NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP

The First Meeting of the NPG
6-7 April 1967
Washington, D.C.
NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP

50th Anniversary of the First Meeting of the NPG
FOREWORD

The first meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) was held in Washington D.C. from 6th to 7th April 1967. President Lyndon B. Johnson hosted Defence Ministers and other representatives from Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and the United Kingdom, as well as the United States. At the time, NPG membership was on a rotating basis, and the Group served as a form of executive committee for the Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee which was open to all Allies.

NATO membership has grown in the last 50 years, and we are delighted now to welcome Montenegro into our Alliance, and to the Nuclear Planning Group. Over those 50 years our core values and goals have not changed, and NATO’s commitment to sharing the risks and responsibilities of remaining a nuclear Alliance has endured. NATO will remain a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist, and the Nuclear Planning Group will continue to work to support the fundamental purpose of NATO’s nuclear capability in preserving peace, preventing coercion and deterring aggression. The clear focus is to ensure that NATO’s nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure and effective.

We can also reflect that, over the past 50 years, we have greatly reduced our reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy and made very substantial reductions in both the types and overall numbers of nuclear weapons, not least those deployed in Europe and on behalf of NATO. The Nuclear Planning Group has played an indispensable role in this regard. In 1971 we had eleven nuclear systems deployed in Europe; today we have just one. The Alliance continues to work towards making further reductions on the basis of reciprocity and creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons based on the principle of undiminished security for all and taking into account the prevailing international security environment.

We can look back with pride on our achievements in the last 50 years, even as we look forward with optimism to maintaining the security of our nations and promoting the peace, freedom and shared values which united those who attended the very first Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Washington.

Jens Stoltenberg
NATO Secretary General
INTRODUCTION

The first meeting of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) on the 6th and 7th of April, 1967 marks an important date in the history of the Alliance. This meeting, held in Washington, D.C. at the level of NATO Defence Ministers, represented the culmination of a long diplomatic process towards a significant turning point in the politics of Alliance nuclear policy-making. Since its inception, NATO has provided an institutional link by which the nuclear guarantee of the United States and the United Kingdom to Western Europe has been maintained. The issue of the sharing of nuclear control in NATO thus became especially important for the Alliance in the 1960s when discussion revolved around the command, control and communication of nuclear forces as part of NATO’s new strategic concept of flexible response. With the establishment of the NPG, the Alliance acquired a new set of consultative machinery. It provided a means by which issues of nuclear planning and doctrine could be isolated for consultation, as well as creating the institutional arrangements in which these consultations could take place. For the past 50 years, the NPG has served successfully as the nuclear consultative body that voices the interests and aspirations of all the Allies in influencing the nuclear policy of the Alliance.

To commemorate the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the NPG, the NATO Archives presents a selection of declassified and publicly disclosed NATO documents, press releases, communiqués and photographs to offer a glimpse into the discussions, the debates, and the public diplomacy that helped structure and pave the way towards that first historic Washington meeting. Presented in chronological order, these documents highlight the gradual evolution of the high-level political process away from debates about nuclear sharing based on Allied ownership and control of nuclear forces, and more toward a consultative approach to nuclear policy.

I hope that this collection provides readers with some insight and appreciation into the NPG in the context of its own creation. Those wishing to dive deeper into the subject will be pleased to know that NATO documents related to nuclear planning that are older than 50 years are now eligible for declassification and public disclosure review.

Ineke Deserno
NATO Archivist

Special thanks to the National Archives and Records Administration in Washington, D.C. and the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library who provided some key documents and photographs for this collection.
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In April 1962 NATO Secretary General Dirk Stikker submitted his Special Report on NATO Defence Policy to the North Atlantic Council. One of the highlights of his Defence Policy were the dominant themes of the control and sharing of nuclear forces within the Alliance.

The issue of the sharing of nuclear control in NATO became important for the Alliance at a time when new weapons were being deployed as NATO shifted to a new strategic concept of flexible response.

Stikker's Defence Policy would be discussed at the meeting of Alliance Foreign and Defence Ministers in Athens in May 1962. The guidelines that emerged from these discussions became NATO's first initiatives to create consensus on nuclear policy.
Dirk Stikker, NATO Secretary General 1961-1964
CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

ANNUAL POLITICAL APPRAISAL

SPECIAL REPORT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL

on

NATO DEFENCE POLICY

I. INTRODUCTORY

At their meeting in Oslo in May 1961 Ministers "requested the Council in Permanent Session as a matter of urgency to con-
tinue its examination of defence questions with the advice of the
NATO military authorities ... and to develop policy guidelines for
NATO defence plans and programmes within the framework of the
Political Directive and related agreed military documents". The
examination was to have been completed in time for considera-
tion at the December Ministerial Meeting. As instructed, the Council
pursued its debates on defence policy through the summer.
Discussions while embracing many aspects of the question, tended
to concentrate particularly on the rôle and organization of the
Shield forces and various points were emphasised such as the need
for flexibility, the credibility of the deterrent, the possibility
of a graduated deterrent and the balance between conventional and
nuclear forces. I endeavoured in a paper circulated informally
to delegations on 1st September (P0/61/7) to present what appeared
to me to be a general consensus of opinion on the rôle of NATO
forces. This paper was found controversial by some delegations
and owing to pressure of events in Berlin was never formally
discussed in the Council and by the time the Ministers met in
December I could do no more than give them a summary of the
discussions which had taken place in the Council in the interval
since their last meeting.

2. The December meeting itself was the occasion for some
interesting and important statements on behalf of member govern-
ments - notably by United States and Federal German Ministers -
on their respective views on the problems of NATO nuclear and
non-nuclear defence. While the Ministers came to no definite conclusions, the debate helped to focus attention on some of the major issues facing the Alliance in the defence field and showed very clearly what were the main divergences to be reconciled. It was agreed that the Council in Permanent Session should resume its work on defence policy early in the New Year.

3. As Chairman of the Council I was particularly impressed by the difficulty of making progress with a discussion in which so many different yet inter-connected questions were involved and which was so apt to develop into a vicious circle. As I saw it, there were four main headings on which Council action was required: the control of the use of nuclear weapons; the ABM requirement; the offer of commitment of Polaris submarines to NATO by the United States; NATO’s requirements in conventional forces. It seemed to me that the only way we could hope to get ahead was to try to narrow down the field of discussion and to proceed step by step dealing with one subject at a time. At the same time I felt that we should be wise to avoid becoming too deeply involved in a theoretical discussion of NATO strategy and that we should carry out our examination of the four subjects mentioned on the basis of the existing Political Directive and NATO Strategic Concept, leaving any changes which might ultimately appear desirable in these latter to come out in a pragmatic way.

4. My recommendation, which the Council accepted, was that we should first of all attempt to reach agreement on the problem of the political control of nuclear weapons. It seemed to me that if we could establish methods for the control of the nuclear armoury at present at the disposal of NATO forces, we should both have created the basis on which to build methods of control for any subsequent nuclear weapons which the Alliance might acquire, and removed some of the uncertainties which inhibited consideration of the MBM requirement. I proposed that without losing sight of the need for a relatively early decision, particularly as regards the latter, we should retain for subsequent consideration the problems raised by the other three questions.

5. My visit to Washington in early February reinforced my view that this was the right way in which to proceed and it encouraged me in the belief that the way to tackle the question of control of nuclear weapons was also step by step.

Briefly, I proposed in my paper NDP/62/2, that the Council proceed by the following stages:

Firstly, the present situation should be clarified by means of a formal assurance - from the United States that they would continue to make available for the Alliance the nuclear weapons adequate in number and kind to meet the needs of NATO defence - and from the United States and the United Kingdom governments that the operational plans of their strategic forces provided for the interdiction of all Soviet missile bases not presently covered by the forces of SACEUR.
and SACLANT.

Secondly, with these assurances solidly behind us, we should explore the means of associating all members of the Alliance more closely with the political control over the use of the nuclear weapons now in possession of the forces assigned or earmarked to NATO. In NDP/62/2 I recalled some of the suggestions which have been put forward for the establishment of multilateral political control of what is sometimes known as a multilateral decision making machinery (e.g. decision by a restricted group acting on behalf of the Alliance, decision by the United States if the government of the country attacked so requested and if this request was supported by SACEUR, a system of weighted voting, creation of a NATO nuclear weapons agency). However, foreseeing that it might be difficult to reach agreement on any of these proposals I suggested that, in order to arrive at an early and at least temporary solution, the Council should seek the formal agreement of the United States government that the United States President act for NATO and, in reaching a decision on the use of nuclear weapons in defence of the NATO area, be governed by previously agreed principles or guidelines.

6. The Council agreed to continue its study on these lines and although we were not wholly successful in keeping out of our discussion of nuclear weapons, issues of strategy and the role and needs for conventional forces, I am very gratified to be able to present for Ministers' consideration the following account of the progress we have made.

II. AVAILABILITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND COVERAGE OF TARGETS

(a) Assurances given by the United States and the United Kingdom

7. The United States Government has indicated that the United States will continue to make available for the Alliance nuclear weapons adequate in number and kind to meet the needs of NATO defence. The United States has a comprehensive programme for supplying nuclear weapons or for supporting its own and other countries' forces earmarked for SACEUR and SACLANT. As significant changes occur in the programme, such changes would be notified to its allies through whatever information mechanism is established for analysis and comment at that time as regards the effect on the adequacy of the overall capability at the disposal of the Alliance. The United States further agrees to consult its allies at that time and to take any allied views fully into consideration.

8. The United States Government has further stated its intention to ensure that its retaliatory power should grow faster than the Soviet striking power, and in combination with NATO forces to continue to cover as fully as possible all key elements of the
latter, including MRBM sites, giving equal priority to the installations threatening NATO Europe as to those threatening the United States. To this end action is in progress to increase the capacity of the strategic forces to survive a Soviet nuclear strike and to improve the speed of retaliation. There would at all times be the fullest co-ordination of the strategic forces maintained under national control with the nuclear forces under NATO commanders in order to ensure the most effective utilisation of the sum of the weapons available.

9. The United States Government has indicated that it is willing:

(i) to co-operate in ensuring that the North Atlantic Council has at its disposal the fullest amount of information compatible with the requirements of security covering, in general terms types, numbers, striking power, deployment and targeting policy of nuclear weapons for the forces assigned or earmarked for assignment to SACEUR and SACLANT.

(ii) to make appropriate information available with regard to the capabilities and intended plans of the strategic forces.

10. This confirmation of the United States Government's intentions provides a solid assurance -

(i) that the means are and will continue to be available to provide Europe with an all-round nuclear defence;

(ii) that the targets of special interest to the European allies which are beyond the range of the weapons currently at the disposal of the NATO forces will be covered as fully as possible;

(iii) that the United States Government is willing, within the limits imposed by security, to co-operate in providing its NATO allies with all the information they require in order to give them a full insight into the overall problem of the organization and control of nuclear defence.

11. In stating their willingness to provide the aforementioned information and to consult on changes in their programme, for supplying nuclear weapons the United States have taken an important step in the direction of associating their allies with their nuclear defence policy. It is of course evident that such association would not be very meaningful if the United States' NATO allies were not in possession of the requisite knowledge of the United States nuclear capability and the overall plans and general arrangements for its use. Nor without such knowledge and
the possibility of reviewing the changing needs of the military situation, would it be possible for the Alliance to consult about what is the adequate level of nuclear weapons to which paragraph 7 above refers.

12. The United Kingdom has also confirmed that it can associate itself fully with the assurances given by the United States under paragraph 10 (ii) and (iii) above insofar as the United Kingdom strategic forces are concerned. Those forces are constituted to cover targets of importance to the defence of Europe generally and to complement in this respect the NATO nuclear strike forces. The United Kingdom Government has further indicated its willingness to give appropriate information within the limits imposed by security about the nuclear capability of its strategic forces.

(b) Sharing of Nuclear Information

13. In light of the United States' and United Kingdom's undertakings, the Council's next task was to create the necessary conditions and machinery for the provision by these countries of the information which had been promised. The essence of the problem was to find a mean between the vital requirement of security and the need for the Council as a whole, and for member countries individually, to have all the information necessary to give them a proper insight into the problem of nuclear defence.

14. Agreement was quickly reached in principle on the proposal made by the United Kingdom that a special body should be created to receive nuclear information, and on the need for special security procedures to be evolved. A decision was accordingly taken on 13th April to set up a NATO Nuclear Committee (see text of Council decision at Annex). It was agreed that the Committee should work out its own functions in greater detail in light of experience, in particular as regards the possible need for establishing special channels for information and local or regional, rather than NATO-wide interest, and the potential role of the Committee as a consultative body on certain aspects of NATO nuclear policy.

15. Considerations of security have already played, and doubtless will continue to play an important part in the whole arrangement for the exchange of information on nuclear questions. The Council accordingly agreed to establish - on an interim basis - a special system for the handling of highly classified nuclear information.

III. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GUIDELINES

16. Since it soon became apparent that none of the various suggestions which had been put forward for the creation of a multilateral decision-making machinery would command unanimous support, the Council turned its attention to the problems involved
in the establishment of guidelines. The suggestion that responsibility for decision be delegated to the United States President did not find acceptance. The Council's efforts were therefore directed to the elaboration of an agreed statement of what action would be necessary on the part of member countries collectively and individually in the various circumstances in which NATO might be faced with a decision to use nuclear weapons.

17. The United States Secretary of State had recalled at the December Ministerial meeting that United States policy in this respect was already the subject of guidelines whose terms were set out in the United States Permanent Representative's statement to the Council on 26th April 1961 (see PC/61/419, paragraph 16). The task facing the Council was therefore to examine the possibility of refining and extending these unilateral guidelines in a form which would be acceptable to all member governments so as to provide a common basis for action in the event of Soviet aggression against NATO.

18. The desirability of reaching such agreement had been enhanced by the indication given by the United States Government that it would be willing to consult its allies, not only about the use in support of NATO of its external strategic forces, but about the use of these forces anywhere.

19. After very thorough debate in the Council, I am able to submit for the approval of Ministers the text contained in paragraph 5 of the conclusions to the present report.

20. Among the various important points which emerged during the discussions leading up to the formulation of the text I have quoted above, special mention should be made of the following. It is generally understood that any decision to use nuclear weapons should be based on an evaluation by the major NATO Commander concerned of the need for their employment in order to maintain or restore the military situation in the event of a Soviet attack. At the same time it would be within the normal prerogatives of any country which was the victim of such an attack to initiate a request for the use of nuclear weapons for the defence of its territory. It is further generally understood that, conscious as we all must be of the dangers of unlimited nuclear war, the targets against which nuclear weapons would be used should be restricted to those whose destruction was indispensable to the defence of NATO. There is, I believe, general agreement that these guidelines should be regarded as no more and no less than a constructive interpretation of the Political Directive and the Strategic Concept contained in NC 14/2 and 48/2.
21. The nature of the guidelines brings out very clearly that if we are to make consultation in the Council in time of crisis a reality and to ensure that we do not incur delays which could imperil the safety of our forces and of our peoples, there must at all times be the closest communication between Permanent Representatives and their governments. We must be certain that when consultation is necessary that the physical media exist to enable Permanent Representatives to give an immediate expression of their government’s views. Finally, I should perhaps note that the Council has turned its attention to problems of military control as set out in MC 95. This document has naturally formed a background to our discussion and I have personally maintained the closest touch with the major NATO Commanders and the Standing Group at all stages.

IV. FUTURE WORK OF THE COUNCIL

22. In concluding this section of my report, it is only right that I should recall that the Permanent Council should now move on as soon as possible to the question of the possible introduction of MEBMs into the NATO armoury and of the build-up and role of the conventional forces.

23. As regards MEBMs, time is beginning to press, since we cannot long delay decisions which must be taken very soon if NATO and military planning after 1964 is not to be thrown out of gear. The military authorities, in execution of their responsibility for providing the Council with an assessment of force requirements for 1963-66, have in the Enclosures to document MC 25/4 indicated that this may necessitate a requirement for MEBMs to replace certain elements of the tactical nuclear Air Strike Forces - the confirmation of this requirement being subject to further guidance from the Council. Before, however, the Council can have a constructive discussion of this question, it will need to have basic technical information on the characteristics and performance of the weapons under development which would respond to the requirement indicated by the NATO military authorities. I hope this information will be available to the Council in the near future.

24. As regards conventional forces, I also hope that it will be possible to make progress in the coming months. We must clearly examine urgently the means of putting the forward strategy into operation wherever this is attainable, and in particular of overcoming the weaknesses which have hitherto impeded its full implementation in the Central region. In this context we shall have to give very careful consideration to NATO’s needs in conventional forces, on which particular emphasis was laid by the United States Secretary of Defence in his statement at the December 1961 Ministerial meeting. This problem is of course closely linked with the Triennial Review now in progress, which will at one and the same time give us an up-to-date picture of member countries’ planning over the next years and provide the vehicle through which we can secure progress towards a balanced deterrent embracing nuclear and non-nuclear forces.
V. CONCLUSIONS

25. Against this background I have prepared the following text of conclusions on which Ministers might be invited to agree at the meeting in Athens. Fourteen members of the Alliance have already indicated that they can accept this text, subject only in the case of some members to a preference for some minor amendments in paragraphs 5(b) and (c). The French Permanent Representative has informed the Council that his Government could accept paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7, but that they have reservations in regard to paragraphs 5 and 6. Should it not be possible for France to lift these reservations, I would suggest that the Ministers could agree on this text on the understanding that these guidelines and the undertaking to consult in NATO would apply only to all those countries having effective responsibility for a decision to authorise the use of nuclear weapons and willing to accept these conclusions as a whole. It would naturally be open to France to participate in any consultation initiated by one of her Allies.

(1) That the Alliance has received the most satisfactory assurances, first, that the United States will continue to make available for the Alliance nuclear weapons adequate in number and kind to meet the needs of NATO defence; and second, that the United States and the United Kingdom strategic forces will continue to cover as fully as possible in combination with NATO forces all key elements of Soviet nuclear striking power, including MRBM sites, giving equal priority to those threatening the mainland of Europe as to those threatening the United States and the United Kingdom.

(2) That the Council welcomes the intention of the United States and United Kingdom Governments to furnish their NATO allies with the fullest amount of information compatible with the requirements of security on the nuclear weapons and external forces referred to in the preceding paragraph, with a view to assisting their allies in obtaining a full insight into the overall problem of the organization and control of NATO nuclear defence.

(3) In order to enable the flow of information to begin, a NATO Nuclear Committee, consisting of the Permanent Representatives, has been established to receive and study on a permanent and systematic basis nuclear information relating to NATO defence. The Committee should give consideration in the light of experience to problems of its own internal organization as well as to the possibility of defining more closely the scope and nature of the information of which it would be the recipient, and of extending its function into the consultative field.
(4) Special security procedures shall be observed for the handling of all documentation of the NATO Nuclear Committee in accordance with rules established by the Permanent Council.

(5) As regards the possible recourse by NATO to nuclear weapons in its self-defence:

(a) In the event of an unmistakable Soviet attack with nuclear weapons in the NATO area, the forces of the Alliance should respond with nuclear weapons on the scale appropriate to the circumstances. The possibilities for consultation in this context are extremely limited.

(b) In the event of a full-scale attack by the Soviet Union with conventional forces, indicating the opening of general hostilities on any sector of the NATO area, the forces of the Alliance should, if necessary, respond with nuclear weapons on the scale appropriate to the circumstances. It is anticipated that time will in this case permit consultation.

(c) In the event of a Soviet attack not fulfilling those conditions described in (a) and (b) above but which threatened the integrity of the forces and the territory attacked and which could not be successfully held with the existing conventional forces, the decision to use nuclear weapons would be subject to prior consultation in the Council.

(6) That the Council notes with deep satisfaction the intention of the United States and United Kingdom Governments to consult with the North Atlantic Council, if time permits, concerning the use of nuclear weapons, anywhere in the world.

(7) That the Council notes with approval the progress made since the Oslo Ministerial Meeting with the development of NATO Defence Policy and urges the Permanent Council to press forward with the examination of the outstanding problems in this field.

(Signed) D. U. STIKKER

C/NATO, Paris, XVIc.
Draft Council Decision

In the light of its discussion in the course of restricted sessions on NATO defence policy, the Council agreed:

(a) To establish a NATO Nuclear Committee to receive and study on a permanent and systematic basis nuclear information relating to NATO defence. The scope and nature of such information would be defined more precisely in due course as the Committee gains experience.

(b) That the Committee should operate under special security procedures regarding the handling of information as laid down in C-M(62)50.

(c) That the Committee should consist of the Permanent Representatives meeting under the chairmanship of the Secretary General assisted as necessary by such members of their respective staffs as provided in the special security procedures referred to in (b).

(d) That the NATO Nuclear Committee should give further consideration in the light of experience to the desirability of establishing:

(i) sub-committees on a geographical or other basis for the handling of special categories of information;

(ii) arrangements for the bilateral transmission of detailed information whose wider dissemination would be contrary to the interests of security.

(e) That the NATO Nuclear Committee should determine, also in the light of experience, to what extent it could usefully assume a consultative role as regards the general organization of NATO nuclear defence without prejudice to the responsibilities vested in the North Atlantic Council.
Meeting of Alliance Foreign and Defence Ministers, Athens, Greece 4-6th May 1962
The regular Spring Ministerial Session of the NATO Council was held in Athens from 4th – 6th May, 1962. The meeting was attended by the Foreign Ministers of member countries as well as by the Defence Ministers, who had met separately on 3rd May.

2. In their review of the international situation, Ministers discussed disarmament, and the problem of Germany and Berlin. In addition, various statements were made by Ministers on matters of particular concern to their countries.

3. In reviewing developments at the Geneva Conference, the Council reaffirmed that general and complete disarmament under effective international control is the best means of ensuring lasting peace and security throughout the world. They noted with satisfaction the position taken by the Western Powers in Geneva in order to achieve this goal, and emphasised the importance and urgency of reaching agreement.

4. The Council examined the Berlin question in the light of the basic commitments of NATO in this regard. They took note of the most recent developments in the situation, including the fact that exploratory talks were taking place with the Soviet Union. They took the opportunity to reaffirm their attachment to the principles set forth in their Declaration of 16th December, 1958, on Berlin.

5. The Council noted the progress which has been made in the direction of closer co-operation between member countries in the development of the Alliance's defence policy. In this respect Ministers welcomed the confirmation by the United States that it will continue to make available for the Alliance the nuclear weapons necessary for NATO defence, concerting with its allies on basic plans and arrangements in regard to these weapons. In addition, both the United Kingdom and the United States Governments have given firm assurances that their strategic forces will continue to provide defence against threats to the Alliance beyond the capability of NATO-committed forces to deal with.

6. So that all member states may play their full part in consultation on nuclear defence policy, it has been decided to set up special procedures which will enable all members of the Alliance to exchange information concerning the role of nuclear weapons in NATO defence.
7. The purpose of NATO is defence, and it must be clear that in case of attack it will defend its members by all necessary means. The Council has reviewed the action that would be necessary on the part of member countries, collectively and individually, in the various circumstances in which the Alliance might be compelled to have recourse to its nuclear defences.

8. The Council noted the progress made during the last twelve months in the defence effort of the Alliance and, in particular, the qualitative and quantitative improvements brought about in the NATO assigned or earmarked forces of member countries. Ministers noted with satisfaction the United States commitments of Polaris submarines to NATO.

9. The Council is convinced that, if the Alliance is to meet the full range of threats to its security, the balance between the conventional and nuclear forces must be the subject of continuous examination. The contribution of member countries towards balanced forces for NATO defence during the coming years is to be examined within the framework of the Triennial Review procedure which is already under way. The Council expects to consider a report on this question at its next meeting in December.

10. At their separate meeting on 3rd May, the Defence Ministers discussed and approved a report from the Armaments Committee which reviewed progress made since their meeting in April 1962 in sharing the burden of research, development and production of military equipment, and made a number of recommendations for improving this co-operation. While there had been certain initial difficulties, Ministers agreed that the programme of co-operative projects launched at that time had made a successful start. Further efforts should now be made to build on this achievement. To obtain the necessary results, Ministers decided to set up a high-level group to examine the existing machinery and to make recommendations to the Ministerial Meeting in December 1962 for any improvements necessary to achieve agreement on future military requirements and a better co-ordination of the resources of the Alliance. Meanwhile, special efforts would be made to take final decisions on projects ripe for joint development.

11. The Council reviewed the development of political consultation within the Alliance. It noted the steady and encouraging progress made over the past twelve months in deepening and extending the process of consultation.

12. The Council had before it a detailed analysis of the work of the Alliance in scientific and technical co-operation. They discussed the proposals for fostering international scientific co-operation put forward by a group of eminent scientists appointed by the Secretary General. Ministers requested the Council in Permanent Session to consider these proposals further with a view to making recommendations to member governments.
13. Ministers noted that the Council in Permanent Session had discussed a report by the International Staff on Communist bloc activities in the economic field in less-developed countries. It was clear from this report that by far the largest proportion of the aid received by these countries continued to be that contributed by the economically most advanced countries of the Free World, and that the aid extended by the Communist bloc was not only substantially smaller than the assistance contributed by the Free World, but was also closely tied to political purposes.

Ministers noted with satisfaction the efforts the Free World is making to help developing countries to raise their standards of living while fully respecting their national independence and freedom, and emphasised the importance of continuing and intensifying these efforts.

14. Ministers gave special attention to the economic development requirements of Greece and Turkey. Bearing in mind the contribution of Greece and Turkey to the defence of the Alliance and their continuing efforts to accelerate their economic development in order to improve the living conditions for their peoples, Ministers recognised the need for external assistance to these two countries. With a view to achieving the common objectives in this matter, they agreed that member governments in a position to assist Greece and Turkey should examine urgently the manner of establishing, in an appropriate forum, possibly with other countries and appropriate international organizations, consortia to co-ordinate the mobilisation of resources needed to ensure the economic development of Greece and Turkey at a satisfactory rate. The Ministers also agreed to establish a Study Group to consider further the special defence problems of Greece.

15. The next Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council is scheduled to be held in Paris in December, 1962.
Robert S. McNamara, United States Secretary of Defence, arrives in Athens for the NATO Ministerial Meetings on 4-6 May 1962.
When I had the honor of addressing you in December I put forward my government's views on the directions that NATO defense policy should take.

At the time, I gave you our estimates of Soviet nuclear strike capabilities and compared them with the current nuclear strength of the Alliance. The results of that comparison were, on balance, encouraging, and nothing has occurred during the past five months to shake our confidence in the design and adequacy of our programs. In the aggregate, Alliance nuclear forces are numerically larger than those of the Soviet Union. They are more diversified, better deployed and protected, and on a higher state of alert. They are combat-ready and able to engage in flexible and decisive action.

You will recall that I also expressed confidence in the ability of the Alliance to maintain its superiority over the Sino-Soviet Bloc in a general nuclear war even though we must face the prospect of great and growing damage in the event that deterrence should fail. I then indicated my government's reasons for believing that the Alliance should bring its non-nuclear forces to a better balance with its nuclear forces. Today, I would like to discuss in greater depth our views on the problems of general nuclear war and its deterrence, the role and level of non-nuclear forces, and the linkage between these two types of forces in relation to deterrence. At the end of my remarks I will relate these considerations to several of the defense issues which have recently occupied the attention of the Alliance.

1. The need for the exchange of information to help provide a more adequate basis for closer consultation, participation and consensus on important issues, including in particular nuclear issues.

