THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (START) : AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

LE TRAÎTÉ DE RÉDUCTION DES ARMES STRATÉGIQUES (START) : APERÇU HISTORIQUE

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PART I : BOOKS
PREMIERE PARTIE : LIVRES*

2009

327.3 /00672
xii, 173 p.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 1584873817
Author(s): 1. Blank, Stephen J.

Subject(s):
1. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
2. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--USA
3. USA--MILITARY RELATIONS--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
4. RUSSIA (FEDERATION)--MILITARY RELATIONS--USA

Added entry(s):
1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)

Notes:
'Russo-American relations are generally acknowledged to be at an impasse. Arms control issues feature prominently in that conflicted agenda. Since the outbreak of the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008, both Russia and the U.S. have further hardened positions and raised tensions apart from the war itself and Russia's quite evident refusal to abide by its own cease-fire terms. Nevertheless, and for better or worse, arms control and its agenda will remain at the heart of the bilateral Russo-American relationship for a long time. Arms control and disarmament issues are quintessentially political as well as military issues that are among the most critical components of the bilateral relationship and regional security in both Europe and Asia. For these reasons, neither the political nor the military aspect can be divorced from the other. And for these same reasons, we cannot refuse to participate in the bilateral effort to resolve those issues.'

ID number: 80022477
Year: 2009
Type: M

2002

327.3 /00617
Russia and the United States in Search for a New Strategic Framework - Moscow : Carnegie Moscow Center.
4 p.; 30 cm.
(Briefing Papers ; vol. 4, issue 2, February 2002)
Author(s): 1. Pikayev, Alexander

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
2. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--USA
3. ABM TREATY

Added entry(s):
1. Carnegie Moscow Center (SU)

Notes:
'On December 13, 2001 the United States officially notified Russia that for reasons of national security, and in accordance with

* This list contains material received as of April 7th, 2010. – Cette liste est arrêtée au 7 avril 2010.
Article 16 of the Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty), the American side would withdraw from the Treaty upon the expiry of the six month, contractually fixed notice period. This means that a document, which both parties had described as the cornerstone of their strategic relationship for almost three decades, will be terminated as of June 2002. The coming event begs many questions. Was it right for Russia to reject, for three years, the Clinton Administration's suggestions concerning a gradual and partial modification of the Treaty? What will happen to the continued bilateral strategic arms control regimes? Will they go the way of the ABM Treaty or will it prove possible to preserve some of them? Will the few months left until George Bush's visit to Moscow and St. Petersburg, slated for the end of May, be enough for Russia and the United States to draw up a new document on deep strategic nuclear reductions? Will the new document be a full-fledged and meaningful agreement rather than a meaningless sheet of paper? Will it become an important milestone on the way to creating a new non-confrontational strategic framework between Russia and the US, or will it be a nice gesture to calm down the world public concerned by the broken ABM Treaty.'
International nuclear disarmament is at a standstill. This book discusses many of the steps that could and should be taken to get nuclear disarmament 'back on track'. These include de-alerting nuclear weapons, negotiating an end to production of fissile material, introducing policies of 'no first use' of nuclear weapons, increasing transparency in national nuclear weapons programmes, and developing new technologies for verification. Also needed, and discussed in the book, are alternatives to the expansion of NATO, and alternatives to negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The book begins with a history of attempts to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world, together with a refutation of arguments that pursuing nuclear disarmament is in turn too difficult, too dangerous and too distracting from other arms control issues. The book also includes an analysis of whether nuclear weapons prevented war in Europe between 1945 and 1991, and a worldwide survey of public opinion on nuclear weapons.'
views from the academic and policy-making worlds. Some argue that growing interdependence creates both the need and the opportunity for a radical reorientation of arms control efforts, while others contend that increasing complexity in arms control problems still constrains what can be negotiated and ratified.

1996

327.3 /00536
Arms Control Toward the 21st Century - Boulder, CO : Lynne Rienner.
xii, 348 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
ISBN: 1555875610
Subject(s):
1. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
Added entry(s):
1. Larsen, Jeffrey Arthur, ed.
Notes:
Includes index.

