IRREGULAR WARFARE

LA GUERRE IRRÉGULIÈRE

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• Comment obtenir les publications de la Bibliothèque :

  Toutes les publications de la Bibliothèque sont disponibles sur les sites Intranet et Internet de l’OTAN.
The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One
- London: Hurst.
xix, 346 p.: ill.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 9781850659556
Author(s):
1. Kilcullen, David
Subject(s):
1. GUERRILLA WARFARE
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY
3. INSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
4. INSURGENCY--IRAQ
5. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
6. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
7. LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICTS (MILITARY SCIENCE)
Notes:
Includes index.
'In the first few years of the post-9/11 era, the established models for fighting 'small wars' proved distressingly ineffective against resilient insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the insurgents fought Western militaries to a stalemate, it was clear that a new approach was necessary. The author takes us on the ground to uncover the face of modern warfare, illuminating both the global challenge (the 'War on Terrorism') and small wars across the world. He explains that today's conflicts are a complex hybrid of contrasting trends: local social networks and worldwide movements; traditional and postmodern culture; local insurgencies seeking autonomy and a broader terrorist campaign. He warns that America has tended to conflate these trends, blurring the distinction between local and global struggles and thereby enormously complicating our challenges. The West has continually misidentified insurgents with limited aims and legitimate grievances - 'accidental guerrillas' - as members of a unified worldwide terror network. We must learn how to disentangle these strands, develop strategies that deal with global threats, avoid local conflicts where possible, and win where necessary.'
ID number: 80022499
Year: 2009
Type: M

Ideas as Weapons: Influence and Perception in Modern Warfare
xv, 458 p.: ill.; 24 cm.
ISBN: 9781597972604
Subject(s):
1. INFORMATION WARFARE--USA
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
3. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE--USA
4. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-
Added entry(s):
1. David, G. J., ed.

* This list contains material received as of June 11th, 2009 – Cette liste est arrêtée au 11 juin 2009.

Notes:
- Includes index.
- "This book seeks to illuminate the uses of information in armed conflict by juxtaposing the views of those who engage in manipulating information against the historic context. The anthology is divided into four sections: geopolitical, strategic, operational, and tactical. Because the nexus of information conflict is most easily viewed in the world's contemporary violent confrontations, this anthology is heavily weighted toward military personnel who have managed these difficult issues."

ID number: 80022543
Year: 2009
Type: M

323 /01103
Cyber Conflict and Global Politics - Abingdon, UK : Routledge.
xvi, 246 p.; 24 cm.
(Contemporary Security Studies)
ISBN: 9780415459709
Subject(s):
1. CYBERSPACE--POLITICAL ASPECTS
2. INTERNET--POLITICAL ASPECTS
3. POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Added entry(s):
1. Karatzogianni, Athina, ed.

Notes:
- "This volume examines theoretical and empirical issues relating to cyberconflict and its implications for global security and politics. Taking a multidimensional approach to current debates in Internet politics, the book comprises essays by leading experts from across the world. The volume includes a comprehensive introduction to current debates in the field and their ramifications for global politics, and follows this with empirical case studies. These include cyberconflict, cyberwars, information warfare and hacktivism, in contexts such as Sri Lanka, Lebanon and Estonia, the European Social Forum, feminist cyber crusades and the use of the Internet as a weapon by ethnoreligious and sociopolitical movements. The volume presents the theoretical debates and case studies of cyberconflict in a coherent, progressive and truly multidisciplinary way."

ID number: 80022019
Year: 2009
Type: M

2008

355.4 /01593
xviii, 67 p. : ill. ; 23 cm.
ISBN: 9780833043221
Subject(s):
1. LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICTS (MILITARY SCIENCE)--USA
2. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE--USA
3. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE--USA

Added entry(s):
1. Rand Corporation (US)

Notes:
- "The objective of this study was to provide an analytic framework for intelligence analysis of irregular warfare environments"
that could be used as the basis for a subsequent IW intelligence analysis curriculum development effort. The authors conducted a review of recent policy, strategy, doctrinal, and other materials pertaining to IW, concluding that although the term irregular warfare remains somewhat nebulous, situations considered within the realm of IW generally can be thought of in terms of two main stylized types: (1) population-centric IW situations, which include such missions as counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, and support to insurgency, where the indigenous population is the center of gravity; and (2) counterterrorism operations, whether conducted as one element of a theater commander's campaign or as part of the US Special Operations Command-led global war on terrorism, where a cellular network is being targeted. The authors identify the intelligence and analytic requirements associated with each of these two stylized forms of IW and describe a top-down framework, or analytic procedure, that can be used for assessing IW environments. Also included is a list of references to IW-relevant doctrinal publications.'

ID number: 80022498
Year: 2008
Type: M

355.4 /01538
(Routledge Global Security Studies ; 2)
ISBN: 9780415413572
Subject(s):
1. WARFARE
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Added entry(s):
1. Terriff, Terry, 1953- , ed.
2. Karp, Aaron, ed.
Notes:
Includes index.
'This book examines the meaning of the rising tide of terrorism and guerrilla warfare, which increasingly dominates world-wide military planning. After the 1991 war with Iraq, it seemed that the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' would assure the United States and its allies of ever greater military dominance. However, rapid victories like the toppling of the Afghan Taliban in 2001 and Saddam Hussein in 2003 now seem like isolated events in a long struggle. For the first time since the Vietnam War ended, the problems of insurgency have leapt to the top of the international security agenda. Coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq are bogged down by insurgency, while virtually every country is struggling to ensure its domestic safety against terrorist threats. In this book, some leading advocates of 'Fourth-Generation Warfare' maintain that irregular warfare is evolving into the dominant form of conflict. However, other strategic thinkers argue that the novelty of irregular warfare has been exaggerated. Others examine the lessons of warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the ability of military organizations to deal with the new challenge. Case studies from the United States, India, Israel, NATO and others reveal military thinkers working at the limits of their trade to adapt old institutions and assumptions to address the rising challenge.'

ID number: 80021518
Year: 2008
Type: M
Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare – Botley, UK : Osprey Publishing.
304 p. : ill.; 24 cm.
ISBN: 9781846032813
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Added entry(s):
1. Marston, Daniel, ed.
Notes:
'Insurgency, terrorism and the resulting bloodshed have become facts of life in the modern world and the difficulties armies face in controlling them have been graphically demonstrated, not least in Iraq and Afghanistan. Strategies and tactics used to counter insurgencies range from conventional military operations to a combination of military and political strategy, including propaganda and Psy-Ops. However, successful strategies and lessons learned in one conflict are often forgotten following its conclusion, with bloody consequences for the next war. A range of military and civilian experts are brought together here to examine the development and practice of counterinsurgency doctrine from the beginning of the twentieth century to the Iraq conflict. Each of the thirteen chapters discusses the conflict and its background, the strategies and tactics developed in the attempt to contain and defeat the insurgency and their success or otherwise, and the contribution of the conflict to the overall development of counterinsurgency in modern warfare.'
ID number: 80022173
Year: 2008
Type: M

vii, 263 p. : ill.; 25 cm.
ISBN: 9780313349959
Subject(s):
1. COMMAND OF TROOPS
2. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
3. COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS
4. NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE
Added entry(s):
1. Kott, Alexander, ed.
Notes:
Includes index. 
'Since the beginning of the Information Revolution, the military in the United States and elsewhere has been analyzing and implementing the changes driven by rapidly advancing information technologies. Among military theorists and practitioners, many focus on the Information Revolution's impact on matters of military equipment. Far fewer, however, seem to worry about the gray matter – the mind of the commander, the place where all the information power of the new age is supposed to converge and to yield its mighty dividends. Consider that it is the human mind, particularly the minds of military commanders and their staffs, that remain the pinnacle and the ultimate consumer of the rapidly growing information flows. What if the true weak link of the Information Age force is not the hardware of machines, but the software of the human mind? If so, could it be that the entire conceptual structure of the information revolution theorists, at least as it applies to military affairs, is built on sand, on the notorious fickleness of human cognition? These are the questions this book strives to examine. Looking at the command and control of
information-rich warfare, the authors explore its potential new processes, techniques, and organizational structures. As they do so, they find reasons for both optimism and concerns about the limitations of human cognition and supporting technologies in commanding Information Age battles.'

ID number: 80022166
Year: 2008

174 p.; 21 cm.
ISBN: 9782262028466
Author(s):
1. Grange, Arnaud de La, 1965-
Subject(s):
1. MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Notes:
'Qu'arrive-t-il a la puissance occidentale ? Elle tente
desesperement d'imposer a ses adversaires une guerre que
ceux-ci refusent de mener. Dans cette nouvelle forme de guerre,
dite de 'quatrieme generation', l'Adversaire n'a nul besoin de
conquerir ou defaire son enemi. Il lui suffit de le perturber,
le lasser, le faire flancher dans ses certitudes morales afin
qu'il renonce et se retire. En raison du desequilibre des
moyens disponibles en faveur du Fort occidental, le Faible ne
cesse d'innover en termes de strategies, de modes operatoires,
de communication, de gestion du temps et du sens. Face a
l'"insurge innovant", les dirigeants occidentaux peinent a
penser ces formes de conflictualites deregulles et a adapter la
strategie 'classique' a cette nouvelle donne. Cet ouvrage n'est
pas une analyse de plus de l'echec irakien ou du bourbier
afghan. Il dresse pour la premiere fois le constat d'un
tournant strategique majeur et terriblement inquietant pour
l'avenir. Demain, ce sont d'autres acteurs emergents - au
Moyen-Orient on en Asie -, dotes d'autres moyens que les
insurges sunnites irakiens ou talibans, qui developperont les
memes strategies de contournement de puissance, mais a un autre
niveau.'

ID number: 80022040
Year: 2008
Type: M

Propaganda and Information Warfare in the Twenty-first Century : Altered
Images and Deception Operations - Abingdon, UK : Routledge.
xi, 204 p.; 24 cm.
(Contemporary Security Studies)
ISBN: 0415771455
Author(s):
1. Macdonald, Scot
Subject(s):
1. PROPAGANDA
2. DECEPTION (MILITARY SCIENCE)
3. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
4. INFORMATION WARFARE
Notes:
'This is the first book to analyse how the technology to alter
images and rapidly distribute them can be used for propaganda
and deception operations. Such images have already appeared,
including altered images of British troops abusing prisoners in
Iraq and altered photographs of a 1970s anti-Vietnam War rally
with Jane Fonda sitting near 2004 presidential candidate John
Kerry. Using examples from history, the author outlines the principles of propaganda and deception, and presents a history of the use of altered images (both still and moving) in politics, diplomacy, espionage and war. Discussion of the key elements of propaganda, deception and photography serve as the foundation for an examination of why the United States and the West are likely targets for attacks using altered images, how adversaries might use such images against the West and what the possible defenses are against them.

ID number: 80021133
Year: 2007
Type: M

Rethinking Insurgency - Carlisle, PA : US Army War College.

vii, 69 p.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 1584872977
Author(s):
1. Metz, Steven, 1956-
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Added entry(s):
1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
Notes:
'The U.S. military and national security community lost interest in insurgency after the end of the Cold War when other defense issues such as multinational peacekeeping and transformation seemed more pressing. With the onset of the Global War on Terror in 2001 and the ensuing involvement of the U.S. military in counterinsurgency support in Iraq and Afghanistan, insurgency experienced renewed concern in both the defense and intelligence communities. The author argues that while exceptionally important, this relearning process focused on Cold War era nationalistic insurgencies rather than the complex conflicts which characterized the post-Cold War security environment. To be successful at counterinsurgency, he contends, the U.S. military and defense community must rethink insurgency, which has profound implications for American strategy and military doctrine.'

ID number: 80021387
Year: 2007
Type: M


liv, 419 p. : ill.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 9780226841519
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
Bibliography: p. 391-399. Includes index.
'When the US military invaded Iraq, it lacked a common understanding of the problems inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns. It had neither studied them nor developed doctrine and tactics to deal with them. This volume was written to fill that void. The manual espouses an approach to combat that emphasizes constant adaptation and learning, the importance of decentralized decision-making, the need to understand local politics and customs, and the key role of intelligence in winning the support of the population. The manual also emphasizes the paradoxical and often counterintuitive nature of
counterinsurgency operations: sometimes the more you protect your forces, the less secure you are; sometimes the more force you use, the less effective it is; sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction.'

ID number: 80021871
Year: 2007
Type: M

355.4 /01510
viii, 241 p.; 24 cm.
ISBN: 0745633641
Author(s):
1. Thornton, Rod
Subject(s):
1. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
Notes:
In recent years, the nature of conflict has changed. Through 'asymmetric warfare', radical groups and weak state actors are using unexpected means to deal stunning blows to more powerful opponents in the West. From terrorism to information warfare, the West's air power, sea power and land power are open to attack from clever, but much weaker, enemies. The author unpacks the meaning and significance of asymmetric warfare, in both civilian and military realms, and examines why it has become such an important subject for study. He seeks to provide answers to key questions, such as how weaker opponents apply asymmetric techniques against the Western world, and shows how the West's military superiority can be seriously undermined by asymmetric threats. The book concludes by looking at the ways in which the US, the state most vulnerable to asymmetric attack, is attempting to cope with some new battlefield realities.'

