HISTORY

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED POWERS EUROPE

THE NEW APPROACH
1953-1956

OTAN SECRET
FOREWORD

THE NEW APPROACH describes many of the more important aspects of General Alfred M. Gruenther's tenure as Supreme Allied Commander Europe. This volume was developed to assist SHAPE staff officers and to serve as a starting point for historians. It was designed to be used with the Historical Section's GRUENTHER PAPERS and SHAPE Central Records' microfilm coverage of the era.

Portions of this volume have been in preparation for more than twenty years. Most of the work was written by Mr. Morris Honick, Assistant SHAPE Historian, who has served continuously in the SHAPE Command Group from the midpoint of General Gruenther's command to the present. Parts of several chapters were written or restructured by the undersigned.

Parts of this account were taken directly from papers compiled by staff officers of NATO, the Standing Group, the Military Committee, SHAPE and the Major Subordinate Commands. Where the authors found a lucid, acceptable description of an event, time was not wasted in rewriting. These accounts were used with minor changes, so that the Historical Section might get on with writing the history of other years.

Mr. R. B. John Adams, SHAPE Central Records, greatly assisted the authors by maintaining key documents in a form that the authors could best use and by willingly sharing his extensive knowledge of the early years of SHAPE.

This volume was typed, retyped and finalised by Miss Lindsay Abraham who did in 16 months what a secretary would normally do in three years.

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Lieutenant Colonel, USA
Chief, Historical Section

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Supreme Allied Commander Europe

General Alfred M. Gruenther, United States Army
Early in 1953, following the death of Stalin, and despite indications that dramatic changes might be taking place in the government of the Soviet Union, political and military authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, collectively, continued to perceive a growing threat to world peace. This was evident, they said, in the numbers and state of readiness of the forces of the Soviet Union and the Soviet satellite nations stationed in Europe -- the largest military formations ever maintained by any nation, or grouping of nations, in time of nominal peace.

The speeds of newer aircraft, with which the Soviet Union's forces already had been equipped, and the introduction into the Soviet armoury of modern, intercontinental and medium-range ballistic missiles had reduced the size of the Continent of Europe -- in terms of time and air-distances -- to one third of the area it had represented to military planners during World War II.

During the first two years of the existence of Allied Command Europe (ACE), a number of far-reaching, practical measures had been taken to defend the NATO nations against a Soviet attack. But much of the progress that had been made was of a preliminary planning and organisational nature.

NATO military leaders still lacked assurances that a sufficient number of combat-ready divisions, reserves, air-defence units, command-and-control systems, logistical systems, and other resources, which were required to guarantee a fully effective military defence of the ACE area, would be immediately available to them when needed.

Strategically, therefore -- as most political and military authorities acknowledged -- the only real deterrent to the actions of a potential aggressor continued to be the capacity of the United States Strategic Air Command and the United Kingdom Bomber Command to carry out an atomic attack upon the aggressor's homeland.

But this rather restrictive concept of deterrence implied that the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) had little optional selectivity; that is, he had few choices among methods for reacting to other contingencies such as limited incursions or probing interventions in ACE, contingencies for which a full-scale retaliatory atomic attack might hardly be considered a credible, optional choice.
As a result, beginning in 1953, under the direction of General Alfred M. Gruenther, United States Army, SHAPE planners set out in a new direction. They sought a "New Approach" to Allied defensive concepts and their progressive implementation. At first, aimed primarily at further strengthening the overall capability of Allied forces to meet and to cope with an attack -- especially in the vital Central European Region -- Allied efforts later were oriented toward establishing conditions that would offer a greater number of alternative methods of response in all areas of ACE.

The New Approach Group (NAG), SACEUR's predecessor, General Matthew B. Ridgeway, United States Army, already had sought information from US authorities on the possibility of incorporating "new weapons" into the Allied armoury. But even while still awaiting the availability of full data, and, recognising the myriad of implications that such weapons held for his command, General Gruenther, and a group of SHAPE planners specially designated within his staff -- destined to become known as the New Approach Group -- set out to devise the "New Approach", and the new concepts that were needed for the defence of NATO Europe.

The NAG was the first major, special-study group to function for an extended period within Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) on matters of overall strategic import. Its work was given the highest priority. The facilities of the entire SHAPE Staff were placed at its disposal. Its probing, analysing, and incisive efforts were not restricted to the Headquarters, alone, however; and, as it progressed, its members consulted with Major Subordinate Commanders of ACE, their planners, and national authorities throughout NATO Europe.

The studies that the NAG carried out, and the conclusions it reached, were to become not only the elements of a fundamental change in the evolution of overall Allied defence strategy, but also the precedents and patterns for almost all subsequent planning cycles at SHAPE.

As the result of the NAG's comprehensive efforts, wider optional selectivity in the choices for responding to aggression became available to the SACEUR. Ultimately, a new strategic concept was to be the outcome.

Signs of Diminishing Support. Almost simultaneously, however, some Allied nations, for the first time since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, either were compelled to reduce, or indicated a reluctance to meet established force-requirements and goals -- goals to which they already had agreed, or which had been set as indispensable minimums by SACEUR.
Not least of the factors underlying the reluctance of those nations was the understandable anticipation of the availability of "new weapons"—weapons that, somehow, would obviate the need for greater numbers of forces, and a greater expenditure of resources. Other factors were the diverging national policies on the proposed European Defence Force (EDF), a grouping of Continental defences that all NATO nations had, at first, eagerly sought within a European Defence Community (EDC). The EDF of the EDC Treaty (signed in Paris on 27 May 1952) was to have been an official means for integrating German forces into an overall international European military command that would be responsive to Allied authorities, and such additional German forces were considered by some Allied nations to offer a possibility for more limited financial commitment on their part.

But, in France, while the government had placed ratification of the European Defence Treaty in the forefront of its foreign policy in 1952, it also had, in 1953/54, insisted on continued Treaty negotiations to secure the insertion of certain protocols—protocols which, France felt, would preserve the integrity of the French Army and the French Union within the EDC, and, at the same time, which would permit the withdrawal of French units from Europe for service overseas, if necessary.

Efforts also were directed toward establishing valid bases for additional British cooperation on the Continent. The British attitude, expressed by the Foreign Secretary in January 1953, held that, short of joining the EDC itself, the UK Government was giving it every possible support, and proposed, among other things, assignment of British officers to EDF staffs; joint exercises under SACEUR; and coordination of air-defence systems within EDC countries.

In West Germany, the Bonn Government consistently favoured ratification of the EDC Treaty, as did The Netherlands and Belgium. But the apparent divergence of views on European military integration brought a reaction from the United States, early in 1953. On taking office as Secretary of State of the United States, in January, Mr. Foster Dulles gave explicit warning that if the Western European nations went their separate ways, or if there were delays in the establishment of the EDC, the US might have to undertake an "agonising reappraisal" of its policies.

Nevertheless, the entire year -- 1953 -- was to pass without any notable progress in bringing the EDC into being.

Meanwhile, on 17 June, the Eastern Sector of Berlin, and much of East Germany became a ferment. Popular resistance to the Pankow regime mounted. Wage demonstrations which, at first, were tolerated, assumed alarming proportions. The Ulbricht Government called on the Soviet Union for help in quelling the disturbances.
The uprising was suppressed by Soviet tanks and other forces. But to the Western Powers, they had clearly demonstrated the firm ground on which the latter stood in maintaining their position for German reunification through free elections, a position which was to be reemphasized by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, on 14 July 1953.

The West also was shocked by the shooting-down of two American F84 aircraft over the American Zone in Germany by two MIGs from Czechoslovakia. American protests were met with flat rejection by the Prague Government, which maintained that the US aircraft were outside the American Zone and had been ordered to land.

Almost at the same time that this rejection was received, a British bomber was shot down by the Soviets near Luneberg.

The Soviet H-Bomb. On 11 July 1953, shortly after General Gruenther's assumption of command as SACEUR, Mr. Malenkov, who had been appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR following Stalin's death, announced that the United States had "no longer a monopoly of the hydrogen bomb". The Soviet Union followed this declaration with a further announcement that tests recently had been carried out on several new types of atomic bombs.

Proposals, Counter-Proposals, and Continuing Discord. Shortly before, on April 16, 1953, President Eisenhower, of the United States, in a major speech -- his first following the death of Premier Stalin -- appealed to the Soviet government to show by deeds, on the questions of Korea, Indo-China, Germany and Austria, genuine evidence of a desire for peace, as a prelude to a general reduction in armaments. He pledged that the US would devote a substantial part of any savings achieved by disarmament to a war on poverty in the underdeveloped areas of the world.

New proposals to the Soviet Union by the Foreign Ministers of the US, the UK, and France for a Foreign Ministers' conference to discuss the question of Germany and Austria led to a Soviet counter of preconditions for such a conference -- preconditions which were tantamount to requiring the West's complete abandonment of NATO and other regional defensive arrangements.

A change in Soviet tactics would permit a meeting to take place in Berlin in January 1954; however, Soviet intransigence and persistent demands for the dissolution of the Western security system -- Western guarantees to the Soviet Union against aggression, notwithstanding -- were to result in yet another failure to achieve constructive agreement.
To NATO military authorities, Soviet policy in Europe remained apparently unaltered. Although the June uprising in East Germany was followed by certain conciliatory modifications in relations between the East German government and the people, a Soviet communique of 23 August 1953 repeated the traditional Soviet formula for reunification of Germany: conclusion of a peace treaty and establishment of a government composed of representatives of both East and West German governments.

Almost simultaneously, at a banquet for an East German government delegation in Moscow, on 20 August M. Malenkov violently denounced Western policy, accusing the Western Powers of wanting to perpetuate the division of Germany, to make of West Germany an instrument of transatlantic monopolies, and to revive German militarism.

Other Views and Threats. In northern Europe, Norway's relations and problems, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, also were reviewed by leaders of that country. In a Speech from the Throne in January, King Haakon announced Norway's intention to join the European Coal and Steel Community, and stressed the country's obligations as a member of NATO. Meanwhile, the Foreign Minister had to deal with Soviet accusations of a breach of faith by Norway in the development of the airfield at Andoy as a foreign military base. The Foreign Minister, Mr. H. Lange, was emphatic in pointing out that the base was an essential part of the defence of the North, and over 300 miles from the nearest Soviet territory.

Thus, within the context of East-West relations, the threat that faced the West early in 1953 remained formidable. General Gruenther, in publicly reviewing the situation just prior to his assumption of command as SACEUR, declared that the Soviet forces, generally, "as of today Monday 18 May are stronger than any force that we have. They have a significant advantage over us...." The Soviets, he said, have an existing force of 175 infantry divisions, which constituted the most effective land army in the world, and the capability of expanding to approximately 300 divisions within the first 30 days of any hostilities.

The Soviets had 20,000 planes in operational units; and a submarine fleet on which their energies were being concentrated.

Other significant events played their parts in conditioning the outlook of the nations of NATO Europe. The conclusion of an Austrian Peace Treaty, and the consequent withdrawal of foreign forces from Austria; the opening of Disarmament Conferences in Geneva; agreement among NATO-member nations for the cooperative exchange of atomic information; the evacuation of Trieste by British and US forces; and the nationalisation of the Suez Canal by Egypt were among these.
But among the Allied Nations, the arrangements that had been sought for the formation of a European Defence Community (EDC) finally collapsed in mid-1954. Nine-Power and Four-Power Conferences followed quickly in London and Paris, respectively. (The 9-Power Conference included: the US, UK, France, Canada, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany. Four-Power representatives included the US, UK, France and the FRG).

The resulting London and Paris Agreements, which amended the Brussels Treaty of 1948, provided for the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty, the integration of West German forces into Allied Command Europe, and the creation of a Western European Union (WEU) -- composed of the original signatories to the Brussels Treaty (Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and France) plus Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Tenor of the Gruenther Command. Despite indications that the immediate threat to Western Europe had receded slightly in some areas since the ominous actions of the Soviet Union shortly after World War II, SACEUR would constantly warn the NATO nations against complacency or indifference to the ultimate aims of the Soviet government in Europe toward any nation or group of nations that resisted the Soviet Union's encroachment.

This History, then, describes Allied efforts in the defence of NATO Europe under the direction of General A.M. Gruenther, whose tenure of command -- the longest of the three SACEUR's up to that time, and the first under which international Allied atomic planning was extensively carried out -- began on 11 July 1953, and ended on 20 November, 1956.

SHAPE, Belgium
July, 1976

Morris Honick
# NATO UNCLASSIFIED

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NATO RESTRICTED
CHAPTER I

COMMAND STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION

General Gruenther Assumes Command

On 9 May 1953, the President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, asked Lord Ismay, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, to release General Matthew B. Ridgway from his duties as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) so that General Ridgway might be appointed Chief of Staff, United States Army. "The United States," President Eisenhower stated, "regards the position of SACEUR as of the highest importance and has solemnly accepted the responsibilities inherent in the appointment to that position of a United States officer, General Ridgway. I have carefully weighed this factor against our own need to select the next leader of the United States Army."

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) released General Ridgway and asked President Eisenhower to nominate another officer for the post of SACEUR. The President nominated General Alfred M. Gruenther who was particularly well qualified since he had been closely connected with SHAPE. In forwarding his nomination to the Council, President Eisenhower said, "As Supreme Allied Commander Europe, I feel the fine traditions and worthy objectives sought by all nations will be upheld and carried forward through the leadership of General Gruenther."

The NAC unanimously approved the President's choice and, on 12 May 1953, notified General Gruenther of his appointment. General Gruenther, responding on 19 May, thanked the Council for its decision. He said, "I appreciate the Council's expression of its faith and confidence in my ability to undertake this vitally important assignment. My own deficiencies, I am sure, will be made up by the strength of our great alliance. As you know, I have unlimited faith in the NATO countries, and I look forward to the pleasure of serving in our common cause." (1)

In a brief ceremony at SHAPE on 11 July 1953, General Ridgway relinquished his command to General Gruenther. The new SACEUR told the observers at the ceremony, "I begin my assignment with complete faith in the North Atlantic Treaty and in the will of

(1) C-M (53) 66, 13 May 53; and Ltr, Gen. Gruenther to Lord Ismay, 19 May 53.
our peoples and their governments to survive. Where freedom lives, the will to preserve it lives also." (1)

The New SACEUR. From the time of his graduation from the United States Military Academy in 1918, General Gruenther had been assigned to many posts which called for a high degree of executive and leadership ability and which served to prepare him for the very responsible position he was to occupy. He had developed these qualities and skills particularly during his service in World War II as Chief of Staff of the Fifth U.S. Army in Italy and North Africa, and, later, as Chief of Staff of the Fifteenth Army Group in Italy. Since both of these major units, particularly the latter, had been multinational in composition, General Gruenther had been brought into contact with international aspects of military planning, organization and leadership.

