NATO’s 25th summit meeting

Chicago, 20-21 May 2012

At the Chicago Summit, 20-21 May 2012, NATO will drive forward key Alliance principles and policies that will shape the Alliance of 2020 and beyond. It will deliver on decisions taken at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, turning them into concrete programmes and initiatives.

Allies will commit to maintain the necessary capabilities and to developing cooperation and dialogue with partners. And at a time of austerity, it will be a question of striking the right balance between fulfilling NATO’s shared responsibilities and balancing national budgets.

The summit will principally focus on three main themes:

- the Alliance’s commitment to Afghanistan through transition and beyond;
- ensuring the Alliance has the capabilities it needs to defend its population and territory and to deal with the challenges of the 21st century; and
- strengthening NATO’s network of partners across the globe.

NATO is an essential source of stability. In order to maintain its capacity to safeguard the security and values of its members, it needs to continue developing the means to do so and building partnerships beyond the North Atlantic region.

For more information on Alliance policies and activities, please check the online “A to Z” pages of the NATO website.

- Previous summit meetings
- Member countries
- NATO partners

I. Operational priorities

Afghanistan – through transition and beyond

NATO is committed to supporting Afghanistan beyond 2014, when the gradual transition of security responsibility from ISAF troops to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) will be fully implemented and the ISAF mission will come to a close. Until then, and as transition implementation progresses, the ISAF mission is evolving from a combat to a support role. In 2013, when the last tranche of transition is expected to be announced, the ANSF will be in the lead for combat operations across the country. ISAF will increasingly shift to a training and advising role, but continue to support combat operations alongside Afghan forces, as necessary.
At Chicago, leaders will map out how NATO intends to complete the transition process by end-2014. They will also agree on how NATO will provide training, advice and assistance to the ANSF, and will demonstrate their commitment to sustaining the ANSF beyond 2014, as part of the Afghan government’s and the broader international community’s efforts.

- NATO in Afghanistan
- NATO in Afghanistan: through transition and beyond
- ISAF’s mission in Afghanistan

Other operational priorities

NATO is also engaged in other operations and missions, all of which are explained below.

- NATO operations and missions
- NATO’s role in Kosovo
- Counter-piracy operations
- Operation Active Endeavour
- NATO assistance to the African Union
- Commitments to operations and missions
- Troop contributions

II. Developing capabilities under budgetary constraints

At a time of austerity NATO is also seeking to ensure better value for money for its security. With the financial crisis in Europe and beyond, severe deficit reduction measures in the United States and increased pressure on defence budgets, NATO’s added value is to help countries work together. NATO has the capacity to connect forces and manage multinational projects. This is one of its strengths. However, the challenge is having to prepare NATO today, for the security challenges of tomorrow.

“Smart defence”

In Chicago, Allies will support new multinational projects that will allow the Alliance to provide more security for its citizens in an age of financial austerity. The goal is an Alliance that is fit for the next decade and beyond. The way to get there is confirming a renewed culture of cooperation – “smart defence”.

Projects in the spirit of Smart Defence will comprise a package of multinational projects to address critical capability shortfalls. They will include programmes such as missile defence, Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) and Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance as well as
projects covering areas such as pooling maritime patrol aircraft and remote-controlled robots for clearing roadside bombs.

- Smart defence
- Interoperability: connecting NATO forces
- NATO defence planning process
- Education and training
- Exercises
- Improving NATO’s capabilities
- Ballistic missile defence
- NATO air defence
- Defending against cyber attacks
- NATO and the fight against terrorism
- Alliance Ground Surveillance
- Improving NATO’s strategic air- and sea-lift capabilities
- AWACS

**Reviewing NATO’s defence and deterrence posture**

At Chicago, heads of state and government will also examine NATO’s mix of conventional, nuclear and missile defence forces, known as NATO’s Defence and Deterrence Posture Review. This was mandated at the Lisbon Summit. This review will allow NATO to check its overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance, taking into account the changes in the evolving international security environment.

- NATO’s nuclear forces
- Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation in NATO

**Seeking to optimise assets**

Being able to put together complex joint operations at short notice is a priority for the Alliance. To do this at a time of crisis, NATO is seeking to reform its structures and processes to get a better return on investment. This means introducing change now in order to have flexible, deployable forces, and the right mix of capabilities at hand in ten years’ time.

- Paying for NATO
- Information on defence expenditures
- NATO reform
- Organisations and agencies
- International Staff
- International Military Staff
III. Greater flexibility with partners

Chicago will be an opportunity for Allies to deepen existing relations and broaden its networks of partnerships. The summit will therefore give a new impetus to partnerships, highlighting their integral role in NATO’s peace support and crisis-management operations and overall political agenda.

Heads of state and government will also focus on engaging other organisations in addressing global challenges.

- Partnerships: a cooperative approach to security
- Partnership tools
- NATO-Russia relations
- NATO-Ukraine relations
- NATO-Georgia relations
- Mediterranean Dialogue
- Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
- NATO’s relations with partners across the globe
- NATO enlargement
- Membership Action Plan (MAP)
- NATO’s relations with the UN
- NATO-EU: a strategic partnership

NATO summit meetings

NATO summit meetings provide periodic opportunities for Heads of State and Government of member countries to evaluate and provide strategic direction for Alliance activities.

These are not regular meetings, but rather important junctures in the Alliance's decision-making process. For instance, summits have been used to introduce new policy, invite new members into the Alliance, launch major new initiatives and build partnerships with non-NATO countries.
From the founding of NATO in 1949 until today there have been twenty-four NATO summits. The 25th is taking place in Chicago, United States, 20-21 May 2012.

**Summit meeting agendas**

NATO summit meetings are effectively meetings of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) - the Alliance’s principal political decision-making body - at its highest level, that of Heads of State and Government.

Due to the political significance of summit meetings, agenda items typically address issues of overarching political or strategic importance. Items can relate to the internal functioning of the Alliance as well as NATO’s relations with external partners.

**Major decisions**

Many of NATO’s summit meetings can be considered as milestones in the evolution of the Alliance. For instance, the first post-Cold War summit was held in London, 1990, and outlined proposals for developing relations with Central and Eastern European countries. A year later, in Rome, NATO Heads of State and Government published a new Strategic Concept that reflected the new security environment. This document was issued as a public document for the first time ever. At the same summit, NATO established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council – a forum that officially brought together NATO and partner countries from Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus.

The 1997 Madrid and Paris Summits invited the first countries of the former Warsaw Pact – Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – to join NATO, and established partnerships between NATO and Russia and Ukraine, while the 2002 Prague Summit saw major commitments to improving NATO’s capabilities and transformed the military command structure.

These are just a few of the many decisions that have been taken over the decades (a full summary of all NATO summit meetings can be found under “Previous summit meetings”).

**Implementation of summit decisions**

Typically, the decisions taken at a summit meeting are issued in declarations and communiqués. These are public documents that explain the Alliance’s decisions and reaffirm Allies’ support for aspects of NATO policies.

The decisions are then translated into action by the relevant actors, according to the area of competency and responsibility: the NAC’s subordinate committees and NATO’s command structure, which cover the whole range of NATO functions and activities.

**Timing and location**
Timing

Summits are convened upon approval by the NAC at the level of Permanent Representatives (or Ambassadors) or foreign and defence ministers. They are usually called on an ad hoc basis, as required by the evolving political and security situation.

From the founding of NATO until the end of the Cold War – over forty years – there were ten summit meetings. Since 1990, their frequency has increased considerably in order to address the changes brought on by the new security challenges. In total, twenty-four summit meetings have taken place between 1949 and 2011.

Location

NATO summit meetings are held in one of the member countries, including Belgium, at NATO HQ. Members volunteer to host a summit meeting and, after evaluating all offers, the NAC makes the final decision concerning the location.

In recent years, summit locations have held some thematic significance. For example, the Washington Summit of 1999 commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in that city. Istanbul – which hosted a summit meeting in 2004 – connects Europe and Asia and is where the Alliance launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. This initiative is intended to foster linkages between NATO and the broader Middle East.

• Previous summit meetings

The first time that Heads of State and Government from NATO countries met was at the actual signing ceremony of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949, but this was not a summit meeting. The first summit meeting was held six years later, in Paris in 1957, and subsequent summits occurred at key junctures in the history of the Alliance.

Paris, 16-19 December 1957

Reaffirmation of the principal purposes and unity of the Atlantic Alliance; Improvements in the coordination and organization of NATO forces and in political consultation arrangements; Recognition of the need for closer economic ties and for cooperation in the spirit of Article 2 of the Treaty, designed to eliminate conflict in international policies and encourage economic collaboration (Report of the Committee of the Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO, the so-called report of the Three Wise Men).

Brussels, 26 June 1974

Signature of the Declaration on Atlantic Relations adopted by NATO foreign ministers in Ottawa on 19 June, confirming the dedication of member countries of the Alliance to the aims and ideals of the
Treaty in the 25th anniversary of its signature; Consultations on East-West relations in preparation for US-USSR summit talks on strategic nuclear arms limitations.

**Brussels, 29-30 May 1975**

Affirmation of the fundamental importance of the Alliance and of Allied cohesion in the face of international economic pressures following the 1974 oil crisis; Support for successful conclusion of negotiations in the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (to result in 1975, in the signing of the Helsinki Final Act).

**London, 10-11 May 1977**

Initiation of study on long-term trends in East-West relations and of a long-term defence programme (LTDP) aimed at improving the defensive capability of NATO member countries.

**Washington D.C., 30-31 May 1978**

Review of interim results of long-term initiatives taken at the 1977 London Summit; Confirmation of the validity of the Alliance’s complementary aims of maintaining security while pursuing East-West détente; Adoption of 3% target for growth in defence expenditures.

**Bonn, 10 June 1982**

Accession of Spain; Adoption of the Bonn Declaration setting out a six-point Programme for Peace in Freedom; Publication of a statement of Alliance’s goals and policies on Arms Control and Disarmament and a statement on Integrated NATO Defence.

**Brussels, 21 November 1985**

Special meeting of the North Atlantic Council for consultations with President Reagan on the positive outcome of the US-USSR Geneva Summit on arms control and other areas of cooperation.

**Brussels, 2-3 March 1988**

Reaffirmation of the purpose and principles of the Alliance (reference to the Harmel Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance published in 1967) and of its objectives for East-West relations; Adoption of a blue print for strengthening stability in the whole of Europe through conventional arms control negotiations.

**Brussels, 29-30 May 1989**

Declaration commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Alliance setting out Alliance policies and security objectives for the 1990s aimed at maintaining Alliance defence, introducing new arms control initiatives, strengthening political consultation, improving East-West cooperation and
meeting global challenges; Adoption of a comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament.

**Brussels, 4 December 1989**

Against the background of fundamental changes in Central and Eastern Europe and the prospect of the end of the division of Europe, US President Bush consults with Alliance leaders following his summit meeting with President Gorbachev in Malta. While the NATO summit meeting is taking place, Warsaw Pact leaders denounce the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and repudiate the Brejnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty.

**London, 5-6 July 1990**

Publication of the London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, outlining proposals for developing cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe across a wide spectrum of political and military activities including the establishment of regular diplomatic liaison with NATO.

**Rome, 7-8 November 1991**

Publication of several key documents: the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept, of the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation and of statements on developments in the Soviet Union and the situation in Yugoslavia.

**Brussels, 10-11 January 1994**

Launching of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative; All North Atlantic Cooperation Council Partner countries and members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) are invited to participate; Publication of the Partnership for Peace Framework Document; Endorsement of the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) and other measures to develop the European Security and Defence Identity; Reaffirmation of Alliance readiness to carry out air strikes in support of UN objectives in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

**Paris, 27 May 1997**

Signing of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Founding Act states that NATO and Russia are no longer adversaries and establishes the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.

**Madrid, 8-9 July 1997**

Invitations to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks; Reaffirmation of NATO’s Open Door Policy; Recognition of achievement and commitments represented by the NATO
Russia—Founding Act; Signature of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine; First meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council at summit level that replaces the North Atlantic Cooperation Council; An enhanced Partnership for Peace; Updating of the 1991 Strategic Concept and adoption of a new defence posture; Reform of the NATO military command structure; Special Declaration on Bosnia and Herzegovina.

**Washington D.C., 23-24 April 1999**

Commemoration of NATO’s 50th Anniversary; Allies reiterate their determination to put an end to the repressive actions by President Milosevic against the local ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo; The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland participate in their first summit meeting; Adoption of the Membership Action Plan; Publication of a revised Strategic Concept; Enhancement of the European Security and Defence Identity within NATO; Launch of the Defence Capabilities Initiative; Strengthening of Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, as well as the Mediterranean Dialogue; Launch of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative.

**Rome, 28 May 2002**

NATO Allies and the Russian Federation create the NATO-Russia Council, where they meet as equal partners, bringing a new quality to NATO-Russia relations. The NATO-Russia Council replaces the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.

**Prague, 21-22 November 2002**

Invitation of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to begin accession talks; Reaffirmation of NATO’s Open Door Policy; Adoption of a series of measures to improve military capabilities (The Prague Capabilities Commitment, the NATO Response Force and the streamlining of the military command structure); Adoption of a Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism; Decision to support NATO member countries in Afghanistan; Endorsement of a package of initiatives to forge new relationships with partners.

**Istanbul, 28-29 June 2004**

Participation of seven new members to the event (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia); Expansion of NATO’s operation in Afghanistan by continuing the establishment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams throughout the country; Agreement to assist the Iraqi Interim Government with the training of its security forces; Maintaining support for stability in the Balkans; Decision to change NATO’s defence-planning and force-generation processes, while strengthening contributions to the fight against terrorism, including WMD aspects; Strengthening cooperation with partners and launch of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative with countries from the broader Middle East region.

**Brussels, 22 February 2005**
Leaders reaffirm their support for building stability in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq, and commit to strengthening the partnership between NATO and the European Union.

**Riga, 28-29 November 2006**

Review of progress in Afghanistan in light of the expansion of ISAF to the entire country and call for broader international engagement; Confirmation that the Alliance is prepared to play its part in implementing the security provisions of a settlement on the status of Kosovo; Measures adopted to further improve NATO’s military capabilities; NATO Response Force declared operational; Comprehensive Political Guidance published. Initiatives adopted to deepen and extend relations with partners; Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia invited to join Partnership for Peace.

**Bucharest, 2-4 April 2008**

At Bucharest, Allied leaders review the evolution of NATO’s main commitments: operations (Afghanistan and Kosovo); enlargement and the invitation of Albania and Croatia to start the accession process (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* will also be invited as soon as ongoing negotiations over its name have led to an agreement); the continued development of military capabilities to meet.

**Strasbourg/ Kehl, 3-4 April 2009**

Against the backdrop of NATO’s 60th anniversary, adoption of a Declaration on Alliance Security, calling for a new Strategic Concept; adherence to basic principles and shared values, as well as the need for ongoing transformation; in-depth discussion on Afghanistan, NATO’s key priority; welcoming of two new members: Albania and Croatia, and the pursuit of NATO’s open door policy (invitation extended to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* as soon as a solution to the issue surrounding the country’s name is reached); France’s decision to fully participate in NATO structures and the impact of this decision on the Alliance’s relations with the European Union; and NATO’s relations with Russia.

**Lisbon 19-20 November 2010**

Publication of a new Strategic Concept, “Active Engagement, Modern Defence”; gradual transition process to full Afghan security responsibility to start in 2011, backed by Allied agreement on a long-term partnership with Afghanistan; decision to develop a NATO missile defence system to protect populations and territory in Europe, in addition to deployed troops, against potential ballistic missile attacks, with Russia invited to cooperate as part of a broader “reset” of its relations with NATO; adoption of a comprehensive approach to crisis management, including a greater role in stabilization and reconstruction for the Alliance, together with greater emphasis on training and developing local forces; continue to support arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, and maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces; adoption of the Lisbon Capabilities Package that identifies critical capabilities needed to address emerging threats; agreement to develop a
NATO cyber defence policy and action plan for its implementation; streamlining of NATO’s military command structure as well as the consolidation and rationalization of NATO agencies; new impetus given to relations with partners and NATO’s partnership policy in the broad sense of the term.

- **Organizing and holding these events**

NATO summit meetings are centred on the activities of the NAC. As with all meetings of the NAC, the Secretary General chairs the meetings and plays an important role in coordination and deliberations, as well as acting as the principal spokesman of the Alliance.

As with meetings at the levels of Permanent Representatives and ministers, the work of the NAC is prepared by subordinate committees with responsibility for specific areas of policy. Much of this work involves the Deputies Committee, consisting of Deputy Permanent Representatives, sometimes "reinforced" by national experts. In such cases it is known as the SPC(R). This committee has particular responsibility for issuing declarations and communiqués, including those published after a summit.

Other aspects of political work may be handled by the Political and Partnerships Committee. Depending on the topic under discussion, the respective senior committee with responsibility for the subject assumes the lead role in preparing Council meetings and following up Council decisions.

Support to the Council is provided by the Secretary of the Council, who is also Director of the ministerial and summit meeting Task Forces. The Secretary of the Council ensures that NAC mandates are executed and its decisions recorded and circulated. A small Council Secretariat ensures the bureaucratic and logistical aspects of the Council’s work, while the relevant divisions of the International Staff support the work of committees reporting to the NAC.

- **Participation**

NATO summit meetings normally involve member countries only. However, on occasion, and provided Allies agree, meetings can be convened in other formats although there is no formal obligation to hold such assemblies.

They include, for instance, meetings of defence or foreign ministers, Heads of State and Government of countries belonging to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Russia Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission or the NATO-Georgia Commission. They can also include leaders from ISAF troop-contributing countries, as was the case at the Lisbon Summit. External stakeholders can also be involved: for instance, top representatives from international organizations such as the UN, the EU Commission or the World Bank.
Member countries

At present, NATO has 28 members. Albania and Croatia are the countries that joined the Alliance most recently, in April 2009.

In 1949, there were 12 founding members of the Alliance. Provision for enlargement is given by Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that membership is open to any "European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area".

Alphabetical list of NATO member countries

- Albania
- Belgium
- Bulgaria
- Canada
- Croatia
- Czech Republic
- Denmark
- Estonia
- France
- Germany
- Greece
- Hungary
- Iceland
- Italy
- Latvia
- Lithuania
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
- Norway
- Poland
- Portugal
- Romania
- Slovakia
- Slovenia
- Spain
- Turkey
- United Kingdom
About member countries and their accession

The founding members

On 4 April 1949, the foreign ministers from 12 countries signed the North Atlantic Treaty at the Departmental Auditorium in Washington D.C.: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Within the following five months of the signing ceremony, the Treaty was ratified by the parliaments of the interested countries, sealing their membership.

The 12 signatories

Some of the foreign ministers who signed the Treaty were heavily involved in NATO’s work at a later stage in their careers:

- Belgium: M. Paul-Henri Spaak (NATO Secretary General, 1957-1961);
- Canada: Mr. Lester B. Pearson (negotiated the Treaty and was one of the “Three Wise Men” who drafted the report on non-military cooperation in NATO, published in 1956 in the wake of the Suez crisis);
- Denmark: Mr. Gustav Rasmussen;
- France: M. Robert Schuman (architect of the European institutions, who also initiated the idea of a European Defence Community);
- Iceland: Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson;
- Italy: Count Carlo Sforza;
- Luxembourg: M. Joseph Bech;
- the Netherlands: Dr. D.U. Stikker (NATO Secretary General, 1961-1964);
- Norway: Mr. Halvard M. Lange (one of the “Three Wise Men” who drafted the report on non-military cooperation in NATO);
- Portugal: Dr. Jose Caerio da Matta;
- the United Kingdom: Mr. Ernest Bevin (main drive behind the creation of NATO and as Foreign Secretary from 1945 to 1951, he attended the first formative meetings of the North Atlantic Council);
- the United States: Mr. Dean Acheson (as US Secretary of State from 1949 to 1953, he attended and chaired meetings of the North Atlantic Council).

Flexibility of NATO membership

On signing the Treaty, countries voluntarily commit themselves to participating in the political consultations and military activities of the Organization. Although each and every signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty is subject to the obligations of the Treaty, there remains a certain degree of flexibility which allows members to choose how they participate. The memberships of Iceland and France, for instance, illustrate this point.

- Iceland
When Iceland signed the Treaty in 1949, it did not have – and still does not have – armed forces. There is no legal impediment to forming them, but Iceland has chosen not to have any. However, Iceland has a Coast Guard, national police forces, an air defence system and a voluntary expeditionary peacekeeping force. Since 1951, Iceland also benefits from a long-standing bilateral defence agreement with the United States. In 2006, US forces were withdrawn but the defence agreement remains valid. Since 2008, air policing has been conducted on a periodic basis by NATO Allies.

Today, Iceland with its population of 320 000 is represented on all of NATO’s principal committees; it pays toward NATO’s military budget, civilian budget and the NATO Security and Investment Programme. Since 2006, it has also assumed the responsibility of a host and user nation to NATO infrastructure based in Iceland. Iceland also contributes civilian peacekeepers to NATO-led operations. It regularly hosts NATO exercises and events, and is taking a more active role in NATO deliberations and planning.

- **France**

In 1966, President Charles De Gaulle decided to withdraw France from NATO’s integrated military structure. This reflected the desire for greater military independence, particularly vis-à-vis the United States, and the refusal to integrate France’s nuclear deterrent or accept any form of control over its armed forces.

In practical terms, while France still fully participated in the political instances of the Organization, it was no longer represented on certain committees, for instance, the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group. This decision also led to the removal of French forces from NATO commands and foreign forces from French territory. The stationing of foreign weapons, including nuclear weapons, was also banned. NATO’s political headquarters (based in Paris since 1952), as well as the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe or SHAPE (in Rocquencourt since 1951) moved to Belgium.

Despite France’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military structure, two technical agreements were signed with the Alliance, setting out procedures in the event of soviet aggression. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, France has regularly contributed troops to NATO’s military operations, making it one of the largest troop-contributing states. It is also NATO’s fourth biggest contributor to the military budget.

From the early 1990s onwards, France distanced itself from the 1966 decision with, for instance, its participation at the meetings of defence ministers from 1994 (Seville) onwards and the presence of French officers in ACO and ACT structures from 2003. At NATO’s Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, April 2009, France officially announced its decision to fully participate in NATO structures.

**The accession of Greece and Turkey**

Three years after the signing of the Washington Treaty, on 18 February 1952, Greece and Turkey joined NATO. This enabled NATO to reinforce its "southern flank".

At a time when there was a fear of communist expansion throughout Europe and other parts of the world (soviet support of the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950), extending security to south-eastern Europe was strategically important. Not only did NATO membership curb communist influence in Greece – a country recovering from civil war - but it also relieved Turkey from soviet pressure for access to key strategic maritime routes.

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1 However, France has chosen not to become a member of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group
The accession of Germany

Germany became a NATO member on 6 May 1955. This was the result of several years of deliberations among western leaders and Germany, whose population opposed any form of rearmament.

Following the end of the Second World War, ways of integrating Germany into West European defence structures was a priority. When the European Defence Community failed, Germany joined the Western Union, which became the Western European Union as soon as it had adhered to the organization. This, together with the termination of its status as an occupied country, was a stepping stone to becoming a member of NATO.

The Federal Republic of Germany officially joined the Western Union on 23 October 1954 and its status as an occupied country came to an end when the Bonn-Paris conventions came into effect on 5 May 1955. The next day, it became NATO’s 15th member country.

With the reunification of Germany on 3 October 1990, the länder of the former German Democratic Republic joined the Federal Republic of Germany in its membership of NATO.

The accession of Spain

Despite considerable public opposition, Spain joined the Alliance on 30 May 1982, but refrained from participating in the integrated military structure. This position was reaffirmed in a referendum held in 1986.

Spain fully participated in the political instances of the Organization. With regard to the military aspects, it was present as an observer on the Nuclear Planning Group; reserved its position on participation in the integrated communication system; maintained Spanish forces under Spanish command and did not accept to have troops deployed outside of Spain for long periods of time. Nevertheless, Spanish forces would still be able to operate with other NATO forces in an emergency.

Spain’s reservations gradually diminished and at the nomination of Dr Javier Solana as NATO’s first Spanish Secretary General (1995-1999), the Spanish Parliament endorsed the country’s participation in the integrated military command structure (1996).

The first wave of post-Cold War enlargement

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact after the end of the Cold War opened up the possibility of further NATO enlargement. Some of the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe were eager to become integrated into Euro-Atlantic institutions.

In 1995, the Alliance carried out and published the results of a Study on NATO Enlargement that considered the merits of admitting new members and how they should be brought in. It concluded
that the end of the Cold War provided a unique opportunity to build improved security in the entire Euro-Atlantic area and that NATO enlargement would contribute to enhanced stability and security for all.

The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were invited to begin accession talks at the Alliance’s Madrid Summit in 1997 and on 12 March 1999 they became the first former members of the Warsaw Pact to join NATO.

Drawing heavily on the experience gained during this accession process, NATO launched the Membership Action Plan - or MAP - at the Washington Summit in April 1999. The MAP was established to help countries aspiring to NATO membership in their preparations, even if it did not pre-judge any decisions.

The second wave of post-Cold War enlargement

Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia and Slovenia were invited to begin accession talks at the Alliance’s Prague Summit in 2002. On 29 March 2004, they officially became members of the Alliance, making this the largest wave of enlargement in NATO history.

All seven countries had participated in the MAP before acceding to NATO.

The accession of Albania and Croatia

The most recent accessions are those of Albania and Croatia. Albania had participated in MAP since its inception in 1999 and Croatia joined in 2002. They worked with NATO in a wide range of areas, with particular emphasis on defence and security sector reform, as well as support for wider democratic and institutional reform.

In July 2008, they both signed Accession Protocols and became official members of the Alliance on 1 April 2009.

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Partners

NATO cooperates with a range of international organizations and countries in different structures. Below is a list of these partners with links to their information servers.

**Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)**

The EAPC consists of all NATO Member countries and the following partner countries:
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Finland
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Georgia
Ireland
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Malta
The Republic of Moldova
Montenegro
Russia
Serbia
Sweden
Switzerland
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan

**NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue**

The following seven countries of the Mediterranean region are currently involved:

- Algeria
- Egypt
- Israel
- Jordan
- Mauritania
- Morocco
- Tunisia

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2 Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)

To date, the following four countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council have joined:

- Bahrain
- Qatar
- Kuwait
- United Arab Emirates

Partners across the globe

In addition to its formal partnerships, NATO cooperates with a range of countries which are not part of these structures. Often referred to as “Partners across the globe”, these countries develop cooperation with NATO in areas of mutual interest, including emerging security challenges, and some contribute actively to NATO operations either militarily or in some other way.

- Afghanistan
- Australia
- Iraq
- Japan
- Pakistan
- Republic of Korea
- New Zealand
- Mongolia

International organizations

In addition to its partnerships with countries, NATO cooperates with a range of international organizations.

- European Union (EU) - http://europa.eu

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Afghanistan – through transition and beyond

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At Chicago, leaders will map out how NATO intends to complete the transition process by end-2014. They will also agree on how NATO will provide training, advice and assistance to the ANSF, and will demonstrate their commitment to sustaining the ANSF beyond 2014, as part of the Afghan government’s and the broader international community’s efforts.

NATO’s role in Afghanistan

NATO’s primary objective in Afghanistan is to enable the Afghan authorities to provide effective security across the country in order to ensure Afghanistan can never again be a safe haven for terrorists. To achieve this goal, the 50 nations that make up the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) conduct security operations and train and develop the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

NATO is in Afghanistan at the express wish of the democratically elected government of Afghanistan and is widely supported by the Afghan population. The Bonn Agreement of 5 December 2001 requested the United Nations to authorise the development of a security force to assist in maintaining security in Kabul and its surrounding areas. On 20 December 2001, the UN Security Council approved the first resolution 1386 authorizing the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
The conduct of operations in Afghanistan has also led to the development of a series of initiatives, programmes and agreements not carried out exclusively by NATO member nations but often done in cooperation with a number of Partner countries, aimed at supporting the troops on the ground and furthering relations with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

At the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010, NATO and Afghanistan reaffirmed their long-term ties with the signing of a Declaration on Enduring Partnership. The document, which marks NATO’s continued commitment to Afghanistan, provides a political framework for future enhanced cooperation, particularly in the field of Afghan National Security Forces capacity-building and Security Sector Reform.

**NATO-ISAF Mission in Afghanistan**

NATO-ISAF aims to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a haven for terrorists, to help provide security, and to contribute to a better future for the Afghan people. NATO-ISAF, as part of the overall international community effort and as mandated by the United Nations Security Council, is working to create the conditions whereby the government of Afghanistan is able to exercise its authority throughout the country.

**NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan**

Established on 21 November 2009, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) brings together national training efforts under one signle umbrella. It works in close partnership with the Afghan Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior, as well as in collaboration with the European Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) and the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF).

NTMA’s key tasks include the provision of training and mentoring to the Afghan national security forces, support the ANA’s institutional training base, and the ANP reform at the district level and below. It also aims at addressing the ANA enabling capability shortfalls (including close air support, medevac, intelligence) through ‘train the trainer’-modeled programmes.

The launch of NTM-A was made hand in hand with the establishment of the ISAF’s Joint Command (IJC), which is focused on operations. Whilst NTM-A focuses on training the initial recruits and building the institutional training capability of the Afghan national security forces, development of the Afghan army and police continues in the field. The IJC is responsible for developing fielded ANSF units through advising and assisting.

There are now 38 nations contributing to NTM-A.

**NATO-Russia Cooperation**

NATO and Russia share common objectives in stabilizing Afghanistan and the broader region.
Counter-Narcotics Training

Since December 2005, the NRC has been running a project to train counter-narcotics personnel from Afghanistan, Pakistan and other Central Asian countries. The project aims to bolster the capacity of national authorities to fight the trade in narcotics originating in Afghanistan. At the NRC Summit in Lisbon in November 2010, NRC members agreed to expand the scope of the project to consider further cooperation in the counter-narcotics field. As of April 2012, the project had trained 2,000 officers from the seven participating nations.

Domodedovo Counter-Narcotics Training Center. At the Lisbon Summit, the NATO-Russia Council agreed to the establishment of a second training center in St Petersburg.

NATO-Russia Council (NRC) Helicopter Trust Fund

In 2011, the NRC agreed to launch a Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund, which provides vitally-needed maintenance and repair capacity, including the provision of spare parts and technician training, to the Afghan Air Force (AAF) helicopter fleet. The goal of the programme is to bolster the capabilities of the Afghan Air Force to operate its fleet of Russian-made helicopters more effectively. A first group of technicians started their training in Russia on 1 April 2012. Some 30 personnel are expected to receive training under the project.

Transit agreement

Since 2008, Russia has facilitated the transit of non-military equipment for ISAF contributors across Russian territory in support of the ISAF mission. The current arrangement allows cargoes to travel by rail both to and from Afghanistan.

NATO-Russia transit arrangements for non-lethal goods proved critical to the development of the northern supply route to Afghanistan, thereby linking rail transportation between the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Initially set for non-lethal equipment originating from NATO member states, the arrangement was extended to the non-NATO Troop Contributing Nations, including reverse transit, at the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010.

NATO Afghan First Policy

Approved by NATO Foreign Ministers in Tallinn on 22-23 April 2010, the NATO-Afghan First policy aims at facilitating procurement of local goods and services through simplified bidding and contracting procedures in Afghanistan.

In line with the NATO-Afghan First Policy, in September 2010, General David Petraeus (then the Commander of ISAF), issued a Counter-Insurgency Contracting Guidance aimed at maximising Afghan economic dividend through increased contracting opportunities with Afghan local businesses.
Building Integrity

Developing capacity in the defence and security sector through education and training are key to fighting corruption and improving governance. Capacity building contributes to the sustainability of the ANSF and thereby provides positive conditions for economic and social development and increasing stability.

The Building Integrity programme seeks to raise awareness, promote good practice and provide practical tools to help nations enhance integrity and reduce risks of corruption in the security sector by strengthening transparency and accountability.

Within the framework of the Enduring Partnership, NATO is working with the Afghan authorities to develop integrity, transparency and accountability and promote good practice in the management of financial (budgets, procurement and auditing) and human resources in the Afghan Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior.

SILK-Afghanistan

Named after the Great Silk Road trading route linking Asia and Europe, the SILK-Afghanistan project provides affordable, high-speed Internet access via satellite and fiber optics to Afghan universities and other governmental institutions in Kabul. The project has been operational at Kabul University in Afghanistan since 2006.

Today, the Government Media and Information Centre in Kabul, as well as the vast majority of university students and lecturers from 18 universities in Baghlan, Balkh, Bamiyan, Faryab, Ghazni, Helmand, Herat, Jawzjan, Kabul (four universities), Kandahar, Khost, Kunduz, Nangarhar, Paktia and Parwan provinces are connected to the information highway through the SILK-Afghanistan Programme. The Programme is jointly funded by NATO and the US Department of State and provides, in addition to connectivity, extra funding to build IT infrastructure at the universities and to train their IT staff.

Professional Military Education

Since 2009, NATO's Professional Military Education (PME) programme for Afghanistan has been delivering education to the Afghan National Army (ANA) officer corps, with the main aim of developing the teaching branch of the ANA Training and Education Commands. The PME programme also supports the faculty of the newly established Afghan National Security University, which will host all ANA education institutions and some of its training organisations.

In coordination with the NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan (NTM-A), the PME programme facilitates Afghan access to NATO's education institutions and organises seminars and conferences on specific topics of interest for the ANA. These seminars and conferences are usually conducted by the programme's network of academic experts from NATO countries.
NATO and Afghanistan: through transition and beyond

NATO’s primary objective in Afghanistan is to enable the Afghan authorities to provide effective security across the country in order to ensure Afghanistan can never again be a safe haven for terrorists. To achieve this goal, the 50 nations that make up the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) conduct security operations and train and develop the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

NATO and the Afghan Government have a clear road map to achieve this objective through the Transition process, or Inteqal in Dari and Pashtu. Transition is the process by which security responsibility for Afghanistan is gradually transitioned from ISAF to Afghan leadership. Implementation is well underway with Afghan forces in the leading for security for around 50% of the Afghan population. The aim is for the Afghan Security Forces to have full responsibility for security across the country by 2014, in line with the target set at the NATO summit in Lisbon in 2010.

As the Afghan National Army and Police grow in size and strength they are taking an ever-increasing lead in the conduct of security operations across Afghanistan. This enables the NATO-ISAF mission to evolve from leading combat operations to providing training, advice and assistance to the ANSF. How NATO Allies and ISAF partners will pursue this effort until 2014 and beyond will be at the core of discussions at the NATO summit in Chicago.

Developing professional, capable and self-sustaining Afghan National Security Forces is at the centre of the NATO-ISAF effort and the core mission of the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A). This not only enables implementation of the Transition process until 2014, but will guide NATO’s long-term commitment to Afghanistan over the long term. At the NATO Chicago Summit in May 2012, Heads of State and Government will consider how best to provide continued support to the Afghan Security Forces after transition is complete. This will include an agreement on how the
Afghan Government, the ISAF nations and the broader international community together can fund sufficient and financially sustainable Afghan forces in the future.

NATO’s commitment to Afghanistan stands firm and will remain beyond transition. At Lisbon, NATO and the Government of Afghanistan signed the Enduring Partnership Declaration. At Chicago, NATO Allies, along with ISAF partners, will continue to build on their long-term engagement to Afghanistan and decide how to take forward their mission post-2014, after NATO-led combat operations have ended, and continue to provide the Afghan national security forces with the necessary training, advising and assistance that they need to fulfil their duties.

Inteqal: Transition to Afghan lead

Inteqal – the Dari and Pashtu word for transition – is the process by which security responsibility for Afghanistan is gradually transitioned from the NATO/ISAF to Afghan leadership. Implementation is well underway, with Afghan forces in the leading for security for around 50% of the Afghan population. The aim is for the Afghan security forces to have full responsibility for security across the country by 2014, in line with the target set at the 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon.

- Download the May 2012 version of this backgrounder (PDF/2.24Mb)

- Transition Tranches

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Transition Tranche 1

On 22 March 2011, President Karzai announced the first set of Afghan provinces and districts to start transition. This decision was based upon operational, political and economic considerations, drawing on the assessment and recommendations of the Afghan government and NATO/ISAF through the Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board (JANIB).
Transition Tranche 2

On 27 November 2011, following the decision-making process above, President Karzai announced the second set of Afghan provinces, districts and cities for transition implementation.

Transition Tranche 3

On 13 May 2012, President Karzai announced the third set of areas to enter the transition process, covering over 75% of the Afghan population. Once this decision is implemented, transition will have begun in every one of the 34 provinces of Afghanistan, including every provincial capital, and will cover almost two-thirds of the country’s districts.

Transition Process explained
Transition draws on the JANIB’s recommendations, which are based on a thorough assessment of the security, governance and development situation on the ground.

The following elements are taken into consideration as part of the decision-making process:

- the capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to shoulder additional security tasks with less assistance from ISAF;
- the level of security allowing the population to pursue routine daily activities;
- the degree of development of local governance, so that security will not be undermined as ISAF assistance is reduced; and
- whether ISAF is postured properly to thin out as ANSF capabilities increase and threat levels diminish.

For Transition to be successful, the Afghan National Security Forces, under effective Afghan civilian control, need to assume their security responsibility on a sustainable and irreversible basis – albeit with some level of continued support from ISAF.

The Transition implementation can take up to 18 months for each area, depending on conditions on the ground.

**ISAF Principles for Transition**

At the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010, ISAF Heads of State and Government agreed a list of principles which guide ISAF’s gradual shift from a combat to an increasingly supporting role.

These principles, which have since been fully incorporated in the Transition implementation process, include:

- ensuring a better alignment of NATO/ISAF assistance with Afghan national priority programmes;
- working through increasingly capable Afghan institutions;
- adjusting ISAF’s troop profile and configuration by reinvesting some of the Transition dividend, where appropriate, to meet critical security, training and mentoring needs;
- further strengthening Afghan National Security Forces capacity; and
- supporting the evolution of the international civilian effort, including that of the ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), to enable greater Afghan capacity and leadership.

**Evolution of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)**

In June 2011, Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) nations agreed a set of principles for the evolution and ultimate dissolution of their PRTs. Many PRTs are already evolving, shifting their efforts from direct delivery to providing technical assistance and building the capacity of provincial and district governments to provide essential services to the Afghan people. By the time transition is completed, all PRTs will have handed over their functions to the Afghan government, traditional
development actors, non-governmental organisations and the private sector, and will have phased out.

- **Key Dates**

  28 August 2008  Lead security responsibility for Kabul city transferred to Afghan forces.

  19 November 2009  President Karzai, having won a second presidential term, expresses his ambition to see the Afghan National Security Forces take the lead security responsibility across Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

  20 July 2010  Kabul Conference; the Joint Afghan-NATO *Inteqal* Board (JANIB) is established as the mechanism to assess districts and provinces for Transition.

  20 November 2010  NATO Lisbon Summit; the *Inteqal* process is agreed between the Afghan government and NATO.

  22 March 2011  Afghan New Year; President Karzai announces the first set of Afghan provinces and districts to start the transition process.

  17 July 2011  First transition ceremony takes place in Bamyan province.

  27 November 2011  President Karzai announces the second set of Afghan provinces, districts and cities to start the transition process.

  13 May 2012  President Karzai announces the third tranche of Transition.

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**ISAF's Mission in Afghanistan**

[Image of soldiers and civilians]
NATO-ISAF aims to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a haven for terrorists, to help provide security, and to contribute to a better future for the Afghan people. NATO-ISAF, as part of the overall international community effort and as mandated by the United Nations Security Council, is working to create the conditions whereby the government of Afghanistan is able to exercise its authority throughout the country.

- ISAF mandate

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been deployed since 2001 under the authority of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which authorised the establishment of the force to assist the Afghan government in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas – in particular to enable the Afghan authorities as well as UN personnel to operate in a secure environment.

At that time, the operation was limited to the Kabul area, and its command was assumed by ISAF nations on a rotational basis.

In August 2003, upon request of the UN and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, NATO took command of ISAF. Soon after, the UN mandated ISAF’s gradual expansion outside of Kabul.

While not technically a UN force, ISAF has a peace-enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Fourteen UN Security Council Resolutions relate to ISAF, namely: 1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 1707, 1776, 1833, 1817, 1890, 1917, 1943 and 2011 (12 October 2011).

A detailed Military Technical Agreement agreed between the ISAF Commander and the Afghan Transitional Authority in January 2002 provides additional guidance for ISAF operations.

- ISAF’s priorities

To carry out its mission, ISAF conducts population-centric counterinsurgency operations in partnership with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and provides support to the government and international community in security sector reform, including mentoring, training and operational support to the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). The intention of this counterinsurgency strategy is to isolate extremists by building relationships with the Afghan people and the government.

ISAF’s campaign aims at:

- Protecting the population from violence, coercion, intimidation and predatory groups.
- Neutralising insurgents networks and degrade their capability to a level that the Afghan national security forces can manage, and to deny sanctuary in Afghanistan to the extremists.
Building a professional, independent and sustainable Afghan National Army and Police, so that they are able to provide security and law enforcement to the Afghan people throughout the country.

Promoting effective governance: helping the Afghan Government to become inclusive, accountable and acceptable to the people.

**NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan**

Established on 21 November 2009, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) brings together national training efforts under one signle umbrella. It works in close partnership with the Afghan Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior, as well as in collaboration with the European Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) and the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF).

NTMA’s key tasks include the provision of training and mentoring to the Afghan national security forces, support the ANA’s institutional training base, and the ANP reform at the district level and below. It also aims at addressing the ANA enabling capability shortfalls (including close air support, medevac, intelligence) through ‘train the trainer’-modeled programmes.

The launch of NTM-A was made hand in hand with the establishment of the ISAF's Joint Command (IJC), which is focused on operations. Whilst NTM-A focuses on training the initial recruits and building the institutional training capability of the Afghan national security forces, development of the Afghan army and police continues in the field. The IJC is responsible for developing fielded ANSF units through advising and assisting.

There are now 38 nations contributing to NTM-A.

**ISAF Mission Evolution**

Transition to Afghan security lead is well underway and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is growing stronger and more capable. As a result, ISAF’s mission is evolving in nature and scope.

Since the beginning of transition implementation in July 2011, ISAF’s mission has been gradually evolving from one focussed primarily on combat to an enabling Security Force Assistance (SFA) role, which centres on training, advising and assisting its Afghan partners.

The aim of this evolution is to ensure that ISAF continues to support the development of ANSF operational effectiveness so that they are able to fully assume their security responsibilities by the completion of transition at the end of 2014. As ANSF progress towards that goal, the ISAF forces can gradually thin out.

At the Chicago Summit, ISAF leaders will map out the practical details of ISAF mission evolution from 2012 until the end of 2014.
The 2013 milestone will mark the moment when the last tranche of transition will be announced and Afghan national security forces will assume lead security responsibility across the whole country. At that time, ISAF forces will have moved primarily to a supporting role. This will be a critical step in the transition towards full Afghan security responsibility by end-2014.

After this date, Afghan national security forces will assume full security responsibility for their country and ISAF’s mission in Afghanistan will cease. However, NATO will continue to train, assist and advise the Afghan national security forces after 2014, and ensure that the trainers have the resources needed to fulfil their mission. Details of the new NATO mission profile post-2014 will be further defined at the Chicago Summit.

• History of ISAF

Origin of ISAF

ISAF was created in accordance with the Bonn Conference in December 2001. Afghan opposition leaders attending the conference began the process of reconstructing their country by setting up a new government structure, namely the Afghan Transitional Authority. The concept of a UN-mandated international force to assist the newly established Afghan Transitional Authority was also launched at this occasion to create a secure environment in and around Kabul and support the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

These agreements paved the way for the creation of a three-way partnership between the Afghan Transitional Authority, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and ISAF.

NATO takes on ISAF command

On 11 August 2003 NATO assumed leadership of the ISAF operation, turning the six-month national rotations to an end. The Alliance became responsible for the command, coordination and planning of the force, including the provision of a force commander and headquarters on the ground in Afghanistan.

This new leadership overcame the problem of a continual search to find new nations to lead the mission and the difficulties of setting up a new headquarters every six months in a complex environment. A continuing NATO headquarters also enables small countries, less likely to take over leadership responsibility, to play a strong role within a multinational headquarters.

Expansion of ISAF’s presence in Afghanistan

ISAF’s mandate was initially limited to providing security in and around Kabul. In October 2003, the United Nations extended ISAF’s mandate to cover the whole of Afghanistan (UNSCR 1510), paving the way for an expansion of the mission across the country.
Stage 1: to the north

In December 2003, the North Atlantic Council authorised the Supreme Allied Commander, General James Jones, to initiate the expansion of ISAF by taking over command of the German-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kunduz. The other eight PRTs operating in Afghanistan in 2003 remained under the command of Operation Enduring Freedom, the continuing US-led military operation in Afghanistan.

On 31 December 2003, the military component of the Kunduz PRT was placed under ISAF command as a pilot project and first step in the expansion of the mission.

Six months later, on 28 June 2004, at the Summit meeting of the NATO Heads of State and Government in Istanbul, NATO announced that it would establish four other provincial reconstruction teams in the north of the country: in Mazar-e-Sharif, Meymana, Feyzabad and Baghlan.

This process was completed on 1 October 2004, marking the completion of the first phase of ISAF’s expansion. ISAF’s area of operations then covered some 3,600 square kilometres in the north and the mission was able to influence security in nine Northern provinces of the country.

Stage 2: to the west

On 10 February 2005, NATO announced that ISAF would be further expanded, into the west of Afghanistan.

This process began on 31 May 2006, when ISAF took on command of two additional PRTs, in the provinces of Herat and Farah and of a Forward Support Base (a logistic base) in Herat.

At the beginning of September, two further ISAF-led PRTs in the west became operational, one in Chaghcharan, capital of Ghor province, and one in Qala-e-Naw, capital of Badghis province, completing ISAF’s expansion into the west.

The extended ISAF mission led a total of nine PRTs, in the north and the west, providing security assistance in 50% of Afghanistan’s territory. The Alliance continued to make preparations to further expand ISAF, to the south of the country.

In September 2005, the Alliance also temporarily deployed 2,000 additional troops to Afghanistan to support the 18 September provincial and parliamentary elections.

Stage 3: to the south

On 8 December 2005, meeting at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, the Allied Foreign Ministers endorsed a plan that paved the way for an expanded ISAF role and presence in Afghanistan.
The first element of this plan was the expansion of ISAF to the south in 2006, also known as Stage 3.

This was implemented on 31 July 2006, when ISAF assumed command of the southern region of Afghanistan from US-led Coalition forces, expanding its area of operations to cover an additional six provinces – Daikundi, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Uruzgan and Zabul – and taking on command of four additional PRTs.

The expanded ISAF led a total of 13 PRTs in the north, west and south, covering some three-quarters of Afghanistan’s territory.

The number of ISAF forces in the country also increased significantly, from about 10,000 prior to the expansion to about 20,000 after.

Stage 4: ISAF expands to the east, takes responsibility for entire country

On 5 October 2006, ISAF implemented the final stage of its expansion, by taking on command of the international military forces in eastern Afghanistan from the US-led Coalition.

In addition to expanding the Alliance’s area of operations, the revised operational plan also paved the way for a greater ISAF role in the country. This includes the deployment of ISAF OMLTs to Afghan National Army units at various levels of command.

Other operational priorities

NATO is also engaged in other operations and missions, all of which are explained below.

- NATO operations and missions
- NATO’s role in Kosovo
- Counter-piracy operations
- Operation Active Endeavour
- NATO assistance to the African Union
- Commitments to operations and missions
- Troop contributions
NATO operations and missions

NATO is an active and leading contributor to peace and security on the international stage. Through its crisis management operations, the Alliance demonstrates both its willingness to act as a positive force for change and its capacity to meet the security challenges of the 21st century.

Since its first major peace-support operation in the Balkans in the early 1990s, the tempo and diversity of NATO operations have increased. NATO has been engaged in missions that cover the full spectrum of crisis management operations – from combat and peacekeeping, to training and logistics support, to surveillance and humanitarian relief. Today, 138,000 military personnel are engaged in NATO missions around the world, successfully managing complex ground, air and naval operations in all types of environment. These forces are currently operating in Afghanistan, Kosovo, the Mediterranean, off the Horn of Africa and in Somalia.

• Current operations and missions

NATO in Afghanistan

Afghanistan constitutes the Alliance’s most significant operational commitment to date. Established by UN mandate in 2001, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been under NATO leadership since August 2003.

ISAF comprises approximately 129,000 troops from 50 different countries deployed throughout Afghanistan. Its mission is to extend the authority of the Afghan central government in order to create an environment conducive to the functioning of democratic institutions and the establishment of the rule of law. It also aims to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a safe haven for terrorists.
A major component of this mission is the establishment of professional Afghan National Security Forces that, step by step, will enable Afghans to assume responsibility for the security of their country. Much progress has already been made. From a non-existent force in 2003, the Afghan army currently comprises approximately 195,000 soldiers, and has begun taking the lead in most operations; and the Afghan police comprises approximately 150,000 officers.

In addition to conducting security operations and building up the Afghan army and police, ISAF is also directly involved in facilitating the development and reconstruction of Afghanistan through 28 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) which are engaged in identifying reconstruction needs and supporting humanitarian assistance activities throughout the country.

**NATO in Kosovo**

While Afghanistan remains NATO’s primary operational theatre, the Alliance has not faltered on its other commitments, particularly in the Balkans. Today, approximately 5,500 Allied troops operate in the Balkans as part of NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR).

Having first entered Kosovo in June 1999 to end widespread violence and halt the humanitarian disaster, KFOR troops continue to maintain a strong presence throughout the territory, preserving the peace that was imposed by NATO nearly a decade earlier.

Following Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008, NATO agreed it would continue to maintain its presence on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1244. In June 2008, the Alliance decided to take on responsibility for supervising the dissolution of the Kosovo Protection Corps and to help create a professional and multiethnic Kosovo Security Force.

**Monitoring the Mediterranean Sea**

NATO operations are not limited only to zones of conflict. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, NATO immediately began to take measures to expand the options available to counter the threat of international terrorism. With the launching of the maritime surveillance operation *Active Endeavour* in October 2001, NATO added a new dimension to the global fight against terrorism.

Led by NATO naval forces, *Operation Active Endeavour* is focused on detecting and deterring terrorist activity in the Mediterranean.

Since April 2003, NATO has been systematically boarding suspect ships. These boardings take place with the compliance of the ships’ masters and flag states in accordance with international law.

The increased NATO presence in these waters has benefited all shipping traveling through the Straits of Gibraltar by improving perceptions of security. More generally, the operation has proved
to be an effective tool both in safeguarding a strategic maritime region and in countering terrorism on and from the high seas. Additionally, the experience and partnerships developed through Operation Active Endeavour have considerably enhanced NATO’s capabilities in this increasingly vital aspect of operations.

**Counter-piracy off the Horn of Africa**

Building on previous counter-piracy missions conducted by NATO (Operation Allied Provider and Operation Allied Protector - see below), Operation Ocean Shield is focusing on at-sea counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa. Approved on 17 August 2009 by the North Atlantic Council, this operation is contributing to international efforts to combat piracy in the area. It is also offering, to regional states that request it, assistance in developing their own capacity to combat piracy activities.

**Supporting the African Union**

Well beyond the Euro-Atlantic region, the Alliance continues to support the African Union (AU) in its peacekeeping missions on the African continent.

Since June 2007, NATO has assisted the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by providing airlift support for AU peacekeepers. Following renewed AU requests, the North Atlantic Council has agreed to extend its support by periods of six months and has done this on several occasions. NATO also continues to work with the AU in identifying further areas where NATO could support the African Standby Force.

**Terminated operations and missions**

**NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

With the break-up of Yugoslavia, violent conflict started in Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1992. The Alliance responded as early as summer 1992 when it enforced the UN arms embargo on weapons in the Adriatic Sea (in cooperation with the WEU from 1993) and enforced a no-fly-zone declared by the UN Security Council. It was during the monitoring of the no-fly-zone that NATO engaged in the first combat operations in its history by shooting down four Bosnian Serb fighter-bombers conducting a bombing mission on 28 February 1994.

In August 1995, to compel an end to Serb-led violence in the country, UN peacekeepers requested NATO airstrikes. Operation Deadeye began on 30 August against Bosnian Serb air forces, but failed to result in Bosnian Serb compliance with the UN’s demands to withdraw. This led to Operation Deliberate Force, which targeted Bosnian Serb command and control installations and ammunition facilities. This NATO air campaign was a key factor in bringing the Serbs to the negotiating table and ending the war in Bosnia.
With the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord in December 1995, NATO immediately deployed a UN-mandated Implementation Force (IFOR) comprising some 60,000 troops. This operation (Operation Joint Endeavour) was followed in December 1996 by the deployment of a 32,000-strong Stabilization Force (SFOR).

