WEAPONS PROLIFERATION
LA PROLIFÉRATION

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Toutes les publications de la Bibliothèque sont disponibles sur les sites Intranet et Internet de l'OTAN.
2010

623 /01090

Iran and Nuclear Weapons: Protracted Conflict and Proliferation - Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
xii, 156 p. : ill.; 24 cm.
(Routledge Global Security Studies)
ISBN: 9780415453073

Author(s):
1. Khan, Saira

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY--IRAN
2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--IRAN
3. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--IRAN
4. IRAN--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA

Notes:
Bibliography: p. 138-151. Includes index.
'This book investigates what is driving Iran's nuclear weapons program in a less-hostile regional environment, using a theory of protracted conflicts to explicate proliferation. It underscores the importance of protracted conflicts in proliferation decisions, and underpinning this is the assumption that non-proliferation may be achieved through the termination of intractable conflicts. The aims of this work are to demonstrate that a state's decision to acquire nuclear weapons depends largely on its engagement in protracted conflicts, which shows not only that the presence of nuclear rivals intensifies the nuclear ambition, but also that non-nuclear status of rival states can promote non-proliferation incentives in conflicting states inclined to proliferate.'

ID number: 80022890
Year: 2010
Type: M

623 /01102

Rapport d'information fait au nom de la commission des affaires etrangeres, de la defense et des forces armees sur le desarmement, la non-proliferation nucleaire et la securite de la France - Paris : Senat.
250 p.; 30 cm.

Author(s):
1. Chevenement, Jean-Pierre

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

Notes:

ID number: 80023268
Year: 2010
Type: M

* This list contains material received as of June 30th, 2010. – Cette liste est arrêtée au 30 juin 2010.
'Rarely in the atomic age have hopes for genuine progress towards disarmament been raised as high as they are now. Governments, prompted by the renewed momentum of non-proliferation and disarmament initiatives, have put nuclear policy at the top of the international agenda. But how can countries move from warm words to meaningful action? By what means could the world be weaned from its addiction to nuclear weapons and who should undertake the task of supervising this process? This paper examines practical steps for achieving progress towards disarmament, assessing the challenges and opportunities associated with achieving a world without nuclear weapons. It places the current debate over abolition in the context of urgent non-proliferation priorities, such as the need to prevent terrorists. It distils lessons from states that have already given up nuclear programmes and from the end of the Cold War to suggest ways of countering the efforts of Iran and North Korea to acquire nuclear weapons. For the longer term, it offers policy recommendations for moving towards a reduced global reliance on nuclear weapons.'
cooperation might be built; the prospects for comprehensive nuclear disarmament in Europe; the politics of disarmament in the Anglo-American context; and how the EU might be able to exert a more significant impact on future developments'.

As currently interpreted, it is difficult to see why the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) warrants much support as a nonproliferation convention. Most foreign ministries, including that of Iran and the United States, insist that Article IV of the NPT recognizes the 'inalienable right' of all states to develop 'peaceful nuclear energy'. This includes money-losing activities, such as nuclear fuel reprocessing, which can bring countries to the very brink of acquiring nuclear weapons. If the NPT is intended to ensure that states share peaceful 'benefits' of nuclear energy and to prevent the spread of nuclear bomb making technologies, it is difficult to see how it can accomplish either if the interpretation identified above is correct.'
viii, 319 p.; 24 cm.
ISBN: 9780804761314
Author(s):
1. Paul, T. V.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY
2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--GOVERNMENT POLICY
3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--MORAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS
4. NUCLEAR WARFARE--PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS
5. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
Notes:
'This book offers an in-depth analysis of the nuclear policies of the US, Russia, China, the UK, France, India, Israel, and Pakistan and assesses the contributions of these states to the rise and persistence of the tradition of nuclear non-use. It examines the influence of the tradition on the behaviour of nuclear and non-nuclear states in crises and wars, and explores the tradition's implications for nuclear non-proliferation regimes, deterrence theory, and policy. And it concludes by discussing the future of the tradition in the current global security environment.'

ID number: 80022641
Year: 2009
Type: M

Le Traite de Pelindaba : l'Afrique face aux defis de la proliferation nucleaire - Bruxelles : GRIP.
36 p. : ill. ; 30 cm.
(Rapports du GRIP ; 3/2009)
Author(s):
1. Poitevin, Cedric
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--AFRICA
2. NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES--AFRICA
Added entry(s):
1. Groupe de Recherche et d'Information sur la Paix et la Securite (BE)
Notes:
'Actuellement, lorsqu'on evoque la proliferation nucleaire, l'Afrique est rarement au centre des preoccupations; ce sont d'autres regions du monde, comme le Moyen-Orient et l'Asie, qui se trouvent au-devant de la scene. Pourtant, depuis les debuts de l'arme atomique, l'Afrique s'est frequemment trouvée impliquee dans la proliferation nucleaire : l'uranium congolais a ete utilise lors des bombardements d'Hiroshima et de Nagasaki; la France a effectue des essais nucleaires atmospheriques et souterrains en plein coeur du Sahara; l'Afrique du Sud a, pendant un temps, ete une puissance nucleaire; et enfin, la Libye a tente de le devenir pas le biais du trafic international. Dans ce contexte, l'entree en vigueur du Traite de Pelindaba qui institue une zone exempte d'armes nucleaires en Afrique permettrait aux Etats du continent de faire face aux defis strategiques, securitaires, economiques et environnementaux de la proliferation nucleaire. Ce Traite representeraient également une contribution spectaculaire de l'Afrique au renforcement du regime international de non-proliferation, si souvent mis a mal ces dernieres années.'

ID number: 80022602
Year: 2009
Type: M

Subject(s): 1. WMD NONPROLIFERATION

Added entry(s):
2. Joyner, Daniel, ed.

Notes:
- Bibliography: p. 343-373. Includes index.
- This volume provides cutting-edge essays on controlling the spread of WMDs. The spread of weapons of mass destruction poses one of the greatest threats to international peace and security in modern times - the specter of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons looms over relations among many countries. The September 11 tragedy and other terrorist attacks have been painful warnings about gaps in nonproliferation policies and regimes, specifically with regard to nonstate actors. In this volume, experts in nonproliferation studies examine challenges faced by the international community and propose directions for national and international policy making and lawmaking. The first group of essays outlines the primary threats posed by WMD proliferation and terrorism. Essays in the second section analyze existing treaties and other normative regimes, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons Conventions, and recommend ways to address the challenges to their effectiveness. Essays in part three examine the shift some states have made away from nonproliferation treaties and regimes toward more forceful and proactive policies of counterproliferation, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, which coordinates efforts to search and seize suspect shipments of WMD-related materials. The editors have gathered together many leading scholars in the field to provide their insights on nonproliferation - an issue that has only grown in importance since the end of the Cold War.'

ID number: 80022415
Year: 2009
Type: M


Author(s):
1. Brenner, Michael J.

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--USA
2. NUCLEAR ENERGY--LAW AND LEGISLATION--USA

Notes:
- Includes index.
- The author recounts here how the United States dealt with the problem of nuclear proliferation in the period from 1974 to 1981. The year 1974 is critical because of three highly coincidental events: India's explosion of a bomb, which served to highlight the link between the civilian and the military atoms; an upsurge in the demand for nuclear energy triggered by the oil crisis; and the commercialization of fuel-producing technologies that could be used for weapons purposes. This book is at once a narrative account of how nuclear policy was made at the highest levels of the American government and a critical assessment of those policies. Based on close observation of the
process and extensive interviews with the principals involved, it offers a detailed and occasionally anecdotal picture of how the political system worked. The author places the chronicle of how policy is shaped within the context of interagency and legislative politics, as well as within the larger context of international conflicts concerning access to and control of nuclear power. He locates the proliferation problem historically, emphasizing the dual personality of atomic power and noting the tendency of military and civilian programs to diverge steadily until the events of 1974 forced an attempt to bring them into single focus. He examines the Ford administration's rethinking of prevailing attitudes and programs and the more drastic reforms of the Carter administration. He offers an overall assessment of US performance during this critical period when it sought to restore a greater measure of national and international control over the growth of nuclear power.'

Kalashnikov Culture: Small Arms Proliferation and Irregular Warfare -
xiv, 185 p.; 25 cm.
(PSI reports)
ISBN: 9780313346149
Author(s):
  1. Carr, Christopher, 1947-
Subject(s):
  1. FIREARMS
  2. ILLEGAL ARMS TRANSFERS
  3. WEAPONS PROLIFERATION
  4. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
Notes:
  Bibliography: p. 169-175. Includes index.
  'In the late 1980s, officials in Pakistan began to refer to a condition they called 'Kalashnikov culture'. The reference was to an amalgam of problems that were contributing to chronic insecurity within Pakistan centering on the proliferation of small arms. Yet, the condition itself prevailed elsewhere and in earlier times. Kalashnikov cultures have proliferated without regard for geography or even for levels of development. This cultural dynamic has a direct and deadly impact on issues such as arms control, illegal and illicit trading, gun cultures, the nexus between criminality and militia warfare and the social impact of arms proliferation, and the struggle for weak states that attempt to govern. The author investigates the cultural impact of the availability of these easy-to-come-by weapons. The work takes the form of alternating chapters in which elements of Kalashnikov enculturation, for example the peculiar forms of aberrant economic activity that exist within Kalashnikov cultures, are paired with chapter-length, mini-case studies, such as that dealing with armed gang movements in Jamaica, Papua New Guinea, and Brazil. The whole work is bounded by the contention that, under certain conditions, heavily weaponized societies create their own milieu, which in turn gives rise to communities that find ways to survive (and sometimes thrive) within an ambiance of chronic insecurity.'
xxviii, 132 p.; 21 cm.
ISBN: 9780307473264
Subject(s):
1. WMD TERRORISM--USA
2. WMD NONPROLIFERATION--USA
Added entry(s):
1. Graham, Bob, ed.
Notes:
'The bipartisan Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism was established by the US Congress to build on the work of the 9/11 Commission by assessing the nation's progress in preventing weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism, and providing a roadmap to greater security with concrete recommendations for improvement. The Commission interviewed more than 250 experts inside and outside of government. They met with counterterrorism and intelligence officials at home and abroad who are working to stop proliferation and terrorism. The Commission's report examines the government's current policies and programs, identifies gaps in the government's prevention strategy and recommends ways to close them.'
ID number: 80022511
Year: 2008
Type: M

95 p.; 19 cm.
(Boston Review Book)
ISBN: 9780262026444
Author(s):
1. Blix, Hans
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
Notes:
'This book is a plea for a renewed global disarmament movement. It includes specific suggestions - how the UN can set the stage for a credible multilateral disarmament and nonproliferation process; what kind of treaties would be most helpful - and recommendations for regional policy, including providing the Middle East with enriched uranium for civilian nuclear power production but not allowing uranium enrichment there.'
ID number: 80021901
Year: 2008
Type: M
xiv, 335 p.; 24 cm.
(Contemporary World Issues)
ISBN: 9781598840711
Author(s):
1. Diehl, Sarah J.
2. Moltz, James Clay
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS
2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
Notes:
Bibliography: p. 275-318. Includes index.
'This book covers the development of nuclear weapons and the various efforts aimed at controlling and eliminating them.'
ID number: 80023075
Edition: 2nd ed.
Year: 2008
Type: M

xiv, 253 p.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 0815710178
Subject(s):
1. WMD NONPROLIFERATION
2. TERRORISM--PREVENTION
Added entry(s):
1. Bosch, Olivia, ed.
2. Ham, Peter van, 1963-, ed.
Notes:
Includes index.
'Adopted in April 2004, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 obliges all states to take steps to prevent non-state actors from acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction, related materials, and their means of delivery for terrorist purposes. The United Nations thus placed itself firmly in the center of one of the world's key international security challenges. In this book the authors examine a broad range of counter-proliferation measures, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, within the scope of the resolution, and discuss its impact on the bioscientific community, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the International Atomic Energy Agency, trade and customs, and the role of the UN. UNSCR 1540 calls on each state to prioritize and systematize its legal frameworks for curtailling proliferation. Its adoption raises many questions. How are the resolution's provisions being made operational and enforceable? Will 1540 make up for the inadequacies of the existing non-proliferation treaty regimes? Could it, in fact, serve as the foundation for a new system of international governance that effectively stifles proliferation, terrorism, and illicit trafficking?'
ID number: 80021294
Year: 2007
Type: M
623 /01050
126 p.; 22 cm.
(NDC Occasional Paper ; 21)
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--NATO
Added entry(s):
1. Pilat, Joseph F., ed.
2. Yost, David Scott, 1948- , ed.
3. NATO Defence College (IT)
ID number: 80021447
Year: 2007
Type: M