2. The formulation of guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons.

3. The role of external nuclear forces in the defense of the Alliance.

4. The level of non-nuclear force appropriate for the Alliance.
General Nuclear War and Its Deterrence

Nuclear technology has revolutionized warfare over the past seventeen years. The unprecedented destructiveness of these arms has radically changed ways of thinking about conflict among nations. It has properly focused great attention and efforts by the Alliance on the prevention of conflict. Nevertheless, the US has come to the conclusion that to the extent feasible basic military strategy in general nuclear war should be approached in such the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That is, to say, our principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the Alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces while attempting to preserve the fabric as well as the integrity of allied society. Specifically, our studies indicate that a strategy which targets nuclear forces only against cities or a mixture of civil and military targets has serious limitations for the purpose of deterrence and for the conduct of general nuclear war.

In our best judgment, destroying enemy forces while preserving our own society is — within the limits inherent in the great power of nuclear weapons - a not wholly unsustainable military objective. Even if very substantial exchange of nuclear weapons were to occur, the damage suffered by the belligerents would vary over wide ranges, depending upon the targets that are hit. If both sides were to confine their attacks to important military targets, damage, while high, would nevertheless be significantly lower than if urban-industrial areas were also attacked. As an example, our studies of a hypothetical general nuclear war occurring in 1966 show that, with the conflict starting under one particular set of circumstances, and with the Soviets confining their attacks to military targets, the United States under present civil defense plans might suffer 25 million deaths and Europe might suffer somewhat fewer. On the other hand, were the Soviets to attack urban-industrial as well as military targets, the United States might incur 75 million deaths and Europe would have to face the prospect of losing 115 million people. While both sets of figures make grim reading, the first set is preferable to the second. There are others like them.

In the light of these findings the United States has developed its plans in order to put a variety of strategic choices. We have also instituted a number of programs which will enable the Alliance to engage in a controlled and flexible nuclear response in the event that deterrence should fail. Whether the Soviet Union will do likewise must remain uncertain. All we can say is that the Kremlin has very strong incentives — in large part provided by the nuclear strength of the Alliance — to adopt similar strategies and programs. Thus, we calculate that in 1966, if the Alliance were to limit its retaliatory attack to military targets in the Soviet Union, while holding superior forces in reserve, the Soviets might suffer around 25 million deaths, whereas if we attack urban-industrial targets in the wake of a Soviet strike against European and American cities, the Soviets would suffer at least 100 million deaths.

Other factors besides target strategies of the belligerents would determine the damage in a thermo-nuclear war. The yields of the warheads used in a nuclear exchange would make a significant difference in the amount of
blast, thermal, and fallout damage; and it is possible to match the yields to the particular targets under attack and so reduce damage to civilians. Furthermore, as the accuracy of missiles improves, the belligerents could attack targets with greater assurance of destroying them; they could also reduce the yields with which they strike. If they so choose, they could regulate the height at which they burst their weapons and thereby affect the amount of fallout that is distributed. The existence of civil defenses also could have a significant impact on the number of deaths, especially if only military targets are attacked so that the principal danger to most civilians is from fallout. Depending on these and other factors, the number of deaths could vary over a wide range—by four times or more. The more discriminating the attacks, the less the damage.

I have raised these points because we think they are relevant to allied defense policies now and in the future. In particular, we believe that they have important implications for the general war posture of the Alliance and the role that NATO should assign to nuclear forces in its grand strategy.

II. The General War Posture of the Alliance

Perhaps the most important implication of these observations is that nuclear superiority has important meanings. I want to stress that for the most relevant planning period—through the mid 1980's—there can be little question about the ability of the Alliance to maintain nuclear superiority over the Sino-Soviet Bloc. During the coming fiscal year the United States plans to spend close to $15 billion on its nuclear weapons to assure such superiority.

Strategic Retaliatory Forces

We are confident that our current programs are adequate to ensure continuing superiority for as far into the future as we can reasonably foresee. By 1985, as shown in the table below, these programs will give us 355 long-range bombers, about 800 air-launched missiles, and over 1,500 ICBM and Polaris missiles in addition to nuclear forces stationed in Europe, the Far East and at sea.
US Strategic Retaliatory Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bombers (a)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-52</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>630</td>
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<td>630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-47</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-58</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Bombers</strong></td>
<td>1495</td>
<td>1550</td>
<td>1295</td>
<td>1150</td>
<td>955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air-Launched Missiles</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mound Dog</strong></td>
<td>216</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Skybolt</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total GAM's</strong></td>
<td>216</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ICBM and Polaris Missiles</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Atlas</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>129</td>
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<tr>
<td>Titan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minuteman, Hardened &amp; Dispersed</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polaris</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total ICBM/Polaris</strong></td>
<td>108</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>1147</td>
<td>1507</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Effective 1st August, 1961, the program provides for approximately 50% of the B-52 and B-47 forces, less those units assigned to training, to be on 15 minute ground alert.

We doubt that the Soviet Union will be able to match this capability. Nevertheless, as insurance against the unforeseen, we have already purchased the capability to increase rapidly the production of the Minuteman missile beyond our expected requirements by installing production lines additional to those required by our current program. We can take other remedial measures as well should our estimates of Soviet capabilities undergo significant changes.

Target Coverage of Threat to Europe

The relevance of our nuclear capability to the nuclear threat facing Europe deserves some emphasis. This threat is not inconsiderable. At the present time SAGUR's most urgent set of targets, the threat list, consists of approximately 700 targets. (There are in addition other lower priority targets to be dealt with by major subordinate commanders, during and after the first strikes.) The SAGUR threat list includes such high priority targets as MREW sites, bases for Soviet nuclear-capable aircraft, nuclear storage sites, and military command and control centers. A planned strike against one of these targets may consist, for example, of a B-52 launched from a base in the United States, an A4D from an aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean, and also a missile
fired from the United States or from SACEUR's area. By means of this cross-targeting we achieve a high probability of destroying the designated targets.

More than 1500 weapons are scheduled against SACEUR's nuclear threat list. SACEUR plans to assure the destruction of 90 targets on the list with his forces alone. Approximately 300 targets are scheduled for attack and destruction solely with external forces. SACEUR schedules sorties against another 200 or more targets with his own forces, but the assurance that he will be able to destroy them is not enough to warrant reliance on his attacks alone. Therefore, with respect to these 200 targets, additional sorties are assigned to forces external to his theater. The entire threat list is covered and approximately 90% of it is scheduled for attack by external forces. Of the weapons now assigned to this tank, about two-thirds will be delivered by the US Strategic Air Command. The United States has made clear that it places the major Soviet nuclear forces threatening Europe in the same high priority category as those also able to reach North America. In short, we have undertaken the nuclear defense of NATO on a global basis. This will continue to be our objective. In the execution of this mission, the weapons in the European theater are only one resource among many.

Survivability and Control

A large nuclear force is not enough to assure a politically responsible force, or to carry out a policy of controlled and selective response, or to permit us to fulfill all important general war missions. These vital properties depend on the survivability and endurance of the forces and their vital networks of command and control. The Alliance now possesses the ability to absorb a Soviet attack and go on to destroy a very high proportion of the targets of importance in the Sino-Soviet bloc. This powerful, second-strike force will be maintained together with the ability to control and direct the forces as the military situation may dictate at the time. For this purpose, distance, dispersal, mobility, hardness, and alertness represent the best effective measures at our disposal. All are being exploited in current bomber and missile programs.

In light of these considerations, the bulk of the nuclear resources of the Alliance, to the extent of 90% of the alert nuclear weapons and over 90% of the total yield of alert nuclear weapons, is stationed outside of European territory, designed to function as a single instrument to accomplish a single indivisible task. Geographic, technical and military considerations suggest that most of these forces should continue to be so located. And with a large overall gain in effectiveness. For example, the large missile force that is planned will greatly reduce the elapsed time from decision to launch to destruction of enemy targets - even with remotely based missiles.
Effectiveness in Combat

I think we are entitled to be confident that the Soviet Union will not initiate the use of nuclear weapons in the face of our nuclear superiority. A surprise nuclear attack, coming out of the blue, simply is not a rational course of action for the Soviet Union. However, even if such an attack were to come, looking ahead as far as 1966, we are confident that in the wake of such an attack we could destroy about 90% of the fixed targets in the Soviet Union while retaining large reserve forces with which to counter surviving bloc forces and to force an end to the conflict. We could also inflict civil damage over a wide range depending upon our target strategy. The Soviets could not win such a war in any meaningful military sense and they might lose their country in the course of the conflict.

A Soviet-initiative in the use of nuclear weapons as an outgrowth of a limited engagement in Europe or elsewhere appears equally unlikely. In this case also, the Soviets would find themselves unable to gain any fruitful objectives.

Indivisibility of Control

I have already mentioned the importance of command and control. If we are to exercise the necessary direction of our forces, a system of command must survive for that purpose. But there is more to command and control than the underground centers, seaborne controls, and airborne operations centers that we possess or are developing. The efficient use of our resources implies that the Alliance deterrence system have three vital attributes: unity of planning, executive authority, and central direction - for nuclear war to be war there are no theaters, or rather, the theater is world-wide. Specific missions and the most efficient way to perform them should determine the weapons that we acquire, where we deploy them, and who should command them.

It is even more important that the Alliance have unity of planning, decision-making, and direction with respect to responses to enemy actions and especially to retaliatory attacks against them. There must not be competing and conflicting strategies in the conduct of nuclear war. We are convinced that a general nuclear war target system is indivisible and if nuclear war should occur, our best hope lies in conducting a centrally controlled campaign against all of the enemy's vital nuclear capabilities. Doing this means carefully choosing targets, pre-planning strikes, co-ordinating attacks, and assessing results, as well as allocating and directing follow-on attacks from the center. These call, in our view, for a greater degree of Alliance participation in formulating nuclear policies and consulting on the appropriate occasions for using these weapons. Beyond this, it is essential that we centralize the decision to use our nuclear weapons to the greatest extent possible. We would all find it intolerable to contemplate having only a part of the strategic force launched in isolation from our main striking power.

If a portion of the Alliance nuclear force, acting by itself, were to initiate a retaliatory attack by destroying only a small part of the
Soviet nuclear force, our enemy would be left free to reallocate other weapons to cover the targets originally assigned to the destroyed part. Thus, aside from endangering us, a strike aimed at destroying the Soviet MIRV's aimed at Country A, which left the others standing, would be of little value to Country A. It would merely oblige the Soviets to shift other missiles to cover the Country A targets. We would all find it equally intolerable to have one segment of the Alliance force attacking urban-industrial areas while, with the bulk of our forces, we were succeeding in destroying most of the enemy's nuclear capabilities. Such a failure in co-ordination might lead to the destruction of our hostages - the Soviet cities - just at a time when our strategy of coercing the Soviets into stopping their aggression was on the verge of success.

Failure to achieve central control of NATO nuclear forces would mean running a risk of bringing down on us the catastrophe which we most urgently wish to avoid.

In this connection, our analyses suggest rather strongly that relatively weak nuclear forces with enemy cities as their targets are not likely to be adequate to perform the function of deterrence. In a world of threats, crises, and possibly even accidents, such a posture appears more likely to deter its owner from standing firm under pressure than to inhibit a potential aggressor. If it is small, and perhaps vulnerable on the ground or in the air, or inaccurate, it enables a major antagonist to take a variety of measures to counter it. Indeed, if a major antagonist came to believe there was a substantial likelihood of it being used independently, this force would be inviting a pre-emptive first strike against it. In the event of war, the use of such a force against the cities of a major nuclear power would be tantamount to suicide, whereas its employment against significant military targets would have a negligible effect on the outcome of the conflict. In short, the weak nuclear capabilities, operating independently, are expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent.

It is for these reasons that I have laid such stress on unity of planning, concentration of executive authority, and central direction. Without them general nuclear war means certain ruin; with them we have a chance of survival as nations.

III. The Role of General War Strength in Alliance Strategy

What does the Alliance accomplish by creating this complex machinery to maintain nuclear superiority over the Sino-Soviet bloc? And what is the impact on NATO's policies of both the grave damage that would result from nuclear war and the great variations in that damage under different strategies?

My Government feels that the strategic capabilities I have described have important political consequences. The Alliance continues to possess much of the diplomatic freedom that it has enjoyed in the past. We can confidently reject the missile threats that Mr. Khrushchev so imprudently brandishes. If the Soviets or their satellites impinge on
our interests we can resist with considerable confidence that our antagonists will not wish to escalate the conflict. The question at issue now is the point at which NATO, not the Soviets, would wish to escalate a non-nuclear conflict.

As the President has indicated on a number of occasions, the United States is prepared to respond immediately with nuclear weapons to the use of nuclear weapons against one or more members of the Alliance. The United States is also prepared to counter with nuclear weapons any Soviet conventional attack so strong that it cannot be dealt with by conventional means. But let us be quite clear what we are saying and what we have to face. Owing to our non-nuclear deficiencies, there is, first, a high probability that in an ambiguous situation the West, not the East, would have to make the decision to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. Secondly, there is the almost certain prospect that, despite our nuclear superiority and our ability to destroy the Soviet target system, all of us will suffer deeply in the event of major nuclear war.

The Berlin crisis exemplifies a type of threat that we should expect to face elsewhere in the NATO area. In such a crisis the provocation, while severe, does not immediately require or justify our most violent reaction. Also as such a crisis develops, as military force is threatened or becomes engaged— even in limited quantities— the increasingly alert nuclear posture of the belligerents makes the prospective outcome of a nuclear attack for both sides even less attractive.

In short, faced with the more likely contingencies, NATO, not the Soviets, would have to make the momentous decision to use nuclear weapons, and we would do so in the knowledge that the consequences might be catastrophic for all of us.

We in the United States are prepared to accept our share of this responsibility. And we believe that the combination of our nuclear superiority and a strategy of controlled response gives us some hope of minimizing damage in the event that we have to fulfill our pledge. But I would be less than candid if I pretended to you that the United States regards this as a desirable prospect or believes that the Alliance should depend solely on our nuclear power to deter the Soviet Union from actions not involving a massive commitment of Soviet forces. Surely an Alliance with the wealth, talent, and experience that we possess can find a better way than this to meet our common threat.

We shall continue to maintain powerful nuclear forces for the Alliance as a whole. They will continue to provide the Alliance a strong sanction against Soviet first use of nuclear weapons. Under some circumstances they may be the only instrument with which we can counter Soviet non-nuclear aggression, in which case we shall use them. But, in our view, the threat of general nuclear war should constitute only one of several weapons in our arsenal and one to be used with prudence. On this question I can see no valid reason for a fundamental difference of view on the two sides of the Atlantic.
IV. Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons

Our great nuclear superiority for general war does not solve all our problems of deterring and dealing with less than all-out direct assault. What, then, is the prospect that NATO can fall back on the local or tactical use of nuclear weapons? Battlefield nuclear weapons were introduced in NATO at a time when our shield forces were weak and the Soviet atomic stockpile was small. In those circumstances it was reasonable to hope that NATO might very quickly halt a Soviet advance into Western Europe by unilateral application of nuclear weapons on or near the battlefield. Using nuclear weapons tactically might still accomplish a desired end in the early 1960's. Consequently, we continue to maintain substantial nuclear forces within the European theater and we now have over nuclear weapons of various yields stockpiled in Europe.

But how much dependence should NATO place on these capabilities? We should succeed in deterring the Soviets from initiating the use of nuclear weapons, and the presence of these weapons in Europe helps to prevent Soviet use locally. But NATO can no longer expect to avoid nuclear retaliation in the event that it initiates their use. Even a local nuclear exchange could have consequences for Europe that are most painful to contemplate. Further, such an exchange would be unlikely to give us any marked military advantage. It could rapidly lead to general nuclear war.

To be sure, a very limited use of nuclear weapons, primarily for purposes of demonstrating our will and intent to employ such weapons, might bring Soviet aggression to a halt without substantial retaliation, and without escalation. This is a near-to-last option we cannot dismiss. But prospects for success are not high, and I hesitate to predict what the political consequences would be of taking such action. It is also conceivable that the limited tactical use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield would not broaden a conventional engagement or radically transform it. But we do not rate these prospects very highly.

Highly dispersed nuclear weapons in the hands of troops would be difficult to control centrally. Accidents and unauthorised acts could well occur on both sides. Furthermore, the pressures on the Soviets to respond in kind, the great flexibility of nuclear systems, the enormous firepower contained in a single weapon, the ease and accuracy with which that firepower can be called in from unattacked and hence undamaged distant bases, the crucial importance of air superiority in nuclear operations - all these considerations suggest to us that local nuclear war would be a transient but highly destructive phenomenon.

I realize there is a school of thought which believes that the United States and the Soviet Union might seek to use Europe as a nuclear battleground and thus avoid attacks on one another's homelands. Not only does my government emphatically reject such a view; we also regard it as unrealistic. It ignores the basic facts of nuclear warfare I have described; it contemplates geographical limits unrelated to the actualities of target locations, and of the varied sources from which
attacks would come. Any substantial nuclear operation in Europe inevitably would involve both forces and targets in the US and USSR. It is possible, as I have mentioned, that a small, demonstrative use of nuclear weapons could be contained locally, and possibly, distant nuclear operations in less vital locations outside the NATO area, or at sea, may be limitable. But there is likely to be no effective operational boundary, or set of mutual restraints, which could restrict large-scale nuclear war to NATO Europe and the satellites. As we understand the dynamics of nuclear warfare, we believe that a local nuclear engagement would do grave damage to Europe, be militarily ineffective, and would probably expand very rapidly into general nuclear war.

V. Non-Nuclear Forces and Deterrence

With the Alliance possessing the strength and the strategy I have described, it is most unlikely that the Soviet Union will launch a nuclear attack on NATO. But there are other forms of aggression, and in December I mentioned our concern that the threat of general war might not be adequate against many lesser Soviet actions, political as well as military. Some such hostile actions we could thwart now; others we might not. To deal with these others, now can we convincingly show that aggression, if continued, would lead to a situation where the danger of nuclear war was very great indeed? Let us assume two situations:

In the first, the NATO front is lightly covered by our forces. In the event of deep penetration by Soviet non-nuclear forces which our forces cannot prevent, the only military options open to Alliance forces are immediate nuclear response or defeat. This might be true even for a minor Soviet challenge.

In the second, we assume the NATO front firmly hold under a concept of forward strategy. Ready and able to deal with any Soviet non-nuclear attack less than all-out, NATO forces guard positively from the front against any quick strike or ambiguous aggression. The NATO front can be broken only by massive application of Soviet power. In such a major fight, if Western forces were thrown back, Alliance nuclear action would follow.

If you were on the other side, which situation would you consider more laden with a real risk of nuclear war with all its consequences? Which would make you more inclined to refrain from a series of actions designed, step by step, to erode NATO's interests? To us the answer is clear.

In the first situation, it simply is not credible that NATO, or anyone else, would respond to a given small step - the first slice of salami - with immediate use of nuclear weapons. Nor is it credible that a chain of small actions, no one of which is catastrophic, would evoke a response of general nuclear war. We regard it as much more evident that NATO would find it politically possible to act in effective defense of its interests from the second posture than from the first.
The development of recent events concerning Berlin may provide relevant evidence of the utility of limited but decisive action. Although it would be premature to announce the end of this crisis, and in any case we cannot be certain of the influence that most affect Kremlin policy, it is not unlikely that the NATO non-nuclear buildup conveyed to the Soviets the right message about Berlin. When the Soviets began menacing Berlin, they may have entertained doubts about Western determination; clearly they were not deterred from their initial steps by our previous nuclear threats. But the creation of greater new non-nuclear strength has reinforced our overall deterrent, and the aggression has not occurred. It was not simply the substantial increase in NATO manpower and the addition of the equivalent of four combat-ready divisions, 36 more ships and 19 more air squadrons, but the meaning which their addition conveyed of our determination that may have given the Soviets second thoughts.

For the kinds of conflicts we think most likely to arise in the NATO area, non-nuclear capabilities appear to be clearly the sort the Alliance would wish to use at the outset. The purpose of our common effort is the defense of the populations and territories of NATO. To achieve this, at least initially, with non-nuclear means requires that our non-nuclear defense begin where the populations and territories begin. A truly forward deployment, along the lines General Harstad has advocated, we consider an urgent need of the Alliance.

Let me make clear however that we do not believe that a forward defense must be able to defeat in non-nuclear action every conceivable element of Soviet strength that might be thrown against it. Our nuclear forces would rapidly come into play if an all-out attack developed. We believe the Soviets can hardly doubt that; hence, we think it quite improbable that a major attack would develop out of a crisis.

In our view, an urgent military task facing NATO is to provide in the Central Region non-nuclear forces of the approximate size called for in MC 26/4, with those forces being fully equipped and manned, and adequately supported. Provision of the organized units is one step, and, from the table below, you can see some of what remains to be done.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Region Ground Strength (a)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Divisions in Being 1st April, 1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat division equivalent</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(a) Strength includes Brigades as 1/3 Division
We are about two-thirds of the way toward our 30-division-equivalent force; during the last year we have seen a 25% increase in fully combat ready division equivalents. In air forces our present strength of 2,682 aircraft is quite near the goal, and the numbers have been increased by 10% over this year. Our air and ground force goals are not distant, and during the past year we have made real progress toward them. The quality of our forces, however, is another question and one to which all NATO governments should give searching attention. In December, I spoke of this problem citing the surveys by major NATO commanders. Some actions were under way then, and some further ones have been begun. Here too we have seen some improvement. But even after current programs are completed, there will still remain serious deficiencies. Manning levels still promise to be inadequate, and many needed combat support units are missing or weak. Some reflection of how this can drag down our combat capabilities is seen in the table by the contrast, both for a year ago and for today, between nominal division totals and the number of fully combat ready division equivalents. There are also alarming weaknesses in our service support systems. Defects which degrade our ability to support sustained non-nuclear combat include exposed positioning of stocks, lack of depth in depot systems, low levels of war reserve of ammunition and repair parts, and much obsolescent or absent material. The improvements which have been made in supply and stockage levels for certain types of ammunition, smoke幕, and Army personnel carriers, suggest that we can correct our other logistical deficiencies.

These deficiencies should be of concern to the Alliance for an additional reason. They suggest that the Alliance is not carrying out its defense tasks efficiently. The resources currently devoted to non-nuclear forces on both sides of the Atlantic are by no means small. But until these forces are strong enough to make possible effective action against those of the Bloc, they contribute little to our defense. Moreover, our efforts are unbalanced. For example, NATO has more men under arms than the Soviet Union and its European satelliles but judges itself to be inferior in non-nuclear capacity--that type of conflict in which manpower counts most. To a considerable extent, this inferiority stems from specific, remediable deficiencies. As long as they continue to exist, they will serve to undermine our overall efforts.

May I emphasize the earnestness with which my government regards this non-nuclear buildup by recalling some of our relevant programs. Having put in hand a series of measures, including the addition of $4 billion to the 1962 and 1963 budgets, to assure adequate protected strategic nuclear strength, last summer we undertook to strengthen our non-nuclear power by adding $10 billion for this purpose to the previously planned level of expenditures for fiscal years 1962 and 1963. To take the immediate steps which Berlin obliged, and to tide us over while new permanent strength was being created, we called up 150,000 reservists. We will be releasing them this summer, but only because in the meantime we have built up on an enduring basis more added strength than the call-up temporarily gave us. The number of US combat-ready divisions has been increased from 11 to 16. Stockpiled here in Europe now are full sets of equipment for two additional divisions; the men of these divisions can be rapidly moved to Europe by air.
The US is prepared to offer its Allies help in overcoming their logistics support difficulties and equipment shortages by providing credit for the purchase of material and supplies and by providing for the delivery of such material, in certain cases, from existing US stocks or from current US production to allied forces.

I want to repeat that meeting these goals, and improving the quality and staying power of these forces may not enable us to defeat an all-out Bloc non-nuclear attack. But it will fill in the major gap in our deterrent strength. With improvements in ground force strength and staying power, improved non-nuclear air capabilities, and better equipped and trained reserve forces, the Soviet Union can be assured that no gap exists in the NATO defense of this vital region, and that no aggression small or large can succeed.

VI. Current US Views on Alliance Decisions

Although it is not our purpose at this meeting to reach decisions on the major issues confronting the Alliance, my government believes that we must do so in the very near future. Consequently, I shall summarize our current views on these issues as they have developed out of our current and ongoing review. I trust that the result will be a further exchange of ideas among us.

Exchange of Information

An important item is the amount of information that the Alliance should have about nuclear posture and strategy. Our own view is that the flow of information should be greater than it has been in the past. We welcome the new procedures for handling sensitive information and we plan to provide information about our nuclear forces and consult about basic plans and arrangements for their use on a continuing basis.

At this meeting, as at the December meeting, I have attempted to be forthright in providing information that bears on the crucial issues facing us. Last week, General Power presented to the MAC a statement on certain aspects of US strategic retaliatory power. In the coming months, US military personnel will be prepared to discuss other aspects of our common problems.

Guidelines and Consultation

The formulation and adoption of guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons has also occupied the attention of the Alliance. I believe the discussion has been a useful one. It has cast light on the complexity of the problems of deterrence and war conduct. We feel that the guidelines that have been agreed to by a large majority of the Alliance are appropriate and helpful.

Coverage of Soviet Forces Threatening Europe

I have described the strength of the strategic retaliatory forces devoted to Alliance tasks. This force works in conjunction with NATO-
committed forces and is devoted to a very considerable degree to countering Soviet forces that are able to attack Western Europe. This mission is assigned not only in fulfillment of our treaty commitments but also because the indivisible character of nuclear war compels it. More specifically, the US targets key elements of Soviet nuclear striking power, including ICBM's, with as high priority to that portion that can reach Western Europe as to that portion that also can reach the United States.

**Commitment of POLARIS**

A major and growing component of these external forces is the POLARIS fleet. The President stated at Ottawa that the US would commit certain of these submarines to NATO. Effective today, we are committing the five fully operational ships, earmarked for assignment to SACLANT. By the end of 1962, two more will be committed for a total of seven. By the end of 1963, we expect to have committed 12, and probably withdrawn two for overhaul, leaving a net of 10. Thus our entire POLARIS Force ready at that time will be committed to NATO.

As the program develops thereafter, it is our present intention to commit to NATO those POLARIS submarines which are fully operational—that is, those which have been worked up to readiness, less those withdrawn for major shipyard overhaul—which operate normally in NATO waters. Under present plans, this will be the bulk of the POLARIS fleet, since some will go to the Pacific, and perhaps some in due course, to other stations.

This protected, long endurance, controllable force is a vital and unique element of NATO’s retaliatory capacity. It must be used so as to make a maximum contribution to the overall NATO nuclear response which we regard as indivisible. Specifically, operations, targeting, and firing timing of the POLARIS submarines must be responsive to the overall requirements of the Alliance as a whole. Their use therefore, will not be limited to the support of any single theater or major commander.

**An ICBM Force**

We are prepared to enter into a detailed discussion of the need for an ICBM force in the Permanent Council as soon as possible after this meeting. We will then be ready to discuss the full range of technical, military and political problems that would be associated with such a force. We expect our allies will wish to consider very carefully the full implications of undertaking this venture. There are many complicated questions to be dealt with. In the meantime, the US, although it is not committed to the procurement or deployment of an ICBM weapon system, is proceeding with the design of such a weapon. Certain of the technical specifications of the weapon we have under development are listed in the attached Appendix.

