THEMATIC BIBLIOGRAPHIES
NO. 7/2007

INSURGENCIES AND COUNTERINSURGENCIES

INSURRECTIONS ET CONTREINSURRECTIONS

Bibliographies thématiques
No. 7/2007
To contact us:

- NATO Library
  Public Diplomacy Division
  Room Nb123
  1110 Brussels
  Belgium
  Tel.: 32.2.707.44.14
  Fax: 32.2.707.42.49
  E-mail: library@hq.nato.int
- Intranet:
  - Minerva network: http://hqweb.hq.nato.int/oip/library/
- Internet: http://www.nato.int/structur/library/library-e.htm

How to borrow items from the list below:

As a member of the NATO HQ staff you can borrow books (Type: M) for one month, journals (Type: ART) and reference works (Type: REF) for one week. Individuals not belonging to NATO staff can borrow books through their local library via the interlibrary loan system.

How to obtain the Library publications:

All Library publications are available both on the NATO Intranet and Internet websites.

Pour nous contacter:

- Bibliothèque de l'OTAN
  Division de la Diplomatie Publique
  Bureau Nb123
  1110 Bruxelles
  Belgique
  Tél.: 32.2.707.44.14
  Télécopieur: 32.2.707.42.49
  E-mail: library@hq.nato.int
- Intranet:
  - Réseau Minerva: http://hqweb.hq.nato.int/oip/library/
- Internet: http://www.nato.int/structur/library/library-f.htm

Comment emprunter les documents cités ci-dessous:

En tant que membre du personnel de l'OTAN vous pouvez emprunter les livres (Type: M) pour un mois, les revues (Type: ART) et les ouvrages de référence (Type: REF) pour une semaine. Les personnes n'appartenant pas au personnel d’OTAN peuvent s'adresser à leur bibliothèque locale et emprunter les livres via le système de prêt interbibliothèques.

Comment obtenir les publications de la Bibliothèque:

Toutes les publications de la Bibliothèque sont disponibles sur les sites Intranet et Internet de l’OTAN.
Rethinking Insurgency - Carlisle, PA : US Army War College.

vii, 69 p.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 1584872977
Author(s):
  1. Metz, Steven, 1956-
Subject(s):
  1. INSURGENCY
  2. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Added entry(s):
  1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
Notes:
'The U.S. military and national security community lost interest in insurgency after the end of the Cold War when other defense issues such as multinational peacekeeping and transformation seemed more pressing. With the onset of the Global War on Terror in 2001 and the ensuing involvement of the U.S. military in counterinsurgency support in Iraq and Afghanistan, insurgency experienced renewed concern in both the defense and intelligence communities. The author argues that while exceptionally important, this relearning process focused on Cold War era nationalistic insurgencies rather than the complex conflicts which characterized the post-Cold War security environment. To be successful at counterinsurgency, he contends, the U.S. military and defense community must rethink insurgency, which has profound implications for American strategy and military doctrine.'
ID number: 80021387
Year: 2007
Type: M

xx, 402 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
(Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)
ISBN: 0521860776
Author(s):
  1. Weinstein, Jeremy M.
Subject(s):
  1. INSURGENCY
  2. VIOLENCE
Notes:
Includes index.
'Some rebel groups abuse noncombatant populations, while others exhibit restraint. Insurgent leaders in some countries transform local structures of government, while others simply extract resources for their own benefit. In some contexts, groups kill their victims selectively, while in other environments violence appears indiscriminate, even random. This book presents a theory that accounts for the different strategies pursued by rebel groups in civil war, explaining why patterns of insurgent violence vary so much across conflicts.'

*This list contains material received as of September 4th, 2007 – Cette liste est arrêtée au 4 septembre 2007.
It does so by examining the membership, structure, and behavior of four insurgent movements in Uganda, Mozambique and Peru. Drawing on interviews with nearly two hundred combatants and civilians who experienced violence firsthand, it shows that rebels' strategies depend in important ways on how difficult it is to launch a rebellion. The book thus demonstrates how characteristics of the environment in which rebellions emerge constrain rebel organization and shape the patterns of violence that civilians experience.'

ID number: 80021110
Year: 2007
Type: M

323 /01007
xiii, 71 p. : ill.; 23 cm.
(Letort Papers)
ISBN: 1584872756
Author(s):
  1. Mitra, Durga Madhab (John)
Subject(s):
  1. INSURGENCY--DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
  2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
  3. INSURGENCY--INDIA
Added entry(s):
  1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
Notes:
  'This monograph analyzes the susceptibility of Third World countries to insurgency and develops a theoretical perspective to illuminate some of the factors contributing to insurgency in these countries. A simple linear model for India has been developed to demonstrate how the degree of inaccessibility of an area, the strength of separate social identity of its population, and the amount of external influence on the area determine the propensity of that area for insurgency. The author discusses implications of the Indian model for various aspects of counterinsurgency strategy for the Third World, including economic development, the role of democracy, social and political autonomy, and counterinsurgency operations. He then makes recommendations for effective counterinsurgency strategy and for long-term stability in these countries.'

ID number: 80021235
Year: 2007
Type: M

2006

323 /01035
viii, 211 p.; 25 cm.
ISBN: 0275989909
Author(s):
  1. Cassidy, Robert M.
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
  2. INSURGENCY
  3. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-
Notes:
  'Since September 2001, the United States has waged what the government initially called the 'global war on terrorism (GWOT)'. Beginning in late 2005 and early 2006, the term Long War began to appear in US security documents. The description Long War - unlimited in time and space and continuing for
decades - is closer to reality and more useful than GWOT. The author argues that this protracted struggle is more correctly viewed as a global insurgency and counterinsurgency. Al Qaeda and its affiliates, he maintains, comprise a novel and evolving form of networked insurgents who operate globally, harnessing the advantages of globalization and the information age. They employ terrorism as a tactic, subsuming terror with their overarching aim of undermining the Western-dominated system of states. Placing the war against al Qaeda and its allied groups and organizations in the context of a global insurgency has vital implications for doctrine, interagency coordination, and military cultural change – all reviewed in this work. The author combines the foremost maxims of the most prominent Western and Eastern philosophers of war to arrive at a threefold theme: know the enemy, know yourself, and know what kind of war you are embarking upon. To help readers arrive at that understanding, he first offers a distilled analysis of al Qaeda and its associated networks, with a particular focus on ideology and culture. In subsequent chapters, he elucidates the challenges big powers face when they prosecute counterinsurgencies, using historical examples from Russian, American, British and French counterinsurgent wars before 2001. The book concludes with recommendations for the integration and command and control of indigenous forces and other agencies.'
Armes mais desoeuvres : groupes armes, armes legeres et securite humaine dans la region de CEDEAO - Geneve : Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales.
xx, 391 p. : ill.; 21 cm.
ISBN: 2872910239
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY--AFRICA, WEST
2. FIREARMS--AFRICA, WEST
3. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--AFRICA, WEST
Added entry(s):
1. Florquin, Nicolas, ed.
2. Berman, Eric G., ed.
3. Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales (CH)
Notes:
'La Communaute economique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEDEAO) est depuis longtemps confrontee aux effets desastreux que la proliferation des armes legeres et de petit calibre exerce sur ses citoyens. La plupart d'entre elles sont utilisees non pas pour promouvoir la paix et la securite, mais se trouvent plutot aux mains de groupes armes, notamment des insurges, et d'individus qui perpetrent des activites illicites, dont le crime organise, le trafic de stupefiants, l'exploitation illegale des ressources naturelles et le terrorisme.'
ID number: 80020735
Year: 2006
Type: M