Following the war, General Gruenther had served as Director of the Joint Staff for the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and as Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans of the United States Army. Later, as Chief of Staff and advisor to General Eisenhower during the early formative days of SHAPE, General Gruenther occupied a unique position which required his close participation in key planning and policy development in the fields of strategy, training, force requirements and logistics for all the areas under SACEUR's command. With the arrival of General Ridgway in May 1952, General Gruenther remained as Chief of Staff, SHAPE, giving continuity to the top command echelon. Thus, in 1953, command of ACE fell on experienced shoulders, and the transition was smooth and swift. (2)

General Gruenther's appointment was welcomed by the nations which furnished forces to SACEUR under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty. From the very beginning of his association with official representatives of these nations in 1951, General Gruenther had shown a marked ability to reconcile effectively the military aspects connected with the defence of ACE with those things which the nations felt able to do politically and economically.

General Gruenther held no illusion as to the permanent nature of alliances, as viewed historically; nor to the motives which had brought the NATO nations together, or the nature of the tasks facing him in preserving that alliance. He fully recognized that NATO had been created in an atmosphere of fear.

2) For details of General Gruenther's experience as Chief of Staff, SHAPE from 1951-1953, see SHAPE History, Vols I & II.
Ancient rivalries between nations had to be put aside and political differences reconciled because, as he expressed it, "The threat was towering, the hour was late. The whips of fear drove us into each other's arms."

He also foresaw that the gradual disappearance of that fear might well change the attitudes of partners toward each other, and that great effort must continue to be made to prevent a weakening of NATO under the strain of prolonged economic burdens, particularly in an atmosphere of relaxing tensions.

Referring to the military resources of his command, General Gruenther observed, "Our armed forces will be effective only to the extent that the nations supporting them remain strong in spirit, active in intellectual endeavour and sound economically. The task therefore for the NATO countries is to establish on a long-term basis that balance between military, economic, and social factors which will make us reasonably secure both from external attack by an aggressor and from internal disintegration resulting from poverty and discouragement." A defence programme was not something that could be turned off every time Soviet leaders spoke of the possibility of coexistence, and turned on again when some trouble threatened. "I think it requires no great vision to be able to predict," he said, "that NATO's next three years will be more difficult than its first three-year period." (1)

SACEUR's Terms of Reference. General Gruenther reduced to a simple statement the responsibilities and missions which he had inherited from General Ridgway. "I am charged by NATO," he said, "with the defence of Europe, extending from the northern tip of Norway to the eastern borders of Turkey, an arc of some 4,000 miles. I am charged with defending it tonight, tomorrow, or next year. I am charged with defending all of Western Europe, not merely the easy portions." (2)

This task, with all its implications and ancillary responsibilities had been confirmed for SACEUR more than a year previously when the Standing Group slightly revised his Terms of Reference (TOR). (3) The TOR then in effect gave General Gruenther a dual responsibility, one in peacetime and another in time of war.

SACEUR's peacetime mission was to ensure that, if an emergency occurred, the forces made available by NATO nations for the defence of Western Europe would be organised, equipped and trained, and ready to carry out agreed war plans. This function was a prelude, of course, to his wartime responsibility for defending his area of command.

(1) Address by General Gruenther, New York City, 8 Oct 53.
(2) Address by General Gruenther, New York City, 8 Oct 53.
(3) MC 22/12(F), 19 Feb 52.
Peacetime responsibilities specifically charged to General Gruenther by the North Atlantic Council included:

- The organisation and training of assigned national forces united into an effective integrated force.
- The preparation of plans for carrying out his assigned missions and coordination of these plans with other NATO, national and Allied Commanders in accordance with principles set forth in document MC 36. (1)
- The deployment of major elements of his assigned forces in consultation with appropriate national authorities and in consonance with operational plans.
- Training and exercising of assigned forces in maneuvers.
- Informing national authorities of his operational, personnel, and logistic needs.
- Making recommendations, as necessary, to the Standing Group and to the nations on infrastructure, training standards, adequacy of forces, priorities for organisation and equipping of assigned and earmarked forces, and for building training and support facilities for forces, and any other military matters which affected his ability to carry out both his peacetime and wartime missions.
- The maintenance of an efficient organisation, including the subordinate planning and command organisations with staff elements charged with logistic support planning which would be the nucleus for expansion in war for the control of the battles for the defence of Europe.
- Proposing to the Standing Group any increase, elimination or reorganisation of subordinate Allied planning and command organisation which he considered necessary. (2)

These general and specific responsibilities carried with them certain powers in time of peace. SACEUR exercised operational control over all national forces assigned to his command in peacetime. He could establish training programmes and standards, supervise and inspect the training of these forces as well as the training of earmarked forces. He also could require national authorities to deploy assigned forces as he thought necessary.

(1) MC 36(F), 8 Nov 51.
(2) MC 22/12(F), 19 Feb 52. General Gruenther’s personal view was that these powers were sufficient; that it was not so much a matter of having power vested in SACEUR, but of making the various nations desirous of fulfilling the requirements. The first step was to make national authorities see these requirements in the same light as informed military planners saw them.
When it came to logistic support of these forces, however, SACEUR, was assigned a lesser role. He could only recommend to national authorities the type and quantity of equipment his assigned forces should have.

As to the strength and composition of forces which he felt he needed, SACEUR could only recommend to national authorities the most necessary measures, and the methods and priorities he felt were best in raising and equipping military units for assignment to his command, or for earmarking those for later assignment.

General Gruenther's wartime powers and responsibilities were not set forth in such detail. During a war, SACEUR would be responsible to the Standing Group, NATO (SGN), the executive agency for the NATO Military Committee and the highest military authority in NATO for the overall direction and conduct of operations against the enemy within his command area. He would exercise the powers of a Supreme Commander, but these powers were not spelled out with any degree of finality.

General powers granted SACEUR in connection with his overall mission included the right to work directly with the various chiefs-of-staff and defence ministers of the NATO nations, and with the heads of governments, when he thought it necessary. (1)

The Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein remained as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR), the post he had held under the two previous Supreme Commanders. He had carried out with great vigour his primary duty of "furthering the organisation, equippage, training and readying of national forces allocated to the Supreme Commander."(2) His frequent searching visits to troop units of headquarters throughout SACEUR's area, and to national authorities of the NATO nations uncovered numerous flaws in a system which was still in its elementary stages.

The DSACEUR's outlook and views on NATO and the task at hand were similar to those expressed by General Gruenther. "I regard NATO as the all-important organisation today in the world," FM Montgomery said. "It is my very firm belief that if NATO had come into being earlier there would have been no Second World War....It is also my belief that in the strengthening of NATO lies the best hope of preventing a Third World War." (3)

(1) MC 22/12(F), 19 Feb 52.
(2) Msg, SHAPE 20215, SHAPE to DA(US), 19 Mar 51.
(3) Address by FM Montgomery to NATO Defence College, 12 Sep 53.
In FM Montgomery's opinion there was far too much centralisation in the operating procedures of the SHAPE Staff. He told key officers on 29 July 1953, that "We must decentralise and spread the load at SHAPE. The junior level must be given more responsibility and there must be greater cooperation between staff branches. It always seems to me that the senior officers do too much work and have no time to think; the juniors have not enough to do, have plenty of time to think, but do not know what to think about. Many officers do not know what is going on because the work begins at the top and takes a long time to get down to the lower level. The proper way is for work to come up to the seniors from below."

Criticizing what he considered to be unnecessary demands for speed which tended to sacrifice accuracy and mature judgement, FM Montgomery noted that there was too much "rush work". "Studies and opinions which require mature thought are demanded by 'tomorrow'," he reflected. "In my view much of the work put up by the staff is ill-considered and rushed, and its value suffers accordingly." (1)

Operational air matters also came under the scrutiny of the DSACEUR. "Air power is the dominant factor in modern war. There is one way and one way only in which SACEUR can influence the war in the first few weeks, and that is by air power. He must be able to control and coordinate the air operations, coordinate air defence matters throughout his command, and control the employment of atomic weapons in support of the land forces," FM Montgomery declared.

SACEUR's Staff.

General Gruenther made few substantive changes in the composition or organisation of the SHAPE Staff other than the long-planned major change which brought about an expanded role for his Air Deputy. (2)

The Air Deputy. As a result of a year's planning and approval by the Military Representatives Committee, a new post in the SHAPE Command Echelon, that of the Air Deputy, had been established. (3) At the Critique of Exercise TRY OUT II, General Gruenther informed a group of SHAPE officers that the new Air Deputy, General Lauris Norstad, and his staff, would shortly arrive at SHAPE. "We will have a new group of officers, all of them Air Force, that is the Air Deputy's office," General Gruenther told his staff. "And I want to have very clearly in

(3) Ibid
mind that we welcome them and that we make their work very easy. Because just exactly what the relationships will be between the Air Deputy staff and the regular staff divisions that are functioning now, is something that cannot be clearly charted at the moment. But by cooperation -- the usual SHAPE friendly spirit -- I'm sure that we're going to be able to find a solution." (1)

The new Air Deputy, General Lauris Norstad, was a familiar figure to Allied Command Europe (ACE). On 22 January 1951 he had assumed command of the United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE). On 2 April 1951 he became Commander-in-Chief, Allied Air Forces Central Europe, (AAFCE) and served in that capacity under both General Eisenhower and General Ridgway. His intimate involvement in air problems in the critical area of Western Europe made him a natural choice for the new role of Air Deputy.

While General Gruenther was not able to forecast the exact scope of General Norstad's responsibilities, nor what staff relationships would be developed from the new addition to his staff, he knew exactly what he wanted from the Air Deputy. On 17 July, he had issued a firm directive outlining General Norstad's missions:

You are designated Air Deputy, effective 27 July 1953, and as such will be directly responsible to the SACEUR.

Your basic mission in war is to ensure that all air power available to SACEUR is employed to the best advantage in furtherance of SACEUR's mission... (2)

In time of war General Norstad would take charge of the overall direction of target policy, selection of target systems for air attack and the allocation of tactical air forces between regional commands as necessary. He would request and allocate external air assistance. Coordination and direction of mutual support between SACEUR's air forces and those of outside commands would be his responsibility, and he would be SACEUR's advisor on all air matters. He also was to take executive action on SACEUR's behalf as necessary.

During peacetime, the Air Deputy was to ensure that suitable operational and logistic plans and programmes for air operations of SACEUR's forces were prepared and that all preparations were made to carry out his wartime responsibilities.

(1) Comments by Gen Gruenther, Critique, Exercise TRY OUT II, 20 Jul 53.
(2) See AG 2230, Directive for Air Deputy to SACEUR, 17 Jul 53.
He would supervise the international combined training of national air forces assigned to or earmarked for SACEUR, and establish standards of training and readiness, and operational procedures and priorities in forming, equipping and supplying air units to be established in time of peace.

In less formal terms, General Gruenther wanted General Norstad to ensure that all available air power was used to the best advantage in time of war and, accordingly, in peacetime he wanted him to make the necessary preparations for executing successfully the wartime mission.

General Norstad was determined that the work of his staff in the Air Deputy Office would not cut across the work already being done by other staff sections of SHAPE. His functions would be closely coordinated with the SHAPE staff agencies concerned and particular attention would be given to avoiding duplication of effort. Any additional functions or services required by the Air Deputy in the way of logistics, communications and the like would be performed for the Air Deputy by the existing SHAPE structure.

The new Air Deputy divided the Air Staff into three major sections: an Inspection and Analysis Section; a Policy Section; and an Operations Section. Through Inspection and Analysis, General Norstad hoped to determine the capabilities and requirements of air forces assigned to SACEUR. His Policy Section would study the major air problems and recommend courses of action to forestall anticipated deficiencies or to remedy existing ones. The Operations Section was charged with supervising and coordinating air plans and with establishing plans for using external air forces, including special weapons forces which might operate in support of SACEUR.

The initial officer strength of General Norstad's staff was set at five general officers and 45 other officers.

The Naval Deputy, Admiral Andre C. Lemmonier, French Navy remained in place as Naval Deputy to SACEUR and continued to serve in that post until 2 May 1956. (1) An officer of long and distinguished service in the navy of his own country, Admiral Lemmonier had held many important national commands. As the first Naval Deputy at SHAPE, he advised SACEUR on all naval matters related to his command, and kept a close watch on the development of the Allied naval power assigned or earmarked for SACEUR.

(1) When he was succeeded by Adm. A. Sala, Fr.
The Chief of Staff. To fill this important position, General Gruenther selected Lieutenant General Courtlandt V.R. Schuyler, US A. General Schuyler had come to SHAPE first in January 1951, and had served as Special Assistant to General Gruenther. On 5 February 1953, General Schuyler left the Headquarters to assume command of the U.S. 28th Infantry Division in Germany, where he was serving when ordered back to SHAPE as Chief of Staff. General Schuyler returned on 8 July 1953 and, following General Gruenther's assumption of command, quickly and ably took over the direction of the staff operations.

It was, thus, with an experienced Command Group that General Gruenther, as the third SACEUR, assumed the direction of Allied Command Europe on 11 July 1953. His tenure of command, which was to last until 20 November 1956 -- more than three and a half years -- the longest up to that time -- was to see not only the emergence of some of the most significant political rearrangements in Europe since the end of the second World War, but also, and as a direct result, major revisions in the overall NATO Strategic Concept, itself, as well as in the methods for implementing that Concept.
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COMMAND ECHELON

11 July 1953 - 20 November 1956

SACEUR

Deputy SACEUR
FM Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, UK A 2 Apr 51

Air Deputy (AIRDEP)
ACM H. Saunders, UK AF 2 Apr 51
Gen. L. Norstad, US AF (1) 27 Jul 53

Vice AIRDEP
AVM F. Miller, CA AF 17 Aug 54
AVM H.L. Campbell, CA AF (2) 10 Aug 55

Naval Deputy (NAVDEP)
V/Adm. A. Lemonnier, FR N 2 Apr 51
Adm. A.P. Sala, FR N 1 Aug 56

Vice NAVDEP
R/Adm. G. Collett, UK N 7 Feb 55

Chief of Staff (CofS)

Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics & Administration (DCS/L&A)
Lt. Gen. J. Valluy, FR A 19 May 52
Maj. Gen. C. Garvin, US A (3) 24 Sep 53
Lt. Gen. O. Poydenot, FR A 19 Oct 53

Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans & Operations (4)
AVM W. Dawson, UK AF 1 Aug 53
AM H.A. Constantine, UK AF 25 May 56

Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans & Policy (5)
AM H.A. Constantine, UK AF 15 Sep 56

Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations (5)
AVM H. Campbell, CA AF 15 Sep 56

Secretary of the Staff

(1) Gen. Norstad was appointed Special Assistant to SACEUR on 16 Jul 53 prior to becoming Air Deputy.
(2) Upon discontinuance of the Air Deputy Office, AVM Campbell was appointed DCS/OPS (See Note (5).
(3) Acting.
(4) DCS/P&O was discontinued on 15 Sep 56 and AM Constantine was appointed DCS/P&P same date.
(5) DCS/P&P and DCS/OPS were established on 15 Sep 56.
ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE
DECEMBER 1953

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED POWERS EUROPE
PARIS

ALLIED FORCES
NORTHERN EUROPE
OSLO

ALLIED LAND FORCES
NORWAY
OSLO

ALLIED LAND FORCES
DENMARK
COPENHAGEN

ALLIED AIR FORCES
NORTHERN EUROPE
SANDVIK
NORWAY

ALLIED NAVAL FORCES
NORTHERN EUROPE
OSLO

ALLIED FORCES
CENTRAL EUROPE
FONTAINEBLEAU

ALLIED LAND FORCES
CENTRAL EUROPE
FONTAINEBLEAU

ALLIED AIR FORCES
CENTRAL EUROPE
FONTAINEBLEAU

ALLIED NAVAL FORCES
CENTRAL EUROPE
FONTAINEBLEAU

ALLIED FORCES
SOUTHERN EUROPE
NAPLES

ALLIED LAND FORCES
SOUTHERN EUROPE
NAPLES

ALLIED AIR FORCES
SOUTHERN EUROPE
NAPLES

NAVAL STRIKING
AND SUPPORT FORCES
SOUTHERN EUROPE
NAPLES

ALLIED FORCES
MEDITERRANEAN
MALTA

GIBRALTAR
AREA
GIBRALTAR

CENTRAL
MEDITERRANEAN AREA
ALGIERS

EASTERN
MEDITERRANEAN AREA
NAPLES

SOUTHEASTERN
MEDITERRANEAN AREA
ANKARA

WESTERN
MEDITERRANEAN AREA
ISMIR

NORTHEASTERN
MEDITERRANEAN AREA
VERONA

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SHAPE HISTORIES

THE NEW APPROACH

JULY 1953 - NOVEMBER 1956

by

Morris Honick

and

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CHANGE OF COMMAND CEREMONY 11 July 1953

SHAPE, Rocquencourt
CHAPTER II

STRATEGIC PLANNING

Background to a "New Approach" in Planning.