In light of the improved security situation, NATO brought its peace support operation to a conclusion in December 2004 and the European Union deployed a new force called Operation Althea. The Alliance has maintained a military headquarters in the country to carry out a number of specific tasks related, in particular, to assisting the government in reforming its defence structures.

**NATO in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia***

Responding to a request from the Macedonian government to help mitigate raising ethnic tension, NATO implemented three successive operations there from August 2001 to March 2003.

First, Operation Essential Harvest disarmed ethnic Albanian groups operating on Macedonia’s territory.

The follow-on Operation Amber Fox provided protection for international monitors overseeing the implementation of the peace plan.

Finally, Operation Allied Harmony was launched in December 2002 to provide advisory elements to assist the government in ensuring stability throughout Macedonian territory.

These operations in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia demonstrated the strong inter-institutional cooperation between NATO, the EU and the OSCE. NATO remains committed to helping the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures. To that end, NATO HQ Skopje was created in April 2002 to advise on military aspects of security sector reform; it still operates today.

**NATO’s first counter-terrorism operation**

On 4 October 2001, once it had been determined that the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. had come from abroad, NATO agreed on a package of eight measures to support the United States. On the request of the US, it launched its first ever counter-terrorism operation – Operation Eagle Assist - from mid-October 2001 to mid-May 2002.

It consisted of seven NATO AWACS radar aircraft that helped patrol the skies over the United States; in total 830 crew members from 13 NATO countries flew over 360 sorties. This was the first time that NATO military assets were deployed in support of an Article 5 operation.

**The second Gulf Conflict**
During the second Gulf Conflict, NATO deployed NATO AWACS radar aircraft and air defence batteries to enhance the defence of Turkey. The operation started on 20 February until 16 April 2003 and was called Operation Display Deterrence. The AWACS flew 100 missions with a total of 950 flying hours.

**Protecting public events**

In response to a request by the Greek government, NATO provided assistance to the Olympic and Paralympic Games held in Athens with Operation Distinguished Games, 18 June – 29 September 2004. NATO provided intelligence support, provision of Chemical, Biological Radiation and Nuclear (CBRN) defence assets and AWACS radar aircraft. This was the first operation in which non-Article 4 or 5 NATO assistance was provided within the borders of a member country.

In the same vein, NATO responded to a request made by the Latvian government for assistance in assuring the security of the Riga Summit, November 2006. NATO provided technical security, CBRN response capabilities, air and sea policing, improvised explosive device (IED) detections, communications and information systems and medical evacuation support.

**NATO and Iraq**

NATO conducted a relatively small but important support operation in Iraq from 2004 to 2011 that consisted in training, mentoring and assisting Iraqi Security Forces. At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, the Allies rose above their differences and agreed to be part of the international effort to help Iraq establish effective and accountable security forces. The outcome was the creation of the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I). The NTM-I delivered its training, advice and mentoring support in a number of different settings. All NATO member countries contributed to the training effort either in or outside of Iraq, through financial contributions or donations of equipment. In parallel and reinforcing this initiative, NATO also worked with the Iraqi government on a structured cooperation framework to develop the Alliance's long-term relationship with Iraq.

**Hurricane Katrina**

After Hurricane Katrina struck the south of the United States on 29 August 2005, causing many fatalities and widespread damage and flooding, the US government requested food, medical and logistics supplies and assistance in moving these supplies to stricken areas. On 9 September 2005, the North Atlantic Council approved a military plan to assist the US, which consisted in helping to coordinate the movement of urgently needed material and supporting humanitarian relief operations. During the operation (9 September-2 October), nine member countries provided 189 tons of material to the US.

**Pakistan earthquake relief operation**
Just before the onset of the harsh Himalayan winter, a devastating earthquake hit Pakistan on 8 October 2005, killing an estimated 53,000 people, injuring 75,000 and making at least four million homeless. On 11 October, in response to a request from Pakistan, NATO launched an operation to assist in the urgent relief effort. The Alliance airlifted close to 3,500 tons of supplies and deployed engineers, medical units and specialist equipment to assist in relief operations. This was one of NATO’s largest humanitarian relief operations, which came to an end on 1 February 2006.

Over time, the Alliance has helped to coordinate assistance to other countries hit by natural disasters, including Turkey, Ukraine and Portugal. It does this through its Euro-Atlantic Disaster Coordination Centre.

**Assisting the African Union in Darfur, Sudan**

The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) aimed to end violence and improve the humanitarian situation in a region that has been suffering from conflict since 2003. From June 2005 to 31 December 2007, NATO provided air transport for some 37,000 AMIS personnel, as well as trained and mentored over 250 AMIS officials. While NATO’s support to this mission ended when AMIS was succeeded by the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the Alliance immediately expressed its readiness to consider any request for support to the new peacekeeping mission.

**Counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa**

From October to December 2008, NATO launched Operation Allied Provider, which involved counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia. Responding to a request from UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, NATO naval forces provided escorts to UN World Food Programme (WFP) vessels transiting through the dangerous waters in the Gulf of Aden, where growing piracy has threatened to undermine international humanitarian efforts in Africa.

Concurrently, in response to an urgent request from the African Union, these same NATO naval forces escorted a vessel chartered by the AU carrying equipment for the Burundian contingent deployed to AMISOM.

From March to August 2009, NATO launched Operation Allied Protector, a counter-piracy operation, to improve the safety of commercial maritime routes and international navigation off the Horn of Africa. The force conducted surveillance tasks and provided protection to deter and suppress piracy and armed robbery, which are threatening sea lines of communication and economic interests.

**NATO and Libya**

Following the popular uprising against the Qadhafi regime in Benghazi, Libya, in February 2011, the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted resolution 1970 and 1973 in support of the Libyan people, "condemning the gross and systematic violation of human rights". The resolutions introduced active measures including a no-fly-zone, an arms embargo and the authorization for
member countries, acting as appropriate through regional organizations, to take “all necessary measures” to protect Libyan civilians.

Initially, NATO enforced the no-fly-zone, then on 31 March, NATO took over sole command and control of all military operations for Libya. The NATO-led "Operation Unified Protector" had three distinct components:

- the enforcement of an arms embargo on the high seas of the Mediterranean to prevent the transfer of arms, related material and mercenaries to Libya;
- the enforcement of a no-fly-zone in order to prevent any aircraft from bombing civilian targets; and
- air and naval strikes against those military forces involved in attacks or threats to attack Libyan civilians and civilian-populated areas.

The UN mandate was carried out to the letter and the operation was terminated on 31 October 2011 after having fulfilled its objectives.

• From 1949 to the early 1990s

**During the Cold War**

When NATO was established in 1949, one of its fundamental roles was to act as a powerful deterrent against military aggression. In this role, NATO’s success was reflected in the fact that, throughout the entire period of the Cold War, NATO forces were not involved in a single military engagement. For much of the latter half of the 20th century, NATO remained vigilant and prepared.

**After the Cold War**

With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s came great changes to the international security environment. The Alliance witnessed the emergence of new threats and the resurgence of old but familiar ones.

With these changing conditions came new responsibilities. From being an exclusively defensive alliance for nearly half a century, NATO began to assume an increasingly proactive role within the international community. Before engaging in its first major crisis-response operation in the Balkans, NATO conducted several other military operations:


After Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, NATO Airborne Early Warning aircraft deployed to Konya, Turkey, to monitor the crisis and provide coverage of south-eastern Turkey in case of an Iraqi attack during the first Gulf Crisis/War.


In response to a Turkish request for assistance to meet the threat posed by Iraq during the first Gulf Crisis/War, NATO deployed the ACE Mobile Force (Air) and air defence packages to Turkey.
Following the break-up of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the collapse of its centrally-controlled economic system, NATO assisted an international relief effort by flying teams of humanitarian assistance experts and medical advisors to Russia and other Commonwealth of Independent States nations using AWACs trainer cargo aircraft.

During a period of growing Western tension with Libya after the UN Security Council imposed sanctions designed to induce Libya to surrender suspects in the bombing of a Pan Am airliner over the town of Lockerbie in Scotland in 1988, NATO provided increased AWACS coverage of the Central Mediterranean to monitor air approach routes from the North African littoral. NATO AWACS aircraft flew a total of 36 missions with a total of 2336 flying hours.

* Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

NATO's role in Kosovo

NATO has been leading a peace support operation in Kosovo since June 1999 in support of wider international efforts to build peace and stability in the area.

Today, some 5,500 troops from the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), provided by 30 countries (23 NATO and seven KFOR partners) continue to contribute towards maintaining a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement for all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origin.

Following the unilateral declaration of independence on 17 February 2008, the Alliance reaffirmed that KFOR shall remain in Kosovo on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244, unless the United Nations Security Council decides otherwise. In June 2008, NATO agreed to take on new tasks in Kosovo. These new tasks included the standing down of the Kosovo Protection Corps and the creation of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) as an all-crisis voluntary, professional, multi-ethnic, lightly armed force with a mandate encompassing crisis response, assistance to civil
authorities in responding to natural and other disasters and emergencies, Explosive Ordinance Disposal and civil protection. These tasks, together with KFOR’s overall mandate, have not been affected by the ruling of the International Court of Justice on 22 July 2010: the Advisory Opinion of the Court on the legality of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence is that it did not violate international law, nor UNSCR 1244.

Throughout Kosovo, and bearing in mind its operational mandate, KFOR is cooperating with and assisting the UN, the EU and other international actors, as appropriate, to support the development of a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic and peaceful Kosovo.

Over time, as the security situation has improved, NATO has been gradually adjusting KFOR’s force posture towards a minimal presence: essentially a smaller force progressively relying more on flexibility and intelligence with fewer static tasks. The pace and level of successive troop reductions is decided by the North Atlantic Council as the security situation on the ground evolves and in light of security conditions. This process is conditions-based and not calendar-driven.

• **KFOR’s objectives**

KFOR deployed into Kosovo on 12 June 1999, in the wake of a 78-day air campaign. This air campaign was launched by the Alliance in March 1999 to halt and reverse the humanitarian catastrophe that was then unfolding.

KFOR derives its mandate from UNSCR 1244 of 10 June 1999 and the Military-Technical Agreement (MTA) between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia. KFOR is operated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and, as such, is a peace enforcement operation, which is more generally referred to as a peace support operation.

Initially, KFOR’s mandate was to:

- deter renewed hostility and threats against Kosovo by Yugoslav and Serb forces;
- establish a secure environment and ensure public safety and order;
- demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army;
- support the international humanitarian effort; and
- coordinate with and support the international civil presence.

KFOR’s presence has been crucial in maintaining safety and security for all individuals and communities in Kosovo. Today, KFOR continues to contribute towards maintaining a safe and secure environment in Kosovo for the benefit of all citizens.

• **KFOR’s tasks**

**Initial tasks**
KFOR tasks have included assistance with the return or relocation of displaced persons and refugees; reconstruction and de-mining; medical assistance; security and public order; security of ethnic minorities; protection of patrimonial sites; border security; interdiction of cross-border weapons smuggling; implementation of a Kosovo-wide weapons, ammunition and explosives amnesty programme; weapons destruction; and support for the establishment of civilian institutions, law and order, the judicial and penal system, the electoral process and other aspects of the political, economic and social life of the province.

Special attention continues to be paid to the protection of minorities. This includes regular patrols near minority enclaves, check points, escorts for minority groups, protection of heritage sites such as monasteries, and donations including food, clothes and school supplies.

**New tasks**

On 12 June 2008, NATO agreed to start implementing its new tasks in Kosovo, i.e assist in the standing down of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and in the establishment of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) and a civilian structure to oversee the KSF. These tasks are implemented in close coordination and consultation with the relevant local and international authorities.

- **Stand-down of the KPC**

The KPC was conceived as a transitional post-conflict arrangement, under the responsibility of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Its mandate was to provide disaster response services, perform search and rescue, provide a capacity for humanitarian assistance in isolated areas, assist de-mining and contribute to rebuilding infrastructure and communities.

The KPC ceased its operational activities on 20 January 2009 and was formally dissolved on 14 June 2009. In parallel, the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) was developed to ensure that key capabilities were available for emergency situations.

Those KPC members not recruited into the KSF have been resettled, reintegrated or retired with dignity. A resettlement programme funded by a NATO Trust Fund is being implemented by a local partner Non-Governmental Organisation (APPK) under the supervision of the UN Development Program (UNDP).

- **Stand-up of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF)**

NATO is responsible for supervising and supporting the stand-up and training of a multi-ethnic, professional and civilian controlled KSF. The first ever Kosovo-wide recruitment campaign for the KSF started on 21 January 2009 and focused on encouraging all minority communities in Kosovo to apply.
The KSF will be a lightly armed force, with no heavy weapons such as tanks, heavy artillery or offensive air capability. It shall have primary responsibility for security tasks that are not appropriate for the police such as emergency response, explosive ordnance disposal, management of hazardous material, fire fighting and civil protection. It may also participate in crisis response operations, including peace support operations.

This professional, all-volunteer force is being trained according to NATO standards and is placed under civilian-led, democratic control. The recruitment process is reaching out across society and being carried out in two official languages: Albanian and Serbian. At present, the KSF comprises about 2,200 active personnel. Its total strength shall not exceed 2,500 active personnel and 800 reservists. Training activities and courses started on 2 February 2009. The Initial Operational Capability was reached in mid-September 2009, with some 1,500 personnel. Recruitment and training continue, supported by KFOR.

- Establish a civilian-led body to supervise the KSF

NATO continues to assist in establishing a civilian-led organisation that exercises civilian control over the KSF. Primary responsibility for this task rests with NATO HQ in Brussels; KFOR is tasked to support the NATO Advisory Team that has been established in Pristina.

Today, the long term process of transformation of the KSF has come to a new and critical stage, as NATO is currently considering whether the KSF is ready for Full Operational Capability. At the appropriate moment, NATO will make a decision on any future relationship with the KSF beyond Full Operational Capability.

- Command and structure of KFOR

With the move to the so-called Transition Gate 2, KFOR has been restructured, reducing the number of MNBGs to two. The decision to restructure was taken in October 2010, based on the security situation in Kosovo and the performance of the Kosovo police and the European Rule of Law Mission (EULEX).

**Today’s Multinational Battle Groups**

A Battle Group is a military organization at the level of a battalion, consisting of numerous companies. These companies are highly mobile, flexible and rapidly deployable to potential trouble spots all over Kosovo. There are two MNBGs, which constitute KFOR and are ready to react to any threatening situation:

- HQ MNBG East, located at Camp Bondsteel;
- HQ MNBG West, located at Camp Villagio Italia.
HQ KFOR continues to be located at Camp Film City and there are twelve other Camps to accommodate the companies of KFOR. In addition to the KFOR troops in Kosovo, NATO continues to maintain a reserve force ready to deploy if necessary and required.

KFOR comes under a single chain of command, under the authority of Commander KFOR (COMKFOR). COMKFOR reports to the Commander of Joint Force Command Naples (COM JFCN), Italy. The current COMKFOR is Major General Erhard Drew, German Army. He assumed command of the Kosovo Force on 9 September 2011.

**Previous formations**

Originally, KFOR was formed by four Multinational Brigades (MNB East, MNB Center, MNB Northeast, MNB Southwest) and from June 2006, by five Multinational Task Forces (MNTF): Multinational Task Force (MNTF) Centre based in Lipljan; MNTF North based in Novo Selo; MNTF South based in Prizren; MNTF West based in Pec; and MNTF East based in Urosevac.

KFOR’s transition from Brigades to Task Forces was aimed at improving the effectiveness of the forces and their ability to operate flexibly throughout Kosovo without restriction. In addition, it placed more emphasis on intelligence-led operations, with MNTFs working closely with both the local police and the local population to gather information.

In February 2010, KFOR was restructured and the five Multinational Task Forces, which had been in place since June 2006, were succeeded by mission-tailored Multinational Battle Groups (MNBGs).

- MNBG North;
- MNBG South;
- MNNG East;
- MNBG West; and
- MNBG Centre, which also covered the KFOR Headquarters in Pristina.

These operated until October 2010 when the present configuration was put into place.

**Former KFOR commanders**

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Lt. Gen. Thorstein Skiaker, NO A</td>
<td>06 Apr 2001 - 03 Oct 2001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Lt. Gen. Markus Bentler, GE A 08 Sep 2009 – 1 Sep 2010
Maj. Gen. Erhard Bühler, GE A 01 Sep 2010 - 08 Sep 2011
Maj. Gen. Erhard Drews, GE A 09 Sep 2011 - Present

• The evolution of NATO’s role in Kosovo

**KFOR deploys**

UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 was adopted on 10 June 1999 and on 12 June, the first elements of the NATO-led Kosovo Force, or KFOR, entered Kosovo. By 20 June, the withdrawal of Serbian forces was complete.

KFOR was initially composed of some 50,000 men and women from NATO member countries, Partner countries and non-NATO countries under unified command and control. By early 2002, KFOR was reduced to around 39,000 troops. The improved security environment enabled NATO to reduce KFOR troop levels to 26,000 by June 2003, then to 17,500 by the end of 2003 and today, down to around 5,500.

**Renewed violence**

A setback in progress towards a stable, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo occurred in March 2004, when renewed violence broke out between Albanians and Serbs. At that time, KFOR troops were under attack. An additional 2,500 soldiers were rapidly deployed to reinforce the existing KFOR strength.

At the 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO leaders condemned the renewed ethnic violence and reaffirmed NATO’s commitment to a secure, stable and multi-ethnic Kosovo.

**The Kosovo status talks**

After 14 months of UN-led negotiations, the Special Envoy for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, presented his Comprehensive Proposal for a Kosovo Status Settlement to the UN Secretary-General in March 2007. Whilst Pristina endorsed the Ahtisaari Proposal, Belgrade categorically rejected it.
On 1 August 2007, in the absence of any UN Security Council decision on Kosovo’s future status, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon launched an extended period of engagement with the parties, led this time by an EU, Russia, US Troika under the auspices of the Contact Group. By the end of the Troika’s mandate on 10 December 2007, the negotiating parties failed to reach any agreement on Kosovo’s status.

Throughout the negotiations, NATO supported the efforts of Martti Ahtisaari and, subsequently, those of the Troika to settle Kosovo’s status; KFOR helped maintain safety and stability on the ground allowing the negotiations to proceed without disruption.

In December 2007 NATO foreign ministers agreed that KFOR would remain in Kosovo on the basis of UNSCR 1244, unless the Security Council decided otherwise. They also renewed their commitment to maintain KFOR's national force contributions, including reserves, at current levels and with no new caveats.

At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, NATO leaders agreed that NATO and KFOR would continue to work with the authorities. They also agreed that, bearing in mind its operational mandate, KFOR would cooperate with and assist the United Nations, the European Union and other international actors, as appropriate, to support the development of a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic and peaceful Kosovo. They also stressed that NATO stands ready to play its part in the implementation of future security arrangements.

NATO foreign ministers, on 2-3 December 2008, reaffirmed that the UN-mandated NATO-led KFOR presence will remain in Kosovo on the basis of UNSCR 1244. They stressed that the prompt deployment of the European Union’s Rule and Law mission (EULEX) throughout all Kosovo was an urgent priority, and in this context noted the adoption by the UN Security Council of a statement of its presidency in support of the reconfiguration of UNMIK. They reaffirmed that NATO will continue to work towards the standing down of the Kosovo Protection Corps and the establishment of the Kosovo Security Force on the basis of NATO’s voluntary trust funds.

**An improved security situation**

Since then, the security situation has continued to improve. As a result, on 11-12 June 2009, NATO defence ministers decided to gradually adjust KFOR’s force posture towards what is called a deterrent presence. This means that, when appropriate and according to the evolution of events, over time NATO will reduce the number of forces on the ground, with the remaining forces in theatre progressively relying more on intelligence and flexibility.

At their informal meeting in Istanbul on 3-4 February 2010, NATO defence ministers were informed by the NATO Military Authorities that KFOR had successfully achieved the so-called Gate One in its transition to a deterrent presence, reducing the number of troops on the ground to some 10,200. The move to Gate 2, allowing for a total of approximately 5,000 troops was recommended by NATO
Military Authorities and authorized by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on 29 October 2010. Gate 2 was declared on 28 February 2011.

In a separate development, the improved security situation on the ground in Kosovo has also allowed NATO to continue with the implementation of the so-called unfixing process, the gradual transfer of security for religious and cultural heritage sites under KFOR protection to Kosovo Police responsibility. By the end of May 2012, KFOR will have unfixed seven properties with Designate Special Status (PrDSS) including the Gazimestan Monument, Gracanica Monastery, Zociste Monastery, Budisavci Monastery, Gorioc Monastery and Devic Monastery.

The situation in Northern Kosovo

The security situation in the northern part of Kosovo deteriorated in July 2011 over a customs dispute. Clashes ensued, resulting in two major spikes of violence in July and September, followed by a third in November, prompting the Alliance and its partners to adapt their posture on the ground. In this context, a NATO Operational Reserve Force battalion was deployed in August, with a troop contribution of around 600 soldiers, in order to help bolster KFOR’s deterrent presence.

Amid the heightened tensions and clashes in Northern Kosovo, KFOR acted carefully, firmly and impartially, with a view to guaranteeing the population a stable environment, freedom of movement and security. Meanwhile, at the political level, NATO continues to support the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina under EU auspices.

The Operational Reserve Force battalion was deployed to strengthen NATO’s deterrence posture; a second Operational Reserve Force battalion was deployed to theatre ahead of the Serbian parliamentary and presidential elections of 2012. A reduction of KFOR has been delayed with the aim to ensure the ability to maintain a safe and secure environment if tensions arise.

Future decisions on further reducing KFOR’s footprint in Kosovo will continue to need the approval of the NAC in the light of both military and political considerations, with no automaticity in the move to a deterrent presence Gate 3.

Counter-piracy operations
Growing piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa is undermining international humanitarian efforts in Africa and the safety of one of the busiest and most important maritime routes in the world – the gateway in and out of the Suez Canal. NATO has been helping to deter and disrupt pirate attacks, while protecting vessels and helping to increase the general level of security in the region since 2008.

On the request of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, in late 2008, NATO started to provide escorts to UN World Food Programme (WFP) vessels transiting through these dangerous waters under Operation Allied Provider (October-December 2008). In addition to providing close protection to WFP chartered ships, NATO conducted deterrence patrols and prevented, for instance, vessels from being hijacked and their crews being taken hostage during pirate attacks. This operation was succeeded by Operation Allied Protector (March-August 2009), which continued to contribute to the safety of commercial maritime routes and international navigation. It also conducted surveillance and fulfilled the tasks previously undertaken by Operation Allied Provider. This operation evolved in August 2009 in Operation Ocean Shield.

Operation Ocean Shield also contributes to providing maritime security in the region and is helping to reduce the overall pirate attack success rate. The latter has been reduced from 44 per cent in 2004 to 16 per cent in 2011. In order to respond to new piracy tactics, NATO has created greater synergies with other initiatives, recognised the continued need for regional capacity-building, within means and capabilities, and focused on areas where it provides added value. The March 2012 Strategic Assessment highlighted the need to erode the pirates’ logistics and support base by, among other things, disabling pirate vessels or skiffs, attaching tracking beacons to mother ships and allowing the use of force to disable or destroy suspected pirate or armed robber vessels.

NATO is conducting counter-piracy activities in full complementarity with the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and with actions against piracy initiated by other actors, such as the European Union.

- **Operation Ocean Shield – ongoing**

**The mission, its objectives and scope**
Piracy and armed robbery are disrupting the delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia, as well as threatening vital sea lines of communication (SLOC) and economic interests off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Aden.

Building on the two previous counter-piracy missions conducted by NATO, Operation Ocean Shield principally focuses on at-sea counter-piracy operations. NATO vessels conduct, for instance, helicopter surveillance missions to trace and identify ships in the area, they help to prevent and disrupt hijackings and to suppress armed robbery. NATO has also agreed, at the request of the UN, to escort the UNSOA - United Nations Support Office for AMISOM - supply vessels to the harbour entrance of Mogadishu. The Alliance has broadened its approach to combating piracy by offering, within means and capabilities to regional states that request it, assistance in developing their own capacity to combat piracy activities. More recently, NATO has also taken on measures aimed at eroding the pirates’ logistics and support base.

In sum, NATO’s role is to provide naval escorts and deterrence, while increasing cooperation with other counter-piracy operations in the area in order to optimise efforts and tackle the evolving pirate trends and tactics.

This operation was approved by the North Atlantic Council on 17 August 2009 and has been extended until the end of 2014.

**Composition and command of the naval force**

**The current rotation**

SNMG 2 is currently conducting Operation Ocean Shield. The following ships were initially assigned under the command of Rear Admiral Sinan Tosun (Turkish Navy):

- TCG Giresun (Flagship – Turkey);
- HDMS Absalon (Denmark);
- ITS Grecale (Italy);
- RFA Fort Victoria (United Kingdom);
- USS Dewert (United States);
- USS Carney (United States).

Rear Admiral Tosun is under the overall command of Admiral George Zambellas, Allied Maritime Component Command Headquarters Northwood, in the United Kingdom, which is one of the three Component Commands of Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum.

**Previous rotations**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>June 2011-Dec. 2011</strong></th>
<th><strong>SNMG1</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rear Admiral Gualtiero Mattesi</strong></td>
<td>ITS Andrea Doria (Flagship – Italy); USS Carney (United States); USS De Wert (United States);</td>
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<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Commander / Flagship</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>December 2010 – June 2011 SNMG2</strong>&lt;br&gt;Commodore Michiel Hijmans (Royal Netherlands Navy)</td>
<td>NRP D. Francisco De Almeida (Portugal).&lt;br&gt;HMNLS De Ruyter (Flagship – The Netherlands);&lt;br&gt;HDMS Esbern Snare (Denmark);&lt;br&gt;TCG Gaziantep (Turkey); and&lt;br&gt;USS Laboon (United States).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>August – Early December 2010 SNMG1</strong>&lt;br&gt;Commodore Christian Rune (Danish Navy)</td>
<td>HDMS Esbern Snare (Flagship, Denmark);&lt;br&gt;HMS Montrose and RFA Fort Victoria&lt;br&gt;(United Kingdom);&lt;br&gt;USS Kauffman and USS Laboon (United States);&lt;br&gt;ITS Bersaglieri (Italy); and&lt;br&gt;HNLMS Zeeleeuw (NL submarine).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>March-August 2010 SNMG2</strong>&lt;br&gt;12 March-30 June:&lt;br&gt;Commodore Steve Chick (UK)</td>
<td>HMS Chatham (Flagship, United Kingdom).&lt;br&gt;HS LIMNOS (Greece)-under national control from 30 May.&lt;br&gt;ITS SCIROCCO (Italy)-under national control from 5 June.&lt;br&gt;TCG Gelibolu (Turkey).&lt;br&gt;USS Cole (United States).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1st July-6 August</strong>&lt;br&gt;Commodore Michiel Hijmans (Royal Netherlands Navy)</td>
<td>HNLMS De Zeven Provinciën (Flagship, The Netherlands);&lt;br&gt;TCG Gelibolu (Turkey);&lt;br&gt;USS Cole (United States).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>November 2009 – March 2010 SNMG1</strong>&lt;br&gt;Commodore Christian Rune (succeeded Rear Admiral Jose Pereira de Cunha (PO) from 25 January 2010).</td>
<td>NRP Álvares Cabral (outgoing flagship, Portugal);&lt;br&gt;HDMS Absalon (incoming flagship, Denmark);&lt;br&gt;HMS Fredericton (Canada);&lt;br&gt;USS Boone (United States);&lt;br&gt;HMS Chatham (United Kingdom).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>August – Nov. 2009 SNMG2</strong>&lt;br&gt;Commodore Steve Chick (UK)</td>
<td>HS Navarinon (Greece);&lt;br&gt;ITS Libeccio (Italy);</td>
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<td>Period</td>
<td>Commanding Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 2011-Dec. 2011 SNMG1</td>
<td>Rear Admiral Gualtiero Mattesi (Italian Navy)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Aug. – Nov. 2009 SNMG2</td>
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</table>
Commodore Steve Chick (UK) | HS Navarinon (Greece);  
| ITS Libeccio (Italy);  
| TCG Gediz (Turkey);  
| HMS Cornwall (United Kingdom);  
| USS Donald Cook (United States).

SNMG1 and SNMG 2

NATO has two Immediate Reaction Forces: the Standing NATO Maritime Groups composed of the SNMG1 and the SNMG2; and the Standing NATO Maritime Mine Countermeasure Groups (SNMCMG1 and SNMCMG2).

The Standing NATO Maritime Groups are a multinational, integrated maritime force made up of vessels from various allied countries. These vessels (including their helicopters) are permanently available to NATO to perform different tasks ranging from participating in exercises to actually intervening in operational missions. These groups provide NATO with a continuous maritime capability for operations and other activities in peacetime and in periods of crisis and conflict. They also help to establish Alliance presence, demonstrate solidarity, conduct routine diplomatic visits to different countries, support transformation and provide a variety of maritime military capabilities to ongoing missions.

SNMG1 and SNMG2 alternate between each other for the six-month rotations of Operation Ocean Shield and otherwise function according to the operational needs of the Alliance, therefore helping to maintain optimal flexibility. Their composition varies and they are usually composed of between six and ten ships from as many NATO member countries.

Currently, SNMG2 and SNMCMG2 come under the command of Allied Maritime Component Command (CC-Mar) Naples, which is one of the three Component Commands of Allied Joint Force Command Naples. However, for Operation Ocean Shield, SNMG2 has been put under the Operational Control of Component Command Maritime Headquarters Northwood. As a result of the new NATO Command Structure, MC Northwood will have command over all SNF’s in the near future.

- Past operations

**Operation Allied Protector**

The mission, its objectives and scope

Operation Allied Protector helped to deter, defend against and disrupt pirate activities in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa.
From 24 March until 29 June 2009, the operation was conducted by SNMG1 vessels. As previously indicated, SNMG1 is usually employed in the Eastern Atlantic area, but it can deploy anywhere NATO requires. The first phase of Operation Allied Protector was undertaken as the force left for NATO’s first ever deployment to South East Asia. It made a short visit to Karachi (Pakistan) on 26-27 April. However, with the increase in pirate attacks, on 24 April NATO had already decided to cancel the other two port visits planned to Singapore and Australia. As such, the second phase of the operation, which was meant to take place as SNMG1 made its return journey towards European waters end June, was brought forward to 1 May.

From 29 June 2009, the Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2) took over responsibility from SNMG1. It had conducted NATO’s first counter-piracy operation – Operation Allied Provider (see below).

Composition and command of the naval force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>24 March-29 June 2009 SNMG1</th>
<th>Rear Admiral Jose Pereira de Cunha (PO)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NRP Corte Real (flagship, Portugal)</td>
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<td>HMCS Winnipeg (Canada)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>HNLMS de Zeven Provinciën (The Netherlands)</td>
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<td>SPS Blas de Lezo (Spain)</td>
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Operation Allied Provider (October-December 2008)

The mission, its objectives and scope

Allied Operation Allied Provider was responsible for naval escorts to World Food Program (WFP) vessels and, more generally, patrolled the waters around Somalia. Alliance presence also helped to deter acts of piracy that threatened the region.

While providing close protection for WFP vessels and patrolling routes most susceptible to criminal acts against merchant vessels, NATO ships could use force pursuant to the authorized Rules of Engagement and in compliance with relevant international and national law.
Allied Provider was a temporary operation that was requested by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, on 25 September 2008. NATO provided this counter-piracy capacity in support of UNSC Resolutions 1814, 1816 and 1838, and in coordination with other international actors, including the European Union.

NATO defence ministers agreed to respond positively to the UN’s request on 9 October, during an informal meeting held in Budapest, Hungary. Following this decision, planning started to redirect assets of SNMG2 to conduct anti-piracy duties.

SNMG2 was already scheduled to conduct a series of Gulf port visits in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates within the framework of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). As such, it started to transit the Suez Canal on 15 October to conduct both duties at the same time.

**Composition and command of the naval force**

At the time of the operation, SNMG2 comprised seven ships from Germany, Greece, Italy, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, of which three were assigned to Operation Allied Provider:

- ITS Durand de la Penne (flagship, destroyer D560, Italy);
- HS Temistokles (frigate F465, Greece);
- HMS Cumberland (frigate F85, United Kingdom).

The other four ships (FGS Karlsruhe-Germany; FGS Rhön-Germany; TCG Gokova-Turkey; and USS The Sullivans-USA) continued deployment to ICI countries. This was the first time a NATO-flagged force deployed to the Gulf.

At the time of the operation, SNMG2 was commanded by Rear Admiral Giovanni Gumiero, Italian Navy, who was appointed to this post in July 2008. He reported to the Commander of Allied Component Command Maritime (CC-Mar) Naples. CC Mar Naples is one of the three Component Commands of Allied Joint Force Command Naples.

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**Operation Active Endeavour**

**Under Operation Active Endeavour, NATO ships are patrolling the Mediterranean and monitoring shipping to help detect, deter and protect against terrorist activity.**

The operation evolved out of NATO’s immediate response to the terrorist attacks against the United States of 11 September 2001 and, in view of its success, is being continued.
As the Alliance has refined its counter-terrorism role in the intervening years, the operation’s mandate has been regularly reviewed and its remit extended.

The experience that NATO has accrued in Active Endeavour has given the Alliance unparalleled expertise in the deterrence of maritime terrorist activity in the Mediterranean Sea. This expertise is relevant to wider international efforts to combat terrorism and, in particular, the proliferation and smuggling of weapons of mass destruction, as well as enhanced cooperation with non-NATO countries and civilian agencies.

• The aim of the operation and its current functions

Operation Active Endeavour is NATO’s only article 5 operation on anti-terrorism initiated as support to the United States immediately after 9/11. It therefore aims to demonstrate NATO's solidarity and resolve in the fight against terrorism and to help detect and deter terrorist activity in the Mediterranean.

NATO forces have hailed over 100,000 merchant vessels and boarded some 155 suspect ships. By conducting these maritime operations against terrorist activity, NATO’s presence in these waters has benefited all shipping traveling through the Straits by improving perceptions of security. NATO is helping to keep seas safe, protect shipping and control suspect vessels. Moreover, this operation is also enabling NATO to strengthen its relations with partner countries, especially those participating in the Alliance’s Mediterranean Dialogue.

Keeping seas safe and protecting shipping

Keeping the Mediterranean’s busy trade routes open and safe is critical to NATO’s security.

In terms of energy alone, some 65 per cent of the oil and natural gas consumed in Western Europe pass through the Mediterranean each year, with major pipelines connecting Libya to Italy and Morocco to Spain. For this reason, NATO ships are systematically carrying out preparatory route surveys in “choke” points as well as in important passages and harbours throughout the Mediterranean.

Tracking and controlling suspect vessels

Since April 2003, NATO has been systematically boarding suspect ships. These boardings take place with the compliance of the ships’ masters and flag states in accordance with international law.

What happens in practice is that merchant ships passing through the Eastern Mediterranean are hailed by patrolling NATO naval units and asked to identify themselves and their activity. This information is then reported to both NATO’s Allied Maritime Component Commander in Naples, Italy, and the NATO Shipping Centre in Northwood, the United Kingdom. If anything appears
unusual or suspicious, teams of between 15 and 20 of the ships’ crew may board vessels to inspect documentation and cargo. NATO personnel may otherwise convey this information to the appropriate law-enforcement agency at the vessel’s next port of call. The suspect vessel is then shadowed until action is taken by a responsible agency/authority, or until it enters a country’s territorial waters.

**Unexpected benefits**

While the mandate of Active Endeavour is limited to deterring and detecting terrorist-related activities, the operation has had a visible effect on security and stability in the Mediterranean that is beneficial to trade and economic activity.

NATO ships and helicopters have also intervened on several occasions to rescue civilians on stricken oil rigs and sinking ships. This includes helping 84 workers to evacuate an oil rig in high winds and heavy seas in December 2001 and winching women and children off a sinking ship carrying some 250 refugees in January 2002 and helping to repair the damaged hull.

Operation Active Endeavour provided the framework for the maritime component of NATO’s assistance to the Greek government to ensure the safe conduct of the 2004 Olympic and Paralympic Games in August and September 2004. Task Force Endeavour conducted surveillance, presence and compliant boarding operations in international waters around the Greek peninsula with Standing Naval Forces surface ships, supported by maritime patrol aircraft and submarines and in coordination with the Hellenic Navy and Coast Guard.

**Closer cooperation with partners**

The increased NATO presence in the Mediterranean has also enhanced the Alliance’s security cooperation programme with seven countries in the wider Mediterranean region – Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. This programme - the Mediterranean Dialogue - was set up in 1995 to contribute to regional security and stability and to achieve better mutual understanding between NATO and its Mediterranean Partners.

Mediterranean Dialogue countries are equally concerned by the threat of terrorism and have already been cooperating with NATO in Active Endeavour by providing intelligence about suspicious shipping operating in their waters.

Enhanced coordination and cooperation mechanisms are currently being developed.
The operation is under the overall command of Joint Forces Command (JFC), Naples, and is conducted from the Allied Maritime Component Command Naples, Italy (CC-Mar Naples) through a Task Force deployed in the Mediterranean.

Task Force ENDEAVOUR consists of a balanced collection of surface units, submarines and maritime patrol aircraft. The operation also regularly makes use of NATO’s two high-readiness frigate forces, which are permanently ready to act and capable of conducting a wide range of maritime operations.

The current operational pattern uses surface forces as reaction units to conduct specific tasks such as locating, tracking, reporting and boarding of suspected vessels in the light of intelligence.

The NATO Standing Maritime Groups 1 and 2 rotate in providing periodic support to Operation Active Endeavour. The two groups rotate in providing “surges” to the operation. A surge is when the entire group participates. Periodically, the groups are asked to provide individual units to be on-call to support Operation Active Endeavour when the operation has no regularly assigned forces.

**Evolution**

**An Article 5 deployment**

The deployment was one of eight measures taken by NATO to support the United States in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, following the invocation of Article 5, NATO’s collective defence clause, for the first time in the Alliance’s history.

The deployment started on 6 October and was formally named Operation Active Endeavour on 26 October 2001. Together with the dispatch of Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft to the United States, it was the first time that NATO assets had been deployed in support of an Article 5 operation.

Since October 2001, NATO ships have been patrolling the Mediterranean and monitoring shipping, boarding any suspect ships. Compliant boarding operations are essential to the successful continuation of OAE. They are limited to trying to establish whether a vessel is engaged in terrorist activity.

Moreover, in March 2003, Active Endeavour was expanded to include providing escorts through the Straits of Gibraltar to non-military ships from Alliance member states requesting them. This extension of the mission was designed to help prevent terrorist attacks such as those off Yemen on the USS Cole in October 2000 and on the French oil tanker Limburg two years later. The area was considered particularly vulnerable because the Straits are extremely narrow and some 3,000 commercial shipments pass through daily. In total, 488 ships took advantage of NATO escorts until Task Force STROG (Straight of Gibraltar) was suspended in May 2004. Forces remain ready to move at 30-days notice’.
Covering the entire Mediterranean

One year later, in March 2004, as a result of the success of Active Endeavour in the Eastern Mediterranean, NATO extended its remit to the whole of the Mediterranean.

At the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, Allied leaders decided to enhance Operation Active Endeavour. They also welcomed offers by Russia and Ukraine to support the operation.

An evolving operation

In the revised Concept of Operations approved by the North Atlantic Council on 23 April 2009, the Military Committee highlighted two considerations: the need to further enhance information-sharing between NATO and other actors in the region; the fact that in some cases, the operation is hampered by the lack of consent to conduct compliant boarding of suspect vessels.

In addition, the Operational Plan approved in January 2010, is shifting Operation Active Endeavour from a platform-based to a network-based operation, using a combination of on-call units and surge operations instead of deployed forces; it is also seeking to enhance cooperation with non-NATO countries and international organizations in order to improve Maritime Situational Awareness.

• Contributing countries

Being an Article 5 operation, Operation Active Endeavour initially involved member countries only.

Some NATO members, mainly Greece, Italy, Spain and Turkey, contribute directly to the operation with naval assets. Escort operations in the Straits of Gibraltar used to involve the use of fast patrol boats from Northern European Allies Denmark, Germany and Norway. Spain also provides additional assets in the Straits. Operation Active Endeavour relies heavily on the logistic support of Mediterranean NATO Allies.

From 2004, Partner and non-NATO countries started offering their support.

All offers are considered on a case-by-case basis. To date, Exchanges of Letters have been signed between NATO and Israel, Morocco, Russia and Ukraine. In addition, Finland and Sweden have informally expressed their interest in contributing to the operation. Georgia is sending a liaison officer to Naples following the signing of a tactical Memorandum of Understanding with NATO, in 2010, on the exchange of information. Russia deployed vessels twice, in 2006 and 2007, and Ukraine a total of four times, twice in 2007 and in 2008. Russia was due to deploy a third time in summer 2008, but this deployment was cancelled due to events in Georgia. It has since expressed its willingness to resume contributions without yet specifying what or when and Ukraine deployed a ship between 10-17 November 2010 for a surge operation. Besides Russia and Ukraine, Morocco and Israel have also offered physical assets for 2011.
NATO assistance to the African Union

At the request of the African Union (AU), NATO is providing assistance to the AU Mission in Somalia and capacity-building support to its long-term peacekeeping capabilities, in particular the African Standby Force. NATO also provided support to the AU Mission in Sudan, at the request of the AU, from mid-2005 to end 2007.

To ensure maximum synergy, effectiveness and transparency, NATO's assistance is aligned and coordinated closely with other international organizations – principally the United Nations and the European Union – as well as with bilateral partners.

Through this assistance, the Alliance and the AU are developing a "very positive" relationship, according to the Head of the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) of the AU, Mr Sivuyile Thandikhaya Bam, on a visit to NATO HQ, February 2010. "We see this [cooperation] more as long term and would like to continue as such". This has been confirmed by the repeated AU requests for NATO assistance and the AU’s desire to build on and expand this collaboration.

The AU was established in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 2002, bringing together 53 African member states. NATO support goes through one of the AU’s eight commissions: the Peace and Security Commission.

• Providing support for missions and capacity-building

NATO’s support to the AU started in 2005 with assistance to the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). This was the Alliance’s first mission on the African continent and as such represents a landmark decision by the North Atlantic Council. Since then, NATO has committed to support other AU missions and objectives.

Assisting the AU in Somalia

NATO has accepted to assist the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by providing strategic airlift and sealift support to AU member states willing to deploy in Somalia under AMISOM. NATO has, for
instance, put into practice airlift support from Burundi to Mogadishu and has escorted an AU ship that carried Burundi military equipment for one of the battalions that it had airlifted into Mogadishu.

NATO has also been providing subject matter experts for the PSOD that supports AMISOM. These experts offer expertise in areas such as maritime planning, strategic planning, financial planning and monitoring, air movement coordination, logistics, communication and information systems, military manpower management and contingency planning.

In addition to this logistical and planning support, NATO is also a member of the International Contact Group on Somalia. It was first invited to attend these meetings in June 2009 and has participated in subsequent meetings.

**Contributing to the establishment of an African Standby Force**

NATO has been providing expert and training support to the African Standby Force (ASF) at the AU’s request. Not only does it offer capacity-building support through courses and training events, but it also organizes different forms of support for the operationalization of the ASF all at AU’s request.

The ASF, which is intended to be deployed in Africa in times of crisis, is part of the AU’s efforts to develop long-term peacekeeping capabilities. ASF represents the AU’s vision for a continental, on-call, security apparatus with some similarities to the NATO Response Force. NATO is, inter alia, assisting the AU with the evaluation and assessment processes linked to the operational readiness of the ASF brigades. This continental force is expected to reach full operational capability by 2015 and could be seen as an African contribution to wider international efforts to preserve peace and security.

**Assisting the AU in Darfur, Sudan**

The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) aimed to end violence and improve the humanitarian situation in a region that has been suffering from conflict since 2003.

From June 2005 to 31 December 2007, NATO helped the AU expand its peacekeeping mission in Darfur by providing airlift for the transport of additional peacekeepers into the region and by training AU personnel. NATO support did not imply the provision of combat troops.

Alliance support ended on 31 December 2007 when AMIS was transferred to the United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The Alliance has expressed its readiness to consider providing support to the new UN-AU hybrid peacekeeping force made up of peacekeepers and civilian police officers, if requested.

- **The evolution of NATO’s support to the AU**
In June 2005 and at the request of the African Union, NATO began assisting the AU in its mission in the Sudanese province of Darfur. NATO assistance was terminated on 31 December 2007 when AMIS was completed. NATO has offered its support to the UN-AU hybrid mission in Darfur (UNAMID), which succeeded AMIS on 1 January 2008.

In March 2007, during a visit to NATO Headquarters, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Said Djinnit, evoked expansion of NATO-AU cooperation into new areas, including possible long-term capacity-building support by the Alliance to the AU. This was to come a little later in the year. Before that, in June 2007, NATO agreed in principle to support the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by providing strategic airlift. This support has been extended several times and has been broadened into different areas since then.

On 5 September 2007, the North Atlantic Council – NATO’s top political decision making body - agreed to provide assistance to the African Union with a study on the assessment of the operational readiness of the African Standby Force (ASF) brigades. With this commitment, NATO started its capacity-building support to the AU and, more specifically, the ASF, which is part of the AU’s efforts to develop long-term peacekeeping capabilities.

• The bodies involved in decision-making and implementation

Based on advice from NATO’s military authorities, the North Atlantic Council is the body that agrees to provide support to the AU.

The Norwegian Embassy in Addis Ababa provides diplomatic resources in support of NATO’s activities in Africa. The AU requests are communicated via “Note Verbale” from the AU to the Norwegian Embassy, then via the Joint Force Command (JFC) Lisbon and SHAPE to NATO HQ to consider the requests and take action, as necessary. AU requests are considered on a case-by-case basis.

The NATO Senior Military Liaison Officer (SMLO) is the primary point of contact for the Alliance’s activities with the AU. An SMLO is deployed on a permanent six-month rotational basis in Addis Ababa and is supported by a deputy and an administrative assistant. More specifically, with regard to NATO’s support to the AU mission in Somalia, JFC Lisbon – under the overall command of Allied Command Operations - was responsible for the SMLO team operating out of the Ethiopian capital.

This team not only conducts NATO’s day-to-day activities, but also serves as the NATO military point of contact with partner countries and regional organisations. It served the same function for the representatives of troop-contributing countries for the AMISON operation, the representatives of the donor nations pledging support to the African Union, the United Nations, the European Union and various embassies.
Commitments to operations and missions

NATO nations contribute forces and capacities in several operations and to standby forces under NATO and other auspices. The following table provides details related to individual national commitments.

Content is provided by NATO countries on a voluntary basis.

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### Troop contributions

When a NATO operation or mission is deemed necessary, NATO member and partner countries volunteer personnel, equipment, and resources for the mission. These national contributions operate under the aegis of the Alliance.
NATO is an alliance of 28 sovereign countries, which does not possess military forces of its own. While personnel serving in a NATO operation are often referred to collectively as “NATO forces”, they are actually multinational forces composed of individuals, formations and equipment drawn from NATO member countries and, in some cases, partner countries or other troop-contributing countries.

The procedure for staffing an operation or mission is often referred to as “force generation”. This procedure ensures that Alliance operations or missions have the manpower and materials required to achieve set objectives.

**Obtaining troop contributions for operations and missions**

The final decision on whether to contribute troops and equipment to a NATO-led operation or mission is taken by national capitals, which communicate continuously with NATO through their permanent diplomatic missions, national military representation, or partnership liaison teams.

**Force generation**

When a NATO operation or mission is deemed necessary, NATO’s military authorities draft a concept of operations – referred to as a CONOPS – which outlines the troop and equipment requirements necessary to meet the operations’ or mission’s objectives. Upon approval of the concept of operations and the release of a “Force Activation Directive” by the North Atlantic Council, Allied Command Operations (ACO), led by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, initiates the force generation and activation process.

In general, the force generation process follows a standard procedure. For a given operation or mission, a list of personnel and equipment requirements (the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements), is produced by ACO and sent to NATO member countries and, in some cases, partner countries.

National offers to provide personnel are addressed during conferences attended by representatives from NATO and partner countries. These conferences take place on an ad hoc basis as required. For example, a force generation conference will take place prior to the start of a new operation or mission, or if there are significant changes in an ongoing operation. In addition to these conferences, an annual conference is held for all operations and missions, the Global Force Generation Conference.

Contributions by individual countries, both NATO members and partners, are subject to their overall national capacity, taking into account prior commitments, force size, structure, and activity level. Every contribution, whether big or small, is valuable and contributes to the success of the operation or mission.
In many cases, NATO or partner countries will commit complete or formed units to operations or missions. A country may volunteer to send a complete battle group, which – in the case of ground forces – could include infantry personnel, an armoured reconnaissance element, an artillery battery to provide fire support, and service support personnel.

Countries that provide leadership for an entire operation or mission, or take responsibility for central elements, are identified as “lead.” For example, the lead country for a given operation or mission might provide the command element and a significant part of the forces, and will also be responsible for filling the remainder of the force required.

Although NATO as an Alliance does own and maintain some specialised equipment, such as the AWACS aircraft and strategic communications equipment, troop-contributing countries generally commit the equipment necessary to support their personnel in pursuit of operational objectives.

**Caveats**

It is during the force generation process that caveats are stated. While national contributions to NATO operations are expected to operate under the Alliance’s chain of command, the provision of forces by NATO and partner countries is sometimes conditional on factors such as geography, logistics, time, rules of engagement, or command status. Known as “caveats,” these conditions can restrict NATO commanders by limiting their flexibility to respond to situations on the ground. For this reason, the Alliance seeks national contributions with as few caveats as possible.

**Provincial Reconstruction Teams**

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), such as those established in Afghanistan under the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), constitute an exception to the normal force generation process. In contrast to traditional military operations, PRTs are interdisciplinary. That is, they are comprised of development workers, military forces, diplomats and civilian police, who work to extend the authority of the central Afghan government in remote areas, and to facilitate development and reconstruction.

Because of the unique combination of personnel, NATO is involved in generating forces for the military component of a PRT, while it is the responsibility of the contributing country to staff the civilian components. As a result, PRTs are a hybrid of personnel who fall under either NATO or national chains of command.

**Coordinating troop contributions for non-NATO operations**

Over the years, the Alliance has developed significant expertise in coordinating troop contributions for multinational operations. In the past, it has offered this expertise in support of non-NATO operations.
Under the Berlin Plus agreement, the Alliance cooperates closely with the European Union (EU) in the resourcing of selected operations. When requested by the EU, NATO’s Deputy SACEUR and his staff provide support in coordinating member countries’ troop contributions. For example, the Deputy SACEUR was identified as operational commander for Operation Althea, the EU-led operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and was responsible for force generation.

NATO also provided force generation support to Germany and the Netherlands, during their leadership of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force in 2003 in Afghanistan, prior to its conversion into a NATO-led operation.

Who decides?

In determining troop contributions, ACO engages with the Military Committee, the North Atlantic Council, and individual countries, all of which have critical roles to play in bringing Alliance operations and missions to reality.

ACO, commanded by SACEUR, is responsible for executing all Alliance operations and missions. The Deputy SACEUR and his staff coordinate troop contributions.

Force generation through time

For much of NATO’s history, the Alliance’s primary operational commitment was focused on the former border between East and West Germany. For over 40 years, NATO strategists spoke of medium and long-term “force plans” rather than “force generation” for specific operations. This was because during that time, the Alliance maintained static, “conventional” forces in former West Germany, poised for an attack from the former Soviet Union.

Beginning 1986, conventional forces were reduced and, following the end of the Cold War, bases of individual NATO countries in Germany were largely dismantled or converted to other use, although some remain functional to this day.

NATO’s first major land expeditionary operation took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a result of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. The NATO force generation process, which is still in use today, was developed during the NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and later in Kosovo.

Transforming to meet operational needs

While the core procedures for contributing troops and equipment remain valid, the process has been refined in tandem with NATO’s transformation. At their May 2002 meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, NATO foreign ministers decided that: “To carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives.”
NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan in 2003 posed a number of new problems for force generation. It soon became apparent that the nature of the mission was different from previous tasks. Greater flexibility was needed in types and numbers of forces, from rotation to rotation, and from area to area. In addition, with many countries moving to smaller, more highly trained and highly equipped forces, it became unrealistic to expect large standing commitments from individual countries.

The procedure for staffing an operation or mission was made more responsive to operational requirements. Communication between NATO commanders and member/partner countries was improved, allowing potential troop-contributing countries to be better informed about evolving operational requirements.