ID number: 80021134
Year: 2007
Type: M

323 /01063
vii, 30 p.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 1584873302
Author(s):
1. Jager, Sheila Miyoshi
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
2. CULTURAL AWARENESS--USA
Added entry(s):
1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
Notes:
The author explores the role that cultural knowledge must play in thinking about a new strategy for counterinsurgency. Although the importance of cultural awareness and understanding of adversary societies has been widely recognized as essential to operations and tactics on the battlefield, its significance has been largely ignored in formulating the broader strategic goals of counterinsurgency. The author highlights the importance of culture, and cultural awareness, in formulating a broad strategy for counterinsurgency which also has wide-ranging implications for U.S. foreign policy.'

ID number: 80021667
Year: 2007
Type: M
Since September 2001, the United States has waged what the government initially called the 'global war on terrorism (GWOT)'. Beginning in late 2005 and early 2006, the term Long War began to appear in US security documents. The description Long War - unlimited in time and space and continuing for decades - is closer to reality and more useful than GWOT. The author argues that this protracted struggle is more correctly viewed as a global insurgency and counterinsurgency. Al Qaeda and its affiliates, he maintains, comprise a novel and evolving form of networked insurgents who operate globally, harnessing the advantages of globalization and the information age. They employ terrorism as a tactic, subsuming terror with their overarching aim of undermining the Western-dominated system of states. Placing the war against al Qaeda and its allied groups and organizations in the context of a global insurgency has vital implications for doctrine, interagency coordination, and military cultural change - all reviewed in this work. The author combines the foremost maxims of the most prominent Western and Eastern philosophers of war to arrive at a threefold theme: know the enemy, know yourself, and know what kind of war you are embarking upon. To help readers arrive at that understanding, he first offers a distilled analysis of al Qaeda and its associated networks, with a particular focus on ideology and culture. In subsequent chapters, he elucidates the challenges big powers face when they prosecute counterinsurgencies, using historical examples from Russian, American, British and French counterinsurgent wars before 2001. The book concludes with recommendations for the integration and command and control of indigenous forces and other agencies.
323  /01005

xxvii, 213 p. : ill.; 18 cm.
(Strategies & Doctrines)
ISBN: 9782717855098
Author(s):
1. Galula, David, 1919-1967
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
'Les armees occidentales actuellement engagees dans des conflits
d'un type nouveau, face a un adversaire insaisissable,
pourraient-elles s'inspirer de l'histoire des guerres
revolutionnaires pour se sortir de l'impasse strategique dans
laquelle elles semblent installees ? Pour l'auteur, la victoire
des insurges n'est pas une fatalite : en s'adaptant a la
situation, le gouvernement de contre-insurrection peut
s'assurer du soutien de la population, qui est la cle du
succes. Son approche de la question est donc avant tout
politique, sans recours systematique a la violence.'
ID number: 80021978
Year: 2006
Type: M

355.4  /01495

Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias : The Warriors of Contemporary
316 p. : ill.; 24 cm.
ISBN: 0231129823
Author(s):
1. Shultz, Richard H., 1947-
2. Dew, Andrea J.
Subject(s):
1. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
2. INSURGENCY
3. MILITIA
4. PARAMILITARY FORCES
5. ARMED FORCES
Notes:
Includes index.
'Since the end of the Cold War, conventional militaries and their
political leaders have confronted a new, brutal type of warfare
in which non-state armed groups use asymmetrical tactics to
successfully fight larger, technologically superior forces. In
order to prevent further bloodshed and political chaos, it is
crucial to understand how these unconventional armed groups
think and to adapt to their methods of combat. The authors
investigate the history and politics of modern asymmetrical
warfare. By focusing on four specific hotbeds of instability -
Somalia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq - they conduct a
careful analysis of tribal culture and the value of clan
associations. They examine why these 'traditional' or 'tribal'
warriors fight, how they recruit, where they find sanctuary,
and what is behind their strategy. Traveling across two
centuries and several continents, the authors examine the
doctrinal, tactical, and strategic advantages and consider the
historical, cultural and anthropological factors behind the
motivation and success of the warriors of contemporary combat.'
ID number: 80020970
Year: 2006
Type: M
Since the end of the Cold War, and especially since September 11, 2001, the United States has faced daunting challenges in the areas of foreign policy and national security. Threatened by failing states, insurgencies, civil wars, and terrorism, the nation has been compelled to re-evaluate its traditional responses to global conflict. The authors present here a much-needed strategy for conducting unconventional warfare in an increasingly violent world. In the early 1990s, Manwaring introduced a new paradigm for addressing low-intensity conflicts, or conflicts other than major wars. Termed the Manwaring Paradigm or SWORD (Small Wars Operations Research Directorate) model, it has been tested successfully by scholars and practitioners and refined in the wake of new and significant 'uncomfortable wars' around the world, most notably the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. This book broadens the definition of the original paradigm and applies it to specific situations. Outlining the seven basic principles underlying their paradigm, the authors show how the successful – or failed – application of these principles has contributed to the outcomes of several types of conflicts.

Bibliography: p. 315–324. Includes index.

The author examines here why the US military cannot conduct unconventional warfare despite a significant effort to create and maintain such a capability. He argues that although the operation in Afghanistan appeared to have been a masterpiece of military creativity, the United States executed its impressive display of power in a totally conventional manner. Pointing out that the initial phase of the war was appropriately conventional given the conventional disposition of the enemy, the author maintains that once the Taliban fell and the war became increasingly unconventional, the US response became more conventional. In this book, the author presents an authoritative overview of the current American way of war and
addresses the specific causes of the 'conventionalization' of US Special Forces, using the war in Afghanistan as a case study. He draws a distinction between special operations and unconventional warfare, reminding us that the use of Special Forces does not automatically make the fighting unconventional, and he questions the ability of US forces to effectively defeat irregular threats. In conclusion, the author suggests ways to regain lost unconventional warfare capacity.'

xv, 309 p.; 24 cm.
ISBN: 9781929223718
Author(s):
1. Weimann, Gabriel, 1950-
Subject(s):
1. TERRORISM
2. INTERNET
3. CYBERTERRORISM
Notes:
Includes index.
'The author reveals here that terrorist organizations and their supporters maintain hundreds of web sites, taking advantage of the unregulated, anonymous, and accessible nature of the Internet to target an array of messages to diverse audiences. Drawing on an eight-year study of the World Wide Web, the author examines how modern terrorist organizations exploit the Internet to raise funds, recruit members, plan and launch attacks, and publicize their chilling results. He also investigates the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures, and warns that this cyberwar may cost us dearly in terms of civil rights.'

xvi, 174 p. : ill. ; 23 cm.
ISBN: 1579060722
Author(s):
1. Gompert, David C.
2. Lachow, Irving
3. Perkins, Justin, 1975-
Subject(s):
1. COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS--USA
2. NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE
3. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY--USA
4. OPERATIONAL ART (MILITARY SCIENCE)
Added entry(s):
Notes:
'Taking the information revolution as a starting point, this book argues that only by strengthening the relationship between information technology and brain matter will the US military enhance its ability to outsmart and outfight future adversaries. The authors approach this transition in great detail by making a strong case for building what they call battle-wisdom. An improved light machinegun will not measurably
improve our soldiers' capability if they are outsmarted by an adversary who has blended into a hostile town and is not in a uniform. Neither will improved weapons offer the necessary edge against a sophisticated strategic adversary in the information age. What will improve our soldiers' capability are the means to draw discreet tactical information and the capacity to weigh a multitude of tactical options - all at battlefield speed. This is the essence of battle-wisdom.'

ID number: 80021045
Year: 2006
Type: M

2005

323 /00994
xxix, 249 p.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 0226567702
Author(s):
1. Nagl, John A., 1966-
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
2. MALAYA--HISTORY--MALAYAN EMERGENCY, 1948-1960
3. VIETNAM WAR, 1961-1975
4. COUNTERINSURGENCY--MALAYA
5. COUNTERINSURGENCY--VIETNAM
Notes:
'Armies are often accused of preparing to fight the previous war. In this book, the author considers the now-crucial question of how armies adapt to changing circumstances during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared. Comparing the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960 with what developed in the Vietnam War from 1950 to 1975, the author argues that organizational culture is key to the ability to learn from unanticipated conditions, a variable which explains why the British army successfully conducted counterinsurgency in Malaya but why the American army failed to do so in Vietnam.'

ID number: 80021140
Year: 2005
Type: M

323 /00948
xii, 66 p.; 23 cm.
(Whitehall Paper Series; 64)
ISBN: 0855161175
Author(s):
1. Mackinlay, John
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Added entry(s):
1. Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (GB)
Notes:
'In the counter-insurgency campaigns that followed the swift and successful interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, Coalition forces failed to exploit their technical and planning superiority; the best they have achieved is a war of gradual attrition. Meanwhile, it is the globally organized insurgents who have become the more successful manoeuvrists, moving with surprising agility and impact between the operational, the
strategic and the virtual. The author argues here that to turn the tide against a global insurgency requires a rigorous effort to define the adversary with greater precision. This would reveal a headless, structureless network that grows organically and responds instinctively to events in a way that is more dangerous than the vertically organized versions of Al-Qa'ida that are part of the misleading rhetoric of 'global terrorism'. The international response to this phenomenon is, at present, too unwieldy and disparately motivated to succeed. To regain the initiative, a future Coalition needs to be more globally minded, culturally inclusive and less tolerant of the multi-agency shambles that characterizes the operational space.'

Author(s): 1. Arreguin-Toft, Ivan
Subject(s): 1. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
'How do the weak win wars? The likelihood of victory and defeat in asymmetric conflicts depends on the interaction of the strategies weak and strong actors use. Using statistical and in-depth historical analyses of conflicts spanning two hundred years, the author shows that, independent of regime type and weapons technology, the interaction of similar strategic approaches favors strong actors, while opposite strategic approaches favor the weak. This new approach to understanding asymmetric conflicts allows us to make sense of how the United States was able to win its war in Afghanistan (2002) in a few months, while the Soviet Union lost after a decade of brutal war (1979-1989). The author's strategic interaction theory has implications not only for international relations theory, but for policymakers grappling with interstate and civil wars, as well as terrorism.'

Subject(s): 1. LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICTS (MILITARY SCIENCE) 2. GUERRILLA WARFARE
Added entry(s): 1. US Marine Corps
Notes: 'This reprint of the 1940 edition of the 'Small Wars Manual' is an aid to education and training in the historical approach of Marine Corps units conducting operations in low-intensity conflicts. In the 1930s, such conflicts were referred to as 'small wars'. The 'Small Wars Manual' is one of the best books on military operations in peacekeeping and counterinsurgency operations published before World War II.'
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has developed a national security strategy designed to eliminate the conditions that spawn asymmetric threats. An important part of that is helping build stable, legitimate governments in nations which allowed or supported terrorism and other forms of asymmetric aggression. This has led the United States to renewed involvement in counterinsurgency. The United States, particularly the Army, has a long history of counterinsurgency support. During the past decade, though, this has not been an area of focus for the American military. To renew its capability at counterinsurgency, the military is assessing 21st century insurgency, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, and revising its strategy, operational concepts, organization, and doctrine. This monograph is designed to contribute to this process. The authors argue that 20th century strategy, operational concepts, organization, and doctrine should not be applied to 21st century insurgency without further refinement. They contend that there are two major variants of insurgency which they label 'national' and 'liberation'. Most existing strategy, operational concepts, organization, and doctrine are derived from American experience with national insurgencies, but these need to be adapted when confronting liberation insurgencies.
potential adversaries can take advantage of these limitations, thus spawning 'asymmetrical warfare'. Professor Barnett defines asymmetrical warfare as not simply a case of pitting one's strength against another's weakness but rather of taking the calculated risk to exploit an adversary's inability or unwillingness to prevent, or defend against, certain actions. This reluctance to retaliate in 'an eye for an eye' fashion complicates the dilemma of American policymakers who seek to wield power and influence on the world stage while simultaneously projecting a peaceful and benign image.'

ID number: 80018882
Year: 2003
Type: M

xii, 257 p.; 24 cm.
ISBN: 0743212495
Author(s):
1. Berkowitz, Bruce D.
Subject(s):
1. INFORMATION WARFARE--USA
2. USA--MILITARY POLICY
3. MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE--USA
4. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY--USA
Notes:
Includes index.
'The author's explanation of how information war revolutionized combat and what it means for our soldiers could not be better timed. As Western forces wage war against terrorists and their supporters, in actions large and small, on several continents, this book explains how they fight and how they will win or lose. There are four key dynamics to the new warfare: asymmetric threats, in which even the strongest armies may suffer from at least one Achilles' heel; information-technology competition, in which advantages in computers and communications are crucial; the race of decision cycles, in which the first opponent to process and react to information effectively is almost certain to win; and network organization, in which fluid arrays of combat forces can spontaneously organize in multiple ways to fight any given opponent at any time. America's use of networked, elite ground forces, in combination with precision-guided bombing from manned and unmanned flyers, turned Afghanistan from a Soviet graveyard into a lopsided field of American victory. Yet we are not invulnerable, and the same technology that we used in Kuwait in 1991 is now available to anyone with a credit card and access to the Internet. Al Qaeda is adept in the new model of war, and has searched long and hard for weaknesses in our defenses. Will we be able to stay ahead of its thinking? In Iraq, Saddam's army is in no position to defeat its enemies - but could it defend Baghdad? As the world anxiously considers these and other questions of modern war, the author offers many answers and a framework for understanding combat that will never again resemble the days of massive marches on fortress-like positions.'