The International Scene. The sense of urgency that, in 1949, had welded the determination of the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to defend themselves (as Allies) had diminished considerably by mid-1953. General Gruenther's assumption of command coincided roughly with several events which suggested that the Soviet bloc might be preparing to alter its policies toward the West.

In March 1953, the death of Stalin had given rise to rumours of dissension and an internal struggle for power within the Soviet Union. The subsequent arrest of Lavrenti Beria, chief of Stalin's secret police, seemed to underscore the passing of the old regime and suggested that a new and friendlier Soviet government might now emerge. More significant were firm indications that the USSR wished to convene a Four-Power Conference.

In the same week that General Gruenther became SACEUR, the Chinese and Korean authorities agreed to conclude the long-disputed Armistice Agreement in Korea. Although final signing of the Agreement, on 27 July 1953, left the Korean issue far from settled, the threat of a major war involving China and the US diminished.

In Indo-China, French attempts to bring about a diplomatic settlement of the conflict with the Viet Minh insurgents met with increasing resistance both within the countries of the Associated States, and within France, itself, where demands for total withdrawal of French forces were voiced. Political instability in France added to the difficulties in settling the conflict, however. The Pinay government fell at the end of 1952 and was replaced in January by the Mayer ministry which lasted only four months. Then more than a month passed before M. J. Laniel, on 26 June 1953 found sufficient support to form a government, however with only a precarious majority.

The French battle for Indo-China also held great significance for SHAPE because the commitment of French military forces there substantially reduced the French capability for assisting in the defence of Central Europe.

International developments in mid-1953, which brought hope to some, brought no relief to SHAPE. Just before his departure, General Ridgway said in a report to the Standing Group that:
Since Stalin's death there has been much conjecture about possible changes of policy by the rulers of the Soviet Union. These are matters beyond my purview. Moreover, as a soldier I cannot afford to deal with conjecture. I feel it my duty to state that I know of no facts which would lead me to conclude that the military danger from the East has lessened.

The North Atlantic Council also found that there had not yet been any change in the fundamental threat. "The most striking evidence of this continuing threat," the Council reported on 25 April, "is the huge and constantly strengthened military force maintained by those nations whose policies have been responsible for the present tension and who are still promoting aggressive war in several parts of the world." (1)

The Soviet bloc could employ no more effective technique against NATO than a subtle campaign to allay the common fears from which the Alliance had sprung and, upon which, the common military means were being built. Soviet threats and harshness had only served to bind the NATO nations more closely; but Soviet subtlety and concession also were recognized as a means to undermine and erode the foundations of the Alliance. Almost at the same time that General Gruenther assumed command, the latter dangers were being reported. "The era of emergency exhortation and exertion is dying..." one periodical stated, "not only the Soviet cooing, but sounds the Russians did not want heard, the clash of revolt and unrest...had destroyed the impulse of emergency...The drive which had produced NATO and propelled Europe onto the road to unification was gone..." (2)

Shortly after assuming command General Gruenther said, "I think it would be a major error for us to relax at this time. We have arrived at a position of moderate strength, which is beginning to pay dividends. We have momentum now, and if we should lose it, it would be most difficult to recover. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the armed forces of the Soviet bloc are becoming weaker. On the contrary, all intelligence reports indicate that they are growing stronger." (3)

The Status Quo. When General Eisenhower arrived in Europe in 1951 he found that he had 15 divisions in varying degrees of combat readiness and 1800 aircraft. He had 15 airfields, none of which could take jets, an academic

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(1) Second Annual Report, SACEUR to SG, p.21, 30 May 53.
(3) Interview, General Gruenther, U.S. News and World Report, 11 Sep 53.
deficiency, since there were few jets to put on the fields. He found that the European nations had appropriated only about five billion dollars for their 1950 defence budgets. Also there was no adequate machinery to command the inadequate resources which had been allocated to him. (1)

The military forces of the Communist bloc (barring US intervention with atomic weapons) could have swept over Western Europe with comparative ease in 1951. But by mid-1953, the days of a cheap victory for the Soviets were past. The nations west of the Iron Curtain were no longer as weak, disorganized, and defenceless as they had been in 1951. ACE forces were now from two to three times as effective as they were when General Eisenhower came to Europe. (2) The defence budgets of members of NATO had doubled, and nearly all the nations had increased the period of national service for their armed forces.

However the threat remained. The powerful land forces maintained by the Soviet Union and its satellite nations represented the largest military formation ever maintained by any nation or group of nations in time of nominal peace. From 1947 the Soviets had held their active ground strength at a level of about 3,000,000 men. These troops were organised into 175 line divisions, of which 65 were armored or mechanized. Rifle divisions had been provided with motorized equipment, organic tanks and additional artillery. In 1952 the USSR had intensified its efforts toward a systematic strengthening of its ground forces by improving and modernizing weapons systems and organisation, thus increasing the firepower and mobility of its existing divisions. A high standard of combat readiness was maintained through a rigorous training programme. (3)

The Soviet armies stationed in East Germany, comprising 22 divisions, of which 18 were armored, provided the Soviet military with a ready-made spearhead for a rapid advance into Western Europe. In the Eastern European satellite countries and the western portion of the USSR were 60 more Soviet divisions.

(1) Address by Gen. Gruenther, 10 Mar 54.
(2) Address by Gen. Gruenther, 8 Oct 53.
(3) Second Annual Report to the SG, p.30, 30 May 53; SACEUR EDP 1-53, Annex “B” Estimate of Soviet Capabilities and Possible Courses of Action in the Event of a War Beginning in 1953, 1 May 53; SG 161/3(F), Soviet Bloc Strength and Capabilities, 1 May 53.
With a reserve system of considerable efficiency and depth, the Soviet government could mobilize 145 additional divisions within 30 days. The Soviet economy had maintained a level of military production sufficient to provide equipment and supplies for Soviet and satellite forces and still allow for stockpiling.

The Soviet satellite forces had increased from 1,000,000 men, organised into 65 divisions in January 1952, to a strength of more than 1,300,000 men totalling approximately 80 divisions. This did not include the various units of the East German police, the nucleus of a new Army which numbered about 100,000 men. (1)

The potential destructive power of the Soviet Air Force with 20,000 aircraft, fully supported by trained aircrews and well-dispersed bases, had increased greatly since 1951. The Soviet leaders had placed the greatest emphasis on modernization of their air arm. The replacement of piston-type craft with jet-aircraft and the expansion of the pilot and technician reserve forces gave the Soviet Air Force a capability greatly exceeding that which it had possessed when SHAPE was established. The air arms of the satellite nations had also been increased, but were not yet a major factor to be considered. SHAPE was well aware that the Soviets had more than 15,000 combat aircraft in positions from which they were capable of attacking all of ACE on any future D-day. (2)

Soviet naval progress since World War II had been spectacular. By mid-1953, the Soviet navy had become the second largest in the world. Twenty new, fast cruisers of remarkably effective design and more than 100 destroyers of equally modern construction were the backbone of the Soviet surface fleet. But most disturbing to NATO authorities, and by far the greatest threat to Western control of sea lanes in case of war, was the existing and fast-growing Soviet submarine fleet of 350 vessels. Continuing from the point the Germans had reached in 1945, and taking advantage of the availability of German prototypes and technicians, the Soviet authorities had developed long range submarines which were very maneuverable and capable of high speeds.

The Soviet naval air arm had been modernized with jet aircraft and improved devices for bombing, torpedo attacks and minelaying. The Soviet navy was capable, in the event of war, of providing powerful support to land or amphibious operations, as well as of carrying out an offensive war at sea using aircraft and the very latest mines and torpedoes.


The land, air and naval forces of the Soviet Union and its satellites were known to be capable of conducting both conventional and nuclear operations. (1)

SACEUR's capability in terms of actual manpower and weapons to meet a Soviet/satellite attack was not impressive. As noted, SHAPE's ground, air and sea strength had been increased; but the Allied forces and resources did not begin to match on a man for man, or plane for plane basis, those of the potential enemy. (2)

SHAPE planners were alert to the fact that the "division counters" — those who would judge ground combat potential by the criterion of numbers — were on dangerous ground in trying to assess the strength of ACE by a statistical method. A division, for example, might consist of 10,000 to 20,000 men, of whom not more than half might be of the combat arms. The rest existed to ensure that the rifleman or tank crew would be moved to the front line and supplied with ammunition, food, clothing and other vital supplies. If communications in one division were poor, if junior leadership in another were lacking, or if the commander of a third proved incompetent, the value of each formation was lowered; but by how much it was impossible to determine.

With these reservations in mind, SHAPE planners viewed the ground forces situation of ACE in mid-1953 as described briefly in the following paragraphs.

General Ridgway, before relinquishing his position as SACEUR, had informed the Standing Group that he would need a minimum of 68 and 23/3 divisions on M-Day. This was the most realistic number that could be determined by planning at that time. These divisions would form the "Shield" behind which reserves would be mobilized and brought into action to drive off any invader. (3) This "Shield" was obviously inadequate because the nations had reported that they could provide only 58 of the required M-Day divisions. SACEUR and his staff believed that the effective combat strength of the reported divisions would actually be 25 and 2/3 divisions on M-Day, exclusive of Greek and Turkish

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(1) Statement, Mr. J.P.L. Thomas, First Lord of the Admiralty, House of Commons, 16 Mar 53.
(2) SACEUR Report on ACE, 11 Apr 53.
(3) SHAPE/704/53, 10 Jul 53. SHAPE planners usually dealt in fractions of divisions, since nations contributed regiments and brigades as well as complete divisions. Thus, the total minimum requirement in SHAPE staff terminology might be expressed in this case as 68 and 23/3 divisions, rather than 75 and 2/3 divisions.
The reserve forces to augment the "Shield" forces in 30 days were also less than desired, whereas the planners believed that a total of 143 would be needed by D+30. The nations reported that a total of 96 and 1/3 divisions would be available. SHAPE believed that only 40 and 2/3 divisions (less those of Greece and Turkey, reported but not evaluated at 46 divisions) would be on hand on D+30.

The D-Day requirements for aircraft had been determined as 9,979 aircraft, less than half of the number already in the hands of the potential enemy. The nations estimated that they could furnish on D-Day a total of only 2,997 aircraft to SACEUR. The SHAPE evaluation reduced these figures somewhat, but not materially, especially in view of the already existing great discrepancy between estimated needs and what could be furnished.

The naval support committed to SACEUR approximated only half of what his plans envisioned would be needed on D-Day. This factor was controlled, more than ground and air, however,

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1. Ltr, SACEUR to SG, Subj: SACEUR Report on ACE, 11 Apr 53. Note: This discrepancy is explained by the manner in which SACEUR assigned a capability to each division or fraction thereof under his command. These "Force Capabilities" were based on a comparison of the inspection reports of the Commands and of SHAPE inspectors with Standards of Readiness set up by SHAPE. Thus, nation X might report that it had 12 divisions under SACEUR control on D-Day. But because of their status of training, discipline, leadership, and other factors, SHAPE would consider the prerequisite capability of these 12 divisions to be only that of 6 effective divisions. The studies on the effectiveness of Greek and Turkish divisions, reported to number 18 and 16/3, were not completed.

2. MC 26/2, A Report by the SG on Revised NATO Force Requirements as of 31 Dec 54, 24 Apr 53. An earlier study, SHAPE 1215/2, 8 Nov 52, had set the aircraft requirement at 11,842, while SHAPE document SH704/3 raised the tentative requirement for a war occurring in 1956 to 12,913. The 9,979 figure however, was the valid requirement on which planning was based in June and July 1953.

by the flexibility of the navies of the United States and the United Kingdom. The fact that a certain number of ships had not been officially committed, did not mean that the ships required to carry out the mission would not be made available if they were needed.

The most recent SHAPE analysis had shown that ACE would be critically weak in its capability to accomplish its mission if the Soviets should choose to launch a full-scale attack.

According to SHAPE's estimate, currently assigned or available forces could not defend Northern Europe effectively against a full-scale Soviet attack. Norway and Denmark were not capable, within their own resources, of providing the forces required for such a defence. Allied planning for external reinforcement was still in the preliminary stage.

In Central Europe there were serious shortcomings; a slow rate of force build-up, logistic weakness, and inadequate unit-effectiveness. However, the new concepts then being developed, which provided for a strategic air offensive, the use of nuclear and other new weapons, and the increased capabilities of the conventional air and land forces which the nations had raised in the two-year period provided the basis for a more effective deterrence and defence posture.

The highly defensible terrain of South and Southeastern Europe would afford tremendous advantages to NATO commanders in stopping any attack by the Soviets. The land forces there were improving and gradually were approaching the requirements for successful defence. Air forces in the south, however, were dangerously limited, particularly in Italy.

While the territorial borders of Greece and Turkey could not be successfully defended at that time, the determination and spirit with which the people of both nations were approaching their military problems gave evidence of a successful defence of these border areas in the future.

In mid-1953 the most serious deficiencies and weaknesses in AFSOUTH's ground forces were: the serious lack of logistical and combat support units; the limited ammunition available - restricting these units to effective fighting for a period of only from 10 to 20 days; and field artillery shells -- a supply in this area existed for only from 5 to 10 days of combat. (1)

The critical sea routes to support the forces on the Southern flank, which also linked Europe with the Middle East, were well guarded by Allied naval forces deployed in the Mediterranean area. Although certain deficiencies limited the

(1) SHAPE 411/53, as supplemented by SHAPE 442/53, 22 Apr 53.
effectiveness of those naval forces, the Mediterranean was the area which held the greatest chance for NATO to successfully defend against a Soviet attack.