The first Global Force Generation Conference was held in November 2003; Prior to this, force generation meetings had been called on an ad hoc basis as required. During this annual conference, troop and resource requirements for all NATO-led operations and missions are addressed at the same time.

While ad hoc meetings are still necessary to address immediate needs, rolling numerous meetings into one facilitates improved coordination between and within troop-contributing countries and NATO military authorities.

Lastly, NATO military planners are taking a longer view of force generation. While developments in operations, as well as political developments within troop-contributing countries, prohibit definitive troop and material commitments far into the future, NATO military planners are looking beyond immediate needs, which allows both the Alliance and troop-contributing countries to plan their resources better.

II. Developing capabilities under budgetary constraints

At a time of austerity NATO is also seeking to ensure better value for money for its security. With the financial crisis in Europe and beyond, severe deficit reduction measures in the United States and increased pressure on defence budgets, NATO’s added value is to help countries work together. NATO has the capacity to connect forces and manage multinational projects. This is one of its strengths. However, the challenge is having to prepare NATO today, for the security challenges of tomorrow.

“Smart defence”

In Chicago, Allies will support new multinational projects that will allow the Alliance to provide more security for its citizens in an age of financial austerity. The goal is an Alliance that is fit for the next
decade and beyond. The way to get there is confirming a renewed culture of cooperation – "smart defence".

Projects in the spirit of Smart Defence will comprise a package of multinational projects to address critical capability shortfalls. They will include programmes such as missile defence, Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) and Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance as well as projects covering areas such as pooling maritime patrol aircraft and remote-controlled robots for clearing roadside bombs.

Smart Defence

In these times of austerity, each euro, dollar or pound sterling counts. Smart defence is a new way of thinking about generating the modern defence capabilities the Alliance needs for the coming decade and beyond. It is a renewed culture of cooperation that encourages Allies to cooperate in developing, acquiring and maintaining military capabilities to undertake the Alliance’s essential core tasks agreed in the new NATO strategic concept. That means pooling and sharing capabilities, setting priorities and coordinating efforts better.

From 2008 the world economy has been facing its worst period since the end of the Second World War. Governments are applying budgetary restrictions to tackle this serious recession, which is having a considerable effect on defence spending.

Furthermore, in the course of this crisis the Alliance's security environment has been changing, and has become more diverse and unpredictable. The crisis in Libya is a recent example, underlining the unforeseeable nature of conflicts, but also showing the need for modern systems and facilities, and for less reliance on the United States for costly advanced capabilities.

In these crisis times, rebalancing defence spending between the European nations and the United States is more than ever a necessity. The other Allies must reduce the gap with the United States by equipping themselves with capabilities that are deemed to be critical, deployable and
sustainable, and must demonstrate political determination to achieve that goal. There must be equitable sharing of the defence burden. Smart defence is NATO’s response to this.

- **The constituents of Smart Defence**

Smart defence is based on capability areas that are critical for NATO, in particular as established at the Lisbon summit in 2010. Ballistic missile defence, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, maintenance of readiness, training and force preparation, effective engagement and force protection – these are all on the list.

For the purposes of smart defence, the Alliance nations must give priority to those capabilities which NATO needs most, specialize in what they do best, and look for multinational solutions to shared problems. NATO can act as intermediary, helping the nations to establish what they can do together at lower cost, more efficiently and with less risk.

**Prioritization**

Aligning national capability priorities with those of NATO has been a challenge for some years. Smart defence is the opportunity for a transparent, cooperative and cost-effective approach to meet essential capability requirements.

**Specialization**

With budgets under pressure, nations make unilateral decisions to abandon certain capabilities. When that happens the other nations fall under an increased obligation to maintain those capabilities. Such specialization “by default” is the inevitable result of uncoordinated budget cuts. NATO should encourage specialization “by design” so that members concentrate on their national strengths and agree to coordinate planned defence budget cuts with the Allies, while maintaining national sovereignty for their final decision.

**Cooperation**

Acting together, the nations can have access to capabilities which they could not afford individually, and achieve economies of scale. Cooperation may take different forms, such as a small group of nations led by a framework nation, or strategic sharing by those who are close in terms of geography, culture or common equipment.

- **The mechanisms of Smart Defence**

**The designation of special representatives**

The NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, has designated General Stéphane Abrial, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, and the Deputy Secretary General, previously
Ambassador Claudio Bisogniero and his successor Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, as special representatives for smart defence. As such they have visited many capitals. National support as we approach the Chicago Summit is essential, both as regards the concept of smart defence and on the concrete multinational projects developed by ACT.

**Coordination with Partners**

Working together as Allies also means seeking cooperation with players outside NATO. NATO and the EU are facing a similar challenge, that of reconciling the urgency of savings with a modern defence. NATO and the European Union, in particular the European Defence Agency, are working together to avoid needless duplication with the pooling and sharing initiative. Concrete opportunities for cooperation have already been identified, in particular combating improvised explosive devices, chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and medical support. The Alliance should also cooperate with Partners case by case, in accordance with its normal principles and procedures.

But smart defence also presupposes innovative multinational cooperation by industry. Our industrial partners are essential players in this enterprise.

- **Smart Defence in the long term**

At their meeting in April 2012 Defence Ministers discussed the ways needed to make sure that NATO has the modern capabilities it needs for the coming decade and beyond.

At the forthcoming Chicago Summit, Smart Defence will be one of the elements addressed in an overall defence package to ensure that the Alliance can acquire and maintain the capabilities required to achieve its goals for NATO Forces 2020. The Summit will be a first but essential step in implementing this Smart Defence concept, with possible agreement between the Allies on a series of concrete multinational projects, and a commitment to a new approach and a new mindset as regards the acquisition and maintenance of capabilities in the long term.

**Interoperability: Connecting NATO Forces**
An Alliance of 28 nations can only work effectively together in joint operations if provisions are in place to ensure smooth cooperation. NATO has been striving for the ability of NATO forces to work together since the Alliance was founded in 1949. Interoperability has become even more important since the Alliance began mounting out-of-area operations in the early 1990s.

NATO’s interoperability policy defines the term as the ability for Allies to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational and strategic objectives. Specifically, it enables forces, units and/or systems to operate together and allows them to share common doctrine and procedures, each others’ infrastructure and bases, and to be able to communicate. Interoperability reduces duplication, enables pooling of resources, and produces synergies among the 28 Allies, and whenever possible with partner countries.

**Components**

Interoperability does not necessarily require common military equipment. What is important is that the equipment can share common facilities, and is able to interact, connect and communicate, exchange data and services with other equipment.

Through its technical (including hardware, equipment, armaments and systems), procedural (including doctrines and procedures) and human (including terminology and training) dimensions, and complemented by information as a critical transversal element, interoperability supports the implementation of such recent NATO initiatives as Smart Defence and Connected Forces.

**Mechanisms**

Interoperable solutions can only be achieved through the effective employment of standardization, training, exercises, lessons learned, demonstrations, tests and trials.

By strengthening relationships with the defence and security industry and by using open standards to the maximum extent possible, NATO is pursuing interoperability as a force multiplier and a streamliner of national efforts.
Evolution

NATO militaries have achieved high level of interoperability through decades of joint planning, training and exercises. More recently, Alliance members have put their interoperability into practice and developed it further during joint operations and missions in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, Afghanistan, Libya and elsewhere. These operations have also enabled NATO’s partner countries to improve interoperability with the Alliance.

The NATO Defence Planning Process

Defence planning in the Alliance is a crucial tool which enables member countries to benefit from the political, military and resource advantages of working together. Within the defence planning process, Allies contribute to enhancing security and stability, and share the burden of developing and delivering the necessary forces and capabilities needed to achieve the Organization’s objectives. The defence planning process prevents the renationalisation of defence policies, while at the same time recognizing national sovereignty.

The aim of NATO defence planning is to provide a framework within which national and Alliance defence planning activities can be harmonized to meet agreed targets in the most effective way. It aims to facilitate the timely identification, development and delivery of the necessary range of forces - forces that are interoperable and adequately prepared, equipped, trained and supported - as well as the associated military and non-military capabilities to undertake the Alliance’s full spectrum of missions.

The NDPP has a coherent and comprehensive defence planning process. It applies a specific approach and mechanism through which NATO is bringing its civilian and military side, including the Strategic Commands, closer together by engaging them in a common, functionally integrated approach to the issue of defence planning alongside national planners. Work is done in a functionally integrated manner while at the same time ensuring that products are fully coordinated, coherent, persuasive, clear, result-oriented and delivered on a timely basis.
Defence planning encompasses several planning domains: force, resource, armaments, logistics, nuclear, C3 (consultation, command and control), civil emergency planning, air defence, air traffic management, standardization, intelligence, medical support and research and technology. The NDPP has introduced a new approach to defence planning and operates within the new NATO committee structure. The Defence Policy and Planning Committee (DPPC) is the central body that oversees the work of NATO bodies and committees responsible for the planning domains.

The NATO Defence Planning Process – NDPP

The NDPP consists of five steps. Although the process is sequential and cyclical in nature (four year cycle with bi-annual elements), some elements occur at different frequencies and Step 4 is a continuous activity.

**Step 1 - Establish political guidance**

The intent is to develop a single, unified political guidance for defence planning which sets out the overall aims and objectives to be met by the Alliance. It translates guidance from higher strategic policy documents (i.e., the Strategic Concept and subsequent political guidance) in sufficient detail to direct the defence planning efforts of the various planning domains, both in member countries and in NATO, towards the determination of the required capabilities. This will obviate the requirement for other political guidance documents for defence planning.

Political guidance should reflect the political, military, economic, legal, civil and technological factors which could impact on the development of the required capabilities. It will, inter alia, aim at defining the number, scale and nature of the operations the Alliance should be able to conduct in the future (commonly referred to as NATO’s Level of Ambition). It will also define the requisite qualitative capability requirements to support this overall ambition. By doing so, it will steer the capability development efforts of Allies and within NATO. Furthermore, it will clearly define associated priorities and timelines, as appropriate, for use by the various planning domains.

Any political guidance needs to be written against the background that the majority of capabilities sought by the Alliance are and will be provided by individual member countries.

Political guidance will be reviewed at least every four years.

**Step 2 - Determine requirements**

There is one single consolidated list of Minimum Capability Requirements, including eventual shortfalls. These requirements are identified by the Defence Planning Staff Team, with the Strategic Commands, notably Allied Command Transformation in the lead. The team take into account all NDPP-related guidance and ensure that all requirements considered necessary to meet quantitative and qualitative ambitions set out in the political guidance are covered. The process is structured,
comprehensive, transparent and traceable and uses analytical supporting tools coupled with relevant NATO expert analysis.

Planning domains are fully engaged throughout the analysis, assisting the Strategic Commands in providing a sound framework for further work which, ultimately, needs to be usable by each planning domain.

Strategic Commands must be transparent, while ensuring that political considerations do not prematurely qualify the process during which requirements are identified. This is achieved by seeking expert advice and feedback from member countries, inviting the latter to observe key milestones and decision points, together with regular briefings to Allies.

**Step 3 - Apportion requirements and set targets**

Target setting initially apportions the overall set of Minimum Capability Requirements to individual countries and NATO entities in the form of target packages, respecting the principles of fair burden-sharing and reasonable challenge.

Initially led by the Strategic Commands, the Defence Planning Staff Team will develop targets for existing and planned capabilities against the Minimum Capability Requirements and cover them in the draft target packages, together with their associated priorities and timelines. Targets should be expressed in capability terms and be flexible enough to allow national, multinational as well as collective implementation.

Each individual Ally has the opportunity to seek clarification on the content of targets and present its national views on their acceptance during a meeting between the relevant national authorities and representatives from the Defence Planning Staff Team. Subsequently, the Defence Planning Staff Team will consider the member country’s perspective and priorities with the aim of refining the NATO target packages and providing advice on what constitutes a reasonable challenge.

Following discussions with member countries, leadership of the Defence Planning Staff Team will transition from the Strategic Commands to the International Staff. At this point, the Defence Planning Staff Team will continue to refine and tailor individual draft target packages in line with the principle of reasonable challenge. To ensure transparency and promote Alliance cohesion, packages will be forwarded to Allies with a recommendation of which targets should be retained or removed to respect this principle. Allies will review these packages during a series of multilateral examinations.

Agreed packages are accompanied by a summary report, which is prepared by the Defence Policy and Planning Committee (Reinforced), on the targets as a whole. This will subsequently be forwarded to permanent representatives for submission to defence ministers for adoption. The
summary will include an assessment of the potential risk and possible impact caused by the removal of planning targets from packages on the delivery of the Alliance’s Level of Ambition.

**Step 4 - Facilitate Implementation**

This step assists national efforts and facilitates multinational and collective efforts to satisfy agreed targets and priorities in a coherent and timely manner.

The aim is to focus on addressing the most important capability shortfalls. This is done by encouraging national implementation, facilitating and supporting multinational implementation and proceeding with the collective (multinational, joint or common-funded) acquisition of the capabilities required by the Alliance. This step also facilitates national implementation of standardization products (STANAGs/Allied Publications) developed to improve interoperability.

The detailed work needed to develop and implement a capability improvement or action plan is carried out by multidisciplinary task forces. These task forces are composed of representatives from all stakeholders, under the lead of a dedicated entity. Each task force is supported by a “Capability Monitor” who keep themselves abreast of progress in the implementation phase and report to all relevant bodies and committees, providing feedback and additional guidance to the task force leader.

Unlike other steps in the process, this step – or function - is continuous in nature.

**Step 5 - Review results**

This step seeks to examine the degree to which NATO’s political objectives, ambitions and associated targets have been met and to offer feedback and direction for the next cycle of the defence planning process.

The Defence Planning Capability Review (DPCR) scrutinises and assesses Allies’ defence and financial plans as well as collective efforts so as to provide an overall assessment of the degree to which the combined Alliance forces and capabilities are able to meet the political guidance, including the NATO Level of Ambition. The DPCR provides a key mechanism for generating feedback and input for the next cycle. Capability reviews will be carried out every two years.

The review process begins with the development of the Defence Planning Capability Survey. It seeks data on national plans and policies, including Allies’ efforts (national, multinational and collective) to address their planning targets. It also seeks information on the national inventory of military forces and associated capabilities, any relevant non-military capabilities potentially available for Alliance operations and national financial plans.
The Defence Planning Staff Team conduct a preliminary analysis and produces draft assessments for each Ally. These assessments constitute a comprehensive analysis of national plans and capabilities, including on force structures, specific circumstances and priorities. The assessments also include a statement by the Strategic Commands regarding the impact each country’s plans have on the ability of Allied Command Operations to conduct missions. They may also include recommendations including, as appropriate, on the redirection of resources from surplus areas to the identified Alliance deficiencies areas.

Once a draft assessment has been developed, it will be circulated to the country concerned for discussion between the national authorities and the Defence Planning Staff Team to ensure information in the draft assessment is correct. The draft assessments are then revised accordingly and submitted to the Defence Policy and Planning Committee (Reinforced) for review and approval during a series of multilateral examinations. During these examinations, the working practice of consensus-minus-one will be continued.

In parallel with the examination of country assessments, the Military Committee, based on the Strategic Commands’ Suitability and Risk Assessment, will develop a risk assessment on the military suitability of the plans and the degree of military risk associated with them in relation to political guidance for defence planning, including the Level of Ambition.

On the basis of the individual country assessments and Military Committee Suitability and Risk Assessment, the Defence Policy and Planning Committee (Reinforced) prepares a NATO Capabilities Report, highlighting individual and collective progress on capability development as it relates to NATO’s Level of Ambition.

The Report will also provide an assessment of any associated risks, including a brief summary of the Military Committee’s Suitability and Risk Assessment. It will also include an indication of whether the risks identified could be mitigated by capabilities developed by member countries outside the NATO defence planning process or by contracting civil assets. This would not relieve Allies from the obligation of trying to meet NATO’s Level of Ambition from within Alliance inventories, nor would it diminish the need to develop the capabilities sought. However, it will assist defence planners in prioritising their efforts to overcome the most critical shortfalls first.

The report will also contain further direction to steer capability development.

- **Current support structures**

  Although a more integrated and comprehensive process has been agreed comprising a coordinating framework with more flexible working arrangements, the committee and staff structures to support the process remain unchanged.

  - **The senior committee for defence planning**
The Defence Policy and Planning Committee is the senior committee for defence planning. It is responsible for the development of defence planning-related policy and the overall coordination and direction of NDPP activities. Effectively, the DPPC is the central body that oversees the work of the NATO bodies and committees responsible for the planning domains on behalf of the North Atlantic Council. It can provide feedback and, as required, defence planning process-related direction to them. On appropriate occasions and as required by the subject matter being reviewed and discussed, the DPPC will meet with appropriate subject matter experts invited to "reinforce" the regular representatives. When meeting in this format the DPPC is referred to as the DPPC "Reinforced" or DPPC(R).

- **Capability Development Executive Board (CDEB)**

  The CDEB is a senior staff-level board providing unity of oversight, policy, direction and guidance, and enforce authority and accountability throughout NATO capability development, bringing together the senior leadership of the relevant civil and military capability development stakeholders in the NATO staffs. The CDEB acts as a steering board to direct staff efforts associated with NATO capability development in accordance with the guidance provided by nations through the relevant committees. This executive body brings all relevant stakeholders together at a senior level to take authoritative decisions with regard to staff efforts associated with capability development which would be implemented, via their representative, by the relevant staff entities.

- **Defence Planning Staff Team**

  The work of the DPPC and CDEB is supported by the NATO Defence Planning Staff Team. Conceptually, the Defence Planning Staff Team is a virtual pool of all civil and military expertise resident within the various NATO HQ staffs and Strategic Commands. This entity supports the entire defence planning process throughout the five steps. In practice, the Defence Planning Staff Team provides the staff officers required to undertake the majority of the staff work to support the NDPP.

- **The planning domains and related committees**

  In concrete terms, defence planning at NATO encompasses many different domains: force, resource, armaments, logistics, nuclear, C3 (consultation, command and control), civil emergency, air defence, air traffic management, standardization, intelligence, medical support and research and technology.

  **Force planning**

  Force planning aims to promote the availability of national forces and capabilities for the full range of Alliance missions. In practical terms, it seeks to ensure that Allies develop modern, deployable, sustainable and interoperable forces and capabilities, which can undertake demanding operations
wherever required, including being able to operate abroad with limited or no support from the
country of destination. However, force planning should not be understood to refer primarily to
“forces”; the focus is on “capabilities” and, how best nations should organise their priorities to
optimise these. Therefore force planning also addresses capability areas that are also covered by
single-area specific planning domains.

The term “force planning” has often been used interchangeably with “defence planning” and
“operational planning”. Defence planning is a much broader term and operational planning is
conducted for specific, NATO-agreed operations.

The Defence Policy and Planning Committee

The Defence Policy and Planning Committee (DPPC) oversees the force planning process. It is the
senior decision-making body on matters relating to the integrated military structure of the Alliance.
It reports directly to the North Atlantic Council (NAC), provides guidance to NATO's military
authorities and, in its reinforced format, oversees the defence planning process, of which force
planning is a constituent activity.

Resource planning

The large majority of NATO resources are national. NATO resource planning aims to provide the
Alliance with the capabilities it needs, but focuses on the elements that are jointly or commonly
funded, that is to say where members pool resources within a NATO framework. In this regard,
resource planning is closely linked to operational planning, which aims to ensure that the Alliance
can fulfill its present and future operational commitments and fight new threats such as terrorism
and weapons of mass destruction.

There is a distinction to be made between joint funding and common funding: joint funding covers
activities managed by NATO agencies, such as the NATO Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS) and NATO pipelines; common funding involves three different budgets: the civil budget,
the military budget, and the NATO Security Investment Programme.

Relatively speaking, these budgets represent a small amount of money, but they are key for the
cohesion of the Alliance and the integration of capabilities.

The Resource Policy and Planning Board

The Resource Policy and Planning Board (RPPB) is the senior advisory body to the North Atlantic
Council on the management of all NATO resources. It has responsibility for the overall management
of NATO’s civil and military budgets, as well as the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP)
and manpower.

Armaments planning
Armaments planning focuses on the development of multinational (but not common-funded) armaments programmes. It promotes cost-effective acquisition, co-operative development and the production of armaments. It also encourages interoperability, and technological and industrial co-operation among Allies and Partners.

The Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD)

The Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) is the senior NATO committee responsible for Alliance armaments cooperation, material standardization and defence procurement. It brings together the top officials responsible for defence procurement in NATO member and Partner countries to consider the political, economic and technical aspects of the development and procurement of equipment for NATO forces, with the aim of arriving at common solutions.

Logistics planning

Logistics planning in NATO aims at ensuring responsive and usable logistics support to NATO operations. This is achieved by promoting the development of military and civil logistics capabilities and multinational cooperation in logistics.

The Logistics Committee

The Logistics Committee is the senior advisory body on logistics at NATO. Its overall mandate is two-fold: to address consumer logistics matters with a view to enhancing the performance, efficiency, sustainability and combat effectiveness of Alliance forces; and to exercise, on behalf of the North Atlantic Council, an overarching coordinating authority across the whole spectrum of logistics functions within NATO.

Nuclear planning

The aim of nuclear policy and planning is to promote the maintenance of a credible nuclear deterrent and force posture, which meets the requirements of the current and foreseeable security environment.

Nuclear planning must ensure that the Alliance's nuclear posture is perceived as a credible and effective element of NATO's strategy of war prevention. As such, its overall goal is to ensure security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces.

NATO has developed an adaptive nuclear planning capability. Accordingly, nuclear forces are not directed towards a specific threat nor do they target or hold at risk any country. In addition, the formulation of the Alliance's nuclear policy involves all NATO countries (except France), including non-nuclear Allies.

The Nuclear Planning Group
The Nuclear Planning Group takes decisions on the Alliance’s nuclear policy, which is kept under constant review and modified or adapted in light of new developments.

C3 planning

The effective performance of NATO’s political and military functions requires the widespread utilization of both NATO and national Consultation, Command and Control (C3) systems, services and facilities, supported by appropriate personnel and NATO-agreed doctrine, organizations and procedures.

C3 systems include communications, information, navigation and identification systems as well as sensor and warning installation systems, designed and operated in a networked and integrated form to meet the needs of NATO. Individual C3 systems may be provided by NATO via common funded programmes or by members via national, multi-national or joint-funded co-operative programmes.

C3 planning is responsive to requirements, as and when they appear, so there is no established C3 planning cycle. However, activities are harmonized with the cycles of the other associated planning disciplines where they exist.

The Consultation, Command and Control (C3) Board

The Consultation, Command and Control Board is a senior multinational body acting on behalf of and responsible to the NAC on all matters relating to C3 issues throughout the Organization. This includes interoperability of NATO and national C3 systems, as well as advising the CNAD on C3 cooperative programmes.

Civil emergency planning

Civil emergency planning in NATO aims to collect, analyse and share information on national planning activity to ensure the most effective use of civil resources for use during emergency situations, in accordance with Alliance objectives. It enables Allies and Partners to assist each other in preparing for and dealing with the consequences of crisis, disaster or conflict.

The Civil Emergency Planning Committee

The Civil Emergency Planning Committee is the top advisory body for the protection of civilian populations and the use of civil resources in support of NATO objectives.

Air defence planning

Air defence planning enables members to harmonize national efforts with international planning related to air command and control and air defence weapons. NATO integrated air defence (NATINAD) is a network of interconnected systems and measures designed to nullify or reduce the
effectiveness of hostile air action. A NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme has been initiated to enhance the existing NATINAD system, particularly against theatre ballistic missiles.

The Air Defence Committee (ADC)

The Air Defence Committee advises the North Atlantic Council and the relevant Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council bodies on all elements of air defence, including missile defence and relevant air power aspects. It promotes harmonization of national efforts with international planning related to air command and control and air defence weapons.

Air Traffic management

NATO's role in civil-military air traffic management is to ensure, in cooperation with other international organizations, safe access to airspace, effective delivery of services and civil-military interoperability for air operations conducted in support of the Alliance's security tasks and missions while minimizing disruption to civil aviation, already constrained by the limited capacity of systems and airports, and mitigating the cost implications of new civil technologies on defence budgets.

The Air Traffic Management Committee (ATMC)

The ATMC is the senior civil-military advisory body to the NAC for airspace use and air traffic management. The committee's mission is to develop, represent and promote NATO’s view on matters related to safe and expeditious air operations in the airspace of NATO areas of responsibility and interest.

Standardization

At NATO, standardization is the process of developing shared concepts, doctrines, procedures and designs to achieve and maintain the most effective levels of "compatibility, interchangeability and commonality" in operations, procedures, materials, technology and administration. The primary products of this process are Standardization Agreements (STANAGS) between member countries.

The Committee for Standardization

The Committee for Standardization is the senior authority of the Alliance responsible for providing coordinated advice to the NAC on overall standardization issues.

Intelligence

Intelligence plays an important role in the defence planning process, in particular with the emergence of multidirectional and multidimensional security challenges such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Improved intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance as well as strategic warning and assessment capacity for NATO are essential to ensure maximum warning and preparation time to counter military and terrorist attacks. Intelligence sets out the requirements for the improved provision, exchange and analysis of all-source political, economic, security and military intelligence, and closer coordination of the intelligence producers within the Alliance.

*The Intelligence Steering Board*

The Intelligence Steering Board acts as an inter-service coordination body responsible for steering intelligence activities involving the International Staff and the International Military Staff and for providing effective support to the decision-making process at NATO Headquarters. It is tasked, among others, with developing the Strategic Intelligence Requirements from which any capability requirements are derived.

*The Military Intelligence Committee*

It is responsible for developing a work plan in particular in the areas of NATO Intelligence Support to Operations and oversight of policy guidance on military intelligence.

*Medical support*

Medical support is normally a national responsibility, however planning needs to be flexible to consider multinational approaches. The degree of multinationality varies according to the circumstances of the mission and the willingness of countries to participate.

*The Committee of the Chiefs of Military Medical Services in NATO (COMEDS)*

COMEDS is composed of the senior military medical authorities of member countries. It acts as the central point for the development and coordination of military medical matters and for providing medical advice to the Military Committee.

*Research and Technology*

NATO promotes and conducts cooperative research and information exchange to support the effective use of national defence research and technology and further the military needs of the Alliance.

*The Research and Technology Board (RTB)*

The RTB is an integrated NATO body responsible for defence research and technological development. It provides advice and assistance to the CNAD, as well as to the Military Committee. It coordinates research and technology policy in different NATO bodies and is supported by a specialized NATO Research and Technology Agency.
Evolution of defence planning within NATO

Article 5 operations and automaticity

In essence, defence planning existed during the Cold War but "operational planning", in the sense that we now know it, did not. This was because it was the task of force (and nuclear) planning to identify all the forces required to implement the collective defence war plans and members were expected to assign and employ the requested forces virtually without question. These war plans were, in effect, the only "operational plans" of the era.

Non-article 5 operations and force generation

When, after the Cold War, the Alliance started to get involved in non-Article 5 operations, the situation had to change. Since these missions are, by agreement, case-by-case and the provision of national forces is discretionary, the automaticity of availability associated with force planning during the Cold War period was lost. This led to the requirement for "force generation conferences" to solicit the necessary forces and "operational planning" to develop the plans.

Existing processes were adjusted so that "defence planning" disciplines no longer focused exclusively on meeting collective defence requirements and the needs of a largely "fixed" operational concept. Forces, assets, capabilities and facilities had to be capable of facing threats posed by failed states, ethnic rivalry, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism among others. In fact, acknowledging the ever-changing situation and recognizing the benefits of harmonization and coordination, the existing procedures were reviewed on a regular basis and adjusted as appropriate.

In practical terms, there was no standard defence planning process or defence planning cycle per se. Each one of the then seven principal disciplines was managed by a different NATO body and applied special procedures. They also contributed differently to the overall aim of providing the Alliance with the forces and capabilities to undertake the full range of its missions.

Introducing greater integration and harmonization

With the differences between the various components of the defence planning process and interrelated disciplines, the need for harmonization and coordination was essential.

While force planning had provided, to a certain extent, a basis for this harmonization and coordination, at the Istanbul Summit NATO leaders concluded that more was required. They directed the Council in Permanent Session to produce comprehensive political guidance in support of the Strategic Concept for all Alliance capabilities issues, planning disciplines and intelligence, responsive to the Alliance's requirements. They also directed that the interfaces between the respective Alliance planning disciplines, including operational planning, should be further analyzed.
A new process and working methodology were introduced in 2009: the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). It aimed to improve the harmonization of the planning domains, including their related committee structure and staffs, and encourages member countries to harmonize and integrate their national defence planning activities so as to complement NATO efforts. In his introductory remarks to defence ministers in June 2009, the then NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, underlined: "If successfully implemented, the NDPP will mark the most profound change to defence planning in decades and has a very high potential to deliver tangible practical results".

Work on the comprehensive political guidance and a suitable management mechanism to ensure its implementation was completed mid-2009.

Efforts to enhance and coordinate defence planning are not limited to the remit of the Alliance. NATO and the European Union discuss this topic in the EU-NATO Capability Group, which aims to develop the capability requirements common to both organizations. These initiatives build on the "EU and NATO: Coherent and Mutually Reinforcing Capability Requirements" document.

The introduction of NDPP is currently in its first "transitional" cycle and much has been learned which will influence subsequent cycles in a continuous improvement approach which is expected to lead to increasing integration, efficiency and effectiveness.

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**Education and training**

NATO conducts education and training to ensure its forces are effective and interoperable, as part of its cooperation with non-member countries, and as part of NATO-led operations.

Historically, NATO education and training has been focused on ensuring that military forces from member countries can work together effectively in operations and missions. Today, NATO education and training functions have expanded significantly. NATO has a network of training schools and
institutions, conducts regular exercises and runs training missions as far away as Afghanistan and Africa.

The three main purposes are to enhance the interoperability and effectiveness of NATO-led multinational forces, assist partner countries in their reform efforts, and help bring peace and stability to crisis-hit areas.

- **Purpose and practical implementation**

- **Enhancing interoperability**

Troops for NATO operations are drawn from the forces of NATO member and partner countries, as well as non-NATO and non-partner countries.

Ensuring that these multinational forces can work together effectively despite differences in tactics, doctrine, training, structures, and language is a priority for NATO. This “interoperability” is built in a number of ways.

- **Courses and seminars**

NATO’s network of training institutions offers a broad range of courses on both strategic and operational issues. While courses differ, they tend to focus on knowledge and skills required by individuals who will occupy senior or specialized positions within the structure of the Alliance, or who hold NATO-related posts in their own countries.

For instance, the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy, is NATO’s primary strategic-level educational facility and includes areas of study such as trends in the international security environment and their potential effects on NATO countries. It provides training for senior commanders whereas the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, is the primary operational-level training centre for students. Operational-level training focuses on joint planning of NATO operations, logistics, communications, civil emergency planning, or civil-military cooperation.

Courses are being offered in an increasing number of locations to ensure all available expertise is being utilised, for instance, civil-military training at the CIMIC Centre of Excellence. Courses can last anywhere from a day to several months depending on the type of activity. They are all open to personnel from NATO member countries and some to personnel from countries participating in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, as well as selected "partners across the globe" (non-member and non-partner countries, also referred to as "global partners"). Some are also open to civilian participants.

- **Exercises**
Exercises provide opportunities to test and validate all aspects of NATO operations, including procedures, concepts, systems, and tactics. They also build and reinforce interoperability by focusing on practical training for personnel from NATO countries and partners with which the Alliance cooperates.

During an exercise, forces will typically be asked to respond to a fictional scenario that approximates what might occur in real life. This allows them to employ their previous training and experience in a practical way, and increases their level of readiness should they be deployed in a crisis.

Exercises cover the full range of military operations, from combat to humanitarian relief to stabilization and reconstruction. They can vary in length and scope, from a few senior officers working on an isolated problem to full-scale combat scenarios involving aircraft, ships, artillery pieces, armoured vehicles and thousands of troops. NATO also exercises its strategic-level political and military arrangements. This ensures that its consultation and decision-making architecture is refined and that key players are kept aware of how the Alliance works.

NATO partners are fully involved in exercises as participants and hosts through the Military Training and Education Programme.

- **Experimentation and development**

NATO is constantly trying to improve the way its forces operate. In line with its transformation agenda, the Alliance is continuing to focus on development of new concepts and capabilities to ensure future NATO forces are trained and equipped to the highest possible standard.

NATO countries conduct their own experimentation. The Alliance -- through Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and its subordinate bodies -- provides a forum for members to engage in knowledge-sharing regarding concepts and capabilities.

NATO also develops new concepts and capabilities to benefit NATO forces. For instance, the NATO Undersea Research Centre in La Spezia, Italy, has developed technologies and training for underwater reconnaissance and port protection. A separate initiative called the "NATO Friendly Force Tracker" helps to promote interoperability and is being employed in Afghanistan to help NATO-led forces better coordinate their actions and reduce the possibility of casualties.

**Working with NATO partners on defence reform**

NATO members have reduced levels of military personnel, equipment and bases from Cold War levels, and transformed their forces to meet today’s needs. Many partner countries are still going through this process, often with scarce resources and limited expertise.
Education is a key agent of transformation and NATO is using it to support institutional reform in partner countries. For that purpose, NATO has launched the Education and Training for Defence Reform and the Defence Education Enhancement Programmes. The Alliance’s education and training programmes – initially focused on increasing interoperability between NATO and partner forces – have been expanded to provide a means for members and partners to collaborate on how to build, develop and reform educational institutions in the security, defence and military domain... These include courses and seminars, a training network, tailor-made assistance and access to NATO experts.

Furthermore, in 2005, NATO began development of an “Education and Training for Defence Reform” initiative that provides a framework for cooperation for both military and civilian personnel.

- **Courses, seminars and workshops**

  Countries which work with NATO through its various cooperation frameworks, as well as personnel from Global Partners are able to participate in an array of NATO education and training activities - courses, roundtables, seminars, and workshops.

- **Tailor-made education and training**

  Each country participating in defence reform, in consultation with NATO, agrees on an individualized programme which varies in depth and breadth, depending on its interests and level of commitment and cooperation. This can include – in addition to participation in courses, seminars, and exercises – tailor-made education and training programmes such as on-the-job training, language training, and resettlement and retaining of redundant military personnel.

NATO is leading a series of tailored programmes called the Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP) with the support of the PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes, the Partnership Training and Education Centres and Allied as well as partner defence institutions. These programmes focus on faculty building. There are currently six DEEPs in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova and Mauritania. A reflection on "what to teach" and "how to teach" led to two initiatives. One resulted in the development of generic reference curricula on defence institution-building, on professional military education for officers, and currently ongoing on non -commissioned officers. The latter gave birth to a Defence Educators’ Programme which provides an opportunity for faculty members to exchange with their peers on best practices on modern teaching methodologies.

Furthermore, in Ukraine NATO has financed and implemented language and management courses in cooperation with Ukraine’s National Coordination Centre, which is in charge of the social adaptation of redundant military servicemen.
“Mobile education and training teams” (METTs) are another example of the tools the Alliance employs in response to partners’ defence reform needs. METTs are small groups of trainers who travel to the interested countries to deliver training tailored to the local context.

- **Advice and expertise**

NATO countries are among the most advanced in the world in terms of defence capabilities. Countries cooperating with the Alliance on defence reform are able to take advantage of this expertise. For most countries, this is done through the Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP).

Countries with special relationships with NATO can have additional mechanisms for exchanging advice and expertise. For instance, the NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform provides a forum through which consultation can take place on initiatives as diverse as civil-military relations, democratic oversight and civilian management of the armed forces and other security sector agencies, defence planning, policy, strategy and national security concepts.

- **Training initiative for Mediterranean and Middle East**

A dedicated Middle East faculty has been established at the NATO Defense College in Rome as part of the NATO Regional Cooperation Course.

**Education and training in NATO-led operations**

NATO’s efforts to bring stability to crisis areas go beyond deploying troops. Through training and education programmes, NATO is helping countries such as Afghanistan develop its own security institutions and provide for its own security.

- **Afghanistan**

An important aspect of NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan is assisting the country in developing its security structures and forces. While the United States is the lead country for training the Afghan National Army (ANA), NATO is assisting and supporting this process. This includes special courses to train Afghan soldiers in specific skills and to prepare them to work in tandem with NATO forces. The Alliance has also deployed Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams to Afghan National Army units at various levels of command. These are small groups of experienced officers and non-commissioned officers that coach and mentor the ANA units to which they are attached.

In 2006, NATO signed a declaration with Afghanistan, establishing a substantial programme of long-term co-operation. The Afghan Cooperation Programme provides for further training assistance, including opening NATO courses and partnership activities to Afghan participation, providing advice and expertise on defence reform and the development of security institutions, as well as specific assistance such as language training.
Subsequently, on 20 November 2010, NATO and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan signed a Declaration on an Enduring Partnership at the NATO Summit in Lisbon. The Enduring Partnership is intended to provide long-term political and practical support to Afghanistan as it rebuilds its security institutions and assumes full responsibility for its own security through the Transition process. It includes a series of agreed programmes and activities undertaken as part of the ongoing cooperation between NATO and Afghanistan. This includes the Professional Military Education Programme for Afghanistan which aims to further develop Afghan institutions.

NATO and Russia also are collaborating through the NATO-Russia Council on a counter-narcotics training pilot project tailored to Afghan and Central Asian personnel.

- **The African Union**

  At the request of the African Union (AU), NATO assisted the AU (June 2005-end December 2007) in strengthening its peacekeeping force in Darfur in a bid to halt the continuing violence. Initially, NATO’s support consisted in training AU troops in strategic-level planning and operational procedures. It provided support to a UN-led map exercise and later, in summer 2006, also provided training assistance in the fields of pre-deployment certification and “lessons learned”, as well as information management.

- **Iraq**

  From 2004 to end 2011, NATO helped Iraq provide for its own security by training Iraqi personnel and supporting the development of the country’s security institutions.

  NATO trained and mentored middle and senior level personnel from the Iraqi security forces in Iraq and outside of Iraq, at NATO schools and training centres. The Alliance also played a role in coordinating offers of equipment and training from individual NATO and Partner countries.

- **The training bodies and institutions**

  There are a number of main bodies through which training is organized and run. Some operate under the direction of the Alliance and others are external, but complementary to Alliance structures.

**Allied Command Operations**

Allied Command Operations was created as part of the reorganization of NATO’s command structure in 2002. Training responsibilities are being realigned and from July 2012 it will have the main responsibility for setting collective training requirements and conducting the evaluation of headquarters and formations.

**Allied Command Transformation**
Allied Command Transformation (ACT) is located in Norfolk, Virginia, and as its name indicates, leads NATO transformation.

To help realise this objective, ACT holds lead responsibility for NATO and PfP joint education, individual training, and associated policy and doctrine development as well as for directing NATO schools. From July 2012, it will also manage collective training and exercises based on Allied Command Operation’s requirements.

**NATO’s principal and ancillary educational facilities**

- **The principal educational facilities**

  **The NATO Defense College**

  At the strategic level, the NATO Defense College in Rome is NATO’s foremost academic institution. It contributes to Alliance objectives by developing its role as a major centre of education, study and research on transatlantic security issues. Founded in 1951, several thousand senior officers, diplomats, and officials have since passed through its doors.

  Its main tasks are to help prepare both civilian and military leaders for senior appointments within NATO; conduct outreach activities directed at partner countries; and provide fresh perspectives to NATO decision-makers. It also provides an annual venue, through the Conference of Commandants of Defence Academies, for an exchange of views on how they conduct business. Since the 2009 Conference that was dedicated to the Comprehensive Approach, Partnerships and Education, defence education and partnerships have always been a subject of exchange between defence education institutions. In 2012, the theme of the 41st Conference will be “Changes in the Strategic landscape – Changes in Higher Education curricula”.

  **The NATO School**

  The NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, operates under the auspices of ACT, but also supplies training support to operations. It is NATO’s key operational-level training facility, providing short-term, multidisciplinary training tailored to military and civilian personnel from NATO, PfP, Mediterranean Dialogue and global partners. As part of its support for NATO operations, the NATO School has also hosted personnel from countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, it serves as a facilitator for the harmonization of programmes with 24 Partnerships Training and Education Centres.

  **The NATO Communications and Information Systems School**

  Located in Latina, Italy, the NATO Communications and Information Systems School (NCISS) is one of the Alliance’s key training institutions. It provides advanced training for civilian and military personnel from NATO and non-NATO countries in the operation and maintenance of the Alliance’s communications and information systems. Like the NATO School, NCISS falls under the direction of ACT but provides support to NATO-led operations.
• **The principal training facilities**

**Joint Warfare Centre**

The Joint Warfare Centre conducts training to improve interoperability at the operational level. It also conducts experimentation, analysis, doctrine development, and exercise evaluation with a particular focus on joint and combined staffs.

**Joint Force Training Centre**

JFTC conducts training to improve interoperability at the tactical level. It conducts experimentation, analysis, doctrine development, and exercise evaluation with a particular focus on joint tactical staffs.

**NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre**

This centre leads efforts to improve the Alliance's capability to conduct interdiction operations at sea.

• **The ancillary facilities**

**Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre**

This is NATO's centre for performing joint analysis of operations, training, exercises and experiments. Part of its responsibilities includes establishing and maintaining an interactive lessons learnt database.

**NATO Undersea Research Centre**

This institution conducts research and testing to address NATO's maritime requirements. Activities are carried out to support NATO's current operational requirements and to support its transformation agenda.

• **Additional training institutions and organizations**

The following training institutions and organizations have a relationship with NATO but are not related to the Alliance in the same way as the NATO Defense College or the Joint Warfare Centre. They are typically administered by sponsor countries, national authorities or civil organizations, but are open to participation by personnel from NATO member and partner countries.

**Centres of Excellence**

These are centres that have been accredited by NATO. One of their roles is to provide high-quality education and training to the Euro-Atlantic community.
They are funded nationally or multi-nationally and their relationship with NATO is formalized through memoranda of understanding. The first Centres of Excellence to be fully accredited by NATO were the Joint Air Power Competence Centre in Germany, and the Defence Against Terrorism Centre of Excellence in Turkey. Many more have been established since then.

**Partnerships Training and Education Centres**

Partnerships Training and Education Centres focus on the operational and tactical levels. Each one has a different area of expertise and provides enhanced training and facilities for personnel from all partner countries. There are currently twenty three Partnerships Training and Education Centres.

The NATO School chairs the annual conference of the Commandants of the Partnerships Training and Education Centres. This programme has been opened to the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and to the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI).

In April 2011, NATO foreign ministers adopted a concept for Partnership Training and Education Centres. This "Policy for a More Efficient and Flexible Partnership", states that "all partners will be offered deeper political and practical engagement with the Alliance, including through support for defence education, training and capacity building, within existing resources." With this initiative, NATO has committed itself to support interested partners in developing their defence education and training capacities even further.

**Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes**

The PfP Consortium was established in 1999 to help promote education in topics related to security. It does this by facilitating cooperation between both civilian and military institutions in NATO and PfP countries in support of NATO priorities. These priorities include programmes and initiatives such as the Partnership Action Plan for Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB) or Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs), the Training and Education Enhancement Programme (TEEP) and the Education and Training for Defence Reform Initiative. Participating organizations include universities, research institutions and training centres.

The PfP Consortium operates by establishing working groups that bring together experts, policymakers, and defence and security practitioners to pool information and develop products (such as educational tools or scholarly publications).

In 2008, the PfP Consortium has produced what is called a reference curriculum on PAP-DIB. This document aims to provide Partner countries with in-depth learning objectives and curriculum support for academic courses focused on reforming or building defence institutions. In 2011, the PfP Consortium produced a generic reference curriculum on professional military education for officers. This Reference Curriculum supports the Defence Education Enhancement Programme and the
Education for Reform Initiative. The PfP Consortium is currently working on developing a Reference Curriculum for non-commissioned officers.

The PfP Consortium is also running an Educator’s Programme to familiarize Partners with modern teaching methodologies and is supporting Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in education-related aspects of their IPAPs.

The George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies forms the Secretariat.

Education and training: a key activity since 1949

Collective education and training has been ongoing since the inception of the Alliance in 1949. Over time, it has expanded dramatically and has become an integral aspect of the Alliance’s ability to provide security.

Interoperability

In the early years of the Alliance, NATO forces conducted joint training to strengthen their ability to practice collective defence. In other words, education and training was conducted to ensure that forces were prepared in the case of an attack.

An integrated force under centralized command

An integrated force under centralized command was called for in September 1950. The first Supreme Commander Europe, US General Dwight D. Eisenhower, was appointed in December 1950. Following this appointment, national forces were put under centralized command.

The Alliance’s first exercises

The Alliance’s first exercises were held in the autumn of 1951. During 1953, there were approximately 100 exercises of various kinds conducted by NATO. From this point on, NATO forces began to gain cohesion.

Education for individuals

Individual education soon followed. The need for a specialized setting to explore issues unique to the Alliance was first recognized by General Eisenhower in April 1951. The NATO Defense College was inaugurated later that year, on 19 November and was transferred to Rome in 1966, where it is still located.

The NATO Communications and Information Systems School in Latina, Italy was established in 1959, when a civil contractor began to train a small number of NATO personnel on what would
become NATO’s ‘ACE HIGH Communications System.’ And on 2 May of the same year, the NATO Undersea Research Centre in La Spezia, Italy was commissioned.

In 1971, the Military Committee established the NATO Training Group. The NATO Training Group met for many years in joint session with the Euro-training sub-group, which was set up to improve multinational training arrangements between European states.

In 1975 the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, received its charter and present name. For almost twenty five years, its principal focus was on issues relating to NATO collective defence.

**NATO training opens to partners**

Since the end of the Cold War, the Alliance has increased its political engagement with non-member countries and opened its education and training to these countries.

**PfP countries**

When NATO invited former Warsaw Pact countries, former Soviet Republics and non-member Western European countries to join the PfP programme in 1994, participating countries committed to increase interoperability with NATO forces. This opened the way for joint training and marked the beginning of NATO’s support for defence reform.

NATO training institutions soon followed suit. The first officers’ course for partner countries was conducted in October 1994 at the NATO Communications and Information Systems School. Similarly, the NATO Defense College integrated PfP issues into its Senior Course.

**Mediterranean Dialogue countries**

The Mediterranean Dialogue was likewise created in 1994, initially as a forum for political dialogue. In 1997, at a meeting in Sintra, Portugal, the Alliance decided to open selected military training activities to countries participating in this initiative (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia).

**Increasing cooperation with all partners**

In 1998, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council approved the creation of the Partnership for Peace Consortium, which included PfP Training Centres and the PfP Simulation Network.

At the 1999 Washington Summit, NATO leaders approved plans for an Enhanced and More Operational Partnership. This enhanced military cooperation through the creation of sub-initiatives such as the Training and Education Enhancement Programme (TEEP). In addition, with the revision
of the NATO Strategic Concept in 1999, the role of the NATO School was fundamentally altered to include cooperation and dialogue with civilian personnel from non-NATO countries.

In May 2002, the Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre in Monsanto, Portugal was established. This facility's mission is to perform joint analysis and experimentation of operations, training and exercises, also with Partners.

In February 2005, the North Atlantic Council noted the Education and Training for Defence Reform (EfR). EfR helps EAPC educators incorporate principles linked to defence institution building into their curricula. Since the courses are aimed at civil servants and other persons participating in defence institution building, they contribute indirectly to improving defence reform.

**Transformation through training**

With the creation of the two new strategic commands in 2002, the coordination and coherence of NATO education and training activities was greatly increased. This led to the creation of additional training institutions and initiatives.

*New training centres*

A Joint Warfare Centre in Stavanger, Norway was inaugurated on 23 October 2003.

The Joint Force Training Centre in Bydgoszcz, Poland, inaugurated on 31 March 2004, supports training for both NATO and Partner forces to improve joint and combined tactical interoperability.

*Stepping up training and partnerships*

At the 2004 Istanbul Summit, Alliance leaders elevated the Mediterranean Dialogue initiative to a genuine partnership, to include increased participation in exercises and individual training at NATO institutions. Provision was also made for cooperation on defence reform. At the same time, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) was introduced, which paved the way for cooperation between NATO and countries from the broader Middle East in areas such as education and training.

This summit also made provision for partners to engage in joint training for terrorism and to train jointly with the NATO Response Force.

NATO’s efforts on defence reform gained added momentum with the creation of the Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building, which outlines what NATO and Partners want to achieve in this area. Increased emphasis on defence reform meant that the 1999 Training and Education Enhancement Programme took on a defence reform role.

*The assistance of NATO-led EAPC teams of experts*
One concrete element of assistance in education and training is the visits to partner countries by multinational teams of experts. These NATO-led visits aim to address the various education and training requirements listed in the Action Plans. The South Caucasus countries and Moldova have been targets of such visits; the most recent one took place in April 2012 in Mauritania.

Exercises

Exercises are important tools through which the Alliance tests and validates its concepts, procedures, systems and tactics. They also provide an opportunity to build interoperability, i.e., improve the ability of militaries to work together, and contribute to defence reform.

While individual NATO countries conduct exercises as a routine part of their national preparation for operations, they also participate in Alliance exercises. Frequent exercises ensure that forces are able to operate effectively and efficiently in demanding crisis situations.

NATO military exercises are developed from the strategic priorities and objectives defined by the NATO military authorities, emergent operational requirements and specific exercise objectives defined in exercise specifications.

- The aim of NATO exercises

Exercises serve a number of specific purposes:

- **Training and experience**

Exercises allow forces to build on previous training in a practical way, thereby heightening forces’ level of proficiency in a given area. Exercises have varying levels of complexity but most assume that basic training is complete and that a sufficient number of trained personnel are available.
Testing and validating structures

Exercises are designed to practice the efficiency of structures as well as personnel. A structure consists of many components – concepts, doctrine, procedures, systems and tactics – that must function together. Supply structures, for instance, require specialised training, equipment and operating procedures, which must be combined to effectively support a mission’s objectives. Putting these structures into practice allows them to be tested and, if need be, refined.

Interoperability

NATO-led forces must be able to work together effectively despite differences in doctrine, language, structures, tactics and training. Interoperability is built, in part, through routine inter-forces training between NATO member states and through practical cooperation between personnel from Allied and partner countries.

Defence Reform

Participation in NATO exercises is one of the options available to help with defence reform. They provide the possibility for NATO member countries to test reforms implemented nationally and give partner countries the opportunity to be involved in and observe the structures and mechanisms that Alliance members have in place.

The making of an exercise

Exercise scenarios

During an exercise, forces are asked to respond to a fictional scenario that resembles what might occur in real life. Exercises cover the full range of military operations, from combat to humanitarian relief and from stabilisation to reconstruction. They can last from a day to several weeks and can vary in scope from a few officers working on an isolated problem, to full-scale combat scenarios involving aircraft, navy ships, artillery pieces, armoured vehicles and thousands of troops.

Alliance exercises are supported by NATO countries and, as appropriate, by partner countries, which provide national commitments in the form of troops, equipment or other forms of support. The participating countries are normally responsible for funding any form of national contribution.
Each exercise has pre-specified training objectives which drive the selection of activities. Objectives may be to build skills and knowledge, practice coordination mechanisms, or validate procedures.

At the conclusion of an exercise, commanders and, in many cases, troops collectively review their performance. This process allows them to identify areas that work well ("best practices") and areas that can be improved ("lessons learnt"). In this way, exercises facilitate continuous improvement of interoperability, efficiency and performance.

**The Military Training and Exercise Programme**

Events and activities related to NATO training and exercises are developed by both Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT). This process culminates with the publication of the annual Military Training and Exercise Programme (MTEP). From July 2012, ACO will set the training requirements and conduct NATO’s evaluations. ACT will manage the MTEP and execute the exercise programme.

The MTEP provides detailed information on training, exercises and related activities scheduled for the first two calendar years, and outlines information on training and exercise activities scheduled for the following three calendar years.

The document is based on the priorities and intent of the strategic commanders. The areas typically included are current and future operations, the NATO Response Force, transformational experimentation and NATO’s military cooperation programmes.

NATO exercise requirements are coordinated during MTEP Programming Board Meetings (which are open to representatives from partner countries) starting at least eighteen months before the beginning of the next cycle. Preliminary planning culminates in the NATO Training and Exercise Conference, where NATO Commands, NATO and partner countries, and other invitees conduct final exercise coordination and provide support to the annual MTEP.

**The participation of partner countries**

In accordance with NATO’s partnership policy, exercises are to be opened to all formal partners, either as observers or as participants. The type of participation is determined by NATO and the partner’s level of ambition in cooperating (whether, for instance, it intends to provide forces to current or future NATO -led operations). Partner participation or even the hosting of exercises is of mutual benefit to NATO and partners as it increases interoperability and cooperation.