229 p. : ill.; 22 cm.
ISBN: 9781844671007
Author(s):
1. Cockburn, Patrick
Subject(s):
1. IRAQ WAR, 2003-
2. INSURGENCY--IRAQ
3. CIVIL WAR--IRAQ
4. MILITARY OCCUPATION
Notes:
Includes index.
'This book explores the mosaic of communities in Iraq, the US and Britain's failure to understand the country they were invading and how this led to fatal mistakes. The author, who has been visiting Iraq since 1978, describes the disintegration of the country under the occupation. Travelling through Iraq, he records the response of the country's population to the invasion, the growth of the resistance and its transformation into a full-scale uprising. He explains why deepening religious and ethnic divisions drove the country towards civil war. Above all, the author traces how the occupation's failure led to the collapse of the country, and the high price paid by Iraqis. He charts the impact of savage sectarian killings, rampant corruption and economic chaos on everyday life. The book is a compelling portrait of a ravaged country, and the appalling consequences of imperial arrogance.'
ID number: 80021394
Year: 2006
Type: M
In this sobering account of the ongoing violence in Iraq, the author reveals the insurgents behind the widespread revolt, their motives, and their tactics. The insurgency, he shows, is not a united movement directed by a leadership with a single ideological vision. Instead, it involves former regime loyalists, Iraqis resentful of foreign occupation, foreign and domestic Islamist extremists, and elements of organized crime. These groups have cooperated with one another in the past and coordinated their attacks; but the alliance between nationalist Iraqi insurgents on the one hand and religious extremists has frayed considerably. The US-led offensive to retake Fallujah in November 2004 and the success of the elections for the Iraqi National Assembly in January 2005 have led more 'mainstream' insurgent groups to begin thinking of reinforcing the political arm of their opposition movement and to seek political guarantees for the Sunni Arab community in the new Iraq. The author begins by placing the Iraqi revolt in its historical context. He next profiles the various insurgent groups, detailing their origins, aims, and operational and tactical modi operandi. He concludes with an unusually candid assessment of the successes and failures of the Coalition's counter-insurgency campaign.'
Strategic Challenges for Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terrorism - Carlisle, PA : US Army War College.
v, 307 p. : ill.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 1584872470
Subject(s):
1. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
4. IRAQ WAR, 2003-
Added entry(s):
1. Murray, Williamson, ed.
2. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
ID number: 80021069
Year: 2006
Type: M

xiv, 237 p. ; 24 cm.
ISBN: 052184570X
Author(s):
1. Bob, Clifford
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY
2. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
3. PUBLIC RELATIONS
4. MASS MEDIA
Notes:
How do a few political movements challenging Third World states become global causes celebres, whereas most remain isolated and obscure? This book rejects the common view that needy groups readily gain help from selfless nongovernmental organizations. Even in the Internet age, insurgents face a Darwinian struggle for scarce international resources - and, to succeed, they must aggressively market themselves. To make this argument, the author systematically compares two recent movements that attracted major NGO support, Mexico's Zapatista rebels and Nigeria's Ogoni ethnic group, against similar movements that failed to do so. Based on primary document analysis and more than 45 interviews with local activists and NGO leaders, the author shows that support goes to the savviest, not the neediest. The book develops a realistic, organizational perspective on social movements, NGOs, and 'global civil society'.
ID number: 80020308
Year: 2005
Type: M

xii, 66 p. ; 23 cm.
(Whitehall Paper Series ; 64)
ISBN: 0855161175
Author(s):
1. Mackinlay, John
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Added entry(s):
1. Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security
Studies (GB)

Notes:
'In the counter-insurgency campaigns that followed the swift and successful interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, Coalition forces failed to exploit their technical and planning superiority; the best they have achieved is a war of gradual attrition. Meanwhile, it is the globally organized insurgents who have become the more successful manoeuvrists, moving with surprising agility and impact between the operational, the strategic and the virtual. The author argues here that to turn the tide against a global insurgency requires a rigorous effort to define the adversary with greater precision. This would reveal a headless, structureless network that grows organically and responds instinctively to events in a way that is more dangerous than the vertically organized versions of Al-Qa'ida that are part of the misleading rhetoric of 'global terrorism'. The international response to this phenomenon is, at present, too unwieldy and disparately motivated to succeed. To regain the initiative, a future Coalition needs to be more globally minded, culturally inclusive and less tolerant of the multi-agency shambles that characterizes the operational space.'

ID number: 80020436
Year: 2005
Type: M

vi, 47 p.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 1584871911
Author(s):
1. Manwaring, Max G.
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY
2. GANGS
3. ORGANIZED CRIME
Added entry(s):
1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)

Notes:
'The primary thrust of the monograph is to explain the linkage of contemporary criminal street gangs (that is, the gang phenomenon or third generation gangs) to insurgency in terms of the instability it wreaks upon government and the concomitant challenge to state sovereignty. Although there are differences between gangs and insurgents regarding motives and modes of operations, this linkage infers that gang phenomena are mutated forms of urban insurgency. In these terms, these 'new' nonstate actors must eventually seize political power in order to guarantee the freedom of action and the commercial environment they want. The common denominator that clearly links the gang phenomenon to insurgency is that the third generation gangs' and insurgents' ultimate objective is to depose or control the governments of targeted countries. This monograph concludes with recommendations for the United States and other countries to focus security and assistance responses at the strategic level. The intent is to help leaders achieve strategic clarity and operate more effectively in the complex politically dominated, contemporary global security arena.'

ID number: 80020001
Year: 2005
Type: M

v, 21 p.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 1584871830

Author(s):
1. Beckett, Ian F. W.

Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY -- IRAQ
2. GUERRILLA WARFARE -- IRAQ

Added entry(s):
1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)

Notes:
'The continuing proliferation of insurgent organizations suggests that insurgency is still widely perceived as an effective means either of achieving power and influence, or of bringing a cause to the notice of an international or national community. The end of European decolonization and the collapse of the Soviet Union together removed the motivational impulse for much conflict between the late 1940s and the late 1980s. However, new ideological, political, and commercial imperatives are now encouraging intrastate conflict and insurgency amid the breakdown of the international bipolar political system and the emergence of identity politics and of many more nonstate actors. This monograph considers the patterns of insurgency in the past by way of establishing how much the conflict in Iraq conforms to previous experience. In particular, the author compares and contrasts Iraq with previous Middle Eastern insurgencies such as those in Palestine, Aden, the Dhofar province of Oman, Algeria, and Lebanon. He suggests that there is much that can be learned from British, French, and Israeli experience.'

ID number: 80020000
Year: 2005
Type: M


xxix, 249 p.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 0226567702

Author(s):
1. Nagl, John A., 1966-

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
2. MALAYA -- HISTORY -- MALAYAN EMERGENCY, 1948-1960
3. VIETNAM WAR, 1961-1975
4. COUNTERINSURGENCY -- MALAYA
5. COUNTERINSURGENCY -- VIETNAM

Notes:
'*Armies are often accused of preparing to fight the previous war. In this book, the author considers the now-crucial question of how armies adapt to changing circumstances during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared. Comparing the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960 with what developed in the Vietnam War from 1950 to 1975, the author argues that organizational culture is key to the ability to learn from unanticipated conditions, a variable which explains why the British army successfully conducted counterinsurgency in Malaya but why the American army failed to do so in Vietnam.'