623 /01056
The Nuclear Jihadist : The True Story of the Man Who Sold the World's Most Dangerous Secrets ...and How We Could Have Stopped Him - New York : Twelve.
xv, 413 p.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 9780446505604
Author(s):
1. Frantz, Douglas
2. Collins, Catherine
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR MATERIAL DIVERSION--PAKISTAN
2. ILLEGAL ARMS TRANSFERS--PAKISTAN
3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--PAKISTAN
4. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--PAKISTAN
Notes:
Includes index.
'This is the definitive account of how one man facilitated the spread of nuclear weapons technology to the world's most dangerous rogue nations - and how the US government knowingly allowed it to happen. The father of the Islamic bomb, Khan masterminded Pakistan's successful atomic program and built a network for smuggling this technology to other nuclear-capability-seeking countries, including Iran, North Korea, and Libya. US intelligence authorities watched Khan for decades and could have prevented him from making Pakistan a nuclear power, but amazingly, America's political leaders chose to watch, wait, and concentrate on what they believed to be more immediate strategic priorities. Based on interviews with sources deep within Khan's network and expert nuclear investigators, the book reveals unknown facts about criminals who have jeopardized the national security of the US - and every other country on the planet. Any future nuclear attack can probably be traced back to A.Q. Khan. This book explains how he did it - and why his work continues to endanger us all.'
ID number: 80021802
Year: 2007
Type: M
xxii, 514 p. : ill.; 20 cm.
ISBN: 9781843545354
Author(s):
1. Levy, Adrian
2. Scott-Clark, Catherine
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS --PAKISTAN
2. NUCLEAR MATERIAL DIVERSION--PAKISTAN
3. ILLEGAL ARMS TRANSFERS--PAKISTAN
4. PAKISTAN--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
5. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--PAKISTAN
6. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--PAKISTAN
Notes:
'This book reveals how Pakistan built a nuclear arsenal with US aid money and sold the technology to countries hostile to the West, while giving shelter to the resurgent Taliban and a-Qaed. It also reveals a much larger deception : how every American administration from Jimmy Carter's to George W. Bush's has actively condoned Pakistan's nuclear activity, destroying and falsifying evidence provided by US and Western intelligence agencies, lying about Pakistan's intentions and capability, and facilitating the spread of the very weapons we so fear terrorists will obtain.'

176 p. : ill.; 30 cm.
ISBN: 9780860792017
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR MATERIAL DIVERSION--PAKISTAN
2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--PAKISTAN
3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--PAKISTAN
4. ILLEGAL ARMS TRANSFERS--PAKISTAN
Added entry(s):
1. International Institute for Strategic Studies (GB)
Notes:
Includes index.
'The arrest and public confession of Pakistani nuclear weapons scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan in 2004 revealed the existence of a global proliferation network which had, over almost two decades, provided nuclear technology, expertise, and designs to Iran, North Korea, Libya and possibly other countries. Khan was not the only nuclear arms merchant and Pakistan was not the only country implicated in his shadowy network. It spanned three continents and eluded both national and international systems of export controls that had been designed to prevent illicit trade. The discovery of the network highlighted concerns that nuclear technology is no longer the monopoly of industrially advanced countries, but can be purchased off-the-shelf by both states and terrorist groups. This dossier on nuclear black markets provides a comprehensive assessment of the Pakistani nuclear programme from which the Khan network emerged, the network's onward proliferation activities, and the illicit trade in fissile materials. In addition, the dossier provides an overview of the clandestine nuclear procurement activities of other states, along with the efforts made both by Pakistan and the international community to prevent the
reoccurrence of further proliferation networks and to secure nuclear technology. The final chapter assesses policy options for further action.'

ID number: 80021625
Year: 2007
Type: M

355.4 /01558
xii, 267 p.; 24 cm.
ISBN: 9780815731467
Author(s):
1. Gill, Bates
Subject(s):
1. CHINA--NATIONAL SECURITY
2. CHINA--FOREIGN RELATIONS
3. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--CHINA
4. CHINA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
5. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--CHINA
Notes:
Includes index.
'This volume offers a detailed and policy-oriented look at the impact and meaning of China's security policies at both regional and global levels. It first offers a concise framework for understanding the goals of Beijing's 'new security diplomacy'. From there, the book describes and explains how China seeks to realize these goals through active policies across a range of specific security-related issue areas: regional and global security mechanisms and confidence-building measures, bilateral 'partnerships', military-to-military relations, views toward alliances, nonproliferation and arms control measures at multilateral, bilateral, and domestic national levels, changing views on sovereignty and intervention, and approaches to such issues as counterterrorism and international peacekeeping. The book recognizes throughout that China's new security diplomacy presents significant challenges as well as opportunities to other players in the international system, and devotes concluding chapters to what those are and how the United States and the international community can respond.'

ID number: 80021809
Year: 2007
Type: M

623 /01092
xv, 357 p. : ill.; 24 cm.
(Studies in Asian Security)
ISBN: 9780804755528
Author(s):
1. Medeiros, Evan S.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--CHINA
2. CHINA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
3. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--CHINA
Notes:
'This book examines one of the most important changes in Chinese foreign policy since the country opened to the world: China's gradual move to support the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, missiles, and their related goods and technologies. Once a critic of the global nonproliferation regime, China is now a supporter of it, although with some reservations. The
author analyzes how and why Chinese nonproliferation policies have evolved so substantially since the early 1980s. He argues that US diplomacy has played a significant and enduring role in shaping China's gradual recognition of the dangers of proliferation, and in its subsequent altered behavior.'

623 /01051
xix, 364 p. : ill.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 9780801885617
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
2. NUCLEAR ENERGY
3. NUCLEAR TERRORISM
Added entry(s):
1. Pilat, Joseph F., ed.
Notes:
Bibliography: p. 335-337. Includes index.

On December 8, 1953, President Eisenhower proposed in a speech to the United Nations to promote nuclear nonproliferation by offering peaceful nuclear technology to countries that would renounce nuclear weapons. Today the value of that basic tradeoff - atoms for peace - is in question, along with the institutions that embody it. Deployment of weapons by India and Pakistan, noncompliance with safeguards by North Korea and Iran, and the threat of nuclear terrorism have weakened the image of the nonproliferation regime. At the same time, new proposals and technologies for peaceful uses of nuclear power are coming forward, including the US Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, although they are accompanied by the realization that 1950s' hopes for nuclear energy 'too cheap to meter' were unrealistic. The twenty-five contributors to this book present a wide range of views on nuclear proliferation, nuclear terrorism, and the future of nuclear energy. They are among the opinion leaders in these critical, rapidly evolving fields, and include officials, scientists, and academics from around the world.'

623 /01043
xxiii, 357 p.; 24 cm.
(Routledge Global Security Studies ; 1)
ISBN: 9780415420471
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
Added entry(s):
1. Maerli, Morten Bremer, ed.
2. Lodgaard, Sverre, ed.
Notes:
Bibliography: p. 320-351. Includes index.

The nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the backbone of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and the only treaty obliging all member states to work for the elimination of such arms. In retrospect, and despite setbacks, the overall impact of the NPT has been significant and gratifying. However, its continued success is by no means guaranteed. Nuclear weapons remain an essential part of the
security policies of leading states; other countries entertain nuclear weapon options; and some non-state actors have taken an active interest in the acquisition of nuclear capabilities. In search of an overarching strategy that recognizes both the flaws of the existing non-proliferation regime and the value of some of the alternatives proposed by regime critics, this volume assesses contemporary efforts to stem proliferation.'

2006

Libya and Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping Back from the Brink - Abingdon, UK: Routledge.

104 p.: ill.; 24 cm.
(Adelphi Paper; 380)
ISBN: 0415412382

Author(s):
1. Bowen, Wyn Q.

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--LIBYA
2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--LIBYA
3. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--VERIFICATION--LIBYA

Added entry(s):
1. International Institute for Strategic Studies (GB)

Notes:
'For over three decades, driven by the core motive of deterring external threats to its security, Libya sought to acquire nuclear weapons. Having attempted but failed to procure them 'off the shelf' from several states during the 1970s, by late 2003 it had succeeded in assembling much of the technology required to manufacture them. Nevertheless, following secret negotiations with the UK and US governments, in December 2003 Colonel Muammar Gadhafi resolved to abandon the pursuit of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This decision reflected the regime's radically altered security perceptions during the 1990s and early twenty-first century. The pursuit of nuclear weapons had come to be viewed as a strategic liability.

This paper examines the motives for Libya's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, from Gadafi's rise to power in 1969 through to late 2003. It assesses the proliferation pathways that the regime followed, including early dependence on Soviet technology and assistance and, subsequently, its reliance on the A.Q. Khan network. It examines the decision to give up the quest for nuclear weapons, focusing on the main factors that influenced the regime's calculations, including the perceived need to re-engage with the international community and the United States in particular. The process of dismantling the nuclear programme is also addressed, as is the question of whether Libya constitutes a 'model' for addressing the challenges posed by other proliferators.'
NATO and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Regional Alliance, Global Threats
Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
xvi, 246 p.; 24 cm.
ISBN: 0415379636
Author(s):
1. Terzuolo, Eric R.
Subject(s):
1. WMD NONPROLIFERATION--NATO
2. NATO--MILITARY POLICY
Notes:

*NATO was hugely successful in facing off the Soviet Union during the Cold War. But has it been equally successful in addressing the 'new threats' of the post-Cold War era? This study assesses how the organization's political and military initiatives, and its outreach to Russia, Ukraine, and other countries in the Euro-Atlantic and Mediterranean regions, have devoted considerable attention to WMD proliferation risks. It also probes the political factors, both inside and outside NATO, as well as resource constraints, which have limited the alliance's 'added value' in the international community's effort to combat proliferation. The events of 11 September 2001 and bitter intra-alliance controversy over the 2003 Iraq intervention have highlighted questions regarding NATO's future role, and even its continued viability. This book is a serious reflection on how the alliance should figure in the fight against WMD and terrorist threats and an examination of today's key issues, including the use of force in international relations, and the possibility of constructing new, post-Cold War collective security rules. This is the first study to evaluate, critically and in-depth, how a long-standing security organization has adapted -- and must continue to adapt -- to the global security challenges of our time.'

ID number: 80020421
Year: 2006
Type: M

Russian Nonproliferation Policy and the Korean Peninsula
vii, 39 p.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 1584872691
Author(s):
1. Ha, Yong-Chool
2. Shin, Beom-Shik
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Added entry(s):
1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
Notes:
'One of the key challenges of our time is the threat posed to the security of Northeast Asia by North Korea's nuclear proliferation. Efforts to resolve this problem through the medium of a six-party negotiation are proceeding with great difficulty. As in any multilateral process, a major problem is understanding the goals and perspectives of each of the participants. One of those participants is Russia, and this monograph focuses upon Moscow's perspectives with regard to North Korea's nuclear program and Russia's own standing in Northeast Asia.'

