HOW CAN GENDER MAKE A DIFFERENCE TO SECURITY IN OPERATIONS

- INDICATORS -

Version 2011
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BACKGROUND
In the final declaration of the Lisbon Summit of November 2010, NATO expressed its continued commitment to the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325. In this declaration, the Heads of State and Governments listed the actions already taken and the way forward: “We have today endorsed an Action Plan to mainstream the provisions of UNSCR 1325 into our current and future crisis management and operational planning, into Alliance training and doctrine, and into all relevant aspects of the Alliance’s tasks. We are committed to the implementation of this Policy and Action Plan as an integral part of our work to improve the Alliance’s effectiveness, and today we endorsed recommendations to this end”.

NATO agreed and published an updated Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) policy on “Implementing UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and related resolutions” on 27 Jun 2011. Additionally, the Strategic Commands are reviewing the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) as well as the Bi-SC 40-1 document “Integrating UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives in the NATO command structure including measures for protection during armed conflict”.

Action plans for the implementation of the Resolution have been developed both by NATO Headquarters (HQ), Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in diverse domains such as operations, training and public diplomacy.

To take the work forward at operational and tactical levels, NATO has established gender adviser posts at ACO and ACT as well as at NATO HQ ISAF, ISAF Joint Command (IJC) and HQ KFOR.

In support of the Declaration of November 2010, and to assist the implementation of gender perspectives in operations, the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP) decided that the topic for their annual meeting 2011 would be “How can gender make a difference to security in operations? ” The aim of the meeting was twofold: firstly to identify key elements for successful implementation of gender into military operations and to compose a repository of good and bad practices; secondly to identify indicators to measure the effectiveness of gender integration into military operations.

In this brochure, you will find the complete work report of the NCGP 2011.
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

Awareness and knowledge of a subject matter is the key to better support and commitment of the parties involved.

In its work for the Military Committee (MC), the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP) has learned that there is still a lack of basic knowledge on the impact of implementing gender perspective in operations. The NCGP wants to contribute to increasing gender awareness and knowledge regarding the effect of implementing gender perspectives in operations. Consequently, in 2011 the Committee focused on providing more documentation on the topic and on how gender can make a difference to security in operations.

Two of the main concerns for NATO are to ensure security for the troops on operations and to increase security for the local population in order to gain their support. Consequently, the NCGP wanted to document in what ways security could be positively affected by applying a gender perspective.

This brochure initially presents six case studies as preliminary research for the meeting. This background work was outsourced by the Executive Committee (EC) of the NCGP to the Institute for Inclusive Security (IIS) which was later also contracted to facilitate the NCGP 2011 meeting.

The brochure later presents good practices drawn from the case studies that, when applied, could positively impact security in operations. Focus is on documenting the effect at both the tactical and operational as well as the operational and strategic levels.

The brochure also lists a number of factors that influence security in operations. These factors are to be considered as universally applicable in all theatres of operation.

Finally, and before the summary, you will find the list of indicators developed at the NCGP 2011 meeting that, if implemented, could increase security in operations. They are sorted into categories of Procedures and Directives, Operational, and Training and Human Resources.
ABOUT THE NATO COMMITTEE ON GENDER PERSPECTIVES (NCGP)
ABOUT THE NATO COMMITTEE ON GENDER PERSPECTIVES (NCGP)

History
Since 1961 female Senior Women Officers in NATO have organized conferences on an ad hoc basis to discuss the status, organization, conditions of employment and career possibilities for women in the military forces of the Alliance. On 19 July 1976 the NATO Military Committee formally recognized the Committee on Women in NATO Forces (CWINF). Since 1997 a small office located in NATO HQ has supported the Committee functioning as a permanent representative and point of contact for a wide range of issues concerning female military personnel in NATO Forces.

In May 2009 the names and Terms of Reference of the Committee and Office were changed to become the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP), and the NATO Office on Gender Perspectives (NOGP) in order to support the implementation of the UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions.

Mission
The NCGP is to advise the NATO leadership and member nations on gender related issues, including the implementation of relevant UNSCRs.

It is an advisory body to the Military Committee on gender related policies for the Armed Forces of the Alliance. It promotes gender mainstreaming as a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and military operations.

Organisation
The NCGP is composed of delegates of all NATO nations. The Committee formally meets once a year in Brussels with delegates and observers from the member nations. Countries from the Partnership for Peace programme, the Mediterranean Dialogue and other Contact Countries can be invited to participate.

The Committee is directed by an Executive Committee, composed of four elected female or male individuals. However, it is the only NATO Committee of the International Military Staff in NATO that has a female Chair.

See http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50327.htm for more information
METHOD
METHOD

In anticipation of its annual meeting, the NCGP contacted the Institute for Inclusive Security (IIS) who were mandated to conduct research and facilitate the meeting.