ID number: 80021140
Year: 2005
Type: M
In a global climate of turmoil and upheaval, widespread insurgencies are seriously challenging national and international stability. Inevitably, the United States will become involved, directly or indirectly, in some of these conflicts. The author explores insurgencies ranging across five continents and spanning more than two centuries. Analyzing examples from North and South America, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, he identifies recurrent patterns and offers useful lessons for future policymakers. His twofold approach to counterinsurgency is easily applied to a democratic polity such as the US. The first element, developing the strategic basis for victory, emphasizes creating a peaceful path to the redress of legitimate grievances, committing sufficient troops to the counterinsurgent operation, and isolating the conflict area from outside aid. The second element aims at marginalizing the insurgents and includes fair conduct toward civilians and prisoners, systematic intelligence gathering, depriving insurgents of weapons and food, separating insurgent leaders from their followers, and offering amnesty to all but the most incorrigible.'
of insurgency and the broader implications for the promises of democracy, free market economies, and prosperity implicit in the mandates to civil-military forces that confront global and regional instability. These cases are significant because they address counterinsurgency as much as they do insurgency. As a consequence, this examination is a logical point from which to begin to understand how governments and international organizations might ultimately control – or succumb to – the strategic challenges of political-insurgency war. The author's recommendations impose no easy set of tasks. Nevertheless, if the US and other global leadership ignore the highly political aspects of modern unconventional conflict, the resultant instability and possible state failure will adversely shape the security environment in which all nations must struggle to survive.'

ID number: 80019945
Year: 2004
Type: M

323    /00883
viii, 43 p.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 1584871784
Author(s):
1. Metz, Steven
2. Millen, Raymond
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
Added entry(s):
1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
Notes:
'Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has developed a national security strategy designed to eliminate the conditions that spawn asymmetric threats. An important part of that is helping build stable, legitimate governments in nations which allowed or supported terrorism and other forms of asymmetric aggression. This has led the United States to renewed involvement in counterinsurgency. The United States, particularly the Army, has a long history of counterinsurgency support. During the past decade, though, this has not been an area of focus for the American military. To renew its capability at counterinsurgency, the military is assessing 21st century insurgency, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, and revising its strategy, operational concepts, organization, and doctrine. This monograph is designed to contribute to this process. The authors argue that 20th century strategy, operational concepts, organization, and doctrine should not be applied to 21st century insurgency without further refinement. They contend that there are two major variants of insurgency which they label 'national' and 'liberation'. Most existing strategy, operational concepts, organization, and doctrine are derived from American experience with national insurrections, but these need to be adapted when confronting liberation insurrections.'

ID number: 80019944
Year: 2004
Type: M
Author(s):
1. Mackinlay, John
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY
2. GLOBALIZATION
Added entry(s):
1. International Institute for Strategic Studies (GB)
Notes:
'Global changes have altered the nature of insurgency by weakening some Governments, and empowering the rebel forces which seek to overthrow them. Insurgents face both rich and poor governments. Weakened states provide an environment for a poorly constituted insurgent force, but insurgent forces acting against rich and militarily powerful governments have to be better organised and more effective. Global change has created new categories of insurgent forces. At the lowest end of the scale, loosely organised armed bands may succeed against a weakened government. But only insurgent forces with a more developed political manifesto and a close relationship to a supporting constituency seem to survive against militarily more powerful and organised counter-strategies. The bin Laden phenomenon has created a global category of insurgency. However, counter-insurgency thinking is essentially national in character. There have been no wider efforts to create an international approach as in the case of peacekeeping techniques. The globalisation of insurgency leads inexorably to the globalisation of counter-insurgency.'

Author(s):
1. Manwaring, Max G.
Subject(s):
1. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
2. INSURGENCY
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY
4. GUERRILLA WARFARE
5. USA--MILITARY POLICY
Added entry(s):
1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
Notes:
'The author wrote this monograph in response to the fact that today over half the countries in the global community are faced with one variation or another of asymmetric guerrilla war. Insurgencies, internal wars, and other small-scale contingencies (SSCs) are the most pervasive and likely type of conflict in the post-Cold War era. That the United States will become involved directly or indirectly in some of these conflicts is almost certain. Yet, little or no recognition and
application of the strategic-level lessons of the Vietnam War and the hundreds of other smaller conflicts that have taken place over the past several years are evident. The purpose of this monograph is to draw from the lessons of the recent past to better prepare today's civilian and military leaders to meet the unconventional and asymmetric warfare challenges that face the United States and the rest of the international community.'

ID number: 80017445
Year: 2001
Type: M

323 /00721
xxiv, 138 p. : ill. ; 23 cm.
(MR-1405-OTI)
ISBN: 0833030523
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY
Added entry(s):
1. Rand Corporation (US)
Notes:
'This report assesses post-Cold War trends in external support for insurgent movements. It describes the frequency with which states, diasporas, refugees, and other non-state actors back guerrilla movements. It also assesses the motivations of these actors and which types of support matters most. The report concludes by assessing the implications for analysts of insurgent movements.'

ID number: 80017733
Year: 2001
Type: M

1999

323 /00659
285 p. : ill. ; 22 cm.
ISBN: 0333719972
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY
2. VIOLENCE
Added entry(s):
1. Silva, Purnaka L. De, ed.
Notes:
Includes index.
'As the West settles into a post-Cold War, postnationalist and postmodern era, there is danger of slipping into complacency vis-a-vis conflicts that remain active across the globe. In the warm glow projected by the imperial heartlands, many have become anaesthetised to conflict, war and human suffering. Perhaps the most (in)famous case is Baudrillard's assertion that the Gulf War did not really happen and was just a media event. This book brings together a number of political thinkers who, directly or indirectly, have been close enough to the 'front line' to know that war is still real and a just peace is worth struggling for. Apart from this closeness to their subject-matter, the authors are bound by their acute sense of self-critical realism.'

ID number: 80016148
Year: 1999
Type: M

Page 14
Since 1990, the United States and other developed nations have committed substantial diplomatic, economic, and military resources to resolve extreme intra-state conflicts. The world has found that the hatreds behind the conflicts often are very difficult to suppress - and even harder to dissipate. It also has discovered that military interventions alone rarely attenuate the underlying problems that provoked the violence. One result has been a growing worldwide literature on mechanisms to anticipate intra-state conflict and on measures which may preclude the necessity for expensive military interventions. But models and formulae are problematic in the analysis of conflict. Human culture is so complex that it is difficult to identify - let alone 'control for' - all of the variables. History rarely 'reproduces the experiment'. The analyst often is left with the sad role of explaining why problems of conflict were not foreseen, despite the best of resources and intentions. And military force continues to play a key role in intra-state conflict resolution, though often with less than satisfactory results. When a society faced with a situation of severe internal conflict finds an internal solution which does not require outside intervention, that is of keen interest. If the society can do it in a way that preserves ongoing processes of political and economic reform, that is remarkable. If the society employs its military establishment as a key instrument in its processes of national reconciliation, that achievement is worthy of serious study. In this paper, Lieutenant Colonel Kalifa Keita describes how his country - the Republic of Mali - did all of these.'
This volume examines the UN missions in Nicaragua and El Salvador, which constitute two significant examples of successful multilateral intervention in the resolution of internal conflict. Specifically, the volume traces the background of the Nicaraguan and El Salvadoran conflicts, and examines the UN contribution to the settlement of these conflicts, in the form of the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), the United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua (ONUVEN), and the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL). Furthermore, the volume details the efforts of disarmament and demobilization as part of these UN missions. The case studies were researched and authored by Dr. Paulo Wrobel during his stay at UNIDIR in the spring of 1995. The report is the eighth in a series of UNIDIR publications on the disarmament dimension of peace operations.'
In this study, Dr. Metz argues that insurgency is mutating in response to changes in the global security environment, thus making much of US strategy and doctrine obsolete. Even though counterinsurgency is not currently a high priority in US national security policy, the military must keep abreast of such changes and preserve some expertise so that American capability could be reconstituted should policymakers again opt for active counterinsurgency support.