ID number: 80021142
Year: 2006
Type: M
133 p.; 24 cm.
(Chaillot Papers; 93)
ISBN: 9291980994
Author(s):
1. Zanders, Jean-Pascal
2. Nixdorff, Kathryn
Subject(s):
1. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (1972)
2. BIOLOGICAL ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
3. BIOLOGICAL NONPROLIFERATION
Added entry(s):
1. European Union Institute for Security Studies (FR)
Notes:
'This paper focuses on international efforts to prevent biological agents and toxins being developed and used as weapons. It considers the evolution of the BTWC, paying particular attention to the outcomes of the past five review conferences. Its aim is to contribute to current European thinking in the light of the upcoming 6th BTWC Review Conference. Besides examining the evolution of international efforts to promote disarmament, the paper considers challenges to the convention, such as issues of verification and the impact of advances in the field of science and technology. Weaknesses and limitations in current policymaking are identified and analysed.'
ID number: 80021100
Year: 2006
Type: M

41 p.; 30 cm.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
Added entry(s):
1. Advisory Council on International Affairs (NL)
ID number: 80020628
Year: 2006
Type: M

42 p.; ill.; 28 cm.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
Added entry(s):
1. Stanley Foundation (US)
Notes:
41st Conference on the United Nations of the Next Decade.
ID number: 80020982
Year: 2006
Type: M
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), launched by US President Bush in May 2003, is intended to prevent traffic in elements of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Most WMD traffic moves by sea, and the focus of the PSI is on maritime interdictions and seizures. Although the PSI has had some significant successes, it has been criticised for lacking sufficient public accountability, stretching international law to the limits, undermining the UN system, potentially limited effectiveness and being politically divisive. Moreover, Asian countries that are key to PSI’s successful implementation – notably China, India, Indonesia and South Korea – have deferred active involvement despite US pressure. Options for increasing PSI participation and enhancing its effectiveness include changes to existing international law; expanding existing conventions or developing a new one; obtaining an unambiguous empowering UN Security Council Resolution; obtaining NATO endorsement; arguing pre-emptive self-defence; and building a coalition of countries willing to perform such interdictions on each other’s ships and aircraft on or over their territorial seas. However, each of these options would face obstacles and limitations that must be overcome for the PSI to be fully effective.


The European Union has identified the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as a key threat to its security, and considers the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a cornerstone of its strategy of fighting the spread of WMD. A successful outcome of the NPT Review Conference in May 2005 is thus of essential interest to the Union. However, the chances of achieving this objective are rather slim: the unresolved question of Iran, the unclear status of North Korea, a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Nuclear Weapons States for further steps towards disarmament, limited progress in the conclusion and implementation of the IAEA’s Additional Protocol are all obstacles to a successful conference. In this situation the EU,
as the main protagonist of a multilateral, treaty-based approach to the fight against proliferation, has a particular responsibility to avoid the Review Conference becoming a failure. To achieve the EU's objective, member states have to overcome their traditional divergences on nuclear issues and put forward innovative proposals. This paper demonstrates that there is enough common ground to do so: four distinguished experts assess the main challenges currently facing the NPT regime and develop ideas for the EU's contribution to a successful conference. Member states should strive to protect the integrity and credibility of the NPT and continue to promote its universality. The EU should support and work towards the implementation of the Additional Protocol as the verification standard; it should also continue to work for the promotion of the early entry into force of the CTBT. Building on the effective national export control policies of its member states, the EU can also declare itself ready to assist third countries to strengthen their export controls. More broadly, regional security concerns must be addressed as well. In this context, CFSP in general can play an important role in supporting the NPT. Last but not least, member states should, within the EU, put aside tactics driven by external groupings and give priority to EU solidarity.'
a regional system of export control standards and practices emerged as a means to ensure not only economic parity, but regional and international security as well. While not necessarily as advanced in terms of regional identity as the European free trade area, the states of Asia could benefit profitably from a regional approach to export control development and coordination. In addition, the states of Asia could also gain from increased export control cooperation with the United States. As a global leader in nonproliferation, the United States can provide critical assistance to export control development efforts through training and the allocation of other resources. Likewise, the United States should focus its export control outreach efforts to the less developed export control systems in Asia, especially the transshipment countries.'

ID number: 80019746
Year: 2004
Type: M

327.3 /00635

Reducing Threats at the Source : A European Perspective on Cooperative Threat Reduction - Oxford, UK : Oxford University Press.

x, 120 p.; 22 cm.
(SIPRI Research Report ; 19)
ISBN: 0199271771

Author(s):
1. Anthony, Ian

Subject(s):
1. CTR
2. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
3. WMD NONPROLIFERATION

Added entry(s):
1. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SE)

Notes:
Includes index.

Although originally conceived as international measures to reduce the dangers posed by the former Soviet Union's cold war arsenals, Cooperative Threat Reduction is increasingly being adapted to fit the new priorities of non-proliferation and counter-terrorism. Considerable experience of implementing CTR has already been accumulated. The political prospects for developing effective CTR are currently favourable and lessons from the political, legal and financial sphere need to be distilled to form the basis for future activities in Russia and elsewhere. The roles played by different types of threat reduction measure and the institutional settings in which they have been carried out are examined as well as project management and implementation to identify patterns of successful experience.'

ID number: 80019270
Year: 2004
Type: M
In the past two decades, China has emerged as a significant player in international arms control and nonproliferation regimes, but the nature of China's interaction with the rest of the world, and specifically with global institutions, remains a subject yet to be examined in detail. This book, an empirically and conceptually trailblazing work, is the first to document China's participation in international arms control in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. It focuses on the distinction between US expectations of Chinese compliance, which China has not always met, and international standards against which Chinese performance is acceptable. The author carefully documents China's role in the seven specific arms control regimes and uses the accompanying examination to offer suggestions about how to gain China's commitment and compliance in the future. The book argues that policy initiatives grounded in the history of Chinese behavior are much more likely to be successful than those stemming from overstatements and misconceptions. Based on extensive fieldwork and interviews with over a hundred Chinese and US government officials, this work casts new light on both the nature of Chinese military power and the regimes that have attempted to constrain it.

Nearly a decade has passed since the NPT was indefinitely extended - ten years that have witnessed the testing of nuclear weapons by two states outside the regime; growing distress over proliferation of technology, materials and knowledge as well as lack of progress in disarmament; widespread alarm about the possibilities of nuclear or radiological terrorism; and unresolved ambiguities about some nuclear programmes. There appears to be little agreement within the international community on how to respond to these issues. Some critics have suggested that the NPT is no longer able to cope with proliferation challenges and that new responses are merited. Others defend the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime as sufficient, only hampered by states parties through its selective implementation. This publication examines the state of the regime, looking ahead to the 2005 NPT Review Conference. Articles focus on recent developments, questions concerning supply networks, the value of new responses such as voluntary measures, safeguards and how to strengthen the NPT.
vii, 361 p.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 1584871725
Subject(s):
1. MAD
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
3. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
Added entry(s):
1. Sokolski, Henry D., ed.
2. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
Notes:
'This is the first critical history of the intellectual roots and actual application of the strategic doctrine of nuclear mutual assured destruction or MAD. Written by the world's leading French, British, and American military policy planners and analysts, this volume examines how MAD and its emphasis on the military targeting of population centers influenced the operational plans of the major nuclear powers and states, such as Pakistan, India, and Israel. Given America's efforts to move away from MAD and the continued reliance on MAD thinking by smaller nations to help justify further nuclear proliferation, this book is a timely must read for anyone eager to understand our nuclear past and future.'

xii, 367 p.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 0815713312
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
Added entry(s):
1. Campbell, Kurt M., ed.
2. Einhorn, Robert J., ed.
3. Reiss, Mitchell B., ed.
Notes:
Includes index.
'This book provides a framework for understanding the myriad factors that shape nuclear policy. Case studies of eight long-term stalwarts of the nonproliferation regime - Egypt, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan and Turkey - flesh out this framework and show how even these countries might be pushed over the edge of a nuclear tipping point.'
Combating Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation: Scope for Action by the European Union - Brussels: ISIS Europe.
11 p.; 30 cm.
(ISIS Europe Briefing Paper; 28)
Author(s):
1. Anders, Holger
Subject(s):
1. FIREARMS INDUSTRY AND TRADE
2. ARMS TRANSFERS--EU
3. WEAPONS PROLIFERATION--EU
Added entry(s):
1. ISIS Europe
Notes:
'The European Union and its member states have actively addressed SALW proliferation. Nevertheless, further action is needed. This paper examines some of the measures that the EU and its member states should consider adopting to strengthen EU controls, build capacity in developing countries and promote further international action.'
URI: http://www.isis-europe.org/isiseu/brieflist/no.28_salw.pdf
ID number: 80018825
Year: 2003
Type: M

105 p.; 24 cm.
(Chaillot Papers; 66)
Subject(s):
1. WMD NONPROLIFERATION
2. WMD NONPROLIFERATION--EU
Added entry(s):
1. European Union Institute for Security Studies (FR)
Notes:
'Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the war in Iraq, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has become a top priority for European policymakers. According to the European Security Strategy, it is potentially the greatest threat to the EU's security, in particular if it is linked to terrorism. Recent events in Iraq, North Korea and Iran have confirmed the importance of WMD non-proliferation strategies for international security. The EU Institute for Security Studies invited three European experts on proliferation to present their views on this issue. They provide here a detailed assessment of the current state of nuclear, biological, chemical and missile proliferation. In addition, they give an analysis of existing non-proliferation tools and develop, for each area, concrete proposals for effective political action. The findings of this report confirm that WMD proliferation is a serious threat, but that it can be managed successfully if the international community follows up on its declared intentions. In this context, the EU has a crucial role to play, and its recently adopted non-proliferation strategy is an important step in the right direction. The authors treat proliferation as a global issue, but develop their assessments and proposals with a specific focus on the EU. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the overall European policy debate on Europe's current and future actions in the fight against proliferation.'
ID number: 80019130
Year: 2003
Type: M
'This analysis of the EU's CTR activities assesses first the threat as seen from Europe and explains how the EU has become an actor in this field. It then presents the legal and institutional framework in which CTR programmes are embedded and discusses a number of projects in detail. It concludes with a look towards the future, including policy recommendations. The main conclusion of this Chaillot Paper is that the EU has made an important contribution, both through the Commission's Technical Assistance to the CIS (TACIS) programme and the EU's Joint Action on non-proliferation and disarmament in Russia. Moreover, the possible combination of first- and second-pillar instruments gives the EU a unique capacity to develop a comprehensive approach and to create positive spillover effects between various programmes. However, the EU could do much better: a cross-pillar strategy to exploit fully potential synergies still needs to be defined. Moreover, EU funding has largely focused on the Commission's nuclear safety activities, with a very small amount provided for disarmament efforts under the CFSP. A substantial increase in funding for CFSP projects will be possible only in 2006, when the next Community budget cycle begins. However, the EU should in the meantime prepare the ground by recognising CTR as a major priority for its CFSP and by improving the interaction between the relevant bodies.'
'Since 11 September, the security debate has been refocused. A brand of terrorism inspired by a militant political theology that sets no limits on the violence it employs, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery to extremist governments, and the combination of both, have become the main security concerns within the Western world that influence the preventive, defensive, and responsive instruments with which states and societies try to preserve their security. The terrorism/proliferation axis has become a very sensitive subject for the transatlantic partners, even though one might expect that their common interest in combating the risk would lead to a convergence of policies. The sharp unilateralist turn in recent US policies on arms control and non/counter-proliferation have divided the member states of the European Union. Strangely, an additional security risk emerges here to the European Union - not to the physical integrity of its member states but to the coherence of its institutions, and thereby to greater European integration.'
623 /00939
Author(s):
1. Cirincione, Joseph
Subject(s):
1. WMD
2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS
3. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
4. CHEMICAL WEAPONS
5. WEAPONS PROLIFERATION
Notes:
Includes index.
'This book is a complete and authoritative resource on the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery. Using the most accurate governmental and nongovernmental resources, it presents a clear picture of the risks posed by the proliferation of these weapons of mass destruction, as well as the successes and failures of international efforts to prevent their spread. It begins with an extended status report on the non-proliferation regime and lucid technical primers on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and ballistic missiles. The body of the volume is country-by-country analyses - including the historical and regional influences on a country's decision to pursue, or abandon the pursuit, of weapons of mass destruction. The book has been designed to serve as an easy-to-use working resource for experts, students, journalists, and the interested public. Clear and meticulously researched charts and maps for each country of proliferation concern provide an up-to-date summary of capabilities and risks.'
ID number: 80018359
Year: 2002
Type: M

327.3 /00621
(VERTIC Briefing Paper ; 01/02)
Author(s):
1. Findlay, Trevor, 1951-
2. Meier, Oliver
Subject(s):
1. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--VERIFICATION
2. WEAPONS PROLIFERATION
Added entry(s):
1. Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (GB)
Notes:
'Exploiting synergies between nonproliferation and arms control and disarmament verification regimes seems an attractive proposition. The similarities and convergences between the three major multilateral verification organisations are large. Given these similarities, the potential for cost-savings and increased effectiveness of treaty monitoring would, at face value, appear to create significant incentives for identifying synergies between regimes.
ID number: 80018186
Year: 2002
Type: M

Subject(s):
1. WMD TERRORISM
2. WMD NONPROLIFERATION
3. SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2001
4. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-

Added entry(s):
1. Barletta, Michael, ed.
2. Monterey Institute of International Studies. Center for Nonproliferation Studies (US)

Notes:
'Since its inception in July 1999, the Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group (MNSG) has been preoccupied by the spread and potential use of mass-destruction weapons, whether by such states as Iraq or transnational terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda. In December 2001, the MNSG met in Monterey, California, to reflect upon the impact of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States and their US and international repercussions, and to strategize about how the United States and international community can avert terrorism and reduce NBC threats to US and international security. This publication includes papers prepared for the meeting and a thematic review of the group's deliberations.'