**Political exercises**

Exercises are organised in both the military and civilian structures of the Alliance. NATO holds exercises based on its political arrangements, concepts and procedures so as to refine consultations and decision-making architecture and capabilities. Political exercises also aim to ensure that primary
advisers – non-elected senior political officials and military commanders in capitals and within the NATO structures – are provided with opportunities to maintain their awareness of how complex, multinational organisations such as NATO work. In some instances, partners engaged in NATO-led operations are able to participate in certain aspects of these exercises.

**What is in an exercise name?**

At the present time, NATO exercises are identified by two words. The first letter of the first word denotes the NATO command responsible for scheduling the exercise.

- **S** Supreme Headquarters Allied Command Europe
- **B** Joint Forces Command Brunssum
- **N** Joint Forces Command Naples
- **L** Joint Command Lisbon

The first letter of the second word denotes the element(s) concerned.

- **A** Air
- **L** Land
- **M** Maritime
- **J** Joint

For example, Exercise NOBLE MARLIN is a maritime exercise organised and directed by Joint Forces Command Naples.

- **The strategic commands in the lead**

ACO and ACT work closely together on NATO military exercises. Both are assisted by the Alliance’s network of education, training, and assessment institutions, as well as national structures.

From July 2012, ACO will have the main responsibility for setting collective training requirements and conducting the evaluation of headquarters and formations; and ACT will manage collective training and exercises, based on ACO’s requirements. ACT also holds lead responsibility for NATO and PfP joint education, individual training and associated policy and doctrine development, as well as for directing NATO schools.

- **Exercises through time**

NATO has been conducting Alliance-level exercises since 1951. In the early years of the Alliance, NATO forces conducted exercises to strengthen their ability to practice collective defence. In other words, they were conducted to ensure that forces were prepared in the case of an attack.
An integrated force under centralised command was called for in September 1950. By December 1950, the first Supreme Commander Europe, U.S. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, was appointed. Following this appointment, national forces were put under centralised command.

The Alliance’s first exercises were held in the autumn of 1951. During 1953, there were approximately 100 exercises of various kinds conducted by NATO commanders. From this point on, NATO forces were no longer a collection of national units, but were beginning to gain cohesion. A year after Allied Command Europe became operational, General Eisenhower reported that “the combat readiness of our troops has improved markedly.”

In 1994, the Alliance launched the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative. One of the initiative’s objectives is to promote closer military cooperation and interoperability. From that time on, PfP members were able to participate in peacekeeping field exercises.

In 2002, the NATO Response Force (NRF) was created. The original NRF concept was revised in 2009 and since, the emphasis has been placed on exercises conducted in support of the NRF. This training is intended to ensure that the Force is able to deploy quickly and operate effectively in a variety of situations.

At the 2004 Istanbul Summit, Alliance leaders elevated the Mediterranean Dialogue initiative to a genuine partnership to include increased participation in exercises and individual training at NATO institutions. At the same time, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative was introduced, paving the way for cooperation between NATO and countries from the broader Middle East in areas such as education and training, and made provision for partners to engage in joint training for terrorism. Following the Lisbon Summit in November 2010 and the introduction of the 2010 Strategic Concept and the new partnerships policy, NATO exercises are now being opened to all partners.

**Improving NATO’s capabilities**
NATO has been engaged in continuous and systematic transformation for many years to ensure that it has the policies, capabilities, and structures required, in the changing international security environment, to deal with current and future challenges, including of course the collective defence of its members. With Allied forces engaged in operations and missions across several continents, the Alliance needs to ensure that its armed forces remain modern, deployable and sustainable.

The Alliance’s 2010 Strategic Concept sets out NATO’s strategic priorities and defines the Organization’s vision of Euro-Atlantic security for the next decade. It provides an analysis of the strategic environment and a framework for all Alliance capability development planning disciplines and intelligence, identifying the kinds of operations the Alliance must be able to perform and setting the context for in which capability development takes place.

Meeting immediate and long-term challenges

Short-term and critical capability shortfalls that arise on operations are tackled through a mechanism whereby urgent operational requirements are raised by the operational commands, scrutinised by the Military Committee and relevant budget committees and put to the North Atlantic Council for consideration as need be.

Defence planning, on the other hand, takes a more systematic approach and has a medium and longer-term perspective, including with respect to identifying requirements, the development and delivery of capabilities, the adjustment of military and civilian structures, personnel issues, equipment procurement and the development of new technologies. (see later a brief description of the process).

With the adoption of a new Strategic Concept, Alliance leaders committed to ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of Allies populations. Therefore the Alliance will:
• maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces;
• maintain the ability to sustain concurrent major joint operations and several smaller operations for collective defence and crisis response, including at strategic distance;
• develop and maintain robust, mobile and deployable conventional forces to carry out both our Article 5 responsibilities and the Alliance’s expeditionary operations, including with the NATO Response Force;
• carry out the necessary training, exercises, contingency planning and information exchange for assuring our defence against the full range of conventional and emerging security challenges, and provide appropriate visible assurance and reinforcement for all Allies;
• ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control and consultation arrangements;
• develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance.
• actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners;
• further develop NATO’s capacity to defend against the threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction;
• develop further our ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber-attacks, including by using the NATO planning process to enhance and coordinate national cyber-defence capabilities, bringing all NATO bodies under centralized cyber protection, and better integrating NATO cyber awareness, warning and response with member nations;
• enhance the capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism, including through enhanced analysis of the threat, more consultations with our partners, and the development of appropriate military capabilities, including to help train local forces to fight terrorism themselves;
• develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and consultations among Allies on the basis of strategic assessments and contingency planning;
• ensure that the Alliance is at the front edge in assessing the security impact of emerging technologies, and that military planning takes the potential threats into account;
• sustain the necessary levels of defence spending, so that our armed forces are sufficiently resourced;
• continue to review NATO’s overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance, taking into account changes to the evolving international security environment.

**Reforming the command structure**

The Alliance is engaged in a fundamental restructuring of its command structure to ensure that it is more effective, leaner and affordable. It will also be more agile, flexible and better able to deploy headquarters for remote operations as well as to protect Alliance territory. A framework for the new structure, without geographic locations for the various facilities, was agreed at the Summit meeting in Lisbon, 19-20 November 2010. Decisions on the locations themselves followed in the first half of 2011.

In the same spirit, a major reform of NATO’s agencies is being conducted. It will result in a significantly smaller number of agencies (from 14 to three), with improved efficiency. NATO Headquarters has also been reformed, including with regard to intelligence-sharing and production,
the establishment of a new Division responsible for emerging security challenges, a review of multinational acquisition processes, and a large reduction in the number and responsibilities of committees.

**Prioritizing capabilities – the Lisbon Capabilities Package**

A package of capabilities representing the Alliance’s most pressing capability needs was endorsed at the Lisbon Summit. The package goes hand in hand with and underpins the new Strategic Concept. It was developed to help the Alliance meet the demands of ongoing operations, face emerging challenges and acquire key enabling capabilities. The package is based largely on existing plans and programmes and a realistic projection of resources. It therefore provides a renewed focus and mandate to ensure that in the competition for resources, these, the most urgent capabilities, are delivered.

**Current priority shortfalls for operations**

**Afghan Mission Network**

NATO is creating a single federated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) network to improve information sharing by easing the information flow and creating better situational awareness among countries participating in ISAF operations. The capability has reached initial operational capability and must be further developed to attain its final operational capability.

**Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)**

IEDs are the main cause of many casualties in Afghanistan. NATO has launched an ambitious Counter-IED Action Plan, led by Allied Command Transformation, fostering collaboration inside and outside NATO. The Action Plan combines short-term measures in support of ISAF with long-term capability development for future contingencies. Work is ongoing at different levels (including initiatives to collate and share intelligence, improved training, new technical capabilities and cooperation with other international organizations) to implement measures that will help protect troops against IEDs and address the insurgent networks behind these destructive devices.

**Improving air- and sea-lift capabilities**

Air- and sea-lift capabilities are a key enabler for operations – so that forces and equipment can be deployed quickly to wherever they are needed. While there is significant ongoing procurement at a national level, many Allies have also pooled resources, including with Partner countries, to acquire new capacities through commercial arrangements or through purchase, giving them access to additional transport to swiftly move troops, equipment and supplies across the globe. This is particularly challenging and important with regard to missions at strategic distance, such as Afghanistan. Helicopter lift in Afghanistan is vital, to increase mobility and save lives; multinational cooperation on maintenance and logistics is bringing additional efficiency on some types operated...
by more than one Ally. Efforts continue to find further areas of cooperation, including in the context of the HIP Helicopter Task Force.

**Collective Logistics Contracts**

In order to be more effective, NATO is examining the possibility of setting up procedures for the development and administration of rapidly usable contracts, including for medical support, with repayment by countries when used. At present, logistics contracts are negotiated and implemented when an operation starts; this initiative proposes to launch procedures in advance to save time and seek synergy with and between contributing countries and NATO to serve personnel in the field more rapidly. The initiative focuses on areas where collective responsibility and common funding are concerned.

**Dealing with evolving and emerging threats**

**Missile defence**

In the context of a broader response to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, NATO is pursuing a “Theatre” Missile Defence Programme aimed at protecting Alliance forces against ballistic missile threats with ranges up to 3,000 kilometres. From the end of 2010 the Alliance will have an interim capability to protect troops in a specific area against short-range and some medium-range ballistic missiles.

At the Lisbon Summit, NATO leaders decided to expand the Theatre Missile Defence Programme to include protection of NATO European populations and territories and at the same time invited Russia to cooperate with this system and to share in its benefits.

**Cyber defence**

NATO is developing new measures to enhance the robustness of its communication and information systems against attempts at disruption through cyber attacks and illegal access. The Alliance is also prepared, on request, to assist Allies in the event of grave cyber attacks against their national systems. These efforts are the practical manifestation of NATO’s policy on cyber defence, which was reinforced in the 2010 Strategic Concept. More specifically, the Lisbon Capabilities Package stresses the importance of the Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC), which is currently under development. The NCIRC, which already has an initial operational capability, will protect the Alliance networks against cyber attacks and provide appropriate technical assistance when requested.

**Stabilization and reconstruction**

The Alliance’s experience with crisis response operations has shown the importance of stabilization and reconstruction – activities undertaken in fragile states or in conflict or post-conflict situations to promote security, development and good governance in key sectors. In modern conflicts,
conventional military means are often not sufficient to re-establish stable, self-sustaining peace. The primary responsibilities for such activities normally lie with other actors, but the Alliance has recently established political guidelines that will help to improve its involvement in stabilization and reconstruction.

**Critical long-term enabling capabilities for operations**

Information superiority (see further down) is a key enabling element in the battlespace and helps commanders at every level make the best decisions, creating the circumstances for success at less risk and greater speed. NATO will therefore continue to develop and acquire a range of networked information systems (Bi-SC Automated Information Systems) that support the two Strategic Commands. They cover a number of domains, including, land, air, maritime, intelligence, logistics and the common operating picture, with a view to enabling more informed and effective, holistic oversight, decision-making and command and control.

**Air Command and Control**

NATO is putting into place a fully interoperable, automated and integrated Air Command and Control System (ACCS). It will provide for real time command and control, as well as mission planning and associated functions. In addition to air defence tasks, it will also have the potential for missile defence tasks.

**Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR)**

NATO needs a JISR capability that will provide for the coordinated collection, processing, dissemination and sharing within NATO of ISR material gathered by the future Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system, the current AWACS and national ISR assets. While NATO is delivering a critical JISR capability in ISAF, an enduring JISR capability, which has yet to be fully defined, has to be developed over the coming years.

**Alliance Ground Surveillance**

The Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system is a key element of transformation and an essential enabling capability for forces across the full spectrum of NATO’s current and future operations and missions. The AGS will be an airborne, stand-off ground surveillance system that can detect and track vehicles, such as tanks, trucks or helicopters, moving on or near the ground, in all weather conditions. Contract award for this key capability is currently being sought.

**Other initiatives**

**The NATO Response Force**

The NATO Response Force (NRF) is a highly ready and technologically advanced multinational force made up of land, air, maritime and special forces components that the Alliance can deploy quickly to
wherever it is needed. It has the overarching purpose of being able to provide a rapid military response to an emerging crisis, whether for collective defence purposes or for other crisis response operations. It is also a driving engine of NATO’s military transformation.

Usability

At the turn of the millennium, too many Alliance forces were not adequately structured, prepared or equipped for crisis response and out of area operations. With the aim of increasing the numbers that could be sustained for such purposes, NATO agreed a goal in 2004 that 40% of land forces should be deployable and that it should be possible to sustain 8% on operations or high-readiness standby (later raised to 50% and 10% respectively). Over the last seven years, this has led to a 7% increase in the number of land forces that are deployable and a 21% increase in the number that can be sustained on operations and other missions. Similar targets of 40% and 8% have recently been set for air forces.

Aviation Modernization Programs

The Alliance will continue to develop its capabilities in the field of air traffic management and engage in civil aviation modernization plans in Europe (Single European Sky ATM Research) and North America (NextGen) with the aim of ensuring safe access to airspace, effective delivery of services and civil-military interoperability in order to safeguard military mission effectiveness at global level and the ability to conduct the full range of NATO operations, including the airspace integration of unmanned aircraft systems.

Improving information superiority

Information superiority aims to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while denying the same to potential adversaries. At the Riga Summit in November 2006, Allied leaders therefore agreed to support efforts to achieve information superiority. Key to these efforts is the implementation of NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities (NNEC), which aims to make all operational elements, from the strategic down to tactical levels, interoperable and network aware. Implementing this network enablement creates a federation of national and NATO networks for which NATO has established the frame, and which can then be used as the bearer for interconnected applications.

Civil emergency planning

In accordance with Alliance objectives, the aim of Alliance civil emergency planning (CEP) is to collect, analyze and share information on national planning activities and capabilities to help ensure the most effective use of civil resources in support of national and NATO military authorities (NMAs).

Within NATO, close civil-military cooperation is key to ensuring an optimum mix of capabilities is available when needed. Coordinated civil-military planning is becoming especially important in the
context of support to NATO operations, including those involving stabilization and reconstruction. 
CEP helps facilitate this through a range of civil emergency planning mechanisms and capabilities, thereby allowing NMAs to draw on civilian expertise and assets in areas such as critical infrastructure, transport, food, water, agriculture, communications, health and industry.

Energy security

The disruption of the flow of vital resources could affect Alliance security interests. At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, Allied leaders reiterated their support for efforts aimed at promoting the security of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines. They also declared that they would continue to ensure that NATO’s efforts would add value and were fully coordinated with those of the international community. A number of practical programmes both within the Alliance and with NATO’s Partner countries are ongoing, alongside workshops and research projects.

• Understanding the procedures

The objectives of the 2010 Strategic Concept have been further specified in the political guidance. This has replaced extant documents, such as the Comprehensive Political Guidance (December 2005), and informed the military implementation of the Strategic Concept. The political guidance, establishes in broad terms what the Alliance should be able to do, how much it should be able to do, and set priorities, thereby guiding procurement and other key activities in the context of the new NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP).

Implementing NATO’s new defence planning process

The NDPP, which was introduced in 2009 to bring more coherence to NATO defence planning activities, encompasses a variety of planning domains: air defence, air traffic management, armaments, C3 (consultation, command and control), civil emergency planning, force, intelligence, logistics, medical support, nuclear, research and technology, resource, and standardisation.

The NDPP therefore provides a framework within which national and Alliance processes can be harmonised to meet Alliance objectives. It establishes in detail how to meet the mandates of the political guidance and sets targets for nations and the Alliance collectively, thereby guiding national and collective capability development. Implemented in a four-year cycle, the NDPP seeks forces and capabilities that are deployable, sustainable and can contribute to the full range of Alliance missions, allocating the totality of the Alliance’s requirements to nations on the principles of fair burden sharing and reasonable challenge. The forces provided by Allies have to be able to operate together in a multinational context, prepared, trained, equipped and supported to contribute to the full range of missions, including in distant and remote areas.

• The bodies involved in decision-making
Efforts to improve NATO capabilities touch on a wide range of activities. Many different bodies are therefore involved in decision-making for their specific areas of expertise. With the aim of bringing additional coherence and eliminating any redundancy, an end-to-end rationalisation of the structures involved in capability development has been initiated. The reform of acquisition processes for NATO common-funded procurement is also to be reviewed.

**Bodies involved in capability development include:**

- the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD), the senior NATO committee responsible for Alliance armaments co-operation, material standardization and defence procurement;
- The Logistics Committee, which advises the North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee on consumer logistics matters;
- The Defence Policy and Planning Committee, responsible to the North Atlantic Council for broad defence policy and planning matters; it is also responsible for streamlining the Alliance’s defence planning process to assist in the transformation of NATO’s military capabilities;
- the Civil Emergency Planning Committee (CEPC), the principal body in the area of civil emergency planning;
- the Military Committee, the senior military authority in NATO under the overall authority of the North Atlantic Council;
- The Air Traffic Management Committee (ATMC), the NATO interface with civil aviation, responsible for airspace usage and air traffic management capabilities;
- Allied Command Transformation (ACT), driving, facilitating, and advocating continuous improvement of Alliance capabilities to maintain and enhance the military relevance and effectiveness of the Alliance.
- the Consultation, Command and Control Board (NC3B); and
- the Resource Policy and Planning Board, which focuses on the management of military common-funded resources.

**The development of capabilities over time**

Since 1999, NATO Allies have made firm commitments and taken a range of initiatives to strengthen capabilities in key areas.

**The Defence Capabilities Initiative**

Launched at the Washington Summit in April 1999, DCI identified a number of areas where improvements in Alliance capabilities were required. These areas fell into five major categories:

- Deployability and mobility: getting forces to the crisis quickly;
- Effective engagement: improving forces’ cutting edge capacity;
- Consultation, command and control: giving forces maximum awareness and control;
- Survivability: protecting forces;
- Sustainability and logistics: supporting forces in the field.

The DCI contributed to improvements in Alliance capabilities in quite a number of important areas. However, countries were not required to report individually on progress achieved and therefore advancement under the DCI was uneven.
The Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative

The Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative was launched, at the same time as DCI, to address the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by intensifying consultations on disarmament and non-proliferation issues. A WMD Centre was set up in May 2000 to coordinate activities in this field.

The Prague Capabilities Commitment

At their meeting in June 2002, NATO defence ministers agreed to refocus their efforts and decided that a new initiative should be based on firm country-specific commitments. This initiative would also be economically realistic, should encourage greater multinational cooperation and must be conducted in coordination with the European Union. At the 2002 Prague Summit, this initiative was formally endorsed and launched under the name of the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC).

The PCC was part of a three-pronged approach to improving defence capabilities, the two others were the creation of the NATO Response Force and the streamlining of the military command structure. Allies also adopted a Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism and initiated a new Missile Defence Feasibility Study.

Under the PCC, Allies made firm political commitments to improve capabilities in more than 400 specific areas, covering the following eight fields:

- chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence;
- intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition;
- air-to-ground surveillance;
- deployable and secure command, control and communications;
- combat effectiveness, including precision-guided munitions and suppression of enemy air defences;
- strategic air and sea lift;
- air-to-air refuelling;
- deployable combat support and combat service support units.

The PCC was coordinated with the European Union’s efforts to improve its capabilities. A NATO-EU Capability Group was set up for this purpose under the so-called “Berlin Plus” arrangements; simple methods of ensuring that the two processes complemented each other were used, for instance, by having the same countries take the lead on the same capabilities in both organisations.

NATO monitored and reported on the implementation of the commitments, undertaken both nationally and as part of multinational projects, until mid-2007.

Ballistic missile defence
Ballistic missiles pose an increasing threat to Allied populations, territory and deployed forces. Over 30 countries have, or are acquiring, ballistic missile technology that could eventually be used to carry not just conventional warheads, but also weapons of mass destruction. The proliferation of these capabilities does not necessarily mean there is an immediate intent to attack NATO, but it does mean that the Alliance has a responsibility to take this into account as part of its mission to protect its populations.

In early 2010, NATO acquired the first phase of an initial capability to protect Alliance forces against ballistic missile threats. At the November 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon, NATO’s leaders decided to develop a ballistic missile defence (BMD) capability to pursue its core task of collective defence. To this end, they decided that the scope of the current Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme’s command, control and communication capabilities will be expanded beyond the capability to protect forces to also include NATO European populations and territory. In this context, the US European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and other possible national contributions were welcomed as a valuable national contribution to the NATO ballistic missile defence architecture.

NATO’s work on BMD started in the early 1990s in response to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, including missiles. The initial focus was on protecting deployed NATO troops (Theatre Missile Defence), but work was expanded in 2002 to include considerations of the protection of population centres and territory (Territorial Missile Defence).

Components

The Alliance is conducting three ballistic missile defence related activities:

1. Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence System capability

The aim of this capability is to protect NATO deployed forces against short- and medium-range ballistic missile threats (up to 3,000-kilometer range). In order to manage the risk associated with the development of such a complex capability, ALTBMD will be fielded in several phases.

The completed capability will consist of a multi-layered system of systems, comprising low and high-altitude defences (also called lower- and upper-layer defences), including battle management,
communications, command and control and intelligence (BMC3I), early warning sensors, radars and various interceptors. NATO member countries will provide the sensors and weapon systems, while NATO will develop the BMC3I segment and facilitate the integration of all these elements into a coherent and effective architecture.

In 2005, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) established the NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence Programme Management Organization (ALTBMD PMO) to oversee the ALTBMD Programme. The NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A) and the NATO Air Command and Control System Management Agency (NACMA) are other key NATO bodies involved in the programme.

The initial activities were mainly focused on system engineering and integration work, and on the development of an integration test bed hosted at the NC3A facilities in The Hague, Netherlands. The integration test bed is essential to validate development work.

In early 2010, the first operational capability, called Interim Capability, was fielded. It provides military planners with a planning tool to build the most effective defence design for specific scenarios or real deployments. A more robust version of that capability, was fielded at the end of 2010, and provides shared situational awareness. The complete lower-layer and upper-layer capability will be fielded in the 2018 timeframe.

2. BMD for the protection of NATO European territory, populations and forces

A ballistic missile defence feasibility study was launched after the November 2002 Prague Summit to examine options for protecting Alliance forces, territory and populations against the full range of ballistic missile threats. The study was executed by a transatlantic, multinational industry team, which concluded that BMD is technically feasible. The results were approved by Allies at the Riga Summit in November 2006, and they have provided a technical basis for ongoing political and military discussions regarding the desirability of a NATO ballistic missile defence system.

In this context, at the April 2008 Bucharest Summit, the Alliance also considered the technical details and political and military implications of the proposed elements of the US BMD system in Europe. Allied leaders recognized that the planned deployment of European-based US ballistic missile defence assets would help protect Allies, and agreed that this capability should be an integral part of any future NATO-wide BMD architecture.

Options for a comprehensive ballistic missile defence architecture to extend coverage to all Allied territory and populations not otherwise covered by the US system were developed and reviewed at the Bucharest Summit, and the Allies also encouraged Russia to take advantage of US proposals for cooperation on BMD. They also stated their readiness to explore the potential for linking US, NATO and Russian ballistic missile defence systems at an appropriate time.
In September 2009, the US announced its European Phased Adaptive Approach for ballistic missile defence in Europe. This new initiative was welcomed by NATO foreign ministers in December 2010.

At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, NATO heads of state and government decided to develop a BMD capability. They agreed that an expanded theatre missile defence programme could form the command, control and communications backbone of such a system.

In June 2011, NATO defence ministers approved the NATO ballistic missile defence action plan, which provides a comprehensive overview of the key actions and NAC decisions required to implement the NATO BMD capability over the next decade.

In the autumn of 2011, Turkey announced its decision to host a ballistic missile defence radar at Kürecik as an integral part of the NATO BMD capability. Romania and the United States agreed to base SM-3 interceptors at Deveselu airbase in Romania, and a similar basing agreement between the United States and Poland entered into force.

In November 2011, the Netherlands announced plans to upgrade four air-defence frigates with extended long-range missile defence early-warning radars as its national contribution to NATO's ballistic missile defence capability. Finally, Spain and the United States announced an agreement to base four Aegis missile defence ships in Rota, Spain, as part of the US contribution to NATO's BMD capability.

Seperately, France plans to develop an early-warning system for the detection of ballistic missiles.

In April 2012, work to develop and install the command and control for the Interim BMD Capability was completed at Alliance Air Command in Ramstein, Germany. NATO conducted a successful series of simulated missile-defence engagements combining assets from the United States, Germany and the Netherlands through the new NATO command and control architecture.

3. Missile defence cooperation with Russia

In 2003, under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), a study was launched to assess possible levels of interoperability among the theatre missile defence systems of NATO Allies and Russia.

Together with this study, several computer-assisted exercises have been held to provide the basis for future improvements to interoperability, and to develop mechanisms and procedures for joint operations in the area of theatre missile defence.

NATO and Russia are also examining possible areas for cooperation on territorial missile defence. At the Lisbon Summit, the NRC agreed to discuss pursuing ballistic missile defence cooperation. They agreed on a joint ballistic missile threat assessment, and to continue dialogue in this area. The NRC
was tasked to develop a comprehensive joint analysis of the future framework for BMD cooperation. In April 2012, NATO and Russia successfully conducted a computer-assisted missile defence exercise.

**Mechanisms**

The Defence Policy and Planning Committee (Reinforced) (DPPC(R)) is the senior NATO committee that oversees and coordinates all efforts to develop the NATO ballistic missile defence capability at the political-military level, as well as providing political-military guidance and advice on all issues related to NATO BMD policy.

The Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) is the senior NATO committee that acts as the tasking authority for the theatre missile defence programme. The ALTBMD Programme Management Organization, which comprises a Steering Committee and a Programme Office, directs the programme and reports to the CNAD.

The NRC Missile Defence Working Group is the steering body for NATO-Russia cooperation on BMD.

**Evolution**

The key policy document providing the framework for NATO’s activities in the area of ballistic missile defence is NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept.

The Strategic Concept recognizes, inter alia, that “the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, threatens incalculable consequences for global stability and prosperity. During the next decade, proliferation will be most acute in some of the world’s most volatile regions.” Therefore, NATO will “develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of our Alliance. We will actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners.” As a defensive capability, BMD will be one element of a broader response to the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles.

**Key milestones**

**Theatre Missile Defence**

**May 2001** NATO launches two parallel feasibility studies for a future Alliance theatre missile defence system.

**June 2004** At the Istanbul Summit, Allied leaders direct that work on theatre missile defence be taken forward expeditiously.

**March 2005** The Alliance approves the establishment of a Programme Management
Organization under the auspices of the CNAD.

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<th>Month</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>September 2006</td>
<td>The Alliance awards the first major contract for the development of a test bed for the system.</td>
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<td>February 2008</td>
<td>The test bed is opened and declared fully operational nine months ahead of schedule.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Throughout 2008</td>
<td>The system design for the NATO command and control component of the theatre missile defence system is verified through testing with national systems and facilities via the integrated test bed; this paves the way for the procurement of the capability.</td>
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<td>March 2010</td>
<td>The Interim Capability (InCa) Step 1 is fielded.</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 2010</td>
<td>NATO signs contracts for the second phase of the interim theatre missile defence capability. This will include the capability to conduct a real-time theatre missile defence battle. At the June 2010 meeting of NATO defence ministers, it is agreed that, should Allies decide at the Lisbon Summit to develop a ballistic missile defence capability for NATO which would provide protection to European Allied populations and territory against the increasing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, an expanded theatre missile defence programme could form the command, control and communications backbone of such a system. The US EPAA would provide a valuable national contribution to this capability.</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 2010</td>
<td>The more robust Interim Capability (InCa 2) passes key tests during the Netherlands Air Force Joint Project Optic Windmill 2010 exercise.</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 2010</td>
<td>At the end of 2010, all InCa 2 components – including BMD sensors and shooters from NATO nations – are linked and successfully tested in an 'ensemble’ test prior to handover to NATO’s military commanders. InCa 2 is subsequently delivered to the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) in Uedem, Germany, as an operational capability.</td>
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**Territorial Missile Defence**

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<th>Month</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>November 2002</td>
<td>At the Prague Summit, Allied leaders direct that a missile defence feasibility study be launched to examine options for protecting Alliance forces, territory and populations against the full range of ballistic missile threats.</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 2006</td>
<td>The study concludes that ballistic missile defence is technically feasible within the limits and assumptions of the study. The results are approved by NATO’s CNAD.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>An update of a 2004 Alliance assessment of ballistic missile defence is performed.</td>
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threat developments is completed.

April 2008 At the Bucharest Summit, Allied leaders agree that the planned deployment of European-based US BMD assets should be an integral part of any future NATO-wide missile defence architecture. They call for options for a comprehensive ballistic missile defence architecture to extend coverage to all Allied territory not otherwise covered by the US system to be prepared in time for NATO’s next Summit.

April 2009 At the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, Allies recognise that a future US contribution of important architectural elements could enhance NATO elaboration of the Alliance effort and judge that ballistic missile threats should be addressed in a prioritised manner that includes consideration of the level of imminence of the threat and the level of acceptable risk.

September 2009 The United States announces its plan for the EPAA.

November 2010 At the Lisbon Summit, the Allies agree to acquire a territorial missile defence capability. They agree that an expanded theatre missile defence programme could form the command, control and communications backbone of such a system. The NRC agrees to discuss pursuing ballistic missile defence cooperation.

June 2011 NATO defence ministers approve the NATO Ballistic Missile Defence Action Plan.

September 2011 Turkey announces a decision to host a missile defence radar as part of NATO BMD capability.

September 2011 Romania and the United States sign an agreement to base interceptors in Romania as part of NATO BMD capability.

September 2011 An agreement between Poland and the United States on basing interceptors in Poland enters into force.

September 2011 The Netherlands announces plans to upgrade four air-defence frigates with extended long-range radar systems as its national contribution to NATO’s BMD capability.

October 2011 Spain and the United States announce an agreement to port US Aegis ships in Rota, Spain, as part of the US contribution to NATO’s ballistic missile defence capability.

April 2012 NATO successfully installs and tests the command and control architecture for the Interim Capability at Alliance Air Command Ramstein, Germany.

NATO-Russia Council Theatre Missile Defence Project
2003 A study is launched under the NRC to assess possible levels of interoperability among theatre missile defence systems of NATO Allies and Russia.

March 2004 An NRC theatre missile defence command post exercise is held in the United States.

March 2005 An NRC theatre missile defence command post exercise is held in the Netherlands.

October 2006 An NRC theatre missile defence command post exercise is held in Russia.

January 2008 An NRC theatre missile defence computer-assisted exercise takes place in Germany.

December 2010 First meeting of the NRC Missile Defence Working Group aimed at assessing decisions taken at the Lisbon Summit and exploring possible way forward for cooperation on ballistic missile defence.

June 2011 NRC defence ministers take stock of the work on missile defence since the 2010 Lisbon summit.

April 2012 Computer-assisted exercise in Ottobrunn, Germany

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NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence

NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence refers to the integration of capabilities and overlapping operations of all services to defend all Alliance territory, populations and forces. Its intent is to ensure freedom of action by negating an opponent’s ability to achieve adverse effects using its air and missile capabilities.

It encompasses a network of interconnected systems to detect, track, classify, identify and monitor airborne objects, and – if necessary – to intercept them using surface-based or airborne weapons systems.

- Components
The NATO Integrated Air Defence System (NATINADS) – soon to become the NATO Air and Missile Defence System (NATINAMDS) – comprises sensors, command and control facilities and weapons systems, such as surface-based air defence and fighter aircraft. Some of these systems are, even in peacetime, under the operational command of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence is a cornerstone of NATO air and missile defence policy, and the NATINAMDS (like the NATINADS) will be a visible indication of cohesion, shared responsibility and solidarity across the Alliance.

**The Air Command and Control System**

Air Command and Control (Air C2) is essential to the success of any operation. The current Air C2 structure in NATO is a patchwork of disparate and aging systems that in many cases are reaching the end of their planned operational life.

In view of the increasingly joint and combined nature of military operations, and the necessity of replacing soon-to-be obsolete equipment, NATO began planning more than a decade ago for the development of a new and more robust capability that would be a C2 system for all air operations. This system, called Air Command and Control System (ACCS), will facilitate the planning, tasking and execution of all air missions, as well as support NATO’s deployed operations and missions.

- **Tasks**

  **Air Policing**

  Air policing is a collective peacetime mission which requires that actions are taken by NATO against all violations and infringements of its airspace using agreed procedures.

  Air policing requires an Air Surveillance and Control System, an Air C2 structure and appropriate interceptor aircraft, usually fighters, to be available continuously. This enables the Alliance to detect, track and identify all violations and infringements of its airspace and to take the appropriate action, which may involve scrambling interceptor aircraft to assist in the process.

  Although not all Allies possess the necessary means to provide air policing of their territory, other nations provide assistance when needed to ensure that no nation is left at a disadvantage and equality of security is provided for all.

  The Supreme Allied Commander Europe is responsible for conduct of the NATO air policing mission.

  **Ballistic Missile Defence**

  In 2010, NATO acquired the first phase of an initial theatre ballistic missile defence capability to protect Alliance forces against ballistic missile threats. At the 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon, NATO’s leaders decided to develop a ballistic missile defence capability to pursue its core task of collective defence. To this end, they decided that the scope of the current Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme’s command, control and communication capabilities would be
expanded beyond the capability to protect forces to also include NATO European territory and populations. In this context, the United States’ European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and other possible national contributions were welcomed as a valuable national contribution to the NATO ballistic missile defence architecture.

**Mechanisms**

The Air and Missile Defence Committee (AMDC) is the senior multinational policy advisory and coordinating body regarding all elements of NATO integrated air and missile defence and relevant air power aspects in a joint approach. It reports directly to the North Atlantic Council (NAC), and is supported by its Panel on Air and Missile Defence and two Drafting Groups. The AMDC meets in Heads of Delegation (twice yearly) and Permanent Session (monthly) formats.

The Military Committee Working Group (Air Defence) is responsible for reviewing, advising and making recommendations to the Military Committee on air and missile defence issues.

Other groups dealing with air and missile defence related issues include the Defence Policy and Planning Committee (Reinforced) with particular responsibilities on ballistic missile defence, the Missile Defence Project Group, which oversees the ALTBMD Programme Office, and the NATO-Russia Council Missile Defence Working Group.

**AMDC and cooperation with Partners**

Since 1994, the AMDC has maintained a dialogue with NATO partner countries in order to promote mutual understanding, transparency and confidence in air defence matters of common interest. The air defence partner cooperation programme includes fact-finding meetings with air defence experts, seminars and workshops, visits to air defence facilities and installations, joint analytical studies and a programme for the exchange of unclassified air situation data. Recent developments include adding Mediterranean Dialogue nations to some aspects of cooperation.

**Evolution**

In the 1970s, NATO nations participating in the military structure realised that national air defence systems operating independently were not as effective or efficient in protecting against air attack as they might be if operating in a more collective manner. Therefore, they started working together to establish a structure able to overcome this deficiency. Combining national assets supplemented as necessary by NATO elements, an integrated air defence structure and system was organised under the command and control of SACEUR.

**NATO and cyber defence**
**Cyber attacks continue to pose a real threat to NATO and cyber defence will continue to be a core capability of the Alliance.**

NATO’s Strategic Concept and the 2010 Lisbon Summit Declaration recognise that the growing sophistication of cyber attacks makes the protection of the Alliance’s information and communications systems an urgent task for NATO, and one on which its security now depends.

On 8 June 2011, NATO Defence Ministers approved a revised NATO Policy on Cyber Defence, a policy that sets out a clear vision for efforts in cyber defence throughout the Alliance, and an associated Action Plan for its implementation. In October 2011, Ministers agreed on details of the Action Plan.

In February 2012, a 58 million Euro contract was awarded to establish a NATO Cyber Incident Response Capability (NCIRC), to be fully operational by the end of 2012. A Cyber Threat Awareness Cell is also being set up to enhance intelligence sharing and situational awareness.

The revised policy will offer a coordinated approach to cyber defence across the Alliance with a focus on preventing cyber attacks and building resilience. All NATO structures will be brought under centralised protection, and new cyber defence requirements will be applied. The policy clarifies political and operational mechanisms of NATO’s response to cyber attacks, and integrates cyber defence into NATO’s Defence Planning Process. It also sets out the framework for how NATO will assist Allies, upon request, in their own cyber defence efforts, with the aim to optimise information sharing and situational awareness, collaboration and secure interoperability based on NATO agreed standards. Finally, the policy sets the principles on NATO’s cyber defence cooperation with partner countries, international organisations, the private sector and academia.

- **Context and evolution**

Although NATO has long been protecting its communication and information systems, the 2002 Prague Summit first placed cyber defence on the Alliance’s political agenda. Building on the
technical achievements put in place since Prague, Allied leaders reiterated the need to provide additional protection to these information systems at their Summit in Riga in November 2006.

A series of major cyber attacks on Estonian public and private institutions in April and May 2007 prompted NATO to take a harder look at its cyber defences. At a meeting in June 2007, the NATO Defence Ministers agreed that urgent work was needed in this area. In the months to follow, NATO conducted a thorough assessment of its approach to cyber defence, and the findings of the assessment recommended specific roles for the Alliance as well as the implementation of a number of new measures aimed at improving protection against cyber attacks. It also called for the development of a NATO cyber defence policy.

Since the cyber attacks against Estonia in 2007, cyber threats have rapidly evolved in frequency and sophistication. In the summer of 2008, the war in Georgia demonstrated that cyber attacks have the potential to become a major component of conventional warfare. The development and use of destructive cyber tools that can threaten national and Euro-Atlantic security and stability represent a strategic shift that has increased the urgency for a new NATO cyber defence policy in order to strengthen the cyber defences not only of NATO Headquarters and its related structures, but across the Alliance as a whole.

With this in mind, the Strategic Concept adopted at the 2010 Lisbon Summit highlighted the need for accelerated efforts in cyber defence and tasked the North Atlantic Council to develop a new NATO policy on cyber defence and an action plan for the policy’s implementation by June 2011.

• Principal cyber defence activities

Coordinating and advising on cyber defence

The NATO Policy on Cyber Defence will be implemented by NATO’s political, military and technical authorities, as well as by individual Allies. According to the revised policy, the North Atlantic Council provides the high level political oversight on all aspects of implementation. The Council will be apprised of major cyber incidents and attacks and exercises principal decision-making authority in cyber defence related crisis management. The Defence Policy and Planning Committee provides Allies’ oversight and advice on the Alliance’s cyber defence efforts at the expert level. At the working level, the NATO Cyber Defence Management Board (CDMB) has the responsibility for coordinating cyber defence throughout NATO Headquarters and its associated commands and agencies. The NATO CDMB comprises the leaders of the political, military, operational and technical staffs in NATO with responsibilities for cyber defence. The NATO CDMB operates under the auspices of the Emerging Security Challenges Division in NATO HQ (i.e. Chairmanship and staff support).

The NATO Consultation, Control and Command (NC3) Board constitutes the main body for consultation on technical and implementation aspects of cyber defence. The NATO Military Authorities (NMA) and NATO’s Consultation, Control and Command Agency
(NC3A) bear the specific responsibilities for identifying the statement of operational requirements and acquisition and implementation of NATO’s cyber defence capabilities.

Lastly, the NATO Communication and Information Services Agency (NCSA), through its NCIRC Technical Centre, is responsible for provision of technical and operational cyber security services throughout NATO. The NCIRC has a key role in responding to any cyber aggression against the Alliance. It provides a means for handling and reporting incidents and disseminating important incident-related information to system/ security management and users. It also concentrates incident handling into one centralised and coordinated effort, thereby eliminating duplication of effort.

**Assisting individual Allies**

Prior to the cyber attacks against Estonia in 2007, NATO’s cyber defence efforts were primarily concentrated on protecting the communication systems owned and operated by the Alliance. As a result of the attacks, which were directed against public services and carried out throughout the internet, NATO’s focus has been broadened. NATO has developed and will be continuously enhancing mechanisms for assisting those Allies who seek NATO support for the protection of their communication systems, including through the dispatch of Rapid Reaction Teams (RRTs). While the Allies continue to bear the main responsibility for the safety and security of their communications systems, NATO requires a reliable and secure supporting infrastructure. To this end, it will work with national authorities to develop principles and criteria to ensure a minimum level of cyber defence where national and NATO networks inter-connect.

**Research and training**

According to the revised policy, NATO will accelerate its efforts in training and education on cyber defence through its existing schools and the cyber defence center in Tallinn. The Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCoE) in Tallinn, Estonia, which was accredited as a NATO CoE in 2008, conducts research and training on cyber defence and has a staff of 30, including specialists from the sponsoring countries. Further information on CCD CoE can be found at [www.ccdcoe.org](http://www.ccdcoe.org)

**Cooperating with partners**

As cyber threats do not recognise state borders, nor organisational boundaries, cooperation with partners on cyber defence is an important element of the revised NATO policy. Engagement with partners will be tailored and based on shared values and common approaches, with an emphasis on complementarity and non-duplication. NATO also recognises the importance of harnessing the expertise of the private sector and academia in this complex area where new ideas and new partnerships will be key.
NATO and the fight against terrorism

The fight against terrorism is high on NATO’s agenda. Both the new Strategic Concept¹ and the Lisbon Summit Declaration² make clear that terrorism poses a real and serious threat to the security and safety of the Alliance and its members. NATO will continue to fight this scourge, individually and collectively, in accordance with international law and the principles of the UN Charter. The Alliance will in particular enhance its capacity to deter, defend, disrupt and protect against this threat including through advanced technologies, more consultations with its Partners and greater information and intelligence sharing.

Terrorism is a global threat that knows no border, nationality or religion. It is therefore a challenge that the international community must tackle together. Since the attacks of 11 September 2001, NATO has been actively engaged in the fight against terrorism. In response to those attacks, NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the Alliance's collective defence clause, for the first time in its history. The North Atlantic Council (NAC), the Alliance’s principal political decision-making body, decides on NATO’s overall role in the fight against terrorism.

The multifaceted nature of terrorism is such that NATO has engaged in a number of initiatives – political, operational, conceptual, military, technological and scientific – to address this issue. The creation of the Emerging Security Challenges Division within NATO Headquarters in August 2010 reflects NATO’s intent to deal with a growing range of non-traditional risks and challenges, including terrorism, in a cross-cutting manner. NATO has since agreed new Policy Guidelines for Counter Terrorism which are to be endorsed at the Chicago Summit.

The Alliance contributes to the international community’s fight against terrorism in several ways. First, NATO is a permanent transatlantic consultation forum, capable of transforming discussions into collective decisions and action. Second, NATO has at its disposal unique military and civilian capabilities that can contribute to fighting terrorism or managing the consequences of an attack. Third, NATO cooperates as part of a very large network of partnerships involving other states and international organizations.
NATO's joint efforts

Operations

NATO conducts a number of operations that support the fight against terrorism.

Operation Active Endeavour

Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) is a maritime surveillance operation led by NATO’s naval forces to detect, deter and protect against terrorist activity in the Mediterranean through monitoring, patrolling, escorting and compliant boarding. Initially limited to the Eastern Mediterranean, OAE was extended to the entire Mediterranean from March 2004.

The operation was one of eight measures taken by NATO to support the United States following the 11 September 2001 attacks, and is currently NATO’s only counter-terrorism operation. Many non-NATO partner countries have also contributed to OAE in support of NATO’s operational activities against terrorism.

NATO in Afghanistan

Since August 2003, NATO has been leading the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist the Government of Afghanistan in expanding its authority and implementing security, thereby helping to remove the conditions in which terrorism could thrive. While not a counter-terrorism operation, ISAF represents NATO’s determination to help the people of Afghanistan build a stable, secure and democratic state free from the threat of terrorism. In addition, many NATO Allies have forces involved in Operation Enduring Freedom, the ongoing US-led military counter-terrorism operation whose major activities are in Afghanistan.

Securing major public events

NATO also provides assistance in protecting the security of major public events in Allied countries that might attract the interest of terrorists. It does this at the request of any member country by deploying capabilities such as NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft (AWACS) or elements of NATO’s multinational Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Battalion. The Alliance has thus assisted high-visibility events such as NATO Summits and Ministerial meetings, as well as sporting events such as the Athens Olympic Games.

NATO started to undertake this type of mission after it provided air surveillance to the United States in 2001 as part of the package of eight measures agreed immediately after the 11 September terrorist attacks. Operation Eagle Assist involved the deployment of NATO AWACS aircraft to the
United States from mid-October 2001 to mid-May 2002 to protect the US homeland and enable US assets to be deployed for its campaign in Afghanistan.

**Managing the consequences of terrorist attacks**

Consequence management involves reactive measures to mitigate the destructive effects of terrorist attacks, incidents and natural disasters. Consequence management is primarily a national responsibility; however, NATO supports countries in several ways. For instance, it serves as a forum where planning arrangements for such eventualities can be coordinated among countries, therefore improving preparedness should a crisis develop. The Civil Emergency Planning Committee (CEPC), composed of national representatives, is responsible for bringing together NATO policies in the field of civil emergency planning and providing the measures to implement these policies.

**Protecting populations and infrastructure**

In the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001, at the Prague Summit in 2002, a Civil Emergency Planning Action Plan was adopted for the protection of populations against the effects of weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, a project was initiated the same year to develop non-binding guidelines and minimum standards for first responders regarding planning, training, procedures and equipment for CBRN incidents. The purpose of this initiative is to provide general guidelines that member and partner countries may draw upon on a voluntary basis to enhance their preparedness to protect populations against such risks. These guidelines also seek to improve interoperability between countries.

NATO’s Public Health and Food/Water Group has developed treatment protocols for casualties following a CBRN attack and, more generally, the Alliance has defined coordination mechanisms for medical evacuation capabilities and a mechanism for allocating and transporting victims to facilities in other countries.

To add flexibility, NATO has developed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the facilitation of vital civil cross border transport. This mechanism can be used, inter alia, for providing assistance required to cope with the consequences of a CBRN incident. The MoU aims to accelerate and simplify existing national border crossing procedures and customs clearance for international assistance to reach the desired location as quickly as possible.

Providing timely information to the public is also a key component of consequence management. NATO has developed guidelines for use by countries in this field to ensure that coordinated warnings are given.

The protection of critical infrastructure against CBRN attacks is principally a national responsibility. Nonetheless, NATO is working to increase national awareness on this issue.
The role of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC)

Allies have established an inventory of national civil and military capabilities that could be made available to assist stricken countries – both member and partner countries – following a CBRN terrorist attack. This inventory is maintained by the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC).

The EADRCC was originally created in 1998 to coordinate responses to natural and man-made disasters and, since 2001, has been given an additional coordinating role for responses to potential terrorist acts involving CBRN agents. The Centre has a standing mandate to respond to a national request for assistance in the event of a terrorist attack using CBRN agents. It organizes major international field exercises to practice responses to simulated disaster situations and consequence management.

NATO Crisis Management System

The NATO Crisis Management System provides a structured array of pre-identified political, military and civilian measures to be implemented by states and NATO in response to various crisis scenarios. This system provides the Alliance with a comprehensive set of options and measures to manage and respond to crises appropriately. Within this system, specific Civil Emergency Planning Crisis Management Arrangements define the roles of the Civil Emergency Planning Committee, the Planning Groups, the EADRCC and the use of civil experts during times of crisis.

Network of civil experts

To support NATO’s work, a network of 380 civil experts located across the Euro-Atlantic area has been built based on specific areas of expertise frequently required. Their expertise covers all civil aspects relevant to NATO planning and operations, including crisis management, consequence management and critical infrastructure protection. Experts are drawn from government and industry. They participate in training and exercises and respond to requests for assistance in accordance with specific procedures known as the Civil Emergency Planning Crisis Management Arrangements.

NATO’s capabilities

NATO supports the development of capabilities and innovative technology that specifically address the threat of terrorism. The aim is to protect troops, civilians and critical infrastructure against attacks perpetrated by terrorists, such as suicide attacks with improvised explosive devices, rocket attacks against aircraft and helicopters and the potential use of weapons of mass destruction.

The Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work
The Defence Against Terrorism (DAT) Programme of Work was developed by the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) in May 2004. It was later approved as part of an enhanced set of measures to strengthen the Alliance’s fight against terrorism at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004.

The DAT Programme of Work has primarily focused on technological solutions to mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks. Most projects launched under the programme are focused on finding solutions that can be fielded in the short term. Individual NATO countries lead the projects with support and contributions from other member countries (and partner nations in some cases), NATO bodies and other stakeholders.

With the increasing importance for the Alliance of countering non-traditional and emerging security challenges, the DAT Programme of Work was transferred to NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division in 2010, where it will be enhanced to offer the Alliance a broader, cross-cutting approach to address the most urgent capability needs in defending against terrorism.

The ten current areas in the programme are:

- Large Aircraft Survivability against Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS);
- Protection of Harbours and Ports;
- Protection of Helicopters from Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPGs);
- Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs);
- Detection, Protection and Defeat of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Weapons;
- Technology for Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Target Acquisition (ISRTA) of Terrorists;
- Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Consequence Management;
- Defence against Mortar Attacks (DAMA);
- Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP); and
- Non-Lethal Capabilities (NLC).

**Capabilities to counter chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats**

The spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their means of delivery and the possibility that terrorists will acquire them are acknowledged as principal threats to the Alliance. Therefore, NATO places a high priority on preventing the proliferation of WMD and defending against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats and hazards. The 2009 Comprehensive Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of WMD and Defending Against CBRN Threats, endorsed at the 2009 Strasbourg-Kehl Summit, states that NATO will work actively to prevent the proliferation of WMD by state and non-state actors. NATO’s Strategic Concept, endorsed at the 2010 Lisbon Summit, reaffirms the Alliance’s determination to ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations. It specifically emphasizes the need to further develop NATO’s capacity to defend against the threat of CBRN weapons.
The NATO multinational CBRN Defence Task Force (which consists of a CBRN Defence Battalion and a CBRN Joint Assessment Team), launched at the Prague Summit in 2002, is designed to respond to and manage the consequences of the use of CBRN agents both inside and beyond NATO’s area of responsibility. It regularly participates in NATO Response Force (NRF) rotations and may also be committed to other tasks. In addition, efforts are underway to identify capabilities to detect which chemical and biological agents have been used in an attack and to provide appropriate warning. NATO-certified Centres of Excellence on Joint CBRN Defence (in the Czech Republic) and on Defence against Terrorism (in Turkey) further enhance NATO’s capabilities to counter CBRN threats.

**Cyber defence**

Against the background of rapidly developing technology, NATO is advancing its efforts to confront the wide range of cyber threats targeting the Alliance’s networks on a daily basis.

NATO’s Strategic Concept and the 2010 Lisbon Summit Declaration recognise that the growing sophistication of cyber attacks makes the protection of the Alliance’s information and communications systems an urgent task for NATO, and one on which its security now depends.

On 8 June 2011, NATO Defence Ministers approved a revised NATO Policy on Cyber Defence – a policy that sets out a clear vision for efforts in cyber defence throughout the Alliance.

The revised policy will offer a coordinated approach to cyber defence across the Alliance with a focus on preventing cyber attacks and building resilience. All NATO structures will be brought under centralised protection, and new cyber defence requirements will be applied. The policy clarifies political and operational mechanisms of NATO’s response to cyber attacks, and integrates cyber defence into NATO’s Defence Planning Process. It also sets out the framework for how NATO will assist Allies, upon request, in their own cyber defence efforts, with the aim to optimise information sharing and situational awareness, collaboration and secure interoperability based on NATO agreed standards. Finally, the policy sets the principles on NATO’s cyber defence cooperation with partner countries, international organisations, the private sector and academia.

In parallel, an Action Plan was adopted, which will serve as the tool to ensure the policy’s timely and effective implementation.

*For complete information on Cyber defence visit the full A-Z Page*  
[Defending against cyber attacks]

**Improved intelligence-sharing**

Since 11 September 2001, NATO has sought to increase consultations on terrorism and terrorism-related issues among its members, as well as with non-member countries. Information-sharing and, more specifically, intelligence-sharing are key aspects of this exchange.
At the 2002 Prague Summit, improved intelligence-sharing was identified as a key aspect of cooperation among Allies. A Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit (TTIU) was set up under the NATO Office of Security at the end of 2003, replacing a temporary cell established immediately after the 11 September 2001 attacks. The TTIU functioned for the following seven years as a joint NATO body composed of officers from civilian and military intelligence agencies, having as its main task the assessment of the terrorist challenges, risks and threats to NATO and its member nations. To that end, the TTIU developed an efficient liaison mechanism with Allied intelligence services and national terrorism coordination centres. In addition, the TTIU shared terrorism-related information with partner nations.

Based on the decision taken at the 2004 Istanbul Summit to review the intelligence structures at NATO Headquarters, connections with partner nations have been improved. In that regard, a new intelligence liaison cell was created at SHAPE in Mons, Belgium, and an Intelligence Liaison Unit (ILU) at NATO Headquarters in Brussels.