ID number: 80019509
Year: 2003
Type: M
This book provides a united front concerning the growing threat non-state entities represent to the security interests of the nation-states. The decade after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union was marked by prosperity and optimism, especially in the United States. These illusions were shattered on 11 September 2001. The Al-Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were a prime example of asymmetrical warfare. This work reflects the fact that the world has changed fundamentally and that there is a new security environment populated by smart enemies. The challenge is to establish a degree of governance in a world of growing disorder. It is a formidable challenge, reflecting new complexities in global politics that call many of the existing assumptions into question, and demanding innovative and imaginative responses based on new organizational structures as well as new security mechanisms and instruments. Just as the United States faces a new strategic environment, it needs to develop new methods and procedures for responding to it. The enemy is flexible, nimble and innovative; government is laboriously slow, wedded to established methods and restricted by standard operational procedures. It needs to overcome these deficiencies if it is to meet the challenges that Robert J. Bunker and the galaxy of experts that he has assembled lay out in this volume. This book contributes significantly to an understanding of the new enemies and the new kinds of threats characteristic of a world in which disorder is no longer on the margin of global politics but a central feature of the global environment. For those with the responsibility for making and implementing national security policy, the analysis of the new threats provided by the editor and authors could hardly be more compelling.

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totalement sur sa superiorité technique et militaire, le faible est celui qui peut tout se permettre. Les exemples historiques dans lesquels les acteurs disposant de moyens limités se sont imposés sont aussi nombreux que ceux où la technique offrait l'avantage. Les guerres asymétriques, a savoir l'opposition de deux adversaires aux forces déséquilibrées, existaient déjà au temps de Sun Tzu, et font même l'objet d'un des plus célèbres épisodes de la Bible : David contre Goliath. Les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 ont fait la démonstration qu'avec des moyens infimes, il est possible d'obtenir des résultats totalement disproportionnés et de terroriser la première puissance mondiale. La réponse à ce danger de voir proliférer les guerres asymétriques ne se trouve pas dans l'acquisition de nouveaux engins de guerre, cela ayant même pour objet d'exacerber davantage la rancœur et de pousser plus loin l'imagination de ceux qui contestent l'autorité du plus fort. Faire de sa faiblesse un avantage et contourner la puissance de son adversaire pour parvenir à un degré de nuisance disproportionné : voilà ce que peut faire l'acteur asymétrique determine.'
'The author wrote this monograph in response to the fact that today over half the countries in the global community are faced with one variation or another of asymmetric guerrilla war. Insurgencies, internal wars, and other small-scale contingencies (SSCs) are the most pervasive and likely type of conflict in the post-Cold War era. That the United States will become involved directly or indirectly in some of these conflicts is almost certain. Yet, little or no recognition and application of the strategic-level lessons of the Vietnam War and the hundreds of other smaller conflicts that have taken place over the past several years are evident. The purpose of this monograph is to draw from the lessons of the recent past to better prepare today's civilian and military leaders to meet the unconventional and asymmetric warfare challenges that face the United States and the rest of the international community.'

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Author(s):  
1. Metz, Steven  
2. Johnson, Douglas V.

Subject(s):  
1. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE  
2. USA--MILITARY POLICY

Added entry(s):  
1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)

Notes:  
'In this special report, the authors recommend a definition of strategic asymmetry that is both simple and comprehensive, reflecting the need for military doctrine that transcends the specific issues of today. They then assess the strategic situation of the United States in terms of both positive asymmetry - that which gives US forces an advantage over opponents - and negative asymmetry that might be used to counter US forces. Finally, they offer five strategic concepts as part of the response to asymmetry: maximum conceptual and organizational adaptability, focused intelligence, minimal vulnerability, full spectrum precision, and an integrated homeland security strategy.'

ID number: 80017012  
Year: 2001  
Type: M


Author(s):  
1. Joes, Anthony James

Subject(s):  
1. GUERRILLA WARFARE  
2. GUERRILLA WARFARE--USA

Notes:  
'Bibliography: p. 382-411. Includes index.  
'From South Carolina to South Vietnam, America's two hundred-year involvement in guerrilla warfare has been extensive and varied. This book analyzes conflicts in which Americans have participated in the role of, on the side of, or in opposition to guerrilla forces, providing a broad comparative and historical perspective on these types of engagements. The author examines nine case studies, ranging from the role of Francis Marion, the Swamp Fox, in driving Cornwallis to Yorktown and eventual surrender to the US support of Afghan rebels that hastened the collapse of the Soviet empire. He analyzes the origins of each conflict, traces American involvement, and seeks patterns and deviations. Studying numerous campaigns, including one staged by Confederate units during the Civil War, the author reveals the combination of elements that can lead a nation to success in guerrilla warfare or doom it to failure.'

ID number: 80018261  
Year: 2000  
Type: M
'The current era has seen more rapid and extensive change than any
time in human history. The profusion of information and the
explosion of information technology is the driver, reshaping
all aspects of social, political, cultural, and economic life.
The effects of the information revolution are particularly
profound in the realm of national security strategy. They are
creating new opportunities for those who master them. The US
military, for instance, is exploring ways to seize information
superiority during conflicts and thus gain decisive advantages
over its opponents. But the information revolution also creates
new security threats and vulnerabilities. No nation has made
more effective use of the information revolution than the
United States, but none is more dependent on information
technology. To protect American security, then, military
leaders and defense policymakers must understand the
information revolution.'
New or Old Wars? Debating a Clausewitzian Future.
Author(s):
1. Fleming, Colin M.
Subject(s):
1. WAR
Notes:
Over the last 18 years or so, much of the debate about modern warfare has been about whether it should be described as 'old' or 'new'. However, there has not been a definitive answer as to which best reflects war in the modern world. Increasingly, the alternative arguments are polarised into opposing camps. Indeed, it would be fair to say that there is little in the way of debate at all. By reevaluating the strengths and weaknesses of each argument, this paper aims to reinvigorate that discussion by examining whether changes in the way we understand war are really required. Finding that the ideas are not in fact mutually exclusive, it suggests that future research could benefit from a combined approach.

Les armées occidentales face aux rebellions locales.
Author(s):
1. Lasserre, Isabelle
Subject(s):
1. MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
The interminable Iraq conflict; the Afghan quagmire; Israel’s inability to crush Hezbollah (in 2006) or Hamas (last winter) ... Since the beginning of the new millennium, Western armies, however powerful and well-equipped they may be, have had a hard time defeating rebellious forces with significantly fewer resources. In the United States as in Europe, a new paradigm is taking shape in military circles. It is drawn from lessons learned from the mistakes of the past few decades – by the French in Algeria and the Americans in Vietnam – as well as the successes fo General David Petraeus in Iraq. Recently appointed commander of the US Army’s Central Command, Petraeus considers it crucial to combine military pressure with efforts to win over the ‘hearts and minds’ of the local population. This is, of course, a long-term process, but in all theaters of operation, it is the only way to achieve real victory.

**This list contains material received as of June 11th, 2009 – Cette liste est arrêtée au 11 juin 2009.
Military History and Fourth Generation Warfare.
Author(s):
1. Junio, Timothy J.
Subject(s):
1. MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Notes:
This article examines 'Fourth Generation Warfare' (4GW), a theory of how warfare has evolved and is evolving, from the perspective of military history. The author makes three primary claims: 4GW advocates' boxing of history into 'generations' is logically and temporally inconsistent; 4GW authors misuse history by selectively choosing case studies and applying them out of context; and other arguments regarding the current and future character of warfare are more convincing. The author concludes that scholars and policy-makers would be well served by considering elements of 4GW, particularly its analysis of insurgency, but that the concept should be subsumed by a broader US grand strategy that retains a strong focus on preparation for conventional warfare.

Irresistible Force or Immoveable Object? The 'Revolution in Military Affairs' and Asymmetric Warfare.
(DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS, vol. 25, no. 1, March 2009, p. 21-36.)
Author(s):
1. Benbow, Tim
Subject(s):
1. REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS
2. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
Notes:
Recognising that some strategic analysts question the value of these two concepts and argue that where one has utility and the other does not and that they represent entirely incompatible views of the world, the author argues that neither should be simply dismissed out of hand for those reasons. By exploring both concepts and their utility in understanding contemporary conflict, the author is able to demonstrate that each helps to clarify the meaning and applicability of the other. The author concludes that both concepts have value, the more so when they are brought together.

Iraq, Afghanistan and British Strategy.
Author(s):
1. Betz, David
2. Cormack, Anthony
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GREAT BRITAIN
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
Notes:

ID Number: JA025846
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

ID Number: JA025770
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

ID Number: JA025695
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART
(WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 32, no. 2, April 2009, p. 103-120.)

Author(s):
1. Byman, Daniel

Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY

Notes:
Talks with insurgents are often necessary to end conflicts, but they can also be politically costly, fail, and even backfire. Policymakers and analysts should consider these eight questions, derived from Iraq and elsewhere, for Afghanistan and beyond.

ID Number: JA025787
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

The United States and Counterinsurgency: 'Political First, Political Last, Political Always'.

Author(s):
1. Cornish, Paul

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA

Notes:
According to the status of forces agreement signed by Iraq and the United States in November 2008, US troops are to be withdrawn entirely from Iraq by the end of 2011. A few days later it was also revealed that the British force in Iraq, numbering about 4,100 troops, will be reduced to a contingent of just a few hundred military advisors by summer 2009. The counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, on the other hand, is to be intensified in the form of a 'surge' in military and political effort. Counterinsurgency operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq have long been at the centre of the security policy debate in the United States and elsewhere; a debate which seems unlikely to be resolved in the near future. But what exactly is counterinsurgency? This article offers some reflections on the practice and the politics of an especially complex form of military engagement. All military activity should be understood through the prism of politics, and counterinsurgency particularly.

ID Number: JA025597
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

The Future of War and American Military Strategy.

Author(s):
1. Horowitz, Michael C.
2. Shalmon, Dan A.

Subject(s):
1. USA--STRATEGIC ASPECTS
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
3. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE--USA
4. LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICTS (MILITARY SCIENCE)--USA

Notes:
The outcome of ongoing debates over the future of American military strategy will play a critical role in shaping the foreign and military policies of the United States over the next decade. Traditionalists worry about the shift towards emphasizing counterinsurgency operations and irregular warfare, believing that the use of force is often ineffective in COIN
situations and the American military should concentrate on planning for conventional war. In contrast, COIN advocates argue that the United States must focus its efforts on preparing for the wars it is most likely to fight, irregular wars. However, both schools of thought rely on assumptions about the future security environment that may reveal another path forward. First, although it seems intuitive to view irregular warfare as the dominant future concern, it is exceedingly difficult to predict accurately the future security environment, as the last 20 years have clearly shown. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the character of emergent threats will depend on how the United States focuses its resources. Paradoxically, no matter what it emphasizes, the military threats the United States is or will be most capable of defeating are the ones it is least likely to face, since potential adversaries will be deterred and seek other ways of confrontation. However, with some smart and careful investments, including the recognition that not all parts of the military have to be optimized for the same task, the United States military can both lock in its conventional dominance and continue to improve its ability to succeed in the irregular wars most likely to dominate the landscape in the short to medium term.

ID Number: JA025694
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

Justice and Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan : A Missing Link.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 154, no. 1, February 2009, p. 6-9.)
Author(s):
1. Ledwidge, Frank
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
2. JUSTICE, ADMINISTRATION OF--AFGHANISTAN
Notes:
Recent counter-insurgency doctrine has largely ignored the justice sector. This article, referring to current multinational efforts in Afghanistan, contends that this is a serious mistake. It is an error not made by the Taliban, who are acutely aware of its importance.

ID Number: JA025652
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

Rage Against the Machines : Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars.
Author(s):
1. Lyall, Jason
2. Wilson, Isaiah
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
During the nineteenth century, states routinely defeated insurgent foes. Over the twentieth century, however, this pattern reversed itself, with states increasingly less likely to defeat insurgents or avoid meeting at least some of their demands. What accounts for this pattern of outcomes in counterinsurgency (COIN) wars? The authors argue that increasing mechanization within state militaries after World War I is primarily responsible for this shift. Unlike their nineteenth-century predecessors, modern militaries possess force structures that inhibit information collection among local populations. This
not only complicates the process of sifting insurgents from noncombatants but increases the difficulty of selectively applying rewards and punishment among the fence-sitting population. Modern militaries may therefore inadvertently fuel, rather than deter, insurgencies. The authors test this argument with a new data set of 286 insurgencies (1800-2005) and paired comparison of two U.S. Army divisions in Iraq (2003-2004). They find that higher levels of mechanization, along with external support for insurgents and the counterinsurgent's status as an occupier, are associated with an increased probability of state defeat. By contrast, the authors find only partial support for conventional power- and regime-based explanations, and no support for the view that rough terrain favors insurgent success.

Author(s):
1. Nagl, John A.
2. Burton, Brian M.
Subject(s):
1. LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICTS (MILITARY SCIENCE)--USA
Notes:
Although military force is not always the tool of choice, the U.S. military must continue to improve its ability to conduct post-conflict reconstruction, counterinsurgencies, and train and advise allied security forces, all while simultaneously preserving its major combat capabilities. Balance is the key.