'How should we think about arms control? Should we pursue it as an ideology or a methodology, a goal or a tool? Is it a field of science or a practical art? Is arms control a new way of thinking, or is it simply diplomacy and war by other means? Although basic answers to these questions were clarified by the arms control revolution, which occurred at the end of the Cold War, definitive answers are still evolving. This book helps provide further answers. This survey of arms control issues gives students of arms control the latest and best synthesis of lessons learned from the Cold War. More important, it points the way to a new millennium.'

1994

327.3 /00519
Stepping Back : Nuclear Arms Control and the End of the Cold War - Westport, CT : Praeger.
xii, 166 p.; 24 cm.
ISBN: 0275946444
Author(s):
1. Vogele, William B.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
Notes:
Bibliography: p. 151-159. Includes index.
ID number: 80011498
Year: 1994
Type: M

xxvii, 772 p.; 24 cm.
ISBN: 0803977514

Author(s):
1. Goldblat, Jozef

Subject(s):
1. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

Added entry(s):
1. International Peace Research Institute (NO)

Notes:
Bibliography: p. 756-763. Includes index.

'Providing an historical overview of arms control, this comprehensive survey analyses all international arms control agreements reached since the latter part of the 19th century through to mid-1993 and also provides the complete text or carefully selected excerpts of all the agreements covered. Each agreement is presented in its political context and its significance is critically assessed. The book also provides a comparative review of the problems of verification and compliance posed by the various treaties. Negotiations which failed to result in any agreement are also discussed and analysed. Recommendations are made regarding possible future arms control undertakings.'

ID number: 80009668
Year: 1994
Type: M


vii, 280 p. : ill.; 28 cm.

Subject(s):
1. STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS
2. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

Added entry(s):
1. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (US)

ID number: 80017466
Year: 1991
Type: M


xiv, 390 p.; 21 cm.
ISBN: 0394740092

Author(s):
1. Talbott, Strobe

Subject(s):
1. INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCES
2. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
3. STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS

Notes:
Includes index.

'This account of nuclear arms control negotiations under the Reagan Administration is an astounding tale of bureaucratic infighting, ideological conflict and personal antagonisms which makes clear for the first time not only how, but exactly why, the most vital negotiations of our times collapsed into dangerous stalemate, and what the chances are for the future.'
327.3 /00421
The Politics of the Nuclear Freeze - Philadelphia : Foreign Policy Research.
xviii, 258 p. ; 23 cm.
(Philadelphia Policy Papers, 0733-3218)
ISBN: 0910191085
Author(s):
  1. Garfinkle, Adam M., 1951-
Subject(s):
  1. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--USA
  2. ANTINUCLEAR MOVEMENT--USA
Added entry(s):
  1. University of Pennsylvania. Foreign Policy Research Institute (US
Notes:
  Includes bibliographies.
ID number: 70004016
Year: 1984
Type: M
SORT-ing Out START: Options for US-Russian Strategic Arms Reductions.  
(JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY, no. 55, 2009, p. 47-58.)
Author(s):
  1. Cimbala, Stephen J.
Subject(s):
  1. START
  2. SORT
  3. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--USA
  4. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
Notes:
Embedded in the construction and negotiation of arms pacts are issues related to post-Cold War geopolitics, including NATO enlargement, US missile defenses deployed in Europe, and Russian military doctrine and reform. This article considers various options for US-Soviet strategic nuclear arms reductions within this larger politico-military context and offers provisional but timely assessment of prospects for success.
ID Number: JA026185
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