Within the framework of the comprehensive intelligence reform at NATO Headquarters that took place in 2010-2011, the TTIU’s functions were taken over by the newly created Intelligence Unit. That transformation further enhanced the analytical approaches on terrorism and its links with other transnational threats. The current mechanism has also enhanced cooperation among the NATO civilian and military intelligence components, and preserved the previously developed mechanisms that ensure coherent intelligence-sharing with partners.

3. The objectives of a former initiative, Precision Air-Drop Technologies, were achieved in 2008, thus this item was removed from the Programme.

• NATO’s partnerships

The threat of terrorism does not affect NATO alone. As a result, the fight against terrorism has become an important element of NATO’s cooperation activities with partners around the world.

The contributions by a number of partners to NATO’s operations, as well as their efforts to introduce defence reforms supported by NATO programmes, contribute to the prevention of terrorism. In addition, NATO is cooperating with other international organizations in order to ensure that information is shared and appropriate action can be taken more effectively in the fight against terrorism.

The Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T)

NATO and its partners are engaged in practical cooperation programmes within the framework of the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T).

The PAP-T was adopted at the Prague Summit in November 2002 and has been evolving and expanding in line with the joint aims and efforts of Allies and partners. The spirit in which it was
adopted was already manifested on 12 September 2001, when the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) condemned the attacks on New York and Washington D.C. the previous day and offered the support of all 46 EAPC members to the United States.

The Action Plan defines partnership roles as well as instruments to fight terrorism and manage its consequences. For instance, NATO and partner countries work together to improve the safety of air space, including through the exchange of data and coordination procedures related to the handling of possible terrorist threats.

All EAPC countries participate in the PAP-T, and it is open to NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative partners, as well as other interested countries on a case-by-case basis.

Three informal working groups have been set up under the PAP-T addressing the security of energy infrastructure, border security, as well as financial aspects of terrorism and disruption of terrorist organizations’ sources of finance.

**Deepening relations with partners to combat terrorism**

Combating terrorism was among the main drivers behind the creation of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in May 2002. The common fight against terrorism remains a key aspect of NATO’s dialogue with Russia, as well as a focus of the NRC’s practical cooperation activities. For example, Russia has contributed to the fight against terrorism by participating in Operation Active Endeavour, in 2006 and 2007.

In December 2004, the NRC agreed an Action Plan on Terrorism that laid out areas of cooperation and was subject to regular review. In April 2011, NRC Foreign Ministers approved an updated NRC Action Plan on Terrorism that aims to enhance capabilities to act, individually and jointly, in three critical areas: preventing terrorism, combating terrorist activities and managing the consequences of terrorist acts (for more information, see NATO-Russia Action Plan on Terrorism).

In 2003 the NRC also launched the Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI) to foster cooperation on airspace surveillance and air traffic coordination, with the underlying goal to enhance confidence-building and to strengthen capabilities required for the handling of situations in which aircraft are suspected of being used as weapons to perpetrate terrorist attacks. The CAI system will reach its full operational capability in 2011.

Relations with Mediterranean Dialogue partners have also deepened, including through contributions to Operation Active Endeavour.
Furthermore, at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, NATO launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative to reach out to countries in the broader Middle East region, widening NATO’s network of partnerships in order to facilitate the fight against terrorism.

NATO has also reinforced its relations with partners across the globe. These are countries that are not NATO members but they share similar security concerns and have expressed an interest in developing relations with the Alliance through individual partnership relations. They comprise countries such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Republic of Korea. Their level of involvement with NATO varies, as do the areas of cooperation.

**Increasing cooperation with other international organizations**

NATO is also working to deepen its relations with the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations to strengthen efforts in fighting terrorism.

With regard to cooperation with the United Nations, NATO works with affiliated bodies such as the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee, its Executive Directorate and the Security Council Committee 1540. It has also established contacts with the UN on its Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and works closely with the UN agencies that play a leading role in responding to international disasters and in consequence management – the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons – as well as other organizations.

NATO also exchanges views with the OSCE’s Action against Terrorism Unit.

**Working with aviation authorities**

The use of civilian aircraft as a weapon on 11 September 2001 led NATO to heighten awareness of such forms of terrorism and enhance aviation security. NATO’s efforts in this field include improving civil-military coordination of air traffic control by working with EUROCONTROL, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the US Federal Aviation Authority, major national aviation and security authorities, airlines and pilot associations and the International Air Transport Association so that information is shared and action taken more effectively.

**Training and education**

NATO offers a range of training and education opportunities in the field of counter-terrorism to both Allies and partner countries. It can draw on a wide network that includes the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, the NATO Defence College in Rome, Italy and the Centres of Excellence (COEs) that support the NATO command structure. Currently, there are 19 COEs, 16 of which have been fully accredited by NATO. Several of the COEs have a link to the fight against terrorism, in particular the Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism in Ankara. The Centre of Excellence for Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) has served as both a location and catalyst for
international dialogue and discussion regarding defence against terrorism issues. The COE-DAT has established links with over 50 countries and 40 organizations to provide subject matter expertise on terrorism.

**Science cooperation**

"Defence Against Terrorist Threats” is one of two key priorities under the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme. The aim of the SPS Programme is to enhance security, stability, solidarity and support among NATO and partner nations by providing the best scientific technical expertise to help solve issues of mutual concern. The sub-elements of the "Defence Against Terrorist Threats” priority include such topics as: defensible methods of fuel, supply and personnel transportation; medical counter measures for non-CBRN terrorist attacks; explosives detection; computer terrorism countermeasures, cyber defence (i.e. the defence of communication and information systems (CIS)) and computer network exploitation by terrorists; the study of human factors in defence against terrorism; and border and port security (technology, systems approach and data fusion, intelligent borders, counter-proliferation).

The "Defence Against Terrorist Threats” activities under the SPS Programme involve a variety of mechanisms, including workshops, training courses and multi-year research and development projects. A few examples of the activities initiated under this priority area include, but are not limited to:

- New biosensors for rapid and accurate detection of anthrax;
- New technology for detection of "dirty bombs”;
- Technologies for cargo container inspection;
- Advanced techniques for bio-weapon defence;
- Technology for stand-off detection of explosives (including the suicide bomber case);
- Treatments for nerve agent poisoning;
- Human and social aspects of terrorist activity (including root causes, social and psychological aspects of terrorism, use of the internet as a tool for recruitment, and the “intangibles of security”); and
- Protecting information networks from terrorist attacks.

The "Defence Against Terrorist Threats” element of the SPS Programme has been successful in bringing together scientists and experts from NATO and partner countries, thereby contributing to a better understanding of the terrorist threat, the development of detection and response measures, as well as fostering an effective network of experts in key fields.

In addition, the 2010-2012 Action Plan for the NATO-Russia Council SPS Committee has identified the following three areas for cooperation between NATO and Russia under the SPS key priority of "Defence Against Terrorist Threats”:
I) Explosives Detection: consisting of cooperative scientific research that will lead to better detection of both trace and bulk explosives. The most prominent example of this endeavour is the Stand-Off Detection of Explosives project, popularly called the STANDEX Programme;

II) Information Technology-based Threats: cooperative research geared towards strengthening the security of systems that are vulnerable to terrorist attacks. The objective of this initiative is to create a better understanding of how terrorists use information technology; and

III) The Study of Human Factors in Defence Against Terrorism: a dynamic and unconventional attempt to understand the motivations of terrorism from a social science perspective. In this context, the experience of the Virtual Forum provides an innovative platform for further discussion and research.

This work will continue to be a core priority of the Science for Peace and Security Programme for the foreseeable future (www.nato.int/science).

• Historical background

The Alliance's 1999 Strategic Concept already identified terrorism as one of the risks affecting NATO’s security. The Alliance’s response to 11 September 2001, however, saw NATO engage actively in the fight against terrorism, launch its first operations outside the Euro-Atlantic area and begin a far-reaching transformation of its capabilities. NATO’s new Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, recognizes that terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly.

Response to 11 September 2001

On the evening of 12 September 2001, less than 24 hours after the attacks, and for the first time in NATO’s history, the Allies invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the Alliance’s collective defence clause.

The North Atlantic Council - NATO’s principal political decision-making body - agreed that if it was determined that the attack had been directed from abroad against the United States, it would be regarded as an action covered by Article 5, which states that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.

Earlier on the same day, NATO partner countries, in a meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, condemned the attacks, offering their support to the United States and pledging to "undertake all efforts to combat the scourge of terrorism". This was followed by declarations of solidarity and support from Russia, on 13 September, and Ukraine, on 14 September.
On 2 October, Frank Taylor, the US Ambassador at Large and Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, briefed the North Atlantic Council on the results of investigations into the 11 September attacks. As a result of the information he provided, the Council determined that the attacks had been directed from abroad and would be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

Two days later, on 4 October, NATO agreed on eight measures to support the United States:

- to enhance intelligence sharing and cooperation, both bilaterally and in appropriate NATO bodies, relating to the threats posed by terrorism and the actions to be taken against it;
- to provide, individually or collectively, as appropriate and according to their capabilities, assistance to Allies and other states which were or may be subject to increased terrorist threats as a result of their support for the campaign against terrorism;
- to take necessary measures to provide increased security for facilities of the United States and other Allies on their territory;
- to backfill selected Allied assets in NATO’s area of responsibility that were required to directly support operations against terrorism;
- to provide blanket overflight clearances for the United States and other Allies’ aircraft, in accordance with the necessary air traffic arrangements and national procedures, for military flights related to operations against terrorism;
- to provide access for the United States and other Allies to ports and airfields on the territory of NATO nations for operations against terrorism, including for refuelling, in accordance with national procedures;
- that the Alliance was ready to deploy elements of its Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean in order to provide a NATO presence and demonstrate resolve; and
- that the Alliance was similarly ready to deploy elements of its NATO Airborne Early Warning Force to support operations against terrorism.

Shortly thereafter, NATO launched its first ever operation against terrorism – Operation Eagle Assist. At the request of the United States, seven NATO AWACS radar aircraft were sent to help patrol the skies over the United States from mid-October 2001 to mid-May 2002; in total 830 crewmembers from 13 NATO countries flew more than 360 sorties. This was the first time that NATO military assets were deployed in support of an Article 5 operation.

On 26 October, the Alliance launched its second counter-terrorism operation in response to the attacks on the United States, Operation Active Endeavour. Elements of NATO’s Standing Naval Forces were sent to patrol the eastern Mediterranean and monitor shipping to detect and deter terrorist activity, including illegal trafficking. On 10 March 2003, the operation was expanded to include escorting civilian shipping through the Strait of Gibraltar.

**Reykjavik meeting of Foreign Ministers – end of "out of area" debate**

NATO’s immediate response to 11 September 2001 was further strengthened by a decision at the Reykjavik meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in May 2002 that the Alliance would operate when and where necessary to fight terrorism.
This landmark declaration effectively ended the debate on what constituted NATO’s area of operations and paved the way for the Alliance’s future engagement with ISAF in Afghanistan. It was also a catalyst for the broad transformation of the Alliance’s capabilities that was launched at the 2002 Prague Summit in November.

**Prague Summit - adapting to the threat of terrorism**

At the 21-22 November 2002 Prague Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government expressed their determination to deter, defend and protect their populations, territory and forces from any armed attack from abroad, including by terrorists.

To this end, they adopted a Prague package, aimed at adapting NATO to the challenge of terrorism. It comprised:

- a Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism: this underlines the Alliance’s readiness to act against terrorist attacks or the threat of such attacks; to lead or support counter-terrorism operations; provide assistance to national authorities in dealing with the consequence of terrorist attacks; support operations by other international organizations or coalitions involving Allies on a case-by-case basis; and to conduct military operations to engage terrorist groups and their capabilities, as and where required, and as decided by the North Atlantic Council;
- a Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T);
- five nuclear, biological and chemical defence initiatives: a deployable nuclear, biological and chemical analytical laboratory; a nuclear, biological and chemical event response team; a virtual centre of excellence for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons defence; a NATO biological and chemical defence stockpile; and a disease surveillance system;
- protection of civilian populations, including a Civil Emergency Planning Action Plan;
- missile defence: Allies are examining options for addressing the increasing missile threat to Alliance populations, territory and forces in an effective and efficient way through an appropriate mix of political and defence efforts, along with deterrence;
- cyber-defence: efforts are underway within the Alliance to better protect against and prepare for a possible disruption of NATO and national critical infrastructure assets, including information and communications systems;
- cooperation with other international organizations; and
- improved intelligence sharing.

In addition, they decided to create the NATO Response Force, streamline the military command structure and launch the Prague Capabilities Commitment to better prepare NATO’s military forces to face new challenges, including terrorism.

**Riga Summit – reaffirming the threat of terrorism**

In endorsing the Comprehensive Political Guidance at the Riga Summit in November 2006, NATO’s Heads of State and Government recognized that “Terrorism, increasingly global in scope and lethal in results, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction are likely to be the principal threats to the Alliance over the next 10 to 15 years.”

**Lisbon Summit – a new Strategic Concept**
At the November 2010 Summit of NATO Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept, which outlines NATO’s enduring purpose and nature and its fundamental security tasks.

The security environment and the Alliance had changed considerably since the previous Strategic Concept was adopted in 1999. The 2010 Strategic Concept recognizes new and emerging security threats that have arisen, especially since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. It identifies terrorism as a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly, and commits Allies to enhance the capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism, including through enhanced analysis of the threat, more consultations with our partners, and the development of appropriate military capabilities, including to help train local forces to fight terrorism themselves.

- **Decision-making bodies**

The North Atlantic Council, the Alliance’s principal political decision-making body, decides on NATO’s overall role in the fight against terrorism. Specific aspects of NATO’s involvement are developed through specialized bodies and committees.

For instance, depending on the participating countries or the issue, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) can be involved, as can the NATO-Russia Council or the NATO-Ukraine Commission.

The Civil Emergency Planning Committee is the main NATO advisory body for the protection of civilian populations and the use of civil resources in support of NATO’s objectives in the fields of terrorism preparedness and consequence management, humanitarian and disaster response and protecting critical infrastructure.

The CEPC coordinates planning in several areas, to ensure – when necessary - civil support for the Alliance’s military operations or support for national authorities in civil emergencies.

The committee has for example developed a plan for improving the civil preparedness of NATO and Partner countries against terrorist attacks.

The Committee on Proliferation (CP) is the senior advisory body to the North Atlantic Council on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their associated delivery systems and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defence. The CP is responsible for information sharing, policy development and coordination on the issues of prevention of and response to proliferation, including terrorist access to WMD, bringing together experts and officials with responsibilities in this field.
Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS)

NATO plans to acquire an Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system that will give commanders a comprehensive picture of the situation on the ground. NATO’s operation to protect civilians in Libya showed how important such a capability is. A group of Allies intends to acquire five unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and the associated command and control base stations. NATO will then operate and maintain them on behalf of all 28 Allies.

The AGS system is expected to be acquired by 13 Allies (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the United States), and then will be made available to the Alliance in the 2015-2017 timeframe. This key transatlantic procurement programme is in its final approval phase before the 13 nations authorise contract signature.

The NATO-owned and -operated AGS core capability will enable the Alliance to perform persistent surveillance over wide areas from high-altitude, long-endurance, unmanned aerial platforms operating at considerable stand-off distances and in any weather or light condition. Using advanced radar sensors, these systems will continuously detect and track moving objects throughout observed areas and will provide radar imagery of areas of interest and stationary objects.

The main operating base for AGS will be located at Sigonella Air Base in Italy, which will serve a dual purpose as a NATO Joint Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance (JISR) deployment base and data exploitation and training centre.

Just as NATO’s Airborne Early Warning & Control (NAEW&C) aircraft – also known as AWACS – monitor Alliance airspace, AGS will be able to observe what is happening on the earth’s surface, providing situational awareness before, during and, if needed, after NATO operations.

AGS responds to one of the major capability commitments of the Lisbon Summit.

• Components
The AGS Core will be an integrated system consisting of an air segment, a ground segment and a support segment.

The air segment consists of five Global Hawk Block 40 high-altitude, long-endurance UAVs. The UAVs will be equipped with a state-of-the-art, multi-platform radar technology insertion program (MP-RTIP) ground surveillance radar sensor, as well as an extensive suite of line-of-sight and beyond-line-of-sight, long-range, wideband data links. The air segment will also contain the UAV flight control stations.

The ground segment will provide an interface between the AGS Core system and a wide range of command, control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C2ISR) systems to interconnect with and provide data to multiple deployed and non-deployed operational users, including reach-back facilities remote from the surveillance area.

The ground segment component will consist of a number of ground stations in various configurations, such as mobile and transportable, which will provide data-link connectivity, data-processing and exploitation capabilities and interfaces for interoperability with C2ISR systems.

The AGS Core support segment will include dedicated mission support facilities at the AGS main operating base (MOB) in Sigonella, Italy.

Contributions-in-kind provided by France and the United Kingdom will complement the AGS with additional surveillance systems.

The composition of the AGS Core system and these contributions-in-kind will provide NATO with considerable flexibility in employing its ground surveillance capabilities.

This will be supplemented by additional interoperable national airborne surveillance systems from NATO nations, tailored to the needs of a specific operation or mission conducted by the Alliance.

**Mechanisms**

The NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance Management Organization (NAGSMO) is responsible for the acquisition of the AGS core capability on behalf of the 13 participating nations. The AGS Implementation Office (AGS IO) at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) is responsible for ensuring the successful operational integration and employment of the NATO AGS core capability.

The NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance Management Agency (NAGSMA), representing the 13 AGS acquisition nations, has received the final AGS system proposal from the prime contractor and the contractual negotiation has been successfully finalised. The contractual arrangements are being evaluated and staffed by procurement nations. The contract award is expected at the Chicago
Summit or shortly thereafter. The industries of all 13 participating nations will contribute to the delivery of the AGS system.

The engagement of NATO common funds for infrastructure, communications, operation and support will follow normal funding authorisation procedures applicable within the Alliance.

By the time AGS becomes fully operational in 2017, France and the United Kingdom will sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Strategic Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), outlining the modalities for making their contributions-in-kind available to the Alliance.

**Supporting NATO’s core tasks**

The Lisbon Summit set out the vision of Allied heads of state and government for the evolution of NATO and the security of its member nations. This vision is based on three core tasks, which are detailed in the new Strategic Concept:

- cooperative security
- crisis management
- collective defence

AGS was recognised at Lisbon as a critical capability for the Alliance and is planned to be a major contributor to NATO’s Joint Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance (JISR) ambition.

AGS will contribute to these three core tasks through using its Swath & Spot Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and its Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) capabilities to collect information that will provide political and military decision makers with a comprehensive picture of the situation on the ground.

**Evolution**

Originating from the Defence Planning Committee in 1992, the AGS programme was defined as a capability acquisition effort in 1995, when the NATO Defence Ministers agreed that “the Alliance should pursue work on a minimum essential NATO-owned and operated AGS core capability, supplemented by interoperable national assets”.

The AGS programme was to provide NATO with a complete and integrated ground surveillance capability that would offer the Alliance and its nations unrestricted and unfiltered access to ground surveillance data in near-real-time and in an interoperable manner. It was to include an air segment comprising airborne radar sensors and a ground segment comprising fixed, transportable and mobile ground stations for data exploitation and dissemination, all seamlessly interconnected linked through high-performance data links.
From the outset, the AGS capability was expected to be based on one or more types of ground surveillance assets either already existing or in development in NATO nations, an approach that later also came to include proposed developmental systems based on US or European radars. However, all those approaches failed to obtain sufficient support by the NATO nations to allow their realisation. In 2001, the Reinforced North Atlantic Council (NAC(R)) decided to revitalise AGS through a developmental programme available to all NATO nations and a corresponding cooperative radar development effort called the Transatlantic Cooperative AGS Radar (TCAR).

In 2004, NATO decided to move ahead with what was labelled as a mixed-fleet approach. The air segment was to include Airbus A321 manned aircraft and Global Hawk Block 40 UAVs, both carrying versions of the TCAR radar, while the ground segment was to comprise an extensive set of fixed and deployable ground stations.

Due to declining European defence budgets, NATO decided in 2007 to discontinue the mixed fleet approach and instead to move forward with a simplified AGS system where the air segment was based on the on the off-the-shelf Global Hawk Block 40 UAV and its associated multi-platform radar technology insertion program (MP-RTIP) sensor. The ground segment, which would largely be developed and built by European and Canadian industry, remained virtually unchanged as its functional and operational characteristics were largely independent of the actual aircraft and sensor used.

In February 2009, the NATO nations participating in the AGS programme started the process to sign the Programme Memorandum of Understanding (PMOU). This was a significant step forward on the road towards realising an urgently required, operationally essential capability for NATO. NAGSMA was established in September 2009, after all participating nations had agreed on the PMOU. The PMOU serves as the basis for the procurement of this new NATO capability.

Another important milestone for the AGS programme was the 2010 Lisbon Summit, where the strong operational need for a NATO owned and operated AGS capability was re-confirmed with NATO’s new Strategic Concept. AGS also featured in the Lisbon Package as one of the Alliance’s most pressing capability needs.

On 3 February 2012, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) decided on a way ahead to collectively cover the costs for operating AGS for the benefit of the Alliance. The decision to engage NATO common funding for infrastructure, satellite communications and operations and support paves the way for awarding the AGS acquisition contract by 13 Allies. In addition, an agreement was reached to make the United Kingdom Sentinel system and the future French Heron TP system available as national contributions-in-kind, partly replacing financial contributions from those two Allies.

- **Facts and Figures**

General characteristics of the Global Hawk Block 40 UAV:
Primary function: High-altitude, long-endurance intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

Power Plant: Rolls Royce-North American AE 3007H turbofan

Thrust: 7,600 lbs

Wingspan: 130.9 ft / 39.8 m

Length: 47.6 ft / 14.5 m

Height: 15.3 ft / 4.7 m

Weight: 14,950 lbs / 6,781 kg

Maximum takeoff weight: 32,250 lbs / 14,628 kg

Fuel Capacity: 17,300 lbs / 7,847 kg

Payload: 3,000 lbs / 1,360 kg

Speed: 310 knots / 357 mph / 575 kph

Range: 8,700 nautical miles / 10,112 miles / 16,113 km

Ceiling: 60,000 ft / 18,288 m

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Improving NATO’s strategic air- and sealift capabilities

Giving Alliance forces global reach

NATO member countries have pooled their resources to acquire special aircraft and ships that will give the Alliance the capability to transport troops, equipment and supplies across the globe. Robust strategic air- and sealift capabilities are vital to ensure that NATO countries are able to deploy their forces and equipment rapidly to wherever they are needed.

The ability to reach out globally is particularly important today, as NATO takes on missions and operations in distant areas such as Afghanistan. By pooling resources, NATO countries have made significant financial savings, and have the potential of acquiring assets collectively that would be prohibitively expensive to purchase as individual countries.

Components

In terms of airlift, there are two complementary initiatives:

a. A multinational consortium of 14 countries is chartering Antonov An-124-100 transport aircraft as a Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS). SALIS provides assured access to up six AN-124-100 aircraft (mission-ready within nine days in case of crisis) in support of NATO/EU operations. In order to pay for this assured access, SALIS partner nations have access to two aircraft with some prepayment of flying hours. SALIS flights started in February 2006 with a humanitarian aid mission to Pakistan for an earthquake relief operation. Since then the number of missions has risen to over 200 per year, fulfilling a variety of commitments in support of military and humanitarian operations. Today, support missions for forces in Afghanistan are predominant. The SALIS initiative is likely to continue until the Airbus A400m aircraft comes into service with participating nations.

b. Twelve nations (ten Allies and two partner countries) have acquired three C-17 Globemaster III transport aircraft in order to create a Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC). The SAC has been in operation since July 2009. Its operational arm, the Heavy Airlift Wing at Papa Airbase in Hungary, operates the aircraft. It is manned by multinational personnel and its missions support national requirements. Operations have included support to ISAF (Afghanistan), humanitarian relief in Haiti...
and Pakistan, African peacekeeping and assistance to the Polish authorities following the air disaster in Russia.

For sealift, a multinational consortium of ten countries provides a special “roll-on/roll-off” ship capability. The principal aim of this multinational group is to provide nations with assured access, price guarantee and the provision of mutual sealift support.

**Evolution**

The decision to improve the Alliance’s collective strategic air- and sealift capabilities was made at the 1999 Washington Summit, as part of the Defence Capabilities Initiative launched by NATO leaders.

NATO military authorities identified a shortfall of 19 European strategic lift aircraft and “an overall significant European shortfall” in roll-on/roll-off, multiple purpose and container ships.

Efforts to address these shortfalls were stepped up when the Defence Capabilities Initiative was transformed into the more focused Prague Capabilities Commitment at the 2002 NATO Summit in the Czech capital.

This new programme sets firm and country-specific commitments to address capability shortfalls in eight key fields, including air- and sealift.

At their annual spring meeting in Brussels in June 2003, NATO Defence Ministers signed letters declaring their intent to form multinational consortia to address the air- and sealift shortfalls.

In December 2003, and at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, these were translated into specific agreements between a number of NATO countries to pool their resources and provide the Alliance with the required air- and sealift capabilities.

**Mechanisms**

The signatories of the three initiatives have established multinational bodies to coordinate strategic lift, allowing for cost effectiveness and avoidance of duplication of effort.

SALIS is controlled by a Steering Board/Partnership Committee. It is an interim outsized cargo capability that comprises the strategic airlift assets, available under specific terms and conditions as laid down in a memorandum of understanding. The capability is coordinated on a day-to-day basis by the Strategic Airlift Coordination Centre, which is collocated with the Movement Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE) based in Eindhoven, The Netherlands. The NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) provides support by managing the SALIS contract and the SALIS Partnership.
The Multinational SAC Steering Board has the overall responsibility for the guidance and oversight of the SAC programme and formulates the programme’s requirements. The NATO Airlift Management Organisation board of directors exercises overall responsibility for the guidance, execution, control, and supervision of the Airlift Management Programme (AMP). The NATO Airlift Management Agency is responsible for the acquisition, management and support of the AMP and to provide administrative support to the Heavy Airlift Wing at Papa Airbase.

The multinational sealift capability is coordinated on a day-to-day basis by the MCCE. The overall governance of the capability is provided by members of the ten participating nations in the form of the Multinational Sealift Steering Committee, which meets regularly to provide direction and guidance based on a Multinational Implementation Arrangement.

**AWACS: NATO’s 'Eye In The Sky’**

**NATO owns and operates a fleet of Boeing E-3A 'Sentry' Airborne Warning & Control System (AWACS) aircraft, which provides the Alliance with an immediately-available airborne command and control (C2), air and maritime surveillance and battle management capability. NATO Air Base (NAB) Geilenkirchen, Germany, is home to the 17 NE-3A aircraft.**

The NE-3A is a modified Boeing 707 equipped with long-range radar and passive sensors capable of detecting air and surface contacts over large distances. The plot-extracted track data can be transmitted directly from the aircraft to other users on land, at sea or in the air.

The NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force (NAEW&CF), headquartered at SHAPE, Belgium, is a mixed force comprised of the E-3A Component and the United Kingdom’s E-3D Component. The United Kingdom provides the E-3D Component as a “contribution in kind”. The NAEW&CF is the Alliance’s largest collaborative programme and is an example of what NATO member countries, in this case 18 nations, can achieve by pooling resources (Smart Defence) and working together in a truly multinational environment.

**Role and responsibilities**

NATO AWACS performs a unique and valuable role for the Alliance by conducting a wide range of missions such as air policing, counter-terrorism, consequence management, non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), embargo, initial entry, crisis response and demonstrative force operations.
In recent years, the Force has been increasingly deployed on complex and demanding tactical missions, including among numerous others:

- support to maritime operations;
- close air support (CAS);
- airspace management;
- combat search and rescue (CSAR);
- disaster relief; and
- counter-piracy.

**Critical asset for crisis management**

Since it commenced flight operations in 1982, the NAEW&C Force has proven to be a key asset in crisis-management and peace-support operations.

Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, aircraft from the NAEW&CF E-3A Component (at NAB Geilenkirchen) deployed to eastern Turkey to help reinforce NATO’s southern flank. Operation Anchor Guard included monitoring air and sea traffic in the eastern Mediterranean, as well as providing airborne surveillance along the Iraqi-Turkish border. The mission was conducted from August 1990 to March 1991.

For most of the 1990s, starting in July 1992, aircraft from both the NATO and United Kingdom’s AEW&C fleets operated extensively in the Balkans, supporting UN resolutions and Alliance missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo during Operation Deliberate Force and Operation Allied Force. AWACS aircraft from the French Armée de L’Air and the US Air Force also helped achieve the objectives of these missions.

In early 2001, the Force also supported NATO’s defensive deployment to south-eastern Turkey during Operation Display Deterrence.

In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, NAEW&CF aircraft were deployed to the United States to help defend North America against further attacks in Operation Eagle Assist. This represented the first time in Alliance history that NATO assets were deployed in support of the defence of one of its member nations.

Since 2007, the NAEW&C Force has been used successfully in support of NATO’s counter-terrorism activities in the Mediterranean Sea during Operation Active Endeavour, as well as for numerous other high-visibility events.

In winter 2009, the NAEW&C Force’s E-3D Component deployed for three months in support of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Subsequently, in January 2011, the E-3A Component also deployed in support of ISAF operations. Both components were lauded for their impact on improved response times for troops in contact (TIC) situations and combat search and rescue (CSAR) operations.
Additionally in 2011, during Operation Unified Protector, both components provided crucial battle management functions to Alliance air assets operating over Libya. This included the issuing of real-time tactical orders and taskings to NATO and coalition fighter aircraft, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft, air-to-air refuelers and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). By providing an aerial maritime surveillance capability, the NAEW&C Force also supported Alliance ships and submarines enforcing the maritime arms embargo against Libya. This simultaneous support to air and maritime mission taskings was a first for the NAEW&C Force. In addition, the employment of the NE-3A’s and E-3D’s from the same forward operating base (FOB) represented another first for the NAEW&C Force.

**Protecting NATO Populations**

As a consequence of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO governments have been able to request the air surveillance and control capability of NAEW&C Force to assist with security for major public occasions. These high-visibility events have included the 2004 Summer Olympic Games in Greece, the 2004 European Football Championship in Portugal, and the 2006 World Cup Football Championship in Germany, as well as important meetings held by other international organisations. The NAEW&C Force has consistently provided air support to meetings of Alliance heads of state, governmental and non-governmental meetings, and NATO summits.

- **Working Mechanism**

‘Multinationality’ is the key characteristic of the 18-nation NAEW&C Programme Management Organisation (NAPMO). Currently, the full member nations are: Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The United Kingdom exercises participation as a NAPMO member and its fleet of six E-3D aircraft contribute directly to the NAEW&CF. France maintains an observer role and ensures that its E-3Fs remain interoperable with NAEW&CF and the US fleet.

HQ NAEW&C Force Command is co-located with Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, and exercises operational control over the Force, consisting of two operational components:

- the NE-3A Component based at NAB Geilenkirchen, which operates the 17 NATO-owned NE-3A aircraft (the squadrons are manned by integrated international crews from 16 nations); and
- the E-3D Component based at RAF Waddington, United Kingdom, which operates that nation’s six Boeing E-3D aircraft (the component is manned by RAF and exchange personnel only).

The Force also maintains three forward operating bases in Konya, Turkey; Aktion, Greece; Trapani, Italy; and a forward operating location (FOL) at Oerland, Norway.
The NAEW&C programme is managed on a day-to-day basis on behalf of the NAPMO nations by the NAEW&C Programme Management Agency (NAPMA), which is located in Brunssum, Netherlands. The agency is staffed both by military officers seconded to the agency and by civilians from the nations participating in the programme. The general manager is responsible to the NATO Secretary General for a number of administrative and personnel matters for the agency.

**How the NAEW&C Force Works**

All NAEW&C aircraft are similar, but have subtle differences as they undergo continuous modernisation. The standard crew for an NE-3A aircraft modified under the NATO Mid-Term (NMT) Programme numbers 16, while the original E-3D employs a standard crew of 17. Whatever the variant, the flight and mission crews are highly-trained men and women whose expertise covers all areas of flying crew, battle management, weapons control, surveillance control, data-link management and the technical aspects of communications, data systems and mission radar.

Under normal circumstances, the aircraft can operate for up to ten hours, and longer with air-to-air refuelling, at 30,000 feet (9,150 metres). They can detect low-flying aircraft out to a distance of around 250 miles (400 kilometres) and medium-level aircraft out to a distance of approximately 325 miles (520 kilometres).

The active surveillance sensors are located in the radar dome (rotodome) which makes the AWACS such a uniquely recognisable aircraft. This structure rotates once every ten seconds and provides 360-degree, wide-area primary and secondary radar surveillance coverage. Passive sensors are located on the fuselage and wings.

One aircraft flying at 30,000 feet has surveillance area coverage of approximately 120,463 square miles (312,000 square kilometres) and three aircraft operating in overlapping, coordinated orbits can provide unbroken radar coverage of the whole of Central Europe.

The AWACS is able to track and identify potentially hostile aircraft operating at low altitudes, as well as provide fighter control of Allied aircraft. It can simultaneously track and identify maritime contacts, and provide coordination support to Allied surface forces.

In addition to the active and passive surveillance systems, the NAEW&C fleet also carries extensive avionics equipment for navigation, communications and data processing. It is able to conduct simultaneous real-time datalink operations on Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) Link 16 and Link 11.

The NAEW&CF previously operated three trainer/cargo aircraft (TCA), which were used primarily for pilot instruction and cargo/passenger transport. As an integral part of the operational fleet, the TCA aircraft could convert rapidly from an all-passerger configuration into an all-cargo configuration or a
combination of the two. The TCA aircraft were successfully employed in disaster relief operations such as:

- the earthquake in Pakistan in 2004;
- Hurricane Katrina in the United States in 2005;
- the earthquake in Haiti in 2009; and
- the flood in Pakistan in 2010.

The three TCA aircraft were retired from service in 2011. Support to the NAEW&C Force Command is now provided by a contracted commercial Boeing 757 aircraft capable of simultaneously carrying cargo and passengers.

**Evolution**

During the 1960s, it became clear that military aircraft could no longer fly high enough to avoid surface-to-air missiles. To survive in an increasingly lethal air defence environment, hostile aircraft were forced down to near tree-top levels. By the early 1970s, it had become essential for air defences to have the ability to look down with radars to see these low-flying aircraft. To acquire this capability, it was necessary to install radar into an airborne platform.

The solution came in the form of an Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), integrated into a militarised Boeing 707 aircraft with a rotating, disk-like rotodome housing a long-range radar attached to its fuselage. In December 1978, NATO's Defence Planning Committee approved the joint acquisition of 18 Boeing NE-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft to be operated as an Alliance-owned airborne early warning and control capability.

In addition to the delivery of 18 NE-3A aircraft to the NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control Force (NAEW&CF) between February 1982 and May 1985, the NAEW&C programme included the AEGIS project to upgrade 40 NATO Air Defence Ground Environment (NADGE) sites, stretching from northern Norway to eastern Turkey, to make them interoperable with the NE-3A.

One of the reasons for the success of the programme was that the North Atlantic Council (NAC) granted organisational, administrative and financial autonomy to NAPMO, establishing it as a production and logistics organisation to implement the programme. The 18 NE-3As were delivered on schedule and under cost estimate with some US$100 million in savings. Part of these savings was used to buy three used 707s and convert them into trainer/cargo aircraft.

**Transformation**

Despite an ever-changing security environment, the NE-3A fleet stays relevant through modernisation programmes, which ensure that it remains a powerful tool for command and control, battle management and both air and maritime surveillance. For instance, the fleet has been part of
the NATO Response Force (NRF), a vehicle of Alliance transformation, since the initial NRF activation in October 2003.

The NE-3A fleet underwent a modernisation programme which included the integration of enhancements to its computers (open system architecture), displays, communications, navigation and target identification systems. This major fleet upgrade was declared fully operational by the NAEW&C Force Commander in October 2010 and delivers enhancements in nine major functional areas:

- improved human-machine interface;
- multi-sensor integration;
- automated digital communication switching;
- navigation system improvement;
- wide-spectrum very high frequency (VHF) radios;
- ultra high frequency (UHF) satellite communications;
- additional display consoles; and
- new identification friend-or-foe (IFF) transponders (with Mode S)
- new IFF interrogators (with Mode S)

**The Future**

The next phase of enhancements will include an upgrade to the flight deck and the addition of advanced IFF interrogation capabilities, planned to be completed by 2018. These enhancements will allow the Force to continue to meet the operational requirements of NATO’s commanders well into the future.
Reviewing NATO’s defence and deterrence posture

At Chicago, heads of state and government will also examine NATO’s mix of conventional, nuclear and missile defence forces, known as NATO’s Defence and Deterrence Posture Review. This was mandated at the Lisbon Summit. This review will allow NATO to check its overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance, taking into account the changes in the evolving international security environment.

NATO's nuclear forces

In the Strategic Concept adopted by Allies at the Lisbon Summit at the end of 2010, NATO committed to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons.

The Strategic Concept also reconfirmed that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance. Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of NATO’s strategy, even though the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote.

- What does this mean in practice?

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The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear of forces the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.

The Allies concerned ensure that all components of NATO’s nuclear deterrent are safe, secure and effective.

The dramatic changes in the Euro-Atlantic strategic landscape brought about by the end of the Cold War have been reflected in the Alliance’s 1991, 1999 and 2010 Strategic Concepts. The Alliance has continued to take far-reaching steps to adapt its overall policy and defence posture to the new security environment.

NATO’s reduced reliance on nuclear forces has been manifested in a steady and very significant reductions in the number of systems, overall weapon numbers and readiness levels since the end of the Cold War. NATO no longer has standing peacetime nuclear contingency plans, and NATO’s nuclear forces do not target any country.
• **Mechanisms**

Political oversight and control are the cornerstones of NATO’s nuclear posture and are shared among member countries. NATO members agreed to ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control and consultation arrangements. Within the NATO HQ structure, the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) provides a forum in which nuclear and non-nuclear Allies alike (except France, which has decided not to participate) engage in the development of the Alliance’s nuclear policy, and in decisions on NATO’s nuclear posture. The NPG is composed of ministers of defence, and is presided over by NATO’s Secretary General. It meets around once per year, but has subordinate and advisory groups which meet more frequently.

New members are full members of the Alliance in all respects, including their commitment to the Alliance’s policy on nuclear weapons, and the guarantees which that policy affords to all Allies.

• **Evolution**

NATO will review its posture to reflect the current strategic environment. As an example of this, NATO has been conducting a Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR), in which nuclear policy and posture have been examined as part of a review of NATO’s overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance. Alliance leaders are expected to agree to its final report at the Chicago summit.

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**Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation in NATO**

NATO has a long-standing commitment to an active policy in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The Alliance continues to pursue its security objectives through these policies, while at the same time ensuring that its collective defence obligations are met and the full range of its missions fulfilled.

Allies participate actively in international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements. NATO itself does not belong to any treaty as an entity but it continues to encourage its members, partners and other countries to implement their international obligations fully.

NATO’s policies in these fields cover consultation and practical cooperation in a wide range of areas. These include conventional arms control; nuclear policy issues; promoting mine action and combating the spread of small arms and light weapons (SALW), munitions and man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS); preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
and developing and harmonizing capabilities to defend against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats.

Arms control and disarmament are key elements of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Over the past two decades, Allies have significantly contributed to more stable international relations at lower levels of military forces and armaments, through effective and verifiable arms control agreements.

At the Bucharest Summit in 2008, Allied leaders took note of a report on raising NATO’s profile in the fields of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. As part of a broader response to security issues, they agreed that NATO should continue to contribute to international efforts in these fields and keep these issues under active review. Subsequently these commitments were reaffirmed in the Strasbourg/Kehl Declaration in 2009 and the Lisbon Declaration in 2010.

**Definitions**

While often used together, the terms arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation do not mean the same thing. In fact, experts usually consider them to reflect associated, but different areas in the same discipline or subject.

**Arms control**

Arms control is the broadest of the three terms and generally refers to mutually agreed-upon restraints or controls (usually between states) on the research, manufacture, or the levels of and/or locales of deployment of troops and weapons systems.

**Disarmament**

Disarmament, often inaccurately used as a synonym for arms control, refers to the act of eliminating or abolishing weapons (particularly offensive arms) either unilaterally (in the hope that one’s example will be followed) or reciprocally.

**Non-proliferation**

For the Alliance, “non-proliferation refers to all efforts to prevent proliferation from occurring, or should it occur, to reverse it by any other means than the use of military force.”¹ Non-proliferation usually applies to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), which the Alliance defines as a weapon that is "capable of a high order of destruction and of being used in such a manner as to destroy people, infrastructure or other resources on a large scale."

**WMD Proliferation**

Attempts made by state or non-state actors to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or devices and their means of delivery or
related material, including precursors, without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the States
Parties to the following agreements: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),
the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC) and the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
Their Destruction (BTWC).

1. According to NATO’s Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Defending Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN)
Threats.

- The ways in which NATO effectively participates

NATO contributes to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation in many ways: through its
policies, its activities and through its member countries.

**Conventional forces**

Allies have reduced their conventional forces significantly from Cold War levels. Allies remain
committed to the regime of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. As a response to
Russia’s unilateral “suspension” of its Treaty obligations in 2007, NATO CFE Allies have ceased
implementing certain Treaty obligations vis-à-vis Russia in November 2011, while still continuing to
implement fully their obligations with respect to all other CFE states parties. In December 2011,
Allies stated that these decisions are fully reversible should Russia return to full implementation and
that they remain prepared to work toward finding a solution to preserve, strengthen and modernise
the conventional arms control regime in Europe.

**Nuclear forces**

NATO is committed to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons – but
reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear
Alliance. However, it will do so at the lowest possible level and with an appropriate mix of nuclear
and conventional forces. The nuclear weapons committed to NATO have been reduced by more than
95 percent since the height of the Cold War. NATO nuclear weapon states have also reduced their
nuclear arsenals and ceased production of highly-enriched uranium or plutonium for nuclear
weapons. All Allies are parties to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and view it as an
essential foundation for international peace and security.

**Armed forces**

Through its cooperation framework with non-member countries, the Alliance supports defence and
security sector reform, emphasizing civilian control of the military, accountability, and restructuring
of military forces to lower, affordable and usable levels.
Small arms and light weapons (SALW), and mine action

Allies are working with non-member countries and other international organizations to support the full implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW in All its Aspects.

NATO also supports mine action activities. All NATO member countries, with the exception of the United States, are party to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, often referred to as the Ottawa Convention.

NATO’s PfP Trust Fund Policy was initiated in 2000 to assist countries in fulfilling their Ottawa Convention obligations to dispose of stockpiles of anti-personnel landmines. The policy was later expanded to include efforts to implement the UN Programme of Action on SALW. More recently, the Trust Policy has also been expanded to include projects addressing the consequences of defence reform.

NATO/PfP Trust Funds may be initiated by a NATO member or partner country to tackle specific, practical issues linked to these areas. They are funded by voluntary contributions from individual NATO allies, partners, contact countries and organizations.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

"With due respect to the primarily military mission of the Alliance, NATO will work actively to prevent the proliferation of WMD by State and non-State actors, to protect the Alliance from WMD threats should prevention fail, and be prepared for recovery efforts should the Alliance suffer a WMD attack or CBRN event, within its competencies and whenever it bring added value, through a comprehensive political, military and civilian approach."²

NATO stepped up its activities in this area in 1999 with the launch of the WMD Initiative and the establishment of a WMD Centre at NATO Headquarters the following year. NATO Allies have also taken a comprehensive set of practical initiatives to defend their populations, territory and forces against potential WMD threats. As part of NATO outreach to Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) partners, Mediterranean Dialogue Countries, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Countries and other partner countries, the NATO Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation is the only annual conference, sponsored by an international organization, dealing with all types and aspects of weapons of mass destruction.

Of particular importance is NATO’s outreach to and cooperation with the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), other regional organizations and multilateral initiatives that address WMD proliferation.

². NATO’s Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Defending Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats, Para 4.
The evolution of NATO’s contribution to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation

Active policies in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation have been an inseparable part of NATO’s contribution to security and stability since the Harmel Report of 1967.

The Harmel Report

This report formed the basis for NATO’s security policy. It outlined two objectives: maintaining a sufficient military capacity to act as an effective and credible deterrent against aggression and other forms of pressure while seeking to improve the East-West relations. The Alliance’s objectives in arms control have been tied to the achievement of both aims. It is therefore important that defence and arms control policies remain in harmony and are mutually reinforcing.

The Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament

In May 1989, NATO adopted a Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament, which allowed the Alliance to move forward in the sphere of arms control. It addressed the role of arms control in East-West relations, the principles of Alliance security and a number of guiding principles and objectives governing Allied policy in the nuclear, conventional and chemical fields of arms control.

It clearly set out the interrelationships between arms control and defence policies and established the overall conceptual framework within which the Alliance sought progress in each area of its arms control agenda.

The Alliance’s Strategic Concept

NATO’s continued adherence to this policy was reaffirmed in the 2010 Strategic Concept (with regard to nuclear weapons):

"It [This Strategic Concept] commits NATO to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons – but reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance."

The Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 19-20 November 2010 continues, on a more general note:

"NATO seeks its security at the lowest possible level of forces. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation contribute to peace, security and stability, and should ensure undiminished security for all Alliance members. We will continue to play our part in reinforcing arms control and in promoting disarmament of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, as well as non-proliferation efforts".
Summit declarations

Allied leaders have reiterated this commitment in declarations made at previous summit meetings held in Washington (1999), Istanbul (2004), Riga (2006), Bucharest (2008), and in Strasbourg-Kehl (2009). At the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit NATO's Heads of State and Government endorsed NATO’s Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Defending Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats.

The subject of arms control is also embedded in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and in the declaration made by Allied and Russian leaders at the 2002 Rome Summit, which set up the NATO-Russia Council.

• NATO bodies dealing with these issues

A number of NATO bodies oversee different aspects of Alliance activities in the fields of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Overall political guidance is provided by the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s highest political decision-making body. More detailed oversight of activities and policy in specific areas is provided by a number of bodies, including the High Level Task Force (HLTF) on Conventional Arms Control, the Nuclear Planning Group High Level Group (NPG/HLG), the Committee on Proliferation (CP) in politico-military as well as in defence format.

Within NATO’s cooperative frameworks, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (in particular, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Mine Action) and the NATO-Russia Council (in particular, the Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation (ADN) format) have central roles.

Seeking to optimise assets

Being able to put together complex joint operations at short notice is a priority for the Alliance. To do this at a time of crisis, NATO is seeking to reform its structures and processes to get a better return on investment. This means introducing change now in order to have flexible, deployable forces, and the right mix of capabilities at hand in ten years’ time.

Paying for NATO
Member countries make direct and indirect contributions to the costs of running NATO and implementing its policies and activities.

The greatest part of these contributions comes through participation in NATO-led operations and missions, and in efforts to ensure that national armed forces are interoperable with those of other member countries. Member countries incur the deployment costs involved whenever they volunteer forces to participate in NATO-led operations. With a few exceptions, member countries also pay for their own military forces and military capabilities.

Direct contributions to budgets managed by NATO are made by members in accordance with an agreed cost-sharing formula based on relative Gross National Income. These contributions represent a very small percentage of each member’s overall defence budget, and finance the expenditures of NATO’s integrated structures.

Direct contributions generally follow the principle of common funding, that is to say, member countries pool resources within a NATO framework. There are three budgets that come under common funding arrangements:

- the civil budget;
- the military budget, and;
- the NATO Security Investment Programme.

Common funding covers collective requirements such as the NATO command structure, NATO-wide air defence, command and control systems or Alliance-wide communications systems, which are not the responsibility of any single member.

Projects can also be jointly funded, which means that the participating countries can identify the requirements, the priorities and the funding arrangements, but NATO provides political and financial oversight.

Financial management of these different types of contributions is structured to ensure that the ultimate control of expenditure rests with the member countries supporting the cost of a defined activity, and is subject to consensus among them. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) approves NATO budgets and investments, and exercises oversight over NATO financial management. The Council takes into account resource considerations in its decision-making. The Resource Policy and Planning Board (RPPB) advises the Council on resource policy and allocation. For example, when the Council decided to undertake the Libya operation, it did so with the benefit of a full evaluation of the costs from Allied Command Operations and the RPPB. The Budget Committee and the Investment Committee, which report to the RPPB, also review and approve planned expenditures.

The NATO Office of Resources brings together all members of the NATO International Staff working on resource issues. The office provides integrated policy and technical advice to the NAC and the
Secretary General, NATO resource committees, and other NATO bodies. The office facilitates agreements on resource matters among member countries.

- **Country contributions**
Member countries contribute to NATO in accordance with an agreed cost-sharing formula based on Gross National Income.

### NATO COMMON-FUNDED BUDGETS & PROGRAMMES

#### COST SHARE ARRANGEMENTS VALID FROM 1/1/2010 TO 31/12/2011

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| Total             | 100.0000             | 100.0000                | 100.0000     |

- Different forms of direct funding
Direct contributions to NATO come principally in two different forms: common funding and joint funding. They can also come in the form of trust funds, contributions in kind, ad hoc sharing arrangements and donations.

Several factors influence the choice of funding source to address a given priority. These include the required level of integration or interoperability, affordability at the national level, the complexity of the system involved, and the potential for economies of scale. Often, a combination of funding sources is used.

**Principle and practices of common funding at NATO**

**The principle of common funding**

When a need for expenditure has been identified, countries in the Resource Policy and Planning Board discuss whether the principle of common funding should be applied – in other words whether the requirement serves the interests of all the contributing countries and therefore should be borne collectively.

The criteria for common funding are held under constant review and changes may be introduced as a result of changing circumstances, for instance, the need to support critical requirements in support of Alliance operations and missions.

Common funding arrangements principally include the NATO civil and military budgets, as well as the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP). These are the only funds where NATO authorities identify the requirements and set the priorities in line with overarching Alliance objectives and priorities.

Where military common funding is concerned - the military budget and the NATO Security Investment Programme – the guiding principle for eligibility is the "over and above" rule:

"common funding will focus on the provision of requirements which are over and above those which could reasonably be expected to be made available from national resources."

**The civil budget**

The civil budget provides funds for personnel expenses, operating costs, and capital and programme expenditure of the International Staff at NATO Headquarters. It is financed from national foreign ministry budgets (in most countries), supervised by the Budget Committee and implemented by the International Staff.

The civil budget is formulated on an objective-based framework, which establishes clear links between NATO’s strategic objectives and the resources required to achieve them. There are four front-line objectives and four support objectives.
**The four frontline objectives**

- Active operations: provide effective policy and planning in support of NATO operations and missions;
- Alliance capabilities: conduct necessary policy and planning work to promote and support improved Alliance capabilities;
- Consultation and cooperation with partners: conduct effective consultations and cooperation activities with partners to strengthen security and respond to new security challenges and threats to the Euro-Atlantic region;
- Public relations: build awareness of, and support for, NATO, its operations and its role in promoting security through a comprehensive public diplomacy action plan.

**The four support objectives**

- Consultation and support: support the North Atlantic Council (NAC), its subordinate committees, the Military Committee Structure and the International Staff in the consultation process with Allies;
- Headquarters Operational Environment: operate and maintain the NATO Headquarters facility and site, including through the development of a viable and tested Business Continuity Plan and continue to provide effective support to the new NATO Headquarters project;
- Governance and Regulation: develop, implement, control and monitor NATO Headquarters-wide business policies, processes and procedures;
- Headquarters security: ensure compliance NATO-wide with NATO security policy and provide a safe and secure environment for all HQ staff and operations.

**The military budget**

This budget covers the operating and maintenance costs of the international military structure. It is composed of over 50 separate budgets, which are financed from national defence budgets (in most countries). It is supervised by the Budget Committee and implemented by the individual budget holders. In all cases, the provision of military staff remains a nationally funded responsibility.

The military budget effectively provides funds for the International Military Staff, the strategic commanders and the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control (NAEW&C) Force and, more specifically for:

- the Military Committee, the International Military Staff and military agencies;
- the two strategic commands and associated command, control and information systems;
- theatre headquarters for deployed operations and support of critical theatre-level enabling capabilities such as theatre medical capabilities or theatre engineering capabilities;
- the NATO Standardization Agency, the NATO ACCS Management Agency, the NATO Command and Control Agency and the NATO CIS Services Agency;
- the NATO static and deployable Combined Air Operations Centres, deployable ARS and radar systems, and deployable HQ communication systems;
- the Joint Warfare Centre (Norway), the Joint Force Training Centre (Poland), the Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre (Portugal), the NATO Defense College (Italy), the Communications and Information Systems School (Italy), the NATO Programming Centre (Belgium), the Multi-Service Electronic Warfare Support Group (United Kingdom);
the Scientific Programme of Work of the NC3A, Allied Command Transformation experimentation funds, the Research and Technology Agency (France) and the Undersea Research Centre (Italy);

- limited partnership support activities and part of the Military Liaison Offices in Moscow and Kyiv.