The initial and preliminary research aimed at the identification of best practices and lessons identified on gender in military operations, primarily focussed on specific NATO operations conducted by NATO nations, but it could also include other operations in order to make sure that best practices and lessons identified cut across institutions. This preliminary research was conducted through interviews and questionnaires with key NATO stakeholders, and resulted in the documenting of six case studies. Additionally, it was possible to identify factors that increase the security of personnel and equipment in NATO’s operations.

Based on this research, and in advance of the meeting, the IIS would draft a list with indicators that reflect the different themes identified during the research. The proposed indicators had to be clear, practical and, most of all, measurable.

During the meeting, the initial list of indicators were discussed, refined and categorised.

For the purpose of the study, and as military doctrine does not provide a single definition of “security in operations”, for the NCGP 2011 meeting this is defined as a “reduction of physical threats to personnel and equipment”.

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1 About the Institute for Inclusive Security
A non-profit organization, Inclusive Security works with military, police, and civilians around the world. Through training, advocacy, and research, they identify and convey practical approaches for uniformed personnel to engage constructively with women in the communities they serve. They also help enable women and other civil society leaders to communicate and cooperate more effectively with security-sector professionals. In addition to past collaboration with NATO, Inclusive Security has worked with the OSCE, UN, DCAF, and other bodies, and regularly leads trainings with senior US, Dutch, and other military personnel. Inclusive Security also works with networks of women government and civil society leaders in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Liberia, the Middle East, Pakistan, Sudan, and elsewhere, often facilitating interaction between local women leaders and international forces. (www.inclusivesecurity.org)
CASE STUDIES

1. Dutch Military in Kabul:
Outreach activities with women create a foundation of confidence between community and troops

NATO gender advisers in Afghanistan piloted a successful initiative to enable Afghan women to set up small businesses in a secure environment. Their “Afghan Women’s Bazaar” invited local Afghan women, and their families, to sell handicrafts to civilian and military NATO personnel on base in Kabul which provided NATO personnel with the opportunity to expand their cultural knowledge and build new relationships with community members.

Specific summary of intervention

A Dutch Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) conceived the idea for a women’s market. In her role as Gender Adviser for ISAF, the LCDR fostered contacts with the Afghan Women Business Federation (AWBF), a large network of small women business owners. After seeing their products displayed at a showroom in Kabul City, she decided to support Afghan women’s business efforts by expanding their customer base to include NATO personnel. The Afghan women she proposed this to were delighted; one said, “This is a dream coming through for us: a market for ISAF.”

The first market was held in January 2010 on the NATO base. Approximately thirty women participated, accompanied by two Afghan American women who taught them about entrepreneurship and interpreted for those who did not speak English. From the hours of 10h00 to 16h00, civilian and military personnel visited the market, bought goods from the Afghan women, and conversed with them in English when possible. The Afghan women made over USD 10,000.

After the success of the first one, subsequent markets were held and the turnout rate by NATO personnel increased considerably. The LCDR’s has replicated the model several times to date (as of May 2011). Organizing the markets required the support of the Base Commander (for permission and the identification of a location) and the Force Protection Commander (for security matters). Logistical arrangements involved: approving the list of female Afghan participants (sent from AWBF); compiling the licence plate numbers, car colours, and driver names for any trucks driven to the base; making catering arrangements; and advertising the event. Security measures required that the Afghan women be picked up outside the Base gates, escorted to the body scan area, and provided with a bus to the market site. The gender advisers solicited the help of their colleagues, who proved quite enthusiastic, to check the women in at the Base gate, help them set up their stalls, and provide general assistance throughout the day.
What difference did it make to incorporate a gender perspective?

Prior to the Afghan Women’s Bazaar, many NATO personnel had little direct exposure to Afghan women. Inviting women to the Base provided NATO personnel with an opportunity for meaningful exposure to “the other half of the population.” The markets in turn favourably exposed NATO personnel to the women who benefited financially, and from being able to practice their English skills.

One gender adviser reported that she perceived the women became more confident about themselves and their abilities. She also explained that NATO/ISAF personnel were no longer perceived by them to be “the enemy.” In addition, the Gender Adviser’s role became elevated through enhanced visibility across the Base. The markets raised gender awareness with personnel and developed new allies for the gender adviser across specialties and units.

What impact did the intervention have on operational security and effectiveness?

The three gender advisers consulted recommended the market model as a relatively simple way to engage the local community, bolster Afghan women’s incomes and enhance community knowledge of ISAF. While the impact on security and operational effectiveness was indirect, according to the gender advisers, the markets contributed to the objective of “winning hearts and minds.” By appealing directly to female Afghans (and their husbands who participated in the market) they leveraged Afghan women as wielders of familial influence and increased the likelihood of support for NATO objectives.

