THEMATIC BIBLIOGRAPHIES
No. 6/2002

KOSOVO:
LESSONS AND CHALLENGES AHEAD

LE KOSOVO : LEÇONS ET DÉFIS À VENIR

Bibliographies Thématiques
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COMMENT OBTENIR D’AUTRES PUBLICATIONS DE LA BIBLIOTHEQUE:

In order to move towards a resolution of Kosovo's final status, two distinct aspects need to be considered: an 'external' and an 'internal' dimension. The 'external' dimension involves devising a process to address final status, including all of the different actors with a stake in Kosovo's future. The 'internal' dimension concerns the development of Kosovo's own democratic institutions, the rule of law and human rights, so as to prepare Kosovo for whatever final status might eventually be agreed. These dimensions are duly treated in a pair of reports sharing a common title, 'A Kosovo Roadmap'. Together, these reports comprise a roadmap that shows two, parallel paths which need to be negotiated simultaneously in order to reach the desired destination: a stable, democratic Kosovo, standing on its own feet, peacefully integrated in its region, and with a clearly defined place in the international community.
be agreed. These dimensions are duly treated in a pair of reports sharing a common title, 'A Kosovo Roadmap'. Together, these reports comprise a roadmap that shows two, parallel paths which need to be negotiated simultaneously in order to reach the desired destination: a stable, democratic Kosovo, standing on its own feet, peacefully integrated in its region, and with a clearly defined place in the international community. Part II discusses benchmarks for assessing progress in Kosovo's internal development. It is often argued that, given the lack of functioning institutions and the unsatisfactory position of minorities in Kosovo, it is too soon to begin considering Kosovo's eventual status. However, while the achievement of such benchmarks must influence the timing of the implementation of an agreed final status, it should not determine what that status should be. This is because the decision on Kosovo's final status is itself of key importance in achieving a stable Kosovo and a stable region. The fact that much remains to be done internally is no reason to delay a formal consideration of the relative merits of different options for final status.'

ID number: 80017855
Year: 2002

338.9 /00663
iii, 34 p.; ill.; 30 cm.
(ICG Balkans Report ; 123)
Subject(s):
1. KOSOVO (SERBIA)--ECONOMIC POLICY
2. KOSOVO (SERBIA)--HISTORY--CIVIL WAR, 1998-1999--RECONSTRUCTION
Added entry(s):
1. International Crisis Group (BE)
Notes:
accessed 23/01/02.

'Kosovo cannot have a stable future without sustainable economic development. This report considers the task of promoting such development. After surveying the present state of the economy, it assesses the international efforts so far to lay the groundwork for future prosperity. It also considers the prospects for the former socially owned sector, including plans for privatisation and prospects for restructuring and investment.'

ID number: 80017778
Year: 2001

321 /00633
Quel statut pour le Kosovo? - Paris: Institut d'Etudes de Securite de l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale.
vii, 119 p.; 24 cm.
(Cahiers de Chaillot ; 50)
Subject(s):
1. KOSOVO (SERBIA)--INTERNATIONAL STATUS
Added entry(s):
1. Institut d'Etudes de Securite de l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale (FR)
2. Triantaphyllou, Dimitrios, ed.
Notes:
'L'exception du Kosovo, avec toutes ses ramifications juridiques et politiques, continue de preoccuper l'ensemble de la region des Balkans et la communautee internationale. Apres etre intervenue, sur une base juridique incertaine, afin d'empecher un genocide des Albanais du Kosovo, la communautee internationale, les pays occidentaux notamment, s'est retrouvee aux prises avec l'exception du Kosovo. Forte de 22 000 hommes,
l'opération, qui a été le plus grand déploiement en temps de guerre en Europe depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale, est le seul exemple d'histoire moderne de renversement d'un processus de suppression systématique de groupes ethniques. Le casse-tête du Kosovo traduit surtout les contradictions entre les options et les choix politiques de la communauté internationale, compte tenu de la tâche quasiment impossible que représentent l'application de préceptes universels et le traitement cohérent des conséquences. Joue également la question très importante du statut. Le sort du Kosovo reflète la désintégration continue de la Yougoslavie et en dépend. Ses liens avec le Monténégro et la Serbie - le triptyque qui maintient la République fédérale de Yougoslavie (RFY) sous sa forme actuelle - ne devraient pas être négligés à une époque où les autorités du Monténégro ne reconnaissent plus la légitimité du gouvernement fédéral. Au-delà de l'avenir de la Fédération et des ses liens avec le statut définitif du Kosovo, la situation interethnique au Kosovo même mérite d'être examinée soigneusement dans la mesure où elle détermine les avantages et les inconvénients de la forme actuelle et future du Kosovo. L'objectif de ce Cahier de Chaillot est d'explorer tous les aspects de la question du Kosovo telle qu'elle se présente aujourd'hui. Six spécialistes connus ont été invités à présenter leurs perspectives sur la question de statut. L'essence du statut futur du Kosovo se résume à une équation fondamentale : elle doit être résolue dans un cadre qui ne cherche pas à dissuader mais au contraire encourage la stabilité et la coopération régionales.'
perspective on the status issue. The essence of the future
status of Kosovo boils down to a basic equation - it needs to
be resolved in a framework which abets, rather than deters,
regional stability and cooperation.'

ID number: 80017565
Year: 2001

341.3 /00104
Persons Missing in Relation to the Events in Kosovo from January 1998 -
209 p.; 35x24 cm.
Subject(s):
1. MISSING PERSONS--KOSOVO (SERBIA)--REGISTERS
2. KOSOVO
Added entry(s):
1. International Committee of the Red Cross (CH)

Notes:
'The events in Kosovo have left thousands of families without news
of their relatives. Members of all communities are caught
between hope and despair, uncertain about the fate of their
loved ones. To date, more than 3525 persons are still reported
missing, their names are in this book.'

ID number: 80017162
Edition: 2nd ed.
Year: 2001

323 /00679
The Southern Balkans : Perspectives from the Region - Paris : Institute
for Security Studies of Western European Union.
v, 68 p.; 24 cm.
(Chaillot Papers ; 46)
Subject(s):
1. BALKAN PENINSULA--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
2. UNITED NATIONS--ARMED FORCES--KOSOVO (SERBIA)
3. NATO--ARMED FORCES--KOSOVO (SERBIA)
4. EU--BALKAN PENINSULA
5. BALKAN PENINSULA--FOREIGN RELATIONS
Added entry(s):
1. Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union (FR)
2. Triantaphyllou, Dimitrios, ed.

Notes:
'Recently, the Southern Balkans have become the focal point of
European (and American) interest in the wider Balkan region,
with a low-intensity conflict in southern Serbia, an unsettled
security situation in Kosovo and the most serious threat facing
FYROM's sovereignty in its brief existence. These developments
merit serious consideration. On the other hand, the longer-term
issues of state-building, economic and political
reconstruction, combating organised crime and corruption,
resolving the various questions of status that are pending, and
integration with the rest of Europe remain on the agenda. This
paper attempts to address some of these issues from a regional
perspective. For the first time, authors from South-Eastern
Europe exclusively, and the southern Balkans in particular,
have been asked to contribute collectively to a Chaillot Paper.
The contributors come from different countries or entities and
have points of view that could be said to be diametrically
opposed to each other. The authors were all asked to address
the same set of questions pertaining to how they envision the
future of South-Eastern Europe. More specifically, they were
asked to give their perceptions of the role of the
international community and what the key impediments to
stability in the region were. Though the approaches they have
taken in answering have differed considerably, each has in
effect provided a vision of the issues and difficulties ahead.
The most striking feature of the four contributions is the authors' seemingly pro-interventionist rhetoric: all four call for the active participation of the European Union (and the Euro-Atlantic community to a certain degree) in their affairs. The reasons vary, as do the criticisms of Europe's role to date, but the message is clear. This unambiguous message can only lead to one course of action for the European Union. In other words, the EU should not lose sight of the fact that, if integration and stability are to become permanent processes in the region, it has to set the agenda.'

ID number: 80017102
Year: 2001

496.3 /00335
Alliance Politics, Kosovo, and NATO's War: Allied Force or Forced Allies?
New York: Palgrave.
xiv, 246 p.; 22 cm.
ISBN/ISSN: 0312238177
Subject(s):
1. NATO--ARMED FORCES--KOSOVO (SERBIA)
2. KOSOVO (SERBIA)--HISTORY--CIVIL WAR, 1998-1999
Added entry(s):
1. Martin, Pierre, ed.
2. Brawley, Mark R., ed.
Notes:
Includes index.
'As NATO's first hostile offensive military action, Operation Allied Force placed new demands and pressures on the Alliance. Those pressures and demands offer an opportunity to answer critical questions regarding Alliance politics: How much autonomy do the Alliance members have? Does the U.S. dictate Alliance policy? Can the Alliance function politically while engaging in combat? Contributors explore the experience of NATO's members individually as well as in terms of implications for theories of alliances. More fundamentally, the contributors to this volume ask whether Operation Allied Force reflected a consensus among NATO's members, or whether some members were 'Forced Allies'.
Year: 2000

496.3 /00321
Collaboration between NATO and International Organizations: The Basis for Peace and Stability in Europe?: The Balkans: A Case Study = La collaboration entre l'OTAN et les organisations internationales: une clef de voute pour la paix et la stabilité en Europe: Les Balkans: un cas d'école - Wesseling: Konrad Adenauer Foundation.
205 p.; 30 cm.
Subject(s):
1. NATO--ARMED FORCES--KOSOVO (SERBIA)
2. NATO--ARMED FORCES--FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
3. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS--NATO
Added entry(s):
1. Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers
2. Confederation Interalliee des Officiers de Reserve
Notes:
ID number: 80017026
Year: 2000

323 p. : ill.; 17 cm.
(Axes ; 22)
ISBN/ISSN: 2802713825

Subject(s):
1. KOSOVO (SERBIA)--HISTORY--CIVIL WAR, 1998-1999
2. NATO--ARMED FORCES--KOSOVO (SERBIA)
3. USE OF FORCE (INTERNATIONAL LAW)

Added entry(s):
1. Morand, Charles-Albert, ed.

Notes:
Bibliography : p. 299-313. Includes index.

'Le present ouvrage cherche a comprendre et a expliquer, d'un point de vue historique, politique et juridique, le conflit qui a eclave au Kosovo en mai 1999. La partie consacree a l'histoire de la region met en lumiere les multiples manipulations et reappropriations, a des fins strategiques, d'un passe riche et complexe. La partie politique quant a elle, montre que l'intervention de l'OTAN, pourtant geographiquement localisee, a eu des consequences geopolitiques importantes sur l'ensemble des Balkans. La partie juridique traite de la difficile question de savoir si des violations massives des droits de l'homme rendent licite l'emploi de la force armee.'

ID number: 80016998
Year: 2000


x, 222 p.; 22 cm.
ISBN/ISSN: 074531631X

Subject(s):
1. KOSOVO (SERBIA)--HISTORY--CIVIL WAR, 1998-1999
2. MASS MEDIA AND WAR
3. NATO--ARMED FORCES--KOSOVO (SERBIA)

Added entry(s):
2. Herman, Edward S., ed.

Notes:

'The media served a highly partisan and propagandistic role in NATO's Kosovo war, uncritically reproducing official spin in a way that was incompatible with their proclaimed democratic role as objective purveyors of information. This is the first book to integrate a critical interpretation of Western policy toward the former Yugoslavia with an analysis of media coverage of the Kosovo crisis and war. It offers an important corrective to the hysteria and misinformation that permeated media coverage of the war, and analyses how the war was reported in different countries around the world, including the United States, Britain, Germany, India, Greece, Russia, and France.'