SACEUR's air defence and his capability to provide an effective warning of enemy air attack were even more limited. Not only was there little equipment to provide a radar "fence", but in certain cases the equipment on hand could not be manned on a round-the-clock basis because of a lack of qualified operators. There was only enough fuel to sustain the air forces for 6 days of battle. Of the 720 all-weather aircraft which would be needed as a minimum, SACEUR had available less than 120. "Air forces," General Gruenther stated, "are probably the weakest link in our defence. The air arm requires higher priority action until a better balance is achieved." (1)

Because the logistic support of ACE forces was handled nationally -- that is, each nation was responsible for its own contribution -- SACEUR's command was handicapped logistically. The logistical organization was largely ineffective, and this weakness was aggravated by the extreme shortage of supplies.

The establishment of a closer relationship between the nations and SHAPE was required if SHAPE were to have precise data on the Reserve Forces, which represented such a large and important part of ACE's combat power.

A serious deficiency existed from an intelligence standpoint. The present system would provide only three days warning before an attack. A surprise attack could be devastating. Lengthening the warning period was of vital importance and one of SACEUR's most pressing problems.

On the credit side, some accomplishments had been achieved by SHAPE and ACE since 1951. While they did not lend themselves to statistical definition, nonetheless they added to the defensive strength of ACE.

A well-defined and operating command structure had been established. Although not ideally established for war-time operations, ACE command arrangements were flexible enough to allow ready adaptation to war conditions. In the North, guarding the vulnerable region of Western Europe, CINCNORTH was responsible for the defence of Norway and Denmark and contiguous sea areas. In the vital Centre area, the command was still decentralized. Although this would be shortly changed, Allied naval, land and air forces were each under their separate MSC and directly subordinate to SACEUR.

(1) SHAPE 442/53, 22 Apr 53.
the south, Allied Forces Southern Europe and all Allied forces in Italy, Greece and Turkey were commanded by CINCSOUTH. The Allied Forces Mediterranean Command controlled forces in the Mediterranean from Gibraltar to the Dardanelles. (1)

The continuous planning which had been carried out by the SHAPE staff since 1951 provided plans for the defence of ACE which, in an emergency, could be put into effect. These plans were dependent to a large extent on forces which were not available, but they at least pointed the direction for the necessary actions in case of attack. Missions had been assigned and forces allotted both under the Medium Term Defence Plan and the Emergency Defence Plan.

Progress also had been made in the logistic field. Communications systems capable of supporting combat operations, at least initially, were in being or under construction. Ports and storage facilities were being constructed, and lines of communications were being oriented away from the vulnerable areas to more desirable locations. The building of airfields, a matter of priority under the SHAPE Infrastructure Program, was well underway. Thirty-one fields had been completed, sixty-six were suitable for emergency use; thirty-three more, although not usable, had been started and thirty-two fields were awaiting ground-breaking.

The New Approach

The true centre of gravity at SHAPE, the focal point around which all other activities of the Headquarters revolved, in the final analysis, was the strategic


The Central Region was changed on 20 August 1953 when Marshal Juin became Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe (CINCENT). Three commands subordinate to CINCENT were formed: Allied Land Forces Central Europe (LANDCENT), under General M.M. Carpentier, Fr A, (now as a Commander, and not a Commander-in-Chief), Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AIRCENT), under ACM Sir B. Embry, UK AF (also appointed as a Commander, rather than Commander-in-Chief); and Allied Naval Forces Central Europe (NAVCENT), under Vice Admiral R. Jaugard (also appointed as a Commander, rather than Flag Officer). See page 13 for ACE Command Structure as of 20 August 1953.
planning for the defence of ACE. Although many types of planning were carried on concurrently by SHAPE and by the staffs of the MSC's, all planning remained subordinate and complementary to the continuing development of concepts for the defence of Allied territories.

The Military Committee (MC) had given SACEUR strategic planning guidance in December 1952. (1) This guidance placed emphasis on two principal phases of action in the event of an attack on ACE - a ground defensive and an air offensive. "The general concept of defence of NATO areas in the first phase, required arresting the Soviet advance, thus protecting and preserving the integrity of Allied territories to the maximum extent feasible and covering their progressive mobilization. As Europe is likely to be the target of the main Soviet advance, and as its possession will be of overriding importance in later phases, special emphasis must be given to its first phase defence," the MC advised. "To this end, the primary effort must be devoted to delaying and arresting the main enemy thrust while holding and exploiting elsewhere. Since this is so, we should aim at having the maximum forces available at the very outset."

Concurrently with this holding action across the front, SACEUR's air and external air forces would begin the strategic air offensive against the enemy. "The indirect effort of this offensive on the defensive battle," the MC believed, "will be the cumulative and may be decisive. But basically, SACEUR's air plan should be aimed at achieving air superiority." (2)

The Emergency Defence Plan (EDP), which set forth the strategic concepts to be followed against any enemy attack on ACE, had been developed by SHAPE to provide the best employment of currently available forces and weapons during the initial period of hostilities. It was only a step, however, toward the fulfillment of the full concept of a "Forward Strategy" which was deemed necessary to accomplish SACEUR's mission under the Medium Term Defence Plan. The EDP in effect in mid-1953, was oriented toward a stubborn ground defence with air and navy forces supporting that defence as best they could. It was a conventional defence plan, a reflection of the cumulative experiences in World War II and in Korea. (3)

(1) MC 14/1(F), 9 Dec 52.
(2) MC 14/1(F), 9 Dec 52.
(3) SHAPE History, Vol. I, Chapter VII, describes this concept under the Medium Term Defence Plan, and explains the development of Emergency Defence Plans.
Only strong, well-trained and well-equipped ground forces immediately available could carry out either the Emergency or the Medium Term Plan with reasonable hope of success. The weakness of SACEUR's ground forces in 1953, both active and reserve, and the contrasting superior strength of Soviet ground forces in both categories meant that such a defence, which pitted NATO's greatest weakness against the potential enemy's greatest strength, was almost certainly doomed to failure. One solution lay in attempting to increase SACEUR's ground forces, both in strength and quality, to a level matching that of the Soviet bloc. (1) However, strong indications received at SHAPE and in higher quarters of NATO showed that this solution could not, as a practical matter, be achieved. It was obvious from the trend of preliminary reaction by the nations to questions being asked them in the process of the 1953 Annual Review that they were not going to accelerate the rate of build-up of their forces to any great extent. The nations, collectively, had not met fully their 1952 goals. (2)

This change in the build-up pattern was due to political and economic considerations of considerable complexity and not necessarily to any effect of recent Soviet "peace" efforts. The nations now viewed the defence build-up as a long term effort and were planning for forces which could be maintained over a long period, rather than forces which would increase at a steeper rate of build-up toward a peak, as visualized at the Lisbon Conference in early 1952. (3) There was also no valid basis for assuming that if Soviet forces were matched by the Western Alliance, the Soviets would fight as they had in the past, that is, by relying mainly on masses of ground troops. There was an increasing possibility that the Soviets might start a war using nuclear weapons, which they were known to possess, although in what quantity it had not yet been determined. It was certain, nevertheless, that Soviet atomic delivery capabilities would increase substantially in the next three years since Soviet technical progress in the "new weapons" field was known to be at least as rapid as that of the Western nations.

SHAPE planners had been aware for some time of the inadequate and unrealistic nature of those strategic plans which were tied to assumptions and not facts. On 23 August 1952, General Ridgway had informed the Standing Group that the capabilities of new weapons and techniques of warfare might well alter materially the estimated force requirements

(1) EDP 1-53, 1 May 53.
(2) CM(53)50.
(3) MC 39/3(F), 2Dec 53.
of ACE for subsequent years. He proposed to begin a study of this vexing problem and asked the SG to furnish him a statement of Soviet military capabilities and possible operational intentions for 1956. (1) This information was provided. (2)

A month later General Ridgway asked the US Joint Chiefs of Staff to send him the latest information on nuclear weapons capabilities. (3) Some limited information was furnished on this matter. (4) At that point, he directed the SHAPE staff to prepare a study, in light of such information as had been furnished, on the force requirements for ACE for mid-1956.

As he relinquished his command, General Ridgway informed the SG of the results of the SHAPE's study and research. He told them that the proper integration of nuclear and conventional forces and the ability to counter any aggression in Europe with nuclear fires would make the next war a short one. In view of the great destructive power of nuclear weapons, SACEUR felt that NATO had to take measures to give responsible military commanders, including SACEUR, adequate authority in advance of D-Day, so that they could take swift nuclear retaliatory action.

"Regardless of how politically infeasible such pre-D-Day arrangements and delegations of authority may have been in the past," General Ridgway charged, "these measures now become of vital importance, in view of the distinct possibility that surprise, if achieved and exploited, could result in decisive Allied defeat." (5)

The new concept for employment of conventional forces and new weapons indicated that the balance and phasing of NATO forces then approved would almost certainly require revision. But the study had been based on many factors which were not definitely established. General Ridgway stated that "prior to determination of final firm force requirements, action must be taken at the highest level to reduce to a minimum the present indeterminate factors."

He recommended that for the purposes of the 1953 Annual Review, already underway, the nations continue to develop their force buildup in accordance with current plans.

(1) SHAPE/883/52, 23 Aug 52.
(2) SG 161/3.
(3) SHAPE/1004/52, 20 Sep 52.
(4) SGM 208-53, 30 Jan 53.
(5) SHAPE/704/53, Ltr, SACEUR to SG, 10 Jul 53.
But these goals should be only temporary because a radical change in SHAPE's strategic concept was urgently called for. (1)

General Gruenther had been closely involved with this planning project and with the Special Weapons Course established by SACEUR to give officers of ACE intensive training in the nature and effects of nuclear weapons. When he became SACEUR his first order to his planning staff was to get down to cases on strategic planning, using the most realistic concepts possible. The history of SHAPE for the next year and a half is, essentially, the story of the radical changes in strategic planning which General Gruenther directed and closely supervised.

Formation of the New Approach Group. On 20 August 1953 General Gruenther visited the Special Weapons Course at Oberammergau and observed the training being conducted there. Shortly after his return he directed Air Marshal Dawson, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations (DCPO), to establish an ad hoc committee which, under conditions of great secrecy, would devote all its efforts to planning for the defence of Europe under new conditions and using new assumptions. Officers for this committee were selected on the basis of their experience, training, natural abilities and energy. It was an ambitious project, which would be carried on under pressure and which demanded the best efforts of the best planning minds at SHAPE on a nearly full-time basis. The committee, under the DCPO, was designated the New Approach Group (NAG) and its offices were established in the area occupied by the Air Deputy. (2)

(1) The Standing Group was fully aware of all the factors being considered by SACEUR. On 9 Dec 52, the SG had reported to the NAC, "It has been assessed by sources with knowledge of weapons of mass destruction that, although by the period of 1953-54 their effect on the conduct of war will not dictate a need to reduce current NATO force goals, greater availability of such weapons and increased delivery capability during the period 1954-56 may then necessitate re-evaluation of the requirements for a successful defence of the NATO area. However, as the conventional NATO forces at present in being fall far short of requirements, no relaxation can be allowed in their planned expansion until progress in the development of weapons justifies a reassessment, particularly in reserve and buildup forces."

(2) The original New Approach Group comprised Colonel Andrew J. Goodpaster, Jr, US A, Colonel Robert C. Richardson III, US AF, Colonel Pierre M. R. Gallois, Fr AF, Colonel Frank R. Harrington, UK A, and Commander Francois Y. M. Picard-Destelan, Fr N. Representing all three SG countries and all three services, these officers provided a cross-section of military background and thought most appropriate to the nature of the vital planning project to which they had been assigned. Other participants who joined the Group later were: Colonel Charles Billingslea, US A, and Colonel Dmitry D. Zvegintzov, UK A.
The NAG might be an efficient planning team, but without recognition by higher authority of the NAG's aims, its final product would have very little significance. SACEUR was responsible to higher NATO military authorities through the Standing Group for the preparation of plans. The SG's prior approval of his plans therefore was desirable and prerequisite to their final approval by the MC and the NAC.

Hence, the first specific task which SACEUR assigned the NAG—even before its concentrated efforts began—was to prepare a clear statement of the need for new plans, and a brief but logical statement of how the Group intended to go about its assignment.

On 24 September 1953, General Grunther forwarded the results of the NAG's first effort to the SG. He wrote that "From the preliminary studies of the problem of future planning as it affects this command, I have concluded that there is a need for a supplementary planning project to fill a deficiency in our present planning procedures." He emphasized that his project was in addition to other planning already in progress (on Emergency Defence Plans, etc.) and that it would not affect any other planning specifically directed by the Standing Group.

General Grunther also wrote that he believed that the so-called first phase of the NATO build-up was over. This first-phase effort had built up military strength quickly as a deterrent against Soviet attack, and had given confidence to European nations of NATO that they could deal with an aggressor. "We do not have all the forces we need," General Grunther reminded the SG, "but we have made real progress toward our objective."

In the past, numerous estimates had been prepared. Such estimates had incorporated the best information possible, setting forth the size of the ground, air and naval forces which would be needed to meet and defeat a Communist attack on ACE. All of these estimates, while differing to some extent among themselves, were considerably larger than the forces which were being indicated in the 1953 Annual Review. "Further," General Grunther pointed out, "we are entering a period during which the employment of new weapons on both sides will not only affect force requirements but will also influence our strategy and our over-all organization." Thus these two developments, the clear indication that sufficient forces were not going to be on hand when and if needed, and the probability that nuclear weapons would be employed in any future fighting, marked for General Grunther the beginning of "the second" phase of the NATO build-up.
The object in the second phase was to organise and prepare forces so that they could be sustained efficiently through a prolonged cold war period and take the strain of wartime tasks in event of hostilities.

To accomplish this, General Gruenther wrote that he should determine the right combination of forces of all kinds, both active and reserve, and that he should strengthen and improve the effectiveness of these forces and their equipment. He wanted increased emphasis to be placed on the build-up of Allied air forces, which were the weakest part of the structure; emphasis on reserve forces, and national mobilization systems to provide units quickly; and on logistic support. SACEUR also believed he should correlate his mission with any forces, in or out of NATO, which might fight on the side of the West if war occurred.

Five Steps to a New Approach. SACEUR then explained the steps that should be followed in developing a plan oriented toward a period three to five years in the future:

Step I - To arrive at a more exact definition of the operational mission of his command, indicating specifically the type and scope of the campaign which he should plan and be prepared to conduct.

Step II - To estimate the forces which nations will have created by the end of the period selected, this estimate to be in a form to permit an analysis of major deficiencies with respect to these forces and the development of operational plans.

Step III - To apply these forces' capabilities against the mission arrived at under Step I, and with due consideration for nuclear weapons, to prepare a plan for their employment taking full account of Soviet capabilities.

Step IV - To submit this plan to the SG for correlation with other command plans and force programs, both within and outside NATO in order to eliminate duplication and to assure operational continuity in the conduct of the war.

Step V - To refine the plan based upon the outcome of Step IV and development recommendations affecting force programs.