During a crisis management operation, when an operational decision with financial implications is taken by the NAC, the RPPB is immediately consulted for the availability of funds. Effectively, this means that in the throes of a crisis, the RPPB can at times be in quasi-permanent session, as was sometimes the case for instance during the Libya operation (March-October 2011).

The NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP)

This programme covers major construction and command and control system investments, which are beyond the national defence requirements of individual member countries. It supports the roles of the NATO strategic commands by providing installations and facilities such as air defence communication and information systems, military headquarters for the integrated structure and for deployed operations, and critical airfield, fuel systems and harbour facilities needed in support of deployed forces.

The NSIP is financed by the ministries of defence of each member country and is supervised by the Investment Committee. Projects are implemented either by individual host countries or by different NATO agencies and strategic commands, according to their area of expertise.

Joint funding

Joint funding arrangements are structured forms of multinational funding within the terms of an agreed NATO Charter. The participating countries still identify the requirements, the priorities and the funding arrangements, but NATO has visibility and provides political and financial oversight.

Joint funding arrangements typically lead to the setting-up of a management organization within a NATO agency. NATO Agency activities range from the development and production of fighter aircraft or helicopters to the provision of logistic support or air defence communication and information systems. NATO agencies also coordinate Research and Development activities or are active in the fields of standardization and intelligence-sharing.

Jointly funded programs vary in the number of participating countries, cost-share arrangements and management structures. Work is underway, however, to streamline their activities around procurement, logistic support and air defence and communication capabilities, and to introduce shared service arrangements.

Other forms of funding
In addition to common funding and joint funding, some projects can take the form of trust fund arrangements, contributions in kind, *ad hoc* sharing arrangements and donations. The most important trust fund is the one supporting the sustainment of the Afghan National Security Forces.

**Management and control**

Financial management within NATO is structured to ensure that the ultimate control of expenditure rests with the member countries supporting the cost of a defined activity, and is subject to consensus among them. Under the overall authority of the NAC, various bodies exercise managerial control over all four of the principal elements of the Organization’s financial structure:

- the International Staff, financed by the civil budget;
- the international military structure, financed by the military budget;
- the Security Investment Programme; and
- NATO Agencies.

When cooperative activities do not involve all member countries, they are, for the most part, managed by NATO Production and Logistics programs within NATO agencies. Such programs and agencies have their own supervisory boards and Boards of Directors, and finance committees and distinct sources of financing within national treasuries.

Financial regulations applied at NATO provide basic unifying principles around which the overall financial structure is articulated. They are approved by the NAC and are complemented by rules and procedures adapting them to specific NATO bodies and programmes.

**Financial management of the civil and military budgets**

The civil and military budgets are annual, coinciding with the calendar year. Each budget is prepared under the authority of the head of the respective NATO body, reviewed and is reviewed by the Budget Committee composed of representatives of contributing member countries, and approved for execution by the NAC.

Failure to achieve consensus before the start of the financial year entails non-approval of the budget and the financing of operations, under the supervision of the Budget Committee, through provisional allocations limited to the level of the budget approved for the preceding year. This regime may last for six months, after which the Council is required to decide either to approve the budget or to authorize continuation of interim financing.

When the budget has been approved, the head of the NATO body has discretion to execute it through the commitment and expenditure of funds for the purposes authorized. This discretion is limited by different levels of constraint prescribed by the Financial Regulations regarding such matters as recourse to competitive bidding for contracts for the supply of goods and services, or transfers of credits to correct over or under-estimates of the funding required. Discretionary
authority to execute a budget may be further limited by particular obligations to seek prior approval for commitments and expenditure. These may occasionally be imposed by the Budget Committee in the interests of ensuring strict application of new policies or of monitoring the implementation of complex initiatives such as organizational restructuring.

Financial management of the NATO Security Investment Programme

Implementation of the NATO Security Investment Programme starts from capability packages. These packages identify the assets available to and required by NATO military commanders to fulfil specified tasks. They assess common-funded supplements (in terms of capital investment and recurrent operating and maintenance costs) as well as the civilian and military manpower required to accomplish the task. They are reviewed by the Resource Policy and Planning Board then approved by the NAC.

Once they are approved, authorization for individual projects can move forward under the responsibility of the Investment Committee. The "Host Nation," (a term which refers to either the country on whose territory the project is to be implemented, or a NATO agency or strategic command responsible for implementing a project) prepares an authorization request. Once the Committee has agreed to the project, the Host Nation can proceed with its final design, contract award and implementation. Unless otherwise agreed by the Investment Committee, the bidding process is conducted among firms from those countries contributing to the project.

The financial management system which applies to the NSIP is based on an international financial clearing process. Host nations report on the expenditure foreseen on authorized projects within their responsibility. Following agreement of the forecasts by the Investment Committee, the International Staff calculates the amounts to be paid by each country and to be received by each host nation. Further calculations determine the payment amounts, currencies and which country or NATO agency will receive the funds.

Once a project has been completed, it is subject to a Joint Final Acceptance Inspection to ensure that the work undertaken is in accordance with the scope of work authorized. As soon as this report is accepted by the Investment Committee, it is added to the NATO inventory.

Financial control

With respect to the military and civil budgets, the head of the NATO body is ultimately responsible for the correct preparation and execution of the budget. The administrative support for this task is largely entrusted to Financial Controller of the Agency or NATO body.

Each Financial Controller has final recourse to the Budget Committee in the case of persistent disagreement with the head of the respective NATO body regarding an intended transaction. The Financial Controller is charged with ensuring that all aspects of execution of the budget conform to
expenditure authorizations, to any special controls imposed by the Budget Committee, and to the Financial Regulations and their associated implementing rules and procedures. He may also, in response to internal auditing, institute such additional controls and procedures as he deems necessary for maintaining accountability.

The International Board of Auditors

An independent International Board of Auditors (IBAN) for NATO is responsible for auditing the accounts of the different NATO bodies. Its principal task is to provide the NAC and member governments with the assurance that joint and common funds are properly used for the settlement of authorized expenditure and that expenditure is within the physical and financial authorizations granted.

The Board’s mandate includes not only financial but also performance audits, which extend its role beyond safeguarding accountability to the review of management practices in general. IBAN is composed of officials normally drawn from the national audit bodies of member countries. These officials are appointed by and responsible to the NAC.

- Bodies involved

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) approves NATO budgets and investments, and exercises oversight over NATO financial management. The Council takes into account resource considerations in its decision-making. The Resource Policy and Planning Board (RPPB) advises the Council on resource policy and allocation. For example, when the Council decided to undertake the Libya operation, it did so with the benefit of a full evaluation of the costs from Allied Command Operations and the RPPB. The Budget Committee and the Investment Committee, which report to the RPPB, also review and approve planned expenditures.

The NATO Office of Resources brings together all members of the NATO International Staff working on resource issues. The office provides integrated policy and technical advice to the NAC and the Secretary General, NATO resource committees, and other NATO bodies. The office facilitates agreements on resource matters among member countries.

The Resource Policy and Planning Board

The Resource Policy and Planning Board (RPPB) is the senior advisory body to the NAC on the management of all NATO resources. It has responsibility for the overall management of NATO’s civil and military budgets, as well as the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP) and manpower. Both the Budget Committee and the Investment Committee report to the RPPB.

The Budget Committee
The Budget Committee is responsible to the Resource Policy and Planning Board for NATO’s civil and military budgets. The civil budget covers all costs related to NATO’s International Staff at NATO HQ in Brussels; the military budget covers all costs related to the International Military Staff at NATO HQ, the strategic commands and the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control (NAEW&C) Force.

The Investment Committee

The Investment Committee is responsible to the Resource Policy and Planning Board for the implementation of the NATO Security and Investment Programme (NSIP).

The NATO Security and Investment Programme finances the provision of the installations and facilities needed to support the roles of the two strategic commands – Allied Command, Europe and Allied Command Transformation - recognized as exceeding the national defence requirements of individual member countries.

Information on Defence Expenditures

NATO publishes an annual compendium of financial, personnel and economic data for all member countries. Since 1963, this report has formed a consistent basis of comparison of the defence effort of Alliance members based on a common definition of defence expenditure. Through the links below, you can find data covering the years from 1949 to the present.

Working mechanism

The figures represent payments actually made or to be made during the course of the fiscal year. They are based on the NATO definition of defence expenditure. In view of the differences between this and national definitions, the figures shown may diverge considerably from those which are quoted by national authorities or given in national budgets.

Evolution

Each year, updated tables with nations’ defence expenditures are published on the NATO website in PDF and Excel format. The latest version of the compendium provides tables covering key indicators on the financial and economic aspects of NATO defence, including:

- Total defence expenditures
- Defence expenditure and GDP growth rates
- Defence expenditures as a percentage of GDP
- Defence expenditures and GDP per capita
- Defence expenditures by category
- Armed forces personnel strength
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NATO reform

At the Lisbon Summit, November 2010, NATO leaders endorsed a new Strategic Concept, which states that the Alliance will “engage in a process of continual reform, to streamline structures, improve working methods and maximise efficiency.”

This process had already started in June 2010 with the internal organization of NATO Headquarters, i.e., the NATO Committee review. In parallel, NATO also engaged in the reform of its Command Structure – the NATO Command Structure Review - and that of its Agencies – the NATO Agencies Review.

- The Committee Review has been implemented and is currently being fine-tuned;
- the NATO Command Structure Review was launched at the Lisbon Summit and the approval of the model and geographical footprint was approved by defence ministers in June 2011. Its implementation will be conducted over a period of one year;
- the Agencies Review aims to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of capabilities and services, to achieve greater synergy between similar functions and increase transparency and accountability. At the Lisbon Summit, Allies agreed to streamline the 14 NATO agencies into three major programmatic themes: procurement, support, and communications and information.

Additionally, NATO’s International Staff is being reviewed as part of this broader package of reform being undertaken within the Organisation. Similarly to the other initiatives, it aims to streamline and adapt structures to today’s environment.

Organizations and agencies

A number of organizations and agencies fall under the NATO umbrella that deal with specific subject areas or approaches – from research, logistics and communication to pipeline management and helicopter production. They provide a focus for specialized
research and advice, the implementation of Alliance decisions, the management and operation of cooperative programmes and systems, and education and training. Agencies are a vital mechanism for procuring and sustaining capabilities collectively.

The starting point of an organization or agency is a Charter that lays out the tasks and responsibilities of a NATO organization. A board is normally set up to guide the work of the new organization, and an agency is often created to carry out its activities. In some cases, more than one agency works within the framework of an organization.

Although NATO organizations and agencies are autonomous, they are required to follow the terms set out in their charters and usually report to either the North Atlantic Council or the Military Committee, or to both. They benefit from NATO’s tax-exempt status and primarily serve the Alliance and its member states. Some, however, also assist with the needs of NATO partners when this benefits the Alliance.

NATO’s organizations and agencies are located within the Alliance Headquarters in Brussels and a number of Allied countries.

**NATO Agencies Reform**

The NATO Agencies Reform is part of an ongoing NATO reform process, which is also focusing on the military command structure.

Today, there are 14 NATO Agencies located in seven member states, all providing essential capabilities and services to NATO Armed Forces. The reform aims to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of capabilities and services, to achieve greater synergy between similar functions and to increase transparency and accountability. The Agencies Reform will ultimately bring savings, in particular, with regard to overhead costs and sharing of support services.

At the Lisbon Summit, Allies agreed on a model that will streamline the agencies into three major programmatic themes: procurement, support and communications and information.

Existing agencies that are managing multinational procurement programmes, such as Eurofighter and NATO Helicopter for the 90s (NH90), will, when arrangements are in place, become Programme Offices within the new NATO Procurement Agency. They will remain in their current locations near their industrial partners at least initially.

The NATO Support Agency will be located in Capellen, Luxembourg, the site of the current NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA). The NATO Communications and Information Agency Headquarters will be in Brussels, as will the very small staff that will design the new NATO Procurement Agency.
Further changes include a new NATO Science and Technology (S&T) Organization to be created before July 2012, consisting of the Science and Technology Board, the Programme Office for Collaborative S&T, and the NATO Undersea Research Centre (NURC).

The current NATO Standardization Agency will continue and be reviewed by spring 2014.

In June 2011, NATO Defence Ministers considered detailed options for the new agency structure and agreed to pursue a transition period of one year to implement the reform.

They also agreed to create a "shared services" environment by consolidating support services among NATO Agencies, NATO HQ and other organizational units in the areas of finance and accounting, general procurement, human resources, general information technology and facilities.

Since June 2011, steps towards the creation of the new organizations have been undertaken: founding charters are being prepared, provisional governing bodies have been established and new heads of agencies have been selected.

The reform will ensure an orderly transfer of responsibilities so that critical capabilities will continue to be delivered and services will continue to be provided to ongoing operations throughout.

**NATO’s organizations and agencies include**

1. **NATO Communications and Information Agency (C & I A)**
2. **NATO Procurement Agency**
3. **NATO Standardization Agency**
4. **NATO Support Agency**
International Staff

Some 1,200 civilians work within NATO’s International Staff (IS) at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. The primary role of the IS is to provide advice, guidance and administrative support to the national delegations at NATO Headquarters. It helps to implement decisions taken at different committee levels and, in doing so, supports the process of consensus-building and decision-making within the Alliance.

The IS is headed by NATO’s Secretary General, who from an administrative point of view, is also a member of the IS. Staff members are recruited from NATO member countries. Worldwide, some 5,000 civilians work for NATO in different agencies and strategic and regional commands.

The IS is currently being reviewed as part of a broader package of reform being undertaken within the Organisation, in line with commitments made under the 2010 Strategic Concept.

• Role and responsibilities

The IS is an advisory and administrative body that supports the delegations of NATO members at different committee levels and helps implement their decisions. For instance, the IS produces policy papers, background notes, reports and speeches on issues relevant to NATO’s political and military agenda. It supports and advises committees, and prepares and follows up on their discussions and decisions, therefore facilitating the political consultation process. It also liaises closely with NATO’s
International Military Staff (IMS) located in the same building in Brussels. The IMS is the executive body of the Military Committee – NATO’s senior military authority.

Members of the IS owe their allegiance to the Organisation throughout the period of their appointment. They are either recruited directly by the Organisation or seconded by their governments and each appointment is approved by the Secretary General.

Vacancies within the IS are announced on NATO’s website and are open to member country citizens.

- **The structure of the IS**

The International Staff includes the Office of the Secretary General, seven divisions, each headed by an Assistant Secretary General, and a number of independent offices headed by directors.

**The Private Office**

The Secretary General heads the IS and has a Private Office that includes a director and staff, the Deputy Secretary General, a Policy Planning Unit and the Council Secretariat.

**Divisions**

The IS fulfills a number of roles filled by different divisions:

- **Political Affairs and Security Policy Division**: this division provides political advice and policy guidance. It has the lead role in the political aspects of NATO’s core security tasks, including regional, economic and security affairs, as well as relations with other international organisations and partner countries.
- **Defence Policy and Planning Division**: this division develops and implements the defence policy and planning dimension of NATO’s fundamental security tasks. This includes defence planning, the Alliance’s nuclear policy, defence against weapons of mass destruction and certain aspects of operational planning.
- **Operations Division**: Operations provides the operational capability required to meet NATO’s deterrence, defence and crisis management tasks. Responsibilities include NATO’s crisis management and peacekeeping activities, and civil emergency planning and exercises.
- **Defence Investment Division**: this division is responsible for developing and investing in assets and capabilities aimed at enhancing the Alliance’s defence capacity, including armaments planning, air defence and security investment.
- **Emerging Security Challenges Division**: this division was more recently created to deal with a growing range of non-traditional risks and challenges. It started its work at the beginning of August 2010 and is focusing on terrorism, nuclear issues, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber defence and energy security, as well as NATO’s Science Programme.
- **Public Diplomacy Division**: communicating with the wider public is one of NATO’s priorities. The Public Diplomacy Division is responsible for informing different target audiences about NATO’s activities and policies through the media, the NATO website, multimedia and print products, seminars and conferences.
- **Executive Management Division**: this division manages staff, finances and security standards. It is tasked with ensuring that NATO’s IS works efficiently and also provides support to all elements operating at NATO headquarters, including support
and conference services, information management and NATO's human and financial resources.

Independent offices

Also within the IS is the NATO Office of Security and the NATO Office of Resources, both headed by a Director; the Intelligence Unit; the Office of the Legal Adviser; the Office of the Financial Controller; and an independent International Board of Auditors.

The NATO Office of Security is a distinct body responsible for coordinating, monitoring and implementing NATO security policy, for overall security within NATO and for the NATO Headquarters Security Service.

The NATO Office of Resources was created in 2007. Under the direction of the Director, it brings together all IS members working on NATO military common-funded issues, with the aim of reinforcing military common-funded resource management at NATO HQ.

Evolution of the IS

The IS was created in 1951 to support the North Atlantic Council (NAC). It was made responsible for the preparation and follow-up of action in all matters of the Council. The ‘Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’ defined its status, which National Representatives and International Staff negotiated and signed in September 1951.

Throughout the years, the IS has been reorganised many times. One of the most recent restructuring exercises stemmed from the November 2002 Prague Summit, when NATO leaders approved a package of measures to enhance the Alliance's ability to meet new security threats. This included a reorganisation of NATO's IS and the implementation of modern management processes. The restructuring aimed to ensure a fairer redistribution of responsibilities among divisions, strengthen management of the staff and improve coordination on key issues and programmes.

More recently, a review of the IS has been launched as part of a larger package of reform – that of the military command structure, organisations and agencies and NATO committees. This process forms part of NATO's commitment to "engage in a process of continual reform, to streamline structures, improve working methods and maximise efficiency", made in the Strategic Concept endorsed at the Lisbon Summit, November 2010.

International Military Staff

The International Military Staff (IMS) is the executive body of the Military Committee, NATO’s senior military authority.
It is responsible for preparing the assessments, evaluations and reports on all NATO military matters, which form the basis of discussion and decisions in the Military Committee (MC). The IMS also ensures that decisions and policies on military matters taken by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the MC are implemented by the appropriate NATO military bodies.

The IMS comprises some 450 military personnel supported by approximately 90 civilian personnel. It is headed by a Director General and divided into five functional divisions and several branches and support offices. It is able to move swiftly and smoothly into a 24 hours a day, seven days a week crisis mode for a limited period of time without additional personnel.

- **Role and responsibilities**

  The International Military Staff is the essential link between the political decision-making bodies of the Alliance and NATO’s Strategic Commanders (the Supreme Allied Commander Europe – SACEUR - and the Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation - SACT) and their staffs, liaising closely with NATO’s civilian International Staff located in the same building in Brussels.

- **Working mechanism**

  The IMS is headed by a Director General, at the level of a three star general or flag officer, assisted by 12 general/flag officers who head the divisions and administrative support offices within the IMS.

  Several key positions are located within or attached to the Office of the Director General of the IMS:

  - the Executive Coordinator (EXCO): the incumbent manages staff activities and controls the flow of information and communication, both within the IMS and between the IMS and other parts of NATO Headquarters;
  
  - the Public Affairs and Strategic Communications Adviser (PA&SCA): the incumbent advises the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the MC, and the Director General of the IMS on strategic communications and public affairs matters. The Adviser works closely with the office of the Chairman of NATO’s MC, acting as military spokesperson for the Chairman, and as the main source of information for all MC matters and activities;

  - the Financial Controller (FC): the incumbent advises key officials on all IMS financial and fiscal matters;

  - the Legal Officer (LO): this person provides guidance on all legal issues to the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the MC, the Director General of the IMS and all organisations under the authority of this office, and the MC.

  - the NATO Office on Gender Perspectives (NOGP): they provide advice and support to the IMS on gender issues. It is the permanent focal point for collecting, providing and sharing information regarding national programmes, policies and procedures on these issues, including the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions on women, peace and security (UNSCRs 1325 and 1820). It maintains liaison with the NATO IS and international organisations concerned with the integration of a gender perspective into military operations, as well as with gender related issues.

- **The five divisions**

  - [Role and responsibilities](#)
  - [Working mechanism](#)
  - [The five divisions](#)
The IMS’ key role is to support the MC, and to do this it is organised into five functional divisions responsible for the following.

- **Plans and policy (P&P)**  
The IMS develops and coordinates the MC’s contribution to NATO policy and planning matters, defence policy, strategic planning, special weapons policy and planning, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, defence and force planning, the NATO Response Force and capabilities in general.

- **Operations (OPS)**  
The IMS supports the MC in developing operational plans and addressing questions about the NATO force posture and other military management issues regarding NATO’s role in international crises. It promotes and develops multinational training and exercises for NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries.

- **Intelligence (INT)**  
The IMS provides day-to-day strategic intelligence support to the NATO Secretary General, the NAC, the MC, the Defence Policy and Planning Committee and other NATO bodies. It collates and assesses intelligence received from NATO member countries and commands. It also develops, maintains and implements basic intelligence policy, doctrine and documents.

- **Co-operation and regional security (C&RS)**  
The IMS liaises with military contacts and cooperates within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and PfP programme, the NATO-Russia Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission, the NATO-Georgia Commission, the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and with individual partner countries across the globe. Military advice on NATO involvement in different aspects of disarmament, arms control and cooperative security issues is also developed.

- **Logistics and Resources (L&R)**  
The IMS develops and coordinates the MC’s contribution to NATO strategic logistics and resource planning in support of NATO military bodies. It provides staff support to NATO policy and procedures within the framework of logistics, medical issues, armaments, Research & Technology, manpower and personnel, and investment and finance.

### Additional functions and offices

- **Consultation, Command and Control (C3)**  
The NATO HQ Consultation, Command and Control Staff (NHQC3S), combines the communications elements of both the IMS and the IS. This means it is an integrated staff with IMS and IS personnel that serves the NAC, the MC and the C3 Board. Two of its branches are mainly coordination branches: one is focused on overall policy and governance of the C3 domain and the other focuses on the implementation aspects. The Information Assurance and Cyber Defence Branch, the Information Communities of Interest Services Branch and the Spectrum and C3 Infrastructure Branch are subject matter branches.

- **The NATO Situation Centre (SITCEN)**  
The SITCEN is positioned between the IS and the IMS and consists of both civilian and military personnel. It is NATO Headquarters’ central agency for providing situational awareness throughout the headquarters, fully supporting the crisis management mechanism 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

### III. Greater flexibility with partners

Chicago will be an opportunity for Allies to deepen existing relations and broaden its networks of partnerships. The summit will therefore give a new impetus to partnerships, highlighting their integral role in NATO’s peace support and crisis-management operations and overall political agenda.
Heads of state and government will also focus on engaging other organisations in addressing global challenges.

Partnerships: a cooperative approach to security

NATO’s new Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, identifies “cooperative security” as one of NATO’s three essential core tasks. It states that the promotion of Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through a wide network of partner relationships with countries and organizations around the globe. No one country or organization can deal with the complex and unpredictable challenges of the evolving security environment on its own: coordinated multilateral action is required.

At Lisbon, Allied leaders declared that NATO’s partnerships “can provide frameworks for political dialogue and regional cooperation in the field of security and defence; contribute to strengthening our common values; and are essential to the success of many of our operations and missions.”

A focused effort to reform NATO’s partnerships policy was launched at Lisbon, with a view to making dialogue and cooperation more inclusive, flexible, meaningful and strategically oriented. Following up on the Lisbon decisions, a new partnership policy was endorsed by NATO foreign ministers at their meeting in Berlin in April 2011.

“*The newly approved ‘Berlin partnership package’ will allow us to work on more issues, with more partners, in more ways,*” stated NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen.

Over the past two decades, the Alliance has developed a network of structured partnerships with countries from the Euro-Atlantic area, the Mediterranean and the Gulf region, as well as individual relationships with other partners across the globe.

The new policy aims to reinforce NATO’s existing partnerships by strengthening consultation mechanisms and by facilitating more substance-driven cooperation. In addition, the new policy outlines a “toolbox” of mechanisms and activities, simplifying the way that NATO develops cooperation offers to partners.

In line with the new Strategic Concept, NATO will offer its partners “more political engagement with the Alliance, and a substantial role in shaping strategy and decisions on NATO-led operations to which they contribute.” While preserving their specificity and further developing the existing partnership frameworks, the new partnership policy offers all partners more cooperation and more dialogue. Moreover, there will be consultation and, as appropriate, cooperation in flexible formats, which will bring NATO and partners together, across and beyond existing frameworks.
NATO is also prepared to widen its engagement to develop political dialogue and practical cooperation with key global actors and other new interlocutors across the globe that share the Allies’ interest in peaceful international relations but have no partnership programme with NATO. "Our new policy recognises that in today’s world we need cooperative security if we are to accomplish our security tasks. And to that end we want to reach out to major players across the globe," said NATO’s Secretary General after the Berlin meeting.

NATO also engages actively with other international actors and organizations on defence and security-related issues, and is seeking to deepen this cooperation. The complexity of today’s peace-support and stabilization operations and the multi-faceted nature of 21st century security challenges call for a comprehensive approach that effectively combines political, civilian and military instruments.

• A network of partnerships with non-member countries

NATO pursues dialogue and practical cooperation with non-member countries on a wide range of political and security-related issues, and partners contribute to NATO’s goals and tasks, including to NATO-led operations and its actions against terrorism and emerging security challenges.

In the Euro-Atlantic area, the Alliance engages in relations with non-member countries through the 50-nation Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace ( PfP) – a major programme of bilateral cooperation with individual Euro-Atlantic partners. Among these partners, NATO has also developed specific structures for its relationships with Russia, Ukraine and Georgia.

NATO is developing relations with the southern Mediterranean-rim countries through the Mediterranean Dialogue, as well as with countries from the Gulf region through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

In addition to these more structured partnerships, NATO cooperates with a range of countries which are not part of these structures. Formally referred to as “partners across the globe” – or often simply as “global partners” – they include Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan and Mongolia.

• Strategic objectives for partnership

Under the new partnership policy, the strategic objectives of NATO’s partner relations are to:

- Enhance Euro-Atlantic and international security, peace and stability;
- Promote regional security and cooperation;
- Facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation on issues of common interest, including international efforts to meet emerging security challenges;
- Prepare interested eligible nations for NATO membership;
- Promote democratic values and reforms;
- Enhance support for NATO-led operations and missions;
• Enhance awareness of security developments including through early warning, with a view to preventing crises;
• Build confidence, achieve better mutual understanding, including about NATO’s role and activities, in particular though enhanced public diplomacy.

Priority areas for dialogue, consultation and cooperation

Within these strategic objectives for partnership, dialogue, consultation and cooperation will be prioritized in the following areas, as appropriate:

• Political consultations on security developments, as appropriate, including regional issues, in particular with a view to preventing crises and contributing to their management;
• Cooperation in NATO-led operations and missions;
• Defence reform, capability and capacity building, education and training;
• Interoperability;
• Counter-terrorism;
• Counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;
• Emerging security challenges, including related to cyber-defence, energy security and maritime security, including counter-piracy;
• Civil emergency planning.

Towards a more efficient and flexible partnership

Under the new policy endorsed at Berlin, steps are being taken to:

• streamline NATO’s partnership tools in order to open all cooperative activities and exercises to partners and to harmonise partnership programmes;
• better engage with partners across the globe who contribute significantly to security, and reach out to relevant partners to build trust, increase transparency and develop practical cooperation;
• develop flexible formats to discuss security challenges with partners and enhance existing fora for political dialogue; and
• build on improvements in NATO’s training mechanisms and consider methods to enhance individual partner’s ability to build capacity.

While respecting the specificity of existing partnership frameworks, all partners are offered access to the whole spectrum of partnership activities NATO offers. All partners with which NATO has an individual programme of cooperation – whether they be Euro-Atlantic partners, or partners in the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, or global partners – have access to a new Partnership Cooperation Menu, which comprises some 1,600 activities.

NATO will further develop the “28+n” formula as a mechanism to provide more flexible formats for meetings and, as appropriate, activities which will bring NATO and partners together, across and beyond existing frameworks. Such meetings are not new to NATO, could be thematic or event-driven and will be used, on a case-by-case basis, to enhance consultation on security issues of common concern and cooperation in priority policy areas. A meeting “28+n” meeting was held at NATO Headquarters in September 2011 to discuss counter-piracy, involving representatives from 47
nations and organizations involved in counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean. Cyber defence is another topic which may be considered for discussion in this format.

In terms of widening NATO’s engagement to key global actors and other new interlocutors with which NATO does not have formal partnership arrangement, NATO is prepared to develop political dialogue and practical cooperation with any nation across the globe that shares its interest in peaceful international relations. Contacts will be developed based on decision of the North Atlantic Council and in a flexible and pragmatic manner. These new interlocutors may include countries such as China, India, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Colombia or Brazil.

Allies also decided at Lisbon to review the Political-Military Framework that governs the way NATO involves partners in political consultation and the decision process for the operations and missions to which they contribute. This review was conducted, in consultation with partners, in 2011. At Berlin, NATO foreign ministers endorsed proposals for the establishment of a more structured role for NATO’s operational partners in shaping the strategy of NATO-led operations to which they contribute.

- **Active engagement with other international organizations**

Since the 1990s, NATO has developed close working relations with the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). This is an integral part of the Alliance’s ongoing transformation to address effectively the complex challenges of crisis management, as well as terrorism and emerging security challenges such as the proliferation of weapons, cyber security, energy security and piracy.

The Alliance is also developing cooperation in specific areas with a number of other international and non-governmental organizations, including the African Union, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Organization for Migration, the World Bank, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

The Alliance is committed to pursuing efforts towards enhancing its relations with other relevant international organizations in accordance with the Strategic Concept, the Lisbon Summit Declaration, and the action plan for the Comprehensive Approach. Key objectives guiding this cooperation, as appropriate, are to:

- play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security;
- engage actively before, during and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis, planning and conduct of activities on the ground, in order to maximise the coherence and effectiveness of the overall international effort;
- increase support for training and regional capacity building.
Partnership tools

NATO has developed a number of partnership tools and mechanisms to support cooperation with partner countries through a mix of policies, programmes, action plans and other arrangements. Many tools are focused on the important priorities of building capabilities and interoperability, and supporting defence and security-related reform.

Most of these partnership tools were originally developed in the framework of NATO’s cooperation with Euro-Atlantic partners through the Partnership for Peace. However, with the reform of NATO’s partnerships policy in April 2011, steps were taken to open the “toolbox” to all partners, across and beyond existing regional partnership frameworks.

From 2012 onwards, all partners have access to a new Partnership Cooperation Menu, which comprises some 1600 activities. An Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme will be jointly developed and agreed between NATO and each partner country that requests one. These two-year programmes will be drawn up from the extensive Partnership and Cooperation Menu, according to each country’s specific interests and needs.

Building capabilities and interoperability

Partner countries have made and continue to make significant contributions to the Alliance’s operations and missions, whether it be supporting peace in the Western Balkans and Afghanistan, training national security forces in Iraq, monitoring maritime activity in the Mediterranean Sea, or helping protect civilians in Libya.

A number of tools have been developed to ensure that partner forces are capable of participating actively in NATO-led operations. They include the following:

The Planning and Review Process (PARP) helps develop the interoperability and capabilities of forces which might be made available for NATO training, exercises and operations. It also provides a framework to assist partners to develop effective, affordable and sustainable armed forces as well as promoting wider defence and security-sector transformation and reform efforts. PARP is open to Euro-Atlantic partners on a voluntary basis and is open to other partner countries on a case-by-case basis, upon approval of the North Atlantic Council. Under PARP, planning targets are negotiated with each country and regular reviews measure progress. PARP is conducted by Allies and participating partners together. (See also A-Z page on PARP)

The Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) Evaluation and Feedback Programme is used to develop and train partner land, maritime, air or special operations forces that are declared available for NATO-led operations and the NATO Response Force, so that they meet NATO standards. This can often take a few years, but it ensures that partner forces are effective and interoperable with Allied forces once deployed. Some partners use the OCC as a strategic tool to transform their defence
forces. The OCC has contributed significantly to the increasing number of partner forces participating in NATO-led operations and the NATO Response Force.

The **Political Military Framework (PMF)** sets out principles, modalities and guidelines for the involvement of all partner countries in political consultations and decision-shaping, in operational planning and in command arrangements for operations to which they contribute. A review of the Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP operations was launched at the Lisbon Summit to update the way NATO works together with partner countries and shapes decisions on the operations and missions to which they contribute. This review was conducted, in consultation with partners, in 2011.

The **Training and Education Enhancement Programme (TEEP)** is the primary tool to promote training to support military interoperability, especially through collaboration among national institutions focused on operational/tactical level training for staff taking part in multinational headquarters. Beyond Euro-Atlantic partners, the TEEP has been open to countries from the Mediterranean and Gulf region (i.e. Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative partners) for a number of years, and steps are being taken to open the programme to other partners across the globe. The **Military Training and Exercise Programme (MTEP)** allows partners to take part in exercises to promote interoperability. Through the MTEP, a five-year planning horizon provides a starting point for exercise planning and the allocation of resources. The Bi-Strategic Command Military Cooperation Division, which is principally located at Allied Command Operation in Mons, Belgium, is responsible for supporting partner involvement in exercises. In addition, and on a case-by-case basis, Allies may invite partners to take part in **North Atlantic Council-level Crisis Management Exercises** that engage ministries in participating capitals, and national political and military representation at NATO HQ, in consultations on strategic management of exercise crises. (See also A-Z page on Education and training)

The **Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism (PAP-T)** is a framework through which Allies and partner countries work to improve cooperation in the fight against terrorism, through political consultation and a range of practical measures. It facilitates consultation and cooperation in areas such as intelligence-sharing, terrorism-related training and exercises, and the development of capabilities for defence against terrorist attack or for dealing with the consequences of such an attack. (See also A-Z page on PAP-T)

Opportunities for cooperation between NATO and partners in the areas of **armaments, air defence and airspace and air traffic management** are provided through the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD), the Air Defence Committee (ADC) and the Air Traffic Management Committee (ATMC).

- Supporting transformation
Several tools have been developed to provide assistance to partner countries in their own efforts to transform defence and security-related structures and policies, and to manage the economic and social consequences of reforms. An important priority is to promote the development of effective defence institutions that are under civilian and democratic control.

Some of the main tools supporting transformation include the following:

**Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs)** offer partners the opportunity to deepen their cooperation with NATO and sharpen the focus on domestic reform efforts. Developed on a two-year basis, these plans include a wide range of objectives and targets for reforms on political issues as well as security and defence issues. They are designed to bring together all the various cooperation mechanisms through which a partner country interacts with the Alliance. Since the launch of the IPAP in 2002, six countries have chosen to develop IPAPs with NATO. The development of IPAPs is open to all partners, on a case-by-case basis, upon approval of the North Atlantic Council. (See also A-Z page on IPAP)

The **Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB)** aims to reinforce efforts by partner countries to reform and restructure their defence institutions to meet domestic needs as well as international commitments. (See also A-Z page on PAP-DIB)

**Education and training** in a number of areas is offered to decision-makers, military forces, civil servants and representatives of civil society through institutions such as the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany; the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy; and some 20 national Partnership Training and Education Centres. Moreover, the **Education and Training for Defence Reform initiative** supports the education of civilian and military personnel in efficient and effective management of national defence institutions under civil and democratic control. (See also A-Z page on Education and Training)

In addition, a **Professional Development Programme** can be launched for the civilian personnel of defence and security establishments to strengthen the capacity for democratic management and oversight. Training provided under such a programme is closely aligned to the partner country's overall defence and security-sector reform objectives and harmonized and de-conflicted with the bilateral efforts of individual Allies and other programmes.

Through the **Partnership Trust Fund policy**, individual Allies and partners support practical demilitarization projects and defence transformation projects in partner countries through individual Trust Funds. (See also A-Z page on Partnership Trust Funds)

The **Building Integrity Initiative** is aimed at promoting good practice, strengthening transparency, accountability and integrity to reduce the risk of corruption in the defence establishments of Allies and partners alike. This includes developing a tailored programme to
support the Afghan National Security Forces as well as supporting good practice in contracting and implementation of the NATO Afghan First Policy. (See also A-Z page on Building Integrity Initiative)

- **Wider cooperation**

The NATO **Science for Peace and Security (SPS)** programme promotes joint cooperative projects between Allies and partners in the field of security-related civil science and technology. Funding applications should address SPS key priorities -- these are linked to NATO’s strategic objectives and focus on projects in direct support to NATO’s operations, as well as projects that enhance defence against terrorism and address other security threats. (See also SPS web site)

**Disaster-response and preparedness** is also an important area of cooperation with partners. The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) is a “24/7” focal point for coordinating disaster-relief efforts among NATO and partner countries. The Centre has guided consequence-management efforts in more than 45 emergencies, including fighting floods and forest fires, and dealing with the aftermath of earthquakes. Partners are represented on many of the Alliance’s civil emergency planning groups and are also involved in education and training in this area. (See also A-Z pages on EADRCC and Civil Emergency Planning)

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**NATO’s relations with Russia**

**The 28 Allies and Russia work together as equal partners in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), which was established in 2002. The NRC provides a framework for consultation on current security issues and practical cooperation in a wide range of areas of common interest. Its agenda builds on the basis for bilateral cooperation that was set out in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act.**

NATO’s new Strategic Concept, approved at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, stresses the importance to the Allies of developing “a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia” and their determination to “enhance political consultation and practical cooperation with Russia in areas of shared interests” and to “use the full potential of the NRC for dialogue and joint action”.

Lisbon also hosted the third summit in the history of the NRC. The 29 NRC leaders pledged to “work towards achieving a true strategic and modernized partnership based on the principles of reciprocal confidence, transparency, and predictability, with the aim of contributing to the creation of a common space of peace, security and stability.”

At Lisbon, NRC leaders endorsed a Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges, which include Afghanistan (including counter-narcotics), terrorism (including the vulnerability of critical infrastructure), piracy, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery,
as well as natural and man-made disasters. Practical cooperation is being developed in each area.

NRC leaders agreed to resume cooperation in the area of theatre missile defence as well as to develop a comprehensive joint analysis of the future framework for broader missile defence cooperation. They also agreed on a number of initiatives to assist in the stabilization of Afghanistan and the wider region.

Since Lisbon, progress has been made in a number of important areas:

- On issues related to Afghanistan, a project to help the Afghan Armed Forces to operate their helicopter fleet was launched in 2011 and the first training of Afghan maintenance began in Novosibirsk in April 2012; the ongoing project to train Afghan and Central Asian counter-narcotics personnel increased the number of trainings and trainees and in April 2012 reached the landmark of 2000 trainees since the Project’s beginning; and work on further developing multi-modal reverse arrangements for transit of the non-lethal cargo for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is well advanced;
- In the area of combating terrorism, the Cooperative Airspace Initiative, after a successful June 2011 live exercise entitled “Vigilant Skies 2011”, reached its operational readiness at the end of 2011 and a table top exercise on counter-terrorism took place in March 2012;
- Work is underway to strengthen cooperation on counter-piracy in particular by improving communication channels during naval operations;
- A computer-assisted exercise on theatre missile defence took place in March 2012.

NRC nations agree that the NRC is a valuable instrument for building practical cooperation and for political dialogue on all issues – where they agree and disagree. While political differences remain on some high-level issues – such as Russia’s suspended implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), Libya and issues related to Georgia – the driving force behind the NRC’s pragmatic spirit of cooperation is the realization that NATO and Russia share strategic priorities and face common challenges.

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has expressed his desire to see progress in cooperation on three tracks, which he deems essential to build trust between the Allies and Russia: missile defence, conventional arms control, and reducing the number of short-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

- Framework for cooperation

Cooperation between Russia and NATO member states is directed by the NRC and developed through various subordinate working groups and committees. Every year, NRC member countries agree on an annual work programme.

Key areas of cooperation include the fight against terrorism, defence reform, military-to-military cooperation, counter-narcotics training of Afghan, Central Asian and Pakistani personnel, theatre missile defence/missile defence, counter-piracy, crisis management, non-proliferation, airspace management, civil emergency planning, scientific cooperation and environmental security.
The NRC has provided a forum for the development of a continuous political dialogue on current security issues, which has expanded steadily to include frank and constructive exchanges on topical and sometimes controversial issues. Discussions have been held on subjects such as the situation in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus, Central Asia, the Middle East, Iraq and Libya, as well as exchanges on issues such as NATO’s transformation, energy security, missile defence and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Dialogue also generates ideas for practical cooperation to help address shared security challenges.

To facilitate cooperation, Russia has established a diplomatic mission to NATO and Russian Military Branch Offices have been set up at NATO’s two top military command headquarters. In Moscow, a NATO Information Office seeks to explain NATO and promote the benefits of the NATO-Russia partnership, and a Military Liaison Mission is helping improve transparency and coordination on the military side.

- **Key areas of cooperation**

  **Support for ISAF and the Afghan Armed Forces**

  In spring 2008, the Russian Federation offered to facilitate the land transit of non-military equipment for ISAF contributors across Russian territory in support of the NATO-led, UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Similar arrangements have been concluded with the other transit states, opening up this important supply route for ISAF in 2010. At the Lisbon Summit, NRC leaders agreed amendments to the arrangements agreed in 2008 with a view to allowing land transit both to and from Afghanistan of non-lethal cargo. Work is underway on a multi-modal reverse transit arrangement that would permit a mix of rail and air transit for ISAF equipment through Russian territory.

  NRC leaders also agreed at Lisbon to establish an NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund to help the Afghan Armed Forces to operate their helicopter fleet. The project was officially launched in March 2011 at the NRC Ministerial meeting in Berlin with Germany acting as the lead nation and the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) serving as the project’s executing agent. Ten donor nations (Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Russia, Turkey and United States) have contributed a total of around seven million US dollars in financial contributions and 15 million US dollars worth of in-kind contributions to the Trust Fund project, which aims to provide a much-needed maintenance and repair capacity, including spare parts and technical training. Tailored training for Afghan Air Force helicopter maintenance staff started in April 2012 at the OAO Novosibirsk Aircraft Repair Plant in Russia.

  **Counter-narcotics training of Afghan and Central Asian personnel**

  The NRC pilot project for counter-narcotics training of Afghan and Central Asian personnel was launched by NRC foreign ministers in December 2005 to help address the threats posed by the
trafficking in Afghan narcotics. It seeks to build local capacity and to promote regional networking and cooperation by sharing the combined expertise of NRC member states with mid-level officers from Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Pakistan became the seventh participating country in 2010.

The project is being implemented in cooperation with the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC). It is a joint endeavour of many NRC nations – Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States – and Finland (since 2007) together with the project’s beneficiary countries. Ukraine will shortly become the second, non NRC contributing nation.

Fixed training takes place in one of four institutes either in Turkey, Russia or the United States and mobile courses are being conducted in each of the six participating countries. At the Lisbon Summit, NRC leaders agreed to expand the scope of the project to provide further direct assistance to institutional capacity building in the future. By April 2012, some 2000 officers had been trained under the NRC project.

**Combating terrorism**

An NRC Action Plan on Terrorism was launched by NRC foreign ministers in December 2004 to improve overall coordination and provide strategic direction for cooperation in this area. NRC leaders underlined the continued importance of cooperation in the fight against terrorism at Lisbon in November 2010 and an updated Action Plan on Terrorism was approved by NRC foreign ministers at their meeting in April 2011 in Berlin. A first civilian-military counter-terrorism table top exercise was conducted in the framework of the NRC at NATO Headquarters in March 2012.

Regular exchanges of information and in-depth consultations take place within the NRC on various aspects of combating terrorism. Under the Cooperative Airspace Initiative (see below), an information exchange system has been developed to provide air-traffic transparency and early notification of suspicious air activities to help prevent terrorist attacks such as the 9/11 attacks on the United States. In the scientific and technical field, work is ongoing on the STANDEX project, which aims to develop technology that will enable the stand-off detection of explosive devices in mass transport environments. Trials are due to take place in 2013. Countering improvised explosive devices is another important focus of ongoing work.

Over the years, several Russian ships have been deployed in support of Operation Active Endeavour, NATO’s maritime operation against terrorism in the Mediterranean.

**Cooperative Airspace Initiative**
Significant progress has been made on the Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI). The CAI information exchange function is focusing primarily on the aspects of the fight against terrorism. The system is also providing air traffic transparency and early notification of suspicious air activities. This facilitates transparency, predictability and interoperability in airspace management.

Based on a feasibility study completed in 2005, detailed system requirements and a project plan were agreed for the system to enable the reciprocal exchange of air traffic data between centres in NATO countries and in Russia. Implementation started in 2006. The system reached its operational capability in December 2011 and the CAI operational phase is expected to be formally launched by mid-2012, once national procedures regarding the reciprocal coordination of air-traffic situations for countering air terrorist threats have been completed in participating countries, allowing entry into force of the legal agreement concerning CAI.

The operational readiness of the CAI system was demonstrated during counterterrorism exercise “Vigilant Skies 2011”, which took place in June 2011. It was the first such joint live-flying, real-time counter-terrorism exercise, during which Polish, Russian and Turkish fighter jets intervened in response to the simulated hijacking of a passenger aircraft by terrorists.

A total of around 10 million euros have been invested in the CAI project. Nations that have contributed financially include Canada, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Russia, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The system is open for participation by other nations. So far, Finland and Ukraine have indicated an interest in joining the initiative.

The NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A) has led the implementation of the NATO part of the CAI system, and the software was procured from EUROCONTROL. Implementation of the Russian part of the system was led by the State Air Traffic Management Corporation, under the guidance of the Federal Air Navigation Authority. The Russian segment of the system was developed and supplied by the “Almaz-Antey” Concern.

The CAI system consists of two coordination centres, in Moscow and in Warsaw, and local coordination sites in Russia (Murmansk, Kaliningrad, Rostov-on-Don) and in NATO member countries (Bodø, Norway; Warsaw, Poland; and Ankara, Turkey).
Theatre Missile defence/ Missile defence

Cooperation in the area of theatre missile defence (TMD) has been underway for a number of years to address the unprecedented danger posed to deployed forces by the increasing availability of ever more accurate ballistic missiles. A study was launched in 2003 to assess the possible levels of interoperability among the theatre missile defence systems of NATO Allies and Russia.

Three command post exercises have been held – the first in the United States in March 2004, the second in the Netherlands in March 2005, and the third in Russia in October 2006. Computer assisted exercises have taken place in Germany in January 2008 and March 2012. Together with the interoperability study, these exercises are intended to provide the basis for future improvements to interoperability and to develop mechanisms and procedures for joint operations in the area of theatre missile defence.

In December 2009, a NRC Missile Defence Working Group was established. It was tasked to build on the lessons learned from the previous TMD cooperation and to exchange views on possible mutually beneficial cooperation on missile defence, based on a joint assessment of missile threats.

At the Lisbon Summit, NRC leaders approved the joint ballistic missile threat assessment and agreed to discuss pursuing missile defence cooperation. They decided to resume TMD cooperation and to develop a joint analysis of the future framework for missile defence cooperation. NRC defence ministers meeting in June 2011 took stock of the work on missile defence. While they agreed that NATO and Russia are coming closer to reaching agreement on the key principles that should govern this cooperation, more work will need to be done over the next few months.

Non-proliferation and arms control
Dialogue on a growing range of issues related to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has developed under the NRC. Concrete recommendations have been made to strengthen existing non-proliferation arrangements. A number of in-depth discussions and expert seminars have been held to explore opportunities for practical cooperation in the protection against nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Since under the NRC, work has been underway to assess global trends in WMD proliferation and their means of delivery, and to review areas in which NRC nations could work together politically to promote effective multilateral arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

The NRC has also provided a forum for frank discussions on issues related to conventional arms control, such as the CFE Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty and confidence-and-security-building measures. A key priority for all NRC nations is to work towards the ratification of the Adapted Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. The Allies have expressed concern over Russia’s unilateral “suspension” of its participation in the treaty in December 2007. While differences remain on this issue, it is important to note that the Allies remain committed to ratifying the Adapted Treaty. Discussions are ongoing with Russia, both in the framework of the NRC and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe on how to make this possible.

At the Lisbon Summit, NRC leaders emphasized their strong support for the revitalisation and modernisation of the conventional arms control regime in Europe and their readiness to continue dialogue on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation issued of interest to the NRC. A Joint NRC Statement was agreed for the 7th Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in December 2011.

**Nuclear weapons issues**

In the nuclear field, experts have developed a glossary of terms and definitions and organized exchanges on nuclear doctrines and strategy.

Experts and representatives from Russia and NATO member countries have also observed four nuclear-weapon-accident-response field exercises in Russia in 2004, the United Kingdom in 2005, the United States in 2006, and France in 2007. As a follow-on to these four exercises, in June 2011 Russia and NATO member countries also participated in a table top exercise dealing with emergency response to a nuclear weapon incident. Inviting experts to attend such exercises increases transparency, develops common understanding of nuclear-weapon-accident-response procedures, and builds full confidence that the nuclear weapon states of NATO (France, the United Kingdom and United States) and Russia are fully capable to respond effectively to any emergency involving nuclear weapons. Expert seminars have also been held to discuss nuclear doctrine and strategy (2005, 2009 and 2011), lessons learned from nuclear weapons incidents and accidents (2007) and potential responses to the detection of improvised nuclear or radiological devices (2010).

**Military-to-military cooperation**
Since the NRC was established, military liaison arrangements have been enhanced, at the Allied Commands for Operations and for Transformation, as well as in Moscow. A key objective of military-to-military cooperation is to build trust, confidence and transparency, and to improve the ability of NATO and Russian forces to work together in preparation for possible future joint military operations.

Military-to-military cooperation has resumed, following a temporary suspension in the wake of the August 2008 Georgia crisis. The military work plan for 2011 focuses on several agreed areas of cooperation – logistics, combating terrorism, search-and-rescue at sea, counter piracy, theatre missile defence and military academic exchanges – and related military activities.

A “Political-Military Guidance Towards Enhanced Interoperability Between Forces of Russia and NATO Nations” was approved by NRC defence ministers in June 2005.

Another key document is the Partnership for Peace Status of Forces Agreement (signed by Russia in 2004 and ratified by the Russian parliament in May 2007), aimed at facilitating military-to-military and other practical cooperation, in particular the deployment of forces participating in joint operations and exercises.

**Countering piracy**

Countering piracy is one of the key areas of common interest and concern identified in the Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges approved at Lisbon in November 2010. Limited cooperation at the tactical level has been developing between Allied ships and Russian vessels since late 2008.

NATO and Russia have agreed to explore ways to strengthen cooperation to counter piracy under the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) Work Programme for 2012. Building on ongoing military tactical cooperation off the Horn of Africa, they are seeking to strengthen information exchange and coordination and considering possible mutual support, such as refuelling and medical assistance, for ships involved in counter-piracy operations.

**Submarine-crew search and rescue**

Work in the area of submarine-crew search and rescue at sea intensified following the signing of a framework agreement on cooperation in this area in February 2003.

A Russian navy submarine was fully integrated into a NATO-led exercise for the first time during search-and-rescue exercise Bold Monarch 2011 off the coast of southern Spain, from 30 May to 10 June 2011. The Alrosa submarine was supported by three other Russian ships – a submarine-rescue vessel, a salvage vessel and a heavy-lifting vessel.
Prior to this, Russia took part in NATO’s exercise Sorbet Royal, in June 2005. The experience and networks developed during the exercise contributed to the success of an actual rescue operation in August 2005 off the coast of Russian Kamchatka peninsula. Russia also participated in exercise Bold Monarch 2008.

**Crisis management**

NATO and Russia have a long history of cooperation in crisis management. In fact, between 1996 and 2003, Russia was the largest non-NATO troop contributor to NATO-led peacekeeping operations. Close cooperation in the Balkans has been critical in improving relations and building trust between the Russian and Allied militaries.

Since 2002, the NRC has taken steps to prepare for possible future cooperation in this area, notably through the approval in September 2002 of "Political Aspects for a Generic Concept for Joint NATO-Russia Peacekeeping Operations". This paper explores common approaches, establishes a framework for consultation, planning and decision-making during an emerging crisis, and defines issues related to joint training and exercises. These were tested in a procedural exercise, conducted in three phases between May 2003 and September 2004.

**Defence transparency, strategy and reform**

With a view to building mutual confidence and transparency, dialogue is ongoing on doctrinal issues, strategy and policy, including their relation to defence reform, nuclear weapons issues, force development and posture.

Past initiatives launched in the area of defence reform have focused on the evolution of the military, management of human and financial resources, reform of defence industries, managing the consequences of defence reform, and defence-related aspects of combating terrorism. NATO and Russian linguists have also produced a terminological glossary to support practical cooperation and contribute to understanding within the NRC, which was completed in 2011.