Missing Links: The Evolution of German Counter-Insurgency Thinking. (RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 154, no. 1, February 2009, p. 16-21.)
Author(s):
1. Noetzel, Timo
2. Schreer, Benjamin
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GERMANY
Notes:
The need for COIN operations to tackle the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan is accepted by most coalition members. The German army has yet to adapt to this development. This article examines why the German political establishment still contests the need for counter-insurgency tactics in northern Afghanistan.
Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan.
(SURVIVAL, vol. 51, no. 1, February - March 2009, p. 29-60.)
Author(s):
  1. Roberts, Adam
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
Notes:
The ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan are exposing the
difficulty of applying traditional counter-insurgency doctrine
in today's conditions.
ID Number: JA025551
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

Victory over Terrorism: Essential Services as Counterinsurgency
Strategy.
(JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY, no. 53, 2009, p. 110-115.)
Author(s):
  1. Treistman, Jeffrey Philip
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
  2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
ID Number: JA025704
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

2008

Talking 'Bout Our Generation: Assessing the Concept of
'Fourth-Generation Warfare'.
Author(s):
  1. Benbow, Tim
Subject(s):
  1. WARFARE
Notes:
This article outlines and evaluates the concept of
'fourth-generation warfare' (4GW). It provides an overview of
the arguments made by proponents of the concept, and assesses a
series of criticisms that have been directed against it,
particularly that it tends to exaggerate the decline of the
state and that it does not describe anything truly new. The
article argues that although there are some serious
shortcomings in 4GW theory, it does provide many important
observations about the changing nature of contemporary
conflict. Despite being a flawed model, it is useful as a
corrective to the tendency to focus on state-against-state
warfare.
ID Number: JA024831
Year: 2008
Language: English
Type: ART
Beyond the War on Terror: Into the Fifth Generation of War and Conflict.
Author(s): 1. Reed, Donald J.
Subject(s): 1. MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Notes: Fifth generation warfare has arrived and is irreversibly changing the character and nature of human conflict. It confronts the United States with the evolving strategic dilemma of not only dealing with the War on Terror, but of simultaneously crafting strategies that look beyond military preparedness for past wars and embrace the perspective of national preparedness for the spectrum of future conflicts. This article uses four essential elements of war— the new domains of conflict, the changing nature of adversaries, the changing nature of objectives, and the changing nature of force— to build a generational typology of war and conflict that informs the characteristics of fifth generation warfare. The resultant model produces two outcomes: First, it demonstrates how recent events such as the rise of computer hackers, the 2001 anthrax and the 2003–2004 ricin attacks, the 2004 Madrid bombings, and the emergence of Al Qaeda demonstrate characteristics of fifth generation warfare. Second, it illustrates the way in which these events are unique indicators of a future in which non-state entities are increasingly able to wage war on equal footing with nation-states. The article concludes that the United States must embrace fifth generation warfare if it is to successfully confront these threats that have taken on new and heretofore unimagined forms in the postmodern era of war.

ID Number: JA025099
Year: 2008
Language: English
Type: ART

Mythes et realites des cyberguerres.
(POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 73e annee, no. 4, 2008, p. 829–841.)
Author(s): 1. Samaan, Jean-Loup
Subject(s): 1. INFORMATION WARFARE
Notes: Cyberspace may be physically, syntactically and semantically identified. But the cyberwar is more difficult to define, as it seems to adopt rather classical conceptions. Even though a big bang sending us far from the IT age remains a remote possibility, we nonetheless have to work out operational plans making use of cyberspace elements. Co-operation with the private sector is essential to achieve such an aim.

ID Number: JA025415
Year: 2008
Language: French
Type: ART
In April–May 2007, Estonia experienced several weeks of coordinated cyberattacks against its financial and sociopolitical institutions. Although the origin of these attacks cannot be definitively named, it is widely believed in Estonia and among many analysts that Moscow was behind these attacks. Certainly these attacks represented the culmination of plans set in motion a year earlier to attack the Estonian government and society for their supposedly anti-Russian policies. And the accompanying demonstrations in Tallinn at this time also represented well-worn Soviet techniques used in earlier coups in Eastern Europe. Ultimately the advent of such new forms of military operations confirms a threat assessment by which any one operation on land, sea, air, underwater, or space can target anyone in any of these dimensions and raises provocative issues for both analysts of war and government officials.
effect, making policy corrections far more difficult.

With Friends Like These: Grievance, Governance, and Capacity-Building in COIN.
(PARAMETERS, vol. 38, no. 2, Summer 2008, p. 79-90.)
Author(s):
1. Chamberlain, Robert M.
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
Notes:
The author challenges here an emerging trend within today's military to develop a standardized template for counterinsurgency. Specifically, that portion of the template that assumes enhancing the power of the state will make the population less likely to support insurgents. In developing a rationale for arguing against such a template the author applies the doctrine outlined in FM 3-24 to the 1980-91 insurgency in El Salvador. He believes the lessons gained from an insurgency that ended some 17 years ago provide a valuable guide for leaders dealing with the contradictions inherent in the Long War. The author concludes that while the American military has made significant strides in the tactical and operational aspects of counterinsurgency, it faces great challenges in the strategic realm.

The Art of Petraeus.
(NATIONAL INTEREST, no. 98, November - December 2008, p. 53-59.)
Author(s):
1. Hammes, Thomas X.
Subject(s):
1. USA-- ARMED FORCES
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
Notes:
There is no doubt that General Petraeus's strategies salvaged Iraq. His successes, however, mask a vital policy debate about the future of our armed forces. American leaders must ignore the false choice between forces prepared for counterinsurgency or those trained for conventional warfare. Can we create a military ready for all types of future wars?

(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 153, no. 1, February 2008, p. 36-40.)
Author(s):
1. Lewis, Julian
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
The Folly of 'Asymmetric War'.
(WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 31, no. 3, Summer 2008, p. 33-52.)
Author(s):
1. Nazarr, Michael J.
Subject(s):
1. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
2. USA--MILITARY POLICY
Notes:
Shifting U.S. defense policy to focus on asymmetric threats would distort defense priorities for years to come and trap U.S. armed forces in endless conflicts that military power cannot win.
ID Number: JA024963
Year: 2008
Language: English
Type: ART

Counter-What ? Germany and Counter Insurgency in Afghanistan.
Author(s):
1. Noetzel, Timo
2. Schreer, Benjamin
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GERMANY
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
ID Number: JA024874
Year: 2008
Language: English
Type: ART

Kriegswerkzeug Massenkommunikation : Medien als ein zentraler Faktor im asymmetrischen Konflikt.
(OSTERREICHISCHE MILITARISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT, 65. Jg., Heft 5, September - Oktober 2008, S. 585-594.)
Author(s):
1. Reeb, Hans-Joachim
Subject(s):
1. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
2. MASS MEDIA
ID Number: JA025359
Year: 2008
Language: German
Type: ART

Global Counterinsurgency : Strategic Clarity for the Long War.
Author(s):
1. Roper, Daniel S.
Subject(s):
1. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-
2. INSURGENCY
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
Notes:
America's policy of framing its war against extremists as a 'War on Terrorism' has resulted in an erroneous paradigm for countering terrorism and insurgencies. Not only does this policy mischaracterize the enemy, it obscures an understanding of their techniques and impedes the development and implementation of a strategy to counter the acts of these enemies. The author outlines a number of steps the United States should take to refocus its strategic frame of reference to more effectively address remediating symptoms and the deeper causes associated with such threats. He calls for clear thinking supported by clear language; characterized by
removing the phrase 'war on terrorism' from the official lexicon and replacing it with more precise and descriptive terms. It is this clear articulation of this strategy that will allow for the integration of all the elements of national power in the effective prosecution of America's national security objectives.

Author(s):
1. Sky, Emma
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
2. IRAQ WAR, 2003-
ID Number: JA024828
Year: 2008
Language: English
Type: ART

Notes:
This study explores the meaning of 'dirty war'; a term that has been in increasing usage in popular and academic discussion. It endeavors to detach the phrase from its normative connotations, and using a strategic methodology along with supporting case studies, seeks to arrive at a theoretical exposition of the dirty war concept. The investigation attempts to provide a working definition that helps make sense of the term, and develops some notions of what dirty war might constitute in contradistinction to its antonym, clean war. It is argued that dirty war represents a form of strategic practice occurring in the gray area between the criminal justice and war models of counterinsurgency, and possesses its own distinctive escalatory path. Finally, the analysis returns to the ethical and normative features implicit in the term, pointing to the outstanding dilemmas that continue to permeate the study of war.

Innovation or Inertia: The US Military and the Learning of Counterinsurgency.
(ORBIS, vol. 52, no. 2, Spring 2008, p. 290-310.)
Author(s):
1. Ucko, David
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
Notes:
Following its encounter with insurgent violence in Iraq, the US
Department of Defense (DoD) has sought to improve the US military's ability to conduct counterinsurgency. This effort suggests a potential turning-point in the history of the US military, which has traditionally devoted its attention and resources to 'high-intensity' or 'conventional' combat. Given this institutional culture, what are now the prospects of the US military 'learning counterinsurgency'? In many ways, the ongoing reorientation is promising and targeted, informed directly by the US campaign in Iraq. At the same time, Pentagon priorities still reveal a remarkable resistance to change, and this in spite of the radically altered strategic environment of the War on Terror. Given this intransigence - and the eventual fallout from the troubled Iraq campaign - the ongoing learning of counterinsurgency might very well fail to produce the type of deep-rooted change needed to truly transform the US military.

Feldzugsplanung zur Counterinsurgency.
(OSTERREICHISCHE MILITARISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT, 46. Jg., Heft 2, Marz - April 2008, S. 151-162.)
Author(s):
1. Vego, Milan
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY

Intelligence Sharing for Counter-Insurgency.
(DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS, vol. 24, no. 3, September 2008, p. 281-301.)
Author(s):
1. Walsh, James Igoe
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
2. INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
Notes:
This article analyzes how and why governments co-operating against an insurgency can effectively share intelligence. Host countries facing armed opposition on their territory often secure military and intelligence assistance from allied states.

Confronting Insurgencies : Historical Experience and Policy Responses.
(CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 28, no. 1, April 2007, Special Issue.)
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY

2007
Bits, Bytes and Bullets.
(WORLD TODAY, vol. 63, no. 11, November 2007, p. 20-22.)
Author(s):
  1. Hughes, Rex
Subject(s):
  1. INFORMATION WARFARE
Notes:
The recent decision by the United States to create the world’s first cyberspace command has enormous implications for the future of cyber warfare. As the sole hyperpower, the US stands a good chance of establishing the rules of the game. But, as the current global information and internet hub, it could also lose the most in a major onslaught. While no one can predict the potential for an electronic attack - an 'ePearl Harbour' or an 'e-9/11' - the thought keeps a fair number of Pentagon planners up late at night. Some cyber experts even speculate that a devastating attack on a national power grid could turn a developed country into a third world nation. Information highways need defence just as sea lanes once did.

Redefining Warfare.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 152, no. 1, February 2007, p. 34-39.)
Author(s):
  1. Layton, Peter
Subject(s):
  1. WARFARE
Notes:
This article proposes fresh principles of war based on an examination of war in our times. The principles offered are intended to advance discussion about current operational problems and the building of future forces by describing the contours of modern warfare. They are not intended to be didactic but rather points of departure.

The Fallacy of 'Irregular' Warfare.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 152, no. 4, August 2007, p. 18-24.)
Author(s):
  1. Salmoni, Barak
Subject(s):
  1. WARFARE
ID Number: JA023981
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

Revising the British Army’s Counter-Insurgency Doctrine.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 152, no. 4, August 2007, p. 6-11.)
Author(s):
  1. Alderson, Alexander
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GREAT BRITAIN
ID Number: JA023979
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART
US COIN Doctrine and Practice: An Ally's Perspective.
Author(s):
1. Alderson, Alexander
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
Notes:
The author notes here that throughout history counterinsurgency operations have been viewed as an arduous business, entailing tremendous popular support, political resolve, and resources. He believes that the recent publication of US Army Field Manual 3-24 and US Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 does, for the first time, provide a slight glimmer of hope and a reasonable degree of tactical momentum for the way America attempts to counter insurgent threats. Utilizing his 'ally's perspective' the author reviews the process associated with the drafting of the new documents and their application in Iraq and Afghanistan. From an ally's perspective, he believes the new doctrine reflects sound theory providing the doctrinal underpinning for successful counterinsurgency operations. He believes the new doctrine is to be commended not just for what it says, but for how it translates to effective operations in the field.
ID Number: JA024477
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

Learning, Adapting, Applying: US Counter-Insurgency Doctrine and Practice.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 152, no. 6, December 2007, p. 12-19.)
Author(s):
1. Alderson, Alexander
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
ID Number: JA024509
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

The European Union and Counter-Insurgency: Capability, Credibility, and Political Will.
(CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 28, no. 1, April 2007, p. 182-196.)
Author(s):
1. Bird, Tim
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--EU
Notes:
Contemporary counter-insurgency (COIN) operations demonstrate the necessity of ensuring that military lines of activity are coordinated with wider political, economic, and diplomatic strands. Some observers see the European Union as being uniquely well placed to provide such policy coordination because of its ability to draw on a wide range of civil and military capabilities. This article argues that the EU's potential as a significant and credible COIN actor is, in fact, severely undermined, both by a failure to develop the capabilities required to conduct sustained high-intensity military operations, and also by a strategic discourse that sees such activity as either illegitimate, too problematic, or outside the mission framework typology that has underpinned the development of the EU's security and defence policies. The lack of consensus on an approach, and the absence of the political will to develop one, suggests that, with respect to highly
challenging contemporary COIN operations, the EU has little to offer.