ID number: 80011703
Year: 1995
Type: M

1992

323 /00512
Modern Guerrilla Insurgency - Westport, CT : Praeger.
234 p. : ill.; 25 cm.
ISBN: 0275942635
Author(s):
1. Joes, Anthony James
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY
2. GUERRILLA WARFARE
Notes:
'This study argues that guerrilla insurgencies will be a major feature of the post-Cold War international scene, and that the advisability of intervention in some of them will become a serious issue in American politics. The author analyzes several major insurgencies of this century, all of which the US became involved in to one degree or another. While approaching each guerrilla insurgency as a primarily political phenomenon with a definite historical and cultural context, Joes also provides the reader with a clear understanding of the military aspects of such conflicts.'

ID number: 80009233
Year: 1992
Type: M

1990

323 /00464
xxii, 151 p. : ill.; 24 cm.
(The Washington papers, 0278-937X ; 147)
ISBN: 0275938174
Author(s):
1. Pardo-Maurer, Rogelio
Subject(s):
1. NICARAGUA--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
2. INSURGENCY--NICARAGUA
Added entry(s):
1. Georgetown University. Center for Strategic and International Studies (US)
Notes:
Includes index.

ID number: 80006252
Year: 1990
Type: M
1988

355 /00249
ix, 58 p. : map ; 23 cm.
(Special report)
ISBN: 0080367232
Subject(s):
1. MILITARY ASSISTANCE, AMERICAN--EL SALVADOR
2. USA--MILITARY RELATIONS--EL SALVADOR
3. EL SALVADOR--MILITARY RELATIONS--USA
4. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
5. COUNTERINSURGENCY--EL SALVADOR
Added entry(s):
1. Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (US)
Notes:
'A publication of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.'
ID number: 70002762
Year: 1988
Type: M

1985

323 /00334
Latin American Insurgencies - Washington : Georgetown University.
x, 214 p. : ill. ; 23 cm.
Subject(s):
1. LATIN AMERICA--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
2. INSURGENCY--LATIN AMERICA
3. GUERRILLAS--LATIN AMERICA
Added entry(s):
1. Fauriol, Georges A., ed.
2. National Defense University (US)
3. Georgetown University. Center for Strategic and International Studies (US)
Notes:
Papers presented at three meetings, held in the Spring of 1984, sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the National Defense University.
Includes index.
ID number: 70001323
Year: 1985
Type: M

1984

323 /00290
20 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
(Conflict studies, 0069-8792 ; 167)
Author(s):
1. Calvert, Peter
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY--GUATEMALA
2. GUATEMALA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
3. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--GUATEMALA
4. GUATEMALA--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
Added entry(s):
1. Institute for the Study of Conflict (GB)
ID number: 70001286
Year: 1984
Type: M
1983

323 /00268
20 p.: ill.; 25 cm.
(Conflict studies, 0069-8792 ; 151)
Author(s):
1. Hodder-Williams, Richard
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY--ZIMBABWE
2. ZIMBABWE--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
Added entry(s):
1. Institute for the Study of Conflict (GB)
ID number: 70001269
Year: 1983
Type: M

1979

323 /00573
Malaysia: Containing the Communist Insurgency - London: Institute for the Study of Conflict.
18 p.: ill.; 30 cm.
(Conflict studies, 0069-8792 ; 110)
Author(s):
1. Sim, Richard
Subject(s):
1. COMMUNISM--MALAYSIA
2. INSURGENCY--MALAYSIA
Added entry(s):
1. Institute for the Study of Conflict (GB)
Notes:
'Racial tension between Malays and Chinese is the dominating factor in Malaysia, exacerbated by an economic and social gap open to exploitation by Communist insurgents. Following 1969 race riots legislation accorded Malays protected status, and a New Economic Policy (NEP) has had some success in improving their economic Position though this nationalistic policy - known as bumiputra - was at the cost of alienating much of the Chinese community. Government's long-term aim is national unity.'
ID number: 80011912
Year: 1979
Type: M

1972

323 /00136
35 p.; 25 cm.
(Adelphi papers, 0567-932X ; 85)
Author(s):
1. Davis, Jack
Subject(s):
1. LATIN AMERICA--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
2. VIOLENCE--LATIN AMERICA
3. INSURGENCY--LATIN AMERICA
Added entry(s):
1. International Institute for Strategic Studies (GB)
ID number: 80009485
Year: 1972
Type: M
PART II : JOURNAL ARTICLES
DEUXIEME PARTIE : ARTICLES DE REVUES**

2007

A Social Network Approach to Understanding an Insurgency.
(PARAMETERS, vol. 37, no. 2, Summer 2007, p. 19-30.)
Author(s):
1. Reed, Brian
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY
Notes:
The author explores the foundations of network analysis and its relationship to war. His insightful review of the analytical tools and strategies required to defeat a networked enemy's array of linked resources leaves little doubt regarding the immediate need to reevaluate America's military strategy. The author champions a totally new way of thinking about insurgencies based on a network analysis of the linkages between people, groups, units, and organizations. Using this social network perspective the environment supporting an insurgency is expressed as patterns or irregularities in relationships; the essence of the non-linear organization that characterizes today's insurgencies. The author closes with a cautionary note that modern insurgency represents an evolved form of warfare that takes advantage of pre-existing and affiliated social, economic, and military networks. A reality that is likely to continue far into the future.
ID Number: JA023769
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan.
Author(s):
1. Johnson, Thomas H.
2. Mason, M. Chris
Subject(s):
1. TALIBAN
2. INSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
Notes:
Afghanistan is in danger of capsizing in a perfect storm of insurgency that mimics operations and tactics witnessed in Iraq. This article assesses this insurgency and the re-emergent Taliban. The common view of the Taliban as simply a radical Afghan Islamist movement is overly simple, for that organization has been able to build on tribal kinship networks and a charismatic mullah phenomenon to mobilize a critical and dynamic rural base of support. This support, buttressed by Talib reinforcements from Pakistan's border areas, is enough to frustrate the US-led Coalition's counterinsurgency strategy. At the operational level, the Taliban is fighting a classic 'war of the flea', while the coalition continues to fight the war largely according to the Taliban 'game plan'. This is resulting in its losing the war in Afghanistan one Pashtun village at a time.
ID Number: JA023346
Year: 2007
Language: English

** This list contains material received as of September 4th, 2007 – Cette liste est arrêtée au 4 septembre 2007.
Iraq's Civil War.
(Foreign Affairs, vol. 86, no. 2, March - April 2007, p. 2-15.)
Author(s):
  1. Fearon, James D.
Subject(s):
  1. Civil War--Iraq
  2. Insurgency--Iraq
  3. Iraq--Politics and Government
Notes:
The White House still avoids the label, but by any reasonable historical standard, the Iraqi civil war has begun. The record of past such wars suggests that Washington cannot stop this one - and that Iraqis will be able to reach a power-sharing deal only after much more fighting, if then. The United States can help bring about a settlement eventually by balancing Iraqi factions from afar, but there is little it can do to avert bloodshed now.
ID Number: JA023471
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

Iraq's Civil War.
(Current History, vol. 106, no. 696, January 2007, p. 3-10.)
Author(s):
  1. Hashim, Ahmed S.
Subject(s):
  1. Iraq--Politics and Government
  2. Insurgency--Iraq
  3. Civil War--Iraq
Notes:
Accepting the fact that a civil war has started is a necessary first step toward bringing an end to the conflict.
ID Number: JA023294
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

