, and the West should be prepared for such an eventuality.

55. He was also struck by the fact that the Soviet Union seemed to consider a non-proliferation agreement as a European agreement, rather than a universal one, and one intended to weaken the NATO Alliance. Mr. Schnippenkötter had rightly pointed out the relation between security arrangements and non-proliferation, and Lord Chalfont had made the same point.

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56. For the future, the Council should continue to examine objectively, without being influenced by Soviet manoeuvres, the two subjects of Alliance security, and the need to extend a non-proliferation agreement to non-aligned countries. The Council had so far discussed the Kosygin proposal only in a preliminary way and should consider carefully the more serious guarantees suggested by the United States.

57. There should be no priority between the work of the Four Powers in Geneva and that of the Council; the studies should continue in parallel, and the Council should be free to consult at any time. Continuing reports from the Four Powers would be welcome. It was essential that all the Allies should be able to express their views. He hoped that eventually the two parallels would meet and that a non-proliferation agreement could be signed which would be of value to the Alliance and to the cause of peace.
Restricted Annex to summary record of a meeting of the Council held on Wednesday, 15th March, 1966, at 10.15 a.m.

DISARMAMENT

GENERAL BURNS made the following statement:

"Mr. Chairman:

I am very pleased to have this opportunity to report to the Council on developments through the last fortnight in the ENDC. You get the regular fortnightly factual written reports; I shall not give you a lot of detail today, but try rather a few impressions of the direction of our work.

"Up to and including our meeting of 3rd March we spent most of our time discussing the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. By agreement the Committee devoted the two meetings last week to other collateral measures and this week is discussing general and complete disarmament. It is intended that the discussion on non-proliferation should resume next week and it will probably continue for several meetings.

Non-proliferation

"The major problem in this area remains the question of nuclear sharing within NATO. In a long statement on 3rd March, the Soviet Representative underlined that a treaty would have to include provisions to prevent unilateral control of nuclear weapons through a military alliance. He has said that any arrangements which give special status to present non-nuclear members of NATO would be unacceptable. The West has denied the Soviet claim that the United States draft would permit proliferation and has reiterated the right of any alliance to make arrangements for its collective defence."
The non-aligned spokesmen have in general had little to say on this particular question with the exception of the United Arab Republic Representative. At the meeting on 3rd March Ambassador Khalil said it would be difficult to accept the United States Article I as it appeared to leave a gap in the principle of non-proliferation. He felt that the sort of organization permitted under this article might disintegrate, individual nations might fall heir to the organization's weapons, so nuclear proliferation could result. In general, the non-aligned have expressed the hope that this conflict over NATO nuclear sharing and non-proliferation should be settled at an early date.

The difference of view between NATO members and Communist representatives over the obligations to be undertaken in Articles I and II of the draft treaty is clearly the most contentious issue at present. But there are other important matters which are beginning to receive attention and which are of main interest to the non-aligned. These will have to be settled before final agreement can be reached on a non-proliferation treaty. Some of the non-aligned countries are those which are most likely to 'go nuclear' within the next few years. Therefore, thought must be given to the treaty provisions which may be necessary to secure their adherence.

A number of countries have dwelt on safeguards over peaceful uses of atomic energy, and in particular over transfers of fissionable material for peaceful purposes. Article III of the United States draft, of course, provides that parties will undertake to co-operate in facilitating the application of IAEA or equivalent international safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities. The Soviet treaty - as was pointed out by the Swedish Representative contains no article explicitly dealing with this subject. A number of the non-aligned have come out in favour of a strong safeguard clause in the treaty; these included Sweden, Brazil and the United Arab Republic. In reply the Soviet Representative on 3rd March indicated the USSR would be prepared to consider this question at an appropriate stage but felt discussion should be concentrated on the main issue for the present.

Another question is whether the treaty should be of unlimited duration or whether there should be a provision for a review after a certain number of years. A related question is the matter of withdrawal from the treaty which a number of representatives have argued should not be made too easy.

The so-called Kosygin proposal, to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states parties to the treaty not having nuclear weapons on their territory, has already been considered by this Council on several occasions as well as by the Four Western members of the ENDC in their regular meetings in Geneva.
We shall continue to examine the question in Geneva and would hope before long to be able to indicate to this body some views on the approach we feel will be most appropriate. It seems to our Delegation that it will be very difficult for the West to reject this proposal without offering any alternative, as it has already received and will probably continue to enjoy such non-aligned approval. If the Kosygin proposal is to be set aside, it would seem the West must find some acceptable alternative means for guaranteeing the security against nuclear attack of non-nuclear signatories of a treaty. Unfortunately, it looks to be hard to include a formal guarantee of protection by nuclear states in a simple non-proliferation treaty, such as those of the United States and USSR. This is because it would be necessary to state precisely the conditions under which assistance would be rendered and under which actions would be taken by the guarantor if a guarantee was to be credible. It might however be possible for the nuclear powers to agree upon an article embodying in general terms the principle that they should assure non-nuclear states against nuclear attack. Such an article could serve as the basis for bilateral or multilateral agreements between such nuclear and non-nuclear states as so desire.

"Perhaps the matter of most concern to the non-aligned is that there should be some quid pro quo on the part of nuclear powers to balance the undertakings which the non-nuclear states would accept in signing a non-proliferation treaty. As the Council is aware, this concern has taken many forms - from the demand by India that there should be a provision in the treaty prohibiting further production of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon vehicles, through the Egyptian and Brazilian suggestion that nuclear powers should commit themselves in the treaty to begin at a later stage reduction of nuclear arsenals, to the Mexican view that work should be begun in parallel on a comprehensive test ban. The important point, it seems to me, is that whatever form it takes, the concern is deeply felt. It will be difficult to ignore it.

"This is not to say, of course, that a non-proliferation treaty must include provisions for collateral measures such as those just mentioned. To attempt this would merely delay agreement indefinitely. Both Western and Communist Delegations have underlined this point of view. The United States Delegation has pointed out that a non-proliferation treaty would be as much in the interest of non-nuclear states as in that of the nuclear powers.

"The Council may have the feeling at this point that the more the matter is discussed the more complicated it becomes. However, in my view, the discussions on non-proliferation so far this session have been very useful. We have begun to hear substantive statements of position, in particular from the non-aligned countries whose adherence to a treaty would be essential. It can be expected that when debate resumes on this subject next week, an effort will be made to get down to more detailed consideration of the treaty article by article.
"In order to facilitate this article by article consideration, the United States Delegation has decided to table the amendments to Articles I, II and IV of its draft treaty, which were circulated some time ago to the Council. The United States plans to take this step at next Tuesday's or Thursday's meeting, depending on whether talks are taken up again, after informing the non-aligned shortly beforehand in general terms of what they intend to do.

Nuclear Test Ban

"As I have said, one of the subjects mentioned as a possible quid pro quo by nuclear powers for adherence to a non-proliferation treaty by non-nuclear states has been agreement on a comprehensive test ban. Of course a comprehensive test ban would have advantages other than its effect on non-aligned readiness to sign an agreement not to obtain nuclear weapon. Indeed, in itself, it would act as a barrier to the testing of nuclear weapons and presumably therefore to the development of nuclear weapon capability by a non-nuclear state. Moreover it would suggest to the world that the nuclear powers seriously intend to press on with nuclear disarmament.