ID Number: JA024463
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

Regular and Irregular Indigenous Forces for a Long Irregular War.
Author(s):
1. Cassidy, Robert
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
2. GUERRILLA WARFARE--USA

ID Number: JA023430
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

La France et les nouvelles menaces.
(POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, no. 117, automne 2007, p. 283-296.)
Author(s):
1. Chauprade, Aymeric
Subject(s):
1. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

Notes:
According to an increasingly popular argument, the nuclear era sounded the death knell for the conventional conflicts between countries that have been the rule for many centuries. We have now entered a period of asymmetrical warfare involving rebel groups and other non-state players. Faced with these new threats, our defense forces are ill-adapted, or so the argument goes. The truth, however, is a little more complicated. First, although asymmetrical wars do exist, they can often be won by conventional means. Secondly, conventional conflicts haven't really disappeared. Within the next few years, the Western world will be confronted with the rise of potentially aggressive and powerfully armed states. Only by focusing on superior firepower and conventional destruction capabilities will the West be able to prevent this type of risk. Instead of dropping its guard, the West should in fact continue to build up modern, high-performance defense forces.

ID Number: JA024238
Year: 2007
Language: French
Type: ART

British Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan.
(DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS, vol. 23, no. 2, June 2007, p. 201-225.)
Author(s):
1. Chin, Warren
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GREAT BRITAIN
2. INSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
4. ISAF

Notes:
The principal focus of this paper concentrates on the counter-insurgency campaign devised by the British to deal with the Taliban and explores the critical challenges confronting British COIN doctrine when fighting in a intra-state conflict like Afghanistan's. In the past, British success in this spectrum of war has relied on a series of pillars of support in the prosecution of such campaigns. Key among these has been an
understanding of the history, culture and language of the people in whose territory the war is being waged, having an effective bureaucratic and security infrastructure through which to conduct the COIN campaign, and centralized national control over the planning process and the resources invested to fight this conflict. Many of these pre-conditions do not exist in Afghanistan and this make the implementation of British COIN strategy extremely challenging.

L'etat de guerre au XXe siecle.
(COMMENTAIRE, vol. 30, no. 120, hiver 2007 - 2008, p. 927-933.)
Author(s):
1. Joffe, Joseph
Subject(s):
1. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
ID Number: JA024302
Year: 2007
Language: French
Type: ART

NATO and Counter-Insurgency: Strategic Liability or Tactical Asset?.
(CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 28, no. 1, April 2007, p. 163-181.)
Author(s):
1. Kay, Sean
2. Khan, Sahar
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--NATO
Notes:
This article examines NATO as a tool for counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. The authors show how its multinational character, reliance on consensus, and limited resources make NATO an unlikely contributor to effective COIN. Its role in the 1995 intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina is used to show that, in a suitably permissive environment, NATO can help to alleviate the conditions that can lead to insurgency movements. However, NATO’s role in Afghanistan shows that the organization has serious limitations in the more challenging circumstances that tend to characterize contemporary COIN. It engaged there in such a way that it was difficult for it to play an effective tactical role, and its strategic liabilities were increasingly exposed. The article puts forward ways in which NATO might be reformed to take a more positive role in COIN and concludes that if it cannot make such a transition, its decline as a relevant tool for international security management will accelerate.
ID Number: JA024461
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

Is UK Doctrine Relevant to Global Insurgency?.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 152, no. 2, April 2007, p. 34-38.)
Author(s):
1. Mackinlay, John
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GREAT BRITAIN
ID Number: JA023625
Year: 2007
Language: English
Author(s):
  1. Metz, Steven
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
  2. INSURGENCY
Notes:
This article is an insightful review of the role that insurgencies have played throughout history and what the strategy portends for the future. The author develops his thesis based on the belief that America erred in its look back to the insurgencies of the twentieth century when formulating counterinsurgency doctrine following 9/11. He believes that the United States has once again used the lessons from old conflicts to derive new strategies; in essence, again preparing to fight the last war. He challenges the military and the defense analytical community to reexamine the lessons learned from the insurgencies of the twenty-first century. The author believes the lessons of Somalia, Bosnia, Congo, and Sierra Leone are much more applicable to today's strategic environment than those modeled on Vietnam and Algeria. He concludes that whether counterinsurgency operations remain a primary mission for the US military or not, we should never again fall into the intellectual trap of confronting new security challenges with outdated ideas and old strategies.
ID Number: JA024476
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

An American View of Twenty-First Century Counter-Insurgency.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 152, no. 4, August 2007, p. 12-16.)
Author(s):
  1. Nagl, John A.
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
ID Number: JA023980
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

Strategic Realignment: Ends, Ways, and Means in Iraq.
Author(s):
  1. Reider, Bruce J.
Subject(s):
  1. INSURGENCY--IRAQ
  2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
Notes:
This article contends that America has overly simplified the conflict in Iraq by defining it primarily as an insurgency. The author utilizes Clausewitz's relationship of ends, ways, and means, the 'paradoxical trinity' to analyze the current situation. He concludes that America needs to refocus its strategy beyond counterinsurgency operations to address the low-grade, civil war and terrorist activities that continue to contribute to instability. It is only through this rebalancing of ends, ways, and means that the United States can realize an acceptable political-end state, achievable within the means the nation is willing to expend, and the ways we as a nation support.
The Military and Reconstruction Operations.
Author(s):
  1. Ryan, Mick
Subject(s):
  1. POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION--AFGHANISTAN
  2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
Notes:
The author paints here a revealing picture of the missions Provincial Reconstruction Teams are undertaking in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of counterinsurgency operations. The convergence of military and non-military tasks is creating an ever-increasing demand for military forces to participate in the conduct of humanitarian missions in support of these operations. The author believes that in many cases, the effects of reconstruction activities are much more critical to the success of counterinsurgency campaigns than tactical operations. The author does not minimize the necessity for robust combat forces, but rather, emphasizes the requirement for the proper balance between kinetic and nonkinetic capabilities.

The Fallacy of 'Irregular' Warfare.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 152, no. 4, August 2007, p. 18-24.)
Author(s):
  1. Salolini, Barak
Subject(s):
  1. WARFARE
ID Number: JA023981
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 152, no. 6, December 2007, p. 8-11.)
Author(s):
  1. Strachan, Hew
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GREAT BRITAIN
ID Number: JA024508
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

Counter-Insurgency : Echoes from the Past.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 152, no. 5, October 2007, p. 18-22.)
Author(s):
  1. Torpy, Glenn
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GREAT BRITAIN
ID Number: JA024259
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART
A Small Wars Service.
(JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY, no. 44, 2007, p. 28-33.)
Author(s):
1. Worley, D. Robert
Subject(s):
1. SPECIAL FORCES (MILITARY SCIENCE)--USA
2. LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICTS (MILITARY SCIENCE)
Notes:
Small wars are not small in the sense of importance, resources committed, or losses sustained. In scale they are national. Scale of operations is achieved not only through greater numbers but also through headquarters that have the capacity to plan, sustain, and command at the theater-strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Conventional forces have those characteristics, by their focus is on major wars, putting small wars at a disadvantage. A common solution is to assign highly focused Special Operations Forces (SOF) to conventional force commands where they are often poorly utilized. Accordingly, this article proposes establishing a new Special Operations Corps.
ID Number: JA023210
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

2006

Systems Thinking and Counterinsurgencies.
Author(s):
1. Baker, Jim
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
This article presents the essentials of a successful counterinsurgency strategy by applying a technique known as systems thinking. The fundamentals of good strategic thought lie both in recognizing the most significant interactions between different players, how they influence each other in unexpected ways, and how to measure progress in achieving the ends of the strategy. Systems thinking has proven successful in other contexts at explaining human behavior, policy choices, unintended consequences, and the resistance of systems to change. It also offers insight into how to assess one of the most difficult questions related to strategy in complex environments - how to know when the strategy has been successful.
ID Number: JA023373
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

The More You Know, the Less You Understand : The Problem with Information Warfare.
Author(s):
1. Betz, David J.
Subject(s):
1. INFORMATION WARFARE
2. NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE
3. REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS
4. MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE--TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS
Notes:
Since the 1991 Gulf War military analysts have talked of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), the idea that just as the 'Information Era' has transformed how societies live and work
it has also transformed the way that they fight. Advocates of the two derivative concepts of the RMA, Information Warfare (IW) and Network-Centric Warfare (NCW), are distinguished from each other in that the former sees information as a potential weapon in and of itself whereas the latter seeks to exploit data to make regular weapons more effective. But both make exaggerated and misleading claims because the experience of recent campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq suggests that both IW and NCW are extremely tricky to implement in practice. Moreover, 'information' is a double-edged sword which benefits, strengthens, and enhances the operational effectiveness of non-conventional forces as much as or more than it does conventional forces.

ID Number: JA022699
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 151, no. 5, October 2006, p. 52-55.)

Author(s):
1. Fayutkin, Dan

Subject(s):
1. INFORMATION WARFARE--CHECHNYA (RUSSIA)
2. CHECHNYA (RUSSIA)--HISTORY--CIVIL WAR, 1994-

Notes:
This article analyzes the Chechens' psychological warfare against the Russians between 1994 and 2006. Particular emphasis is given to the propaganda placed in the Russia media. In fact, the Chechen information campaign had a significant influence on the development of the conflict. During its initial phases, the Chechens did not exploit every information warfare tool available to them; rather, they concentrated their efforts on psychological, electronic and computer warfare.

ID Number: JA022993
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

Outfitting a Big-War Military with Small-War Capabilities.

Author(s):
1. Melillo, Michael R.

Subject(s):
1. USA--MILITARY POLICY
2. USA--STRATEGIC ASPECTS
3. WARFARE

Notes:
The author looks back over the past four years of the Global War on Terrorism and concludes that the US military was so predisposed in preparing for conventional warfare that it failed to recognize the threat posed by irregular enemies. It was only after 9/11 that America's military realized the character of warfare had changed radically. The author analyzes the lessons of Baghdad, Fallujah, and other Iraqi and Afghan towns to highlight the need for change in the 'American way of war'. He traces the transformation of American military strategy and doctrine throughout history to conclude that a major shift in military culture is required if we are to be successful in developing the way American armed forces approach the business of war. The author's analysis leaves the reader with an understanding that America's military is indeed in the midst of a transformation, but not one based on technological evolution; rather, this transformation is fueled by nontraditional threats.
Challenges in Fighting a Global Insurgency.
(PARAMETERS, vol. 36, no. 2, Summer 2006, p. 15-29.)
Author(s):
1. Barno, David W.
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
2. USA--MILITARY POLICY
Notes:
The author provides readers with a soldier's view of how America might successfully conduct a global counterinsurgency. He believes we are at risk of failing to understand the very nature of the war we are fighting - a war of intelligence and perceptions. The author warns that even an unbroken series of military victories in a global counterinsurgency will not ensure strategic success. He concludes that America's military must size ownership of 'war-winning' as well as 'war-fighting' if it is to accomplish its mission of defending the society it is pledged to protect.

Friends like These: Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism.
Author(s):
1. Byman, Daniel L.
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
2. TERRORISM--PREVENTION--USA
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY
4. TERRORISM--PREVENTION
Notes:
US allies that are fighting al-Qaeda-linked insurgencies often suffer illegitimate regimes, civil-military tension manifested by fears of a coup, economic backwardness, and discriminatory societies. These problems, coupled with allies' divergent interests, serve to weaken allied military and security forces tactically, operationally, and strategically. The ability of the United States to change its allies' behavior is limited, despite the tremendous difficulties these problems create, because relying on allied forces is a key component of US strategy in the war on terrorism and the US goal of handing off security to Iraqi military forces. To reduce the effects of allies' weaknesses, the United States should try to increase its intelligence on allied security forces and at times act more like a third party to a conflict. In addition, Washington must have realistic expectations of what training and other efforts can accomplish.
The Long Small War: Indigenous Forces for Counterinsurgency.
Author(s):
  1. Cassidy, Robert M.
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
Notes:
The author develops his thesis based on the belief that the use of indigenous forces in any counterinsurgency will not only yield significant increases in the quantity of troops on the ground, but also an exponential improvement in actionable intelligence. The author provides an analysis of American and French experiences with indigenous forces in various counterinsurgencies. He then concludes with a recommendation that the employment of such forces should be under the direction of a joint or combined interagency counterinsurgency task force. What makes this recommendation unique is the structure of the task force. The author's design would include elements from the armed services' conventional forces, Special Operations Forces, the CIA, Department of State, and indigenous intelligence units. Such an organization would then be capable of carrying out the full range of counterinsurgency operations within any autonomous area.
ID Number: JA022603
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

Brutality or Restraint.
(INTERNATIONALE POLITIK, vol. 7, no. 2, Spring 2006, p. 78-89.)
Author(s):
  1. Creveld, Martin van
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
Counterinsurgency campaigns have proven a very tricky business. In fact, there are surprisingly few examples of successful counterinsurgency actions while there are dozens of examples that have ended in debacle. Two campaigns that worked were Syria's putdown of the Muslims Brothers uprising in the early 1980s and the British Army's campaign in northern Ireland. Both illustrate very different ways to go about it.
ID Number: JA022634
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

Military Persuasion, Intelligence and the War on Terror.
(DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS, vol. 22, no. 1, March 2006, p. 61-72.)
Author(s):
  1. Cimbala, Stephen J.
Subject(s):
  1. STRATEGY
  2. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
  3. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
  4. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-
Notes:
In waging modern war or making peace, the mastery of military persuasion will be indispensable. Military persuasion is based on intelligence and the shrewd application of intelligence to the problem of formulating strategy. Intelligence supports military persuasion in a number of ways. Intelligence lets us see and know the battlespace and communicate what we know to shooters and commanders in a timely manner. But beyond this vital and immediate visual and electronic mapping of war in
good time, intelligence provides anticipatory political and military information that may make possible the avoidance of war by means of successful diplomatic coercion or other means of non-belligerent conflict resolution. Intelligence is as valuable in this regard as it is vulnerable to the inevitable distortions of technical glitches and human nature. Intelligence evolves, along with military persuasion, in a world that refuses to stand still involving new technologies, more actors, adaptive threats and undoubtedly unforeseen systemic disturbances.

