SHAPE HISTORY

CHANGES IN COMMAND STRUCTURE

VOLUME II
SECTION I

CHAPTERS I TO III

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE
FOREWORD

The History of SHAPE is being prepared in a series of volumes. Volume I, comprising three Sections describing the origin, establishment and development of SHAPE under General Eisenhower, has been previously issued. The History of General Ridgway's period is being treated similarly. This booklet contains three chapters comprising Section I of Volume II, the Ridgway Volume, and will be followed by Sections II and III covering General Ridgway's period of command. Major T. O'Driscoll Lumley, UK Army, is the author of Volume II.

Copies of these sections already issued may be obtained for reference purposes from the Historical Branch, Office of the Secretary of the Staff, SHAPE. A limited distribution of Section I, Volume II, is being made within SHAPE. All addressees are invited to comment on this portion of the SHAPE History. Suggestions for improvement of this section should be brought to the attention of the Historical Branch.

S. W. KOSTER
Colonel, US Army
Secretary

June 1959

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION TO THE RIDGWAY COMMAND

General Survey of the World Situation

The period in which General Ridgway took over command of Allied Command Europe from General Eisenhower was of considerable significance in the defense concepts of SHAPE.

In August 1950 Mr. Winston Churchill had spoken at Strasbourg to the Assembly of the Council of Europe. After appreciating that "the Soviet forces in Europe, measured in active divisions in men and vehicles, outnumber(ed) the forces of Western Union by at least six or seven to one", Mr. Churchill had said: "In my judgement we have a breathing space, and if we use this wisely and well, and do not waste it - as we have already wasted so much - we may still greatly increase the deterrents against a major communist aggression....If in the next two years or so, we can create a trustworthy system of defense against the communist invasion, we shall at least have removed the most obvious temptation of those who seek to impose their will by force upon the free democracies...." In June 1951, early in General Eisenhower's period of command, Field Marshal Montgomery had estimated that December 1952 was a Master Date by which SHAPE should have "built up a fighting machine sufficient to ensure the integrity of our homelands if we are attacked...."\(^1\)

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1. See Volume 1, Chapter X, page 301.
It is important, therefore, at this stage to assess the significance of the middle of 1952 against world events contemporary with the change of command at SHAPE.

The political situation in early 1952 showed intense communist activity in the Far East and Middle East. In Korea peace talks had been continuing in a desultory and unsatisfactory manner. During this period the Chinese had increased their forces by nearly a million men and by weapons and equipment which General Ridgway, as Supreme Allied Commander Far East, stated came from Soviet sources. Soviet propaganda was fulsome and allegations had been made that United Nations forces had used germ warfare in Korea. Although General Ridgway had denied these accusations on 27 February, they were repeated through the communist machine at various intervals, and in various places, including representations by Malik at the United Nations meeting on 26 March. The Japanese Peace Treaty had been signed on 15 April and it had been followed by communist-inspired demonstrations against facilities granted to the United States.

The statement made by the Chinese Nationalist Government in Formosa in January, that the Cominform had called its representatives from Malaya, Indo-China, Burma and the Philippines to a conference in Peking to develop plans for the "liberation of South East Asia", seemed to be borne out by later propaganda offensives in Indo-China and Malaya, and disturbances in Japan, Hongkong and Korea.

In Indo-China the offensive absorbed many French divisions which included the cream of French Army officers (8,500) and NCOs (40,000),
which were urgently required to help training in France. Indeed by 14 March the French newspaper "Le Monde" (then widely regarded as expressing French official opinion) had asserted that in view of the costs and difficulties which burdened France in Indo-China, the only solution was withdrawal. In Malaya, General Sir Gerald Templar had taken over command of the military and civilian elements, and in February had launched an offensive which was showing evidence of considerable success. The continuing trouble in Persia between Dr. Mossadeq and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was threatening the stability of the Middle East, and tension between Israel and the Arab League flared still in riot and demonstration.

In North Africa there were disturbances and riots in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria. In Egypt, following the riots of 26 January and the declaration of martial law, increasing pressure was being brought against the British to withdraw from the Suez Canal area. July was to see the coup d'etat which led to King Farouk's abdication and the growth of Egypt's aspirations under Naguib and Nasser for leadership of the Arab League. The Arab League Security Pact of 23 August in its turn reduced hopes for establishing the Middle East Defense Organization.

In the Sudan, Sir James Robertson had announced in January that the British had agreed to hand over administration to Sudanese Ministers during 1952, and the French were apprehensive of the influence of disturbing elements which might filtrate westwards into their North
In Western Europe, Trieste was still a sore point, and talks had been held with a view to adjusting Italian and Yugoslav claims. Agreement was reached on 9 May and plans to withdraw US and British troops were to follow. In Austria frequent attempts by the Western Powers to secure the signature of an Austrian Peace Treaty had been repeatedly frustrated by Soviet tactics, and it was interesting to note that in Austria on 19 April demonstrations of communist origin had broken out against the alleged use of germ warfare by the United Nations Forces in Korea.

The security and stability of France had been shaken by a series of governmental changes. With each change of government the implications of the proposed European Defense Community, agitation for independence in North Africa, and a solution of the Saar problem were re-considered.

The many political thrusts and counter-thrusts in Europe, however, centered around the proposed European Defense Community, involving as it did a military contribution to NATO from the Federal German Government. The USSR had made efforts to secure the armed neutrality of Western Germany and alleged that its proposed rearmament was the responsibility of "Nazis and industrial war-lords". Whenever the Treaty seemed near signature, offers towards a German Peace Treaty and German re-unification had been made by the USSR, and threats had emanated from Herr Grotwöhl in East Germany that the establishment of both the Coal and Steel Community under the Schumann Plan and the rearmament of West Germany would bring "Third World War planning nearer an actual outbreak of war".

African territories.
But by 26 May the Contractual Agreements had been signed at Bonn and on 27 May the European Defense Community Treaty was signed in Paris. Immediately, telephone communications with Berlin were cut by the Soviets, communist demonstrations broke out in Paris and elsewhere (including as far away as Japan) and by 1 June Berlin had been cordoned off and Eastern Germany severed from the West by a 5 km no-man's-land zone along its entire Western border.

General Ridgway is appointed as successor to General Eisenhower

Unity and cooperation had been developing steadily among the NATO nations during the period of General Eisenhower's command as SACEUR, and the acceptance of firm force goals by various nations at the Lisbon Conference in February, together with the accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO, had reflected a growing sense of responsibility and support for the principle of collective security expressed in the Alliance.

Nevertheless, it was fully realized in SHAPE that the forces available to SACEUR, although increased, were still largely of a skeleton nature or, in the "London Times" metaphor, 'a phantom army' in comparison with the readiness and preponderent strength of the Soviet forces, and in the face of obvious Soviet Cold War tactics. On 7 March when Mr. Truman sent to Capitol Hill the First Report of the Mutual Security Program he said: "The year 1952 may well be a critical time in the defense build-up bridging the period between extreme vulnerability to Soviet attack, and effective preparedness..." "The United States' continental defenses might soon
become its front-line defenses".

As early as 31 March the British Prime Minister, Mr. Winston Churchill, had stated in the House of Commons that if the United States government wished to appoint another American as successor to General Eisenhower, it would have the full support of the British Government, and this sentiment was shared by the other nations. The reality of the threat and the inadequacies of the defensive forces available called for a man of world-wide military reputation and proven success in command as a successor to General Eisenhower. In answer to the request of the North Atlantic Council, President Truman nominated General Matthew B. Ridgway, Commander in Chief United Nations, as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and the nomination was accepted by the Council.

In the Christmas season of 1950 General Ridgway had taken over command in battle-torn Korea of a demoralized and retreating army. Within three weeks the Eighth Army was making its first feeble advances, and by the end of March full scale divisions had crossed the Han River and were on their way north to the 38th Parallel. Representing in his manner and skill the dignity, efficiency and comradeship of the professional soldier, General Ridgway's influence on morale in Korea cannot be over-estimated.

On 11 April 1951, General Ridgway was appointed United Nations Commander in the Far East as successor to General MacArthur, and "the tough-muscled paratrooper with rows of ribbons for heroism"^3, a

2. 26 December
professional soldier and the son of a professional soldier, who had spent his entire 57 years living under army rules, had to take on the responsibilities of a statesman-diplomat and face the wily political intrigues of the East. He not only realized that "the expansion of science demands a lot of soul-searching to make sure there is maximum coordination between so-called soldiers and so-called statesmen", but also that there was a need for infinite patience on the part of statesmen and peoples.

It was difficult for a forthright and brilliant soldier, however even-tempered, not to be irritated by the tactics of delays and "hedging". His own words, "I cannot stand people who beat around the bush", expressed his forthrightness and at the same time his opinion of the very stuff of politics.

His battle experience had led him to think ahead of circumscribed military dogma. In August 1942 he had taken over command of the 82d Airborne Division and the following year he had planned and executed the large-scale airborne attack on Sicily, the first large airborne attack in the history of the US Army. The next year he jumped with the leading elements of 82d Airborne Division into Normandy in June and later commanded XVIII Airborne Corps and fought in the battle of the Ardennes alongside Field Marshal Montgomery. At the end of the war in Europe he flew to the Philippines to prepare for the part his Corps was to play in the invasion of Japan. However, war ended, and he became instead the Commander of the Mediterranean Area, as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, in 1945.
From January 1945 onwards, General Ridgway had gained experience in working with the United Nations. At first, he was General Eisenhower's representative on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in London and then in New York, and later became senior US Army member of this Committee which was to advise the Security Council on means of quelling aggression. His appointment as commanding General of Eighth Army in Korea on 26 December 1950 was followed on 11 April 1951 by his appointments as Commander in Chief United Nations; Commander in Chief, Far East; and Supreme Commander Allied Powers.

Soon after the assumption of these latter appointments, he had been made a full General, and immediately came into close contact with political problems. General Ridgway brought the approach of an honest, practical soldier to the problems which faced him, and he had seen how political delays and hedging at Panmunjom meant little more than increased enemy strength and spurious propaganda. After the handover in Japan to General Mark Clark, he left on 12 May for Washington, having faced in his last few days the Koje prison riots which broke out on 7 May. On 22 May he made a special report to the Senate Armed Forces Committee and the House of Representatives. After praising the United Nations forces, which he said "...had left a record of fidelity, valor and cooperation unsurpassed in military history", he again condemned the communist charges of germ and gas warfare by the US in Korea as "...false in their entirety" and "...a monumental warning as menacing and as urgent as a forest fire bearing down on a wooden cottage".4

General Ridgway's arrival in Paris

Immediately following the announcement of 28 April\textsuperscript{5} that the North Atlantic Council had accepted President Truman's nomination of General Ridgway as successor to General Eisenhower, the communist propaganda machine went into action and expressed Soviet opposition to NATO and EDC under a "Ridgway" label. "L'Humanite", newspaper of the communist party in France, launched its anti-Ridgway campaign on 29 April with cartoons of "The Germ Warfare General" and followed this with calls to its adherents to protest against the appointment. Wall slogans appeared - "Ridgway Go Home - Germ Killer" - and organized appeals were made to women, the CGT Metal Works Federal Council, and the dockers, culminating in meetings and demonstrations in Paris, Boulogne, Rouen, Toulon, Bordeaux and elsewhere. Soon the propaganda, which was obviously connected with the imminence of the signature of the German Contractual Agreements and the European Defense Community Treaty, spread to an attack on US information exhibits which were destroyed in Oyonnax and St. Quentin. This attack also found expression against various US members of SHAPE.

The French authorities and Allied counter-intelligence units\textsuperscript{6} were fully aware of these developments and all necessary steps were taken. General Ridgway himself, before leaving the United States on 26 May, was aware that the French communists were preparing to vilify him with "venomous propaganda" but added: "I should not like to give the idea that I am unduly concerned about this. I have every confidence that the peoples of Western Europe will

\textsuperscript{5} The same day on which the Japanese Peace Treaty became effective; General Ridgway had made a contribution toward this Treaty.

\textsuperscript{6} 450 CIC reports.
not be beguiled by the upside-down world of the communist propaganda." The Editor of the Communist newspaper "L'Humanité", M. Henri Stil, was arrested on 25 May following the publication in that paper of an article calling for mass demonstrations against General Ridgway who was due to arrive in Paris on 27 May. In addition to M. Stil, the police also arrested 36 other Communists (mostly students but also a Professor at the Sorbonne and two Paris members of the Municipal Council) who had been charged with resisting the police during an anti-Ridgway demonstration on 23 May. On 28 May, after a series of Communist demonstrations had taken place, M. Brun (Minister of the Interior) had issued a press statement in which he said that "...armed commandoes of the communist party had tried to undermine Republican institutions using the name of General Ridgway as a pretext..." Of the 718 arrested persons 155 were indicted for conspiracy against the security of the Republic, including National Assembly Deputy Jacques Duclos, Communist leader, who had been arrested with wife and bodyguard. Thus ended the worst Paris riots for 20 years.

When General Ridgway took up his appointment at SHAPE as Supreme Allied Commander on 30 May 1952, it would have been difficult for him to

8. Keesings Contemporary Archives, page 12269A, etc.
9. On 9 Jan 1951 after the arrival of General Eisenhower, communist demonstrations had also been planned and the necessary security measures taken. This fact, together with those mentioned heretofore in this summary show how continued were Soviet efforts to delay NATO defense plans.
10. Newsweek, 9 Jun 52.
be unaffected to some degree by the propaganda directed against him. His personal attitude was expressed in the self-confessed inspiration derived from an inscription on a soldier's monument in Edinburgh: "If it be Life that awaits, I shall live forever; if Death, I shall die at last, strong in my pride and free". It was nevertheless to be seen during the year of his command how far his experience with communist-influenced politicians in the Far East and communist organized propaganda in France would affect him as the diplomat in the post of SACEUR.

Problems facing the new Commander

General Ridgway brought to the problem of the defense of Europe the approach of a successful, aggressive and forward-looking General, versed in battle. He anticipated that the use of nuclear weapons and guided missiles from air, surface, or sub-surface against air, would inevitably be employed and could well render purely academic the distinction between tactics and strategy.

He had foreseen that future warfare would be global and would involve the complete coordination not only of the land, air and sea forces, but also of military and civilian elements as well. "We shall take the first punishment, rolling with it, and absorbing it as circumstances may require, striking back in retaliation with as hard and damaging blows as our capabilities permit.....We shall be outmatched by our foe in numbers. We cannot and must not try to match his economic strength with ours....We must weight the scales in our favor in this respect through weapon and equipment..."

11. Address to the Armed Forces Staff College, 15 Feb 1950.
superiority and through more skilfull application to the art of waging war.... On the qualitative side, we must stimulate our leadership to the utmost by every opinion-forming segment of our society to prepare our people for their trials at home and our fighters for theirs abroad.\textsuperscript{12}

He was aware that in the initial phases there would be critical shortages of essential items of equipment and realized that in any new conflict the demands made on body, brain and soul would be far greater than in previous wars. He knew well how training could reduce hesitation, recoil and failure, and accepted the responsibility inherent in good leadership towards building morale: "...unless we permanent professionals recognize and discharge our full responsibility inherent in the commonplace but fateful words that 'the morale is to the physical as three is to one', we shall not measure up to the challenge to our leadership which is ours today.\textsuperscript{13}

He considered that armies must be air-transportable, possessed of both strategical and tactical ability far beyond anything ever known in war before. It was necessary not only to possess the capability to transport the nuclear bomb for great distances and drop it with fine accuracy on a target, but also there must be the capability to lift whole armies, armed with nuclear weapons, and put them down on any spot on the earth's surface where their tremendous and selective air power may be needed.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{12} Address to the Armed Forces Staff College, 15 Feb 1950.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{14} Expressed in Saturday Evening Post, 28 Jan 1956 - "My Battles in War and Peace" by General Ridgway.
philosophy was added the conviction that the place or the foot soldier in the new order was a valid as ever before. From his experience of working with the United Nations in various capacities, he had learned one bitter lesson - that in the World today there can be no peace that is not based on strength.

At his press conference at Orly Field on the day of his arrival, General Ridgway expressed his happiness at being back in France once again and assured press representatives that his experience of having commanded the combat contingents of 16 different nations in Korea had convinced him that the fullest cooperation amongst the NATO nations was possible, and he looked forward with confidence to the future. On his staff were many brilliant staff officers selected and trained for work in SHAPE by General Eisenhower, headed by General Eisenhower's outstanding Chief of Staff, General Gruenther, who was to remain in the same capacity under the new Supreme Commander.

The problems facing the new Supreme Allied Commander were many and varied. They were presented by General Eisenhower and by the senior SHAPE Staff and, analyzed by General Ridgway's shrewd and forceful appraisal, the task facing him appeared to be that of making forces which were realistically available into an effective fighting unit. The only force goals which were of any value were those which were within the economic capability of

15. AG 2202 SEC, 5 Jun 52, Sgd Mock for Starbird, Sub: Major Problems Facing SHAPE. Minutes of Meeting 27 June 52 (between Gen. Ridgway, Lord Ismay, Field Marshal Montgomery, Mr. VanVredenburgh, Gen. Gruenther) and General Ridgway's "Outline" - analysis of approach to problems presented at this meeting.
the nations concerned. Forces had to be built-up to a standard of effectiveness sufficient to meet in the first instance the maximum requirements against an emergency should it occur.

SHAPE's assessment of the Soviet threat was based on Soviet capabilities - the military realities of Soviet strength. Five and a half million were under arms of which all but one million were in Soviet units. Of the thirty divisions in occupied Europe, twenty-two were in Eastern Germany; air and naval forces included 20,000 aircraft and 300 submarines; and a trained reserve of men with equipment were ready and able to expand the Soviet military capability quickly and at short notice. Although the numbers had changed little, the Soviet capability had increased by improved equipment and training. Capabilities were therefore a truer gauge of strength than intentions.

Against this Soviet threat, which had also the advantage of surprise in launching an attack, were assessed the advances made by SHAPE in the previous year of command. Command structure had been built up, relationships with nations established, terms of reference clarified, directives issued and plans for Emergency and Medium Term Defense prepared. Should an emergency occur, therefore, commanders knew what to do. Combat units had been organized and provision had been made for their support which included depots, airfields and combat support units. Plans had been made for the creation of additional units, for the employment and expansion of support units, and for better coordination in the employment of available forces. However, even when these factors were added to the heightening morale of the integrated forces, they were assessed as
still sufficient only to deny unopposed conquest but not to hold a predetermined line. 16

There were deficiencies in Allied preparedness. Command, control and warning arrangements were "fragmentary in the extreme". 17 Air forces were inadequate and were deployed in exposed areas with no prepared redeployment sites, and there was a shortage of aircraft suitable for transport purposes. Subordinate headquarters were still in a formative state, and signals communications were seriously inadequate. It was clear that the manpower organization of the various nations would have to be replanned, and training methods employed both in the regular and conscript forces which would produce the greatest possible number of trained officers, NCOs, specialists, career personnel and trained reserve units.

In addition it was essential that these forces which were realistically possible should be supported logistically and that the Supreme Allied Commander should have more control over logistics support. An estimate of the logistics support available made it obvious that there was a bottleneck in production, and that methods of mass production and other means by which the production sources of the nations could be utilized to the fullest extent were urgently required. Agreement was also required on standards of readiness which could be applied, and the supply of equipment would have to be organized and allocated on priorities based on that agreement. It was foreseen that standardization of

organization as well as of equipment was desirable, and deficiencies were observed not only in the need for increased communication, electronic and cryptographic facilities, but also for organized supply lines and more adequate stores of ammunition.

The increase in forces promised as a result of the Lisbon conference inevitably entailed revision of the command structure and overall concept of defense. The reasons for General Eisenhower's decision to wear the hat of the Commander in Chief of the Central Region in addition to that of the Supreme Allied Commander, have already been discussed in Volume I, Chapter VI. With the increase of strength in SACEUR's forces, and as certain of his powers had been delegated to Major Subordinate Commanders for the more efficient discharge of their responsibilities, the problem of SACEUR's dual command required study.

The incorporation of the forces of Greece and Turkey into Allied Command Europe following the accession of those countries in February, not only extended the Southern flank eastwards by some 1,700 miles, and thereby raised the question of the reorganization of the structure of the command in the South, but at the same time highlighted the weakness of the existing command structure in the Center.

General Eisenhower's acceptance of the responsibility of command in the Center during the early days of SHAPE when the bulk of the available forces were located in the Center had ensured their effective direction in the event of an emergency, and had inspired the confidence and cooperation of the national commanders. In General Ridgway's period of command, however, it was to become evident that these reasons were no longer so
valid but were over-shadowed by the new and significant increase in the dimensions of SACEUR's command. Therefore the command structure in the Center was revealed as unsatisfactory and demanded a solution, and in the South reorganization was necessary to include additional forces and areas. It was to be decided whether the addition of Greece and Turkey merited a separate or a subordinate command, and whether the Mediterranean was also to be treated as a new and separate command.

The problem was further complicated by the fact that command in the Center included at this time air forces earmarked or assigned for SACEUR's overall command and the emergency and medium term defense plans did not envisage their employment solely in the tactical support of the forces in the Center. It should also be remembered that General Eisenhower was not only SACEUR but, as a five star general, outranked other United States commanders in Europe. Soon after General Ridgway's arrival, recognizing the implications and importance of the dual command, President Truman appointed him CINCEUR, and as a four star general he thereby assumed command of all US forces in continental Europe. His responsibilities in this connection were to increase with the growing availability and necessity for priority allocation of equipment received through the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP), as well as the increase in American military potential in Europe. This factor made it even more obvious that SACEUR should not also be CINCENT.

Other problems that required attention included the development of the Forward Strategy Concept and the anticipated German contribution following the recently signed EDC Treaty. The deployment and employment of the West

18. 30 July 1952.
German Forces, relationships with West German agencies, sources of materiel and the organization of a logistics system for the European Defense forces called for considerable planning. There was also the need to establish war headquarters for SHAPE and its subordinate commands, and to locate any such new headquarters that might be considered necessary, including in those areas where tricky political problems of permitting the presence of foreign troops required negotiation.

The anticipated Soviet reaction to the signing of the EDC Treaty had been vividly shown in the events surrounding General Ridgway's arrival in Paris. Subsequent months were to be overshadowed by the knowledge that the Soviet military capability was sufficient to threaten more serious reprisals. The high hopes of mid-1952 heightened this threat but, as the year wore on, hopes diminished through delay in ratification of the Treaty until it finally proved abortive in August 1954.

At the time of assumption of his command, therefore, the Master Date of December 1952 had much significance when reviewed against world events and the problems facing SHAPE. General Ridgway's experience as a soldier and as a General who had fought not only communist forces in action but also in negotiation in the Far East, directed his attention to the need for true assessment of the reality of the effectiveness of the forces under his command and to the need to build a fighting machine sufficient to maintain the integrity of the NATO countries if a sudden attack should be launched.

The analysis which follows of his achievements as Supreme Allied Commander Europe will show the progress made towards attaining this objective during the period of his command.
CHAPTER II

THE COMMAND STRUCTURE IS REVISED - CENTRAL COMMAND

The Supreme Allied Commander Europe was charged by the North Atlantic Council with the defense of the territories and peoples of the Western European nations in NATO. For this purpose he required sufficient trained forces in being and in reserve, adequate logistics support and an existing and workable command organization.

Although the forces at the disposal of SACEUR had increased by 1952, he was not in a position to control positively the extent of the available forces or the kind and degree of logistic support he required as these factors, men and materiel, were the responsibility of the nations. But he could certainly organize his command in the best possible way to meet an emergency should it arise and he could plan the training and develop the readiness of the forces at his disposal.

When General Eisenhower had taken up his command there were limited forces available and the bulk of them were located in the Center. For military and political reasons General Eisenhower had accepted, in addition to his responsibilities as SACEUR, those of Commander-in-Chief, Central Command. One year later, however, by the time General Ridgway assumed his command, conditions had changed considerably. The land forces available had more than doubled and this was particularly evident in the Central Command; his Air Forces had also increased and he had acquired a developing responsibility through his Commander-in-Chief Air Central
Command for the coordination and command of strategic air forces which would not necessarily be committed in tactical support of the land battle in the Center; Greece and Turkey had acceded to NATO and his area of command had extended 2,000 miles to the East in Southern Command, with a considerable addition to his forces; in the North there were problems which required his attention if his Northern Command was to be made effective. In addition General Ridgway, as General Eisenhower before him, was to take on the responsibility of CINCEUR (30 July 1952) and as such he would have command of all US Forces in Europe, both those retained under national command as well as those assigned to NATO. He would also have the responsibility of advising Washington regarding the supply and allocation of equipment through the MDA Program. The period of General Ridgway's command was to prove a heavier year for the supply of end-items through MDAP than the years following in which more assistance for maintenance was needed.¹

In an analysis of the command responsibility and structure it is important to bear in mind the dual responsibility of certain commanders. General Ridgway as SACEUR also commanded, as CINCEUR, US Forces in Europe; General Norstad, as Commander-in-Chief Air Forces, Central Command (COMAIRCENT) commanded also as CINCUSAPE other US Air Forces not assigned to SACEUR; Admiral Carney, as Commander-in-Chief South, also commanded on

¹ Recommendations for the provision of equipment were normally made through the MAAGs in each country, coordinated by JUSMAG and forwarded to CINCEUR who passed them with his recommendations to Washington.
behalf of SACEUR, the US Sixth Fleet, a US National Command; Marshal Juin\(^2\) as Commander-in-Chief Land Forces Central Command was also Inspector General of the French Armed Forces, President of the French Chiefs of Staff, and a possible chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the European Defense Community.

To the problems of command structure General Ridgway gave his immediate attention upon his arrival as SACEUR. He could see that, primarily due to the increased forces at his disposal and the extension of his command in the South, it would be unsatisfactory for him to act as Commander-in-Chief Center as well. Barely a week after his arrival he requested the Chief of Staff to provide him with a "brief analysis of what I consider the faulty structure in the Center Command" together with "the reasons resulting in failure to have a Commander-in-Chief Center instead of accepting the present arrangements".\(^3\)

It was obvious that any analysis of the Central Command involved the review and solution of the air defense and command problem. He therefore instructed his staff to examine the problem of air defense and air command,\(^4\) as the air forces were commanded by the CinC Air Central

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2. Marshal Juin was made Marshal of France 12 March 1952.
3. Memo to Chief of Staff dated 7 June 52, sgd: Ridgway.
4. As the subject of air defense has not been covered thus far in the SHAPE History and as this problem was so intimately connected with the review of the structure of air command, the subject is dealt with as a whole in Chapter III. It should also be realized that studies were continuing on solution of command problems in the South and the Mediterranean (See Chap.IV and V) and in fact a solution was reached on these problems before the Central Command was reorganized and the Air Deputy Command Organization was set up in SHAPE. The problem of command in the Center has been dealt with first because it arose first and because it presented difficult international problems not so sharply defined in the South.
Analysis of the problems of the command structure in the Center soon revealed the many difficulties, not all of them military, which were involved. Decisions on appointments in the higher echelons of command were highly sensitive as they involved claims of national prestige, and the attendant national responsibilities imposed on individuals holding NATO appointments did not make decisions any easier.

In the Center, the system involving three equal Commanders with SACEUR as Theater Commander or Commander-in-Chief Center, was essentially a continuation of the Brussels Treaty system with one important exception—that Field Marshal Montgomery was then Chairman of the Commanders-in-Chief Committee and Commander-in-Chief Designate. In the existing system there was no Chairman or CinC Designate, but three co-equal Commanders-in-Chief.

National views had played a large part in the development of SHAPE because the governments had to make agreed contributions to the SHAPE budget. When the command structure was under consideration, before the actual activation of SHAPE on 2 April 1951, the British Chiefs of Staff had felt that Field Marshal Montgomery should be in command of the tactical land battle in Western Europe with possibly a French deputy commander. The reaction of the De Gaullists and some Leftists to the appointment of General Juin had been shown in the French National Assembly on 21 March 1951,

5. Montgomery, de Lattre, Saunders and Jaujard.

when the whole problem of France's place in the allied Command Europe had been the subject of a serious debate, and also of an attack from both the Leftists and the De Gaullists groups. The De Gaullists' position was that General Juin was not given sufficient power and responsibility consistent with the French contribution and effort in the defense of Western Europe. With the move of Field Marshal Montgomery to SHAPE as DSACEUR in 1951, M. Pleven had made it clear that France was not willing to accept a new Chairman or Commander-in-Chief in the center unless he were a Frenchman.

Both the USAFE and the RAF, however, were opposed to having a French unified Commander-in-Chief in view of the comparative French lack of experience in handling modern air operations, and the French philosophy that Air should be subordinate to the Army. On the other hand, General de Gaulle had constantly urged, when referring to NATO defense, that a Frenchman should occupy the primary command responsibility, on the grounds of responsibility and right.

Although the personal relationships between the Commanders-in-Chief in the Center had been good, the official linkage had not been as satisfactory as was hoped. Despite an agreement to hold regular Commanders-in-Chief meetings, this in fact had not been practised. In addition, in

9. Memo from AVM Hudleston to Chief of Staff dtd 19 Jul 52.
war it would be unlikely that SACEUR would be able to run the Central battle in view of his other responsibilities, and the headquarters at SHAPE had not been designed to do so and would require considerable adjustment if it were to direct Joint Operations in the Center.

In a brief submitted by Major General Bodet there appeared to be three solutions to the organization in the Center. The first was to establish a single unified subordinate command either by designating one existing commander-in-chief to act as overall commander-in-chief in addition to his existing functions, or by creating a new headquarters for a unified commander-in-chief, Central Europe. The second was to nominate one of the existing commanders-in-chief as chairman of the commanders-in-chief committee. The third solution was for SACEUR to assume the function of unified operational commander in Central Europe and to direct the detailed operations in that area.

Considerable attention had been paid to the need for economy and the necessity of avoiding a long period of dislocation and inefficiency in the command structure during a critical period. For these reasons it was not recommended that a new headquarters should be set up between SHAPE and the existing Commanders-in-Chief, Central Europe. Secondly, it was appreciated that in view of the very large area for which SACEUR had overall responsibility, the large number of national and political problems involved and the immaturity of the subordinate commands in the North and the South, SACEUR should not assume responsibility for detailed

10. ACOS, FPANDO - to DCPO, dtd 19 Jul 52.
operational and logistics control in any one area. Accordingly, the SHAPE staff recommended that Marshal Juin should be appointed Chairman of the Commanders-in-Chief Committee, Central Europe.

Field Marshal Montgomery, while realizing that it was obviously wrong for the Supreme Commander to be responsible directly for operations in Central Europe, reacted against the suggestion to appoint a chairman, observing that although a committee without a chairman is useless at any time, a committee with a chairman is equally useless when it came to fighting. It was clearly essential to get rid of SACEUR's direct responsibility to the Center and a compromise in this vital matter was of no value. The Field Marshal considered that there was only "...one sound solution: there must be in the Center one Commander-in-Chief with three subordinate Commanders-in-Chief under him." Nevertheless, the political considerations made the attainment of the obvious solution difficult and lengthy.

By November 1952 in the opinion of General Ridgway and Field Marshal Montgomery it was evident that it was more urgent to make a decision to vest the centralized control and operation of all but limited tactical air in a single individual and to establish a Commander-in-Chief Air directly under SACEUR. This decision, once taken, would solve in part the problem of command in the Center. General Ridgway's guidance to

11. DSAC 2202 dtd 23 Jul 52. Field Marshal Montgomery to AVM Hudleston, DCPO.

12. Memorandum to Chief of Staff dtd 25 Nov 52. See Chapter III for full details.
the staff made it clear that the regrouping of Allied Forces Center into one command under a commander-in-chief would be a corollary to a decision regarding the overall air command.

The French Assembly's claim for the senior command appointment in Central Command, the French interest in the Central land battle, Marshal Juin's prestige as France's foremost soldier, together with the recommendations made by the SHAPE staff, indicated that the Commander-in-Chief Center should be Marshal Juin. But this assumption involved an element of sensitivity and special importance to subsequent decisions regarding the appointment of other subordinate commanders and their deputies. The SHAPE staff recommended to SACEUR that to mention a proposed and practical re-organization to the Standing Group at this stage would result in knowledge of the proposal on the political level and cause premature debate.  

Field Marshal Montgomery considered that the problem of command structure revision should be viewed as a whole because of the wider implications involved. His personal views on this vital matter were that SACEUR needed five subordinate commanders: Commanders-in-Chief in North Europe, Central Europe, South Europe, and the Mediterranean, and an overall Air Commander-in-Chief. Commanders-in-Chief in North Europe and South Europe had already been appointed. The appointment of a Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean had by now been agreed by the Standing Group and the suggested plan for the appointment of a British Admiral Commander-in-Chief under an American Supreme Allied Commander of Europe had the wholehearted

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13. Memorandum from DCPO 220 to Chief of Staff dtd 29 Nov 52.
support of Mr. Churchill and was likely to be supported by General Eisenhower, when he became President in the following month.

In order to avoid the setting up of an additional headquarters in the Center with its attendant expenses and its requirement of additional good staff officers, the Field Marshal proposed that Marshal Juin should be in command of Central Europe, and should continue to command the Land Forces himself through his two army group commanders, at any rate for the time being. This solution gave the French the prestige they desired in the Central Command as well as command of the Central Land battle in which France was particularly interested. The proposed organization for command in the Mediterranean gave the command to a British Admiral and this carried with it not only prestige for Britain and a recognition of British naval power, but the commitment to assign the British Mediterranean Fleet to SACEUR. These two steps towards solving the problem of command made the appointment of an American as overall Air Commander not only more easily acceptable to the nations, but was also in accordance with the recommendations of the senior Air Staff.

After consideration by SACEUR and the Chief of Staff, the comments of a few selected senior officers were invited on a proposed re-organization of the Central Command which placed Marshal Juin as both CINCENT and CINCLANDCENT, and established a US Deputy SACEUR for

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14. Memo from FM Montgomery to Chief of Staff dtd 2 Dec 52.
15. MBR dtd 8 and 10 Dec 52 (limited distribution).
Air in or near SHAPE. The views of General Norstad as Commander-in-Chief Air Forces, Central Command, were of particular interest. He agreed that of the two problems stated in the proposal, the question of the Air Command arrangement within SHAPE was the more important, and advised against any plan which would divide the available air forces.

"The proposed re-organization would in effect divide this force and, what is more serious, would interpose a regional commander between you and the bulk of your allocated air forces". As an interim alternative, General Norstad recommended that the status quo should be maintained with perhaps the assignment of additional functions to AIRCENT as might be necessary to achieve greater effectiveness. "Whatever solution you ultimately adopt, it would seem best to make every reasonable effort to minimise opposition of a political nature in order to avoid unnecessary delay, dissension and confusion. To this end I strongly recommend that you acquaint the appropriate national authorities with your views, perhaps initially presenting them as a general line of thought rather than as firm conclusions or decisions on your part."

When the proposal was forwarded to the British Chiefs of Staff on 22 December they agreed that there should be a single command in the Center, that the Commander-in-Chief Center should be Marshal Juin, and that he should have a small joint integrated staff. However, they

16. Letter from General Norstad to General Ridgway, 16 Dec 52 -- the main points in this letter relative to the setting up of an Air Command are dealt with in Chapter III.

17. Views of British Chiefs of Staff given to AVM Hudleston, 22 Dec 52.
strongly deprecated the suggestion that one officer should double the roles of Commander-in-Chief Center and COMLANDCENT which involved placing the Air Force Commander under the command of the Land Force Commander. They preferred a system in which Marshal Juin would be Commander-in-Chief Center with co-equal commanders, COMLANDCENT and COMAIRCENT, under him. If COMAIRCENT were to be a British Officer they expected COMLANDCENT to be an American officer, or alternatively a French officer, rather than that Marshal Juin should double the roles in addition to his various other functions as a senior French officer. It was considered essential that the staff in Central Command should share a headquarters and work in the closest collaboration with the staffs of COMLANDCENT and COMAIRCENT.

After receiving the views of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff, the proposed re-organization was amended by the SHAPE Staff on General Ridgway's instructions. The amended version, whilst proposing Marshal Juin to be CINCENT, designated Commander Allied Land Forces Central Europe (COMLANDCENT) subordinate to CINCENT but to be initially a US officer. This was forwarded to Marshal Juin by General Ridgway with the comment: "It is still only tentative in nature. I have not come to any conclusions as to the recommendations, if any, I may submit. I would like to have the benefit of your comments on this study at this time."  

Marshal Juin in his reply welcomed a return to "the traditional

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18. Letter from General Ridgway to Marshal Juin dtd 5 Jan 53 enclosing "Proposed Organizational Changes" dtd 3 Jan 53. The proposal that COMLANDCENT should be a US officer embodied the hint that it should be a different officer from the Commander in Chief Center.

concept of an overall command organization structure, with a CinC Center. He recognized that a return to the traditional concept would promote greater efficiency through a clearer definition of the mission and responsibilities of the command in Central Region, and would provide more flexibility in the overall employment of air forces within the whole European theater of war.

Having agreed to these principles, Marshal Juin said that he considered that a region such as the Central European Region was dominated by an individual service, the army, because the ground forces, powerfully supported by the air forces, must check on the continent an aggressor whose purpose would be the over-running of vital land spaces. He recalled General Eisenhower’s report on operations in 1945, "When there is more than one army group in a single theater of operations, you cannot have a ground force Commander-in-Chief of all services who is different from the Supreme Commander of the Theater Command".

For these reasons Marshal Juin expressed his desire that if appointed Commander-in-Chief, Central Europe, he would retain command of the land forces in order that he could exercise direct control over the Army Groups, with the assistance of a deputy who would have a small personal staff. 20

In the meantime General Ridgway had forwarded to General Bradley details of General Norstad’s views and explained that in the revised

outline considered by Marshal Juin modifications had been made as a result of receiving the informal views of the US and British Chiefs of Staff. 21

At a meeting held by General Ridgway on 19 January 1953 with senior members of the SHAPE staff, the divergence of views was still keen. 22 Air Chief Marshal Saunders, the Air Deputy, maintained that it was essential that in this critical theater of operations, commanders should be free to concentrate on the preparation and conduct of the battle unencumbered by distractions of any kind - he felt that the additional role of Commander Land Forces and extraneous responsibilities incumbent upon France's senior officer would distract him from his operational task; secondly, whilst in other theaters a compromise with the ideal command structure might be acceptable, in the Center every effort should be made to attain the ideal, and experience in the last war proved that the land/air battle was indivisible. The Field Marshal adhered to his view that Marshal Juin as Commander-in-Chief Center should wear two hats. He would not be a minor Supreme Commander, he would be Commander-in-Chief of a command under a Supreme Commander and had to fight the land/air battle in his command in war time. He appreciated that the essence of the land battle would be fighting for geographical areas and that it would be done by the army groups supported by the air forces. However, he agreed that as Commander-in-Chief Center, Marshal Juin should not deal with governments in war time.

21. Letter to General Bradley from General Ridgway, 8 Jan 53.
At meetings held at SHAPE on 2 and 4 February 1953, the organizational structure under consideration was again discussed. General Ridgway noted the agreement between himself and Marshal Juin "on the need for a commander-in-chief Center and for an Air Deputy to exercise overall supervision and coordination of the effort of SACEUR's air", and said that the chief point of discussion was the internal structure of the Commander-in-Chief Center's internal command: "Should there be two separate individuals, a Commander-in-Chief Center and a Commander-in-Chief Land Center? And if so, which nation should furnish them?"

Marshal Juin argued at length in favor of having a single Commander-in-Chief who would be simultaneously Land Commander, and was apprehensive about a "Commander-in-Chief Air who would be inclined to fight his own war".

At the first of these meetings General Ridgway emphasized that it was important not to violate the US and British conceptions of equality or co-equal status for ground and air forces, and the difficulty in riding rough-shod over the objections of a great sister service. He also recognized that Marshal Juin in the conduct of operations would be directly subject to French political pressure, and although as Supreme Commander he would try to take as much of this load off Marshal Juin as possible, he was not so naive as to believe he could eliminate all French political pressure. However, at these meetings General Ridgway asked Marshal Juin to give his very careful consideration to both sides of this question.

23. Memo of conversation 2 Feb 53. General Ridgway, General Gruenther, Marshal Juin, General Peron, Colonel Walters, were present.
complex and important question.

At the second meeting held on 4 February 1953, Marshal Juin said that in discussion with M. Pleven, the latter had reacted sharply against the idea of a duality of command in the Center. The possibility of a "Land Deputy" was examined. "The question of nationality was not paramount", Marshal Juin said, "but if this Land Deputy were to be a Frenchman it would make things easier".  

Marshal Juin eventually agreed that the present set-up was highly unsatisfactory and that the proposed idea was an improvement upon it. General Ridgway indicated that he did not think the joint command scheme could possibly obtain approval, and at the same time he felt sure that the French Government would not approve any scheme to which Marshal Juin expressed unalterable opposition. Finally, Marshal Juin said that if he could select the ground commander and could write his terms of reference, he might be able to persuade his Government to accept this as the only scheme which might obtain approval, as it was certainly better than the present set-up, which functioned in times of peace because there were no crises, and because his personal relations with General Norstad were good. He agreed to take the whole matter up with M. Pleven.


25. Marshal Juin, General Ridgway, and General Gruenther agreed that if this was to be the case, Carpentier, Noiret or Valluy would be satisfactory.
Proposals are forwarded to the Standing Group

Finally, after further consideration of the various difficulties involved and of the French point of view, General Ridgway decided to submit to the Standing Group a week later a plan incorporating the basic changes in the command structure of Allied Command Europe. In this plan, it was proposed to appoint a Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe (CINCENT) directly subordinate to SACEUR, with headquarters in Fontainebleau but separate from ALFCE and comprised of a small integrated staff. Marshal Juin was to be CINCENT. Commander-in-Chief, Allied Land Forces Central Europe (CINCLANDCENT) was to be re-designated Commander, Allied Land Forces Central Europe (COMLANDCENT) directly subordinate to CINCENT with his headquarters remaining at Fontainebleau. Initially, COMLANDCENT was to be a French Army Officer. This amendment took into consideration Marshal Juin's views. The Commander-in-Chief, Allied Air Forces Central Europe (CINCAAFCE) was to be re-designated Commander, Allied Air Forces Central Europe (COMAIRCENT) directly subordinate to CINCENT, with his headquarters also remaining at Fontainebleau. Initially COMAIRCENT was to be a British Air Officer. The Flag Officer Central Europe (FOCE) was to be re-designated Commander, Naval Forces Central Europe (COMNAVCENTER) directly subordinate to CINCENT, with his headquarters remaining at Fontainebleau. Initially COMNAVCENTER was to be a French Naval Officer.

In these proposals there was only one Commander-in-Chief, and the previous Commanders-in-Chief of Land and Air Forces became Commanders subordinate to CINCENTER. General Ridgway had accepted the principle of having a Commander of the Land Forces Central Europe separate from the Commander-in-Chief Center, and had respected the French point of view in proposing that this appointment should, in the first instance, be French. His proposals which were contained in this plan were, however, the cause of much discussion in the Standing Group and an impasse occurred on the subject of whether the Land Force Commander was to be an officer other than the Commander-in-Chief. The British Chiefs of Staff still felt strongly that it would be unsound for the same Commander to fight the land battle in Central Europe, and also to have the responsibility for arbitration in giving the final decision when conflict arose between the land and air aspects of the battle. 27

Further discussions took place among the Standing Group Principals in Paris on a memorandum prepared by the International Planning Team clarifying the opposing views on General Ridgway’s proposals regarding the reorganization. 28

At the conclusion of the meeting of the Standing Group on 18 April, General Ridgway had been asked to submit a memorandum giving his views on the international Planning Team’s analysis of the problem and to set out the three organizational plans which had been under discussion at this

27. Memo to General Ridgway from General Brownjohn, 9 Apr 53.
28. IPT 160/2, 17 Apr 53.
meeting. General Ridgway set out the alternative reorganizational proposals as follows:\(^{29}\)

(a) The first alternative, called "Plan A", was the same as that recommended to the Standing Group on 12 February 1953\(^{30}\) proposing Marshal Juin as CINCENTER and an additional commander as CINCLANDCENT, a French officer;

(b) "Plan B" embodied the French point of view insofar as it provided for the same individual serving as both CINCENTER and COMLANDCENT, but there were to be two separate staffs;

(c) "Plan C" was General Ridgway's understanding of the existing US/French position in the Standing Group, by which the CINCENTER would command directly three army groups (two of which were then active and the other envisaged as forces expanded), the Air Command Center and the Navy Command Center. Plan C appeared to involve smaller personnel requirements than either of the other two plans, although it was by no means certain that the staffs would work out to be smaller.

General Ridgway pointed out to the Standing Group the understanding which had been reached between Marshal Juin and himself that in the event of the first of these plans being approved (Plan A), the increase in personnel, if any, incident to the creation of the new headquarters for CINCENTER would be a minimum, as it was planned to create the new headquarters at the expense of existing subordinate headquarters.

29. SHAPE 453, 24 Apr 53, to Standing Group signed Ridgway.

30. See page 38.
Plan C, the third of these plans, was similar in form to the organization employed during the final campaign of 1944 and 1945. The victorious conclusion of the war in this theater lent merit to plans from which only the soundest of reasons could justify change, but in General Ridgway's opinion there were three such reasons representing a radically different situation which both justified and dictated the urgent need for a different organization:

(1) **The number of national forces involved.** In 1944 and 1945 there were Americans, British and Polish. Today there were seven - American, British, French, German, Belgian, Dutch and Portuguese.

(2) **Territory over and from which operations would be conducted.** Conditions were different from the situation existing in 1944 and 1945 as the future operations would be conducted in, over and from, the territories of several effective and operating civil governments, whose sovereign wishes would exercise very great influence on the conduct of the war and exert very great pressure upon CINCENTR.

(3) **Demands for air and logistical support.** The three army group commanders would be pressing their claims directly upon CINCENTR for exceedingly weak air resources which would be critically inadequate for close support missions. Moreover, this would occur at a time when the air battle itself might demand first priority. In addition, the army groups would be competing among themselves for allocation of combat and logistical support, which would probably also be in critically short supply. These appeals would be made direct to CINCENTR, not when SACEUR's forces would be in the full flush of victory with the initiative in the Allies' hands as in World War II but when the initiative would be in the hands of the enemy and the pressure on
SHAPE with all its attendant crises and confusion would be at its height. In General Ridgway's opinion it would be unwise to place such burdens on CINCENTER at a time when he should be able to devote major attention to the situation as a whole.

For these reasons, as well as the fact that Plan A rested on a solid foundation of sound military principles and because of the inherent disadvantages of Plan B, General Ridgway said that he adhered to the recommendation he had originally made for Plan A to be approved.

The Standing Group, after making certain minor modifications as a result of consideration of the plan and discussions with General Ridgway, approached the members of the Military Representatives Committee requesting concurrence in comments in time for a meeting of the committee on 23 June 1953. It was considered that the proposals made by General Ridgway with certain minor modifications represented the best way of improving the organization of command in Central Europe, and noted General Ridgway's wish to put this required organization into effect by 1 July 1953.

On the same day as this memorandum was sent, the "New York Times" reported that "Standing Group, top military echelon in the 14-nation North Atlantic Treaty Organization, has approved in Washington a broad reorganization of the Allied Command arrangements that will make French Marshal Juin Commander-in-Chief of all Allied land, air and sea forces in the vital central sector in Europe.

"This new move has long been sought by the French Government and was recommended to the Standing Group last February by General Matthew B. Ridgway,

31. MRM 50/53, 9 Jun 53.
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe... 32

The situation, however, was neither so clear nor so complete as the press report indicated. At the Military Representatives Committee Meeting, Belgium and Holland objected to the nomination of a French officer as COMLANDCENT. In discussion, however, it became clear that they would probably accept this, subject to an understanding that either the Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief Center or the Chief of Staff COMLANDCENT - they would prefer the latter - should be of a nationality other than French. 33

General Ridgway considered that this objection to the proposals was fundamental and over-riding. If accepted, it would deprive the Supreme Commander, and indeterminately down his command channels it would deprive his subordinates, of their fundamental command prerogative of selection of a Chief of Staff. He considered that this prerogative should be unrestricted with regard to nationality, and should accord the commander the widest practicable latitude to the individual. 34

In a visit to Belgium and Holland on 26 and 27 June, General Ridgway discussed the problem with Defense Minister De Greef in Belgium and Defense Minister Staf in The Hague. He pointed out that after the long period of exploration and negotiation which preceeded the submission of his recommendations to the Standing Group, it represented the maximum of agreement obtainable between the major parties and interests concerned.

32. New York Times, 9 Jun 53
33. DEF 9421707 (TOSHAP 428) dtd 24 Jun 53. Referred to in SCO OUT 29660 dtd 25 Jun 53.
34. SH 29660 dtd 25 Jun 53.
Concerning land conditions, there were two major points made by both Defense Ministers: first, their reluctance to agree to retention by Marshal Juin, if appointed Commander-in-Chief Center, of his present assignment as Inspector General of French Armed Forces or any similar major assignment; and second, the matter of the Chief of Staff of COMLANDCENT.

On the first point, after expressing his full agreement that as this action would be imperative in war it was therefore highly desirable that it should be taken in peace, General Ridgway said that after a personal discussion with Marshal Juin he had obtained Marshal Juin's full agreement on the necessity of separation in time of war and his inclination to agree with separation upon appointment as CINCENTER, although he could not be sure of the latter.

With respect to the matter of the appointment of Chief of Staff COMLANDCENT, General Ridgway expressed his strong objection to any NATO Government making its acceptance of recommended changes contingent upon prior agreement to any particular nationality for the incumbent of Chief of Staff COMLANDCENT. Both ministers understood and agreed with the military position as stated, and after discussion accepted a suggestion that in the event of a French officer being appointed as COMLANDCENT, the Supreme Allied Commander would accept a Benelux Chief of Staff assuming one was offered him of recognized and acceptable character and competence. 35

35. On 27 June General Vernoux told General Gruenther that the Belgians had been informed several days before that Marshal Juin would agree to a Belgian Chief-of-Staff. SH 29700 dtd 27 Jun 53.
Three days later the Standing Group advised SACEUR and the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Council that the Military Representatives Committee had approved the recommendations made by SACEUR for changes in the command organization of Allied Command Europe; subject to one addition and the Press release proposed by SACEUR was also approved.  

In giving approval to SACEUR for changes in the command organization some minor changes had been made. The minor amendments made in the Land Command were as follows: 

"To appoint a Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe (CINCENT), directly subordinate to SACEUR, with headquarters in Fontainebleau, separate from existing headquarters, ALFCE, and comprising a relatively small integrated staff. Initially, a French officer, Marshal Juin, to be CINCENT." (SGM-1028 53/140 1953)  

The Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Council was also advised that at their meeting on 30 June 1953, the Military Representatives Committee had approved SACEUR's recommendations for changes in the command organization Allied Command Europe, and that at this meeting the Military Representatives from Belgium and the Netherlands had received full

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36. SCO IN 16150, SCO IN 15976, DEF 942661 and DEF 942662, 30 Jun 53.  
37. Para 10 on page 5 of MRN/50/53 to read: "It is understood that the re-designation of Flag Officer Central Europe (FOCE) as Commander Naval Forces Central Europe (COMNAVCENT) does not alter the area of responsibilities and functions assigned to this command".  
38. SH 29703 dtd 27 Jun 53; SH 29708 dtd 29 Jun 53.  
39. Details regarding the Air Command will be dealt with in the following Chapter.
assurance from the French Representative on the two points which had been discussed by General Ridgway with their Ministers of Defense. 40

The directive for the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe, which had been prepared in draft form in February, was completed and forwarded after General Gruenther had assumed command as SACEUR. In this, Marshal Juin was designated Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe "effective on a date to be determined". 41

40. MBM-58-53, 1 July 53.
41. AG 2530 dtd 17 July 53.
Study of General Eisenhower's period of command makes it clear that his main purpose had been to set up SHAPE and its subordinate commands as a functioning organization. And, by the time he left, he could truthfully say, "It works".

