I want to express to the Essex Branch of the English-Speaking Union my thanks for giving me the opportunity to be with you tonight. The purpose of the Union is an important one. The work that it has accomplished and inspired has made a most significant contribution to understanding between our peoples, and this understanding, in turn, has provided a keystone in the foundation of improved understanding between many people of many languages. It is an honour for Mrs. Norstad and me to be with you.

I must admit to a feeling of concern at the time that I accepted your invitation. In the course of many years' association with British friends, I have heard certain rather pointed observations on the quality of the language spoken on my side of the Atlantic. In fact, I have frequently had the feeling that when they refer to our speech as English, they have a tendency to put the word in quotation marks. I hope that my appearance here tonight will not do permanent damage to the Queen's English or seriously retard the normal progress of this fine language.

My first visit to Great Britain was just 15 years ago, in 1941, when the blackout and the siren were characteristic of London life. I had been moved before my arrival by the great eloquence of a great Prime Minister conveying to the world something of the strength and character
of the people of these Islands. I was further moved when I saw with
my own eyes that the Prime Minister, even with his magnificent words,
had not done full justice to you.

I had a feeling of pride which, at first, was difficult to understand.
It was explained when I visited Westminster Abbey, the Houses of Parliament,
and other monuments to a culture that is ours by transference (in spite
of 1776) as well as yours by right of birth.

In 1942 I was back again, this time as a participant in the war then
in progress and not as a mere observer. In my close association with the
British Forces in the Mediterranean during the next two years, at first
it seemed to me as if we - the British and Americans - were separated
by a common language. But then the surface differences began to disappear
and I came to appreciate that the common language did indeed make a great
contribution to understanding between the British and American Forces.
Moreover, I also realized that the importance of our common traditions,
of our common philosophy, was even greater.

At the end of the war in 1945, we continued our partnership but at
that time our work and our dreams were directed toward the years of peace
and security that we thought would follow. These dreams were gradually
dimmed in 1946-1947 and received a further crushing blow when Berlin was blockaded. Our two Air Forces aided that besieged city, you with Operation Plan Fare and we with Operation Victuals, and humanity won a great victory when the blockade was lifted. So we again joined together for a common purpose. The effects of this effort were not confined to Germany. American Forces returned to British soil.

The tolerance and generosity of your people in welcoming our forces into your community is something for which we will be eternally grateful. I know that several of you present here tonight have been leaders in the effort to make Americans feel at home in this country and to fit them into the community in which they live.

Your reward is in the great success you have achieved and in the great importance of this endeavour, not only to Anglo-American relations but to the entire Western community. I take this opportunity, however, to thank you for what you have done.

I have heard it said that one speaks German to horses, English to children, French to the ladies and Italian to the angels. This may be true but the important thing is that we speak English to each other — that we have not only a common language but a common tradition which binds us together.
Up to this point I have spoken as an American, but an American well aware of the importance of the unity and strength of the Western family of nations. This unity is built upon a foundation of understanding and common purpose to which the English-speaking people and the relationship that exists between them contribute one of the very solid foundation stones.

I would like to speak now as an International Officer of NATO, in particular of Allied Command Europe.

As long as we as individuals, as nations or as an alliance are active elements in the life of our times, we move towards an horizon established by the tasks confronting us. As problems are solved, new ones take their places, and our horizon, as in nature, constantly recedes as we move forward. But progress is measured by the distance from the point of departure as well as by that separating us from our destination.

In discussing Allied Command Europe, I would like to ask you to join me in looking both ways, starting with a backward glance over the last seven or eight years.

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in early April 1949. I need scarcely remind you of the times and circumstances that prompted twelve of the Western nations to join together for their common defence. The great hopes for peace and security shared by most of the free people
of the world at the end of World War II had dimmed as a result of encroachments from the East. Czechoslovakia had slipped, or been pushed, behind the Iron Curtain. The Soviet blockade of Berlin had created the Berlin airlift.

To meet this insidious form of aggression required unity and strength. It was in this context and to meet these requirements that NATO was formed. The spirit of the founders of NATO, and the foundation on which we now continue to build, is best stated in the Preamble to the Treaty signed in Washington on the 4th of April, 1949.

"The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments.