ID Number: JA022276
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

Combats de demain : le futur est-il previsible ?.
(POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 71e annee, no. 3, 2006, p. 595-607.)
Author(s):
1. Desportes, Vincent
Subject(s):
1. WARFARE
2. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
3. ARMED FORCES
Notes:
Dans les engagements a venir des forces, le national le cedera sans doute au multinational, le militaire au civilo-militaire et le materiel a l'humain. Ces glissements, deja largement perceptibles aujourd'hui, contraignent a imaginer une profonde mutation dans la finalite, les moyens et les formes de l'action militaire. Ce qui comptera demain, autant que la superiorite technique et la taille des forces, c'est leur souplesse et leur capacite d'adaptation a un environnement tres changeant.

ID Number: JA022971
Year: 2006
Language: French
Type: ART

Break Point ? Iraq and America's Military Forces.
Author(s):
1. Gordon, Michael R.
Subject(s):
1. USA--ARMED FORCES
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
Notes:
In terms of its doctrine and training, the United States military has been transformed by the war in Iraq. The army, which is carrying the principal load among the military services, has embraced counter-insurgency as one of its primary missions. These changes reflect the military's ability to adapt to the changing battlefield. They are intended not only to guide the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also future operations in the 'long war' against violent Islamic extremists. The new emphasis on counter-insurgency, however, is largely disconnected from the Defense Department's previously established spending priorities and personnel policy. The result is that American defence is in a state of strategic confusion. There are not enough forces to effectively carry out counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan while maintaining a strategic reserve for other threats. To fully exploit the long overdue emphasis on counter-insurgency, maintain sufficient forces for dealing with unanticipated contingencies and bring coherence to American defence strategy, the Pentagon needs to increase the United States' ground forces.
Fighting Insurgency on Sacred Ground.
(WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 29, no. 2, Spring 2006, p. 149-166.)
Author(s):
1. Hassner, Ron E.
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
Iraqi insurgents are using their own mosques as operational bases, often forcing US military commanders to choose between desecrating a sacred space or letting insurgents escape. Israel and India, along with experience from Iraq to date, offer four core lessons for how to respond.

De Marighella a Ben Laden : passerelles strategiques entre guerilleros et djihadistes.
(POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 71e annee, no. 2, 2006, p. 385-396.)
Author(s):
1. Hecker, Marc
Subject(s):
1. JIHAD
2. GUERRILLA WARFARE
3. TERRORISM--RELIGIOUS ASPECTS--ISLAM
Notes:
La conscience de l'asymetrie des forces en presence, la necessite d'innover tactiquement pour survivre dans un tel contexte, celle de se gagner un soutien politique large qui inverse le rapport des forces materielles : ces trois elements au moins rapprochent les djihadistes d'aujourd'hui des combattants et guerilleros anticolonialistes et anti-imperialistes des annees 1950 et 1960. Ce parallele peut suggerer d'utiles questions sur la maniere de combattre le terrorisme contemporain, sous ses diverses formes.

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq.
(STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 29, no. 2, March 2006, p. 103-121.)
Author(s):
1. Hoffman, Bruce
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
Notes:
The United States has long been frustrated in fighting insurgencies. An almost unbroken string of mostly ill-fated experiences in effectively prosecuting this unique blend of political-military operations can be traced backward over nearly half a century from the situation in Iraq today to the early 1960s, when the US became heavily engaged in Indochina's wars. Vietnam and Iraq thus form two legs of a historically fraught triangle - with America's experiences in El Salvador in the 1980s providing the connecting leg. The aim of this article
is to use the present as prologue in order to understand in counterinsurgency terms where we have gone wrong in Iraq: what unique challenges the current conflict in Iraq presents to the US and other coalition military forces deployed there; and what light both shed on future counterinsurgency planning, operations and requirements.

From the War on Terror to Global Counterinsurgency.
Author(s):
1. Hoffman, Bruce
Subject(s):
1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
3. TERRORISM--PREVENTION--USA

Complex Irregular Warfare : The Next Revolution in Military Affairs.
(ORBIS, vol. 50, no. 3, Summer 2006, p. 395-411.)
Author(s):
1. Hoffman, Frank G.
Subject(s):
1. USA--ARMED FORCES--REORGANIZATION
2. DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION--USA
Notes:
At the time of the 9/11 attacks, Washington was embarking on a defense transformation emphasizing missile defense, space assets, precision weaponry, and information technology. This transformation proved irrelevant to the national security threats we now face, with the emergence of nontraditional adversaries pursuing 'complex irregular warfare'. US forces will have to assume a much more expeditionary character to successfully deal with Islamists' complex irregular warfare. The March 2005 US National Defense Strategy provides a balance to the longstanding American military emphasis on major-theater war, but it remains to be seen whether the military's new interest in operations other than conventional, major-combat operations will last or if it will diminish as soon as a new peer competitor rises, allowing the Pentagon to return to its more familiar paradigm.

Counter-Insurgency Redux.
Author(s):
1. Kilcullen, David J.
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
Counter-insurgency is fashionable again: more has been written on it in the last four years than in the last four decades. This is heartening for those who were in the wilderness during the years when Western governments regarded counter-insurgency as a distraction, of interest only to historians. So it is no
surprise that some have urged the re-discovery of classical, 'proven' counter-insurgency methods. But today's insurgencies differ significantly - at the level of policy, strategy, operational art and tactical technique - from those of earlier eras. An enormous amount of classical counter-insurgency remains relevant. Indeed, counter-insurgency provides the 'best fit' framework for strategic problems in the 'war on terror'. But much is new in counter-insurgency redux, possibly requiring fundamental reappraisals of conventional wisdom.

Learning about Counter-Insurgency.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 151, no. 6, December 2006, p. 16-21.)
Author(s):
  1. Kiszely, John
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
  How well do militaries, in general, learn the lessons of counter-insurgency? What factors affect this learning process? And what might the answer to these questions tell us about how armed forces should approach the subject of learning about counter-insurgency in the future? This article sets out to answer these questions.

Les impasses de la contre-insurrection.
(POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 71e annee, no. 4, 2006, p. 849-861.)
Author(s):
  1. Luttwak, Edward N.
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
  2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
Notes:
  Les nouvelles recommandations des generaux americains pour faire face a l'insurrection irakienne risquent de s'averer vaines. Celles-ci traduisent en effet les reticences des responsables politiques americains a gouverner directement les territoires envahis. Pourtant, les recettes d'une contre-insurrection reussie sont connues. Elles sont applicables en Irak comme sur d'autres theatres, mais le refus ethique et inevitable de les mettre en oeuvre place les occupants dans une situation difficile.

Structural Vulnerabilities of Network Insurgencies : Adapting to the New Adversary.
Author(s):
  1. Muckian, Martin J.
Subject(s):
  1. INSURGENCY
  2. INSURGENCY--IRAQ
  3. COUNTERINSURGENCY
  4. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
This article examines the distinction between Maoist and modern insurgencies and the implications for counterinsurgency methods. First, it contrasts the two types of insurgencies in terms of their organizations and strategies. Building on that information, it analyzes the vulnerabilities of Maoist and modern insurgencies in their organization, political cohesion, support base, and use of information technology. From this analysis, it draws conclusions about how to modify twentieth century methods to combat the modern insurgent. The purpose of this article is not to propose a comprehensive strategy for a modern counterinsurgency. Instead, it examines one component of such a plan - understanding and exploiting the insurgent's structural vulnerabilities. It does not exhaust this analysis; the conclusions drawn here are demonstrative of the possibilities inherent in this methodology. Throughout the article, the conflict in Iraq is used as an illustrative example of a modern insurgency. The Iraqi insurgency is thus far the most advanced embodiment of netwar, where small groups coordinate, communicate, and conduct their campaigns in an interneted manner, without a precise central command. As such, this conflict is a powerful predictor of the future of insurgency.

ID Number: JA023372
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

Conflits asymetriques et stabilisation, l'illusion de la bataille decisive.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE ET SECURITE COLLECTIVE, 62e annee, no. 3, mars 2006, p. 125-140.)
Author(s):
1. Rols, Yves F.
Subject(s):
1. ASymmetric warfare
2. IRAQ war, 2003-
Notes:
Les situations auxquelles font face les forces americaines dans le 'Triangle sunnite' irakien, la force francaise Licorne en Cote-d'Ivoire ou l'armee israelienne dans les 'Territoires occupes' illustrent bien le type de conflits auxquels nous continuerons vraisemblablement a etre confrontes dans un avenir previsible. Il s'agit d'engagements essentiellement non-conventionnels, avec des adversaires 'asymetriques' cherchant a atteindre nos vulnerabilites plutot qu'a s'engager dans un affrontement direct. Sans prejuger de l'issue des conflits en cours, les difficultes rencontres, notamment en Irak, doivent nous inciter a nous interroger sur la facon d'aborder cette sorte d'operations et tout particulierement la phase de stabilisation dont depend le retour a la normale.

ID Number: JA022316
Year: 2006
Language: French
Type: ART
Afghanistan : reduire l'insurrection : le cas du Sud-Est.
(POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 71e annee, no. 1, 2006, p. 105-118.)

Author(s):
1. Trives, Sebastien

Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN

Notes:
L'insecurite s'accroit dangereusement dans nombre de regions d'Afghanistan. Dans le sud-est du pays, le developpement de l'insurrection est aide de l'exterieur, mais il depend aussi de facteurs internes : la force des structures tribales, des reseaux religieux traditionnels, la faible presence du gouvernement central, etc. Une strategie globale de contre-insurrection est necessaire, qui prenne en compte l'ensemble de ces facteurs, avec un engagement renouvelle de la communauta internationale.

ID Number: JA022429
Year: 2006
Language: French
Type: ART

2005

Psychological Operations and Counterterrorism.
(JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY, no. 37, 2005, p. 105-110.)

Author(s):
1. Post, Jerrold M.

Subject(s):
1. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
2. TERRORISM--GOVERNMENT POLICY

ID Number: JA021413
Year: 2005
Language: English
Type: ART

War Evolves into the Fourth Generation.
(CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 26, no. 2, August 2005, p. 189-228.)

Author(s):
1. Hammes, Thomas X.

Subject(s):
1. WARFARE

Notes:
Posing the most serious challenge to international security today, fourth-generation warfare (4GW) uses all available networks - political, economic, social and military - to convince the enemy's political decision-makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. It is rooted in the fundamental precept that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power. 4GW does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy's military forces. Instead, combining guerrilla tactics or civil disobedience with the soft networks of social, cultural and economic ties, disinformation campaigns and innovative political activity, it directly attacks the enemy's political will. Over the past 50 years, 4GW has defeated superpowers in Vietnam, Somalia, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Chechnya. Each time, using protracted campaigns, the insurgents defeated the will of the enemy rather than his military. In sum, 4GW is political, socially (rather than technically) networked and protracted in duration. It is the antithesis of the high-technology, short war the Pentagon is preparing to fight.

ID Number: JA021863
Year: 2005
Les défis de l'asymétrie.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE, 61e année, no. 2, février 2005, p. 121-130.)
Author(s):
1. Bechon, Jean-Christophe
Subject(s):
1. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
Notes:
Les armées européennes doivent relever les défis de l'asymétrie
pour remporter un combat qui met en jeu à la fois la stabilité
des relations internationales et la cohérence de nos sociétés.
Elles en possèdent les capacités, au prix d'un effort
d'adaptation et de coopération plus étroite avec les acteurs
civils de ces crises. Après avoir tenté de définir les
différents cas d'asymétrie, cet article présente les tactiques
possibles pour un outil militaire conventionnel, fondues sur la
dissuasion et l'action, avant d'en tirer des pistes de
reflexion pour l'armée française aujourd'hui.
ID Number: JA021262
Year: 2005
Language: French
Type: ART

Future Warfare: Or, the Triumph of History.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 150, no. 5, October 2005, p. 16-19.)
Author(s):
1. Gray, Colin
Subject(s):
1. MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE--FORECASTING
2. WAR--FORECASTING
ID Number: JA021924
Year: 2005
Language: English
Type: ART

Cyber War und Cyber Terrorismus als neue Formen des Krieges.
(OSTERREICHISCHE MILITARISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT, 43. Jg., Heft 2, Marsz-
April 2005, S. 203-211.)
Author(s):
1. Unger, Walter F.
2. Vetschera, Heinz
Subject(s):
1. CYBERTERRORISM
2. NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE
3. INFORMATION WARFARE
ID Number: JA021314
Year: 2005
Language: German
Type: ART

Does the Iraq War Reflect a Phase Change in Warfare ?.
(DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS, vol. 21, no. 2, June 2005, p. 121-142.)
Subject(s):
1. WARFARE
2. IRAQ WAR, 2003-
Notes:
The purpose of this article is twofold. At one level it is
interested in the pattern of historical change in warfare,
trying to find out if the dynamics of the Iraq War reflect a
continuous, evolutionary process of change or rather a
discontinuous transition in the framework of a process of
'punctual equilibrium'. At another level it is interested in the practical implications of the war for defense policies and military planning of Western democracies. If one accepts the second interpretation, then it follows that a business-as-usual approach in defense policies and planning is enough. The first interpretation, on the other hand, means that the new form of warfare will only be realized if a radical policy agenda is enacted.