As he said to General Marshal, "no one will necessarily agree with every detail of my planned organization". Changes were inevitable through development and because of the flexibility necessary in a live organization. General Eisenhower had realized the need for prompt decisions, and in accepting responsibility as a Theater Commander in the Center, he had realized that this decision would not be the final answer to problems of command in the Center, but he felt that "if the innumerable committees of NATO once start trifling with these specific features of organization, we'll be helpless to proceed".¹

As soon as General Ridgway began to consider the reorganization of the command structure in the Center, it became obvious that it involved the structure of command for his air forces even more than it did that of the land forces. The land forces, although meagre in the extreme, existed on the ground and were or would come under SACEUR's command. The problem, as far as they were concerned, was mainly one of build-up, equipment and

¹. See The SHAPE History, Vol I, Section 1, Chapter IV, page 107.
training. As far as the air forces were concerned, however, not only were some of the air forces involved strictly under national control and likely to remain so (although plans for their command and control by SHAPE had been formulating for some time), but the existing organization did not have the capability for the concentration of the air forces available to SACEUR, should the need arise.  

From the early days SHAPE planners had foreseen that changes in command structure, insofar as the air forces were concerned, would be inevitable as strength developed. Therefore, plans for reorganization of the command structure in the Center were not necessarily based on General Ridgway's disinclination to tie himself to the responsibilities of command in the Central Region. The Air Command problem was very complicated, and as no survey of the development of the air forces has yet been given, it seems appropriate at this stage to review the formation of the tactical air forces, the plans for liaison with air forces outside SACEUR's command, and the formulation of plans for air defense, which constitute the background to the problem.

Historical Background

Prior to the signature of the Brussels Treaty in 1948, plans had been formulated for the air defense of the territories of the Brussels Treaty

2. General Gruenther's memorandum to AVM Hudleston of 12 June 52: "General Ridgway has asked for a study on the concept of having a single European Air Command for SACEUR's air forces. He fears that the present organization disperses the air effort and material into small packets and thus violates a fundamental principle and largely nullifies a major asset of air power, which is mobility."
powers. One of the military aims of the Treaty was to form an integrated air defense system covering North West Europe. Air defense, however, remained a national commitment. As a result of pre-planning it became possible effectively to integrate the various systems as soon as the Treaty was signed. The integration included the use of common types of aircraft, common types of radar and other equipment, and common operating procedures.

After signature of the Brussels Treaty, the Western Union Defense Organization was set up (UNITION). The Air Commander-in-Chief, AFWE, was responsible for the build-up of the tactical air forces through the Air Advisory Committee at WUDO, and developed the air defense policy through an Air Defense Sub-Committee. The coordination between the national air defense authorities and the tactical air forces was achieved through an Air Defense Air Staff.

At this time the air forces in Central Command, which formed the bulk of those available, consisted of the RAF 2 TAF, initially with one Group, and the US 2d Air Division in the South. In 2d TAF, 83 Group was added to 2 Group when Belgian and Dutch Air Forces were assigned, and, later, with the addition of 69 Group, became 2 ATAF in November 1951. The US 2d Air Division later became 12th AF and, with the addition of the French 1er Division Aerienne, became 4th ATAF at the same time.

3. M3 36 (Final), 21 Nov 51, re-affirmed this responsibility.

4. Memo for Record by Wing Commander D. Mawhood, RAF, dtd 4 Dec 56.
The Formation of Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCE)

With the establishment of AAFCE on 2 April 1951, General Lauris Norstad became C-in-C Air Forces Central Europe, and took over command of the available air forces. He inherited an operative system for air defense which had been worked out in cooperation with the Western European nations. Under MUDO, arrangements had also been crystallized for utilizing the support of UK Bomber Command, and General Norstad, as CG USAFE, had established liaison with the US Strategic Air Command and carrier-based aircraft.

General Norstad gave first priority to the development of plans for the land/air battle and the organization of tactical air forces. In his capacity as CG USAFE, he had already requested from SHAPE the operating requirements necessary through fiscal year 1952, to accommodate US Air Forces contemplated for deployment in France in support of NATO. He thoroughly understood the need for strategic air forces to be available for support of SACEUR.

General Eisenhower, in planning his subordinate command structure, had said to the Standing Group: "...In order that I may be assured of the closest possible integration of the strategic air forces with the European defensive effort, and that I may be assured of the fullest possible coordination and utilization of other air forces allocated to me, I regard as essential the establishment of an Allied Air Command reporting directly

5. He also commanded US Air Forces in Europe.

to me on a level co-ordinate with the Commanders-in-Chief of the Northern and Southern Areas."  

The specific mission given to General Norstad as C-in-C Allied Air Forces Central Europe was to defend the Central European area in close conjunction and cooperation with, and supported by, the Allied Land Forces Central Europe and such Naval Forces as might be allocated. This would require destruction of Soviet Air Forces threatening the Central Region; and achieving freedom of action for the Allied surface and air forces of the Central Region by maintaining air superiority, by interdicting and retarding enemy movement of forces and supplies, and by direct support of Allied Land Forces Central Europe. General Norstad was told that in accomplishing this mission, close relationships would be maintained with adjacent air forces.

The Development of the Air Forces

A closer look at the development of SACEUR's air strength reveals the reason why the Air Command in the Center became increasingly vital. Apart from liaison with external air forces and the coordination of air defense, plans were made for the gradual increase in the strength of SACEUR's air forces, particularly in the Center.

The first significant statement of air force requirements had been contained in DC 13, dated 29 March 1950. In accordance with the directives of the Defense Committee the Military Committee of NATO had requested

7. Memorandum to General Gruenther from General Schuyler, 26 Jan 51, w/enclosure "SHAPE Subordinate Command Structure".
8. DC 3 and DC 6/1.
the presentation of an overall defense plan. Regional plans were prepared by the Regional Planning Groups in the light of strategic guidance transmitted to them by the Standing Group. The Standing Group specified the planning date of 1 July 1954 which was selected as "one which should provide time to implement a reasonable program for building up overall military capabilities of NATO nations". For security reasons, the requirements were published only as total numbers of aircraft by types and did not include the detailed breakdown by commands. The air requirement was expressed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IDF and Fighter aircraft</td>
<td>7084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Bomber aircraft</td>
<td>556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical and long range reconnaissance aircraft</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport aircraft</td>
<td>672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8676</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On 18 September 1950 the North Atlantic Council requested the Defense Committee to revise the major force requirements for the Medium Term Plan based on military considerations alone. As a result, the force requirements submitted by Regional Planning Groups were revised. In the case of the Center (Western European Region), the requirements totalled 6932 aircraft, a figure which included the UK and French home defense forces amounting to 1760 IDF aircraft and 240 all-weather fighters. In addition, 88 UK medium bombers would be partially available to SACEUR.

These revised requirements were purported to cover only the phase D to D+90. The total requirements were considered to be the minimum.

9. DC 28, dtd 26 Oct 50, approved by the NAC at their fourth meeting.
necessary, "and the Supreme Commander will no doubt consider eventual movement of forces especially by the time when it may become possible to adopt a forward strategy which perhaps may make possible a decrease in forces in Northern and Southern areas." The Standing Group also noted that they considered "a forward strategy should be our aim, and the Supreme Commander, as soon as he is appointed, should examine and report on what forces are required."

On 30 April 1951, after the official establishment of SHAPE, the Air Chiefs of Staff of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, convened to determine whether the DC 28 air force requirements could be met, and to accelerate national programs with the objective of closing the 1954 gap between minimum requirements and availabilities. The four chiefs were in complete agreement that an air force of 9212 aircraft was the absolute minimum required, but they also determined that unless major changes in national policies occurred, there was no chance of meeting that strength. They were concerned that an unbalance was appearing in that the requisite air forces were not capable of being supplied in phase with the planned land forces, and they recommended that further supporting studies should be carried out in conjunction with the staffs of the Air Deputy, Air Marshal Sir Hugh Saunders at SHAPE, and CinC AAFCE, General Norstad.

The gap referred to was one of some 3459 aircraft between agreed

national contributions in DC 28 and the minimum requirements. The available air forces, assuming that all the smaller nations met their planned contributions, were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dec 1952</th>
<th>Dec 1953</th>
<th>Dec 1954</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total front-line</td>
<td>4003</td>
<td>5028</td>
<td>5769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of DC 28</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Chiefs of Air Staff expressed their conviction that unless the necessary air protection, offensive capability and support were made available, the land forces would be unable to fulfill their share in the defense of Western Europe, and they pointed out that insufficient emphasis had been laid on the essential need to provide the necessary air forces with their supporting units and infrastructure.

They recognized that it was not merely a matter of producing air-craft and trained personnel formed into front line units with necessary reserves. To operate air forces of the size envisaged involved a large and complex organization of command structure, supply and maintenance units, fuel and ammunition supplies, air fields, depots and signal communications. They were prepared to state that it might be necessary to give further priorities to SACEUR's air forces at the expense of the other services, not only naval aviation, but land and surface sea forces.

On 19 June 1951, General Norstad gave a presentation at SHAPE in which a brief description of the strategic concept was followed by an analysis of forces requirements.

11. STSC 0311/51, 19 Jun 51.
After comparing the forces immediately available to the enemy and those to be available to the Central Region in 1954 under the four Chiefs of Staff's proposal, he concluded that although these two figures were roughly equivalent, the proposed allied strength for 1954 was inadequate because the enemy could readily increase the numbers available to him in a relatively shorter period of time.

The requirement in the Central Region he estimated as somewhere between 8000 and 12000 first line aircraft. To meet the deficiency he proposed that consideration be given to factors which might, to some extent, reduce the discrepancies between forces allocated and the requirements of the task. For example, several of the national air forces had large forces not committed to Europe. Whilst accepting the fact that these countries had large commitments elsewhere which contributed to the common purpose, it seemed advisable that they should be requested to analyze their deployments to see whether further forces could be allocated to the Central Region. He recognized, however, that a substantial part of the European forces not allocated to the Central Region would contribute to overall Western strength.

There was also a substantial number of carrier-based aircraft available to the NATO nations, and General Norstad recommended "if we are to count on them, their commitment must be firm as to numbers, time and place". He also recognized that the strategic air offensive would limit the size and the scope of the task facing the Commander-in-Chief, AAFCE: "Its effect on our task will depend on the timing of our own operations".

General Norstad also laid emphasis on the urgency of an adequate infrastructure program in the Central Region, and asserted that provisions
should also be made to permit the operations of air forces of Central Europe from the flank positions should this become desirable. It was difficult, if not impossible, to draw a sharp line in the air between the Central Region and Northern and Southern Regions, and it was essential to increase effectiveness by increasing flexibility.

Summing up, General Norstad specifically proposed that:

(a) The forces now allocated to the Central Region be recognized as being below the minimum required;

(b) The report of the four Air Chiefs of Staff be endorsed as an essential step without accepting it as fully adequate;

(c) SHAPE should continue to consider with the national air forces the possibility of greater allocations to the Allied Air Force;

(d) Support should be given as a matter of urgency to an adequate infrastructure program; and

(e) Examination should be made as to the extent to which carrier aircraft could be made available to the Central European Area.

On the subject of strategy, he proposed that for the period of 1954 onwards a forward strategy should be adopted, based on a general concept of initially holding the best line securable, probably the Rhine, whilst preparing for an effective counter-offensive. The timing of the counter offensive would have to be determined by "the necessity for exploiting fully the effects of our operations in Europe, the requirement for organizing and concentrating our army strength, and the desirability of obtaining some effect from the strategic air offensive".

Until the position promised by the 1954 program was achieved, it was considered that the disposition of the army forces should be consistent with
the capabilities of the air forces. Various factors limited the air strategy concept in the existent Short-Term Plan. The size of the Allied Air Forces, compared with the minimum essential tasks to be performed and in view of the size of the Soviet Air Forces, was small. The occupation mission required forces to be deployed in vulnerable locations East of the Rhine, "with the consequent threat of having to withdraw across the Rhine under overwhelming enemy air superiority". There was a recognized shortage of airfields and lack of base rights west of the Rhine. For instance, there was no authority to stock-pile in peace time the bases in France which 12th US Air Force units would use in war under the Short Term Plan. He recognized also the need for establishing D-Day Tactical Air Forces and also Air Defense Command relationships in peace time.

The Paris Plan, published on 7 June 1951, had resulted from the meeting of the four Chiefs of Air Staff. Recommendations were made in the Paris Plan as to the number and types of air units and organizations which should be set up by the NATO nations to support the DC 28 forces, and these did in fact form the basis of subsequent forces build-up activity. The plan itself, however, did not constitute a commitment by the nations. The Paris Plan neither examined strategy nor requirements as such; however, in the course of its preparation certain short-comings in DC 28 were obvious and recommendations were made to eliminate them, resulting in modifications in the DC 28 figures.

The Paris Plan total figure of 7774 aircraft, representing SACEUR's forces only, also included certain UK and French forces considered available

to SACEUR when required. In addition, the UK and French Home Defense
Force requirements were noted as 956 aircraft (644 IDF and 312 AWX), and
411 aircraft (375 IDF and 36 AWX) respectively, making a total of 9141
aircraft, 5532 of which were to be under CINCAAFCE.

At the same time as work was proceeding on the Paris Plan, SHAPE was
conducting its initial defense plan studies. Although to a certain extent
there was an exchange of opinion between the Paris Planners and the SHAPE
staff, it was not to the extent of agreeing upon overall force requirements.

The Paris Plan was published on 7 June 1951 whereas the first estimate of
SHAPE requirements was not submitted to the Standing Group until 14 August
1951, and was the beginning of submissions in the development of overall
SHAPE requirements.\textsuperscript{14}

The SHAPE aircraft requirement forwarded to the Standing Group in
August 1951 was an adjustment of the Paris Plan and in it, of the 5788 aircraft,
5532 were for the Central Command.\textsuperscript{15}

In November 1951 the North Atlantic Council accepted the air force
requirements that SHAPE had submitted.\textsuperscript{16} It recognized that the question
of a German contribution to EDC was under active discussion, and it considered
that this contribution should be approximately 1000 aircraft. SHAPE had
agreed that the German contribution should not be considered as part of the

\textsuperscript{13} IDF - Interceptor Day Fighter; AWX - All weather fighter.
\textsuperscript{14} SHAPE 333, dtd 14 Aug 51. SHAPE History, Vol I, Chap VII, App "F".
\textsuperscript{15} Although its wording caused some misunderstanding regarding a
requirement for "an additional 2000 to 3000 aircraft" for counter-
offensive operations in relation to future strategy, subsequent
correspondence clarified the purpose of this added requirement
and proposed its allocation to the Central Air Command. SHAPTO 239
dtd 22 Apr 52.

\textsuperscript{16} MC 26/1, 21 Nov 51.
Paris Plan figures, because additional forward strategy aircraft were academic once a German contribution was possible. Of the additional 2000-3000 aircraft required for forward strategy, 1158 had been allocated to the Central Command as the proposed German contribution, and 1861 aircraft as a further allocation to the Central Command as the "additional 2000 aircraft" to complete the forward strategy requirement.

On General Ridgway's arrival he pointed out to the Standing Group that of the 10,532 aircraft then required by SHAPE the nations at Lisbon had promised 2812. In his estimation of this number promised at Lisbon to be available by the end of December 1952, he considered that 2764 would be available but only 2105 would be effective on that date.

The forces provided under the Lisbon goals were only a fraction of those required to meet a determined act of aggression. Even the estimate of 2105 combat effective aircraft was admittedly optimistic. It had not been possible to assess precisely and numerically the effect of inadequate control and warning systems, the shortage of airfields, fuel stocks and technical personnel, including pilot reserves. "These limitations", General Ridgway said, "could have a disastrous effect on the air forces of my command in the event of an emergency". By the end of October 1952 General Ridgway told the Council that out of 3386 aircraft then estimated to be available by the end of December 1952, he considered 2571 to be combat effective.

17. SHAPE/723/52, 12 Jul 52 - SACEUR's Status Report to the SGN.
18. MC 26/1 modified by SH 23074.
At the request of the Standing Group, revised force requirements were submitted in early November and these showed a requirement for 11,640 aircraft of which 8551 were for the Central Command. 20 By December SHAPE's estimate of combat effectiveness of aircraft available was down to 2119 showing a deficiency of 693 against the Lisbon goals. 21

In a special report to the Standing Group in early 1953 22 General Ridgway again re-emphasized the seriousness of the situation. He had barely 20% of the aircraft he required, and this particularly affected Central Command as the bulk of the air forces were to be located there. This was shown as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command Area</th>
<th>Reqmt SHAPE/1215/52</th>
<th>Available SHAPE/ARQ 52</th>
<th>Percentage of Combat Effectiveness</th>
<th>SHAPE estimate of Combat Effectiveness</th>
<th>Percentage of Combat Effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center</td>
<td>8551</td>
<td>1883</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>1760</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>1254</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>10670</strong></td>
<td><strong>2426</strong></td>
<td><strong>22.8%</strong></td>
<td><strong>2119</strong></td>
<td><strong>19.8%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two days before this report was submitted, the North Atlantic Council had approved Air Forces requirements amounting to 12314 aircraft, of which 6690 were to Central Command. 24

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20. SHAPE 1215 dtd 8 Nov 52. The Total of 11840 included 398 aircraft for Greece and 772 for Turkey.
21. SHAPE/1357/52, 6 Dec 52 - SACEUR's Status Report to the SGN.
22. SHAPE/411/53, 11 Apr 53.
23. Excludes UK Fighter Command and French DAT Forces, which if included would raise the total available to 3087.
24. MC 26/2, 9 Apr 53.
After a year of experience as SACEUR, and after studies involving the possible use of atomic weapons, General Ridgway in his final report on 10 July 1953, the day before he left SHAPE, estimated his requirements as:

- 865 aircraft in the North
- 5413 aircraft in the Center
- 2867 aircraft in the South
- Total 9126

Allowing, however, for Allied losses, he set his front-line air forces at a total of 12,913 aircraft, of which 8442 were for Central Command. Because of the entirely new concepts and factors employed in the studies leading up to this final report, the SHAPE Staff had considered that no comparison could be drawn between the estimate then submitted and the figure contained in the previous Military Committee document MC 26/2. Accordingly, since modern warfare was seen to involve the use of substantial numbers of atomic weapons, and since MC 26/2 did not take atomic weapons into consideration, the SHAPE view was that any further developments based on that document would be unrealistic.

Coordination with External Air Forces

General Norstad was also charged with developing coordination with external air forces which might be allocated to SACEUR in an emergency. The support which might be available to SACEUR from US Strategic Air Forces and RAF Bomber Command had been a matter of great interest and concern to the SHAPE Staff from the beginning. It was realized that the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Air Forces Central European Command, would have as his primary mission the gaining and maintaining of air superiority over the Central Area together with the full and continuous support of the army forces of Central European Command, but in addition to these responsibilities he would be required to support the Northern and Southern Area particularly with bomber strikes as the situation might warrant. He would, therefore, require to exercise operational command of any heavy bombers which might be allocated to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. In view of the paucity of aircraft made available and their obviously important role in the defense of Western Europe when ground divisions were few, General Eisenhower had recognized that the bulk of the available air power should be under one commander.

26. Operational Command should be considered as "the function of directing, supervising and controlling the training policy and operations of assigned units, including their redeployment within the area under operational command. It does not include the direct administration or logistical support of assigned units which, although the responsibility of the respective national authorities, should conform to the policy directives issued by the overall operational commander."

Operational Control should be considered to be: "The power of directing, coordinating and controlling the operational activities of deployed units. It specifically excludes redeployment, though for fighter units short term redeployment may be included."
SACEUR needed a medium bomber capability at his disposal to attack
pre-planned targets on D-day, or soon after, as part of this retardation
program, and to provide close support to ground forces using either
conventional or atomic weapons. The establishment of this force should
not interfere with the build-up of RAF Bomber Command and the USAF
Strategic Air Command, but SACEUR should be enabled to take final
decisions as to the employment of any medium or heavy bomber forces made
available to him. If this force was to be commanded by some other
agency than SACEUR, he would require an appropriate guarantee, and liaison
and communications would have to be established between SACEUR and the
agencies concerned. This would involve coordinated target studies and
the establishment of machinery to support such bomber forces as might be
made available.

The UK Bomber Command was primarily committed to support SACEUR —
with certain restrictions relative to the defense of the United Kingdom.
The US Strategic Air Forces were neither allocated nor earmarked for
support of SACEUR, but it was assumed that those forces would on occasion
be available to support SACEUR.27 By the end of 1951 planning had
reached a stage which made it necessary to define the relationship between
SHAPE and its subordinate commands with the external bomber forces of
Strategic Air Command, RAF Bomber Command, and SACLANT when established.

27. Meeting of 15 Oct 51 at SHAPE between General Eisenhower,
General Gruenther, General Norstad, ACM Saunders, General
Bailly - referred to in draft 29 Sep 51. See also documents
re SHAPE Subordinate Command responsibilities and relation-
ships with respect to UK Bomber Command and US Strategic
Air Forces.
At this stage it was realized that SACEUR would be the authority responsible for demanding allocation of bomber support and that the SHAPE air staff would have to be strengthened to enable him to exercise his authority.

At a meeting on 6 December 1951, General Eisenhower had made various decisions with regard to the problem of this SHAPE relationship with external bomber forces. As SACEUR he would retain the responsibility for determining the military significance and priority of targets requiring the utilization of external bomber forces, together with the authority for requesting and allocating such bomber support that was required and provided. Technical and operational feasibility of targets as well as the selection of weapons would rest with SACEUR. The allocation of forces and weapons would be made upon recommendation of SACEUR by the Combined Chiefs of National Staffs or the authority exercising the higher direction of war, but in view of the security restrictions then in force regarding the release of information on special weapons, planning for the use of these weapons, he decided, would be undertaken under the direction of General Norstad at AAFCE. In carrying out his role therefore, General Norstad would in effect be acting as the staff officer of SACEUR. Plans drawn up by the Planning Group under General Norstad at AAFCE were to be submitted to SACEUR for approval through Air Chief Marshal Saunders, the Air Deputy. General Norstad was required to prepare details of the minimum but essential information which should be made available to a limited number of international staff officers, and SACEUR would take steps to
try and obtain the necessary release of this information to non-US officers of the SHAPE Staff. 28

The plans being formulated for use of special weapons, together with General Norstad's responsibilities as Commander of the bulk of the available air forces, placed him in a position of special importance. He was authorized by SACEUR to coordinate with Commanders-in-Chief in order that planning or operations involving external bomber support would take into account the requirements of all commands; he was authorized to communicate directly with commands on this subject, 29 and he acted on behalf of SACEUR with external agencies who would provide bomber support.

The SHAPE Staff considered that over the next few years the ability of the SHAPE land forces to withstand and hold a Soviet attack would be decided by the effectiveness of Allied bomber intervention in the form of either close or direct support in battle. It became clear that any tendency to think in terms of World War II should be checked in order to achieve this objective and to secure the greatest coordination with the US Strategic Air Forces. SHAPE considered that operational demands on RAF Bomber Command were likely to be at short notice, and RAF Bomber Command's main role should not be in strategic tasks until such time as it was re-equipped and had regained the capability of a long-range striking force.

In order to secure the closest liaison and to coordinate planning regarding

28. Memorandum for General Norstad from Chief of Staff, 10 Dec 51, reference meeting of 6 Dec 51.

29. AG I528 SEC. 29 Dec 51.
aiming techniques and target selection, it was considered that liaison officers should be appointed from Bomber Command to SHAPE and even down as far as TAFs.\(^{30}\)

To obtain the coordination necessary for the effective operation of available bomber support, it was also necessary to plan for adequate communications and a system which incorporated the supply of information, requests for support, and the operation and control of bomber strikes. This system was required to operate between the available air and land forces in Northern, Central and Southern Commands, and the Strategic Bomber Forces of the US or UK based in the UK, US, North Africa or on carriers. It was hoped that by the date planned for CPX 1 (19 December 1951), General Norstad would have completed plans which, after review by SACEUR, firmly established the method of coordinating the requests for support by Strategic Air Command. Through arrangements made in the United States, General Norstad had established in Europe a forward headquarters for Strategic Air Command which was capable of rapid communication with the headquarters of Strategic Air Command in the United States, and with Strategic Air Command units in the United Kingdom. Practice communications exercises had shown that the headquarters of the SAC in the United States was ten minutes communications time from Europe.\(^{31}\) The machinery for arranging outside air support for SACEUR's forces was clarified.


31. Memorandum from Colonel Steele, Deputy SPACOFS, to Air Vice Marshal Hudleston, 7 Apr 52.
at a conference held at SHAPE on 30 April 1952 at which SHAPE and its subordinate commands, the US Strategic Air Commands, UK Air Ministry and SACLANT were represented. As a result of this conference more of SACEUR's responsibility was delegated to General Norstad and working parties were to be established to consider and make recommendations on detailed procedures for handling requests and support, standard operating procedures and the logistics requirements of such outside agencies. Bomber Command agreed to provide immediate semi-permanent representation at SHAPE and subordinate commands, and also SACLANT anticipated the provision of liaison representation by 1 June 1952.

Such was the situation with regard to the coordination of external bomber support when General Ridgway took over as SACEUR and began to consider the problem of command in the Center. However, in addition to General Norstad's growing responsibilities with respect to the increase in tactical air strength and bomber support coordination, there was also the problem and responsibility for air defense. Although the former had by this time taken priority over air defense it is necessary to give a background showing the development of plans for air defense in order to explain more fully SACEUR's responsibilities in this respect, and to endorse the growing need for an enlarged Air Deputy's Office at SHAPE.

The Coordination of Air Defense

It had become steadily more apparent after the introduction of the subordinate command organizations in 1951 that there was a need for a closer link-up between the subordinate commands of SHAPE and the appropriate national authorities, and a need to review the arrangements for coordinating the air defense of national territories with those of the air forces under
SACEUR. The recognized geographical and functional overlap between command zones and national air defense zones called for a system of control exercised through a single authority. SACEUR's long-term policy involved the modification of air defense commands throughout Western Europe until it became possible to draw some more clear-cut distinction between the combat zone tactical air forces and the national and communication zones of air defense.

General Eisenhower's policy had been to develop, with the agreement of national authorities, the organization of air defense between commands and national territories in their areas. He proposed that the subordinate commanders through their air commanders should be given operational control of the national air forces allocated for air defense. This proposal was sent to National Military Representatives on 21 March 1952. By June 20, 1952, SHAPE had received replies from all nations except France. All other nations except Italy had agreed to the principles set forth in the SHAPE proposal. At an Air Defense coordination meeting held on this day, General Bailly, the French representative, expressed the views of General Lecheres and General Vernoux, and mentioned that complete ministerial approval had not been obtained, but this was really a question of time rather more than denial.

32. Summary of minutes of meeting on Coordination of Air Defense - French Aspects, 20 Jun 52.

33. AG 1250 SEC, 10 Jan 52. From General Gruenther, Chief of Staff, to Commanders in Chief.

34. AG 1250 PPO, 21 Mar 52.
The French view gave essential agreement to the SHAPE proposals and accepted operational control by SACEUR of the Metz area with its Tactical Air Force, but for the remainder of the French national territory, the French position was that the French Commander of the D.A.T. 35 should be placed under the operational control of the Allied Commander in charge of the air operations in Central Europe. The main reason given for this view was the necessity to retain unity of command throughout the depth of air operations, and to obtain a balance between air defense and tactical air forces. General Bailly stressed the need for inter-command coordination between Northern Europe, Central Europe and Southern Europe, which should include the defense of the UK and North Africa. He also requested clarification as to how the air defense nucleus proposed by SHAPE would be organized.

The AAFCE representative stated that they were convinced that AAFCE was not in a position to take over the control of the French Metropolitan Defense - that the Commander in Chief of the ATAF would in war time be completely occupied with the tactical battle and would be concentrating on this eastern front without time to spare to consider raids on the metropolitan area. He also considered that the liaison or nucleus organization would be better placed at SHAPE than at AAFCE. It could then consider protection of ports and lines of communication and would have under its orders the reinforcement units coming to the battle of Europe.

By August 1952 all nations in the Northern and Central European regions had agreed to the SHAPE coordination and organization arrangements. It was

35. Defense Aerienne Territoriale.
recognized that the extent of the coordination required and its actual
day to day application would tend to change as the air forces were built
up, and as Allied land forces were able to extend their deployment east-
wards. The proposed organization, therefore, had to be capable of
coordination as the overall military system of the allies improved, and
any such modification had to be capable of introduction into the defense
system and communications network which was being developed.\textsuperscript{36}

The division of responsibilities for coordination of air defense was
required on two levels. SACEUR would be responsible for coordination
between subordinate commands, national authorities and any adjacent NATO
commands. SHAPE subordinate air commanders (in North and South for
their respective CinCs) would be responsible for coordination between the
tactical air forces of the subordinate commands and appropriate national
air defense commands. Thus SACEUR, through SHAPE, would be responsible
for establishing the necessary overall relationship and coordination between
subordinate commands and the appropriate national authorities in the
territories whose forces were within their command. In the Central
European Command, however, CINCAAPCE was to be responsible for the coordin-
ation of air defense between forces under his command, the air forces in
Channel Command and the national air defense forces of Belgium, the
Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and the United Kingdom. In fulfilling
this function, he would exercise operational control over the air defense
forces of Belgium, Holland and the eastern sector of France. While the

\textsuperscript{36} ADWE/TS - 8043/ACOS, 31 Jul 51; COS/PLA/A/17/7, 19 Nov 51;
AD 1222, 10 Aug 51.
D.A.T. of Metropolitan France was to remain the responsibility of the French national authorities, CINCAAFCE was to retain and develop the nucleus of an Allied Air Forces Central Europe D.A.T. Should it ultimately be agreed, or should necessity require in the future, the centralized control of all air defense forces in Central Europe, under SACEUR, it was foreseen that this could then be achieved at once.

The Problem of Command is Assessed

Air Marshal Sir Hugh Saunders, appointed Air Deputy in April 1951, was air advisor to SACEUR. He was responsible to him for advice on air matters and for the equipping, training and readiness of air forces. He did not, however, have any command responsibilities. These remained the responsibility of General Norstad as CINCAAFCE on behalf of SACEUR. It had been foreseen in the early days that the responsibilities of the Air Deputy were likely to grow less as those of General Norstad increased, and when, as will be shown, General Norstad moved to SHAPE as Air Deputy in mid-1953, this was a natural outcome of the overall development of air strength.

By mid-1952 the development of SACEUR's Air Forces had increased the responsibilities of CinC Allied Air Forces Central Europe, even to overshadowing those of the Air Deputy at SHAPE because of the special and command responsibilities delegated to him. It had become obvious by the time General Ridgway arrived that to command the air forces which were to be available, demanded the presence at SHAPE, near to SACEUR, of an Air Deputy who was not merely an advisor but a commander acting for him, and charged with the coordination of Air Operations.
The Air Deputy had done much of the overall air planning and the development of airfield infrastructure programs in conjunction with PPANDO Division at SHAPEx. He had also planned in conjunction with the nations the increase of aircraft and crews to strengthen the tactical air forces. He had, however, no command powers and was to a degree limited in his planning for the use of special weapons by the restrictions imposed in the US Atomic Energy Bill. The establishment by General Norstad at HQ AAFCE of a group for liaison with Air Strategic Command (SAC Z) and of a group to study the employment of atomic weapons (Group A), on behalf of SACEUR and at SACEUR's direction, concerned subjects which should more properly be located under SACEUR's Air Deputy at SHAPE.

In mid-1952 General Norstad summarized for General Ridgway the conclusions which he had reached after a year and a half at Fontainebleau. He considered that the air force elements planned for the Northern and Southern regions were minimum or sub-minimum, whilst those for the Central Region, which might be minimum when measured against the requirement, still represented the bulk of the air forces available to SACEUR. For this reason the overall air responsibilities "accruing to Central Command were not necessarily limited to national boundaries" and might be employed in other Commands. In addition to this he held the view that "perhaps the most significant factor to be considered is the assignment of forces having capabilities in the non-conventional field. These forces ought of necessity to be assigned to the command whose mission would normally require their use and whose facilities were adequate to direct their operations effectively. This had led to the assignment to AAFCE of this type of force which then

represented the greatest striking power available to SACEUR." For these reasons General Norstad felt that SACEUR should not delegate to an intermediate commander authority over AAFCE. Since early 1951 he had been of the opinion that overall air command directly under SACEUR was the only solution to the problem.\footnote{Ltr from General Norstad to General Eisenhower dtd 26 Aug 51.}

His concept was confirmed by the additional responsibilities he had undertaken as Commander in Chief AAFCE following liaison with Strategic Air Command, and his appointment in May 1952 as Special Staff Officer to SACEUR for this purpose.\footnote{SHAPE/51/53 dtd 13 Jan 53 formally approved the establishment of a special Air Staff. See also SHAPE 197/53 dtd 17 Feb 53.}

The alternatives facing General Ridgway in reorganizing the command structure involved various factors.\footnote{A staff study prepared by Brig. John B. Carey, USAF, and Air Cmdr Maxwell, had been submitted to Gen Redman on 23 Aug 52 following a directive from AVM Hudleston and the Air Deputy.} There was the recognized need for efficiency, and there were problems of national protocol and of expense. To adhere to the existing command structure arrangement was pointless as it was incapable of performing its essential functions, and therefore, any discussion that it would be cheaper and less troublesome to leave it unchanged was also pointless. The suggestion to create an Air Commander-in-Chief over Theater type Air Forces leaving the Regional Commands unaffected would result in the greater part of SACEUR's air power (his tactical air forces) being inflexibly divided into three regional compartments, and no commander fighting against numerical superiority could
afford to sacrifice the ability to concentrate his forces. Another proposal, which was also considered, was to place under CINCAAFCE all theater type air forces and to charge him with the responsibility for their employment throughout the theater. This attempted to achieve central coordination and control of theater type air forces only, but denied SACEUR the means to employ the greater part of his air power in accordance with the requirements for the overall air situation. In addition, CINCAAFCE would have the invidious task of making an impartial judgement between the conflicting needs for his own region and the other two, and as Air Commander in the Central Region he should be left free to concentrate on his own vital and exacting task.

It seemed evident that to concentrate on the hands of one man the responsibility for the coordination and control of all air forces at SACEUR's disposal was the only effective means of ensuring efficient command of all available air power and its most advantageous employment in the support of his intentions. But its success or failure would depend on the method chosen to put it into practice. The commander would have to have the necessary staff, intelligence facilities and communications to carry out his task.

The SHAPE staff recommended that the function of overall air cooperation and control should be placed where it ought to be - in SACEUR's headquarters. By this means it would ensure that the airman responsible to SACEUR would be in the best possible position to know SACEUR's intentions and offer the most economical means of providing the necessary staff,
intelligence facilities and communications. Extra staff and additional expense might be involved, but in the view of the staff, "the only additional requirement is a small air staff most of which could probably be found from consequent economies elsewhere". This method, if adopted, would enable SACEUR to deal with the single airman, both for issuing directions and for obtaining advice, and who in addition would constitute the ideal focal point for dealing with national air authorities.

The Solution - Reorganization of the Office of the Air Deputy

By November, General Ridgway, realizing that the two problems of command in the Center concerning air and land forces were intimately related, requested from the staff a condensed analysis of these two problems, and gave them guidance which summarized his own views to date. He accepted the principle of centralized control of all but limited tactical air in a single individual with the establishment of a "C-in-C Air" directly under SACEUR, or some other command arrangement such as a "Deputy SACEUR for Air". The excluded tactical air would remain under regional air component commanders and in turn under the respective regional commanders-in-chief, an arrangement which would include CINCENT on the same basis. The individual referred to as "C-in-C Air" or "Deputy SACEUR for Air" was to have the necessary staff and to be located in, or immediately adjacent to, SHAPE. By this time, it would appear that he had taken by far the most important step in the solution of the command structure problem by deciding to provide for the most effective utilization of his available air power and with particular emphasis on his bomber capability.

This guidance issued by SACEUR was in line with the recommendations of
his staff, and had followed discussions with General Norstad and his staff. After a conference with General Norstad on 2 September, Field Marshal Montgomery advised General Gruenther that not only was an Air Commander-in-Chief at SHAPE needed, but that postponement of the decision to create this appointment would restrict the development of SHAPE Air Power and potential. It was accepted that this officer must be "American," because of the restrictions on information about non-conventional weapons, the liaison with Strategic Air Command and the contribution in strength from the US. Once this point had been decided, then one C-in-C in the Center instead of a trinity under SHAPE was the obvious solution for the Central Region command structure. The "Air C-in-C" or "Deputy SACEUR for Air" should actually command all the air forces available to SACEUR, and should allot certain air forces to work directly with subordinate commands. The Field Marshal considered that these air forces were to be "in support" of subordinate commands and not "under command". 43

The advantages to SACEUR of having a US CINCAAFCE during the period of development had been proven and should a "Deputy SACEUR for Air" be appointed with command responsibilities, these same advantages indicated that he should be an American.

General Ridgway forwarded his proposals to the Standing Group in

42. See Chapter 2, page 27.

43. Memo to General Gruenther from Field Marshal Montgomery dtd 3 Sep 52.
February 1953 for approval. He proposed in essence that the functions of the Air Deputy, SHAPE, be enlarged by centralizing in him responsibility for exercising in the name of SACEUR the functions of overall direction and supervision of SACEUR's air forces as a whole. The Air Deputy, SHAPE, was initially to be a US air force officer. His functions were to include the definition of all matters of air policy; target policy and allocation of targets of theater significance to subordinate commands; SACEUR's functions relative to external air support; air reinforcements between the subordinate commands; air defense coordination and sub-assignment of air forces allocated to SACEUR through the Commanders-in-Chief concerned to subordinate Commanders-in-Chief.

Within this broad framework it was proposed that the Tactical Air Forces would remain under regional air commanders directly subordinate to regional commanders-in-chief, and it was envisaged that the Tactical Air Forces normally consisting of IDF (Interceptor Day Fighter), AWX (All-Weather Fighter), FB (Fighter Bomber), and TR (Tactical Reconnaissance) aircraft, would be assigned to subordinate commanders-in-chief.

The International Planning Team forwarded General Ridgway's proposals to the Standing Group with certain specific recommendations. It was considered that light bomber aircraft and, when available, transport air-

45. Memo for General Ridgway from AM Saunders, 3 Oct 51;
Memo for CofS from General Ridgway, 8 Dec 52;
Memo for Gen Gruenther from Gen Schuyler, 9 Dec 52;
Memo for Gen Gruenther from British Chiefs of Staff Committee, 30 Dec 52.
Craft, should also be assigned to subordinate commanders-in-chief, and also that within the broad framework, naval, air and maritime air operating in the performance of regional missions should remain under regional naval commanders and commanders of maritime air who were directly subordinate to regional commanders-in-chief.\(^\text{46}\)

These recommendations served to emphasize the problem at SHAPE of the type and number of aircraft to be assigned to subordinate commanders-in-chief and whether they should be in support or under command.

In General Eidgway's view, in the immediate future and for as long as light bombers would be available in only comparatively small numbers, it would be necessary to retain them under his direct authority so that limited aircraft available could be applied to the best advantage, and for the same reason, whilst fully appreciating the desirability of allocating troop carrier aircraft to subordinate commands, he considered that these also should be subject to a single authority until they became available in sufficient quantity.\(^\text{47}\)

Pending approval by the Standing Group and the Council of these proposals, a decision was required at SHAPE with regard to the staff required for the new Air Deputy organization, its location and the time when re-organization should become effective.

A Technical Committee had been appointed in September 1952 to study the cost, location and personnel required to implement whichever

\(^{46}\) IPT 160/2 dtd 17 Apr 53 amended to IPT 160/4 on 7 May 53. 

\(^{47}\) SHAPE 453, 24 Apr 53.
of the alternative command solutions SACEUR decided upon.\textsuperscript{48}

It was considered in early 1953 that final decisions as to actual cost and other details could not be determined until a decision had been given regarding the nomination of an officer for the post of Air Deputy, in order that his views might be taken into consideration.

The operational desirability of transferring the functions of Group Able and Special Operations from Fontainebleau (AAFCOE) to SHAPE and the establishment of the proposed Air Deputy Organization at SHAPE, became more pressing after 1 January 1953, and accommodation was reserved for this purpose at SHAPE. General Norstad had been opposed to an organizational change "until the last drop of growth had been wrung out of the existing establishment" in order to avoid "lost motion involved in reorganization".\textsuperscript{49} This was particularly true because the nature of the facilities available to AAFCOE up to mid-July 1952 had permitted the air organization to be manned to only about two-thirds of its required strength; because control and operating facilities within the headquarters itself had been sub-marginal; and because the major sub-commands, namely the two Allied Tactical Air Forces, had recently been established and were only then being developed. More rapid progress

\textsuperscript{48} This committee consisted of Air Commodore Stagge, RAF (Manpower), Colonel Stalder, USAF (Manpower), Air Commodore Grundy, RAF (Signals), Colonel Brown, USAF (Facilities). See memo for DCPO, sub: Air Command Arrangements, 7 Nov 53, sgd John B. Carey, Brig General, USAF, forwarding report of Committee.

\textsuperscript{49} Memo for General Gruenther from General Norstad dtd 25 Jul 52.
therefore, was anticipated during the latter half of 1952. It was also desirable that the nomination for the new Air Deputy should be made in a reasonable time to allow a handover by Air Marshal Sir Hugh Saunders who completed his tour of duty towards the end of July, and for the appointment of the Air Forces Commander in the Center who would relieve General Norstad if the latter were appointed to SHAPE as Air Deputy. In addition, the developing air strength of the latest partners who had joined the NATO Alliance in February 1952, Greece and Turkey, required overall direction at the earliest possible moment.

By the end of March 1953, a working party on the organization and composition of an Air Staff at SHAPE tentatively proposed a total of 69 officers and 93 enlisted personnel and civilians, of whom it was anticipated that 30 would be saved from existing organizations. 50

On 30 June 1953, the Military Representatives Committee in Washington approved the recommendations that had been made by General Ridgway, with only minor modifications. 51 This approval covered both the proposed changes of command structure in the Central Command and the overall air organization. The proposals of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe to appoint General Lauris Norstad, USAF, as Air Deputy, SHAPE, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Basil Embry, RAF, as Commander Allied Air Forces Central Europe with the title of COMAIRCENT, were also approved. 52


51. MRM 58/53, 1 Jul 53; and MRM 50/53, 9 Jun 53.

52. SH 29703 dtd 27 Jun 53; SH 29708 dtd 29 Jun 53; SCO IN 16150 dtd 1 Jul 53.
In future the Air Deputy was to be responsible to the Supreme Allied Commander for definition of air policy and the exercise of such overall direction and control of air activities as was necessary to provide essential coordination throughout the command. The main object of this reorganization was to ensure that the total air effort available to the Supreme Commander was used to the best advantage. Under the new organization, the additional authority of the air deputy was to include the overall coordination of the air forces when supporting the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, but which were not under the direct command of the Supreme Commander. It would also include the operational control of theater type air forces consisting of bombers, troop carriers and certain reconnaissance and other air units not specifically assigned to subordinate commands.53

After consultation with him, the Terms of Reference for the Air Deputy were prepared and issued to General Lauris Norstad54 and set out the basic mission of the Air Deputy together with his wartime and peacetime responsibilities.55 The effective date was to be 27 July 1953, by which time General Ridgway had left SHAPE.

By associating the reorganization of command for the air forces with that of the reorganization of command in the Center, delay had been inevitable. There had been very little national objection to the

53. SHAPE/681/53, Memo from AM Dawson to ACM Sir Basil Embry, 10 Feb 53.
54. See Appendix B, this Chapter.
55. AG 2230 of 17 Jul 53.
proposals regarding the reorganization of the Office of the Air Deputy.

The delay had been mainly in the reorganization in the Center Command as described in the previous chapter. The final date by which the time and the reorganization had been effected, coming as it did after General Ridgway had handed over command to General Gruenther, reflected the difficulties General Ridgway faced in accomplishing a reorganization which he had seen to be essential within the first week of his arrival.
### TOTAL AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE

(Effectiveness rating in parentheses)

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APPENDIX "B"
Chapter III

Directive for Air Deputy to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe


1. You are designated Air Deputy, effective 27 July 1953, and as such will be directly responsible to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

2. Your basic mission in war is to ensure that all air power available to SACEUR is employed to the best advantage in furtherance of SACEUR's mission.

3. Your wartime responsibilities will be:
   a. Overall direction of target policy, selection of target systems for air attack and their allocation to commands, and the preparation of target studies for targets of theater significance.
   b. Review and approval of those regional target policies and those target studies which are of overall air significance.
   c. Providing for the reinforcement and reallocation of Tactical Air Forces between regional commands as the situation may require.
   d. Requesting and allocating external air assistance.
   e. Exercising operational direction over such external air forces as may be placed at SACEUR's disposal.
   f. Coordination and the ensuring of essential support between SACEUR's air forces and those of external commands.
   g. Acting as SACEUR's advisor on all air matters and taking executive action on SACEUR's behalf as necessary.

4. Your peacetime responsibilities will include:
   a. Ensuring that suitable operational and logistic plans and programs are prepared, and the necessary preparations are made for the execution of your wartime responsibilities.
   b. Supervision of the international combined training of assigned national air forces and such earmarked forces as may be made available for this purpose.
   c. The establishment for all of SACEUR's air forces of training standards, readiness standards, operational procedures, and priorities
governing the forming, equipping and supplying of air units.

5. In peace and war your responsibilities will include:

   a. The exercise of direct operational command over all air forces assigned to my command, except those which are assigned to regions. Over the latter forces you will exercise on my behalf such overall direction (and supervision) as may be necessary for the fulfillment of your basic mission. Directions for air forces assigned to subordinate commanders-in-chief will be issued in the name of SACEUR to the commander-in-chief concerned.

   b. The coordination of air defense throughout the area of Allied Command Europe.

   c. The formulation of overall air policy.

   d. Effecting close and continuous coordination with adjacent Allied Commands and with NATO national authorities as appropriate.

(Signed)

ALFRED M. GRUENTHER,
General, United States Army
SHAPE HISTORY

FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMAND STRUCTURE
1952 - 1953

VOLUME II
SECTION II

CHAPTERS IV TO VI

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE
The History of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe is being prepared in a series of volumes. Volume I, comprising three Sections describing the origin, establishment and development of SHAPE under General Eisenhower, has been previously issued. The History of SHAPE during General Ridgway's tenure of command is being treated similarly. This booklet, "Further Developments in Command Structure, 1952-1953", contains three chapters comprising Section II of Volume II, the Ridgway Volume. It is the second of the three sections covering General Ridgway's period of command.

Copies of those sections already issued may be obtained for reference purposes from the Historical Branch, Office of the Secretary of the Staff, SHAPE. A limited distribution of Section II, Volume II, is being made within SHAPE. All addressees are invited to comment on this portion of the SHAPE History. Suggestions for improvement of this section should be brought to the attention of the Historical Branch.

JAMES O. CURTIS, Jr
Brig Gen, US Army
Secretary

October 1959
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CHAPTER IV

REVIEW OF THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT

and COMMAND IN THE SOUTH

Soon after General Ridgway set his staff working on the complex situation involved in reorganization of command structure in the Center, he turned his attention to equally difficult problems in the same field in his Southern sector. As was the case in Central Europe, a situation with undesirable ramifications was arising in the South because of new developments. The time was fast approaching when the issues would have to be faced squarely and without delay.

One of the major factors which impelled General Ridgway to take a long and critical look at the command arrangements in the vital Southern area was, of course, the recent accession into NATO of Greece and Turkey. Their entry and the attendant assignment of their forces to SACEUR's command were welcomed by the military leaders charged with the defense of Western Europe. But the accession of these nations raised problems of strategy, command, and control which were broad in scope and difficult of solution.

The defensive front for which SACEUR became responsible had been extended 1000 miles to the East, and now stretched 4000 miles from the northern tip of Norway to the eastern limits of Turkey. The borders of Greece and Turkey were contiguous with enemy territory. The configuration of the terrain presented features of weakness as well as strength which had to be incorporated into the overall strategic concept. The
maintenance of the integrity of these new partners emphasized the need for a strong and efficient command in the Mediterranean for their support, and also a system of command for the land and air forces in the South which could operate effectively on such a wide front.

Shortly after Greece and Turkey had joined NATO, General Eisenhower, Field Marshal Montgomery and Admiral Carney had visited them to assess these problems. The results of these visits indicated that national sensitivities and national interests were likely to make their solution difficult.

Strategic Considerations Affect the Command Problem

The command situation in Southern Europe as it existed when General Ridgway took up his appointment as SACEUR, consisted of a Commander-in-Chief (Admiral Robert E. Carney, CinC AFSE) with three subordinate commanders. Admiral Carney, in addition to being Commander-in-Chief AFSE, was also COMNAVSOUTH and as such commanded the US 6th Fleet, assigned French naval forces in the Western Mediterranean and assigned Italian naval forces in the Tyrrhenian Sea and Adriatic. COMAIRSOUTH was Major General David H. Schlatter, USAF, who commanded the tactical air forces in Italy and who had also a measure of control of Italian Home Defense Air Forces. COMLANDSOUTH, General Enrico Castiglione of the Italian Army, commanded all assigned land forces in Italy.

The NATO Defense Ministers at Lisbon on 21 February 1952 had decided that the ground forces and air forces of Greece and Turkey assigned to NATO would operate under the overall command of SACEUR through the Commander-in-Chief, Southern Europe. The naval forces of Greece and Turkey were to remain under their national chiefs-of-staff, but the operation of their forces was to be closely coordinated with those of other naval forces operating in the Mediterranean. 2  

SACEUR, by his terms of reference, 3 was charged with the responsibility of "proposing to the Standing Group any increase, elimination or reorganization of subordinate allied planning and command organization which he considered necessary". At Lisbon the NATO Ministers had decided that any detailed reorganization of Southern Command should be worked out by SACEUR in agreement with national authorities and subsequently submitted to the Standing Group for approval by the Military Committee. 4 Any alterations in the command structure would obviously depend on General Ridgway's reappraisal of the strategic concept as affected by the addition of the forces of Greece and Turkey within his command.

Studies directed at finding a suitable command structure for the Mediterranean had been in progress at SHAPE since 1950. 5 Staff planners in their early studies had considered that Greece was more closely tied to Europe than the Middle East and that it should be included in SACEUR's

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2. MC 38/2, 1 Feb 52, Command Arrangements for Greece and Turkey.
3. DC 24/3 as revised by MC 22/12, 19 Feb 52.
4. Brief to General Gruenther by AVM Hudleston, 10 Jun 52.
5. Memo for General Gruenther from AVM Hudleston, 20 Apr 51.
European Command, Turkey, on the other hand, had a primary strategic interest in the Middle East, and it should be included in the Middle East Command to be set up under a British Commander with the participation of such Commonwealth and other NATO countries as would agree to be associated with the defense of the area. The Allied Middle East Command Headquarters, it was thought, would consist initially of US, UK, French and Turkish officers and officers of certain Commonwealth nations. On strategic grounds, it would be located in Egypt and have two subordinate commands. The Northern or Turkish sector would be under Turkish command but with provision for adequate coordination with the Southern European Command in view of the importance of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, and the Southern Sector would be under British command. It was proposed that there should be two Allied Naval Commands in the Mediterranean, one subordinate to SACEUR and the other to the Supreme Allied Commander Middle East (SACME).