ID number: 80017902
Year: 2000
xxi, 113 p.; 30 cm.
(RAND Publications ; MR-1391-AF)
ISBN/ISSN: 083330388
Subject(s):
1. NATO--ARMED FORCES--KOSOVO (SERBIA)
Added entry(s):
1. Rand Corporation (US)
Notes:
'This report, a dispassionate assessment of Operation Allied Force, provides perspectives from both sides of the Atlantic as well as political and military implications. The campaign highlighted the growing gap between US military capabilities and those of Europe, and the potential consequences of joining a limited-objective operation that expands to undesirable proportions and duration.'
ID number: 80017659
Year: 2001

NATO's Empty Victory : A Postmortem on the Balkan War - Washington : Cato Institute.
vii, 194 p. ; ill. ; 24 cm.
ISBN/ISSN: 1882577868
Subject(s):
1. NATO--ARMED FORCES--KOSOVO (SERBIA)
2. KOSOVO (SERBIA)--HISTORY--CIVIL WAR, 1998-1999
3. INTERVENTION (INTERNATIONAL LAW)
Added entry(s):
1. Carpenter, Ted Galen, ed.
2. Cato Institute (US)
Notes:
Includes index.
'NATO political leaders claim that the war against Yugoslavia was a great victory, the authors of these essays disagree. The war lasted for longer than anticipated and triggered a refugee crisis. The book offers proposals for preventing the 'victory' becoming an even bigger policy fiasco.'
ID number: 80017043
Year: 2000

Regional Stability and Reconstruction in South-Eastern Europe - [s.l.] : NATO Parliamentary Assembly.
13 p.; 30 cm.
Subject(s):
1. BALKAN PENINSULA--ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
2. STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE
3. NATO--ARMED FORCES--KOSOVO (SERBIA)
4. KOSOVO (SERBIA)--HISTORY--CIVIL WAR, 1998-1999
5. BALKAN PENINSULA--NATIONAL SECURITY
6. EUROPE, SOUTHEASTERN
Added entry(s):
1. NATO Parliamentary Assembly (BE)
Notes:
ID number: 80016701
Year: 2000
La stabilite regionale et la reconstruction de l'Europe du Sud-Est -
[.s.l.] : Assemblee Parlementaire de l'OTAN.
16 p.; 30 cm.
Subject(s):
1. BALKAN PENINSULA--ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
2. STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE
3. NATO--ARMED FORCES--KOSOVO (SERBIA)
4. KOSOVO (SERBIA)--HISTORY--CIVIL WAR, 1998-1999
5. BALKAN PENINSULA--NATIONAL SECURITY
6. EUROPE, SOUTHEASTERN
Added entry(s):
1. Assemblee Parlementaire de l'OTAN (BE)
Notes:
Seminaire Rose-Roth. Compte rendu du secretariat, Ohrid,
1 l'Ex-Republique Yougoslave de Macedoine, 29 juin-ler juillet
2000.
ID number: 80016700
Year: 2000

Depleted Uranium in Kosovo : Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment -
154 p. : ill.; 30 cm.
Subject(s):
1. DEPLETED URANIUM
2. KOSOVO (SERBIA)--HISTORY--CIVIL WAR, 1998-1999
Added entry(s):
1. United Nations Environment Programme
Notes:
Bibliography: p. 148-152.
<http://balkans.unep.ch/du/reports/report.html>
'This report presents the findings of the first-ever international
assessment of the environmental impact of depleted uranium (DU)
when used in a real conflict situation. It has been carried out
as part of the post-conflict assessments conducted by the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in the Balkans.'
ID number: 80017088
Year: 2001

Konfliktentwicklung auf dem Westbalkan - Wien : Bundesministerium fur
Landesverteidigung.
43 p. : ill.; 24 cm.
(Informationen zur Sicherheitspolitik ; 24)
Subject(s):
1. CRISIS MANAGEMENT--BALKAN PENINSULA
2. KOSOVO (SERBIA)--HISTORY--CIVIL WAR, 1998-1999
3. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT--FRY
4. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT--KOSOVO (SERBIA)
Added entry(s):
1. Gustenau, Gustav E., ed.
2. Bundesministerium fur Landesverteidigung (AT)
ID number: 80016516
Year: 2000
The Kosovo Crisis: The End of the Post-Cold War Era

Atlantic Council of the United States.

iii, 27 p.; 28 cm.

(Occasional Paper)

Author(s):

1. Arbatov, Alexei G.

Subject(s):

1. KOSOVO (SERBIA)--HISTORY--CIVIL WAR, 1998-1999--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
2. NATO--ARMED FORCES--KOSOVO (SERBIA)
3. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
4. RUSSIA (FEDERATION)--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA

Notes:

'NATO's military operations against Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999 represented a watershed in the post-Wold War II history of Europe. Even from the vantage point of US policy, the decision to lead a NATO operation against a European state on account of a dispute concerning its own national territory was a remarkable one, notwithstanding the steady development of the crisis triggered by Serbia's behavior that may have made the actual outbreak of war seem more like an incremental step to implement the threats previously made. But for many other countries, the US and NATO decision was no less fateful, while often appearing in a rather different perspective. This paper is a lucid and thorough analysis of how the crisis and NATO's action affected opinion in Russia and Russian views of the prospects for US-Russia relations.'

ID number: 80016808
Year: 2000

The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya


vii, 48 p.; 23 cm.

(Marshall Center Papers; 2)

ISBN/ISSN: 1930831021

Author(s):

1. Arbatov, Alexei G.

Subject(s):

1. RUSSIA (FEDERATION)--MILITARY POLICY
2. RUSSIA (FEDERATION)--NATIONAL SECURITY
3. NATO--ARMED FORCES--KOSOVO (SERBIA)
4. CHECHNYA--HISTORY--RUSSIAN INVASION, 1999--

Notes:

'After an unprecedent decade of disarmament, de-targeting of nuclear missiles, cooperation, and transparency in defense and security matters between Russia and the US, NATO's attack on Serbia in 1999 ended the post-Cold War era. The author provides an authoritative view of Russia's current security position. Russian perceptions of the Kosovo conflict, as well as lessons learned from their own war in Chechnya, have transformed their highest official documents. The revised Military Doctrine and National Security Concept reflect Russia's new emphasis on nuclear deterrence and nuclear first use as the main pillars of Russian security; robust conventional defense against a 'Balkan-type' attack by NATO; and regular employment of the armed forces to deal with local, including domestic, conflicts. This paper not only examines the effects of Kosovo and Chechnya, but also considers threats to national interests, analyzes current military strategy, ponders the importance of
arms control agreements, and weighs several different options for Russian force posture in the year 2010.'

ID number: 80016802
Year: 2000

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32 p.; 30 cm.
(Occasional Papers ; 35)
Author(s):
  1. Chevallier, Eric
Subject(s):
  1. UNITED NATIONS--ARMED FORCES--KOSOVO (SERBIA)
  2. KOSOVO (SERBIA)--INTERNATIONAL STATUS
  3. INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION
Added entry(s):
  1. Institut d'Etudes de Securite de l'Union Europeenne (FR)
Notes:
'Par la resolution 1244 du Conseil de Securite, pour la premiere fois dans l'Histoire, les Nations unies se sont vu confier au Kosovo a partir du mois de juin 1999 une mission d'un nouveau type, visant non plus seulement a maintenir la paix mais a la construire. Dans la perspective de missions ultérieures, fondees sur un mandat de meme nature, ce texte cherche a faire un certain nombre de propositions fondees sur cette experience, plus particulierement a propos : des questions liees a l'etablissement de la loi et de l'ordre, et plus specifiquement les difficultes rencontres dans la definition du droit applicable ou de l'etablissement d'un systeme judiciaire et policier efficace, multiethnique et impartial; de celles touchant au processus de democratisation qui fut amorce rapidement au travers de l'organisation de premières elections, municipales des l'automne 2000, mais aussi du soutien a l'emergence de la societe civile et de medias libres et independants respectueux des regles deontologiques elementaires; de celles tenant a la creation de services publics et d'une administration, dont il fut decide qu'elle associerait des le depart les Kosovars de toutes communautes, dans une logique de responsabilisation des acteurs locaux, comme facteur majeur de stabilisation; et enfin, de celles relatives a la reconstruction et au developpement economique, dans une tension permanente entre les imperatifs de court terme et la necessite de creer les bases d'une economie de marche viable sur le long terme.'

ID number: 80017976
Year: 2002
'Ugly, shocking, frightening, war came to Europe once more in March 1999. The world watched in dismay as Yugoslavia's military machine attacked its own citizens in the province of Kosovo. As had happened so often since the end of the Cold War, ethnic conflict had turned deadly, and the great powers seemed reluctant to get involved. This time, however, the United States and its allies intervened. Using an innovative, high-technology air operation, NATO brought modern military power to bear against Serb forces in the field and the machinery of repression that backed them up. It was modern war - limited in scope, measured in effect, extraordinarily complex in execution. And in the end, after ten weeks of steadily intensifying air attack, the Yugoslav troops were withdrawn and the Kosovar Albanians returned to their homes. Remarkably, the alliance held together despite the strains of war and the tug of differing national interests. In this book, the author recounts not only the events that led to armed conflict, but also the context within which he made the key strategic decisions. The author also describes, for the first time, how he walked the tightrope of high diplomacy and military strategy and navigated the crushing restraints of domestic politics. As the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, the author faced a task far more daunting than simply when and where to deploy his forces and weapons. The author also had to mediate numerous conflicts that threatened to derail the alliance's efforts against the regime of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic - conflicts between the Europeans and the Americans, between the policy makers and the journalists, between the diplomats and the military men. The war in Kosovo may have been short in duration, but it was a harbinger of the new realities of war-fighting and war-planning, and the author offers a blueprint for how modern militaries must adapt to meet the challenges of a new era.'
After eleven weeks of bombing in the Spring of 1999, the US and NATO ultimately won the war in Kosovo. Serbian troops were forced to withdraw, enabling an international military and political presence to take charge in the region. But was this war inevitable or was it the product of failed Western diplomacy prior to the conflict? And once it became necessary to use force, did NATO adopt a sound strategy to achieve its aim of stabilizing Kosovo? In this first in-depth study of the Kosovo crisis, the authors answer these and other questions about the causes, conduct, and consequences of the war. Based on interviews with many of the key participants, they conclude that notwithstanding important diplomatic mistakes before the conflict, it would have been difficult to avoid the Kosovo war. That being the case, US and NATO conduct of the war left much to be desired. For more than four weeks, the Serbs succeeded where NATO failed, forcefully changing Kosovo's ethnic balance by driving 1.5 millions Albanians from their homes and more than 800,000 from the country. Had they chosen to massacre more of their victims, NATO would have been powerless to stop them. In the end, NATO won the war by increasing the scope and intensity of bombing, making serious plans for a ground invasion, and moving diplomacy into full gear in order to convince Belgrade that this was a war Serbia would never win. The Kosovo crisis is a cautionary tale for those who believe force can be used easily and in limited increments to stop genocide, mass killing, and the forceful expulsion of entire populations. The authors conclude that the crisis holds important diplomatic and military lessons that must be learned so that others in the future might avoid the mistakes that were made in this case.
The PLA and the Kosovo Conflict - Carlisle Barracks, PA : US Army War College.
1v, 22 p.; 23 cm.
(Letort Papers)
ISBN/ISSN: 1584870222
Author(s):
1. Dreyer, June Teufel, 1939-
Subject(s):
1. CHINA--MILITARY POLICY
2. KOSOVO (SERBIA)--HISTORY--CIVIL WAR, 1998-1999--CHINA
Added entry(s):
1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
Notes:
'The US armed forces are not the only military that has sought to
discern the lessons of the Kosovo campaign in the spring of
1999. The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has also
analyzed the conflict and drawn its own conclusions. In fact,
as the author observes, rather than reach a single set of
conclusions, different groups within the Chinese military drew
different judgements. The author argues that these differences
of opinion reflect the considerable diversity of thinking about
defense modernization and future war that exists within the PLA
today. The analysis that follows therefore provides an
opportunity for readers to learn about the different strands in
Chinese strategic thinking as that country enters the 21st
century.'
ID number: 80016528
Year: 2000

Wag the Dog : The Mobilization and Demobilization of the Kosovo
Liberation Army - Bonn : Bonn International Center for Conversion.
52 p. : ill.; 30 cm.
(BICC Brief ; 20)
Author(s):
1. Heinemann-Gruder, Andreas
2. Paes, Wolf-Christian
Subject(s):
1. NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS--KOSOVO (SERBIA)
2. KOSOVO (SERBIA)--HISTORY--AUTONOMY AND INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS
3. KOSOVO (SERBIA)--HISTORY--CIVIL WAR, 1998-1999
4. KOSOVO (SERBIA)--ARMED FORCES--DEMOBILIZATION AND MOBILIZATION
Added entry(s):
1. Bonn International Center for Conversion (DE)
2. Friedrich Naumann Foundation (DE)
Notes:
Bibliography: p. 42-44.