SACEUR believed that the first three steps should be taken at SHAPE in order to provide a concrete basis for the SG's considerations. General Gruenther concluded his letter by informing the SG that although he could not give an estimated completion date, the project would have the
highest priority at SHAPE. (1)

At SHAPE, the Chief of Staff, in discussing the new planning project with senior member of the Staff on 30 September 1953 told them, "We are not in a position to come up with firm requirements in view of assumptions we need. However, General Gruenther feels that we must start to look ahead four or five years to see what forces we may reasonably expect to have. We must survey a balance of those forces. One of the first steps is to review SACEUR's mission to determine exactly what will be required in war. We must know what is expected and make sure that this fits in with other commands. Then we will apply the forces against the mission. At that time we will see what adjustments can or should be made." (2)

Word of the work being done by the NAG could not be concealed, and in September SACEUR was asked during an interview whether any conclusions had been reached on the effect that nuclear weapons would have on future strategy. He did not deny the work being done in his headquarters but replied, "We're devoting a great amount of effort to the possible uses of new weapons, as are the planners in the Standing Group in Washington. Now the question is, of course, which is constantly asked by finance ministers, 'To what extent will that get our taxes down?' It is just too soon yet, to give any answers."

"To get a satisfactory answer to that," General Gruenther continued, "we are projecting our thinking four years from now. Many of the new weapons are still untested at this time. So it presents a very difficult problem. Even if these new weapons should reduce the requirement for conventional forces, that would not necessarily lower costs, because some of the new weapons are very expensive. I don't feel that one should hold out at this time the hope that there will be a big reduction -- at least until the subject is more thoroughly studied." (3)

Exploring for Concepts. The NAG was charged by General Gruenther with developing the new concepts, all preparatory studies, and the overall plan. The fullest

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(1) Ltr, AG 1220 SAC, General Gruenther to SG, Subj: Supplementary Planning Project, 24 Sep 53. Note: This letter is filed with document, NAG-1 (Final) 29 Sep 53. The latter document is one of the series of 13 numbered major NAG papers which are on file in SHAPE Microfilm Records, hereinafter referred to as NAG 1, NAG 12/1, etc.

(2) SHAPE/SEC/97/53, COFS' Meeting with Division Chiefs, 30 Sep 53.

cooperation by all planning elements of SHAPE was essential in assisting the NAG in the development of the concept and in the preparation of the plans themselves over the next months. (1)

The mechanics and procedures adopted by the NAG were simple, systematic and effective. During the first phase of the development of the concepts, the Group outlined the procedures to be followed, developed guidelines for the New Approach and prepared directives to the appropriate staff agencies for the preparation of the staff studies required. When considered appropriate, Air Marshal Dawson placed these studies before SACEUR or other senior members of the Staff in order to obtain firm agreement on certain of the basic premises and assumptions which were vital to the new planning concept. (2)

Once a policy had been accepted in principle by the Command Echelon, the NAG broadened its action on that particular phase, calling in staff members of the divisions, or breaking the topics down into sub-divisions on which the appropriate divisions prepared initial drafts based on the guidance developed in the preparatory study. Maximum advantage was taken of all constructive points of view in searching for new solutions. Measures or proposals were not neglected or ignored because they were unorthodox.

Thirteen major studies were prepared by the NAG. Each aspect of SACEUR's position from the standpoint of forces, logistics and capabilities; each aspect of his position vis-a-vis the potential enemy and vis-a-vis all possible Allies; and each influence which could affect his mission, which, itself, was defined in one of these studies, was scrutinized, analyzed and evaluated in the most thorough manner possible.

Studies undertaken were: (1) Analysis of SACEUR's Wartime Mission; (2) Determination of the Force-Levels for the New Approach; (3) SHAPE Analysis of Soviet Capabilities; (4) Analysis of the Implication of New Weapons on SHAPE Operations; (5) Analysis of the Operational Effectiveness of Conventional Forces; (6) Consideration of External Support Capabilities; (7) Analysis of the D-Day Survival Problem; (8) Vulnerability of Rear Areas; (9) Analysis of the Allied Logistic Structure and Limitations; (10) Analysis of Allied Mobilization Capabilities;

(1) NAG-2(Final), 29 Sep 53.
(2) Air Marshal Dawson (DCPO) on 6 Oct 53, told his planning team that "on the process of the staff work, assumptions made and decisions necessary will be submitted to SACEUR for approval." SHAPE/SEC/98/53, Memo, Subj: Discussions at DCPO Staff/Conference, 6 Oct 53.
Determination of Overall Security Situation; System Analysis of War Games Based on Alternative Force Strengths and Strategies; and A Study on Increased Military Integration and National Specialization within NATO.

Each of these major studies was conducted under the direction of the NAG and under the close surveillance of the Command Echelon. As work progressed, the studies were refined and combined into a detailed and comprehensive statement of SACEUR's views on where he would stand and what should be done by him in carrying out his mission if war occurred in 1957. The Group was directed to develop plans for the use of those forces which probably would be available to SACEUR from NATO sources by the middle of 1957.

Analysis of SACEUR's Wartime Mission. The first step in the planning was to determine just what SACEUR's mission would be. His wartime mission had not been stated in his Terms of Reference other than to indicate that he would be the Supreme Commander. (1)

In their Strategic Guidance, the SG had specified in only broad terms, and without indication of relative priorities, the principal objectives which SACEUR should plan to defend in each major area of ACE. (2)

What SACEUR should do after he had conducted a successful defence had never been defined by higher authority. This omission concerned the New Approach Group and the consensus was that before SACEUR could go very far with his strategic planning, he must have more exact definition and delimitation of his operational mission. The NAG had to know the type and scope of the campaign which SHAPE should plan for. (3)

As a result, the Group set about preparing, in conjunction with other staff elements, a statement of the concept of operations, missions and supporting tasks for SACEUR's command, in the event of a mid-1957 war.

It was apparent to the planners that SACEUR's choice of a strategic plan would be limited by the requirements to accomplish four major things. First, SACEUR had to hold adequate areas in each European NATO nation long enough to allow that nation to mobilize and/or to receive reinforcements from her allies. Secondly, he had to do

(1) MC 22/12(F), 19 Feb 52.
(2) MC 14/1, 9 Dec 52.
(3) NAG-13(F), 25 Nov 53.
this with the forces and weapons which reasonably could be expected to exist during the period under consideration. He not only had to increase the depth of his theatre of operations, but also had to obtain the maximum benefit from the planned German contribution. Lastly, SACEUR had to obtain the greatest possible return in effectiveness from the national defence efforts by eliminating duplication, exploiting new weapons and ensuring that all his forces contributed in a coordinated, cumulative and measurable manner to a successful holding action.

The NAG determined that the initial operational mission of SACEUR would be:

"To conduct such initial combat operations for the defence of Western Europe as will: provide minimum essential protection and control of areas and LOCs of vital importance; provide essential protection of Allied mobilization and reinforcement preparatory to sustained defence and/or subsequent offensive operations; and attain such further Allied objectives as forces available will permit."

The Group recognized that SACEUR would have to do this with forces and weapons at hand, and not with those on paper. Therefore, the plan to carry out this mission would have to allocate from available forces and weapons certain units to carry out each specific objective through detailed, time-phased tasks.

Before detailed plans could be made, SHAPE would have to determine and assign a relative priority to the major objectives of operational concern to SACEUR; to determine the Soviet operational threat to each of those objectives; to determine where the Soviet threat was vulnerable to Allied operations, and to develop operations against those points of vulnerability.

The NAG therefore developed operational plans in three successive stages, each in increasing detail. These were: (1) the development of general undertakings; (2) preparation of an outline of tasks; and, (3) preparation of detailed task lists which would be drawn up from the outline tasks and assigned to specific commanders. The separate tasks then would be combined into coordinated, time-phased
Categories of Objectives. New Approach Group planners supported by other SHAPE planners, believed that there were three broad categories of objectives which should be used to mark the direction of future planning. First, there were those objectives which must be achieved if ACE forces were going to be able to remain operational after the first few days of war. These objectives were all aimed at preventing the enemy from striking a knock-out blow early in the fight. Not necessarily in order of priority, these aims, broadly, were: (1) protecting shipping and lines of communication against Soviet attack so as to keep losses under a critical level; (2) countering the Soviet nuclear and/or air attack sufficiently so that Allied will and ability to continue the fight would not be destroyed; (3) keeping the Soviet ground attack from penetrating very far beyond the general area astride the Rhine/IJssel; and (4) preventing any Soviet advance in the South from severing the Mediterranean Command.

The second category of objectives were those actions aimed at holding the enemy at bay long enough to insure the successful mobilization and reinforcing of SACEUR's forces so that a sustained defence of ACE could be made. It would be necessary to delay and stop a Soviet advance against West Germany, Southern Denmark, Northern Norway, Northern Italy, Northern Greece, Western Turkey and Eastern Turkey. Soviet LOCs and concentration areas would have to be attacked to slow down or, if possible, to prevent the build up of enemy forces coming in from support areas.

The last category of objectives was made up of those further objectives which had to be achieved to the maximum extent possible using available forces and, insofar as circumstances would permit. These last objectives actually were complementary to and in extension of

(1) NAG-13(F), 25 Nov 53. The term, "major objectives of operational concern to SACEUR," as used here and later in this discussion is borrowed from the phraseology employed by the New Approach Group. Its meaning in this context is less broad than that generally accorded the term, "objectives". As used here it is nearly synonymous with "mission", or "required task". As an example, "To hold the Rhine River bridges" could be considered as "major objectives of operational concern to SACEUR."
the first two classes. They were to:

a. Hold in Western Germany as far to the East as possible.
b. Maintain a continuous front through Schleswig-Holstein and Northeast Germany.
c. Hold in Northern Norway.
d. Hold the Soviet advance toward Italy and the Tyrol as far to the East as possible.
e. Hold Northern Greece and Thrace, maintaining to the extent possible, a continuous front in this sector.
f. Hold in Eastern Anatolia and establish a threat in Southeast Turkey toward the Southeast.
g. Conduct limited offensive naval operations, primarily submarine and reconnaissance, in the Baltic and Black Sea.
h. Limit losses of Allied forces and territories from Soviet air attack.
i. Limit losses to, or interference with, Allied naval forces and shipping.

In setting forth these more detailed campaign suggestions, the Group determined that as a guiding principle for operational concepts and plans every attempt had to be made to obtain the full objectives of the Allies with the forces available, while being prepared to concentrate forces successively on the most essential, and, finally, on the decisive objectives, if the full objectives proved unattainable. During each successive phase of operations, precedence would be given to the military tasks most directly relating to objectives having the higher priorities.

The Nine Major Campaigns. The NAG felt that nine major campaigns had to be fought by SACEUR. These campaigns had been developed in accordance with the principles of precedence which the Group had established.

Inhibition of the Soviet Air and Atomic Threat. Maximum active and passive air defence measures would be instituted to cope with the initial Soviet nuclear attacks. An immediate all-out counter-attack was to be launched against Soviet air bases by Allied air and naval forces trained, equipped and predesignated for this purpose. The attack upon the Soviet air and nuclear forces, at their source on the ground, would be continued until the resulting reduction in this Soviet capability allowed the scaling down of this effort and its progressive transfer to other objectives.
Interdiction of the Soviet Build-up of Support and Sea Lines of Communications. To limit Soviet capability rapidly to replace losses, conduct amphibious operations, and/or build up forces and offensive potential from mobilization, or through satellite armies and strategic reserves, a preplanned air interdiction campaign would be undertaken in the Eastern European area. Air and submarine action would also be conducted against Soviet sea LOCs in the Black Sea and Baltic. This effort would be accomplished by naval and air force elements pre-designated and trained for the purpose. The timing and magnitude of the nuclear aspects of this undertaking were contingent upon the counter-air task and the possibility that adverse developments in other areas might require that this effort be used for other tasks.

Arrest of the Soviet Land Advance in Western Europe. With a view to halting, if possible, and otherwise retarding the Soviet land advance, an active defence would be conducted, based upon the establishment of strongly held zones in northern and southern areas of Western Germany, and operations of mobile forces between these zones, together with strong counter-attack forces from within the zones, thereby channeling the Soviet forces and inducing sizeable concentrations. These concentrations would then be attacked with air, ground and missile delivered nuclear weapons. As additional forces became available through the phasing-down of counter-air operations, close support and interdiction operations would be stepped up. Concurrently, minimum essential preparations were to be made for a defence astride the Rhine/Ijssel. If the Soviet ground forces penetrated to the Rhine, a maximum Allied effort, employing land and air forces, with all forms of atomic support was to be made to hold on that line.

Combatting of Soviet Attacks on Allied Shipping, Convoys and Naval Forces. Maximum local protective measures for Allied shipping, convoys and naval forces were to be instituted to cope with the Soviet submarine, air and mining threat on D-day and immediately thereafter. Progressively, mining reconnaissance, anti-submarine warfare, and other appropriate operations in the Danish Straits area and in the Dardanelles and Bosphorous were to be undertaken to impose effective closure of these exits. Firm control over land areas contiguous to both Straits would be maintained, and any Soviet-acquired bases in the Mediterranean or North Sea were to be subjected to nuclear attack.
Arrest of the Soviet Land Advance in Denmark.

With a view to arresting the Soviet advance south of the Straits area, operations were planned at the base of the Danish peninsula and coordinated with action planned against the threat from Northern Germany, in order to channel the Soviet attack and force it to mass.

The enemy would then be attacked with air, ground and missile delivered atomic weapons. As counter-air operations were phased down close support and interdiction operations would be stepped up.

Combatting the Soviet Land Advance in Norway.

With a view to retarding the Soviet advance and limiting its extent to a minimum, operations also were to be conducted in threatened sectors of Norway, employing land, air and naval forces locally available. Air and naval air support available from outside commands would be employed in these operations. As nuclear capabilities of SACLANT carrier forces became available after completion of their initial pre-planned counter-air and naval missions, these would be concentrated on interdiction and close support in Norway, Sweden and/or Denmark, depending on criticality of the situation. Plans and preparations also were to be made for the rapid delivery of nuclear strikes against major Soviet amphibious operations.

Combatting the Soviet Land Advance in the Direction of Italy. With a view to arresting, if possible, and otherwise retarding the Soviet advance in the direction of Northern Italy, a defence position would be established and defended in northeast Italy to channel the Soviet attack and create concentrations of attacking forces. These concentrations then would be attacked with air, ground and missile delivered nuclear weapons. With the phasing-down of counter-air operations, close support and interdiction operations would be stepped up. Maximum advantage was to be taken of the possible cooperation of Yugoslav forces. Minimum essential preparations would be made to hold positions which would prevent Soviet penetration in force to the Northern or Eastern shores of the Mediterranean. Where such penetrations threatened the severance of the Mediterranean LOC, a maximum Allied effort employing land, air, naval and amphibious forces, with all forms of nuclear support, would be made to oppose this action.

Combatting the Soviet Land Advance in Greece.

To retard the advance of Soviet bloc forces, and limit the extent of their advance, operations were to be conducted in the threatened sectors of Greece, in conjunction with the expected resistance of the Yugoslav forces. Air and naval support from forces outside the Greek area would
be employed in coordination with these operations. Plans and preparations were to be made for delivery of nuclear strikes against any developing major Soviet concentrations. Minimum essential preparations would be made to hold positions which would prevent Soviet penetration in force to the Northern or Eastern shores of the Mediterranean. Where such penetrations threatened the severance of the Mediterranean LOC, a maximum Allied effort employing land, air, naval and amphibious forces, with all forms of support, would be employed.