"During the discussion last week of collateral measures other than non-proliferation, the Soviet Representative reiterated the position of his Government that the Moscow partial test ban treaty should simply be extended to include underground tests, i.e. using national means of verification. The United States Representative said that the United States was prepared to agree to a comprehensive test ban involving only that degree of international on-site inspection which modern science showed to be necessary.

"The Mexican and Swedish Representatives also made interesting interventions on the test ban question. The Mexican Representative said that he understood the technical obstacles to agreement but noted that these were being reduced by continuous scientific progress. As the differences of views between the United States and the USSR appeared to be so narrow, he suggested that the nuclear powers might make reciprocal concessions. He suggested that there could be agreement to allow inspection by a team composed of reputable scientists from non-aligned countries. An agreed list of scientists could be drawn up and deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations. As a last resort, the Mexican Representative said his country would advocate that agreement should be sought on a treaty which banned underground nuclear tests above an agreed threshold. However, in that case he felt there should be a compulsory yearly review in order to take account of scientific progress with a view to reducing the threshold."
The Swedish Representative discussed the question of verification of a comprehensive ban, taking as a starting point the non-aligned memorandum of 16th April, 1962 (ENDC/28). She outlined a number of steps which could be envisaged as taking place in case a suspicious event were recorded. Withdrawal from the treaty she pointed out, was the only real sanction for maintaining observance by other parties. But withdrawal should not take place without proper justification.

Mrs. Myrdal examined the following possible cases (a) in the first place, the problem would be simple if a party admitted it had conducted nuclear explosions; (b) if the case were disputed there would be a distinction between events which were simply unclear and those which were suspicious. The basic assumption must be that parties to the treaty would be eager to dispel doubts about their actions. If accusations persisted, the suspected state might request inspection – as foreseen in the non-aligned 1962 memorandum and supported by USSR Representative at the 71st ENDC meeting. Placing the onus on the suspected party had the additional merit that in regard to underground explosions it was technically easier to prove one's innocence than to prove someone else's guilt. Mrs. Myrdal characterised this case as "normal"; (c) a more complicated situation would arise if the state accused did not voluntarily seek to clarify the situation. Another state might then request clarification and exchanges could occur designed to restore confidence. An example of this case, said Mrs. Myrdal, was the large Soviet explosion of January 1965 which vented and was the object of an exchange of notes between the United States and the USSR. But in other cases, a demand for verification might not be heeded or information supplied not be satisfactory. Simply to be able to renounce the treaty at that point would not correspond with the requirement that withdrawal be made difficult. Accordingly, the withdrawal clause should include the obligation not only to notify the other parties three months in advance but to provide evidence for withdrawal to an international organization. International scientific opinion would also act as a corrective to unwarranted accusations and inconclusive denials; states would presumably be very attentive to such views. Abrogation of the treaty should only occur when circumstantial evidence of a breach was very strong; (d) a further step, continued Mrs. Myrdal, would be to provide an opportunity for a party to challenge the suspected state to issue an invitation to inspect. If such a challenge – or series of challenges - went unheeded, the case for abrogation would be strong. If there were to be inspections Sweden felt an international element would be necessary in order to convince all parties as to the validity of the findings.
Other collateral measures

"At the meeting on 8th March, the United States Representative elaborated on the proposal for destruction of nuclear weapons by the United States and the USSR, the transfer to peaceful uses of fissionable material obtained from such destruction and a verified halt in the production of fissionable material for weapons used. He stressed that the U235 involved would not be available for fabrication of new weapons but would be put aside under safeguards for peaceful purposes. Communist spokesmen criticised the United States proposal, as in the past, on the grounds that it was not disarmament and would permit espionage, but the Swedish and Mexican Representatives both regarded it with some favour. At the 10th March meeting, the Italian Representative suggested that funds freed through collateral measures of disarmament such as the cut-off and freeze could be used for the benefit of less developed countries.

"Communist spokesmen generally followed the line laid down in the Kosygin message and dwell in familiar terms on the prohibition of use of nuclear weapons or, as a preliminary, agreement on non first use; nuclear free zones, particularly in Central Europe; elimination of foreign bases and foreign troops in foreign territories; and a non-aggression pact. At the meeting on 8th March, the Soviet Representative dwelt at length again on the crash of an American B-52 carrying nuclear weapons off the coast of Spain. At the meeting on 10th March, the Polish Representative mentioned the Rapacki plan for a nuclear free zone in Central Europe and the Gomulka proposal to freeze nuclear weapons in the same area. He said that these proposals were still open for discussion and invited a dialogue with other countries.

General and Complete Disarmament

"At the meeting yesterday, the Committee discussed General and Complete Disarmament. The United States Representative referred to the agreed disarmament principles and argued that the United States treaty outline followed those principles - particularly as regards phasing, balance and control. The USSR draft, on the other hand, sought a drastic modification of the current balance in the first stage; and it did not provide the inspection necessary to verify there were no undeclared armaments in excess of the agreed levels. In accordance with the agreed principle that states should seek the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date, Mr. Fisher suggested the Committee should explore ways to limit further production of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and in this connection outlined once again the United States proposal for a freeze on the numbers and characteristics of strategic offensive and defensive delivery vehicles. The USSR had not yet responded to the United States offer - if progress could be made in exploration of the freeze - to discuss the possibility of significant reductions of nuclear delivery vehicles. The Soviet and Polish Representatives
also outlined their well-known position on General and Complete Disarmament, arguing that rapid and drastic steps had to be taken in the first stage to eliminate the danger of nuclear war. The Soviet Representative confirmed Foreign Minister Gromyko's proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" to be retained into the third stage. As a stimulus to discussion, in view of difficulties in agreement on Stage I measures, Mr. Tsarapkin suggested that the Committee might begin consideration of the proposals for Stage III - which might clarify some problems. This had been suggested by Sweden at the 202nd meeting, and also in the recent Pugwash Conference at Addis Ababa.

Conclusion

"To sum up, it is our view that the discussions on non-proliferation have been useful thus far. However, it will be important - if progress is to be made towards a non-proliferation treaty - that a satisfactory resolution of the nuclear sharing question in NATO be achieved at an early date. It can also be expected that - particularly if there is no progress on non-proliferation - there will be increasing pressure from the non-aligned to make progress to achieve a comprehensive test ban. The line taken by the Swedish Delegation at the meeting on 10th March, which I have outlined, will probably appeal to many members of the ENDC as a reasonable compromise solution.

"The Western Delegations at Geneva have been encouraged by the apparent increase in interest in disarmament matters within foreign ministries. Besides the useful discussions which were held here two weeks ago, more permanent missions in Geneva are following the disarmament debates. We welcome these developments and will be ready any time to consult with our friends on various points of interest."