Higher military direction of SACME was to be provided by a Middle East Standing Group consisting of UK, US and French representatives of the NATO Standing Group. The Middle East Standing Group would be assisted by a Middle East Military Representatives Committee composed of representatives of UK, US, France, Turkey and contributing Commonwealth nations. Above this would be a Middle East Chiefs-of-Staff Committee of the same nations, similar to the NATO Military Committee. Coordination between the two parallel organizations would be provided for by common representation at each level as appropriate.

6. Memo for DCPO from ACOS/PPO, 21 Feb 51, commenting on IPT Report to Standing Group on command in the Mediterranean and Middle East, and SG 80/4, 22 Aug 51. See also PPO 0210, 21 Sep 51, DCOS to COFS, & PPO 2553, 3 Oct 51 to DCOS, "Command in the Mediterranean & Middle East."
In its main features this proposal agreed with the views Field Marshal Montgomery had expressed before the Lisbon Conference. Seeing the urgency for the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO under General Eisenhower, he had recommended the establishment of a fourth, Aegean, Command. In this, Turkey's contribution in terms of divisions would be placed in the Middle East Command in war and Turkey would plan with that command in peacetime. The establishment of a Middle East Command for this purpose, he considered, should be worked out in London by the four powers together with Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.

During the Field Marshal's visit to Greece and Turkey between 7 and 15 May 1952, he purposely did not mention the command problem although he fully appreciated the need for the command structure to be redesigned in such a way as to enable SHAPE to handle effectively its increased responsibilities, and the urgency for this being done quickly. On this visit he had examined and expressed his views on the strategic implications involved as a result of the increased defense perimeter which had become SACEUR's responsibility. These implications basically affected any reorganization of the command structure which might be considered. Turkey, he said, must be regarded as a solid bastion integrated into Western Defense Plans and looking westwards for her support against aggression, and carrying out her new role without detriment to her interests.

7. DSAC 1243, 1 Feb 52.
8. FM 63, 16 May 52.
in the Middle East. He also realized the tremendous importance of the Middle East area to the Western nations and considered that the best way to help the defense of the Middle East and Suez Canal area was to hold securely a front from the Caucasus to the Balkans. The bastion of that front was Anatolia and as long as this was securely held it would be difficult for a Russian land advance to by-pass Turkey and make for the Suez Canal area. He did not consider that the defense of Turkish and Greek territory could be treated as separate problems in isolation. From this time onwards he expressed the view that there should be no question of a voluntary withdrawal from any territory of Greece or Turkey on the outbreak of hostilities, and that every inch of national soil must be considered as sacred and must be fought for. The Russians had to be prevented at all costs from gaining control of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles which would enable them to emerge into the Mediterranean with surface or submarine craft.

The economic position of Greece was not sound as she was spending nearly half her budget on defense, and this situation presented grave dangers. Any increase in Greek defense forces, in his view, should therefore be postponed for the present and proposed expenditure carefully examined.  

The SHAPE staff considered SACEUR's southern flank as a strategic entity involving the defense of Italy, Greece and Turkey by the land

9. FM 63, 16 May 52.
forces of those countries using the most defensible terrain, and supported by naval power and air power from outside sources. Any requirements or any strategy which required a significant increase in air or naval forces, had to be weighed at this time against the requirements in other areas, and the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO had not materially changed the existing concept of reliance on a strong naval flank, in the south.

Solutions Considered

At the Lisbon Conference the Military Committee had stated, "the position as regards the system of command of naval forces in the Mediterranean area and their coordination with land and air forces will be postponed for further consideration with the object of submitting an agreed report to the Council at its next meeting. Progress on the organization of the Middle East Command will be reported to the Council at its next meeting."10

Exploratory conversations conducted with Greece and Turkey before their formal admittance to NATO had made it quite clear that they desired to be included within SACEUR's command, Turkey being particularly insistent that she should be regarded as part of Europe and not of Middle East or Asia.

10. SHAPE/PFO/33/52, 21 Apr 52. Commenting on MC 38/2.
In the opinion of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, the command organization in the South should include the formation of a new Mediterranean Command.¹¹ The Commander-in-Chief Southern Europe should have as subordinate commands under him, a United States Commander-in-Chief Allied Air Forces Southern Europe commanding subordinate Allied Air Commands in Italy, Greece and Turkey; and an Italian Commander Allied Land Forces Turkey. The new Mediterranean Naval Command under a US or UK Commander-in-Chief, subordinate to CINCSOUTH, should have as subordinate commanders a French commander of the Western Mediterranean; an Italian Commander of the Central Mediterranean area, and a UK Commander of the Eastern Mediterranean. The United States Commander of the naval Striking Forces Mediterranean would remain separate from this command.

The Chiefs of Staff of the United Kingdom, however, envisaged a fourth command being established with Greece and Turkey and, in addition, an overall naval commander in the Mediterranean with responsibility for the coordination and conduct of all naval operations other than those of the 6th Fleet which would be retained under SACEUR.¹²

General Eisenhower, for his part, when first approached, expressed the view that Turkey fell more properly into the Middle East Theater. For this reason his first reaction was to support the establishment of a fourth command. The great difficulty experienced at SHAPE in establishing new headquarters and finding trained staff officers, providing the necessary

¹¹. Expressed on 24 Jan 52 and reaffirmed on 5 Feb 52 - see Brief for AVM Hudleston from General Schuyler, 3 Jun 52.

¹². See Chapter V, this Volume.
Communications, equipment, and the necessary funds, led him to express his views to the Standing Group as preferring three land sectors in the South together with an air command involving tactical air commands for each sector; and a naval command comprising all naval forces in the Mediterranean allocated to him by the Standing Group. Admiral Carney was accordingly requested to submit a recommendation for internal command arrangements for Southern Europe on these lines.

After the Field Marshal's visit to Greece and Turkey in May 1952, he expressed the view that it was not possible to command effectively from Naples a front from the Caucasus to the Balkans. He knew that a Commander-in-Chief had to keep a firm grip on operational developments and saw the inadvisability of a Commander-in-Chief being involved in command and control during battle. Accordingly, he suggested that headquarters CINCSOUTH should move eastwards to some suitable place in Greece or Turkey, and that Turkey and Greece should be a sub-theater of their own from the Caucasus to the Balkans. He also suggested for consideration that Italy belonged to Central and Western Europe.

Admiral Carney's views disagreed with those of the Field Marshal. He felt that as a theater commander his task would be essentially one of direction and coordination, with the day-to-day control of operations vested in his subordinate commands. He foresaw a Greco-Turkish sub-theater as primarily an isolated ground force problem which as such would probably be placed under

13. See Brief for General Ridgway by AVM Hudleston, 10 Jun 52.
the command of an army officer who would not have control over the US Navy Striking Force. If Greece and Turkey were not under the same command as Italy, the advantages of air and naval mobility would largely be lost, and unless the Center could hold farther forward than contemplated, he thought the Austrian/Italian battle would immediately isolate South-East from Central Europe. In addition to these views he agreed that the physical move of the present headquarters from Naples would result in considerable expense and disruption of existing arrangements.

He therefore recommended\textsuperscript{14} the establishment of a South-Eastern Command under CINCSOUTH together with the establishment of a single Mediterranean Naval Command which could be commanded by a British Officer as long as CINCSOUTH remained an American Officer, but who would be subordinate to CINCSOUTH; the establishment of separate Italian, Greek and Turkish sectors each under its own national land commander; the retention of the headquarters of CINCSOUTH in Naples; and provision of such Advanced Command Posts as further study might indicate to be necessary. He also desired the appointment of a senior army officer as CINCSOUTH's deputy to assist him in the control of the newly created sectors.

\textbf{Decision to Form a South Eastern Command}

Solution to this problem of command involved many political factors in addition to the more obvious military considerations. The desire of Turkey and Greece to be considered as part of NATO negated plans for the formulation of a Middle East Command to include Turkey.\textsuperscript{15}

\begin{itemize}
\item [14.] Letter from Admiral Carney to General Ridgway, 26 Mar 52
\item [15.] Letter from Admiral Carney to General Ridgway, 26 Mar 52
\end{itemize}
The British, as well as the Turks, had interests and responsibilities in the Middle East, and they, together with the Turks, realized the need to ensure that the NATO Eastern flank was not by-passed by any Russian attack which would split the defensive structure and threaten Cyprus and the Suez Canal even though the latter areas were not within the NATO frame-work. The British Eastern Mediterranean fleet and military forces in the Mediterranean were not under SACEUR's command. It was, however, because of this that coordination between all the forces of the various NATO countries was highly desirable.

The development of the European Defense Community (EDC) and the formation of any planned forces, as well as increasing economic cooperation with EDC countries, gave Italy growing interests and ties in Western Europe. The political attitude of Yugoslavia would also seriously affect the deployment of forces in Greece, who was mindful of her battle in the last war against forces that penetrated through Yugoslavia. Albania, although an enemy base, could be destroyed as an alternative to deploying troops on her border if that was more desirable.

From a military standpoint both General Eisenhower and Field Marshal Montgomery had acknowledged the difficulty of commanding effectively a front from the Caucasus to the Balkans from a headquarters at Naples, and it was obvious that a command headquarters of some kind was essential in either Greece or Turkey. The plans considered took into account the difficulties in the provision of qualified staff officers, the need to avoid additional expense, and the disruption of communications and existing arrangements. The SHAPE staff considered that of the many solutions possible, there were two acceptable
military solutions for the next two years. These were either to adopt the command structure recommended by SACEUR and Admiral Carney, utilizing a deputy to control operations in Greece and Turkey, or to create a subordinate command under CINCSOUTH to include the land and air forces stationed in Greece and Turkey. In view of the probability that any Russian attack on Thrace would split effectively the Greece/Turkey area, and because of the peacetime supervision required in Greece and Turkey to build up their forces, the SHAPE staff considered the latter alternative to be the better of the two.

Seven possible locations were considered for this subordinate headquarters - Athens, Crete, Izmir, Cyprus, Ankara, Iskendron and Rhodes. Communications were extremely meagre in Crete, Cyprus and Rhodes. Although the signals communications were better in the cities, they were not good, but Athens was better than Izmir and Ankara. Assessment from the point of view of suitability for command of both the Turkish and Greek theaters pointed to a location which would not be threatened so much if a wedge were driven between the two countries by the capture of Thrace, particularly Eastern Thrace. These two considerations limited the choice of a site to Turkey, either Ankara, Iskendron or Izmir. Of these, Iskendron was so far to the west that it would be unsuitable both in peace and wartime, and Ankara being the capital of the country and the center of direction for Turkey as well as being the center of Anatolia, made Izmir the planners' choice.

16. Memo, DCPO to SACEUR, summarizing SHAPE staff views, 10 Jun 52.
first choice.  

After study of the problem and the recommendations made by his staff at SHAPE and AF SOUT H, General Ridgway decided to set up a Southeastern Command. The special announcement was made by General Ridgway on 16 July 1952\(^{18}\) that he had decided to organize two land sectors within the Southern European Command, under the overall command of Admiral Robert E. Carney of the US Navy, with headquarters at Naples. The first was to be Allied Land Forces Southern Europe as presently constituted under Lt General Enrico Castiglione, Italian Army. The second was to be Allied Land Forces South Eastern Europe commanded by a US officer who would be designated later.\(^{19}\)

It was stated at this time that the location of Headquarters Allied Land Forces South Eastern Europe had not yet been decided. The command of Allied Land Forces South Eastern Europe was to have operational control of assigned ground forces in Greece and Turkey, with separate Greek and Turkish army commanders operating under his authority. The nucleus of a Tactical Air Force Headquarters was also to be established with Allied Land Forces South Eastern Europe. This air headquarters would report to Major General David H. Schlatter, US Air Force, overall Commander of Allied Air Forces Southern Europe. As in the case of other Allied Commands in Europe, these new land and air headquarters were to have international staffs. The announcement went on to say that no change was involved in naval command arrangements.

\(^{17}\) Brief for DCPO from PPC, 15 Jul 52.

\(^{18}\) SHAPE Press Release No. 61, 16 Jul 52.

\(^{19}\) Lt General Gillard Gordon Wyman, US Army, was appointed 8 Sep 52.
at this time. The naval forces of Greece and Turkey were to remain for the time being under their national Chiefs-of-Staff operating in close coordination with the Commander Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe and with the Commanders of other Allied Naval Forces in the Mediterranean.

The following day Admiral Carney held a conference in Athens to discuss the location of the headquarters for COMLANDSOUTHEAST. Locations suggested by the Greek representatives were Athens or Salonika, and by the Turks, Istanbul or Izmir. Admiral Carney pointed out that Salonika and Istanbul were both too far forward for a main headquarters. The Greek representative said that he recommended Athens as a first priority and stated that if there must be a second priority, it would appear that Izmir should be named. The Turkish representative on this basis recommended Izmir and stated that no consideration should be given to Athens. After on-site surveys, consideration of operational requirements, and the undesirability of establishing a military headquarters of this nature in a capital city, Admiral Carney recommended to General Ridgway that Izmir be selected as the site for the headquarters of COMLANDSOUTHEAST and that an Advanced Command Post should be established at Salonika.

This recommendation had also taken into consideration political

20. Minutes of Conference held at Athens, 17 Jul 52.
factors regarding Yugoslavia and reduced them to a minor status in comparison with other considerations which were involved in choosing a command site suitable for both peace and war. 22

On 18 August 1952 General Ridgway announced that Izmir, Turkey, had been selected as the location for the headquarters Allied Land Forces South Eastern Europe. 23 He also announced that it was planned to set up eventually an Allied Tactical Air Force Headquarters in the same area, initially as an advanced echelon from Major General David H. Schlatter's headquarters in Florence, and that a small Command Post would be located in Salonika. 24 The announcement mentioned that the selection of Izmir was recommended by Admiral Carney after consultation with the Greek and Turkish authorities and careful consideration of all factors involved.

General Ridgway's decision to establish the nucleus of a tactical air force alongside Headquarters Allied Forces South Eastern Europe (HAFSE) took some time to implement. To avoid any further delay HAFSE were asked for their proposed establishment for the Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force, as it was to be called. The nucleus agreed by SHAPE was for 25 officers 25 exclusive of support personnel (officers and other ranks) with the recommendation that there should be at least two UK officers - one operations and one

22. Memo to DCPO from ACOS Intelligence, 9 Aug 52.
23. SHAPE Press Release.
25. Memorandum DCPO 323, to DCLA, 10 Mar 53.
logistics – as British Middle East Air Forces would be working alongside the ATAF. In the circumstances, it was not considered necessary for French and Italian representation to be included. Authority for the activation of headquarters Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force was requested from the Standing Group on 12 June 1953.\textsuperscript{26} The proposed headquarters was required to discharge international (NATO) military responsibilities in both peace and war. It was to have under its jurisdiction the 28th Royal Hellenic Air Force composed of seven tactical air force squadrons, and the 1st and 3rd Turkish tactical air forces including 5 Turkish Air Force Groups. The headquarters was to be an independent headquarters subordinate to the Commander, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe and associated with COMLANDSOUTHEAST for joint operations. Its headquarters was planned to be also at Izmir adjacent to headquarters COMLANDSOUTHEAST.

The estimated total manning requirement for 6 ATAF to be achieved by mid-1954 approximated 250 including staff and communications support. By the end of 1953 it was planned that it should attain a staff strength of 90 officers and other ranks and a 100\% minimum operational strength by mid-1954. Communications support was to be completely built up by the end of 1953.

The Strategic Implications of Yugoslavia

The decision to establish COMLANDSOUTHEAST and headquarters, 6th Allied Air Force at Izmir\textsuperscript{27} with an Advanced Command Post at Salonika, provided

\textsuperscript{26} SH 29476, 12 Jun 53.

\textsuperscript{27} Not officially activated until 14 Oct 53 under Maj Gen R.E.L. Eaton, USAF.
a partial solution to the complex command problem in the South. The problem of command of the naval forces in the Mediterranean, however, was not settled so easily, and will be dealt with in detail in the next chapter.

From the point of view of the land forces there were two other problems that SACEUR and Admiral Carney still had to settle. These were: the effect which possible cooperation from Yugoslavia might have on SACEUR's strategy in Southern and South-Eastern command plans for the defense of Italy and Greece; and the incorporation of troops of NATO nations stationed in Austria and Trieste. Discussion between SACEUR and CINCSOUTH during the first two months after General Ridgway's assumption of command led to an examination of the strategic implications of cooperation with Yugoslavia. Various proposals had been discussed during the previous year between US, UK and France as to the best method of approaching Yugoslavia for coordination of strategic planning. It had been agreed by the three governments that their ambassadors in Belgrade should approach Marshal Tito for his agreement to the initiation of staff talks. The United States government designated General Collins to discuss with representatives of the other two governments the problems and questions to propose to the Yugoslavs in technical military discussions. The talks were to be held in Washington and it was proposed that the three representatives should agree on one of their number for discussions on their behalf with Marshal Tito.

There was no indication that a SHAPE representative would be invited at that stage, but SHAPE required certain definite information and action from
Yugoslavia if it was possible. General Ridgway recognized that Yugoslavia's attitude towards joint defense was of vital importance to his command, but because of Yugoslavia's status as a non-NATO country, he was reluctant to be directly associated with any negotiations which might be undertaken, at least until such time as he received NATO authority to participate.

He considered that although unilateral defense preparations by Yugoslavia would have some value they would be considerably enhanced if Yugoslavia were willing to consider northeast Italy, Yugoslavia and Greece as a single defense area. Should the reaction from Yugoslavia be favorable to this basic concept SHAPE would desire information as to the strength and state of readiness of the Yugoslav armed forces; the Yugoslav strategic plan for the conduct of operations in the event of Soviet/Satellite attack; the type of assistance and support Yugoslavia would require from other allied nations in the event of operations; and the Yugoslav plan should the main Yugoslav defensive positions be broken. The answer to these questions had a direct bearing on the problems of defense of Northern Italy, the position of the Vadar Valley defense and the denial of naval and air bases to the Soviets.

At this time SHAPE was in general disagreement with the conclusions set out in a Standing Group memorandum as to Yugoslav potentialities. The SHAPE staff considered that the Standing Group estimates of Yugoslav strength were

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28. Brief for DCPO from ACOS FFO, FFO/0210, 10 Jul 52. See also comprehensive study "Strategic Concept for Yugoslavia", SHAPE/FPO/21/53 dated 5 May 53.

29. Letter from General Ridgway to General Collins, 19 Jul 52.

30. SGM-1455-52.
overdone and invited Standing Group reactions to its own comments which were submitted in detail. At the end of July the Italian NMR pointed out to General Gruenther the danger of reactions which proposed Greek/Yugoslav naval maneuvers in the waters of Corfu might precipitate. This information was the result of a report from the Italian Embassy in Athens on a proposal made to the Greek Government from Yugoslavia. General Gruenther assured the Italian representative that no proposal had been made to SHAPE regarding Greek/Yugoslav naval exercises.

During the latter part of the year, relationships among these nations improved considerably and on 23 March 1953 the tripartite Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed between Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia.

**Austria and Trieste**

The other rather difficult problem which affected strategy and command in the South which also required tactful handling, was the question of the defense of Northern Italy insofar as it was affected by troops of the occupying powers who were stationed in Austria and Trieste.

Standing Group had approved the allocation of the Allied Forces in Austria to SACEUR as a command subordinate to Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe "on a covert basis for war planning and formally under operational command in event of war, or earlier if so directed by the Standing Group." Standing Group had similarly approved the designation of Lt General

31. SHAPE/754/52, 19 Jul 52
32. SCO OUT 24428, 31 Jul 52.
33. Strictly speaking it was ratified by the Greek Government and the Yugoslav National Assembly on 23 March and by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 18 May. A 20-year military pact between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia was to be signed at Bled on 9 Aug 54.
L.S. Irwin, US Army, as Commander Allied Forces Austria within these limitations. The missions, normal employment, administration, training and relations with civil authorities of the forces in Austria were to continue as before under currently designated French, British and US command arrangements and the peace-time authority of the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe was specifically limited to planning and preparation for emergencies.

Admiral Carney, in preparing his Emergency Defense Plan for 1952 and Medium Term Plan for 1954, was willing to accept a defense on the line of the Isonzo for 1952 because of the inadequacy of existing forces, but projected his forward strategy for 1954 into Austria as being essential for the defense of the Central Sector of his command. In this there was a diversion of opinion from the views of Field Marshal Montgomery as expressed during a visit to Admiral Carney in Italy in 1951. Admiral Carney understood the Field Marshal's views to involve the withdrawal of the forces from Austria and Trieste and that there was no need to strengthen them for the purpose of executing delayed action. C-in-C South believed that in terms of 1954 the integrity of this area should be preserved without regard to the territorial and military situation which existed in 1952. He advocated a forward strategy and suggested that there was a need to hold as far into the Austrian terrain as possible from the very outset, thus inflicting maximum delay on the enemy and ultimately fighting the main battle.

34. SH 20662, 19 Jun 51. To Commanders of Forces of the occupying powers in Austria and MODs (based on TOSHAP 33 of 14 Jun 51).
on the Northern slopes of the Austrian Alps.\textsuperscript{35}

Various political and military facts were involved in this problem. Many efforts had been made to secure agreement with the Soviet Government on the terms of a peace treaty to be signed with Austria, and negotiations were also in progress between the occupying powers, Yugoslavia and Italy regarding the eventual settlement of the Trieste problem. The solution of these two political questions involved the possible withdrawal of the forces of the three occupying powers from these territories and therefore the question of their subsequent deployment arose. There was, however, some urgency as Admiral Carney wished to complete his Emergency Defense Plan which included the defense of the integrity of Italy. General Eisenhower had considered it desirable that the occupation forces should be retained within the area of his command if that was at all practicable. As far as the US forces were concerned this was a question for arrangement with the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.\textsuperscript{36}

SHAPE staff studies on the possible redeployment of these forces reached conclusions, however, which were out of line with the Field Marshal's views and the British Chiefs of Staff desired to make use of the British Trieste garrison elsewhere. The Field Marshal considered that when the British and US forces came out of Trieste they should come out right away, that there should be no demand for the retention of a covering force only to dispose them in Northern Italy either as part of the covering force or for the purpose of bolstering Italian morale. In the preliminary stages of

\textsuperscript{35} Letter from Adm Carney to Gen Eisenhower, 7 Sep 51.
\textsuperscript{36} Memo to AVM Hudleston from General Schuyler, 24 Nov 51.
a future war, the defense of Italy must rest fairly and squarely upon the shoulders of the Italian army.  

1952 opened with a comprehensive survey of this problem and a presentation at SHAPE by Admiral Carney and General Irwin. In his presentation Admiral Carney gave his reappraisal of the problem and his strategic concept together with specific recommendations as to how it might be implemented. By increasing the depth of defensive effort into Austria, he saw that by gaining additional time he could insure completion of Italian mobilization and the deployment of the Italian forces. The initial importance of the Tyrol concerned the evacuation of non-combatants and the contracting of allied forces to their resistance lines. The Tyrol covered the Brenner Pass and the eastern part of the Swiss redoubt. Carinthia was not only important in relation to Tarvisio as an evacuation route, but also in its relation to Dobbiaco and the Yugoslav border, and it was the richest and most fertile field for the recruiting of loyal and willing Austrian manpower. The holding of Western Austria, he considered, would have a valuable political and psychological effect in strengthening the allied position not only in Austria but in all of Europe, and a firm and determined policy for the defense of Austria should result in adding a substantial number of loyal and resolute men to the allied cause.

Admiral Carney gave it as his conviction that if Southern Europe was

37. Memo to General Ridgway from DCPO, 11 Dec 51
38. Verbatim record of presentation by Adm Carney at SHAPE, 11 Jan 52.

The following were present: SHAPE - Gen Eisenhower, FM Montgomery, Gen Gruenther, ACM Saunders, Gen Redman, Gen Bedet, Gen Bowen, Col Chapman, Gen Leavey, Gen Schuyler, Gen Coudraux, AVM Hudleston, Col Walters, Col Wood;

AUSTRIAN - Adm Carney, Gen West, Gen de la Tour du Moulin, Gen Gavin, Gen Irwin, Col Poorman, Col Finnegan, Gen Bertrand.
lost the democratic cause was lost, for the Mediterranean would be seriously threatened which, in turn, might lead to the loss of the Middle East, resulting in cataclysmic reverses to the allies. He also requested that General Irwin’s position should be clarified and strengthened as the Commanding General of the Allied Forces in Austria, and that he should have the equivalent of an allied staff.

The SHAPE staff views on these proposals were that minimum reinforcements of French and US forces should be agreed and that the requirement for reinforcement of the British zone should be studied. Field Marshal Montgomery, however, was prepared to accept limited augmentation of the general lines proposed, but, "if the decision was left to him he wouldn’t put another man there." 39

The proposals made by the Commander-in-Chief South also included stock piling for such forces as were to be employed and a request for the allocation to him of the French 27th Division which was in SACEUR’s strategic reserve, but this request was subsequently withdrawn.

Although specific authority had been given to General Irwin by the Standing Group, his responsibilities for planning were over and above the commitments of the national forces involved as expressed by their national governments. It seemed that coordination under General Bertrand and subsequently under General de la Tour du Moulin was restricted, as any military decisions of the Commanding General of the French forces had to have the prior approval of the French High Commissioner or through him of the French Foreign Office. For

39. PPO 0210 Austria, 14 Jan 52, to DCPO; and Memorandum for Gen Gruenther from DCPO, 14 Jan 52. For details of forces available and anticipated and their role and action, see Colonel Chapman’s brief to Chief of Staff 14 Jan 52.
this reason Admiral Carney requested clarification and improvement by revision of the instruction (SH 20662) in order that the position of the Commanding General Allied Forces Austria could be improved, and in order that through the Ministers of Defense of Britain and France an improved state of readiness could be achieved. 40

Accordingly, SHAPE requested the Ministers of Defense of France, UK and US, through their National Military Representatives at SHAPE, for assistance in achieving closer cooperation and coordination in Austria, and to this end suggested the establishment of a Planning Group from existing staff in Austria to be formed not as an additional headquarters, but for working in close liaison with the national staffs. In event of war, however, this liaison group would be capable of being extended into an Allied Staff. 41

By the time General Ridgway arrived, the problem was still unresolved. The three nations had agreed in principle to the establishment of a liaison staff, with the US commenting that a sufficiently clear statement was not made regarding the establishment of the nucleus of an Allied Staff, and with French disagreement on holding realistic combined allied training exercises in Austria. Admiral Carney continued to express concern that SHAPE was unable to reinforce Austria at this time, and the effect of this on his Emergency Plan. In SHAPE there was less inclination to commit French 27th Mountain Division for this purpose. General Eisenhower had advised Admiral Carney to make all plans for the utilization of available forces, and for

40. Letter from Admiral Carney to General Eisenhower, 12 Feb 52.
41. SHAPE/237/52, 6 Mar 52.
the utilization of French 27th Division with recognition that the final decision as to where it would be committed would be made by SACEUR in the light of the situation prevailing at the time when hostilities appeared to be imminent. Generally speaking, there was reluctance on the part of the British and French to take any action which might be construed as overt in Austria or Trieste planning. For this reason, a proposal from CINCSOUTH to entitle the Commander Allied Forces Austria "Commanding General Allied Forces Austria" was considered to be unwise in peace although proper in war.42

Admiral Carney's concern in November43 that the British Garrison of Trieste had been reduced to 1400 out of a ceiling of 5000 led to an assurance from the British Chiefs of Staff that the correct figure was 3200 rising to 4000 when an additional battalion rejoined the force in May 1953, and agreeing to SHAPE's proposal to reorganize the Trieste Garrison so as to obtain an effective infantry battalion, but noting, however, that artillery support might not be available.44

On the 18th November 1952 a further discussion took place at SHAPE between General Ridgway, Admiral Carney, and the Commanding General US Forces Austria (Lt General Hays).45 At this conference Admiral Carney emphasized the desirability of denying Austrian territory to the Soviets, and the importance of what he called the "Villach Corner". The position taken

42. To AVM Hudleston from Gen Redman, 9 Jul 52
43. Conference of 18 Nov 52. Encl to SHAPE/1317/52, 29 Nov 52.
44. Memo from AVM Hudleston to UK NMR SHAPE/1288/52, 21 Nov 52.
45. Also present: General Gruenther, AVM Hudleston, Lt Col Rosson.
by General Ridgway with respect to the various proposals made by Admiral
Carney and General Hays at this conference, was that it was militarily
desirable to defend as far to the North and to the East in Western Austria
as possible, but at such time as means were available. Until then,
operations should be governed by the provisions of his basic guidance, but
since Western Austria was not NATO territory and since a decision to
undertake its defense and to support the added requirements must ultimately
rest with the North Atlantic Council, SHAPE would study the question to
determine what recommendations, if any, should be forwarded to higher
authority. He approved the reinforcement of British Troops in Austria
in war time by an infantry battalion, and an artillery battalion from US
forces in Trieste or a combination of US/UK forces in Trieste; and authorized
the stationing of these units on a rotational basis in peacetime at a training
area in Italy near Tarvisio. Command arrangements for the Villach area and
the Northern Italian front together with plans for the employment of Italian
forces forward of the Austrian/Italian border, were to be the subject of
continuing discussions with the Italians but conducted with due regard to the
sensitivity of the issues involved.

Further study of this problem at SHAPE led to the conclusion that no
useful purpose would be served by raising the issue of operations in Austria
with higher NATO authorities at that time. It was agreed that SHAPE's
strategic directives and longer range plans in due course be modified to
reflect SACEUR's opinion that a forward strategy in Western Austria was an

46. SHAPE Operational Memo No.1 referred to in SHAPE/1317/52.
objective to be undertaken at such time as means were available. 47

SACEUR's terms of reference 48 recognized Austria as being within his command area, because this included the area of the three former Regional Planning Groups of NATO. The former area of the Southern European/Western Mediterranean Regional Planning Group had included all of Western Austria and the remainder of the country below the Salzburg/Vienna axis. 49 The 1953 Emergency Defense Plan planned for delaying actions in Austria and Trieste, keeping forces intact to the maximum extent practicable and withdrawing in face of enemy pressure to Italy. 50

The problem, therefore, in essence was one of finding the necessary forces to reinforce those of the occupying powers in order to implement the forward strategy. CinC South's estimates of forces required for his forward strategy in Western Austria had included the 27th Infantry Division for commitment by about D+7, but CINCSOUTH had indicated to SACEUR during 18 November conference that he had dropped this requirement. SACEUR had placed requests upon the nations concerned for small reinforcements for the Austrian Forces, but was forced to advise Admiral Carney that they could not be expected during 1953. 51 However, there was a small augment-

47. Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty provided that an armed attack against one or more of the parties shall be deemed to include an armed attack on the forces, vessels or aircraft of any of the Parties when in, or over, NATO territory. "Any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic Area North of the Tropic of Cancer." SHAPE/PPO/311/52, 10 Dec 52, Appendix A.

48. MC 22/12, 19 Feb 52.

49. CP/EMMO (50) (referred to in SHAPE/PPO/311/52, para 5.)

50. SACEUR EDP 1/53, Para 24(a) referred to in SHAPE/PPO/311/52.

51. SH/22522, 29 Feb 52, referred to in SHAPE/PPO/311/52.
ation of the French forces, and an anticipated increase in the British forces. General Ridgway had approved the reinforcements in war time of the British forces in Austria by an infantry battalion from the US garrison in Trieste or a combination of the US/UK garrison there. Materialization of this, however, was contingent upon the US manpower ceiling for Trieste. He realized in full that this undertaking would only affect the defense of the Tarvisio-Dobbiaco area, and would be of no direct assistance to the implementation of a forward strategy in the US and French zones of Austria. The likelihood of obtaining additional forces was further reduced because of the delay in completing the 1953 Annual Review, and therefore the estimate of forces available in 1953.

Admiral Carney's proposal, for the commitment of UK and US forces from Trieste on a semi-permanent basis to a locality outside Zone "A" of the Free Territory, also met with little success as far as obtaining UK agreement was concerned. The Field Marshal considered this move beyond the point of political desirability or practicable possibility, and that little good would be served by the semi-permanent stationing of troops outside the actual trieste area before the means actually became available. 52

However, plans were made for the reinforcement of the Villach area in war time, and the reinforcement of the British garrison with US units, together with certain staff studies which were carried out with the

52. General Wansbrough-Jones to DCFO, 21 Jan 53. DSAC/1/53.
cooperation of the respective commanders.

As a result of General Ridgway's visit to Austria in the Spring of 1953, he came to conclusions which pointed to the fact that with a relatively small force of one reinforced division, the threat to the Italian Northern frontier from the Dobbiaco inclusive to the east could be eliminated. With the American forces in Austria, perhaps lightly reinforced by an Italian Alpine unit in possession of the Brenner Pass and with another small Italian Alpine unit in possession of the Resia Pass, these avenues of approach to Northern Italy could be effectively blocked indefinitely. This would then leave the bulk of the Italian land forces available for the defense of their eastern frontier. If, as then seemed increasingly probable, Yugoslav forces coordinated their operations with NATO forces, the successful land defense of Italy would become greatly simplified.53

These conclusions of General Ridgway gave a military solution to the problem at this time. At his request they were studied by the staff, but these studies brought out political implications which threatened further delay. The discussions with Yugoslavia for example, if successful, would assure the defense of the Ljubljana Gap. The use of Italian units for the defense of Austria or the Northern frontiers of Italy would involve logistic bases and it was considered that this should not be discussed with the Italians until possible Austrian reactions had been determined. The Austrians still considered that the province of Trento in Italy, which was given to the

53. Memo from General Ridgway to Chief of Staff, 5 May 53.
Italians after World War I, should be Austrian and the reaction to the knowledge that Italian forces might move forward into Austria might be an adverse one. Therefore, an approach to the Occupation Authorities in Austria should be made first to determine their views and, if favorable, the Italian authorities could be approached. On the other hand, an unfavorable reaction from the Occupation Authorities in Austria might prevent discussion of the problem with the Italians. However, these political factors need not delay planning for the defense of Villach Corner.

Agreement from the American Chiefs of Staff as to the reorganization of US forces in Austria and Trieste was awaited. The possibility of the reinforcement of British forces was discounted, but the problem of their logistic support remained. Political discussions aimed at agreement on Trieste continued and were not concluded until 5 October 1954, and the Austrian State Treaty was not signed until 15 May 1955. So, therefore, well into the period of General Gruenther's command, plans for the defense of Italy were made on an emergency basis. SHAPE hoped that adequate forces would become available for the implementation of a forward strategy but the completion of the 1953 Annual Review rendered such hopes unlikely of fulfilment.

After the establishment of Southeastern Command at Izmir, the initiation of planning discussions with Yugoslavia, and examination of a forward strategy in Austria, there remained to complete strategic appraisal and the subsequent reorganization of the command structure in Southern Command, the problem of command in the Mediterranean, vital for the support of the land forces.
CHAPTER V

THE ALLIED NAVAL COMMAND IN

THE MEDITERRANEAN

Historical Background

The North Atlantic Council had decided in 1950 on the establishment of three integrated allied commands: Supreme Allied Command Europe with subordinate commands to be determined after receipt of SACEUR's recommendations; Allied Naval Forces, Mediterranean; and Supreme Allied Command Atlantic. The latter two were to be established at a later date, and all three commands were to come directly under the Standing Group.

After the establishment of SACEUR's Northern Command under a British Admiral (Admiral Sir Patrick Brind) subordinate to General Eisenhower, it was evident that considerable naval support would be required to ensure a successful defense of the Northern flank, and plans were made to ensure this support from the Atlantic and Channel Commands after their establishment. In the Center, although with very limited naval forces under his command, Vice-Admiral Robert Jaujard, French Navy, the Flag Officer Central Europe, held a post of the highest importance in case of hostilities. It was necessary in peacetime to have in the Center an experienced naval officer well versed in port control and attached to the Commander of the ground and air forces in order that the fullest support from the maritime resources could be ensured in planning and in battle.

1. Rhine Flotillas
In the Southern Command the Commander in Chief (CINCSOUTH) was also an Admiral (Admiral Robert R. Carney, USN), and in addition, he was also Commander of the Naval Forces in Southern Command (COMNAVSOUTH). Under Admiral Carney some provision had been made for the defense of the lines of communication in the Mediterranean by the establishment of sub-commands and by the assignment of the US Sixth Fleet to that command. The US Sixth Fleet had an atomic capability, and was a US national naval unit commanded by Admiral Carney on behalf of SACEUR.

After agreement had been reached by the Standing Group in Paris in October 1951, a sub-area of the Western Mediterranean, including Corsica but excluding Sardinia and Sicily, was placed under the command of a French Admiral (Vice-Admiral Leon M. Sala) responsible to COMNAVSOUTH (Admiral Carney), and in November 1951 it was agreed that there should be a sea area covering the approaches to Italy, including Sardinia, Sicily and the Adriatic, which would be under the command of an Italian Admiral (Vice-Admiral M. Girosi), also responsible to COMNAVSOUTH. However, both these, the French and Italian sub-commands thus established, were required through COMNAVSOUTH to support operations of other allied, though non-NATO, naval forces in those areas. Thus far the situation in the Southern sector and Mediterranean had been resolved in a mutually satisfactory manner.

The accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO in February 1952, however,
involved considerations affecting the allocation of their forces to SHAPE and raised once more the question of an overall allied naval command in the Mediterranean. At Lisbon, the North Atlantic Council had postponed for further consideration "the position as regards the system of command of naval forces in the Mediterranean and their coordination with land and air forces," and left to SACEUR the responsibility for making recommendations for a suitable naval command organization.

In consonance with the agreement reached at Lisbon, the naval forces of Greece and Turkey remained, to begin with, under their national naval chiefs-of-staff pending resolution of the system of command for the NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean area as a whole, but the operations of the Greek and Turkish naval forces were to be closely coordinated with those of all other allied naval forces operating in the Mediterranean. These other Allied naval forces included the British naval forces in the Mediterranean which were under the national command of the Commander-in-Chief British Mediterranean Station, and had not as yet been allocated to NATO.

It was understandable that the two allied naval commanders in the Mediterranean, Admiral Carney (CINCSOUTH and COMNAVSOUTH) and Admiral Sir John H. Edelsten (British CinC Mediterranean, succeeded by Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma on 15 May 52) would be deeply concerned

3. MC 38/2, 21 Apr 52.
4. The CINC British Mediterranean Station was a member of the British Commanders-in-Chief Middle East Committee.
with any recommendations which might be made for an overall Allied Command in this theater. Any overall Allied naval command which might be established in the Mediterranean would be responsible for safeguarding the lines of communication supporting the land and air forces of CINCSOUTH and in addition would involve problems concerning those supporting the British Middle Eastern forces. As COMNAVSOUTH, Admiral Carney was already in command of not only the US Sixth Fleet but also the French and Italian naval forces assigned or earmarked for NATO in their respective sub-areas. Admiral Edelsten, and later Admiral Mountbatten, had on the other hand access to many base facilities of considerable administrative and strategic importance which were not as yet available to NATO.

Therefore the problem of the Allied Naval Command in the Mediterranean assumed proportions greater than those affecting naval support for the Northern flank or maritime coordination in the Center, and involved manifold strategic and political considerations.5

Strategic Implications of the Mediterranean

The Mediterranean Sea was of tremendous strategic importance to NATO. It was the main line of communication from the NATO nations to North Africa and to the Middle and Far East. With its contiguous seas, the Aegean, Adriatic and Black Seas, it constituted an avenue of penetration deep into the Eurasian land mass flanking the entire northern

5. DNAV 29, 23 May 52, "Possibilities of Naval forces in the Defense of Europe" (SHAPE/579/52, 7 Jun 52).
littoral of Europe, and separating Europe from Africa. NATO control made it a barrier to Soviet expansion and prevented its use by the USSR as a potential highway to the South and West. France, Italy, Greece and Turkey were vitally dependent upon Mediterranean shipping and, should the enemy gain control of the Mediterranean, France would be divided by severance of the lines of communication between European and African France; Italy, Greece and Turkey would be isolated. In addition, not only did the Mediterranean constitute the main line of communications between the UK and much of the British Commonwealth and British forces in the Middle East, but also it was the shortest line of communication between France, Madagascar and Indo-China. The United States, Canada, Norway and Denmark were heavily dependent upon the Mediterranean for shipping to and from the Indian Ocean and the Far East, and particularly oil traffic to and from the Persian Gulf. From the military standpoint, Allied NATO and non-NATO Forces in Southern Europe and the Middle East were completely dependent upon Mediterranean lines of communications. Naval and air forces operating in and from the Mediterranean were required to support land and air forces in Southern Europe and the Middle East and to conduct defensive tasks against the USSR and its satellites in the event of war.

Control of the exits of the Black Sea had long been an objective of Russia and, should hostilities occur, it was likely that these would be an immediate target for Soviet attack. Conversely, continuation of allied control of the Turkish Straits and the denial of their use to the USSR in war was a high priority strategic objective of the NATO forces.

Broadly stated, the Allied Naval Mission in the Mediterranean was
to secure and maintain control of the Mediterranean including the Adriatic, Aegean and Black Seas, and to support the defense of Southern Europe and the Middle East by naval operations from these seas. 6

**Alternative Proposals Considered**

Shortly before the formal accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO in February 1952, Admiral Carney had made various proposals to SACEUR. 7 These proposals arose from the limitations which he considered lack of decision on the Mediterranean naval command problem had imposed on the build-up of his naval forces (as COMNAVSOOUTH) into an operational command, and in anticipation of other naval problems following the accession of Greece and Turkey. In the main, the proposals were as follows: 8

a. CINCSOUTH's eastern boundary should be abolished. At this time it was the line from Cape Matapan in Southern Greece to the Tripolitan-Tunisian boundary;

b. The Aegean Sea, the Sea of Marmora and the Black Sea should be assigned to CINCSOUTH as additional areas of responsibility;

c. A Sicilian Straits area should be established to include Malta, the Straits of Sicily and approaches thereto, to be controlled from Malta and operated as an Allied Trust;

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6. SHAPE Staff Study on most suitable Naval Command Structure for the Mediterranean, SHAPE/PPO/33/52, 21 Apr 52.


8. See also Amendment No. 1 to General Instructions for SHAPE Subordinate Commanders, 29 Jun 51.
d. CINCSOUTH should be authorized to coordinate plans for the employment of Greek and Turkish naval forces in conjunction with the appropriate National Military Commanders.

Together with these proposals were considerations regarding the operational employment of the US 6th Fleet which remained, and was likely to remain, under CINCSOUTH, and the necessity for establishing a common system of operation with as little delay as possible.

At SHAPE there was general recognition that, from the military standpoint, the naval mission in the Mediterranean and its support tasks could best be accomplished by the establishment of a single naval command in the Mediterranean area which would incorporate all naval and maritime air forces involved. The size and configuration of the area, the many tasks to be performed, the need for effective utilization of the limited forces that would be available, and the necessity for effective coordination, were the principal reasons indicating a need for unity of command. Naval tasks were inter-related, they involved the employment of many of the same elements in the accomplishment of several tasks. Operations of an offensive nature contributed directly and most effectively towards fulfillment of defensive tasks, and the fact that naval and air forces of six nations were involved lent added emphasis to the importance of a single coordinating authority. Division of the Mediterranean into two or more naval commands, organized on either a geographical or a functional basis or a combination thereof, was considered practical and workable, but less desirable than the
single command. The single naval command was recognized as being ideal from the military standpoint, whether the Commander-in-Chief were responsible to the Standing Group, to SACEUR, to a Middle East Commander, or to the Commander-in-Chief Southern Europe. However, should it be necessary for political considerations to establish separate naval commands, geographical divisions or division along functional lines should be considered.

A quantitative approximation based on those naval forces immediately available showed that just under 40% were from the United States, 20% from the United Kingdom, 15% from France, 12% from Italy, and about 7% from Turkey, and 7% from Greece. In consideration of the striking power of naval forces, it was evident that all heavy carrier elements would be provided by the US 6th Fleet, and also the build-up provided for US amphibious forces including US Marine Divisions. However, a proportionate build-up of British forces could be expected should hostilities be limited to the Mediterranean.

Although each of the Mediterranean nations, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey had naval bases developed over the years for the support of their own naval forces, the British had major naval bases at Gibraltar and Malta and facilities in the Eastern Mediterranean. The US had only a naval air facility, and a few associated activities at Port Lyautey\(^9\) with floating support, the principal reliance of the Sixth Fleet.

\(^9\) On the Atlantic, 21 miles NE of Rabat,
US plans provided for the development of a naval base and supporting facilities in the Mediterranean, but under unified direction it was considered possible to provide mutual support and assistance and to make maximum use of all the facilities available on a NATO basis.

Consideration of the problem of command in the Mediterranean offered many alternatives. On the face of it, the Commander-in-Chief appeared likely to be either American or British as representative of the stronger naval powers. He could be responsible direct to the Standing Group or to SACEUR, to SACLANT or to CINCSOUTH. The Mediterranean could be a unified naval command or there could be two commands based on geographical or functional divisions, or one command could be based on the operational employment of the US 6th Fleet with the rest of the Mediterranean area as a separate command.

The problem was discussed on 27 April 1952 between General Eisenhower and the US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William M. Fechteler, with a view to its resolution. Admiral Fechteler indicated his desire to see a naval command structure in which all naval forces involved came under Admiral Carney, and said that five of the nations involved would readily reach agreement on this point, but that it was being blocked by the British. At this meeting, the suggestion that there should be two commands in the Mediterranean in which CINCEASTMED would be a British Admiral was considered as the only practical compromise. 10

10. Memo to Chief of Staff from Capt Anderson, 28 Apr 52.
In the US JCS view expressed on 24 January 1952, and confirmed on 5 February 1952, a naval command organization in the Mediterranean had been envisaged with three subordinate commands: the Western Mediterranean (France); Central Mediterranean (Italy); and Eastern Mediterranean (UK). In addition to these naval commands would be the Command of the Naval Striking Forces, a US national command. The Commander-in-Chief Allied Naval Forces Mediterranean could, in the view of the US JCS, be either US or UK, but would be subordinate to CINCSOUTH.

The UK Chiefs of Staff considered that a fourth command should be established to include Greece and Turkey, and also an overall naval command throughout the Mediterranean with direct responsibility to SACEUR for the coordination and conduct of all naval operations other than those of the Sixth Fleet, which would remain under CINCSOUTH.

Air Vice Marshal Hudleston presented the foregoing background to the problem of naval command of the Mediterranean to General Ridgway a few days after his arrival as the new SACEUR. General Ridgway agreed that the emphasis Admiral Carney placed on the existing advantages of single naval and air commands throughout his theater was probably more apparent than real, and realized that the United Kingdom would never support any arrangement in which a single naval command of the Mediterranean would be subordinate to CINCSOUTH, as Admiral Carney suggested. General Ridgway was also aware that even in SHAPE itself there was some divergence of opinion as to the relative merits of the US JCS/Admiral Carney viewpoint and that put forward by the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff.
In considering generally the problems of command arrangements in the South and the establishment of COMLANDSOUTHEAST, \(^{11}\) the Standing Group took note of the proposal of the UK Chiefs of Staff that, as part of an overall solution of command in the South, an Allied Naval Command for the Mediterranean should now be set up, with direct responsibility to SACEUR; that this Allied Naval Commander should be British and should have under him all Allied Naval Forces in the Mediterranean with the responsibility for guarding Mediterranean communications. He would also have certain national responsibilities to the Middle East Command when set up. \(^{12}\)

It was obviously desirable that, in commenting on these proposals, SACEUR should not become involved in the controversial aspects surrounding the problem of the naval command position in the Mediterranean. For the time being, first priority was given to the establishment of the South Eastern Command, but due to varying opinions expressed in the Standing Group any decision given by the Standing Group had to be taken as a partial and interim solution of the command problem in the Southern flank. Standing Group approval of SHAPE proposals \(^{13}\) acknowledged that the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff

\(^{11}\) See Chapter IV.

\(^{12}\) TOSHAP 200, 26 Jun 52.

\(^{13}\) SHAPTO 264.
approval reserved to them the right to have the whole question reviewed in the light of future developments, in particular when a settlement of command arrangements in the Mediterranean and Middle East came in sight. 

Coordination in the Mediterranean

It was apparent to General Ridgway that every effort had to be made to resolve this command problem in the interests of developing his naval strength. On 10 July he visited London for discussions with the British Chiefs of Staff and reached agreement that, pending a final decision, there must be the closest coordination between the naval commanders in the Mediterranean. Accordingly, instructions were prepared for Admiral Carney from General Ridgway and for Admiral Mountbatten from the British Chiefs of Staff to provide them both with a directive aimed to ensure this coordination and setting forth areas of joint planning.

These directives provided for an interim arrangement between the two Commanders-in-Chief, authorizing and requiring them to conduct discussions with a view to achieving full cooperation between their commands in war plans and operations in the Mediterranean and Black Seas, other NATO or national commanders being consulted if necessary.

14. TOSHAP 205, 9 Jul 52.
15. BRM/1976/52, 8 Aug 52.
16. Admiral Mountbatten had taken over command of the British Mediterranean Fleet on 15 May 52 as CInC Mediterranean.
17. Letter to Admiral Carney from General Ridgway, 15 Jul 52.
Peace-time exercises would be planned and executed in accordance with similar principles. The discussions to be held were intended to resolve the following problems:

a. To ensure that in war the two naval commands which would both be operating throughout the Mediterranean did so with a maximum economy of forces, headquarters, base facilities and logistics. It would be necessary for each CinC to be fully informed of the other's plans and current operations movements.

b. To coordinate in war movement of all ships and maritime and naval aircraft throughout the Mediterranean.

c. The planning and execution of exercises in peacetime.

d. The institution of effective liaison arrangements between the two commands and subordinate commands at the appropriate level.

Both commanders were to submit to SHAPE or to the British Chiefs of Staff, as appropriate, reports on the progress of planning. These directives went some way to meeting protocol and to breaking the deadlock.

On 12 August 1952 before the directives were actually issued, Admiral Carney endeavored to break the impasse or force the issue, depending on the point of view, by a strong letter requesting that existing hampering restrictions be removed in order that he could organize a fully effective naval component in the Southern Command, and arrange for coordination and cooperation between the naval component in his command and other appropriate non-SACEUR Mediterranean forces.
He foresaw that either the British proposals would be met or a single Allied Mediterranean naval command would be established under COMNAVSOUTH subordinate to CINCSOUTH. At any rate some improvement of the status quo was required. 18

In this letter, however, he requested assignment of Greek and Turkish forces to CINCSOUTH; that his maritime area of responsibility should include the Black Sea, the Sea of Marmora, together with the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, the Aegean Sea and Mediterranean Sea lines of communications to Greece and Turkey. The Black Sea, he proposed, should be an operational area for offensive and defensive naval operations under a Turkish Flag Officer subordinate to COMNAVSOUTH, and the Sea of Marmora, together with the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, under a Turkish Flag Officer responsible to the Commanding General of the First Turkish Army. The Gibraltar sub-area and the Sicilian Straits sub-area, he considered, should be controlled by an Allied Trust.

To these proposals of Admiral Carney, General Ridgway replied that he considered the fact of inter-allied cooperation as being of major importance in these particular questions, and requested Admiral Carney to withhold implementing action until he had decided on a positive course which he required to be followed. 19

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18. APSE/745/52, 12 August 52, to SACEUR from Admiral Carney.