Arrest of the Soviet Land Advances in Turkey.
To stop the Soviet advance prior to its reaching the Straits area, operations were to be conducted in Turkish Thrace in order to slow and channel the advance of Soviet bloc forces and create concentrations of the attacking formations. Nuclear attacks were to be made on Soviet bloc forces which were threatening Allied control of the Straits. Air and naval air support available from outside the Turkish area would be employed in coordination with these operations. In Anatolia and in the Turkish Black Sea coastal area, operations would be conducted in threatened sectors employing land, air and naval forces available. The Iskenderun area was to be secured against any threat from the East. A threat would be established in southeast Turkey toward any Soviet advance through Iran and to the south or southwest. Minimum essential preparations were to be made to hold positions which would prevent Soviet penetration in force to the Northern or Eastern shores of the Mediterranean. Where such penetrations threatened the severance of the Mediterranean LOC, a maximum Allied effort employing land, air, naval and amphibious forces, with all forms of nuclear support, was to be made to oppose this action.

It may be noted that in developing their concepts thus far, the NAG had not departed very far from the concepts already embodied in the Medium Term Defence Plan. But when the Group outlined the specific nine major campaigns which it felt must be carried out, and specifically the recommendations for the use of nuclear weapons by ACE, the new look was apparent.

On 25 November 1953, the views of the Group were circulated to the staff officers directly concerned with future planning. Air Marshal Dawson also approved a set of detailed procedures which the Group had developed.

(1) NAG 13(F), 25 Nov 53.
(2) DC 13, NATO Medium Term Defence Plan, 1 Apr 50. This was the first formal defence plan established for the NATO nations. It was issued one year following the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, and approximately one year prior to the establishment of ACE and the activation of SHAPE.
to standardize and facilitate the planning of SHAPE Staff agencies.  

The NAG's plan was also presented to the senior officers of SHAPE for comment and consideration on 25 November. Admiral Lemmonier, the Naval Deputy, upon reviewing the NAG's efforts said, "The work done by the team is a meticulous and systematic approach to the problem. So far, I do not believe there are any points to be corrected. My only remark is that this approach should eventually lead to a clear-cut plan of action and corresponding estimate of forces." As a naval officer, he was particularly interested in the naval aspects of the final plan and suggested that certain essential points should be highlighted by the Group in its later planning. He insisted that it was essential to hold key positions in the Northern and Southern regions, particularly the exits from the Baltic and the Jutland peninsula in the North; and the exits of the Bosphorous and Dardanelles, the Salonika area and the Isonzo line in the South.  

In Central Europe, Admiral Lemmonier felt that it would be necessary to have a field army with adequate air support to defend initially advanced positions east of the Rhine and stop the Soviet forces from reaching the Rhine. "We must also have a strategic force composed of land, air and naval elements of attacking the enemy rear areas in order to destroy his offensive capabilities, reinforcing and supporting a vital threatened sector; and maintaining the threat of diversionary action in order to immobilize enemy forces and upset his plans," the Naval Deputy asserted. 

The Redefined Mission. On 14 December 1953, the NAG issued a statement for the guidance of the SHAPE Staff which attempted to set down, as succinctly as possible, the task with which SACEUR was charged, and the elements of that task which must be carried out if he were to be successful. "The mission of the forces assigned to SACEUR's command," the statement held, "is to defend the NATO nations against external attack within SACEUR's command responsibility to the maximum extent possible."  

In order to do this there were certain minimum essentials to be met. Initially, control of the air must be denied the enemy and ACE had to gain control of the air as soon as possible. The integrity of Allied forces must be maintained in face of the enemy's initial attack.  

In the Northern European area it was essential that the enemy Baltic Fleet be prevented from getting to the high seas. The integrity of Norway and Denmark had to be preserved. In the Central European area the land/air battle had to be fought as far to the east as possible.

(1) See Annex to NAG 13/1, 25 Nov 53  
(2) Memo, Naval Deputy, Comments on NAG 13(F), 5 Dec 53.
Final positions astride the Rhine-IJsel line had to be held at all cost.

In the South, the enemy had to be stopped from reaching the Northern Mediterranean, and from bringing his Black Sea Fleet to the Mediterranean. Italy, the Straits area, and the Anatolia plateau were of primary importance. Successful Yugoslav resistance, holding of Turkish Thrace, and close cooperation of Greek-Turkish forces were key actions. The Mediterranean LOC had to be kept open. (1)

As planning progressed it became readily apparent that in view of the weakness of SACEUR's conventional forces, all the new concepts implied dependence in one way or another on the employment of nuclear weapons.

Meanwhile the SHAPE Staff was concentrating on developing the concrete information which was essential to further planning. By early December 1953, the results of their various studies were being delivered to the New Approach Group.

New Force Studies. Among the most significant of these was a study made to determine the strength of the forces which SACEUR would have by mid-1957. The initial study was rejected by SACEUR and others of the Command Echelon because it had been overtaken by new data contained in the country chapters of the 1953 Annual Review. (2) A second study was approved and, in early December, the NAG received force tables enumerating the major forces which they could use in their planning. This data came from the country plans for 1956 and figures were readjusted only in those few instances where special reasons supported a change. Although SHAPE had reason to believe that the country plans would not produce fully effective units, it was decided not to readjust the countries' estimates downward. The question of effectiveness was felt to be properly the subject of a separate study. (3)

German forces envisioned under the proposed European Defence Community had been included with full realization that the existence of such forces by mid-1957 depended on the starting date of German rearmament. The EDC studies had shown that if German rearmament started by mid-1954, their forces would be available and the planners saw no reason to exclude German units. (4) On 28 December

(1) NAG 12, NAG 12/1(F), 7 Dec 53.
(2) NAG 12, NAG 12/1(F), 7 Dec 53.
(3) See Chapter IV, Forces.
(4) See: NAG 12/1 p.5 for Total Ground Forces; and "new" page 5 for Total Air Forces.
1953, after approval by Air Marshal Dawson, the projected German units were included in those major air and ground units to be available in planning for the defence of the west in mid-1957. (1)

Projected Threat by 1957. The NAG had asked the Intelligence Division (INTEL), SHAPE to provide them with an intelligence estimate of Soviet capabilities and intentions in order that the tasks and objectives might be set up against a realistic and, insofar as was possible, valid background. Since General Gruenther had established a "target" date of 1 July 1957, the NAG had asked that the estimate be prepared on the "directed assumption" that the Soviets would not initiate hostilities against ACE prior to 1 July 1957. (2)

The completed intelligence estimate, a detailed document based on the best information available from all friendly sources as of that date, was furnished to the NAG in January 1954. (3)

INTEL had concluded that the achievement of complete surprise would be the Soviets' primary objective in any major attack. Secondly, they would strive immediately to gain air superiority within ACE. In order to achieve surprise, Communist pre-war preparations would be limited so as to retain tactical surprise in the initial attack. The estimate showed that the enemy could accomplish extensive positioning and readying of forces, and that only enemy actions during the last few days of this period would be likely to give definite military warning to the Allies. Hence, SACEUR could expect to be warned that an attack was highly probable, but he could not be given the exact date of attack.

The estimated number of forces, which would be employed against ACE on D-day did not represent the total forces available to the Soviet bloc since it was known that some forces could not be employed. The Soviets were also credited with the capability of building stockpiles by mid-1957 which would be adequate to support their military operations, mobilize their reserves and to keep up military production for several months after the outbreak of war.

It was felt that the Soviets probably would launch multiple ground offensives against Norway and Sweden, against Denmark and Western Europe, and against Italy.

(1) NAG 12/2(F), 28 Dec 53
(2) NAG 13/5(F), 27 Jan 54.
(3) SHAPE/21/54, An Estimate of the Soviet Threat Against Allied Command Europe, mid-1957, 18 Jan 54.
Yugoslavia, the Aegean area, the Caucasus and Middle East. In the air, the Communist offensive would be extremely intensive. On the sea, the Russian navy would concentrate on seizing the Baltic and Black Sea exits, seizing and destroying shipping, and making extensive use of mine and torpedo warfare.

The intelligence staff felt that the Soviets would not initially employ nuclear weapons in ACE. Rather, they would try to seize Western Europe by conventional means so as to profit more from their conquest. Nuclear weapons would be limited to strategic targets in the United Kingdom and North America, at least until an emergency or critical tactical situation developed. (1)

After reviewing the initial estimate, the NAG asked INTEL to prepare another estimate based on the large scale use of nuclear weapons by both sides.

Guidance from the North Atlantic Council. The NAC convened in Paris in December 1953 and was well aware of the planning going on at SHAPE. At their previous meeting the NAC had directed all military authorities under its control to "Press on with their reassessment of the most effective pattern of military strength for the next few years within the resources which it is anticipated will be made available."

As a result of the decision of the NAC in the December session, SACEUR was directed by the SG to undertake, "as a matter of priority," a capabilities study of the most effective pattern of military strength for his command for the year 1957, "taking due account of new weapons and techniques that are likely to be available to your command."

SACEUR was to base the study on the strength, composition and standards of readiness, including logistical support, of forces and infrastructure which in his best judgement would be assigned or earmarked in December 1956. "In this connection," the SG stated, "you should take into consideration the 1953 Annual Review and your experience with the NATO countries concerned."

SACEUR also was to prepare an estimate of Soviet bloc capabilities, as they would affect his operations in 1957. This estimate was to be based on NATO intelligence guidance to be provided in May 1954.

(1) SHAPE 21/54, 18 Jan 54.

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SACEUR was requested to submit his study by 1 July 1954 and to make recommendations on:

a. The composition, structure or phasing of forces assigned to him.

b. Possible changes in the current system of logistical support and infrastructure. (1)

General Norstad's Nuclear Concepts. General Norstad, the Air Deputy, had carefully followed the work of the NAG since his arrival at SHAPE. When, in late December 1953, the written views of the planners on how SACEUR’s mission should be carried out were presented to him he had some very straightforward comments and specific recommendations to make.

He fully recognized that such planning as had been set down on paper thus far was merely "a basic bibliography" from which the final plan would be prepared under the forthcoming "Step III." In this sense he was prepared to accept the NAG views as a suitable "first approach."

"I feel very strongly," General Norstad told General Gruenther, "that our mandate in this project is to present the Standing Group and NATO with a really new approach to the problem of European defence." General Norstad questioned whether the classic approach of developing objectives and tasks in the conventional manner, and supplementing our capabilities with new weapons being used by the planners would result in a really new approach. General Norstad felt that we would "get the best results through an approach from the opposite point of view, that is, by approaching each task from the standpoint of accomplishing it solely with nuclear weapons."

He elaborated on this radically different method by suggesting that this procedure at least would provide a check against findings arrived at by more conventional planning processes and thus tend to validate any conclusions arrived at with respect to the true state of defences in Europe. (2)

He also felt that once the NAG had solved the problem of European defence based on the use of nuclear weapons alone, they should plan the employment of conventional air, land and sea forces to exploit the results of nuclear attack locally and/or theatre-wide.

(1) SGM 53-54, 12 Jan 54
(2) Memo, SHAPE/AD 2211/53 Air Deputy, Subj: Reference NAG 13(F), 28 Dec 53.
As a result of General Norstad's stand, the NAG was instructed to take his views into consideration in the future development of the Plan under Step III. (1)

The New Approach Takes Definite Shape.

By January 1954, much of the preliminary groundwork, the development of missions and tasks, strategic concepts, and working statistics had been completed. However, there still were gaps in the Group's knowledge and information -- gaps which they wished to fill before committing the final plan to paper. Additional guidance in certain areas from the Command Echelon was needed before the planners could start preparation of final plans. During January the NAG under AM Dawson concentrated on procuring this additional information and on the incorporation of the ideas of the Command Echelon into their planning.

Securing Nuclear Weapons Data. The planning for employment of nuclear weapons was probably the most difficult phase of the NAG's project. The great secrecy which surrounded the entire field and the limited experience in use of such weapons, made the acquisition of valid planning data extremely difficult. (2)

The basic study on "atomic warfare" was undertaken for the NAG by the Operations Directorate of the Office of the Air Deputy. The study aimed at determining the effects of nuclear weapons and guided missiles. This study, when completed, would indicate for mid-1957, the relative suitability of targets (by categories) for attack with these weapons and would give an estimate of the availability of delivery systems by type (3). Closely allied to this study was another assigned to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans, Policy and Operations (PPANDO) on the D-day survival problem.

In NATO, the United States had had the greatest expertise in guided missiles and nuclear weapons, and it was to the United States that SHAPE turned for answers to the many questions on these subjects.

General Ridgway, as early as September 1952, had submitted a series of questions on nuclear weapons to the US JCS. The US response contained insufficient information for operational planning. However, the US JCS pointed out to General Ridgway the difficulty of giving definitive answers to his questions and suggested that, in future, he

(1) NAG 13/4 (F), 4 Jan 54.
(2) NAG 17 (F), 29 Dec 53.
(3) NAG 2, Encl. B, par. IV.
might prefer to submit "assumptions" on such matters for comment. (1)

General Gruenther was so concerned over the lack of detailed knowledge within SHAPE on nuclear weapons that he appealed directly to the US on a personal basis in December 1953. He asked for specific answers which would allow him and his staff to proceed intelligently with the drafting of strategic plans built around use of nuclear weapons. Specifically, the information he required consisted of the following:

a. The general magnitude of the number of atomic weapons which would be made available to NATO commands.

b. Yields and fusing options available with the above weapons.

c. The radii of effects of air, surface, sub-surface nuclear detonations.

d. The expected military results of the Allied strategic air offensive.

e. Soviet capabilities for atomic warfare.

f. Characteristics and capabilities of atomic weapons delivery systems available or programmed to NATO. (2)

Representatives of the US AF had visited SHAPE in mid-September 1953 and had briefed SHAPE planners on nuclear weapons analysis techniques and methods of obtaining, through war-gaming procedures, projections of the outcome of military operations which would result from introducing variations in types and numbers of forces and weapons employed in a given situation.

These techniques and methods were of great interest to members of the NAG because they were readily adapted to solving the many intangibles and unknowns of nuclear warfare. As a result of the great interest expressed by the NAG, the leader of the US group agreed to furnish SHAPE with as much of this sort of data as he reasonably could.

(1)* NAG 11(F), 3 Nov 53; SGM 208-53, 30 Jan 53.
(2) Original Gruenther Manuscript page 66.
In January 1954, several officials of the group returned to SHAPE bringing with them additional planning data, and taking back to the United States for solution a number of further complex problems which the NAG asked them to solve.

The SHAPE planners also lacked detailed, up-to-date information on the various types of new weapons, other than nuclear, which were being planned for early production by the NATO nations. Without this information their plans could not be completely realistic. In late 1953 SHAPE made efforts to secure the information from the national authorities.