2. The CHAIRMAN thought that this very full and interesting report required no amplification. The Council would in particular note the point that if there was no progress on non-proliferation there would be increasing pressure from the non-aligned to make progress to achieve a comprehensive test ban. This was the main point of immediate concern to the Alliance.

3. Thanking General Burns for his report, he noted that this useful communication of information would continue and that the Council would indicate their reactions to the four Western powers as appropriate.
CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
15th April, 1966

NATO SECRET
ANNEX to
C-R165/12
(Limited distribution)

Restricted Annex to summary record of a meeting of the Council
held on Wednesday, 6th April, 1966 at 10.15 a.m.

DISARMAMENT

The CHAIRMAN welcomed Mr. Fisher, the United States
Deputy Representative at the 18-nations Disarmament Conference,
and expressed appreciation of his presence in the Council in
order to give an oral briefing on recent developments in Geneva.

2. MR. FISHER said that as the usual written report would
be made available to the Council the following week, he would
confine his report to events which had taken place since
General Burns' briefing to the Council on 16th March. The
replacement of Mr. Tserapkin by Mr. Roshchin as Soviet
Representative at Geneva had been shrouded in an air of mystery
until 25th March, when Mr. Tserapkin had confirmed to him the
speculation that he was being recalled to Moscow on a permanent
basis. As a negotiator Mr. Roshchin was equally as tough as
Mr. Tserapkin, but he was personally not as abrasive. His
appointment did not, he felt, imply any change in the basic
policy of the Soviet Union and was consistent with the less
forensic style recently adopted by the Soviet Union at the
Geneva Conference. It was expected, however, that this policy,
though substantially unaltered, would be presented with a greater
degree of reasonableness in view of the non-aligned countries'
dislike for unmitigated propaganda.

3. Turning to the schedule of meetings at Geneva, he said
that the Conference was now in "recess" until its next meeting on
14th April; two meetings would then take place on collateral
measures, one or two on general and complete disarmament, and four
on non-proliferation in the latter part of April. In his view,
there would be a recess between 10th May and 14th June and the
Conference would then remain in session until about two weeks
before the opening of the United Nations General Assembly in the
Autumn.
4. The Conference had already devoted two days to the question of general and complete disarmament, during which the United States had explained its position with regard to its proposal for a freeze on strategic delivery vehicles and had pointed out that the United States missile force had increased 600% since the Conference had first started to discuss disarmament; the Soviet Union had replied that such a freeze would not have any very great significance.

5. The Conference had also devoted two days to discussion of collateral measures. The question of nuclear testing was one which still contained high emotional overtones and the non-aligned countries felt the grave dangers inherent in the type of testing permitted by the partial test ban treaty to necessitate its extension to cover all types of testing. Sweden had proposed a system of challenge inspection, but in view of the high number – about 45 – of challenges that might be made each year, the United States had firmly rejected this proposal, emphasising its insistence on the inclusion of on-site inspections in any new treaty. It therefore seemed that an impasse had been reached as regards extending the treaty to cover all forms of testing. The conclusion of a comprehensive test ban however would, he felt, help to mitigate the emotions which had been generated in recent discussions on the question of non-proliferation.

6. As regards "cut-off" or cessation of the production of fissionable material for the use of weapons, he considered this to be a very worthwhile objective to achieve as one of the collateral measures in which the delegations at Geneva were presently interested. To date, some success had been obtained in this respect and both India and Sweden had indicated their approval; in the case of India it was felt that a generally-signed cut-off would help to allay Indian anxieties regarding the large quantity of weapons that could be produced by Communist China.

7. Four meetings had been held on the question of non-proliferation and on 22nd March the United States had tabled its amendments to the United States draft text; these amendments were identical to those previously discussed in the Council, except for the addition in Article 4 of the phrase "nuclear weapons means .... (definition to be supplied)." The United States would discuss the establishment of this definition with other countries in the Council at an appropriate date.

8. The United States had emphasised the importance which it attached to the question of control of nuclear weapons in the event of a nuclear state placing its nuclear arsenal in the hands of any association of states and the United States position in this respect had been supported by Canada and the United Kingdom at Geneva. The Soviet Union had adopted a "broadsword" type of
response and was basing its policy on the need to avoid any loopholes existing in a non-proliferation agreement in accordance with the United Nations Resolution. To date, the Soviet Union had shown no desire to come to grips with the problem, despite the gentler tone of its remarks, and its position was firmly based on the need to prevent access to nuclear weapons.

9. In conclusion, he stated that the non-aligned countries had adopted an attitude of relative calm during the period on which we were reporting and that Brazil, Burma and India had made statements to the Conference.

10. The Chairman thanked Mr. Fisher for his very interesting statement which, he felt, had clearly emphasized the connection which existed between a nuclear test ban, cut-off and non-proliferation.

11. The United Kingdom Representative, reporting on Lord Chalfont’s recent visit to Moscow, recalled that when Mr. Wilson and Lord Chalfont visited Moscow in February, it had been agreed that the latter should return there later to pursue more detailed disarmament talks with Mr. Gromyko. Lord Chalfont had duly visited Moscow from 24th to 28th March. He had been most cordially received and on the social plane, the Russians had been as friendly as they had been during Mr. Wilson’s visit, but their attitude in the talks had been as hard as ever. Lord Chalfont had had a day of formal talks with Mr. Gromyko on 25th March and some less formal discussion with him at the British Embassy on 26th March.

12. The discussion on non-proliferation had followed standard lines, but it had emerged quite clearly that the Russians were opposed to any policial consultation about nuclear weapons taking place in NATO which included the Federal Republic. Mr. Gromyko had made it clear that the Soviet Union, while ready to be flexible about their treaty text in its peripheral aspects, saw no point in a detailed examination of the two draft treaties unless the differences of substance could be overcome.

13. As regards a comprehensive test ban treaty, Mr. Gromyko had categorically stated that any form of international inspection was unacceptable to the Soviet Union and when Lord Chalfont raised, as a hypothetical illustration, the question of “black boxes”, he had said that his statement applied to these as well and that, in any case, the time for them was past. As regards the Swedish proposal for a nuclear detection club, he had said that the Swedes and others could, of course, do what they wished, but that it was nothing to do with the Soviet Union. Such proposals would work to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union, which in any case did not intend to justify itself vis-à-vis international bodies which might claim to have detected suspicious events.
1. Mr. CAVALLETI said that the Geneva Disarmament Conference had adjourned on 10th May to 14th June. It had been decided that the last four meetings should be devoted to a discussion on non-dissemination, but other questions had also come up. On 10th May the Indian Delegate had condemned the third Chinese nuclear explosion in very strong terms, and there had been a brief United States intervention on the subject. Mr. Foster had also told the conference that the United States had decided to throw open to international inspection a commercial nuclear fuel re-processing plant at West Valley, New York, belonging to Nuclear Fuel Services Incorporated. The aim was to make it possible to try out inspection techniques. The Nigerian Delegate had tried to raise the question of Rhodesia, and Lord Chalfont had replied most pertinently. Finally, several delegations, including the Soviet, United Kingdom and Italian Delegations, had recapitulated the work of the session.