Beyond the Point of No Return.
(World Today, vol. 63, no. 1, January 2007, p. 4-6.)
Author(s):
  1. Stansfield, Gareth
Subject(s):
  1. Iraq--Politics and Government
  2. Insurgency--Iraq
  3. Civil War--Iraq
Notes:
Iraq's communities have now collapsed into an ethno-sectarian civil war. Criminality is rife; the government is a bit-part player; and the coalition is, for want of a better word, clueless. In effect, 2006 will be described as the year in which the civil war finally took hold. Perhaps the destruction of the Askariyya shrine in Samarra last February will be seen as the final straw, with the devastating suicide bombs targeting Shi'as in Sadr City at the end of November indicating that the point of no return had been passed and an existential struggle for survival had truly broken out between Sunnis and Shi'as. All that is left to manage the conflicts and prevent them becoming a catalyst for much wider instability.
ID Number: JA023292
Year: 2007
Language: English
The social fabric of Iraq has been torn apart. There is no single and distinct 'Iraqi' nationalism and the country has fractured into regions dominated by sectarian, ethnic or tribal groups. This leaves the government unable to exert authority and it is, at best, one of several 'state-like' actors. There is not one civil war, nor one insurgency, but several civil wars and insurgencies between different communities and organisations. A range of forces seek to undermine, overthrow, or take control of government. In these conditions, security cannot be 'normalised' in a matter of months, but instead should be seen over many years. It is essential that these painful realities are accepted as the framework to devise new strategies.

ID Number: JA023779
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

Structural Vulnerabilities of Network Insurgencies : Adapting to the New Adversary.
Author(s):
1. Muckian, Martin J.
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY
2. INSURGENCY--IRAQ
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY
4. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
Notes:
This article examines the distinction between Maoist and modern
insurgencies and the implications for counterinsurgency methods. First, it contrasts the two types of insurgencies in terms of their organizations and strategies. Building on that information, it analyzes the vulnerabilities of Maoist and modern insurgencies in their organization, political cohesion, support base, and use of information technology. From this analysis, it draws conclusions about how to modify twentieth century methods to combat the modern insurgent. The purpose of this article is not to propose a comprehensive strategy for a modern counterinsurgency. Instead, it examines one component of such a plan — understanding and exploiting the insurgent's structural vulnerabilities. It does not exhaust this analysis; the conclusions drawn here are demonstrative of the possibilities inherent in this methodology. Throughout the article, the conflict in Iraq is used as an illustrative example of a modern insurgency. The Iraqi insurgency is thus far the most advanced embodiment of netwar, where small groups coordinate, communicate, and conduct their campaigns in an internetted manner, without a precise central command. As such, this conflict is a powerful predictor of the future of insurgency.

External Assistance: Enabler of Insurgent Success.
(PARAMETERS, vol. 36, no. 3, Autumn 2006, p. 36-49.)
Author(s):
1. Record, Jeffrey
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY
Notes:
The author analyzes insurgencies throughout history from the American War of Independence to the Vietnam War in an effort to demonstrate that when insurgents have access to external assistance the power ratio between the weak and the strong can be markedly altered, even to the point where the insurgency becomes the stronger side. This thoroughly researched history of insurgencies provides tremendous insight into the correlation between external assistance and insurgent success. The author does, however, draw the reader's attention to the fact that external support alone is not a marker for success. The insurgents still require such intangibles as will, strategy, organization, morale, and discipline if they are to be victorious.

Averting Failure in Afghanistan.
(SURVIVAL, vol. 48, no. 1, Spring 2006, p. 111-127.)
Author(s):
1. Jones, Seth G.
Subject(s):
1. AFGHANISTAN—NATIONAL SECURITY
2. INSURGENCY—AFGHANISTAN
Notes:
The current US and NATO strategy in Afghanistan involves establishing security with a light footprint. The deteriorating security environment demonstrates that this strategy has not been successful. The level of troops, police and financial assistance has been among the lowest of any stability operation since the Second World War, and there has been no peace
settlement. The US decision to hand control of the volatile southern provinces to NATO has also triggered deep concerns among Afghan leaders about America's long-term commitment, as well as NATO's ability to fight a sustained counterinsurgency campaign. These problems are unfortunate, since they may undermine Afghanistan's success to date in building democracy and improving social and economic conditions.

Afghanistan : reduire l'insurrection : le cas du Sud-Est.
(POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 71e annee, no. 1, 2006, p. 105-118.)
Author(s):
1. Trives, Sebastien
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
Notes:
L'insecurite s'accroit dangereusement dans nombre de regions d'Afghanistan. Dans le sud-est du pays, le developpement de l'insurrection est aide de l'exterieur, mais il depend aussi de facteurs internes : la force des structures tribales, des reseaux religieux traditionnels, la faible presence du gouvernement central, etc. Une strategie globale de contre-insurrection est necessaire, qui prenne en compte l'ensemble de ces facteurs, avec un engagement renouvele de la communaut interationale.

Suicide Terrorism in Iraq : A Preliminary Assessment of the Quantitative Data and Documentary Evidence.
(STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 29, no. 6, September 2006, p. 531-559.)
Author(s):
1. Hafez, Mohammed M.
Subject(s):
1. SUICIDE BOMBINGS--IRAQ
2. INSURGENCY--IRAQ
Notes:
This preliminary assessment of suicide terrorism in Iraq sheds light on why some groups in the insurgency employ suicide attacks although others do not. The unequal utilization of suicide bombings corresponds to divergent strategies in the insurgency. Some groups fight to achieve system reintegration, whereas others send suicide bombers to collapse the emerging political order. Quantitative data and documentary evidence substantiate the finding that suicide terrorism is carried out by groups that cannot compete in any future political and institutional alignments in Iraq's new coalition politics. Suicide terrorism is intended to produce system collapse, sectarian warfare, and a failed state.
Signalig Resolve, Democratization, and the First Battle of Fallujah.
Author(s):
1. Malkasian, Carter
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
2. INSURGENCY--IRAQ
3. IRAQ WAR, 2003-
Notes:
Perceptions and efforts to signal resolve can play an important role in counterinsurgency. The Coalition offensive against Fallujah in April 2004 demonstrates the limitations of relying on military force to signal resolve. The offensive catalyzed insurgent violence in Iraq and generated popular support for the insurgency. The Coalition prematurely halted the offensive because the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) could not maintain support for the Coalition in the face of popular outrage. Given the importance of democratizing Iraq and establishing a sovereign government, the objections of the IGC could not be ignored. Without Iraqi political support, military force ultimately signaled weakness instead of resolve.

ID Number: JA022701
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

Systems Thinking and Counterinsurgencies.
Author(s):
1. Baker, Jim
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
This article presents the essentials of a successful counterinsurgency strategy by applying a technique known as systems thinking. The fundamentals of good strategic thought lie both in recognizing the most significant interactions between different players, how they influence each other in unexpected ways, and how to measure progress in achieving the ends of the strategy. Systems thinking has proven successful in other contexts at explaining human behavior, policy choices, unintended consequences, and the resistance of systems to change. It also offers insight into how to assess one of the most difficult questions related to strategy in complex environments - how to know when the strategy has been successful.

ID Number: JA023373
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

Friends like These: Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism.
(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, vol. 31, no. 2, Fall 2006, p. 79-115.)
Author(s):
1. Byman, Daniel L.
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
2. TERRORISM PREVENTION--USA
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY
4. TERRORISM PREVENTION
Notes:
US allies that are fighting al-Qaeda-linked insurgencies often suffer illegitimate regimes, civil-military tension manifested by fears of a coup, economic backwardness, and discriminatory societies. These problems, coupled with allies' divergent
interests, serve to weaken allied military and security forces tactically, operationally, and strategically. The ability of the United States to change its allies' behavior is limited, despite the tremendous difficulties these problems create, because relying on allied forces is a key component of US strategy in the war on terrorism and the US goal of handing off security to Iraqi military forces. To reduce the effects of allies' weaknesses, the United States should try to increase its intelligence on allied security forces and at times act more like a third party to a conflict. In addition, Washington must have realistic expectations of what training and other efforts can accomplish.