Triad of Terror: Post-START Reductions in Broader Context.  
(EUROPEAN SECURITY, vol. 18, no. 2, June 2009, p. 201-225.)
Author(s):
  1. Cimbala, Stephen J.
Subject(s):
  1. START
  2. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--USA
  3. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
Notes:
This paper considers the present condition and future prospects for post-Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (post-START) nuclear arms reductions in the following sequence. First, the author reviews the essential features of the agreement between Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev in July 2009, for a START follow on agreement. Second, the author discusses the larger political and military-strategic contexts within which these post-START negotiations will play out. Thirdly, the author performs an analysis to determine whether START follow-on guidelines would meet prospective requirements for mutual deterrence and, in addition, whether US-Russian reductions could safely go even lower. Fourth, the author takes a look at the estimated impact of defenses on deterrence stability under post-START reductions. Fifth, pertinent conclusions are summarized.
ID Number: JA026529
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

** This list contains material received as of April 7th, 2010.– Cette liste est arrêtée au 7 avril 2010.
After START: Hurdles Ahead.
Author(s):
1. Pifer, Steven
Subject(s):
1. START
Notes:
Moscow and Washington face tricky issues in negotiating a post-START nuclear arms reduction pact that both sides want. After it is signed, the really hard work will begin.
ID Number: JA026259
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

2008

New Presidents, New Agreements? Advancing U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Control.
(ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 38, no. 6, July - August 2008, p. 6-14.)
Author(s):
1. Arbatov, Alexei
2. Gottemoeller, Rose
Subject(s):
1. START III
Notes:
With the Sochi Declaration in April 2008, the poker players in Washington and Moscow effectively laid down their strategic arms control cards for the last time in the Bush and Putin administrations. They reiterated their intention to carry out further reductions in strategic offensive arms, they pledged to continue development of a legally binding post-START arrangement, and they restated their commitment to Article VI of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which calls for eventual total elimination of nuclear weapons.
ID Number: JA025201
Year: 2008
Language: English
Type: ART

2006

ReSTART: The Need for a New US-Russian Strategic Arms Agreement.
(ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 36, no. 7, September 2006, p. 6-11.)
Author(s):
1. Diakov, Anatoli
2. Miasnikov, Eugene
Subject(s):
1. START
Notes:
On June 27, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed to begin talks with the United States on replacing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), set to expire in 2009. Calling for a 'renewed dialogue on the main disarmament issues', Putin did not provide any specifics on the kind of agreement he was seeking; nor was there any direct response from Washington, although US officials say they plan to work with Russia on the issue.
ID Number: JA022937
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART
European Security and the Russian Duma.
(DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS, vol. 18, no. 1, March 2002, p. 75-84.)
Author(s):
1. Segell, Glen M.
Subject(s):
1. START II
Notes:
This article focuses on how the Russian Duma has increasingly played a role in European security since the onset of the process of democratization in the former Communist state. The relevance of the Duma's role for European security is to learn from past errors of judgement, particularly on the significance of who is in charge of changes in Russia. Although few would admit it in hindsight, the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War was not predicted because analysts did not focus on the correct power holders and processes of change in Russia. The focus will be on the Russian Duma as a major symbol, force and source of democracy, which gives it the legitimacy and authority as a major international power deliberator via its stance on the START II Treaty.

Seven Worries about START III.
(ORBIS, vol. 45, no. 2, Spring 2001, p. 175-191.)
Author(s):
1. Clark, Mark T.
Subject(s):
1. START III

Russia Ratifies START II.
(INternational affairs (Minneapolis), vol. 46, no. 3, 2000, p. 1-11.)
Author(s):
1. Gavrikov, V.
Subject(s):
1. START II
Prospects for continued arms control and disarmament agreement between Russia and the US are now problematic. Internally, Russia has been unable to define a coherent foreign and military policy, and the economic situation remains extremely difficult. The policy-making process can work, however, as demonstrated by the Duma’s ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. On the other hand, START II has been subject to the vagaries of domestic politics and issues related to ABM treaty revision. On March 22, 1999, President Yeltsin submitted the Draft Law on START II ratification, revised in close cooperation between the parliament and the government. But the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia meant that further consideration of START II was impossible. Forthcoming Duma and presidential elections raise uncertainties on START II prospects and on the structure of the post-Cold War arms-control process.