2. On the main problem of non-dissemination there had been numerous interventions, but positions remained unchanged. The Soviet Delegation had attacked the United States draft treaty, using in particular the following arguments:

(i) the provision for a veto was indirectly a proof that dissemination was envisaged;

(ii) the draft made provision for the transformation of a nuclear power into an alliance with a nuclear capability;

(iii) the draft was in obvious contrast to the United Nations Resolution insisting on a non-dissemination treaty without loopholes.

3. Other Eastern Delegations generally followed this Soviet position.
4. The four Western Delegations had contested the Soviet criticisms of the United States draft, in particular Mr. Foster. Mr. Cavalletti read a number of passages from Mr. Foster's speech making it clear that it was entirely inappropriate for the conference to become involved in the nuclear defence plans of NATO, and reaffirming the intention of the United States to work out with its allies an arrangement which would not involve nuclear proliferation.

5. The Italian and Canadian Delegations had said that the United States and Soviet drafts were not so very far apart. They had urged that there should be a comparative study of the two drafts (this had originally been a Soviet suggestion), but the Soviets would not agree. In private Mr. Roschin had told him, Mr. Cavalletti, that the immediate need was to agree on principles, and not on details of the two drafts.

6. The non-aligned delegations had generally been silent in recent weeks. The Indian Delegate had spoken only once on non-dissemination, taking as a basis the United Nations Resolution and the need to ensure a balance of obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear countries. He had supported the Canadian and Italian suggestion for a comparative study, but suggested that the draft treaties should also be compared with the United Nations text. He said that the two drafts concerned only "horizontal" and not "vertical" dissemination (vertical dissemination being constituted by further developments in an existing nuclear country); and that they did not cover dissemination between existing nuclear countries.

7. Lord Chalfont had tried to conciliate the non-aligned countries in their requirements for the responsibilities to be accepted by the nuclear countries, and had emphasised the importance for the non-aligned countries of security guarantees as suggested by President Johnson.

8. Passing to general considerations on the work of the last four months, Mr. Cavalletti said that the atmosphere had essentially been good, though the Eastern delegations had continued their attacks on the United States for her policy in Vietnam and on Germany. It was not clear whether the hardening of the Soviet position following on Mr. Roschin's arrival was due to new instructions or to Mr. Roschin's personality. The non-aligned countries had spoken very little, thus showing a certain degree of discouragement. They had not put forward a joint memorandum, as last year, and had not adopted any common position.

9. As regards the substance of the work, no conclusion had been reached, and the difficulties in the way of an agreement had been confirmed. He thought that the Soviet Union would not make any major objection if the agreement to be reached on nuclear sharing in NATO was essentially a consultative one. The Western delegations
had often asked the Soviets how they considered it possible for allies not to consult on the use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Delegation had never replied officially but from the other Eastern delegations one obtained the impression that the latter would consider consultation on the use of nuclear weapons to be normal. He thought, however, that without knowing what would be the concept of nuclear sharing in the Alliance, the Soviet Union was not prepared to sign a non-dissemination treaty. The non-aligned delegations did not see the necessity of nuclear sharing in NATO; rather they saw it as an obstacle to agreement on non-dissemination and claimed that it would be discriminatory against them because they were not members of an Alliance. The Western nations argued that it would not be discriminatory but would be a consequence of their being non-aligned.

10. It should be noted that the Soviet Union had scored a marked advantage with the Kosygin proposal for guarantees, which had had a certain effect on the non-aligned countries. He thought that at the next session the Soviet Delegation would probably present amendments to the Soviet draft, in particular the addition of an article proposing the Kosygin guarantee. This would not help the Western position.

11. There was a general impression that because of the serious difficulties encountered in discussion on non-dissemination, the next session might be devoted particularly to a test ban. Here there had been some new items from the non-aligned countries including the idea of inspection by challenge, and the Swedish proposal for a "detection club". The Soviet Delegation had shown considerable interest in the Swedish initiative.

12. It seemed very clear that the Soviet Union did not wish to break off discussions, but was anxious to continue the dialogue. For example, it had been exceptionally easy at this session to reach certain procedural agreements; and on 10th May Mr. Roschchin had ended on an unusually favourable note as regards the usefulness of the Conference. It might be that the Soviet Union considered it was in their interest to continue the discussions, given the support they had received from the non-aligned countries. However, the dialogue was useful to the West in that it constituted an element of détente and also cost the Soviet Union something as regards its relations with China. One should not exclude the possibility that the Soviets wished to reach some agreements. They were now making less propaganda than in the past, and were insisting on discussing non-dissemination and a test ban, two subjects on which agreement was theoretically possible.

13. The Four Western Powers would remain in contact during the adjournment and the Council would be kept informed if there were any new developments.
14. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE noted that Mr. Cavalletti had expressed the view that so long as they did not know what was the concept of nuclear sharing in the NATO Alliance the Soviets would prefer to delay signing a non-dissemination treaty. He asked whether, if the Allies defined this concept, there was hope of progress.

15. MR. CAVALLETTI said that the Four Western Powers had obviously difficulty in explaining what was meant by nuclear sharing, but that progress on this question might help discussion of a non-dissemination treaty. One could not, however, foresee the Soviet reaction should the allied go beyond consultative arrangements.

16. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE recalled that the last time the Council had discussed this question it was on the basis of statements by Mr. Gromyko that consultation on nuclear sharing was equally unacceptable. He asked accordingly whether this was a different position now held by the Soviets.

17. MR. CAVALLETTI said that the impression he had indicated was one shared by all Four Western Powers, including Lord Chalfont. The Soviet Delegation in Geneva had not said this officially, but in private conversation with the other Eastern delegations, it was clear that the Communist bloc considered that consultation in an alliance on the use of nuclear weapons was only natural.

18. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that he thought throughout the latest session at Geneva the language used by the Soviet Delegation was sufficiently vague to make it possible for the Soviets to oppose whatever the marginal proposal for NATO nuclear sharing might be at any time. There was no evidence that they were prepared to define nuclear sharing arrangements which would be acceptable to them in any way which NATO could accept. He recalled that Lord Chalfont in Moscow had received a negative impression on this.

19. He supported the views expressed by Mr. Cavalletti on the Swedish proposal for “detection clubs”. It was felt that this was a worthwhile subject for study, particularly since it had received some support from countries, for example Japan, who were not represented at Geneva. Further, Mr. Foster had recently received the impression that the Soviet Union was perhaps a little more forthcoming on this subject than on any other subject discussed in the last four months. If the proposal could develop into practical arrangements this was one possible next step towards the banning of underground tests.
20. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE, referring to the apparent discrepancy between the present and former Soviet attitude to nuclear consultation in NATO, noted that Mr. Cavallotti had said that the Russians did not reject the logical argument that members of an alliance should consult on the use of all weapons, including nuclear weapons. He pointed out, however, that the NATO allies had been consulting on defence for years, beginning with conventional weapons and now moving to nuclear weapons. He thought the real question was whether the Soviets considered this intensified consultation was the beginning of the sharing and control of nuclear weapons.

21. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE said that personally he thought that the day that the Alliance settled the question of nuclear sharing and put the Soviet Union before a fait accompli, clearly indicating what were the arrangements, the Soviets would realise that it was no longer possible to use this argument to hold up the signature of a treaty. They would then realistically assess the advantages of a treaty and it would be possible at that stage to see whether they were really interested in one.

22. MR. CAVALLETTI, replying to the Netherlands Representative, said that one could not say what degree of nuclear consultation the Soviets would accept. He repeated that there had been indications from the Eastern delegations, particularly Czechoslovakia, of an awareness of the necessity for nuclear consultation in an alliance.

23. Replying to the Greek Representative he said that he thought that Soviets would probably accept a fait accompli provided its scope were limited. The greater the cohesion among the allies, the weaker would be the Soviet reaction, and vice versa.

24. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE thought that there was another fluctuation in the Soviet attitude in connection with the Swedish proposal. Lord Chalfont had received the impression that Mr. Gromyko opposed the proposal, but it now seemed that the Soviet Delegation was inclined to discuss it. He thought that these fluctuations might not represent a real change in position but might be purely tactical.

25. MR. CAVALLETTI agreed that there was a fluctuation as regards the Swedish proposal. The possible explanation was that the Soviets hoped that the creation of "detection clubs" might result in the conclusion that international inspection was less necessary than the Western Powers claimed.
26. The CHAIRMAN thanked Mr. Cavalletti for his clear and interesting statement, and noted that the reports from Geneva would continue when the Conference resumed. He thought that the allies should not delude themselves by thinking that the Soviets did not know what they wanted when it came to nuclear sharing. On the contrary, they would try to obtain what they wanted by the use of long-term diplomatic tactics in which they were expert.

27. The COUNCIL:

took note of the statements made.
Restricted Annex to summary record of a meeting of the Council
held on Wednesday, 6th July, 1966, at 10.15 a.m.

DISARMAMENT

1. General BURNS said that it was always a pleasure for him
to attend the Council and report developments in the 16-Nation
Disarmament Committee. Unfortunately each time he came to the
Council there had been little progress on what must seem complicated
and esoteric questions in the disarmament field. However, it might
be that the work in Geneva was preparing the way for useful
agreements in the field of arms control when the political
situation improved and capitals were in a position to take decisions.

2. He then made the following report to the Council:

"Since the resumption of meetings on 14th June after a
recess of five weeks, the Committee agreed on an Agenda under which
the first two meetings were devoted to general statements, the next
two to non-proliferation and the following two to other collateral
measures. In fact, the debate on non-proliferation continued until
yesterday. Non-proliferation has again proved - and rightly in
the Western view - to be the principal topic of discussion.

Non-Proliferation

"The discussions on this subject so far have been
characterized by a detailed exchange between the USA and the USSR
over the draft treaties put forward by each side. In several
interventions, the USA Representative stressed that the Soviet
Union must approach the problem realistically, and tailor its
treaty language accordingly. He pointed out that it was easy
enough to come up with blanket provisions which would bar
proliferation and much else besides. What was necessary, however,
was to write a treaty which recognized the realities of the present
world situation and came to grips with the real danger posed by
proliferation. That was the risk that additional entities would
be able to take the decision to fire nuclear weapons. It was
because the USA recognized this as the central problem that their
treaty contained specific provisions covering control and the veto

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by the existing nuclear powers. The Soviet treaty, on the other hand, appeared to bar consultation within an alliance on matters related to the common defence against nuclear weapons and also the deployment by a nuclear power of nuclear weapons in the common defence of the territory of a non-nuclear ally. The USSR thus seemed to be introducing additional obstacles to agreement beyond the obstacles originally described as the main problem - that of the possible creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force.

"At the same time, Mr. Foster pointed out that an additional obstacle was posed by the insistence on the part of some states that other measures should be organically linked to agreement on a non-proliferation treaty. Such measures could be a comprehensive nuclear test ban, the cut-off of production of fissionable material for weapon purposes, and even measures of nuclear disarmament. The United States supported these as eventual goals and indeed had put forward proposals to deal with them; but each of them was more complicated than a non-proliferation treaty, since each would require inspection within the Soviet Union. Accordingly, to tie agreement on them to agreement on a non-proliferation treaty, or vice versa, simply postponed indefinitely any hope of agreement on the latter - to the benefit of no one.

"The Soviet Representative has also spoken several times on non-proliferation. On 23rd June, he alleged that the West was employing delaying tactics in order to put off agreement on a non-proliferation treaty. He also raised familiar charges about the policies of the Federal Republic of Germany. On substance, Mr. Roshchin discussed three aspects of the USA draft. On the definition of control, he argued that the USA provision was too narrow in that it restricted the concept to national control and thus in effect permitted proliferation through an alliance. He further argued that there should be no need in a non-proliferation treaty to include a provision for nuclear powers to retain a veto over the use of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear states. To do so implied that nuclear weapons would be transferred to non-nuclear states and this amounted to proliferation. He asked what guarantee there was that a non-nuclear state, having once obtained the nuclear weapons, would not denounce the right of veto of the nuclear state from which it had obtained the nuclear weapons. Finally, Mr. Roshchin critized the provision in the USA draft under which a nuclear weapon state could give up all its nuclear weapons to an association of nuclear and non-nuclear states. In Mr. Roshchin's view, this clearly amounted to a licence for proliferation. Moreover, because there was no such political association in sight, there was no necessity for the provision and therefore it had been introduced - he claimed - merely to complicate the negotiations.
"At the meeting on 28th June, Mr. Foster explained once again the meaning and purpose of the USA treaty in regard to these three points. He reiterated that the USA had no intention of allowing control of its nuclear weapons to pass to any other state or group of states. The Italian Representative argued that no action should be taken which could inhibit the development of a European federation, a goal of great interest to his Government. But Mr. Bosshard did not appear moved by these explanations and at last Thursday's meeting returned to the charge. He asked which provisions in the Soviet draft treaty barred consultations and how the West would amend or complement the Soviet draft on this point. He also asked whether the consultations the USA had in mind concerned the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons. Finally he asked whether the USA draft treaty would allow a multilateral force and concluded that it would. He stated categorically that whatever assurances the USSR received, it would reject a treaty which permitted the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states with, as only guarantee, retention of the right of veto by a nuclear power "backed up by electro-magnetic locks". The USSR assumed the existence and the effectiveness of such locks today and could not do so for tomorrow; nor could it base its security on such devices.

"On 16th June, Lord Chalfont pointed out that negotiations on non-proliferation involved not only NATO and the Warsaw Pact but also the non-aligned non-nuclear states. Between the former the major difference related to the question of nuclear arrangements within alliances, and he felt it should be possible to reconcile the wording of the two drafts on this point. As for the interests of the non-aligned, he suggested it would be easier to reach agreement on questions like security guarantees and limitations of nuclear armament, when the nuclear powers had resolved the differences separating them. The UK, he said, would listen sympathetically to any proposals for improving the security of non-nuclear states after the signature of the treaty.