Beyond Nunn-Lugar: Curbing the Next Wave of Weapons Proliferation Threats from Russia - Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College.

Subject(s):
1. WMD NONPROLIFERATION--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
2. WMD NONPROLIFERATION--USA
3. CTRP

Added entry(s):
1. Sokolski, Henry D., ed.
2. Riisager, Thomas, ed.
3. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)

Notes:
'The essays in this book were originally commissioned by the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) as part of a year-long study on the future of US-Russian nonproliferation cooperation. What makes the book different from other studies of US-Russian cooperation is its reliance on competitive strategies. Although businesses and other organizations generally use competitive strategies analysis to secure advantage over their challengers, it also can be used to help them identify beneficial opportunities for cooperation. To date, this has not been the approach US officials have taken on nonproliferation cooperation with Russia. Instead, they have assumed that the specifics of cooperation should be determined by whatever goals and strategies Russia and the United States share. This book takes a very different approach. The authors first focus on how Russia's and America's proliferation-related strategies and goals differ. They then identify each nation's relevant strengths and weaknesses and determine where these might best be mated to produce new forms of cooperation.'

ID number: 80018179
Year: 2002
Type: M
'The stalemate in the Middle East Peace Process has taken a drastic turn for the worse in the past months. With violence exploding, hopes for positive steps towards a Palestinian-Israeli accord in the near future are all but extinguished. How will this deteriorating situation effect the rest of the Middle East? What are the near to mid-term prospects for the region? What's happening with ACRS and what, if anything, are its possibilities? Topics such as the international community's wavering equivocations on how to deal with Iraq, recent elections throughout the region and their implications, and the indisputable strategic importance of the Middle East demand a new examination through a regional security and disarmament lens. This issue offers a deeper exploration of how and why the Middle East constitutes such an important challenge to arms control and disarmament.'

Notes:

'Many analysts and defence planners predict that the developing world will soon exploit the scientific, economic and social transformations that are contributing to a 'revolution in military affairs' to develop significant quantities of cruise missiles. Even worse, weak export controls could permit direct purchases of advanced cruise missiles from major industrial suppliers. If the use of large numbers of land-attack cruise missiles becomes widespread in the twenty-first century, the strategic consequences for international security could be profound. This paper illuminates how the cruise-missile threat may unfold and examines its strategic consequences. It argues that, because the unfolding pattern of the threat remains so unclear, more must be done now to develop and implement hedging strategies to dissuade adversaries from acquiring cruise missiles or to delay the threat's emergence. A truly
A comprehensive hedging strategy would need to forge a much
tighter link than yet exists between military solutions and
more effective non-proliferation policies.'

ID number: 80017250
Year: 2001
Type: M

Nuclear Status Report: Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Material, and Export
Controls in the Former Soviet Union: 2001 - Washington: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace.
x, 197 p. : ill.; 28 cm.

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
2. EXPORT CONTROLS--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS
4. EXPORT CONTROLS--FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS
5. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
6. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS
7. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
8. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS

Added entry(s):
1. Wolfstahl, Jon Brook, ed.
2. Chuen, Cristina-Astrid, ed.
3. Daughtry, Emily Ewell, ed.

Notes:
'This book, copublished by the Carnegie Endowment and the Monterey
Institute, is the most comprehensive and authoritative source
for information on Russia's nuclear arsenal, its stockpile of
nuclear materials, and the impact of US assistance to reduce
the proliferation risks posed by the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Chronicled in this report are many of the major
proliferation problems that remain owing to the economic
disarray of the Russian nuclear complex, the relatively low
priority attached to nonproliferation by senior political
leadership, and the inadequacies of safeguards currently in
place at many nuclear facilities.'

ID number: 80017604
Year: 2001
Type: M
2010

Lutter contre les proliferations.
(SECURITE GLOBALE, no. 11, printemps 2010, numero entier.)
Subject(s):
  1. WEAPONS PROLIFERATION
ID Number: JA026735
Year: 2010
Language: French
Type: ART

2009

(COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 28, no. 5, 2009, p. 395-462.)
Subject(s):
  1. PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE
ID Number: JA026467
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

Creating Instability in Dangerous Global Regions : North Korean Proliferation and Support to Terrorism in the Middle East and South Asia.
Author(s):
  1. Bechtol, Bruce E.
Subject(s):
  1. WMD NONPROLIFERATION--KOREA (NORTH)
  2. STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
North Korea contributes to instability in the Middle East and South Asia through its proliferation of missiles and other weapons systems used as delivery platforms for chemical (and the production of chemical munitions) or biological weapons, including long-range artillery. Evidence also shows that North Korea has collaborated in the nuclear programs of Syria, Liban, and Pakistan and has provided weapons and training to terrorist groups in both the Middle East and South Asia (Hezbollah and the Tamil Tigers). Given the recent decision by Washington to take Pyongyang off the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, the recent and ongoing activity by North Korea directly related to proliferation of WMD and the support of terrorist groups could lead to severe foreign policy challenges for the United States and its allies in the future.
ID Number: JA025924
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

** This list contains material received as of June 30th, 2010.– Cette liste est arrêtée au 30 juin 2010.
Un risque de proliferation nucleaire en Asie du Nord-Est ?.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE ET SECURITE COLLECTIVE, 65e annee, no. 4, avril 2009, p. 159-165.)

Author(s):
  1. Courmont, Barthelemy

Subject(s):
  1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--EAST ASIA

Notes:
L'Asie du Nord-Est presente la particularite d'etre potentiellement l'une des regions les plus nuclearisees de la planete. On y compte deux puissances nucleaires reconnues par le Traite de nonproliferation (Russie, Chine), un Etat prolif erant (Coree du Nord), et trois Etats pouvant, dans des delais tres brefs, faire aboutir des programmes nucleaires (Japon, Coree du Sud, Taiwan). Alors que la question de la proliferation nucleaire s'est a nouveau imposee dans l'actualite strategique internationale, et que l'essai nord-coreen d'octobre 2006 a impose un nouveau paradigme securitaire dans la region, quels sont les risques reels de voir l'Asie du Nord-Est se nucleariser ?

ID Number: JA025889
Year: 2009
Language: French
Type: ART

Drawing a Bright Redline : Forestalling Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East.
(ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 39, no. 1, January - February 2009, p. 10-13.)

Author(s):
  1. Fitzpatrick, Mark

Subject(s):
  1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--MIDDLE EAST

Notes:
If Iran goes nuclear, so too will more of its neighbours, or so says the established wisdom. It is a logical deduction given the extent to which Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey feel to need to maintain power and political parity with Iran and the security concerns that Persian Gulf countries already harbour about the would-be regional hegemon to their northeast.

ID Number: JA025570
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

2008

The EU's Nonproliferation Efforts : Limited Success.
(ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 38, no. 4, May 2008, p. 20-26.)

Author(s):
  1. Meier, Oliver

Subject(s):
  1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--EU

Notes:
The European Union has been seeking to become a bigger player on nonproliferation and disarmament issues but has only been partially successful.

ID Number: JA024950
Year: 2008
Language: English
Type: ART
A Tipping Point Realized? Nuclear Proliferation in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East.

Author(s):
1. Russell, James A.

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--PERSIAN GULF REGION
2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--MIDDLE EAST

Notes:
The Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East are precariously perched on an uncertain nuclear threshold. Several regional states may be reconsidering their non-nuclear status. Iran's confrontation with the international community over its refusal to honour its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the overriding component states are viewing. Another element is Israel's nuclear program and its policy of preventing any regional state from threatening the Jewish state with nuclear weapons. Another complicating element in the strategic framework is a resurgent interest in nuclear energy. What is the security policy community to make of these dynamics in which proliferation, deterrence, extended deterrence, and conflict escalation are all interacting in a complex interstate bargaining framework? This article applies a series of competing theoretical explanations for nuclear proliferation and assesses the implications they offer for policy prescription. Stressing neo-realist insights, it is shown here that control of proliferation requires recognition that the Middle East security dilemma has been altered - probably permanently - by the American invasion of Iraq, the increased political influence of Iran and the continued violent spiral in the Arab-Israeli dispute. These three factors have combined to create new internal political pressures on regional regimes while at the same time creating a new and disturbing regional distribution of power that is shaping the region's approach to nuclear issues. Dealing with these factors is crucial in developing policies that can mitigate the further spread of nuclear weapons in the region.

ID Number: JA025451
Year: 2008
Language: English
Type: ART

Reshaping the U.S.-Indian Nuclear Deal to Lessen the Nonproliferation Losses.
(ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 38, no. 3, April 2008, p. 15-21.)

Author(s):
1. Ferguson, Charles D.

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR ENERGY--INDIA
2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--USA
3. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--INDIA
4. INDIA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
5. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--INDIA

Notes:
For decades, India's nuclear programs have been defined by two contradictory forces: the country's vast ambitions and its limited uranium reserves. Its ambitions have led New Delhi to establish a significant civilian nuclear enterprise, to refuse to sign the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and to develop and test nuclear weapons. Its limited uranium reserves, on the other hand, have clearly slowed India's nuclear energy development, most likely hampered its nuclear weapons program, and intertwined the two efforts to a high degree.

ID Number: JA024854
Year: 2008
L'accord nucléaire indo-américain : enjeux et polemiques.
(POLITIQUE ETRANGER, 73e année, no. 4, 2008, p. 803-815.)
Author(s):
1. Gutmann, Raphael
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--INDIA
2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--USA
3. NUCLEAR ENERGY--INDIA
4. INDIA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
5. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--INDIA
Notes:
In September 2008 India signed a co-operation agreement on civil nuclear energy with the United States. In so doing, it got rid of an embargo that lasted for several decades, due to India's refusal to sign the NPT. This agreement has triggered many political debates in India and in the United States as well. Though the treaty is part of a new general design of the Indian diplomacy, it is very likely that it does not mean that New Delhi has radically changed its views on Washington.

ID Number: JA025412
Year: 2008
Language: French
Type: ART

Nucleaire samenwerking tussen Amerika en India : een verdrag met risico's voor proliferatie.
(INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, jg. 62, nr. 6, juni 2008, p. 355-358.)
Author(s):
1. Koster, Karel
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--INDIA
2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--USA
3. NUCLEAR ENERGY--INDIA
Notes:
The author deals with the nuclear agreement between the United States and India. Several American opinion leaders have declared their support for nuclear disarmament. The question is how to achieve that aim. All agree that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime is faltering. The mechanisms for controlling nuclear weapon technology have not prevented non-NPT members India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea from becoming nuclear weapon states. The United States/India nuclear agreement legitimises India's status as a nuclear armed state. It will indirectly allow India to maintain and expand its nuclear strike capacity. The Netherlands government has not taken a clear position on the treaty. However, it could raise opposition through the Nuclear Suppliers Group. If India is allowed to legitimise its nuclear weapons in this way a precedent will be created for other states, which could abandon the NPT and build nuclear weapons. A solution involves the creation of an international fuel bank which would provide nuclear fuel under tightly controlled conditions. Its political control mechanism would be the subject of difficult negotiations.

ID Number: JA024939
Year: 2008
Language: Dutch
Type: ART
Reflections on the USA-India Atomic Energy Cooperation.

Author(s):
1. Ntoubandi, Faustin Z.