On February 25, the Committee on Nuclear Policy released a report to address the current impasse in strategic nuclear arms control exemplified by Russia's delay in ratifying START II. Nuclear dangers inside Russia are expanding too quickly to be addressed by the formal treaty negotiation process alone, argues the committee. To supplement treaties such as START II, it calls for parallel, reciprocal actions by the United States and Russia in three areas: force levels, alert status, and fissile material and warhead controls. The committee's specific recommendations include: reduction to 1,000 deployed strategic nuclear weapons on each side within a decade; cradle-to-grave transparency on all US and Russian warheads and fissile materials; elimination of the launch-on-warning option and
massive attack options from nuclear war plans; and consolidation of Russia's weapons-usable materials into the smallest possible number of locations.

1998

Competing Views on Strategic Arms Reduction.

(ORBIS, vol. 42, no. 4, Fall 1998, p. 587-604.)

Author(s):
1. Benson, Sumner

Subject(s):
1. START II

Notes:
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) I and II are intended to strengthen nuclear stability by eliminating those weapons in both the Russian and US arsenals that are most capable of carrying out a surprise attack. During the five years since START II was signed, that treaty has been widely portrayed in Russia as depriving Moscow of its most potent strategic weapon (heavily armed land-based missiles) and as making Russian nuclear forces potentially vulnerable to US long-range conventional weapons and ballistic missile defenses. These criticisms may be giving rise to a new, more Russia-specific strategic doctrine. This emerging challenge to the official US-Russian consensus on strategic stability probably will not lead Russia to reject START II (particularly in view of 1997 modifications to the treaty), but it does indicate that Moscow would be unlikely to accept the large additional reductions envisaged in several recent unofficial proposals for a 'minimum deterrent' force.

1997

Finishing START and Achieving Unilateral Reductions: Leadership and Arms Control at the End of the Cold War.

(JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, vol. 34, no. 2, May 1997, p. 135-152.)

Author(s):
1. Baglione, Lisa A.

Subject(s):
1. START I
2. START II
3. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--USA
4. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--USSR

Notes:
In 1991, the USA and USSR reached an accord to make significant cutbacks in their strategic arsenals. A few months after the agreement was signed, the superpowers also unilaterally decided to undertake steps to decrease their readiness for war, eliminate tactical nuclear weapons, and accelerate the START reductions. While the outcomes may appear to follow from the collapse of Soviet power or domestic political developments, a closer examination suggests that a singular focus on neither power considerations nor internal politics can explain adequately these instances of arms control. Instead, leaders appear to have played a principal role, simultaneously balancing domestic political considerations against international challenges and opportunities.
Key Aspects of the Russian Nuclear Strategy.
Author(s):
1. Belous, Vladimir
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WARFARE--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
2. START II
3. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
Notes:
The article provides an analysis of Russian Military Doctrine with regard to nuclear weapons, based on the assessed need to maintain strategic stability in a new geopolitical situation. The author analyses the usefulness of the START-I and START-II treaties as seen from a Russian perspective, taking into account the current and prospective structure of the Russian nuclear triad. The chances that START-II will be ratified are considered doubtful because of current US attitudes towards the ABM Treaty and recent US moves to develop a National Missile Defense. The article also analyses various concepts for the use of Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF)--retaliation, launch-on-warning and possible first use in a conventional, defensive war.

ID Number: JA011901
Year: 1997
Language: English
Type: ART

Russia's Nuclear Drawdown: Justice Delayed or Denied?.
(EUropean Security, vol. 6, no. 3, Autumn 1997, p. 66-84.)
Author(s):
1. Cimbala, Stephen J.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
2. START II
Notes:
In this study, the author first considers whether Russia can, from the standpoint of arms control logic and strategic stability, proceed to reduce its strategic nuclear weapons without jeopardizing its security. The author's operational definition of nuclear security for Russia is essentially equivalent outcome status to that of the US following a nuclear exchange. Second, the author discusses the implications of the military-technical revolution in conventional warfare from the perspective of Russian and western military planners. He concludes that Russia can safely reduce to START II levels or below while maintaining essential equivalence in strategic retaliatory power with the US. Confidence in its nuclear deterrent may ballast Russia against present times of trouble in defence economics and against future advances in technology by Russia's Western, and other, competitors. Since, with regard to nuclear weapons, more is not necessarily better beyond a necessary minimum, Russia's nuclear weapons hold at least short term value for which conventional high-technology weapons will not be an available substitute.