"Mr. Cavalletti on 16th June reiterated his suggestion that the Committee work out a document comparing the two draft non-dissemination treaties which could be forwarded to the XXIst United Nations General Assembly. He also recalled the Italian proposal for a moratorium by non-nuclear states on the acquisition of nuclear weapons. While Italy believed that a comprehensive non-proliferation agreement was the best solution, if no progress were made during summer he might revert to his proposal later on.

"The other members of the Warsaw Pact represented in the Committee have taken the floor to support the Soviet proposals on non-proliferation, with the exception of Rumania. They have taken the position that the Kosygin proposal for a ban on use of nuclear weapons by nuclear states against non-nuclear states would be a suitable measure by the nuclear states to balance the undertakings in the non-proliferation treaty by the non-nuclear states. They have supported the Soviet view that other matters should not be
linked to the signature of a non-proliferation treaty. The Soviet Union has now suggested specific language to be included as a separate article to deal with this point. It reads as follows:

"Parties to the Treaty possessing nuclear weapons undertake not to use nuclear weapons and not to threaten the use of such weapons against states which do not possess nuclear weapons and in whose territory, territorial waters and air space there are no foreign nuclear weapons."

"At yesterday's meeting, I suggested it was time the Committee put an end to the sterile exchange of criticisms of each other's positions and got down to the business of working out specific language for an agreed treaty. Even if we could not agree on a complete text, we should at least have something to show to the XXIst UNGA. I accordingly circulated a document containing a tabular comparison of the two draft treaties with the central column left blank, hopefully for the insertion of agreed language. I also suggested that the Committee should now devote regular or informal meetings once a week or once every two weeks to the process of developing an agreed draft. An alternative would be for the Co-Chairmen to hold regular meetings for the purpose of working out mutually acceptable language on points already substantially agreed; they should of course keep the Committee informed of progress.

"At the same time, I took up a number of the points made recently by various communist representatives, in particular the suggestion that the Soviet treaty was so well drafted that the West had no criticism to make. I recalled the previous Canadian criticism that the Soviet draft is unclear and imprecise in many aspects, contains certain unacceptable concepts and fails in several regards to meet the criteria established by U.N. Resolution 2028 (XX).

"Also at yesterday's meeting, Lord Chalfont made a statement in which he attempted to carry further the process of comparing the two drafts. He pointed out that the best draft would be that which adhered most closely to the principles of clarity, conciseness and comprehensiveness. To this end, the West had adopted the approach of stating unequivocally, in outline form, the meaning of non-proliferation as they understood it. The USSR had adopted the approach of trying to deal in specific language in the treaty with every conceivable situation or problem which might arise. In conclusion, Lord Chalfont urged the Committee to proceed to an unpolemical and serious attempt to agree on the meaning of proliferation and to work out an agreed treaty.

"The only non-aligned delegation to speak on non-proliferation was the Mexican Representative who pointed out on 14th June that although the principles set out in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2028 (XX) were very important, there should be no question of sticking so rigidly to those principles that agreement to a non-proliferation treaty by the nuclear powers would be prevented.
Nuclear Test Ban

"Judging by their interventions the non-aligned nations appear at the moment to be interested mainly in this subject – perhaps because they feel there is more chance of their making a useful contribution to it. On 30th June, there were two significant interventions by non-aligned spokesmen – one by the Indian Representative, Ambassador Trivedi and the other by Ambassador Gomez Robledo of Mexico. Both Representatives expressed considerable interest in the Swedish concept of verification by challenge which was outlined to the ENDC in two statements last March and April. I believe the Council is familiar with this proposal. Messrs. Trivedi and Robledo both also expressed interest in the possibility of another partial test ban treaty banning underground nuclear tests above a specific threshold. The Mexican felt that the idea of a moratorium, which has often been suggested in this context, need not necessarily be linked to a threshold treaty – although he had no particular objections to a moratorium. The Indian Representative outlined a four point program on which he felt agreement should be possible:

(a) suspension of all nuclear tests;

(b) a formal treaty banning underground tests above a threshold of seismic magnitude of 4.75 or thereabouts, including a withdrawal clause such as that suggested by Sweden in the ENDC on 14th April (and already reported to the Council);

(c) efforts to support the work of the Stockholm Conference on seismic data exchange; and

(d) increased scientific research to lower the seismic threshold above which it is possible to identify all underground events.

The Mexican Representative also referred to the question of on-site inspection. He commented that he did not believe that an on-site inspection would affect the security of the party inspected; on the other hand, he did not believe that doubtful underground events – which were not very frequent – would weaken the military situation of the great powers. He contended that the nuclear powers should compromise and meet each other half way, each accepting minimum risks.

"The US Representative on 14th June reiterated his Government's adherence to the goal of a comprehensive test ban treaty. He invited comment on the technical considerations he had put forward before the recess and expressed interest in the Stockholm seismic data exchange Conference. He said that the results from the Montana large apparatus seismic array would be freely available to all states. Mr. Foster pointed out that the USSR could greatly assist efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban by recognizing once again that national control systems were not sufficient to monitor such a ban."
"At the following meeting Lord Chalfont recalled the Western position that adequate verification was essential to a comprehensive ban. Western scientific advice at present was that not all underground tests could be identified positively by seismological means. Nevertheless work could go forward on proposals such as those set out before the recess by Sweden, the UAR and Mexico. Referring to the Stockholm Conference on seismic exchange Lord Chalfont said Her Majesty’s Government was always willing to share its seismological knowledge with other interested countries in the hope that this might bring them closer to a solution of the problems that arise in the context of underground nuclear tests.

"The Italian Representative also referred to the Stockholm meeting, suggesting that the Swedish Representative should share the results of the Stockholm meeting with the ENDC. In his view a comprehensive test ban might prove less difficult to achieve than other collateral measures.

"The Soviet Union Representative has also reiterated their point of view, namely that there exist at present fully adequate means to monitor a comprehensive ban without on-site inspections. He claimed that any state which might contemplate a test would be inhibited from testing by the serious likelihood of being caught. He pointed out that the USA was presently engaged in a very active underground testing program and suggested this might explain their insistence on on-site inspections. Yesterday, the Bulgarian Representative expressed some interest in recent UAR and Swedish suggestions but withheld detailed comment in the absence of formal proposals.

Other Topics

"There has been little discussion of other topics so far this session. The Mexican Representative on 14th June gave the Committee an optimistic account of the conference held in May in Mexico City on the demilitarization of Latin America. He said that 90% of the text of a treaty had been approved and suggested that the "residual difficulties" should be susceptible to resolution. Other delegates have welcomed the efforts toward demilitarization being undertaken by the Latin American countries.

"In their opening statements, the representatives of the USA and the USSR mentioned some of the other subjects they felt worthy of further discussion. For the USA these included the freeze on offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, the cut-off of production of fissionable material for weapon purposes to be accompanied by destruction of a quantity of nuclear weapons and transfer of fissionable material to peaceful purposes under safeguards, and the suggestion for regional agreements to limit conventional
arms. The USSR has followed its usual defensive propaganda line that there should be complete nuclear disarmament, including destruction of all stocks, prohibition of further production of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, and elimination of foreign bases.