"They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

"They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

"They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security."
The military branches of the NATO family were established early in 1951, Allied Command Europe, of which I will speak particularly tonight, being founded on the 2nd of April of that year. A senior officer in the newly created allied command was heard to remark, after his survey of the military strength in Western Europe, that our greatest military resources were Faith, Hope and Charity. This would have been strictly true had it not been for the courage and faith of the United Kingdom, France and the Benelux countries who had in 1948 joined together in the Western Union Organization and made plans for the employment of existing forces in the event of war and taken the initial steps toward improving the strength and quality of European defenses. SHAPE profited greatly by taking over the resources of Western Union. However, I believe my friend Field Marshal Montgomery, Monty, that able and distinguished soldier and a leader in the Western Union Organization, would be the first to point out the meagerness of the defensive means available at that time when measured against the magnitude of the threat.

It is not necessary to trace in detail the progress made during the last five years. It is sufficient to point out that our numerical strength is on the order of four to five times what it was in 1951, that supporting forces and facilities have been vastly improved and that all SHAPE forces now operate under a common plan.
Two great events in the growth of NATO and of SHAPE were the inclusion of Greece and Turkey early in 1952 and the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955. These countries brought with them an improvement in our military posture but, more important, their membership has further unified the West and has enhanced the moral strength of the North Atlantic Community.

A few minutes ago I referred to the common plan as essential, giving it as a major factor in determining the effectiveness of our forces. I would like for a few minutes to discuss some of the background of our concept and of the development of this common plan.

In 1951 the problem was to build forces. It was not necessary nor was it possible to establish precise ultimate requirements. Broad objectives or force goals were stated. The direction of our efforts was established, and all the member countries moved forward on this course.

By the summer of 1953, it became clear that based upon two years' experience it was possible to achieve a more precise statement of our requirements. This possibility became more or less of a necessity because of two developments which became apparent at about that time.
The first of these was the fact that, although great progress was being made, countries would find it difficult, if not impossible, to raise and maintain the number of forces which the Lisbon Conference of 1952 estimated would be needed. The second cause was a quantitative and qualitative improvement in the field of atomic weapons which permitted us, for the first time, to contemplate their employment in a so-called tactical role.

Particularly as a result of these two considerations, SACEUR, in the fall of 1953, directed that a study be made, a study having as its purpose the establishment of a concept and the development of a common plan for the direction of forces of Allied Command Europe.

This directive was based upon the fundamental mission of SHAPE as derived from the North Atlantic Treaty and as first enunciated to the Command by the first Supreme Allied Commander, General Eisenhower. This directive was to create in Western Europe forces of such strength, organization and deployment that they would, first, make the maximum contribution to the preservation of peace, and second, in the event of aggression, they would successfully defend the peoples and territories of Western Europe.

Four basic assumptions were made.
1. That Allied Command Europe, large and important as it was, was still but one of the forces and factors that could be brought to bear against an enemy in the event of aggression. The effect of other forces must be accepted as assets and the full value of their support, direct and indirect, added to our own strength.

2. That the forces available by 1957 would be somewhat less than those considered at Lisbon in 1952. Actually, an estimate of forces was made based upon what was then considered to be the ability of participating countries to raise and to maintain army, navy and air forces on a continuing basis.

3. That German army, navy and air forces would be made available to SACEUR in substantially the strength contemplated under EDC. This strength and composition was later established under WEU.

4. That atomic weapons would be available and would be used as required to defend Western Europe.

The details of the study and of the concept and plan which were derived from it are of technical military interest. The general conclusions, however, are of interest to you, and should be to everyone in the Free World.
In general, the product of this study has been labelled "The Forward Strategy." Briefly, it was concluded that, if the assumptions which I have just enumerated were valid and their conditions met by 1957, Allied Command Europe could defend the territories and the peoples of Western Europe in the event of aggression.

We proposed to do this by:

1. Holding a line as far east as possible, essentially the line established by the forward boundaries of the NATO countries. The forces required for this purpose have been termed the "shield force." This force consists of appropriate land and air forces, and naval forces in the sea areas.

2. Maintaining a strong retaliatory force based primarily upon air atomic strength.

3. Maintaining the sea lines of communications essential to the support of Western Europe.

In the "shield force" there exist two serious weaknesses which we hope will be corrected within the next two or three years.

Speaking first of air defence, this subject has been a matter of national responsibility with few exceptions. As a result of action taken by the NATO Council in December of last year, the Supreme
Commander has now been charged with the coordination of air defense throughout the NATO area. As a consequence, we are engaged in two phases of air defense action at the present time. We are now linking together the existing air defense forces and facilities throughout Europe in order that we may achieve a higher degree of defense with what we already have. Progress is being made daily in this field.

We are making longer-range plans which will provide us with an integrated air defense system equipped with up-to-date radar, communications, missiles, and aircraft. We hope to achieve this integration in such a manner that, not only will the defense of each particular area be improved but in doing so, it will contribute more to the common defense.