Brutality or Restraint.
(INTERNATIONALE POLITIK, vol. 7, no. 2, Spring 2006, p. 78-89.)
Author(s):
  1. Creveld, Martin van
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
Counterinsurgency campaigns have proven a very tricky business. In fact, there are surprisingly few examples of successful counterinsurgency actions while there are dozens of examples that have ended in debacle. Two campaigns that worked were Syria's putdown of the Muslims Brothers uprising in the early 1980s and the British Army's campaign in northern Ireland. Both illustrate very different ways to go about it.

Fighting Insurgency on Sacred Ground.
(WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 29, no. 2, Spring 2006, p. 149-166.)
Author(s):
  1. Hassner, Ron E.
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
Iraqi insurgents are using their own mosques as operational bases, often forcing US military commanders to choose between desecrating a sacred space or letting insurgents escape. Israel and India, along with experience from Iraq to date, offer four core lessons for how to respond.

Counter-Insurgency Redux.
Author(s):
  1. Kilcullen, David J.
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
Counter-insurgency is fashionable again: more has been written on it in the last four years than in the last four decades. This is heartening for those who were in the wilderness during the years when Western governments regarded counter-insurgency as a
distraction, of interest only to historians. So it is no surprise that some have urged the re-discovery of classical, 'proven' counter-insurgency methods. But today's insurgencies differ significantly - at the level of policy, strategy, operational art and tactical technique - from those of earlier eras. An enormous amount of classical counter-insurgency remains relevant. Indeed, counter-insurgency provides the 'best fit' framework for strategic problems in the 'war on terror'. But much is new in counter-insurgency redux, possibly requiring fundamental reappraisals of conventional wisdom.

Learning about Counter-Insurgency.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 151, no. 6, December 2006, p. 16-21.)
Author(s): 1. Kiszely, John
Subject(s): 1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes: How well do militaries, in general, learn the lessons of counter-insurgency? What factors affect this learning process? And what might the answer to these questions tell us about how armed forces should approach the subject of learning about counter-insurgency in the future? This article sets out to answer these questions.

Calibrating Ink Spots: Filling Afghanistan's Ungoverned Spaces.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 151, no. 4, August 2006, p. 16-25.)
Author(s): 1. Mills, Greg
Subject(s): 1. POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION--AFGHANISTAN 2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN 3. AFGHAN WAR, 2001-

ID Number: JA022850
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

(JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, vol. 50, no. 6, December 2006, p. 831-854.)
Author(s): 1. Boettcher, William A. 2. Cobb, Michael D.
Subject(s): 1. CASUALTY AVERSION (MILITARY SCIENCE) 2. IRAQ WAR, 2003- 3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
Notes: In the early stages of the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq, military leaders resisted the release of body count and 'casualty ratio' data. However, in the Spring of 2004, the US military (and American media) began to focus on the 'limited' American casualties in specific operations versus the 'significant' number of insurgents killed. This article
examines the extent to which body count/casualty ratio 'frames' and individual casualty tolerance influence public perceptions about the war and the success or failure of US military operations. Two experiments were conducted pitting alternative casualty frames against one another to measure their relative impact. The results demonstrate the influence of framing effects on public perceptions and clarify understanding of the determinants and impact of casualty tolerance.

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq.
(STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 29, no. 2, March 2006, p. 103-121.)

Author(s):
1. Hoffman, Bruce

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA

Notes:
The United States has long been frustrated in fighting insurgencies. An almost unbroken string of mostly ill-fated experiences in effectively prosecuting this unique blend of political-military operations can be traced backward over nearly half a century from the situation in Iraq today to the early 1960s, when the US became heavily engaged in Indochina's wars. Vietnam and Iraq thus form two legs of a historically fraught triangle— with America's experiences in El Salvador in the 1980s providing the connecting leg. The aim of this article is to use the present as prologue in order to understand in counterinsurgency terms where we have gone wrong in Iraq: what unique challenges the current conflict in Iraq presents to the US and other coalition military forces deployed there; and what light both shed on future counterinsurgency planning, operations and requirements.

Les impasses de la contre-insurrection.
(POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 71e annee, no. 4, 2006, p. 849-861.)

Author(s):
1. Luttwak, Edward N.

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ

Notes:
Les nouvelles recommandations des generaux americains pour faire face a l'insurrection irakienne risquent de s'averer vaines. Celles-ci traduisent en effet les reticences des responsables politiques americains a gouverner directement les territoires envahis. Pourtant, les recettes d'une contre-insurrection reussie sont connues. Elles sont applicables en Irak comme sur d'autres theatres, mais le refus ethique et inevitable de les mettre en oeuvre place les occupants dans une situation difficile.
Challenges in Fighting a Global Insurgency.
(PARAMETERS, vol. 36, no. 2, Summer 2006, p. 15-29.)
Author(s):
  1. Barno, David W.
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
  2. USA--MILITARY POLICY
Notes:
The author provides readers with a soldier's view of how America might successfully conduct a global counterinsurgency. He believes we are at risk of failing to understand the very nature of the war we are fighting - a war of intelligence and perceptions. The author warns that even an unbroken series of military victories in a global counterinsurgency will not ensure strategic success. He concludes that America's military must size ownership of 'war-winning' as well as 'war-fighting' if it is to accomplish its mission of defending the society it is pledged to protect.
ID Number: JA022600
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

The Long Small War: Indigenous Forces for Counterinsurgency.
Author(s):
  1. Cassidy, Robert M.
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
Notes:
The author develops his thesis based on the belief that the use of indigenous forces in any counterinsurgency will not only yield significant increases in the quantity of troops on the ground, but also an exponential improvement in actionable intelligence. The author provides an analysis of American and French experiences with indigenous forces in various counterinsurgencies. He then concludes with a recommendation that the employment of such forces should be under the direction of a joint or combined interagency counterinsurgency task force. What makes this recommendation unique is the structure of the task force. The author's design would include elements from the armed services' conventional forces, Special Operations Forces, the CIA, Department of State, and indigenous intelligence units. Such an organization would then be capable of carrying out the full range of counterinsurgency operations within any autonomous area.
ID Number: JA022603
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

Break Point? Iraq and America's Military Forces.
Author(s):
  1. Gordon, Michael R.
Subject(s):
  1. USA--ARMED FORCES
  2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
Notes:
In terms of its doctrine and training, the United States military has been transformed by the war in Iraq. The army, which is carrying the principal load among the military services, has embraced counter-insurgency as one of its primary missions. These changes reflect the military's ability to adapt to the changing battlefield. They are intended not only to guide the
ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also future operations in the 'long war' against violent Islamic extremists. The new emphasis on counter-insurgency, however, is largely disconnected from the Defense Department's previously established spending priorities and personnel policy. The result is that American defence is in a state of strategic confusion. There are not enough forces to effectively carry out counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan while maintaining a strategic reserve for other threats. To fully exploit the long overdue emphasis on counter-insurgency, maintain sufficient forces for dealing with unanticipated contingencies and bring coherence to American defence strategy, the Pentagon needs to increase the United States' ground forces.