ID Number: JA012659
Year: 1997
Language: English
Type: ART
Russia and Nuclear Coercion: How Necessary?, How Much?.
(JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES, vol. 10, no. 3, September 1997, p. 56-78.)
Author(s):
1. Cimbala, Stephen J.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
2. START II
3. NATO--ENLARGEMENT
Notes:
The future of nuclear weapons in Russian military strategy and policy is based on Russian political forecasting and military threat perceptions at two levels. First, Russian assessments of US strategic nuclear capabilities are important, even if the two states are potentially cooperative security partners instead of presumed adversaries. Second, NATO's plans for enlargement bring a US and allied European military alliance system with a nuclear guarantee closer to Russia's borders. The discussion here considers how Russia might evaluate and respond to a continued START strategic arms reduction process and to NATO enlargement, and what all of that might mean for European peace and stability.

The US-Russian Strategic Arms Control Agenda.
(ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 27, no. 8, November - December 1997, p. 12-16.)
Author(s):
1. Mendelsohn, Jack
Subject(s):
1. START II
ID Number: JA012654
Year: 1997
Language: English
Type: ART

1996

(FOREIGN POLICY, no. 104, Fall 1996, p. 102-117.)
Author(s):
1. Arbatov, Alexei
Subject(s):
1. RUSSIA (FEDERATION)--MILITARY RELATIONS--USA
2. USA--MILITARY RELATIONS--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
3. NATO--ENLARGEMENT
4. START II
5. TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (1990)
ID Number: JA011154
Year: 1996
Language: English
Type: ART
1995

START II and the Politics of Arms Control in Russia.
Author(s):
1. Lepingwell, John W. R.
Subject(s):
1. START II
2. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
Notes:
Against a backdrop of disenchantment with reforms and their supporters, the Russian legislature is beginning to exercise its power and take a more active role in foreign policy and defense decision-making. A new and far more complex and unpredictable decision-making system is thus emerging in Russia. These developments lead to the question of what the prospects are for START II ratification and implementation.

ID Number: JA010502
Year: 1995
Language: English
Type: ART

Moscow's START II Ratification: Problems and Prospects.
(ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 25, no. 7, September 1995, p. 8-14.)
Author(s):
1. Nazarkin, Yuri K.
2. Jones, Rodney W.
Subject(s):
1. START II
ID Number: JA010447
Year: 1995
Language: English
Type: ART

1994

The Dangerous Myths of START II.
(PARAMETERS, vol. 24, no. 1, Spring 1994, p. 78-87.)
Author(s):
1. Boldrick, Michael R.
Subject(s):
1. START II
ID Number: JA009096
Year: 1994
Language: English
Type: ART
1993

Auf dem Wege zu einem Abschreckungsminimum : der START II Vertrag und seine Folgeprobleme.
Author(s):
  1. Ruhl, Lothar
Subject(s):
  1. START II
ID Number: JA008620
Year: 1993
Language: German
Type: ART

1992

START and the Bush Initiative.
Author(s):
  1. Clark, Mark T.
Subject(s):
  1. START II
ID Number: JA005648
Year: 1992
Language: English
Type: ART

Desarmement et maîtrise des armements dans la politique des deux Grands.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE, 48e année, no. 11, novembre 1992, p. 27-43.)
Author(s):
  1. Klein, Jean
Subject(s):
  1. START II
ID Number: JA007886
Year: 1992
Language: French
Type: ART