Our other point of weakness is in the land force component of the "shield force." We are substantially weaker in army forces than is permitted by our basic assumptions. The largest part of this deficiency will be corrected as the German forces become available. As you know, this program has just started. It is not an overstatement to say that a German contribution in substantially the numbers envisaged is essential to the forward strategy.
Our progress during the last three years in building up the size and improving the effectiveness of our retaliatory forces has been, within reasonable limitations, according to plan. There is now based in various parts of Europe and immediately available to SACEUR an atomic force, land, sea and air, of substantial proportions. It is growing in size and increasing in effectiveness. Until the full requirements are met, it must continue to grow. When the program is achieved, this force will provide a principal source of our confidence that, in the event of aggression, we will be able to defend Western Europe. But, more important, in so doing we shall go far towards insuring that Western Europe shall not be attacked.

Although I have spent the last few minutes in discussing our ability to fight a war if necessary, we should all of us clearly understand that the first mission of NATO is the preservation of peace. However, there is a relationship between the two which I would like to discuss briefly at this point.

During the last ten years, the word "deterrent" has been used increasingly to describe the purpose of preventing a war or to characterize the means used for this purpose. Any definition of the term,
short of a book, is probably an over-simplification, but for purposes of discussion I would define it as follows: A deterrent is the ability, known or believed to exist, to act so decisively against an enemy that he knows beforehand that victory is impossible—that failure, in fact, is inevitable. I use the word "victory" only in the sense that the only thing worse than winning an atomic war, is losing it.

In the same terms, the requirement, should the deterrent fail, is the application of the ability to act decisively against an enemy while at the same time preventing him from acting decisively against us. It follows, that whatever is regarded as best able to achieve success in war provides, at the same time, the best deterrent. We believe this requirement is met by providing an air-ground-naval "shield force" to prevent the over-running of our territory, by the provision of an air defense system to give us reasonable protection against air attack, and by maintaining a retaliatory force capable of making aggression too costly.

Let us sum up the developments of the last five and a half years and, at the same time, state our position in May 1956.
First, the forces provided in Europe by the NATO countries even today represent a significant deterrent. You will recall that our plan for defending the European members of NATO was based upon assumptions which have not all been met in every respect. Notable among the deficiencies is the German contribution, the development of which has only recently begun. It cannot be said, therefore, that we are able at this time to fulfill completely and in detail our obligation to defend all the people and all the territory of NATO.

But let there be no mistake, the forces now available, operating for a common purpose under a common plan, are even now of great significance.

Second, although it is almost impossible to speak of winning a war in these times, the total effect of all of the forces and factors which would operate on the side of the West in the event of aggression would lead, in my judgment, to the ultimate defeat of the aggressor.

We started this discussion with a quick glance over our shoulders and looked back briefly at the events and developments since the end of World War II. Now having brought ourselves up to the present, let us look forward for a moment.

Military strategy influences and is, in turn, influenced by other
factors. It may be modified or even changed by such influences. For example, all military forces are responsible to the political authority. This is true of Allied Forces as well as those of one nation. As policies change to meet changing circumstances, it is quite normal for the military derivatives to reflect the change. Another illustration is the effect of technological developments and improvement in organization, and system, as well as in equipment. Any great improvement in this field will, of course, be expected to influence the manner in which we carry out our tasks.

With the important qualification that I have just mentioned, I would like to suggest two things:

First, that there will be no startling change in the objectives of our military thinking and planning. Changes there will be surely, but they will be those of normal growth, of evolution and development, and not reversals of trends or even abrupt changes.

The second point is that nothing has happened up to this time to change our view that we must build and maintain adequate military strength.

These points raise a number of questions. Time does not permit
consideration of all of them or, for that matter, of even listing them. However, I would like to mention briefly a few that are perhaps of particular interest at the present time.

A frequent question relates to the balance of forces. In fact, the question is sometimes so phrased that it would suggest a virtual elimination of some of these forces. It has been SHAPE's opinion that the defense of Western Europe requires a balance of land, sea and air forces, and with this I am in complete agreement.

For instance, the "shield" requires substantial numbers of land forces, particularly in the very forward areas. In its most vital sense, these forces must exist and be properly deployed to prevent the violation of NATO territory, and, in case of aggression, to hold back the invading force until the full strength of our ground-air-naval team could be brought to bear against the aggressor. Secondly—and a very important point from a strictly military standpoint—NATO has built a sizable complex of supporting bases and facilities which themselves must be protected from such threats as a rapid armored thrust. The safety of this complex is important not only from the standpoint of supporting the shield in its vital task, but also from the standpoint of the effectiveness of our retaliatory forces.
Another important facet of the "shield" is that, composed as it is of the units of several NATO Nations, it stands as a tangible, visible symbol of the determination of the entire Alliance to withstand and repel aggression. It would be one thing to move across the border of an undefended country; it would be an entirely different matter to make the decision to move against a prepared defence - the decision to do that would be one that would require long and hard thinking, which is in itself a significant deterrent.