From the War on Terror to Global Counterinsurgency.
Author(s):
1. Hoffman, Bruce
Subject(s):
1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
3. TERRORISM PREVENTION--USA

ID Number: JA023085
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

2005

Countering Global Insurgency.
(JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, vol. 28, no. 4, August 2005, p. 597-617.)
Author(s):
1. Kilcullen, David J.
Subject(s):
1. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-
2. INSURGENCY
3. TERRORISM
4. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
Notes:
This article suggests that the War on Terrorism is actually a campaign against a globalized Islamist insurgency. Therefore, counterinsurgency approaches are more relevant to the present conflict than traditional terrorism theory. Indeed, a counterinsurgency approach would generate subtly, but substantially different, policy choices in prosecuting the war against Al Qaeda. Based on this analysis, the article proposes a strategy of 'disaggregation' that seeks to dismantle, or break, the links in the global jihad. Like containment in the Cold War, disaggregation would provide a unifying strategic conception for the war - a conception that has been somewhat lacking to date.

ID Number: JA022059
Year: 2005
Language: English
Type: ART
Al Qaeda as Insurgency.  
(JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY, no. 39, 2005, p. 41-50.) 
Author(s): 
1. Morris, Michael F. 
Subject(s): 
1. INSURGENCY 
2. TERRORISM 
3. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION) 
4. INSURGENCY--IRAQ 
Notes: 
Assessing the nature of the enemy is a critical first step in crafting effective strategy. In the case of al Qaeda, one must answer three important questions to clarify the extent of the danger and further hone America's strategic response. First, does the movement actually represent an insurgency? If so, are there indeed new elements that make al Qaeda different than previous insurgencies? Finally, what implications do these answers have for the current war against Osama bin Laden's movement? This article suggests that al Qaeda represents an emerging form of global Islamic insurgency, the inchoate strategy of which undermines its potential to achieve its revolutionary goals. Nonetheless, not unlike previous failed insurgencies, it possesses both durability and an immense capacity for destruction. These characteristics mandate a counterrevolutionary response at the strategic level that aims not only to destroy the organization but also to discredit its ideological underpinnings. 

Defeating Transnational Insurgencies: The Best Offense Is a Good Fence.  
Author(s): 
1. Staniland, Paul 
Subject(s): 
1. INSURGENCY 
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY 
Notes: 
Transnational insurgencies' unique challenges are not amenable to the offensive strategies that the Bush Doctrine emphasizes against terrorism. History strongly suggests that embracing a containment strategy, combining border defenses with aggressive propaganda and international intelligence cooperation, would be more successful in Iraq and beyond. 

Whither the Iraqi Insurgency: Prospects for Counterinsurgent Success. 
Author(s): 
1. Bazarian, Melissa S. M. 
Subject(s): 
1. INSURGENCY--IRAQ 
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY 
3. IRAQ WAR, 2003- 
Notes: 
The 2003 conflict between Iraq and the US-led Coalition resulted in liberation for the country, enabling its citizens to experience freedom they have not had for decades. While the US-led operation was successful, insurgent movements have
hindered the reconstruction efforts and the rebuilding of the
government in Iraq. The tactics used by these insurgent groups
are not that of 'traditional' warfare, therefore the US and
Coalition forces adapted their tactics to respond to this new
threat. It is argued that with the application of the Manwaring
Paradigm (also known as the SWORD model), the US and Coalition
forces successfully responded to the insurgent movements during
the period leading up to the Iraqi elections in January 2005.

Iraq : From Insurgency to Civil War ?.
Author(s):
1. Hashim, Ahmed S.
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY--IRAQ
Notes:
Today's ambushes, bombings, and beheadings are bad enough. Warfare
along Iraq's sectarian and ethnic divides would be worse.

How to Win in Iraq.
87-104.)
Author(s):
1. Krepinevich, Andrew F.
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY--IRAQ
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY
3. IRAQ WAR, 2003-
Notes:
Because they lack a coherent strategy, US forces in Iraq have
failed to defeat the insurgency or improve security. Winning
will require a new approach to counterinsurgency, one that
focuses on providing security to Iraqis rather than hunting
down insurgents. And it will take at least a decade.

Covering the Iraqi Insurgency.
135-145.)
Author(s):
1. Palmer, Elizabeth
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY--IRAQ
2. IRAQ WAR, 2003-
ID Number: JA022524
Year: 2005
Language: English
Type: ART
(COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 24, no. 4, October - November 2005, p. 361-378.)  
Author(s):  
1. MacFadden, Eric M.  
Subject(s):  
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA  
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GREAT BRITAIN  
Notes:  
To successfully engage and destroy the increasing contemporary insurgent threat, the US must develop standing, multifunctional, capabilities-based joint interagency task forces primarily focused on counterinsurgency operations. This research examines the critical elements of the British counterinsurgency campaign during the Malayan Emergency: 1948-1960. While not all inclusive, analysis of this campaign provides a starting point of annotation of critical capabilities required for the future conduct of counterinsurgency operations. These capabilities, combined with contemporary insurgent vulnerabilities, will define the critical capabilities required to derive the counterinsurgency team. Furthermore, this study proposes the requisite US government national assets necessary to shape the team. Lastly, this paper recommends the organizational structure and the team's relationship to the combatant command in order to facilitate its definitive and relative employment.  
ID Number: JA022182  
Year: 2005  
Language: English  
Type: ART  

2004  
'Draining the Sea': Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare.  
Author(s):  
1. Valentino, Benjamin  
2. Huth, Paul  
3. Balch-Lindsay, Dylan  
Subject(s):  
1. GUERRILLA WARFARE  
2. INSURGENCY  
3. CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTIES  
Notes:  
Why do some wars result in the intentional killing of large numbers of civilians? In this article the authors examine the incidence of mass killing in all wars from 1945 to 2000. In the statistical analysis of their data set of 147 wars, they find strong evidence supporting their hypothesis that mass killing is often a calculated military strategy used by regimes attempting to defeat major guerrilla insurgencies. Unlike conventional military forces, guerrilla armies often rely directly on the local civilian population for logistical support. Because guerrilla forces are difficult to defeat directly, governments facing major guerrilla insurgencies have strong incentives to target the guerrillas' civilian base of support. They find that mass killing is significantly more likely during guerrilla wars than during other kinds of wars. In addition, they find that the likelihood of mass killing among guerrilla conflicts is greatly increased when the guerrillas receive high levels of active support from the local population or when the insurgency poses a major military threat to the regime.  
ID Number: JA020521  
Year: 2004  
Language: English
The Manwaring Paradigm and the Iraqi Insurgency.

Author(s):
1. Battaglia, Phil

Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY--IRAQ
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
3. IRAQ WAR, 2003-

Notes:
This essay uses the SWORD model developed by Max Manwaring to analyze the ongoing insurgency in Iraq and assess the coalition efforts in rebuilding the country, fighting the insurgency and transferring authority to an Iraqi government. This essay was written in late February 2004. The essay looks at the current situation in Iraq and uses a graphical 'conflict mapping' technique developed by the Canadian Pearson Peacekeeping Centre as a visual tool to portray the principal actors in Iraq and their interrelationships. Next, the author applies the seven dimensions of the SWORD model to the ongoing counter-insurgency campaign in Iraq. The seven dimensions of the SWORD model are (1) military actions of the intervening power, (2) support actions of the intervening power, (3) host government legitimacy, (4) degree of outside support to insurgents, (5) actions against subversion, (6) host country military actions, and (7) unity of effort. The model suggests that coalition efforts are hampered by a lack of host government legitimacy, inability to limit outside support to the insurgents, weak host country military actions, and lack of unity of effort at various levels. Although this essay does not offer a prediction of the coalition efforts for the future of Iraq, it does provide some possible lessons learned that may improve the prospects for success in the future of Iraq.

Global Counterinsurgency : Without Strategy.