'In all cases of armed struggles involving armies of liberation it
has been proved that peace and stability can only come about
when all the military forces in a country have been
subordinated to a legitimate monopoly of power. In Kosovo, it
is widely assumed that some former KLA structures have somehow
remained intact and are not, or not completely, under UNMIK's
control. The BICC was asked to analyze the situation of the
former KLA in Kosovo. Only by knowing the reasons for these
alleged parallel structures might it become possible to design
additional instruments, i.e. incentives, training programs for
the civil (re-integration) of former fighters etc., and to
contribute to the debate on changes in the political framework
of Kosovo.'
ID number: 80017493
Year: 2001
The Conflict over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did -
Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
xxxi, 155 p.; 30 cm.
(RAND Publications; MR-1351-AF)
ISBN/ISSN: 0833030035
Author(s):
1. Hosmer, Stephen T.
Subject(s):
1. Kosovo (Serbia)--History--Civil War, 1998-1999
Added entry(s):
1. Rand Corporation (US)
Notes:
Bibliography: p. 139-155.
'This report examines the reasons Slobodan Milosevic, the then
president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decided on
June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the
conflict over Kosovo. Drawing in part upon the testimony of
Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who
directly interacted with Milosevic, the report analyzes (1) the
assumptions and other calculations that underlay Milosevic's
initial decision to defy NATO's demands with regard to Kosovo,
and (2) the political, economic, and military developments and
pressures, and the resulting expectations and concerns that
most importantly influenced his subsequent decision to come to
terms.'
ID number: 80017660
Year: 2001

Esprit.
175 p.: ill.; 21 cm.
ISBN/ISSN: 2909210278
Author(s):
1. Hubrecht, Joel
Subject(s):
1. Kosovo (Serbia)--History--Civil War, 1998-1999
2. NATO--Armed Forces--Kosovo (Serbia)
Notes:
Bibliography: p. 174-175.
'Rendre justice ne veut pas dire rendre la justice mais ne veut
pas dire non plus ne pas prendre parti. L'objectivite n'est pas
la neutralite. Aussi ce livre espere contribuer, en se
rapprochant autant qu'il est possible de la verite des faits
qui se sont deroules au Kosovo depuis 1981, a defendre la
memoire et l'honneur des victimes eclabousses par la rumeur et
le soupcon. Pascal disait: 'Je ne crois qu'aux temoins qui se
font egorger.' Aujourd'hui, l'incredulite va plus loin, si l'on
en juge par les contreverites agitees par des journalistes ou
des intellectuels. Les temoins sont soupconnes, comme en
Bosnie-Herzegovine, de s'etre egorges eux-memes, ou d'avoir
fait semblant d'etre egorges. Le retour sur les faits s'avere
donc necessaire. Car, comme le remarquait Simon Leys, 'un fait
meme infime, est plus respectable qu'un maitre a penser, meme
grandiose.'
ID number: 80017774
Year: 2001
In real wars, whole nations are mobilised, soldiers fight and die, victories are won. In virtual war, hostilities may not even be declared; the combatants are strike pilots and computer programmers, the watching nation is a television audience and instead of victory there is just an uncertain endgame. Kosovo was a virtual war: fought by pilots at 15,000 feet, commanded by generals whose only view of the battle was through their pilots' bombing sights, reported by opposing media with competing versions of the damage; a war in which Americans and NATO forces did the fighting but only Kosovars and Serbs did the dying. The author has travelled these battle zones for a decade, sending back moving reports and penetrating analysis. Yet Kosovo in 1999 moved armed aggression into a new phase, and in this book the author examines this strange, remote type of warfare through the eyes of the key players and of the people who suffered.
496.3 /00334
xxxiv, 66 p.: ill.; 30 cm.
(MR-1365-AF)
ISBN/ISSN: 0833030507
Author(s):
1. Lambeth, Benjamin S.
Subject(s):
1. NATO--ARMED FORCES--KOSOVO (SERBIA)
2. KOSOVO (SERBIA)--HISTORY--CIVIL WAR, 1998-1999
Added entry(s):
1. Rand Corporation (US)
Notes:
'This book examines the conduct and results of Operation Allied Force at the strategic and operational levels.'
ID number: 80017757
Year: 2001

496.3 /00334
NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment. Part II - Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
110 p.; 30 cm.
(MR-1365-AF)
ISBN/ISSN: 0833030507
Author(s):
1. Lambeth, Benjamin S.
Subject(s):
1. NATO--ARMED FORCES--KOSOVO (SERBIA)
2. KOSOVO (SERBIA)--HISTORY--CIVIL WAR, 1998-1999
Added entry(s):
1. Rand Corporation (US)
Notes:
ID number: 80017758
Year: 2001

496.3 /00334
97 p.: ill.; 30 cm.
(MR-1365-AF)
ISBN/ISSN: 0833030507
Author(s):
1. Lambeth, Benjamin S.
Subject(s):
1. NATO--ARMED FORCES--KOSOVO (SERBIA)
2. KOSOVO (SERBIA)--HISTORY--CIVIL WAR, 1998-1999
Added entry(s):
1. Rand Corporation (US)
Notes:
ID number: 80017759
Year: 2001
NATO and Humanitarian Action in the Kosovo Crisis - Providence, RI:
Brown University.
xiii, 198 p. : ill.; 22 cm.
(Occasional Paper ; 36)
Author(s):
1. Minear, Larry
2. Baarda, Ted van
3. Sommers, Marc
Subject(s):
1. NATO--ARMED FORCES--KOSOVO (SERBIA)
2. KOSOVO (SERBIA)--HISTORY--CIVIL WAR, 1998-1999
3. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
Added entry(s):
Notes:
<http://brown.edu/Departments/Watson_Institute/Publications/OP/op36.html> consulted 05/05/2000.
ID number: 80016457
Year: 2000

50 p.; 30 cm.
(Occasional Paper ; 66)
Author(s):
1. Ramet, Sabrina P., 1949-
Subject(s):
1. FRY--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
2. KOSOVO (SERBIA)--HISTORY--CIVIL WAR, 1998-1999
3. FRY--FOREIGN RELATIONS
4. MILOSEVIC, SLOBODAN, 1941-
Added entry(s):
1. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (US)
Notes:
'The third Yugoslavia was born on April 27, 1992, when Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed the establishment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).'
ID number: 80017684
Year: 2001

Kosovo One Year On : Achievement and Challenge - Brussels : NATO.
27 p. : ill.; 30 cm.
Author(s):
1. Robertson, George
Subject(s):
1. NATO--ARMED FORCES--KOSOVO (SERBIA)
2. KOSOVO (SERBIA)--HISTORY--CIVIL WAR, 1998-1999
Added entry(s):
1. NATO
Notes:
'A year ago, NATO launched its airpower to end the repression in Kosovo - and succeeded. In the blizzard of words that has followed it is easy to overlook that simple fact. Much is still misunderstood about what happened. Now is an appropriate time to look back on what NATO did during the conflict, to review what KFOR has achieved since, and to look ahead. The risks were high - NATO faced many problems - and the price was high. But as the Alliance promised at the time, Serbs forces are out, KFOR is in, and the refugees are home. However, there should be
no illusions - the task remaining is formidable.'

ID number: 80017595
Year: 2001

341.2 /00267
134 p.; 21 cm.
(NATO Defense College Monograph Series)
ISBN/ISSN: 8887967016
Author(s):
1. Simonen, Katariina
Subject(s):
1. NATO--ARMED FORCES--KOSOVO (SERBIA)
2. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
3. INTERVENTION (INTERNATIONAL LAW)
4. USE OF FORCE (INTERNATIONAL LAW)
Added entry(s):
1. NATO Defence College (IT)
Notes:
'This is a seminal work on the international legal framework against which NATO's resort to armed intervention in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia is judged. The study considers the legitimacy of that decision, and draws the conclusion that the humanitarian imperatives put forward to justify the intervention fall short of universal legal acceptance. Nevertheless, what emerges from this analysis is that Operation Allied Force can be viewed as a significant milestone in the development of a law of humanitarian intervention. Instead of being considered as an exceptional case, it belongs to a continuum of interventions where humanitarian considerations have played a part.'

ID number: 80017109
Year: 2000

92 MILO/00001
Milosevic, une epitaphe - [Paris]: Fayard.
390 p.; 24 cm.
ISBN/ISSN: 2213607478
Author(s):
1. Stevanovic, Vidosav
Subject(s):
1. MILOSEVIC, SLOBODAN, 1941- --BIOGRAPHY
2. SERBIA--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
3. YUGOSLAV WAR, 1991-1995
4. KOSOVO (SERBIA)--HISTORY--CIVIL WAR, 1998-1999
Notes:
Includes index.
'Toute biographie de Milosevic pourrait paraître de prime abord comme une illustration de la 'banalité du mal', pour reprendre la fameuse expression d'Hannah Arendt. C'est l'irrésistible ascension d'un 'homme sans qualités' succédant, à la tête de la Serbie puis de la Fédération yougoslave, à la figure charismatique de Tito, mort en 1980. Mais, comme souvent quand on évoque les régimes communistes, a fortiori dans ces terres de légendes que sont les Balkans, derrière la prose grisante du socialisme réel se profilent des situations shakespeariennes, dantésques ou homérique. Voici l'extraordinaire histoire d'un homme dont la vie paraît pouvoir se resumer à la liste des postes qu'il a occupés. Voici l'enfance sans enfance du 'Petit Sloba', fils d'un prêtre orthodoxe qui finira par se suicider, tout comme se suicidera sa mère. Voici la petite Miriana, camarade d'enfance, future épouse, inamovible et unique compagne, née en prison et dont l'une des tantes, maîtresse de Tito, fut inhumée sous le balcon du Guide suprême... Etc. C'est
a partir de 1987, lorsque les premiers troubles graves éclatent au Kosovo, que Milosevic s'affiche comme le protecteur farouche de la minorité serbe dans la province. C'est à partir de cet épisode que se dessine une ascension qui est celle d'un anti-Gorbatchev, soucieux de dresser un 'mur de Belgrade' du jour ou tombe celui de Berlin, et capable, dans son pays-bunker, de soutenir une guerre contre le monde occidental dans son entier. Cette biographie en forme d'épitaphe nous en apprend autant sur la poudrière balkanique que sur le pompier pyromane serbe qui a eu tout fait d'éteindre sous sa botte toute trace de vie démocratique autour de son clan.'

ID number: 80016996
Year: 2000

327 /01042
v, 25 p.; 30 cm.
(Occasional Papers ; 28)
Author(s):
1. Wagnsson, Charlotte
Subject(s):
1. RUSSIA (FEDERATION)--FOREIGN RELATIONS
2. KOSOVO (SERBIA)--HISTORY--CIVIL WAR, 1998-1999--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
3. NATO--ARMED FORCES--KOSOVO (SERBIA)
Added entry(s):
1. Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union (FR)
Notes:
'This paper analyses how the Russian top leadership's rhetoric on security and the West evolved during and after NATO's Operation Allied Force against Serbia in 1999. By grasping the logic inherent in political rhetoric, one can arrive at a better understanding of the messages that a political actor is trying to convey, which may also enhance one's ability to predict how that actor will reason in the future. Political implications for relations between Russia and the European Union are discussed in the final section.'