DIAMOND Conference at Malta, 20 October 1952

During September 1952, arrangements were made for a meeting at Malta on 20 October between the two Commanders-in-Chief in the Mediterranean and their respective staffs. At this meeting, it was proposed that the Commanders-in-Chief should exchange views on NATO and British strategic policy in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East; establish liaison links to produce coordination of planning; establish intelligence links; discuss the development of Mediterranean Maritime Force requirements in accordance with tasks and missions; and agree to the holding of staff talks dealing with subjects arising out of these topics. 20

A press release was agreed and issued on 16 October:

"A meeting has been arranged in Malta to initiate coordination of defense effort between SACEUR's Southern flank and the British Middle East Command. The meeting which is due to begin on the 20th of October, will be attended by Admiral Robert B. Carney, USN, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (SACEUR's Southern Command) and the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, General Sir Brian Robertson, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Sanders and Admiral The Earl Mountbatten of Burma, at whose Malta Headquarters the meeting is being held."21

20. BMR/2273/52, 16 Sep 52; Also BMR/2525/52, 30 Oct 52 - Agenda agreed between Cs-in-C.
On 29 September 1952, before the conference had taken place, Admiral Carney had made a further approach to General Ridgway regarding his previous recommendation to break the impasse. As a result of General Ridgway's reply of 29 August, Admiral Carney commented that "measures for the effective organization of naval forces Southern Europe, as well as planning for emergency operations of assigned and earmarked naval forces to carry out the assigned tasks and missions, are being held in abeyance. In an effort to determine measures which can be taken now, without political implications or compromise of national interests, CINCSOUTH has explored various avenues of approach to the problem." As a result of his exploration, Admiral Carney made the following recommendations:

a. CINCSOUTH be authorized to initiate arrangements for the appointment of a US Naval Vice Admiral as Deputy COMNAVSOUTH.

b. SACEUR approve the build-up of facilities and staff for headquarters of COMNAVSOUTH.

c. CINCSOUTH be authorized to arrange with appropriate Turkish and Greek National authorities to commit suitable naval vessels in their war plans for assignment to CINCSOUTH (COMNAVSOUTH) for operations in support and supply of the land and air forces of those countries.

d. SACEUR confirm that, for planning purposes, pending a final documentation with the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in the Southern Command, CINCSOUTH's maritime responsibilities be extended to include the sea areas adjacent to those countries as well as the sea.
lines of communication thereto, insofar as it pertains to CINCSOUTH (COMNAVSOUTH) shipping and war operations.

e. CINCSOUTH be authorized to arrange with appropriate Turkish authorities to establish the Black Sea as an operational area for offensive and defensive naval operations under a Turkish Flag Officer; and to establish the Sea of Marmora together with the Bosphorus and Dardanelles as a naval defensive area under a Turkish Flag Officer subordinate to the Commanding General of the First Turkish Army.

f. CINCSOUTH be authorized to arrange with appropriate Greek and Turkish authorities to establish as a temporary measure, a shipping control headquarters under a Flag Officer with an integrated staff of Greek and Turkish representatives.

h. SACEUR and CINCSOUTH arrange with national authorities for interchange of maritime intelligence and situation reports.

i. SACEUR tentatively allocate naval build-up forces to CINCSOUTH (COMNAVSOUTH) for operational planning purposes. 22

This letter was followed on 19 October by an appraisal of the state of readiness within CINCSOUTH's command. 23 Further points were raised which required coordination and submission by SACEUR to the Standing Group for decision.

22. Letter from Adm Carney to Gen Ridgway, HAFSE/902/52, 29 Sep 52.

The Malta Conference was concluded successfully. There was general agreement on the common strategy between the two commands, the key to which was considered to be Turkey. It was agreed that staff talks should be undertaken as soon as practicable on the coordination of convoy systems and maritime operations by naval and air forces throughout the Mediterranean; the development of Mediterranean maritime force requirements; and coordination of operating procedures and logistics. There was no discussion of the command structure in the Mediterranean as the respective Commanders-in-Chief agreed that its solution must be found above their level. Since, however, the results of these meetings were so satisfactory, and as such a large measure of agreement was reached, General Ridgway considered that it was time to institute certain measures which he believed to be without danger of political implications, and would not prejudice any more comprehensive arrangements or organization which might evolve later.\textsuperscript{24}

An analysis of the Malta meeting showed that the Commander-in-Chief South, and the British Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, had appreciated the importance of securing a firm base in the Lebanon mountains to ensure that enemy forces did not penetrate between the two commands. From the naval point of view, working arrangements and liaison arrangements were to be established forthwith pending a decision on the overall command situation by higher authority.

\textsuperscript{24} Letter expressing Gen Ridgway's satisfaction was sent to Marshal of the RAF Sir John Slessor, and to Adm Carney, 31 Oct 52.
Admiral Carney considered that CINCSOUTH as the NATO Commander was responsible for lines of communication to the Southern Command, for maintaining control of the approaches, and for the possible use of the Mediterranean as a platform from which to launch a counter-attack. Admiral Mountbatten, as British CinC Mediterranean, stated that he had a dual role involving support of the Middle East and responsibilities in the Western Mediterranean. There seemed to be no disagreement with either point of view.

The need for careful coordination between CINCSOUTH's air forces and by CinC Middle East air forces in the event of air operations, was also agreed. Liaison would be initiated between COMLANDSOUTHEAST, when established, and CinC MEAF. 25

Approval of the Standing Group's Proposals

Whilst the problem of the overall naval command in the Mediterranean was under consideration by the Standing Group, Admiral Carney continued to press for the earmarking of Greek and Turkish naval forces to CINCSOUTH as an urgent requirement, particularly in relation to the Fourth Slice Infrastructure program. 26 Following a conference held in Naples on 31 October to 1 November, 27 he had submitted to SACEUR his off-shore naval force and maritime air requirements for the

25. SHAPE/PFO/238/52, 31 Oct 52, to DCPO.
26. AFSE/1048/52, 5 Nov 52.
27. Attended by representatives from all the interested NATO and national authorities.
Mediterranean, assessing the requirements for COMNAVSOUTH on the missions and tasks specifically assigned to him by SACEUR at that time. For the purpose of these recommendations, he considered the appropriate naval forces of Greece and Turkey as being included in the naval forces assigned to COMNAVSOUTH, on the basis of the fact that Greece and Turkey were a part of the Southern European complex and the lines of communication to those countries were the responsibility of CINCSOUTH (COMNAVSOUTH).

The solution proposed by the Standing Group for the organization of command in the Mediterranean was to appoint an Allied Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean (initially a British Flag Officer) as Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Mediterranean (CINCAFMED) with an independent command reporting direct to SACEUR, and with another naval command, the US 6th Fleet, under an American Flag Officer responsible to SACEUR through CINCSOUTH.

The Mediterranean was to be divided into areas for the exercise of those functions which were of a local and national nature. The Commanders of these areas were to be responsible to CINCAFMED for all allied tasks, but were to be under their own national authorities for tasks which were strictly national in character, subject to the necessary coordination by CINCAFMED.

Delineation of the areas was to be developed after consultation between CINCAFMED and national authorities, and recommendations

28. MC 38/3, 10 Dec 52.
forwarded by SACEUR to the Standing Group. The agreements of 9 October 1951 and 22 December 1951 concerning the establishment of a French area in the Western Mediterranean and an Italian area covering the approaches to Italy, were to remain valid except that the Commander to whom the Commanders of these areas were responsible was to be CINCAFMED instead of CINCSOUTH.

In addition to the French and Italian areas, a Gibraltar area was to be established and also areas of command in the Central and Eastern Mediterranean. The Commander of the Gibraltar area was to be responsible both to CINCAFMED and to the appropriate Commander in SACLANT's command. The boundary between CINCAFMED and SACLANT was to be mutually agreed between the two Supreme Allied Commanders and submitted to the Standing Group for approval. National coastal waters were to remain a national responsibility and the division of responsibility in war between national territorial commanders, including the planning and presentation therefor in peace, was to be as described in MC/36. 29

In war CINCAFMED was to assume full responsibility for (a) the command of all forces assigned; (b) security of sea communications in the entire Mediterranean; (c) support of adjacent commands; (d) coordination of logistic support and base facilities; 30 (e) coordination

29. MC 36 (Final) Division of Responsibilities in Wartime between national and NATO Commanders.

30. For all forces assigned within the framework of agreements arrived at with national authorities.
of mine warfare; (f) submarine operations; and (g) anti-submarine operations.

The heavy carriers, amphibious and support forces of the US 6th Fleet, remained as assigned by SACEUR or higher authority. It was to be known in future as STRIKE FORCE but it was necessary to arrange coordination of movements of STRIKE FORCE with those of other submarine surface and air forces operating in the area, in the interests of the safety of all concerned. This coordination was to be exercised on behalf of SACEUR by CINCAFMED. SACEUR could authorize CINCAFMED to request the STRIKE FORCE Commander to deal with any sudden emergency where time was all important.

In CINCAFMED's Command Organization provision was to be made for command of the air components assigned to his command and for the coordination of his air operations as between area commanders and with those of other commanders who would be conducting air operations over the Mediterranean.

On 10 December 1952, the Military Committee forwarded the Standing Group report on the Command Organization for the Mediterranean to the North Atlantic Council for approval. Approval was given and SACEUR was requested to recommend to the Standing Group as soon as practicable any necessary changes in the existing command organization to set up the new command as envisaged, pertinent directives to implement

31. MC 38/3 (Final), 10 Dec 52.
the formation of the command, and any revision of force requirements necessitated by its formation.\(^{32}\)

A conference was held at SHAPE between SACEUR, CINCAFMED and CINCOUTH on 12 December 1952.\(^{33}\) At this conference Admiral Mountbatten explained that he wished to make the transition in an orderly fashion, and that he intended to keep his staff as small as possible.\(^{34}\) He proposed to invite senior French, Italian, Greek and Turkish naval commanders in the Mediterranean, to become his advisors and to nominate senior officers and several junior officers for membership on his staff. The senior officers would become Deputy Chiefs of Staff and at the same time act as representatives of the national commanders who nominated them. General Ridgway, in summing up, said that he felt sure that no matter what the difficulties appear to be at that time, "with the good will of all concerned, a mutual desire to reach a solution of the command problem, and the experience and skill of the officers involved, no insurmountable difficulties would be encountered."

**Problem areas revealed**

Some of the SHAPE staff foresaw that a number of points would require explanation and agreement before the new arrangement could

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32. STAN 445, 16 Dec 52. Following NAC Mtg 16 Dec 52, CR(52)39.
33. PPO/2553, 20 Dec 52. Present also were Adm McLean, AVM Hudleston, Gen Bodet, Adm Vosseller, Cdre Power and Capt Brodkman.
34. Memorandum to COFS from DCPO, 22 Dec 52.
be expected to function smoothly, as the principle of unity of command was not being followed. Some of these points concerned the operation of forces in national territorial waters; the coordination of operations in the Black Sea between CINCAFMED and CINCSOUTH; possible limitations on the employment of the naval forces of NATO countries in the Mediterranean; the coordination of air operations by land-based and carrier-based aircraft; and possible rival claims and divided responsibilities for infrastructure and naval air bases.

To enable directives to be produced which were sufficiently comprehensive as well as satisfactory, drafts were sent by SHAPE to the two Commanders-in-Chief for comment. Admiral Carney was asked for his recommendations on measures for coordinating naval operations in the Black Sea with land and air operations in the Black Sea/Turkey area and on responsibilities for control of the Bosphorus/Sea of Marmora/Dardanelles waterway. Admiral Mountbatten was requested to forward his recommendations including, but not limited to, such problems as boundaries and division of responsibilities between his command, CINCSOUTH and national authorities, as well as on the site of his shore headquarters and the proposed boundary with SACLANT. His views were also requested on the coordination of naval operations and control in the Black Sea and Straits area.

35. Letter from Gen Ridgway to Adm Carney, 18 Dec 52.
36. Letter from Gen Ridgway to Adm Mountbatten, 18 Dec 52.
On the same date Admiral Carney again recommended that SACEUR should delegate his coordinating authority for naval operations in the Black Sea with land and air operations near the Black Sea/Turkish area to CINCSOUTH, and foresaw that there would be certain geographical and functional areas in which he anticipated overlapping command responsibilities. In fact, the problem of boundaries and the establishment of the subordinate area commands in the Mediterranean were to prove difficult to solve for these reasons.

CINCSOUTH had responsibility for the land/air battle and the employment of STRIKE FORCE in the direct support of the battle, if available to him. There was however the question of naval support for the land battle and the logistic support of the land and air forces. National commanders would consider that they had every right to call on the support of their naval forces in their coastal waters, so it was necessary to clarify the boundaries of coastal waters to decide which naval forces were to be assigned to AFMED and which were to remain under national command.

The problems appear to have been rendered more difficult of solution because of the differing personalities of the Commanders-in-Chief and the differing points of view they held regarding their responsibilities. After forwarding details of his proposed organization for the new Allied Naval and Maritime Air Command in the Mediterranean.

37. Letter to Gen Ridgway from Adm Carney, 18 Dec 52, "Implementing New Mediterranean Command Arrangements."
which was to be established in Malta, Admiral Mountbatten sent
General Ridgway his recommendations on the division of responsibilities
within his command, although he considered it advisable to postpone
final comment until he had held discussions with national naval
commanders.

The main points were discussed at SHAPE on 6 January 1953 between
SACEUR, CINCAFMED and CINCSOUTH. At this meeting it was decided
that detailed instructions on some aspects such as the coordination
of air operations over the Mediterranean and the conduct of maritime/
air operations, should be defined separately to allow time for
further study and to avoid delay in the issue of the directives. But
the large measure of agreement reached facilitated the submission of
draft directives to the Standing Group on 17 January 1953.

Establishment of CINCAFMED

After lengthy consideration in Washington, approval was given on
12 March to the establishment of the Allied Mediterranean Naval Command
as CINCAFMED, to be activated on 15 March. At the same time, the
commander of the 6th Fleet assumed NATO duty as Commander Naval Striking
and Support Forces Southern Europe (COMSTRIKFOR SOUTH), as of 0001 hours
on 15 March 1953 aboard the USS Newport News, with a NATO Headquarters
under Rear Admiral McLean at the former NAVSOUTH headquarters at

38. Letter to Gen Ridgway from Adm Mountbatten, 3 Jan 53.
39. 18 January 1953.
40. Memo for Record of meeting held on 6 Jan 53, by Secretary to
CINCMED, dtd 8 Jan 53; and memo for record by DCPO, 9 Jan 53.
41. SHAPE/68/53, 17 Jan 53.
Naples. 42

The compromise arrangement for the Allied Naval Command in the Mediterranean approved by the Council placed a powerful British Mediterranean fleet for the first time under the orders of General Ridgway. Under him, Admiral Mountbatten became Commander-in-Chief of all allied naval forces in the Mediterranean except the US 6th Fleet which remained under CINCSOUTH. The Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean (CINCAFMED) was charged with responsibilities for the entire Mediterranean and Black Seas, directly subordinate and responsible to SACEUR. He was to have two deputies, one a US naval officer and the other an RAF officer, together with a headquarters ashore and an integrated staff comprised of all nations concerned.

Directives were issued to the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Mediterranean, and the Commander-in-Chief Southern Europe on 30 March. 43 In the directive to Admiral Mountbatten as CINCAFMED, he was officially given as his responsibility the whole Mediterranean and Black Sea, excluding the islands therein, and such naval and air bases as were assigned to him. His responsibilities in wartime included the security of sea communications in the entire Mediterranean; the support of adjacent commands; and the coordination of logistics support and base facilities (by this time it had been agreed that

42. AG 2202, 17 Mar 53.

43. SHAPE/376/53 and SHAPE/377/53, both dated 30 Mar 53.
British naval and air bases in the Mediterranean would be placed at the disposal of NATO forces). STRIKFORSOUTH was to remain assigned to CINCSOUTH, but CINCMED was to exercise coordination on SACEUR's behalf of the movements of STRIKFORSOUTH with those of other submarine, surface and air forces operating in the area. "This was in the interests of the safety of all concerned, and to enable STRIKFORSOUTH to execute to the best advantage the missions assigned to it by CINCSOUTH" - a clause which gave Admiral Carney some misgiving. The Mediterranean was to be divided into areas, but national coastal waters were to remain a national responsibility. The division of responsibility in war between national territorial commanders and allied commanders was to be as described in MC 36.

The Sub-Commands of CINCAFMED

These directives were in line with MC 38/3, but there were still problem areas requiring further study and agreement. At a conference at Naples on 18 January 1953, held by CINCMED, proposals were discussed for the organization of the command area into sub-areas and functional commands. National Commanders-in-Chief were nominated as principal advisors to CINCAFMED and their representatives at the proposed CINCAFMED headquarters in Malta were specified. Admiral Sala (ALMEDOC) representing France, nominated Rear Admiral Lancelot as his representative at Malta; Admiral Girosi (COMZOMIT) for Italy, said he would nominate a Rear Admiral as his representative; Admiral Wright (CINCNELM - a US national Command) was nominated for the US.
and in turn was to nominate a Rear Admiral USN with aviation experience to represent him at Malta. For Turkey, Admiral Altincan, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, said he would nominate an appropriate senior officer as his representative in Malta; and for Greece, Admiral Lappas stated that in the first instance he would himself fill this role as Chief of the Naval staff and would nominate a naval captain as his representative at Malta.

Subordinate areas and headquarters were defined as follows:
Western Mediterranean area with headquarters at Algiers under a French Admiral (Admiral Sala); Central Mediterranean area with headquarters at Naples under an Italian Admiral (Admiral Girosi); Eastern Mediterranean area with headquarters at Malta under a British Admiral; an Aegean area with headquarters at Athens under a Greek Admiral (Admiral Lappas); and a Black Sea area with headquarters at Gelöuk under a Turkish Admiral (Admiral Altincan).

Views were expressed at this meeting that the Allied Naval Commander in the Mediterranean should be clearly separated from the British Commander in the Mediterranean, and that British representation should be clearly defined as for the other navies. Admiral Mountbatten considered that the second-in-command to the British Naval Commander-in-Chief should look after British naval interests

44. For Diagram see Appendix A.
in peace, and that there might possibly be a second Commander-in-Chief in war. It was hoped that the necessary staff would report by 24 February, in order that the organization could be set up by 15 March.

At this meeting, no final decision was given on the problems of national coastal waters which Admiral Lappas considered should be 30 miles from the coast; on coordination in the Black Sea area which would have to be worked out with CINCSOUTH; on the establishment of a Sicilian channel sub-zone, although Admiral Manfredi proposed that this should be allocated to the British Navy; or on boundaries between the areas.  

Organization of the AFMED Headquarters (HAFMED)

Admiral Mountbatten's plans for organization of his command in the Mediterranean were received at SHAPE at the end of January. It had been agreed that the nominees of the respective national Commanders-in-Chief should double the role of "representative of their Commander-in-Chief" and "Deputy or Assistant Chief-of-Staff" at HAFMED in charge of divisions dealing with maritime air; operations; plans; intelligence; organization training and technical; logistics; and communications. The Eastern Mediterranean zone was to come under Admiral Mountbatten in his capacity as British Naval Commander.

45. AS 27. Minutes of meetings between Cinc MED and national CinCs at Naples, 18 Jan 53.

46. MED 64, received at SHAPE 30 Jan 53.
in Chief, but any conflicting national interests were delegated
to his second-in-Command, Rear Admiral W. W. Davis, to ensure that
there would be separate representation of British views at meetings
with national commanders, and to allow CINCMED to be in an impartial
position as an Allied Commander-in-Chief.

In order to economize in officers in peace time, staff officers
of each nation could belong to more than one of the allied staff
divisions if desired. Each allied division, as a body, would owe
its collective responsibility and loyalty to the Commander-in-Chief,
but each officer was also to have a national allegiance through his
senior national representative to his own Commander-in-Chief. In
this way, it was hoped that each national Commander-in-Chief would
be assured of having his point of view put before the allied staff
at every stage and thus no national commander would be called upon
to carry out any operation with which he was not in complete accord,
or at least without explanation to him of reasons why his view
could not be accepted. The Deputy Chiefs of Staff were to be
members of the Allied Headquarters, but not members of the allied
staff. They were not entitled to give orders to any member of the
staff, but could act as the representative of their national
Commander-in-Chief. In the establishment of a Secretariat to serve
the Allied Headquarters, English was prescribed as the only official
language - a proposal which caused some eye-brow raising at SHAPE.

The following points were left for further decision at this
stage:

a) Command of the Bosphorus, Sea of Marmora and Dardanelles, and definition of their boundaries;

b) Delineation of national coastal waters after negotiations with the authorities concerned;

c) Decision on whether there was to be a single maritime air division or whether it should be split into (i) air plans and (ii) air operations, coordination and training.

In order to activate this headquarters by 15 March 1953, CINCMED had requested authority for 53 officers and 36 other ranks (of which 29 of the 89 were UK personnel).

**Force Requirements**

At General Ridgway's request, the CINCAFMED (designate) submitted an estimate of naval and maritime air force requirements for the new command. These were considered to supersede CINCSOUTH's estimates of 6 November 1952 and 6 January 1953, as MC 38/3, which set out the new Mediterranean Command agreement, had changed the basis of those estimates. In these force requirements, an interim assessment was made of NATO force requirements for off-shore NATO forces, and incorporated CINCSOUTH's requirement for STRIKEFORCE made on 6 January 1953. The national requirements for in-shore forces were as tabled

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47. Cosmic 64, 24 Jan 53, to SACEUR from Adm Mountbatten.
48. CINCSOUTH AFSE/1353/52, 6 Nov 52.
49. CINCSOUTH AFSE/60/53, 6 Jan 53.
by national representatives at a meeting called by COMNAVSOUTH on 31 October 1952 together with certain amendments to British figures in the light of the changed Command Organization.  

The new naval force requirements resulting from the establishment of CINCAFMED as a NATO Command together with a proposed revision of the naval tasks of CINCSOUTH, were forwarded to the Standing Group on 9 March 1953, along with amended naval requirements for Northern Command German coastal forces and Central Europe. These force requirements embodied naval force requirements as well as the national naval requirements as tabled at Malta.

Zonal Boundaries and Coastal Areas

During discussions held by the Standing Group which led up to the acceptance of MC 38/3, certain additional provisions not included in the paper were agreed with the French.

The French Command Area in Western Mediterranean, as defined in the 9 October 1951 agreement, was to stretch eastwards as far as the general line Agrigento-South Tunisian border, subject to the agreement of the Italians as to details. CINCAFMED was to try and obtain agreement and to arrange for the allocation of forces to area commanders, as necessary for the accomplishment of their missions.

50. See Appendix B for extract of Appendices to Cosmic 64, dated 24 Jan 53.

In the event of forces being assigned to reinforce those of an area commander to meet new developments, these additional forces could come under the area commander whilst so assigned.  

Proposals concerning the location of the staff of the Allied naval command of the Mediterranean, its composition, operations and new denomination of areas, met the approval of the Italian authorities. Considerable doubt, however, was felt by the Italians concerning the proposed displacement of the eastern limit of the French maritime zone to a line from the Tunisian border to Agrigento on the grounds that the operational responsibility for the Sicily/Tunisia channel might rest on a country which had not sufficient forces to discharge the mission involved. Signor Pacciardi, Italian Foreign Minister, suggested that full responsibility for the channel be assigned to Great Britain as having larger forces available. This would involve displacing eastward the eastern limit of the French zone to an extent only necessary "to avoid the crossing of the two zones in the route Bizerta-Naples". France in turn required an assurance that the French security and prestige would receive due consideration in regard

52. SHAPE/21/53, 6 Jan 53, from General Ridgway to Admiral Mountbatten; enclosing CSGN-47-52 dated 9 Dec 52, Letter to General Lecheres signed by General Collins.

to command and air cooperation. 54

Following the conference between Admiral Mountbatten and national naval representatives concerned on 18 January 1953, it became clear that there was some misunderstanding between the views of the British and French as to whether the Eastern Mediterranean area should extend west to the French area, with the Italian area limited on the south by a line running from the southern tip of Sicily to the Island of Corfu, which implied that the boundary in the Sicilian channel became the concern of the British and French as it was then the dividing line between the French area and the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Italians understood that the Sicilian channel was to be a sub-zone set up on the principle that such a focal area in the Mediterranean should be under one command, and as this command called for larger forces, it was thought that the British should command it; and that the Eastern Boundary of the Italian zone should be longitude 26° east and the French zone be limited on the East by a line from Cape Bon to Trapari. MC 38/3 had conceived the establishment of a Central and an Eastern area as well as the French and Italian areas. These different conceptions led to a divergence of opinion which did not allow for an agreed delineation of these boundaries until after General Ridgway had left SHAPE. 55

54. Letter from MOD France to General Ridgway, 6 Feb 53; SHAPE/153/53 dated 7 Feb 53 was the reply.

55. SHAPE/PFO/74/53, 14 Feb 53. Memo for Naval Deputy from Adm Vosseller, "Boundaries of areas in the Central Mediterranean: the background of the problem laying the original conception of CINCSOUTH of the Malta and Gibraltar areas as Allied Trusts."
Another problem area was the Bosphorus, Sea of Marmora, and Dardanelles Area. CINCSOUTH considered that this area constituted a Turkish coastal area, and as such became a national responsibility to be exercised as prescribed in MC 36. This involved the coordination of naval operations, both national and NATO, under the Chief of the Turkish General Staff at Ankara or through the Turkish CinC Naval Forces Turkey as a national responsibility. 56

By the time General Ridgway left SHAPE on 11 July 1953, the delineation of coastal areas had not been agreed, nor had the division of responsibility in them as between national and allied tasks. It was obviously desirable that these should not be so rigid as to interfere with the smooth and efficient conduct of either maritime or joint operations, and in the case of joint operations, whether allied or national, the command arrangements should be satisfactory to the commander being supported. A large degree of coordination was, however, established even though final decisions as to coastal waters and area boundaries were not made until a later date.

Logistics

From a logistics viewpoint, SHAPE considered that functional interest depended on the forces assigned or to be assigned, and that the functional interests of the two Commanders-in-Chief South and Mediterranean should not overlap except in specific areas, such as

56. HAFSE/692/53, 22 May 53. From Admiral Carney to Admiral Mountbatten.
in the case of shore-based facilities. Logistics directives were prepared with the intention of assigning responsibilities where interests overlapped, and therefore predominantly on an area basis. A SHAPE logistics directive was issued after some measure of agreement had been obtained from the respective Chiefs of Staff on this subject. However, it became clear that CINCAPMED considered that the area of responsibility assigned to CINCSOUTH was too extensive, and that logistic responsibility had been assigned on an area basis and without sufficient attention to the functional interests involved.

CINCAPMED considered that he should be able to control the logistic resources of the forces under his command to an extent commensurate with his operational responsibilities. It became clear that Admiral Mountbatten would accept no arrangement which had the effect, or any appearance of the effect, of making his command subordinate to that of CINCSOUTH, or any arrangement which resulted in his requirements or recommendations being channelled through CINCSOUTH if the latter were given any authority to check, query or amend such submissions.

Admiral Carney had accepted the proposed logistics directive which divided the logistic responsibility between the two commanders according to area, whereas Admiral Mountbatten envisaged the division of respons-

57. AG 2202/02-284/53/LOG dated 30 March 53.
58. Memo to Chief of Staff from General Garvin, ACOS LOG, 2 May 53.
ibilities functionally. In fact, Admiral Carney desired to retain complete responsibility for the logistic support of the US 6th Fleet and also the immediate naval logistic support of possible combined operations. Admiral Mountbatten wanted to coordinate all naval logistics in the Mediterranean which, he believed, MC 38 entitled him to do. 59

At a conference at Malta on 13 and 14 May 1953 between the staffs of both the Commanders-in-Chief, it had appeared impossible to arrive at agreed comments on the logistics directive. Admiral Carney, nevertheless, objected to an interim solution whereby the Commanders-in-Chief tendered separate requirements. He considered that "areas of primary logistic interest, (and responsibility for coordination) should coincide with geographical areas of operational responsibility." The logistics support of land, sea and air forces merged and competed with each other, and the responsibility for logistics support was obviously very closely tied in with command responsibilities.

**Decision is postponed.**

Apart from such questions as whether Gibraltar had an international or national status, the main problems centered around the conception of the respective Commanders-in-Chief as to their responsibilities. The matter was brought to a head in planning for exercise WELDFAST, a large scale joint/combined exercise to be held in October 1953. At a conference on WELDFAST held early in June, it again 60

59. Memo for COFS from Gen Valluy, DCLA, 28 May 53, 90/LOG/DCLA.

60. RC 1180 OCAS, 27 Jun 53, to SACEUR from Adm Mountbatten.
became apparent that a fundamental difference of opinion regarding the responsibilities of CINCAFMED and CINCSOUTH existed.

Efforts were made to reach agreement, but it was necessary to submit to General Ridgway the different interpretations which the Commanders-in-Chief held of their responsibilities. Admiral Mountbatten considered that his responsibilities included the entire Mediterranean and Black Seas and that, within this area, all requests from Allied authorities for naval support should be routed through his Allied Command Organization, except insofar as these could be met by STRIKFORCE and that he should be informed of STRIKFORCE activities in order that he could coordinate their movements and support them as necessary to achieve a common objective. Until these differences were resolved, it was impossible to give guidance to area and national commanders for planning for the employment of the naval forces which would be available to them.

The differences of opinion between the two Commanders-in-Chief were thoroughly analyzed at SHAPE, and it became clear that a solution would have to be sought by a revision of the command directives. 61

Revised directives, when prepared, still showed that, in certain points, they would clash with the opinions of one or other of the existing Commanders-in-Chief. As a result it was decided to postpone their publication until Admiral Fechteler, who was shortly due to replace Admiral Carney, could have an opportunity to study and discuss them.

61. Memo for Chief of Staff, FFO/1530, 2 Jul 53.
CINC ALLIED FORCES
CINCAFMED
Adm Mountbatten UK
HQ MALTA

COMMANDER WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN
V/Adm Sala French
HQ ALGIERS

COMMANDER CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN
Adm Girosi Italian
HQ NAPLES

COMMANDER EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN
CINCAFMED*
HQ MALTA

COMMANDER AEGEAN AREA
V/Adm Lappas Greek
HQ ATHENS

COMMANDER BLACK SEA AREA
Adm Altincan Turkish
HQ GOLOUK

* See page 141
Extracts from Appendices to Cosmic 64, 24 Jan 53

N.A.T.O. NAVAL AND MARITIME AIR REQUIREMENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN FOR OFFSHORE OPERATIONS

PART I: ESTIMATED REQUIREMENTS

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Strike Force Requirements are extracted from CINCSOUTH's letter HAFSE/60/53 of 6th January 1953.

3. The figures presented by COMNAVSOUTH under the interim command, and those now submitted for major units, compare as follows:

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DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DECLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE
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### New Estimate

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### The differences in column (H) are accounted for as follows:

1. The increases in Serials 3, 4, part of 6, 12, and 15, are accounted for by Strike Force requirements which are understood to be additional to those envisaged previously by COMNAVSOUTH. It is expected however that the extra requirements in Serials 3, 6 and 12 can largely be met by close coordination between the two Commands, provided that CINCMED's total requirements are available.

2. The increase in Serial 6 is partly taken up by CINCMED increasing his assessment of the escort requirement for CVL's from 4 to 6 per carrier, to come into line with COMNAVSOUTH's previous assessments. This is considered necessary pending further examination, as it is not known whether the lower scale would be acceptable to other Allied Commanders.

3. The reductions in Serials 2, 7 and 8, 9 and 10 result from the separation of Strike Force from general naval activities and consequent re-assessment of overall needs. In Serial 9, CINCMED may have an added requirement for SSR (not yet examined).

4. Serial 5. The Fast Minelayer is a requirement (omitted in error from the U.K. requirement at the Naples Conference) to lay an A/S minefield off the Dardanelles.

5. Serial 14 is a preliminary estimate subject to detailed examination in due course.

6. It is again emphasized that the above are preliminary adjustments. As stated in the notes to the Table in Part I, it is considered possible that on further examination certain of the increases which appear in this table may be reduced or eliminated by close coordination of tasks and operations between NATO and National Commands.
NAVAL AND MARITIME AIR FORCE REQUIREMENTS
(Appendix B to the Commander-in-Chief's No. Cosmic 64 of 24th January 1953)

NATIONAL NAVAL AND MARITIME AIR FORCE REQUIREMENTS (a)

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Notes (a) These particulars, other than the UK figures, are those tabled by National representatives at the meeting held at Naples on 31st October 1952 as their requirements for inshore forces. CINCMED is unable to comment on these figures at this stage.
CHAPTER VI

NORTHERN COMMAND

During the period of General Eisenhower's command, there had been slow but steady progress in the development of Northern Command, but as was also the case in the South, there were certain outstanding problems, not all of them military, which defied solution.¹

The SHAPE strategic concept² had been based on the establishment of strong flanks in the north and south dominating the contiguous sea areas, and on a series of strongly held areas linking the Northern and Southern flanks. In the north, the object was to hold base areas in Denmark and Norway for offensive and counter-attack operations, to close the Baltic, and after stabilization of any Russian attack to destroy enemy forces in the region. Tactically, Norway and Denmark were considered as a single defense area, and in this area the principal aim was to secure the airfield areas and ports and to close the Baltic. Without a hold in Denmark the defense of Norway would be extremely difficult, the Baltic could not be closed, and airfields in Northern Jutland would be lost. In order to achieve this objective, it was therefore essential to make arrangements for adequate air bases and

¹ Summary of discussions between General Eisenhower and Norwegian and Danish officers on 9 and 10 May 52.

naval facilities in Norway and to hold Denmark. This involved the establishment and stocking of bases and the actual existence of forces and equipment at D-day readiness.

The International Background

The main obstacle to the attainment of these objectives was the assurance given by the Norwegian Government to the Soviet Government on 1 February 1949, just before the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Mr. Halvard Lange, visited Washington and London to seek information about the terms of the draft of the North Atlantic Treaty. On 29 January, the Soviet Ambassador in Oslo, Mr. Afanasyev, had handed to the Norwegian Government a Note from the Soviet Government requesting Norway to clarify her attitude towards the proposed Atlantic Pact, and drawing particular attention to the fact that Norway and the USSR had a common frontier. The Note assumed that the proposed treaty represented a group of Powers pursuing aggressive aims and proposing to set up air and naval bases particularly on the territory of powers situated close to the frontiers of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government requested clarification regarding press reports that Norway was joining the Atlantic Alliance and enquired whether she was undertaking any obligations regarding the establishment of air or naval bases on Norwegian territory.³ The Norwegian Government's reply assured the Soviet Government that Norway would not take part in any policy with aggressive aims: "She will

³. USSR Note to Norway of 29 Jan 49 - Keesings Contemporary Archives from 1948-1950, page 9794.
never allow Norwegian territory to be used in the service of such a policy. The Norwegian Government will not join in any agreement with other states involving obligations to open bases for the military forces of foreign powers on Norwegian territory as long as Norway is not attacked or exposed to threats of attack".  

Immediately following this exchange of Notes, the Soviet Government offered Norway a Soviet-Norwegian non-aggression pact (5 February 1949). Norway's reference to an attack or threat of an attack had been taken as a hint that the threat of attack might emanate from the Soviet Union. Under this further pressure the Norwegian Government bravely stood up re-asserting its previous statement regarding bases and forces: "It therefore reiterates most categorically that it will neither cooperate in a policy which has aggressive aims, nor grant bases for foreign military forces on Norwegian territory as long as Norway is not attacked or subjected to threats of attack", stated Mr. H.R. Lange in the Storting (Parliament) on 4 March 1949. In his public statement, the Norwegian Foreign Minister went on to say that adherence to an Atlantic Pact would not shake Norway's desire to maintain its historical good neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union. He made reference to the United Nations Charter which had already laid down the duty of member states to refrain from the threat of use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any state, and considered

4. Norwegian reply of 1 February to Soviet Note of 29 January 1949, Keesing's Contemporary Archives from 1948-1950, page 9794. The phrase "...or exposed to threats of attack" could be interpreted as leaving the door open for action as appropriate, should an emergency arise.
that this obviated the need for a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union.

The Danish island of Bornholm lies 90 miles eastwards in the Baltic, 23 miles from Sweden and 58 miles from Germany. When the island was evacuated by the Russian troops after World War II, the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Gustav Rasmussen, had forwarded a Note to the Soviet Union (as a result of Soviet pressure) stating "I have the honour to inform you that Denmark will be able to take over the command of Bornholm immediately with her troops, and administer the island without any assistance from foreign troops and foreign administrators." On this condition, Russian troops were withdrawn from Bornholm.

Both Norway and Denmark had been discussing a possible Scandinavian defense pact with Sweden, and were both under diplomatic pressure from Russia to stay out of any Atlantic Treaty. However, both nations courageously joined the Atlantic Pact on 4 April 1949, but this was not the end of the diplomatic pressure to be exercised by the Soviet Union on these countries. Nevertheless, the assurances given by Norway and Denmark to the Soviet Union limited the cooperation which these nations, though willing, could give towards the development of a strong flank in the North.

**Comparison of SACEUR's flank defences**

Certain parallels may be drawn at this stage between SACEUR's Northern and Southern flanks, from a geographical, political, as well as

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5. Note by Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs to Soviet Legation, Copenhagen, 7 Mar 46. No similar assurance had been given relative to the rest of Denmark.
a military point of view. Geographically speaking, between Denmark and Sweden there existed a vital straits area. Near the mouth of the Baltic lay the two main islands of Denmark - Zealand and Funen - with 12 miles of sea between them, Zealand being nearly 3 miles from Sweden and Funen connected to the Danish mainland by a bridge about 600 yards long. The Northern shores of Denmark were separated from the Norwegian and Swedish coasts by the Skagerrak and the Kattegat, straits areas some 40 miles wide. To defend Denmark and Norway and to prevent the passage of Soviet naval forces through the Baltic Approaches into the North Sea, it was essential to secure these sea areas, and the key to this defence concept was the maintenance of a firm hold in Denmark, a flat country open to airborne attack.

Mountainous Norway varied in width from 260 miles at its widest part to about 5 miles at its narrowest, and had a frontier of 122 miles in the north with the Soviet Union. As its long coast-line was ice-free all the year round, and as the bulk of the country was forest (24%) and rocks or waste land (72%), its defense could only be assured by the maintenance of its air bases and ports, and was closely linked with that of Denmark. The Norwegian ports were essential for the survival of the civilian population and for naval operations in the Norwegian Sea. At this time, prior to the implementation of a forward strategy, it was felt that in view of the terrain and the paucity of communications, the Oslo and Trondheim areas were the only attractive airborne attack targets.

In the Southern Command there were similar geographical features. There was a vital and narrow straits area, a common frontier with Russia, and a narrow land strip. The straits between Eastern Thrace and Turkey
and Asia varied from 1 to 4 miles, there were larger areas of common frontier with Soviet satellite Bulgaria and with the Soviet in the East, and Grecian Thrace was in parts as narrow as ten miles. The common frontiers with the Soviet Union which existed in Northern and Southern Commands and the proximity to them of the forces and air bases which SHAPE strategic policy required to be established, not unnaturally evoked political pressure from the Soviet Union on the countries concerned. The fact that the smaller countries which were affected joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and supported it from the beginning, illustrates the power inherent in the principle of unity.

Effects of the Basing Policy of Norway and Denmark

By the end of General Eisenhower's regime it seemed that the defense of NATO territories in Northern Command was impossible without some relaxation of the Norwegian and Danish basing policy, however limited, which would permit some foreign units to be stationed in them. The Commander of the Allied Air Forces Northern Europe, General R.K. Taylor, USAF, had pointed out to Admiral Sir Patrick Brind, RN, Commander in Chief, AFNE, that he considered it impossible to ensure the air defense of the Northern Command with the existing restrictions on the basing of foreign forces in Norway and Denmark: "Since the air requirements of this Command assume that all forces would be in place and ready to fight on D-day, any system whereby half of the air forces would not be available until some time after D-day would throw the plans considerably out of balance. Therefore, this policy of prohibiting the stationing
of foreign units in Northern Europe in peacetime is one of the greatest single obstacles which this Command faces relative to the build-up of the air forces". General Taylor hoped that the restrictions would be lifted by the time foreign forces became available for deployment in Northern Command and, failing, this, he considered that the strategy for the command should be revised to conform with the capabilities of the indigenous forces. Admiral Brind supported in the main General Taylor's arguments and stressed the urgent need for a solution of the problem. The political restrictions involved permitted non-Norwegian air forces to be flown in only at a time of emergency, and it was more than obvious to General Eisenhower and his staff that the risks involved to the air forces whilst engaged in this process were considerable.

In February 1952 the Screening and Costing Staff of the Temporary Council Committee had recommended that the foreign element of the air forces of the North European Command should comprise 40% of the whole. It was also planned to put two USAF control and warning squadrons into Northern Command. The political restrictions meant that 24% of the defensive fighters in the case of Denmark and 27% in the case of Norway, and all the fighters, bombers and light bombers for the command, as well as personnel for the control of the warning system, could only be

6. "Report on the Allied Air Forces Northern Europe", AG 3070 PL, 23 Jun 52, signed Taylor - attached to letter to SHAPE and MODs sgd Brind, APNE 537/2542.03/52, 10 Jul 52.

7. In Norway, one USAF IDF Group; in Denmark one USAF IDF Group, one USAF FB/GA Group, one RAF S/CA Wing, and one RAF LB Wing.
flown in after the opening of hostilities or when Norway and Denmark considered their security threatened. 8

The Northern European Command was one of the most exposed parts of the whole NATO area, and at this time its defense relied to an important extent on land and naval forces which would be mobilized only in an emergency. In these circumstances, the efficiency of the air defense system and the defense and close support of the air forces, would be of paramount importance as lack of air power would affect critically the ability of the Commander in Chief, AFNE, to ensure the security of his command in war.

Possible Solutions

In the opinion of the SHAPE staff some compromise solution was necessary. It was suggested that the foreign element of the air forces might be rotated through the command on a squadron basis, but this was expected to meet political repercussions as only a lesser or greater number of aircraft would be involved, and the spirit if not the letter of the assurance given to the USSR would be impaired. On the other hand, as it was Norway who had given the specific assurance to the USSR, it was considered that perhaps Denmark might be the key to the problem, as she had given no specific assurance on basing foreign troops on her territory except insofar as Bornholm was concerned.

It was also more important that the air forces and the control and warning elements should be deployed in Denmark when an attack occurred because of its more exposed position, its key importance to

8. Staff Paper 15 Jan 52 - "The Stationing of Foreign Forces in Norway and Denmark".
the defense of Northern Command, and because in SHAPE planning as much as four-fifths of the foreign element was based there. If the Norwegian Government could be persuaded at the same time to agree to the deployment of control and warning units in war and peace time, this proposal might go a long way towards solving the problem. As Denmark had not given the same assurance as Norway, USSR reaction might not be strong,9 should Denmark agree to the basing of foreign troops on her territory.

Solution of the problem, however, involved not only a possible USSR reaction, but also the reaction of the peoples of Norway and Denmark to the presence of elements of foreign air forces in their countries. It had to be made clear that if restrictions were in any way lifted, the presence of foreign troops would not constitute any form of occupation but would be a limited reinforcement of friendly forces to strengthen the overall capability of the country to resist any possible attack.10

Solution to the problem became more urgent as the availability date of the USAF units drew nearer. General Eisenhower had considered that Northern Command was naked as far as air defense was concerned,11 that there was considerable risk to the units concerned in flying them in after the outbreak of hostilities, and that if agreement could not

9. Memo for Chief of Staff, PFO 1150, 15 Jan 52, and Staff Study attached.
10. Memo for ACOS PFO from DCFO, 14 Jan 52.
11. Memo for Record of Discussions with General Eisenhower in Denmark, 10 May 52, and Norway 12 May 52.
be reached for them to be stationed in Norway or possibly Denmark, they would have to be allocated elsewhere. They could not perform their required mission if deployed in Denmark and Norway after the outbreak of hostilities, and if they had been committed to another area—and SACEUR was critically short of air units in all areas—it would be very difficult to withdraw them in the opening phases of war. In discussions with General Eisenhower the problem was put to the national authorities in Norway and Denmark for consideration as to the forces necessary to ensure the defense of their countries in the event of attack.\(^{12}\) It was made clear that SHAPE did not wish in any way to bring pressure to bear on Norway and Denmark, or to force a change in their basing policy. The responsibility for taking steps to further their defense capabilities had to rest squarely on the national authorities.\(^{13}\)

At the Lisbon Conference, Mr. Acheson and Mr. Lovett had jointly issued a statement to the effect that the US also would not press Norway and Denmark to change their basing policy. The SHAPE staff view, however, supported the position taken by COMAIRNORTH and CINCNORTH that, militarily speaking, all air forces for Northern Command should be in place and operational in peace time if existing concepts were to have a reasonable chance of successful implementation.

12. Ibid.
13. PFO 1140, 15 Apr 52, "Stationing of Foreign Troops in Norway and Denmark".
Coordination with other Commands

The defense of Northern Command, however, involved other considerations. The extent of Norway's coast line and the fact that it formed part of SACLANT's Command, demanded close cooperation with contiguous naval commands. In conversations held at Oslo between CINCNORTH, Admiral Brind, and the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, Admiral Lynde B. McCormick, USN, between 6 and 8 March 1952, Admiral McCormick had said that he considered the security of the Northern flank of the utmost importance to his own operations in the Atlantic, and therefore accepted it as part of his mission to support that flank within the limitations imposed by the capabilities of the forces available to him. At this time no naval forces had been earmarked by Norway and Denmark to SHAPE and the command system and division of responsibilities between national and NATO commanders were still under discussion. It was realized that although there were very limited naval forces available, close cooperation and coordination should be established between CINCAFN and SACLANT's Eastern Atlantic Command, and support, if required, should be assured.

SACLANT's emergency war plan contained a requirement for airfields in Norway for maritime patrol aircraft. The functions of these aircraft were the reconnaissance of the Northern flank of SACLANT's area. This requirement was to develop in more detail as the year progressed.

14. AFNE 319/2050 SACLANT-52, 6 May 52, Record of talks between CINCNORTH and SACLANT in Oslo in March 1952.
and made a second demand for airfields in Norway.  

The other problem which was under consideration was the defense of Jutland. Although SHAPE planned to implement a forward strategy up to the Iron Curtain as soon as possible, much depended on a successful outcome of plans for the establishment of the European Defense Community, the formation of German forces and the maintenance of adequate forces in Schleswig-Holstein, north and east of the Elbe. It was tactically necessary for units to be stationed south of the Danish border and for preparations to be made for demolitions to block the Kiel Canal in order that a delaying action could be fought if necessary. These plans in their turn involved political discussions with the Federal Republic of Germany as the territory concerned was German. It was clear that while the defense of Jutland could not be accomplished by Denmark alone, neither could it be achieved without the assistance of the maximum contribution that Denmark could make. At this time, there were deployed in Schleswig-Holstein one Norwegian brigade, one Danish battalion and one British Armored Car Regiment. But this force was clearly inadequate effectively to perform the role assigned to it. Despite this it became necessary early in 1952 to agree to the withdrawal of the Norwegian Brigade to Norway in the spring of 1953 to provide for the planned expansion of the Norwegian Army. CINCNORTH considered that the covering force to defend Jutland should

15. SHAPE/PFC/449/53, 16 Oct 53, "History of Air Base Development in Norway and Denmark". See also SAACLANT SER 540, (9 Sep 52) from Admiral McCormick to Norwegian NMR, SHAPE.
be at least one division and that until other forces became available this responsibility should be undertaken by two Danish brigades to be stationed in the Kiel Canal Zone.\textsuperscript{16} For this, political agreement with Western Germany was required. The requirement for additional Danish troops, however, facilitated governmental agreement for the extension of national service in Denmark in the spring of 1954 from twelve to eighteen months. This problem was also essentially a political one.

The US Strategic Air Command had also approached Norway for bases, but it was hoped that this requirement, which was of a bilateral nature between Norway and the US, would not be affected by dwindling hopes for agreement to establish the bases required by SHAPE. Just before General Eisenhower left, the SHAPE staff hoped that questions then received from the governments concerned regarding the number of aircraft and personnel involved in establishing the required bases and units might lead to whole or partial agreement to their establishment, and it also appeared that attempts were being made by the two Governments to influence public opinion towards acceptance of proposals which appeared to be necessary for their defense.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{16} Draft by General Gruenther for General Ridgway to Secretary-General of NATO, 7 Feb 53.

\textsuperscript{17} Memo for General Gruenther from AVM Hudleston, 30 Apr 52
Memo for General Gruenther from Gen Schuyler, 29 May 52
Memo for General Gruenther from AVM Hudleston, 29 May 52
The Bilateral Approach

On 2 May 1952, Mr. Langhelle, the Norwegian Minister of Defense, made a special visit to SHAPE to discuss with General Gruenther the question of stationing troops in Norway, specifically in this instance, US troops. He stated that Norway emphatically desired that the planned US Air Force fighter wing should remain allocated despite Norway's existing base policy, and this desire was the hopeful background against which SHAPE planned. At this time one possible solution was that Norway might undertake to finance and construct the necessary airfield in excess of SHAPE standards to meet USAF standards. This possible solution was not favorably considered by SHAPE as Norway would have to develop the airfield entirely out of her own funds, which would amount to 10% of the entire defense budget and affect other areas of Norway's defense effort.

A second possibility was for Norway to approach the US with reference to joint development of an airfield in Norway to SHAPE and USAF standards. After an approach was made to the US, the latter solution was favoured and the US was willing to enter into discussions with Norway on this subject at any time the Norwegians so desired.18

General Eisenhower, on his farewell visit to Norway on 9 May, had further discussed the problem and agreed that SHAPE would use its good offices to consider the requirement for airfields which had been made on Norway from different sources, as one total requirement. Mr.

18. SCO OUT 23199. SCO IN 5448. 6 May 52.
Langhelle visited SHAPE again at the end of May for discussions with
General Gruenther. As a result of the proposals made, General Ridgway,
soon after his arrival, expressed his satisfaction "that the Norwegian
Government is earnestly trying to create a political and public
situation which would permit Norway to accept Allied air units in
Norway as soon as possible", and expressed his willingness also to do
all he could to accommodate military requirements to Norway's special
circumstances in order to facilitate a solution to this difficult and
pressing problem.\(^\text{19}\)

There was no provision in existing NATO procedures for a military
agency of NATO such as SHAPE to enter into a joint agreement with a
national government when the interests of one or more other national
governments were more directly involved. NATO procedures required
that the host and user nations conclude bilateral agreements.\(^\text{20}\) It
was therefore agreed by SHAPE at this time that Norway should approach
the US Government direct on a bilateral basis.\(^\text{21}\)

During the period that followed, the problem with its implications
was discussed by the Norwegian Government in consultation with the
Foreign Relations Committee of the Storting prior to discussion of the
matter with the Danish authorities. The Storting was aware that the
support given by public opinion to Norway's accession to NATO was in
large measure due to its expressed policy on bases and the stationing
of foreign troops, and feared that a change in the Norwegian basing

\(^{19}\) SHAPE/557/52, 4 Jun 52, General Ridgway to MOD Norway.
\(^{20}\) SHAPE/558/52, 4 Jun 52.
\(^{21}\) SHAPE/556/52, 4 Jun 52.
policy at that time might lead to the Soviet Union taking limited measures which might entail a change in the security situation in Scandinavia.

General Ridgway pointed out to the Norwegian Minister of Defense that "the importance to your nation of a rapid build-up of air power is so great that I consider it is critical. The lives of your citizens and cities may well depend on it."22

The discussions in the Storting, however, produced no change in existing basing policy, and it was therefore decided to consider with the Danish Government the possibility of stationing the USAF Fighter Wing allocated to Norway on a Danish airfield as an interim measure. During these discussions, however, it became apparent also that for the present time it would be possible neither for Denmark nor Norway to prepare for the interim peacetime stationing of the allied tactical wing, and neither Government could express any intention of altering their basing policy at any given time in the future.

The Effect of Political Decisions on SHAPE Infrastructure Programs

a. The Danish problem.