In a typical request AM Dawson informed the UK Ministry of Defence that SACEUR would be grateful for the latter's cooperation in providing SHAPE with information on details of the nature and characteristics of new or improved weapons e.g., anti-personnel, anti-tank, anti-submarine, and anti-aircraft, and the scale upon which such weapons were likely to be supplied in 1957; guided missiles of all types, as they were considered to be of sufficient importance to warrant separate treatment apart from other new weapons; the characteristics of new or improved armoured fighting vehicles; estimates of the possible utilization of new weapons and weapon systems to counter-action (e.g., to attacks upon launching sites, deception, etc.); and the characteristics of new types of aircraft and air armament likely to be available by 1957, together with an estimate of any significant changes which the introduction of new equipment would bring about in air warfare.

AM Dawson noted further that if the UK could agree to provide all or some of the information which SHAPE needed, officers representative of the three services could visit the Ministry of Defence to discuss requirements in greater detail. At this time, he suggested, these officers might also be briefed on the basis of any relevant and readily available material and agree to suitable arrangements for the dissemination of information which would take time to prepare. (1)

However, SACEUR could not afford to delay his plans for lack of up-to-date definite information so long as he could make valid assumptions. In early November 1953 the Operations Directorate of the Air Deputy's staff had begun exploration of what nuclear weapons would be available to both sides, what the "worthwhile" targets were that would or could be attacked with those weapons, and what SACEUR's capability was "in terms of vehicles"

to deliver those weapons on these targets. PPANDO was instructed to determine what new types of weapons, devices, weapons systems or combat units, aside from nuclear explosives, might be available to SACEUR in mid-1957. (1)

Allied-Soviet Nuclear Weapons Ratio. By the end of 1953, SHAPE had arrived at some conclusions and figures which could be used in formulating an outline operational plan. Studies showed that from 1957 onward the Allied/Soviet ratio in numbers of nuclear weapons available would be marked by two distinct stages. In the first stage, probably through 1958, a large but finite number would be held by the Allied side with many less for the Soviets. Stage two would be reached by about 1960 when the two sides would approach parity in such weapons with a large, but finite number, available to both. It was decided that the first condition, Allied superiority but not monopoly, should form the basis of the mid-1957 planning.

In order to provide a numerical basis needed for planning, the Soviets were credited with a stockpile of 600 nuclear weapons, with a limited resupply assured. It was assumed that the range of yields of Soviet atomic weapons would be from 20 to 70 kilotons (KT).

It was known that the Soviet government had succeeded in producing thermonuclear weapons, but no information as to their potential in terms of numbers or size was available, as yet. However, it was decided to assume that the enemy possessed (as of mid-1957) 100 heavy bomber delivered 5 megaton (MT) weapons.

"Other than remunerative military use and the need to establish the necessary requirements with sufficient lead time for development in desired categories," the planning officers commented "we know of no valid basis for assuming any particular numerical limitation to the availability of atomic weapons of any type to SACEUR in mid-1957." (2) They therefore recommended that SACEUR be credited, for planning purposes, with a stockpile of 1000 nuclear weapons of all categories plus an additional 500 such weapons be stated as a requirement which could be met with some effort. A range of 20 to 70 KT also was assumed for these devices.

(2) NAG 17(F), Enc. B., Section III, para. 11, 29 Dec 53.
With respect to thermonuclear weapons, it was assumed that SACEUR had a stockpile of 200 weapons initially available and a requirement for a further allocation not to exceed 50 with an average yield of 5 MT. Delivery means for these weapons would be limited to the heavy bombers of the US Strategic Air Command or the UK Bomber Command.

Targets. While one group of officers was trying to determine the number of nuclear weapons that might be used, another group was studying the matter of targets. This group started with the basic premise that by 1957 the nuclear strike capability of ACE, ACLANT, the USAF Strategic Air Command (SAC) and other Allied Commands would be so great that it could destroy the Soviet's will and means to fight. If the initial nuclear strikes did not force the enemy to quit, it was assumed that SACEUR's remaining nuclear weapons would be able to complete the task by (1) destroying enemy air power; (2) destroying enemy combat elements, both in the battle area and in rear assembly areas; (3) preventing reinforcements; (4) destroying his command and communications lines; (5) destroying his supplies; and (6) destroying his naval power.

The preliminary study group decided that there were six types of nuclear targets. Some of these were fixed and attack could be pre-planned in detail. Others could be dealt with only after fighting started and reconnaissance showed the development of a lucrative target. Even with this latter type, however, much could be done prior to hostilities in forecasting the locations at which such targets as troop concentrations could be forced to develop. The targets were: airfields and related elements of the Soviet air complex; troop concentrations, wherever located; interdiction targets such as rail and highway bridges, marshaling yards and port facilities; major military command and/or communications installations; dumps and depots; and naval forces.

The planners could not fix the exact number of targets by type which would have to be destroyed. This would depend on the way in which the war began, the size and direction of the enemy's main attack, the number of secondary attacks and the relative weight of the enemy nuclear assault against ACE as compared with efforts against other parts of the world. However, by using the current situation in SACEUR's area of interest, potential targets and a priority list were submitted to the NAG on 18 February 1954. (1)

(1) NAG 11/1, 18 Feb 54; See Chart B for total and breakdown on use of these weapons.
Similarly, a detailed estimate of how the Soviets would attack targets in ACE and the effect which such an attack would have on SACEUR's further operations was furnished to the NAG. (1)

Forces, Standards of Readiness and Capabilities. On 5 October 1953, the NAG had sent to AM Dawson proposed guidance for the development of a study on the effectiveness and capabilities of the conventional forces that would be available to SACEUR in mid-1957. AM Dawson approved these planning instructions and, on 8 October, sent them to the Operations and Training (OANDT) Division for action.

The OANDT Division was directed to formulate a statement, and tabulations where appropriate, of the estimated military effectiveness and capabilities of the basic combat formations, arms and weapons likely to be included in SACEUR's order of battle in mid-1957. This study would utilize a common approach in covering each of the three services and include an analysis of the effectiveness of each in a form which would meet the needs of the Command Echelon and the planners.

Data was required on two categories of information:

a. Basic operational factors. Performance characteristics of basic, "standard" units of each service in operational terms, such as sortie rates and combat radii for air units, ability to hold frontages against enemy attack for ground forces and time on station for submarines.

b. Relative effectiveness. The operational capabilities of specific units in the order of battle in relation to the performance characteristics of these standard units, as developed from consideration of such factors as organisation; equipment; location; manning and training; adequacy of support elements; suitability to the area of intended employment; etc.

By 18 February 1954, the OANDT Division had completed a detailed study of the capabilities of forces assigned or available to SACEUR for 1957, and had submitted it to the NAG for use in the further development of Step III (preparing a definite plan to carry out SACEUR's redefined mission using the conventional forces and nuclear weapons scheduled to be available in 1957) and as a basis for appropriate recommendations in Step V (final adjusting of the plan and developing recommendations affecting force programs). (2)

(1) NAG 17/3(F)(Rev), 25 Feb 54.
(2) NAG 5(F), 9 Oct 53; NAG 5/1(F) & NAG 5/2(F), 18 Feb 54, also see page 29 for "Five Steps to New Approach."
Further Development of Campaign Concepts. With information gained in the various studies and the guidance from the Command Echelon, the NAG was now ready to develop the campaign objectives as to time, place, and situation.

The first campaign, Inhibition of the Soviet Air and Atomic Threat, was being closely studied. It included air/atomic defence measures and counter-air operations aimed at taking the initiative from the enemy and gaining command of the air in essential areas. It was apparent that, if this campaign were to be successful, ACE must have a greater ability to deliver atomic attack, and to absorb atomic attacks than the Soviet bloc.

It was decided that the Soviet Union could do the greatest damage to ACE’s defensive capability if they made nuclear attacks on Allied forces and installations in the following priority: atomic forces, combat forces, command posts, governmental control centres, depots, supply stocks, support forces, ports, and transportation nets. The means which combat forces could employ to absorb successfully an atomic assault (dispersing, for example) might reduce their operating effectiveness and had to be evaluated in this plan.

Work on the second campaign, Interdiction of Soviet Buildup, Support and Lines of Communication, had to be deferred until more concrete data could be assembled.

The third campaign, Arrest of the Soviet Advance in Western Europe, was taking definite shape by early 1954. This campaign envisaged forward operations in West Germany and reserve positions astride the Rhine. The forward operations would be based on two "forces zones", one in the North German plain, one in Bavaria with mobile operations by self-sufficient forces in the hilly area between, all organized for counter-attack and covered by a screening force to develop Soviet ground forces targets for nuclear attack. Major effort would be expended to hold well forward through D+30, and especially through D+15 to cover mobilization and reinforcement in rear areas.

The reserve position astride the Rhine would be built up with limited active and reserve forces. As the practicability of the forward defence was verified, additional reserve units in some strength would be moved forward to support the forward defence and develop intermediate reserve positions in more advanced locations East of the Rhine which covered areas of particular
importance. A strong army corps would be established astride the Elbe in Northern Germany to defend Schleswig-Holstein.

Considerations of the fourth campaign, Protection of Allied Shipping and Naval Forces against Soviet Attack, were quite clear. A distinction had to be made between merchant ships at sea on D-day and their cargoes. Planners saw that a major effort would have to be made to bring to safety critical cargoes (military supplies, petroleum, oil and lubricants, etc.), as well as ships of special design or high performance. After D-day, the loss of shipping which would have to be tolerated would have to be considered globally. Port capacity in the Mediterranean was deficient although there was enough in the North and Centre. The Turkish and Baltic Straits must be effectively closed. This could be done by physically holding one shore and denying the other to the enemy.

The fifth campaign, Arrest of the Land Advance in Denmark, also lent itself readily to analysis. Denmark occupied a key position with respect to Scandinavian defence, control of the Baltic exits, air defence of the UK, and Atlantic lines of communication. Danish forces would have to build up a reserve position in the area south of the Kiel canal, and had to organise defence of the Danish Islands. The initial defence against any Soviet offensive in the direction of Jutland would be provided by the forces deployed astride the Elbe.

Studying the sixth campaign, Combatting the Soviet Land Advance in Norway, the planners saw that the period of mobilization, through D+30, was the most critical. Quick reaction against any Soviet land, airborne, or amphibious attack would be essential. External Allied atomic forces would be employed against any major amphibious operations. In Northern Norway, the defence would be particularly critical prior to the commitment of SACLANT support, which was slated to arrive about D+15.

Staving off the Soviet land advance toward Italy, the objective of the seventh campaign, would be accomplished by a combination of ground and atomic air attacks against the enemy in Austria and Yugoslavia. This would serve to delay his advance to Tarvisio and/or Gorizia, during Italian mobilization (thru D+30), and to hold him there if he reached the vital passes. Reserve forces would be prepared to reinforce advance elements and to establish reserve positions in Northeastern Italy if required by Soviet offensive pressure.
The Soviet Land Advance into Greece would be retarded by conducting delaying operations on the so-called Struma position long enough for mobilization to be completed in the Larissa area. Any major enemy offensive through limited and restricted approaches to Greece from the North would be attacked with nuclear weapons. Effort would be made to block the southern exits as a preliminary to such attack. Close coordination of operations in Northern Greece with those in Yugoslavia and Turkey was essential. It was particularly important to deny the use of Greek ports to Soviet submarines.

The last campaign was designed to Arrest the Enemy Land Advance in Turkey. Delaying actions would be conducted in Thrace with the purpose of holding the Bosphorus. If Thrace were lost, major effort must be made to hold the enemy west of the Straits, and to deny him control of the western shore in order to cover mobilization centering in western Turkey, and to continue effectively to limit use of the Straits by submarines.

In eastern Turkey, defence would aim at slowing any advance toward Erzerum, at least until mobilization extending through D+30 had been completed. If the enemy advanced beyond this area, a major effort by Turkish forces with nuclear support would be made to hold eastward of the line Malatya-Sivas-Samsun in order to stop any Soviet advance in strength to the Mediterranean.

On 5 February 1954 the NAG issued its planned assignment of forces to the various campaigns. Most army units, because of their origin, nature and/or location, were committed to definite campaigns. For example, a Norwegian infantry battalion logically could be assigned only to the sixth campaign, Combatting the Soviet Land Advance in Norway. But other formations, particularly air and navy, could participate in two or more campaigns, or could be allocated to any one of several alternative campaigns. These latter forces, which included nuclear delivery forces, were placed in a "pool" pending recommendations relative to their deployment based upon further study and analysis of campaign requirements. (1)

Additional Guidance. The guidance which the NAG had received from the Standing Group and the Command Echelon during the first phases of the development of the Capabilities Plan in Steps I and II had been of a general nature. But as Step III approached more specific guidance was given.

(1) NAG 12/4(F), 5 Feb 54.
Deputy SACEUR's Views. On 21 January 1954, FM Montgomery addressed the assembled NAG on a number of important matters with which they were dealing. He told them that it was reasonable to assume that SACEUR would have a short period of warning which would allow a small degree of mobilization. "To assume that the Soviets will not use the atomic weapon and, therefore, the Allies will not use it either," Montgomery continued, "is a false argument which must never be allowed to influence SHAPE thinking. Planning must be based on the assumption that both sides use atomic weapons from the outset."

He saw that the concept of an atomic war, which was then being evolved, must be carefully thought out, and he gave his ideas on the division of nuclear fire zones in the opening battle. "In front of our forces," Montgomery said, "there would be three belts within which atomic attacks would be made. The first extending to a depth of about 20 miles would be covered by atomic artillery and guided missiles under the direct control of ground commanders. Beyond the artillery zone would be a zone of 500 miles deep covered by the tactical air forces, and beyond this a deeper zone 3,000 to 5,000 miles deep covered by strategic air forces.

FM Montgomery then reviewed certain factors which he considered basic to the ground defence. Schleswig-Holstein, which geographically was part of the Jutland peninsula, but politically part of Germany, was particularly troublesome. How and by whom it should be defended had been a bothersome consideration to the planners for a long time. The Field Marshal was quite clear in his opinions. "Germany," he said, "will fight for the defence of Schleswig-Holstein, but cannot be expected to fight for the defence of Denmark."

Montgomery assumed that German divisions would be made available under the terms of the planned European Defence Community. He believed that four of these divisions should be located in the Hamburg area astride the Elbe to defend Schleswig-Holstein. These divisions should be under the command of CINCENT, not CINCNORTH, since "they could not be expected to fight under a Danish General." Montgomery told the NAG officers that they should re-examine the present boundary between the Northern and Central Commands to see if it needed changing because of this command arrangement. The normal lines of communication for German divisions would run from West to East, but there was always the possibility that some part of them might be isolated in Schleswig-Holstein and the administrative implications of this contingency could not be overlooked.
For the Centre, Montgomery envisioned the creation of a "tough resilient shield" of mobile ground forces which would be anchored on strong troop concentrations near Hamburg in the North and in Bavaria at the Southern end. Between these two concentrations lay the mass of Central Europe which was marked by river obstacles, the Elbe, Weser and Rhine, all of which ran roughly North and South.

Montgomery proposed that one of these rivers should form a "forward obstacle line" which would be manned lightly by dispersed forces, mobile and well-armed. Their mission would be to force the enemy to concentrate into "profitable" nuclear targets. Behind the obstacle lines would be stationed extremely mobile corps which would range swiftly from one end of the obstacle line to the other, attack the enemy incessantly, keep him off balance, and break up his attack formations. Behind the mobile "hitting" corps would be reserve divisions astride the rearward-defensive barrier of the Rhine. Montgomery thought it unlikely that these reserve divisions would be good enough to attack the enemy although they might be used in emergency. But the strategic concept he proposed called for great emphasis on the swift mobilisation of SACEUR's reserve divisions -- particularly the ones scheduled to be available from M+3 to M+15.