The Struggle to Transform the Military.
(FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol. 84, no. 2, March - April 2005, p. 103-118.)
Author(s):
1. Boot, Max
Subject(s):
1. USA--ARMED FORCES--REORGANIZATION
2. DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION--USA
Notes:
The fighting in Iraq has exposed the limits of Donald Rumsfeld's transformation agenda. The US military remains underprepared for dealing with guerrillas, and such unconventional threats will grow in coming years. The next stage of military transformation must focus on training large numbers of infantry for nation building and irregular warfare - and Washington must make that task a top priority.

Small Wars Revisited: The United States and Nontraditional Wars.
(JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, vol. 28, no. 6, December 2005, p. 913-940.)
Author(s):
1. Hoffman, Frank G.
Subject(s):
1. LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICTS (MILITARY SCIENCE)
2. USA--STRATEGIC ASPECTS
Notes:
Despite its own extensive experience in nontraditional wars, the United States has rarely excelled at this portion of the conflict spectrum in the past half century. Its current conventional military superiority will ensure that it gets much more experience in today's Small Wars Century, an era that began in the 1950s with the rise of revolutionary warfare. For several decades, thanks in large part due to lingering myths from the Vietnam war, this area has been a conceptual and intellectual orphan in US professional military institutions. Without understanding the past, and how new conditions impact the relevance of this experience as a guide, US military planners and policy makers will be unable to translate America's intentions into effective campaigns. Without a sound grasp of history and the characteristics of nontraditional war as part of the overall social phenomena of war, the US will continue to find its overwhelming military dominance irrelevant to its most pressing security interests.
Controlling Global Insurgency.
(JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, vol. 28, no. 4, August 2005, p. 597-617.)
Author(s):
1. Kilcullen, David J.
Subject(s):
1. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-
2. INSURGENCY
3. TERRORISM
4. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
Notes:
This article suggests that the War on Terrorism is actually a campaign against a globalized Islamist insurgency. Therefore, counterinsurgency approaches are more relevant to the present conflict than traditional terrorism theory. Indeed, a counterinsurgency approach would generate subtly, but substantially different, policy choices in prosecuting the war against Al Qaeda. Based on this analysis, the article proposes a strategy of 'disaggregation' that seeks to dismantle, or break, the links in the global jihad. Like containment in the Cold War, disaggregation would provide a unifying strategic conception for the war - a conception that has been somewhat lacking to date.
ID Number: JA022059
Year: 2005
Language: English
Type: ART

How to Win in Iraq.
(FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol. 84, no. 5, September - October 2005, p. 87-104.)
Author(s):
1. Krepinevich, Andrew F.
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY--IRAQ
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY
3. IRAQ WAR, 2003-
Notes:
Because they lack a coherent strategy, US forces in Iraq have failed to defeat the insurgency or improve security. Winning will require a new approach to counterinsurgency, one that focuses on providing security to Iraqis rather than hunting down insurgents. And it will take at least a decade.
ID Number: JA021797
Year: 2005
Language: English
Type: ART

(COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 24, no. 4, October - November 2005, p. 361-378.)
Author(s):
1. MacFadden, Eric M.
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GREAT BRITAIN
Notes:
To successfully engage and destroy the increasing contemporary insurgent threat, the US must develop standing, multifunctional, capabilities-based joint interagency task forces primarily focused on counterinsurgency operations. This research examines the critical elements of the British counterinsurgency campaign during the Malayan Emergency : 1948-1960. While not all inclusive, analysis of this campaign
provides a starting point of annotation of critical capabilities required for the future conduct of counterinsurgency operations. These capabilities, combined with contemporary insurgent vulnerabilities, will define the critical capabilities required to derive the counterinsurgency team. Furthermore, this study proposes the requisite US government national assets necessary to shape the team. Lastly, this paper recommends the organizational structure and the team's relationship to the combatant command in order to facilitate its definitive and relative employment.

**Why the Strong Lose.**


**Author(s):**

1. Record, Jeffrey

**Subject(s):**

1. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

**Notes:**

The author examines the question of how weaker powers are able to impose considerable military and political pain on the strong (especially democracies). The article provides readers with a historical perspective of the general factors common to 'great-power' losses to weaker adversaries, with particular attention given to recent American experiences. The author's analysis of why the weak are capable of defeating (or at least stalemating) the strong leads to the determination that such outcomes are as old as war itself. Experience shows that often it is the side with the superior strength of commitment that overshadows any military inferiority in time of conflict. The author argues that it is the American military's aversion to unconventional warfare that has placed it at a disadvantage against weaker foes. He opines that it is our 'infatuation with the perfection of military means that has caused us to ignore the political purpose on behalf of which those means are being employed'. He determines that it is not a policy question of whether or not the United States should continue to maintain its conventional primacy, but rather, given the current security environment, should it place more emphasis on forces dedicated to performing operations other than war.

**Konfliktkommunikation in Zeiten asymmetrischer Kriegführung.**

(OSTERREICHISCHE MILITARISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT, 43. Jg., Heft 2, Marz - April 2005, S. 212-216.)

**Author(s):**

1. Schober, Wolfgang

**Subject(s):**

1. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
2. MASS MEDIA AND WAR

**Notes:**

Konfliktkommunikation in Zeiten asymmetrischer Kriegführung. (OSTERREICHISCHE MILITARISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT, 43. Jg., Heft 2, Marz - April 2005, S. 212-216.)

**Author(s):**

1. Schober, Wolfgang

**Subject(s):**

1. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
2. MASS MEDIA AND WAR

**ID Number:** JA022182

**Year:** 2005

**Language:** English

**Type:** ART

**ID Number:** JA022136

**Year:** 2005

**Language:** English

**Type:** ART

**ID Number:** JA021313

**Year:** 2005

**Language:** German

**Type:** ART
Defeating Transnational Insurgencies: The Best Offense Is a Good Fence.
Author(s):
1. Staniland, Paul
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
Transnational insurgencies' unique challenges are not amenable to the offensive strategies that the Bush Doctrine emphasizes against terrorism. History strongly suggests that embracing a containment strategy, combining border defenses with aggressive propaganda and international intelligence cooperation, would be more successful in Iraq and beyond.
ID Number: JA022189
Year: 2005
Language: English
Type: ART

Rethinking the Concept of Asymmetric Threats in US Strategy.
(COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 23, nos. 4 - 5, 2004, p. 343-367.)
Author(s):
1. Blank, Stephen
Subject(s):
1. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
2. USA--STRATEGIC ASPECTS
Notes:
Threat assessment is a critical element in the formulation of any state's strategy, policy, and defense doctrine. It also should be an inherently critical process that liberates policymakers from incorrect, antiquated, or misconceived perceptions. Therefore the US strategic community engages in a never-ending debate over the nature of the threats confronting America. In recent years the term asymmetric threat has become something of a mantra covering every kind of threat even to the degree of labeling the German offensives of 1918 as asymmetric. This essay is an extended critique of the way in which we think about asymmetric threats and argues for a different way of perceiving and analyzing the threats we face. Even if the kinds of threats we face are serious and real, mislabeling and misconceiving them does a disservice to US strategy and policy. Thus new thinking about the nature of the threat is called for.
ID Number: JA021229
Year: 2004
Language: English
Type: ART

The Perils of Counterinsurgency: Russia's War in Chechnya.
Author(s):
1. Kramer, Mark
Subject(s):
1. CHECHNYA (RUSSIA)--HISTORY--CIVIL WAR, 1994-
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
Notes:
The author provides a military overview of the latest Russian-Chechen war, which began in 1999. He examines the tactics used by Chechen guerrillas and the responses of Russian military and security forces. He explains why Russian troops have been unable to crush the separatist insurgency and why Chechen fighters have resorted to increasingly deadly acts of terrorism, including mass hostage-taking and suicide bombings in Moscow. These terrorist attacks have greatly reduced the prospect of a lasting political settlement. Although some of
the problems that have dogged Russian forces in Chechnya are unique to that particular conflict, the prolonged war illustrates the general difficulty of counterinsurgency operations.

Reconsidering Asymmetric Warfare.  
(JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY, no. 36, 2004, p. 102-108.)

Author(s):  
1. Lambakis, Steven J.

Subject(s):  
1. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

Global Counterinsurgency : Without Strategy.  
(WORLD TODAY, vol. 60, no. 2, February 2004, p. 7-9.)

Author(s):  
1. Mackinlay, John

Subject(s):  
1. IRAQ WAR, 2003-  
2. POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION--IRAQ  
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ  
4. INSURGENCY--IRAQ

Notes:
Successes like the capture of Saddam Hussein are morale boosters for security forces in Iraq and may help to ensure victory for President George Bush in his re-election bid. Hopefully they will also demonstrate to the Iraqi people that the coalition is gradually progressing at a tactical level. However, this flush of success also encourages the coalition to continue to operate without a campaign plan. On both sides of the Atlantic, leaders have failed to reveal a genuine counter-insurgent strategy for Iraq or, on a global scale, for the threat of radical Islamic activism. The two are linked and the absence of a strategic concept in Iraq is a microcosm of a larger global failure.

Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare.  
(PARAMETERS, vol. 34, no. 1, Spring 2004, p. 16-28.)

Author(s):  
1. Tomes, Robert R.

Subject(s):  
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY

Notes:
The author revisits a number of classical works on counterinsurgency warfare to reveal common lessons and themes applicable to the current situation in Iraq. He does warn, however, that America's experience in Vietnam offers little for those planning or engaged in counterinsurgency operations. The author concludes it will require more than just dusting off the classics if America's military is to fully understand and inculcate the lessons-learned, insights, and perspectives required for successful counterinsurgency operations.
Les conflits asymetriques : l'avenir de la guerre ?.
(REVUE INTERNATIONALE ET STRATEGIQUE, no. 51, automne 2003, p. 81-150
(plusieurs articles).)
Subject(s):
  1. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
ID Number: JA019640
Year: 2003
Language: French
Type: ART

Operations psychologiques, fonction operationnelle indispensable.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE, 59e annee, no. 10, octobre 2003, p. 148-159.)
Author(s):
  1. Chauvancy, Francois
Subject(s):
  1. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
Notes:
  Les nombreuses operations engagees depuis 1992 ont conduit peu a
peu les etats-majors en operations a employer la fonction
appelee 'operations psychologiques' par l'OTAN, en
complementarite des autres fonctions notamment dans les
operations de soutien de la paix. D'un emploi initialement
empirique, elle a désormaiais trouve sa place dans les theatres
des operations pour participer a la resolution des conflits
dans lesquels sont engagees les democraties.
ID Number: JA019765
Year: 2003
Language: French
Type: ART

Controlling Computer Network Operations.
(STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 26, no. 3, May - June 2003,
p. 215-232.)
Author(s):
  1. Rathmell, Andrew
Subject(s):
  1. INFORMATION OPERATIONS
Notes:
  The development of Information Operations and, more particularly,
  Computer Network Operations (CNO), has been paralleled by calls
to control both the military and the criminal/terrorist use of
these capabilities. The need for multilateral action to control
criminal and terrorist activity is acknowledged and is being
pursued through mechanisms such as the Council of Europe.
Efforts to control military use of CNO through arms control or
multilateral behavioral norms are, however, being undermined by
the failure of the leading powers to resolve a strategic
dilemma : whether to prioritize exploitation of their CNO
advantage for national security purposes or protection of the
global information environment on which it depends. In
resolving this dilemma, Western strategists need to take into
account two increasingly important features of the security
environment - global interdependency and the role of the
private sector.
ID Number: JA019375
Year: 2003
Language: English
Type: ART
National Security in the Information Age.
(CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 24, no. 1, April 2003, Special Issue.)
Subject(s):
1. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
2. SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL
Notes:
This issue examines from multiple perspectives how one of the most important social transformations in history - the information technology revolution - has affected the provision of security. Advances in computerized information and telecommunications technologies have been accompanied by related innovations in management and organizational practices and structures. These changes together have set in motion forces that challenge many of the conceptual and ethical premises that have been the stock and trade of national security experts for the past half century. The information revolution has redefined what it means to be vulnerable by making the most advanced societies the most vulnerable to attack, simply because they are more information dependent. The information revolution has redefined who can pose a significant threat by diffusing and redistributing power to traditionally weaker state actors and non-state actors, empowering them to do harm. The information revolution has altered expectations about conflict among democratic societies, too. Recent experience has shown that voters are uneasy with anything other than extremely accurate killing.

Osama bin Laden and Guerrilla War.
(STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 26, no. 3, May - June 2003, p. 163-170.)
Author(s):
1. Chipman, Don D.
Subject(s):
1. BIN LADEN, OSAMA, 1957-
2. GUERRILLA WARFARE
3. TERRORISM
Notes:
Is Osama bin Laden just an evil person or is he a thoughtful, determined adversary with a well-planned strategy? This article outlines how bin Laden, as a mujahideen fighter in the Soviet Afghanistan War, became familiar with Mao's protracted guerrilla concept, and he later proclaimed its significance in developing his Jihad warfare strategy.

On Dinosaurs and Hornets: A Critical View on Operational Moulds in Asymmetric Conflicts.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 148, no. 4, August 2003, p. 60-63.)
Author(s):
1. Hirsch, Gal
Subject(s):
1. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
Notes:
This article focuses on characteristics of asymmetric conflict and challenges to the operational commander. First, the author addresses three central aspects of the operational challenges facing the operational commander in such conflicts: enemy operational moulds; urbanization; sudden shifts and an unstable
context. Second, he suggests operational solutions to these challenges. Finally, he touches on the issue of decision in asymmetric conflicts and the key question: can decisive victories be achieved in this kind of conflict.