From 2002 to 2008, a NATO-Russia Resettlement Centre helped facilitate the integration of former Russian military personnel into civilian life by providing information regarding job-search and resettlement, professional courses for trainees, job-placement services, and English-language and management courses for small and medium-sized enterprises. Set up in Moscow in July 2002, its operations were gradually expanded into the regions. Over the project’s lifetime, around 2820 former military personnel from the Russian armed forces were retrained and over 80 per cent of found civilian employment as a result of the retraining or the help of the Centre’s job placement unit.

**Defence industrial cooperation**
A broad-based “Study on NATO-Russia Defence Industrial and Research and Technological Cooperation”, launched in January 2005 and completed in 2007, concluded that there is potential in combining scientific and technological capabilities to address global threats.

**Logistics**

Logistics form the backbone of any military operation and in today's security environment, the need for more mobile forces and multinational operations calls for improved coordination and the pooling of resources, wherever possible. Various initiatives are pursuing logistic cooperation on both the civilian and the military side.

Meetings and seminars have focused on establishing a sound foundation of mutual understanding in the field of logistics by promoting information sharing in areas such as logistic policies, doctrine, structures and lessons learned. Opportunities for practical cooperation are being explored in areas such as air transport, air-to-air refuelling, medical services, and water purification. Cooperation is being extended to explore potential capabilities and enhance interoperability to support future operations, particularly in Afghanistan.

**Civil emergencies**

NATO and Russia have been cooperating since 1996 to develop a capacity for joint action in response to civil emergencies, such as earthquakes and floods, and to coordinate detection and prevention of disasters before they occur. Moreover, it was a Russian proposal that led to the establishment in 1998 of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre, which coordinates responses to disasters among all countries of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (the 28 NATO members and 22 Partner countries).

Under the NRC, a key focus of cooperation in this area has been to develop capabilities to manage the consequences of terrorist attacks. Two disaster-response exercises held in Russia (Bogorodsk, 2002, and Kaliningrad, 2004) and another in Italy, in 2006, have resulted in concrete recommendations for consequence management. Another table top consequence-management exercise was hosted by Norway in 2010. Current work is focused on risk reduction, capacity building and cooperation in the area of civil preparedness and consequence management related to high visibility events.

**New threats and challenges**

Scientific and technological cooperation between NATO and Russia dates back to 1998. Over the years, NATO’s science programmes, which foster collaboration and research between scientists in NATO and Partner countries, have awarded more grants to scientists from Russia than any other country.
Under the NRC Science for Peace and Security Committee, promising work is taking place on confronting new threats and challenges through scientific and environmental cooperation. Key areas include explosives detection (such as the STANDEX project mentioned above), protection from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents, cyber security, psychosocial consequences of terrorism, transport security, defence-related environmental issues, environmental security and eco-terrorism, and the forecast and prevention of catastrophes.

Raising public awareness of the NRC

An NRC web site (http://www.nato-russia-council.info/) was launched in June 2007 to increase public awareness of NRC activities. All NRC nations have stated their commitment to explaining the merits of NATO-Russia cooperation to the public.

- Evolution of relations

NATO-Russia relations formally began in 1991, when Russia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997), a forum created to foster transparency and dialogue with the countries after the end of the Cold War. Russia joined the Partnership for Peace in 1994, paving the way for more practical cooperation and, in 1996, Russia deployed a major contingent to the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security provided the formal basis for NATO-Russia relations and led to the development of a bilateral programme of consultation and cooperation under the Permanent Joint Council (PJC). However, lingering Cold War prejudices prevented the PJC from achieving its potential. Differences over the Kosovo air campaign also impacted on relations. However, Russia played a notable diplomatic role in resolving the Kosovo crisis and deployed peacekeepers to support the Kosovo Force in June 1999. From 1999, NATO-Russia relations began to improve significantly.

In 2002, the relationship was given new impetus and substance with the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council. The decision to establish the NRC was taken in the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, which reinforced the need for coordinated action to respond to common threats. It demonstrated the shared resolve of NATO member states and Russia to work more closely together towards the common goal of building a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic Area – a goal which was first expressed in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act.

Following Russia’s disproportionate military action in Georgia in early August 2008, the Alliance suspended formal meetings of the NRC and cooperation in some areas, while it considered the implications of Russia’s actions for the NATO-Russia relationship.

A decision to resume formal meetings and practical cooperation was taken in 2009 and the first formal ministerial-level meeting of the NRC since the Georgia crisis took place in December 2009.
Ministers agreed to improve the working methods of the NRC itself, to make it more result-oriented and politically relevant, and to launch a Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges.

The Joint Review was endorsed by NRC leaders at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, where they also agreed on practical cooperation to address some of the security challenges identified. Moreover, they agreed to discuss pursuing broader missile defence cooperation.

**Milestones**

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Formal relations between NATO and Russia begin when Russia joins the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (later renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council), which was created as a forum for consultation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe following the end of the Cold War; the Soviet Union actually dissolved during the inaugural meeting of this body.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Russia joins the Partnership for Peace (PfP).</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>Russian soldiers deploy as part of the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Memorandum of understanding on civil emergency cooperation is signed.</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>At a summit in Paris, Russian and Allied leaders sign the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security and establish the Permanent Joint Council (PJC).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Russia establishes a diplomatic mission to NATO. Memorandum of understanding on scientific and technological cooperation is signed.</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>Russia suspends participation in the PJC for a few months because of NATO's Kosovo air campaign. Russian peacekeepers deploy as part of the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo.</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>Vladimir Putin becomes President of Russia and says he will work to rebuild relations with NATO in a &quot;spirit of pragmatism&quot;. Broader cooperation in the PJC resumes, following a meeting of NATO and Russian foreign ministers in Florence. The nuclear submarine Kursk sinks, highlighting the need for cooperation between NATO and Russia.</td>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>The NATO Information Office opens in Moscow. President Putin is the first world leader to call the US President after the September 11 terrorist attacks. The attacks underscore the need for concerted international action to address terrorism and other new security threats. Russia opens its airspace to the international coalition’s campaign in Afghanistan and shares relevant intelligence.</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>First high-level conference on the role of the military in combating terrorism is held in Rome. NATO opens a Military Liaison Mission in Moscow. At a summit in Rome, Russian and Allied leaders sign a declaration on &quot;NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality&quot; and establish the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) to replace the PJC.</td>
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A joint NATO-Russia Resettlement Centre opens to help discharged Russian military personnel return to civilian life.
Russia hosts a multinational disaster-response exercise in Noginsk.
Second high-level conference on the role of the military in combating terrorism is held in Moscow.

**2003**
NATO and Russia sign an agreement on submarine-crew rescue.
An NRC meeting is held in Moscow for the first time.
Russian troops withdraw from the NATO-led peacekeeping forces in the Balkans.

**2004**
The NATO Secretary General tries out a new hotline to the Russian defence minister.
The first NRC theatre missile defence command post exercise takes place in Colorado Springs, United States.
Agreements establish Russian military liaison offices to NATO’s strategic command headquarters.
Russia hosts a multinational disaster-response exercise in Kaliningrad.
At an NRC meeting of foreign ministers in Istanbul, Russia offers to contribute a ship to NATO’s maritime counter-terrorist operation in the Mediterranean.
Observers from NRC countries are invited to observe a Russian nuclear-weapons-accident-response field exercise near Murmansk.
The first NATO interoperability courses are held in Moscow military academies.
In the wake of several terrorist attacks in Russia, NRC foreign ministers approve a comprehensive NRC Action Plan on Terrorism.
NATO and Russia exchange letters, agreeing procedures to prepare the way for Russia’s support for Operation Active Endeavour, NATO’s maritime counter-terrorist operation in the Mediterranean.
NRC foreign ministers issue a common statement concerning the conduct of the Ukrainian presidential elections.

**2005**
The second NRC theatre missile defence command post exercise takes place in the Netherlands.
Russia signs the PfP Status of Forces Agreement.
NRC defence ministers endorse a “Political-Military Guidance” aimed at developing, over time, interoperability between Russian and Allied forces at the strategic, operational and tactical command levels.
Russia takes part in a major NATO search-and-rescue-at sea exercise, Sorbet Royal.
A UK team helps rescue Russian sailors trapped in a submarine off the Kamchatka shore.
Observers from NRC countries are invited to observe a UK nuclear-weapons-response field exercise in Edinburgh.
Russian teachers and instructors from the General Staff Academy give the first interoperability courses at the NATO School in Oberammergau.
The NRC launches a pilot project on counter-narcotics training for Afghan and Central Asian personnel.

**2006**
NRC foreign ministers meeting in Sofia agree a set of priorities and recommendations to guide the NRC’s future work.
Observers from NRC countries are invited to observe a US nuclear-weapons-response field exercise in Wyoming.
The third NRC theatre missile defence command post exercise takes place in Moscow.
An NRC civil emergency exercise takes place in Montelibretti, Italy.
The first Russian frigate deploys to the Mediterranean to support Operation Active Endeavour.

2007
Observers from NRC countries are invited to observe a French nuclear-weapons-response field exercise.
Russian parliament ratifies the PfP Status of Forces Agreement.
10th anniversary of the Founding Act and 5th anniversary of the NRC.
A second Russian frigate deploys in active support of Operation Active Endeavour.

2008
A computer-assisted exercise takes place in Germany under the NRC theatre missile defence project.
Russia offers transit to ISAF contributors in support of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan.
Russia takes part in a major NATO search-and-rescue-at sea exercise, Bold Monarch.
Following Russia’s disproportionate military action in Georgia in early August 2008, formal meetings of the NRC and cooperation in some areas are suspended. Cooperation continues in key areas of common interest, such as counter-narcotics and the fight against terrorism.
NATO foreign ministers, meeting in December, agree to pursue a phased and measured approach to re-engagement with Russia.

2009
NATO foreign ministers, meeting in March, decide to resume formal meetings and practical cooperation under the NRC.
In December, at the first formal NRC ministerial since the Georgia crisis, foreign ministers take steps to reinvigorate NRC cooperation and agree to launch a Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges.

2010
In June, the NRC meets for the first time in a political advisory format in Rome for a two-day informal, off-the-record exchange of views on how to make the NRC a more substance-based forum.
In July, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, visits Moscow to discuss the implementation of NRC military-to-military cooperation with the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, Army General Nikolay Makarov, and his staff.
In September, the NRC foreign ministers meet in New York to chart the way forward in relations and cooperation.
In early November, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen visits Russia for meetings with President Dmitry Medvedev and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to prepare for the upcoming NRC summit meeting in Lisbon.
At the Lisbon Summit, NRC leaders pledge to “work towards achieving a true strategic and modernized partnership”. They endorse a Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges and agree to resume cooperation in the area of theatre missile defence as well as to develop a comprehensive joint analysis of the future framework for broader missile defence cooperation. They also agree on a number of initiatives to assist in the stabilization of Afghanistan and the wider region.
2011  In April, NRC foreign ministers meet in Berlin to discuss the situation in Libya and Afghanistan, as well as ongoing work on outlining the future framework for missile defence cooperation between Russia and NATO. They launch the NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund to support the Afghan security forces’ helicopter fleet, and also approve an updated NRC Action Plan on Terrorism.

In May, a NATO-Russia Council Consolidated Glossary of Cooperation (NRC-CGC) is launched, containing over 7000 agreed terms in Russian and English and covers almost all key areas of NATO-Russia political and military cooperation.

In June, for the first time in three years, the NRC defence ministers meet in Brussels to discuss a broad range of defence issues; a Russian submarine takes active part in NATO exercise "Bold Monarch 2011"; joint exercise "Vigilant Skies 2011" demonstrates the operational readiness of the NRC Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI); an NRC conference on the protection of critical infrastructure takes place in Turkey; NATO and Russia participate in a table top exercise dealing with a nuclear weapon incident scenario.

In July, the NRC meets in Sochi, Russia, at the invitation of the Russian authorities, and also meets Russian President Medvedev. NRC ambassadors restate their commitment to pursuing cooperation on missile defence as well as cooperation in other security areas of common interest.

In October, a seminar on national nuclear doctrines and strategies takes place in Germany.

In December, NRC Foreign Ministers meet in Brussels to discuss international security issues and NRC practical cooperation, including on Afghanistan, counter piracy and counter-terrorism. They approve the NRC Work Programme 2012 and announce that the Cooperative Airspace Initiative is ready to initiate operations.

2012  In January, General Nikolai Makarov, the Russian Chief of General Staff, visits Allied Command Operations in Mons, Belgium.

In March, the fifth theatre missile defence (TMD) computer assisted exercise is conducted Germany; a first civilian-military NRC counter-terrorism table top exercise is organized at NATO Headquarters.

In April, the first training course for Afghan Air Force helicopter-maintenance staff gets underway in Novosibirsk under the NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund Project; NRC foreign ministers meet in Brussels to discuss NRC practical cooperation; they also mark 15 years of NATO-Russia relations and take stock of progress achieved through continued cooperation and dialogue.

May marks the 15th anniversary of the Founding Act and 10th anniversary of the NRC.

NATO’s relations with Ukraine
The formal basis for NATO-Ukraine relations is the 1997 Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, which established the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC). An Intensified Dialogue on Ukraine's membership aspirations and related reforms was launched in 2005. Under President Viktor Yanukovych's current government, Ukraine is not presently seeking membership of the Alliance, however, this has had no practical impact on cooperation with NATO.

Allied leaders meeting at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010 stated their respect for Ukraine's policy of "non-bloc" status and welcomed the Ukrainian government's commitment to pursue fully Ukraine's Distinctive Partnership with NATO. They underlined their continued commitment to providing the relevant assistance to Ukraine for the implementation of wide-ranging domestic reforms. They also recalled that NATO's door remains open to Ukraine, in line with the decision taken at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, when Allied leaders agreed that Ukraine may become a NATO member in the future. Ultimately, it is up to the Ukrainian people and their elected leaders to determine the country's future path with NATO.

In December 2008, NATO foreign ministers agreed to enhance opportunities for assisting Ukraine in its efforts to conduct internal reforms, making use of the existing framework of the NUC, the development of a new Annual National Programme, and the reinforcement of the NATO information and liaison offices in Ukraine. A "Declaration to Complement the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine", signed on 21 August 2009, gives the NUC a central role in deepening political dialogue and cooperation, and in underpinning Ukraine's reform efforts.

Dialogue and cooperation between NATO and Ukraine has become well-established in a wide range of areas. In particular, Ukraine has proved to be an important contributor to Euro-Atlantic security in the framework of NATO-led operations.

Another important aspect of relations is the support given by NATO and individual Allies for Ukraine's ongoing reform efforts, particularly in the defence and security sectors. These reforms are vital for the country's democratic development.

- Framework for cooperation

The 1997 Charter for a Distinctive Partnership remains the basic foundation underpinning NATO-Ukraine relations. Over the years, several initiatives have been taken to help Ukraine work towards its stated goals of closer integration with Euro-Atlantic structures. While the current Ukrainian government, which came into power in 2010, is not presently seeking membership of the Alliance, it has decided to continue pursuing cooperation at the same level using the same instruments, because it is in the country's own interest to do.
The NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) directs cooperative activities and provides a forum for consultation between the Allies and Ukraine on security issues of common concern. (See also related web page on the NUC)

Joint working groups have been set up under the auspices of the NUC, to take work forward in specific areas. Of particular importance are the Political and Partnerships Committee in NUC format, which takes the leading role in developing of annual national programmes and preparing high-level meetings of the NUC; and the Joint Working Group on Defence Reform, which facilitates consultation and practical cooperation in the priority area of defence and security sector reform.

Two NATO offices in Kyiv support cooperation on the ground in key areas. The NATO Information and Documentation Centre, established in 1997, supports efforts to inform the public about NATO’s activities and the benefits of NATO-Ukraine cooperation. The NATO Liaison Office, established in 1999, facilitates Ukraine’s participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme and supports its reform efforts, by liaising with the Ministry of Defence and other Ukrainian agencies.

**Annual National Programme (ANP)**

The new ANP, established in 2009, has replaced the previous Annual Target Plans, which implemented the long-term objectives set out in the 2002 NATO-Ukraine Action Plan. It is composed of five chapters focusing on: political and economic issues; defence and military issues; resources; security issues; and legal issues.

The NUC assesses progress under the ANP annually.

The responsibility for implementation falls primarily on Ukraine, which is being urged to take the reform process forward vigorously in order to strengthen democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the market economy. Helping Ukraine achieve a far-reaching transformation of the defence and security sectors is a key priority of NATO-Ukraine cooperation.

In 2010, President Yanukovych established a high-level Commission that would act as a coordination mechanism for cooperation with NATO. The commission includes National Coordinators for each of the five areas covered in the ANP.

- **Key areas of NATO-Ukraine cooperation**

  Consultations and cooperation between NATO and Ukraine cover a wide range of areas identified in the 1997 Charter and the 2002 Action Plan. These include peace-support operations, defence and security sector reform, military-to-military cooperation, armaments, civil emergency planning, science and environment, and public information.

- **Peace-support operations**
Ukraine has a proven track record of actively contributing to Euro-Atlantic security by deploying troops to work together with peacekeepers from NATO and Partner countries. Currently it is the only Partner country contributing actively to the four main ongoing NATO-led operations and missions.

Ukraine contributed an infantry battalion, a mechanised infantry battalion and a helicopter squadron to the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Deployments to the NATO-led operation in Kosovo have included a helicopter squadron, infantry companies, headquarters personnel and support staff. Currently, Ukraine contributes 130 personnel to the KFOR mission as part of the joint Polish-Ukrainian battalion, in the Multinational Task Force "East."

The country is further contributing to international stability and the fight against terrorism by providing over-flight clearance for forces deployed in Afghanistan as part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, or as part of the coalition forces under the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom. A transit agreement for the supply of ISAF was signed by Ukraine in April 2009. Ukrainian medical personnel have supported the Lithuanian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan since 2007, and the Polish PRT since 2010. Currently, Ukraine provides a total of 22 military personnel to ISAF. Recently, Ukraine has also pledged to contribute instructors to the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) to facilitate the transition process there.

From March 2005, Ukraine also contributed officers to the NATO Training Mission in Iraq, which terminated in December 2011.

Moreover, Ukraine supports Operation Active Endeavour, NATO’s maritime operation in the Mediterranean aimed at helping deter, disrupt and protect against terrorism. Ukraine has contributed naval assets to the operation six times since 2007, most recently in November 2010.

Ukraine is also the first partner country to contribute to the NATO Response Force (NRF). In 2010, Ukraine contributed a platoon specialized in nuclear, biological and chemical threats to the NRF. In 2011, Ukraine is providing strategic airlift capabilities with their Antonov aircraft.

**Defence and security sector reform**

Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO in the area of defence and security sector reform is crucial to the ongoing transformation of Ukraine’s security posture and remains an essential part of its democratic transition.

Ukraine has sought NATO’s support in efforts to transform its Cold War legacy of massive conscript forces into smaller, professional and more mobile armed forces, able to meet the country’s security needs and to contribute actively to stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. Another overarching objective of NATO-Ukraine cooperation in this area is to strengthen democratic and civilian control of Ukraine’s armed forces and security institutions.
A Joint Working Group on Defence Reform (JWGDR), established in 1998, directs cooperation in the area of defence and security sector reform. (See also related web page on the JWGDR)

Ukraine’s drive to reform its defence and security sector also benefits from participation in the Partnership for Peace (PFP). In particular, the PFP Planning and Review Process enables joint goals to be developed for shaping force structures and capabilities to help develop Ukraine’s forces to be better able to work with NATO forces.

- **Capacity building and civil control**

  Of fundamental importance for Ukraine’s development as a democratic country and its progress towards further Euro-Atlantic integration is the strengthening of civil control over security and defence structures, including the intelligence sector, and improving the capacities of these structures.

  As part of wider cooperation in this area, a number of specific initiatives have been taken in recent years:

  - a professional development programme for civilians working in Ukraine’s defence and security institutions was launched in October 2005;
  - a NATO-Ukraine Working Group on Civil and Democratic Control of the Intelligence Sector was established in 2006;
  - a Partnership Network for Civil Society Expertise Development was launched in 2006 to promote the sharing of experience on the role of civil society in defence and security affairs among civil society groups and security practitioners in NATO member countries and Ukraine.

- **Retraining and resettling former military personnel**

  Various initiatives are underway to help Ukraine retrain and settle former military personnel made redundant as a result of the progressive downsizing of the Ukrainian armed forces.

  Expert help is being given to help Ukraine develop a comprehensive resettlement programme.

  A NATO-funded retraining programme is providing linguistic and specialized professional courses for several hundred former military personnel per year. A project for the retraining and resettlement of redundant military personnel at a centre in Khmelnytskyi, western Ukraine, is being supported through a PFP Trust Fund. The Centre is the single largest provider of such assistance to retiring military personnel in Ukraine.

- **Destroying stockpiles of weapons and munitions**

  Individual Allies are also supporting the destruction of Ukraine’s stockpiles of anti-personnel mines, munitions and small arms and light weapons through PFP Trust Fund projects.

  The first project involved the safe destruction of 400,000 landmines at a chemical plant in Donetsk, over a 15-month period in 2002-2003. It was the first step in destroying Ukraine’s stockpile of almost seven million anti-personnel mines.

  A second project to destroy 133,000 tons of conventional munitions, 1.5 million small arms and 1,000 man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) was launched in 2005. With projected costs of some €25 million, the project is to be carried out over an estimated twelve years. It is the largest demilitarisation project of its kind ever to be undertaken, and will permanently increase Ukraine's capacity to destroy surplus munitions.
Economic aspects of defence

Dialogue and exchanges of experience with experts also take place with Ukraine on the economic aspects of defence. Issues covered include security aspects of economic development and economic matters related to Euro-Atlantic integration, as well as topics specifically related to defence economics such as defence budgets, the management of defence resources and restructuring in the defence sector. Courses are also organised for Ukrainian staff, covering the whole budgetary process from financial planning to financial control.

Military-to-military cooperation

Helping Ukraine implement its defence reform objectives is also a key focus of military-to-military cooperation, complementing the work carried out under the JWGDR with military expertise.

Another important objective is to develop interoperability through a wide range of PfP activities and military exercises, sometimes hosted by Ukraine, which allow military personnel to train for peace-support operations and gain hands-on experience of working with forces from NATO countries and other partners.

Senior Ukrainian officers also regularly participate in courses at the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy, and the NATO School at Oberammergau, Germany. Contacts with these establishments have been instrumental in setting up a new multinational faculty at the Ukrainian Defence Academy.

The military side has also taken the lead in developing a legal framework to enable NATO and Ukraine to further develop operational cooperation:

- a PfP Status of Forces Agreement facilitates participation in PfP military exercises by exempting participants from passport and visa regulations and immigration inspection on entering or leaving the territory of the country hosting the event (entered into force in May 2000);
- a Host Nation Support agreement addresses issues related to the provision of civil and military assistance to Allied forces located on, or in transit through, Ukrainian territory in peacetime, crisis or war (ratified in March 2004);
- a Strategic Airlift agreement enables Ukraine to make a substantial contribution to NATO’s capability to move outsized cargo by leasing Antonov aircraft to Allied armed forces – an arrangement which also brings economic benefits to Ukraine (ratified in October 2006).

Armaments

Technical cooperation between Ukraine and NATO in the field of armaments focuses on enhancing interoperability between defence systems to facilitate Ukrainian contributions to joint peace support operations.

Cooperation in this area started when Ukraine joined the PfP programme and began participating in an increasing number of the armaments groups which meet under the auspices of the Conference of
National Armaments Directors (CNAD) – a NATO senior body which identifies opportunities for cooperation between nations in defence equipment procurement processes, focusing in particular on technical standards.

A Joint Working Group on Armaments, which met for the first time in March 2004, is supporting the further development of cooperation in this area.

**Civil emergency planning**

NATO and Ukraine have developed practical cooperation on civil emergency planning and disaster-preparedness, since the signing of a memorandum of understanding in 1997.

Ukraine’s western regions are prone to heavy flooding and NATO countries and other partners have provided assistance after severe floods in 1995, 1998 and 2001. A key focus of cooperation has therefore been to help Ukraine to prepare better for such emergencies and to manage their consequences more effectively.

PFP exercises also help develop plans and effective disaster-response capabilities to deal with other natural emergencies such as avalanches and earthquakes, or man-made accidents or terrorist attacks involving toxic spills or chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear agents – Ukraine hosted one such exercise in 2005. In 2010, Ukraine also sent a mobile rescue centre to Poland as part of an aid effort following flooding in the country.

**Science and environment**

Ukraine’s participation in NATO science programmes began in 1991 and intensified following an exchange of letters on cooperation in the area of science and the environment in 1999. Over the years, Ukraine has been second only to Russia in terms of NATO grants for scientific collaboration.

In addition to applying science to defence against terrorism and new threats, Ukraine’s priority areas for cooperation include information technologies, cell biology and biotechnology, new materials, the rational use of natural resources and cooperation focused on defence-related environmental problems.

NATO has also sponsored several projects to provide basic infrastructure for computer networking among Ukrainian research communities and to facilitate their access to the internet. Although the focus of past collaboration has been in the area of physical sciences, project proposals are now also being considered which deal with security issues from a social science perspective. For example, a new Trust Fund is being considered that will help remove and decontaminate military sites with stored radioactive waste.
A Joint Working Group on Scientific and Environmental Cooperation is supporting the further development of cooperation in this area.

**Public information**

It is important for the Ukrainian administration to inform the Ukrainian people about NATO-Ukraine relations and the benefits of cooperation in terms of Ukraine’s own reform programme. Many people in Ukraine still lack information regarding the role, activities and goals of the Alliance, and outdated Cold War stereotypes remain strong in the minds of some.

The Allies have offered to cooperate with the Ukrainian authorities in raising awareness about what NATO is today, and in better explaining the NATO-Ukraine relationship.

The NATO Information and Documentation Centre, based in Kyiv, is NATO’s principal public information facility, offering seminars and talks, as well as coordinating visits by NATO officials to Ukraine and representatives of Ukrainian civil society to NATO Headquarters in order to better illustrate the mechanisms behind the partnership.

**Evolution of relations**

NATO-Ukraine relations were formally launched in 1991, when Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (succeeded by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997), immediately upon achieving independence with the break-up of the Soviet Union.

A few years later, in 1994, Ukraine became the first of the Commonwealth of Independent States to join the Partnership for Peace. The country soon demonstrated its commitment to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security in its support for the NATO-led peacekeeping operations in the Balkans during the 1990s.

The 1997 Charter on a Distinctive Partnership recognised the importance of an independent, stable and democratic Ukraine to European stability. The Charter set out principles and arrangements for the further development of NATO-Ukraine relations and identified areas for consultation and cooperation, establishing the NATO-Ukraine Commission to take work forward.

Steps were taken to deepen and broaden the NATO-Ukraine relationship with the adoption of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan in November 2002, which supports Ukraine’s reform efforts on the road towards Euro-Atlantic integration.

In the wake of the “Orange Revolution, newly elected President Viktor Yushchenko was invited to a summit meeting at NATO Headquarters in February 2005. NATO leaders expressed support for the new President’s ambitious reform plans for Ukraine and agreed to sharpen and refocus NATO-Ukraine cooperation in line with the new government’s priorities.
Two months later, at the NUC meeting of foreign ministers in Vilnius, Lithuania, in April 2005, the Allies and Ukraine launched an Intensified Dialogue on Ukraine’s aspirations to NATO membership. They also announced a package of short-term actions designed to enhance NATO-Ukraine cooperation in key reform areas. At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, Allied leaders agreed that Ukraine may become a NATO member in future.

In August 2009, a “Declaration to Complement the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine” was signed. It gives the NUC a central role in deepening political dialogue and cooperation, and in underpinning Ukraine’s reform efforts pertaining to its membership aspirations.

In 2010, the newly elected government of President Viktor Yanukovych made it clear that while it was not presently pursuing NATO membership, it wished to maintain the existing level of cooperation with the Alliance and to fulfill existing agreements. Continued political and military dialogue for regional stability, practical support for NATO-led operations and defence reform were identified as the main tasks for NATO-Ukraine cooperation. Most recently, President Yanukovych issued a Presidential Decree (1039/2010) establishing a high-level Commission for Ukraine’s Partnership with NATO. This coordination mechanism will assist in the implementation of Ukraine’s Annual National Programme, and other areas of practical cooperation with NATO.

Key milestones

1991
Ukraine joins the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (later renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council).

1994
Ukraine joins the Partnership for Peace (PfP).

1996
Ukrainian soldiers deploy as part of the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

1997
The NATO Information and Documentation Centre opens in Kyiv.
In July, at a summit meeting in Madrid, Spain, the Allies and Ukraine formally sign the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, establishing the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC).
Ukraine establishes a diplomatic mission to NATO.
The NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform is established.

1998
The NATO Liaison Office opens in Kyiv.

1999
The Polish-Ukrainian battalion deploys as part of the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo.
In May, the Ukrainian parliament ratifies the PfP Status of Forces Agreement.

2000
In September, Ukraine hosts a multinational disaster-response exercise, Trans-Carpathia 2000.
In May, President Leonid Kuchma announces Ukraine’s goal of eventual NATO membership. At a NUC meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, foreign ministers underline their desire to take their relationship forward to a qualitatively new level.
In July, a PfP Trust Fund project for the safe destruction of 400,000 landmines is inaugurated in Donetsk.
The NATO-Ukraine Action Plan is adopted at a NUC meeting of foreign ministers in November in Prague, the Czech Republic.

In March, the Ukrainian parliament ratifies an agreement with NATO on Host Nation Support.

Ukraine signs an agreement with NATO on Strategic Airlift.

In the autumn, the Allies closely follow political developments surrounding the presidential elections in Ukraine and the “Orange Revolution”. They stress the importance of respect for free and fair elections and postpone a NUC ministerial-level meeting scheduled for December.

In February, the Allies invite newly-elected President Viktor Yushchenko to a summit meeting at NATO Headquarters. They express support for his ambitious reform plans and agree to refocus NATO-Ukraine cooperation in line with the new government’s priorities.

A PfP Trust Fund project is launched with Ukraine to destroy 133,000 tons of conventional munitions, 1.5 million small arms and 1000 man-portable air defence systems over an estimated 12 years.

In April, at the NUC meeting of foreign ministers in Vilnius, Lithuania, the Allies and Ukraine launch an Intensified Dialogue on Ukraine’s aspirations to NATO membership and a package of short-term actions to strengthen support for key reforms.

An exchange of letters between NATO and Ukraine agrees procedures to prepare the way for Ukraine’s support Operation Active Endeavour.

In September, a series of staff-level expert discussions is initiated under the Intensified Dialogue.

In October, Ukraine hosts a multinational disaster-response exercise, Joint Assistance 2005.

In October, the North Atlantic Council visits Kyiv to discuss the Intensified Dialogue with Ukraine’s foreign and defence ministers.

In February, a Resettlement and Retraining Centre is inaugurated in Khmelnitskyy.

In March, NATO’s Secretary General welcomes the conduct of free and fair parliamentary elections as contributing to the consolidation of democracy in Ukraine.

In September, during a visit to NATO, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych reassures Allies of Ukraine’s commitment to ongoing cooperation with NATO but says the Ukrainian people are not yet ready to consider possible NATO membership.

In October, the Ukrainian parliament ratifies the agreement on Strategic Airlift.

The first Ukrainian ship, the frigate URS Ternopil, deploys in support of Operation Active Endeavour (June), followed by the corvette URS Lutsk (autumn).

Ukraine sends medical personnel to support a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan.

10th anniversary of the NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership.

At the Bucharest Summit in April, Allied leaders agree that Ukraine will become a NATO member in future.

Ukraine deploys two vessels in support of Operation Active Endeavour: the frigate URS Sagaidachnyi (summer) and URS Ternopil (November).

In December, NATO foreign ministers agree to enhance opportunities for assisting Ukraine in its efforts to meet membership requirements, making use of the existing framework of the NATO-Ukraine Commission.
and the development of an Annual National Programme (ANP).

2009

Ukraine signs land transit agreement for the supply of ISAF (April).
A “Declaration to Complement the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine” was signed on 21 August to reflect decisions taken at the Bucharest Summit and December 2008 foreign ministers’ meeting.
In November, the URS Ternopil deploys for the third time (the fifth for a Ukrainian ship) as part of Operation Active Endeavour.
In February, the new Ukrainian government under President Viktor Yanukovych decides to continue present cooperation with NATO, but takes Alliance membership for the country off the agenda.
In February, the first NATO-Ukraine Expert Staff Talks on Cyber Defence in Kyiv are organized under the auspices of the NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform.
In May, Ukraine and Turkey (as the facilitating NATO member) signed a memorandum of understanding on “Air Situation Data Exchange”, which aims to reduce airspace conflicts by minimizing potential cross-border incidents and optimizing responses to renegade situations with civil airplanes.
In November, for the sixth time, Ukraine deploys a ship to the Mediterranean to assist NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour.

2010

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2011

In April, at their meeting in Berlin, NUC Foreign Ministers issued a joint statement reaffirming their distinct partnership and agreeing to take forward practical cooperation activities.

NATO’s relations with Georgia

At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, Allied Heads of State and Government agreed that Georgia will become a member of NATO. This decision was subsequently reconfirmed at the 2009 Strasbourg/Kehl Summit and 2010 Lisbon Summit NATO and Georgia pursue an active political dialogue and practical cooperation, including through the unique framework provided by the NATO-Georgia Commission, in order to assist Georgia to achieve its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

In September 2008, NATO and Georgia established the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) to oversee NATO’s assistance to Georgia following the conflict with Russia and to play a central role in supervising the process set in hand at the Bucharest Summit. In December 2008, Allied foreign ministers agreed that Georgia should develop an Annual National Programme under the auspices of the NGC. In this framework, the Alliance is maximising its advice, assistance and support for Georgia’s reform efforts, in particular in the field of democratic, institutional and defence reforms.

At the Lisbon Summit, Allied leaders declared their strong encouragement and active support for Georgia’s continued implementation of all necessary reforms in order to advance its Euro-Atlantic
aspirations. They welcomed the official opening in October 2010 of the NATO Liaison Office in Georgia, which helps in assisting and supporting the country’s reform efforts.

Another important area of cooperation is Georgia’s support for NATO-led operations. Georgia is actively contributing to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan as the second largest non-NATO troop contributor nation, and also supports Operation Active Endeavour, NATO’s counter-terrorist maritime surveillance operation in the Mediterranean.

• **Framework for cooperation**

The NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) provides the framework for cooperation between NATO and Georgia. Created in September 2008, the NGC serves as a forum for both political consultations and practical cooperation to help Georgia advance its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Existing cooperation programmes, such as the Planning and Review Process (PARP), continue to take place within the framework of the NGC.

In December 2008, NATO foreign ministers decided to further enhance the NGC through the development of an Annual National Programme (ANP), as well as the establishment of a NATO Liaison Office in Tbilisi. The ANP, the first of which was finalised in spring 2009, replaced the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), which has guided NATO-Georgia cooperation since 2004. In addition to Georgia’s contributions to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, key areas of cooperation under the ANP include political, military and security-sector reforms. NATO agrees to support Georgia in these reforms by providing focused and comprehensive advice and activities in several frameworks (both civilian and military) towards its reform goals. Current priorities for Georgia include transforming its public and private sectors in order to promote democracy, good governance, the rule of law and sustainable social and economic development, as well as reforming the defence and security sector, in particular revision of Georgia’s national security plans.

Georgia also cooperates with NATO and other partner countries in a wide range of other areas through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

In parallel with the establishment of the NGC the Military Committee with Georgia was also created as a format for meetings focused on military cooperation. The principle aim of NATO-Georgia military cooperation is to assist Georgia with the implementation of military and defence related issues of the ANP, strategic planning, defence reforms and to increase interoperability in support of Georgia’s contributions to NATO-led operations. The Military Committee with Georgia Work Plan defines key areas and objectives for military cooperation between NATO and the Georgian Armed Forces. The Work Plan comprises activities that help achieve the goals set in the ANP and PARP.

• **Key areas of cooperation**
Security cooperation

Thanks to regular participation in PfP training and exercises, Georgia has been able to contribute actively to Euro-Atlantic security by supporting NATO-led operations. Georgian troops worked alongside NATO troops in the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo from 1999-2008, providing a company-sized unit as part of the German brigade there and an infantry platoon within a Turkish battalion task force.

Georgia currently provides a full infantry battalion serving with United States’ forces, an infantry company serving with the French contingent in Kabul, instructors for training the Afghan National Army, medical personnel to assist ISAF within the Lithuanian Provincial Reconstruction Team and some individual staff officers. With a total of around 800 military personnel, Georgia is the second largest contributors to ISAF among NATO’s partner countries. Recently, the Georgian Parliament approved plans to contribute additional troops to ISAF in 2012, which would make Georgia the largest non-NATO troop contributor.

Georgia participates in NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour, an anti-terrorist maritime surveillance operation in the Mediterranean, primarily through intelligence exchange.

Georgia has a mountain training site, which is accredited as a Partnership Training and Education Centre and is available to Allies and other partner countries.

Defence and security sector reform

NATO is supportive of the wide-ranging democratic and institutional reform process underway in Georgia, as outlined in its ANP. Particularly in the area of defence and security sector reform, NATO and individual Allies have considerable expertise upon which Georgia can draw.

Georgia’s participation in the Planning and Review Process (PARP) since 1999 has helped develop the ability of its forces to work with NATO and is also providing planning targets that are key to security reform objectives in several areas. NATO support has, for example, helped Georgia build deployable units according to NATO standards and interoperable with Allied forces. Georgia’s defence reform objectives within the PARP have facilitated improved financial management in the Ministry of Defence, assisted in reforming the intelligence structure of the armed forces and ensured that a credible Strategic Defence Review was conducted.

A key priority for Georgia is to ensure democratic control of the armed forces. Georgia’s participation in the Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB) is reinforcing these efforts, such as by promoting effective judicial oversight and appropriate defence command and control arrangements through a range of measurable objectives within the ANP.
Education and training is also a key objective of Georgia’s ANP and reform efforts. NATO is leading a tailored programme for Georgia – the Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP) – with the support of the PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes, the Partnerships Training and Education Centres and Allied defence institutions.

Following Georgia’s request in 2008, NATO and Georgia launched a Professional Development Programme for Civilian Personnel in the Ministry of Defence and Other Security Institutions in Georgia in 2009. The programme provides training with the aim of strengthening the capacity for democratic management and oversight in the Ministry of Defence, as well as other security sector institutions. Training and education provided in the framework of this programme is closely aligned to Georgia’s defence and security sector reform objectives outlined in both the ANP and PARP.

Another priority in the area of defence and security-sector reform has been to support demilitarization projects in Georgia through the NATO/PfP Trust Fund mechanism which allows individual Allies and partner countries to provide financial support to key projects on a voluntary basis. Two Trust Fund projects have helped to address problems posed by stockpiles of surplus and obsolete weapons and munitions, and led to the safe destruction of 530 missiles in 2006, as well as 1,080 S-8 missiles, 5,724 Alazan and 1,976 Kristall rockets in 2009. A third Trust Fund project was launched in October 2010 to help build capacity in Georgia for the safe disposal of mines and other unexploded munitions, as well as for the rehabilitation of victims injured by explosions.

**Civil emergency planning**

Georgia is enhancing its national civil emergency and disaster-management capabilities in cooperation with NATO and through participation in activities organized by the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC).

The Centre helped coordinate the delivery of hundreds of tonnes of relief items to Georgia in the wake of the August 2008 conflict. It also coordinated assistance to Georgia in 2005 when the country experienced some of the worst flooding in its history, in 2006 when forest fires broke out in southern Georgia, and after a major earthquake in 2009.

In 2012, Georgia will host the EADRCC consequence-management exercise bringing together expert teams from Allies and partner nations as well as international organizations.

**Science and environment**

Scientists and researchers from Georgia benefit from opportunities offered under the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme, which promotes collaboration, networking and capacity building among scientists from NATO and partner countries. Activities supported include research, seminars, workshops and joint studies on security-related scientific issues and environmental
concerns. NATO has two key priorities for scientific collaboration: defence against terrorism and countering other threats to security.

Georgia has been involved in NATO science activities since 1994. In total, scientists and experts from Georgia have had leading roles in 132 activities, and more have joined various cooperative activities as participants and key speakers. Many activities are aimed at aiding the country’s reform and interoperability efforts, such as research and technology in air defence systems and data standardization, and reducing the environmental impact of military activities and munitions disposal. Other projects include collaboration on improving transboundary water quality and mitigating the risks posed by earthquakes in the southern Caucasus.

Public information

Increasing the public awareness of NATO and its relations with Georgia is also a key area of cooperation. Since 2002, in cooperation with local non-governmental organizations and state authorities, NATO has been organizing numerous activities to this end, including seminars, conferences and workshops. "NATO Weeks" and summer schools are organized on an annual basis to reach out to youth audiences.

Groups of opinion leaders from Georgia are regularly invited to visit NATO Headquarters and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) for briefings about the Alliance, and NATO officials regularly travel to Georgia to speak at public events.

In every partner country an embassy of one of the NATO member states serves as a contact point and operates as a channel for disseminating information about the role and policies of the Alliance. The current NATO Contact Point Embassy in Georgia is the embassy of Lithuania. Georgia’s Ministry of Euro-Atlantic Integration has established an Information Center on NATO, which has its main office in Tbilisi and branches in Kutaisi and Zugdidi. Working in close cooperation with NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division and with the NATO Liaison Office in Georgia, it is an important tool in raising public awareness about the Alliance in the country.

- Response to the Georgian crisis

At an emergency meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 19 August 2008, Allied foreign ministers called for a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict based on respect for Georgia's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

Allied foreign ministers deplored the use of force in the conflict, which is inconsistent with the commitments to the peaceful resolution of conflicts that both Georgia and Russia have made under the Partnership for Peace as well as other international agreements. They expressed particular concern over Russia's disproportionate military action which is incompatible with Russia’s peacekeeping role in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Allies also called on
Russia to take immediate action to withdraw its troops from the areas it must leave under the terms of the six-point agreement brokered by the European Union.

The Allies agreed to support Georgia, upon its request, in a number of areas. These include assessing the damage to civil infrastructure and the state of the ministry of defence and armed forces; supporting the re-establishment of the air traffic system; and advising on cyber defence issues.

On 27 August 2008, the North Atlantic Council condemned the decision by the Russian Federation to extend recognition to the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia, and called on Russia to reverse its decision.

NATO continues to support Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty within its internationally recognised borders as reiterated at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010

**Evolution of relations**

NATO-Georgia relations date back to 1992, when Georgia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (later renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997), upon gaining independence with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Cooperation deepened and broadened after Georgia joined the Partnership for Peace programme in 1994 and the Planning and Review Process (PARP) in 1999.

After the “Rose Revolution” in 2003, the focus on supporting Georgia’s domestic reform process intensified, in particular through the development of the Georgia’s first IPAP with NATO in 2004. Georgia was granted an Intensified Dialogue on membership aspirations in September 2006. At their Summit in Bucharest in April 2008, NATO leaders agreed that Georgia will become a member of the Alliance.

In September 2008, NATO and Georgia inaugurated the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC), which plays a central role in supervising the process set in hand at Bucharest. In December 2008, Allied foreign ministers agreed to the development of an Annual National Programme (ANP) under the NGC.

**Key milestones**

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Georgia joins the Partnership for Peace (PfP), a programme aimed at increasing security and defence cooperation between NATO and individual partner countries.</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>Georgia signs the PfP Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the NATO and partner countries.</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>Georgian Parliament ratifies the SOFA agreement.</td>
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Georgia starts contributing peacekeepers to the Kosovo Force (KFOR).  
2001
Georgia hosts a multinational PfP military training exercise "Cooperative Partner 2001".

2002
Georgia hosts a multinational PfP military training exercise "Cooperative Best Effort 2002".

2003
Georgia declares its aspirations to NATO membership and its intention to develop an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO.
A NATO/PfP Trust Fund project is launched with Georgia to support the demilitarization of ground-to-air defence missiles.
Georgia participates in ISAF’s election security force in Afghanistan.
At the Istanbul Summit, Allied leaders place special focus on the Caucasus – a special NATO representative and a liaison officer are assigned to the region.

2005
Georgia becomes the first country to agree an IPAP with NATO.
NATO and Georgia sign a transit agreement allowing the Alliance and other ISAF troop-contributing nations to send supplies for their forces in Afghanistan through Georgia.
Georgia opens an information centre on NATO with the support of NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division.

2006
NATO offers an Intensified Dialogue to Georgia.

2007
Georgia hosts a NATO/PfP air exercise, “Cooperative Archer 2007”.

2008
At their Summit in Bucharest, NATO leaders agree Georgia will become a member of NATO.
In August, the Allies express deep concern over the armed conflict between Georgia and Russia, calling for a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict based on respect for Georgia’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. They agree to support Georgia’s recovery in a number of areas and also propose the establishment of a NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) to supervise the process set at hand at the Bucharest Summit and to oversee the implementation of support measures.
In September, the North Atlantic Council pays a two-day visit to Georgia. The Framework Document establishing the NATO-Georgia Commission is signed and the inaugural meeting takes place in Tbilisi.
In December, Allied foreign ministers agree to the development of an Annual National Programme (ANP) under the auspices of the NGC.
On 4 February, the Georgian foreign minister, vice prime minister and defence minister visit NATO for the first meeting of the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) in 2009.
On 20 February, Allied and Georgian defence ministers discuss Georgia’s progress in defence reform and its priorities.
On 5 March, the NGC meets in Brussels for the second time at the level of foreign ministers to discuss a range of issues of common interest.
Mid-March 2009, a NATO-led team of experts visits Georgia to address a Georgian request to review the existing military education and training system, and develop a plan of action for reform.
May 2009, the first Steering Committee meeting for the NATO-Georgia Professional Development Programme for Civilian Personnel of Georgian MOD and Other Security Institutions takes place at NATO HQ, Brussels.
Following elections on 31 May in the South Ossetia region of Georgia, NATO’s Secretary General issues a statement saying that NATO does not recognise the elections and that the holding of such elections does not contribute to a peaceful and lasting settlement of the situation in Georgia.

On 3 December, the NGC meets to discuss the course of Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration and process of reform.

On 12 March, key agreements are signed to begin a Trust Fund project that will help Georgia safely dispose of explosive remnants of war.

In March, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili visits NATO Headquarters to meet NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen.

In April, Georgia signs an agreement with NATO to contribute to Operation Active Endeavour, NATO’s maritime counter-terrorist operation in the Mediterranean.


In May, Allies and Georgia Chiefs of Defence meet in the Military Committee to discuss and support the transformation process of the Georgian Armed Forces.

In August, the North Atlantic Council decided to enhance NATO-Georgia relations through effective military cooperation (this leads to the development and implementation of the first annual, Military Committee with the Georgia Work Plan in 2011).

In October, NATO Liaison Office is inaugurated during the NATO Secretary General’s visit to Georgia, where he meets the Georgian president, prime minister and senior ministers.

At the Lisbon Summit, Allied leaders recall their agreement that Georgia will become a member of NATO and reaffirm all elements of their decision made at the Bucharest Summit in 2008, declaring their active support for Georgia’s continued implementation of all necessary reforms. They reiterate their continued support for Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty within its internationally recognized borders.

In February, the Director General of the International Military Staff of NATO visits Georgia to discuss the status and prospect of NATO-Georgia military to military cooperation.

2011

In April, NGC foreign ministers meet in Berlin and adopt, for the first time, a joint statement which reaffirms the basic principles of NATO-Georgia cooperation. NATO ministers express strong appreciation for Georgia’s substantial contribution to Euro-Atlantic security and the overall positive dynamic in Georgia’s democratic development.

In June, the Chairman of the Parliament of Georgia visits NATO HQ for a meeting of the NGC and informs Allies about key democratic reforms in his country.

In May, Military Committee with Georgia meets at the level of Chief of Defence to discuss Georgia’s contributions to operations and the status of the implementation of defence reforms derived from the strategic defence review.

In July, the Georgian foreign ministry hosts a conference on emerging security challenges with the support of the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme.

In August, SACEUR visited Georgia to discuss Georgia’s current and future contribution to operations.
Following so-called presidential elections on 26 August in the Abkhazia region of Georgia, NATO’s Secretary General states that NATO does not recognize the elections and that the holding of such elections does not contribute to a peaceful and lasting settlement of the situation in Georgia.

In November, the North Atlantic Council pays a visit to Tbilisi and Batumi and meets the President, the Chairman of the Parliament, the Prime Minister and other high-level officials of the country, as well as representatives of civil society, media and the opposition. The NGC agrees to pursue further work on concrete measures to enhance Georgia’s relations with NATO. Following so-called presidential elections on 13 November in the South Ossetia region of Georgia, NATO’s Secretary General issues a statement saying that NATO does not recognize the elections and that the holding of such elections does not contribute to a peaceful and lasting settlement of the situation in Georgia. As a follow-up to the North Atlantic Council’s visit to Georgia, the NGC adopts a set of concrete measures to enhance Georgia’s connectivity with NATO. These measures support reforms, increase the ability of NATO and Georgia to operate together, and strengthen the capacity of the Georgian institutions as the country continues on its path towards Euro-Atlantic integration.

2012

In April 2012, President Saakashvili visits NATO Headquarters to meet the Secretary General and attend a meeting of the NGC Ambassadors.

NATO Mediterranean Dialogue

NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue was initiated in 1994 by the North Atlantic. It currently involves seven non-NATO countries of the Mediterranean region: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.

- Origins and Objectives

The Dialogue reflects the Alliance’s view that security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. It is an integral part of NATO's adaptation to the post-Cold War security environment, as well as an important component of the Alliance's policy of outreach and cooperation.

The Mediterranean Dialogue's overall aim is to:

- contribute to regional security and stability
- achieve better mutual understanding
- dispel any misconceptions about NATO among Dialogue countries

- Key Principles
The successful launch of the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and its subsequent development has been based upon a number of principles:

- **Non-discrimination**: all Mediterranean partners are offered the same basis for their cooperation with NATO.
- **Self-differentiation**, allowing a tailored approach to the specific needs of each of our MD partner countries. Particularly Individual Cooperation Programmes (ICP) allow interested MD countries and NATO to frame their practical cooperation in a more prospective and focused way, enabling interested countries to outline the main short and long-term objectives of their cooperation with the Alliance, in accordance with NATO’s objectives and policies for the Mediterranean Dialogue.
- **Inclusiveness**: all MD countries should see themselves as share holders of the same cooperative effort.
- **Two-way engagement**: the MD is a "two-way partnership", in which NATO seeks partners' contribution for its success, through a regular consultation process; special emphasis is placed on practical cooperation.
- **Non-imposition**: MD partners are free to choose the pace and extent of their cooperation with the Alliance; NATO has no wish to impose anything upon them.
- **Complementarity and mutual reinforcement**: efforts of the MD and other international institutions for the region are complementary and mutually reinforcing in nature; such as, for example, those of the EU’s “Union For the Mediterranean”, the OSCE’s “Mediterranean Initiative”, or the “Five plus Five”.
- **Diversity**: the MD respects and takes into account the specific regional, cultural and political contexts of the respective partners.

Moreover, the MD is progressive in terms of participation and substance. Such flexibility has allowed the number of Dialogue partners to grow - witness the inclusion of Jordan in November 1995 and Algeria in March 2000 - and the content of the Dialogue to evolve over time.

The Dialogue is primarily bilateral in structure (NATO+1). Despite the predominantly bilateral character, the Dialogue nevertheless allows for multilateral meetings on a regular basis (NATO+7).

In principle, activities within the Mediterranean Dialogue take place on a self-funding basis. However, Allies agreed to consider requests for financial assistance in support of Mediterranean partners' participation in the Dialogue. A number of measures have recently been taken to facilitate cooperation, notably the revision of the Dialogue’s funding policy to allow funding up to 100% of the participation costs in Dialogue’s activities and the extension of the NATO/PfP Trust Fund mechanisms to MD countries.

- **The political dimension**

The Mediterranean Dialogue is based upon the twin pillars of political dialogue and practical cooperation.

The Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG), established at the Madrid Summit in July 1997 under the supervision of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), had the overall responsibility for the Mediterranean Dialogue, until it was replaced in 2011 by the Political and Partnerships Committee,
which is responsible for all partnerships. The Committee meets at the level of Political Counsellors on a regular basis to discuss all matters related to the Dialogue including its further development.

Political consultations in the NATO+1 format are held on a regular basis both at Ambassadorial and working level. These discussions provide an opportunity for sharing views on a range of issues relevant to the security situation in the Mediterranean, as well as on the further development of the political and practical cooperation dimensions of the Dialogue.