**Non-Nuclear forces and the Forward Strategy**

We believe that NATO and its military commanders should undertake as a high priority matter the implementation of the forward strategy in the Central
Region. Specifically, that the ground forces needed to defend at the frontier, in the order of 30 divisions, be provided; that ground and air forces be appropriately deployed and supplied with required combat and service support elements; that adequate equipment and stocks to make these forces effective be made available, and that the air forces, in particular, be protected so as to be able to function effectively in non-nuclear combat.

The United States recognizes the difficulties to be overcome in accomplishing this program. But it is a modest one in relation both to the crises that may arise and to the resources we command. The question is not one of the ability of the Alliance but of its will. The obstacles are real. We all have our special problems of conscription, or budget level, or the balance of payments. However, the brute facts of technology and the realities of military power cannot be denied. They call for us to take common action.
Summary Data on Missile "X"

Range
2,000 n. mi.

CET
about 1,000 feet (land based) at 1,000 n. mi.
about 1,700 feet (sea based) at 1,000 n. mi.

Warhead yield

Missile gross weight
12,000 lbs

Method of operation: surface ship, mobile or road mobile to be determined in the light of numerous factors

Cost for 250 missiles: about $2 billion

FY 1963 amount programmed by the US for research and development: $200 million

Availability: Assuming a production decision by 1st July 1963, operational deployment would begin in 1965.
CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
PUBLIC DISCLOSED

NATO RESTRICTED
NATO DOCUMENT
C-R(62)23

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

Note by the Secretary General,
Chairman of the Council

The Council, at the Ministerial Meeting at Athens(1), considered my special report on NATO Defence Policy(2). They will recall that I stated that the Italian Delegation had informed me that, pending the clarification of certain procedural problems arising from the internal juridical situation in Italy, the Italian authorities were not yet in a position to express their final views on the conclusions to the present document, but that I understood that the Italian Delegation hoped to be able to confirm its final position in the Permanent Council at an early date.

2. Taking note of this position, Ministers then accepted my suggestion that they should confirm the factual statement of the position as set out in paragraph 25 of my report, which is reproduced as an Annex to this note, with the minor drafting amendments I introduced at the Council's meeting in Athens.

3. Ministers also agreed that the Council in permanent session should continue its studies on NATO Defence Policy.

(Signed) D.U. STIKKER

CT-N/NATO,
Paris, XVIe.

(1) C-R(62)23
(2) C-W(62)48
Against the background described in paragraphs 1-2a of C-W(62)48 I have prepared the following text of conclusions on which Ministers might be invited to agree at the meeting in Athens. Fourteen members of the Alliance have already indicated that they can accept this text, subject only in the case of some members to a preference for some minor amendments in paragraphs 5(b) and (c). The French Permanent Representative has informed the Council that his Government would accept paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7, but that they have reservations in regard to paragraphs 5 and 6. Should it not be possible for France to lift these reservations, I would suggest that the Ministers could agree on this text on the understanding that these guidelines and the undertaking to consult in NATO would apply only to those countries having effective responsibility for a decision to authorise the use of nuclear weapons and willing to accept these conclusions as a whole. It would naturally be open to France to participate in any consultation initiated by one of her Allies.

(1) That the Alliance has received the most satisfactory assurances, first, that the United States will continue to make available for the Alliance nuclear weapons adequate in number and kind to meet the needs of NATO defence; and second, that the United States and the United Kingdom strategic forces will continue to cover as fully as possible in combination with NATO forces all key elements of Soviet nuclear striking power, including ICBM sites, giving equal priority to those threatening the mainland of Europe as to those threatening the United States and the United Kingdom.

(2) That the Council welcomes the intention of the United States and United Kingdom Governments to furnish their NATO allies with the fullest amount of information compatible with the requirements of security on the nuclear weapons and external forces referred to in the preceding paragraph, with a view to assisting their allies in obtaining a full insight into the overall problem of the organization and control of NATO nuclear defence.

(3) In order to enable the flow of information to begin, a NATO Nuclear Committee, consisting of the Permanent Representatives, has been established to receive and study on a permanent and systematic basis nuclear information relating to NATO defence(2). The Committee should give consideration in the light of experience to problems of its own internal organization as well as to the possibility of defining more closely the scope and nature of the information of which it would be the recipient, and of extending its function into the consultative field.

(2) C-W(62)48
(2) See Appendix
(4) Special security procedures shall be observed for the handling of all documentation of the NATO Nuclear Committee in accordance with rules established by the Permanent Council.

(5) As regards the possible recourse by NATO to nuclear weapons in its self-defence:

(a) In the event of an unmistakable Soviet attack with nuclear weapons in the NATO area, the forces of the Alliance should respond with nuclear weapons on the scale appropriate to the circumstances. The possibilities for consultation in this context are extremely limited.

(b) In the event of a full-scale attack by the Soviet Union with conventional forces, indicating the opening of general hostilities on any sector of the NATO area, the forces of the Alliance should, if necessary, respond with nuclear weapons on the scale appropriate to the circumstances. It is anticipated that time will in this case permit consultation.

(c) In the event of a Soviet attack not fulfilling those conditions described in (a) and (b) above but which threatened the integrity of the forces and the territory attacked and which could not be successfully held with the existing conventional forces, the decision to use nuclear weapons would be subject to prior consultation in the Council.

(6) That the Council notes with deep satisfaction the intention of the United States and United Kingdom Governments to consult with the North Atlantic Council, if time permits, concerning the use of nuclear weapons, anywhere in the world.

(7) That the Council notes with approval the progress made since the Oslo Ministerial Meeting with the development of NATO Defence Policy and urges the Permanent Council to press forward with the examination of the outstanding problems in this field.
Council Decision

In the light of its discussion in the course of restricted sessions on NATO defence policy, the Council agreed:

(a) To establish a NATO Nuclear Committee to receive and study on a permanent and systematic basis nuclear information relating to NATO defence. The scope and nature of such information would be defined more precisely in due course as the Committee gains experience.

(b) That the Committee should operate under special security procedures regarding the handling of information as laid down in C-M(62)50.

(c) That the Committee should consist of the Permanent Representatives meeting under the chairmanship of the Secretary General assisted as necessary by such members of their respective staffs as provided in the special security procedures referred to in (b).

(d) That the NATO Nuclear Committee should give further consideration in the light of experience to the desirability of establishing:

(i) sub-committees on a geographical or other basis for the handling of special categories of information;

(ii) arrangements for the bilateral transmission of detailed information whose wider dissemination would be contrary to the interests of security.

(e) That the NATO Nuclear Committee should determine, also in the light of experience, to what extent it could usefully assume a consultative role as regards the general organization of NATO nuclear defence without prejudice to the responsibilities vested in the North Atlantic Council.
Report by the Working Group

At its meeting on 31st July, 1963(1), the Council considered a note by the Secretary General(2) to which was attached a memorandum and a new draft Agreement for Co-operation regarding Atomic Information submitted by the United States Delegation. The Council agreed to establish a Working Group to consider this draft Agreement and to submit proposals to the Council.

2. The Working Group submits hereafter the draft of an Agreement established in the light of comments made by various delegations on the original United States proposals.

3. It is suggested that for the conclusion of the Agreement a procedure should be followed similar to that adopted in 1955 for the earlier Agreement. The first step under such a procedure would be for the Council to accept a resolution on the following lines:

"THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

NOTING that the Working Group, which was convened to consider the new draft Agreement for Co-operation regarding Atomic Information proposed by the United States to the other Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, has now submitted an agreed text which is attached herewith, and

WELCOMING the initiative of the United States in proposing the Agreement,

APPROVES the draft text of the Agreement, and

RECOMMENDS to member governments that they take action in accordance with their own national requirements with a view to the conclusion of the Agreement."

(1) C-R(63)42, Item III
(2) C-M(63)63

(*) NATO ORIG. DOCUMENT

110.CS. 4000.423

NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP
The second step would be for each nation to sign it under the terms of its constitutional requirements. This, in the case of certain nations, may require the provision to the Permanent Representatives concerned of "Full Powers". The United States Delegation has explained to the Working Group that its own internal processes would be greatly facilitated if signatures could be appended to the Agreement as soon as each individual nation was ready to do so rather than to wait until the last nation was in a position to sign and then for all to sign simultaneously. The Working Group therefore unanimously recommends that the procedure suggested by the United States should be adopted. This view is reflected in Article 12 of the text of the Agreement itself.

5. Thirdly, each nation would, under its constitutional procedures, ratify this Agreement, which would come into force when every nation had done so.

6. As in the case of the previous Agreement it is suggested that the new Agreement should be declassified and issued to the press. This should take place at a date to be decided by the Council. The two Annexes would, however, retain their present classifications and would not, of course, be given to the press.

7. Finally, the Agreement itself will, under the provisions of Article 102 of the United Nations Charter, have to be communicated to that Organisation.

8. It is therefore recommended that the Council should:

(a) adopt the resolution set out in paragraph 3 above;

(b) agree on the procedures for signature and ratification set out in paragraphs 4 and 5 above;

(c) agree that the Agreement should be open for signature forty-eight hours after all delegations have been notified of final confirmation of the acceptance of the resolution in paragraph 3 above by all member nations;

(d) decide on the timing of the declassification and release to the press of the Agreement itself.

(Signed) COLEBRIDGE
Chairman

OTAN/NATO,
Paris, XVIE.

NATO SECRET (*)
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY FOR CO-OPERATION REGARDING ATOMIC INFORMATION

PREAMBLE

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on 4th April, 1949,

recognising that their mutual security and defence requires that they be prepared to meet the contingencies of atomic warfare, and

recognising that their common interest will be advanced by making available to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its member states information pertinent thereto, and

taking into consideration the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, which was prepared with these purposes in mind,

acting on their own behalf and on behalf of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,

agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

In accordance with and subject to the requirements of the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Government of the United States of America will, while the North Atlantic Treaty Organization continues to make substantial and material contributions to the mutual defence and security, co-operate by communicating, from time to time, to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its member states, while they continue to make such contributions, atomic information in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, provided that the Government of the United States of America determines that such co-operation will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to its defence and security.

ARTICLE II

Paralleling the undertaking of the Government of the United States of America under this Agreement, the other member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will, to the extent they deem necessary, communicate to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, including its military and civilian elements, and to member states atomic information of their own origin of the same types provided for in this Agreement. The terms and conditions governing these communications by other member states will be the subject of subsequent agreements, but will be the same or similar to the terms and conditions specified in this Agreement.
ARTICLE III

The Government of the United States of America will communicate to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, including its military and civilian elements, and to Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization requiring the atomic information in connection with their functions related to NATO missions, such atomic information as is determined by the Government of the United States of America to be necessary to:

(a) the development of defence plans;

(b) the training of personnel in the employment of and defence against atomic weapons and other military applications of atomic energy;

(c) the evaluation of the capabilities of potential enemies in the employment of atomic weapons and other military applications of atomic energy; and

(d) the development of delivery systems compatible with the atomic weapons which they carry.

ARTICLE IV

1. Co-operation under this Agreement will be carried out by the Government of the United States of America in accordance with its applicable laws.

2. Under this Agreement there will be no transfer by the Government of the United States of America of atomic weapons, non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons, or non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems involving Restricted Data.

3. The atomic information communicated by the Government of the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement shall be used exclusively for the preparation or implementation of NATO defence plans and activities and the development of delivery systems in the common interests of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

ARTICLE V

1. Atomic information communicated pursuant to this Agreement shall be accorded full security protection under applicable NATO regulations and procedures, agreed security arrangements, and national legislation and regulations. In no case will the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or its Member States maintain security standards for the safeguarding of atomic information less restrictive than those set forth in the pertinent NATO security regulations and other agreed security arrangements in effect on the date this Agreement comes into force.
The establishment and co-ordination of the security
in all NATO military and civilian elements will be
affected under the authority of the North Atlantic Council in
conformity with procedures set forth in agreed security arrangements.

3. Atomic information communicated by the Government
of the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement will
be made available through channels for communicating atomic
information now existing or as may be hereafter agreed.

4. Atomic information communicated or exchanged pursuant
to this Agreement shall not be communicated or exchanged by the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization or persons under its
jurisdiction to any unauthorized persons or, except as provided
in paragraph 5 of this article, beyond the jurisdiction of that
Organization.

5. Unless otherwise specified by the Government of the
United States of America, United States atomic information provided
to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization may be communicated by
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to its member states as
necessary to carry out functions related to NATO missions, provided
that dissemination of such atomic information within such
member states is limited to those specific individuals concerned
with the NATO missions for which the information is required.
Member states agree that atomic information so received from
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or otherwise pursuant
to this Agreement will not be transferred to unauthorized
persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the recipient member state;
however, such information may be communicated to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization or, when authorised by the Government
of the United States of America, to other member states requiring
the information for functions related to NATO missions.

ARTICLE VI

Other provisions of this Agreement notwithstanding,
the Government of the United States of America may stipulate the
degree to which any of the atomic information made available by
it to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or member states
may be disseminated, may specify the categories of persons who
may have access to such information, and may impose such other
restrictions on the dissemination of information as it deems
necessary.
ARTICLE VII

A Party receiving atomic information under this Agreement shall use it for the purposes specified herein only. Any inventions or discoveries resulting from possession of such information on the part of a recipient Party or persons under its jurisdiction shall be made available to the Government of the United States of America for defense purposes without charge in accordance with such arrangements as may be agreed and shall be safeguarded in accordance with the provisions of Article V of this Agreement.

2. The application or use of any information communicated under this Agreement shall be the responsibility of the Party receiving it; the Party communicating the information does not provide any indemnity or warranty with respect to its application or use.

ARTICLE VIII

Nothing in this Agreement shall be considered to supersede or otherwise affect bilateral agreements between Parties to this Agreement providing for co-operation in the exchange of atomic information.

ARTICLE IX

For the purposes of this Agreement:

(a) "Atomic weapon" means any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transporting or propelling the device (where such means is a separable and divisible part of the device), the principal purpose of which is for use as, or for development of, a weapon, a weapon prototype, or a weapon test device.

(b) "Atomic information" to be provided by the Government of the United States of America under this Agreement means information which is designated "Restricted Data" or "Formerly Restricted Data" by the Government of the United States of America.

ARTICLE X

1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon receipt by the Government of the United States of America of notification from all Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty that they are willing to be bound by the terms of the Agreement.
The Government of the United States of America will inform all Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, and will also inform the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, of each notification and of the entry into force of this Agreement.

3. This Agreement shall remain in force until terminated by unanimous agreement or superseded by another agreement, it being understood, however, that termination of this Agreement as a whole shall not release any Party from the requirements of this Agreement to safeguard information made available pursuant to it.

ARTICLE XI

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article VI(4) of the Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for Co-operation regarding Atomic Information, signed in Paris on 22nd June, 1955, the present Agreement shall upon its entry into force supersede the above-mentioned Agreement, it being understood, however, that information communicated under that Agreement shall be considered for all purposes to have been communicated under the provisions of this Agreement.

ARTICLE XII

This Agreement shall bear the date on which it is opened for signature and shall remain open for signature until it has been signed by all the States Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

In witness whereof the undersigned Representatives have signed the present Agreement on behalf of their respective States, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and on behalf of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Done at Paris this day of 19 , in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authoritative, in a single original which shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America.
The Government of the United States of America shall transmit certified copies thereof to all the signatory and acceding States:

For the Kingdom of Belgium:
For Canada:
For the Kingdom of Denmark:
For France:
For the Federal Republic of Germany:
For the Kingdom of Greece:
For Iceland:
For Italy:
For the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg:
For the Kingdom of the Netherlands:
For the Kingdom of Norway:
For Portugal:
For Turkey:
For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
For the United States of America:
The provisions of this Annex implement certain of the provisions of the Agreement for Co-operation Regarding Atomic Information Done at Paris on ..., (hereafter referred to as the Agreement) of which this Annex forms an integral part.

SECTION I

Subject to the terms and conditions of the Agreement, the types of atomic information which the Government of the United States of America may make available to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its member states are:

A. As may be necessary for mutual defence planning, training, and logistical requirements, information concerning the numbers, locations, types, yields, aiming, safing, command and control, and fusing of those atomic weapons which can be made available for use by or in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

B. Effects to be expected or resulting from the detonation of atomic weapons.

C. Response of structures, equipment, communications and personnel to the effects of atomic weapons, including damage or casualty criteria.

D. Methods and procedures for analyses relating to the effects of atomic weapons.

E. Information on the capabilities of potential enemy nations for atomic warfare.

F. Information on atomic weapons and atomic weapons systems required for attainment of delivery capability with specified atomic weapons which can be made available for use by or in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, including information required for evaluation of atomic weapons systems to determine NATO requirements and strategy.

G. Information regarding delivery systems, including tactics and techniques and duties of maintenance, assembly, delivery and launch crews required for attainment of delivery capability with specified atomic weapons.
To the extent that they will influence NATO planning, the results to be expected from the strategic air offensive.

I. Information required for attainment of compatibility of specified atomic weapons with specified delivery vehicles.

J. Safety features of specified atomic weapons and of the operational systems associated with such weapons and information necessary and appropriate for salvage and recovery operations incident to a weapons accident.

K. Information required in planning for and training of personnel in the employment of and defence against atomic weapons and including information concerning:
   1. Military uses of isotopes for medical purposes.
   2. Defence against radiological warfare.

L. Information regarding civil defence against atomic attacks.

M. Other information as may be determined by appropriate United States Authorities to be necessary for support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and transferable under provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Agreement.

SECTION II

No information on other military applications of atomic energy, military reactors, or naval nuclear propulsion plants, will be communicated under the Agreement.

For the Kingdom of Belgium:
For Canada:
For the Kingdom of Denmark:
For France:
For the Federal Republic of Germany:
For the Kingdom of Greece:
For Iceland:
For Italy:
For the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg:
SECURITY ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
PARTIES TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY FOR CO-OPERATION
REGARDING ATOMIC INFORMATION

This Annex sets forth the security measures which the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the member states shall
apply to safeguard atomic information made available by the
Government of the United States of America to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization and its member states pursuant to the Agreement
for Co-operation Regarding Atomic Information done at
Paris on .......... (referred to hereinafter as “the Agreement”)
of which this Annex is an integral part. In the event a
member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization other than the
Government of the United States of America makes atomic
information available pursuant to Article II of the Agreement,
such information shall be safeguarded by security measures no
less restrictive than those set forth in this Annex.

SECTION I

GENERAL

A. NATO security regulations, no less restrictive than
those which are presently set forth in C-W(55)15(Final) and the
Confidential Supplement of 1st January, 1961, thereto, as well as
the security measures specified in this Annex, shall be applied
by NATO military and civilian elements and by member states
to atomic information communicated pursuant to the Agreement.

B. The security programme as implemented by all NATO
military and civilian elements and by member states receiving
atomic information pursuant to the Agreement shall provide fully
for carrying out the security requirements laid down in this Annex.

C. The Secretary General, acting in the name of the
North Atlantic Council and under its authority, shall be responsible
for supervising the application of the NATO security programme
for the protection of atomic information under the Agreement.
He will ascertain by means of the procedures set forth in
Section X of this Annex that all measures required by the NATO
Security programme are taken in NATO civil and military elements
and national civil and military elements to protect the
information exchanged under the Agreement.

D. No individual shall be entitled to access to atomic
information solely by virtue of rank, appointment, or security
clearance.
B. Access to atomic information made available to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall be limited to nationals of member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization who have been granted security clearances in accordance with Section II of this Annex and whose responsibilities require access to the information.

F. Access to atomic information made available to a member state pursuant to the agreement shall be limited to its nationals who have been granted security clearances in accordance with Section II of this Annex and whose duties require access in order that the member state can fulfill its responsibilities and commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

SECTION II

PERSONNEL SECURITY

A. No individual shall be granted a security clearance for access to atomic information unless it is determined that such clearance will not endanger the security of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the national security of the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

B. Prior to assigning access to atomic information, the determination of eligibility (decision to grant security clearance) for each individual to be afforded such access shall be made by a responsible authority of the government of the individual concerned.

C. The decision as to whether the granting of a security clearance is clearly consistent with the interests of security shall be a determination based on all available information. Prior to this determination, an investigation shall be conducted by a responsible government authority and the information developed shall be reviewed in the light of the principal types of derogatory information which create a question as to an individual's eligibility for security clearance, as these are set forth in Section III of the Confidential Supplement of 1st January, 1961, to C-M(55)15(Final).

D. The minimum scope and extent of the investigation shall be in accordance with the standards set out in Section II of the Confidential Supplement to C-M(55)15(Final), except that a background investigation shall be required for clearance for access to atomic information classified Secret for individuals other than members of the armed forces or civilian personnel of the military establishments of the member states.
Each establishment handling atomic information shall maintain an appropriate record of the clearance of individuals authorised to have access to such information at that establishment. Each clearance shall be reviewed, as the occasion demands, to ensure that it conforms with the current standards applicable to the individual's employment, and shall be re-examined as a matter of priority when information is received which indicates that continued employment involving access to atomic information may no longer be consistent with the interests of security.

Effective liaison shall be maintained in each state between the national agencies responsible for national security and the authority responsible for making clearance determinations to assure prompt notification of information with derogatory implications developed subsequent to the grant of security clearance.

SECTION III

PHYSICAL SECURITY

A. Atomic information shall be protected physically against espionage, sabotage, unauthorised access or any other hostile activity. Such protection shall be commensurate with the importance of the security interest involved.

B. Programmes for physical security of atomic information shall be established so as to ensure:

1. Proper protection of atomic information on hand for immediate use, in storage or in transit.

2. The establishment of security areas, with controlled access, which deemed necessary by reason of the sensitivity, character, volume and use of the classified atomic information, and the character and location of the building or buildings involved.

3. A system of controlled access which shall embody procedures for a competent authority to authorise access, assure method of personnel identification and accountability for identification media; and a means of enforcing limitations on movement within, and access to, security areas.

C. The provisions of paragraph B above will be in addition to the procedures set forth in Section IV of C-K(55)15(final).
SECTION IV

CONTROL OF ATOMIC INFORMATION

A. Information control programmes shall be maintained which will have for their basic purposes:

1. Control of access.

2. Ready accountability commensurate with the degree of sensitivity.

3. Destruction when no longer needed.

B. Security classifications applied by the Government of the United States of America to atomic information communicated under the Agreement shall be observed at all times; regrading or declassification may be done only with the approval of the Government of the United States of America.

C. Documents containing United States atomic information communicated under the Agreement shall bear NATO markings and a security classification equivalent to that assigned by the Government of the United States of America, followed by the word ATOMIC. In addition, the following marking shall be entered on the document in the language of the document:

"This document contains United States atomic information (Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data) made available pursuant to the NATO Agreement for Co-operation Regarding Atomic Information signed ........(date) .......... and will be safeguarded accordingly."

D. Accountability records shall be maintained for all Top Secret and Secret documents, and for all documents on which special limitations have been placed in accordance with Article VI of the Agreement. These records shall show the identity of all recipients of documents on which special limitations have been placed.
2. Reproductions, including extracts and translations, of documents containing United States atomic information bearing the markings specified in paragraph 3 above may be made under the following rules:

1. Documents classified Secret and Top Secret may be reproduced only with the prior approval of the Government of the United States of America. Such documents shall bear a suitable notation to this effect. In emergencies when prior approval cannot be obtained in time, this rule may be waived, but the Government of the United States of America shall be so informed by the most expeditious means.

2. Documents classified Confidential may be reproduced only as necessary to meet current requirements.

3. Reproductions, including extracts and translations, shall bear all security markings (including the marking described in paragraph 1) found on the original document and shall be placed under the accountability controls applied to the original document. Where paragraphs bear separate classifications, the security classification of documents containing extracted atomic information shall bear the classification of the paragraph with the highest classification from which extracts were taken and where appropriate the marking specified in paragraph 2. Accountability controls for extracted atomic information shall be as provided in paragraph 3 of this section. Further, such special limitations as may have been placed on the original document shall apply to documents containing the extracts.

F. Documents prepared to record atomic information received under the Agreement by oral or visual means shall bear the markings specified in paragraph 1 above and shall be subject to the rules for accountability and control applicable to the level of classification involved.
CHANNELS OF TRANSMISSION

Communications by the Government of the United States of America of atomic information under the Agreement, including oral and visual communication, shall be through channels now existing or as may be hereafter agreed. To assist the Secretary General in the discharge of his security responsibilities under paragraph C of Section I of the present Annex, the Government of the United States of America shall provide the Secretary General with sufficient information to identify each written communication of atomic information by the Government of the United States of America and each communication authorised by the Government of the United States of America under the Agreement. This information will also be sent to the Standing Group for all communications made to military elements.

SECTION VI

REPORTS

A. Each member state and NATO military and civilian element which receives United States atomic information under the Agreement shall submit by 31st March of each year, utilising channels now existing or as may be hereafter agreed, through the Secretary General to the Government of the United States of America a report containing the following:

1. A list of all atomic documents received from the Government of the United States of America during the twelve months ending 31st December of the previous year.

2. A record of the distribution of the documents listed in paragraph 1 above, and

3. A certification that a physical muster has been made of all atomic documents for which the member state or NATO military or civilian element is accountable under the Agreement. The certification shall include a list of all documents unaccounted for, with a statement of the results of the investigation of the loss and the corrective action taken to prevent a recurrence.

B. If United States atomic information communicated under the Agreement is compromised by loss of documents or any other means, an immediate report including all pertinent information concerning the compromise shall be made, utilising channels now existing or as may be hereafter agreed, to the Secretary General and the Government of the United States of America.
SECURITY EDUCATION

Member states and NATO military and civilian elements receiving information under the Agreement shall maintain an adequate programme to assure that all individuals who are authorised access to atomic information are informed of their responsibilities to safeguard that information. The programme shall include a specific initial indoctrination and orientation, periodic re-emphasis of individual responsibilities and a termination interview stressing the continuing responsibilities for protection of atomic information.

SECTION VIII

SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED CONTRACTS

Every classified contract, sub-contract, consultant agreement or other arrangement entered into by Parties to the Agreement, the performance of which involves access to atomic information exchanged under the Agreement, shall contain appropriate provisions imposing obligations on the private parties involved to abide by the security arrangements set forth in this Annex.

SECTION IX

CONTINUING REVIEW OF SECURITY SYSTEM

A. It is recognised that effective and prompt implementation of security policies can be materially advanced through reciprocal visits of security personnel. It is agreed to continue a thorough exchange of views relative to security policies, standards and procedures and to permit United States security working groups to examine and view at first hand the procedures and practices of the agencies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and of the agencies of member states responsible for the protection of documents and information communicated under the Agreement, such visits to be undertaken with a view to achieving an understanding of adequacy and reasonable comparability of the respective security systems.

B. The Secretary General, and the Standing Group in the case of visits to military elements, will be informed of these visits and reports setting forth pertinent findings of the United States working groups will be furnished to them following each visit. All visits to national elements will be carried out in co-operation with the national security authorities of the states concerned.
SECURITY INSPECTIONS

A. Comprehensive security inspection of all NATO military and civilian elements and member nations which have received atomic information under the Agreement shall be made regularly, but not less often than once every twelve months, in accordance with the criteria set forth in Section I, paragraph A of this Annex. These inspections shall be made by the NATO agencies having responsibility for the application of the NATO security programme, using qualified personnel. The Council, as it considers necessary or desirable, direct special inspections to be made and designate ad hoc inspection teams composed of personnel from NATO civilian and military agencies or other qualified personnel. Visits to military and civilian elements of member states will be co-ordinated with the appropriate national authorities.

B. All phases of the security programme shall be examined and within thirty days after the completion of the inspection, a written report that shall include a list of any deficiencies found in the application of the security regulations will be sent to the Secretary General.