ID number: 80017278
Year: 2001

321 /00632
Kosovo Under International Administration : An Unfinished Conflict - Athens : Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy.
viii, 172 p.; 23 cm.
ISBN/ISSN: 9607061829
Author(s):
1. Yannis, Alexandros
Subject(s):
1. KOSOVO (SERBIA)--INTERNATIONAL STATUS
2. UNITED NATIONS--ARMED FORCES--KOSOVO (SERBIA)
3. NATO--ARMED FORCES--KOSOVO (SERBIA)
4. INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION
Added entry(s):
1. Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy (GR)
Notes:
Published with the support of the NATO Office of Information and Press.
'This analysis reviews the role of UNMIK and KFOR in the light of the experience of the first phase of the international administration in Kosovo as well as the changing realities in the Balkans and it provides policy recommendations for the future involvement of the international community in Kosovo and
the requirements for stability in Kosovo and the region. The first part provides a critical analysis of the period between June 1999–October 2000 that culminated in the municipal elections of 28 October 2000, covering basically the first phase of the international administration in Kosovo under the leadership of Bernard Kouchner, the first Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Kosovo. The second part provides a policy-oriented analysis of the future role of the international presence in Kosovo and the prospects for stability in Kosovo and the region during the second phase of the international administration that started after the advent of democracy in both Belgrade and Pristina in October 2000. These analyses are supplemented by a third part that contains key and often rare documents of the political process in Kosovo between June 1999–October 2000, providing useful background information as well as insight into political developments during the first phase of the international administration in Kosovo.

ID number: 80017554
Year: 2001
Un ano despues de la guerra.  
La crisis de Kosovo es un desastre politico y estrategico un ano despues de la campana de la OTAN. Los aliados aun no saben como transformar su ventaja militar en victoria politica.

K/SFORce for Peace.  
NATO'S NATIONS AND PARTNERS FOR PEACE, no. 1, 2000, Whole Issue.

La Minuk au quotidien : entretien avec un representant de l'ONU au Kosovo.  
COURRIER DES PAYS DE L'EST, no. 1013, mars 2001, p. 82-87.  
Pour la premiere fois de son histoire, l'ONU exerce sur un territoire, le Kosovo, le pouvoir executif, legislatif et judiciaire jusqu'a la mise en place de 'l'autonomie substantielle'. Du 14 fevrier au 14 aout 2000, Michel Champredon a represente les Nations Unies en tant que charge de mission pour les affaires civils a Novo Brdo, l'une des trente municipalites, qui compte 5000 habitants et, fait exceptionnel, est mixte. Sa mission en collaboration avec du personnel local etait de remettre en place une administration et un conseil municipal, de preparer les elections municipales d'octobre 2000 et de proposer des projets de developpement. Si a cette occasion, il decouvrit que les representants des deux communautes serbe et albanaise pouvaient s'entendre, il n'en etait pas de meme dans la vie quotidienne, les deux etant completely separees y compris a l'ecole. Dans cette interview sont evoques aussi entre autres les reactions vis-a-vis des organisations internationales, l'insecurite, le role des ONG et le manque de coordination entre tous les acteurs etrangers presents.

The NATO Capability Gap.  

STUDIEN UND BERICHTE ZUR SICHERHEITSPOLITIK, Nr. 4, September 2000, Whole Issue.

Alkan, Necmettin  
Historical, Cultural and Political Background of the Kosovo Question.  
As a result of the nationalist movements combined with provocations of Westernism, riots of the Balkan states against the Ottoman state ended when the Ottoman state withdrew from the Balkans in 1912-13, following 500-century sovereignty. In this article, the near past has been studied and an examination of the historical, cultural, and political infrastructure of the Kosovo Issue has been completed. The author argues that the events are not simply a Balkan Issue, but that the Balkan Issue transformed into the East Question, the East Question into the Kosovo Issue and the Kosovo Issue into the Balkan Issue again.

** This list contains material received as of July 11th, 2002 – Cette liste est arretée au 11 juillet 2002.
- Antonenko, Oksana
Russia, NATO and European Security after Kosovo.
http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod
NATO's air campaign against Yugoslavia precipitated the most dangerous
turn in Russian-Western relations since the early 1980s. Although
tensions have eased since the end of the Kosovo war, the anger and
suspicion engendered on the Russian side will not easily dissipate. The
anger will endure not least because the Russian reaction had little to do
with the Serb-Kosovar conflict itself, and much more to do with Russia's
growing unease about NATO's post-Cold War transformation: its
enlargement and pretensions to act beyond the territory of its members
without an explicit UN mandate. Repairing relations will require
political realism in Russia, the absence of a major new crisis in Kosovo,
and restraint from NATO.

- Arbatova, Nadia Alexandrova
European Security after the Kosovo Crisis: The Role of Russia.
JOURNAL OF SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN AND BLACK SEA STUDIES, vol. 1, no. 2, May
2001, p. 64-78.
The international crisis around Kosovo resulting from NATO's military
intervention in Yugoslavia should be regarded as a watershed in post-Cold
War international relations, since it drastically affected Russia's
relations with the West and particularly with NATO and the USA. It can
also be viewed as culmination and logical conclusion of the over-ripe
Russian-Western contradictions in the field of security and the growing
gap between Russian and Western threat perceptions. This crisis entailed
dramatic consequences for Russia's domestic development, having
reinforced anti-Western feeling and nostalgia for a strong hand which
would reinstate Russia's international prestige. The future of European
security will depend on the post-Kosovo relationship that emerges between
Russia, the USA and Europe.

- Babst, Stefanie
Der Kosovo-Krieg, die NATO und die Medien.

- Baranovsky, Vladimir
The Kosovo Factor in Russia's Foreign Policy.
The article analyses Russia's perceptions of, and attitudes to the
developments in and around Kosovo, as well as their implications for
Russia's foreign and security policy thinking and policy making. It is
argued that the Kosovo crisis has influenced Russia's ideas on its
relations with the outside world in a more fundamental way than any other
event during the last decade. Russia's policy during the crisis and
Russia's involvement in the crisis management are considered. The ongoing
reassessment of Russia's national interests in the light of the Kosovo
crisis might have a significant impact on the major lines of Russia's
foreign and security policy, especially with respect to such issues as
the role of military factors and the use of force. In particular, there
may be substantive links between the case of Kosovo and the war in
Chechnya. However, although comments in Russia about the performance of
NATO-led conflict settlement in Kosovo are becoming increasingly
sceptical, the issue seems to be overshadowed by new foreign policy lines
associated with the change in the political leadership in Moscow.
- Bellamy, Alex
Grievance and Greed.
The sound of gunfire in the Balkans is once again worrying the
international community. Is all the good work to be undone by a campaign
for a greater Kosovo or greater Albania? And how far is pure profit the
motive? People in Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia need to feel they have a
stake in the peace, that armed force is not necessary to get results.

- Bellamy, Alex J.
Lessons Unlearned: Why Coercive Diplomacy Failed at Rambouillet.
On 29 January 1999, the Contact Group of states that had monitored the
Bosnian war summoned the Serbs and Kosovar Albanians to Rambouillet and
presented them with an ultimatum: accept the proposed settlement by 21
February or face the use of military force. This article considers the
use of coercive diplomacy at Rambouillet, and its attempt to replicate
the conditions which produced the Dayton settlement in 1995. It is argued
that the environment in which the Rambouillet ultimatum was issued was
considerably different from the permissive environment at Dayton. This
meant that the use of the ultimatum, while appearing innovative and
forward-thinking, was actually untimely, misplaced and likely to fail.

- Bellamy, Alex J.
Reconsidering Rambouillet.
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 22, no. 1, April 2001, p. 31-56.
The Rambouillet negotiations provide one of the greatest 'what-ifs' of
the Kosovo war. The British anti-war movement used Rambouillet to justify
its arguments against NATO. They contended that the Interim Settlement
offered there was deliberately unworkable and designed solely to offer a
pretext for bombing Yugoslavia. This article challenges this view, which
has become the orthodox position within media and academic circles. After
detailing five key anti-war arguments, it argues that Rambouillet offered
the best chance for peace in Kosovo. The article returns to Rambouillet
to take up John Pilger's challenge to decipher 'what really happened'. It
shows that under the Settlement, the role of KFOR would have been limited
and the supreme authorities would have been indigenous. The article
demonstrates that the Yugoslav government never accepted the core
principles of the negotiating process, such as the principle of autonomy,
and that it was this intransigence that necessitated NATO's war to save
Kosovo.

- Bellamy, Alex J.
Griffin, Stuart
OSCE Peacekeeping: Lessons from the Kosovo Verification Mission.
The Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) was a watershed in the development
of the peacekeeping role of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE). It was to be larger than every other OSCE mission
combined and ten times larger than the previous largest mission. However,
there has been little analysis of the mission. This article places the
mission in the context of evolving OSCE practices of peacekeeping and
long-term deployments and poses two sets of questions: Where does OSCE
peacekeeping fit into the wider European security architecture? And, if
the role is to be developed further, what operational lessons does the
organisation have to learn? The authors argue that the OSCE fulfils a
particular and valuable role through facilitation, confidence-building
and the human dimension but that this role lends itself to a
qualitatively different type of peacekeeping to that offered by military
organisations such as NATO. This brings with it advantages that allow the
OSCE to deploy in places that NATO cannot, but is also restricted by
being unarmed and consent-dependent. What the Kosovo case showed,
however, is that different organisations can complement each other with
OSCE reporting ultimately providing the tripwire for NATO military
action.

- Betts, Richard K.
The Lesser Evil.
NATIONAL INTEREST, no. 64, Summer 2001, p. 53, 13 p.
The article suggests a strategy for the United States in withdrawing its
military intervention in the Balkan region. It stresses the importance of
forging a connection between sovereign self-government and interstate
stability in the Balkans. It suggests potential solutions in settling the
sectarian and ethnic conflicts in the Balkans and surveys the impact of
the US operations in the Balkans on US relations with China.

- Bieber, Florian
Cyberwar or Sideshow ? : The Internet and the Balkan Wars.
http://www.currenthistory.com
Serbian Internet users logged on in unprecedented numbers during last
year's NATO bombing. But was it a breakthrough that Serbia's tiny
population of Internet users could access along with Western users the
same limited and 'spun' information NATO doled out during the Kosovo
conflict ?

- Biermann, Rafael
Der kunftige Status Kosovos : Vorbereitung auf das Unvermeidliche.
Die wohlklingenden Formelkompromisse der UN-Resolution 1244 konnen den
prinzipiellen Dissens und die Ratioligkeit uber den endgultigen Status
Kosovos nur kaschieren. Nach einer Analyse der verschiedenen Vorschlage
kommt der Autor zu dem Schluss, dass dieser Status nur in der
Unabhangigkeit liegen kann, verbunden mit einer Gesichtswahrung fur
Belgrad.

- Blanchon, David
Le Kosovo, geographie d' un territoire a reconstruire.
71-82.
Le Kosovo, situe a la croisee des Balkans, a ete marque, jusqu'au debut
du siecle, par des frontieres relativement fluves entre les differentes
ethnies. A l'heure actuelle, l'agriculture et l'industrie lourde ne
permettent pas un developpement economique; par ailleurs, un fort taux de
chomage et une economie 'grise' contribuent a fragiliser la situation
sociale. Pour autant, le Kosovo ne semble pas, par sa situation
geographique ou sa demographique, voue au sous-developpement. Depuis des
decennies, les communautes albanaise et serbe se cotoient sans se
melanger. En outre, au sein de la societe albanaise, des clivages sociaux
et geographiques existent, donnant naissance a une veritable mosaique.
Apres la repression serbe et les frappes de l'OTAN, la reconstruction du
Kosovo est necessaire; l'attention devra etre portee sur les voies de
communication. Cependant, cette entreprise ne pourra se faire que dans un
climat de confiance et avec l'aide de la communaute internationale.

- Blumi, Isa
Kosovo : From the Brink - and Back Again.
http://www.currenthistory.com
Instead of shutting out new ways of interpreting Kosovo's problems and
giving a monopoly of authority to a small clique of dubious character, it
should be stressed (rather than ignored) that the conflicts in Kosovo
have much more to do with colonial exploitation, power politics, and
economic greed than primordial hatreds manipulated by indicted war
criminals.
Le bilan de la guerre au Kosovo est, aujourd'hui encore, difficile à établir. Cependant, les résultats apparaissent très contrastés : le conflit n'a conduit ni à une victoire éclatante, ni à un échec complet. Si la politique de répression du régime de Belgrade à l'encontre des Kosovars a pris fin, il n'en demeure pas moins que la situation politique et économique du Kosovo, de la Serbie et de l'ensemble de la région est extrêmement fragile. Par ailleurs, les principes au nom desquels les pays occidentaux ont mené l'intervention militaire soulèvent des questions cruciales pour l'évolution de la société internationale. En outre, la contradiction entre la souveraineté et l'ingérence n'est pas résolue ; la primauté de l'une ou de l'autre risque de conduire au retour de la loi du plus fort. Les deux principes doivent ainsi être pris en compte par la communauté internationale dans la définition de nouvelles règles.