2. Canadian PRT² in Kandahar: Sustained engagement with women fosters relationships and information exchange with military personnel

Recognizing that women are vital to the reconstruction and stability that NATO seeks in Afghanistan, the Canadian-led PRT in Kandahar regularly engaged with Afghan women to improve its operations. Risking their own lives, Afghan women provided key intelligence and contextual information to help NATO shape more effective operations and policies. They provided timely information on critical security situations, verified progress on development projects in areas where NATO troops had limited physical access, and informed NATO of corrupt practices related to NATO-provided infrastructure and services.

Specific summary of intervention

The PRT’s collaboration with Afghan women started with one Afghan woman who frequently visited the NATO Base in Kandahar to sell
handicrafts. Upon learning about her enterprise employing local woman artisans, female Canadian military personnel expressed their interest in conversing with Afghan women. The local female counterpart identified and convened a variety of women - including doctors, farmers, and stay-at-home mothers - who she organized into groups of literate professionals and illiterate women. She worked with a Canadian Captain, a NATO public information officer at the Kandahar Airbase, to organize and facilitate more than a dozen meetings over a six-month period between PRT officials (generally two female NATO officers) and Afghan women (typically five to seven per meeting). The meetings were held in a private room at Kandahar International Airport. For security reasons, the PRT notified women of the meeting dates and times only a day or two in advance and transported them there through a trusted male driver; women also wore burqas to and from the meetings. While the local female counterpart acted as the interpreter, the NATO officers moderated the discussions, generally opening meetings with broad questions and allowing more specific security information to emerge naturally in the course of the conversation.

What difference did it make to incorporate a gender perspective?

Engaging local women provided NATO with a better understanding of the local context in which it operated. Women helped identify priority infrastructure and human development needs that differed from traditional male community leaders by focusing more on familial and community well-being and longer-term sustainability. At the same time, contributing to decision-making processes provided the Afghan women with a sense of ownership over Afghanistan’s reconstruction. They gained greater awareness of PRT policies, discussed the nature of the input sought by NATO forces with their families and communities, and spoke highly of NATO personnel. As the women became more committed to NATO’s success through their collaboration, they even reported that this led them to discourage their sons’ sympathies towards insurgents.

What impact did the intervention have on operational security and effectiveness?

The female participants in this initiative improved intelligence within the PRT by sharing insight on people, programmes, and organizations that affected operations. They pointed out corrupt practices in which individuals entrusted by NATO with contracts to build infrastructure or deliver services were not honouring the agreements; named individuals who were purporting to collaborate with NATO officials while secretly organizing insurgent activities; and verified progress in areas where NATO troops had limited physical access. Further, women provided timely information on critical security situations. For example, when insurgents attacked Kandahar prison and attempted to free nearly 700 detainees in June 2008, one of the consultation participants called the Canadian
Captain to inform her of the break-in. The Captain was the first person on the NATO Base to learn of the attack, news she received ten minutes before anyone else in the mission.

3. United States Female Engagement Teams in Sangin: Female military personnel serve as successful interlocutors with local men

Female military personnel are not only effective interlocutors with local women but also with local men. The use of Female Engagement Teams (FETs) in Afghanistan increases the number of trained female military on patrol who engage directly with local communities. Near Sangin district in Helmand province, Afghanistan in August 2010, a FET member with the Marine Expeditionary Force I (MEF) was the only interlocutor accepted by a male informant who shared lifesaving information about the location of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and the identities of Taliban supporters.

Specific summary of intervention

In mid-2010, Sangin district was heavy with insurgent activity and called one of the most dangerous areas of Afghanistan. Working alongside an infantry unit, a US Corporal was one of two members of a FET visiting a village in Sangin that had not yet been patrolled. The Corporal approached a male farmer and they began a lengthy conversation about his crops. The FET established excellent rapport with the male farmer, who was thrilled to be talking to someone who shared his enthusiasm for his favourite crop: watermelon. The farmer walked the Corporal to his field and gave her two watermelons as a gift. She accepted the gift and as they continued talking, the man revealed that he had information about the Taliban and security threats in the area. The Corporal told the man that she would alert her colleagues and that they would return to speak with him.

Upon returning to the Forward Operating Base (FOB) and sharing information about the situation, the unit Commander, intelligence staff, and others returned to speak with the farmer. The farmer received them and they sat in his field for some time exchanging pleasantries until the farmer revealed that he would not share the information unless the female Marine returned. While FETs are not designed to have a direct intelligence gathering purpose, the Corporal was sent for and asked to participate. She joined the conversation with the farmer who revealed the location of several IED belts laid in the area, as well as key Taliban conspirators in the area. The information was verified as correct.