The political decisions made by Norway and Denmark which affected their basing policy and the stationing of foreign troops in these countries not only prevented the allocation of forces when they became

22. Letter from General Ridgway to MOD Norway, 2 Jul 52.
available, but also hindered the construction of bases. At this time
SHAPE made recommendations for the expenditure of NATO funds for air-
field construction according to the type of airfield. "Main airfields"
were fields for permanent occupation in peacetime with operational
facilities sufficient to develop full use of their war combat potential.
From main airfields a wing could operate, and sufficient buildings and
stocks were available for operational purposes. "Redeployment airfields"
were airfields not occupied in their entirety in peacetime but they were
to be immediately available at the outbreak of war for use and occupation
by units deployed from their peacetime location. Housing accommodation,
however, was to be provided only for a maintenance party of 100 men.
The balance of the housing in peacetime or in wartime for 2900 personnel
was to be on a field basis of which only essential utilities in camp
construction would be provided in peace. "Alternate airfields" were
fields for use as accommodation for wartime reinforcements, for alternate
use if main or redeployment airfields were out of action and to give
tactical flexibility. The housing accommodation provided at these
fields was for a maintenance party of only 50 men. Stocks at the
latter two types of airfield and in particular at the alternate airfields
were less than those at main airfields.23 The cost of construction,
equipping, and manning these airfields, varied considerably depending on
the type of field.

In infrastructure planning, therefore, the political decisions

regarding basing of foreign troops on Norwegian or Danish soil closely affected type and amount of funds which could be allocated for the construction of bases. In addition, the agreed criteria for NATO airfields were not so demanding as those required by Strategic Air Command standards, and therefore the treatment of the airfield requirements for Norway and Denmark as a sum total added further complications.

For this reason, Norway, through the good offices of SHAPE, opened discussions on a bilateral basis with the United States. Behind the negotiations lay the hope that it might be possible at some time in the comparatively near future to secure popular and governmental agreement that other than Norwegian air forces could be stationed on the airfields.

As the availability date of the USAF Fighter Wing allocated to Norway drew nearer, it became obvious that the United States should not be required to commit itself to the creation of an interim airfield in Norway for this Wing for which it was unlikely to be the "user nation". The Wing was therefore offered to Denmark in an effort to retain it within Northern Command.

Word of these discussions with Denmark caused a Soviet Note to be addressed to the Danish Government on 1 October 1952 which declared that, according to statements made by the Danish Government and reports in the Danish Press, the Danish Government intended to allow the stationing on Danish soil in peacetime of foreign armed forces belonging to members of the Atlantic Pact; that it was thus turning Denmark into a "base for foreign troops"; and that Denmark had started negotiations with
the US Government. The Soviet Government considered such action a violation of previous assurances that foreign troops would not be afforded bases in Denmark in peacetime; alleged that the Atlantic Pact pursued "aggressive aims", and that the presence of NATO troops would therefore be "directed against the Soviet Union". The Soviet Government pointed out that any proposed stationing of foreign armed forces on Danish territory in peacetime could not be justified by reasons of defense, and considered such an act as a threat to the Soviet Union and other countries in the Baltic area, and placed the entire responsibility for possible consequences of such a policy on the Danish Government.

Mr. Ole Bjørn Kraft, the Danish Foreign Minister, in a Press statement on 2 October 1952, stated that the only question the Danish Government had considered was the stationing in Denmark of air forces from other NATO countries. After emphasizing that the Atlantic Pact was purely defensive in character, he said that no decision had been taken on this question and that any such decision would be reached in consultation with Parliament. He added that there never had been any question of stationing foreign troops in Bornholm.  

Towards the end of October, the Soviet Government sent a further Note to the Danish Government assuming that the Danish Government had permitted the stationing in Denmark of foreign troops of the

North Atlantic Bloc, asserting that it had "deviated from the position held by it in 1946 concerning the question of setting up a Danish administration on Bornholm without the participation of foreign troops", and warned Denmark that such action was "not in the interests of Denmark herself since it creates a threat to her independence and security".

On the following day, Mr. Kraft, the Foreign Minister, speaking in Parliament, affirmed that a final decision could not be taken on this question until the completion of investigations of a technical character. Until then the Government would not submit any proposals to Parliament, which would of course have the final word. "The Government's view on this matter", he added, "was that any implementation of the proposal to station Allied air forces in Denmark in peacetime must necessarily fulfill the following criteria: 1) it must meet Denmark's national interests; 2) it must strengthen the country's defenses; 3) it must be carried out in such a manner that the doubts naturally attaching to such a decision could be overcome."

A conciliatory reply to the Soviet Note, which emphasized that the Government's attitude was supported by the entire Danish democratic Press and by a united public opinion, acknowledged the Soviet assurance that the USSR had no aggressive designs against Denmark, and concluded that the USR had no aggressive designs against Denmark, and concluded that the Danish Government would never permit Danish territory to be used as a base for attack against any nation. The sensitivity of the political situation was increased by inferences made by the Soviet Union regarding the NATO exercise "Main Brace", which was to take place in Northern Command. In a bitter

...
article in "Pravda" allegations were made that the stationing of US forces in Denmark and the operation of such forces on Danish territory in this exercise and a planned maneuver in the Bornholm area also violated the Danish/Soviet agreement made in 1946.25

In the meantime, both Norway and Denmark had been proceeding with the construction of airfields and the building up of their air forces.26 Nevertheless, CINCNORTH was anxious that the US IDF Wing programmed for Norway should not be lost to his command, and put forward a plan to retain it by stationing it in Schleswig.27

CINCNORTH continued to negotiate with the Danish Authorities in an effort to gain an additional main airfield in Denmark pending a final decision as to the allocation of this Wing. CINCNORTH outlined three proposals which had been put before the Danish Government for the deployment of the US IDF Wing28 but these proposals were considered by the US to preclude the possibility of accepting any of them,29 and SHAPE therefore proposed to re-allocate the US IDF Wing to Central Command.

However, after a meeting between General Ridgway and Admiral Brind on 9 March 1953, this decision was deferred until the Danish elections in 1953 had been held. After the elections, it became

25. SCO OUT 24363, 27 July 52.
26. See Appendix A.
27. SCO IN 10169, 13 Nov 52.
28. SCO IN 10918, 13 Dec 52.
29. SCO OUT 27659, 12 Feb 53.
apparent that satisfactory arrangements could not be made to deploy this unit in the Northern Command, and accordingly a decision was made to re-allocate it to Central Europe.  

b. The Norwegian Situation

A "Pravda" article of 28 December 1952, broadcast by Moscow radio, also attacked the Norwegian Government for taking extensive measures for "the building of naval and air bases in regions of Northern Norway bordering on the Soviet Union under the direction of the American High Command", and it referred to numerous US "inspectors" and "observers" who had continuously travelled over Norwegian territory.

Mr. Lange, speaking in the Storting on 16 January 1953, repudiated Soviet complaints that Norway had violated her promise not to allow foreign bases to be built on Norwegian territory, and pointed out that the projected airfield at Andoya (of which specific complaint was made) was a necessary part of the defense of Northern Norway, and lay more than 300 miles by air from the nearest Soviet territory. He expressed satisfaction at the NATO offer to station Allied fighters in Denmark, as this would strengthen the joint defense of both Norway and Denmark, but he stated that Norway herself would not receive any similar offers because NATO respected the Norwegian policy on bases as expressed in the Norwegian notes to the Soviet Union in 1949.

General Ridgway believed that the defense of the Northern Command

30. SCO OUT 29701, 27 Jun 53.
would be possible if both Norway and Denmark made their own maximum effort. He recognized that much had been achieved, but that much required to be done.

On November 14, 1952, Mr. Langhelle had informed General Ridgway that the Norwegian Government had decided to make the necessary arrangements with the United States authorities in preparation to meet the NATO requirement for the stationing of US forces in Norway in time of war, but the lack of agreement on arrangements to increase peacetime strength led inevitably to a cut in NATO funds allocated for airfield construction in Northern Command.

At the meeting of the Council of Ministers in December 1952, the Fourth Slice Infrastructure Program was reduced from £169 million to £82 million, which limited progress in establishing bases as the cost could not be borne by the Alliance. General Ridgway warned the Ministers that these arbitrary cuts would do much to undermine the security that he was trying to build, and expressed his dissatisfaction with the Council's decision. This expression of his dissatisfaction, incidentally, gave rise to the first Press rumours that he might leave SHAPE.

There were, however, encouraging signs. In connection with the

32. SHAPE/1152/52, 29 Oct 52, General Ridgway to Admiral Brind, ref: AFNE 953/2030, 13 Oct 52, following meeting with SACEUR.
33. SHAPE/1424/52, 19 Dec 52, General Gruenther to Admiral Brind explaining why certain items of CINCNORTH's Infrastructure Program, 4th Slice, were omitted.
1952 Annual Review, General Ridgway was "gratified to note the substantial improvements which Norway had planned for her armed forces during these years (1953-54)", and pointed out to the Norwegian Minister of Defense that "in view of the vital importance of the Northern flank to our whole effort, you will readily appreciate how extremely anxious I am that our progress should continue, especially since Norway had felt obliged to take a calculated risk in reducing the call-up, thereby seriously weakening her forces for the time being."

The Norwegian and Danish governments in May 1954 extended the period of national service. The period for the Norwegian Air Force and Navy was extended from 12 to 18 months and to 16 months in the Army, and Denmark extended from 12 to 16 months.34

**Division of Responsibilities between National Authorities and Allied Commanders.**

Policy on the division of responsibility between National Authorities and Allied Commanders had been set out in MC 36 (26 Nov 51). The earmarking of forces to the NATO Commander in the North awaited governmental decisions on the division of responsibility as so developed.35

The difficulty in Norway and Denmark, particularly the latter, was that the Governments found it very difficult to accept a commitment which

34. Letter from General Ridgway to Mr. Langhelle, 24 Feb 53.
35. SCO IN 3948 from CINCNORTH, 8 Feb 52.
involved the surrender of all sovereignty to the local Allied Commander. They were particularly sensitive about the sovereignty and allocation of all their forces, and this was a subject likely to be charged with awkward questions in Parliament, should it arise. The defense of Norway and Denmark might involve evacuation of the armed forces from Zealand or withdrawal from the Oslo area, both of which would have enormous political repercussions. It was therefore important that the Governments of Norway and Denmark understood that it was implicit in the concept of collective security that the Governments conferred their sovereignty in the Combat Zones on the Supreme Commander, who could delegate it to his major subordinate commanders as necessary for the conduct of operations. The Allied Commanders held their authority from NATO and not from individual national authorities. In the Combat Zone, therefore, major subordinate commanders exercised their authority on behalf of the Supreme Allied Commander.

With the development of mutual confidence and the realization that NATO and national objectives were synonymous, it was hoped that a serious conflict of interests was unlikely to arise in practice. National wishes would be met so far as practicable, particularly on questions of major political importance, and the Governments could at all times exercise their right to refer to the Supreme Commander or superior NATO authority if required. This realization meant that the interests of the Governments concerned would be safeguarded.

36. AFNE 0904/52, Admiral Brind to AVM Hudleston, 11 Feb 52.
General Eisenhower himself had held strong views on this question, and was prepared to act, but preferred that the matter should be settled through the Subordinate Commander concerned. In 1952 the Commander-in-Chief, AFNE, had only a Norwegian brigade and a Danish battalion group in Germany assigned to him, together with certain Danish forces earmarked for assignment on mobilization for the defense of Denmark only, but he was confident that the navies, field forces and air forces of both countries would be allocated if an emergency arose. 37

It was not possible to plan the naval defense of SACEUR's Northern Command unless the NATO Commander was given adequate responsibility over the coastal waters and shore installations and this question was considered by the nations concerned. The Norwegian Representative, at an informal meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 5 November 1952, read a statement giving extracts from a memorandum it was proposed to issue to the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Northern Europe, placing on him the responsibility for the defense of Norwegian coastal waters pending agreement on the SACEUR/SACLANT boundary. 38

The Standing Group, aware that the relevant paragraph of MC 36 (Final), paragraph 24B (1), had been vaguely worded on purpose since

37. Letter to Admiral Brind from AVM Hudleston, 21 Feb 52.
38. SCO IN 10140, 13 Nov 52.
the importance of such an agreement would vary greatly according to the area concerned, was prepared to examine the proposals carefully in view of the precedents they might establish.39

The proposals from Norway gave CINCNORTH responsibility for Norwegian coastal waters together with operational control over those naval forces, shore operating authorities (including coastal artillery) and naval bases which were assigned to him. This responsibility was to include the assembly, routing and protection of the convoys within his area.

Denmark proposed that CINCNORTH would assume total responsibility of the defense of Denmark and her lines of communication immediately upon the declaration by the Danish Government that Denmark was in a state of war due to aggression against the country, or as a consequence of membership in the NATO. The entire territory mentioned would be considered Combat Zone.

SHAPE considered that these proposed agreements were acceptable and desirable from an operational viewpoint, but that the proposed transfer of responsibility for in-shore operations should have no implication on the force requirements, as CINCNORTH's naval requirements had always included in-shore forces. SHAPE recommended that, should any future requests be made in other areas for similar transfer of responsibility, in-shore force requirements should continue to be the

39. SCO IN 10079, 11 Nov 52.
responsibility of the appropriate national authority. Both countries, whilst fully appreciating that it would be impossible for CINCNORTH to control the narrow waters for which he had been given responsibility without operational control over the coastal waters, made it quite clear that this responsibility for Danish and Norwegian coastal waters would be purely an operational one. In accordance with this concept, Norway ear-marked all its operative naval forces for his operational control in case of war, pending conclusion of this agreement, but expected assistance from NATO sources in an emergency, for the sea battle in the same way as for land and air.

The problems which Admiral Brind encountered as CINCNORTH did not end with his departure at the end of March 1953. Nevertheless, General Ridgway could truly say in the scroll which he presented to him on 30 March: "The difficulties he confronted and those which he overcame were both great. In two years, starting with exceedingly slender resources, he had laid the solid foundations for an effective and efficient command".

Lieutenant General Sir Robert Mansergh, UK Army, took over command as CINCNORTH on 1st April 1953. As he had been Deputy to Admiral Brind since October 1951, he was aware that in the North the nations had earmarked all their armed forces except a proportion of the National Guard, and had not retained a major element for employment under national control as was usual elsewhere in NATO. The implementation of national

40. SCO IN 10472, 26 Nov 52.
defense policy, therefore, rested almost entirely with the Allied Commander, since he alone had the forces with which to carry out this policy. It was therefore reasonable that the Norwegian Government, in fulfillment of their national sovereignty, should require some hand in framing defense plans. The ultimate responsibility for the defense of Norway rested with the Norwegian constitutional authorities. The delegation of operational control in war time to CINCNORTH would be based on the declaration by the Norwegian Government that Norway was in a state of war, approval of the appropriate defense plans in accordance with the Norwegian constitution, declaration of a Combat Area by the King in accordance with the Emergency Powers Act of 15 December 1950, No. 7. Denmark was in a similar position.

It was therefore necessary to reconcile the sovereignty requirements of these nations with the precepts of MC 36, and in doing so avoid conflict with SACEUR's Terms of Reference. SHAPE studies recognized the need for the political authorities concerned to appreciate that the heavy responsibilities which would befall SACEUR and his Major Allied Commanders in time of war must be accompanied by commensurate power to make vital military decisions and to act thereon in all matters affecting the security and integrity of his forces. It had been taken for granted that no Allied Commander would take responsibility for a policy which would give rise to

41. Memo from Norwegian MOD to CINCAFNE, 7 Apr 53 (attached to AFNE 2206.Def., 9 Apr 53).
serious political repercussions if by so doing the basis of unity on which Allied success must ultimately depend would be weakened. Under SACEUR's Terms of Reference he was "responsible to the Standing Group for the overall direction and conduct of wartime operations within his command area". MC 36 provided that in an emergency "the national territory commanders will fulfill the requests made by the Allied Commander...".

It was proposed therefore that SACEUR would take into account all factors including the vital interests of the respective Governments involved, and provide for the protection of installations and facilities essential to the national interest. Conversely, the plans of the Norwegian authorities would make suitable provision for the protection of key points essential to the success of allied operations located outside the Combat Area. At this time, however, the proposed agreement avoided the necessity for obtaining the advance approval of the Norwegian Government and met most of SHAPE views on the matter.

Although final agreement was not reached on this problem amongst others during General Ridgway's period of command, the story of development in Northern Command demonstrates the limitations imposed on SHAPE planning by political factors, and also how the increasing

42. SACEUR's Terms of Reference, para. 5.
43. MC 36, para. 3C.
44. FPO 2206 (AFNE), 11 Apr 53.
45. AG 2205 FPO, 11 Dec 53.
confidence of the nations in NATO was marked by a willingness to surrender certain aspects of national sovereignty in the interest of the Alliance as a whole.

**ALERT MEASURES**

The need for adequate early warning measures had been repeatedly emphasized by both General Eisenhower and General Ridgway. Progress in this field in Northern Command had also been restricted for reasons inherent in the Norwegian and Danish basing policy. In accordance with instructions received from the Standing Group, SACEUR, after the MODs had agreed to his proposed procedure for the conduct of negotiations on this subject, had directed his Major Subordinate Commanders to conduct bilateral negotiations on his behalf with each of the NATO nations in their respective areas of responsibility.

The object of these negotiations was to obtain for SACEUR or, in some cases, his Major Subordinate Commanders in their areas of responsibility, prior delegation of authority to implement certain measures in the event of an alert being declared in an emergency, without prior approval by national authorities. Alternatively, agreement was sought from Norway and Denmark as well as other national authorities that they would immediately implement certain alert measures on the

46. STAND 524, 9 Jul 53.
request of SACEUR or, in some cases, of Major Subordinate Commanders in their areas of responsibility, and coordinate arrangements for the actual implementation of the various alert measures. Governments were naturally cautious about taking steps which would entail publicity and disturb the way of life of their peoples.

The initial discussions which were held between the representatives of CINCNORTH and those of the Danish and Norwegian national authorities on 18 and 19 August 1953 achieved comparatively little. The Danish and Norwegian representatives stated that they were not authorized to make any agreements at that time as their Ministers of Defense considered that the meeting was of an initial and informatory nature only. The Danish representative took the position that any negotiations on alert measures could only affect assigned forces, and discussion on the prior delegation of authority to SACEUR (or CINCNORTH) regarding an emergency declaration of a Simple Alert was limited to the Danish assigned forces in Schleswig-Holstein. Delegation of authority could not be given in respect of earmarked forces, and if forces were assigned to SACEUR within national territory in peacetime, national authorities wished to preserve their position. As the number of forces actually assigned by Norway and Denmark to SACEUR was limited, the bulk of CINCNORTH's forces in an emergency being earmarked, progress towards achieving an adequate alert system was severely handicapped.

However, a limited number of measures were considered reasonable to implement and the national authorities concerned, in conjunction with CINCNORTH, agreed to make every endeavour to develop national alert
plans so that they could be implemented in consonance with those SHAPE alert measures which came within the scope of SG 129/4 (Revised Final).

Subsequent efforts by CINCNORTH to resume negotiations produced little result in the following months, and it was realized that much of the delay in resuming negotiations had been caused by the work entailed in bringing national plans more into line with the SHAPE alert system.

In March 1954, after the other ten nations in Allied Command Europe had examined in great detail the alert measures proposed by SHAPE and had reached a considerable degree of agreement, international relations relative particularly to Norway and Denmark still complicated agreement on this subject. The position was, however, a great deal more hopeful as discussions between the Standing Group Liaison Officer and the Norwegian and Danish Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic Council were continuing. 47

In conclusion, although final agreement on matters relative to the division or delegation of national responsibilities between SHAPE or SACEUR's Major Subordinate Commanders and the nations concerned was not concluded by the time General Ridgway left, it will be seen how agreements were seriously delayed by difficult and sensitive international considerations. There was no doubt of the basic willingness

47. PPO 2063/5, 14 Mar 54, enclosing a resume of negotiations with Norway and Denmark on Alert Measures.
on the part of the Governments of Norway and Denmark to cooperate to the utmost, but they had problems peculiar to themselves which affected their relations with the USSR; the support of local public opinion was necessary to progress; and in addition they were handicapped by limited financial resources available.

The success which was eventually achieved reflected the growing confidence of the member nations in NATO - a confidence which grew as the strength of NATO grew and as the unity inherent in the Alliance made it evident that the NATO-built deterrent to aggression from the East was becoming effective.
## Growth of Norwegian and Danish Air Forces

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Figures in brackets indicate:
1. Lisbon Goals (not applicable until 1952).
2. Number of Squadrons available.

Requirements are as established in DC 28.
### Build-up Expenditures for the Norwegian Forces

1. The total build-up expenditures in the years 1949/50-1955/56 are shown below (in millions of Norwegian Kr.): These figures indicate Norway's defense expenditures in comparison with assistance from NATO and MDAP.

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PROGRESS AND PROGRAMS
1952 – 1953

VOLUME II
SECTION III

CHAPTERS VII TO IX

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE

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was in dupliate form only.

To 6 June 1960. Dupliacts.

(i.e. context and substance of document), footnotes, and notes
needed editing and revision to great extent.

Vol II Sect. III was therefore completely
revised and rewritten following departure
from N.B.I. with giving histoiries.

(See Foreword to Vol II Sect. II.)

M. Hansh

[Signature]

April 1962.
FOREWORD

The SHAPE History is being prepared in a series of volumes, of which the first three will cover the periods of command of Generals Eisenhower, Ridgway, and Gruenther. The following chapters conclude Volume II, the History of SHAPE under General Ridgway's command. Volume I, the History of SHAPE under General Eisenhower's command, and the first two sections of the present volume have been published. Volume III, a record of developments during General Gruenther's command, is in preparation.

The History of SHAPE under General Norstad's command is being undertaken on the basis of annual volumes. Unpublished drafts of the 1957 and 1958 Histories are available for reference in the Historical Branch, Office of the Secretary of the Staff, SHAPE. The SHAPE History 1959 (SHAPE 237/61) has been published.

Addressees are invited to comment on this section of the SHAPE History. Suggestions for improvement should be brought to the attention of the Historical Branch.

HARRY H. CRITZ
Brigadier General, USA
Secretary

24 April 1962
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CHAPTER VII

THE ANNUAL REVIEW - 1952

An account of the novel survey carried out by the Temporary Council Committee (TCC), in which an attempt was made to reconcile military requirements with the politico-economic capabilities of the NATO nations, has already been given. It had been recognized, as early as the Rome meeting in November 1951, that it would be desirable for the work begun by the TCC to be continued on a permanent basis.

Mr. Harriman, member of the Executive Bureau of the TCC, had commented at Rome that the TCC could not in the short time at its disposal "cover all problems finally and with precision." Accordingly, when it became evident how successful the work of the TCC and its Screening and Costing Staff (SCS) had been, the North Atlantic Council resolved that a review of the same type as the TCC operation should be made an annual feature of NATO's work. This resolution was made at the Lisbon meeting in February 1952, when it was also decided to strengthen the permanent civilian organization of NATO.

(1) SHAPE History, Vol I, Sec II, Chap VIII.
(2) Speech by Mr. Averell Harriman at Rome Meeting of NAC on 21 Nov 51, C8-VR/3.
(3) Resolution on Reports of the TCC. C9-D/20, 23 Feb 52, p 7, para 17(b): The NAC ... "Resolves ... to prepare necessary material for comprehensive annual reviews of the requirements for building and maintaining adequate defensive strength on a realistic foundation of politico-economic capabilities; the first such review to be completed in the fall of 1952."
Two months later a reorganized International NATO Staff under a newly appointed Secretary General, Lord Ismay, was set up in Paris at the Palais de Chaillot. One of the first major operations in which this Staff took part was the Annual Review for 1952, and it was on the International Staff that the main responsibility for carrying out this Review rested. Advice and assistance from the Standing Group was given to the International Staff through the Standing Group Liaison Officer and his staff, who also worked in the Palais de Chaillot. In the early stages of the 1952 Annual Review, SHAPE played a less prominent part than it had done during the TCC inquiry, although SHAPE representatives kept in touch with developments at the Palais de Chaillot by liaison visits and by attending conferences from time to time.

Initial Planning - 1952 Annual Review

On 6 May 1952, the North Atlantic Council decided to appoint a Committee on the Annual Review, with the Deputy Secretary General of the Council as Chairman. Member nations were invited to send representatives to sit on this committee if they so desired. The committee was to be responsible for carrying out the main work of the Annual Review, although the most important decisions were to be referred to the Council. On the same day a plan of action and timetable was


(5) AC/19-D/2, 6 May 52.

(6) AC/19-R/1, 8 May 52.
prepared by the Secretariat of NATO which, with a few minor amendments, was to be followed in conducting the Annual Review. The major tasks stated therein included the following:

a. To reach agreement between civil and military agencies of the Council on a revised basis for costing military requirements.

b. To draft, approve and issue to countries AR Questionnaires and to coordinate with the OEEC questionnaire.

c. To complete reports on NATO military requirements and costing of requirements, including:

1. Preliminary revised military force goals for 1953, 1954 and 1955, based on the assumption that present agreed firm goals for December 1952 would be met;

2. Infrastructure and equipment requirements;

3. Strategic guidance with respect to priorities necessary to achieve a proper balance in build-up of forces.

d. To analyze countries' replies to questionnaires and report on how far countries had adopted TCC recommendations.

e. To examine means of reconciling requirements with capabilities stated by countries, considering the military risks involved.

f. To draft proposals for revision of countries' defense efforts; thereafter, to re-examine the means of reconciliation, to conduct discussions, or "country reviews", with representatives of each country concerned, and to prepare a draft report to the Council.

g. After consideration by the Council and the governments of

(7) AC/19-D/1, 6 May 52.

(8) Organization for European Economic Cooperation.
the draft report and specific proposals therein, to prepare a final report for the Council's consideration, including recommendations for action by the governments and NATO agencies.

It was planned that the whole Review should be completed by 12 November 1952, when the Council was to consider the Final Report. A questionnaire was to be issued to the nations at the beginning of June and returned by 31 August. That this estimate was overly optimistic will be seen later, when some of the difficulties encountered in carrying out the 1952 Annual Review are described.

The Committee for the Annual Review, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Van Vredenburch, Deputy Secretary General of the North Atlantic Council, decided at its first meeting on 8 May 1952 that, as the formulation of the questionnaire was a priority task, an Economic Analysis Working Group should be set up to deal with this subject. In the following week the Annual Review Committee and the North Atlantic Council agreed to establish such a Working Group, composed of representatives from nearly all the NATO nations, with Mr. R. Sergeant, Assistant Secretary General for Economic Affairs, as Chairman. On May 12, initial discussions were begun on the subject of drafting the questionnaire. At its first meeting the Working Group took up the questions of the scope and period to be covered. The OEEC had already reached an advanced stage in preparing its own questionnaire, and it was naturally desirable that the NATO questionnaire should not cover the same field. However, the OEEC had been careful not to prejudge matters which were relevant to the NATO Annual Review, and in
particular had not dealt with the content of defense budgets. Obviously, there were many other subjects which would have to be covered in the NATO questionnaire which were outside the scope of OEEC.

On 9 July the questionnaire was issued to member governments, and nations were requested to reply by 1 September. As the Secretary General stated, the questionnaire had been completed "only after discussions and arguments which extended over two months." Major reasons for the delay in issuing the questionnaire were the difficulties encountered in reaching agreement on cost-sharing and priorities and in formulating questions dealing with such complex subjects as infrastructure. Also, while it was decided not to ask nations for details of their non-NATO military programs, in some cases it was desirable for NATO planning that information on such programs should be available.

The Questionnaire

It was hoped to determine from the Review:

a. Whether the forces which countries were planning to achieve would, when taken together, provide a suitable force for the defense of the NATO area. If not, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,

(9) AC/19(EQ)-R/1, Summary Record of First Meeting of Working Group on Economic Questionnaires, 12 May 52.

(10) C-M(52)125, Report by the Secretary General of Progress during the period 4 Apr 52 - 30 Nov 52.
"taking into account both politico-economic capabilities and the military risks involved", would have to "recommend such measures as might be necessary to establish firm goals for 1953, and develop provisional goals for 1954 and planning goals for 1955." (11)

b. The level of defense expenditure which would be required to reach NATO goals and non-NATO commitments, including maintenance and infrastructure, for 1953, and what nations planned (12) to spend to carry out these goals.

Further detailed information was also sought on equipment production, covering both end-item aid and self-financed production. From this information it was hoped that NATO would be able to help nations and NATO agencies direct production toward priority items. In addition, from the replies to the first part of the questionnaire and from nations' routine quarterly reports on infrastructure, defense expenditure and defense production, a "stocktaking" was to be made of the NATO defense effort as of 30 June 1952. This would be a first step in carrying out the recommendation made at the Lisbon meeting of the North Atlantic Council for a "continuous review", and (13) would be of great assistance in assessing the state of NATO forces.

The questionnaire was divided into two parts. Part A, on the Defense Effort, requested information on force availabilities,

(11) ARQ(52), General Introduction, p 5, para 6.
required and planned expenditures for all aspects of the defense effort, equipment requirements and resources, and NATO common infrastructure. Part B covered Economic Considerations, supplementing the OEEC questionnaire issued at the same time. In the NATO questionnaire, nations were requested to emphasize the factors which were of major importance in determining their ability to undertake defense commitments, relating these considerations to the general information given in their replies to the OEEC questionnaire.

Specialized information was sought by NATO on the relationship between defense expenditures and the balance of payments, on details of production in the metal and machine industries, and on the definition and classification of defense expenditure.

Each part of the questionnaire was preceded by detailed guidance and instructions in order to assist nations in making their replies. Members of the International Staff were also to be made available to provide technical assistance. Nations were told that they were to assume, without committing themselves, that all member nations would be making the "maximum possible contribution" toward meeting the Military Representatives Committee's force goals for 1953-55. Most of the information requested was to be submitted in tabular form, and the tables adopted were similar to those which had been employed by the


(15) As contained in MRC 12 (Final), 25 June 52. Details of estimated 1953 goals are at Appendices B, C and D. There were also provisional and planning goals for 1954 and 1955. They had been developed for use in this Annual Review. Infra pp 201-2.
In addition, nations were to supplement the tables with a narrative outlining major problems encountered in achieving their defense and economic programs. The questionnaire covered the period 1953-55. It was essential for nations to complete the information required for 1953, and desirable that they should give as much detailed information as possible for 1954 and 1955, although the Annual Review Committee recognized that in some instances it would be impossible to forecast in detail developments three years ahead. In the part of the questionnaire dealing with economics, nations were asked to give reasons, where applicable, for failure to achieve their military goals for 1952 and to outline measures being taken to improve the situation. Countries were asked to cost the recommended 1953 force goals set in MRC 12, but not to cost 1954 and 1955 MRC 12 goals. They were, however, required to cost their own planned forces for 1953, 1954 and 1955.

Military Contribution to the Annual Review

Although the International Staff of NATO had the chief responsibility for carrying out the 1952 Annual Review, it would require military advice and information to be readily available. At the Lisbon meeting of the North Atlantic Council in February 1952, it was agreed that the Standing Group would provide military guidance to the North Atlantic Council and would also be responsible for providing personnel.

(16) For details of the TCC review, see SHAPE History, Vol I, Sec II, Chap VIII.
(17) SG 190/3, 21 Jul 52.
considered necessary for this purpose and directing their work.

The Standing Group suggested to the Secretary General the following main phases and division of responsibilities for the Annual Review:

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The specific areas in which military agencies were to provide the North Atlantic Council with information and assistance included force goals for 1953-55, unit and equipment priorities, infrastructure requirements and programs, and screening and costing operations.

The Military Committee was also to submit its comments on the Secretary General's report, with an evaluation of the risks involved.

The Standing Group also decided to send a representative expert in logistics and materiel planning to Paris, to advise the Standing Group Liaison Officer during the early stages of the Annual Review.

The first conference to decide how military agencies should participate in the Annual Review was held on 13 May 1952, when Air Marshal Sir William Elliot, RAF, representing the Standing Group, met with a Standing Group Working Team, representatives from SHAPE, and the Standing Group Liaison Officer. At this meeting it was agreed that

(18) MC 39 (Final), 19 Feb 52; SG 190/2, 2 Jul 52, p 2, para 2.
(19) SG 190, 11 Mar 52.
(20) SG 190/1(F), 8 May 52, p 2, para 4.
(21) Memo for all ACOS, Chief of Budfin, and CSO, sgd Starbird, May 52.
military participation in the Annual Review should broadly follow the pattern suggested by the Standing Group. During June, further guidance on military participation was given by the International Planning Team of the Standing Group. Although at this time no detailed procedure had been laid down and approved by the North Atlantic Council for the conduct of the Annual Review, the Council and the International Staff had already begun to refer to the Standing Group Liaison Officer, whose staff had been strengthened since the Lisbon meeting, for military advice.

It was becoming evident that the military aspects of the Annual Review were of great importance to all nations and that the Military Representatives should participate fully. It was particularly desirable that national military views should be known before military advice was given to the Council. However, it was found that to obtain national military views involved delay, and it seemed likely that if existing machinery were used for incorporating such views in all advice to the Council there might be a danger of holding up the progress of the Review.

(22) Memo for Record, Meeting held at Palais de Chaillot on 13 May 52 between representative of SGN, Air Marshal Sir Wm Elliot, SG Wkg Team, SGLO (Maj Gen Lindsay, USAF), his successor (V/Adm R. Dick, RN) and SHAPE representatives, sgd Goodpaster, 14 May 52.

(23) SG 190/2(F), 2 Jul 52.

(24) It can be seen from the following example that to obtain national comment was a slow process. On 22 Apr 52, national comments on the SGN paper on force goals (SGM-874-52) were requested by 21 May 52. By 4 June the majority of comments had not been received and the paper was not issued in final form (as MRC 12) until 25 Jun 52.
In order to accelerate this process, a procedure was evolved by which the Annual Review Staff in general received guidance from the SGLO in Paris, who was able himself to settle many problems which arose and who, when necessary in matters outside his terms of reference, in turn contacted the Standing Group. Although the Military Representatives who did not belong to the Standing Group nations were kept informed of important developments, they were not burdened with minor matters. Only if action could not be accomplished at staff level were matters referred by the IPT to the Standing Group and/or Military Representatives Committee.

The first major military contribution to the Annual Review was the establishment by the Standing Group and Military Representatives Committee of estimated force goals for 1953/55. Without such goals it would have been impossible to carry out a Review. The goals established were tentative Firm Force Goals for 1953, Provisional Goals for 1954, and Planning Goals for 1955 which could be used as reasonable basic assumptions for the 1952 Annual Review. It was assumed that the Lisbon Goals for 1952 would be met, and a preliminary assessment was also made of a Greek and Turkish contribution. The SGLO's statement to the North Atlantic Council on June 4 on the subject of force goals explained their purpose:

"These goals were not based solely on military considerations inasmuch as they reflect the economic considerations that were included in the Lisbon goals and thus at this time

(25) SG 197/1, 26 Jun 52.
(26) Statement by SGLO at Council Meeting, 4 Jun 52. SGM-1377/52, 16 Jun 52.
represent a preliminary estimate of capabilities, though not of military requirements. The goals moreover have been adjusted to provide for the reduction of force goals for 1952 as approved by the Council in Annex B of TCC Supplemental Report from the force goals of the original TCC Report (SCS Annex). The 1953 and 1954 goals, when finalized, are likely, in fact, to be somewhat below those produced at Lisbon...

"The Standing Group have of course based their paper on military considerations but that does not mean that the goals proposed to the Chiefs of Staff as a basis for the Review are merely idealistic. These goals firstly take into account a realistic estimate of the military capabilities of nations, under certain assumptions as to the development of world-wide defense commitments." (27)

From the above it will be seen that preliminary screening of force goals had been accomplished by the Standing Group in MRC 12. Strictly speaking, however, this process of "screening and reconciliation of acceptable force goals within the economic capabilities of the member countries" was the responsibility of the North Atlantic Council. In order to settle any doubts on the matter of basic responsibility, the SGLO on 16 June 1952 added that "it had never been the intention of the Standing Group to carry out the function of scrutinizing the military program". At this stage it was not necessary to submit the Annual Review Questionnaire formally to the Military Representatives Committee, as it was a Council document, but the Military Representatives were given the opportunity of making informal comments if they so wished.

(27) Idem.

(28) Annex to AC/19-R/3, 17 Jun 52.

(29) Idem.
Military guidance and advice was provided on two other important subjects during the early stages of preparation for the 1952 Annual Review. The first of these concerned priorities for the build-up of units, the allocation of equipment, and the preparation of infrastructure program requirements. The second was the degree of military risk which would arise in accepting the force goals set as a result of the 1952 Annual Review.

The Assessment of Priorities

At the Lisbon Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the Military Committee had been directed to "devise in consultation with Major NATO Commanders and put into operation a system designed to achieve the highest priority for the most important units and activities (including the provision of infrastructure) and lower priority for less important units and activities..." (30) At the same time, the Terms of Reference of SACEUR and SACLANT had been revised to include provision for these Commanders to make recommendations to the Standing Group and to nations on priorities. The Military Committee agreed that there was "need for improvement in the system of determining priorities of units and assignment of equipment."

(30) C9-D/20, 23 Feb 52.
(32) MC 39 (Final), 19 Feb 52, p 8, para 18(g).
Firm recommendations for priorities were to be made by the Major NATO and Subordinate Commanders, but the Standing Group was responsible for providing over-all information and guidance to these commanders in this matter. In April 1952 the International Planning Team made a report on this subject which was issued to nations for comment. The report considered that it was evident that separate series of priority assessments would have to be set up for units, for equipment, and for infrastructure, and that a system should be evolved of "integrated priorities for the units of the three services." Concerning NATO common infrastructure, NATO commanders would each have to recommend priorities for their own command areas, and the Standing Group would then integrate the NATO priority system recommendations into the final program.

A meeting was held on 11 June 1952 between members of the Standing Group International Planning Team and representatives of the NATO commands, at which the work of the Major Subordinate Commands was stated to consist of "categorizing units by type, and where possible by name, in their phased build-up program". On the same day SHAPE issued its own guidance

(33) SGM-825-52, 15 Apr 52.
(34) Idem.
(35) STSG 0028/52, 12 Jun 52.
on priorities to Major Subordinate Commands, and on 12 June
the Standing Group submitted its guidance paper for approval by the
Military Representatives Committee, with the recommendation
that the Major Commands and national Chiefs of Staff be requested
to submit priorities for the most important units by 24 July 1952.
The Military Representatives Committee approved this paper on
25 June, but its dispatch was deferred because the whole Annual
Review had fallen behind schedule. It was stressed in the Standing
Group's paper that an elaborate priority system was not desired
and that national staffs could probably conduct the major portion
of computing requirements and deficiencies. Force or unit
priorities were to be recommended under three categories:
first, units required to meet the initial Soviet attack; second,
units for the immediate reinforcement of first priority units;
and third, other NATO forces and further reinforcements not
included in the first two categories. Priority planning was aimed
to ensure that NATO resources were utilized to the best advantage
in the build-up for war, but the actual effect of an outbreak of
war on the system of priorities was not to be considered. As the

(36) SHAPE/582/52, Guidance on Priorities of Army Force Build-
up, and the allocation of equipment in accordance with priorities,
11 June 52. Appendix A to this document was revised in
November 1952, when it was necessary to issue further planning
guidance in connection with the Annual Review. Appendix A was
issued as SHAPE 1213/52, 8 Nov 52. SHAPE Air Priorities
Guidance Paper (SHAPE/581 Draft) was issued in July 1952 and
subsequently finalized as SHAPE/1034/52, 30 Sep 52. (See OANDT
History July 52-March 53).

(37) SG 199/1 (Final), Report by the IPT on the NATO Priority System,
12 Jun 52.
force goals contained in MRC 12 were to be used in determining priorities, priority lists would require revision each time the force goals were changed. In addition to this guidance on unit priorities, the Standing Group prepared a list of fifty-one major items of equipment for priority assessment in conjunction with the ARQ.

**Evaluation of the Military Risk**

It was particularly important that the Military Committee should be able to assess accurately any military risk involved in accepting the force goals resulting from the 1952 Annual Review. As the first step in carrying out this assessment, a report was issued by the Joint Intelligence Committee to the Standing Group which was to be taken as intelligence guidance by both the Standing Group and the NATO commands.

**SHAPE Participation in the Annual Review**

In the autumn of 1952, after the Annual Review Questionnaire had been dispatched to nations, it became evident that in view of SACEUR's command and planning responsibilities SHAPE should play a more active part in the subsequent stages of the

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(38) Idem.

(39) SG 176/1, first issued in April 1952. After national staffs and NATO commands had commented, the document was reissued on 21 July 1952 as SG 176/2.

(40) On 9 July 1952.
Annual Review. A SHAPE Liaison Officer, Colonel David Block, (41) British Army, was appointed as the SHAPE representative for the transmission of requests for information from the SGLO to SHAPE, to be responsible for keeping General Ridgway as SACEUR, DSACEUR, the Chief of Staff, and the Division Chiefs at SHAPE informed on the progress of the Annual Review. In addition, an officer from each staff division concerned was nominated to handle all matters connected with the Annual Review. As work progressed and nations' replies began to be received, SHAPE was called upon to make recommendations and to comment on a variety of complex subjects at short notice. (43) Accordingly, on 28 October 1952 Major General C.V.R. Schuyler, Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff, was assigned the responsibility of monitoring the activities of the SHAPE staff on all Annual Review matters. He was assisted by Colonel Hamilton Twitchell, US Army, and Lt Colonel Andrew Goodpaster, US Army, from the Office of the Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff. Although this group was established on an ad hoc basis, an Annual Review Office with an establishment of 6 officers and other ranks was later set up permanently with Colonel E.S. Hartshorn, US Army, as its chief. (44)

(41) SCO OUT 25278, 12 Sep 52.
(42) Memo for Record, AR 1952, 17 Sep 52.
(43) Memo, AG 2100, 28 Oct 52. Gen Schuyler was succeeded in January 1953 by Maj Gen Bodet, ACOS PPANDO.
(44) In January 1953.
Certain difficulties arose concerning the participation of SHAPE officers in the Annual Review. SHAPE wished to make it clear to the International Staff and to the Office of the Standing Group Liaison Officer (SGLO) that, although SHAPE officers might take part in the Review on a planning level, their comments did not constitute formal SHAPE policy. If a policy statement were desired in advance of SACEUR's comments on the completed report on the Annual Review, it would have to be specifically requested.

However, it was not clear whether participation by military officers of the SGLO's staff committed the Standing Group and Military Committee. The Standing Group maintained that, as the Annual Review Report was to be presented to the Military Committee, all responsibility for the Annual Review was to be borne by the Secretary General and his staff, even though Standing Group personnel might to some extent influence the Review. The danger from the military point of view was that the International Staff, in making basic decisions on the form, content and objectives of the Report, might commit Standing Group representatives in such a way that the military agencies would not be able to challenge the report when it was completed. This question, concerning the philosophy of the Annual Review procedure and the conflicting interests of military and non-military agencies, had important

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(45) Memo for Gen Gruenther, sgd C.V.R. Schuyler, 17 Sep 52.

(46) Memo for Gen Schuyler, sgd Goodpaster, 30 Oct 53.
repercussions for SHAPE when it was later discovered that the
Annual Review Report did not adequately reflect SACEUR's
views and indeed had been based on information which some of
the SHAPE staff considered to be inaccurate and incomplete.
SHAPE was particularly concerned with what it considered to
be an unrealistic approach in the drafts of the first, or interim,
Annual Review Report of December 1952. For example, SHAPE
considered that: "Particular examples have arisen in the
Military Considerations Team Working Papers for the Interim
Report on the Netherlands and Denmark. In both of these cases,
it is the SHAPE view that the general tenor of the paper indicates
an anticipated degree of military strength in those countries,
both for the end of 1952 and for the end of 1953 as well, which,
according to the best information available at SHAPE, is beyond
what will in all probability exist. To base an analysis of a national
program upon an appraisal which in its military aspects is not in
accord with that of the military commander responsible for defense
in the area concerned might, in its effect, lead to consequences
of great gravity." (47)

By October it had become apparent that the TCC's estimate,
presented at Lisbon, of the rate of build-up of forces during 1952
had been too optimistic and that because of the "sizeable shortage

(47) Draft of Memo to SGLO: SHAPE Views on National Programs
under consideration by AR Committee, sgd Gruenther, undated.
Enclosed with Memo for Adm Dick, sgd Schuyler, 22 Nov 52.
of funds" MRC 12 goals would not be met. Therefore, it would again be necessary for SHAPE to advise on priorities, to make recommendations on the composition of military programs in order to ensure that a proper balance of forces was achieved, and to point out particular weaknesses in each command. In order that SHAPE should be able to evaluate how the resources made available by nations could best be employed, SHAPE began to analyse the capabilities of each Major Subordinate Command to implement the Emergency Defense Plan with the forces assigned and earmarked to SACEUR as of December 1952.

When replies by nations to the Annual Review Questionnaire became available, a series of analyses was prepared at SHAPE on each country's 1953 defense program. These analyses were then forwarded to the SGLO for use in discussions with the nations concerned, and a "country chapter" was prepared by the Secretary General's and SGLO's staffs, setting out the military programs and proposed force goals for each nation and making recommendations on these programs. However, the draft country chapters had been circulated in SHAPE for comment before completion of

(48) SHAPE/1084/52, Extract from summary record of meeting of SACEUR and CinCs, 1 Oct 52. For the purpose of the MRC 12 estimate, it had been necessary to assume that the 1952 firm force goals approved at Lisbon would be achieved by end-1952.

(49) Memo for Gen Bodet, sgd E. C. Hudleston, 5 Oct 52.

SHAPE's analyses. Consequently, SHAPE's comments and analyses were submitted too late to have any material effect on the country (51) chapters. SHAPE therefore published, on 6 December 1952, its own full appreciation of the situation, which was sent to the Standing (52) Group.

Despite these difficulties, SHAPE's views on certain important points were incorporated in the draft First Report on the 1952 Annual Review. For example, SHAPE's comments on the Military Considerations Team's report, a document of particular interest to SHAPE, were partially embodied, although there was a considerable difference between SHAPE's estimate of army and air forces available at the end of 1952 and those shown as available in the report.

Preparation of Annual Review 1952 - First Report - December 1952

By early November 1952 it had become evident that, owing to the difficulties involved and the late receipt of national replies to the Annual Review Questionnaire, the Annual Review would not be completed in the form originally envisaged in time for the December (53) Ministerial Meeting. Whereas, under the original timetable, replies to the ARQ were to have been submitted by 1 September, in

(51) OANDT History for 1 July 52 - 31 March 53, p 5, para 7.
(52) SHAPE 1357/52, SACEUR Status Report, 6 Dec 52.
(53) LOM/63/52, Memo for Secy General, Situation in Regard to the AR, 11 Nov 52.
fact the last reply did not arrive until mid-November. A SHAPE cable succinctly stated, "Progress Annual Review nil due to non-arrival nations' reply to Questionnaire." As a result of this delay, the North Atlantic Council decided on 19 November 1952 that it was not practicable to produce a Final Annual Review Report in time for the Council meeting on 15 December. Instead an interim report was to be prepared for this meeting.

The decision to defer the Final Report was received with misgivings by some nations. The US delegation in particular, while accepting the fact that firm force goals could not be produced for 1953 in time for the December meeting, expressed concern that a final report on the lines first envisaged should in fact be produced at a later date. The delegation also commented on the practicability of the standards of readiness required:

"What the US understands by 'acceptable standards of readiness' is not standards which are desirable but which simply cannot be met. Acceptable standards are those which forces can actually meet and which will make them combat effective. We must of course start from some measuring stick which is now MRC 12. But we must look at the forces unit by unit, applying the direct test whether they do or do not meet standards acceptable for NATO." (57)

An additional reason for US concern over the date of completion of the Review was that the US presidential election had just taken

(54) Memo, sgd Schuyler, NATO Annual Review, 17 Nov 52.
(55) SCO OUT 25422, 24 Sep 52.
(56) PARSEC 259, 19 Nov 52.
place, bringing with it changes in administration, which would affect US aid programs.

The interim report, known as the First Report, on the Annual Review was published on 12 December 1952 and was considered by the North Atlantic Council on 18 December 1952. The Report consisted of three parts: Part I, a general report, Part II, team reports and special studies, and Part III, country studies.

Annual Review Part I - The General Report

Part I consisted of a survey of developments in 1952 and the prospects for 1953, a discussion of problems to be solved and decisions necessary in December 1952, and a survey of future work. Reviewing the economic considerations, it pointed out that, although overall achievement in 1952 had been less encouraging than had been envisaged at Lisbon, there had been, despite a slackened growth of output, marked expansion in the defense expenditures of nearly all member nations. On the subject of forces build-up, it noted that there had not been time to set firm goals for 1953 and that some nations had provided no data for 1954 and 1955. Deficiencies were especially serious in army ammunition reserves as well as in major items of army equipment and air force electronics equipment. Also, progress in construction of 2nd and 3rd Slice infrastructure projects fell far short of the requirements for the forces expected to be at the disposal of SACEUR at the end of 1953.

(59) C-M(52)130, Parts I - III, 12 Dec 52.
Accurate screening had not proved possible, as the nations' replies to the Questionnaire had contained certain discrepancies. It had not been possible, either, in the time available, to solve the fundamental problem of reconciling military goals with politico-economic capabilities. Although at Lisbon the North Atlantic Council had decided on a progressive increase in the number of front-line units to be raised during 1952/54, leaving until later the build-up of operational reserves, it had become clear that this policy would have to be reconsidered, as it might result in leaving NATO forces with a dangerously low level of reserves, particularly in jet fuel and ammunition.

At this stage of the Annual Review, therefore, guidance from the Council was particularly necessary to reach an agreed decision on firm goals for 1953, and also to determine the character of future planning. In addition, an immediate Council decision on problems connected with infrastructure and ammunition reserves was required.

Part II - Team Reports and Special Studies

Part II consisted of reports from each of the Annual Review Working Teams which had been set up to study military considerations, defense expenditures, equipment and production, infrastructure, and

(60) A process by which nations' replies to the ARQ were reviewed in order to ensure they were based on a common set of assumptions, i.e. MRC 12, and that they came up to the standards of MRC 12. Screening also involved examination of nations' replies in order to recommend economies in defense programs. AC/19-D/3 and AC/19-D/9, 9 Jul 52.
economic capabilities. It also included special studies on standards of readiness of land forces, major equipment deficiencies excluding ammunition, operational reserves, defense production capability, spare parts, annual recurring cost of end-1953 forces, North American end-item aid and off-shore procurement.

It is not possible within the scope of this chapter to describe in detail each of these reports and studies. An outline will be given, however, of the contents of two which were of particular interest to SHAPE: The Report of the Military Considerations Team and the Study on Standards of Readiness.

**Part II(a) Section (i) - Report of the Military Considerations Team**

The purpose of the Report of the Military Considerations Team was to provide information, by means of a series of tables, on the status of forces at 31 December 1952 and an analysis of the plans for 1953. The forces tables compared, country by country, the status of forces at 31 December 1952 with the Lisbon Force Goals. There was a material difference between SHAPE's estimate of army and air forces available at the end of 1952 and those shown in the team's report. The report explained this as follows: "... These tables have been based on countries' existing and planned forces as adjusted for special conditions where MRC 12 standards of readiness could not be applied without modification. The figures therefore

(61) SHAPE estimated an overall shortage of 10 divisions against 4 2/3 shown in the MCT Report, and a shortage of 693 aircraft against 403.
differ from SHAPE's assessment of combat effectiveness which is based on SHAPE's own figures and on considerations which are not the same as those for the Annual Review.\(^{(62)}\)

For the information of the North Atlantic Council, SHAPE estimates of the available forces and their combat effectiveness were also included in the tables.