C. Copies of these inspection reports shall be made available by the Secretary General to the United States pursuant to the Agreement and, consistent with other provisions thereof and as may be appropriate, to the installation inspected, the national security authority concerned, and the military headquarters.

D. Within thirty days after receipt of the inspection report, the appropriate authorities of the NATO or national element inspected shall forward to the Secretary General a report of action taken to correct all deficiencies listed in the inspection report. After reviewing the inspection reports and the reports of corrective action taken, the Secretary General, acting on behalf of the Council, shall, as appropriate, draw the attention of the national authorities, the Standing Group or the civilian element concerned to whatever further action may be required to meet NATO security criteria and the provisions of this Agreement. Copies of the reports of corrective action as well as copies of any comments forthcoming from the Secretary General in accordance with this paragraph shall be distributed in the same manner as provided in paragraph C of this Section for the inspection reports.
DOWNGRADED TO NC   (SEE: DN(98)1)

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In the event that a problem regarding corrective action taken from a security inspection remains unresolved after the application of procedures set forth in paragraph B of this section the Secretary General shall bring the matter to the attention of the Council with a recommendation that an ad hoc inspection team be designated to investigate the problem and report to the Council, which will thereupon take appropriate action.

For the Kingdom of Belgium:

For Canada:

For the Kingdom of Denmark:

For France:

For the Federal Republic of Germany:

For the Kingdom of Greece:

For Iceland:

For Italy:

For the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg:

For the Kingdom of the Netherlands:

For the Kingdom of Norway:

For Portugal:

For Turkey:

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

For the United States of America:
Manlio Brosio, NATO Secretary General 1964-1971
To: Permanent Representatives
From: Secretary General

RESUMPTION OF DISCUSSION OF NUCLEAR QUESTIONS

As I indicated at the Private Meeting of the Council this morning, I attach herewith a note on the possibility of resuming discussions on a wide range of nuclear questions. I propose that the Council should consider this note in restricted session at its meeting on Wednesday, 7th July.

2. Permanent Representatives will observe that the attached note makes some reference to Mr. McNamara’s recent proposals, concerning which we had the benefit of a statement from the United States Permanent Representative this morning. It is, however, mainly directed towards the more general nuclear questions confronting the Alliance, some of which were mentioned in the brief discussion following the statement by the United States Permanent Representative.

3. I suggest that at its meeting on Wednesday, 7th July, the Council might address itself first to any further discussion of specific points arising from Ambassador Finletter’s statement, and secondly to the more general questions outlined in my note.

(Signed) Manlio PRODIO

NATO SECRET

PC/65/360
1. Permanent Representatives may wish to consider whether the time has not come to start a new round of discussions on nuclear questions. It is recognised that these raise difficult and delicate problems, but events are moving swiftly in the world and it is suggested that the Council cannot afford to stand aside for long from issues which are of such fundamental importance to the security of all member countries.

2. The last attempts to deal with the general nuclear problems facing the Alliance were made at the Ministerial Meetings of Athens and Ottawa following intensive preparation by the Council in Permanent Session. More recently, some interesting ideas were put forward by Mr. McMahon at the Defence Ministers Meeting in Paris. An early renewal of our discussions therefore seems all the more necessary.

3. It is true that some allied countries are pursuing their studies on closely related subjects and that these may at some future time lead to developments and give rise to problems which we should then have to consider. It is not suggested that the Council should at this stage involve itself with these discussions. The present initiative is directed towards the general nuclear questions which concern the whole Alliance at this time. It must be recognised that there have been important developments in the world, both technical and political, which may need to be carefully examined by us. For example, some nuclear weapon systems are becoming obsolescent; for others more refined delivery vehicles are being developed. A member country - France - is acquiring nuclear weapon capability; Communist China has already exploded two nuclear devices. We certainly cannot ignore these facts and their technical and political consequences.

4. It is not intended at this stage to submit to the Council a formal list of questions but merely to invite Permanent Representatives to consider the main categories of problems which might eventually form the subject of our discussions.

(a) Problems concerning the nuclear forces committed to NATO

5. At their meeting in Athens in May 1962, Ministers took note, following the Secretary General's special report on Defence Policy\(^1\), of the assurances given by the United States Government that it would "continue to make available for the Alliance nuclear weapons adequate in number and in kind to meet

\(^1\) CM(62)48
the needs of NATO defence (1). The United States also undertook to notify its Allies as significant changes occurred in its programme for supplying nuclear weapons for its own and other
allied countries forces committed to NATO, to submit such
information for analysis and comment as regards the effect on
the adequacy of the overall capability at the disposal of the
Alliance and, furthermore, to consult its NATO allies at that
time and take their views fully into consideration (2).

6. The Council may wish to exchange ideas on how this offer may best be implemented within the developing pattern of
nuclear co-operation in NATO. The Council might also find it
valuable to broaden its understanding of the role in the defence
of the Alliance of existing nuclear forces such as the Polaris
submarines and United Kingdom V bombers which have been assigned
or earmarked to NATO and of any other nuclear forces (such as
ANHEMs) which may in the future be so assigned or earmarked.

(b) Problems concerning control of nuclear forces

7. Problems arising from the control of nuclear weapons
are dealt with in paragraph 25(5) of the Secretary General’s
special report to the Athens meeting. This sub-paragraph
became known as the “Athens Guidelines”. It will be recalled
that at the time one member country made reservations concerning
these “guidelines”. After three years it might be worthwhile
investigating whether there is room for some refinement. For
example, would it now be possible, or desirable, to draw a
distinction between the circumstances in which battlefield
nuclear weapons would have to be used and those in which
countries would need to have recourse to other nuclear weapons?
Another question which may need a new study and a clearer
definition is that concerning the power of the Council as
regards consultation on the use of nuclear weapons. As
Mr. McNamara recently reminded Defence Ministers the provision
of rapid and adequate communications between all political and
military authorities is a closely related topic which may also
need to be looked at again.

(1) C-M(62)66, paragraph (1)
(2) C-M(62)48, paragraph (7)
(c) Problems concerning co-ordination between nuclear forces committed to NATO and external nuclear forces in the NATO area

8. At Athens Ministers also noted the assurances set out in the Secretary General's special report that "the United States and the United Kingdom strategic forces will continue to cover as fully as possible in combination with NATO forces all key elements of Soviet nuclear striking power, including MRBM sites, giving equal priority to those threatening the mainland of Europe as to those threatening the United States and the United Kingdom"(1). The assignment of the United Kingdom V bomber force to NATO at the Ottawa Ministerial Meeting in May 1963 in no way affected this commitment. Similar assurances would no doubt be welcomed if given by countries which are envisaging building up new nuclear forces.

9. It was also agreed at the Ottawa Meeting to extend the role of non-nuclear member countries in NATO nuclear planning by the creation of the post of nuclear deputy to SACEUR and by ensuring wider national representation in ACE nuclear planning staffs and SACEUR's Liaison Group at Omaha. It is suggested that further efforts should now be made to associate all member countries more closely with the overall planning for the nuclear defence of the Alliance. In this connection, we should also examine Mr. McNamara's recent proposal for a Special Committee of Defence Ministers to study and make proposals on how allied participation can be extended in planning for the use of nuclear forces, including strategic nuclear forces, might be improved and extended.

(d) Problems concerning consultation for the use of nuclear weapons outside the NATO area

10. In this respect Ministers at the Athens Ministerial Meeting were informed of the intention of the United States and the United Kingdom Governments to consult with the North Atlantic Council, if time permits, concerning the use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world(2). The Council may wish to discuss whether it is possible to extend or to refine these statements.

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(1) O-M(62)66, paragraph (1)
(2) O-M(62)66, paragraph (6)
(e) NATO Nuclear Committee

11. Finally I think we should give full implementation to the Council decision concerning the creation of a NATO Nuclear Committee. Members of the Council will recognize that this Committee has not been very active in recent years; this was partly because negotiations have until recently been underway with the United States Government regarding atomic information. As these negotiations have now been concluded, nothing should prevent the Nuclear Committee from receiving and studying "on a permanent and systematic basis nuclear information relating to NATO defence".

12. To conclude, these suggestions should be regarded simply as providing a general framework within which the Council might, if it so decides, draw up a proper and definite Agenda by defining items more accurately, including new ones, dropping others, classifying the order in which questions should be discussed and by taking any other procedural decisions which may be considered helpful. The main aim is to make possible a calm, dispassionate, rational and positive discussion of such problems of the Alliance.
In May 1965, United States Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara outlined in general terms a new way to deal with the nuclear sharing issue in NATO. He proposed the formation of a “Special” Committee of Defence Ministers to study ways to increase Allied participation in the determination of Alliance nuclear policy and in nuclear consultation.
COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE (65) 18

Lundi 22 novembre 1965

REUNION DU COMITE SPECIAL

Les Ministres de la Défense d'un certain nombre de pays membres de l'OTAN se réuniront en Comité Spécial à Paris le samedi 27 novembre 1965, sous la présidence de M. Manlio Brosio, Secrétaire Général de l'OTAN.

C'est à la suite d'une proposition formulée lors de la réunion des Ministres de la Défense des pays de l'OTAN, qui s'est tenue les 31 mai et 1er juin 1965, que ce Comité Spécial a été créé. Au cours de sa prochaine session, il étudiera les moyens d'améliorer les consultations et d'étendre la participation des pays alliés en ce qui concerne l'élaboration des plans nucléaires.

Le Comité Spécial présentera un premier rapport à la session ministérielle du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord qui doit se tenir à Paris du 14 au 16 décembre 1965.

PRESS RELEASE (65) 18

MEETING OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

A Special Committee of Defence Ministers of a number of NATO member countries will meet in Paris on Saturday, November 27th, 1965, under the chairmanship of Mr. Manlio Brosio, the Secretary General of NATO.

This Special Committee has been set up in pursuance of a proposal made to the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in Paris on 31st May and 1st June, 1965. At its forthcoming meeting it will study ways of improving consultation and extending allied participation in nuclear planning.

The Special Committee will make an interim report to the meeting of the full North Atlantic Council at Ministerial level due to take place in Paris on December 14th to 16th, 1965.
PRESS RELEASE(65)19
Paris, 27th November, 1965

SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF DEFENCE MINISTERS

As previously announced a Special Committee of the Defence Ministers of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States met in Paris on Saturday, November 27th, 1965, under the chairmanship of Mr. Manlio Brosio, Secretary General of NATO.

Today's session of the Special Committee was largely devoted to reviewing existing nuclear capabilities and arrangements within the Alliance, means to improve allied consultation concerning the use of nuclear forces, including strategic forces, and ways of improving and extending allied participation in nuclear policy and planning. On the basis of these discussions the Defence Ministers established three working groups concerned with Communications, Data Exchange and Nuclear Planning under the guidance of a steering committee consisting of the Permanent Representatives of the participating countries.

The Special Committee will make an interim report to the meeting of the full North Atlantic Council at Ministerial level due to take place in Paris on December 14th-16th, 1965, and has decided to meet again at the end of March 1966.
To: Permanent Representatives of France, Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal

From: Secretary General

MEETING OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF DEFENCE MINISTERS ON 27TH NOVEMBER, 1965

In response to the requests made to me by certain of you, I am happy to say that I am now authorised by the Steering Committee of the Special Committee of Defence Ministers to provide the nations who are not members of the Special Committee with certain background documentation connected with the meeting of the Special Committee on 27th November. I am accordingly providing you, separately, with copies of two background briefs circulated prior to the meeting. These are:

SOD(65)D/2

(A. Military Command and Control Procedures for Nuclear Weapons)

(B. Present arrangements for Nuclear Planning in NATO and for Allied participation)

and

SOD(65)D/1

(C. Communications capabilities in support of consultations on the Nuclear aspects of Crisis Management)

(D. Availability of data essential to consultations on the Nuclear aspects of Crisis Management)

2. I am in addition attaching hereto copies of my Opening Statement at the meeting; the Opening Statement by Secretary of Defense McNamara; and the oral statements highlighting the main points of the two briefs made by Lt. General Van Rollegem, Deputy for Nuclear Affairs to SACEUR, and Lord Coleridge, Executive Secretary.
COSMIC TOP SECRET
F9/65/676

(Page 2 of 20 pages)
I. OPENING STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL

1. The CHAIRMAN said he was happy to welcome Ministers to the first meeting of the Special Committee of Defence Ministers, gathered together to examine matters of common interest concerning consultation, communications and planning in relation to NATO's nuclear defense. This was the first meeting of the Special Committee itself, not a preliminary meeting to decide if and how such a Committee should carry out its tasks. It was a meeting of only ten Defence Ministers, but it was taking place with the understanding and approval of the whole NATO Council representing all fifteen member countries. The Committee remained upon to participation on the part of those allied Ministers of Defence who were not present and he thought that there was some prospect that at least one other country might join at a later stage. Meanwhile, however, the Committee's current membership and its Terms of Reference had been agreed and the business of Ministers was to launch its work along the lines already laid down.

2. In his view, the Committee very properly took its place in the chain of initiatives and activities in nuclear matters developed by NATO over a considerable period and established in the last few years. At various times since 1961 the Council had occupied itself with discussions of the difficult problems involved in the control of nuclear weapons. In particular, as Ministers would recall, the Ministerial Meeting at Athens in 1962 had approved (subject to reservation on the part of one member country) the so-called "Athens Guidelines" concerning the employment of nuclear weapons and the probable scope of consultation in the Council prior to the taking of decisions on their use. At Ottawa in 1963, Ministers had approved a number of measures taken to reorganize the nuclear forces assigned or earmarked to SACEUR, including the establishment on SACEUR's staff of a deputy responsible to him for nuclear affairs and arrangements to ensure increased participation of allied officers representing Allied Command Europe in the co-ordination of operational planning at Strategic Air Command Headquarters at Omaha. It was also at Ottawa that they had initiated what had become known as the NATO Defence Planning Exercise.

3. It was in the framework of the Council's previous discussions, particularly the decisions taken at Athens and Ottawa, that he believed the tasks of the Committee should be considered. In this connection, he wished to make four observations of a general character. The first was that it was precisely because Mr. McNamara's initiative in proposing the setting up of the Committee was intended to maintain a momentum behind the development of a number of important aspects of NATO's defence policy in the period of some uncertainty and possible change through which the Alliance was passing, that it was to be welcomed.
4. Secondly, Mr. McNamara's suggestion had come as no surprise to those who had been closely following, as the North Atlantic Council must, the political and military situation of the Alliance and who were consequently well aware of the need for new studies and solutions. It would be recalled that since the beginning of the year there had been informal exchanges between Permanent Representatives and the Secretary General which had foreseen a resumption of discussion of nuclear matters within the Council as one of the elements of more comprehensive discussions regarding the future of the Alliance. Indeed, in a paper which he had circulated on 29th June, he had himself attempted to indicate the main lines which discussions of nuclear questions in the Council might take. The scope of the work proposed for the Committee coincided with much of the ground which he had suggested might be covered by the more general discussions, and he thought everyone agreed that Mr. McNamara's initiative had been a timely response to a genuine and widely felt requirement.

5. His third observation concerned the relationship between the Committee's work and the NATO Defence Planning Exercise initiated at Ottawa in 1963. In its recent report on the military implications of the Major NATO Commanders' force goal proposals for 1970, the Military Committee had suggested that the provision of satisfactory machinery for the timely release of nuclear weapons might be a necessary corollary of certain possible decisions regarding the force goals to be adopted for 1970. This question was rather different from those to which the Committee would immediately be addressing itself, but the links between them were obvious, and it might well be that these respective lines of enquiry would at some stage come together. On this point, another interesting document had been circulated by the Turkish Delegation. It might be useful to recall that as long ago as 1961 the Military Committee had presented to the Council a document (MC 95) on military aspects of the control of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the Defence Planning Committee had not taken a final decision regarding the best means of studying the question of machinery for the timely release of nuclear weapons.

6. His fourth observation was that in considering the establishment of the Committee, it was necessary to bear in mind that for well over two years discussions and negotiations had been taking place with regard to plans for a Multilateral Force or an Atlantic Nuclear Force. These discussions had taken place among interested countries outside the formal NATO framework. The question of a NATO Nuclear Force was quite independent of the Athens and Ottawa decisions, whose implementation and improvement were the main purposes of the Special Committee, and he thought there was general agreement that it must continue to be treated, as it had been since 1963, as a parallel and separate question.
7. He now wished to make a few remarks concerning the development of the Committee's work, although it was not for him to anticipate the depth and scope of the Committee's debates. Its Terms of Reference were sufficiently flexible to allow for either a limited scope, relating only to clarification and implementation of the Athens and Ottawa decisions, or a wider range, relating to improvement and extension of these decisions. Consultation and planning might be interpreted in either a restricted or a comprehensive sense. However, as he saw it, even if the Committee were to confine itself to the interpretation and implementation of the Athens Guidelines, i.e. to the machinery of consultation on the use of nuclear weapons, it would have a very delicate, and certainly not purely technical, task to fulfil. An excellent paper circulated by the Canadian Delegation had already indicated the kind of questions that such a discussion might encompass and its possible range.

8. As Ministers were aware, the essence of the Athens Guidelines was that decisions about the use of nuclear weapons should, if time permitted, be taken in the light of the views expressed by the fifteen sovereign nations in the course of consultation in the North Atlantic Council. But the question arose as to how to ensure that the Council should be the focal point of such consultation. Direct consultation between Governments in times of crisis was certain to take place, but how should the results of such consultation be reflected in the Council? It would also be wise, he suggested, to clarify the role of the Military Committee and Standing Group in a period of crisis or hostilities. If their role was primarily conceptual and policy-making, rather than operational, then the Council would, presumably, deal directly with theMajor NATO Commanders.

9. The manner in which the Council conducted its own consultation was also of the utmost importance. Someone, possibly the Secretary General, should have the authority to sum up the Council's discussion on the question whether or not nuclear weapons should be used and report its outcome, with the necessary precision and speed, to the national authority that had control of the weapons. Ministers would recall that the Athens Guidelines envisaged the most likely circumstances in which consultation would take place as being those of a full-scale attack with conventional forces, or an attack with conventional forces less than full-scale, but threatening the integrity of NATO forces and territory. If the Council was to continue to operate in the face of hostilities, the problem of a protected headquarters site arose and the problem of protected communications assumed new dimensions. The Situation Room at Forte Dauphine would certainly be a very early target for attack. All these considerations referred to only a few facets of a complex problem which deserved, indeed required, a full analysis in order to achieve the smooth working and the simple solutions that would be needed in times of crisis.
10. The problem of communications was obviously related to all these other problems and it was his impression from the Background Briefs that, especially on the civilian side, fast, reliable and safe communications systems, able to carry an ever-increasing load of intelligence data and to ensure the communication of important decisions, were still, in some cases, to be found.

11. In the field of planning, it was, of course, for Ministers to decide how far they should pursue their study. Just as the question of consultation could be extended if one wished to cover new methods of facilitating the making of decisions in special cases, so the question of planning might be limited to the field of targeting, or extended to wider questions such as what weapons should be available and used, when and where. In this connection, Ministers would recall that at Athens the whole Alliance had been given assurances that the United States would continue to make available for the Alliance nuclear weapons adequate in number and kind to meet the needs of NATO defence.

12. In the Background Brief that had been prepared for Ministers on present arrangements for nuclear planning in NATO and for allied participation, the principal activities of Allied Command Europe related to nuclear policy and planning were summed up under four main headings, which seemed to him to be useful. First, there was broad nuclear policy and concept, secondly, weapons requirements studies, thirdly, the strike programme for pre-planned targets and finally, control and execution procedures. He ventured, however, to suggest caution and a slow, gradual approach in these matters, first by examining the best method of operating the existing arrangements, and at a later stage considering improvements with great care and due regard to practical problems.

13. These thoughts would have shown Ministers that, in his view, the present exercise could be more than a mere technical exercise and could produce substantial progress in the important field of nuclear defence. It was not, of course, for the Committee, which was a special and temporary Committee, to make final decisions, but to produce new ideas and to make recommendations. At the end of the meeting he hoped that Ministers would be able to agree on the lines of the report to be submitted to the Council at its meeting at Ministerial level in December. This would, as he saw it, be in the nature of a progress report which would give some indications of the Committee's ideas as to the way in which its future work might develop. On the question of procedure, he suggested that the Committee could achieve the most useful results if it came as soon as possible to practical issues. As far as Item IV (Ministerial Presentations and Discussions) was concerned, while not wishing in any way to discourage Ministers from making statements, he considered that it would be very helpful if they could reduce them to the very essential points and to the minimum length, in order that the Committee might have sufficient time to reach constructive conclusions and proceed with the practical work involved in Items V to VII.
14. The Agenda now called for a statement by Mr. McNamara. He knew that all members of the Committee were extremely appreciative of Mr. McNamara’s readiness to make this statement and thus to initiate the Committee’s discussions. As the establishment of the Committee had been a United States initiative, it seemed to him fitting that the United States should be the first to express their considered point of view as to the scope of the discussion and the best approach to the problems involved.
II. OPENING STATEMENT BY SECRETARY McNAMARA

1. Mr. McNAMARA (United States) first provided the Committee with some basic facts concerning existing stocks of nuclear weapons in Europe. In his view, these facts constituted a logical foundation for the briefings which were to follow and an appreciation of the size, composition and location of the nuclear stockpile was a prerequisite to understanding and debate of associated nuclear matters.

2. A number of very important questions were suggested by the nuclear arsenal:

   (i) Were these weapons and their delivery systems properly safeguarded and controlled?

   (ii) Did the Alliance have the proper foundations of information to make the right decisions as to their use?

   (iii) Did the Alliance have the means to communicate and consult mutually as to their use in emergencies?

   (iv) Were the numbers of weapons and types of delivery systems, their deployment and the plans for their use, the proper ones?

3. The first of these questions had probably been answered satisfactorily. The physical security, military communications and military command and control procedures had been well developed, as was indicated by the briefing papers distributed before the meeting, although he would expect the Committee’s review and discussions to produce some useful suggestions for improvement even in this area.

4. The gaps which had to be filled, were, in his opinion, found mainly in the other three areas. There was a gap in the up-to-date information that would be available to each national government, should emergency consultations be required on whether and under what conditions to use nuclear weapons; there was a gap in the facilities for emergency consultation among national governments, whether directly or through the North Atlantic Council; there was also a gap in the area of planning together for the creation, deployment and use of NATO’s nuclear strength, including strategic forces supporting NATO and the determining of the types of weapons to be used.

5. The problem in the information and communications areas—that is, the areas relating to emergency consultations—might be particularly acute in situations short of general war. This was so because consultation about NATO’s response if the Soviet Union really started a massive attack would probably be brief and easy.
The "Athens Guidelines" were precise on this subject. The interesting and important consultation issues were likely to be the product of other contingencies - political-military confrontations containing a risk of escalation - such as the Berlin crisis of 1961-62, the Cuba missile crisis at the end of 1962, threats on NATO's flanks, either Northern or Southern, or crises which might spread to the NATO area as a consequence of the activities of Communist China or of the Soviet Union elsewhere in the world.

6. In connection with the nuclear planning area, the Alliance was concerned with the whole range of weapons in the nuclear arsenal. It had been agreed at Ottawa to improve arrangements for participation by nations under SACEUR in the whole process of integrating the use of strategic nuclear weapons assigned to SACEUR with external nuclear forces. He considered that it was now necessary to examine whether and how it was possible to make this kind of joint planning more extensive, including the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

7. As the work progressed, the Special Committee and its Working Groups would be expected to begin their examination of the nuclear problem from the ground up. Ultimately, it would be necessary to appraise the process by which the threat was measured; the way in which the nuclear forces of the Alliance were planned, procured and managed; the detailed plans for their use; the command and control arrangements in the Alliance; the adequacy of information available to all countries in the event that emergency consultation became necessary; and the sufficiency of means of communications to ensure that if the occasion arose to consult on the immediate use of nuclear weapons, such consultations would be possible and effective. In short, it was desirable to elaborate ways of holding practical consultations at government level about the whole nuclear strategy of the Alliance.

8. Now that Ministers had been reminded of the great power of nuclear weapons at the disposal of the Alliance, in and for Europe, it was logical to turn to a discussion of the briefings proposed for the Committee.
III. SUMMARY OF FIRST BACKGROUND BRIEF BY SACEUR'S DEPUTY FOR NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Document: SCD(65)D/2 and Corrigendum

Lt. General VAN ROLLEGHEM (Deputy for Nuclear Affairs, SHAPE) made the following statement:

"The purpose of this briefing is to review the major points made in the material which was distributed to the Committee two weeks ago, and to highlight items of particular significance.

Although the Agenda lists Command and Control for nuclear weapons first and Nuclear Planning second, I shall reverse the order in this briefing in order to explain first what we plan to do; and second, how we will execute those plans.

Looking at the subject of "Present Arrangements for Nuclear Planning in NATO and for Allied Participation", I want to emphasise that most of the NATO Military Staffs at all echelons of command are engaged in some aspect of nuclear planning. The most sensitive area of planning, of course, is the operational planning for use of nuclear weapons in war; however, intelligence, logistical, administrative, communications, budget and scientific planning is essential to support nuclear operational planning.

Insofar as SACEUR and SAGLANT and their subordinate commands are concerned, nuclear planning is done on a multinational basis. Further, the implementation of these plans would be carried out by multinational forces. Allied officers of all NATO nations except Iceland, Luxembourg and Portugal participate in activities relating to nuclear policy and planning. These activities are:

(1) Preparation of Emergency Defence Plans.
(2) Preparation of Nuclear Strike Plans and Programmes.
(3) Participation in Nuclear Weapons Requirements Studies.
(4) Preparation of control and execution procedures for both General War and Aggression—Less—Than—General War.

(Please continue on page 12.)
To provide added assurance of allied participation in nuclear activities:

(1) Key positions on the SHAPE staff pertaining to nuclear planning, policy and operational matters are held by allied officers.

(2) The nuclear planning and targeting staffs at SHAPE and at subordinate levels down through the Army Group/Allied Tactical Air Force level are completely multinational.

(3) Similarly, SAALT's nuclear targeting and planning organization is multinational.

(4) NATO nuclear targeting is co-ordinated with the targeting conducted by the US Director of Strategic Target Planning through a SACEUR liaison group at Omaha, Nebraska, headed by a US general officer. This liaison group is now composed of seven allied officers: one German, one French, one Italian, one British and three US. It is anticipated that the four non-US positions will be rotated among other Allied Command Europe nations.

All war planning is designed to accomplish the assigned missions in light of the Soviet bloc capabilities which confront the Alliance and stems from the basic NATO strategic guidance laid down by the North Atlantic Council. In consideration of the enemy's military capability, NATO Military Authorities must determine the forces required to accomplish the missions assigned by higher authority. The determination of nuclear delivery systems requirements is a key and integral part of force planning. As national programmes are developed in response to force goals, planning for the associated infrastructure, communications, personnel and logistic support must be accomplished.

Each of the Major NATO Commanders has developed basic war manuals called Emergency Defence Plans (EDPs), which contain the overall objectives for war and assign tasks to Major Subordinate Commanders. The broad spectrum of tasks contained in the EDPs can be categorised into those related to General War and to Agression/Less-Than-General War. Amplification of the roles and assigned tasks for nuclear delivery forces is contained in another basic manual, the Nuclear Strike Plan.