The NATO intervention in Kosovo in Spring 1999 was a watershed event for transatlantic relations. On the one hand, it was NATO's first military intervention, and its success reconfirmed a half-century of US-Western European cooperation and community-building in their security relations. On the other hand, Operation Allied Force and the operations preceding and following it deepened fissures in the transatlantic relationship that had begun to emerge with the end of the Cold War. NATO's intervention in Kosovo quickened the pace of change in transatlantic relations and fueled the European challenge to the mantel of Western political leadership worn by the US throughout the Cold War and into the early post-Cold War period. Thus, Allied Force represents an important transition point in the shift from one international order to the next, one still murky in its outline.

Current international involvement may actually hinder the development of lasting security based on self-determination. An appropriate balance between international engagement and indigenous self-dependence holds the key to regional stability.
The authors seek to dispel the notion that NATO air attacks alone brought Serbia to the negotiating table. They argue instead that air power worked synergistically with other factors — including the threat of a NATO ground assault, declining Russian support for the Serb cause, and the role of the Kosovo Liberation Army — in ending the conflict. More generally, the authors maintain that the current debate over the role of air power as an instrument of coercion is 'fundamentally flawed'. Noting that the outcome of this debate could have broad policy implications, the authors suggest that instead of asking if air power alone can coerce an adversary to surrender, political and military leaders, as well as theoreticians, should ask: 'How can air power contribute to successful coercion, and under what circumstances are its contributions most effective?'

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Dit artikel beoogt het ethisch gehalte van operatie 'Allied Force' (Kosovo) en operatie 'Enduring Freedom' (Afghanistan) te vergelijken aan de hand van de 'rechtvaardige oorlog' - of 'bellum justum' - theorie. Deze laatste vormt een ethisch-normatieve traditie die stelt wanneer en op welke wijze militair geweld mag worden aangewend. De principes die aangeven wanneer geweld is toegestaan, vormen het zogenoemde 'jus ad bellum' (rechtvaardige zaak, juiste intenties, redelijke kans op succes, proportionaliteit, laatste redmiddel, en legitiem gezag). De criteria die bepalen op welke wijze dit dient te gebeuren, is het 'jus in bello' (discriminatie en proportionaliteit). Uit de vergelijkende analyse blijkt dat beide operaties zowel enkele overeenkomsten als verschilpunten vertonen. Zo ging het bij beide operaties in essentie om de bescherming van onschuldige burgers (rechtvaardige zaak). Ook hadden beide operaties te kampen met een duidelijk 'legitiem gezag'-probleem. Verschillen waren er bijvoorbeeld op het vlak van de redelijke kans op succes. Hoewel er bij beide operaties sprake was van een duidelijk militair overwicht, moesten de slaakansen van 'Allied Force' iets lager worden ingeschat dan die van 'Enduring Freedom'. Vanuit het proportionaliteitsperspectief ('in bello') was er eveneens een licht voordeel voor 'Enduring Freedom'. Dit laatste had vooral te maken met het relatief groter aantal duale doelwitten waarop tijdens de NAVO-interventie werd gericht.

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Two and a half years ago bombs were raining down on what remained of Yugoslavia. Now the people of Kosovo, whose treatment triggered the attack, are invited to vote. But the situation there carries worrying lessons about how to build peace after conflict.
The 1995 and 1999 Balkan conflicts changed the nature of strategy and command responsibilities. Warfare and military operations have become politicized with concerns over collateral damage, losses of friendly forces and the requirement to sustain coalition unity. During the Cold War, commanders focused on the massive application of violence. Most decisions involved ways to defeat the enemy while protecting friendly forces. Today, in conflicts which possess ill-defined objectives, coalition forces are tied down by extensive political guidance which often influences the details of tactical operations. Commanders therefore have to be more than simply managers of violence and will need the skills of a statesman strategist.

The international community has shown that it could save Kosovo from Serbia. It now faces another, far more complicated task: saving Kosovo from itself.

While it might seem as though the confrontation with Slobodan Milosevic is old news, recent events in Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro point to the probability that events this summer will likely bring US policy vis-a-vis the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia back to the front pages. All sides in the 1999 conflict over Kosovo attempted to manipulate the regional and international perception of the struggle. This perception conflict was in many ways more important than the casualties sustained or the land controlled. This article examines the attempt to gain the informational 'high ground' and addresses how perception management should affect current US policy towards Serbia and Milosevic government.

A captain in the U.S. Marine Corps argues that, despite the success of the 1999 campaign over Kosovo, air power has limitations. As the Bush administration sets its defense strategy, it should be wary of overconfidence in a tool with practical and moral risks.

US criticisms of Europe's efforts in the Balkans, though widely held, are deeply flawed. Focusing on the Spring 1999 air war as a case study, the authors make their case for a sustained US role alongside the existing larger European contributions.
La guerre en Yougoslavie a donné lieu aux plus vives tensions dans les relations entre la Russie et l’Occident depuis la fin de la guerre froide. Moscou a dénoncé avec virulence l’intervention militaire de l’OTAN en Yougoslavie, tout en veillant à ne pas se laisser entrainer dans le conflit. Après quelques atermoiements, la Russie a en effet choisi d’œuvrer en faveur d’un règlement politique du conflit et a joué un rôle de médiation important – quoique controversé – entre Belgrade et les pays occidentaux. Illustration de l’erosion des positions russes sur la scène internationale, le conflit dans les Balkans a par ailleurs ravivé les craintes de Moscou de se voir marginalisée en Europe, et pourrait avoir de lourdes conséquences sur la politique étrangère et de sécurité de la Russie.

Without a UN Security Council authorization, the case for humanitarian intervention in Kosovo cannot justify NATO's use of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999. By contrast NATO member states could have defended an armed intervention as a collective self-defence action under Article 51 of the UN Charter, though the campaign would have been significantly different than Operation Allied Force. Because it demands that one consider the legal interest of the intervening states in the defence of the victim and whether the forceful intervention is sufficiently targeted at the violation in question, the doctrine of self-defence may provide a legal basis for interventions in humanitarian crises and a useful set of criteria to valuate their legality, especially when the UN Security Council fails to act.

The author analyses the main causes of the current security vacuum in Kosovo which not only has allowed for the prolongation of ethnic violence but also continues to make the everyday life of the people of the region insecure. According to the author, this woeful state of affairs requires a major review of the entire international effort in Kosovo, particularly of the arrangements for international police support. Drawing on the experience of other international interventions, he proposes a formal extension of the role of the NATO-led military mission (KFOR) to the police field or, as a more radical alternative, a dramatic reinforcement of the cooperation links between KFOR and the UN police force.

On 28 October 2000, nearly 900,000 Kosovar Albanians, 79 per cent of the province's voting-eligible ethnic-Albanian population, braved a gray morning's weather to stand in line to participate in the province's first democratic election. Old and young alike queued well before the polls opened, wanting to be the first to cast their vote in what they hope will be only a prelude to their nourished goal that those elected will lead Kosovo to independence. For the International Community (IC), a euphemism used there for the US, France, Britain, Germany and sometimes Italy and Austria, the elections were instead the first step in a process of open-ended democratization without any firm commitment on Kosovo's future. Such 'constructive ambiguity', as the IC's policy has become known, has abandoned NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) within the precarious

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wide chasm between Kosovar Albanian aspirations and Western political objectives.

- Everts, Daan W.
The OSCE Mission in Kosovo: Two Years into Institution Building.
HELSINKI MONITOR, vol. 12, no. 4, 2001, p. 245-256.
The OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) was established on 1 July 1999, on the basis of Decision No. 305 of the OSCE Permanent Council. Since then, it has focused its policies and programmes on two main objectives: democratic governance and human rights/rule of law. In comparison with the UN-pillar dealing with current day-to-day administration, the OMIK mandate has been directed towards building institutions and capacities for the future.

- Eyal, Jonathan
Kosovo: Killing the Myths After the Killing has Subsided.

- Eyal, Jonathan
The Media and the Military: Continuing the Dialogue after Kosovo.

- Forage, Paul C.
Bombs for Peace: A Comparative Study of the Use of Air Power in the Balkans.
http://www.catchword.com
For many decision-makers, precision guided weapons represent what the aerial bomber promised the early air power idealists in the 1930s—a technological solution to difficult wars without the risk of casualties. In 1995, NATO used its air power to bring an end to the war in Bosnia and tried again in 1999 to use bombs to end the conflict in Kosovo. The failure to bring about a quick cessation of the fighting using air power was in part due to misinterpreting the war in Bosnia, as well as misunderstanding, in general, when and where air power is effective.

- Fry, Rob
A View from Kosovo.

- Garden, Timothy
La participation britannique à l'intervention au Kosovo.
Le Royaume-Uni s'est impliqué de manière constante dans le conflit au Kosovo. Ainsi, lors des tentatives pour parvenir à une solution negociée, les responsables politiques britanniques jouèrent un rôle important. Par ailleurs, lorsque le recours à la force militaire s'avéra nécessaire, le Royaume-Uni offrit sa contribution à l'opération Allied Force. Si leur participation ne fut pas négligeable, les armées britanniques, en pleine restructuration, rencontrèrent des difficultes pour mobiliser une force plus conséquente. La modestie des moyens militaires semble avoir été contrebalance par l'intense activité des responsables politiques, et notamment, du Premier ministre, Tony Blair. Les Britanniques ont tiré des leçons du conflit quant à leurs capacités militaires, mais également quant à la nécessité pour l'Europe de développer une politique étrangère et de sécurité commune.
- George, Bruce
The House of Commons Defence Committee Report: Lessons of Kosovo.

- Gligorov, Vladimir
The Economics of Kosovo: Does Viability Matter?
This article reviews some of the arguments about 'viability in the economic sense'. It then looks at some empirical discussions about the viability of small states and develops some criteria of viability and subsequently check those against the description of the economic situation in Kosovo (both current and past). Finally, the article discusses some of the economic consequences of alternative political arrangements that Kosovo may be facing. Some conclusions are drawn at the end.

- Goulding, Vincent J.
From Chancellorsville to Kosovo: Forgetting the Art of War.

- Gousseff, Catherine
L'effet Kosovo sur les nouveaux partenaires.
COURRIER DES PAYS DE L'EST, no. 1001, janvier 2000, p. 4-16.
A peine la République tchèque, la Pologne et la Hongrie étaient-elles entrées dans l'OTAN que commençaient les bombardements sur la RFY. Les gouvernements de ces trois pays, comme de ceux qui sont encore à la porte de l'Alliance, oscillaient alors entre extrême réserve, soutien embarrassé et pleine adhésion à cette action militaire. Les incidences furent marginales de ce dernier point de vue, car réduites à des autorisations de survol des espaces aériens. Elles furent beaucoup plus importantes pour les États concernés, lorsqu'il s'est agi de prendre des mesures d'accueil et d'aide aux réfugiés du Kosovo ou d'évaluer les coûts et manques à gagner induits par la guerre. De leur côté, les réactions des populations furent aussi très divergentes, et parfois hostiles aux positions officielles. En analysant tous ces paramètres, l'auteur peut ainsi donner la mesure de l'empreinte laissée par ce conflit en Europe centrale et orientale.

- Hadzic, Miroslav
Kosovo and the Security Stabilization of South-East Europe.
The Kosovo conflict and NATO's military interventions have changed the key security parameters of south-east Europe. Halting the Serbian-Albanian purges has temporarily solved one, but at the same time opened new, or revived old, challenges to south-east Europe's security. This article focuses on the foundations of the conflict and the short- and long-term interventionist measures undertaken in Kosovo that will decisively influence the postwar processes in the region. Identification and analysis of the critical security issues in the Serbian-Albanian conflict, enables us to draw up an inventory of the obstacles to any implementation of the nascent Balkan Stability Pact.