For 1953, it was anticipated that the most serious problems arising in the build-up of NATO forces would be:

a. The failure to attain a materially progressive build-up of air forces in addition to overcoming deficiencies at the end of 1952, and a continual inclusion of obsolescent types of aircraft.

b. A levelling-off of the number of major army units at the level of 1952 with insufficient strengthening of existing units, particularly in the field of combat and service support.

c. A shortage of coastal and inshore minesweepers and some delays in availability of ships, particularly ocean escorts.\(^{(63)}\)

In addition, other major problems, deficiencies or weaknesses were revealed which concerned the shortage of regular, long-term officers, NCOs and trained technicians, the training of pilots, the length and quality of training of reserves, standardization, support units, operational reserves of ammunition, and the need to adjust national defense programs in order to achieve a better balance of forces. The Military Considerations Team recommended that as early as possible

\(^{(62)}\) Military Considerations Team Report, p 3, part II(a), section (i), para 2.

\(^{(63)}\) Ibid, p 4, para 4(a), (b) and (c).
in 1953 firm force goals for 1953 and tentative force goals for 1954 and, if possible, for 1955 should be agreed; that priority should be given, insofar as army and air force units were concerned, to the development of adequately supported combat forces in 1953 and to increased availability of naval forces; and that conclusions should be reached on standards of readiness, levels of operational reserves, and logistical support objectives, together with an expression of the degree to which these standard levels should be attained during 1953 and 1954.

**Part II(b) Section (i) - Standards of Readiness - Land Forces**

This study proposed a new system for assessing the standards of readiness of major units to replace the MRC 12 standards of readiness, which had not proved satisfactory. The proposed new system would be based on a series of "Force Status Tables", representing progressive categories of preparedness. Major units would qualify for inclusion in a particular table by attaining the appropriate degree of readiness. For each table certain criteria would be established, to be measured against the SHAPE-defined ultimate standards of readiness. When a unit had improved its state of preparedness it would be "promoted" to a higher classification, or table. The study recommended that SACEUR should propose the initial criteria for the Army Forces Status Tables, and classify the assigned and earmarked army forces accordingly by January 1953. When this classification had been approved

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(64) e.g. Levels of manning, training, equipment and support units. Infra, pp 275-281.
by the Military Representatives Committee, the Supreme Commanders, in consultation with nations, were to propose the levels of manning, equipment and training, and the scale of support units which nations should plan to attain by the end of 1953 and the end of 1954. SHAPE agreed with the recommendations in this study.

Part III - Country Studies

These studies, one for each NATO nation, discussed briefly each nation's program for the build-up of its forces, and its implications with respect to infrastructure, equipment and production, defense expenditure, and economic capabilities. National programs for 1953 were measured against MRC 12 goals. The introduction stated that these country studies were very short and necessarily gave neither a balanced collective view nor an entirely accurate picture of individual national views. It also stated that the studies did not present the views of the Supreme Commanders, as they would have to make their own estimates of combat effectiveness. Each country study contained the following sections:

- Problems Revealed by the Annual Review;
- Defense Finance;
- Economic Situation.

These sections were brief, tentative, and in some cases based on incomplete information.

After reviewing the country studies in draft, SHAPE considered that they failed to give a true picture of the forces assigned and earmarked to SACEUR, and for this reason, as mentioned above, (65) Supra, p 211.
sent to the Standing Group its own estimate of the forces' status.

After consideration of this First Report on the 1952 Annual Review, the North Atlantic Council decided that a Final Report should be prepared in time for a Council meeting in March or April 1953. The Council directed NATO military agencies to provide such continuing participation and advice on military planning factors as is required for the completion of the 1952 Annual Review.

SHAPE's first contribution to this second phase of the Annual Review consisted of the preparation of a series of charts showing the status of major ground force units and their support units. The charts depicted the status of personnel and major categories of basic equipment on a percentage basis, plotted against the national wartime tables of organization and equipment. No information on operational reserves was included. Initially, it had been intended to plot units against SHAPE Standards of Readiness. However, this method was not acceptable to certain nations whose forces did not measure up to the required standards, so the percentage method was used.

Meanwhile, in conjunction with NATO


(67) Summary of major points discussed in meeting between representatives of the Annual Review Staff and SHAPE, 9 Jan 53.
commands and national staffs, SHAPE was considering the whole question of standards of readiness, with the result that in March 1953 SHAPE's ultimate standards for effective combat and provisional standards to be used during 1953-54 were submitted to the Standing Group.

The second major task undertaken by SHAPE was the preparation of a further series of analyses and recommendations on national defense efforts for 1953-54. The recommendations dealt with those aspects of national defense programs which should be emphasized during 1953-54, but did not attempt to set force goals. Only a SHAPE estimate of availabilities during the period was included. Major Subordinate Commands assisted by supplying information, which was submitted in greater detail for ground forces than for naval and air forces. The analyses were completed by mid-February, as arranged with the Annual Review Staff, but the recommendations were prepared under pressure of time and were therefore not as full as SHAPE had intended them to be. After the submission of SHAPE's country analyses to the Standing Group Liaison Officer, and following consideration of national comments, SHAPE made further recommendations. This somewhat laborious method was not considered to be altogether satisfactory.

(68) Infra, pp 286 ff.


(70) SH 27097, 14 Jan 53.
either by SHAPE or by the nations concerned.

In the procedure used in the Second Phase of the 1952 Annual Review, information on national defense programs was requested by SHAPE rather than in an Annual Review Questionnaire issued by the International Staff, and SHAPE, instead of the International Staff, made recommendations to nations. This proved more satisfactory than had the procedure used earlier, in that SHAPE's views were better reflected, but the recommendations were produced too late to have any material effect on 1953 defense programs. SHAPE's recommendations on 1954 programs were also unsatisfactory, as only limited information on national plans for 1954 - and in some cases none at all - was made available to SHAPE. A further obvious shortcoming was the fact that delay in completion of the Annual Review might have an adverse impact on consideration of the 1954 Mutual Aid Program.

The Final Report - 1952 Annual Review

Before the Final Report on the Annual Review could be produced, the Annual Review Staff, in consultation with national staffs, had to complete its costing of the recommended defense programs. In some cases, where a country could not undertake

(71) Memo for AVM Hudleston from Col E.S. Hartshorn, USA, "Notes for your Discussion of the Annual Review with the NATO Council", 25 Feb 53.

(72) Summary of major points discussed in meeting between representatives of the Annual Review Staff and SHAPE, 9 Jan 53.
all the recommended proposals, SHAPE was asked to state its preferences concerning the priorities which should be given to certain items and also to state military alternatives.

The Final Report contained an introduction outlining the procedures and principles followed in preparing the report, and was published in three parts. The Report included an analysis of the Greek and Turkish forces, but this was restricted to the years 1953 and 1954. As a basis, it was assumed that the Soviet Threat to NATO would be undiminished in 1953 and 1954.

a. Part I was a summary of the force goals for 1953 and provisional goals for 1954.

b. Part II dealt with a variety of topics related to economic developments, problems of production and costing, and standardization.

c. Part III consisted of the Country Chapters, each of which included the force goals for the nations concerned, priorities recommended by military authorities, comments by the national delegations and military recommendations which had been accepted by governments.

The recommended firm force goals for 1953 in Part I of the Final Report showed an increase over the Lisbon Force Goals for

(73) Memo for SGLO, sgd Bodet, 4 Mar 53.
the end of 1952, and the provisional goals for 1954 provided for an increase over the firm force goals for 1953. It was also recommended that forces should be improved in quality. Among the factors which presently limited the effectiveness of NATO forces were inadequate length of national service, low percentage of regular personnel, shortage of equipment and ammunition, inadequate reservist training, and deficiencies in logistic support.

The air force deficiency was revealed as the largest among the three services. There were not only deficiencies in aircraft, but also shortages of trained personnel, and logistic support was inadequate. The following table compares SHAPE requirements with force goals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHAPE Requirements</th>
<th>1953 SHAPE Firm Goals</th>
<th>SHAPE Est. of Availability</th>
<th>1954 SHAPE Est. of Goals</th>
<th>SHAPE Est. of Availability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11,840</td>
<td>4,169</td>
<td>4,153</td>
<td>5,721</td>
<td>5,442</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The recommended goals represented only 36% of SHAPE requirements in 1953 and 49% in 1954.

The naval force goals attempted to achieve a mean between the conservative Lisbon goals and the optimistic goals of MRC 12. The

(75) See SHAPE History, Vol II, Chap IX.

(76) Ibid, Chap III.

(77) SHAPE/1215/52, AG 1105/5 PPO, SACEUR's Revised Force Requirements, 8 Nov 52. Infra, p 258.
Report showed that, although the build-up of naval forces had continued, the rate of build-up had slowed. The same factors which influenced the effectiveness of army and air forces also influenced the effectiveness of naval forces, i.e. lack of modern equipment, shortages of some major items of equipment, and insufficient regular personnel. The SHAPE recommendations for naval forces were those of MRC 12. The latter exceeded the 1954 provisional goals of the Annual Review Report by 118 vessels and 95 maritime aircraft, and nations were urged to approach the MRC 12 goals as closely as possible.

Part II of the Report reviewed various aspects of the production and maintenance of defense equipment. In addition, recent economic developments in the NATO countries and general economic trends were considered collectively. In assessing the capabilities of member countries, the amount and type of assistance expected from the US and Canada was taken into consideration. SHAPE agreed with the conclusions contained in Part II of the Report, although this part was, for the most part, outside SHAPE's province.

Part III, the Country Chapters, contained detailed recommendations concerning the build-up of forces in each country. After stating the MRC 12 goals for the country concerned, it set out revised force goals in detail. It provided estimates of total output and defense expenditure, and discussed problems arising in the achievement of the required goals for each Service. The narrative
section of each Country Chapter concluded with a series of recommend-
ations on specific economic measures to be taken to assist the defense build-up, including recommendations concerning production. It also indicated priorities in the build-up of forces, as recommended by the NATO military authorities, and included the comments of the national delegations and a summary of the recommendations made by the military authorities which had already been accepted by the government of the country concerned.

The North Atlantic Council Approves the Final Report and Force Goals

When the Final Report on the 1952 Annual Review had been produced in draft form, SHAPE and the Military Committee (78) commented on the document. SHAPE was unable, in the short time available, to comment on the general acceptability of the Report, but it made certain observations, including a statement that the cut-back in air force goals was considered a very serious matter and a comment that the document did not express the military programs in sufficiently definitive form to permit analysis.

The Military Committee considered that the force goals recommended in the Report fell short of the militarily desirable build-up but were nevertheless an advance toward the achievement of necessary military strength. It therefore requested the Council to urge all countries to meet their force goals for 1953 and 1954 and to carry out, so far

(78) SHAPE/371/53, Comments on the Secretariat Reports to Annual Review Committee, 28 Mar 53; and MC 39/2 (Final), 18 Apr 53.
as possible, the military recommendations of the Report and of the NATO Military Commanders for improving the effectiveness of their forces.

On 24 April the North Atlantic Council, having considered the Final Report on the 1952 Annual Review, published a resolution adopting the force goals set out in Part I of the Report as firm goals for 1953 and provisional goals for 1954. The resolution further stated that "the agreed force goals do not attain adequate levels and that the security of the North Atlantic Area continues to require a progressive build-up of the size and effectiveness of NATO defense forces." Continued shortages of ammunition, aircraft, escort vessels, minesweepers, and electronic equipment, and the inadequacy of operational reserves of spare parts were noted. Annexed to the resolution were the Military Committee's comments, which the North Atlantic Council accepted as military guidance.

Lessons Learned from the 1952 Annual Review Process

Before the North Atlantic Council had approved the Final Report of the 1952 Annual Review, in April, work had already begun on the 1953 Annual Review. Because of the many problems which had delayed completion of the 1952 Review, time was too short to allow a full year for work on the 1953 Review, as had been originally planned. It was considered that the process should

(79) See Appendix A for text of Military Committee's comments.
be completed annually by October in order to have the greatest
effect on national budgets. There was general agreement, not
only on the part of SHAPE but also between the International
Staff and the Standing Group, that the procedure used in carrying
out the 1952 Review had left a great deal to be desired.

It was therefore necessary to re-examine procedure and
to analyze problems which had caused delays, including the
matter of time-phasing, which had not, for example, permitted
satisfactorily thorough replies to Questionnaires. It was felt
that there was need for more precise direction as to SHAPE's
role in the Review and, indeed, for a clearer definition of
the entire military contribution to the process. The lack of
clear direction as to the objectives of the Annual Review, the
allocation of responsibility, and the degree of definition and
detail required in the Annual Review Report was a contributory
cause to the over-generalization found in the Final Report on the
1952 Annual Review.

One of SHAPE's chief complaints was the lack of time allowed
for the provision of detailed information. This had resulted in
undue pressure on SHAPE Divisions and in some cases had made
it impossible, in the time available, to produce as thorough data
as SHAPE desired to provide. SHAPE also expressed emphatically
the opinion that recommendations from Supreme Commanders

(80) Memo for Record, original sent to AVM Hudleston,
SHAPE/SG Meeting Concerning 1953 Annual Review, April 53.
should be made at a time when they could have the maximum impact upon planned defense programs. During the 1952 Review these recommendations had been made too late to have any material (81) effect on national defense plans for 1953.

The following extract from a report of the International Planning Team to the Standing Group sums up some of the difficulties experienced during the later stages of the 1952 Annual Review:

"As the emphasis in the 1952 Annual Review shifted towards considering improvements in effectiveness of forces, so the necessity for bringing the Supreme Commanders more intimately into the working of the Review increased. It became necessary to pass to countries the results of a detailed examination of the effectiveness of their forces, and the Supreme Commanders' recommendations concerning them. The need for consultation between nations and Supreme Commanders concerning these recommendations was clearly expressed. The fact that this examination was made in the final stages of the Review was a considerable disadvantage as it limited seriously the time which nations could devote to considering the Supreme Commanders' recommendations and making the necessary costing calculations. Further, it will probably result in a number of purely military questions being debated in the Costing Committee on the Annual Review which might have been settled between Supreme Commanders and nations beforehand." (82)

This report not only surveyed the problems and shortcomings of the 1952 Review but also suggested amended procedures and time-phasing for subsequent Reviews. The views of Supreme Commanders on the International Planning Team's report were sought, and these were later embodied in a study submitted to the North Atlantic Council.

SHAPE's own study of the problem of making the Annual Review

(81) AG 2100/AR, to SGN, 25 Mar 53.
(82) SGM-304-53, Report by IPT to SGN on 1953 AR, 2 Mar 53.
more effective had led it to the conclusion that "the present procedure for the conduct of the Annual Review for all NATO nations simultaneously did not result in the desired effect upon the defense programs of all nations. The variations in fiscal years and planning cycles of NATO nations is such that, regardless of the month in which the Annual Review is completed, the planning of some nations will have reached too advanced a stage to permit the recommendations formulated in the Annual Review to have an effect on their defense programs." It was foreseen that the same difficulty would arise in connection with the 1953 Annual Review, for the recommendations which would be made in October would be too late to have any effect on the defense programs of the five nations whose fiscal years began in January 1954. For this reason, SHAPE would have preferred to handle as much as possible of the military content of the Review on a continuing basis rather than as a single operation completed annually in October, regardless of the effect of this procedure upon the simultaneous comparison of defense efforts. SHAPE believed that, for future Annual Reviews, there was a need for very close coordination between agencies representing the Mutual Defense Assistance Program and the nations when national plans were

(83) See draft minutes, Chiefs of Staff Subordinate Commands Conference, 5 Feb 52.

(84) AG/2100/AR to SGN, Annual Review, 25 Mar 53. This contained SHAPE's comments on SGM-304-53.
being formulated and that more information concerning MDAP deliveries should be made available to SHAPE than had been done in 1952. SHAPE's possession of such information would prevent the possible necessity for major revision in the reconciliation stage of the Review. SHAPE also recognized that closer cooperation between NATO Commanders was desirable. During the 1952 Review, for example, SACLANT had recommended a 90-day level of reserves in certain instances where SACEUR had recommended only 30 days' reserves.

The NATO International Staff also recommended improvement in the time-phasing of the Review. It suggested basing the Review on the calendar instead of the fiscal year, since this varied from nation to nation. It further considered that to base the Annual Review Questionnaire on the costs of hypothetical forces, as had been done in the 1952 Review, was unsatisfactory; and it proposed that the 1953 Review Questionnaire be based on the costs of forces actually planned by the nations.

Among other shortcomings noted by the International Planning Team were the complexity of the Questionnaire, which had been a principal reason for the delay in receiving replies from the nations.

(85) Memo for Record, SHAPE/SG Meeting Concerning 1953 Annual Review, April 53.
(86) C-M(53)40 (Revised), 20 April 53.
the fact that the Military Guidance (MRC 12) issued with the Questionnaire had taken a long time to prepare and had not proved to be an ideal basis for planning, the treatment of NATO infrastructure as a separate subject until the final stages of the Review, and the fact that, owing to limitations of scope and procedure during the early stages of the Review, not enough emphasis had been given to the need for increased effectiveness of forces.

As it was important that the 1953 Annual Review should not be further delayed, SHAPE issued guidance to Commanders-in-Chief immediately on receipt of guidance from the Standing Group. The principles to be applied were those which had been adopted in the second phase of the 1952 Review. In the light of experience in the previous Review, major emphasis was directed to the effectiveness and proper balance of forces:

"Where resources are inadequate to meet in full the militarily desirable force plans, emphasis should be given to the effectiveness of the forces, rather than to numerical increases of units inadequately supported..."

"In framing their recommendations, commanders should pay primary attention to the need for a balance of forces within their own command, and within their subordinate commands...

"In general, guidance for 1954 must continue to emphasize further development of the effectiveness of forces, rather than development of additional forces whose effectiveness is limited..."(91)

(88) SCO IN 13644, 30 Mar 53.
(89) SHAPE/567/53, 23 May 53.
(91) SHAPE/567/53, 23 May 53; Quotes MC 46/2, 19 Apr 53.
It will therefore be seen that SHAPE's approach to the 1953 Annual Review reflected General Ridgway's concern with the actual effectiveness of his forces.

Although it might be inferred that the 1952 Annual Review lacked the inspiration and effect of the preceding survey of the Temporary Council Committee, it must be said, without reflecting unfavorably on the NATO International Staff, that for the 1952 Review to produce such a forcible impact would have been an impossibility. The TCC had been composed of an exceptionally brilliant group of experts, temporarily convened, whose outstanding reputation inspired confidence and lent authority to their recommendations. It was obviously impracticable to convene such a committee annually; so the newly-formed NATO International Staff at the Palais de Chaillot, who had other duties to discharge, had to develop and standardize a satisfactory Annual Review procedure. A certain amount of trial and error was inevitable, but it was some achievement that force goals for 1953 and 1954 were in fact agreed and that valuable conclusions were drawn on methods of influencing member nations to build up their defense forces.

After the Annual Review procedure with its many complications and ramifications had been largely standardized, the years immediately following appeared to bear out, not only the unquestionable value of such a survey, but also the foresight and judgment of those connected with its development. The 1952 Review established
the following pattern of events for the conduct of future Annual Reviews, as far as SHAPE's participation was concerned:

a. Issue of Planning Guidance to countries.

b. Dispatch of the Annual Review Questionnaire to countries.

c. Visits to countries by SHAPE teams for advice and consultation.

d. Receipt and examination of Country Replies to the Questionnaire.

e. Forwarding of SHAPE comments on Country Replies.

f. Receipt, consideration and approval of the Final Annual Review Report by the North Atlantic Council.

General Ridgway and Field Marshal Montgomery had agreed in June 1952 that the real bottleneck was production, and that the manpower problem and the equipment problem had to be solved together. (92)

The Annual Review of 1952 and subsequent Reviews proved to be useful in identifying deficiencies in equipment, sub-standard units, bottlenecks in production and other weaknesses; in estimating the economic impact of proposed remedies; and in reaching agreement on what was both desirable and practicable. As such the Review became "one of the most important tasks performed by NATO", and SHAPE participation as herein described was an integral part of the process. (93)

(92) Minutes of Meeting in SACEUR's office, 27 Jun 52.

(93) Lord Ismay, The First Five Years of NATO, p 96.
ANNEX TO C-M(53)47 (Final)

Conclusions to the Comments by the Military Committee on the 1952 Annual Review Report

It is therefore concluded that the Military Committee should advise the Council that:

a. The Military Committee requests the Council to urge all countries to meet their force goals for 1953 and 1954 including, as far as possible, the military recommendations of the Annual Review Report and the NATO Military Commanders for improving the effectiveness of forces and to consult with military commanders where necessary in connection with the implementation thereof.

b. The build-up of forces provided by the 1953 and 1954 recommended force goals presents an advance toward the achievement of the military strength required to defend the North Atlantic Treaty Organization area. However, there is an unbalance in the force goals in the rate of build-up of modern air forces, mine-sweepers and escort vessels of which the most serious are the shortages in all-weather fighters, light bombers, interceptor day-fighters, and shore-based naval and maritime aircraft. Nations should be encouraged to improve the build-up of these forces.

c. The priorities contained in the Country Chapters were recommendations based on existing conditions and designed principally for use in arriving at the best possible force goals. However, the Council should note the continuing application of such of these priorities as individual countries may consider desirable and feasible in the form of suggestions for improvement of forces.

d. The production of modern aircraft, particularly all-weather fighters, shore-based naval and maritime aircraft, light bombers and interceptor day-fighters, is delaying the build-up of effective air forces and steps should be taken to correct this situation.

e. There is a continuing need to increase the length of National Service to provide necessary initial training, together with the need for subsequent call-up periods for adequate refresher training.
f. Nations should take further steps to improve the recruitment of regular long-term service personnel.

g. There is an urgent need to continue the build-up of ammunition reserves in peacetime.

h. Except for ammunition and supplies, war reserves should be normally considered a secondary requirement until existing units are equipped to the levels recommended by Supreme Commanders.

i. The 1952 Annual Review Report contains no information on the European Defense Community forces of German origin. In the face of the continuing threat to the security of the free world by the Soviet Bloc, the Military Committee must reiterate the need for the rapid entry into force of the Treaty establishing the European Defense Community so as to provide for the early participation in Western defense of contingents of German origin.
### MRC 12 ESTIMATED ARMY GOALS FOR 1953

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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**TOTALS**: 44 11/3, 9 7/3, 1

**M+30 Days Inf | Arm | Mtn | A/B | Total**

| Belgium/Luxembourg       | 4 1/3 | 1 | 5 1/3 |
| Canada                   | 1 1/3 | 1 | 1 1/3 |
| Denmark                  | 3 3/3 | 3 | 3 3/3 |
| France                   | 11 1/3 | 4 | 15 1/3 |
| EDC (German)*            | 6      | 6 | 6     |
| Greece                   | 12 1/3 | 12 1/3 |
| Italy                    | 10 3/3 | 15 1/3 |
| Netherlands              | 4      | 4 | 4     |
| Norway                   | 3 2/3 | 3 2/3 |
| Portugal                 | 2      | 2 | 2     |
| Turkey                   | 19 1/3 | 19 2/3 |
| U.K.                     | 4 1/3 | 4 1/3 |
| U.S.                     | 1 6/3 | 1 6/3 |

**TOTALS**: 76 16/3, 12 7/3, 2 1/3, 1 91 24/3, 112 12/3, 16 1/3, 2 1/3, 2 132 14/3

*Table shows possible German contribution in the event of approval of EDC.*
## APPENDIX C

### MRC 12 ESTIMATED NAVAL GOALS FOR 1953

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**GREECE**  
(Corrig. 9 July 52)

**TURKEY**

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(Corrig. 7 Aug 52)

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* Lighter than air squadrons.
ESTIMATED FIRM NAVY FORCE GOALS FOR 1953

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<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>Cruiser (CA/CL)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>41</td>
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<tr>
<td>Destroyer (DD)</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>286</td>
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<tr>
<td>Destroyer Escort (DDE)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>94</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ocean Escort (DE)</td>
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<td>183</td>
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<td>Coastal Escort (PC)</td>
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<td>Ocean M/S (AM)</td>
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<td>Submarine (SS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Motor Torpedo Boat (MTB)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>49</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast Minelayer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Lift Division</td>
<td>2.2/3</td>
<td>2.2/3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Division</td>
<td>2.2/3</td>
<td>2.2/3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Air Wing</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZP Rons *</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shore Based Naval</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Maritime A/C</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

* Lighter than air squadrons.
# MRC 12 Estimated Air Forces Front Line

## Aircraft Goals for NATO for 1953

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>IDF/FB</th>
<th>IDF</th>
<th>FB</th>
<th>AWX FTR</th>
<th>AWX INTR</th>
<th>LB</th>
<th>MB</th>
<th>RECCE</th>
<th>TP CARRIER</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>375</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
<td>48</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>279*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>54</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>36</td>
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<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
<td>250</td>
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<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>U.K.</td>
<td>304</td>
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<td>328</td>
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<td>144</td>
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<td>1882</td>
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<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>D-Day</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>96</td>
<td></td>
<td>144</td>
<td>192</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1132</td>
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<tr>
<td>Post D-Day to</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td>72</td>
<td>240</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>810</td>
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<tr>
<td>D-Day Total</td>
<td>1154</td>
<td>2032</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>446</td>
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<td>6777</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>1154</td>
<td>2032</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>686</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7587</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The figures for Germany are those listed in the Special Military Agreement to the EDC (assuming ratification date of October 1952). These figures are as of May 1952.
During the period of General Eisenhower's command, SHAPE had "set up shop". A working command structure had been organized, operable defense plans had been prepared, cooperation between nations had been established, and there had been a definite increase in the number of forces available to SACEUR. However, most of these forces were, so to speak, in the shop window, and there was little on the shelves. During this period the various analyses of the strength and effectiveness of forces available or likely to be available to SACEUR to meet the Soviet threat had showed such an obvious and disturbing disparity that General Eisenhower had been impelled to approach the North Atlantic Council through the Standing Group, requesting that a drastic re-appraisal be undertaken by the nations in order to increase materially the strength and effectiveness of the forces at his disposal.

As a result of this, the Temporary Council Committee had presented to the Council, at Lisbon in February 1952, more realistic estimates of force goals and recommendations for greater effectiveness, to which the nations had agreed. General Eisenhower had believed it to be absolutely essential that the action taken at the Lisbon Conference should result in a clear statement and definition of what forces were to be in existence for his command by the end of 1952. "We must
therefore know what the specific forces are to be and in what specific measure they are agreed and assured." (1)  

As has already been described in detail, the agreements reached at Lisbon gave some confidence to SACEUR that the forces promised by the nations for the end of 1952 would be realised, and he had fair hopes that the provisional goals set for 1953 might be achieved. At Lisbon, the concept of a NATO priority system had been accepted, through which available essential equipment could be allocated to units on the basis of most effective use; and in the deliberations of the Temporary Council Committee /TCC7 the matters of standards of readiness, by which the effectiveness of forces could be accurately assessed, had been actively considered.  

The revelation made public at Lisbon that the number of divisions available for the defense of SACEUR's command area was neither as large nor as effective as had been supposed led to caustic comments in the press, and these comments continued in the early days of General Ridgway's period of command. Within a few days of his arrival, General Ridgway initiated staff studies at SHAPE to ascertain

(1) SCO OUT 22320 to SGN from Gen Eisenhower, 7 Feb 52.
(3) Ibid, Chap VII, p 239.
(4) SGM 825-52, IPT Report on NATO Priority System for Units and Equipment, 15 Apr 52.
(6) Ibid, p 330; Also, The London Times, 26 Feb 52, "The Phantom Army".
the "cold facts" of the strength of the forces at his disposal, expressing the view that "we are certainly not kidding the Soviets as to the status of these forces; furthermore we should most certainly not kid ourselves".

His determination to find the actual facts regarding the effective strength of his forces as opposed to their reported strength was given weight by a letter he received from Air Chief Marshal Elliot, Chairman of the Standing Group, barely ten days after his arrival at SHAPE. In this letter, Air Chief Marshal Elliot referred to the North Atlantic Council's agreement at Lisbon on force goals and to its instructions that an Annual Review, broadly on the lines of that conducted by the TCC in preparation for the Lisbon Conference, should be carried out with the object of confirming or modifying these force goals and producing firm force goals for 1953. The primary purpose of this Review would be to reconcile the requirements for adequate defense in Western Europe with the political and economic capabilities of the countries. Important factors in assessing militarily reasonable force goals for 1953 would be the actual state of the available forces at the end of 1952 and the extent of any shortfalls from the agreed 1952 goals.

Air Chief Marshal Elliot stated that the Standing Group considered that the time of General Ridgway's arrival to take up his command was

(7) PPO 2342/2, 13 Jun 52.
(8) CSGM-20-52, 11 Jun 52.
a suitable occasion on which to ask him to forward his views on:

a. the progress which had been made toward the provision of forces promised for 1952;

b. the degree of fulfillment likely to be achieved by the end of 1952 of the forces promised at Lisbon for that year;

c. the state of readiness of those forces; and

d. the efficiency with which all levels of his command organization would be ready to carry out the tasks required of them in time of war.

General Ridgway was asked to reply by end-July. Although on the surface the Standing Group request, dated 11 June, appeared to allow him little time in which to make his own evaluation, the work was facilitated by the instructions he had issued to his staff immediately on his arrival to provide him with the "cold facts". Work at SHAPE had been proceeding along these lines, in fact, during the period immediately prior to his arrival.

A detailed Status Report was forwarded to the Standing Group (9) on 12 July 1952, setting out the SHAPE assessment of SACEUR's forces. General Ridgway concurred with General Eisenhower's statement in his First Annual Report, that "there is no real security yet achieved in Europe, it is only a beginning". He considered that "security" as a term was only meaningful when measured against an evaluated threat, and in view of the increased Soviet threat he found

(9) SHAPE 723/52, 12 Jul 52. Enclosure I to this report lists "Additional matters requiring early attention".
that the build-up of forces necessary for minimum military requirements was progressing even more slowly than had been anticipated.

In this report, the land and air forces required for an effective defense were compared with the Lisbon 1952 goals and with a SHAPE estimate of the effectiveness of available forces as of 31 December 1952:

"GROUND FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divisions</th>
<th>M-Day</th>
<th>M+3</th>
<th>M+15</th>
<th>M+30</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense Plan Requirements (MC 26/1)</td>
<td>46 1/3</td>
<td>46 1/3</td>
<td>77 1/3</td>
<td>98 1/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisbon Force Goals (Dec 1952)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30 1/3</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>50 2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE Evaluation of Effective Divisions (Dec 1952)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28 2/3</td>
<td>38 1/3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(M-Day and D-Day are assumed to coincide)

AIR FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense Plan requirements (MC 26/1 modified by SH 23074)</td>
<td>10,532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisbon Force Goals (Dec 1952)</td>
<td>2,812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE Estimate of Availability (Dec 1952)</td>
<td>2,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE Estimate of Combat Effectiveness (Dec 1952)</td>
<td>2,105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Force figures for Greece and Turkey were not included in this comparison, and the air force figures did not include U.K. and Metropolitan France Home Defense Forces. The Lisbon total of 2,912 aircraft for SACEUR had been reduced by the 100 aircraft retained for French Home Defense.
General Ridgway emphasized that the failure of NATO nations to meet present and progressively agreed force goals would reduce in corresponding proportion his ability to fulfill his assigned mission. Some deficiencies he considered of grave significance. The M-Day divisions which were planned for use as covering forces for the land defense of Europe were likely to be one division short of the Lisbon commitment of 25 divisions. Even more serious was the fact that, although well-trained and able to give a good account of themselves in action, the divisions were generally undermanned and short of essential equipment. Of the twenty-five and two-thirds reserve divisions agreed at Lisbon to provide replacements for the covering forces within the first thirty days after M-Day, SHAPE estimated that only thirteen had a reasonable prospect of meeting acceptable standards of effectiveness by the end of 1952. He was seriously concerned about the slow progress being made toward the development of battle-worthy reserves.

As far as the air forces were concerned, the forces provided under the Lisbon goals represented only a fraction of those required to meet a determined act of aggression. The estimate of 2,105 combat-effective aircraft was considered to be optimistic, as it had not been possible to assess the effect of inadequate control and warning systems, or the shortage of airfields, fuel stocks and technical personnel, including pilot reserves. These limitations were likely to have a disastrous effect on the air forces of the Command in the event of an emergency.
In the logistics field, there was an acute shortage of logistic supporting units, essential reserve stocks and adequate capacity for repair and overhaul of equipment, in addition to a lack of overall logistics control.

General Ridgway recommended that his report be considered as a matter of urgency by the Standing Group and that appropriate portions of it be furnished to the respective governments. He hoped that action would be initiated with all governments concerned as soon as possible in order to overcome the deficiencies and that a public information program would be conducted to acquaint the civilian populations of NATO with the problem.

Press speculation as to the strength of the NATO forces continued, and as a result the subject was considered by the Permanent Representatives at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 20 August 1952. The American Representative, Mr. William H. Draper, Jr., assured his colleagues that important progress had been brought about since the Lisbon meeting. "Collectively," he said, "we have made very real strides towards reaching the military goals which were set at Lisbon. So far as I know, no member nation should fall seriously short of reaching its target this year. With four more months to go, I hope and believe that in the time remaining every effort will be made by all NATO countries to actually reach the force goals set for 1952."

The North Atlantic Council had previously

(10) Infra, Chap IX.
emphasized that any member country, if in difficulties and unable to meet fully these Lisbon commitments for 1952, should advise the Council. No member country had so far advised the Council that it would not meet its Lisbon commitments. At this meeting, the national representatives assured the Council that, although in many cases they were encountering difficulties, it was the earnest intention of their governments to fulfill their commitments.

"In the past six months," Mr. Draper had added, "nearly $700 million of off-shore procurement contracts has been placed to strengthen the European production base. NATO has recently developed recommendations for a coordinated European aircraft production program, to which the United States is gearing a part of its new off-shore procurement program." In fact, the prospects that the 1952 goals would be met seemed, at Council level, quite hopeful.

Force Requirements are Revised

At SHAPE, however, the staff was not so hopeful that the 1952 force goals would be fulfilled, and achievement of the tentative planning goals recommended by the TCC for 1953 and 1954 seemed even less likely. The procedure developed for the Annual Review pre-supposed a request to SHAPE for military guidance, and studies were initiated at SHAPE on force requirements in anticipation of the 1953 Annual Review process.

(11) C-M(52)64, 20 Aug 52.
considered that the tentative goals proposed by the Military Representatives Committee in MRC 12, for the 1952 Annual Review, were so much in excess of the forces actually in sight as to make those goals of little value in programming the expansion of NATO forces in 1953, 1954 and 1955. The SHAPE staff went to work to categorize, within each single service, all major elements of military expenditure, specifically to include the increase and maintenance of major units, the development of supporting units, and the build-up of war reserves, of national and international infrastructure and cadres for units to be formed in later years. The completion of the lists of supporting units by countries was considered as a matter of priority.

In calling for these studies, General Gruenther directed the staff also to make an analysis of country programs, employing austerity standards, as he felt that SHAPE might be required to plan on this basis.

General Ridgway, convinced that there would be a shortfall in planned forces, gave attention at this time to an appraisal of the effects of new weapons. If these weapons could be used, they might compensate to some degree for weakness in numbers of forces. There was no military justification for any relaxation of efforts to meet force goals planned up to 1954. It appeared to General Ridgway, however, that a comprehensive study of the effects of new weapons

(13) MRC 12 (Final), 25 Jun 52. Supra, Chap VII, p 197.
upon force planning was urgently required. In particular, he considered that such a study, which would take full account of the capabilities of weapons and techniques of warfare expected to be available in 1956, might well alter materially the estimated force requirements for that and following years, the cost of such forces, or both.

A full assessment of Soviet capabilities was essential for this study. The Standing Group was requested to provide a statement of Soviet military capabilities and possible operational intentions in the event of war in 1956. There was no basis, in advance of the contemplated study, for any assumption as to whether overall requirements for the defense of Allied Command Europe in 1956 would be greater or less than those already on record.

The Standing Group requested that SACEUR submit his estimate of military requirements for 1956 by 8 November, so that these, together with those of the other Major Commanders, might be considered by the Council in December. To provide an intelligence basis for this work, the Standing Group created an ad hoc intelligence working group which was, by 2 October, to provide the Commanders with an interim and partial intelligence estimate. The same group was to continue its work, preparing a more complete and authoritative assessment which was to be sent to the Major Commanders by late October.

(14) SHAPE/883/52, General Gruenther to SGN, New Weapons and Tactical Techniques, 23 Aug 52.
(15) STAND/381, 9 Sep 52.
(16) STAND/380, 9 Sep 52.
Later, however, when it was seen that force requirements for 1956 could not be prepared in time for the December meeting, the Standing Group altered its request, limiting the information to be submitted in November to 1954 requirements. The interim intelligence summary intended to be furnished Commanders in October would not be provided. Instead, revised 1954 force requirements were to be developed on the basis of an intelligence estimate already prepared and existing strategic guidance. SACEUR was requested to continue his study of 1956 requirements, for submission at a later time.

Under the circumstances, it was difficult, and perhaps fruitless, for SHAPE to attempt to revise 1954 requirements, since a revision must be based on essentially unchanged intelligence data and unchanged strategic policy. Requests to subordinate commanders for revised estimates produced little or no change from existing figures. In Central Command, for example, Marshal Juin's reconsideration of his estimate of 65 land divisions produced the same total, 65 divisions.

On the air force side the situation was very similar. Here, requirements so exceeded capabilities that even if requirements could be reduced, the resulting figure would still appear to be excessive in view of the economic difficulties of the nations.

(17) TOSHAP/258, 19 Sep 52 (amended 25 Sep 52).
(18) STAND/386, 22 Sep 52.
On 8 November 1952, General Ridgway's Revised Major Force Requirements for the defense of Allied Command Europe were submitted to the Standing Group. These Revised Force Requirements were based on the strategic outline used in SHAPE's first estimate of force requirements, but took into account the most recent intelligence estimate received from the Standing Group and revised strategic guidance. SHAPE pointed out to the Standing Group that, although revised force requirements for 1954 had been requested, those now submitted bore no relation to a particular date but instead constituted requirements for 1954 or any year thereafter until a change in the concept of operations or the enemy threat, or the impact of new developments, made further revision necessary. The most significant differences between these requirements and those previously submitted were the result of the recent accession of Greece and Turkey.

There were no changes in the estimated land force requirements for the Northern European Command from those set forth in SHAPE/333/51, nor were there changed requirements for Central Europe. However, SACEUR emphasized that the nations concerned in the Central European Command should be urged to accelerate the build-up of forces

(19) SHAPE/1215/52, 8 Nov 52.
(20) SHAPE/333/51, 14 Aug 51.
(21) SG/176/2, 21 Jul 52.
(22) SG 13/24, 26 Sep 52. This was revised as SG 13/25, 4 Nov 52.
(23) TOSHAP/258, 25 Sep 52.
then planned for D+15, in order to ensure that the fifty D+15 divisions could be operational by D+10. The same recommendation was made regarding the Italian sector forces in the Southern European Command. The land force requirements for the defense of Greece were based on the existing program for the development of the Greek army and its capability for rapid mobilization in position. Although eight of the ten Greek divisions were under strength by D-Day standards of readiness, existing equipment programs and national mobilization plans provided for these divisions' being brought to full strength in position by D+7. Turkish land force requirements, also, were within the goal already planned, with the exception of one armored brigade.

Naval force requirements for the Northern and Southern Commands were estimated in coordination with SACLANT and British Forces in the Mediterranean.

The air forces requirement did not include NATO forces remaining under national command, such as the French and UK air defense forces and air transport required by national authorities for the logistic support of their forces. Apart from such slight modifications this revision represented almost no change from the earlier statement of requirements.

On the same day that the revised estimate of force requirements was forwarded to the Standing Group, the SHAPE staff completed an analysis of the forces likely to be available at the end of 1952.

(24) Infra, Appendices A-C. SHAPE 333/51 was the SHAPE submission to SG which was generally incorporated in MC 26/1, 21 Nov 51. See SHAPE History, Vol I, Sec II, Chap VII.

(25) Staff Study, SHAPE/PPO/243/52, 8 Nov 52.
This study had been called for on the assumption that the build-up forecast by the Lisbon goals would not be achieved and that it would be necessary for SHAPE to advise as to the areas in which the greatest national efforts should be directed and as to how the resources which the nations made available could best be employed. Each Major Subordinate Command was analyzed from the standpoint of its capability to implement the Emergency Defense Plan with the forces and resources assigned and earmarked for SACEUR as of December 1952. On this basis, SHAPE attempted to determine in which fields the greatest weaknesses lay and how far these coincided with areas of national responsibility, and to suggest priorities for corrective action.

Major weaknesses in the end-1952 position of Allied Command Europe, in order of seriousness, were listed as follows:

a. Low levels of supply and equipment reserves.

b. Lack of adequate combat and service support troop structure for all three services throughout the Command.

c. Incapability of the reserve systems within most NATO nations to produce the replacement formations and carry out the progressive build-up of trained post-D-Day units necessary to carry on the defense under conditions of sustained combat.

d. The drastic gap between SACEUR's tactical aircraft requirements and aircraft availabilities, together with the delayed availability of carrier-borne aircraft.

(26) Memo, DCPO, 5 Oct 52.

(27) Infra, Chap IX for discussion of logistics deficiencies.
e. Deficiencies in land force availabilities.

f. Shortage of escort vessels and minesweepers.

g. General weakness in signal communications, early warning and cryptographic facilities.

The sectors of Allied Command Europe were listed in order of priority for the receipt of equipment and relative need for general strengthening. Central Europe was assigned highest priority, Denmark second, Northern Italy and Thrace third, Southern Norway and Eastern Turkey fourth, and finally Northern Norway.

SHAPE recommended to the Standing Group that the findings contained in this study be approved as the basic SHAPE short term position for formulating advice as to the balance of forces and the allocation of resources to alleviate service deficiencies. The findings, if approved, would also serve as a basis for SHAPE studies during 1953 involving longer term priorities.

Facing Realities

The end of 1952, the mid-passage of General Ridgway's period of command, was a period of considerable significance in the history of SHAPE. The necessity for planning on facts, however unpleasant they might be, was recognized and accepted. Ideal military requirements were obviously unlikely to be met. The forces then available were far lower than those required, and even lower than those agreed upon at Lisbon, both in number and in effectiveness.

(28) Supra, p 251.
Field Marshal Montgomery had not hesitated to state in his final report on the development of the Western Union Defense Organization that the nations had not provided, and did not appear willing to provide, the forces which the military commanders considered necessary for the defense of Western Europe. The NATO Military Commanders might, at this time, have seconded his statement.

Having weighed the available strength of his forces in number and effectiveness, General Ridgway saw that the nations must be forced as far as possible to increase this strength and that, to bridge the gap in face of the Soviet threat, the atomic potential available to the Allies would have to be employed. This forecast the necessity for a decision from the nations that atomic weapons could be used, together with agreement by the United States to share certain information in the field of atomics with its NATO allies, and to supply atomic weapons for the use of their forces.

In April 1953 the Military Committee approved the Standing Group Report on Revised NATO Force Requirements for end-1954. This report, which amended MC 26/1 of November 1951, incorporated the SHAPE force requirements submitted in November. There were various reasons which demanded the amendment of MC 26/1. Greece and Turkey had been admitted into NATO. The Atlantic, (29) MC 26/2, 9 Apr 53.

(30) SHAPE/1215/52, 8-Nov 52. See tables at Appendices A-C.
Channel and new Mediterranean Command organizations had been established, it had become possible to estimate more clearly the increased requirements for all three services resulting from the adoption of a "forward strategy" and the inclusion of Western Germany in the area to be defended, and national authorities had made, or were in the course of making, agreements with adjacent NATO Commanders regarding the division of responsibilities in coastal waters. Nevertheless, in this estimate of force requirements regard was not paid to the actual capabilities of the NATO nations. Military requirements were established to meet military objectives; but, although requirements were assessed with an awareness of the financial and political difficulties which restricted capabilities, it was left to the Annual Review process to determine the actual build-up of force goals. MC 26/2 clearly stated that consideration of any force increase was "impracticable unless the standards of readiness of the forces were considered at the same time". Accordingly the revised Standards of Readiness were included.

The approval given by the Military Committee to SACEUR's end-1954 force requirements was, therefore, a stop-gap pending a more satisfactory approach to the problem of estimating requirements.

The studies undertaken at SHAPE at this time, in the process of "facing realities", involved serious implications. The day before

(31) See MC 26/2, Appendix A.
General Ridgway left SHAPE he forwarded to the Standing Group a study, on which his staff had been engaged for six months, setting forth recommended force requirements for Allied Command Europe in mid-1956. This "Estimate of the Situation and Force Requirements" endeavoured to lessen the gap between ideal force requirements and estimated actual forces which might be available to SACEUR to discharge his mission. General Ridgway said in his covering letter, "The concepts contained in this study are based on arbitrary values assigned to many admitted variables and on equally arbitrary evaluation of imponderables to which no conventional planning factors are applicable and for which no empirical data are available as guidance. The study shows, however, that we may be on the threshold of a new strategic conception which would form the basis of our future defense planning. The consequences of this are so far-reaching that final decision as to the size and phasing of the mid-1956 force requirements contained in the study should be deferred for the reasons stated herein. Moreover, it may be premature at this stage to try to link this concept to 1956. I have, however, reached certain conclusions and recommendations." His conclusions were based on awareness that decisive results might be attained in the first few months of war, that the mass destruction inherent in atomic warfare might compel nations to take pre-D-Day measures hitherto considered politically inadvisable, that responsible military commanders must have adequate pre-D-Day authority to initiate instant retaliation,

(32) SHAPE/704/53, 10 Jul 53.
that the balance and phasing of forces approved at that time would require revision, and that the indeterminate factors inherent in the study should be reduced to a minimum by decision at the highest level. General Ridgway recommended to the Standing Group that, not only should the nations continue to develop their forces build-up in accordance with existing plans, but the Standing Group should clarify the implications of changes in the strategic concept and the concept of operations, and provide estimates of the atomic capability available to SACEUR and to the Soviets.

**Standards of Readiness**

The need for a yard-stick by which the effectiveness of divisions could be assessed had been seen in 1951. Following the establishment of firm force goals for 1952 at the Lisbon Conference and the decision to hold an Annual Review, the Standing Group had issued guidance on force goals for 1953, 1954 and 1955 which included a statement of required standards of readiness.

SHAPE considered that the standards contained in the Standing Group guidance were optimistic to a degree, and this optimism might lead to an unrealistic evaluation of the over-all NATO forces. SHAPE also considered that the standards of readiness proposed for 1953 and 1954 were too low to be acceptable. It informed the

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(33) See pp 293 ff for fuller treatment of this Report.


(35) SGM 874/52, Force Goals for 1953, 54, 55, 22 Apr 52. See MC 26/2.
Standing Group that the question of readiness standards was under study and that SHAPE's views would be forwarded at an early date.

As it was hoped that the preliminary estimates of force goals for 1953, 1954 and 1955 would be ready by mid-June 1952, and infrastructure requirements and unit and equipment priority estimates by August 1952, it was important that SHAPE's views on readiness standards should be made known without delay in view of the part these standards would play in the assessment of forces.

During June a good deal of discussion went on at SHAPE on this subject, and Field Marshal Montgomery considered that some guidance was necessary. In his view, the combat readiness of a division was directly related to its situation as regards equipment, manpower strength, and training. A D-Day division he considered to be one that actually existed in peace and was kept at such strength in manpower and equipment that it could fight effectively at any time without further mobilization procedure. Consequently, the relative combat potential of divisions depended on their degree of equipment and manpower strength in time of peace and the amount and quality of training done throughout the year. For example, a division maintained in peace at a manpower strength of 60 to 65 per cent and without its

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(36) SHAPE/509/52, AG 1105 PPO, 19 May 52. See STAND/338, 29 May 52, on unit priority estimate and scale of equipment with particular reference to standards of readiness; also SHAPE/573/52, AG 1100 OT, SHAPE Comments on Standards of Readiness for Naval Forces, 7 Jun 52. Supra, p 219.

(37) Staff Study, OT 1101, 11 Jun 52.

(38) D/SACEUR 1100, 25 Jun 52.
full-scale equipment needed mobilization and training thereafter. Under these circumstances, it would be a D+30 division. If, however, it were filled up with reservists every year and did a minimum of one month’s training annually at a divisional camp it would be classified as a D+15 division.

SHAPE considered that the interim characteristics established for 1952 by the Screening and Costing Staff were not only unsatisfactory but also unrealistic, since they demanded an unacceptably low level in some respects and an unattainably high level in others. For example, SCS standards for peacetime strengths were far too low for active divisions, and in nearly all cases these strengths were already exceeded by the nations. On the other hand, the requirement of 28 days’ reservist training annually for all divisions was considered to be quite unattainable under existing economic and political conditions.

The Standing Group had already suggested that the SCS interim characteristics for 1952 be applied to 1953 and 1954. Unless SHAPE’s revised standards were submitted in the near future they would be too late to affect force planning for 1953. There was some difference of opinion as to how far it was wise at this time to specify in detail


(40) OT 1101, AGOS OANDT to DCOS P&O, 27 Jun 52. This document set out ultimate standards (in terms of D-Day) as established by SHAPE, interim standards for 1952 (in terms of M-Day) as established by SCS, and suggested interim standards for 1953 (in terms of M-Day) for submission by SHAPE to the Standing Group.
the "regular or long service content", the establishment of combat
tests, or any agreed reduction in training standards. Field
Marshal Montgomery was opposed to SHAPE's laying down rigid
conditions regarding combat tests and training exercises, as such
rigid rules could easily be twisted to suit any philosophy. He con-
sidered that the interim standards for 1953 now proposed contained
details which lay within the military judgment of subordinate
military commanders and should not be the concern of a head-
quartres at SHAPE's high level.

Considered SHAPE views on standards of readiness of army
forces and interim characteristics for 1953 were forwarded to the
Standing Group on 30 July, with the request that the Standing
Group recommend to the Military Committee that the standards be
approved for issue to the nations and that the proposed new interim
characteristics for 1953 be adopted and MRC 12 amended accordingly.
The new interim characteristics had been designed with a view to
achieving a general improvement in the readiness of forces without
losing sight of practical possibilities.

The whole problem of standards of readiness was complicated
by various factors. Assessments of effectiveness affected not only
the goals to be set for the nations, but also priorities for issue of

(41) Memo, General Redman to AVM Hudleston, D/SAGEUR 1100,
7 Jul 52.

(42) Memo, FM Montgomery to AVM Hudleston, 9 Jul 52.

(43) AG 1101 OT, 30 Jul 52.
MDAP equipment and the establishment of training requirements. The standards proposed by SHAPE to the Standing Group included ultimate standards at which the nations should aim. Criticisms were levelled at the standards set by Field Marshal Montgomery. Some of the SHAPE staff considered that they were not sufficiently clear-cut and detailed to prevent dispute on the part of nations over NATO assessment of their forces. On the other hand, some of the nations argued that these standards were too high. It was found that many national forces made a very poor showing when the ultimate standards were applied to them. In the Field Marshal's opinion, this was "just too bad and SHAPE had better face up to it".

Politically, however, the problem was not so easily disposed of, and for this reason it was decided to apply the new interim characteristics for 1953, which were not so hard to attain as the ultimate standards of readiness and through which it would be possible for a more favorable picture to emerge. The Field Marshal, however, resolutely refused to have anything to do with the interim characteristics and considered that it was no use pretending that SACEUR had, for example, D+15 divisions when in fact half of them would not be able to take the field until D+6 months.