Air-atomic weapons are in our arsenal in quite good supply. Our plans place great dependence upon the effectiveness of these weapons, both as a deterrent and for use by a retaliatory force in the event the deterrent should fail. We must continue to have these weapons and plan for their use in our own defence should it become necessary. I am not inclined toward being apologetic in speaking of atomic weapons or the fact that we would use them in our own defence. They are essential to our protection but, alone, they do not meet many of the important aspects of our mission. For this we need land, sea and air forces, balanced against the tasks that would confront us in an emergency. We need all of these to have our deterrent.
In the last few weeks there has been increasing mention of broadening the scope of NATO activities by further actions in the political and economic fields. You will recall the NATO Charter contemplated these developments. In fact, the designers of the Treaty had this object very much in mind. Count Carlo Sforza, at the signing, said:

"Signing a Pact ... is not enough. Life shall have to circulate through it, as a result of constant free collaboration in the service of peace between all its members, present and future .... Not only would we fail the spirit of the Pact, we would also belittle its force if we considered it only as a protective umbrella. We must pray to God that this Pact will prove to be like the English Magna Carta: on one side intangible, on the other side a continuous creation."

Consideration of cooperation in non-military fields will be welcomed by the military, for we see therein not only great benefits in itself, but also the prospect of greater unity in NATO, which, of course, will have a salutary effect upon the military effort as well.

If NATO has been pre-occupied with military matters during the course of its life up to this time, that has been because of the
importance of creating a foundation of strength upon which to build. The progress made has been sufficient to permit consideration at this time of new and important undertakings. I am sure you all share the satisfaction we at SHAPE feel on learning that our unique alliance may now place greater emphasis on a broader common effort for the common good. I am sure, also, that the most ardent advocates of activities in fields other than the military would agree that such activities can be developed only from a position of reasonable strength.

There are so many members or former members of the military services in this room tonight that I need scarcely mention the fact that those who have seen war at first hand hate it with a passion. For that reason, we have followed with the greatest interest the efforts towards disarmament that have been made in the last several years, and, most recently, the sub-committee meetings that have been taking place in London.

We at SHAPE are reassured by the fact that our statesmen continue their efforts to reduce the chances of war, and we hope these efforts will continue. We are further reassured by the fact that smiling faces have not been mistaken for friendly acts or good words taken as a substitute for good deeds, for we are well aware of the build-up - not decrease - of military capabilities, while the smiles have widened.
We at SHAPE hope for progress in the disarmament field, but the progress must be toward reducing the chances or the causes of war rather than the elimination of certain weapons or forces on which may depend the defence of NATO. One-sided weakness is not a deterrent but an invitation to aggression.

In democracies the will of the people is the deciding factor.

If we are to maintain the strength which we believe to be the minimum essential to the preservation of peace and freedom, the support of the people of the NATO countries must continue. When something goes badly there is a tendency to blame the government or our political and military leaders. I would like to suggest that we all have a responsibility and that we in this room - all of us - who have some particular knowledge of, or an interest in, what is happening in the world, have a particular obligation.

It is sometimes surprising to us that NATO and its activities, all of which are so vital in the lives of the people of the member countries, should be so little known and so little understood. I can make this statement quite freely here because I believe that in the United Kingdom there is perhaps a better appreciation and great knowledge than in
almost any other NATO country. There still remains a question as to whether the situation even here is good enough. It would seem to me that all of us, whether in official or private life, must work constantly to increase the knowledge of, and consequently the support for, this organization which plays such a vital part in our lives.

It can still be said that "In knowledge there is strength".

Today is the eleventh anniversary of the end of a great world war. Eleven years ago we hoped to see the beginning of a new world born after the tragedy of almost six years of war. If this dream no longer seems quite as near to achievement, it is nonetheless essential that it be achieved. On this occasion we can do no better than to dedicate ourselves to this task.

I would like to conclude with some words of a great man, Abraham Lincoln, spoken at a time of crisis.

"The world knows we know how to save it. We - even we here - hold the power and bear the responsibility. The way is plain, peaceful, generous, just - a way which, if followed, the world will forever applaud, and God must forever bless."