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR ENERGY--INDIA
2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--USA
3. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--INDIA
4. INDIA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
5. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--INDIA

Notes:
On 2 March 2006, the USA sealed a civilian nuclear cooperation deal with India, which ended more than three decades of US sanctions against India. On 9 July 2008, India took a decisive step towards implementing the deal by submitting to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Board of Governors for approval a draft safeguards plan aiming at applying the IAEA safeguards to its civilian nuclear programme. The proposed deal raises two issues of utmost importance that may become fundamental in shaping the future of the international effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. First, it impacts on the existing nuclear non-proliferation legal regime, and may have consequences on the behaviour of other actors in the field of non-proliferation. In this sense, the proposed deal appears to be in contradiction with the basic rationale of the 1969 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that requires a non-nuclear-weapon state to receive civilian nuclear assistance only after it has foregone nuclear weapons. In addition, the deal may have opened up a Pandora's Box for claims based on the safety exception contained in the NSG Guidelines, which would allow members of the NSG to proliferate at will. Secondly, the controversial deal may achieve the very objectives of non-proliferation during its implementation phase, providing that as a result of it, India adheres to the NPT, becomes a full member of the NSG and accepts IAEA’s safeguards and NSG Guidelines on export and control. The future of the military component of India's nuclear programme will then depend on the general attitude adopted by all nuclear weapon states towards implementing fully their other basic obligations under the NPT.

ID Number: JA025543
Year: 2008
Language: English
Type: ART

Connecting the Dots: Nuclear Arms Control and Proliferation after Bush and Putin.
(JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES, vol. 21, no. 2, April - June 2008, p. 259-278.)

Author(s):
1. Cimbala, Stephen J.

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--USA
2. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
3. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--USA
4. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)

Notes:
Russia and the United States have opportunities for significant accomplishments in nuclear arms control during the denouement of the George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin presidencies and in the early stages of the new American and Russian administrations. Both states should establish momentum that carries forward toward meaningful post-START and post-SORT strategic nuclear arms reductions. In addition, those reductions should provide a basis for Russian and American
leadership in supporting the nuclear nonproliferation regime, including the rollback of North Korea's nascent nuclear capability and the prevention of Iran's nuclear weaponization. The costs of failure in either of these endeavours, let alone both, should be unacceptable to Russian, US and allied NATO leaders.

Author(s):
1. Cimbala, Stephen J.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--USA
2. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
3. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--USA
4. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
Notes:
Russia and America have a special responsibility to connect 'vertical' nuclear disarmament and 'horizontal' nonproliferation. Russian and American behavior will influence the choices made by nonnuclear states about the decision for a nuclear weapons capability or for the acquisition of a complete nuclear fuel cycle with the potential for weaponization. This study uses an analytical model to examine the stability of a possible future world in which nonproliferation efforts 'hold the line' against new nuclear states, while the U.S. and Russia maintain stable deterrence at reduced levels of deployed forces.

Author(s):
1. Stohl, Rachel
2. Myerscough, Rhea
Subject(s):
1. FIREARMS--AFRICA, SUB-SAHARAN
2. ARMS TRANSFERS--AFRICA, SUB-SAHARAN
3. WEAPONS PROLIFERATION--AFRICA, SUB-SAHARAN
Notes:
The small arms trade - both legal and illicit - is having continuing negative consequences in both conflict and post-conflict zones throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Fortunately, potential remedies are available at the national, regional, and global levels to counter small arms proliferation and misuse.
Maritime Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
(JOURNAL OF CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW, vol. 12, no. 1, Spring 2007, p. 1-36.)
Author(s):
1. Guilfoyle, Douglas
Subject(s):
1. WMD NONPROLIFERATION
2. PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE
Notes:
This article examines current multilateral and bilateral efforts to interdict the maritime transport of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related 'precursors' used in their construction. The US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) has focused international attention on the proliferation of WMD, including proliferation by maritime transport. While the PSI's Statement of Interdiction Principles focuses on existing bases of jurisdiction under domestic and international law, the interdiction framework within which it operates has now been broadened. New legal bases for maritime WMD interdiction include US bilateral shipboarding agreements, the 2005 Protocol to the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation Convention and, potentially, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 if it affects the law of the territorial sea. Starting from a consideration of the existing framework of maritime jurisdiction, this article examines the history and likely effectiveness of these new measures, including the creation of new crimes of maritime proliferation.
ID Number: JA023792
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Global Prohibition Regime in the Making ?.
(DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS, vol. 23, no. 3, September 2007, p. 281-295.)
Author(s):
1. Holmes, James R.
2. Winner, Andrew C.
Subject(s):
1. PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE
Notes:
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) began several years ago by an agreement among 11 states and has steadily added countries to the list of those subscribing to PSI. Today, there are more than 60 participating countries. The Initiative is aimed at weapons' delivery systems, components for uranium enrichment and other materials and information that can lead to further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Although the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the most subscribed-to treaty among nations, PSI fills a need to interdict materials that could be used to destabilize regions.
ID Number: JA024115
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART
(Arms Control Today, vol. 37, no. 5, June 2007, p. 17-21.)
Author(s):
1. Valencia, Mark J.
Subject(s):
1. Proliferation Security Initiative
2. WMD Nonproliferation
Notes:
The Bush administration's Proliferation Security Initiative has increased the urgency with which proliferation is addressed and constrained some relevant illicit trade, but it has several shortcomings that have hampered its effectiveness.
ID Number: JA023830
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

From the Shores of Tripoli.
(National Interest, no. 89, May - June 2007, p. 26-32.)
Author(s):
1. Miller, Judith
Subject(s):
1. WMD--Libya
2. Arms Control and Disarmament.--Libya
3. Weapons Proliferation
Notes:
The story of how Libya disarmed - and the lessons not learned for North Korea and Iran.
ID Number: JA023743
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

Peripheral or Powerful? The European Union's Strategy to Combat and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
(European Security, vol. 16, no. 3 - 4, 2007, p. 267-288.)
Author(s):
1. Rynning, Sten
Subject(s):
1. Nuclear Nonproliferation--EU
Notes:
The European Union has since 2003 developed both a security and a Weapons of Mass Destruction strategy, and it has become the primary interlocutor of Iran in the dispute related to Iran's nuclear development. These are signs of significant policy progress. However, the fact that four years of nuclear diplomacy have brought few results invites a critical appraisal of EU strategy. This essay undertakes this appraisal, arguing that the EU is notably ambivalent regarding its underlying conception of international order. The EU wishes to be pluralist (in the tradition of sovereign equality), but is also anti-pluralist (in the liberal-democratic tradition). The essay lays out how the EU has coped with pressures for reform - arising notably from the United States - within the current international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and how this has made the EU problem apparent. The essay finally suggests that to salvage its policy of effective multilateralism the EU must acknowledge its anti-pluralist bias and promote a common transatlantic approach to nuclear non-proliferation.
ID Number: JA024458
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART
La proliferation nucleaire en Asie du Sud.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE ET SECURITE COLLECTIVE, 63e annee, no. 7, juillet 2007, p. 5-16.)

Author(s):
1. Lamballe, Alain

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--SOUTH ASIA

Notes:
L'Inde et le Pakistan n'ont signe ni le Traite de non-proliferation (TNP) ni le Traite d'interdiction complete des essais (Tice). En procedant a des essais en 1998, ils n'ont donc viole aucun accord international, mais ils ont porte un severe coup a la non-proliferation en incitant d'autres pays dont l'Iran a se doter eux aussi d'une panoplie nucleaire. La finalite de la force de frappe indienne est de dissuader la Chine; le Pakistan espere, avec une force de frappe credible, dissuader l'Inde de toute attaque d'envergure. Le fait nucleaire est désormais ancre dans les mentalites en Asie du Sud ou la course aux armements continue sans relache dans tous les domaines. En temoignent les nombreux lancements de missiles balistiques et de croisiere par les deux pays. Avec l'interet des mouvements radicaux islamiques pour les systemes d'armes nucleaires, on risque de quitter le monde rationnel et de verser dans l'irrationnel, avec tous les dangers que cela represente.

ID Number: JA023848
Year: 2007
Language: French
Type: ART

Nuclear Proliferation and Deterrence in Asia : The View from Vladivostok.

Author(s):
1. Cimbala, Stephen J.

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--ASIA

Notes:
The present study considers how the spread of nuclear weapons might affect deterrence stability and the possibility of deliberate or accidental/inadvertent war in Asia, with implications for Russian and US national security and arms control policy. The time horizon is about a decade and a half : roughly 2015-2020 or thereabouts. In this scenario, unconstrained proliferation leads to the deployment of nuclear arsenals by eight Asian/Middle Eastern powers. The author assigns notional forces of variable size and composition to these states and compares their robustness against preemptive or preventive war. In addition, he models the addition of ballistic missile defenses to the equation : in order to interrogate whether they might affect the likelihood or the consequences of proliferation.

ID Number: JA023660
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART
Beyond the NRA Doctrine.
(NATIONAL INTEREST, no. 87, January - February 2007, p. 55-60.)
Author(s):
1. Ferguson, Charles D.
2. Ham, Peter van
Subject(s):
1. WMD NONPROLIFERATION--USA
2. WMD NONPROLIFERATION--EU
Notes:
America should join with Europe in aggressively policing proliferation.
ID Number: JA023320
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

From Non-Proliferation to Post-Proliferation : Explaining the US-India Nuclear Deal.
(CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 28, no. 3, December 2007, p. 464-493.)
Author(s):
1. Carranza, Mario E.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--USA
2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--INDIA
3. NUCLEAR ENERGY--INDIA
4. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--INDIA
5. INDIA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
Notes:
How can the reversal in American policy toward South Asia from the Clinton administration's strong condemnation of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998 and the enforcement of American non-proliferation legislation to the lifting of sanctions and the de facto recognition of India and Pakistan as nuclear weapon states be explained? The Indian-American nuclear deal of March 2006/July 2007 is examined here through alternative theoretical perspectives to explain the American reversal. Defensive realism and social constructivism offer the stronger explanations for the shift under the Bush administration. Both can be used to explain a deal that makes major concessions in previous American policy. They also help draw attention to the problems arising from a situation where the future of Indian-American relations will depend not only on Indian but also American actions. The nuclear deal, it is concluded here, could irreparably damage the Non-Proliferation Treaty while increasing the danger of actual use of nuclear weapons in a future Indo-Pakistani war.
ID Number: JA024428
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART
Why the US-India Nuclear Accord is a Good Deal.

Author(s):
1. Paul, T. V.
2. Shankar, Mahesh

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--INDIA
2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--USA
3. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--INDIA
4. INDIA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
5. NUCLEAR ENERGY--INDIA

Notes:
The March 2006 US-India nuclear accord has been criticised for its likely adverse effect on the nuclear non-proliferation regime, especially the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Without such an accord, however, India, as a rising power, will remain outside the regime and remain less than fully integrated, strategically, politically, economically and technologically, in the international system. The damage critics envision to the non-proliferation regime from the US-India accord pales in comparison to the damage that can be done by India's actions and rhetoric as a dissatisfied state. But in fact the deal upholds and strengthens rather than undermines the regime. Attempts by the United States to integrate India into the non-proliferation regime as a lead actor augur well for the longevity of both the non-proliferation regime and the international order, and suggest to other rising powers that the system is flexible enough to allow for inevitable changes in the global distribution of power.

ID Number: JA024177
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

The US-India Nuclear Accord: Implications for the Nonproliferation Regime.
(INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, vol. 62, no. 4, Fall 2007, p. 845-861.)

Author(s):
1. Paul, T. V.

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--INDIA
2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--USA
3. NUCLEAR ENERGY--INDIA
4. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--INDIA
5. INDIA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA

Notes:
The US-India nuclear accord of July 2005 and the subsequent Henry Hyde nuclear cooperation act of December 2006 have generated considerable debate among supporters and opponents largely on the basis of its potential implications for the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Critics argue that the agreement undermines confidence in the nonproliferation regime; it enhances the political role of nuclear weapons, but it sets bad precedents for other states seeking nuclear weapons. It increases India's weapons capability and numbers and will result in a two-way nuclear arms race in Asia between India and Pakistan and India and China. In this article, the author contends that the critics are stretching their points and that the accord's implications for the nonproliferation regime are not as negative as they portray. Although the accord may impinge on the regime in terms of legitimacy and fairness, its negatives are more than compensated by the positives, i.e. the integration of a rising major power as a responsible nuclear state with some restraints on its military program. In a political and strategic sense, it is better to have a rising global power inside the regime than outside it. Bringing in
India as a stakeholder of the regime is in the longer term to the benefit of the regime and to the cause of nuclear nonproliferation.