What difference did it make to incorporate a gender perspective?

Significant information about local security threats was collected as a
result of a FET member engaging directly with men. Female personnel can work within stereotypes to exploit gender norms towards achieving a desired end. The FET Commander in Sangin perceived that female military personnel changed the dynamic when in dialogue with men.

What impact did the intervention have on operational security and effectiveness?

The information provided by the male farmer to female military personnel had direct implications on force protection. The safe removal of several IED belts saved the lives of military personnel and created a safer environment for the local population. Beyond situational awareness, details about the identities of Taliban supporters helped advance intelligence gathering to inform operations.

4. Swedish PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif: Local women’s perspectives strengthen situational awareness

By increasing direct engagement with local women, the Swedish PRT in Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan, was able to strengthen its situational awareness and avoid a misunderstanding that would have had negative implications for mission security. Soldiers benefited from the technical expertise of a gender field adviser whose recommendations on patrolling patterns led to the collection of critical information from a local family.

Specific summary of intervention

During the summer of 2009, an all-male rifle patrol within the Swedish PRT approached the PRT’s gender field adviser to learn why the patrol never saw Afghan women in public. The PRT Commander and Chief of Staff had been vocal about their interest in engaging “the other half of the population” and an extensive system of gender focal points in each military unit had increased awareness of gender issues across the PRT. The gender adviser worked with the team to understand exactly where the male soldiers were regularly patrolling.

Upon reviewing a map of their typical routes, the gender field adviser identified that the soldiers were only travelling on large streets frequented by men. She suggested that they venture into smaller, less busy streets to find more women. The rifle patrol implemented the advice and complemented its patrol of major thoroughfares with trips into smaller streets and alleys. The patrol was pleased when it began to encounter local women. They were surprised when women approached their all male team, including a male interpreter, and wanted to speak.

In one instance, several women approached the patrol and, after a brief conversation, invited them to meet their male family members at home. At the women’s homes, the soldiers were introduced to the male family
members. A conversation ensued over tea and the topic of “what they each were looking forward to” came up. The women explained that they were looking forward to a large wedding that was going to take place in the town in two days. Several hundred family members and relatives were going to descend on the town for the celebration. None of the men had shared this information.

**What difference did it make to incorporate a gender perspective?**

Women provided insights about a forthcoming event that was critical to enhancing the soldiers’ situational awareness. When hundreds of people descended on the town 48 hours later, the Mission was expecting them. Additionally, that male soldiers and interpreters could engage directly with local women helped not only extend the range of possible engagements in their specific area of operation but proved the fluidity of cultural norms around dialogue with women.

**What impact did the intervention have on operational security and effectiveness?**

The information from the women about a forthcoming major event in the town allowed the PRT time to create a plan for monitoring the flow of people and helped redirect mission assets and personnel. The details about the wedding also prevented a potential escalation of tensions when the international military presence was met with an unexpected wave of movement into the town. The information helped the force avoid circumstances in which military personnel would be surprised and overwhelmed by hundreds of people arriving in the area. Without a benign explanation, personnel could interpret the movement as an insurgent tactic and violence could ensue which could lead to immediate security risks as well as longer term risks to the force from a resentful community.

5. **United Nations Joint Protection Teams in the Congo:**

**Increased female personnel strengthen protection of civilian efforts**

Joint Protection Teams (JPTs) are small ad-hoc teams of UN civilian, military, and police staff with diverse expertise that deploy to high-risk areas in order to make recommendations for the protection of civilians and foster good relations with local communities. JPTs investigate and assess protection risks in emergency situations and generate specific protection recommendations that highlight mission priorities and contingency plans for liaising with local leaders in the event of armed attacks. The use of JPTs in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) offers a particularly encouraging model for increasing protection by civil-military actors, advancing engagement with local women, and improving force protection through increased situational awareness.
Specific summary of intervention with women

JPTs enhance the ability of military peacekeepers to engage directly with local women by increasing the number of female staff on missions. MONUSCO estimates that at least 15 to 30 percent of JPTs have female members, while only three percent of MONUSCO military and police peacekeepers were women as of March 2010. JPTs have facilitated engagement with local women to combat sexual violence; promoted contact between peacekeepers and the local community leading to increased situational awareness; enhanced the ability of civilian experts to reach hard-to-access areas; and increased the number of women involved in protection efforts.

Information collected by female personnel from local women about sexual violence and human rights violations has been critical to informing UN protection operations. For example, as a result of JPT activities in South Kivu human rights officers were able to visit the inaccessible village of Matili where human rights attacks and sexual violence had been reported in order to investigate the charges. They informed local women about a legal clinic in Shabunda specializing in sexual violence cases and maintained a motorbike for the community to transport victims to Shabunda and health and legal experts to the rural areas.