"At yesterday's meeting, the Romanian Representative first reiterated support for a conference to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. Then, in what seemed an important statement, he turned to the liquidation of military blocs, and said that in the Romanian view NATO and the Warsaw Pact were anachronistic. He suggested that there was a growing tendency amongst states to base their security on non-military measures. It was only by abolishing military blocs that security in Europe would be created. Romania was anxious to have good relations with all states without regard to the type of their régime. He quoted from a recent statement by Party Secretary Ceaucescu to the effect that it was imperative to create conditions such that the reunification of Germany would be the result of the agreement of both states and peoples; until then one had to recognize the reality of the existence of the two German states. Romania was interested in a peaceful solution of the German question; they naturally did not wish to see Germany acquire nuclear weapons.

Conclusion

"The actual discussion by the USSR and its allies of specific disarmament topics has been on the whole detailed and concrete. To that extent, therefore, the atmosphere of the discussions has been good. However, the Eastern European Representatives have seen fit to denounce American policy in Vietnam in very strong terms. This unfortunately does not help the atmosphere for negotiations."

3. The CHAIRMAN noted that General Burns had covered four main points: non-proliferation, a comprehensive test ban, the conference on the denuclearisation of Latin America and the Romanian proposal for the dissolution of the NATO and Warsaw Pact blocs. This latter proposal was not a new one, and as was well known any such dissolution would simply be to the advantage of the Eastern side.

4. He asked General Burns whether it was the case that Lord Chalfont, in commenting on the text of the Soviet draft non-proliferation treaty, had referred to a loophole which would allow for the possibility of the Soviet Union giving nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear country during the time-lag between the signature of the treaty and its ratification by governments.
5. General BURNS confirmed that Lord Chalfont had made this comment, which was a technical legal objection to the Soviet draft. The Soviet draft referred only to nations possessing nuclear weapons, without specifying who those nations were or limiting them to the present five nuclear powers. Thus, the list of nuclear countries would be left open until after the treaty was ratified, and there was the possibility that a non-nuclear country could receive nuclear weapons in the interval. This difficulty could be avoided by amending the Soviet text to limit the nuclear countries to the five existing nuclear powers.

6. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE wished to assure General Burns that the Council did not consider the questions under discussion to be esoteric, but on the contrary took a keen interest in them. As regards the slow rate of progress, it was to be feared that the discussions on non-proliferation might drag out as an interminable exchange of views on the two draft treatises. He therefore supported the recent Canadian initiative aimed at getting out of this impasse. He asked whether the presentation of the Canadian paper showing the two draft treaties in comparative form had produced concrete results, or was simply likely to prolong the previous discussion. He also asked what had happened to the United Kingdom draft treaty, and whether it might not provide a way of getting out of the difficulty. He noted that it must be admitted that even in the Council there was not agreement on the definition of non-proliferation.

7. General BURNS said that the object of the Canadian proposal was to provoke a discussion on treaty language in those cases where the corresponding articles in the United States and Soviet texts were similar in concept, thus avoiding a discussion of matters on which agreement had not been reached in the NATO Alliance. Instead of arguing about the meaning of non-proliferation, which was differently interpreted by the Eastern and Western sides, the object was to aim at agreement on the framework of a treaty in order that when the NATO Alliance had concluded its own arrangements, a treaty could be drafted which would be acceptable to all.

8. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE noted that this left aside the main difficulty, which was the definition of proliferation. The United States draft of Article 1 reconciled all the positions expressed in the Council on this subject. However, he suggested that it was now time, in the light of the Ministerial discussions in Brussels on East/West relations, to have a discussion in the Council on the subject of proliferation with a view to facilitating the presentation of the Western position in Geneva.

9. On the subject of a test ban, he asked General Burns whether in fact the Russians were carrying out many underground nuclear tests, and whether these were detected by the West.
10. General BURNS said that a certain number of underground tests in the Soviet Union had been reported, this number being much smaller than the number of United States tests officially announced by the United States Government. As regards detection of the Soviet underground tests, the Geneva Conference was not informed what proportion of seismic events the United Kingdom and the United States now considered they could identify satisfactorily.

11. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE, referring to the comments by the Romanian and other delegations regarding the liquidation of military blocs, and the situation in Vietnam, pointed out that these questions were outside the competence of the Geneva Conference. He asked whether it appeared that these speakers wished to extend the competence of the Conference, or whether they were simply taking advantage of it as an existing forum.

12. General BURNS said that his own view was that the periodic denunciations by the Soviet Union and its allies of United States action in Vietnam was due to the fact that they felt that they were under criticism by at least Communist China, and perhaps Communist parties elsewhere, for the reason that they were negotiating with the United States during the Vietnam conflict. He agreed that these questions were outside the competence of the Geneva Conference, but the argument of the Eastern delegations was that the Conference could not ignore the general state of international affairs.

13. In answer to a question by the CHAIRMAN, who asked whether he attached any special significance to the Romanian proposal for the dissolution of the NATO and Warsaw Pact blocs, General BURNS said that while the idea was a familiar one, it seemed that this was the first time that the Romanians had expressed it in an East/West group. He thought that they had simply taken advantage of the Geneva Conference to put forward the idea.

14. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE supported the Belgian Representative on the importance of a Council discussion on non-proliferation. He thought that the Council should, at a date not too far distant in the future, renew its discussions of the summer of 1965, review developments in the intervening year in the light of the Brussels Ministerial meeting, and see what were the possibilities of discussing the principles underlying a non-proliferation treaty. He therefore thought that his Government would be very much interested in the proposal by the Belgian Representative. He noted that the fundamental principles were not being discussed either in the Council or at Geneva, and that there was little hope of agreement on a treaty without such a discussion.
15. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE said that he thought that probably the Romanians were sincere in wishing to see the Warsaw Pact dismantled, since it was in the Romanian interest to shake off the Soviet yoke. However, he pointed out that the idea that the Warsaw Pact and the NATO Alliance were comparable was a highly dangerous one, since they had had entirely different origins and justifications. If such a wrong idea were to be widely accepted by public opinion, this might create a dangerous tendency to ask for the dismantling of NATO in order to secure, or not to impede the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact. The Western Allies should insist on the raison d’être of NATO, which remained valid. Even if the Western Bloc should wish to dismantle the Warsaw Pact, that would be no reason for the West to dismantle NATO.

16. The CHAIRMAN, supporting this view, noted that governments should bear in mind this presentational aspect of the problem.

17. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE drew attention to a private conference on the problem of non-proliferation recently held in Canada, which had been attended by a number of personalities from NATO countries. He had not yet received a formal report of the conference, but it seemed that there had been a discussion of control of underground tests. An article in the "New York Times" of 27th June reported that a proposal had been made for an experimental suspension of underground nuclear tests, accompanied by a system of "verification by challenge". He asked if his colleagues had any information on this subject.