- Hanson, Joanna
Kosovo Albanian Refugees: Perceptions of the Motherland.

- Heinemann-Gruder, Andreas
Germany's Anti-Hitler Coalition in Kosovo.
MEDITERRANEAN QUARTERLY, vol. 12, no. 3, Summer 2001, p. 31-46.
At the NATO's Madrid conference in 1997, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were asked to join Europe's premier military alliance. In order to gain admission, these states engaged in extensive lobbying efforts and made considerable diplomatic promises to convince full members of their shared values and willingness to assist in NATO's post-Cold War mission. However, only days after their membership was ratified, the alliance initiated a bombing campaign on Kosovo. This article examines the contributions of the Visegrad states in this operation, and finds much disparity in the diplomatic and military support provided to NATO. The findings have implications not only for NATO's ability to provide for European security in the future, but also for Eastern European States and others who seek full membership in the alliance.

Operation "Allied Force" and with that also the first German use of weapons after World War II is six-month-old history by now. The Air Force has made use of the past months analyzing the missions/sorties flown within the scope of this operation, assessing them and drawing respective conclusions from that. Important for the evaluation of the result of the overall operation is the fact that NATO had announced the employment of its air forces in October 1998 already, but then postponed it in January 1999 till the end of March in favour of the political talks in Rambouillet and Paris. From a purely military point of view, the employment of the air forces occurred too late to achieve quick successes for the purposes of the political objective. The political goals for an employment of the air forces which had already been defined in October 1998 were laid down in the "Allied Force" operation plan.
NATO has passed its first credibility test - survival after the Cold War - by engaging Central and Eastern Europe. The Kosovo war in 1999 tested NATO's capacity to promote its members' values and to fight a war efficiently. But it also re-opened serious questions about NATO's credibility by revealing the gap between rhetoric and action. NATO has to devote resources and political energy to its implementation. This means re-orienting national military training, upgrading equipment and advancing the ability to project power. The problem with this radical shift in the original purpose of NATO is that such a commitment of resources is highly unlikely. After Kosovo, NATO is ill-equipped to live up to its ambitious goals and declared purposes. If the leaders of the Alliance do not clarify what they can achieve in the areas of humanitarian war and defending values, then the very survival of NATO may be at risk again. It is vital that NATO's central functions are not squandered over a loss of credibility due to its inability to match rhetoric, will and capacity.

This paper contends that the British Labour government had compelling reasons to play a leading role in the Kosovo conflict. First, it examines the government's perception of what was at stake in terms of Britain's reputation and values, strategic interests and milieu goals. Then it elucidates the debate on the conflict principally through the prism of parliamentary deliberations. These arguments revealed unexpected alignments. Thus, Conservatives expressed fierce criticisms of the conduct and impact of NATO's air campaign with some joining mainly left-wing Labour parliamentarians in deploring the absence of UN authorization. In these circumstances it was remarkable to find most Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs strongly supporting NATO military action and pursuing a course that made Britain the most hawkish member of the Alliance. The paper concludes with an assessment of the major part played by Britain in shaping NATO's response in the conflict, a role prompted principally by the government's commitment to protecting human rights and by its concern to prevent a repeat of British and NATO failures in Bosnia.

The NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 resolved some problems but also fuelled wider Albanian nationalist aspirations. Albanian nationalist movements have spread outside the borders of the Albanian state, in Presevo and Tetovo, throughout 2001. There have been attempts to coordinate the cultural and economic integration of Albanian groups in an 'Albanian Space' in Southeastern Europe. There has also been an escalation of the domestic conflicts in FYROM. Albanian mobilization in
all those areas may be attributed to the continuing nebulous international status of Kosovo. As long as the status of Kosovo remains unclear, other Albanian groups outside of Kosovo may increase their demands and escalate their political and military activities. In view of the above, placing Kosovo under the temporal 'trusteeship' of the United Nations could be a solution. This solution was applied after the Second World War to various colonies and territories formerly belonging to Western powers. The new status of Kosovo as a territory under United Nations trusteeship requires that FR Yugoslavia voluntarily agrees to this interim status and that one or more countries, perhaps including Yugoslavia, would constitute an Administration Authority to govern Kosovo while it prepares for self-government or independence.

- Kramer, Steven Philip
Les relations franco-americaines a l' epreuve de la crise au Kosovo. 
L'auteur s'interesse ici a l'impact de la crise kosovare sur les relations franco-americaines et sur la question de la securite europeenne. Apres avoir montre a quel point depuis deux siecles les relations franco-americaines sont empreintes de mefiance reciproque, il insiste sur l'opposition entre theses americaine et francaise concernant la securite europeenne. Si, des deux cotes de l'Atlantique, la tendance semble etre actuellement en faveur de la seconde, la crise au Kosovo a souleve - malgre la convergence des positions americaine et francaise - la question du degre de fiabilite que Europeens et Americains peuvent a l'avenir esperer les uns des autres. L'auteur evoque enfin le role eventuel du Royaume-Uni dans l'amélioration des relations franco-americaines.

- Kut, Sule
Turks of Kosovo : What to Expect ?

- Lantis, Jeffrey
The Moral Imperative of Force : The Evolution of German Strategic Culture in Kosovo.
http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod
This article explores continuity and change in German security policy in the decade since unification by examining German responses to the crisis in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999. Specifically, the utility of strategic culture - the most popular theoretical vehicle for interpreting contemporary German security policy - is evaluated as an explanation for its behavior in the Balkans.

- Larose, Martin
Letourneau, Paul
L' Allemagne et le Kosovo : entre l' ethique et la raison d' Etat ?
Au printemps 1999, la participation de la RFA aux bombardements de l'OTAN sur la RFY a constitue une etape clef de la 'normalisation' de la politique etrangere et de securite allemande. Le premier objectif de cet article consiste a analyser les reactions de l'Allemagne durant toute la crise. Cet examen permet de voir que non seulement le gouvernement a participe aux 'frappes aeriennes' mais qu'il a largement contribue aux mesures d'aide humanitaire et a la solution diplomatique ayant mis un terme au conflit. En second lieu, les auteurs analysent ces actions en relation avec la rhetorique du gouvernement pendant la crise. Le but consiste ici a identifier la part des interets nationaux et celle de la morale dans les motivations allemandes. Pour ce faire, la theorie de la guerre juste est utilisee. Les auteurs concluent que si le gouvernement allemand et l'OTAN pouvaient moralement recourir a la coercion dans le cas du Kosovo, la conduite de cette guerre ne correspondait pas aux
criteres de l'ethique de la guerre juste. Bien que la raison d'Etat
n'exclut pas les considerations morales, la premiere primait probablement
sur les secondes dans l'esprit des decideurs allemands.

- Latty, Franck
Guerre et paix au Kosovo : le droit international dans tous ses etats.
89-102.
Le recours 'a la carte' au droit international par les differents
protagonistes de la guerre du Kosovo a ete flagrant. L'intervention des
pays de l'OTAN, fondee sur le respect des droits de l'homme, s'est
pourtant faite au mepris des regles internationales en matiere
d'interdiction du recours a la force. Neanmoins, la Cour internationale
de Justice, saisie par la Yougoslavie, a refuse de se prononcer sur cette
violation de la Charte des Nations unies. Selon certains auteurs, il faut
voir dans l'exemple du Kosovo la formation d'une nouvelle regle de droit
internationale qui permettrait, dans certains cas limites, le recours a
la force sans l'autorisation du Conseil de securite. Ce n'est que dans
l'apres-conflict que l'action du Kosovo a pu se situer dans une sphere
juridique et non plus politique et militaire. La resolution 1244 (1999)
du Conseil de securite prevoit la mise en place de 'presences
internationales civiles et de securite' au Kosovo, mais le statut de ce
dernier reste encore precaire. La guerre du Kosovo aura en tout cas mis
en lumiere la vigueur grandissante du droit international penal et le
role important du Tribunal penal international pour l'ex-Yougoslavie,
coume l'a demontrer l'inculpation de Slobodan Milosevic.

- Levitin, Oleg
Inside Moscow's Kosovo Muddle.
SURVIVAL, vol. 42, no. 1, Spring 2000, p. 130-140.
http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod
In the aftermath of the Kosovo war, analysis has focused mainly on the
deficiencies of Western policies. Yet it is Russia that has suffered the
real fiasco in Kosovo and in the Balkans as a whole, where its influence
and prestige have fallen significantly. Russia missed a number of
opportunities to prevent the conflict in Kosovo, which has proven
disastrous to its interests. However, the Kosovo crisis also proved that
it is worth trying to have Russia on board for as long as possible, and
that Russian intransigence can often be overcome through Western
persistance. What is usually assumed to be Russia's principled opposition
is sometimes more the result of inertia and incompetence. Sometimes it
might not be so difficult to persuade Moscow - still basically
opportunistic and lacking a clear vision of its own long-term interests -
to behave more constructively.

- Lhuissier, Jean-Marie
Le Kosovo : lecons pour la defense.

- Lyon, Charlie
Operation Allied Force : A Lesson on Strategy, Risk, and Tactical
Execution.
http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod
In the post-Cold War period the US has waged war in pursuit of results
that are not critical to the nation's strategic goals. This essay
connects strategic decision making to tactical execution and highlights
the cost of intervention and the impact of strategic decisions from the
perspective of military commanders at the tactical level. Differences of
opinion among commanders and varying assumptions about risk and the
impact of risk on the mission are explored; from the observed effects of
these disconnects in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, recommendations
for the future can be formulated with the goal of ensuring that
assumptions are shared among at all command levels.

- Macgregor, Douglas A.
The Balkan Limits to Power and Principle.

- Mangum, Ronald Scott
NATO's Attack on Serbia: Anomaly or Emerging Doctrine?
This article does not attempt to assess right or wrong in the NATO attack on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It does, however, examine the factual background and legal arguments for and against that action. And it raises questions which the international community should address in resolving the appropriateness of the use of force in humanitarian crises. Finally, it proposes guidelines which NATO and the US, if they are to be the moral leaders of the free world, can take to formalize a doctrine of humanitarian intervention.

- Marcus, Jonathan
Kosovo and After: American Primacy in the Twenty-First Century.
http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod
For some, Western intervention in Kosovo represents a new beginning for US engagement abroad. What blueprint does this experience provide for the US?

- Matveeva, Anna
Paes, Wolf-Christian
Trapped in its Own Maze.
Two beaten-up coaches rumble down the dusty streets of Kosovo on a spring morning. Swedish KFOR tanks - one in front, the other behind - provide some protection. The coaches, filled to capacity with members of the Serb and Roma population of Gracania, a village near Pristina, are bound for isolated areas in Kosovo. This 'minority shuttle system', run by the Danish Refugee Council in cooperation with UNMIK, offers a lifeline for Serbs living in the south of Kosovo. There are few better illustrations of the Serb minority's difficult position in the UN-run protectorate.

- Meckel, Markus
Kosovo Aftermath and Its Implications for Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management.
http://www.nato-pa.int/publications/comrep
In various studies carried out since the end of the Kosovo conflict in June 1999 an attempt has been made to learn lessons from the Kosovo conflict. The main focus of attention seems to have been placed on the military dimension. As important as the military and policy lessons are, they tend to hide another dimension that is at least as important. The question as to what lessons can be learned from the failed crisis prevention measures of the past few years and how the crisis management efforts of the Western countries might be improved has not received sufficient attention. In addition to the fundamental problems of crisis prevention and crisis management this report also deals with questions regarding appropriate relations with Serbia and a political solution for Kosovo.
Meseznikov, Grigorij
The Crisis in Kosovo and its Impact on the Slovak Domestic Politics.
SLOVAK FOREIGN POLICY AFFAIRS, vol. 1, no. 2, Fall 2000, p. 31-52.
Since Slovakia's independence, the Kosovo crisis was the first foreign policy event that became a significant factor in Slovak domestic politics. What were the reasons behind its significance? This article attempts to offer some answers. It analyzes attitudes of the principal actors in Slovak politics - the government and the main political parties - as they were recorded prior to and shortly after the beginning of the crisis in Yugoslavia. It illustrates the key Slovak political actors' understanding of the basic trends in international relations and their respective foreign policy priorities. The governing political parties acted in accordance with the declared Slovak orientation toward membership in NATO, while the attitude of the opposition parties was in evident contradiction to such an orientation.