Nevertheless, in view of the divergence of national opinions on this subject, the Standing Group requested SHAPE to give further

(44) Memo, FM Montgomery to General Wansbrough-Jones, D/SAC 1100, 4 Dec 52.
consideration, in consultation with national staffs, to the standards of readiness for effective combat which had been submitted. Although not wishing to specify the details of the criteria by which SACEUR estimated the combat effectiveness of his forces, the Standing Group felt that further consideration was needed on the subject of D+3 divisions and more flexibility in the assessment of support units of the land forces of continental European nations. It was considered that MRC 12 should be revised by the inclusion of SHAPE’s suggested interim characteristics for 1953, but that some portions - particularly those having to do with equipment levels and training - were likely to be considered during the reconciliation phase of the Annual Review.

The problem was an important one to resolve. The essential difficulties lay in the various national systems of mobilization and differing standards of effectiveness. It was felt that if the nations were asked for too much they would tend to become discouraged. Some nations were not in a position to achieve the interim standards. Therefore, it was objected that the characteristics as set out could not be applied to all theaters.

The Planning Cycle is Changed

In the Autumn of 1952, when difficulties were being encountered in developing an Annual Review procedure, when the establishment

(45) 2/O&T/DCLA, General Valluy to COFS, 9 Oct 52.
of readiness standards for the forces was not yet agreed, and when various other factors were affecting estimates of force requirements, the Standing Group decided to establish a proper sequence of planning actions linked to the Annual Review. The program involved the following major items, the first three being subject to continuous review and the last two being subject to annual review:

First - STRATEGIC GUIDANCE (Prepared by the Standing Group)

Second - COMMANDERS' ESTIMATES OF THE SITUATION AND FORCE REQUIREMENTS (Subject to Standing Group review and coordination)

Third - NATO FORCE REQUIREMENTS (Prepared by the Standing Group)

Fourth - FORCE GOALS agreed through the ANNUAL REVIEW

Fifth - COMMANDERS' EMERGENCY DEFENSE PLANS (Prepared one year ahead and submitted to the Standing Group for approval in October).

For the purpose of initiating this NATO military planning program, it was considered that December 1956 should be adopted as the target date. The use of this date was not intended to imply that the threat in the intervening years was lessening, that the capabilities of the NATO forces in the intervening years were sufficient to combat the threat effectively, or that there was a greater possibility of war at that time than during the preceding years. In this planning cycle, the major NATO commanders were to prepare their estimates of the situation on the basis of the strategic guidance issued and from these estimates deduce their requirements for forces to enable them to carry out their tasks. This step in the planning cycle was intended to eliminate
the confusion which had arisen in the past over the phrase "Medium Term Defense Plan". It had apparently not been universally understood that the Medium Term Defense Plan was based on "requirements" as opposed to "capabilities", and for this reason the phrases used in the second and third stages of the planning cycle had been made more explicit. The Standing Group also intended to avoid possible confusion between the terms "requirements" and "goals". Force requirements represented a purely military estimate of the forces required to implement the war strategy determined to be the most efficient to meet and defeat the enemy threat. On the other hand, annual force goals were phased steps towards the attainment of these requirements. The goals were based on consideration of economic and political factors as well as military requirements. The force requirements, seen in this light, were targets which NATO nations must strive to reach.

It will therefore be seen how significant in the assessment of force goals were the Standards of Readiness for Effective Combat. There was, on the one hand, the need to avoid discouraging nations and to present them with goals which they could be encouraged to meet. On the other hand, it was necessary to take into account the need for forces meeting definite standards of readiness adequate for SACEUR to discharge his mission.

The SHAPE force requirements submitted on 8 November were

(46) SG 20/49, 7 Oct 52.
practically unchanged from earlier requirements except for the inclusion of forces from Greece and Turkey. At the same time, much thought was being given to the establishment of ultimate standards of readiness and, as a stop-gap, to interim characteristics or reduced standards of readiness for 1953. The establishment of interim characteristics by priority was closely connected with the Annual Review process. Nevertheless, SHAPE appreciated that there was a danger in carrying forward the SCS interim characteristics accepted for 1952 into 1953, because this would confirm the tendency to consider the interim requirements as final and the characteristics as a yard-stick against which the actual effectiveness of forces could be measured.

SHAPE considered that if the standards which it proposed were not fully met in all respects by December 1953 the situation would be no worse, and probably better, than that existing at end-1952, when the characteristics which had been established by the Screening and Costing Staff, even though considered realistic and attainable, had not been achieved in most cases.

To clarify the terms involved, SHAPE recommended to the Standing Group the following definitions:

a. **Standards of Readiness for Effective Combat** were standards which indicated the state of readiness that must be reached by units before they could be considered ready for combat. As the standards of readiness were in most cases unrealizable in the immediate future, when active and reserve formations were in the
process of build-up, interim characteristics were required as a
guide for national efforts until the ultimate standards were
attained.

b. **Interim characteristics** were therefore temporary
standards adopted to measure progress toward the achievement
of the ultimate standards of readiness.

By the end of November 1952, the Military Considerations
Team of the Annual Review had discussed informally with national
representatives the interim characteristics proposed by SHAPE.
The consensus of the nations was that they were unattainable for
1953 and that more easily attainable interim characteristics should
be substituted. As a system had to be ready for costing action by
1 January 1953, SHAPE reconsidered the problem and suggested
the preparation of forces status tables on a sliding scale. If this
proposal were adopted, the term "interim characteristics" would
be discontinued. At the same time SHAPE also forwarded to
the Major Subordinate Commanders, for their comment, criteria
for Ultimate Standards of Readiness for Effective Combat.

(47) SHAPTO 310, 14 Oct 52, and STAND/398, SCO IN 9394,
16 Oct 52. (In accordance with a request from the SGN, SHAPE
also forwarded standards of readiness for air forces (SHAPTO
327, 4 Nov 52) relative at this stage only to that element of
the air force operations which included the flying units and
air base support.)

(48) AG 0905 OT, 28 Nov 52.

(49) AG 1101 OT, 29 Nov 52.
If the Annual Review were to be completed, a compromise was necessary. At the request of the Standing Group, SHAPE set out, in conjunction with the nations concerned, to produce (50) force status tables.

The North Atlantic Council Considers Forces and Effectiveness

The results of the effort to measure the forces available to SACEUR against those he required to discharge his mission were becoming apparent by October 1952. General Ridgway felt strongly that the public of the member nations should be informed of the true situation. Accordingly, he told the North Atlantic Council in October 1952 that if, as Supreme Commander, he was convinced that he had fewer forces at his disposal than he needed to accomplish his task, he must draw attention to this fact.

It was quite clear that, no matter what a policy of "balanced optimism" dictated, the Lisbon goals were not going to be met by end-1952, and in land forces alone the end-1952 status was likely to be about 50 per cent of the minimum requirement. (52)

In accordance with the changed cycle, the whole approach to NATO planning had been revised and drastically altered to fit

(50) SGM 2681/52, 17 Dec 52, and SHAPTO 370, 20 Dec 52. Supra, p 217.
(51) See CR(52)24, Summary Record of NAC Meeting, 8 Oct 52.
(53) SG 20/49, 7 Oct 52. Supra, p 271.
the Annual Review pattern. For this reason considerable attention had been paid to the establishment of satisfactory standards of readiness. The old method of evaluating force effectiveness had produced masses of paper and figures which resulted in no action. The aim, now, was to produce a system which, by its relation to the Annual Review, would have a greater impact on the nations concerned.

In early December 1952 General Ridgway sent to the Standing Group an evaluation of the effectiveness of his forces as of 31 December 1952. In it, he pointed out the serious deficiencies that existed in the fields of manning, training, and combat and (54) service support.

In making his evaluation of effectiveness, he had used as a basis the following factors, some of which could not be measured in mathematical terms:

SHAPE Ultimate Standards of Readiness,
Visits by SACEUR, his Deputies, Subordinate Commanders and their Staffs,
Manning levels,
Length and quality of training,
Equipment levels,
Availability of combat and service support,
Morale and leadership, and
Regular content.

Overall, he estimated that the discrepancy between the Lisbon goals (55) and actual effective strength was ten divisions and 693 aircraft.

(54) SHAPE/1357/52, 6 Dec 52.
(55) Infra, Appendices E and F.
In his report, General Ridgway particularly invited the attention of the Standing Group to certain deficiencies, common to the forces of most nations, which he considered could result in making many units ineffective for combat for some time to come. He listed them as follows:

- General weakness of tactical air forces,
- Low manning levels of units M+3 through M+30,
- Very low regular content of officers, NCOs and specialists,
- Insufficient length of national service,
- Insufficient annual training of reservists,
- Lack of essential equipment,
- Lack of adequate combat and service support units, and
- Lack of minimum operational reserves.

He was well aware that nations had been prevented from achieving more by political, economic, financial and other difficulties, but he considered that he would be failing in his duty if he did not make it clear at this stage that the standards of combat effectiveness of his forces were well below those required to carry out the task entrusted to him.

In the meetings of the North Atlantic Council in December 1952, the proposed new system of standards of readiness was considered. It was recognized that defining ultimate standards of readiness was the responsibility of the military authorities, since it was the Supreme Commanders upon whom the responsibility lay for committing forces to battle. However, the differing conditions with regard to standards of readiness in the various countries should, the Council considered, be the subject of discussion between the national Chiefs of Staff and SACEUR, who could consider the steps which might
be taken to ensure the combat effectiveness of NATO forces. At this meeting General Ridgway made it quite clear that the means at his disposal for ensuring the defense of NATO territory in Europe fell far short of what he would need should war break out immediately. He also pointed out that it was essential "that the military strength which existed and which could be made available should be organized to give the maximum degree of operational efficiency: this was certainly not the case at the moment."

At the same meeting, General Ridgway discussed some of the principles guiding the Supreme Commander and his principal commanders in discharging their duties. These included recognition of the following:

a. That all the problems confronting the military commanders contained inseparable political, economical, financial and social factors.

b. That economic and political stability was an essential foundation without which military strength was illusory.

c. That the final decision in all major military problems rested with the civilian governments, whose authority was supreme.

d. That the military commanders were responsible for

(56) C-R(52)34, Summary Record of Meeting of the Council with the Military Committee, 11 Dec 52.

(57) C-R(52)37, Summary Record of Council Meeting, 15 Dec 52.

(58) C-M(52)136, 15 Dec 52.
furnishing to the Council the best and most objective estimates possible of military capacity and requirements.

In short, General Ridgway placed the burden of responsibility for final decisions with the civilian authorities and with the North Atlantic Council.

The Council, however, "noted with satisfaction that the increase in forces agreed to at Lisbon had been substantially achieved by the end of 1952..." and directed that "more emphasis should be given to increasing the effectiveness of the forces of the Alliance and the units necessary for their support rather than to the provision of greater numbers, to the extent that resources were not available for both tasks." (59)

Attempts at a Solution

The comments received from the nations in the Annual Review showed that it was impossible to get general agreement on any system of interim standards leading to SHAPE ultimate standards. SHAPE therefore recommended a system establishing "Criteria for Land Forces", in lieu of "Interim Standards of Readiness". The object was to permit reporting, for all units, the most important costable factors which conditioned effectiveness, submitting recommendations for improvement in the same terms, and including factors such as peacetime strength and regular content,

(59) NATO - The First Five Years, Ismay, p 193.
in terms of percentage of wartime requirements, training, equipment, and support elements.

This proposal, submitted by SHAPE to the Standing Group in January 1953, was reviewed in a report by the International Planning Team. The report pointed out that SHAPE had attempted to prepare a series of force status tables representing levels of readiness for the evaluation of units short of the ultimate standards of readiness, but found it impossible at this time to get general agreement by the nations. Furthermore, it had been very difficult to prepare suitable status tables due to the widely varying circumstances of units, and it was recognized that this situation would continue until some action had been taken to rectify the most serious deficiencies. SHAPE now proposed, pending agreement outside the ultimate standards of readiness, to show the situation in each unit according to the system outlined above, and in part graphically. This would result in showing the present state of readiness of the unit without relation to either the controversial status tables or the ultimate standards of readiness. On the other hand, it would not result in establishing minimum acceptable standards for units in accordance with their time-phasing. The International Planning Team felt that it was necessary to devise some method of excluding units which were at such a low state of

(60) AG 1101 OT, 10 Jan 53.
(61) SG/169/3, 16 Jan 53. Supra, p 216.
preparedness that they could not under reasonable standards be classified as available for combat by M+30 in the year concerned. Unless this were done, the equipment requirements would become too large for reconciliation during the Annual Review. It was suggested, therefore, that SHAPE should include recommendations as to whether units could be employed prior to M+30, and estimate the strength and effectiveness of the peace-time cadre of inactive units.

The Problem is Reviewed by SACEUR

In mid-January, General Ridgway discussed this general problem with his staff. At this meeting the SHAPE ultimate standards of readiness were considered as being the minimum standards required by SACEUR for the various categories of divisions to enable him to pursue the NATO strategy and to carry out his mission when these divisions were committed to battle. The standards proposed by Field Marshal Montgomery and those proposed by CINCSOUTH were discussed, as well as those jointly put forward by Marshal Juin and the French Minister of Defense.

It was assumed that an initial attack would be launched against NATO in great strength and without warning. Therefore, it was


(63) Ltrs, N 2031/EMCFA/11, MOD Paris to Gen Ridgway, 6 Jan 53, and Gen Navarre, COFS ALFCE, to Gen Ridgway, 26 Dec 52.
considered advisable that standards of readiness should be expressed in terms of D-Day rather than M-Day, and that different standards should be demanded of units according to the time each was required for battle. Marshal Juin held that a D+3 division should be evaluated on the basis of commitment to battle on D+10, when it could be expected to fight in the battle for the Rhine. The Supreme Commander, however, was adamant that in such circumstances a division must be considered a D+10 rather than a D+3 division. In the French view the time required to move into contact with the enemy should be applied in rating a division in terms of D-Day; but General Gruenther, the Chief of Staff, was firmly opposed to this and adopted Field Marshal Montgomery's point of view that the only realistic definition of a D-Day division was that it should be able to fight effectively on D-Day. Its location at that time he did not consider relevant to this problem.

The Supreme Commander believed that some consideration would have to be given to national interests. He felt that the answer might lie somewhere between the French view and the existing SHAPE position. The consensus of the meeting was that a militarily valid formula should be found, but not necessarily under the pressure of the current Annual Review. General Gruenther suggested that the issue of ultimate standards should not be raised again until a compromise proposal acceptable to the nations was possible or until SACEUR was ready to make a decision without further reference to national views. General Ridgway stated that he was not
prepared to make a decision without regard to the views of the nations and directed OANDT Division to continue its studies in order that he could establish a SHAPE position on the matter.

Further study of the proposed standards of readiness revealed that, while the SHAPE ultimate standards were unquestionably sound from a military point of view, it seemed unlikely that the nations could, or would, achieve them. This was particularly apparent in the matter of required periods of annual training. These were expensive and bound to cause a certain amount of disturbance in national industry. On the other hand, SACEUR had publicly stated that nothing less than a 28-day annual training period and a two-year term of service could be considered militarily sound.

The revised views of the SHAPE staff on the standards of readiness were discussed with General Ridgway on 19 February 1953. General Ridgway expressed his agreement with the two basic requirements of the problem: the standards must represent the minimum required by SACEUR to enable him to carry out his mission, and they must also give the nations a goal to which their efforts might be directed in order to provide effective forces. However, he said, the direct relationship between combat effectiveness of the forces and casualty rates had to be borne in mind,

(64) Memo, Gen Evans, ACOS OANDT to SACEUR, OT 1101, 14 Feb 53, forwarding Staff Study on Standards of Readiness.

(65) M/R, Col S.K. Eaton, Secretary, 19 Feb 53.
particularly in any presentations which were to be made to
civilian authorities. Hitherto, this relationship had not been
brought out sufficiently, in that SHAPE had not pointed out that
casualty rates were in indirect proportion to the combat effect-
iveness of the forces. General Ridgway stated unequivocally that
he would not change his position regarding the twenty-four
months requirement for active service, but that he was prepared
to change his position regarding standards of readiness. He did
not, however, consider that the classification of reserve units
in D+3, D+15 and D+30 categories was sound. He stated that
there could be no such thing as a reserve unit in these categories
as long as M-Day and D-Day were assumed to be the same. At
this time units were either active or in the D+60 category. However,
if M-Day should precede D-Day by 30 days the latter would become
D+30 reserve units.

General Ridgway considered that certain minimum training
requirements were essential. The four months basic training
requirement for each individual should consist of thorough, pro-
gressive training, and not of uncoordinated periods of duty totalling
four months. Reserve units should have a minimum of 21 consecutive
days' training each year rather than periods of training every other
year.

With this guidance, the SHAPE staff continued to study the
general problem, which was seen to center on the reserve divisions.
Certain nations did not have sufficient manpower to maintain active
divisions, and yet circumstances dictated that divisions from these nations might be committed to battle at the very start of a war, whatever the standards they might have been able to achieve in peacetime. Standards for reserve divisions were difficult to establish because they would vary in detail depending upon national policies. The effectiveness of such divisions would depend upon the presence of regular cadres and on regular training for reservists. Finally, it was considered that the order in which reserve divisions were planned to be committed to battle should determine their priority for aid in equipment.

Another aspect of the problem of standards, as it applied to reserve divisions, was dramatically expressed by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and Administration, General Valluy. In his view, under existing circumstances there would be only one defensive battle for the Continental peoples - the first. The battle of the Rhine, he believed, would be fought with about fifteen international covering divisions, "worn out and decimated", and with some other divisions in which there would be a high proportion of reservists. It was these latter divisions, half active, half reserve, or for that matter all reserve, which would form the last ditch defense of the free nations on the continent of Europe. These divisions, even if not combat ready, were still going to fight. "If we refuse to equip them they will still fight, but they will fight badly... If we are

(66) Memo, 1101/1, Maj Gen Wansbrough Jones, DSACEUR, to DCPO, 25 Feb 53.
presently financially and industrially unable to equip these divisions in accordance with present day standards, let us at least make them into divisions of some sort, perhaps only large brigades provided with heavy armament and with reduced service support, but for God's sake don't just let them go down the drain simply because they cannot measure up to a theoretical standard."

Revised Standards are Presented to the Standing Group

Finally, in March, the SHAPE revised Standards of Readiness for Army Forces were forwarded to the Standing Group.

In the view of the Supreme Commander, ultimate standards of readiness for effective combat had to be established from the military point of view in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding and to show nations clearly the full extent of the current shortfalls. "Any deviation from this approach would allow for dangerous misinterpretation and unrealistic feelings of confidence."

Accordingly, the ultimate standards proposed did not basically depart from the position previously formulated and submitted to the Standing Group on 30 July 1952. General Ridgway realized that, in view of any realistic estimate of present national capabilities, the attainment of these ultimate standards would be impossible for some years to come.

(67) Memo, General Valluy to General Ridgway, 4/OT/DCLA, 10 Mar 53.

(68) AG 1101.3 OT, 21 Mar 53. Supra, p 220.
Because of the possibly discouraging effects of demanding efforts beyond the capabilities of the nations which were contributing the forces, a set of provisional standards for active divisions, to be used only for the NATO planning period 1953-56, was also submitted. These standards were considered to be within the practical capabilities of the nations. Their attainment would not provide the required superior quality, but only the minimum conditions under which divisions could undertake war operations with a limited chance of success. It was pointed out that units reaching these limited standards would be bound to suffer heavy casualties in the initial battle. These casualties would affect considerably the development of the operations since the regular cadres would suffer most, and valuable equipment would either be lost or destroyed. It might well be impossible to replace these losses in men and equipment in time.

As these standards did not apply to reserve divisions, a set of provisional standards for reserve units was also forwarded. Reserve units attaining these provisional standards would be considerably less effective than comparable active units.

The Special Report

In April 1953, prior to the ministerial meeting due to be held later in the same month, a special report on Allied Command Europe was forwarded to the Standing Group. Its purpose was to place before the responsible authorities a condensed and current
estimate of the military potential of Allied Command Europe, with General Ridgway's recommendations for urgently required action. The report followed the Standing Group's "Intelligence Estimate of Soviet Offensive Capabilities", which had shown the continually increasing power of the Soviet forces. In the light of the Standing Group's estimate, SACEUR considered that a full scale Soviet attack in the near future would find his command critically weak in its capability of accomplishing its assigned mission. As it was estimated that the initial battle, likely to be of short duration, could be decisive, there was an urgent need for adequate D-Day forces, for a system by which sufficient warning of an enemy attack could be obtained, and for high and sustained discipline and morale throughout the civilian populations. Although he recognized the steady improvement in effectiveness, organization and back-up of his forces, General Ridgway considered that the tasks that lay ahead had to be faced squarely.

Each area of the command was assessed. Northern Europe could not be effectively defended against a full scale Soviet attack. Norway and Denmark were not, with their own resources, capable of providing the forces required for such a defense. These nations had to have external support, and this support was contemplated in SHAPE planning. However, there were military measures which these nations themselves could take which would substantially increase their ability to defend the vital northern flank.

In the Center, the slow rate of force build-up, logistic weakness
and inadequate unit effectiveness were all serious deficiencies which had to be overcome. However, the potential of the Allied strategic air offensive, the probable effects of atomic weapons in the tactical field, combined with the capabilities of the conventional forces which the nations had raised, had improved the prospect of withstanding a Soviet attack; and there were still hopes that the European Defense Treaty might result in a German force contribution relatively soon.

In southern and southeastern Europe, the air forces were dangerously short of aircraft. The air requirements in this area were beyond the combined capabilities of Italy, Greece and Turkey to provide. Italy's ability to hold an enemy thrust on the ground was steadily increasing, and a successful defense of the borders of Greece and Turkey would be possible if proper, timely measures were taken.

In the Mediterranean, although certain deficiencies continued to limit the effectiveness of naval forces, the position was somewhat better.

General Ridgway was keenly aware of the military progress made by the Soviets and of the increase in their offensive capabilities. As the responsible commander, he considered it his duty to stress the grave deficiencies which existed, "and to seek unremittingly from higher NATO authority and from NATO national governments the combat potential needed to assure the successful accomplishment of [his] mission." He reported that his estimated
force requirements for the defense of Europe had been kept to an
absolute minimum and that some of his principal subordinate
commanders remained convinced that his estimates were too low
and that the build-up would be too late. He was aware that these
factors had been made clear in reports previously submitted.
Nevertheless, he wrote, "I deem it advisable to submit them
again in condensed form in this communication, in order that
there may be no doubt of their nature and in order that NATO and
national authorities concerned may take appropriate remedial action."

At this stage, the air forces were considered to be probably
the weakest link in the defense. The air arm would require higher
priority action until a better balance had been achieved.

The preparation of revised force requirements for 1956 which
would reflect new technical development and the employment of
atomic weapons had not yet progressed to a stage warranting a
conclusion as to whether these developments might lead to a
reduction in conventional requirements, but it was already clear
that the new weapons would powerfully reinforce the capabilities
of the conventional forces.

General Ridgway considered that, since he could expect only
three days' warning prior to a hostile attack, a renewed effort to
lengthen this period through improved intelligence was vitally
important, in order to reduce the devastating effect of surprise and
to gain the added fighting strength possible from timely mobilization
and deployment.
Finally, the importance of rapid initial action in the event of war emphasized the need for early agreement on preparatory measures incident to Simple and Reinforced Alerts.

Within a week, the International Planning Team had analyzed General Ridgway's special report and had recommended to the Standing Group that action should be initiated where necessary. It recommended that the following points should be drawn to the attention of the North Atlantic Council:

a. the lack of adequate air power,
b. the lack of satisfactory logistic support,
c. the need for improved intelligence if the minimum essential warning of attack were to be obtained, and
d. the importance of maintaining confidence in NATO and a high civilian as well as military morale.

Four days later, at a Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, General Ridgway acknowledged the steady improvement in effectiveness of the armed forces of NATO during the last twelve months, but pointed out the growth of Soviet offensive capability indicated by intelligence reports. "I must therefore," he told the Ministers, "continue respectfully to stress the existing grave deficiencies and to seek unremittingly from higher NATO authority and from NATO civilian governments the combat potential needed

(69) SHAPE/411/53, SACEUR's Report to the Standing Group, 11 Apr 53.
(70) IPT 160/3, 20 Apr 53.
to ensure the successful accomplishment of the mission you have assigned my command." He was aware that the conclusions and recommendations he had made were receiving the active consideration of the Military Committee. Mentioning the main areas where deficiencies existed, he added, "With profound respect for this Council, I would like here to express the hope that, if and when these matters come before you or your agencies, they be acted upon with the expedition which I believe they so urgently require." (71)

Forward Planning

In accordance with the revised planning cycle established by the Standing Group, work continued at SHAPE on the evaluation of force requirements for 1956. Strategic guidance had been issued by the Standing Group in December, and the Final Estimate of the Situation and Force Requirements were forwarded to the Standing Group in July.

This estimate took into consideration continuing studies on the effects of new equipment, weapons and tactics which might be in use in 1956. Information had been sought from the Standing Group and from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington on this


(72) MC 14/1, 9 Dec 52.

(73) SHAPE/704/53, Estimate of the Situation and Force Requirements, 10 Jul 53, pp 17 ff.
subject. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had acknowledged the obvious difficulty of giving definitive answers to questions on this subject and suggested that it might be easier to give "assumptions" upon which plans were to be based. In sending its conclusions to the Standing Group, SHAPE emphasized the following points:

a. The proper integration and utilization of new weapons with conventional forces and the resulting ability to initiate instant, powerful reaction to enemy attack might make possible the attainment of decisive results in the first few months of war.

b. The mass destruction inherent in atomic warfare would compel nations, in order to meet an atomic attack, to take pre-D-Day measures which theretofore would not have been considered politically feasible.

c. The responsible military commanders would have to be delegated adequate pre-D-Day authority given in accordance

(74) SHAPE/883/52, New Weapons and Tactical Techniques. The query was made when the study of 1956 force requirements, in the light of new developments likely to be available, was initiated. See also SHAPE 1004/52, SHAPE 1956 Force Requirements, 20 Sep 52; SM 208/53, US JCS, SHAPE Force Requirements - Information Required for the Computation of SHAPE 1956 Force Requirements, 30 Jan 53; and SM 800/53, US JCS, Answers to Questions Concerning New Equipment, Weapons and Tactics Expected To Be in General Combat Use by 1956, 5 Apr 53. The intelligence estimate of the enemy threat for 1956 had been provided in SG 161/3, 22 Oct 52.
with pre-D-Day NATO agreement by the highest governmental authorities concerned which would permit them to initiate instant retaliation to hostile attack.

d. Regardless of how politically unfeasible such pre-D-Day arrangements and delegation of authority might have been in the past, these measures had now become of vital importance in view of the distinct possibility that surprise, if achieved and exploited, could result in decisive Allied defeat.

e. The concept for the employment of conventional forces and new weapons set forth in the study indicated that the balance and phasing of currently approved forces would almost certainly require revision.

f. Prior to the determination of firm force requirements, action would have to be taken at the highest level to reduce to a minimum the indeterminate factors then inherent in the study.

General Ridgway recommended that the Standing Group, as a matter of urgency, initiate action to clarify the still undetermined factors, with particular emphasis on the strategic concept and the concept of operations in relation to the operation of other commands, the length of time - assumed to be from five to seven days - which SACEUR would have in which to intensify his preparations prior to attack, estimated Soviet atomic capability, and SACEUR's estimated atomic capability. SHAPE considered that, with the Allied atomic capability envisaged in the study, a forward strategy in the Central and Southern Commands should be adopted. However,
it would be essential that SACEUR have at the outbreak of hostilities:

   a. on hand and operationally deployed, a complete, flexible delivery system and sufficient atomic weapons,

   b. authority to initiate atomic weapons and to expend atomic weapons,

   c. highly trained, mobile forces, and

   d. a reliable and flexible command, control and communications system. These were in addition to the early warning requirements previously outlined.

   The report contained requirements for land divisions up to M+90, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>M-Day</th>
<th>M+3</th>
<th>M+15</th>
<th>M+30</th>
<th>M+60</th>
<th>M+90</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>68 23/3</td>
<td>82 23/3</td>
<td>96 25/3</td>
<td>116 25/3</td>
<td>129 25/3</td>
<td>140 25/3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   For the air forces, 9136 aircraft were required to be available on D-Day:

   856 in the North,

   5413 in the Center, and

   2867 in the South.

   These figures did not provide for the losses which would be incurred if the Soviets attacked the Allied airfields with atomic weapons. It was considered apparent at this stage that dispersal was an important

(75) SHAPE/704/53, 10 Jul 53, Appendix.
method of reducing losses, but dispersal would involve a lower sortie rate. However, if aircraft losses attributable to such attack were estimated at 18% in the North, 30% in the Center, and 18% in the South, the requirement reached the figure of 12,913 aircraft, as against the previous estimate in November 1952 of 11,842.

Training and Maneuvers

Training plans for 1952 and 1953 had been begun in the autumn of 1951 and continued into the following spring. CPX I, held in April 1952, had shown the need for giving commanders and staffs experience of operations, for increasing inter-service cooperation, and for developing a sound logistics organization. The general theme chosen for 1952 autumn maneuvers opposed two enemies of unequal strength on a general north-south line in the vicinity of the Main River. However, when SHAPE approached the various governments in order to determine the numbers of troops which might be made available, it found that there were a number of impediments to carrying out the maneuvers as planned. France pointed out that financial difficulties partly due to re-armament and the war in Indo-China would "not allow the heavy expenses for the total execution of your project". As far as

(76) SHAPE/1215/52, 8 Nov 52.

(77) SHAPE History, Vol I, Sec III, pp 334 ff.

(78) 7597 EMCFA/12-2C, M. Bidault, MOD France, to Gen Eisenhower, 10 Jan 52.
the United Kingdom was concerned, there was little hope that any reserve formations could be mobilized and made available for participation in the maneuvers. (79)

At about the time when General Ridgway took over command, Marshal Juin had expressed uneasiness over the renewal of Soviet activities directed against the Allies and over Soviet opposition to the EDC and Contractual Agreements. He considered that the Soviets would seize upon every pretext to develop tension and any opportunity offered them to claim that they were being attacked. Such an opportunity, in Marshal Juin's view, would be offered by the large scale maneuvers planned to be carried out by Central European forces in 1952. He considered that smaller scale maneuvers, such as those of 1951, would be more useful, together with command and signals exercises, and advised reconsideration of the maneuver plan for 1952. (80)

Some nations pointed out that, as they had not heard until February 1952 that it was planned to conduct mobilization exercises, it would be impossible to complete arrangements for the recall of reservists during that year.

Some mobilization exercises were carried out, nevertheless, and proved of great value; and as a result General Ridgway planned for further mobilization exercises during 1953. He asked the

(79) BMR/640/52, 13 Mar 52.
(80) C/993/ALFCE/SG, 26 May 52.
Ministers of Defense to make preparations for exercising a
selected part of the mobilization machinery, to include the recall
of officers and other ranks without warning, this to be followed
by a tactical move to a training area and a divisional exercise.
The large scale maneuvers originally planned were thus modified
and in part carried over into 1953.

During 1952 and 1953, however, exercises were carried
out to test headquarters staffs and units. At General Ridgway's
direction, live ammunition was used overhead and aircraft fired
live ammunition in close support.

**Command Post Exercise II**

Plans for 1953 envisaged the achievement of training
objectives under national programs. SHAPE itself did not plan
to conduct field exercises or maneuvers in 1953. It did plan,
however, to hold two command post exercises, CPX's II and III,
in March and November, which would be attended by senior
commanders and selected staff officers.

CPX II was divided into two parts. In the first part two sub-
jects were studied which were vital to the development of SHAPE
policy and to the strength of Allied Command Europe. These

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(81) Ltr, General Ridgway to MOD Belgium, 22 Sep 52.
(82) Training Directive No 9, AG 2333 OT, 30 Oct 52.
were the impact of atomic weapons on modern war and logistics. The second part of the CPX was a strategic exercise concerning the defense of the northern and southern flanks. Three conclusions were reached and expressed by Field Marshal Montgomery in his closing address: "Firstly, we have not got today the minimum forces we really need for this job to handle this threat should it develop; we have not got it. Secondly, we have not got the logistic backing for the forces we have, quite apart from the forces we ought to have; we have not got that. And thirdly, we lack the infrastructure that we need." These three points, the Field Marshal mentioned, "have been consistently urged upon governments by General Ridgway ever since he first came to take over the command in Europe. He has never failed to emphasize these points, and I would say that this exercise proves that he has been entirely right in this matter; entirely right. And I would go further to say that I think it is incumbent upon all of us in this room here to stand firmly behind him in that matter and never cease to do so. That has been entirely proved by this exercise..."

General Ridgway in his closing address said that the objective of reaching "a proper training level by all NATO forces with respect to atomic weapons should be a high priority objective in our future training." He then announced that he had received from the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff authority to initiate training in this field, and had directed General Handy, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, US Forces in Europe, to organize a school to train senior commanders..."
and key staff officers in the employment of and defense against atomic weapons in support of land forces. It was General Ridgway's wish that all Major Subordinate Commanders should include atomic play in at least one of their major exercises in the autumn of 1953.

He summarized the requirements of his Command in three words: men, material, morale. Although it was the primary responsibility of the civilian authorities to provide the first two, men and material, the military commanders must discharge in full their continuing responsibility, he said, for stating their minimum needs in these essentials. Given the men and the material, it was the primary responsibility of the commanders to provide the third, morale.

(84) CPX II Master Papers.
# LAND FORCE REQUIREMENTS

## SHAPE/1215/52

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<tr>
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* Expressed as Div Equivalents.
### NAVAL FORCE REQUIREMENTS

**SHAPE/1215/52**

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<td>D/30</td>
<td>D/15</td>
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<td>ML</td>
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<td>MINING AC</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* A two division force is required as a strategic reserve. They will be deployed wherever required within Allied Command Europe. Present planning envisages one of these divisions in Northern Europe before D+30.
# Appendix C

## Air Force Requirements

**SHAPE/1215/52**

### Northern Europe

<table>
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<th>Type</th>
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**Total** 865 (42)

### Central Europe

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<td>MB</td>
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<tr>
<td>RECCE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Troop Carrier</td>
<td>464 (29)</td>
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**Total** 8551 (404)
### SOUTHERN EUROPE

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<td>96 (6)</td>
<td>32 (2)</td>
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**TOTALS**

1254 (64) 398 (19) 772 (37) 2424 (120)
### Chapter VIII

**FORCE TABLES AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1952 - ARMY**

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Note: *Since no trained units of an RCT or above are maintained on an active basis in peace, it is not possible to consider any Danish Forces as combat effective before M+30.*

(85) SHAPE/1357/52, 6 Dec 52, Appendix A. SACEUR's Status Report did not include tables on NATO naval forces, a large proportion of which were not assigned to the Command.
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Notes: * Until the 18 months period of national service is effective, the twice-a-year turn-over of the existing Brigade makes an M+Day assessment inadvisable.

† SHAPE is not presently in a position to make an accurate assessment of the combat effectiveness of the Greek and Turkish forces.
FORCE TABLES AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1952 - AIR

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(86) SHAPE/1357/52, Appendix B.
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Note: *Excludes 100 French and 1050 U.K. aircraft retained under National Control.

### GREECE AND TURKEY

SHAPE is not presently in a position to make an accurate assessment of the combat effectiveness of the Greek and Turkish Air Forces.
CHAPTER IX

LOGISTICS AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Introduction

On May 19, 1952, ten days before General Ridgway arrived to assume Supreme Command in Europe, General Gruenther had said at a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the Major Subordinate Commands, "... of all these problems, ... logistics, communications, reserves and command, the one that we are probably less advanced in solving than any /other/ is logistics, which is our greatest headache." (1)

There were many factors which made progress very slow in the fields of logistics and infrastructure. Difficult problems of a political, economic, legal and military nature affected the nations in varying degrees. International tension was decreasing, and for political reasons this affected defense budgets; the NATO countries were encountering increasing economic difficulties; legal problems were developing as land acquisition and internationally-financed construction proceeded; and competition for the supply of equipment had led to a system of priorities which was the cause of much discussion. For these reasons, although much work was done during the periods of command of General Eisenhower and

(1) SHAPE/616/52, Verbatim Report, Meeting of Chiefs of Staff, SHAPE and Subordinate Commands, 19 May 1952, 18 Jun 52.
General Ridgway, the progress actually achieved was chiefly related to clearing the way for future development.

In this chapter, the SHAPE Logistics Plan and the Fourth Slice Infrastructure Program, which were developed during General Ridgway's period of command, will be set against the logistics background in mid-1952, at the close of General Eisenhower's period of command. It will be seen that at the time of General Ridgway's departure from SHAPE, although the foundations for future achievements in the fields of logistics and infrastructure had been laid, he was forced to express his dissatisfaction with progress made, as had General Gruenther a year before. "The growth of land forces during the past year," General Ridgway wrote, "while not satisfactory, has been encouraging. This... is not true of the arrangements for supply and support of those forces."

The Logistics Situation Mid-1952

In the Status Report which General Ridgway sent to the Standing Group soon after his arrival in 1952, he outlined the major deficiencies in the field of logistics and pointed out that he was concerned that member nations were unable to provide timely and adequate logistic support for their forces under combat

(2) Second Annual Report by SACEUR, 30 May 53, p 16.
(3) SHAPE 723/52, 12 Jul 52, para 6(c). Supra, pp 239 ff.
conditions, even on the most austere basis. He asked that nations be called upon to correct the current acute shortage of logistic support units, to build up essential reserve stocks, and to provide for positive wartime resupply. Ammunition stocks, with the partial exception of those for the United States and United Kingdom forces, were dangerously low. Unless immediate remedial action were initiated, existing forces, weak as they were, would exhaust existing stocks in a few days of combat. The provision of adequate means for the repair and overhaul of equipment was also required.

In addition, communications were seriously deficient within Allied Command Europe. There were no means of direct communication, for example, between Norway and the United Kingdom, between Italy and Greece, between Greece and Turkey and between Sicily and Tunisia. There were inadequate communications between Norway and Denmark and weak networks in Italy, Greece, Turkey and parts of Central Europe. By the end of 1952 communications in Central Europe were expected to meet minimum essential needs, but it was not anticipated that conditions in other areas would improve appreciably.

Infrastructure

General Ridgway's report mentioned the progress made in providing airfields under infrastructure programs. One hundred and thirty airfields had been programmed for completion by the
end of 1953. Against a requirement of 39 airfields for the forces currently available, only 32 were usable. The principal deficiencies in elements essential to operations were a lack of adequate fuel storage and distribution facilities, lack of Ground Controlled Approach (GCA) electronics systems and lack of airfield lighting.

The POL logistics complex had been fully discussed in a report issued in June 1952 by Headquarters Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCE). It was evident from the statements made in this report that much overall planning by SHAPE and higher NATO agencies was required before operational standards could be reached in the Commands. The report revealed that, although nearly fifteen months had passed since the foundation of AAFCE, no basic decisions regarding lines of communication and base ports had been made. Moreover, no firm decisions had been reached regarding such essential items as standardization of equipment, storage and issue of POL, and means of transportation.

**Authority for Logistics Control**

In SACEUR's Revised Terms of Reference, approved by the North Atlantic Council at Lisbon, the basic logistics policy

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(4) Includes airfields in 4th Slice Infrastructure Program due for completion by end 1953.

(5) SHAPE 723/52, 12 Jul 52.

(6) AAFCE 446/52, POL Logistics Complex, 15 Jun 52.

(7) MC 22/12, Revision of SACEUR's Terms of Reference, para 12, 19 Feb 52. Also DC 24/3 (Fin), 27 Aug 52, App "A", para 12.
The responsibility for logistic support to national component forces will, in general, remain with the responsible authorities of the nations concerned. The responsibility for coordination will, however, rest with the Supreme Commander, and with his Major Subordinate Commanders at the appropriate levels.

Although the Military Committee had also provided more specific direction, the problem of authority in logistic matters continued to be studied at SHAPE. The elements of the problem could be summed up as follows:

a. The basic inflexibility of a logistic support system which comprised several separate national lines of communication under separate national control, restricting the deployment of allied forces to narrow limits;

b. The inadequate authority of allied commanders to ensure that the logistic support provided by nations was capable of supporting actual operations envisaged and responsive to the continuously changing requirements of operation in actual battle conditions; and

c. The complex method of ascertaining the overall logistic capabilities of national systems.

The subject of logistics control was associated with the study which was undertaken for the establishment of an adequate logistics organization.

Logistics Organization

At the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at Lisbon during February 1952, the Council had approved a

(8) MC 36 (Fin), Division of Responsibilities between National Territorial Commanders and Major Subordinate NATO Commanders, 21 Nov 51.
resolution proposed by the Temporary Council Committee directing the Military Committee and the Major NATO Commanders to prepare the plans and groundwork for an operative logistics and supply system in support of NATO defense. A staff study initiated at SHAPE for submission to the Standing Group as a result of this resolution was to be the basis for the establishment of an operative logistics system.

This study took into account the deficiencies revealed by CPX I, held at SHAPE during April 1952. Taking the ground forces of the Central European Sector as an example, this exercise had clearly demonstrated that, even if there had been adequate stocks, transport, and service troop units, the logistics organization as a whole was so complex and inflexible as to provide no sound backing to the operational plan.

The SHAPE staff study on "Logistics Organization and Control Allied Command Europe" was forwarded to the Standing Group in October 1952. It was approved in May 1953, but with certain reservations. Further discussions were held between working parties from SHAPE and the NATO nations, and when General Ridgway left SHAPE in June 1953 these discussions were

(9) C9-D/20, Minutes of NAC Meeting, 23 Feb 52, para 9(c).


(11) SGM-698-53, Comments by Standing Group on SHAPE 1130/52, 6 May 53.
still continuing. The foundations were in fact being laid for the new logistics organization which was to be set forth in a revised plan submitted to the Standing Group in February 1954.

As a result of this delay, progress toward achieving an adequate logistics system for Allied Command Europe and toward investing in SACEUR the powers necessary for its operation was very limited.

**Development of National Resources**

Nations were already committed, under agreed NATO policies, to the provision of logistic support for their own forces, but it was doubtful that an appreciable part of the forces that were assigned to SACEUR could have been logistically supported for more than a few days of sustained operations. In the peacetime buildup of the logistics system within Allied Command Europe, therefore, SHAPE was concerned with two main problems: the provision of adequate logistic resources, including stocks, transport and service troop units, and the attainment of an organization capable of providing flexible support to several national components operating under a single allied command.

In carrying out SACEUR's peacetime responsibility for ensuring the readiness of his forces, SHAPE had stated to the nations the minimum essential requirements in logistic resources

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(12) AG 1228.08/P93/54 LOG, Logistics System Allied Command Europe, 16 Feb 54.
and organization for the support of the SHAPE Defense Plan. These requirements were entirely consistent with the policy that the logistic support of forces remained the responsibility of each national government concerned.

The SHAPE staff considered the principal areas of deficiency in resources to be initial equipment, war reserves, resupply in wartime and maintenance.

Effective equipping of SACEUR's forces depended essentially upon increased military production. Although the question of production was outside SACEUR's direct sphere of responsibility, it was of vital concern to him. The preparation of the Annual Review provided nations with factual data as to the more critical deficiencies and the measures needed to alleviate them. It was essential that the bottleneck in production be cleared.

Nations had tended to concentrate on the initial equipping of their forces, and this had resulted in an inability to provide requirements for reserve stocks, which were at a very low level. The nations averaged only 10 to 15 days' supply of artillery and mortar ammunition, estimated at SHAPE consumption rates, and the levels for aircraft ammunition were believed to be

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(13) SHAPE 412/51, Tentative Logistics Annex to the SHAPE Defense Plan, 1 Sep 51.

(14) SHAPE/SEC/26/52, 16 Oct 52.

(15) Infra, Chap VII.
dangerously low. In the case of jet fuel for aircraft, less than 50% of the prescribed requirement was on hand. Inspection reports indicated that reserves of spare parts were also in very short supply.

No estimate had as yet been made by NATO nations of requirements for the resupply of their forces in wartime. SHAPE had urged that a 90-day level of stocks be built up for resupply in combat. This level was considered to be the very minimum to sustain the forces until such time as a regular overseas convoy system could operate and a wartime resupply system be established. It was essential that a system be planned in peacetime, as obviously there would be no time after the outbreak of war. Before any such plans could be made, however, it was necessary to ensure that supplies could be procured, manufactured and delivered in the quantities required.

Inspection reports indicated also that maintenance of equipment was unsatisfactory. For the month of August 1952, for example, of 1189 aircraft assigned to AAFCE, an average of only 59% were capable of combat operations. This state of affairs existed also in other parts of Allied Command Europe and was attributed to various causes: lack of spare parts, lack of maintenance organization, and lack of facilities.

The comparatively limited provision of resources agreed

(16) SHAPE/SEC/26/52, 16 Oct 52, Tab III G.
upon in 1948 for the support of the Western Union Short Term Plan had not, some three years later, been fully implemented. In some cases, in spite of these agreements, there had been virtually no increase in the levels of stocks available for the support of the forces. SHAPE was forced to point out that although, with the exception of Greece and Turkey, the nations had accepted the SHAPE minimum logistic requirements, many of them had indicated that they were unable to fulfill them, either with their own resources or with foreseeable external aid.

The SHAPE Logistics Plan - 1952

The proposals outlined in the SHAPE staff study submitted to the Standing Group dealt with each of the main deficiencies and suggested that, in order to achieve an efficient system, it would be necessary to amend SACEUR's Term of Reference in the field of logistics. SACEUR's authority had to be broadened to allow the establishment of an integrated logistics system.

The proposals in connection with resources and resupply were:

a. To establish specific stock levels in the combat zone and in intermediate depots. Intermediate depot commanders in wartime were to maintain their supply levels by demand upon base sections of interior installations as specified by appropriate national authorities.

(17) SHAPE 1130/52, 30 Oct 52.
b. To establish specified reserve stocks in peacetime in base depots in the United Kingdom, France and North Africa, for the resupply of common-user type items in the hands of allied forces, in order to permit SACEUR to direct the flow of these items in wartime to where they were most needed.

c. To start this system as recommended without delay and to exercise it in peacetime by passing material through it. This was suggested in the knowledge that reserves of equipment and certain types of supplies could not be built up for a considerable period of time.

The more difficult problems of SACEUR's authority and the relations of allied commanders with national authorities were to be solved by the adoption of three proposals:

a. Nations should designate logistics staff officers and commanders with authority over base facilities and installations used in the support of those of their national forces assigned to Allied Command Europe. Such staff officers and commanders were to provide the channel for direct coordination and recommendation by allied logistics staff officers and commanders at appropriate levels.

b. Allied commanders at appropriate levels should be given authority to order intermediate depot commanders to assist in the support of operational units of other nationalities when such units were deployed away from their own lines of communication.
c. The power of authority of the allied commanders at all levels over logistic matters should be precisely defined by appropriate modification of SACEUR's terms of reference.

The proposals which concerned the supply of forces involved the establishment of centralized reserves. These reserves would permit the use of items in short supply according to the requirements of projected operations. In order to simplify the problems that would arise regarding costs, it was suggested that the centralized reserves should either be set up under the control of the producer nations, the United States and United Kingdom respectively, or stocks owned by individual nations should be turned over to the "host" nation as custodian. In either case, "host" nations should provide depot facilities.

Limited Approval by the Standing Group

The Standing Group gave approval to the SHAPE Plan for the Organization of Logistic Support of NATO Forces on 6 May 1953. There were, however, reservations which limited the scope of the plan as approved. The Standing Group drew attention to the fact that the SHAPE proposals would have far-reaching financial implications for nations producing common-user items of equipment. It was not possible for the Standing Group to take final action on the plan until such time as the staff at SHAPE had had the opportunity

(18) SGM-698-53, 6 May 53.
to discuss in detail the proposed changes with national representatives of the NATO nations and with ACE subordinate commanders at appropriate levels.

The Standing Group considered that the SHAPE proposals, if not properly regulated, might tend to release the NATO nations from the agreed principle that each nation was responsible for the logistic support of its own forces. Until such time as conditions proved the desirability of altering the principle, the Standing Group considered that they must continue to support the concept that national governments controlled the expenditure of their defense budgets and resources, particularly in peacetime. The SHAPE plan indicated that there would be some modifications to this policy, and any such modification should be guarded against.

Proposals for setting up and retaining central reserves of common-user items had been outlined in the SHAPE plan, which had also suggested that the producer nations should accept responsibility for these central reserves. SHAPE acknowledged that this would put a heavy financial burden on these nations. In addition to the cost of the initial provision of stocks, there was a risk that the stocks might become obsolete; and the problems of stock control and accounting and security arrangements would add to the producer nations’ manpower and financial requirements. The United Kingdom had stated that it could not accept this additional financial burden.
Finally, the Standing Group pointed out that logistic resources were being developed in SACEUR's geographical area of responsibility to support forces which were not specifically assigned to NATO. These resources were intermingled with those required for the support of forces of the same nations which were committed to NATO. It would be necessary, therefore, to ensure that the logistic support of any purely national forces was neither prejudiced nor compromised by any changes in SACEUR's logistic authority.

Within these limitations, the Standing Group supported any proposed modifications to SACEUR's logistics system which would eliminate major deficiencies without compromising agreed principles. In carrying out the SHAPE proposals, the nations must take effective steps to provide service support units and reserve stocks of equipment and supplies and to develop plans for the resupply of forces in war on a NATO-wide basis. Otherwise there would be no guarantee of a firm foundation for NATO logistic support planning for war.

The Standing Group agreed with SHAPE's statement of the basic need for increased military production and financing of production by the European NATO nations. These measures were as necessary as the improvement of the present logistics system, since no system, regardless of its merits and theoretical efficiency,

(19) e.g., The United States Strategic Air Command and the Military Air Transport Service.
could meet the demands placed upon it unless adequate stocks were available.

The SHAPE study had shown the requirement for further study of the procedures under which equipment and supplies were to be made available by the United States to recipient countries. The Standing Group interposed no objection to a preliminary study in this field. However, final approval of the details involved would rest, of course, with national governments and would be affected by national policies within and without NATO.

Standing Group approval of SHAPE's proposal that SACEUR's terms of reference be amended was withheld until discussions had progressed sufficiently to establish very clearly the area and extent of the changes required. Any action on the proposed changes was to be so limited as to deny, except in the case of critical emergency, the power to reallocate or divert national resources without the consent of the appropriate national authorities.

Finally, subject to the comments contained in its memorandum, the Standing Group recommended that the Military Committee approve SHAPE's plan as a basis for further discussion.

In August 1953 SHAPE issued to its Major Subordinate Commands revised Logistics Instructions. These superseded Logistics Directive No. 1, which had been issued in April 1951. The purpose of the new Instructions was to outline the basic principles for the development in peace and operation in war of logistic support for
the forces of Allied Command Europe and to delineate the responsibilities of SACEUR and his Major Subordinate Commanders in these matters.

Planning the Fourth Slice Infrastructure Program

The 1954 force planning goals presented to the North Atlantic Council at Lisbon in February 1952 provided a basis for planning also the infrastructure projects designed to support the forces proposed. As a result of instructions from the Standing Group, SHAPE initiated plans for a Fourth Slice Common Infrastructure Program, which would apply to the construction of projects to be undertaken in 1953. Major Subordinate Commanders were requested to submit projects for inclusion in the program, and when these had been received SHAPE prepared a consolidated program for Allied Command Europe. All projects were analyzed, screened, cost-checked and examined for their suitability as NATO Common Infrastructure. Projects totalling £266 million were rejected.

The final recommended program was dispatched to the Standing Group on 25 June 1952.