18. General BURNS said that he had been present at the conference, along with Lord Chalfont, Mr. Adrian Fisher, Deputy Director of the United States Disarmament Agency, and other personalities. The conference had been held under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, the Institute for Strategic Studies of London, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the American Assembly of Columbia University. Those present had attended in their private capacity, and expressed their private views only. The suggestion was made to try out the Swedish proposal by an agreement among the nuclear powers to suspend their tests for a period of say one or two years, during which one might test whether the possibilities of detection by existing means were adequate, subject to verification by challenge in the case of a suspicious event. The representatives from the United States and the Soviet Union had acquiesced in this suggestion, which had been included in the final report by the conference. He thought that there might be a reference to it in future at Geneva.
19. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that he concluded from General Burns' description of the Russian interpretation of proliferation that the Russians were objecting even to consultation with non-nuclear powers on the use of nuclear weapons, and that in fact what they opposed was the proliferation not of nuclear weapons, but of thinking among Allies on the subject. It looked as if there might be a semantic debate with the Soviets ahead, similar to that which had already taken place on words such as "democracy". The Allies must beware of allowing any discussion to take place on the essentials of NATO's cohesion as an Alliance, which included the right to consult on, and make available for the common defence, all weapons including nuclear weapons.

20. It might be useful, once the Russians were more specific on the subject, for the Council also to discuss non-proliferation, but it was not possible to make progress at the expense of compromising on the philosophy of the Alliance. Once the Russians produced more concrete ideas, the Allies should try to do the same in order that the Western Delegation at Geneva should feel that they were supported by the Alliance as a whole, but this must not in any way weaken the cohesion of the Alliance.

21. General BURNS said that the right of non-nuclear powers to nuclear consultation and to having nuclear weapons stationed on their territory had been raised by the Western Delegates in Geneva as a criticism of the Soviet draft. This draft would prevent consultation, and was therefore both inadmissible and unenforceable, since consultation was the essence of an Alliance. The draft also seemed to prohibit existing bilateral arrangements regarding tactical atomic weapons. This would be entirely unacceptable, since it would in fact be a measure of disarmament without prior negotiations.

22. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE thought that the comments by the Netherlands Representative were in fact a beginning of a discussion in the Council on non-proliferation, and that they showed how necessary such a discussion was. He thought that it was high time that the Council reached a sufficiently precise definition of what it meant by non-proliferation, in order to reinforce the Western position at Geneva. He recalled that at an earlier meeting of the Council the Netherlands Representative had read his Government's definition of proliferation. He, the Belgian Representative, said that he would take this as a point of departure for a Council discussion.

23. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE noted that the conference to which the Norwegian Representative had referred, while non-governmental, had been attended by a number of disarmament officials and specialists from 25 countries. He suggested that it might be useful for the Committee of Political Advisers to have an exchange of information on this conference in the near future, and asked whether the Canadian Delegation might help in providing a report on the conference.
24. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE, replying to the comments by the Netherlands Representative, said that he was not optimistic about the results of any discussion in the Council on non-proliferation, but thought that his comments and those of the Netherlands Representative were two sides of the same coin, and should be borne in mind by the Council.

25. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE, noting that Mr. Roshchin had challenged the Western Delegations to say where, in the Soviet draft, consultation on nuclear questions was prohibited, asked what was the answer to this challenge.

26. General BURNS said that Article 1 of the Soviet draft included a provision to the effect that non-nuclear powers should not participate in the control of nuclear weapons. The Western Delegations thought that this meant that non-nuclear powers should have no voice in determining policy or strategy in the use of nuclear weapons by an Alliance. However, Mr. Roshchin's challenge might have been rhetorical to a certain extent, and there were certain signs, including the statement by the Polish Representative, that so far none of the arrangements made in NATO went beyond what the Eastern powers would consider as proliferation.

27. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE, replying to the Danish Representative, agreed with his comment that there were two sides of the same coin to be borne in mind. He recalled that he had circulated some months ago the statement he had made on non-proliferation, on which he would welcome discussion. He would be glad to make this statement available again as a starting point for discussion by the Council.

28. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE asked firstly, whether the apparent Soviet objection to what they called nuclear proliferation in the NATO Alliance had been supported by the other Warsaw Pact member countries, in particular Romania. Secondly, he asked whether the Romanian proposal for the abolition of military blocs and the basing of security on non-military measures had been supported by the Soviet Union.

29. General BURNS, replying to the first question, said that as he had already indicated above in reply to the United Kingdom Representative, the hard line on proliferation in NATO which had been adopted particularly on the occasion of the visit by Mr. Stewart and Lord Chalfont to Moscow, did not seem to be followed strictly in Geneva. In general, the Eastern Delegations supported the Russian draft. On the second point, he said that there was no support for the Romanian proposal, judging from the facial expressions of the Soviet and Czechoslovak Representatives when the Romanian Representative spoke, although no official comments were made on that occasion.
30. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE asked how effective Mr. Roshchin appeared as the new Soviet Delegate, particularly vis-à-vis the non-aligned countries; also how effectively he put across the guarantee proposal by Mr. Kosygin.

31. General BURNS said that the impression of the Western Delegations was that Mr. Roshchin was prepared to negotiate the various subjects in a more objective and businesslike way than Mr. Tsurapkin. The Kosygin proposal had been accepted by Nigeria, (it had originally been based on a Nigerian proposal), India, Mexico, and Sweden. No non-aligned country had objected to it.

32. Replying to the comments by the German Representative, he said that the conference in Canada had been attended by personalities from the Federal Republic, including Mr. Schnippenkoetter, and that those attending would receive a final report summarising the ideas discussed. He thought it would be useful for the Committee of Political Advisers to exchange views on this subject. He suggested that delegations who so desired should apply to the American Assembly of Columbia University for copies of the final report.

33. As regard the future work of the Geneva Conference, it was hoped to continue work on the less contentious clauses of a non-proliferation treaty, but a final agreement would depend on a Council discussion, as suggested by the Belgian Representative. It was possible that the nuclear powers might discuss further an underground test ban, perhaps on the lines of the Toronto Conference.

34. It was possible that some progress might be made before the recess at the end of August, though he doubted if any agreement could be reached on either of these subjects before the recess. If on the other hand, it seemed that negotiations were fruitful, they might continue beyond the end of August.

35. The CHAIRMAN, summing up, noted that this had been a very useful discussion. The Belgian Representative had suggested that the Council should resume its discussion of the meaning of non-proliferation. He, the Chairman, thought that in discussing the opportunity of such a discussion the Council should take account of the position of the Four Western Powers in Geneva. He suggested accordingly that the Four Powers should reflect on this subject and inform the Council of their views, and that the Council might then relate its discussions of non-proliferation with its planned discussion of East/West relations. While the subject of non-proliferation might be raised in the Council in August, especially if the Four Powers had suggestions to make, it might be appropriate to invite the Committee of Political Advisers to examine the question when they met with Disarmament Experts from 13th to 16th September, although this might be considered too late.
36. He noted that it was agreed that the Committee of Political Advisers should have an exchange of views on the results of the Toronto Conference. In this connection it would be helpful if the text of the final report could be made available to the Secretariat. The Political Advisers Committee might report to the Council early in September.

37. The COUNCIL:

took note of the statements made.
Negotiations of Articles I and II the NPT

SELECTED DOCUMENTS
VOLUME 1 (1961-1966)