Author(s):
1. Mackinlay, John

Subject(s):
1. IRAQ WAR, 2003-
2. POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION--IRAQ
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
4. INSURGENCY--IRAQ

Notes:
Successes like the capture of Saddam Hussein are morale boosters for security forces in Iraq and may help to ensure victory for President George Bush in his re-election bid. Hopefully they will also demonstrate to the Iraqi people that the coalition is gradually progressing at a tactical level. However, this flush of success also encourages the coalition to continue to operate without a campaign plan. On both sides of the Atlantic, leaders have failed to reveal a genuine counter-insurgent strategy for Iraq or, on a global scale, for the threat of radical Islamic activism. The two are linked and the absence of a strategic concept in Iraq is a microcosm of a larger global failure.
Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare.  
(PARAMETERS, vol. 34, no. 1, Spring 2004, p. 16-28.)
Author(s):
1. Tomes, Robert R.
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
The author revisits a number of classical works on counterinsurgency warfare to reveal common lessons and themes applicable to the current situation in Iraq. He does warn, however, that America's experience in Vietnam offers little for those planning or engaged in counterinsurgency operations. The author concludes it will require more than just dusting off the classics if America's military is to fully understand and inculcate the lessons-learned, insights, and perspectives required for successful counterinsurgency operations.
ID Number: JA020137
Year: 2004
Language: English
Type: ART

The Perils of Counterinsurgency : Russia's War in Chechnya.  
Author(s):
1. Kramer, Mark
Subject(s):
1. CHECHNYA (RUSSIA) --HISTORY--CIVIL WAR, 1994-
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
Notes:
The author provides a military overview of the latest Russian-Chechen war, which began in 1999. He examines the tactics used by Chechen guerrillas and the responses of Russian military and security forces. He explains why Russian troops have been unable to crush the separatist insurgency and why Chechen fighters have resorted to increasingly deadly acts of terrorism, including mass hostage-taking and suicide bombings in Moscow. These terrorist attacks have greatly reduced the prospect of a lasting political settlement. Although some of the problems that have dogged Russian forces in Chechnya are unique to that particular conflict, the prolonged war illustrates the general difficulty of counterinsurgency operations.
ID Number: JA021404
Year: 2004
Language: English
Type: ART

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq.  
Author(s):
1. Metz, Steven
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
2. IRAQ WAR, 2003-
3. INSURGENCY--IRAQ
Notes:
The United States faces an intractable dilemma in Iraq: insurgency if it stays or instability if it leaves. The sooner that a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy, based on six principles, can be implemented, the better the chances to forestall the threat.
ID Number: JA020143
Year: 2003
Language: English
2001

NATO and Bin Laden.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 146, no. 6, December 2001, p. 36-40.)
Author(s):
1. Mackinlay, John
Subject(s):
1. SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2001
2. INSURGENCY
3. NATO
4. TERRORISM--AFGHANISTAN
Notes:
Bin Laden represents a more powerful phenomenon than terrorism, his reach is almost global and his supporting constituency is numbered in millions. In the longer term the West will have to recognize that his growing army of outraged supporters pose a much greater danger than bin Laden himself. An effective campaign to contain and disarm the hostility of bin Laden's growing constituency of Muslim supporters will require a multi-faceted counter strategy which involves political, humanitarian, developmental and human rights initiatives working alongside an international military security force. Can NATO, the slow moving military giant, influence a campaign which continues to widen beyond its European reach and proliferate into areas of governance and development that lie beyond its provenance?

Global Insurgent.
(WORLD TODAY, vol. 57, no. 11, November 2001, p. 15-17.)
Author(s):
1. Mackinlay, John
Subject(s):
1. SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2001
2. INSURGENCY
Notes:
The idea of insurgency provides a useful way of analysing the motives of the hijack bombers who attacked America. But the lessons of counter insurgency are far from comforting as we search for ways of dealing with them. Western society has created a virus which is allowing the global insurgent to thrive.

1998

War Lords.
Author(s):
1. Mackinlay, John
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY
Notes:
In the post-Cold War world there has emerged a new type of war lord - a consequence of the new social and political pressures. The international community has so far not been able to adapt to dealing with these new non-state actors and as a result war...
lords have been able to thwart many of the actions taken by international organizations in emergency situations. The author here addresses the challenge these new war lords pose. He traces the relationship between procedures of peace support operations and the types of crises in which these war lords flourish, the latter in many ways determining the former. As the war lords are very diverse in character as well as operational methods it is not easy to gain an understanding of how they operate. And, the author argues, even if the international community were to gain a better grasp of the war lords of the post-Cold War world, it is likely that it will continue to utilise the language and responses of Cold War thinking, which are increasingly inadequate to address the issues at hand.

The Origins of the 'Contra War' in Nicaragua : The Results of a Failed Development Model.
Author(s):
1. Hager, Robert P.
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY--NICARAGUA
2. NICARAGUA--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
Notes:
This article considers the causes of the 'Contra War' in Nicaragua during the 1980s. This conflict has often been portrayed as an American 'proxy war' fought by Somoza's former National Guard against a regime supported by most common Nicaraguans. This article proposes an alternate view. The Managua regime, with the advice and assistance of the Soviet bloc, pursued a model of political consolidation and economic development followed by other Third World Marxist-Leninist states. As in other 'states of socialist orientation' in the 1970s and 1980s, this one encountered considerable popular resistance. The conflict in Nicaragua, thus, was a civil war caused by Sandinista policies.

Kabul to Grozny : A Critique of Soviet (Russian) Counter-Insurgency Doctrine.
(JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES, vol. 9, no. 4, December 1996, p. 689-705.)
Author(s):
1. Dyke, Carl van
Subject(s):
1. USSR--MILITARY POLICY
2. RUSSIA (FEDERATION)--MILITARY POLICY
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
Notes:
The purpose of this study is to conduct a preliminary analysis of Russia's doctrinal response to counter-insurgency warfare in Afghanistan and Chechnya. Part I briefly defines the three main principles involved in that doctrine: forward defense, lightning war, and continuous assessment of lessons learned. Parts II, III and IV examine how these principles were manifested during the war in Afghanistan, the reform and reorganisation of the Russian army after the dissolution of the
1991

A New Era of Counterinsurgency.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 136, no. 1, Spring 1991, p. 73-78.)

Author(s):
1. Mockaitis, Thomas R.

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY

ID Number: JA003100
Year: 1991
Language: English
Type: ART
## Previous Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/06</td>
<td>China’s Foreign Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/06</td>
<td>Iraq Three Years On</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/06</td>
<td>Democracy Promotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/06</td>
<td>Iran’s Nuclear Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/06</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/06</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/06</td>
<td>Five Years of ‘War on Terror’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/07</td>
<td>Japan’s Defence and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/07</td>
<td>Afghanistan Five Years On : An Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/07</td>
<td>The China-Taiwan Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/07</td>
<td>The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/07</td>
<td>The Ten-Year Anniversary of the NATO-Russia Partnership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Anciens numéros

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/06</td>
<td>Les relations extérieures de la Chine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/06</td>
<td>L’Irak, trois ans après</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/06</td>
<td>La promotion de la démocratie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/06</td>
<td>Le programme nucléaire iranien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/06</td>
<td>La Corée du Nord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/06</td>
<td>Le Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/06</td>
<td>Cinq années de ‘guerre au terrorisme’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/07</td>
<td>La politique de défense et de sécurité du Japon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/07</td>
<td>L’Afghanistan cinq ans plus tard : une évaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/07</td>
<td>Les relations entre la Chine et Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/07</td>
<td>L’ère Eltsine : la politique intérieure russe de 1991 à 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/07</td>
<td>Le traité sur les forces armées conventionnelles en Europe (1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/07</td>
<td>Le dixième anniversaire du partenariat OTAN-Russie</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>