The objectives of NATO nuclear forces in General War are three-fold:

(1) to destroy the enemy's nuclear capability;

(2) to disrupt as far as possible the enemy's command and control facilities;

(3) to destroy or render ineffective the enemy's air, land and sea forces.
In situations of Aggression-Less-Than-General War, nuclear forces have as their objectives:

(1) to halt and contain the aggression and to restore the integrity of NATO territory; this objective will involve nuclear strike forces only insofar as they may be required for the selective use of nuclear weapons;

(2) to preserve, insofar as possible, the General War capability of nuclear strike forces. This is accomplished by maintaining a high degree of readiness and by dispersal.

Planning for nuclear strike forces in General War is predetermined to a large extent in various target programmes. SACEUR and SACLANT Scheduled Programmes are the principal target programmes. Strikes in these programmes are designed so that they can be launched as soon as general nuclear release has been authorised. They are basically counternuclear programmes designed to be carried out by aircraft and missiles to render ineffective the enemy's bomber bases, missile sites, nuclear weapons storage sites, and key military control centres. These programmes are developed within Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic with participation of the staffs of all NATO commanders.

In planning nuclear strikes there is no assurance that each delivery vehicle launched will be able to reach its target. In order to achieve a high level of damage, a number of weapons are allocated to each target. The number and yields are dependent, in each instance, on the type, location and relative importance of targets as well as the capabilities of available weapons systems. The most urgent and time-sensitive targets are normally assigned to Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) weapons systems. The term "Quick Reaction Alert" is applied to those weapons systems - aircraft and missile - which hold a continuous readiness state of 15 minutes in peacetime.

In addition to the scheduled programme previously described, there are the ACE "Major Subordinate Commanders' Regional Programmes". These programmes - the Counternuclear, Interdiction, Landbattle and Naval Programmes - consist of potential targets which each Major Subordinate Commander considers as a particular threat to his own region. They consist largely of "on-call" targets, some of which can be prelocated while others, of a mobile nature, develop during the course of the battle. The exceptions to the "on-call" programme are known as the "Regional Priority Programmes (RPF)". They represent a selection of the most critical regional targets which the Major Subordinate Commanders consider are sufficiently important and time-sensitive to warrant pre-planned strikes. They therefore have specific forces allocated and are considered in the same light as the Schedule Strike Programme since they may be launched, at the Major Subordinate Commander's discretion, as soon as full nuclear release has been authorised.
No specific target programmes are developed for Aggression-Less-Than-General War situations. Targets can only be determined based on the requirements of the developing situation.

In all of the nuclear strike programmes previously described, an important objective of nuclear weapon planning is the accomplishment of the required military tasks with an absolute minimum destruction of non-military personnel and facilities, particularly in friendly, neutral and Satellite nations. SACEUR's nuclear programmes do not include urban-industrial attacks; they include only military targets which threaten Allied Command Europe.

The United States conducts nuclear planning on a world-wide basin. This planning is conducted by the United States Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff located at Omaha, Nebraska. The Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff develops plans (the US Single Integrated Operational Plan - SIOp) to attack targets which are potentially a threat to North America and NATO Europe. Many of these targets are of critical importance to Major NATO Commanders since they threaten forces and installations in Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic.

The nuclear planning of the various NATO commanders is co-ordinating among themselves and with external United States forces. Since all Major Subordinate Commanders, with the respective Executing Commanders, participate in the planning process for these programmes, no special additional co-ordinating effort is required.

Co-ordination between SACLANT and SACEUR is effected through regular nuclear strike plan co-ordinating conferences held at SHAPE to review new programmes. SACLANT is authorised direct liaison with Allied Command Europe's Northern and Central Region Commanders, both of whom he may be called upon to support.

As the co-ordinating authority for nuclear targeting in NATO, SACEUR maintains an allied liaison staff as previously described for purposes of co-ordinating NATO nuclear strike planning with that of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff.

This completes the presentation on "Present Arrangements for Nuclear Planning". I shall now turn to an examination of Military Command and Control Procedures for Nuclear Weapons.
The fundamental military principle upon which all planning for the command and control of nuclear weapons is based is that Major NATO Commanders exercise centralised control of all procedures, plans and programmes for nuclear capable forces. Through continuing effort between these Commanders, these procedures have been generally standardised. These procedures require the dissemination throughout the military commands of precise and comprehensive instructions. These are already in being, are tested and practised during exercises and are constantly examined to determine if they can be improved upon.

Following a political decision to authorise the employment of nuclear weapons, each Major NATO Commander retains the sole authority within his respective command to direct their employment in support of operations.

United Kingdom nuclear weapons are employed solely by UK forces and remain in UK custody until they are released by both NATO and UK Authorities.

Nuclear weapons allocated by the United States for employment in support of SACEUR and SAICN plans will remain in the custody of United States personnel until released by appropriate procedures to the NATO delivery units. The United States exercises custody of weapons through a system of storage sites at or near the location of the NATO delivery units. When the political and military decision to employ nuclear weapons is made, that decision, together with the Permissive Action Link and authentication codewords, is transmitted to the United States custodial personnel via both NATO and US communications circuits. Upon receipt of this information through either communications channel, storage site custodians are able to unlock Permissive Action Links and to transfer nuclear weapons to delivery units as necessary to support the Allied Command Europe war plans. In the case of Allied Command Atlantic, the majority of weapons made available to SAICN are carried in the ship with the weapon delivery systems involved.

Turning now to the procedures for the employment of these weapons in a General War situation, the implementation of all nuclear war plans is directed by an execution message originated by either SACEUR, SACEUR, or both, and sent directly to nuclear executing Commanders throughout their respective commands. The execution message is called the R-Hour Message. In the case of SACEUR, the message contains all necessary information and authority to enable both the US weapon custodians to "Unlock" the Permissive Action Link on the weapons and release them to NATO Operational Commanders, and for Allied Command Europe Commanders to execute SACEUR's Scheduled Programme and Regional Strike Programmes. Commander-in-Chief, US European Command inserts into the message a US control authenticator and the Permissive Action Link combination while SACEUR inserts into the message a NATO control authenticator. Thus, US weapons custodians and NATO executing Commanders can act on the same combined NATO-US message. This system ensures the full utilisation of all communications means available in Allied Command Europe to deliver the release message through alternate communications systems.
The SAICANT R-Hour message is paralleled by national
authority for weapons employment.

Procedures for selective release of nuclear weapons involve
an exchange of messages between Major NATO Commands and their
subordinate commanders concerned to meet circumstances as they arise.
The message transmitting SACEUR approval provides all the necessary
information and authority to enable US weapons custodians to "Unlock"
and transfer specific numbers and types of weapons to appropriate
NATO commanders, and for these NATO commanders to employ the released
weapons in the area and under the conditions authorised. Again the
SAICANT message is paralleled by a national message for weapon
release.

There would, of course, be only one R-Hour release. However, there could be a number of Selective Releases. Selective
Release procedures for SACEUR and SAICANT are basically the same.
Therefore, in this presentation, only SACEUR's procedure is discussed.
The selective release procedures envisage either a request from a
subordinate and a reply from SACEUR or an initiated release from
SACEUR without prior request. In the case of a request from a
subordinate - for example, one of the Allied Tactical Air Forces or
Army Groups - in the interest of speed, the message is sent directly
to SACEUR with copies to the requester's Major Subordinate Commander
and also to Command-in-Chief, US European Command. Because of the
vital importance of selective release messages, their format has been
standardised. First a request must specify the type and number of
weapons required. Second, a statement of the restraints, restrictions, or limitations to be placed on use of the weapons must
be provided. Next the specific commander or commanders who are to be
the releasing commanders must be named. Finally, and most important,
the requester must answer the question "Why are nuclear weapons
required?". A concise statement of the requester's justification
must be provided. He must describe the situation, specify the actual
threat, state why conventional weapons are not adequate, and point
out the consequences of disapproval.

Upon receipt of this message, SACEUR, in concert with his
operational staff, studies the overall situation and arrives at a
military decision. As a part of this deliberation, SACEUR invites
the comments of the Major Subordinate Commander concerned.

Should SACEUR determine that a military requirement to
employ nuclear weapons exists, he would immediately inform the NATO
Council of his recommendation and the basis therefor, and request
political authority for SACEUR to employ these nuclear weapons.
Simultaneously with transmittal of his recommendation to the Council,
SACEUR would send the request to the US European Command. US
European Command would then seek the US approval for weapons release.
Upon receipt of political authority to employ nuclear weapons, an execution message containing the Permissive Action Link combination and authenticator codewords is transmitted over both the custodial and command and control nets to the custodians and releasing commanders for action.

In the case where SACEUR is releasing weapons without prior request from a subordinate, similar procedures, including consultation with all appropriate echelons, are followed.

Both SACEUR and SACLANT have alternate headquarters and have provided for a succession of command to subordinates in case of necessity. In general, the headquarters concerned have primary and alternate communications linking their headquarters with subordinate commands and nuclear units.

The headquarters and the communications have been covered in detail in the two papers already distributed and I shall not discuss them further.

Responsibility for implementation of nuclear strike plans extends down the chain of command from SACEUR and SACLANT to the Major Subordinate Commanders and thence to their subordinate commanders who possess nuclear capable forces.

In conclusion, I would like to summarise the major points regarding the nuclear activities of SACEUR and SACLANT:

1. Basic strategic guidance for nuclear planning is provided by the North Atlantic Council.

2. This guidance is further delineated in the statement of missions assigned to the Major NATO Commanders.

3. Nuclear plans are developed by multinationally manned headquarters.

4. Plans are co-ordinated between the Major NATO Commanders and external forces.

5. Provision are established to avoid unauthorised release of nuclear weapons and positive military command and control procedures exist to ensure that nuclear weapons can be employed rapidly and with precision.

6. The timely manner in which political decisions to employ nuclear weapons can be reached and transmitted to Major NATO Commanders will be a critical and perhaps decisive factor in determining success or failure in implementing NATO military nuclear plans."

(Page 17 of 20 pages)
IV. SUMMARY OF SECOND BACKGROUND BRIEF BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Document: SCD(65)D/1

1. Lord COLEBRIDGE (Executive Secretary) said that the Background Briefs set out in document SCD(65)D/1 dealt with two aspects of what was now known as "Crisis Management" – communications capabilities, and the provision of the data essential to enable consultation to take place in the North Atlantic Council with regard to the use of nuclear weapons, under the provisions of the "Athens Guidelines". These briefs had been prepared jointly by the NATO Military Authorities and the International Staff. They were factual, and set out the capabilities and the weaknesses of the Alliance, but did not suggest remedies.

2. The Council had, of course, always had responsibilities in a period of tension and war in relation to the provision of instructions and guidance to the NATO Military Authorities. It had also, for many years, had a role in relation to the NATO Alert System, but it was not until the Ministerial Meeting in Athens in the Spring of 1962 that a decision was taken with regard to consultation in the Council, should time permit, on the use of nuclear weapons, not only in the North Atlantic area, but also worldwide. These new responsibilities imposed, or rather, emphasised, the need for the most rapid secure communications, not only between the Council as a whole and the NATO Military Authorities, but also between individual Permanent Representatives and their respective governments. While the former type of communication remained a NATO responsibility and was NATO financed, the latter – that is to say, communications between Permanent Representatives and their governments – remained a national responsibility and were organized and financed by each individual government.

3. Exercise FALLEX 64, in which the Council participated last year, afforded the first opportunity for the testing of the procedures and facilities by which the Council would exercise its responsibilities in time of tension or hostilities, including its responsibilities in relation to consultation on the use of nuclear weapons. In general, this Exercise had shown that communications between the Council and the NATO Military Authorities, and particularly between members of the Council and their respective capitals, were somewhat less than adequate. As a result of the lessons learned from the Exercise, the Council had agreed to a significant increase in the secure telegraphic links between the NATO Headquarters at the Porte Dauphine and the NATO Military Authorities. In addition, it was known that many nations had also improved their own secure communications capabilities between Permanent Representatives and their respective national capitals. (He must add, in parenthesis, that no secure voice system was available to NATO, and that the above remarks therefore referred to telegraphic communications only.)

(Page 19 of 20 pages)
4. The Council had now decided, in principle, to participate in PALLEx 66, an exercise which would give a further opportunity of testing the machinery by which consultations under the provisions of the "Athens Guidelines" could take place. It was hoped that this would show the extent to which communications, both national and international, had been improved, and that it would test their present adequacy, as well as afford an opportunity of testing the machinery by which the Council and national governments could be provided with what was now known as an agreed "Data-Base", on which their decisions could be formulated. In particular, it was hoped to test the arrangements made to ensure the provision of an input of political intelligence from Foreign Ministries, which was an essential ingredient of the "Data-Base", but which had not been played in PALLEx 64.

5. Summarising his conclusions, Lord Coleridge said that he thought "Crisis Management" could be described as an essential complement, on the civil side, to command and control arrangements on the military side. As far as NATO was concerned, this was a relatively new concept, but a start had been made. A Council Situation Room had been constructed in the Porte Dauphine building, close to the communication facilities, where available information could be displayed. Arrangements had been tested in these headquarters for the collection and dissemination of intelligence from military sources: such intelligence would doubtless come largely from the Major NATO Commanders, using information obtained by reconnaissance or from forces in contact with the enemy, as well as - and this was very important - from Ministries of Defense.
It was hoped to improve arrangements for the dissemination of such intelligence and to devise and test in PALLEx 56 comparable arrangements in relation to the collation and dissemination of intelligence from political sources. With regard to communications, the existing military network was being improved, as were communications between Permanent Representatives, and their respective governments. The extent of these last improvements had yet to be tested.

6. In conclusion, he hoped that this meeting would give a powerful impetus to current planning for "Crisis Management" and that PALLEx 66 would test the extent to which arrangements and facilities were improved.
SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF DEFENCE MINISTERS

The first meetings of two Working Groups established by the NATO Special Committee of Defence Ministers were held in Paris from February 7 through 9, Secretary General Manlio Brosio, Chairman of the Committee, announced today. A third Working Group, concerned with nuclear planning, will hold its first meeting in Washington, D.C., on February 17th and 18th.

The Working Group on Intelligence and Other Data Exchange met at NATO Headquarters on February 7th and 8th with Mr. J.P. Waterfield of the British Foreign Office in the chair. Member countries are Belgium, Canada, Greece, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Experts from Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States took part in February 8th and 9th meetings of the Working Group on Communications. General Willem den Toon of the Netherlands is Chairman.

A representative of the Secretary General was present at all meetings.

The three Sub-Groups work under the guidance of a steering committee consisting of the Permanent Representatives of the participating countries. Their recommendations will be submitted to the Special Committee of Defence Ministers, which will, in turn, report to the North Atlantic Council, as it did during the Ministerial session in December, 1965.

Note: Member countries of the Nuclear Planning Committee are: Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.
The second meeting of the Working Group for Nuclear Planning of NATO's Special Committee of Defense Ministers will be held in London on April 28 and 29. Defense Ministers attending will be Kai-Uwe von Hassel, Germany; Roberto Tremelloni, Italy; Ahmet Topaloglu, Turkey; Denis Healey, United Kingdom; and Robert S. McNamara, United States, who will serve as Chairman. Manlio Brosio, the Secretary General of NATO, also will attend. The Working Group is studying ways of improving and extending allied participation in the planning for nuclear forces in the defense of NATO.

The first meeting of the Nuclear Planning Working Group, held in February, was devoted to questions concerning planning with regard to strategic nuclear weapons.

Two other Working Groups have been meeting regularly at NATO headquarters in Paris to discuss the work programs assigned to them and have made substantial progress.

In the forthcoming meeting the Ministers will address themselves to a consideration of various aspects of tactical nuclear weapons.

The Working Group on Planning, as well as the others, will in due course submit their recommendations to the Special Committee of Defense Ministers which in turn will report to the North Atlantic Council.
ENGLISH ONLY
15th May, 1966

To: Permanent Representatives of Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Germany
Greece
Italy
Netherlands
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States

From: Secretary General

SPECIAL COMMITTEE
DRAFT PROGRESS REPORT TO BRUSSELS MINISTERIAL MEETING

I attach hereto a draft Progress Report to the Council in Ministerial Session in Brussels which I suggest that the Steering Committee should discuss at their meeting at 11 a.m. on Monday, 15th May.

(Signed) Manlio BROSIO
Ministers will recall that in December 1965 they received a progress report on the activities of the Special Committee of Defence Ministers which was created by the Council to examine means of increasing allied participation in nuclear planning, including planning for the use of strategic nuclear weapons, and improvement in the machinery for carrying out agreed methods of consultation, with special reference to improved communications. The report informed Ministers that in order to facilitate its work, the Special Committee had decided to establish three Working Groups, the members of which would be Defence Ministers themselves or their nominees. The three groups are: (1) Working Group on Intelligence and Other Data Exchange; (2) Communications Working Group; (3) Nuclear Planning Working Group.

2. In all three of the fields in which their Working Groups have been working, the Defence Ministers and their deputies have assessed existing arrangements, identified relevant problems and are considering appropriate recommendations.

3. First, in the field of Intelligence and Other Data Exchange, Working Group I has:

- defined the kind of information, intelligence and other data required in order that governments may engage in meaningful and timely consultation about the possible use of nuclear weapons in the NATO area;

- compared these requirements with existing arrangements for the exchange of intelligence and other data in NATO;

- indicated where deficiencies appear to exist and begun to consider how these might be rectified.
4. The Special Committee Working Group II on Communications has carried out studies on existing communications facilities above the level of military command and control especially as they relate to consultation among governments at government level, and through the North Atlantic Council. It appears from these studies that present inter-governmental facilities and nationally-owned full-time circuits may not be adequate for the purpose under review; that NATO military circuits would have no spare traffic capacity in time of emergency; and that a separate system would help make decision both faster and more relevant by helping to ensure that there is timely exchange of information and that consultations could be effective. The Working Group on Communications has designed and estimated the costs of several alternative communications systems to improve NATO's ability to engage in meaningful and timely consultation. After consultation with Working Group I it has selected one scheme which from the technical viewpoint appears to warrant further examination, and will now proceed with a detailed system engineering study for that scheme. In addition, the Working Group will consider communications requirements of the recommendations which will be made by Working Group III in the coming months, as well as any other later requirements which may indicate additional features or facilities are needed.

5. In the field of Nuclear Planning the information and analysis required for the development of serious recommendations have not been readily available to the governments of non-nuclear nations. As a result of new arrangements between NATO and the United States Government(1), information required for more detailed consultation on nuclear planning can now be made available to NATO governments. The Special Committee Working Group III on Nuclear Planning, therefore, had to approach its

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(1) The 1965 Agreement for the Exchange of Atomic Information (C-M(65)39)
task by first exchanging information about the status of present nuclear forces, the plans that now exist, and the uncertainties and unknowns which also exist. For these reasons the Committee's Working Group on Nuclear Planning has been operating at the level of Defence Ministers.

6. From the work of the Nuclear Planning Working Group, it appears that:

a. The general magnitude of existing strategic nuclear forces is adequate to deter a large-scale attack by the Soviet Union, but there appears to be no way to prevent unacceptable damage to the West from an all-out nuclear exchange.

b. The tactical nuclear weapons available to SACEUR and SA CLANT appear to be sufficient in quantity under present conditions, but the optimum "mix" of such weapons might profitably be further studied.

c. SACEUR's nuclear strike programme is a plan designed for use in general nuclear war in association with the bulk of the strategic nuclear forces available to the Alliance.

d. In conditions of less than general war, a number of uncertainties, including uncertainties as to how Soviet capabilities might be used, make it difficult to predict whether it would be of net advantage to NATO to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in aggression less than general war in Allied Command Europe.

e. There is a need to identify possible cases in the various regions in which nuclear weapons might be used in conditions less than general war, to prepare plans to cover such cases, and to have those cases and plans discussed at the highest political-military levels. Such discussions will both expand the understanding of the problems associated with the use of nuclear weapons and serve as a foundation for decision making.

f. Since the selective use of nuclear weapons in case of aggression less than general war must be subject to political
decision, and since "pre-delegation" in general presents serious political difficulties, the question of special decision procedures in particular circumstances and areas requires serious study. Preparation for rapid decision can be made by advance development of specific plans for the use in typical cases of such defensive nuclear weapons as ADMs, AW weapons and air defence weapons over one's own territory.

g. There is at present within NATO no organization or established procedure for the continuous review at the highest political-military levels of these and related matters. The Special Committee is therefore proposing to consider and recommend possible modifications in organization and procedure to enable a greater degree of participation in nuclear planning by non-nuclear nations, including participation in selection, deployment, targeting, and conditions of use across the whole spectrum of nuclear weapons; and to make possible appropriate consultations in the event their use is considered.

7. Recommendations on these subjects, together with recommendations on Alliance arrangements for improving consultation on "developing situations", will thus be the content of the next phase of the Special Committee's work. It expects to report to the Council, with recommendations for action, at the regular Ministerial Meeting in December 1966.

8. The Council is invited to take note of this report.
ENGLISH ONLY
18th August, 1966

To: Permanent Representatives of Belgium
   Canada
   Denmark
   Germany
   Greece
   Italy
   Netherlands
   Turkey
   United Kingdom
   United States

From: Acting Secretary General

NUCLEAR PLANNING WORKING GROUP OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE
AGREED MINUTES OF MEETING ON 26TH JULY, 1966

I attach herefor your information, a copy of the
Minute of the Meeting on 26th July of the Nuclear Planning
Working Group of the Special Committee of Defence Ministers.

(Signed) James A. ROBERTS
SECRET
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

MEETING OF THE NUCLEAR PLANNING WORKING GROUP
NATO SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF DEFENSE MINISTERS

Paris, 26 July 1966

AGREED MINUTE

1. At their third meeting, in Paris 26 July 1966, the Ministers considered primarily modifications in organization, procedure and guidelines to make possible broader participation in nuclear planning.

2. The Ministers discussed the papers submitted by the members of Working Group III and the Greek Government.

3. The Ministers agreed that the work of the Nuclear Planning Working Group had demonstrated that:
   a. It is vital that key governmental officials -- in the first instance, Ministers of Defense -- personally participate in the discussion of nuclear planning matters.
   b. The sharing of basic information (excluding weapons technology) regarding nuclear weapons and plans is essential to and has made possible the beginning of meaningful consultation.
   c. Discussion in small groups with very limited numbers of persons in attendance is essential to substantive and frank exchanges of views.
   d. Adequate preparation by participants, including preliminary staff work in preparing the ground for Ministerial discussion, is an important ingredient in meaningful consultation.

SECRET
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
4. The Ministers agreed that their deputies should now prepare specific proposals to achieve the following objectives:

a. There should be some form of permanent NATO body which would meet at ministerial level (with Permanent Representatives as Deputies), to propose general policy on nuclear defense affairs of the Alliance. In order to accomplish the detailed work required, there should be a small planning working group which would also meet periodically at ministerial level.

b. The planning group would consider the following subjects, among others:

(i) Policies, plans and programs for the use of nuclear weapons, including strategic weapons not assigned to the Alliance, in the defense of NATO.

(ii) Improvement in the machinery for carrying out agreed methods of consultation with respect to actual or potential use of nuclear weapons in defense of NATO.

(iii) Possible modernization of existing weapons systems and the development and deployment of new weapons systems.

c. A draft work program on nuclear defense matters for the first year of the planning group's work.

5. The Ministers agreed that their Deputies should develop proposals for arrangements whereby NATO members can introduce their national views on nuclear plans into the work of the NATO military authorities.

6. The Ministers agreed to meet in Rome on September 23 and 24 to consider the proposals referred to above and to prepare recommendations to the Special Committee for consideration by the North Atlantic Council at the December 1966 meeting. In addition, they agreed to discuss at Rome how NATO might address the Italian proposal for improving political consultation in times of crisis.
PRESS RELEASE (66) 9

For immediate release

Paris, 16th September 1966

WORKING GROUP III ROME MEETING

The fourth meeting of the Working Group for Nuclear Planning of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Special Committee of Defence Ministers will be held in Rome on September 23rd. Defence Ministers who are members of the Working Group and who will attend are:

Kai Uwe von Hassel, Germany
Roberto Tremelloni, Italy
Ahmet Topaloglu, Turkey
Denis Healey, United Kingdom
and Robert S. McNamara, United States, who will serve as Chairman.

Manlio Brosio, the Secretary General of NATO, will also attend. The Working Group is studying ways of improving and extending Allied participation in the planning for nuclear forces in the defence of NATO.

The Defence Ministers of the Nuclear Planning Working Group met at Washington in February, at London in April, and at Paris in July to discuss planning with regard to strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and organizational and procedural matters related to nuclear planning.

In the forthcoming meeting the Ministers will focus their attention on proposals to strengthen organizational and procedural arrangements to permit more effective Allied participation in the nuclear affairs of the Alliance, with a view toward submitting their findings and recommendations to the Special Committee at an early date.
Roman, 23rd September, 1966

NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP OF DEFENCE MINISTERS

The Nuclear Planning Group of Defence Ministers issued the following communique after their meeting in Rome, September 23rd:

"The Defense Ministers of Nuclear Planning Working Group today devoted their fourth meeting to consideration of modifications in organization and of procedures and guidelines to bring about more effective allied participation in nuclear planning. As a result of today's discussions, the Ministers recommended to the Special Committee a framework of permanent arrangements for Nuclear Planning in NATO. It is hoped that the Special Committee will consider these recommendations before the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting in December and decide on further action. Defense Ministers in attendance were Kai Uwe von Hassel, Germany; Roberto Tremelloni, Italy; Ahmet Topaloglu, Turkey; Denis Healey, United Kingdom; and Robert S. McNamara, United States, who served as Chairman. Mr. Manlio Brosio, Secretary General of NATO, also attended. Previous meetings of the Nuclear Planning Working Group have dealt with various aspects of planning associated with strategic nuclear forces, tactical nuclear forces, as well as organizational questions".
Summary record of a meeting held
at the Permanent Headquarters, Paris, Iee., on
Wednesday, 14th December, 1966, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman and Secretary General: Mr. Manlio Brosio

SEE: DN (2005)002

H.E. Mr. P. Harmel:
H.E. Mr. Ch. Poswick:
H.E. Mr. A. de Storerke:

Minister for Foreign Affairs
Minister of National Defence
Permanent Representative

H.E. Mr. J.O. Krag:
H.E. Mr. Victor Gram:
H.E. Mr. H. Hjorth-Nielsen:

Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Minister for Defence
Permanent Representative

H.E. Mr. Gerhard Schröder:
H.E. Mr. Wilhelm Grewe:

Federal Minister for Defence
Permanent Representative

H.E. Mr. C. Mitsotakis:
H.E. Mr. S. Costopoulos:
H.E. Mr. G. Melas:
H.E. Mr. Ch. X. Falamas:

Minister for Economic Co-ordination
Minister for National Defence
Minister of Finance
Permanent Representative

(PAGE 1 OF 19 PAGES)
ICELAND
H.E. Mr. Emil Jónsson: Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Henrik Sv. Björnsson: Permanent Representative

ITALY
The Hon. Roberto Tremelloni: Minister for Defence
H.E. Mr. Adolfo Alessandrini: Permanent Representative

LUXEMBOURG
H.E. Mr. Pierre Werner: Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Paul Reuter: Permanent Representative

NETHERLANDS
H.E. Mr. J.M.A.H. Luns: Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. P.J.S. de Jong: Minister for Defence
H.E. Mr. H.N. Boon: Permanent Representative

NORWAY
H.E. Mr. John Lyng: Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Otto Grieg Tidemund: Minister for Defence
H.E. Mr. Georg Kristiansen: Permanent Representative

PORTUGAL
H.E. Mr. A. Franco Nogueira: Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Gen. Genes de Araujo: Minister for National Defence
H.E. Mr. Vasco da Cunha: Permanent Representative

TURKEY
H.E. Ihsan Sabri Çaglayan: Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Ahmet Topaloğlu: Minister for National Defence
H.E. Mr. Nuri Birgi: Permanent Representative

UNITED KINGDOM
The Rt.Hon. George Brown: Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
The Rt.Hon. George Thomson: Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster
The Rt.Hon. Denis Healey: Secretary of State for Defence
H.E. Sir Bernard Burrows: Permanent Representative

(Page 2 of 19 pages)
The Hon. Dean Rusk: Secretary of State
The Hon. Henry Fowler: Secretary of the Treasury
The Hon. Robert S. McNamara: Secretary of Defense
The Hon. Harlan Cleveland: Permanent Representative

INTERNATIONAL STAFF
Mr. J.A. Roberts: Deputy Secretary General
Mr. P.D. Grogh: Deputy Secretary General - Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance
Mr. J. Jaenicke: Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs
Mr. J. Beith: Assistant Secretary General for Production, Logistics and Infrastructure
The Lord Coleridge: Executive Secretary

ALSO PRESENT
Lt.Gen. Baron G.P. de Cumont: Chairman, Military Committee
General E. Forber: Director of International Planning Staff, Military Committee
General L.D. Lemnitzer: Supreme Allied Commander Europe
Admiral T.H. Moorer: Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
Admiral Sir John Frewen: Commander in Chief, Channel Military Committee
Maj.Gen. W.W. Stromberg: Representative
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I. MILITARY QUESTIONS

(b) NATO Defence Planning (Contd)

1. Mr. TOPALOGLU (Turkey) said that DPC/D(66)30 represented a first step towards meeting the need for political guidance to the military authorities, though its preparation under pressure of time made it far from adequate to meet the requirements of the Alliance. He distributed, in the form of an explanatory note, the preliminary conclusions by the Turkish Authorities on their first reading of the document. He thought that the document should be studied by the Defence Planning Committee with due consideration to comments made during this meeting, and that it should then be presented to the Spring Ministerial meeting in the form of a final report.