ID Number: JA019484
Year: 2003
Language: English
Type: ART

Unorthodox Thoughts about Asymmetric Warfare.
(PARAMETERS, vol. 33, no. 2, Summer 2003, p. 4-18.)
Author(s):
1. Meigs, Montgomery C.
Subject(s):
1. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
Notes:
This article analyzes the combination of asymmetry and the ability of terrorists to devise 'idiosyncratic' means for unorthodox approaches to warfare. The author uses history to demonstrate the distinction between asymmetric and idiosyncratic attack and the resulting impact on the current operational and strategic environments. He concludes that although the concept of asymmetry is important, it is operational idiosyncratic attack and its potential that hold the greatest threat to national and military security.

ID Number: JA019167
Year: 2003
Language: English
Type: ART

La guerre asymetrique et l'avenir de l'Occident.
(POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 68e annee, no. 1, printemps 2003, p. 25-40.)
Author(s):
1. Metz, Steven
Subject(s):
1. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
Notes:
Une ere nouvelle s'est substituee a la guerre froide : celle de la guerre asymetrique. Paradoxalement, c'est l'efficacite des puissances occidentales en materie de guerre conventionnelle qui a poussé leurs adversaires a privilegier des strategies d'asymetrie (la guerilla, l'insurrection, la guerre prolongee), face auxquelles ces memes armees occidentales ne sont ni les plus adaptees ni les plus efficaces. Les Etats occidentaux doivent donc rever leur approche des questions de securite, revoir la place de l'armee dans l'organisation militaire, creer des structures nouvelles (par exemple pour centraliser les ripostes a des cyber-attaques), adapter le cadre normatif et juridique des conflits armes, et surtout consolider leur foi dans leurs valeurs et leurs modele politiques. L'asymetrie a deplace l'espace du conflit vers les medias, les manifestations de rue, les Nations unies et autres theatres de la lutte politique et psychologique. A l'Occident de se montrer, sur ce terrain mouvant, aussi efficace et convaincant que sur le champ de bataille.

ID Number: JA019075
Year: 2003
Language: French
Type: ART
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq.
Author(s):
1. Metz, Steven
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
2. IRAQ WAR, 2003–
3. INSURGENCY--IRAQ
Notes:
The United States faces an intractable dilemma in Iraq: insurgency if its stays or instability if it leaves. The sooner that a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy, based on six principles, can be implemented, the better the chances to forestall the threat.
ID Number: JA020143
Year: 2003
Language: English
Type: ART

Strategic Leader Readiness and Competencies for Asymmetric Warfare.
Author(s):
1. Williams, Thomas J.
Subject(s):
1. COMMAND OF TROOPS
2. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
Notes:
The author is well aware of the criticism leveled against today's senior military leaders for being too cautious, devoid of creativity, and lacking in the ability to engage in 'out-of-the-box' thinking. He builds his thesis on the premise that the leadership skills, traits, and attributes of today's senior leaders are being redefined by asymmetric warfare. The author contrasts the leadership skills and attributes required of 'conventional warriors' throughout history with those facing asymmetric threats. He then provides a list of selective attributes and competencies required to promote the mental readiness and strategic agility required of today's senior leaders.
ID Number: JA019168
Year: 2003
Language: English
Type: ART

2002

(COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 21, no. 2, 2002, p. 107-114.)
Author(s):
1. Jajko, Walter
Subject(s):
1. INFORMATION OPERATIONS--USA
Notes:
The dependence of modern military establishments on information and information systems, the increase worldwide in information systems, and their interconnection and interdependence offer opportunities for their exploitation through hostile information operations. The U.S. Department of Defence has issued a departmental policy directive and a joint military doctrine for the conduct of information operations by U.S. armed forces. A close examination of these two documents reveals many fundamental disconnects, contradictions, and gaps affecting peacetime and wartime operations. Unresolved, these issues could significantly alter the course and outcome of a military operation or a national security policy.
Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror.
(PARAMETERS, vol. 32, no. 1, Spring 2002, p. 5-14.)
Author(s):
1. Gray, Colin S.
Subject(s):
1. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
Notes:
The author examines the character of asymmetric threats and cautions that traditional attempts to define such threats have generally been unproductive. The author provides eight basic characteristics of asymmetry and then applies each in the context of terrorism to determine how the United States should react tactically, operationally, and strategically. He cautions American military planners not to become overly focused on asymmetry, thereby ignoring other legitimate threats.

Low-intensity Conflicts: Why the Gap Between Theory and Practice?
(DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS, vol. 18, no. 1, March 2002, p. 15-38.)
Author(s):
1. Kober, Avi
Subject(s):
1. LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICTS (MILITARY SCIENCE)
Notes:
This article addresses the following questions: (1) Why is it that strategic thinkers have done such an unsatisfactory job in crystallizing a theory of LIC?; and (2) What needs to be done to fill the gap between the importance of LICs and their theoretical coverage, if anything?

Understanding 'Asymmetric' Threats to the United States.
(COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 21, no. 4, 2002, p. 241-277.)
Author(s):
1. Lambakis, Steven
2. Kiras, James
3. Kolet, Kristin
Subject(s):
1. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
2. USA--NATIONAL SECURITY
Notes:
This article evaluates whether the concept of asymmetry has analytical utility and characterizes the threat environment facing the United States. The concept of asymmetry has come to bear too great a burden, as it is used to explain: different and challenging threats; the United States' position in the world and the security challenges it faces; US legal and political self-imposed constraints; vulnerabilities to new and old threats; and novel approaches designed to offset US strengths. The term does reflect the uncertainty that currently exists in the international security environment, and it does impress upon us that the United States is either vulnerable to some menace or unprepared at some level to cope with a
selection of modern-day threats. Yet, can such a concept serve defense planners and policy makers well? This article finds that the utility of the term 'asymmetry' for understanding security matters has diminished since it was introduced in the mid-1990s. Examination of specific uses of the term 'asymmetry' indicates that the frequent references today to threats that are so labeled do little to help order defense priorities. Given the international security realities and the analytical shortcomings of this concept, and given the clear imperative today to clarify national defense priorities, the relatively young concept of asymmetry will fade from defense jargon in the years ahead.

ID Number: JA018491
Year: 2002
Language: English
Type: ART

Asymmetric Threats to the United States.
Author(s):
1. Kolet, Kristen S.
Subject(s):
1. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
Notes:
Asymmetric strategies attempt to circumvent an opponent's advantage in capabilities by avoiding his strengths and exploiting his weaknesses. Through the application of military, political, economic, and technological leverage, asymmetric strategies may undermine an opponent's strengths. Although one contestant may not be able to win on a traditionally framed battlefield, the strategies employed may nullify the adversary's conventional advantages, erode his will to fight, disrupt his ability to operate effectively, or deter him from action entirely.

ID Number: JA017137
Year: 2001
Language: English
Type: ART

WAR.com - the Internet and Psychological Operations.
(JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY, no. 28, Spring - Summer 2001, p. 13-17.)
Author(s):
1. Lungu, Angela Marie
Subject(s):
1. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
2. INTERNET
Notes:
Cyberspace 'clickskrieg' represents a dramatic shift in strategic thinking that changes the way we look at war. As an information medium and vehicle of influence, the Internet is a powerful tool in open societies as well as others where the only glimpse of the outside world increasingly comes from Web pages, e-mail, and chat rooms. This electronic innovation cuts both ways, as enemies adopt the Internet as a vehicle for influencing public opinion or inciting hostility against the United States. The Armed Forces must be able to wage war online. Consequently, the realm of military psychological operations (PSYOP) must be expanded to include the Internet.

ID Number: JA017681
Year: 2001
Language: English
Type: ART
Irregular Warfare and the Internet.
(STRATEGIC REVIEW, vol. 29, no. 2, Spring 2001, p. 49-52.)
Author(s):  
 1. Lungu, Angela M.
Subject(s):  
 1. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE  
 2. INTERNET
Notes:  
The face of warfare has evolved with the advent of the Internet,  
and US modern warfare, including psychological operations, has  
also reflected these changes. The use of the Internet as a  
medium of psychological operations was used effectively for the  
first time during the Zapatista revolution, which used the  
Internet to pass symbolic messages to a target audience, as  
well as to raise international and domestic support (both  
perceived and actual).
ID Number: JA016712  
Year: 2001  
Language: English  
Type: ART

Munitions of the Mind: Strategic Information Operations.
Author(s):  
 1. Amico, Robert D'  
 2. Lynn, Dennis  
 3. Wexler, Eric S.
Subject(s):  
 1. INFORMATION OPERATIONS
Notes:  
'Strategic Information Operations' (SIO) is the integration,  
deployment, and control of media and information as a  
non-lethal means to channel perceptions in a favorable  
direction to our political aims. In general, SIO requires a  
national-level integrative effort to ensure unity of effort in  
pursuing national interests and values around the globe, and in  
protecting the US homeland. Data were gathered from interviews  
of senior decision-makers and leaders both inside and outside  
government service from defense, diplomatic and academic  
fields.
ID Number: JA016259  
Year: 2001  
Language: English  
Type: ART

La guerra cibernetica.
(POLITICA EXTERIOR, vol. 15, no. 80, marzo - abril 2001, p. 131-149.)
Author(s):  
 1. Wegener, Henning
Subject(s):  
 1. INFORMATION WARFARE  
 2. CYBERTERRORISM  
 3. INTERNET--LAW AND LEGISLATION
Notes:  
Las tecnologicas de la informacion han llegado tambien a la esfera  
de la seguridad. En un fenomeno que no conoce fronteras, la  
defensa nacional requiere estrategias y medios para prevenir y  
afrontar ataques ciberneticos. La cooperacion multilateral y  
las legislaciones nacionales probablemente sean insuficientes  
para actuar contra delitos de esta naturaleza.
ID Number: JA016444  
Year: 2001  
Language: Spanish  
Type: ART
Back to the Future with Asymmetric Warfare.
Author(s):
  1. Goulding, Vincent J.
Subject(s):
  1. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
ID Number: JA015979
Year: 2000
Language: English
Type: ART

War and Culture in the Information Age.
Author(s):
  1. Mahnken, Thomas G.
Subject(s):
  1. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY--USA
  2. USA--ARMED FORCES
Notes:
The integration of information and related technologies into military organizations and doctrine may radically alter the way we fight on land, at sea, and in the air, and bring conflict into the information spectrum and outer space. It will also reshape the organizations that wage war. Just as past transformations of war have influenced military culture, the information revolution today is changing the role of the military in society, the composition of the armed forces and the shape of each of the military services. Fully exploiting the emerging revolution in warfare will require a substantial change in service culture.
ID Number: JA014908
Year: 2000
Language: English
Type: ART

Les actions dans les champs psychologiques.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE, 56eme annee, no. 2, fevrier 2000, p. 29-44.)
Author(s):
  1. Francart, Loup
Subject(s):
  1. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
ID Number: JA014944
Year: 2000
Language: French
Type: ART

Les operations psychologiques au service de la strategie militaire.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE, 56eme annee, no. 12, decembre 2000, p. 71-86.)
Subject(s):
  1. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
ID Number: JA016044
Year: 2000
Language: French
Type: ART
Is There a Military Utility to Information Operations?.
(DEFENSE ANALYSIS, vol. 16, no. 3, December 2000, p. 277-297.)
Author(s):
1. Ager, J. N.
Subject(s):
1. INFORMATION OPERATIONS
Notes:
The author's concern is with the rapid developments in
digitization, connectivity and information that are impacting
on the battlespace and encapsulated in the term 'information
operations' (IO). This is yet another area where decision-makers
face a major challenge and one with which not all states have
fully come to terms. The author notes the increasing reliance
on information to inform, and timely decision-making, but it
also has opened up opportunities to corrupt and manipulate
enemy data. Termed 'Computer Network Attack', the potential to
undermine enemy decision-making has received high priority in
the USA, but noticeably less so in the UK. While the capability
raises substantial, if not difficult, ethical, legal and
political issues, the conclusion is that the UK should develop
a CAN capability and the policy to accompany it as a matter of
priority. Perhaps then it might go some way to achieving Sun
Tzu's aspiration of defeating the enemy without having to
fight.

ID Number: JA016702
Year: 2000
Language: English
Type: ART

Information Operations - Challenge or Frustration?.
(MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, vol. 24, no. 5, 2000, p. 86-89.)
Author(s):
1. Bosch, J. M. J.
Subject(s):
1. INFORMATION OPERATIONS
Notes:
Information Operations can only be understood in the broader
context of change and continuity. Cyberspace is, like land,
sea, air and space a dimension in which war can be waged, where
defence is a necessity while attack is a possibility. There is
a close relationship between information-based warfare and
Information Operations; IOs do not only impact the military
domain, they may also influence national, international and
even global layers of connectivity. In the end all layers need
command and control to keep order in the system. After all it
is man who decides and acts. We face new threats; the challenge
is here and now. The frustration comes with the complexity of
the challenge.

ID Number: JA015468
Year: 2000
Language: English
Type: ART

Informations-Operationen.
(EUROPAISCHE SICHERHEIT, 49. Jg., Nr. 2, Februar 2000, S. 14-18.)
Author(s):
1. Theuerkauf, Thomas
Subject(s):
1. INFORMATION OPERATIONS
Notes:
Already today is the information and communications technology
both in the civilian and military fields the dominating
influence factor for the effectiveness of an overall system.
Information requirements in the armed forces increase
constantly, among other things due to the wide variety of
thinkable missions, the higher dynamics of military operations and the growing efficiency of reconnaissance, command control and weapon systems as well as the application of the information and communications technology. Information operations must be regarded as a new form of fighting out conflicts between nations or other organizations, groupings and individual actors.
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