India's Emergence as a 'Responsible' Nuclear Power.
(INternational Journal, vol. 62, no. 4, Fall 2007, p. 825-844.)
Author(s):
1. Sasikumar, Karthika
Subject(s):
1. Nuclear Nonproliferation--India
2. Nuclear Nonproliferation--USA
3. Nuclear Energy--India
4. USA--Foreign Relations--India
5. India--Foreign Relations--USA
Notes:
This article provides a concise description of the provisions of the 2005 India-US nuclear agreement, and analyzes its global, regional, and domestic implications.

The Proliferation Security Initiative: Cornerstone of a New International Norm.
(NAVAL War College Review, vol. 59, no. 2, Spring 2006, p. 29-57.)
Author(s):
1. Doolin, Joel A.
Subject(s):
1. Proliferation Security Initiative
2. WMD Nonproliferation
Notes:
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), launched in 2003, is an international effort to limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction to rogue states and terrorists. With sixteen core member states and some sixty cooperating nations, it enjoys today many advantages of law and organization in coastal waters, but it lacks useful authority to interdict WMD on the high seas. PSI itself, however, represents an opportunity to alter international law and fill that critical gap.
US Policy on Small Arms and Light Weapons.
(NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, vol. 59, no. 1, Winter 2006, p. 119-140.)
Author(s):
1. Bondi, Loretta
Subject(s):
1. FIREARMS
2. WEAPONS PROLIFERATION--USA
3. FIREARMS INDUSTRY AND TRADE
Notes:
The United States has for over a decade pursued a cautious and incremental approach to limiting the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. It has led, supported, and devised valuable initiatives and procedures, but is has characteristically refused - largely for reasons of domestic politics - to participate in formal, legally binding international arrangements. This approach could harm both unstable regions and perceptions of American commitments among allies and partners.
ID Number: JA022381
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

Libya's Nuclear Turnaround : What Lies Beneath ?.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 151, no. 6, December 2006, p. 52-55.)
Author(s):
1. Braut-Hegghammer, Malfrid
Subject(s):
1. WMD--LIBYA
2. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--LIBYA
3. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--LIBYA
Notes:
Three years after Libya's nuclear turnaround, the reasons behind the Muammar Qadhafi regime's decision to end the pursuit of nuclear weapons remain disputed. What caused Libya's welcome decision? Was Libya's nuclear turnaround the result of multilateral negotiations, increasingly robust counter-proliferation measures, or domestic developments? This article examines Libya's proliferation motives and how Tripoli responded to the international community's efforts to persuade the regime to change course. The so-called 'Libya model' is discussed in order to consider whether this counter-proliferation success can be replicated.
ID Number: JA023329
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

La securite dans le Bassin mediterraneen : terrorisme et armes de destruction massive.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE ET SECURITE COLLECTIVE, 62e annee, no. 8 - 9, aout - septembre 2006, p. 105-118.)
Author(s):
1. Benoit, Loick
Subject(s):
1. TERRORISM--PREVENTION--EU COUNTRIES
2. WMD NONPROLIFERATION--EU
3. EMP
4. EU--MEDITERRANEAN REGION
Notes:
L'Union europeenne a pris conscience de la gravite de la menace du terrorisme et des armes de destruction massive (ADM) et s'est donnee une strategie pour s'en prevenir, en particulier dans le Bassin mediterraneen. L'auteur esquisse un bilan des mesures prises pour lutter contre ces faleux.
America's New Strategic Partner.
(FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol. 85, no. 4, July - August 2006, p. 33-44.)
Author(s):
1. Carter, Ashton B.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--INDIA
2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--USA
3. NUCLEAR ENERGY--INDIA
4. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--INDIA
5. INDIA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
Notes:
Over the last year, the US and Indian governments struck a deal that recognizes India as a nuclear weapons power. Critics say Washington gave up too much too soon and at a great cost to nonproliferation efforts. Perhaps. But India could in time become a valuable security partner. So despite the deal's flaws and the uncertainties surrounding its implementation, Washington should move forward with it.

The Case for the US-India Nuclear Agreement.
(WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, vol. 23, no. 2, Summer 2006, p. 11-19.)
Author(s):
1. Ganguly, Sumit
2. Mistry, Dinshaw
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--INDIA
2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--USA
3. NUCLEAR ENERGY--INDIA
4. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--INDIA
5. INDIA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA

Wrong Ends, Means, and Needs : Behind the US Nuclear Deal with India.
(ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 36, no. 1, January - February 2006, p. 11-17.)
Author(s):
1. Mian, Zia
2. Ramana, M. V.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--INDIA
2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--USA
3. NUCLEAR ENERGY--INDIA
4. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--INDIA
5. INDIA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
Notes:
A July 2005 nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and India is a mistake for both countries. It is likely to harm global nonproliferation efforts, spur an unnecessary arms race in Asia, and rescue an incompetent Indian nuclear industry.
Author(s): 1. Milhollin, Gary
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--INDIA
2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--USA
3. NUCLEAR ENERGY--INDIA
4. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--INDIA
5. INDIA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
Notes: The United States cannot weaken export controls for India without undermining them for everyone.
ID Number: JA023041
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

The US-India Nuclear Pact: A Good Deal.
Author(s): 1. Mistry, Dinshaw 2. Ganguly, Sumit
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--INDIA
2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--USA
3. NUCLEAR ENERGY--INDIA
4. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--INDIA
5. INDIA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
Notes: India already has nuclear arms. The question is whether it will have a strategic partnership with America.
ID Number: JA023042
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

The Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Much More Than Meets the Eye.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 151, no. 2, April 2006, p. 60-63.)
Author(s): 1. Pant, Harsh V.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--INDIA
2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--USA
3. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--INDIA
4. INDIA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
5. NUCLEAR ENERGY--INDIA
ID Number: JA022414
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART
The New Energy in the US-India Relationship.
(DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS, vol. 22, no. 4, December 2006, p. 353-372.)
Author(s):
1. Srivastava, Anupam
2. Gahlaut, Seema
Subject(s):
1. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--INDIA
2. INDIA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
3. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--INDIA
4. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--USA
5. NUCLEAR ENERGY--INDIA
ID Number: JA023227
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

(ORBIS, vol. 50, no. 2, Spring 2006, p. 355-369.)
Author(s):
1. Thyagaraj, Manohar
2. Thomas, Raju G. C.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--INDIA
2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--USA
3. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--INDIA
4. INDIA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
5. NUCLEAR ENERGY--INDIA
Notes:
President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India signed a statement of intent in 2005 to allow India access to civilian nuclear technology, despite it not being a signatory to the Nonproliferation Treaty. This deal would reverse decades of US nonproliferation policy, since India was the source for much of US law on this count. It would require Congress to amend that law to create special exceptions for India. Rationales and critiques of the proposed deal have focused on its impact on the future exercise of US authority on nonproliferation policy worldwide. But the broader impact may be felt internally, since nonproliferation decisions have been inextricably linked to national security imperatives. In acknowledging an economic justification for allowing India access to nuclear energy, the deal has also created a new dependency between US national security policy and the energy profile of emerging powers.
ID Number: JA022267
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

L'usage pacifique du nucléaire et la non-proliferation.
(POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 71e année, no. 3, 2006, p. 609-621.)
Author(s):
1. Boutherin, Gregory
2. Kiffer, Daniel
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
2. NUCLEAR ENERGY
3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--IRAN
4. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--IRAN
Notes:
La crise actuelle avec l'Iran met en lumière la difficulté de concilier le droit à l'usage pacifique des technologies nucléaires et la non-proliferation. Si l'Iran respecte la lettre du TNP, il n'en respecte pas l'esprit, ayant mèn...
activités non déclarées préalablement à l'AIEA, et n'ayant pas respecte ses propres engagements d'application du protocole additionnel aux garanties de l'Agence. On se retrouve donc face à un problème d'interprétation des dispositions du TNP.

ID Number: JA022970
Year: 2006
Language: French
Type: ART

2005

The Proliferation Security Initiative and North Korea: Legality and Limitations of a Coalition Strategy.
(SECURITY DIALOGUE, vol. 36, no. 2, June 2005, p. 193-211.)
Author(s):
1. Cotton, James
Subject(s):
1. PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE
2. WMD NONPROLIFERATION
3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--KOREA (NORTH)
Notes:
As a US-led coalition operation designed to obstruct weapons proliferation, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is especially applicable to North Korea. Though practical measures have been developed to implement the interdiction of seaborne weapons shipments in particular, the PSI has yet to be rendered consistent with the international legal regime supporting free navigation of the high seas. Nor has it attracted specific United Nations support. A review of the 1962 'quarantine' of Cuba demonstrates that in the absence of a more restrictive approach towards Pyongyang and conclusive evidence that North Korean weapons capability poses a current threat to the United States, the appellation 'Cuba Lite' is not inappropriate. Furthermore, in the context of multilateral diplomacy intended to persuade North Korea to relinquish its nuclear weapons programs in exchange for security guarantees, the PSI may be interpreted as pressuring Pyongyang and thus may not be perceived - even by PSI coalition partners - as consistent with that diplomacy.

ID Number: JA021644
Year: 2005
Language: English
Type: ART

Author(s):
1. Garvey, Jack I.
Subject(s):
1. PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE
2. WMD NONPROLIFERATION
3. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS
Notes:
This article examines the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a recent US nonproliferation initiative for the interdiction of cargo shipments involving weapons of mass destruction. The PSI is analysed in the context of current US foreign policy's avoidance of traditional international institutional organisation in favour of reliance on the so-called coalitions of the willing, characterised by the Bush Administration as the new multilateralism. The author examines the interaction between the PSI and the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention and looks to situations of potential international
nuclear conflict, for assessing the PSI and the potential role of law and international organisation. It is argued that the PSI approach unnecessarily undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of interdiction and that the distinctiveness of the threat, involving both state and non-state actors, requires rather than negates the advantages of institutional organisation. It is institutional process, the article explains, that can provide the necessary capacity for intelligence sharing, mutual critique and maximisation of political consensus. This difference in approach would ground the international community's response to the interdiction challenge on a more solid legal, practical and political foundation, leading to a more effective and comprehensive modality for countering the most serious threat of our time.

ID Number: JA021722
Year: 2005
Language: English
Type: ART

The Proliferation Security Initiative: The New Face of Interdiction.
Author(s):
1. Winner, Andrew C.
Subject(s):
1. PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE
2. WMD NONPROLIFERATION
Notes:
Political rhetoric and debates about interdiction's impact on Libya have led to a number of misconceptions about this coalition of the willing's focus and potential effectiveness as well as myriad political, legal, operational, and informational issues outlined in this article.

ID Number: JA021440
Year: 2005
Language: English
Type: ART

Combating Light Weapons Proliferation in West Africa.
(INTernational AFFAIRS, vol. 81, no. 2, March 2005, p. 341-360.)
Author(s):
1. Vines, Alex
Subject(s):
1. FIREARMS INDUSTRY AND TRADE--AFRICA, WEST
2. WEAPONS PROLIFERATION--AFRICA, WEST
Notes:
Light weapons proliferation is a serious problem in West Africa. A regional moratorium on imports of small arms and light weapons has not worked and UN arms embargoes on Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire have had limited impact. The Economic Community of West African States is currently drafting a new binding legal instrument aimed at controlling flows in West Africa but this will only succeed if the heads of state and government seriously adopt it. This needs to include greater compliance of UN sanctions, international reform of the End User Certificate system, mapping the spread of artisan production and an examination of ammunition imports to West Africa. Better control of ammunition imports in particular may assist the combat of light weapons proliferation as well as the comprehensive destruction of weapons from disarmament efforts. The illicit weapons trade in West Africa is increasingly transnational and it requires regional and international cooperation and support to combat it.

ID Number: JA021371
Year: 2005
Language: English
The European Union and Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Does Soft Power Work?