2. With reference to the Turkish force plans, he said that as was well known the area occupied by Turkey was of strategic importance for the Alliance. Furthermore, Turkey, with the NATO defence installations existing on her soil, made a great contribution to the common defence.

3. According to analyses and appreciations recently made by various NATO authorities, practically no warning time existed in this particular area. A surprise attack in any form and dimension on the part of the Soviet Union was therefore always probable, whence the necessity of forces ready for immediate response. The characteristics of the area occupied by Turkey, such as its sensitivity, its exposure to surprise attack and its distance from the reinforcement sources of the Alliance, emerged as the main factors in the defence preparations. In various documents prepared for the present meeting, it was stated that the weaknesses in the flanks were of a nature to encourage the Soviet Union to undertake an aggression under any form. Equally, stress was laid on the necessity for adequate and balanced local forces which would play a deterrent rôle in the area and which, in case of an attack, would prevent losses of major portions of territory and avoid disintegration of the forces until the arrival of the reinforcements. This was particularly emphasised as being the best method of remedying the existing weaknesses. On the other hand, current studies on the question of improving the defence capability of the flanks by external reinforcements indicated that, even were the time needed for the arrival of these forces and the necessary reception facilities to be discarded, the size of these forces was such that they could only be considered as useful in contributing to NATO's solidarity and deterrence; they could neither increase the defence power nor could they replace the defence needs of the local forces. The general inadequacies of the Turkish armed forces were clearly described in various documents prepared by the NATO Military Authorities and remedies requested on every occasion. The plan before the Committee was not
based on the philosophy that the Turkish armed forces would take
upon themselves alone the defence of the area under threat. On
the contrary, this posture was a reflection of a minimum balanced
local force necessary to fulfill the missions incumbent upon it,
for the defence of the area, under the pledge embodied in the
principles and the spirit of the Alliance. In the preparation of
this plan, great care had been taken to be realistic and to
reconcile the existing capabilities with the defence mission
which Turkey had to exercise within the defence system of the
Alliance. In this connection, he wished to point out that this
force posture was a logical evolution of the system within which
the responsible NATO Commander-in-Chief maintained it was
impossible to prevent the loss of the Turkish straits and of
major portions of Turkish territory. The studies commonly
conducted by the Turkish Military Authorities on the one hand
and the United States and German Military Authorities on the
other, concerning the quantity and nature of military aid by
these two Allies and the existing national capabilities, had
revealed that the Turkish force plans would be realized almost
entirely. The decisions taken in the previous Ministerial
meetings and during the last July meeting of the Council,
concerning aid to Turkey by Canada and Italy, and the expressed
views of Turkey's Allies in favour of this aid, had given
Turkey hope that she would be able to meet existing minor
deficiencies. He wished, on this occasion, to extend heartfelt
thanks from his Authorities to Turkey's American friends and to
his colleague Mr. McNamara personally, as well as to the
governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada and Italy
for their help. In the light of the above comments, he wished
to conclude by asking the Ministers to accept the Turkish force
plan which his Authorities deemed necessary for the defence of
the area.

4. On NATO's capabilities to respond to defence
emergencies on the flanks he said that Turkey had always been
in favour of conducting studies aimed at remedying weaknesses
of the South-Eastern flank of the Alliance. Turkey was of the
opinion that the paper, DPC/D(66)33, showed very clearly that
the method of improving the defence capabilities of the flanks
lay in increasing the adequacy and the effectiveness of the
local forces in the area. He was glad to see that the comments
made by the NATO Military Authorities in this respect supporting
Turkey's views had been included in this report. It was Turkey's
hope that this principle would guide the future work on this
subject. It was common knowledge that the ACE Mobile Force, in
its present form, played a negligible part in the reinforcement
of flanks. The preliminary data in the report not only confirmed
this but also indicated the enormous efforts which would have
to be deployed in order to transform this force into a convincing
reserve force under SADUR, capable of realising the purpose for
which it was created. If the sums allocated for the establishment
of these units were to be spent on correcting the weaknesses of
the local forces, this would constitute a solution independent
of all sorts of conditions.
5. The studies carried out with a view to developing a Quick-Reacting Mobile Force in addition to the existing ACE Mobile Force had been most useful since they had served to explore the means of its realisation. He hoped that the further work to be undertaken on this particular question would lead to the development of realistic plans capable of supporting the defence planning. Nevertheless, the findings in the report indicated already that the adoption of the above measure could not constitute a significant and effective remedy to the deficiencies of the local forces. In Turkey's opinion, the creation of such a force from the point of view of its size and modality of employment was dependent on the realisation of many conditions which could not be guaranteed beforehand and which would necessitate very important outlays.

6. In conclusion, although Turkey found these studies beneficial, she nevertheless believed that the least expensive and the most rational way to remedy the existing deficiencies of the defence capability on the South-Eastern Flank of the Alliance consisted in increasing the capabilities of the local forces.

7. Mr. RUSK (United States) said that he did not think that the Allies should be too discouraged if they could not put down in great detail what they thought about a wide range of contingencies; experience had proved that the more detailed studies became, the more problematic a comprehensive understanding became. He supposed that the essential purpose of NATO was to be prepared for whatever might arise; this might range from an assured peace to crises of the gravest dimension. In times of such crises NATO looked to her military establishments to respond to the decisions of heads of government and it was to be hoped that the latter would make the right decisions to meet the situation. In this context, balanced forces were of the utmost importance as they permitted heads of government to take those decisions that were necessary for the peace of the world. Moreover, balanced forces were necessary to ensure that the most powerful of deterrents was credible to the other side. This was of particular relevance as he thought that one might be approaching a point where deterrents based on irrationality would no longer serve their purpose; the enemy might then be led to assumptions of the gravest danger to NATO. If the United States seemed cautious to recognise changes in the character of military establishments, it was because political change took place more quickly than the "lead times" in NATO military establishments. Five years force planning was under study in NATO, but only some four years ago the world was recovering from a very grave crisis resulting from a threat of war in Berlin, in which the United States had been involved, with the necessary redeployment of additional forces to Europe and increases in her own forces. Concern had also to be given to the nature of the threat. There was some feeling in the Alliance that the Soviet threat to Europe was diminishing.
Nonetheless, while there were signs of potential changes, there was no alteration to the fundamental lines of Soviet policy which divided Europe. He thought that Mr. Healey was very right in saying that if there were signs of a reduction in the hostility from the East, this was not only because the military power of the Alliance was formidable, but also because her unity of purpose was clear. He also stressed that it would be a great mistake to repeat the tragedy of immediate demobilisation in the post-war period; to some extent it could be said that since 1946, the results of this mistake were still being remedied. It would be tragic if, by an undue reduction in the defence capacity of NATO, a change of attitude in Eastern Europe were to be induced.

8. Within the Alliance there was considerable agreement on strategy and force requirements and he hoped that the force planning process would give specific recommendations for action in future years. There were, however, still some imbalances of forces, both in structure and between individual countries. Moreover, there could not be a healthy relationship in the Alliance if some members refused to share the burdens. Despite the general feeling that the enemy was reducing its military capacity, the Soviet build-up was nonetheless continuing, as was illustrated by the addition of an ABM component and the provision of tactical nuclear weapons to Soviet ground forces. This was allowed for in NATO's force planning.

9. With reference to the Trilateral Talks, he said that members of the Committee would have received a progress report and, in addition, Mr. McCoy and Mr. Thomson had reported to Permanent Representatives on the first two meetings. The Secretary General had also been present or had been represented at the meetings. The United States continued to believe that the Alliance was vital to the security of all its members and she would continue to play her part as in the past. It followed naturally that Allied military dispositions would be based on the implications of such security. The members of the Alliance should be capable together of finding fair methods for financing the military posture necessary, taking due account of their respective financial positions. He stressed that the appraisal of the security need must be kept up to date, and an objective view of the measures needed to adjust the strategy of the Alliance was essential, both for governments and for public understanding, so that the countries of the Alliance might act with confidence and clarity in taking the necessary measures. His Government looked to the regular institutions and procedures of NATO to accomplish such a review and to offer guidance. The Trilateral Talks were an ad hoc approach to a specific problem and could not be considered intelligently without looking into the military capacity and deployments required to defend the central region of NATO. Just as all agreed that security was a common interest, so the economic and fiscal problems arising

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from efforts taken in the interests of all should also be treated as a common problem and should be solved on the basis of mutual aid. It was clear that the location of forces on foreign soil brought a foreign exchange gain to the host country and a corresponding loss to the country providing the forces. Bilateral and multilateral ways to neutralise this situation should be sought in the context of the overall financial position. He was sure everyone agreed that it was important to solve these problems in a way to strengthen the Alliance and not to divide it. The Trilateral Talks had not been concluded but would be continued, and the three powers would keep the Committee advised. Any decisions would be taken in the interest of the Alliance as a whole.

10. In conclusion, he said that the United States, perhaps for the first time since World War II, was facing a deep discussion on defence, on the sharing of commitments and on arrangements within the Alliance. He was sure that the Committee were aware of the strong attitudes of several important Senators and the opening months of the new session of Congress would see a considerable debate on these questions. He wished to stress that his President and his Administration did not consider that these questions could be solved by one country alone. What was needed was a consensus within the Alliance over the nature of the threat, measures taken together in prudence to deal with this threat, and a solution as to how members should share the necessary burdens. The United States were no less committed to the idea of collective security and continued to attach the same importance to the vital characteristics of the safety of the NATO area and to the necessity for action in unity, so as to achieve the great purposes for which the Alliance had been organized.

11. Mr. McNAMARA (United States) supported his colleague's views on the value as regards general progress, and especially to the Military Committee, of the Defence Planning Committee's document DPC/D(66)30(Revised), and whilst recommending that the latter be reconsidered by the Ministers at their Spring meeting, proposed that it be forwarded immediately to the Military Committee for their information and consideration in the intervening period. He shared Mr. Hailey's opinion that the document inadequately treated the question of political and military warning, although in many respects he disagreed with his British colleague's analysis. In particular, he questioned his pessimistic appraisal of the relative strength of Soviet and Allied capabilities, and his conclusions that there was no longer a requirement for the existing type of conventional forces, and that combat duration might be as short as fifteen days. Earlier discussion on the extent of requirements for conventional as opposed to nuclear forces had revealed a division of views; it was apparent that this problem called for further attention before the Spring meeting.
12. Referring to document DPU/D(66)35, he commented that the report on force structure proposed by the Turkish Authorities contained a disturbing statement of a requirement for assistance in excess of Turkish national resources and external aid already promised. He suggested therefore that the Defence Planning Committee be invited to reconsider this paper before its submission for approval in order to ensure the incorporation into future force planning of a force structure capable of financial support within the limits already proposed.

13. Mr. THOMSON (United Kingdom) commented that the purpose of the Tripartite Talks, on which Mr. Rusk had already spoken, had been to find a satisfactory solution to the balance of payments problem of maintaining United States and United Kingdom forces in Germany. However, these financial problems had to be related to questions of force levels and strategy. As had been stated in the Tripartite report, this point, of vital importance to the Alliance, was accepted by the three powers from the outset. It should be noted that there had been no attempt by any government to make decisions which affected Allied security and could only properly be taken by the Alliance collectively. The presence of the Secretary General or his representatives at the Talks was welcomed by the three powers who similarly welcomed the adoption of the accelerated procedure for force planning as a means of keeping the two sets of discussion in phase.

14. The United Kingdom had hoped that the results of the Talks could be reported on at this meeting particularly in view of their relation to parallel current deliberations in NATO. In the absence of such a report his Government had agreed to continue negotiations to reach timely agreement on financial and military arrangements. In the meantime, it undertook to make no changes to the present force dispositions in Germany. However, if no agreement had been reached by June 1967 the United Kingdom must consider itself free to take steps to reduce costs for the period 1967 to 1968. Needless to say, his Government would act in agreement with its Allies and in accordance with NATO and WEU procedures.

15. Referring to the United States offer to make military purchases in 1967 up to $35 million and in excess of commitments already undertaken, he said his Authorities wished to place on record their appreciation and acceptance of this useful and constructive gesture.

16. The Tripartite Talks were to be resumed early in 1967 and results would be reported to the Council. It was hoped that with good will and determination agreement could be achieved and a valuable contribution made to the overall force posture of the Alliance.
17. Mr. HELLYER (Canada) supported Mr. McNamara's suggestion that the Defence Planning Committee's report should be referred to the Military Committee for further consideration rather than agreed at the present meeting.

18. He stressed his Government's continued support for the concept of collective Allied defence and informed the Council of the progress of a fundamental reorganization of military forces which was taking place in Canada. Legislation was now before Parliament to make effective a new system by which air and land forces would be amalgamated into a single service with a common uniform, common rank designations, and common control and operation. He must emphasise that this change should not be seen as a threat to the Canadian contribution to the Alliance; on the contrary, it would permit an increase in Canadian military capability and improve his country's ability to meet its military obligations with modern viable forces. By eliminating duplication, funds had become available for the re-equipment of land forces and for the improvement of their tactical and strategic mobility - a measure of direct implication on the offer, still outstanding to the Alliance, of an additional battalion for the ACE Mobile Force.

19. Mr. HEALEY (United Kingdom) hoped that Mr. McNamara's remarks would not lead to a misunderstanding of his point of view. If Allied capability was greater than he himself imagined, there was considerable scope for reduction of conventional forces. On the other hand, if Soviet capability was superior, conventional forces became indispensable to the overall defence posture. The problem, and the root of disagreement, lay in the estimation of how large this conventional factor should be. He personally felt it should be sufficiently great to confront the enemy during a time period long enough to allow for a decision on the employment of nuclear weapons to be taken.

20. To conclude the discussion under Item I(b), the following decisions were then taken:

(1) Procedures for NATO Defence Planning Review

Document: DPC/D(66)12(Revised)

The DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE:

(a) took note of the report DPC/D(66)12(Revised);

(b) agreed that a defence planning review cycle on the lines described in DPC/D(66)12(Revised) should be initiated early in 1967 with a view to the adoption in December 1967 of NATO force goals and in December 1968 of a NATO force plan covering the five-year period 1969-1973;

(1) Separately circulated as DPC/D(66)44.
(c) noted that a decision would be required on whether the next following defence planning review cycle should be initiated early in 1968 (relating to the five-year period 1970-1974) or early in 1969 (relating to the five-year period 1971-1975), but that this decision need not necessarily be taken before the second half of 1967;

(d) reiterated the importance of a review, in the light of experience, of the procedures adopted for the first cycle, as directed by Ministers in their endorsement of paragraph 14(d)(v) of C-M(66)70.

(2) 1966-1970 Force Plans for Greece and Turkey

References: DPC/D(66)4(GREECE)
DPC/D(66)4(TURKEY)(Revised)

Documents: DPC/D(66)34
DPC/D(66)35

The DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE:

(a) noted the Greek force plan set out in document DPC/D(66)4(GREECE);

(b) noted that the Greek Authorities did not regard the force structure as a reflection of Greek military requirements but as a plan to make the best use of available manpower and resources on the assumption that $161½ million of financial aid, over and above the equipment aid which Greece already expected to receive from her Allies, would be made available over the period 1966-1970, and as a first step in the implementation of their 1965 "Artemis" plan;

(c) noted the Turkish force plans set out in document DPC/D(66)4(TURKEY)(Revised);

(d) noted that those Turkish force plans were aimed at implementing the Turkish BRAVO posture which, in the view of the Turkish Authorities, was the minimum force posture required to meet the threat against Turkey, taking fully into account NATO's overall defence capabilities, and, in particular, the expected availability of external reinforcements;

(e) noted that the implementation of those Turkish force plans required, in addition to Turkey's own national resources and to the assistance which had already been promised, the supplementary amount of $273 million of external aid over the period 1966-1970;
(f) noted that the NATO Military Authorities cannot carry out objectively their task of providing military planning guidance for Greece or Turkey until sufficient information has been provided regarding the total defence resources including external aid available to these two countries;

(g) requested the Defence Planning Committee in Permanent Session, in consultation with the NATO Military Authorities, to study further:

(i) the improvement of the forces planned by Greece and Turkey, taking into account information given to the Council regarding the external aid that will be made available to these two countries by their Allies, and also the views of the Military Committee quoted in document DPC/D(66)33(Revised), paragraph 2;

(ii) the provision of external reinforcements to the flanks, as an additional measure to increase their defence capabilities, the first aim being the elaboration and submission of firm proposals on the three possible measures listed in document DPC/D(66)33(Revised), paragraph 15;

(h) invited the Military Committee to take these ongoing studies into account in preparing its appreciation of the military situation as it will affect NATO through 1975.

(3) Accelerated Defence Planning Procedures - Trilateral Talks - Political Guidance to Military Committee

Documents: DPC/D(66)30(Revised)
DPC/D(66)33(Revised)
PO/66/613

In respect of political, strategic and economic guidance to the Military Committee, and further to the Resolution adopted by the Defence Planning Committee in Permanent Session on 4th November, 1966, MINISTERS:

(a) requested the Defence Planning Committee in Permanent Session to examine further, in the light of the Ministerial discussion and in consultation as appropriate with the NATO Military Authorities, the draft Ministerial guidance in document DPC/D(66)30(Revised) in order that the Defence Planning Committee in Ministerial Session might be able to take a final decision in the Spring of 1967 upon the guidance to be given to the Military Committee;
(b) requested the Military Committee to make use of
document DPC/D(66)30(Revised) as background in the
light of the Ministerial discussions;

(c) requested the Military Committee to continue its
preparatory work directed towards an appreciation
of the military situation as it will affect NATO
through 1975;

(d) noted the report on the Trilateral Talks between
the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom
and the United States (PO/66/613);

(e) confirmed the invitation previously extended to
these three governments to keep their NATO partners
fully informed of their discussions;

(f) requested the Defence Planning Committee in Permanent
Session to examine further, in consultation as
appropriate with the NATO Military Authorities, and
taking into account the studies being conducted by
the three governments, the questions listed in
Annex II to document DPC/D(66)30(Revised).

(4) Status Report on Force Planning Studies Previously
Assigned by Ministers

Document: DPC/D(66)37(Revised)

21. The DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE:
took note of the report DPC/D(66)37(Revised).

I. (c) Financing of the ACE Mobile Force

Document: DPC/D(66)20(Revised)

22. The CHAIRMAN recalled that, at their meeting in July,
the Defence Ministers had had some discussion of the problem of
financing the exercises of the ACE Mobile Force. A considerable
number of Defence Ministers had expressed themselves in favour of
the principle of common financing of the costs of these exercises,
but unanimity had not been achieved. The Ministers had given
instructions for further study of the problem in the hope that
a solution could be achieved by the time of the present meeting
at the latest.

23. The document DPC/D(66)20(Revised) showed that the search
for an agreed solution had made little progress at official level.
He was very glad to be able to tell Ministers, however, that the
United Kingdom Permanent Representative had informed him that his
Authorities were now prepared to agree in principle to common
financing of the exercises of the ACE Mobile Force.
24. He understood that the Portuguese Authorities might not yet be in a position to agree similarly, but hoped that they might be able to do so in the near future and that a decision could be taken on this item subject to their confirmation later.

25. Mr. NOGUEIRA (Portugal) stated that his Government had always supported the principle of the ACE Mobile Force which had both a political and psychological role in preventing a local crisis from developing into general conflict. However, if Portugal were to accept common funding of exercises, such a decision would entail a greater financial outlay for defence expenditure. At earlier discussions of this problem, during which the United Kingdom and Portugal had opposed integral common funding, it had been agreed that further consultations should take place and these were continuing. Although unable to accept at present the principle of integral common funding, he wished to match the attitude of the United Kingdom and would renew consultations with his financial colleague.

26. The DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE:

27. The CHAIRMAN said that Ministers would be aware that, following proposals made by the United States Government in September 1966, earnest consideration had been given to the possibilities of instituting a NATO Satellite Communications Programme. The generous and imaginative proposals put forward by the United States Government were welcomed and had been the subject of detailed examination and report by the Senior Communications and Electronics Group.

28. The Council in Permanent Session had agreed the recommendations in paragraph 23 of the second report of this Group (DPC/D(66)40(Revised)), whereby NATO would implement the first Phase of the proposed programme, and to this end, lease, at a relatively modest cost, two transportable ground terminals, one to be installed near SHAPE and one near APSOUTH. By about July 1967. These terminals, using time on the existing United States satellite system, would enable NATO, for a period of about one year, to undertake tests, evaluation and the development of NATO concepts and requirements and for NATO personnel to be trained in the use of satellite communications techniques.
29. Meanwhile urgent and detailed examination was being undertaken of a possible Phase II programme in which NATO might, with the aid of the United States, have two synchronous satellites available to it, operating with some ten NATO ground stations and forming an operational system to meet NATO's unique and vital defence requirements.

30. He asked if Ministers were prepared to endorse the recommendations, which had already been considered by the Defence Planning Committee in Permanent Session, and which featured in paragraph 23 of DPC/D(66)40(Revised).

31. Mr. McNAMARA (United States) expressed support for the recommendations as outlined in the report.

32. Mr. SCHRODER (Germany) stated that his Government shared the view that NATO participation in the communications satellite programme was desirable and had therefore taken part in the experts' discussions within NATO. Germany felt, however, that the satellite programme required further detailed study before a final decision could be made and, as far as Phase II was concerned, a cost and implementation plan would be desirable to cover all the questions raised in discussion. This further examination would constitute the final factor in any decision.

33. The DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE:

endorsed the recommendations in paragraph 23 of DPC/D(66)40(Revised).

II. REPORTS BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF DEFENCE MINISTERS

(a) Suggested Improvements for Nuclear Planning

Document: DPC/D(66)59

(b) Consultation in Times of Tension and Crisis

Document: DPC/D(66)32

34. The CHAIRMAN drew Ministers' attention to the two reports at reference prepared by the Special Committee of Defence Ministers and its three Working Groups. The report at reference (a) recommended the creation of two permanent bodies within NATO: a policy body - the Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee (NDAC), and a working body - the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). The second report (reference (b)), which was a synthesis of the findings and recommendations of Working Group I on Data Exchange and Working Group II on Communications made recommendations concerning the establishment of a NATO-wide communications system and improvement of arrangements in each Allied government. It also
invited the Secretary General to make specific proposals on improving the exchange of information and on the proposed communications system, to keep the consultation machinery under constant review and to propose further improvements. Finally, the report recommended that Ministers note that it had not been possible to evolve procedures for consultation in crisis and that they should consequently agree to the need for further studies.

35. In his view, the two reports at reference completed the assignment of the Special Committee and he proposed that it be disbanded if the Ministers approved the two reports before them and created the permanent bodies recommended on nuclear planning. He sensed general agreement as to the substance of the two reports, apart from the question of the exact composition of the NPG referred to in paragraph 4(a) of reference (a). He therefore invited Ministers to express their general approval of the two reports before turning to the matter of the NPG's composition.

36. Mr. TIDEMAND (Norway) said Norway could support the establishment of the NDAC as well as the introduction of national views into the work of the NATO Military Authorities and the steps taken regarding consultation in tension and crisis. The Norwegian Government found it important to participate in the NDAC, as it had in the Nuclear Committee created after the Athens Ministerial meeting of 1962. Nevertheless, Norway's support and wish to participate did not imply a change in established Norwegian policy regarding atomic weapons and the stationing of non-Norwegian troops on its territory. His Government hoped that the permanent organization envisaged would have a constructive effect on the solution of non-proliferation problems.

37. General GOMES de ARAUJO (Portugal) said Portugal approved the recommendation to establish a permanent organization for nuclear planning. Moreover, Portugal wished to participate in the NDAC and would take part, as the occasion arose (according to whatever method of composition was chosen), in the NPG. As for the question of consultation in times of crisis, Portugal approved the recommendations contained in paragraph 6 of reference (b).

38. There being no further comments, the CHAIRMAN took it that the two reports at reference were generally approved. He then turned to the question of the composition of the NPG and suggested that it might be advisable for discussion of this point to be held in restricted session.

39. Ministers then continued their meeting in restricted session and resumed discussion later as follows.

40. The CHAIRMAN said he understood two Ministers wished to make statements on subjects other than the composition of the NPG.
41. Mr. SCHRODER (Germany) expressed satisfaction that the necessary practical basis for future work had been found; the recommended solution would warrant an appropriate composition of the NPG at all times. In the light of the recommended solution, he wished to say something about the real substance of the work ahead. Recalling the mission of the Special Committee of Defence Ministers and the reflection of this mission in the proposed Terms of Reference of the NMAC and NPG, he said that by contributing to policies, plans, programmes and procedures for the use of nuclear weapons, including strategic weapons not assigned to the Alliance, the Federal Republic would like to participate to a greater extent in the Alliance's nuclear policy. In particular, the German Government would like to suggest a study of whether and how those Allies, from whose territory nuclear weapons would be employed or on whose soil they would have their effects if used against an attack, could be given a special influence on the decision to release those weapons. He felt that the 1962 Athens guidelines concerning consultation on the release of nuclear weapons formed a good basis for the further expansion of the consultations envisaged therein. He added that in the light of past experience, the solution of the problem of nuclear consultation procedures in a crisis, which would ideally include the process of a common estimate of the situation and decision, was particularly difficult

42. Report DPC/D(66)32 indicated that the Steering Committee had not yet been in a position to accomplish this particular mission given to the Special Committee by its Terms of Reference. He proposed that the work should be continued in an appropriate framework, giving due consideration to the Italian proposal, and that a decision should be taken as to which body should be charged with the matter. For its part, the German Government was prepared to contribute to all meaningful approaches to the solution of the nuclear problems of NATO and would not be opposed to farther-reaching projects for the improvement of co-operation in this field, provided that the Alliance was in favour of them and that they were designed to strengthen its coherence.