Strategic Nuclear Forces Under START II.
(ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 22, no. 10, December 1992, p. 10-14.)
Author(s):
  1. Lockwood, Dunbar
Subject(s):
  1. START II
  2. STRATEGIC FORCES
ID Number: JA008080
Year: 1992
Language: English
Type: ART

Die amerikanischen Wahlen und die nukleare Rustungskontrolle :
Minimalabschreckung und Raketenabwehr ?.
(EUROPAISCHE SICHERHEIT, 41. Jg., Nr. 10, Oktober 1992, S. 545-548.)
Author(s):
  1. Meier, Ernst-Christoph
Subject(s):
  1. START II
ID Number: JA007836
Year: 1992
Language: German
Type: ART
La Russie face au traite START II.
(Strategique, no. 56, 4e trimestre 1992, p. 147-162.)
Author(s):
  1. Romer, Jean-Christophe
Subject(s):
  1. START II
ID Number: JA008356
Year: 1992
Language: French
Type: ART

1991

Destination Unknown : from SALT to START.
(Strategic Review, vol. 19, no. 2, Spring 1991, p. 32-43.)
Author(s):
  1. Gray, Colin S.
Subject(s):
  1. START
  2. SALT I
  3. SALT II
ID Number: JA003953
Year: 1991
Language: English
Type: ART

Von SALT zu START.
Author(s):
  1. Hecht, Rudolf
Subject(s):
  1. SALT II
  2. START
ID Number: JA005169
Year: 1991
Language: German
Type: ART

Why START ?.
(Arms Control Today, vol. 21, no. 3, April 1991, p. 3-9.)
Author(s):
  1. Mendelsohn, Jack
Subject(s):
  1. START
ID Number: JA003274
Year: 1991
Language: English
Type: ART

La negociation Start : etat des lieux.
(Defense Nationale, 47e annee, janvier 1991, p. 43-53.)
Author(s):
  1. Villars, Jean
Subject(s):
  1. START
ID Number: JA001720
Year: 1991
Language: French
Type: ART
START II : 'Good' Arms Control ?.
(GLOBAL AFFAIRS, vol. 6, no. 3, Summer 1991, p. 47-57.)
Author(s):
  1. Gray, Colin S.
Subject(s):
  1. START II
ID Number: JA004509
Year: 1991
Language: English
Type: ART

Reduktion strategischer Kernwaffen START-Erfolg nach neun Jahren.
(EUROPAISCHE SICHERHEIT, 40. Jg., Nr. 9, September 1991, S. 520-525.)
Author(s):
  1. Meier, Ernst-Christoph
Subject(s):
  1. START II
ID Number: JA004924
Year: 1991
Language: German
Type: ART

Der START-Vertrag : eine erste Reduzierung strategischer Angriffswaffen.
Author(s):
  1. Ruhl, Lothar
Subject(s):
  1. START II
ID Number: JA005167
Year: 1991
Language: German
Type: ART

1990

Les START et la strategie nucleaire americaine.
(STRATEGIQUE, no. 47, 3e trimestre 1990, p. 139-150.)
Author(s):
  1. Boyer, Yves
Subject(s):
  1. START
  2. NUCLEAR WARFARE--USA
ID Number: JA001548
Year: 1990
Language: French
Type: ART

START or Finish ? : The Future of Strategic Arms Control and Profound
Force Reductions.
(DEFENSE ANALYSIS, vol. 6, no. 3, September 1990, p. 235-254.)
Author(s):
  1. Chernoff, F.
Subject(s):
  1. START
ID Number: JA001110
Year: 1990
Language: English
Type: ART
Deterrence After Deep Cuts.
Author(s):
  1. Coffey, Joseph
Subject(s):
  1. START
  2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--NATO
ID Number: JA002292
Year: 1990
Language: English
Type: ART

Revising the START Process.
(SURVIVAL, vol. 32, no. 6, November - December 1990, p. 497-505.)
Author(s):
  1. Einhorn, Robert
Subject(s):
  1. START
ID Number: JA001372
Year: 1990
Language: English
Type: ART

Beyond START : How to Make Much Deeper Cuts.
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