Milinkovic, Branislav
De oorlog in Kosovo : vereenvoudigde lessen van een dubieuw precedent.
INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, jg. 54, nr. 2, februari 2000, p. 86-90.
The author argues that the dominant simplification in western public opinion, according to which NATO waged a victorious war over Kosovo for human rights and regional stability, is misleading. Undoubtedly, NATO's intervention was decisive in creating an international protectorate over Kosovo. Yet the victory was only partial since the peace plan contains some face-saving elements for Belgrade. NATO's action was far from the humanitarian intervention it pretended to be. In addition, it also threatened regional stability. The Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe seems to have better perspectives for the region. However, the decision to exclude Serbia is counter-productive. Serbia's further isolation only alienates Serbs from the West, crystallizes anti-Western sentiments and hinders conditions for political change in Serbia.

Mohr, Josef
Die Sicherheit im Kosovo braucht Zeit.
Attacks against Serbs, Roma and other minorities in Kosovo continue. The spectrum ranges from intimidation and harassment to arson, looting, abductions and murder. According to estimates of the United Nations Commission for Refugees, the acts of violence effected that approximatively 180,000 Serbs, Montenegrins and Roma left the Kosovo. The protective measures of KFOR produced a noticeable decline in the acts of violence, however. In total, the security situation in Kosovo will probably improve only by very small steps with every new act of violence involving the risk of triggering a spiral of violence and counter-violence which is difficult to contain and which could again ruin the hard-earned gains made in the field of public order and security. In view of the extremely difficult situation in this province and the deep-rooted hatred and enmity between the sections of population in particular there is still a great deal of work to do.

Odom, William E.
Making NATO Interventions Work.
NATO has entered a new era in which it must make its interventions succeed if it is to retain its relevance for European and Atlantic security. Enlargement is an intervention into Central Europe, and the NATO military operations in Bosnia and Kosovo are interventions in the Balkans. Putting the NATO umbrella over these areas is analogous to putting it over Western Europe in the 1950s. That was successfully done by a decisive war against Germany and Italy. Unless NATO perceives the wars in the Balkans as requiring similar outcomes and carries through to achieve them, it risks its very future.
Papasotiriou, Harry
The Kosovo War: Kosovar Insurrection, Serbian Retribution and NATO Intervention.
http://www.ingenta.com
This article analyzes the triangular strategic interaction between the Kosovar Albanians, the Serbs and NATO in the Kosovo War. The focus is first on the origins and nature of the armed conflict between the Kosovar Albanians and the Serbs in 1998, the strategy of which is analysed in terms of guerrilla warfare theory applied to the political and geopolitical context of Kosovo. An assessment follows of the reasons that led the Milosevic regime to its policy of a mass expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo, taking into account political and demographic factors. The second half of the article analyses the strategic interaction between Serbia and NATO in the spring of 1999 that determined the course and outcome of the culminating phase of the Kosovo War.

Parmentier, Guillaume
Apres le Kosovo: pour un nouveau contrat transatlantique.
POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 65e annee, no. 1, printemps 2000, p. 9-32.
Les progres effectues en matiere de politique etrangere et de defense europeenne au cours des dernier mois, et en particulier apres le conflit du Kosovo, imposent une reflexion rapide sur l'adaptation de l'OTAN. On ne saurait en effet concevoir les deux processus de facon isolee. On est loin des debats opposant atlantistes et europeistes, qui ont fait fureur apres la fin de la guerre froide. En outre, les faiblesses de l'OTAN revelees au grand jour lors du conflit rendent necessaire son adaptation en profondeur aux nouveaux enjeux. Encore faut-il que ces changements soient porteurs d'une efficacite plus grande, tout en donnant une souplesse d'action indispensable a l'organisation, qui lui permette également de donner corps aux ambitions de moindre dependance des pays europeens. L'auteur identifie les faiblesses du systeme actuel de l'OTAN, et envisage les moyens qui permettraient de leur porter remede.

Pauwels, Ann
Een 'nieuwe' generatie VN-vredesoperaties.
De VN-operaties in Kosovo en Oost-Timor gaan een stap verder dan de 'klassieke' vredesoperaties, in die zin dat zij ook de opdracht hebben tijdelijk het volledige bestuur over een bepaald gebied uit te oefenen. Zowel 'Kosovo' als 'Oost-Timor' kunnen als test cases worden beschouwd voor de toekomst van VN-vredesoperaties. Het succes of falen van beide operaties zal immers medebepalend zijn voor het verdere VN-beleid ten aanzien van vredesoperaties. In dit artikel wordt ingegaan op deze nieuwe ontwikkelingen ten aanzien van vredesoperaties en op de nieuwe, ongekende dilemma's en uitdagingen die de VN-operaties in Kosovo en Oost-Timor met zich brengen. Na een kort overzicht van de belangrijkste kenmerken en dan vooral van de vernieuwende elementen in de mandaten van beide operaties, wordt aandacht besteed aan enkele problemen die zich voordoen bij de concrete uitvoering van het mandaat, met name bij de opbouw van een onafhankelijke rechterlijke macht. Daarnaast worden enkele juridische kwesties die door deze nieuwe ontwikkelingen aan de orde zijn, besproken. Daarbij komt niet alleen de rechtmatigheid van het VN-optreden in Kosovo en Oost-Timor ter sprake, maar wordt ook ingegaan op de vraag in hoeverre het oude Trustschapsstelsel, zoals in het VN-handvest neergelegd, als juridisch kader kan dienen voor het instellen van VN-besturen over bepaalde gebieden. Deze vragen leiden uiteindelijk tot de kern van dit betoog, namelijk de toekomst van VN-vredesoperaties.
Elections in Kosovo have changed the agenda - independence is now the most likely medium-term outcome. Parliamentary polling next year will see a new battle for votes, but all parties agree on the aim.

Questions continue to swirl around Slobodan Milosevic's decision to pit Serb troops against NATO forces in the 1999 battle over Kosovo. Given NATO's overwhelming military superiority, what motivated the Serb leader to reject the Rambouillet accords and to fight a war that, at least on the surface, Serbia stood no chance of winning? Moreover, why did Milosevic agree to negotiate an end to the war when he did? The author addresses both questions through the 'lens of strategy'. According to him, Milosevic most likely had a political-military strategy to deal with NATO: his aim was to divide its members over Kosovo. As long as his strategy held out the possibility of driving a wedge between the coalition members, Milosevic could afford to keep the war going. Once it became clear that the coalition would not split over Kosovo, Milosevic agreed to settle the war on terms more favorable to Serbia than the Rambouillet accords. It was, says the author, a strategy that 'on the whole worked surprisingly well'.

A discernible shift occurred in civil-military relations in relief and humanitarian actions during the 1990s. The certainties of civilian and military roles have become hazier. Kosovo revealed the paradox in NATO's double roles. Military organizations appear to have gained new authority in the relationship, and humanitarianism may be, in part, a form of substitution for military engagement. It may fill a need and not just a hegemonic role. Kosovo has posed a predicament for the UN itself, for the UNHCR as the designated lead agency and for NGOs. The military has advantages in some areas of relief, especially construction and preparations for infrastructure and in providing, above all, a secure environment. Euro-military institutions have accepted the need to establish effective relations with civilian organizations to safeguard their own military goals. It could be that the more military forces are involved in human rights and relief work, the more civilianized the military establishment might become - reflecting the interplay between
hegemonic and solidarist interpretations of the civilian and military regimes.

- Reinhardt, Klaus
  Commanding KFOR.
  The author reflects on KFOR's contribution to the Kosovo peace process and highlights difficulties that lie ahead.

- Reinhardt, Klaus
  Lehren aus Kosovo : militarische und politische Herausforderungen.
  Sieben Monate, von Oktober 1999 bis April 2000, war der Autor Befehlshaber der in Kosovo stationierten KFOR-Schutztruppe, eines militärischen Grossverbands, dem etwa 50 000 Soldaten aus 39 Nationen angehören. Der Einsatz dieser Soldaten vollzog sich in einem Komplizierten Umfeld unterschiedlicher Vorstellungen, Grundsätze und Vorschriften; er wurde möglich durch ununterbrochene Zusammenarbeit und vorausschauende Verhandlungen. Der Autor beschreibt Aufgaben und Aktivitäten dieses Verbands und zieht aus dessen Einsatz Lehren für die Vorbereitung und Durchführung künftiger Friedenseinsätze.

- Reveron, Derek
  Coalition Warfare : The Commander's Role.
  http://www.catchword.com
  The author assesses General Wesley Clark's leadership in the coalition warfare waged against Yugoslavia in 1999. He argues that in Operation Allied Force, General Clark pursued a deliberate strategy that not only pushed the limits of NATO members at the strategic level, but also involved NATO diplomats in tactical decisions. Coalitions, he concludes, are vulnerable to splintering, but once united, they are invincible. He gives General Clark much credit for keeping NATO together during Operation Allied Force.

- Rieff, David
  Kosovo's Humanitarian Circus.

- Rohde, David
  Kosovo Seething.
  Kosovo is again erupting with ethnic killings. Just who is to blame for the ongoing violence: hard-line extremists or the embittered populace? Western leaders have avoided this central question because they are unhappy with the answer and its implications for their peacekeeping mission. It is time to face reality: Serb and Albanian grievances run deep, NATO troops are stuck in Kosovo for the long haul, and the West must take a stronger hand in governing this battered province.

- Ronzitti, Natalino
  Options for Kosovo’s Final Status.
- Rucker, Laurent
La Russie et l'operation 'Force Alliee' : a la recherche de la puissance perdue.
COURRIER DES PAYS DE L'EST, no. 1001, janvier 2000, p. 32-44.
L'operation "Force alliee" en ex-Yugoslavie a cristallise les atouts et les faiblesses de la Russie et a mis en lumiere l'interdependance des facteurs internationaux, regionaux et interieurs de sa politique etrangere. Elle a demonstre que la Russie ne dispose plus des ressources necessaires pour influencer l'agenda et les decisions internationales. Opposee a l'intervention de l'OTAN contre Belgrade, elle n'a rien pu faire pour l'en empecher et elle n'a pu etre associee au reglement de la crise qu'en s'alignant sur les exigences de l'Alliance a l'egard de la RFY. La crise du Kosovo a aussi consacre la division de la CEI entre les pays du GUUAM et les autres Etats-membres, en particulier la Russie et la Bielorussie. Le "pluralisme geopolitique" est désormais une realite de l'espace post-sovietique. Moscou eprouve de grandes difficultes a trouver des reponses adaptees a ce retrecissement strategique. Au plan interieur, la crise dans les Balkans a ete instrumentalisee dans la lutte pour le pouvoir et a permis a Boris Eltsine d'evincer Evgueni Primakov. Si la classe politique et l'opinion publique se sont retrouvees dans une condamnation quasi unanime de l'operation "Force alliee", en revanche le theme de la fraternite slavo-orthodoxe n'a recueilli qu'un faible echo dans la societe.

- Rupnik, Jacques
Yugoslavia After Milosevic.
http://www.swetsnetnavigator.nl/prod
The wars of Yugoslavia's dissolution might not be over yet. There remains much unfinished business, including, most urgently, the question of Kosovo's future status. If left unresolved, this question could well trigger a new round of violence and instability. If an obvious and satisfactory solution existed, it would already be known. None of the available options - including a reconfigured Yugoslavia containing an autonomous Kosovo, an indefinite international protectorate, or Kosovo's partition - are appealing. The least problematic option is probably to prepare Kosovo for a form of 'conditional' independence, with heavy international supervision of minority rights and guarantees against further revisions of borders. This would require the new Serb leadership to make a clean break with the Milosevic era and the myth of Serbian 'reconquest' of Kosovo. It also would require Kosovo Albanian leadership that is mature enough to embrace a twenty-first century - rather than a nineteenth-century - concept of sovereignty.