43. Mr. TREVIELLO (Italy) said his Government could agree to the two reports at reference. He realised that the lack of time had not made it possible to complete a study for defining crisis management procedures and that this was a delicate matter which all the Allies, and especially those with nuclear responsibilities, would wish to continue studying. Nevertheless, he was particularly satisfied by the large degree of agreement now reached in this field, which augured well for the future, and he was confident that the new permanent organization the Ministers were called upon to set up would have the means and the time to study and resolve the problems concerned.
44. The CHAIRMAN proposed that the statements just made by the German and Italian Ministers of Defence, which contained important elements of interpretation, should be noted and considered as elements in the further study. He pointed out that paragraph 8(e) of DPC/D(66)32 left open the point raised by the German Defence Minister as to which body should study crisis management problems. He suggested, and it was agreed, that this matter be left for the Permanent Representatives to resolve.

45. He went on to say that as a consequence of the agreement reached at the meeting in Restricted Session, the second sentence of paragraph 4(a) of DPC/D(66)39 should be amended to read:

"The maximum number is thought to be seven, who would be chosen by the NDAC each eighteen months to serve a term of eighteen months."

He added that the rest of the paragraph would remain as it stood; on this basis, he took it that the two reports were approved in their entirety.

46. In conclusion, the DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE:

(1) approved DPC/D(66)59, subject to the amendments to the second sentence of paragraph 4(a) recorded above and to the interpretations of this document made by the German and Italian Ministers;

(2) approved the recommendations contained in paragraph 8 of DPC/D(66)32 and noted that Permanent Representatives would consider further the question of which body should further study the problems referred to in paragraph 8(e);

(3) noted the statements by the German and Italian Ministers recorded above;

(4) agreed that the NDAC should meet at Permanent Representative level early the following week to appoint the initial members of the NPS, to examine its programme of work and to receive a statement concerning the "gentlemen's agreement" reached by the Ministers in Restricted Session.

III. DRAFT COMMUNIQUE

47. After discussion of the draft Communiqué, it was agreed to remit certain passages for further joint consideration by the Danish, Greek, Norwegian and Turkish Delegations, it being understood that the text as finally agreed would form part of the press release to be issued on conclusion of the Ministerial meeting of the Council (M3(66)3).

OTAN/NATO,
Paris, (16e).

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Ministers of member governments of the Atlantic Alliance have met in Paris.

2. The North Atlantic Council, meeting on 15th and 16th December, reaffirmed the purposes and principles of the Alliance, and their resolve to ensure stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area, and to unite their efforts for the preservation of peace and security for their peoples.

3. The Alliance has demonstrated its value by successfully averting threats to peace and safeguarding the security of the Atlantic area. By its defensive strength including its effective means of deterrence, as well as by maintaining its solidarity, the Alliance has produced the basis for the present marked reduction of tension in Europe. This basis remains essential for the security of the Alliance and for progress towards a peaceful solution of outstanding problems, including the problem of Germany.

4. The Council associated itself with the views expressed in the Declaration by the Governments of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States which appears as an Annex to this Comminiqué. With regard to Berlin, the Council stands by its declaration of 16th December, 1958.

5. Ministers agreed on the need for continued efforts to achieve a peaceful solution of the German problem to meet the German people's fundamental right to reunification. So long as Germany continues to be divided there cannot be a genuine and stable settlement in Europe. The peaceful progress of Europe must proceed from reciprocal confidence and trust, which will take time to grow from sustained policies of co-operative effort and better understanding on both sides. It means especially removing barriers to freer and more friendly reciprocal exchanges between countries of different social and economic systems.
For their part, the members of the Atlantic Alliance have confirmed their intention to continue their efforts to secure better relations with the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe in the political, economic, social, scientific and cultural fields. Ministers examined the report on East/West relations prepared in accordance with the instructions given at the last Ministerial meeting in June 1966. They welcomed the wide range of suggestions in the report and emphasised their willingness to explore ways of developing co-operation with the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe in tasks of interest and benefit to all concerned. They, moreover, noted that contacts, conversations and agreements have recently increased. In the field of East/West relations, there are clearly different approaches which can be adopted, whether between individual countries or in a wider international framework.

Ministers welcomed the approval by the United Nations Outer Space Committee of a draft treaty on the peaceful use of outer space. Encouraged by this, they affirmed their determination to continue to consult actively on problems of disarmament, to keep under review the progress of international discussions on measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to seek agreement on satisfactory arms control measures which might contribute to the improvement of European security and the relaxation of tension. In so doing, they hoped to bring about conditions which could permit a gradual and balanced revision in force levels on both sides. At the same time, they reaffirmed their conviction that no acceptable permanent solution to the question of European security is possible without agreement on the most critical political problems.

Turning to economic questions, Ministers noted that the gap between the most advanced and the less-developed countries had widened further. They reaffirmed that all advanced countries, whatever their economic systems, had a responsibility to offer assistance to developing countries.

Ministers expressed the hope that the present multilateral tariff negotiations (Kennedy Round) would be carried to a successful conclusion and would promote the expansion of trade to the greater benefit of all. They also attached great importance to the initiatives designed to overcome the existence of two trading areas in Western Europe and to facilitate technical co-operation between the European countries concerned.

On the initiative of the Italian Government there was an exchange of views on questions arising out of the uneven technological development of different countries. Ministers, after stressing the importance and complexity of this problem, invited the Permanent Representatives to study the procedure which might be followed for further examination and implementation of the Italian proposals, and to report their findings to the Spring Ministerial meeting. A Resolution on this subject was adopted and is attached.
11. The Council reaffirmed the importance of continuing to assist Greece and Turkey within the framework of the Alliance in order to maintain the effectiveness of their contribution to the common defence. Recommending wide participation in the aid programme, the Council agreed that this programme should be extended to cover the period 1966-1970.

12. Ministers took note of the Secretary General's report on his "Watching Brief" concerning Greek-Turkish relations and reaffirmed their support for the continuation of his activities in this respect. They expressed their firm hope that the continuing exchanges of views between Turkey and Greece on the Cyprus question and on Greek-Turkish relations would contribute to bringing about positive results. They reiterated their appreciation of the presence of the United Nations Force in Cyprus and the hope that an improvement in the situation in the island would be achieved. They stressed that no action should be taken which could worsen the situation in the island and increase the tension.

13. On the proposal of the Belgian Government and recalling the initiative taken by Canada in December 1964, the Council resolved to undertake a broad analysis of international developments since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. Its purpose would be to determine the influence of such developments on the Alliance and to identify the tasks which lie before it, in order to strengthen the Alliance as a factor for a durable peace. A Resolution on this subject was adopted and is attached.

14. Ministers approved a report on Civil Emergency Planning. They noted that a reappraisal of these activities within NATO had been completed and they reaffirmed the importance of such planning for the protection of civil populations and in the support of overall defence.

15. Ministers met as the Defence Planning Committee on 14th December, 1966. As a further step in the process initiated at Athens in 1962, they approved recommendations regarding nuclear planning and consultation, submitted by the Special Committee of Defence Ministers. They agreed to establish in NATO two permanent bodies for nuclear planning - a policy body called the Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee, open to all NATO countries, and, subordinate to it, a Nuclear Planning Group of seven members which will handle the detailed work.
16. To improve the ability of NATO to engage in timely consultation in the event of crisis, Ministers approved the development of new arrangements for the rapid exchange and the more effective use of relevant information and data. To facilitate such exchange of data, Ministers approved in principle the establishment of a new NATO-wide communications scheme along the lines recommended by the Special Committee. They also examined a report from the Special Committee on possible improved procedures for consultation. They agreed that further studies and planning in this important area should be undertaken, and requested the Secretary General and Permanent Representatives to consider how this work could most usefully be carried forward. The Special Committee, set up in June 1965, has now completed its task.

17. Ministers reviewed reports on the present status of NATO's military effort and noted the force commitments undertaken by governments for 1967 under the NATO Force Plan adopted by Defence Ministers in July 1966.

18. After a comprehensive review of questions of strategy, force requirements, and resources, in the course of which they discussed the military capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union, Ministers considered the political, strategic, and economic guidance to be given to the NATO Military Authorities for their appreciation of the military situation as it will affect NATO up to and including 1975. They gave instructions for further studies in these fields in the light of this discussion.

19. On the basis of the results of numerous studies conducted since July 1966, Ministers gave instructions for further work to be carried out within the framework of the new defence planning review procedures due to be initiated in January 1967 for the regular projection of NATO force planning five years ahead. This work will be directed, primarily, towards securing the best balance of forces and the most effective use of the resources made available by NATO governments for defence.

20. Ministers underlined the importance of the defence of the flank regions of the North Atlantic Treaty area and issued further guidance regarding the provision of external reinforcements in defence emergencies. They also gave instructions concerning the improvement of the local forces in the South-Eastern Region. Substantial progress was made towards agreement upon the common funding of the exercises of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force.
21. Ministers agreed to study whether a NATO satellite communication programme should be established which would provide for a co-operative effort by member nations in the new and developing field of space technology and its application to NATO's vital communications needs. Meanwhile, an experimental project was agreed which will provide a link between SHAPE at its new headquarters and APSOUTH at Naples.

22. France did not take part in the discussions referred to in paragraphs 15 to 21 and did not associate herself with the corresponding decisions.

23. The Council decided that a new permanent headquarters should be constructed at the Haysel in Brussels, and a new temporary headquarters at Evere, also in Brussels. The Council expressed its gratitude to the Belgian Government for having made available these two sites.

24. The regular Spring Ministerial Meeting will be held in Luxembourg in 1967.
The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States met on 14th December, 1966, on the eve of the Ministerial Meetings of the North Atlantic Alliance, in Paris in order to discuss the situation in Germany.

The meeting took place exactly eight years after the four Foreign Ministers had met in Paris on 14th December, 1958, when Foreign Minister BRANDT, then Governing Mayor of Berlin, reported on the situation of Berlin. The Foreign Ministers confirmed that their governments would continue to be responsible for the security and viability of a free Berlin.

The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States took note of the intention of the Federal Republic of Germany to develop human, economic and cultural contacts between the two parts of Germany. These contacts aim in particular at alleviating the human misery which is a result of the partition of the German people. The three Ministers share the views of the Federal Government and will support these efforts within the framework of the responsibilities incumbent on their governments.

The Ministers re-emphasised that the solution of the German question is one of the essential problems in the relations between East and West. This solution can only be achieved by peaceful methods, on the basis of the right of self-determination, and through the creation of an atmosphere of détente on the continent, under conditions guaranteeing the security of all countries.
RESOLUTION ON INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGICAL CO-OPERATION

(Adopted by the Council on 15th December, 1966)

The NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL:

RECOGNISING the need for continued promotion of economic co-operation within the spirit of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty;

HAVING NOTED proposals submitted by the Italian Government on 5th October and 7th December, 1966, the additional comments provided to the Council by the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the statements of other Ministers in the course of the debate;

CONVINCED that it is important that consideration be given to the Italian proposals so that measures can be applied as soon as possible to give renewed impetus to international co-operation in the technological field; and to such other measures as will serve to raise the general level of scientific and technological achievement;

RECOMMENDS that the Council in Permanent Session study the procedure which might be followed for further examination and implementation of the Italian proposals, and report its findings to the Spring Ministerial Meeting;

INSTRUCTS the Secretary General to submit shortly to the Council in Permanent Session, a report on the scientific and technological programmes already underway in NATO in view of the contributions these activities can make toward a reduction of technological disparities.
RESOLUTION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

The COUNCIL, desirous of achieving the fundamental purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty in the spirit of cohesion and solidarity between the signatories of the Treaty:

CONSIDERS it essential to analyse the political events which have occurred since the Treaty was signed, with a view to ascertaining their influence on international relations and on the Alliance itself;

Accordingly, the Council UNDERTAKES to study the future tasks which face the Alliance, and its procedures for fulfilling them, in order to strengthen the Alliance as a factor for a durable peace. It will examine ways of improving consultation within the Alliance, including the European member countries.

In carrying out this study at a high political level, the Council will UTILISE the most appropriate possible procedures for fulfilling its mandate.

A preliminary report will be examined at the Spring 1967 Ministerial Meeting and the Ministerial Council at its meeting in December 1967 will draw the appropriate conclusions that emerge from the enquiry.
The Nuclear Planning Group was founded in December 1966, when the Defence Planning Committee in Ministerial Session accepted the recommendation of the Special Committee of Defence Ministers to establish a consultative process on nuclear doctrine within NATO.

The Nuclear Planning Group originally consisted of the Defence Ministers from seven NATO member countries: Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The following biographies of the Nuclear Planning Group Defence Ministers who attended the first meetings held in Washington D.C. on 6-7 April 1967 are presented as they originally appeared in the NATO Biographical Series prepared by the NATO Information Service (with the exception of Robert S. McNamara, whose entry in the series is missing from the collection).
PRESS RELEASE (66) 15

Paris, 19th December, 1966

MEETING OF NUCLEAR DEFENCE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

The Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee of the North Atlantic Council held its first meeting today and chose the following member nations to be represented on the Nuclear Planning Group for the period 1st January 1967 until 30th June 1968:

Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Greece will take Turkey's seat during the period at an appropriate moment.

COMMUNIQUÉ DE PRESSE (66) 15

Paris, le 19 décembre 1966

REUNION DU COMITE DES AFFAIRES DE DEFENSE NUCLEAIRE

Le Comité des Affaires de défense nucléaire du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord a tenu aujourd'hui sa première réunion, au cours de laquelle il a décidé que, pour la période du 1er janvier 1967 au 30 juin 1968, le Groupe de Planification nucléaire serait composé de représentants des pays membres suivants:

Canada, République Fédérale d'Allemagne, Italie, Pays-Bas, Turquie, Royaume-Uni et États-Unis.

Au cours de cette période, la Grèce succèdera à la Turquie au moment opportun.
To: The Permanent Representatives of Canada, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States

From: Secretary General

NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP - MINISTERIAL MEETING

In the light of our discussion at the meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group on 9th March, I circulate below the agenda and approximate time-table which I propose for the Ministerial meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group to be held in Washington on 6th and 7th April, 1967, and for which the United States Government has kindly proposed to make available Conference Room A in the Department of State.

Thursday, 6th April

A.M. 1. (a) Review of NPGW conclusions on Strategic Forces
  (Discussion leader - Secretary McNamara)
  (b) Some AEC considerations
  (Discussion leader - Secretary McNamara)

2. Review of NPGW conclusions on Tactical Nuclear Forces
  (Discussion leader - Secretary Healey)

P.M. 3. A study of ADMs with special reference to the Southeastern Flank
  (Discussion leader - Minister Topaloglu)

4. (time permitting) Arrangements with Host Countries in respect of Nuclear weapons
  (Discussion leader - Minister Schroeder)
Friday, 7th April

a.m. Item 4 - as above (as required)

5. (time permitting) Future Work Programme

6. (time permitting) Communiqué

p.m. As may be required to complete any unfinished items.

(Signed) Nanlio BROSIO.
The NATO Nuclear Planning Group, consisting of the Defense Ministers of seven NATO countries, will meet at the Minister of Defense level in Washington on April 6-7. Ministers attending will be Paul Hellyer, Canada; Gerhard Schroeder, Germany; Roberto Tremelloni, Italy; Petrus de Jong, Netherlands; Ahmet Topaloglu, Turkey; Denis Healey, United Kingdom; and Robert S. McNamara, United States. NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio will be chairman.

The Nuclear Planning Group is part of the permanent structure established by the North Atlantic Council at the Ministerial meeting in Paris last December to advise the Council on nuclear policy. At that time, the Council created a policy body called the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee, open to all NATO countries and, subordinate to it, the seven-nation Nuclear Planning Group, which is responsible for handling the detailed work.

In the forthcoming meeting, the Ministers will consider various aspects of strategic and tactical nuclear planning.
Though Paul Hellyer was Canada's Defence Minister in 1967, he was present only for the meeting of 6th April 1967. Mr. Ritchie served as Canada's Deputy Principal Delegate to the Washington NPG Meeting.
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Mr. GERNHARD SCHÖDER, Minister of Defence

Mr. Schröder, who was born at Saarbrücken on 11th September, 1910, studied law and political science at the Universities of Königsberg, Edinburgh, Berlin and Bonn. He is a Doctor of Law.

After practising in Bonn and Berlin, he became Assistant at the Faculty of Law of Bonn University. In 1945, he was appointed Chairman of the German Committee on Electoral Law, under the Allied Control Commission and, in 1947, he returned to the Bar, at Düsseldorf, also becoming a member of several boards of Directors of industrial firms.

He was elected a Christian Democrat Union Member of the Federal Parliament in 1949, and in 1952 was Deputy Leader of the CDU parliamentary group in the Bundestag.

Mr. Schröder became Minister of the Interior in 1953, and Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1961.

In December 1966, he was appointed Minister of Defence.
Mr. Roberto Tremelloni, Minister of Defence

Mr. Tremelloni, who was born in Milan on 30th October, 1900, is a Doctor of Economics. He is at present Professor of Industrial Economy at the Technical University of Milan.

He has played an active rôle in the Socialist Party since 1922, and was a member of the Constituent Assembly in 1946. Mr. Tremelloni was elected deputy for the constituency of Milan in the First, Third and Fourth Legislatures.

In 1946 he was Under-Secretary of State for Industry in the Second Cabinet of Mr. Gasperi, and later became Minister of Industry in the Fourth Cabinet of Mr. Gasperi in 1947. From 1948 to 1950 Mr. Tremelloni was Minister attached to the Presidency of the "C.I.R." and Minister of Economic Co-operation in the Fifth Cabinet of Mr. Gasperi. He was appointed Minister of Finance in the Cabinet of Mr. Fanfani from 1954 to 1955, and in 1962 he became Minister of the Treasury in the Fourth Cabinet of Mr. Fanfani.

After being Minister of Finance in the First and Second Cabinets of Mr. Moro from 1963 to 1966, Mr. Tremelloni became Minister of Defence in the Third Cabinet of Mr. Moro in January 1966.
Biographical Series

NETHERLANDS

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL WILLEM DEN TOOM, Ministry of Defence

Born at Rotterdam in July 1911, Lieutenant-General den Toom attended the Royal Military Academy, and first served in the 12th Infantry Regiment before being transferred to the Air Force and then to the Ministry of Defence in 1937.

He served in the Air Force during the war and from 1942 to 1945 was a prisoner of war in Germany. After being on the Air Force Staff from 1946 to 1948, he graduated from the Senior Staff College in 1949 and became an adviser in the military cabinet of the Minister of War. In 1950 he was appointed Chief of Operations on the Air Staff.

In 1952 he was Chief of the Air Force Section of the European Defence Community in Paris, and returned to The Hague in 1953 to become Vice Chief of the Air Staff. From 1958 to 1960, Lieutenant-General den Toom was head of the Netherlands Military Liaison Mission to SHAPE and military adviser to the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the North Atlantic Council.

In 1960 he was appointed Deputy Chief of the Air Staff and was State-Secretary for Air from 1963 until April, 1965, when he took up his duties as Chairman of the NADGE (NATO Air Defence Ground Environment) Policy Board.

Lieutenant-General den Toom became the Netherlands Minister of Defence in April, 1967.
TURKEY

Mr. AHMET TOPALOGLU, Minister of National Defence

Born in 1914 at Kadirli, in the province of Adana, Mr. Topaloglu graduated from the Faculty of Political Science.

Mr. Topaloglu, who is Deputy for Adana, was Minister of the Interior in the first Coalition Government in November 1961, and later Minister of Customs and Monopolies in the fourth Coalition Government in February 1965.

He was appointed Minister of National Defence in the Government of Mr. Suleyman Demirel in October 1965.
Biography Series

UNITED KINGDOM

The Rt. Hon. DENIS HEALEY, M.B.E., M.P.,
Secretary of State for Defence

Born in 1917, Mr. Healey was educated at Oxford and during World War II joined the Army seeing active service in North Africa and Italy.

After the war he became Secretary of the International Department at the Labour Party Headquarters. Elected to Parliament in 1952, he represented the United Kingdom at the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. He became a member of the Parliamentary Committee of the Parliamentary Labour Party in 1959, and was successively Labour's spokesman in the House of Commons on foreign affairs, the Commonwealth and Colonies and defence.

A former member of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Mr. Healey was appointed, in October 1964, Secretary of State for Defence in the Government of Mr. Harold Wilson.
Robert McNamara was named Secretary of Defense in 1961, shortly after he had accepted the prestigious post of President of the Ford Motor Company. McNamara built on his reputation as a financial and managerial expert, and went on to become a top national security and foreign policy advisor to both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. In his own words, McNamara described his goal as Secretary of Defense, “to bring efficiency to a $40 billion enterprise beset by jealousies and political pressures while maintaining American military superiority.”

Mr. McNamara spent his first few years in the Defense Department attempting to reverse the reliance on nuclear deterrence that had been established during the Eisenhower administration. He advocated the development of a broader choice of deterrent forces. In later years, as attention shifted to Vietnam, McNamara found himself in the center of a quagmire that he had helped to create. In 1968, he resigned as a result of dissatisfaction with the deteriorating situation in Vietnam and became President of the World Bank, a position he held until 1981. He later became an outspoken advocate for controlling the spread of nuclear weapons.

1916 Born, San Francisco, California
1937 B.A., University of California, Berkeley
1939 M.B.A., Harvard University
1940 Assistant Professor of Business Administration, Harvard University
1943 Army Air Forces, England
1946 Manager, Ford Motor Company planning and financial offices
1949 Comptroller, Ford Motor Company
1953 Assistant General Manager, Ford Motor Company
1957 Vice President in charge of car and truck divisions, Ford Motor Company
1960 President, Ford Motor Company
1961-1968 Secretary of Defense, Kennedy Administration
1968-1981 President, World Bank
2009 July 6, Died

Source


CONSEIL DE L’ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

ENGLISH ONLY
3rd April 1967

NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP

List of delegations to the Washington meeting,
6th - 7th April 1967

Chairman and Secretary General : Mr. Manlio Brosio

CANADA

The Hon. Paul Hellyer : Minister of National Defense
H.E. Mr. C.S.A. Ritchie : Permanent Representative to NATO
Mr. H.B. Robinson : Deputy Undersecretary of State for External Affairs
Air Vice Marshal F.W. Ball : Deputy Chief of Operations, Canadian Forces Headquarters
Mr. P.A. Bissonnette : Department of External Affairs
Colonel J.C. Leonard : Director, International Plans, Canadian Forces Headquarters
Mr. J.C. Harris : First Secretary, Canadian Delegation to NATO
Lt. Commander J.P. Whitby : Directorate of International Plans, Canadian Forces Headquarters

GERMANY

H.E. Dr. Gerhard Schröder : Minister of Defense
H.E. Mr. Wilhelm Grewe : Permanent Representative to NATO
General Ulrich de Maiziere : Inspector General, German Armed Forces
Colonel Krauss : Deputy Chief Operations Division, MOD, Bonn

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**GERMANY (Contd.)**

Colonel Schmoller-Halby : German Delegation to NATO  
Captain (CW) A. Zimmermann : Operations Division, MOD, Bonn  
Dr. Ulrich Escheke : Ministry for Foreign Affairs  
Dr. Wilfried Hofmann : Second Secretary, German Delegation to NATO

**ITALY**

The Hon. Roberto Tremelloni: Minister of Defense  
H.E. Mr. Adolfo Alessandri: Permanent Representative to NATO  
General Giuseppe Aiaia : Chief of Defense General Staff  
Brigadier General Andrea Cacino: Chief of Plans and Operations Branch, Defense General Staff  
Mr. Diego Simonetti : Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Brigadier General Lelio Massarini : Italian Delegation to NATO  
Mr. Giolamo Nisio : Counsellor of Embassy, Italian Delegation to NATO  
Colonel Giulio Gensini : Aide de camp to the Minister of Defense  
Lt. Colonel Sandro Barbacini: Aide de camp to the Chief of Defense General Staff

**NETHERLANDS**

H.E. Mr. P.J.S. de Jong : Minister of Defense  
H.E. Mr. H.N. Boon : Permanent Representative to NATO  
General M.P. Zielstra : Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Joukheer J.A. de Ranitz : Director General of Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Dr. W.P. van Eckelen : First Secretary, Netherlands Delegation to NATO  
Lt. Colonel M.G. Geschiere : Staff Officer, Joint Staff  
Lt. Colonel J.M. Lamersee : Aide de camp
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**TURKEY**

H.E. Mr. Ahmet Topaloglu : Minister of National Defense
H.E. Mr. M. Nuri Birgi : Permanent Representative to NATO
General Refik Tulga : Deputy Chief of Staff
Mr. Sukru Elokdag : Assistant Secretary General for NATO Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Staff Colonel Isahan Atabay : Head of the Planning Programming and Co-ordination Group, MOD

Staff Colonel Kemal Soyupak: Director of Plans Section, Department of Operations, Turkish General Staff
Mr. Seip Sungurtskin : First Secretary, Turkish Delegation to NATO
Colonel Ali Unlutepe : Turkish General Staff
Major Fahrettin Yontem : Ministry of Defense

**UNITED KINGDOM**

The Rt. Hon. Denis Healey : Secretary of State for Defense
H.E. Sir Bernard Burrows : Permanent Representative to NATO
Admiral Sir N. Henderson : British Defense Staff, Washington
Mr. George Leitch : Deputy Undersecretary of Defense
Colonel B.J. Palmer : Staff Officer
Mr. T.C.G. James : MOD Chief of Public Relations
Mr. Pat Nairne : Private Secretary to the Secretary of State
Mr. A.W.G. LeHardy : United Kingdom Delegation to NATO
Mr. David Thomas : Foreign Office

**UNITED STATES**

The Hon. Robert S. McNamara: Secretary of Defense
The Hon. Harley Cleveland : Permanent Representative to NATO
General Earle G. Wheeler : Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Mr. J.T. McNaughton : Assistant Secretary of Defense

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NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP

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UNITED STATES (Contd)

Mr. Frederick Wise : Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Department of State
Mr. Eugene McAuliffe : Director, Force Planning Group, United States Delegation to NATO
Dr. T.W. Stanley : First Secretary, United States Delegation to NATO
Mr. M. Newlin : United States Delegation to NATO
Commander R.A. DuVall : Security Adviser, United States Delegation to NATO
Colonel A. Ives

NATO INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Mr. A.P. Hockaday : Acting Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance

Mr. J.W. Simms
Mr. T.M. Moran

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NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP

NATO Nuclear Planning Group Holds First Ministers Meeting

The first meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group at the ministerial level was held April 6–7 at Washington. Following is a statement concerning the meeting made by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara at his news conference on April 3, together with the text of a communiqué released by the NATO Nuclear Planning Group at the close of the meeting on April 7.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY McNAMARA

On Thursday and Friday of this week [April 6–7] I shall be meeting in Washington with the defense ministers of Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom; and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. These ministers comprise the new NATO Nuclear Planning Group which, together with the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee, was established as a permanent body by the North Atlantic Council last December to advise it on matters of nuclear policy.1

I am especially pleased to be the host for this meeting. It represents, I believe, a significant new approach and achievement after more than a decade of persistent endeavor by many individuals and by many nations to bring all members of the alliance into fuller partnership in the planning of nuclear strategy. It is a milestone in the history of NATO.