What difference did it make to incorporate a gender perspective?

Local women provide valuable details about their communities that enhance situational awareness and promote mission protection objectives. For example, through a meeting organized in North Kivu with local women, UN staff learned how tensions among families of the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and local populations were leading to hostility and violence. In response, MONUSCO organized a series of dialogues to promote communication and reconciliation between FARDC families and local populations. JPTs in the DRC also learned about times and areas where women were more vulnerable to sexual violence which resulted in the establishment of peacekeeping patrols at specific days and times to ensure safer passage for women.

What impact did the intervention have on operational security and effectiveness?

JPTs capitalize on the military presence in high-risk locations to facilitate civilian experts’ movements and bring multi-disciplinary perspectives that contribute to a more holistic understanding of peacekeeping missions in operating zones. They enhance protection in a variety of specific ways, including: market and field escorts by peacekeepers; provision of health services in difficult-to-reach areas; prosecution of human rights abuses; creation and implementation of protection plans; access to legal services for victims of sexual violence; and adherence to international humanitarian
The more effectively missions can protect local populations, the greater (a) general stability they can promote, and (b) likelihood that local populations will associate peacekeepers with protection and turn their allegiances towards them rather than insurgents and armed combatants.

6. **European Union Force (EUFOR) in Chad:**

   **Visible presence of women in the military and dialogue with local women increases force acceptance**

   By increasing direct engagement with the local female population, the European Union Force Chad/CAR (also EUFOR Tchad/RCA) was able to achieve its mandate to protect civilians more fully, facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid, and ensure the safety of UN personnel. Dialogue with local women created a more comprehensive view of security threats in the area and increased force acceptance.

   **Specific summary of intervention**

   Upon its 2008 deployment, the EU Force in Chad was met with local hostility. Locals accused the force of stealing the best agricultural land and perceived it as a colonist holdover. As a result, community members refused to engage with EU personnel and were outwardly aggressive to patrols and convoys; stones were regularly thrown at troops. The mission attempted to raise awareness of the EUFOR assignment through “bush movies” and information sharing sessions, but audiences were mostly male and tensions still ran high.

   Eager to increase force acceptance and thereby contribute to force protection, EUFOR personnel organized meetings with women in October 2008. The gender adviser obtained approval from the Force Commander for the meetings by reporting entirely new information about the local area she had gathered through conversations with local women. She asserted that meetings had the potential to not only increase force acceptance, but also enhance situational awareness for the mission.

   In the Southern, predominantly Christian, part of Chad information about the meetings was broadcast via local radio. Sessions were held in a neutral location outside of the force compound, typically in schools and during the afternoon to decrease security threats for the women. The mission provided a small security detail. The meetings were flexibly structured, allowing the 50-60 participants to come and go as needed so as not to disturb their normal activities. The three female meeting facilitators, including the mission Gender Adviser and a Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) officer, were interested in the local security situation, but eased into discussions about specific security threats by asking first about women’s families and livelihoods. A local female interpreter, affiliated to the radio station, facilitated the session using the local Arabic dialect and French.
In the Northern, predominantly Muslim, part of the country, rather than directly advertising the meetings, CIMIC teams worked through local NGO contacts to identify meeting participants. Adhering to local custom, plans were discussed with the local Sultan or Prefect. Earlier statements about “not having any contact with our women” were clarified; the elders wished only that the women were not disrespected. An all-female EUFOR team with female interpreters was stood up within the Polish contingent to ensure there would be only female personnel as part of the dialogue. A first meeting was held inside a private home. A female, Muslim Arabic interpreter was deemed culturally appropriate for the group and increased the women’s level of acceptance of the interaction. The women were grateful to offer their perspectives on security and community priorities; no one had asked them these types of questions before.

What difference did it make to incorporate a gender perspective?

The force collected critical information from women about local security threats that prompted it to adapt its operations. The women explained that local police regularly robbed them when they returned from collecting firewood or water outside of town. As EUFOR was cooperating with the defense and police force, the public confused the EUFOR troops with the local police. EUFOR thereby needed to address police corruption, but also the community’s association of EUFOR with the corrupt police.

In another meeting, security information was revealed in conversations with women about how they collected water and firewood. The presence of armed groups in nearby mountains was causing the women to collect in other locations. No men travelled regularly to the mountains; it was only women who were privy to this information. A CIMIC group ensured that the local base was aware of armed elements nearby and that patrols were organized in the area.

Engagement with women in the North unintentionally provided an opportunity for community building. When asked to participate in the meeting, the women designed a system of appointing one individual from each village to represent her community. A positive consequence of the meeting was the creation of a network of women across areas of traditional rivalry. Given the competition for resources in the region - land, firewood, etc., - the women vowed to continue their network as an informal dispute resolution forum.