Author(s): 1. Tertrais, Bruno
Subject(s): 1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--EU
Notes:
The author argues that Europe's interest in non-proliferation and its potential capacity to play a leadership role derive principally from its nurtured image as a normative power in the field of foreign policy. Particularly in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and following the elaboration by the EU of the notion of 'effective multilateralism', the Union's interest in the NPT as a multilateral instrument to advance the goal of non-proliferation has increased. To re-enfranchise the Treaty, the EU could further develop its policies of conditionality, ensuring that access to its markets and investments is granted conditionally upon compliance with the 'non-proliferation clause'. The Union could also develop additional and more specific clauses concerning ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the IAEA's Additional Protocol.

ID Number: JA021976
Year: 2005
Language: English
Type: ART

Nuclear Proliferation and the Middle East.


Author(s): 1. Bahgat, Gawdat
Subject(s): 1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--MIDDLE EAST
Notes:
For the last several decades the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has been considered a major threat to international security. Both chemical and biological weapons are universally banned. Nuclear weapons, however, are regulated by a more complicated international regime. This essay begins with a general survey of the literature on nuclear proliferation. Specifically, in the first part the author addresses the question why countries seek to acquire nuclear weapons. To answer, the article examines five theoretical models: globalization and technological imperative; leadership/cognitive and psychological approaches; internal dynamics and domestic politics model; national pride and prestige; and security. The section that follows addresses the question of how countries are 'persuaded' or 'pressured' to give up their nuclear aspirations. Three models are discussed: change in the economic and political orientations; the international non-proliferation regime; and United States policy. Given recent development in Iraq, Iran, and Libya, references are made to nuclear proliferation and rollback in the Middle East.

ID Number: JA022127
Year: 2005
Language: English
Type: ART
East Wind Deadly: Nuclear Proliferation in Asia.
Author(s):
1. Cimbala, Stephen J.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--ASIA
Notes:
The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia during the first two decades of the twenty-first century has the potential to disrupt existing security arrangements within and outside of the region, to provide a catalytic agent for an outbreak of conventional or nuclear warfare, and to consign to the ash heap of history optimistic projections about the triumph of economic globalism and political postmodernism in the twenty-first century.
ID Number: JA022125
Year: 2005
Language: English
Type: ART

Nuclear Proliferation in Asia and Missile Defense.
(COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 24, no. 4, October - November 2005, p. 313-326.)
Author(s):
1. Cimbala, Stephen J.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--ASIA
2. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES--ASIA
Notes:
Nuclear proliferation in Asia threatens to overturn existing nonproliferation regimes and to create temptations toward first-strike strategies among states in the region. Missile defenses may help to reduce the risks of war if they are combined with defensive military strategies. On the other hand, as complements to strategies based on preemption or prompt offensives, missile defenses in Asia may contribute to crisis instability and war.
ID Number: JA022184
Year: 2005
Language: English
Type: ART

Russian Scientists and Rogue States: Does Western Assistance Reduce the Proliferation Threat?
(INTernational Security, vol. 29, no. 4, Spring 2005, p. 50-77.)
Author(s):
1. Ball, Deborah Yarsike
2. Gerber, Theodore P.
Subject(s):
1. BRAIN DRAIN--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
2. WMD NONPROLIFERATION--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
Notes:
The authors consider the likelihood of Russian scientists with knowledge of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons selling their expertise to so-called rogue states seeking to produce weapons of mass destruction. Using data collected in an unprecedented survey of Russian WMD scientists, the authors assess the effectiveness of US and Western nonproliferation assistance programs aimed at keeping these scientists employed in Russia, where, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, they have watched their salaries plummet and their job security sharply decline. Despite the overall success of these programs, one-fifth of the survey's participants stated they would consider working in a 'rogue' state - a possibility that
Testing Time for Europe's Nonproliferation Strategy.
(Arms Control Today, vol. 35, no. 4, May 2005, p. 6-12.)

Author(s):
1. Meier, Oliver
2. Quille, Gerrard
Subject(s):
1. WMD Nonproliferation--EU

Notes:
Members of the European Union, shaken by their failure to unite on a pre-war strategy toward Iraq, decided in late 2003 that they needed a new approach for dealing with future challenges from countries with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. In the realm of stated policy, the European Council in December 2003 adopted the landmark 'EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction'.

Limiting the Damage: The US-Indian Nuclear Deal.
(National Interest, no. 82, Winter 2005-2006, p. 112-116.)

Author(s):
1. Einhorn, Robert
Subject(s):
1. Nuclear Nonproliferation--India
2. Nuclear Nonproliferation--USA
3. USA--Foreign Relations--India
4. India--Foreign Relations--USA
5. Nuclear Energy--India

Notes:
The United States has an important national interest in strengthening relations with India and making it a strategic partner in the 21st century. But efforts to cement ties with India should not be pursued in a way that undermines a US national interest of equal or arguably greater importance: preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Bush Administration has made precisely that mistake in the nuclear deal reached this past summer during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Washington.

Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East: Iran and Israel.
(Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 26, no. 1, April 2005, p. 25-43.)

Author(s):
1. Bahgat, Gawdat
Subject(s):
1. Nuclear Nonproliferation--Iran
2. Nuclear Nonproliferation--Israel
3. Nuclear Weapons--Iran
4. Nuclear Weapons--Israel

Notes:
Since the early 2000s the nuclear non-proliferation regime has been seriously challenged, particularly by North Korea and Iran. In the Middle East, following the toppling of Saddam
Hussein's regime by an American-led international coalition, the international community's attention has focused on Iran's nuclear programme. The United States claims that Iran is actively seeking to develop nuclear weapons. The European Union, led by the United Kingdom, France and Germany, and the International Atomic Energy Agency agree with their counterparts in Washington that a nuclear Iran would pose a serious challenge to strategic stability in the Middle East and Central Asia. The EU and the IAEA, however, are focused more on carrots (diplomacy and economic incentives) and less on sticks (military force). Iranian officials categorically deny any interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. Iran's nuclear programme should not be addressed in isolation from other regional dynamics. It cannot be fully understood without reference to the only nuclear power in the Middle East - Israel. This study examines nuclear proliferation in Iran and Israel. It analyses the motivation and the capability of both countries as well as the possibility of a pre-emption Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear installations. The paper argues that the non-proliferation regime needs to be re-examined to accommodate the growing need for nuclear technology without converting it into nuclear weapons.

Post-Nuclear Strategy.
(NATIONAL INTEREST, no. 80, Summer 2005, p. 86-92.)
Author(s):
1. Blechman, Barry M.
Subject(s):
1. WMD NONPROLIFERATION--USA
Notes:
The historical record makes clear that nuclear weapons favor the weak. Given that the United States is currently the world's dominant military power and seems likely to remain so for the foreseeable future, it should do all within its powers to reduce the perceived utility of weapons of mass destruction, to contain and roll back their spread, and eventually to eliminate all such weapons. Anything less would be irresponsible and potentially catastrophic.

L'Initiative americaine de securite contre la proliferation (PSI).
(DEFENSE NATIONALE, 60eme annee, no. 10, octobre 2004, p. 112-123.)
Author(s):
1. Gregoire, Bertrand
Subject(s):
1. PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE
2. WMD NONPROLIFERATION
Notes:
L'Initiative de securite contre la proliferation (PSI), lancee par le president Bush le 31 mai 2003, a pour objectif d'intercepter les transports d'armes de destruction massive, leurs vecteurs et materiels connexes, a destination ou en provenance d'Etats comme d'acteurs non-etatiques, qui suscitent des preoccupations en matiere de proliferation. Cette initiative, qui met en oeuvre des moyens coercitifs pour lutter contre la proliferation, fait actuellement l'objet d'un processus visant a renforcer sa legitime et sa legalite internationales.
Can Interdiction Stop Proliferation?.
(Arms Control Today, vol. 34, no. 5, June 2004, p. 6-13.)

Author(s):
1. Joseph, Jofi

Subject(s):
1. Proliferation Security Initiative
2. WMD Nonproliferation

Notes:
This month, the United States joins 13 other nations in celebrating the first anniversary of the launch of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). PSI combines the aggressive use of existing national and international legal authorities with better intelligence sharing and multilateral coordination in an effort to interdict the transport of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, delivery mechanisms, and related components.

The War on Terror and the Nonproliferation Regime.
(Orbis, vol. 48, no. 3, Summer 2004, p. 489-504.)

Author(s):
1. Gahlaut, Seema
2. Bertsch, Gary K.

Subject(s):
1. Weapons Proliferation

Notes:
The challenge before the United States and the international community is to modify the existing nonproliferation regime in a way that balances legalism and normative concerns with the new international imperative to monitor the activities of non-state actors, establish culpability for violations, and devise actionable sentences against violators.

Arms Control, Proliferation and Terrorism: The Bush Administration's Post September 11 Security Strategy.
(Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 27, no. 1, March 2004, p. 59-88.)

Author(s):
1. Newman, Andrew

Subject(s):
1. Arms Control and Disarmament--USA
2. Weapons Proliferation--USA

Notes:
The current Bush Administration considers 'outlaw regimes' and their terrorist clients acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) the gravest danger to international security. Thus, arms control, proliferation and terrorism are inextricably linked. The administration also believes that arms control and non-proliferation, as traditionally practiced, do not provide effective tools for preventing WMD spread. As evidenced in Iraq, Washington subscribes to an interventionist policy of rolling back WMD programs it considers threatening. This article examines the logic that underpins US arms control and
proliferation thinking and considers the implications of US policy for relations with other states deemed to be proliferation risks.

ID Number: JA020626
Year: 2004
Language: English
Type: ART

The 'Americanization' of EU Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy.
(DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS, vol. 20, no. 2, June 2004, p. 113-131.)
Author(s):
  1. Sauer, Tom
Subject(s):
  1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--EUROPE
Notes:
The aim of this article is to describe and analyze European Union policy vis-a-vis the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and, in particular, nuclear weapons. First, the threat of nuclear proliferation is clarified. Second, a catalog of non-proliferation instruments is sketched out, after which this framework is applied to the EU in comparison with the US.

ID Number: JA020501
Year: 2004
Language: English
Type: ART

Securing Former Soviet Biological Weapons.
(ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 34, no. 6, July - August 2004, p. 18-23.)
Subject(s):
  1. BIOLOGICAL NONPROLIFERATION--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
  2. CTR
  3. BIOLOGICAL ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
Notes:
Preventing a biological weapons attack – long a terrifying battlefield danger and now a serious threat to civilian populations as well – is a major contemporary global security priority. The anthrax attack on the US Congress, the discovery of ricin laboratories in France and the United Kingdom, and the unearthing of documents detailing pathogen production process in al Qaeda hideouts indicate that terrorists are willing to pursue both biological weapons development and use.

ID Number: JA020749
Year: 2004
Language: English
Type: ART

Does China Belong in the Missile Technology Control Regime ?.
(ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 34, no. 8, October 2004, p. 20-26.)
Author(s):
  1. Zaborsky, Victor
Subject(s):
  1. MTCR
  2. BALLISTIC MISSILES NONPROLIFERATION--CHINA
  3. ARMS TRANSFERS--CHINA
Notes:
China has been making strides in controlling its arms exports. The United States and other members are more likely to see further progress if they let China join the MTCR club, rather than keep it out.

ID Number: JA021008
Year: 2004
Language: English
Type: ART
Prospects for Russia-US Cooperation in Preventing WMD Proliferation.

Author(s): Pogorely, Mikhail
Subject(s): WMD NONPROLIFERATION--RUSSIA (FEDERATION), WMD NONPROLIFERATION--USA
Notes: Modern non-proliferation ideology and practice were born out of a broadly understood and loosely defined gut-feeling shared by the five original nuclear powers that existing weapons technologies are far too dangerous to be acquired by everyone wishing to acquire them. Thus, non-proliferation practice has been an attempt to keep outsiders as far away as possible from acquiring their own nuclear arsenals, and later other classes of weapons of mass destruction - chemical and biological.

ID Number: JA020516
Year: 2004
Language: English
Type: ART

Nonproliferation Requires Transatlantic Cooperation.