The personal participation of the seven defense ministers in the Nuclear Planning Group reflects the new intimate involvement of nationally responsible government leaders in NATO planning activities. Such active participation by top defense authorities is essential to assure realism in our work and the vigorous support of the member govern-

ments in carrying out NATO plans. It is, I believe, largely responsible for the great progress we have made in nuclear planning in the past 2 years.

The foundation of the security of the alliance is nuclear power. Thus, it is only natural that the nonnuclear members of the alliance have always felt a need to be informed about nuclear matters and to participate in nuclear planning. They have been uncertain of their role. They believed, and rightly so, that they should have a greater voice in assessing the nuclear threat to the alliance, in determining the nuclear forces required to meet that threat, and in working out how and under what conditions these nuclear forces would be employed.

For more than 10 years the NATO nations have struggled with the problem of how to better integrate the nuclear and nonnuclear powers on nuclear matters and have considered many recommendations and proposals. These efforts include:

1. A proposal in 1960 that the United States sell or assist in the European production of Polaris missiles to be deployed under SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe].

2. Another suggestion in 1960 to create a multilateral atomic authority which would have made NATO “a fourth atomic power.”

3. An additional proposal in 1960 for a NATO medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) force involving Polaris submarines and missile-carrying surface ships, with multilateral ownership, financing, and control and “mixed manning to the extent operationally feasible.”


5. A suggestion in 1963 for an inter-Allied nuclear force to include U.K. V-bombers, Polaris submarines, and other nuclear elements.

6. A proposal in 1963 for a multilateral nuclear force comprising Polaris submarines provided by the United Kingdom, United States forces, and possibly mixed-manned ships.

7. A proposal in 1964 for an Atlantic

1 For text of a final communiqué released at the close of the North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting on Dec. 16, 1966, see Bulletin of Jan. 9, 1967, p. 49.
nuclear force of British V-bombers, British Polaris submarines, U.S. Polaris boats, and other elements.

8. Suggestions in the early 1960’s that mobile medium range ballistic missiles (MMRBM) might be deployed in Europe on railroad cars or truck-drawn trailers.

It has only been in the last year and a half that substantial progress in expanding the role of the nonnuclear powers in nuclear affairs has been accomplished.

The meeting this week stems from a proposal by the United States to the NATO defense ministers in June 1965 for consultation by a small group of the ministers about the problems of nuclear planning. As a result, a Special Committee of Defense Ministers met in Paris in November 1965. It set up the Nuclear Planning Working Group composed of five NATO defense ministers. This ad hoc group met four times in 1966: in Washington, London, Paris, and Rome. It reviewed and discussed the strategic and tactical nuclear resources of the alliance, the potential circumstances and consequences of their use, and the way in which the alliance should organize to carry on future discussion of these subjects.

These were by far the most substantive and effective discussions on nuclear matters ever attempted between NATO’s nuclear and nonnuclear powers. For example, one of my colleagues stated in February that there had been more progress on NATO nuclear problems during the past 12 months than in the preceding 17 years.

The Working Group recommended that a permanent organization be created to carry on this work, and the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee, open to all NATO countries, and the Nuclear Planning Group were established by the foreign and defense ministers during the meeting of the North Atlantic Council last December.

At this week’s meeting, the Nuclear Planning Group will continue to examine NATO nuclear strength in all of its aspects, including plans for the development, production, and use of strategic and tactical weapons systems. In addition, we shall discuss the recent steps taken by the Soviet Union to deploy an anti-ballistic-missile system, as well as the status of the U.S. ABM program. We shall also discuss the effort being made by this country to persuade the Soviet Union to join with us in holding down the spiraling of a fruitless arms race.

Again, I want to emphasize the significance of this meeting. It is without question one of the most important and far-reaching steps of the last decade in the evolution of NATO.

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE, APRIL 7

The NATO Nuclear Planning Group, composed of Ministers of Defense of seven NATO countries, adjourned today after a two-day conference in Washington. Attending the first meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group were Paul Hellyer, Canada; Gerhard Schroeder, Germany; Roberto Tremoloni, Italy; Willem den Toom, Netherlands; Ahmet Topaloglu, Turkey; Denis Healey, United Kingdom; and Robert S. McNamara, United States. NATO Secretary-General Manlio Brosio was chairman.

The United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. Robert S. McNamara, led a discussion of the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance and anti-ballistic missile defense. The Ministers reviewed the changes which have occurred in the strategic nuclear threat facing the Alliance since the meeting of the Nuclear Planning Working Group in February 1966, and the means and plans available to counter that threat. They concluded that the size of existing strategic nuclear forces and the plans for employing them are adequate to the need. They discussed the technical, strategic and financial aspects of ballistic missile defense including both the Soviet deployments and the U.S. R&D program, and agreed to keep this subject under review. The Ministers also received a report from Secretary McNamara on the current status of discussions initiated by the U.S. with the Soviet Government to explore ways of preventing a further spiraling of the arms race. The Ministers noted that the U.S. Government intends to keep its allies fully advised as these discussions progress.

The United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defense, Mr. Denis Healey, led a discussion of tactical nuclear forces. The Ministers agreed that the number of tactical nuclear weapons available to the Allied Commanders in Europe and the Atlantic are adequate but that the appropriate distribution of types of weapons should be kept under continuous review. They also agreed to initiate a number of specific studies to help in clarifying important questions related to the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
Mr. Ahmet Topaloglu, the Minister of Defense of Turkey, led a discussion of atomic demolition munitions and considerations related to the possible use of these weapons in the defense of the treaty area. The Ministers agreed to conduct further studies on this subject.

Dr. Gerhard Schroeder, Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany, led a discussion on the role of host countries in Allied arrangements for the planning and use of nuclear weapons.

The Ministers noted that the Nuclear Planning Group itself as well as the Military Committee of the Alliance offer the opportunity for national governments to exert a direct influence on nuclear planning in the Alliance through their senior political and military authorities. They will conduct further detailed studies on specific aspects of this question and will continue their discussion at the next Ministerial meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group.

The Ministers set a work program for the future and agreed to meet again in Ankara in September 1967.

The Nuclear Planning Group is part of the permanent structure established by the North Atlantic Council at its Ministerial Meeting in Paris in December 1966. At that time, the Council established the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee, open to all NATO countries, to advise the Council on nuclear policy. At the same time the seven-nation Nuclear Planning Group was created to handle the detailed work of the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee.

Letters of Credence

Singapore

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Singapore, Wong Lin Ken, presented his credentials to President Johnson on April 7. For texts of the Ambassador’s remarks and the President’s reply, see Department of State press release dated April 7.

Zambia

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Zambia, Rupiah Bwembeni Banda, presented his credentials to President Johnson on April 7. For texts of the Ambassador’s remarks and the President’s reply, see Department of State press release dated April 7.

U.S. Decides Not To Resume Arms Aid to India and Pakistan

Department Statement

The Department of State announced on April 12 that the Government has concluded an extensive review of policy with regard to the provision of military equipment to India and Pakistan and has decided that the United States will not resume grant military assistance, which has been suspended since September 1965.

The United States is, therefore, closing the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group in Pakistan and the U.S. Military Supply Mission in India. This process is expected to be completed by July 1, 1967, in both cases.

The U.S. Government has also decided to remove its present restrictions on the kinds of spare parts which may be sold to India and Pakistan for previously supplied equipment. Henceforth, the Government will be prepared to consider on a case-by-case basis all requests for export permits covering the cash purchase of spare parts.

The United States will continue to keep its military sales policy under careful review to insure that it is not contributing to an arms race between India and Pakistan. The United States strongly hopes that both countries will make progress in resolving the problems and differences that divide them and that they will accord an increasing priority in the allocations of their resources to agricultural and industrial development.

1 Read to news correspondents by the Department spokesman on Apr. 12.
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During their first meeting on 7 April, 1967, the Nuclear Planning Group was welcomed to the White House to meet with United States President Lyndon B. Johnson.

According to the White House Daily Diary, President Johnson met with the Nuclear Planning Group at 12:06pm, posed for a group photograph with them in the Flower Garden of the White House at 12:25pm, and then returned to the Oval Office at 12:30 in time for his Partial Briefing of the Press, where he made a short statement.

Thanks to the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration and the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, the documents referenced above are presented over the following pages.
**The President began his day at (Place):** The White House  
**Day:** Friday  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entry No.</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Telephone for t</th>
<th>Activity (include visited by)</th>
<th>Weight: 212 3/4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8:30</td>
<td></td>
<td>Breakfast: poached egg on a small piece of toast w/ Canadian bacon (1 slice)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:25a</td>
<td>t</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Attorney General - Ramsey Clark</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:39a</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>Manor</td>
<td>Chairman John Macy - Civil Service Commission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:58a</td>
<td>f</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Attorney General - Ramsey Clark</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:05a</td>
<td>t</td>
<td></td>
<td>Director Charles Schultze</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:15a</td>
<td>t</td>
<td></td>
<td>To Oval Office - w/ JJ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:17a</td>
<td>t</td>
<td></td>
<td>MW (pl)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS</td>
<td>Fish Room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H.E. Dr. Wong Lin Ken of the Republic of Singapore</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H.E. Rupiah Bwenzani Banda of the Republic of Zambia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The President broke track records of presentations because following the formal presentation in the Fish Room consisting of the handshake and presentation of papers the President invited the two gentlemen into his office and sat them down, turned to Dr. Wong and said he was glad to have him in Washington. Dr. Wong, in a very subdued voice said that relations with Singapore had been always good and expected them to always continue so.
Today the Press Secretary released a statement expressing appreciation of Governor Romney's strong endorsement of the fundamentals of the Administration's position on VietNam.

The White House

The President smiled at this remark and turned to Amb. Banda who made the identical statement for his country whereupon the President thanked both gentlemen and bid them farewell.

Jim Symington mjdr:mj

Briefing papers to Dorothy Territo.

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<tr>
<th>Entry No.</th>
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<td>Lo LD</td>
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</table>

11:33a 11:50a

Cong. Bernie Sisk

and representatives of the California wine industry: Sisk, the wine industry leaders could meet the President and summarize their problems.

Edmund Mirasso

This group presented the President a plaque in the shape of the State of California reading "To The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson President of the United States in grateful recognition of your interest and your leadership in focusing world attention on American Wines from the Wine Growers of California April 7, 1967"

11:55a

Under Secy of Treasury, Joseph Barr

12:05p

MW (pl)
12:06p
To Cabinet Room to meet w/
Secretary McNamara
and NATO Defense Ministers
Harlan Cleveland, U. S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council
Manlio Brosio, Secy-General of NATO and Chairman of the Nuclear Planning Group
Edgar Ritchie, Canadian Ambassador to the U. S. and Deputy Principal Delegate to the
Washington NPG Meeting
Gerhard Schroeder, Minister of Defense, Federal Republic of Germany
Roberto Tremelloni, Minister of Defense, Italy
Lt. Gen. Willem den Toorn, Minister of Defense, The Netherlands
Ahmet Topaloglu, Minister of National Defense, Turkey
Denis Healey, Secretary of State for Defense, United Kingdom

Interpreters:
Mr. Neal A. Seidenmarch
Mr. Abraham Bodrugil

These ministers form the NATO Nuclear Planning Group. It, together with the
Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee, was established as a permanent body
of the North Atlantic Council last December to advise on matters of nuclear policy.
The group represents the Executive Committee, so to speak. It is on a
rotating basis among the NATO countries. Press Briefing # 801-Armf
(this press briefing also contained info given by GC relative to this mtg.)
Today announced plans for the fourth annual Presidential Scholars program, and today designated the week beginning May 1, 1967, as National CARIH Asthma Week.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entry No.</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Telephone</th>
<th>Activity (include visited by)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In</td>
<td>Out Lo LD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12:25p</td>
<td></td>
<td>To Flower Garden w/ NATO Defense Ministers - for pictures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12:30p</td>
<td></td>
<td>To Oval Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12:35p</td>
<td></td>
<td>Press to Oval Office for Partial Briefing of the Press by the President on the NATO Defense Ministers The President made a short statement and then took several questions from the press</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See travel record for travel activity.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entry No.</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Telephone</th>
<th>Activity (include visited by)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In/Out</td>
<td>for t</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:40p</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>Walt Rostow (pl)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:44p</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>Mike Manatos</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:17p</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>Walt Rostow (pl)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:22p</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>Marvin Watson (pl)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:25p</td>
<td>1:30p</td>
<td>OFF RECORD: Howard Samuels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On a memo from Bill Connell, the President agreed to see Mr. Samuels, a businessman from upstate NY, to discuss the New York situation. Mr. Samuels ran as Lt. Governor in New York, and is a very bright man and solid Johnson supporter. He wanted to talk to the President and see what he could do to be helpful in carrying the state for the President next year.

1:33p - 1:38p  
- OFF RECORD: 
  - the kitchen—talked to Mrs. Zephyr Wright

1:38p - 2:13p  
- Frank Pace, President, International Executive Service Corps, NYC
- David Rockefeller

These gentlemen wanted to give the President an up-to-date report on the International Executive Service Corps. The IFSC was started by Mr. David Rockefeller, Mr. Sol Linowitz, Dan Kimball, Ray Eppert, and Bill Paley, and it was launched by the President in the Rose Garden a little over 3 years ago. It is a private effort to solve some of thst [sic] problems overseas.

1:43p - 1:48p  
- George Christian (pl)

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entry No</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Telephone for:</th>
<th>Activity (include visited by)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2:12p</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sen. Dirksen was talking w/ Joe Califano and asked to be transferred to the President to talk to him about the Railroad situation. Joe Califano went to midr's office and talked to the President advising him of the matter on the pl from midr's office. The President said to tell the Senator that he was in a meeting w/ Mr. David Rockefeller and others and would like to call him back. The President then told Joe Califano to get him briefed on what he should say to Dirksen. The President told JAC, Jr. to call Mr. Meany and tell him that Dirksen is making an issue of the situation and it could really turn out bad. He said to get Wirtz advised immediately.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2:15p</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President to the Cabinet Room to join Dolph Briscoe and a delegation from Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Oklahoma, and Mexico to present the President an expression of appreciation for his leadership in the eradication of the screwworm program.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Mr. Frank Pace
- Mr. David Rockefeller
- Octavio Ochoa y Ochoa, Mexico City, Mexico
- Marcos Ramirez-Geno Brigandi, México City, Mexico
- H. Nelson, San Antonio, Texas
- C. H. DeVaney, Waco, Texas
- Joe T. Lane, Alpine, Texas
- Jerry Puckett, Fort Stockton, Texas
- Claude K. McCann, Victoria, Texas
- V. A. Clements, Jr., Longview, Texas
- John Hays, Yarnell, Arizona
- C. G. Scruggs, Dallas, Texas
- T. A. Kincaid, La Verna, Texas
- D. V. Guerra, McAllen, Texas
- Charles D. Fuller, Roswell, New Mexico
- Dolph Briscoe, Jr., Uvalde, Texas
- Ed Ketchum, Duncan, Oklahoma
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entry No.</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Telephone f or l</th>
<th>Activity (include visit by)</th>
<th>Expenditure Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Harry Jersig, San Antonio, Texas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The group presented the President a scroll from the Southwest Animal Health Research Foundation for his help in bringing about a screw-worm free U.S.A.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2:20p</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President and the group to the flower garden for picture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2:25p</td>
<td></td>
<td>To the mansion for LUNCH w/ above group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3:25p</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President escorted the group out onto the Truman Balcony and pointed various things out to them (as observed from mldr's office)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3:50p</td>
<td></td>
<td>Group departed mansion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**The White House**

**President Lyndon B. Johnson**

**DAILY DIARY**

The President began his day at (Place).

The White House

**Day Friday**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entry No.</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Telephone for t</th>
<th>Activity (include visited by)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3:58p</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President to the Oval Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4:13p</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>Hon. Charles Schultze, Director, Bureau of the Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4:18p</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>Walt Rostow (pl)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

Page No. 8
The White House

The President began his day at (Place).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entry No.</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Telephone f or l</th>
<th>Activity (include visits by)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>Lo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 4:25p     | Hon. William L. Porter
President had asked for Mr. Porter to be brought in to see the President sign his commission for the D. C. Public Service Commission. |
| 4:28p     | Press Pool in for pictures
The President asked Mr. Porter, "I hear from all my advisers that you are an outstanding man. Should I believe that?" Mr. Porter replied that he did not know. Then the President said that Mr. Macy and all others believed him the best man for the job. Tom Johnson

| 4:27p     | f | John Roche |
| 4:31p     | f | The Attorney General, Hon. Ramsey Clark |
| 4:37p     | f | Marvin Watson (pl) |
| 4:38p     | 4:50p | Ashton Gonella w/ a note from Mrs. Johnson |
| 4:55p     | t | Jake Jacobsen (pl) |
| 5:00p     | t | Marvin Watson (pl) |
| 5:00p     | 5:07p | Walt Rostow |
| 5:10p     | 5:20p | OFF RECORD: Judge and Mrs. Walter Ely |

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY


Page No. 9
## Daily Diary

**Date:** April 7, 1967  
**Day:** Friday

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity (include visited by)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6:06p</td>
<td>Called Chuck Bailey back and stood in the door of MW’s office reading a poll of voting RETURN percentages by age groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:30p</td>
<td>Ashton Currell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:06p</td>
<td>To oval office w/ Marvin Watson going over the various papers MW had gathered for the President re appointments, the remaining people on today’s schedule, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:20p 7:03p</td>
<td>OFF RECORD: Senator Everett Dirksen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:04p 7:05p</td>
<td>Senator Dirksen back in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:30p</td>
<td>Joe Califano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:51p</td>
<td>Mrs. Johnson</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**The White House**  
**President Lyndon B. Johnson**

The President began his day at (Place)  
The White House  
Day Friday
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entry No.</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Telephone for</th>
<th>Activity (include visited by)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7:07p</td>
<td></td>
<td>OFF RECORD: Max Frankel, New York Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7:35</td>
<td></td>
<td>President gave her a large stack of birthday gifts and posed for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7:40p</td>
<td></td>
<td>pictures with her; apologizing for keeping her so late, and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>thanking her for all her years of faithful service to him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8:45p</td>
<td></td>
<td>working desk w/ Mary S and JJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8:56p</td>
<td></td>
<td>Joe Calhano--not in for office, so reached him at home about the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>labor situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9:03p</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mrs. Johnson--re plans for the evening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9:30p</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dale Malechek, LBJ Ranch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9:35p</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President to mjdr's room--reading the papers--&quot;The Evening Star&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9:43p</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President to the mansion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10:07p</td>
<td></td>
<td>w/ Jake Jacobsen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9:45p</td>
<td></td>
<td>DINNERS w/ Mrs. Johnson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>JJ, Mary S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Issued President's Proclamation on Cancer Control Month**

**The White House**
**President Lyndon B. Johnson**
**Daily Diary**

The President began his day at (Place).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Telephone Lo</th>
<th>Activity (include visited by)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9:54p</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>Don Thomas, Austin, Texas--re personal business, progress on buying the house for Luci, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:05p</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President and JJ to the President's room for the President to change shirts for him and Mrs. Johnson to go to Bill Moyer's home for coffee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:12p</td>
<td>OFF RECORD: The President and Mrs. Johnson</td>
<td>departed for Bill Moyer's home in McLean, Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:20p</td>
<td></td>
<td>Arrived the Moyers' residence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:30a</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President and Mrs. Johnson returned to the White House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:38a</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>Joe Califano--returning his call of 11:09p when the President was out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:00a</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President retired</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Date April 7, 1967**

**The White House**

**Day Friday**

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SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

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NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE        APRIL 7, 1967

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

PARTIAL BRIEFING OF THE PRESS
BY THE PRESIDENT
ON THE NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS' MEETING
THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE

(AT 12:30 P.M. EST)

THE PRESIDENT: We have demonstrated that aggression just doesn't pay. The purpose of this committee and the enterprise in which they are engaged is assurance that it never will pay. It was largely a welcome, an assurance of cooperation, and an exchange of views.

We wanted to share with them all the information and analysis that we had related to nuclear planning. We believe that joint planning is the best guarantee of effective deterrence. We believe that if we, together, can handle this awesome military power intelligently, prudently and responsibly it will be a mighty force for peace in the world.

Secretary McNamara told me yesterday that he went into some detail with them on the problems of ABM deployment, what we are doing in that regard and our consultations with other nations about it.

We pointed up some of the things that NATO could now begin to push forward positively on, like bridges to the East, trying to lower ugly lines of walls and watchtowers that deface the map of Europe, and resolving some of the bitter controversies which have so divided neighbors.

Some of the things they are discussing are detailed ABM presentations, NATO's various capabilities, the views of various members on their country's attitudes on deployment of nuclear weapons, the East-West strategic balance, and generally things of that kind.

I reviewed with you the seven items that are here. I welcomed them. I encouraged them. I reviewed with them the success of NATO and its future. I expressed great pleasure that Secretary McNamara had brought them here for this very historic meeting.

As you know, Mr. Harlan Cleveland, our US Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council, was also here.

That was what happened in the meeting.

QUESTION: Did you discuss, Mr. President, troop cuts by American forces?

THE PRESIDENT: No. I reviewed with you what we discussed. I took them one by one.

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QUESTION: Did you, Mr. President, give them assurance that the United States, in its current talks with Russia, would do everything it could to end this spiraling arms race?

THE PRESIDENT: No. I gave no assurances of any kind. I discussed the subjects I outlined with you. I told them we heartily concurred in this kind of thinking, this kind of planning, this kind of exchange of views, but it wasn't for me to say to them that I will give you this guarantee or this assurance. We just didn't get into that.

QUESTION: Mr. President, did you discuss the question of nuclear land mines that Turkey was reported to have requested?

THE PRESIDENT: No. I welcomed them to the White House and discussed with them what I told you.

Each one of you can ask a question about what I discussed and I will tell you the same. I just reviewed my statement. It is there for you to look at.

Maybe if they had had more time and I had had more time we could, but that would be the function of the committee to take up the various subjects. ABM deployment is one of them, nuclear capability is one of them, building bridges is another one.

There are a good many studies that will come out of this meeting. They will come back in September or later in the year and make reports on it. This is a historic meeting. It is a very effective organization. It is one of the things that NATO can do and I am glad is doing. That is it.

There is one other thing I said to the countries represented, like the Germans, the English, and the Netherlands, about the Vice president's visit. I told them I had full reports from him. I expressed my appreciation and gratitude for the very thorough, fruitful and, I think, profitable exchange between their Governments and ours.

That was not on the agenda, but I thought of that while I was trying to figure out if we discussed anything else. We talked about his visit to England and Germany and so on and so forth.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END (AT 12:35 P.M.)
MR. CHRISTIAN: Let me give you the names of the individuals in the meeting:

Secretary McNamara; Harlan Cleveland, U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council; Manlio Brosio, Secretary-General of NATO and Chairman of the Nuclear Planning Group; Edgar Hitchis, Canadian Ambassador to the United States and Deputy Principal Delegate to the Washington Nuclear Planning Group meeting; for the Federal Republic of Germany, Gerhard Schroeder, Minister of Defense; for Italy, Roberto Tremoloni, Minister of Defense; for the Netherlands, Lieutenant General Willem den Toom, Minister of Defense; for Turkey, Ahmet Topaloglu, Minister of National Defense; and for the United Kingdom, Denis Heasley, Secretary of State for Defense.

The NATO Nuclear Planning Group, together with the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee, was established as a permanent body of the North Atlantic Council last December to advise on matters of nuclear policy.

The group today represents the Executive Committee, so to speak. It is on a rotating basis among the NATO countries.

The President summarized pretty much what he said.

Q Are you going to run that off, George?

MR. CHRISTIAN: We will run off the President's remarks to you. He went right down the line.

Q You will give us a transcript of what he said, rather than a copy of what he read from?

MR. CHRISTIAN: We will get that for you as quickly as we can.

Q Could we have that read to us?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I will go over it with you. I took notes on what he said.

The President said that the meeting has demonstrated that we are ready to share with you the full range of information and analysis related to nuclear planning.

The President said that we firmly believe that joint planning is the best guarantee of effective deterrence. He said that the Atlantic nations can handle this awesome military

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power intelligently, prudently, responsibly, and together it will continue to be the mighty force for peace that NATO was intended to be.

Q Can you go back and reread that sentence where you said, "The meeting shows that we are ready to share with you the full range of information and analysis...?"

MR. CHRISTIAN: The President said that the meeting demonstrates we are ready to share with you the full range of information and analysis related to nuclear planning. He added that we -- this country -- thoroughly believes in joint planning.

The President mentioned the record of NATO as a deterrent. He referred to it as a successful deterrent and said that the nations together had made it clear in Europe that military aggression will not pay.

I will give you this as a direct quote. The President said, "Largely because of NATO's success, it is now possible to push ahead together with the positive works of peace in Europe. We can begin building bridges to the East. We can try to lower that ugly line of walls and watchtowers that defaces the map of Europe. We can seek to resolve some of the bitter controversies which for centuries have divided neighbors."

Then the President went on to say that the military links in NATO continue to be vital to the security of these countries and the security of the rest of the world.

He said that we look forward to many further meetings. The President encouraged further consultations such as this, and he quoted from his speech of October 7 in New York to the Editorial Writers. He said, "The Alliance must become a forum for increasingly close consultations. These should cover the full range of joint concerns from East-West relations to crisis management."

I think that is pretty much the rundown.

Q George, this is the first meeting of the new group, is it not? Did the President say that?

Q Or the first meeting here?

MR. CHRISTIAN: This is the first meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group.

Q What did he say about September? They will come back in September?

MR. FRANCIS BATOK: No, I don't think there was a specific discussion on that. The President did indicate some time, perhaps in September, but it is not set -- I don't think.

There are two other things about the meeting that you should know on BACKGROUND.

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One is that the President did emphasize that he has been engaged in extensive consultation on a wide range of political matters with NATO and European allies.

MR. CHRISTIAN: The President mentioned that he has met with the Prime Minister of Great Britain in 18 separate business sessions and with the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in 8 such sessions.

This was part of the President's discussion that this country believes in close consultation with its allies.

MR. BATOR: The other point worth saying is that Secretary-General Brosio reported about the content of the meetings during the last day and a half. Part of the meeting was taken up by his report on what they had talked about and what sort of proposals for joint studies emerged at the end of it.

Q What did he say?

MR. BATOR: I think that is off the record, apart from what the President told you.

Q Is this covered in the communique put out at the State Department? Do you know?

MR. BATOR: Whatever we put out is covered by the State or Defense Departments.

Q Are those the topics the President covered when he was talking to us?

MR. CHRISTIAN: No.

MR. BATOR: There is some overlap.

Q You mean the general report from Brosio?

MR. CHRISTIAN: No. Secretary-General Brosio made just a general report on the meetings of yesterday and this morning.

Q Did the President raise a bunch of issues like ABM's?

MR. CHRISTIAN: He didn't raise the issues.

Q He said they were working on them.

MR. CHRISTIAN: Secretary-General Brosio reported that studies were beginning on some of these problems. That was in his report.

Q How much time did they spend with the President?

MR. CHRISTIAN: About half an hour.

Q It was in the Cabinet Room?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.
Q: During the meetings has there been some sort of decision on the part of the United States to share more nuclear knowledge with Germany, say, or others?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I am not current, Helen, on what has taken place in the meetings with Secretary McNamara.

Q: I take it this group has nothing whatsoever to do with the question of troops and offset payments?

MR. BATOR: Nothing whatever.

Q: That is separate?

MR. CHRISTIAN: It wasn't mentioned or brought up at all.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END AT 12:55 P.M. EST
NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP

The First Meeting of the NPG
6-7 April 1967
Washington, D.C.