Two weeks after the initial meeting, the women contacted the Polish troops for a second meeting - a sea change from previous hostility to the EUFOR troops. The women had learned more about the EUFOR mission and were able to share that information with their families and communities. The men in the area witnessed that the force was not there to harm the women thereby creating a more positive impression.
of the force. Lastly, the EUFOR mission had a better sense of the unique security needs of men and women in the local area.

**What impact did the intervention have on operational security and effectiveness?**

Women provided important information that served to enhance EUFOR’s situational awareness in Chad. Women pointed out police corruption and shared community priorities which had not been shared by men. As in the case of women reporting the presence of nearby armed groups, the information shared had direct implications on force protection.

The meetings also provided an opportunity for EUFOR to educate women about the mission mandate and answer specific questions. The women shared this information with their families and communities who had many misconceptions about the troop presence. When the community had more information about the force, through female interlocutors, relations improved, force acceptance increased and EUFOR was better able to fulfill its mandate.
GOOD PRACTICES
GOOD PRACTICES
In incorporating Gender Perspectives into Operations

The following section draws from the case studies and additional research highlighting key practices that, when applied, could positively impact security in operations. Recommendations are organized by level of implementing actors (field-based implementers at the most local level of deployment vs. implementers at the regional or headquarter level). When appropriate, implementation examples are cited. Unless otherwise noted, examples were gathered during personal interviews.

Tactical and Operational

Staffing

- Increase deployment of female soldiers serving in civil-military engagement, civil affairs, human terrain assessments, and intelligence extraction capacities in all missions and forward operating bases.

- Require inclusion of female soldiers and officers in outreach units and patrols. This is of special importance for Civil Affairs/Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Psychological Operations, (PSYOPS) and Human Intelligence (HUMINT). Teams may be all female or mixed, reflecting local needs and circumstances.

- Ensure adequate numbers of female interpreters with knowledge of local customs and circumstances. Specific activities may include accelerated interpreter training for women in country or expanded language training for female soldiers serving in outreach units.

- Require that each unit has a gender focal point who liaises with a gender field adviser. For example, the Swedish PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif has between 20 and 25 gender focal points across its units. A commander’s order required contingents to identify focal points.

Planning

- Implement participatory, gender-sensitive needs assessments preceding all stabilization interventions to ensure that the needs of women are incorporated into all direct community assistance delivered through NATO entities.

- Mandate that all concepts of operation (CONOPS) at the brigade and battalion level include attention to gender, specifically plans for direct engagement with local women, and gender-sensitive information operations campaigns.

- Implement practical operational tools (such as checklists) for personnel to incorporate gender into planning. For example, the gender adviser of
NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) is currently implementing use of the NATO Bi-SC Directive 40-1 operational planning checklist across the mission.

**Training and Education**

- Ensure all personnel, including unit commanders and patrol members, have overall basic training and in-theatre training on gender issues. Training should be practical, related to local circumstances and focused on Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), rather than emphasizing theory. While training on Standards of Behavior, Code of Conduct, and Sexual Exploitation are critical, these subjects are inherently different from how to engage with local women. Training on conducting a basic gender analysis of an area of operation should be included.

- Design creative solutions for providing training to ensure maximum exposure. For example, during the EUFOR TChad/RCA operation, the gender adviser trained gender focal points in each unit who in turn briefed other team members.3

**Operations**

- Consult regularly with local women in the theatre of operations. Structures designed to promote sustained, repeated contact with women should be prioritized to promote confidence building. Meeting design should reflect local circumstances and preferences of local women per examples provided in the case studies.

- Promote outreach activities that involve women and their families. For example, bazaars for women to sell merchandise, held regularly by the Dutch PRT, provided obvious financial benefit to the women but also served as an opportunity for relationship building between personnel and the local population.

- Ensure all reporting requirements, from weekly reporting to After Action Reviews, include attention to gender issues. Adapting current formatting is preferable to developing additional reports. For example, data collected from Female Engagement Teams is incorporated into existing reporting vehicles.

- Devise databases specifically for tracking female contacts. For example, the Dutch Armed Forces complemented existing “red” and “white” plate databases listing individuals allied with the force and those viewed as hostile, with a “pink plate” database specifically for female key leaders.

- Strengthen coordination with international and local NGOs with local Area of Operation (AO) so that troops are aware of resources for women in the community. For example, EUFOR Congo troops developed a referral

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3 Gender Annex to End of Mandate report, EUFOR TChad/RCA, July 2008.
system to share information about local gender-based violence services for women.4

Operational and Strategic

Staffing

• Request that Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) include more women in outreach units as part of Force Generation processes. The Head of Mission for the EUFOR TChad/RCA operation, General Patrick Nash, sent a letter to all member states to find more female personnel for the mission.5

• Harmonize the distribution of female personnel across military occupational specialties through targeted recruitment techniques and transition opportunities. For example, the Dutch military has tried to channel women from Administration and Logistics to other specialties,

• Position gender advisers strategically in the command structure, close to the operation or mission management, ideally reporting directly to Operational or Force Commanders. Gender advisers from different NATO missions contend that direct access to senior leaders is critical to elevating their work.