Meetings in the NATO+7 format, including NAC+7 meetings, are also held on a regular basis, in particular following the NATO Summit and Ministerial meetings, Chiefs-of-Defence meetings, and other major NATO events. These meetings represent an opportunity for two-way political consultations between NATO and MD partners.

At the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO’s Heads of State and Government elevated the MD to a genuine partnership through the establishment of a more ambitious and expanded framework, which considerably enhanced both the MD’s political and practical cooperation dimensions.

Since then, the constant increase in the number and quality of the NATO-MD political dialogue has recently reached a sustainable level. Consultations of the 28 Allies and seven MD countries take place on a regular basis on a bilateral and multilateral level, at Ministerial, Ambassadorial and working level formats. That has also included three meetings of the NATO and MD Foreign Ministers in December 2004, 2007 and 2008 in Brussels. Two meetings of NATO and MD Defense Ministers in 2006 and 2007 in Taormina and Seville. Ten meetings of the Chief of Defense of NATO and MD countries have also take place so far. The first ever NAC+7 meeting took place in Rabat, Morocco, in 2006 and, more recently, the first MD Policy Advisory Group meeting with all seven MD partners took place in San Remo, Italy, on 15-16 September 2011.

The political dimension also includes visits by NATO Senior Officials, including the Secretary General and the Deputy Secretary General, to Mediterranean Dialogue countries. The main purpose of these visits is to conduct high-level political consultations with the relevant host authorities on the way forward in NATO’s political and practical cooperation under the Mediterranean Dialogue.

The new Strategic Concept, which was adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2011, identifies cooperative security as one of three key priorities for the Alliance, and constitutes an opportunity to move partnerships to the next generation. Mediterranean Dialogue partners were actively involved in the debate leading to its adoption.

The Strategic Concept refers specifically to the MD, stating that: “We are firmly committed to the development of friendly and cooperative relations with all countries of the Mediterranean, and we intend to further develop the Mediterranean Dialogue in the coming years. We will aim to deepen the cooperation with current members of the Mediterranean Dialogue and be open to the inclusion in the Mediterranean Dialogue of other countries of the region.”
MD partners have reiterated their support for enhanced political consultations to better tailor the MD to their specific interests and to maintain the distinctive cooperation framework of the MD.

**The practical dimension**

Measures of practical cooperation between NATO and Mediterranean Dialogue countries are laid down in an annual Work Programme which aims at enhancing our partnership through cooperation in security-related issues.

The annual Work Programme includes seminars, workshops and other practical activities in the fields of modernisation of the armed forces, civil emergency planning, crisis management, border security, small arms & light weapons, public diplomacy, scientific and environmental cooperation, as well as consultations on terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

There is also a military dimension to the annual Work Programme which includes invitations to Dialogue countries to observe - and in some cases participate - in NATO/PfP military exercises, attend courses and other academic activities at the NATO School (SHAPE) in Oberammergau (Germany) and the NATO Defense College in Rome (Italy), and visit NATO military bodies.

The military programme also includes port visits by NATO's Standing Naval Forces, on-site train-the-trainers sessions by Mobile Training Teams, and visits by NATO experts to assess the possibilities for further cooperation in the military field.

Furthermore, NATO+7 consultation meetings on the military programme involving military representatives from NATO and the seven Mediterranean Dialogue countries are held twice a year.

**State of play**

At their Summit meeting in Istanbul in June 2004, NATO’s HOSG invited Mediterranean partners to establish a more ambitious and expanded framework for the Mediterranean Dialogue, guided by the principle of joint ownership and taking into consideration their particular interests and needs. The aim is to contribute towards regional security and stability through stronger practical cooperation, including by enhancing the existing political dialogue, achieving interoperability, developing defence reform and contributing to the fight against terrorism.

Since the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, an annual Mediterranean Dialogue Work Programme (MDWP) focusing on agreed priority areas has been the main cooperation instrument available and has been expanded progressively in more than 30 areas of cooperation, going from about 100 activities in 2004, to over 700 activities and events in 2011.

While the MDWP is essentially military (85% of the activities), it comprises activities in a wide range of areas of cooperation including Military Education, Training and Doctrine, Defence Policy and

At their Berlin meeting in April 2011, NATO Foreign Ministers endorsed the establishment of a single Partnership Cooperation Menu (PCM) for all partners. As of 1 January 2012, the single partnership menu will be effective, thus dramatically expanding the number of activities accessible to MD countries.

A number of cooperation tools have also been progressively opened to MD countries, such as:

- The e-Prime database which provides electronic access to the MDWP allowing close monitoring of cooperation activities;
- The full package of Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) to improve partners’ capacity to contribute effectively to NATO-led Crisis Response Operations through achieving interoperability;
- The Trust Fund mechanism that currently includes ongoing substantial projects with MD countries such as Jordan and Mauritania;
- The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC) aims at improving partners’ capacity in supporting NATO’s response to crises;
- The Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism (PAP-T) aims at strengthening NATO’s ability to work effectively with MD partners in the fight against terrorism;
- The Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) action plan aims at improving the civil preparedness against CBRN attacks on populations and critical infrastructures.

The NATO Training Cooperation Initiative (NTCI), launched at the 2007 Riga Summit, aims at complementing existing cooperation activities developed in the MD framework through: the establishment of a “NATO Regional Cooperation Course” at the NATO Defence College (NDC) in Rome, which consists in a ten-week strategic level course also focusing on current security challenges in the Middle East.

**Individual Partnership Cooperation Programmes**

The Individual and Partnership Cooperation Programme (IPCP), which replaces the previous Individual Cooperation Programme (ICP) framework document, aims at enhancing bilateral political dialogue as well as at tailoring the cooperation with NATO according to key national security needs, framing NATO cooperation with MD partner countries in a more strategic way. Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia have all agreed tailored Individual Cooperation Programmes with NATO. This is the main instrument of focused cooperation between NATO and MD countries.

Taking into account changes in the Middle East and North Africa, NATO stands ready to support and assist those Mediterranean Dialogue countries undergoing transition, if they so request. Drawing on in-house experience and expertise, through Individual Partnership Cooperation Programmes the Alliance could provide assistance in the areas of security institutions building, defence transformation, modernisation and capacity development, civil-military relations, and defence-related aspects of the transformation and reform of the security sector.
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)

Reaching out to the broader Middle East

NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, launched at the Alliance's Summit in the Turkish city in June 2004, aims to contribute to long-term global and regional security by offering countries of the broader Middle East region practical bilateral security cooperation with NATO.

ICI focuses on practical cooperation in areas where NATO can add value, notably in the security field. Six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council were initially invited to participate. To date, four of these -- Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates -- have joined. Saudia Arabia and Oman have also shown an interest in the Initiative.

Based on the principle of inclusiveness, the Initiative is, however, open to all interested countries of the broader Middle East region who subscribe to its aims and content, including the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Each interested country will be considered by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis and on its own merit. Participation of countries in the region in the Initiative as well as the pace and extent of their cooperation with NATO will depend in large measure on their individual response and level of interest.

What key principles is the Initiative based on?

The ICI is based on a number of important principles, including:

- **Non-discrimination**: all ICI partners are offered the same basis for their cooperation with NATO.
- **Self-differentiation**: a tailored approach to the specific needs of each of our ICI partner countries. Particularly Individual Partnership Cooperation Programmes (IPCP), allow interested ICI countries and NATO to frame their practical cooperation in a more prospective and focused way, enabling interested countries to outline the main short and long-term objectives of their cooperation with the Alliance, in accordance with NATO’s objectives and policies for the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.
- **Inclusiveness**: all ICI countries should see themselves as stakeholders of the same cooperative effort.
- **Two-way engagement**: the ICI is a "two-way" partnership, in which NATO seeks partners’ contribution for its success, through a regular consultation process; special emphasis is placed on practical cooperation.
- **Non-imposition**: ICI partners are free to choose the pace and extent of their cooperation with the Alliance; NATO has no wish to impose anything upon them.
- **Complementarity and mutual reinforcement**: efforts of the ICI and other international institutions for the region are complementary and mutually reinforcing in nature.
Diversity: the ICI respects and takes into account the specific regional, cultural and political contexts of the respective partners.

What does this mean in practice?

The Initiative offers a 'menu' of bilateral activities that countries can choose from, which comprises a range of cooperation areas, including:

1. tailored advice on defence transformation, defence budgeting, defence planning and civil-military relations;
2. military-to-military cooperation to contribute to interoperability through participation in selected military exercises and related education and training activities that could improve the ability of participating countries' forces to operate with those of the Alliance; and through participation in selected NATO and PfP exercises and in NATO-led operation on a case-by-case basis;
3. cooperation in the fight against terrorism, including through intelligence-sharing;
4. cooperation in the Alliance's work on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;
5. cooperation regarding border security in connection with terrorism, small arms and light weapons and the fight against illegal trafficking;
6. civil emergency planning, including participating in training courses and exercises on disaster assistance.

Individual and Partnership Cooperation Programme (IPCP) allow interested ICI countries and NATO to frame their practical cooperation in a more prospective and focused way, enabling interested countries to outline the main short and long-term objectives of their cooperation with the Alliance.

How did the Initiative evolve?

NATO recognizes that dealing with today's complex new threats requires wide international cooperation and collective effort. That is why NATO has developed, and continues to develop, a network of partnerships in the security field.

The Initiative was preceded by a series of high level consultations conducted by the then Deputy Secretary General of NATO, Ambassador Minuto Rizzo, with six countries of the region in May, September and December 2004. These were: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. During these consultations all of the countries expressed their interest in the Initiative.

ICI was launched at the Summit meeting of NATO Heads of State and Government in Istanbul, 28 June 2004. Following the Summit, from September to December 2004, the Deputy Secretary General of NATO paid a second round of visits to the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, to discuss the way ahead.

In the first three months of 2005, three countries: Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar formally joined the ICI. In June 2005, the United Arab Emirates joined the Initiative.
The ICI has since developed both in the political and the practical dimensions. While the political dialogue has evolved to include high-level meetings, the practical dimension was progressively enhanced through the opening of new partnership tools and activities as well as through the contribution of these countries to NATO-led operations. The multilateral dimension of the partnership also developed, with the first NAC+4 meeting held in November 2008, followed by two other such meetings in 2009 and 2010.

Since the Istanbul Summit in 2004, an annual Menu of Practical Activities focusing on agreed priority areas has been opened to ICI countries and has been gradually enhanced. Whereas in 2007, the offer of cooperation to ICI countries included 328 activities/events, the 2011 Menu of Practical Activities now contains about 500 activities.

The NATO Training Cooperation Initiative (NTCI), launched at the 2007 Riga Summit, aims at complementing existing cooperation activities developed in the ICI framework through the establishment of a “NATO Regional Cooperation Course” at the NATO Defence College (NDC) in Rome, which consists in a ten-week strategic level course also focusing on current security challenges in the Middle East. ICI partners, as well as Saudi Arabia, actively participate in these courses.

The importance of public diplomacy has been underlined by ICI nations. High visibility events gave way to informal discussions on security related issues of common interest. The ICI Ambassadorial Conferences in Kuwait (2006), Bahrain (2008) and the United Arab Emirates (2009), which were attended by the Secretary General, the Deputy Secretary General and the 28 NATO Permanent Representatives, as well as by high-ranking officials, policymakers and opinion leaders from ICI countries, focused on discussing and addressing the perception of NATO in the Gulf, as well as ways to develop NATO-ICI partnership in its two dimensions. The fourth ICI Ambassadorial Conference took place in Qatar in February 2011 and focused on deepening NATO-ICI partnership.

The new Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, identifies cooperative security as one of three core tasks for the Alliance. It refers specifically to the ICI, and states: "We attach great importance to peace and stability in the Gulf region, and we intend to strengthen our cooperation in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. We will aim to develop a deeper security partnership with our Gulf partners and remain ready to welcome new partners in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative."

With the approval of the new partnership policy at the meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Berlin in April 2011, all NATO partners will have access in principle to the same range and number of activities. This will dramatically expand the number of activities accessible to ICI countries.

ICI partners have also increasingly demonstrated their readiness to participate in NATO-led operations, acting as security providers. Today, several ICI partners actively contribute to the NATO ISAF operation in Afghanistan. Following the launch of Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya,
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates promptly provided air assets to the operation and were recognised as contributing nations, playing a key role in the success of the operation.

- **Which NATO bodies have a central role?**

Following the launch of the ICI, NATO countries decided to establish the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Group, composed of political counsellors from the 28 delegations of member countries to NATO, which was replaced in 2011 by the Political and Partnerships Committee, which responsible for all partnerships.

The Committee is in charge of defining the procedures for the development of a menu of practical activities with interested countries and ensuring its successful implementation. It also reports to the Council or to NATO’s Senior Political Committee and prepares the ground for the decisions to be adopted by the North Atlantic Council on ICI.

In addition, the Committee engages countries participating in the Initiative on a ‘28+1’ basis for the development of individual workplans and follows up on their implementation.

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**NATO’s relations with partners across the globe**

NATO cooperates on an individual basis with a number of partner countries which are not part of its other partnership frameworks (i.e. the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council/Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative). Formally referred to as “partners across the globe” – but often simply as “global partners” – they include Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan and Mongolia.

These countries develop cooperation with NATO in areas of mutual interest, including emerging security challenges, and some contribute actively to NATO operations either militarily or in some other way. Individual global partners choose the areas where they wish to engage with NATO, as well as the extent of this cooperation, in a spirit of mutual benefit and reciprocity.

Over recent years, NATO has developed bilateral relations with each of these countries. Global partners now have the same access to partnership activities as other partners. Activities range from joint exercises and joint operations, to strategic-level training, and information, intelligence as well as technology exchange.

The importance of reaching out to nations and organizations across the across the globe was underlined in the Strategic Concept adopted at the November 2010 Lisbon Summit. At Lisbon, Allied leaders declared their intention, as part of a focused effort to reform NATO’s partnerships policy, to better engage with partners across the globe which contribute significantly to security. Following up
on the Lisbon decisions, Allied foreign ministers approved a new partnerships policy at their meeting in Berlin in April 2011.

In line with the new policy, all partners will be treated in the same way offering them the same basis of cooperation and dialogue. Moreover, are now more frequent opportunities for meetings in flexible formats, bringing together NATO and partners from across and beyond existing partnership frameworks, as well as other countries with which NATO may have no bilateral programme of cooperation. One such meeting was held at NATO Headquarters on September 2011 to discuss counter-piracy, involving representatives from 47 nations and organizations involved in counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean. Other similar meetings have taken place to consult partners on different issues, such as partnership or countering narcotics in Afghanistan.

- Support for NATO-led operations

The significant contributions from partners across the globe to NATO-led operations have a direct, advantageous impact for international peace and security.

In the Balkans, Argentinean and Chilean forces have worked alongside NATO Allies to ensure security in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Kosovo, Argentina has helped NATO personnel to provide medical and social assistance to the local population and has cooperated on peace agreement implementation since 1999.

In Afghanistan, a number of global partners such as Australia, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea, work alongside the Allies as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Other countries, such as Japan, support ISAF efforts of stabilization in Afghanistan without being involved in combat, by funding large number of development projects and dispatching liaison officers.

Pakistan’s support for the efforts of NATO and the international community in Afghanistan remains crucial to the success of the Alliance’s mission, despite the different difficulties experienced over recent months. NATO remains committed to engage and cooperate with Pakistan in an effort to enlist support to stabilize Afghanistan.

The participation of partners in NATO-led peace support operations is guided by the Political-Military Framework (PMF), which has been developed for NATO-led Partnership for Peace operations. This framework provides for the involvement of contributing states in the planning and force generation processes through the International Coordination Centre at Allied Command Operations. Building on lessons learned and reinforcing the habit of cooperation established through KFOR and ISAF, NATO Allies decided at the 2010 Lisbon Summit to review the PMF in order to update how NATO works together and shapes decisions with partner countries on the operations and missions to which they contribute.
Typically, forces from global partner countries are incorporated into operations on the same basis as forces from NATO member nations. This implies that they are involved in the decision-making process through their association to the work of committees, and through the posting of liaison officers in the operational headquarters or to SHAPE. They often operate under the direct command of the Operational Commander through multinational divisional headquarters. Regular meetings of the Council at Ambassadorial, Ministerial and Heads of State and Government are held to discuss and review the operations, as illustrated by the meeting on ISAF that will take place at the Chicago Summit in May 2012.

**Evolution of relations**

NATO has maintained a dialogue with countries which were not part of its partnership frameworks, on an ad hoc basis, since the 1990s. However, NATO’s involvement in areas outside of its immediate region – including Afghanistan and Libya – has increased the need and the opportunities for enhanced global interaction. Clearly, the emergence of global threats requires the cooperation of a wider range of countries to successfully tackle challenges such as terrorism, proliferation, piracy or cyber attacks. Dialogue with these countries can also help NATO to avert crises and, when needed, to manage an operation during all its phases.

Since 1998, and according to a set of general guidelines for relations countries which were then referred to as “Contact Countries”, NATO has invited nations across the globe to participate in its activities, workshops, exercises and conferences. This decision marked a policy shift for the Alliance, allowing these countries to have access, through the case-by-case approval of the North Atlantic Council, to activities offered under NATO’s structured partnerships.

Significant steps were taken at the 2006 Riga Summit to increase the operational relevance of NATO’s cooperation with both countries that are part of its structured partnership frameworks and other partners across the globe. These steps were reinforced by decisions at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, which defined a set of objectives for these relationships and created avenues for enhanced political dialogue, including meetings of the North Atlantic Council with ministers of the countries concerned, high level talks, and meetings with ambassadors. In addition, annual work programmes (then referred to as Individual Tailored Cooperation Packages of Activities) were further developed.

At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, Allies agreed to develop a more efficient and flexible partnership policy, in time for the meeting of Allied foreign ministers in Berlin in April 2011. To this end, they decided to:

- streamline NATO’s partnership tools in order to open all cooperative activities and exercises to partners and to harmonise partnership programmes;
- better engage with partners across the globe who contribute significantly to security, and reach out to relevant partners to build trust, increase transparency and develop practical cooperation;
- develop flexible formats to discuss security challenges with partners and enhance existing fora for political dialogue; and
build on improvements in NATO’s training mechanisms and consider methods to enhance individual partner’s ability to build capacity.

As part of efforts to reach out across the globe to nations and organizations that share the Alliance’s interest in peaceful international relations, NATO is also seeking to develop dialogue with countries that do not have a formal bilateral programme of cooperation. These include countries such as China, India, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Colombia.

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**NATO enlargement**

**NATO’s new Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010,** reaffirmed the Allies commitment that NATO’s door remains open to any European country in a position to undertake the commitments and obligations of membership, and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Since 1949, NATO’s membership has increased from 12 to 28 countries through six rounds of enlargement. Albania and Croatia, which were invited to join NATO at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, formally became members when the accession process was completed on 1 April 2009.

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has, like Albania and Croatia, been participating in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for a number of years to prepare for possible membership. At Bucharest, Allied leaders agreed to invite the country to become a member as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the issue over the country’s name has been reached with Greece.

A number of other important decisions concerning enlargement were taken at Bucharest. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro were invited to start Intensified Dialogues on their membership aspirations and related reforms. Allied leaders also agreed that Georgia and Ukraine – which were already engaged in an Intensified Dialogue with NATO – will become members in future.

In December 2009, NATO foreign ministers invited Montenegro to join the MAP and assured Bosnia and Herzegovina that it will join once it has achieved the necessary progress in its reform efforts.

In April 2010, NATO foreign ministers at their meeting in Tallinn, reviewed progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s reform efforts and invited the country to join the MAP. However, they authorized the North Atlantic Council to accept the country’s first Annual National Programme only when the immovable property issue has been resolved.

NATO’s "open door policy" is based on Article 10 of its founding treaty. Any decision to invite a country to join the Alliance is taken by the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s principal decision-making body, on the basis of consensus among all Allies. No third country has a say in such deliberations.
NATO’s ongoing enlargement process poses no threat to any country. It is aimed at promoting stability and cooperation, at building a Europe whole and free, united in peace, democracy and common values.

- **Support for aspirant countries**

Countries that have declared an interest in joining the Alliance are initially invited to engage in an Intensified Dialogue with NATO about their membership aspirations and related reforms.

Aspirant countries may then be invited to participate in the Membership Action Plan to prepare for potential membership and demonstrate their ability to meet the obligations and commitments of possible future membership. Participation in the MAP does not guarantee future membership, but it constitutes the key preparation mechanism.

Countries aspiring to join NATO have to demonstrate that they are in a position to further the principles of the 1949 Washington Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. They are also expected to meet certain political, economic and military criteria, which are laid out in the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement.

- **1995 Study on Enlargement**

In 1995, the Alliance published the results of a Study on NATO Enlargement that considered the merits of admitting new members and how they should be brought in.

It concluded that the end of the Cold War provided a unique opportunity to build improved security in the entire Euro-Atlantic area and that NATO enlargement would contribute to enhanced stability and security for all.

The Study further concluded that enlargement would contribute to enhanced stability and security for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area by encouraging and supporting democratic reforms, including the establishment of civilian and democratic control over military forces; fostering patterns and habits of cooperation, consultation and consensus-building characteristic of relations among members of the Alliance; and promoting good-neighbourly relations.

It would increase transparency in defence planning and military budgets, thereby reinforcing confidence among states, and would reinforce the overall tendency toward closer integration and cooperation in Europe. The Study also concluded that enlargement would strengthen the Alliance’s ability to contribute to European and international security and strengthen and broaden the transatlantic partnership.

According to the Study, countries seeking NATO membership would have to be able to demonstrate that they have fulfilled certain requirements. These include:
Once admitted, new members would enjoy all the rights and assume all the obligations of membership. This would include acceptance at the time that they join of all the principles, policies and procedures previously adopted by Alliance members.

- **Accession process**

Once the Allies have decided to invite a country to become a member of NATO, they officially invite the country to begin accession talks with the Alliance. This is the first step in the accession process on the way to formal membership.

The major steps in the process are:

1. **Accession talks with a NATO team**

These talks take place at NATO headquarters in Brussels and bring together teams of NATO experts and representatives of the individual invitees. Their aim is to obtain formal confirmation from the invitees of their willingness and ability to meet the political, legal and military obligations and commitments of NATO membership, as laid out in the Washington Treaty and in the Study on NATO Enlargement.

The talks take place in two sessions with each invitee. In the first session, political and defence or military issues are discussed, essentially providing the opportunity to establish that the preconditions for membership have been met. The second session is more technical and includes discussion of resources, security, and legal issues as well as the contribution of each new member country to NATO’s common budget. This is determined on a proportional basis, according to the size of their economies in relation to those of other Alliance member countries.

Invitees are also required to implement measures to ensure the protection of NATO classified information, and prepare their security and intelligence services to work with the NATO Office of Security.

The end product of these discussions is a timetable to be submitted by each invitee for the completion of necessary reforms, which may continue even after these countries have become NATO members.

2. **Invitees send letters of intent to NATO, along with timetables for completion of reforms**
In the second step of the accession process, each invitee country provides confirmation of its acceptance of the obligations and commitments of membership in the form of a letter of intent from each foreign minister addressed to the NATO Secretary General. Together with this letter they also formally submit their individual reform timetables.

3. Accession protocols are signed by NATO countries

NATO then prepares Accession Protocols to the Washington Treaty for each invitee. These protocols are in effect amendments or additions to the Treaty, which once signed and ratified by Allies, become an integral part of the Treaty itself and permit the invited countries to become parties to the Treaty.

4. Accession protocols are ratified by NATO countries

The governments of NATO member states ratify the protocols, according to their national requirements and procedures. The ratification procedure varies from country to country. For example, the United States requires a two-thirds majority to pass the required legislation in the Senate. Elsewhere, for example in the United Kingdom, no formal parliamentary vote is required.

5. The Secretary General invites the potential new members to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty

Once all NATO member countries notify the Government of the United States of America, the depository of the Washington Treaty, of their acceptance of the protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of the potential new members, the Secretary General invites the new countries to accede to the Treaty.

6. Invitees accede to the North Atlantic Treaty in accordance with their national procedures

7. Upon depositing their instruments of accession with the US State Department, invitees formally become NATO members

- Evolution of NATO’s “open door policy”

NATO’s “open door policy” is based upon Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, which states that membership is open to any “European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area”.

The enlargement of the Alliance is an ongoing and dynamic process. Since the Alliance was created in 1949, its membership has grown from the 12 founding members to today’s 28 members through six rounds of enlargement in 1952, 1955, 1982, 1999, 2004 and 2009.
The first three rounds of enlargement – which brought in Greece and Turkey (1952), West Germany (1955) and Spain (1982) – took place during the Cold War, when strategic considerations were at the forefront of decision-making.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, signalled the end of the Cold War and was followed by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the break up of the Soviet Union, ending the division of Europe. The reunification of Germany in October 1990 brought the territory of the former East Germany into the Alliance. The new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe were eager to guarantee their freedom by becoming integrated into Euro-Atlantic institutions.

NATO enlargement was the subject of lively debate in the early 1990s. Many political analysts were unsure of the benefits that enlargement would bring. Some were concerned about the possible impact on Alliance cohesion and solidarity, as well as on relations with other states, notably Russia. It is in this context that the Alliance carried out a Study on NATO Enlargement in 1995 (see above).

**Post-Cold War enlargement**

Based on the findings of the Study on Enlargement, The Alliance invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks at the Alliance’s Madrid Summit in 1997. These three countries became the first former members of the Warsaw Pact to join NATO in 1999.

At the 1999 Washington Summit, the Membership Action Plan was launched to help other aspirant countries prepare for possible membership.

Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia and Slovenia were invited to begin accession talks at the Alliance’s Prague Summit in 2002 and joined NATO in 2004. All seven countries had participated in the MAP.

**Bucharest Summit decisions**

At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, Allied leaders took a number of steps related to the future enlargement of the Alliance.

Several decisions concerned countries in the Western Balkans. The Allies see the closer integration of Western Balkan countries into Euro-Atlantic institutions as essential to ensuring long-term self-sustaining stability in this region, where NATO has been heavily engaged in peace-support operations since the mid 1990s.

- Albania and Croatia were invited to start accession talks to join the Alliance and joined NATO in April 2009.
- The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* was assured that it will also be invited to join the Alliance as soon as a solution to the issue of the country’s name has been reached with Greece.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro were invited to start Intensified Dialogues on their membership aspirations and related reforms. Montenegro was invited to join MAP in December 2009 and Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 2010.
Allied leaders also agreed at Bucharest that Georgia and Ukraine, which were already engaged in Intensified Dialogues with NATO, will one day become members. In December 2008, Allied foreign ministers decided to enhance opportunities for assisting the two countries in efforts to meet membership requirements by making use of the framework of the existing NATO-Ukraine Commission and NATO-Georgia Commission – without prejudice to further decisions which may be taken about their applications to join the MAP.

4 April 1949
Signature of the North Atlantic Treaty by 12 founding members: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. Article 10 of the treaty provides basis NATO’s “open door policy”.

18 February 1952
Accession of Greece and Turkey.

6 May 1955
Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany.

30 May 1982
Spain joins the Alliance (and the integrated military structure in 1998).

October 1990
With the reunification of Germany, the new German Länder in the East become part of NATO.

January 1994
At the Brussels Summit, Allied leaders reaffirm that NATO remains open to the membership of other European countries.

28 September 1995
Publication of NATO Study on Enlargement.

8-9 July 1997
At the Madrid Summit, three Partner countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – are invited to start accession talks.

12 March 1999
Accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, bringing the Alliance to 19 members.

23-25 April 1999
Launch of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the Washington Summit. (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia join the MAP.)

14 May 2002
NATO foreign ministers officially announce the participation of Croatia in the MAP at their meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland.

May 2002
President Leonid Kuchma announces Ukraine’s goal of eventual NATO membership.

21-22 November 2002
At the Prague Summit, seven Partner countries – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia – are invited to start accession talks.

26 March 2003
Signing ceremony of the Accession Protocols of the seven invitees.

29 March 2004
Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

21 April 2005
Launch of the Intensified Dialogue on Ukraine’s aspirations to NATO membership and related reforms, at an informal meeting of foreign ministers in Vilnius, Lithuania.

21 September 2006
NATO foreign ministers in New York announce the decision to offer an Intensified Dialogue to Georgia.
28-29 November 2006
At the Riga Summit, Allied leaders state that invitations will be extended to MAP countries that fulfil certain conditions.

2-4 April 2008
At the Bucharest Summit, Allied leaders invite Albania and Croatia to start accession talks; assure the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹ that it will be invited once a solution to the issue of the country’s name has been reached with Greece; invite Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro to start Intensified Dialogues; and agree that Georgia and Ukraine will become members in future.

9 July 2008
Accession protocols for Albania and Croatia are signed.

1 April 2009
Accession of Albania and Croatia.

4 December 2009
NATO foreign ministers invite Montenegro to join the Membership Action Plan.

22 April 2010
NATO foreign ministers invite Bosnia and Herzegovina to join Membership Action Plan, authorizing the North Atlantic Council to accept the country’s first Annual National Programme only when the immovable property issue has been resolved.

1. Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

Membership Action Plan (MAP)

The Membership Action Plan (MAP) is a NATO programme of advice, assistance and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance. Participation in the MAP does not prejudge any decision by the Alliance on future membership.

Current participants in the MAP are the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹, which has been participating in the MAP since 1999, and Montenegro, which was invited to join in December 2009. Welcoming progress made in its reform efforts, in April 2010, the Allies formally invited Bosnia and Herzegovina to join the MAP with one important condition: the first Annual National Programme under the MAP will only be accepted by NATO once a key remaining issue concerning immovable defence property has been resolved.

Countries participating in the MAP submit individual annual national programmes on their preparations for possible future membership. These cover political, economic, defence, resource, security and legal aspects.

The MAP process provides a focused and candid feedback mechanism on aspirant countries' progress on their programmes. This includes both political and technical advice, as well as annual meetings between all NATO members and individual aspirants at the level of the North Atlantic
Council to assess progress, on the basis of an annual progress report. A key element is the defence planning approach for aspirants, which includes elaboration and review of agreed planning targets.

Throughout the year, meetings and workshops with NATO civilian and military experts in various fields allow for discussion of the entire spectrum of issues relevant to membership.

The MAP was launched in April 1999 at the Alliance’s Washington Summit to help countries aspiring to NATO membership in their preparations. The process drew heavily on the experience gained during the accession process of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, which had joined NATO in the Alliance’s first post-Cold War round of enlargement in 1999.

**Participation in the MAP**

Participation in the MAP has helped prepare the seven countries that joined NATO in the second post-Cold War round of enlargement in 2004 (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) as well as Albania and Croatia, which joined in April 2009.

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia1 continues to participate in the MAP – Allied leaders have agreed to invite the country to become a member as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the issue over the country’s name has been reached with Greece.

When NATO foreign ministers invited Montenegro to join the MAP in December 2009, they also assured Bosnia and Herzegovina that it will be able to join once it has achieved the necessary progress in its reform efforts.

In April 2010, NATO foreign ministers at their meeting in Tallinn, reviewed progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s reform efforts and invited the country to join the Membership Action Plan. However, they authorized the North Atlantic Council to accept the country’s first Annual National Programme only when the immovable property issue has been resolved.

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**NATO’s relations with the United Nations**

**NATO and the United Nations (UN) share a commitment to maintaining international peace and security. The two organizations have been cooperating in this area since the early 1990s.**

At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, the Allies underlined their commitment to strong and productive cooperation with the UN and welcomed the strengthened practical cooperation following the Joint Declaration on UN/NATO Secretariat Cooperation of September 2008. NATO aims to deepen this practical cooperation and further develop political dialogue on issues of common
interest, including through enhanced liaison, more regular political consultation, and enhanced practical cooperation in managing crises where both organizations are engaged.

NATO’s new Strategic Concept commits the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilize post-conflict situations, including by working more closely with NATO’s international partners, most importantly the United Nations and the European Union. The UN is at the core of the framework of international organizations within which the Alliance operates, a principle that is enshrined in NATO’s founding treaty.

UN Security Council resolutions have provided the mandate for NATO’s operations in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, and the framework for NATO’s training mission in Iraq. More recently, in March 2011, the Allies decided to take on the whole military operation in Libya under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, in order to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of attack. This operation was highly successful. It terminated on 31 October 2011.

Over the years, NATO-UN cooperation has been extended beyond cooperation in peace-support and stabilization operations to include consultations between NATO and UN specialised bodies on issues such as crisis assessment and management, civil-military cooperation, logistics, combating human trafficking, mine action, civilian capabilities, women and peace and security, arms control and non-proliferation, and the fight against terrorism.

Close cooperation between NATO and the UN and its agencies is an important element in the development of an international “Comprehensive Approach” to crisis management and operations. At Lisbon, the Allies decided to enhance NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach to crisis management as part of the international community’s effort and to improve NATO’s ability to deliver stabilization and reconstruction effects.

NATO has also provided support to UN-sponsored operations, including logistical assistance to the African Union’s UN-endorsed peacekeeping operations in Darfur, Sudan, and in Somalia; support for UN disaster-relief operations in Pakistan, following the massive earthquake in 2005; and escorting merchant ships carrying World Food Programme humanitarian supplies off the coast of Somalia.

**Framework for cooperation**

NATO’s Secretary General reports regularly to the UN Secretary General on progress in NATO-led operations and on other key decisions of the North Atlantic Council in the area of crisis management and in the fight against terrorism. In recent years, staff-level meetings and high-level visits have become more frequent. The UN is frequently invited to attend NATO ministerial meetings.

In September 2008, building on the experience of over a decade of working together, the Secretaries General of the two organizations agreed to establish a framework for expanded consultation and cooperation. This includes regular exchanges and dialogue at senior and working
levels on political and operational issues. Increasing cooperation will significantly contribute to addressing the threats and challenges that the international community faces.

Within this framework, cooperation will be further developed between NATO and the UN on issues of common interest, including in communication and information-sharing; capacity-building, training and exercises; lessons learned, planning and support for contingencies; and operational coordination and support. Cooperation will continue to develop in a practical fashion, taking into account each organization’s specific mandate, expertise, procedures and capabilities.

Staff-level meetings also take place with other UN organizations, such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), and NATO experts participate in events organized by other UN bodies.

NATO also contributes actively to the work of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (UN CTC) – established in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1373 in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States – and participates in special meetings of the Committee bringing together international, regional and sub-regional organizations involved in this process. NATO and the UN conduct reciprocal briefings on progress in the area of counter-terrorism, in their respective committees. NATO is also committed to supporting the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

Since 2004, NATO has been working with a number of UN agencies in the framework of the Environmental Security (ENVSEC) Initiative, through the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme. (See NATO A-to-Z page on Environmental Security)

### Evolution of NATO-UN cooperation in the field

Working relations between the United Nations and the Alliance were limited during the Cold War. This changed in 1992, against the background of growing conflict in the western Balkans, where their respective roles in crisis management led to an intensification of practical cooperation between the two organizations in the field.

#### Bringing peace to the former Yugoslavia

In July 1992, NATO ships belonging to the Alliance's Standing Naval Force Mediterranean, assisted by NATO Maritime Patrol Aircraft, began monitoring operations in the Adriatic in support of a UN arms embargo against all republics of the former Yugoslavia. A few months later, in November 1992, NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) began enforcement operations in support of UN Security Council resolutions aimed at preventing the escalation of the conflict.

The readiness of the Alliance to support peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council was formally stated by NATO foreign ministers in December 1992. A number of
measures were subsequently taken, including joint maritime operations under the authority of the NATO and WEU Councils; NATO air operations; close air support for the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR); air strikes to protect UN "Safe Areas"; and contingency planning for other options which the United Nations might take.

Following the signature of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Agreement) on 14 December 1995, NATO was given a mandate by the United Nations, on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1031, to implement the military aspects of the peace agreement. NATO’s first peacekeeping operation, the Implementation Force (IFOR) began operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina to fulfill this mandate in December 1995. One year later, it was replaced by a NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR). Throughout their mandates both multinational forces worked closely with other international organizations and humanitarian agencies on the ground, including UN agencies such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF).

From the onset of the conflict in Kosovo in 1998 and throughout the crisis, close contacts were maintained between the UN Secretary General and NATO’s Secretary General. Actions were taken by the Alliance in support of UN Security Council resolutions both during and after the conflict. The Kosovo Force (KFOR) was deployed on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 12 June 1999 to provide an international security presence as the prerequisite for peace and reconstruction of Kosovo. Throughout its deployment, KFOR has worked closely with the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

In 2000 and 2001, NATO and the United Nations also cooperated successfully in containing major ethnic discord in southern Serbia and preventing a full-blown civil war in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹.

**Afghanistan**

Cooperation between NATO and the UN is playing a key role in Afghanistan. The Alliance formally took over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a UN-mandated force, in August 2003. Originally tasked with helping provide security in and around Kabul, ISAF has subsequently been authorized by a series of UN Security Council resolutions to expand its presence into other regions of the country to extend the authority of the central government and to facilitate development and reconstruction.

NATO and ISAF work closely with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and other international actors that are supporting governance, reconstruction and development. The close cooperation takes place in various settings, in Afghanistan as well as in UN and NATO capitals. It includes co-membership of the Joint Co-ordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) overseeing the implementation of the internationally endorsed Afghanistan Compact, co-chairmanship together
with the Afghan Government of the Executive Steering Committee for Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and other joint Afghan-International Community bodies.

The practical close work also covers cooperation between UNAMA, ISAF and the NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Kabul on civil-military issues such as operational planning. Beyond Kabul city, close civil-military cooperation between UNAMA and ISAF is also being pursued in those provinces where both ISAF and UNAMA are present. This practical work is now being developed comprehensively in the context of UNAMA’s Integrated Approach to selected prioritized Afghan districts.

**Iraq**

Under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1546 and at the request of the Iraqi Interim Government, NATO is providing assistance in training and equipping Iraqi security forces.

**Supporting African Union missions**

In June 2005, following a request from the African Union and in close coordination with the United Nations and the European Union, NATO agreed to support the African Union’s Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which is trying to end the continuing violence in the Darfur region. NATO assisted by airlifting peacekeepers from African troop-contributing countries to the region and also helped train AU troops in how to run a multinational military headquarters and how to manage intelligence.

Following a request from the African Union in 2007, NATO accepted to assist the African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by providing airlift support to AU member states willing to deploy on this mission. NATO is also providing capacity building assistance for the African Union via a Senior Military Liaison Office in Addis Abbaba. The Alliance also protects UN shipping in support of AMISOM.

**Deterring piracy**

In October 2008, NATO agreed to a request from the UN Secretary General to deploy ships off the coast off Somalia to deter piracy and escort merchant ships carrying World Food Programme cargo.

**Libya**

On March 27, NATO Allies decided to take on the whole military operation in Libya under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. The purpose of Operation Unified Protector was to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of attack. NATO implemented all military aspects of the UN Resolution. Allies moved swiftly and decisively to enforce the arms embargo and no-fly zone called for in the resolution, and to take further measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas from attack. Operation Unified Protector was successfully concluded on 31 October 2011.
1. Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name

- The North Atlantic Treaty and the UN Charter

The Charter of the United Nations, signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945 by fifty nations, provides the legal basis for the creation of NATO and acknowledges the overall responsibility of the UN Security Council for international peace and security.

The preamble to NATO’s North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington on 4 April 1949 makes it clear that the UN Charter is the framework within which the Alliance operates. In its opening phrases, the signatories of the Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter.

In Article 1 they also undertake to settle international disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN Charter.

Article 5 of the Treaty makes explicit reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter in asserting the right of the Allies to take, individually or collectively, such action as they deem necessary for their self-defence. Moreover, it commits the member countries to terminating any armed attack and all measures taken as a result, when the UN Security Council has itself taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Further reference to the UN Charter can be found in Article 7 of the North Atlantic Treaty. It states that the Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of Allies under the Charter, and reaffirms the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

And finally, in Article 12, a clause was included in the Treaty providing for it to be reviewed after ten years, if any of the Parties to it so requested. It stipulated that the review would take place in the light of new developments affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal and regional arrangements under the UN Charter.

NATO-EU: a strategic partnership
Sharing strategic interests, NATO and the European Union (EU) cooperate on issues of common interest and are working side by side in crisis-management. At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, the Allies underlined their determination to improve the NATO-EU strategic partnership.

NATO’s new Strategic Concept, adopted at Lisbon, commits the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilize post-conflict situations, including by working more closely with NATO’s international partners, most importantly the United Nations and the European Union.

The Strategic Concept clearly states that an active and effective European Union contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Therefore the EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. The two organizations share a majority of members (21), and all members of both organizations share common values.

NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence. The Allies welcome the entry into force of the European Union’s Lisbon Treaty, which provides a framework for strengthening the EU’s capacities to address common security challenges. Non-EU European Allies make a significant contribution to these efforts. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, their fullest involvement in these efforts is essential.

NATO and the EU can and should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security. The Allies are determined to make their contribution to create more favourable circumstances through which they will:

- fully strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU, in the spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity and respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of both organizations;
- enhance practical cooperation in operations throughout the crisis spectrum, from coordinated planning to mutual support in the field;
- broaden political consultations to include all issues of common concern, in order to share assessments and perspectives;
- cooperate more fully in capability development, to minimise duplication and maximise cost-effectiveness.
Close cooperation between NATO and the European Union is an important element in the development of an international “Comprehensive Approach” to crisis management and operations, which requires the effective application of both military and civilian means.

Institutionalized relations between NATO and the European Union were launched in 2001, building on steps taken during the 1990s to promote greater European responsibility in defence matters (NATO-WEU cooperation¹). The political principles underlying the relationship were set out in the December 2002 NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP.

With the enlargement of both organizations in 2004 followed by the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union in 2007, NATO and the European Union now have 21 member countries in common².

1. At that time, the Western European Union (WEU) was acting for the European Union in the area of security and defence (1992 Maastricht Treaty). The WEU’s crisis-management role was transferred to the European Union in 1999.
2. 27 EU member countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom.

**Framework for cooperation (March 2003)**

An exchange of letters between the NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency in January 2001 defined the scope of cooperation and modalities of consultation on security issues between the two organizations. Cooperation further developed with the signing of the NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP in December 2002 and the agreement, in March 2003, of a framework for cooperation.

NATO and the EU meet on a regular basis to discuss issues of common interest. Meetings take place at different levels including at the level of foreign ministers, ambassadors, military representatives and defence advisors. There are regular staff contacts at all levels between NATO’s International Staff and International Military Staff, and their respective EU interlocutors (Council Secretariat, European External Action Service, EU Military Staff, European Defence Agency, Commission, European Parliament, ...).

Permanent military liaison arrangements have been established to facilitate cooperation at the operational level. A NATO Permanent Liaison Team has been operating at the EU Military Staff since November 2005 and an EU Cell was set up at SHAPE (NATO’s strategic command for operations in Mons, Belgium) in March 2006.

**NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP**

The NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP, agreed on 16 December 2002, reaffirmed the EU assured access to NATO’s planning capabilities for its own military operations and reiterated the political principles of the strategic partnership: effective mutual consultation; equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy of the European Union and NATO; respect for the interests of EU and NATO
members states; respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; and coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the military capability requirements common to the two organizations.

**The “Berlin-Plus” arrangements**

As part of the framework for cooperation adopted on 17 March 2003, the so-called “Berlin-Plus” arrangements provide the basis for NATO-EU cooperation in crisis management by allowing the European Union to have access to NATO’s collective assets and capabilities for EU-led operations, including command arrangements and assistance in operational planning. In effect, they allow the Alliance to support EU-led operations in which NATO as a whole is not engaged.

- **Cooperation in the field**

**The Balkans**

In July 2003, the European Union and NATO published a “Concerted Approach for the Western Balkans”. Jointly drafted, it outlines core areas of cooperation and emphasises the common vision and determination both organizations share to bring stability to the region.

- **The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia**

  [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm - _ftn1#_ftn1]

  On 31 March 2003, the EU-led Operation Concordia took over the responsibilities of the NATO-led mission, Operation Allied Harmony, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This mission, which ended in December 2003, was the first “Berlin Plus” operation in which NATO assets were made available to the European Union.

- **Bosnia and Herzegovina**

  Building on the results of Concordia and following the conclusion of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Union deployed a new mission called Operation Althea on 2 December 2004. The EU force (EUFOR) operates under the “Berlin-Plus” arrangements, drawing on NATO planning expertise and on other Alliance’s assets and capabilities. The NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe is the Commander of Operation Althea. The EU Operation Headquarters (OHQ) is located at SHAPE.

- **Kosovo**

  NATO has been leading a peacekeeping force in Kosovo (KFOR) since 1999. The European Union has contributed civil assets to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) for years and agreed to take over the police component of the UN Mission. The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), which deployed in December 2008, is the largest civilian mission ever launched under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The central aim is to assist and support the Kosovo authorities in the rule of law area, specifically in the police, judiciary and customs areas. EULEX works closely with KFOR in the field.

**Cooperation in other regions**

- **Afghanistan**
NATO and the European Union are playing key roles in bringing peace and stability to Afghanistan, within the international community’s broader efforts to implement a comprehensive approach in their efforts to assist the country. The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force helps create a stable and secure environment in which the Afghan government as well as other international actors can build democratic institutions, extend the rule of law and reconstruct the country. NATO welcomed the EU’s launch of an ESDP Rule of Law mission (EUPOL) in June 2007. The European Union has also initiated a programme for justice reform and is helping to fund civilian projects in NATO-run Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that are led by an EU member country.

- **Darfur**

  Both NATO and the EU supported the African Union’s mission in Darfur, Sudan, in particular with regard to airlift rotations.

- **Piracy**

  Since September 2008, NATO and EU naval forces are deployed side by side (respectively Ocean Shield and EUNAVFOR Atalanta), with other actors, off the coast of Somalia for anti-piracy missions.

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3. Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

- **Other areas of cooperation**

  **Capabilities**

  Together with operations, capability development is an area where cooperation is essential and where there is potential for further growth. The NATO-EU Capability Group was established in May 2003 to ensure the coherence and mutual reinforcement of NATO and EU capability development efforts.

  Following the creation, in July 2004, of the European Defence Agency (EDA) to coordinate work within the European Union on the development of defence capabilities, armaments cooperation, acquisition and research, EDA experts contribute to the work of the Capability Group.

  Among other issues, the Capability Group has addressed common capability shortfalls in areas such as countering improvised explosive devices and medical support. The Group is also playing an important role in ensuring transparency and complementarity between NATO’s work on “Smart Defence” and the EU’s Pooling and Sharing initiative.

  **Terrorism and WMD proliferation**

  Both NATO and the European Union are committed to combat terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They have exchanged information on their activities in the field of protection of civilian populations against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN)
attacks. The two organizations also cooperate in the field of civil emergency planning by exchanging inventories of measures taken in this area.

**New areas of cooperation**

Since the adoption of the NATO’s new Strategic Concept at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, which identifies the need for the Alliance to address emerging, several new areas of cooperation with the EU are under consideration. This concerns in particular energy security issues and cyber defence. Consultations are taking place at staff level.

- **Participation**

Since the enlargement of NATO and the European Union in 2004 and the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union in 2007, the organizations have 21 member countries in common.

Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, and the United States, which are members of NATO but not of the EU, participate in all NATO-EU meetings. So do Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and since 2008, Malta, which are members of the EU and of NATO’s Partnership for Peace ( PfP) programme.

However, Cyprus which is not a PfP member and does not have a security agreement with NATO on the exchange of classified documents, cannot participate in official NATO-EU meetings. This is a consequence of decisions taken by NATO and the EU in December 2002 – before the 2004 rounds of enlargement – when NATO had 19 members and the EU 15. Informal meetings including Cyprus take place occasionally at different levels (foreign ministers, ambassadors and military delegates).

- **Key milestones**

  **February 1992**  
  The EU adopts the Maastricht Treaty, which envisages an intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the eventual framing of a common defence policy (ESDP), with the WEU as the EU’s defence component. Close cooperation established between NATO and the WEU.

  **June 1992**  
  In Oslo, NATO foreign ministers support the objective of developing the WEU as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance and as the defence component of the EU, that would also cover the “Petersberg tasks” (humanitarian search and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, crisis management tasks including peace enforcement, and environmental protection).

  **January 1994**  
  Allied leaders agree to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy. NATO endorses the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces, which provides for “separable but not separate” deployable headquarters that could be used for European-led operations
and is the conceptual basis for future operations involving NATO and other non-NATO countries.

**June 1996**  
In Berlin, NATO foreign ministers agree for the first time to build up an ESDI within NATO, with the aim of rebalancing roles and responsibilities between Europe and North America. An essential part of this initiative was to improve European capabilities. They also decide to make Alliance assets available for WEU-led crisis management operations. These decisions lead to the introduction of the term "Berlin-Plus".

**December 1998**  
At a summit in St-Malo, France and the United Kingdom make a joint statement affirming the EU's determination to establish a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

**April 1999**  
At the Washington Summit, Heads of State and Government decide to develop the "Berlin-Plus" arrangements.

**June 1999**  
European Council meeting in Cologne decides "to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence".

**December 1999**  
At the Helsinki Council meeting, EU members establish military "headline goals" to allow the EU, by 2003, to deploy up to 60,000 troops for 'Petersberg tasks'. EU members also create political and military structures including a Political and Security Committee, a Military Committee and a Military Staff. The crisis management role of the WEU is transferred to the EU. The WEU retains residual tasks.

**September 2000**  
The North Atlantic Council and the interim Political and Security Committee of the European Union meet for the first time to take stock of progress in NATO-EU relations.

**December 2000**  
Signature of the EU's Treaty of Nice containing amendments reflecting the operative developments of the ESDP as an independent EU policy (entry into force February 2003).

**January 2001**  
Beginning of institutionalised relations between NATO and the EU with the establishment of joint meetings, including at the level of foreign ministers and ambassadors. Exchange of letters between the NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency on the scope of cooperation and modalities for consultation.

**May 2001**  
First formal NATO-EU meeting at the level of foreign ministers in Budapest. The NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency issue a joint statement on the Western Balkans.

**November 2002**  
At the Prague Summit, NATO members declare their readiness to give the EU access to NATO assets and capabilities for operations in which the Alliance is not engaged militarily.

**December 2002**  
EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP.

**March 2003**  
Agreement on the framework for cooperation. Entry into force of a NATO-EU security of information agreement. Transition from the NATO-led operation 'Allied Harmony' to the EU-led Operation 'Concordia' in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*.

**May 2003**  
First meeting of the NATO-EU capability group.

**July 2003**  
Development of a common strategy for the Western Balkans.

**November 2003**  
First joint NATO-EU crisis-management exercise.
February 2004  France, Germany and the United Kingdom launch the idea of EU rapid reaction units composed of joint battle groups.

December 2004  Beginning of the EU-led Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

September 2005  Transatlantic (NATO-EU) informal ministerial dinner (New York).

October 2005  Agreement on Military Permanent Arrangements establishing a NATO Liaison Team at EUMS and an EU cell at SHAPE.

December 2009  Transatlantic informal dinner gathering NATO and EU Foreign Affairs ministers (Brussels).

November 2005  NATO Permanent Liaison Team set up at the EU Military Staff.

March 2006  EU Cell set up at SHAPE.

April 2006  Transatlantic informal ministerial dinner gathering NATO and EU Foreign Affairs ministers (Sofia).

September 2006  Transatlantic informal ministerial dinner gathering NATO and EU Foreign Affairs ministers (New York).

January 2007  Transatlantic informal ministerial dinner gathering NATO and EU Foreign Affairs ministers (Brussels).

April 2007  Transatlantic informal ministerial dinner gathering NATO and EU Foreign Affairs ministers (Brussels).

September 2007  Transatlantic informal ministerial dinner gathering NATO and EU Foreign Affairs ministers (New York).

December 2007  Transatlantic informal ministerial dinner gathering NATO and EU Foreign Affairs ministers (Brussels).

September 2008  Transatlantic informal ministerial dinner gathering NATO and EU Foreign Affairs ministers (New York).

December 2008  Transatlantic informal ministerial dinner gathering NATO and EU Foreign Affairs ministers (Brussels).

January 2009  NAC agreement to schedule a joint NATO-EU crisis management exercise (CMX/CME) in 2010.

March 2009  Transatlantic informal ministerial dinner gathering NATO and EU Foreign Affairs ministers (Brussels).

September 2010  Transatlantic informal ministerial dinner gathering NATO and EU Foreign Affairs ministers (New York).

December 2010  At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, the Allies underline their determination to improve the NATO-EU strategic partnership and welcome recent initiatives from several Allies and ideas proposed by the Secretary General to enhance the NATO-EU cooperation. NATO’s new Strategic Concept states that an active and effective European Union contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area and that therefore the EU is an essential partner for NATO.

September 2011  Transatlantic informal ministerial dinner gathering NATO and EU Foreign Affairs ministers (New York).