(20) AG 2353.02/P865/53 LOG, Logistics Instructions Allied Command Europe, 25 Aug 53.
(21) STAND 302, 18 Mar 52.
(22) SHAPE 6100/I/147/52, Fourth Slice Infrastructure Program - Submission of Projects for Inclusion, 4 Apr 52.
(23) SHAPE 591/52, SHAPE Fourth Slice Recommended Infrastructure Program, 25 Jun 52.
In summary, the Fourth Slice Program proposed:

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<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>COST ESTIMATES (In millions of pounds sterling)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War Headquarters</td>
<td>4.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signals Communications</td>
<td>20.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airfields</td>
<td>146.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jet Fuel Facilities</td>
<td>34.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Facilities</td>
<td>30.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radar Warning Facilities</td>
<td>7.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Navigational Aids</td>
<td>2.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Defensive Works</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Ports Improvements</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Fleet Bases</td>
<td>15.67</td>
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This recommended program included new categories of NATO Common Infrastructure in addition to the previously accepted war headquarters, signals communications and airfields. No projects were included which were not considered vital to the implementation of SHAPE operational plans and necessary to enhancement of the efficiency of the forces they were designed to support.

The cost of infrastructure construction in Germany had theretofore been borne by the Occupying Powers and had not been included in NATO cost-sharing agreements. SHAPE's recommended Fourth Slice Program, therefore, was the first to include projects for construction in Germany.

The Standing Group was also supplied with a list of the relative priorities of projects for the recommended program. The facilities

(24) SHAPE/715/52, Relative Priorities within the SHAPE Recommended Infrastructure Program, 17 Jul 52.
for jet fuel storage and distribution needed for NATO airfields already programmed were assigned the highest priority. National authorities were requested to comment on the proposals, and representatives were invited to attend meetings at SHAPE to discuss any proposed modifications.

In October 1952 the Standing Group requested SHAPE to prepare a list of projects arranged in order of relative importance with respect to the program as a whole. SHAPE, however, replied that it was not feasible to establish balanced listing on such a basis. It was requested that, if a limiting financial ceiling were to be imposed, SHAPE should be furnished with one, or possibly two, cost ceilings within which to revise its recommended program. At this time, however, SHAPE received MRC-16, which contained the comments of the Military Committee on SHAPE's recommended program submitted in June. As a result of these comments, SHAPE, in consultation with the Major Subordinate Commanders, national military authorities, and technical experts, prepared a revised program. Although including supplementary projects for Greece and Turkey, the total cost estimate, £233 million, was somewhat lower than that of the earlier program. The revised program was divided into two increments, the first of £163 million and the second of £70 million.

(25) TOSHAP 300, 28 Oct 52.
(26) SHAPE 1286/52, SHAPE Recommended FourthSlice Infrastructure Program, 25 Nov 52.
Difficulties in Financing the Program

The Infrastructure Committee of the North Atlantic Council received the Revised Fourth Slice Infrastructure Program on 26 November 1952 and commenced discussions, calling in SHAPE representatives for clarification and assistance.

On 3 December 1952 the Council decided that the Fourth Slice Program would be placed on the agenda for consideration at the Ministerial Meeting of that month, provided that the Military Committee had approved the program as militarily necessary.

The Military Committee deemed it "essential that a decision regarding the financing of the infrastructure program should be reached before 1st January 1953. Unless authority is given for work to commence by this date," they told the Council, "delays in placing contracts for materials and supplies and delays in land acquisition negotiations will result in loss of the coming construction season. Consequently, facilities for existing forces would be delayed by a further year and it might not be possible to deploy the minimum air forces which it is estimated will be built up by 1954."

Having been notified of the Military Committee's approval,

(27) STAND 442, SG to MODs, 4 Dec 52.

(28) C-M(52)129, Report by the Infrastructure Committee (quoting remarks by the Military Committee in MCM-34-52), 13 Dec 52.

(29) MCM-34-52, Recommendations by Military Committee, 11 Dec 52.
the Council discussed the Infrastructure Program at their (30)
Meeting on 13 December 1952. General Ridgway was present and gave his views on the proposed program. He pointed out that the issue under discussion was directly and fundamentally related to the successful accomplishment of the mission with which he had been charged. The Infrastructure Program was an essential part of his planning. Assisted by a highly qualified staff, he had drawn up his recommended program with considerations of economy in mind. His chances of carrying out his mission successfully would be seriously impaired, he said, if implementation of (31) the Fourth Slice were held up.

The Council requested the Infrastructure Committee to meet at once with the appropriate military authorities in order to continue its studies of the eligibility of certain projects in the Fourth Slice Program, reporting its conclusions to the Council at the earliest possible moment. (32) The Infrastructure Committee's report invited the North Atlantic Council to accept the cost estimate of £163 million and, on that basis, to consider whether the program could be financed. Referring to the Military Committee's conclusion that the proposed projects were militarily essential, the Infrastructure Committee

(30) C-M(52)34, Summary Record of a Meeting of the NAC, 11 Dec 52.
(31) Idem.
(32) C-M(52)129, Report by the Infrastructure Committee, 13 Dec 52.
invited the Council to consider what projects should be included in the approved program and how their cost should be shared.

The Netherlands and French representatives suggested that the Council approve the program as recommended by the Military Committee and instruct the Infrastructure Committee to obtain confirmation from the host countries on the cost and layout of projects about which any uncertainty still existed. The Infrastructure Committee recommended that the total cost of the programs accepted for cost-sharing be regarded as a financial ceiling within which the programs should be carried out.

The Council met on 15 December to consider the Report of the Infrastructure Committee. General Ridgway was again present at this meeting and made a more specific statement with regard to the Fourth Slice Infrastructure Program as it affected SHAPE. He emphasized that the program represented the minimum requirements to support the military forces and to permit them to fight effectively. The program recommended for financing included only the most critically needed projects required to bring the elements of NATO strength into balance. It had been subjected to the most intensive screening, as a result of which projects originally totalling £497 million, all of which had been recommended by Major Subordinate Commanders as essential military requirements, had been reduced by two-thirds to arrive at the present total of approximately £163 million. This reduced program included only the most critically needed additional airfields and signals communi-
cations, and only a part of the other facilities required to cope with existing deficiencies.

The Council decided that a Special Committee of Ministers under the Chairmanship of Mr. Kristensen, Danish Finance Minister, with the assistance of appropriate military authorities, should examined the Fourth Slice Infrastructure Program and report its conclusions to the Council.

The Special Committee issued its report on 17 December 1952. Annexed to the report was a strongly worded statement by SACEUR regarding the Committee's recommendations.

The Committee had concluded that the projects planned to be constructed in Germany should be deleted from the program as not appropriate for cost-sharing within NATO. Deletion of these projects would reduce the total cost to £150 million. "It soon became apparent", however, "that the NATO countries were unable at this stage to commit themselves to the financing of a program of even this order of magnitude."

The Committee had then requested the Standing Group, in consultation with the two Supreme Commanders involved, to produce a program based on a ceiling of £100 million. This had been

(33) C-R(52)37, Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council, 15 Dec 52, paras 26-35.
(34) Ibid, para 39.
(36) Idem.
presented, but the Committee had thereupon concluded that it would not be possible at that time to commit themselves to even this figure. Still another program had been produced by the Standing Group and the Supreme Commanders, limiting expenditure to £82 million.

In his statement General Ridgway wrote, "In presenting this revised program, I desire to make it unmistakably clear that the reductions made have been made solely in accordance with the financial limitations imposed by the Governments of the North Atlantic Treaty. This arbitrarily reduced program in no way reflects any change or reduction in SACEUR's military commitments nor in my estimate of the essential infrastructure requirements needed to meet them." He went on to list the implications of these cuts. The elimination of seven alternate landing grounds would reduce the possibility of providing alternate airfields should any existing airfields be neutralized and would limit the ability of the Command to receive reinforcements for the air forces. The reduction in fuel facilities would reduce the ability of the air forces to operate intensively and might lead to the grounding of some units after a few days' operations. SACEUR placed particular emphasis on the proposed elimination of air training facilities. He explained that this would make it impracticable to provide adequate operational training for the available forces. It would, he said, "materially reduce the ability of my air forces to support my ground forces; materially
reduce combat efficiency; result in materially higher casualty rates in combat; and further materially reduce the effectiveness of the already inadequate planned air forces to counter the enemy threat and support the army." He asked the Council to remember "that we presently have no spare aircraft and few extra pilots to meet inevitably heavy initial battle losses."

After pointing out the effects of the cuts on naval airfields and naval bases, he enumerated the results of cutting communications infrastructure. "The reduction of this program", he said, would "decrease the ability to conduct a coordinated land, sea and air defense; reduce the effectiveness of overall direction of defense. Signal communications are an essential exercise of command and one of our few means for reducing Soviet superiority."

SACEUR explained how the lack of navigational aids and radar warning installations, which had been totally eliminated, would weaken the air and sea defense and increase the threat to civil populations, military installations, and civil and military lines of communications. Finally, he mentioned the delay in completing war headquarters which would be brought about as a result of the cuts, and the effect of this upon command control.

Concluding his statement, General Ridgway urged reconsideration of the projects not provided for in the Special Committee's report.
"The gravity and consequences of the above implications will be evident to Governments," he said. "It is essential that they should be entirely cognizant of them. I am fully aware of the present conditions of economic and financial stringency... Nonetheless, I cannot over-emphasize the importance, or over-stress the urgency, of making good at the earliest opportunity those measures now omitted from the program originally submitted to me... I therefore urge most strongly that those infrastructure items for which provision is not made at this time be reconsidered and financed by the Council at their meeting, as a part of, and during, the process of the Annual Review and the final determination by nations of their force goals for 1954."

Despite this appeal, two days later, on 19 December 1952, the Council approved the second revised program of £82 million, of which approximately £78 million was for the provision of infrastructure projects within Allied Command Europe.

Details of the approved program were issued by SHAPE on 23 December 1952 to the Subordinate Commands, MODs, and the Standing Group. The £78 million was apportioned as follows:

- Airfields: £37.5 million
- POL Installations: £28.5 million
- Signal Communications: £9.4 million
- War Headquarters: £2.5 million
- Total: £77.9 million

(37) C-R(52)42, Minutes of North Atlantic Council Meeting, 19 Dec 52.

(38) SHAPE/1420/52, Implementation of the Approved Portion of Fourth Slice Infrastructure Program, 23 Dec 52.
Financing the Second Increment of the Fourth Slice Infrastructure Program

In early January 1953, SHAPE submitted to the Standing Group the remaining items for which no provision had been made at the December meeting of the North Atlantic Council. The urgency of financing this second portion was stressed, even though part of the 1953 construction season had been lost. To the Ministries of Defense of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, SHAPE stressed the vital need for early financing and implementation of the approved projects located in Germany. On 13 March 1953, representatives of SHAPE appeared before the Infrastructure Committee of the North Atlantic Council to answer technical questions concerning the projects under consideration.

At its meeting in Paris on 23-25 April 1953, the Council gave approval to the Second Increment of the Fourth Slice. The costs were apportioned as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>Airfields</td>
<td>£29.7 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Training Installations</td>
<td>£10.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Training Installations</td>
<td>£1.0 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>Naval Base Installations</td>
<td>£12.5 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>POL Installations</td>
<td>£3.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radar Warning Installations</td>
<td>£0.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Navigational Aids</td>
<td>£1.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signals Communications</td>
<td>£4.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Headquarters</td>
<td>£1.0 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL**  
£64.7 million

(39) SHAPE/1/53, Fourth Slice Infrastructure Program - Second Increment, 7 Jan 53.

(40) LOG 6100/4/E 75/53, 9 Feb 53, Appendices A & B.

(41) C-R(53)22 and C-R(53)23, Minutes of NAC Meeting, 24 Apr 53.
Supplementary Infrastructure Program

The Third Slice Infrastructure Program, which had been approved at the Lisbon meeting of the North Atlantic Council in February 1952, was revised in September 1952. The adjustments made to the program resulted in increasing the costs by £2.4 million, bringing the total cost to £154.4 million. A further revision of the Third Slice was made in April 1953, and the total was readjusted to £152.1 million.

The Third Slice cost-sharing program had contemplated 84 airfields, but the adjustments made in April 1953 reduced this number to 81, estimated on the basis of the original data to cost £134.4 million. Progress made in the construction of airfields during 1952 had been such that, of the 125 airfields programmed for the first three slices, 66 were available for at least limited operations when supplemented with portable equipment. An additional 28 airfields were available for emergency use.

Long-Range Infrastructure Programs

Although the SHAPE staff had been occupied with the Fourth Slice Program during most of 1952, the provision of infrastructure

(42) For a description of the original program see SHAPE History, Vol I, Sec III, Chap IX, pp 285-288. The revised program was issued as SHAPE/839/52, 5 Sep 52.

(43) SHAPE/266/53, Revised Recommended Third Slice Infrastructure Program, 7 Apr 53.

(44) LOG 2208/P 167/53, SHAPE/LOG/55/53, LOG DIV Historical Report, 23 Feb 53.
support for the forces during the period following 1954 was indicated in August 1952 when SHAPE forwarded to the Standing Group estimates of the tentative requirements for "Fifth and Later Slices of NATO Common Infrastructure." These estimates totalled £177 million.

The Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in April 1953 was memorable in that the Council not only gave approval to the second increment of the Fourth Slice but also made provision for long-range infrastructure projects. Future programs could be submitted by the Supreme Commanders for the period 1954, 1955, and 1956 involving expenditures of up to £250 million, subject to the approval of the nations. These programs could include a wide range of projects such as airfields, telecommunications, naval bases and port facilities, pipelines and radar installations. As General Ridgway stated in his Annual Report, "This far-sighted departure from previous year-by-year financial approval represents a long step forward. It will enable us to improve greatly the planning for construction by placing it on a firm, long-range basis."

(45) SHAPE/706/52, SHAPE Tentative Fifth and Later Slice Infrastructure Program, 2 Aug 52.

(46) Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the NAC, 23/25 Apr 53.

(47) Second Annual Report, 30 May 54, p 17.
Problems in Processing Common Infrastructure Programs

As a result of the difficulty of securing approval of many projects recommended by the Major Subordinate Commands, it was found necessary to clarify the concept of common infrastructure. This, it was hoped, would prevent recurrence of the long delays which had resulted from attempts to include in the programs items which were not clearly eligible for classification as NATO Common Infrastructure.

For example, if those projects eventually declared ineligible by the Special Committee of Ministers had been processed under national infrastructure programs from the beginning, progress might have been quicker.

National infrastructure SHAPE defined as those fixed static installations which were required by respective nations for the operational, logistic, or administrative support of their own forces, including the national forces assigned to or earmarked for SACEUR. The fact that two nations might have a joint interest in an installation did not in itself mean that the installation could be classified as NATO Common Infrastructure. Such installations would normally be provided under national programs.

As a further step toward a definitive logistics policy, SHAPE

proposed to the Standing Group that methods of cost estimating and inspection of infrastructure projects be defined more clearly. SHAPE maintained that, although it was responsible for the original preliminary rough cost estimates when recommending new programs, it should not be responsible for detailed cost estimates. Also, SHAPE should not become involved in cost control or inspection of the activities of national civil agencies, although it should be authorized to visit projects in order to gain information required to plan their utilization and to determine their operational acceptability. SHAPE suggested that matters pertaining to cost estimates should be handled by the International Staff of the North Atlantic Council, where a suitable organization could be established to work out detailed and precise cost data. Inspection of infrastructure projects as necessary to supervise their construction quite properly rested with the executing nation.

These SHAPE recommendations were incorporated in an overall directive, published by the Standing Group in March 1953, which established a procedure for processing Annual Infrastructure Slice Programs. According to this procedure, the Supreme Commander's recommendations were to be screened for military essentiality and adequacy by the Standing Group and the Military

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(49) LOG 6100/1-603/52, Responsibilities for NATO Common Infrastructure, 16 Oct 52.

(50) C-M(53)24, 6 Mar 53. For a description of the control of expenditure on infrastructure projects, see Ismay, NATO, The First Five Years, p 118.
Committee, and then submitted to the North Atlantic Council. The military programs were to be screened from the technical, financial, economic and political points of view by experts of the NATO International Staff and by the Infrastructure Committee, which would finally present the program to the Council. Following Council approval, implementation would be subject to a further system of budgetary control.

Planning in the Medical Field

A survey of logistics would not be complete without mention of planning in the field of medicine. Plans developed in the Medical Section of SHAPE's Logistics Division required considerable coordination with the NATO nations and with the Major Subordinate Commands.

A survey of health resources and the medical material and supply situation within the forces assigned or earmarked for assignment to SACEUR, as well as a broad initial survey of the situation in the NATO countries, was accomplished in 1952 by the Medical Section, with the assistance of Colonel H. B. Nelson, USAF (MSC). In cooperation with the Medical Section, Colonel Nelson prepared a questionnaire and set the pattern for surveys of both the military and civilian medical material situation in the countries of NATO with forces assigned to SACEUR.

One function of the Medical Section was to plan the medical support for Allied Command Europe. Its planning encompassed
the provision of medical facilities, material, professional and technical personnel, hospital facilities, evacuation capabilities, medical training, and the requirements for laboratories. All this necessitated close liaison with both civil and military authorities, particularly in the field of atomic, biological and chemical warfare.

At a Medical Planning Conference held at SHAPE on 2-4 October 1952, progress was made in the development of ABC medical defense capabilities, the standardization of medical material and medical procedures, the establishment of uniform terminology and records, and the provision of essential supplies and planning for medical training. At a subsequent conference, held 8-10 June 1953, which was also attended by senior medical officers, both military and civilian, from fourteen countries, General Gruenther commented on the problem facing SHAPE in this field.

"We're short in the field of supplies," he said, "we're short in the organizational set-up in logistics, because the countries themselves haven't, as a general principle, devoted enough attention to it. And every decision that's made in the field of logistics carries with it a budget implication. You know best yourself in your particular field, the medical field, that for the most part you are dangerously short of supplies to back up any

(51) SHAPE Medical Planning Conference - 1952, 2-4 Oct 52, (in Medical Branch, LOG DIV).
(52) Minutes of Meeting, AG 2030/MED-272/53(LOG), 2 Oct 53.
kind of war effort now."

In his closing address, the Chief of the Medical Section particularly emphasized the need for international coordination in the field of medicine. The review of medical material resources made by SHAPE had indicated that serious deficiencies existed in this area. In wartime there was little difference between military and civilian requirements, and the greater number of casualties might possibly be among the civilian population. However, there was no agency responsible for gathering information on total civilian and military requirements. There was an urgent need for international coordination of the national agencies that existed. The conferees agreed that an "international approach to the health resources requirements must be established" and recommended that the Standing Group be requested to appoint a working party to study the organization, scope of responsibility, terms of reference, aims, and objectives of a peacetime board for medical resources, in order that the North Atlantic Council might consider the establishment of a NATO Medical Committee.

Northern Command - Developments in Logistics and Infrastructure

Although much discussion had taken place, no firm plan had developed regarding the location of supply bases in Norway, Denmark

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(53) Brig General W.J. Kennard, USAF.
(54) The NATO Medical Committee held its first meeting in Nov 54.
and Great Britain, or on the lines of communication for the
maintenance of the Northern European Command from those bases.

It had been proposed to establish a main supply base in
the United Kingdom, but at the time General Ridgway relinquished
his post as Supreme Commander no decision had yet been reached.
The heavy cost involved in creating supply bases in Norway and
Great Britain was one of the limiting factors. The Norwegian
Chiefs of Staff were of the opinion that the reserves of supplies
in Norway ought to cover 90 days' wartime consumption for the
three services. Bases would have to be established in Norway,
including one for the supply of material to Denmark, in addition
to the main base in Great Britain. A shortage of shipping suitable
for small ports necessitated the employment of larger, more
expensive, ships and off-loading to small vessels, which made for
an expensive system of supply and distribution. By January 1953
it was realized that the establishment of a 90-day level of stocks
would be too costly and that a phased system should be worked
out. The first increment of about 30 days' supply would be
stored in the port areas in Denmark and Norway, and that for the
last 30 days would be accumulated in the United Kingdom. Stock-

(55) See SHAPE History, Vol I, Sec III, Chap IX, pp 268-270, for
a survey of the supply problem.

(56) AFNE/716/52, View of Joint Planning Team, 6 Aug 52.

(57) M/R, 66/LOG/DCLA, 8 Jan 53.
Piling would require many warehouses, and sea transport would have to be planned to move the stocks to the combat units. The geography of Norway, particularly in the North, added to the cost of establishing bases. It would be more effective to supply Northern Norway by sea, because the land route from Bergen was vulnerable and not open all the year round. The defense of Jutland also presented difficulties in the logistic support of whatever troops would be engaged.

Progress in organizing the lines of communication was slow. By July 1953 it had been decided that, of the proposed 90 days' supply, stocks for 60 days should be located in Norway and Denmark and the remainder in base depots in the United Kingdom. Stockpiles would have to be established in Norway and Denmark before any commitments could be made by the United Kingdom to develop base depots there.

Commonly funded NATO Infrastructure in the North, however, showed more progress. The approved Third Slice NATO Common Infrastructure Program provided for airfields, communications and war headquarters. The effect on infrastructure projects of the political situation in Norway and Denmark at this time has already been described.

(58) 30 days operational, 30 days transitional, covering the time required to establish resupply. See Memo for DCLA, SHAPE/DSAC/6/53, 10 Jul 53.

(59) Supra, p 335.

(60) SHAPE History, Vol II, Sec II, Chap VI, pp 170-8.
Although the first airfields in Norway were included in the Program agreed at Lisbon in February 1952, it was not until April 1953 that a clear picture of the airfield construction program appeared. The Third Slice Infrastructure Program, as amended, included four main and three alternate airfields for Norway, with five main and two alternate fields for Denmark.

The proposed Fourth Slice Infrastructure Program presented to the Standing Group in June 1952 provided for one additional airfield in Denmark and four in Norway, at a cost of £7.15 million. As a result of revision of the program in November 1952, the Danish airfield was excluded and three of the four airfields were included for Norway at a cost of £2.03 million. The other Norwegian airfield was excluded from the program in view of the political situation. After the drastic cut in NATO Common Infrastructure Projects at the Paris Ministerial Meeting in December 1952, the approved portion of the Fourth Slice Program contained only one airfield project in Norway, Fornebu, which was an existing

(61) SHAPE/266/53, NATO Common Third Slice Infrastructure Program (Amended), 7 Apr 53.
Norway: Main airfields - Bodo, Garnermoen, Orlandet, Rygge
Alternate airfields: Bardufoss, Lista, Torp.
Denmark: Main airfields - Aalborn, Karup, Skrydstrup, Tirstrup, Vandel.
Alternate airfields: Kastrup, Vaerlose.

(62) SHAPE/591/52, NATO Common Fourth Slice Infrastructure Program, 25 Jun 52.

(63) SHAPE/1286/52, NATO Common Fourth Slice Infrastructure Program, 25 Nov 52.
airfield to be accepted without cost. Another airfield, Flesland, 
was reserved for the second portion. The final program for the Fourth Slice, approved in April 1953, included these two air-
fields at a cost of £3.11 million.

Other infrastructure projects included in the recommended Fourth Slice Program were jet fuel facilities, radar warning installations, radio navigational aids and naval bases. Although
the program was seriously cut in December 1952, it was hoped that some of the excluded items would be approved at the
next Ministerial Meeting. In a letter to Admiral Sir Patrick Brind, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Northern Europe, General Gruenther said, "We regret that the financial limitations imposed upon us made it necessary to omit these projects ... we shall make every effort to have the deleted projects considered during the process of the Annual Review and their financing reconsidered at the next meeting of the Council of Ministers."

When the second portion of the Fourth Slice Program was financed, at the April 1953 meeting of the Ministers, the completed program approved construction in the following categories, exclusive of airfields:

(64) SHAPE 1420/52, NATO Common Fourth Slice Infrastructure Program, 23 Dec 52.
(65) For example, all radar warning installations were excluded.
(66) SHAPE/1424/52, 19 Dec 52.
(67) AG 6100/4/E-80/54, Approved Fourth Slice NATO Common Infrastructure Program, 30 Jan 54.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NORWAY</th>
<th>DENMARK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(In millions of pounds sterling)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jet Fuel Installations</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>1.76</td>
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<tr>
<td>Naval Base Installations</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Warning Installations</td>
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<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Navigational Aids</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Communications</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Headquarters</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The POL Infrastructure Program in Norway provided for the storage of fuel at each of the airfields except Lista and Fornebu. Tanker discharge facilities were to be constructed with connecting pipelines to the airfields. Where necessary, jetties were to be constructed to facilitate tanker discharge. The Danish airfields were to be supplied in the same way, with tanker discharge facilities at the ports and pipelines to the airfields. Karup and Vandel, two inland airfields, were connected by a pipeline with Aalborg, in the North. This pipeline was some 140 miles in length and accounted for much of the expenditure on POL facilities in Denmark.

Future infrastructure projects in the Northern Command were planned to extend storage capacity and provide for an additional 60 days' reserve in the United Kingdom. There was also a project for the construction of a war headquarters for Allied Land Forces, Northern Command, to be built in Norway at a cost of £100,000.

The logistics position at the end of the period could not, however,
be considered satisfactory. General Ridgway referred to the inadequacy of the lines of communication, particularly those in the North, in his Status Report to the Standing Group in April 1953. The approved programs constituted a start toward providing support of the defense of the Northern areas of Allied Command Europe, but the unsettled political situation made the task of the SHAPE logistics staff difficult, and planning was held up and decisions were delayed pending an improved political climate.

Central Command - Airfields Programmed

The Third Slice Program of NATO Common Infrastructure made provision for the construction of 55 airfields within the Central Command. These airfields were allocated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1st Slices</th>
<th>2nd Slices</th>
<th>3rd Slices</th>
<th>Estimated Cost (In millions of pounds sterling)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>54.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The airfields programmed under the First and Second Slice had to be altered to conform to SHAPE criteria, as they had been constructed originally on the basis of standards set by the Western Union.

(69) SACEUR's Status Report to the Standing Group, 11 Apr 53.

(70) SHAPE 266/53, Revised Recommended Third Slice Infrastructure Program, 7 Apr 53, TAB C.
There were, in addition, airfields in Germany to be financed under occupation budgets. Of these, ten were airfields which required improvements to the construction provided for in the First and Second Slices, and twenty had not been previously programmed. Only five new airfields were programmed under the Fourth Slice Program, four in France and one in the Netherlands. These represented a programmed total outlay of £10.99 million.

The POL Logistics Complex - Central Europe

In accordance with SHAPE policy, Headquarters, Allied Air Forces Central Europe, studied the POL logistics complex in the Central Command as it affected aviation fuel. This study resulted in an outline of requirements for jet fuel facilities which were included in the recommended Fourth Slice Program. The deficiencies revealed in the study underscored the need for urgent action in establishing an efficient and adequate supply system. There was, in particular, a shortage of storage facilities throughout the Central Command. The existing reserve was held mainly in barrels, and this created a difficult distribution problem.

The development of programs to increase air strength and to construct airfields made it necessary to establish stock levels

(71) AG 6100/4/E-80/54, Approved Fourth Slice Infrastructure Program, 30 Jan 54, Annex II.

(72) AAFCE/446/52, The POL Logistics Complex, AAFCE, 19 Jun 52.
necessary to maintain the planned forces. It was considered necessary to maintain a minimum of seven days' supply of jet fuel, estimated at maximum rate of effort, to be held at airfields. In addition, 90 days' reserve was required: 30 days' combat supply, assessed at maximum rate of effort, as a forward reserve - assumed to be within one day's haul of the airfields - and 60 days' combat supply, assessed at intensive rate of effort, to be stocked in the rear of the Communications Zone, in the United Kingdom or in main base areas as a base reserve.

The AAFCE study pointed out the inherent weakness in the principle that the provision of POL was a national responsibility. The planning and administration of the whole POL logistics complex could not remain divided into five or six segments within the "jigsaw of national responsibility". The study urged that the entire complex be brought under a central agency, endowed with sufficient authority to induce executive action by the nations as required.

The Fourth Slice Infrastructure Program, as finally approved, provided for the following jet fuel installations:

(73) SHAPE 412/51, Tentative Logistics Annex to the SHAPE Outline Defense Plan, 1 Sep 51.
(74) AAFCE/446/52, 19 Jun 52.
(75) AG 6100/4/E-80/54, 30 Jan 54, Annex III.
The final allocation of facilities was the result of much discussion as to the relative priority of port clearance of fuel as against forward area distribution. General Norstad, then Commander United States Air Forces Europe, considered that the former should have first priority:

"The problem of port clearance is of major importance, and as POL constitutes well over half the total list, a rapid means of clearing it from the ports of entry must be provided. Should the port lines be laid before the airfield lines, the forward distribution problem remains. However, more detailed study of the location of the airfields and their surrounding territory leads one to believe that resupply to many of them would not create as great a transportation difficulty as would port clearance along heavily congested lines of communication. Any accumulation of supplies at a port would tend not only to bring that port to a standstill but would also increase the value of that port as a target for enemy attack."

The Fourth Slice Program was planned to provide storage for 30 days' operating stocks of jet fuel and underground pipelines and

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(76) AAFCE/WKS/6100, Fourth Slice Infrastructure Program - The Storage and Distribution of the Forward Reserve of Aviation Jet Fuel, 1 Nov 52.
pumping stations for distribution of this fuel to NATO airfields. Wherever practicable, stocks were to be located in central areas serving groups of airfields. Thus, the proposed jet fuel facilities program was looked upon as a direct extension of the NATO airfields program. The proposed Fourth Slice Program did not include major pipeline installations from ports to central reserve storage areas, or facilities for the remaining 60 days' storage required to meet the planned 90 days' reserve supply level.

Future provisions to be included in the SHAPE Tentative Fifth and Later Slices Infrastructure Programs were governed by the following requirements:

a. storage and distribution facilities for 30 days' operational stocks for NATO common airfields yet to be programmed,

b. storage facilities for the remaining 60 days' reserve stocks of jet fuel for the total planned build-up of ACE air forces,

c. pipelines from ports to central storage areas, and

d. additional port in-transit jet fuel storage and discharge facilities.

In the Central European Command, the approximate cost of these requirements for storage tanks and pipelines was estimated at £27.3 million for the Fifth Slice and a further £8.6 million in later slices. The provision of this POL storage and distribution complex was to be one of the great logistic achievements of NATO.

(77) SHAPE/706/52, Estimated Tentative Requirements for Fifth and Later Slices, 2 Aug 52.
Other Infrastructure Projects in Central Command

The Fourth Slice Program also made provision for other important infrastructure support of airfields in the Central Command. Radar warning installations were to be constructed in France and Belgium at a total cost of £.13 million. Radio navigational aids, including air traffic control centers, were to be built in France, Belgium and the Netherlands. It was expected that these, supplementing national programs of radar infrastructure, would provide adequate permanent coastal and air defense for the Command, except for an area over the Netherlands where additional radar watching sites were needed to complete the cover against seaborne attacks and remaining areas in Germany which as yet did not have the advantage of static radar cover. It was estimated that there would be a need to have operating, by 1956-8, semi-permanent control and reporting centers on a line 50 miles to the rear of the existing operating zone boundaries. These two requirements were tentatively included in the Fifth Slice Program.

Wartime Use of Ports - Central Europe

Reference has been already made to the problem of re-organizing supply lines of the British and American Forces in Germany. The problem proved difficult to overcome.

(78) Idem.

(79) See SHAPE History, Vol I, Sec III, Chap IX, pp 272-3 for an account of the early planning.
There was agreement regarding the need for British use of the French port of Le Havre and the Channel Ports of the Pas de Calais if the facilities of Antwerp, Zeebrugge and the Hook of Holland should be denied in wartime, but the circumstances of their use were not finally decided until December 1952. In the British view, the Channel Ports should be used first, and then, if their use should be denied, Le Havre. The British considered that the units to support extended lines of communication would not become available in time to make use of Le Havre feasible until three weeks after M-Day, whereas Hq ALFCE took the view that Le Havre should be used immediately.

After a series of discussions with the British authorities and Hq ALFCE, Lt General Valluy, Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics and Administration, SHAPE, recommended a solution which was approved in principle by General Ridgway. This solution, which was passed by SHAPE to the British Chiefs of Staff for their agreement, provided that the actual move from one port to another would be decided depending on the actual situation existing at that time and not upon a pre-planned time schedule. The British would plan and be able to use either the Channel Ports, Le Havre, or a combination of both immediately after D-Day, and the decisions as to what move would be made, when and where, would be a matter for agreement between Allied Command Europe, the British national

(80) 48/LOG/DCLA, 21 Nov 52.
(81) SHAPE/1334/52, 11 Dec 52.
authorities, C-in-C Channel Command, and the national authorities of the country or countries on whose territory the ports were situated.

An agreement was signed on 12 November 1952 between Belgium and the United Kingdom concerning the establishment of a British base in the Province of Antwerp. This was to involve the construction of two small ports along the Albert Canal. As Belgium was situated on the lines of communication of the British forces, the agreement provided that the expense of the base would be shared by the two countries and that, if the Belgian Government should request it, the British Government would permit the establishment, on a similar basis, of a Belgian military base in the United Kingdom.

Southern and Mediterranean Commands - Logistic Support

When the strength of NATO was increased by the addition of the forces of Greece and Turkey in February 1952, the problem of logistic support for these additional forces was added to the overall logistic planning responsibilities of SACEUR.

The geographical location of Greece and Turkey, particularly the latter, gave SACEUR increased opportunities for action, but considerable infrastructure would have to be completed before operations could be initiated or maintained. The territory of these two nations

(83) See SHAPE History, Vol I, Sec III, Chap XII, pp 372 ff.
allowed the siting of advanced airfields, but their geography necessitated extremely long lines of communication over difficult terrain.

Command Structure and Logistic Responsibilities - AFSOUTH/AFMED

The establishment of the new Mediterranean Command made it necessary to define clearly the logistic responsibilities of the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Mediterranean, and the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe. In proposed directives issued by SHAPE on 30 March 1953, their geographical areas of responsibility were defined. CINCSOUTH's area was to consist of Italy (including Sardinia and Sicily), Southern France, Corsica, French North Africa, Greece (including Crete), the islands of the Aegean and Turkey. CINCAFMED was to command in the rest of the Mediterranean area, including Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus and, where applicable, all non-NATO territories in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. In matters of infrastructure, CINCSOUTH had responsibility for developing and recommending common infrastructure programs for all land and tactical air forces and for the naval forces under his command, coordinating his activities in this field with national authorities. CINCAFMED was responsible for developing and recommending infrastructure programs for his naval forces, but, with respect to projects in French

(84) AG 2202.02/P-284/53 LOG, Logistic Responsibilities - Peace and War, 30 Mar 53.
North Africa, CINCSOUTH was to effect the necessary coordination with the French authorities. There would be joint responsibility for all naval common infrastructure projects required to be jointly used by the two commands, and the Commanders-in-Chief were to coordinate their efforts in order to avoid duplication. Common infrastructure projects already approved would remain the responsibility of CINCSOUTH, but projects approved thereafter were to be the responsibility of the command having primary interest. There were inevitable differences in viewpoint between the two Commanders-in-Chief as to the working details of this arrangement. CINCAFMED felt that the division of logistic responsibilities did not permit him to control the resources of his command to an extent commensurate with his operational responsibilities. The national naval force commanders looked to CINCAFMED for operational guidance, but under the proposed logistics directive they would have to look to CINCSOUTH for guidance on all logistic matters.

Under the proposed arrangement, recommendations for all NATO common infrastructure projects related to shore bases, including those developed by CINCAFMED, were to be submitted to SHAPE through CINCSOUTH. CINCAFMED objected to this.

(85) See SHAPE History, Vol II, Sec II, Chap V.

(86) See Memo, Air Commodore Stagge, LOG DIV, for General Gavin, 12 May 53.
Since he would have the bulk of the naval forces under his command in the Mediterranean area, he considered that he should be in a position to submit infrastructure projects for the support of his naval forces directly to SHAPE.

A meeting between representatives of the two Major Subordinate Commands, held at SHAPE on 27 May 1953, clarified the main issues involved. Admiral Carney, CINCSOUTH, wished to retain complete responsibility for the logistic support of the United States Sixth Fleet and also for the immediate naval logistic support of his possible combined operations. Admiral Mountbatten wished to coordinate all naval logistics in the Mediterranean. At this meeting it was decided that CINCAFMED should prepare a suggested directive in accordance with his views and forward it to SACEUR through CINCSOUTH, who would add his comments and proposals.

In a review of the situation on 1 September 1953, it was stated that the proposed directive from CINCAFMED on logistics had been sent to CINCSOUTH on 27 June 1953 for the comments of Admiral Fechteler, who had been appointed to succeed Admiral Carney.

CINCAFMED's proposals offered a basis for a compromise solution. The idea of primary responsibility, which had proved a

(87) Idem.

(88) See Memo, Lt Gen Valluy, DCLA, for Chief of Staff, 28 May 53.

(89) Memo, Air Marshal Dawson, DCPANDP, for Chief of Staff, Controversial Matters in Southern Europe/Mediterranean Area, 1 Sep 53.
stumbling block, was abandoned. Emphasis was given, instead, to the principle of coordination between the two commands in all matters of mutual interest, to ensure a unified approach to national authorities. It was also proposed to set up central agencies in the Mediterranean area to deal with POL and ship repair facilities, in which both commands and appropriate national authorities would be represented.

Infrastructure Projects - AFMED/AFSOUTH

The Fourth Slice NATO Common Infrastructure Program was the first which included projects for Greece and Turkey. It was proposed that the following programs should be financed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GREECE (In millions of pounds sterling)</th>
<th>TURKEY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airfields</td>
<td>10.95</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jet Fuel Installations</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>5.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radar Warning Installations</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Navigational Aids</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signals Communications</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>3.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Installations</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Headquarters</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The airfield program included 14 airfields. Five were to be constructed in Greece - three main airfields, one alternate and one maritime. Turkey was to have nine airfields - six main and three alternate fields. A large amount of signals communications was needed, particularly in Turkey.

(90) AG 6100/4/E-80/54, 30 Jan 54.
The Fourth Slice Program also included projects in Italy and French North Africa. Originally, eight airfields had been recommended for construction in Italy under this slice, but only three were included in the first increment, approved in December 1952. In a letter to the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, General Ridgway explained his reasons for recommending so few airfield projects: "I do not consider there is any possibility of recommending construction of additional main airfields in Italy until such time as there is a positive indication of a further build-up in the Italian Air Force. In pressing for financing for the Fourth Slice Program in December, it was necessary to revise our original program to include only those main airfields for which it appeared certain that units would materialize in 1954. Our evaluation, based on the Italian reply to the Annual Review Questionnaire, MDAP delivery data and the views of the NATO International Production Staff, indicated that there would be a large slippage in aircraft for the Italian Air Force as compared to MRC-12 goals".

The airfields projected in Italy were:

(91) AG 6100 LOG, 7 Feb 53. For discussion of MRC-12 goals, see Chap VII, above.

(92) Ltr, AG 6100/E-37/55 LOG, and Incl 1, NATO Common Infrastructure Data Book, 9 Feb 55.
The Fourth Slice Program provided for two maritime airfields in French North Africa, at Oran and Bizerte, the cost of which was estimated at £6.63 million. These two projects were tied to construction projects for naval bases in the same locations. The differences of opinion between CINCSOUTH and CINCAFMED particularly affected these projects in French North Africa. It was obvious that both commands would have requirements there, and it was essential that coordination with the national authorities should be handled by a single NATO authority, if only to avoid duplication.

**Position at End-1952**

*General Valluy's Report*

Although complete information was not available within SHAPE, a status report on the logistics situation in Allied Command Europe at end-1952 was prepared by SHAPE staff officers from a number of official and semi-official reports. It was concluded on the basis of all available evidence that, not only were the current organization and stocks insufficient to maintain the existing combat forces of most nations

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(93) SHAPE/PPO/243/52, Analysis of End-1952, 8 Nov 52, Appendix A to Enclosure G.
in sustained operations for more than a few days, but the rate of build-up of logistics organizations, service support units, installations and stock reserves was inadequate to achieve an operative logistics system to support the SHAPE Defense Plan by 1954 or even 1955.

In a summary of a presentation he proposed to make at CPX II, Lieutenant General Jean Valluy, Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics and Administration, outlined the progress made in overcoming problems in the logistics field. "At the SHAPE echelon," he said, "we have worked out the infrastructure program in liaison with the national staffs and Subordinate Commands; we have prepared plans for the utilization of national transportation facilities with considerable assistance from the Subordinate Command staffs; activated the build-up of the necessary support units; indicated to the nations the stock totals to be reached, and asked the short nations to conclude agreements with the surplus nations in order to build up and replace their stocks; instructed the Subordinate Commands to prepare, jointly with the national staffs, the overall plans for the organization of supply for each theatre of operations (installation of LOC's and bases, plans concerning convoys, etc.) and we have ourselves prepared a logistics system intended to give more flexibility to the distribution of supplies.

"At the NATO echelon", General Valluy continued, "the

(94) 49/LOG/DCLA, 1 Dec 52.
Committee on Standardization has endeavoured to standardise ordnance equipment and ammunition; the Committee on Production has inventoried the unused productive capabilities of each nation and has pointed them out to the other nations; important infrastructure programs have been financed. The Annual Review has called the attention of each nation to the gaps and the efforts which should be made to correct them."

In conclusion, General Valluy summarized the results of these efforts. "On the credit side," it could be shown that "a large but still insufficient infrastructure program is being carried out; a worthwhile part of our logistic support units has been built up; and the coordination of our transport facilities is making progress... On the liability side", however, he reported, "the standardization of our main equipment has not been achieved; the stocks and maintenance installations necessary for the support of our units have only been constituted to a very inadequate extent; and no country having a shortage has been financially in a position to negotiate a bilateral agreement with a country having a surplus in order to ensure the completion or replenishment of its stores. The necessity of flexibility in the logistics system has been accepted as a theory but not as a reality." In General Valluy's opinion, "In spite of the efforts which have been put forth, our forces have the capability of conducting war operations for a few days only, and even that more in the confusion of cooperation than in the simplicity of co-integration."

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NATO SECRET
Command Post Exercise II

CPX II, held 9-13 March 1953, brought out clearly the deficiencies of the logistics system. General Valluy outlined some of the major problems in his presentation to the national and international senior officers who were present.

It was in the realm of stocks and maintenance that SHAPE was most urgently preoccupied, he said, and it was in this field that achievement was hardest to attain. SHAPE, with the approval of the Standing Group, had established a figure of 90 days as the amount of wartime supply needed to be procured and stocked for the forces of each of the NATO nations. This figure represented the time necessary before wartime resupply could be fully established and flowing. This figure of 90 days was indisputable as an ultimate aim, but for some nations a 90-day level of stocks was obviously quite impossible to attain at that time. General Valluy cited the case of Belgium. The cost of 90 days' stocks of ammunition alone would be 30 billion Belgian francs; the total defense budget of the country was in fact scarcely 17 billion Belgian francs. It was realized that there would have to be a phased build-up to the 90-day level and that phases would vary for different nations, theaters and even materials.

On the average for the continental nations there presently

(95) 64/LOG/DCLA, Speech on Logistics at CPX II.
existed, for example, five to six days' stocks of 105 mm and less than two days' of 155 mm ammunition. There was no more than a 7-days' reserve of jet fuel on the airfields in the Center, and in other commodities the situation was also bad. In addition to the seriousness of the supply problem, it was apparent that there was an equally difficult problem in maintenance of combat effectiveness. SHAPE estimated that attrition in combat would be high, and it was apparent that at the present time there were inadequate means to replace losses.

In this connection, General Valluy mentioned the problem of spare parts. The various forces in NATO were equipped with material from many different sources, but for the most part American. The Americans however were beginning to replace their own equipment with more modern and more complicated types. American equipment which had been placed at the disposal of other nations through the Mutual Defense Assistance Program could be expected to last for 16 to 24 months, but after that time there would be problems of replacement. These required study and decision soon.

In his summary of the Exercise, Field Marshal Montgomery endorsed the views which had been expressed by General Valluy. It was clear, he said, that there was an enormous amount to be done in the logistics field. SHAPE might go on making operational plans, but no operational plan could be sound without proper logistic backing. If the national and NATO higher military authorities did
not face these problems squarely and soon, he believed, the Alliance would face disaster if war should come.

Conclusion

Almost a year after he had become Supreme Allied Commander, General Ridgway reported that, "In the logistics field... progress lags far behind that which is the essential."

The political scene in 1952 had had a bearing on the slow rate of improvement in the fields of logistics and infrastructure. Some politicians held the opinion that the threat to Europe was not so strong as in former years, and this attitude contributed to the inability of the Council of Ministers to agree to finance all of the infrastructure programs recommended to them as militarily necessary. Also, certain countries were meeting economic difficulties which affected national defense policies. It is against this background that the progress made in providing logistic support for Allied Command Europe must be evaluated.

In his Status Report to the Standing Group, SACEUR mentioned the need for over-all control authority and flexibility in logistics. A SHAPE Logistics Plan had been submitted to the Standing Group in October 1952 and returned to SHAPE for further study.

(96) DSAC 1705/2, SHAPE CPX TWO, Final Address by DSACEUR, 13 Mar 53.
(97) SHAPE/411/53, Status Report to the Standing Group, 11 Apr 53.
(98) SHAPE/1130/52, 30 Oct 52.
in the following May. Until a more flexible logistics system was approved, organized and operating, it would be difficult to implement many projects SHAPE had planned. For example, although plans had been made for establishing supply bases, these plans could not be implemented until the question of how much control allied commanders should have over national logistics systems had been decided. Supply organization was largely ineffective because of its strictly national character, and this grave weakness aggravated the extreme shortage of supplies.

Forces had been somewhat strengthened, but the support of these forces had been neglected. It had been necessary in the early days of NATO to emphasize the build-up of forces, to show the world that NATO could weld national forces into a single deterrent force. It was apparent, however, that more had to be done to ensure adequate support for the forces under SACEUR's command. In order to achieve a better balance between forces and their support, infrastructure programs were recommended, the question of stock levels was re-examined, and improvement in coordination of planning with the nations and the Major Subordinate Commands was attained. SHAPE policy directives in such matters as "Responsibilities for NATO Common Infrastructure" and "Cost Estimates and Inspections", had, by the end of General Ridgway's

(99) See SHAPE History, Vol I, Sec III, Chap IX.
(100) See SHAPE History, Vol I, Sec II, Chap VII, re forces build-up.

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period of command, established basic procedures that were to form the foundation for the logistics support organization of Allied Command Europe.

Nevertheless, national economic, political and legal difficulties continued to delay the development of an adequate logistics system in Allied Command Europe, a responsibility with which SACEUR had been charged at the Lisbon Conference in February 1952.
FOURTH SLICE (1953) INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM

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NOTES: (a) Including projects in French N.A.  
(b) Including £ .060 m for a project located in SAAR.

Extracted from AG 6100/4/E-80/54 LOG Approved Fourth Slice (1953) Infrastructure Program, 30 January 54, (NS).
Logistics Division 1952-53

Reorganization

The evolution of logistics policy in Allied Command Europe and the developing responsibilities of the Subordinate Commands brought about a reorganization of the SHAPE Logistics Division at the end of 1952.

When the Division had been organized in 1951, the need for qualified technical experts had been recognized. There were certain limitations to the number of personnel who could be assigned to SHAPE, but General Leavey, Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics, had obtained approval for a skeleton staff to provide technical advice. By 4 October 1951 this group of specialists had become the Services Branch of Logistics Division. During 1952 this Branch took an active part in all the logistic functions of SHAPE.

The Military and political situation, however, eventually made it advisable to work out a more flexible organization for the Logistics Division. Accordingly, the December 1952 reorganization was proposed which involved the abolition of Services Branch. It was expected that, in the event of an emergency, the new organization would be augmented with qualified technical personnel.

The following table shows the Logistics Division organization before and after 29 December 1952:
Before 29 Dec 52

Plans & Programs (P&P) Branch
Movements & Transportation (M&T) Branch
Supply Branch
Infrastructure Branch

(POL Section
(Engineer Section
Services (Medical Section
Branch (Arms & Ammunition
Section (Air-Navy Section

After 29 Dec 52

Plans Branch
Movements & Transportation Branch
Supply Branch
Engineer Branch

Medical Branch
Maintenance Branch

The functions of the reorganized branches and the functions and responsibilities of the two Deputy Assistant Chiefs of Staff were outlined in a memorandum issued in March 1953. The Assistant Chief of Staff continued to control, direct and supervise the activities of the Division, with particular attention to policies, plans and directives. He was assisted by two Deputy Assistant Chiefs of Staff, each directly supervising the branches indicated in the following table:

DAC/S Log Air - Plans Branch
Supply Branch
Maintenance Branch

DAC/S Log Land - Engineer Branch
M & T Branch
Medical Branch

The responsibilities and functions of the branches were described as follows:

(101) Logistics Division Memorandum No. 14, 18 Mar 53.
Plans Branch was responsible for the coordination of policies, plans and procedures within Logistics Division, SHAPE, and the Major Subordinate Commands, responsible for all studies on logistic capabilities and the development and allocation of logistic resources for Allied Command Europe, and responsible for monitoring the special activities of Logistics Division. The Situation Section of Plans Branch was to operate the Logistics Situation and Data Room, to assemble and maintain current data and information on the logistics situation of Allied Command Europe, to include the status of stocks provided by the nations, national plans for providing operational reserves and operational project requirements.

Engineer Branch was closely concerned with infrastructure requirements. Coordination of the development of NATO common infrastructure programs and the evaluation of national infrastructure programs was carried out by the Programming Section, while the Construction Section developed policies with regard to standards and site locations and reviewed the progress of construction of all projects except communications projects. Making necessary field inspections was a special function of the Construction Section. This section was not authorized to exercise technical staff supervision over the implementation of communications infrastructure, as this was the responsibility of the Signal Division.

Supply Branch was responsible for the very important work of assessing the supply requirements of ACE. The various national supply systems were analyzed and stock levels assessed so that
develop a wartime reserve equipment and supply status reporting system. It was found necessary to establish a section especially for coordinating POL requirements and planning the distribution of POL.

**Movements and Transportation Branch** was concerned with the development of plans and policies for lines of communication in peace and war. National systems of transportation were to be studied and coordinated. The Water Section was responsible for all policies and plans relating to shipping, port organization and over-the-beach resupply. Inland water transportation was a responsibility of the Land Section.

**Maintenance Branch** was responsible for coordinating the maintenance and salvage plans for the support of SACEUR's forces with the maintenance and salvage plans of national forces.

**Medical Branch**, formerly a section of Services Branch, had the special task of formulating broad medical policy for Allied Command Europe. The branch was to maintain close liaison with civil authorities on health problems and on the use of hospitals. Training in defense against atomic, biological and chemical warfare was to be undertaken by a "Special Assistant, Medical Aspects of ABC Warfare". Special studies were to be undertaken by the Professional Services and Personnel Section in the fields of standards of medical care, drugs, and the provision of first echelon emergency medical care and first aid treatment and evacuation.
requirements of certain types of common war casualties.

Personnel

Major General Edmond H. Leavey, US Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics, at SHAPE since 1951, retired on 11 August 1952. General Leavey had been recalled to active duty on the activation of SHAPE and had been responsible for the initial planning and organization of Logistics Division.

Major General W. L. Weible, US Army, who succeeded him, arrived from the Far East with many years of experience in the logistics field. In 1946 he had commanded the Yokohama Base, which provided logistic support for all units under direct control of the Commanding General, US Eighth Army. Since October 1950 he had commanded the Japan Logistical Command.

General Weible remained at SHAPE for a few months only, being reassigned to Washington in March 1953. He was, however, responsible for the reorganization of Logistics Division which took place in December 1952.

The next Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics, at SHAPE was Major General Crump Garvin, US Army. General Garvin had commanded the 2nd Logistics Command in Korea. He arrived at SHAPE on 10 February 1953 to take over from General Weible, who returned to Washington to become Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Administration, US Army.

During General Garvin's service at SHAPE, the strength of Logistics Division was increased from 58 officers and 48 others
to 90 officers and 84 others. The growth of the Division reflected the increased emphasis placed on developing an adequate logistics system for the forces of Allied Command Europe.