• Strengthen communication between gender advisers once in theatre as well as pre-deployment. For example, the Swedish Armed Forces require a two-week overlap of gender advisers to ensure consistency of activities.

• Ensure that gender advisers are not “dual-hatted” and can dedicate their full attention to advancing attention to gender issues.

Planning

• Include individuals with gender expertise on the planning team for an operation or a mission. For example, upstream planning allowed the inclusion of human rights and gender training in EU Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia’s syllabus.6

Training and Education

• Enhance pre-deployment gender training opportunities for all personnel and provide training to gender focal points.

• Offer opportunities for Commanders to hone knowledge of gender issues, specifically how to effectively use gender advisers. For example,

Genderforce offers the Swedish Armed Forces a “gender coaching” programme for Brigadier Generals.

- Create opportunities for sharing operational best practices and lessons learned related to gender. For example, EU Military Staff (EUMS) have developed an internal database, EUMS Lessons Management Application, for entering, acting on, following up, and retrieving lessons “observed” for military operations. It includes six lessons learned on gender dimensions from EUFOR DRC. Additionally, Allied Command Transformation (ACT) is currently populating an unclassified database of lessons learned.

Operations

- Incorporate knowledge of, and attention to, gender as a component of all job descriptions and subsequent performance reviews.

- Require all field data collected to be gender disaggregated, and adapt data collection systems and reporting formats accordingly. For example, Period Mission Reviews through SHAPE/NATO count the number of female personnel, including those in leadership positions.
FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE SECURITY IN OPERATIONS
FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE SECURITY IN OPERATIONS

Numerous elements impact the security of personnel and equipment. The following list is not exhaustive.

The factors outlined are universally applicable in all theatres of operation. What may increase security in one context may decrease security in another.

Situational Awareness
Thorough information on the theatre of operations including, but not limited to, physical terrain, threats, location of enemy combatants, identities of local powerbrokers, kinship and patronage networks, community interests and needs, and the impact of mission-led operations on civilian populations can increase preparedness and capacity to effectively leverage social networks towards accomplishment of mission objectives.

Unit Cohesion
Knowing how your unit will respond to an immediate threat can increase the likelihood of an effective, coordinated response. This consideration is of particular concern when a variety of NATO countries come together to form a single unit.

Training
Effective pre-deployment and in-theatre training can ensure maximum mental and physical readiness to respond to threats and can also improve unit cohesion.

Force Acceptance
Trust and confidence between civilian populations and the force can increase civilian engagement in the achievement of mission objectives and decrease animosity towards the force that could translate into a physical threat. Various operations and actions contribute to force acceptance including:

- Civil-military cooperation and civil affairs
- Strategic communications and local media outreach
- Minimization of collateral damage
- Demonstration of understanding and respect for the local culture

Local Government Partners
Strong and capable local governing bodies can assist in cultivating force acceptance among their constituents, implementing stabilization operations, and sharing vital information.
Mandate and Rules of Engagement

Shared understanding of a clear mandate and rules of engagement can increase the knowledge of parameters for responding to threats and the probability of a legally-sound, coordinated response.

Equipment

Functioning equipment that is appropriate to the physical threats and terrain of the environment is critical for effective execution of operations and defensive response.

Secure Channels of Communication

Communication breaches can jeopardize operations by, among other things, alerting enemy combatants to force positions. Access to, and use of, the equipment necessary for secure communications can decrease this threat.

Defensive Physical Security Measures

Physical security measures such as check points and defensive walls that are designed according to appropriate situational analysis can stem physical threats.

Kill or Capture

The presence of firepower and the use of Special Forces to kill or capture irreconcilables can diminish physical threats presented by insurgent groups.

National Security Forces

Effective national security forces in host countries can improve the general security environment by maintaining localized security and management of criminal activity. Strong relationships with these forces can present synergies for joint patrol and information sharing.

Economic Development

Job creation and increases in household income generation can mitigate the economic incentive for joining insurgent groups which will limit the recruitment capacities of insurgent leaders.
INDICATORS
INDICATORS

The following proposed indicators aim to broaden and strengthen implementation of actions that will incorporate gender perspectives in NATO-led operations. In advance of the NCGP meeting, Inclusive Security proposed a set of practical and simple indicators to track elements and activities that, if implemented, could increase security in operations. During the meeting, NCGP members refined and prioritized these indicators and suggested possible new ones.