Author(s): Harnisch, Sebastian
Subject(s): WMD NONPROLIFERATION--USA, WMD NONPROLIFERATION--EU
Notes: Americans and Europeans must work closely together if they are to have any hope of halting the spread of WMD. Both are trying to fill gaps in the present regime. Both assume that international law now needs to be modified to meet 21st-century risks. But Europeans are skeptical of the US resort to preemption, while Americans are skeptical of European reliance on the UN. It should be possible to find a synergy of both approaches.

ID Number: JA020259
Year: 2004
Language: English
Type: ART

Russia and Global Security Norms.

Author(s): Trenin, Dmitri
Subject(s): NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--RUSSIA (FEDERATION), ARMS TRANSFERS--RUSSIA (FEDERATION), RUSSIA (FEDERATION)--FOREIGN RELATIONS
Notes: Russia's attitude toward weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear proliferation, activities in the field of arms transfers, and its role in its post-Soviet neighborhood, will largely define Russia's international position in the beginning of this century.

ID Number: JA020298
Year: 2004
Language: English
Type: ART
The North Korean nuclear issues have exposed the international community to a great proliferation risk for more than ten years. They have grown particularly serious since North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea, DPKK) reportedly admitted in October 2002 that it had clandestinely pursued development of nuclear weapons based on uranium enrichment. Legally speaking, the North Korean proliferation risk reached its worst point in January 2003, when Pyongyang announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, this was not the first instance in which North Korea had declared withdrawal. They had done so in March 1992, but at that time the declared withdrawal was suspended one day before its effectuation (withdrawal takes effect three months after its notification). Given the complicated nature of the situation, there can be several ways of interpreting the North Korean status under the NPT. This article tries to examine four such interpretations, including those given by North Korea itself and by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It also gives some thought to the North Korean obligation to accept IAEA safeguards under the Safeguards Agreement with the Agency and under other legal and political arrangements.

How to Counter WMD.

The Bush administration has done little to contain the spread of weapons of mass destruction, even as undeterrable nonstate actors grow more intent on obtaining and using them. US counterproliferation policy needs an overhaul. Its new goals should be to get nuclear material out of circulation, reinforce nonproliferation agreements, and use new technologies and invasive monitoring to get better and more actionable intelligence.

Arms Control Law in Crisis? A Study of the North Korean Nuclear Issue.

How to Counter WMD.
Asia's Nuclear Dominos ?.
(CURRENT HISTORY, vol. 102, no. 663, April 2003, p. 170-175.)
Author(s): 1. Wolfsthal, Jon B.
Subject(s): 1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--ASIA
Notes: Nuclear proliferation is neither out of control nor inevitable. The tools required to reduce the demand for nuclear weapons exist and remain effective if they are used constructively by the United States and other concerned countries. But if these tools are left unused, the dominos could start toppling.
ID Number: JA019063
Year: 2003
Language: English
Type: ART

Naar een 'Amerikaanse' EU-strategie tegen massavernietigingswapens.
(INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, jg. 57, nr. 9, september 2003, p. 425-429.)
Author(s): 1. Sauer, Tom
Subject(s): 1. WMD NONPROLIFERATION--EU
Notes: The author describes how the European Union recently adapted its non-proliferation policy. Partly as a reaction to the internal split about the Iraq crisis, partly to answer the North Korean and Iran cases, the EU presented a draft Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the summit of Thessaloniki in June 2003. A new approach is the emphasis on sanctioning non-compliance and the introduction of non-proliferation instruments such as economic sanctions and the use of military force. Whether these instruments will be used in practice remains to be seen. Iran is a first test case. It seems, however, that the EU now takes the non-proliferation issue seriously.
ID Number: JA019598
Year: 2003
Language: Dutch
Type: ART

The Emergence of a European 'Strategic Personality'.
(ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 33, no. 9, November 2003, p. 13-18.)
Author(s): 1. Spear, Joanna
Subject(s): 1. WMD NONPROLIFERATION--EU
2. EU--ESDP--EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY
Notes: European states have agreed on policies to deal with WMD proliferation that point to the realization of a common approach to this issue, an approach that emphasizes multilateral, carrot-based diplomacy.
ID Number: JA019854
Year: 2003
Language: English
Type: ART
China's Strategic Proxies.  
(ORBIS, vol. 47, no. 4, Fall 2003, p. 629-643.)  
Author(s):  
1. Bernier, Justin  
Subject(s):  
1. WMD NONPROLIFERATION--CHINA  
2. CHINA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA  
3. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--CHINA  
Notes:  
Whether selling the knowledge and parts to manufacture chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons or giving up the secrets to the long-range ballistic missiles that might ultimately deliver them, China continues to disappoint the United States through its proliferation practices. The United States sees WMD as its largest security challenge for the foreseeable future, and the George W. Bush administration has been harshly critical of serial proliferators such as North Korea and Iran. Though its relations with the People's Republic of China remain considerably more cordial on the matter, the administration's patience seems to be wearing thin. It warned Beijing early in 2002 that WMD proliferation is now a friend-or-foe issue for the United States.

ID Number: JA019731  
Year: 2003  
Language: English  
Type: ART

Israel, India, and Pakistan : Engaging the Non-NPT States in the Nonproliferation Regime.  
(ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 33, no. 10, December 2003, p. 15-20.)  
Author(s):  
1. Miller, Marvin  
2. Scheinman, Lawrence  
Subject(s):  
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--ISRAEL  
2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--INDIA  
3. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--PAKISTAN  
Notes:  
The US administration needs to pay more attention to the three de facto nuclear-weapon states that are outside the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: Israel, India and Pakistan.

ID Number: JA019979  
Year: 2003  
Language: English  
Type: ART

North Korea and Iran : Test Cases for an Improved Nonproliferation Regime ?.  
(ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 33, no. 10, December 2003, p. 11-14.)  
Author(s):  
1. Cirincione, Joseph  
2. Wolfsthal, Jon B.  
Subject(s):  
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--KOREA (NORTH)  
2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--IRAN  
Notes:  
The type of nuclear challenge posed by these two states has not been nor is likely to be fully prevented over the long term using only existing nonproliferation-regime mechanisms. This requires initiatives that go beyond the regime as currently defined. The two cases, aside from their immediate impact, shed new light on long-standing gaps within the regime.

ID Number: JA019978  
Year: 2003  
Language: English
Pyongyang : The Case for Nonproliferation With Teeth.
(Arms Control Today, Vol. 33, No. 4, May 2003, P. 8-11.)
Author(s):
1. Sokolski, Henry
Subject(s):
1. Nuclear Weapons -- Korea (North)
2. Korea (North) -- Foreign Relations -- USA
3. USA -- Foreign Relations -- Korea (North)
4. Nuclear Nonproliferation -- Korea (North)
Notes:
Inaction against Pyongyang would foment more diplomatic and military intrigue than any bureaucracy could ever hope to reign in — a global 1914 spring-loaded to go nuclear.

ID Number: JA019226
Year: 2003
Language: English
Type: ART

How Will the Iraq War Change Global Nonproliferation Strategies ?.
(Arms Control Today, Vol. 33, No. 3, April 2003, P. 3-6.)
Author(s):
1. Cirincione, Joseph
Subject(s):
1. WMD Nonproliferation -- USA
2. Iraq War, 2003-
Notes:
The focus has shifted from eliminating weapons to eliminating certain regimes that have those weapons. It is a strategy of picking and choosing good guys and bad guys.

ID Number: JA019117
Year: 2003
Language: English
Type: ART

Author(s):
1. Fuller, James
Subject(s):
1. Weapons Proliferation -- Russia (Federation)
2. Debt Relief
3. Swaps (Finance)
ID Number: JA017496
Year: 2002
Language: English
Type: ART

The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Mediterranean.
(Rusi Journal, Vol. 147, No. 4, August 2002, P. 46-52.)
Author(s):
1. Delpech, Therese
Subject(s):
1. WMD Nonproliferation -- Mediterranean Region
Notes:
Making an objective, impartial and comprehensive European assessment of the nature and magnitude of weapons of mass destruction proliferation in the Mediterranean is no easy task. First, no such assessment has ever been undertaken by the European Union. Secondly, since much proliferation-related
activity is by nature clandestine and therefore hidden from expert observation, strategic intelligence - an asset which Europe hardly possesses - appears essential. Finally, the scene is under constant and rapid evolution, particularly in the Middle East, with new developments that frequently have WMD implications.

Nuclear Japan : Oxymoron or Coming Soon ?.
Author(s): 1. Kamiya, Matake
Subject(s): 1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--JAPAN 2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--JAPAN
Notes: Comments by two Japanese government officials earlier this year have reinforced realist predictions and international suspicion that Japan might choose to pursue nuclear proliferation. Yet, Japan is not willing, interested, or able to become a nuclear power.

At the Crossroads : US Non-proliferation Policy Toward South Asia After the Indian and Pakistani Tests.
(CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 23, no. 1, April 2002, p. 93-128.)
Author(s): 1. Carranza, Mario E.
Subject(s): 1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--INDIA 2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--PAKISTAN 3. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--USA
Notes: This article critically examines US non-proliferation policy toward South Asia, arguing that there are formidable obstacles to achieving stable nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan. The nuclearization of the subcontinent can still be reversed if the United States assumes the responsibility of enforcing the norm against proliferation while moving decisively toward the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide. The article considers the Clinton administration's response to India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests of May 1998, whether economic sanctions could have been more effective, the failure of Clinton's nuclear diplomacy to obtain Indian and Pakistani accession to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the US tilt toward India, and the danger of a nuclear exchange in the subcontinent after the Kargil war. President Bush's missile defence plans have exacerbated the South Asian nuclear predicament, making it very difficult to achieve any non-proliferation goals in the region. The conclusion discusses two alternative scenarios for international nuclear relations in the 21st century and the prospects for nuclear arms control in South Asia in each scenario.
Preventing Nuclear Entrepreneurship in Russia's Nuclear Cities.

(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, vol. 27, no. 2, Fall 2002, p. 126-158.)

Author(s):
1. Weiner, Sharon K.

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR MATERIAL DIVERSION--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
2. BRAIN DRAIN--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
3. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
4. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--USA

Notes:
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, concern that Russian nuclear weapons scientists could sell their expertise to the highest bidder or steal nuclear weapons or their components has risen dramatically. The author considers several ways to discourage these potential 'nuclear entrepreneurs' from undertaking such efforts. In addition to calling for changes in US nonproliferation programs that seek to create nonmilitary jobs for Russia's idle nuclear weapons workers, the author recommends greater US investment in public goods and services such as radioactive waste cleanup and research and development on a variety of nonproliferation activities.

ID Number: JA018760
Year: 2002
Language: English
Type: ART

2001

The End of Unilateralism? Arms Control After September 11.

(ARGMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 31, no. 8, October 2001, p. 3-7.)

Author(s):
1. Korb, Lawrence J.
2. Tiersky, Alex

Subject(s):
1. WEAPONS PROLIFERATION--USA
2. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--USA

ID Number: JA017147
Year: 2001
Language: English
Type: ART

South Asian Nuclear Weapons and Dilemmas of International Non-Proliferation Regimes.

(CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 22, no. 2, August 2001, p. 27-48.)

Author(s):
1. Nizamani, Haider K.

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--INDIA
2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--PAKISTAN
3. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--SOUTH ASIA

Notes:
The May 1998 nuclear tests initiated by India and followed by Pakistan call into question the effectiveness of international non-proliferation regimes such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). These explosions demonstrate that the norm against nuclear testing and the spread of nuclear weapons is not as strong as the norm against their use. A closer look at the dynamics of politics of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan proves the primacy of domestic politics as the determining factor behind the 1998 tests. The international community's attitude toward India and Pakistan proves that the proliferation issue has been subsumed by other concerns such as economic co-operation in the case of India, and international terrorism in the case of Pakistan. Unless the norm against the spread of nuclear weapons becomes as strong as the norm against
their use, the world is destined to live with de facto nuclear powers like India and Pakistan.

In Praise of Indifference toward India's Bomb.  
Author(s):
1. Kampani, Gaurav
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--INDIA
2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--INDIA

Missing the Forest for the Trees : US Non-Proliferation Programs in Russia.  
(ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 31, no. 5, June 2001, p. 6-11.)
Author(s):
1. Spector, Leonard S.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--USA
2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
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