- Rynning, Sten
French Defence Reforms after Kosovo : On Track or Derailed ?
How well prepared has France been politically for the operational implications of its efforts to build a military instrument designed for extra-territorial interventions such as that conducted by NATO in Yugoslavia in 1999 ? Did the prolonged bombing campaign and the question of deploying ground troops provoke severe criticism and controversies ? This article assesses the French Kosovo debate both in the political centre and the broader elite public. The analysis finds that the new French military instrument receives solid backing from key policymakers who now race to claim parenthood of the military reform programme. The utility of a new military instrument was at one stage developing into a major concern to the elite public. However, an engineered anti-American agenda hijacked the debate, failed to address military issues, and ultimately could not mobilize the elite public. The conclusion outlines that an energized political centre has an opportunity to press ahead with military reforms but also points out that the relationship between France, Europe and NATO requires careful political management.
Bien que les opérations terrestres soient toujours en cours, il est d'ores et déjà possible de tirer quelques enseignements de la guerre du Kosovo. Guerre asymétrique, opération d'intervention menée au nom de valeurs et non plus d'intérêts nationaux, guerre dont les civils ont été à la fois l'enjeu et l'otage, elle conduit en outre à insister sur le concept d'interopérabilité, à s'interroger sur l'efficacité du 'tout aérien' et sur la RMA, à mettre en évidence la notion de combat à 'armes différentes'. Enfin elle pourrait remettre en cause certaines idées recues en matière d'avions et d'hélicoptères.

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Peace and justice in the Balkans require an independent Kosovo. But stability also requires embedding Kosovo in a broad, regional network.

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Moscow's efforts to redefine its national interests and relations with the West in the post-Cold War era has directed the country's stance towards the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. Russia's intention to present itself as an influential power in the international efforts to manage the crises following the dissolution of Yugoslavia largely explains Moscow's frequently contradictory stances, not only towards the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, but also in its intention to play the role of an effective mediator in the region. At the same time, Russia's strategic concern to sustain its international standing and influence through its membership in international organizations, such as the UN and OSCE, has rendered Moscow as the state that considers the weakening of those organizations as one of its external security threats.

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The author, a former ambassador of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Belgrade, returns to the Kosovo crisis in 1998-1999 and notes that most scholars in international law would agree that NATO's military force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Spring 1999 was illegitimate, being at variance with the UN Charter. He then argues that the preceding threat of force by NATO, of 28 May 1998, against the FRY was equally illegitimate. Also, NATO's threat to use force violated political commitments solemnly adopted at various occasions by OSCE participating states since 1975. Finally, he points to the contrasts between the way in which Western countries responded to the atrocities committed by Serbs in Kosovo in 1998/1999, leading to the threat and use of force by NATO, in comparison with their response to the atrocities committed by Croats in the Croatian Serb area of Krajina in the Summer of 1995.
1995, which was lenient.

- Surroi, Veton
  Das Experiment Kosovo : ehrgeizige Ziele, unrealistische Erwartungen.
  Auch in den nachsten funf Jahren wird Kosovo keine Musterdemokratie und
  kein wirtschaftlich bluhender Staat sein. Dies ist nicht verwunderlich,
  denn das heute von den Vereinten Nationen verwaltete Territorium hat 50
  Jahre Kommunismus und zehn Jahre apartheidahnliche serbische
  Vorrherrschaft hinter sich. Fest steht ledglich, so der Autor dass das
  Streben der Albaner nach Unabhangigkeit unumkehrbar ist.

- Surroi, Veton
  Kosovo Political Life : Past or Prologue ?
  27-33.
  The author illustrates the historical legacies and the related
  distortions that have characterized the process of state-building in
  Kosovo, chief among them the neglect for the problem of the democratic
  legitimacy of the emerging centres of administration and power. His
  general conclusion is that both the local and the international actors
  involved in the management of post-conflict Kosovo should give high
  priority to the creation of mechanisms capable of ensuring sound
  consensus-building and the quality of the new institutions.

- Swift, John
  De oorlog over Kosovo en de leer van de humanitaire interventie.
  INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, jg. 54, nr. 5, mei 2000, p. 238-247.
  The author discusses some of the principal arguments for and against the
  NATO action in the Kosovo war and in particular, the justification or
  otherwise of armed intervention in, and on behalf of, Kosovo in the name
  of humanitarian values. Addressed are matters such as a definition of the
  doctrine of humanitarian intervention; the background against which the
  doctrine evolved; how NATO defined its position before and during the
  war; and what critics of the war have said about it.

- Thomann, Jean-Claude
  Temoignage : le Kosovo.
  DEFENSE NATIONALE, 56eme annee, no. 10, octobre 2000, p. 21-47.

- Thomas, Timothy L.
  Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information Superiority.
  This article looks at the conflict between NATO and Yugoslavia not from
  the standpoint of the intent or success of the air campaign (although
  these issues will be touched upon) but rather through the prism of
  information superiority. Information superiority allowed NATO to know
  almost everything about the battlefield, but NATO analysts didn't always
  understand everything they thought they knew.

- Tilford, Earl H.
  Operation Allied Force and the Role of Air Power.
- Tomes, Robert
Operation Allied Force and the Legal Basis for Humanitarian Interventions.
This article reviews international law arguments against NATO’s bombing campaign, suggests that the operation should be considered legitimate, and concludes with a jus cogens argument - similar to a natural law argument - in support of intervention to stop gross violation of human rights.

- Torkunov, A.
International Relations in the Post-Kosovo Context.
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (Minneapolis), vol. 46, no. 1, 2000, p. 74-81.

- Torre, Arnaud Martins da
Les illusions dangereuses d' une victoire aerienne.
Les operations militaires de l'OTAN contre la Yougoslavie sont l'objet de vives controverses. Certes, il n'y a pas eu d'echec militaire; cependant, les forces allies n'ont que partiellement atteint les objectifs vises. Par ailleurs, la conduite de la campagne aerienne mit en evidence des incoherences, liees notamment au non-respect de principes doctrinaux developpes au cours de precedentes interventions. Au-dela des resultats de la campagne, il est necessaire de s'interroger sur le choix du 'tout aerien'. En effet, si l'on se referre aux concepts developpes par l'USAF, il n'est pas evident qu'il s'agisse d'une option par defaut, mais plutot d'une volonte deliberee de demontrer la superiorite de l'Air Power sur les forces terrestres et maritimes. Enfin, si les Europeens ont pris conscience de la necessite de combler le fosse technologique separant leurs armes de celles des Etats-Unis, cela ne doit pas aboutir a ce que les forces europeennes adoptent les principes strategiques americains.

- Torrisi, Steven A.
How Serbia is heading the Way of post-Versailles Germany.
This analogy written before Milosevic's ouster theorizes that Serbia in the aftermath of Kosovo mirrors Germany after 1919 as a nation forced to accept an imposed peace. From the evidence a resurgence of Serb nationalism and territorial ambition is still inevitable. Various parallels support this conclusion including the use of post-war sanctions, demands to hand over a wanted war criminal and owe up to guilt, geographical fragmentation, political uncertainty, economic depression, and military association with Russia. The salient point remains one of oversight by the victors to acknowledge an ignominious settlement is the source of all grievances and patterns of instability.

- Tsygankov, Andrei P.
The Final Triumph of the Pax Americana ? : Western Intervention in Yugoslavia and Russia's Debate on the Post-Cold War Order.
This paper addresses the question of world order by considering how Western military actions in Yugoslavia were perceived from a different cultural perspective. It traces how the NATO-led bombing campaign during March-June of 1999 affected various visions of world order that had existed in Russia before the campaign and describes the discursive change this campaign produced. The argument is made that Russia's foreign policy elites, from Westernizers to Neo-Communists and Expansionists, perceived Western goals in Yugoslavia differently from their counterparts in the West. However, they differed in their recommendations regarding Russia's response and lessons to be drawn from the Kosovo crisis. The paper also identifies several points where the different perspectives can converge.
More specifically, all Russian schools of thought viewed the NATO campaign as a dangerous precedent potentially destabilizing the existing world order. They also shared the conviction that Russia should play a larger role in world affairs and that without Russia's involvement there could be no peace and stability in the Balkans and in Europe. They point to the UN as the only forum for debating the legitimacy of military interventions and for preventing interventions carried out without the approval of the UN.

- Tudor, Valeriu
  War in the Balkans : Lessons and Challenges Ahead.

- Valki, Laszlo
  Kosovo, International Law and Humanitarian Intervention.

- Vogel, Tobias K.
  'Preponderant Power' : NATO and the New Balkans.

- Vrieze, Franklin De
  Towards Self-Government in Kosovo,
  During 2001 Kosovo went through a considerable political transformation. On 15 May 2001 a 'Constitutional Framework' was promulgated, outlining the competencies of Kosovo's new Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. On 17 November 2001 Kosovo wide Assembly elections saw the participation of all communities. On 10 December 2001, for the first time since the abolition of Kosovo's autonomy 12 years previously, Albanian, Serbian and other Members of the Kosovo Assembly were sitting side by side to start the process of substantial self-government in Kosovo. This article analyses the political and institutional transformation of Kosovo throughout last year.

- Vrieze, Franklin De
  Het voorlopig samenlevingsmodel in Kosovo : zelfsbestuur onder internationaal toezicht.
  The author examines Kosovo's political transformation, following the promulgation of the 'Constitutional Framework for Self-Government' on 15 May 2001 and the inclusive Assembly elections of 17 November 2001. Whether the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government will succeed in their main task of improving living conditions in Kosovo largely depends upon different parameters such as finding a pragmatic working relationship between the quarrelling Kosovo-Albanian political parties, establishing a consensus between the new government and UNMIK, creating better living conditions for the Kosovo Serbs and other minorities, and combatting crime. While the international community is very careful not to prejudge the final status of Kosovo during the actual interim period, a difficult triadegue between Belgrade, Prishtina and the international community is expected. Until further notice, Kosovo's self-government under international supervision will be the model for the years ahead.

- Ward, Benjamin
  The Failure to Protect Minorities in Post-War Kosovo.
In her article on the regional implications of the 'waiting game' that the international actors seem to be playing in Kosovo, the author points out that the political process concerning the status of Kosovo cannot be kept separate from the developments in neighbouring states, which, in turn, are undergoing major political transformations of uncertain outcome. In the concluding part of the article, she sketches out some key elements for a comprehensive strategy that would take into due account the complex interrelationship between the future of Kosovo and that of the entire Balkan area.

Despite the fall of Milosevic in FR Yugoslavia and the victory of moderate political forces in the municipal and national elections in Kosovo, the situation in that area remains precarious. The representatives of the international community stationed in Kosovo enjoy today greater legitimacy among the Kosovar Albanian and Serbian communities than in the past. For the time being, the status of Kosovo may be 'frozen' because there is an absence of international and local consensus about its future. The more rigorous implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 could prevent Kosovo from sliding back to open conflict. Democratic elections alone cannot solve the problem. There is a need for a road map to meet the minimum demands of Kosovar Albanians and Serbs. However, it would be dangerous to meet the maximum demands of either. To that effect, a new 'agenda of coexistence' could be adopted which could ensure the functional autonomy of Serbs within the substantial autonomy of Albanians. There is also need for a long-term commitment of the international community to the development of the region. This does not necessarily mean the indefinite perpetuation of international military presence or undiminished financial aid, but substantive assistance to build effective democratic institutions. The democratic change in Serbia in 2000 and the victory of moderate political forces in the elections in Kosovo have opened a window of opportunity.

The destabilising potential of Kosovo remains largely intact. The underlying cause of the crisis has not yet been addressed. The Kosovo conflict is not a dispute over power or form of government. It is a dispute over control of territory: a contest between Yugoslavia's sovereignty and Kosovo's independence. The UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the NATO-led forces (KFOR) arrived in June 1999 to scenes of chaos. By October 2000, when the first-ever free and fair municipal elections were held in the territory, the UN administration has succeeded in establishing a modicum of stability. The unresolved problems remained daunting: the inherent ambiguities and contradictions of the UN mandate; the diametrically opposed aspirations of the Kosovo Albanians and Serbs; and continued vengeful violence by Albanians. But UNMIK and KFOR could point to one most critical - albeit fragile - accomplishment. They had finally won the confidence and cooperation of both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. Maintaining that confidence will be a difficult challenge, requiring a close study of the lessons of the first 18 months of international administration.
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