Indicators related to Procedures and Directives

1. Number and percentage of all gender advisers who report directly and have access to the Chief of Staff or Commander or who are included in the command group.

2. Percentage of units that include female personnel (including Civil Affairs/ CIMIC, Intelligence, PSYOPS, Public Affairs, J1 through J9.)

3. The presence of a paragraph addressing gender included in each NATO Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive. (Number and percent of Concepts of Operations (CONOPS), Operational Orders, Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs), Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) etc. that incorporate an approach for engaging women).

4. Number and percentage of operations planned using the Bi-SC Directive 40-1 operational planning checklist.

5. Number and percentage of final mission reports that include documentation of engagement with women and outcomes of those engagement activities

Indicators related to Operational Impact

1. Number and percentage of units tasked with engaging civilian populations with access to female interpreters.

2. Number and percentage of women consulted who initiate or allow subsequent engagement by NATO personnel within x period of time.

3. Number and percentage of NATO-led needs assessments related to development projects that include consultations with women.

4. Number and percentage of patrol reports that include documentation of engagement with women and the outcomes of those engagement activities.

5. The number and percentage of engagements by NATO personnel with the local population that directly reduced physical threats to NATO personnel.
and equipment. (collection of this data would need to be disaggregated by sex).

**Indicators related to Training**

1. Number and percentage of deployed personnel who may be in contact with the local population who receive theatre-specific training on how to engage local women and incorporate gender perspectives.

2. Number and percentage of gender advisers, gender field advisers, and gender focal points who receive specific training for that role.

3. The number and percentage of personnel in host-country security forces who are trained on gender and human rights (in NATO-led missions with a mandate to train those forces).

4. Number and percentage of nations in NATO-led missions with gender modules in their pre-deployment training.

**Indicators related to Human Resources**

1. Number and percentage of Gender Focal Points, Gender Advisers, and Gender Field Advisers in each NATO-led mission.

2. The number and percentage of personnel deployed in each NATO-led mission over one year that is female.

**Remark:**

During the discussions, committee members identified the need to clearly define the terms ‘unit’ and ‘engagement’ for additional clarity.
SUMMARY
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The NCGP 2011 focused on documenting how gender can make a difference to security in operations.

This brochure reflects all the work with regard to NCGP 2011 and presents 5 case studies from operations where a gender perspective has been used; it presents good practices from the case studies that could positively impact security in operations; it lists universal factors that can influence security in operations and it lists indicators developed at the NCGP 2011 meeting that will incorporate gender perspectives in NATO-led operations.

The proposed indicators are basic and generic. To be useful, they need to be adapted to a specific situation or mission.

For this reason, the NCGP decided to organize an Ad-Hoc Working Group meeting on Indicators (AHWGI), inviting all interested nations, Strategic Commands and the active gender advisors working in NATO’s missions in ISAF and KFOR. The aim of the NCGP Ad-Hoc Working Group meeting is to adapt the indicators to the particularities of the missions. The results of this AHWGI will not be made public.
PREVIOUS PUBLICATIONS
PREVIOUS PUBLICATIONS

Available on the official Committee web site:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50327.htm

1. CWINFO Guidance for NATO Gender Mainstreaming
   - published in 2007;

2. Best Practices to improve Gender Balance
   - published in 2008;

3. Gender Training and Education
   - published in 2009

4. Template for Pre- Deployment Gender Training
   - published in 2010
ABBREVIATIONS
## ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACO</td>
<td>Allied Command Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>Allied Command Transformation</td>
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<tr>
<td>AHWGI</td>
<td>Ad Hoc Working Group on Indicators</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWBF</td>
<td>Afghan Women Business Federation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bi-SC</td>
<td>Bi-Strategic Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
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<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Concepts of Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>COPD</td>
<td>Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive</td>
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<td>CWINF</td>
<td>Committee on Women in NATO Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAPC</td>
<td>Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>EU Force</td>
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<td>EUMS</td>
<td>EU Military Staff</td>
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<td>EUTM</td>
<td>EU Training Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Forces Armées du (Armed Forces of) DRC</td>
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<tr>
<td>FET</td>
<td>Female Engagement Team</td>
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<td>FOB</td>
<td>Forward Operating Base</td>
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<td>FRAGO</td>
<td>Fragmentary Orders</td>
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<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Human Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Devices</td>
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<tr>
<td>IIS</td>
<td>Institute for Inclusive Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>IJC</td>
<td>ISAF Joint Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPT</td>
<td>Joint Protection Team</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<td>MC</td>
<td>Military Committee</td>
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<td>MEC</td>
<td>Marine Expedition Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCGP</td>
<td>NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSYOPS</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCN</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>Tactics, Techniques and Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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More information related to the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces can be found on the web page:

http://www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/index.html