With regard to the situation on the ground in Southern Europe, Montgomery was quite specific in his instructions. He told the NAG that they should not plan to send Italian troops to fight in Austria or elsewhere. The strategic passes must be held at all costs. Behind the line of the passes lay a considerable depth of mountainous country which must be denied the enemy. The concept of a subsidiary line along the Appenines was dangerous and virtually invited the loss of Po Valley.

FM Montgomery considered the Yugoslavian army as an ally which, in the event of Soviet attack, would hold the approaches from the east into Italy. He favoured coordination of Yugoslav and Italian operational plans as soon as this could be done practicably. Enemy routes through Austria were constricted and presented excellent opportunities for attack by aerial atomic weapons.

Montgomery said that the defence of Turkey was going to be much more difficult. DSACEUR pointed out that there was no depth to the Thrace positions and that the going would be easy for the enemy, especially toward Istanbul. But, both sides of the exits from the Black Sea would have to be held as long as possible, even
though the positions around Catalca would be difficult to defend and might have to be abandoned under heavy pressure and atomic attack. On the other hand, he felt that positions around Gallipoli could be held by determined troops for some time. (1)

Instructions from the Standing Group. On 1 February 1954, the SG forwarded to SACEUR a series of "planning factors" to be used in "current studies on both 1957 Force Requirements and Capabilities Planning". The SG's planning factors were:

Thermonuclear weapons as contrasted with atomic weapons are mainly a matter of degree of destruction caused by one detonation. For planning purposes, therefore, both will be grouped under the heading of atomic weapons.

The Soviets will begin mobilization and concentration in rear areas of minimum forces required to reinforce and support initial combat forces 30 days prior to D-day. They will make every effort to achieve surprise.

No Allied intelligence agency can give positive assurance of a definite period of warning of attack. However, indications of preparation for an attack should be detected. If these are properly assessed, the Allies should be provided with a period of warning. This period may vary from a few minutes warning of an air attack to thirty days warning of an all-out effort. Therefore, NATO Force Requirements should be based on:

a. Forces in being needed to meet a surprise attack by Soviet bloc forces as presently deployed.

b. A build-up of forces needed to meet by \(H(D) + 30\) an all-out Soviet effort.

Present plans for Western German force contributions will have been implemented by 1957.

It should be recognised that the NATO military production base, as now visualized for 1957 will probably be inadequate to support extensive military operations during the first year of a major war. However in order that planning can proceed, the following assumptions on reserve supply and resupply should be made:

(1) DSAC 1105/3. Notes for the Record, Progress of the NAG, 25 Jan 54.
a. Stock levels remaining after the initial air attack will be adequate to support your combat operations for 60 days. In the case of SACEUR, 20 to 30 days supply will be in forward areas.

b. Resupply will remain adequate to support your operations.

National forces under your command which possess an atomic weapons delivery capability will have an adequate number of atomic weapons of all categories for all phases of NATO Commands' planned operations. A limited resupply after the initial phase may be forthcoming in the light of the then existent situation. The decision to initiate atomic operations can be made for these national forces only by the appropriate national authorities.

Atomic planning and training:

a. Detailed pre-planning for engaging targets will have been accomplished.

b. Sufficient training in the employment of atomic weapons will have been accomplished to insure complete integration of atomic and conventional weapons.

Radiological warfare will not be employed on a large scale either side.

Each NATO Commander, should assume that other NATO Commands and Allied Commands, including U.K. Bomber Command and the U.S. Strategic Air Command will support his operations by carrying out their missions and as appropriate, place particular emphasis on:

a. The earliest possible destruction of the Soviet atomic delivery capability.

b. The earliest possible reduction of those elements of Soviet resources which will have the most immediate effect on your combat situation.

c. Retardation of the advance of Soviet Bloc forces against SACEUR's area. (1)

(1) SGM 53-54, 1 Feb 54.
DSACEUR Reviews the Draft Plan. Using the guidance provided by DSACEUR and the Standing Group, the NAG developed the first draft of the Plan during February. In early March they presented the Plan to FM Montgomery in a two day briefing. On the first day they covered the plan for conducting the land battle in Central Europe.

The fundamental principle in the new defence concept was the use of land forces to create atomic targets. Minimum covering forces, probably one battalion every 12,000 to 13,000 yards would man the initial obstacle, the Weser River. The enemy, after penetrating the covering forces and crossing the Weser, would be required to mass prior to launching a successful attack on AFCENT's main defensive positions. At this point, SACEUR's forces would counter attack with nuclear weapons and use brigade size forces to exploit the damage wrought by the nuclear weapons.

In each corps area, ACE could use approximately four hydrogen and sixteen atomic weapons while the Soviets would have 2/3 hydrogen and 4 atomic weapons. Because of this nuclear superiority, the NAG felt that three Allied divisions could match eight Soviet divisions on a 55-mile front. Applying this ratio to the situation in the Centre sector indicated a requirement for 31 M-day divisions.

Montgomery was favourably impressed with the plan and stated that it was in accord with his previous guidance. However, he had some pertinent observations to make. First of all, he wanted the initial obstacle moved eastward from the Weser to the Elbe. He felt that the Germans would insist on defending along the Elbe and a successful defence of Schleswig-Holstein would require it anyway. The Field Marshal observed that SHAPE, for a long time, had paid only lip service to the idea of closing off the Baltic and defending Denmark. He would use four divisions for countering any thrust against Denmark, and would make Schleswig-Holstein the responsibility of CINCENT. Since CINCNORTH and CINCENT had disagreed in the past over this matter, Montgomery felt that SACEUR would have to settle the matter.

Turning to the means which would be available to carry out the plan, Montgomery stated that the present Allied land forces were neither organised nor logistically supported to wage a successful nuclear war. Before these forces could be ready, many changes would have to be made. The M-day divisions would have to be very highly-trained and disciplined to bear the full brunt of the initial attack and would have to be able to fight at any time.
Montgomery said that the reserve forces would be mobilised in echelons. The first echelon should be ready and moving within 7 days. They would need at least one month's training per year to enable them to fight at once. The second echelon would require at least one month's training after mobilisation and therefore would become D+30 formations.

Montgomery stated that he had tried to visualise World War III in an atomic age and had concluded that he could not fight it with the standard equipment then in use. Further, he did not think that ACE's forces could be furnished with the required new equipment in three years time, because it took five years to get equipment from the drawing board to the front line soldier.

On the second day of the briefing, the plans for Southern and Northern Europe were covered. After listening carefully to their explanation, Montgomery gave them his guidance on principles which he felt should be observed in preparing for war in those areas. He noted that so long as Denmark held and Sweden remained neutral Norway would be all right. It therefore was important to secure Denmark. If the islands fell, Jutland would fall. If Jutland fell, the islands would fall. Therefore Montgomery felt that one of the two Danish divisions should be placed in the islands, and the other located in Jutland north of the Schleswig-Holstein boundary. The latter should not be placed under command of the Northern Army Group.

The Field Marshal told the NAG that their report should indicate that Norway must maintain one division in peacetime. Then if Denmark held, and Sweden remained neutral, Norway would have time to mobilize and put up an effective resistance.

Turning to the situation in the South, Montgomery maintained that Italy would have to place an Alpine brigade in each of the major passes to defend them. Behind this mountain front two centrally located infantry divisions were required in reserve. The Isonzo area was not in danger because the Yugoslavs, according to FM Montgomery, would fight the Soviets. In peacetime, he believed, Italy must maintain four divisions in the Tarvisio-Monfalcone front, and relegate everything else to the reserve army.

The NAG changed its plan to fit DSACEUR's guidance and, on 10 March 1954 briefed him again. The principal change was to move the initial barrier forward from the Weser to the Elbe. The advantages to the Elbe position were that it would be favoured by the Germans and would increase the depth of the defended area. The major
disadvantage would be the cost of constructing extensive barrier positions which would be required. This plan would also require 34 divisions instead of the 31 in the original Weser strategy.

At the conclusion of the revised presentation Montgomery made several significant points which he insisted must be observed by any group preparing plans for the defence of Europe.

All planning in the future would have to be based on the use of nuclear weapons. "We have reached the point of no return," DSACEUR declared, "and I will agree to no other policy." He directed the NAG to state this basic premise clearly in their plan. Montgomery felt that nuclear weapons gave the Allies "a heaven-sent opportunity to turn over from a defensive to an offensive policy."

SHAPE must consider the Germans "in" and thus employ the Elbe strategy which also meant defending Schleswig-Holstein.

Using a blackboard, Montgomery illustrated, how he would attack the Soviets if they started a war. He would man his forward obstacle with one German battalion at intervals of 10 miles. These troops would live in the area and would take the initial attack. These units would be in addition to the 12 German divisions envisioned by the EDC. The initial barrier would be supported by "triangular" corps with two armoured and one infantry division. An army area would consist of three corps on 100-120 mile front. A serious penetration or thrust would be countered by an airborne division or divisions, based in the UK, France or even the US. The backstop would be provided by the reserve armies sited astride the Rhine. As far as the command structure was concerned, an Army Group commander would have a forward army and one on the Rhine.

He also considered that the plan being prepared by the NAG should contain a clear indication, nation by nation, of the balance between the active forces (i.e., forward formations) and reserve forces (i.e., along the Rhine) required. (1)

By April 1954 the planning effort was beginning to produce results. The background studies and the command guidance were being blended into a final comprehensive Capabilities Plan for 1957. The SG had directed that the

(1) DSAC 1105/3, Note for the Record, NAG Meetings with the FM, 18 Mar 54.
final plan be submitted to them by 1 July and SHAPE worked at top speed to meet the suspense date. DSACEUR felt that before the report was submitted the comments of the MSCs be obtained. He recommended that after CPX IV SHAPE send a team, preferably the NAG itself, to each of the MSCs in turn to explain the New Approach. (1)

Administrative Preparation of the Plan. On 14 April AM Dawson directed that the report to the SG be a concise summary. It would express SACEUR's views on ACE's 1957 capabilities, outstanding deficiencies as of the date of the report, the relation between stated capabilities and the requirements, and SACEUR's recommendations for future planning. Appended to the report would be three major enclosures: (1) the Capabilities Plan; (2) a paper recommending changes in SHAPE programs which had become evident while developing the Capabilities Plan, and (3) a Capability Requirements Plan which would be an extension of the Capabilities Plan.

The Capabilities Plan would be an outline plan giving SACEUR's estimate of the situation, mission, objectives and strategy, and an analysis of each of these in the light of forecasted 1957 capabilities. It would have a summary of the Nine Campaigns, SACEUR's proposed 1957 atomic tactics and organization, and the considerations from which the campaigns had been derived. Related studies on logistics and targets would be enclosed.

The Capability Requirements Plan would examine areas of the greatest military risk as developed in the Capabilities Plan, and would recommend necessary adjustments in forces and operations.

The report to the SG and the Capabilities Plan were to be completed in the first draft by the NAG by 5 May 1954 and, after thorough coordination, to be submitted to SACEUR by 20 June. The Requirements Plan and the program recommendations were to be completed in draft form by 25 May and be ready for SACEUR on 20 June. (2)

SACEUR's Superiors Are Informed. The higher authorities of NATO had been kept informed in general terms of the New Approach Planning and were aware of the trend which this planning was taking. On 23 March 1954, the members of the North Atlantic Council visited SHAPE where General Gruenther brought them up to date on the military situation in Western Europe. He then explained to them

(1) DSAC 1105/3, Memo for the Record, NAG Meeting, 7 Apr 54.
(2) Memo, AM Dawson to NAG, 14 Apr 54.
his reasons for initiating the New Approach and showed them what he hoped to accomplish. He illustrated his points with statistics on the comparative strengths of Soviet and western forces, their weapons systems, their logistic systems and effectiveness.

SACEUR also explained that SHAPE was including the proposed German forces in its plans and that the New Approach would be severely set back if that assumption were invalid. He was trying to determine what could be done with 50 divisions on a front of 500 miles because strategic and political considerations eliminated using the Rhine as an obstacle for defending Germany. If you tried to defend Germany from behind the Rhine, you would not get any German divisions, therefore General Gruenther said, "we are doing two things: we are trying to defend Western Europe and Germany with a forward strategy, and we are trying to do it with less forces. For the period of 1957 we will use atomic weapons plentifully, and they will be the mainstay of our strategy. We could not hold on any forward line unless we used atomic weapons in great plenty."

Looking specifically to the problems which were going to arise in the matter of costs, forces and Annual Review estimates, SACEUR pointed out to the members of the NAC that he anticipated a rather touch-and-go situation with respect to the Annual Review.

"Your particular government may get the study and say, 'This is impossible, it's crazy'," SACEUR said. "And it might well be crazy. You may be right, and maybe we should take another look at the problem. It is inherently extremely difficult to project yourself forward from three to five years and then attempt to justify the results. What we will get is an arithmetical solution to a problem which does not lend itself very well to arithmetic. However, from the standpoint of taxpayers and tax burdens, it must have some specific quantities with which finance ministers can work." (1)

Just before CPX IV was held in April 1954, the NATO Foreign Ministers (2) came to SHAPE where General Gruenther personally briefed them on the New Approach. SACEUR went to the heart of the matter when he told them in unmistakable terms, "If you accept this philosophy on which we are working, you should understand clearly that upon approval of our plan, you are committed to the use of the atomic bomb. If the atomic bomb is not used, we shall surely need additional forces." (3)

(1) Summary Record of Informal Briefing of the NAG at SHAPE, 1030 hrs, 23 Mar 54.
(2) Ministers of UK, US, France and Canada were absent.
(3) As quoted in SHAPE 249/54, Closing Remarks by Gen. A.M. Gruenther CPX IV, SHAPE, 30 Apr 54.
Selling the New Approach at CPX IV. During CPX IV, military officials and civilian dignitaries from all the NATO nations, except Iceland, gathered at SHAPE to study the problems of defending Western Europe. General Gruenther, Field Marshal Montgomery and General Norstad all took this opportunity to explain and to "sell" the New Approach.

The Air Deputy's Five New Factors in Warfare. General Norstad, who was also responsible for nuclear planning, explained that the use of atomic weapons would change the methods of conducting war. Nuclear weapons would exert "a great compressive effect upon time," in the defense and offense. One jet bomber could now destroy more than hundreds of World War II bombers, and do it much more rapidly. This capability could exist on D-day. General Norstad recalled that many years were required in World War II to design, train, build, equip and deploy Allied Forces before the enemy could be defeated. In the future "we now see that it would be possible to expend and to have expended against us infinitely greater military effort by relatively small forces which can be sustained readily in peacetime."

The compressive time effect led General Norstad to a second consideration, that of readiness, "We can no longer expect a period of grace during which we can organize, train and equip forces tailored to fit new weapons employed in the early stages of a war." A nuclear attack could disrupt Western industrial mobilisation for a substantial and critical period of time. Preparations, which we normally made only after a war was started, would have to be made in advance. On the offensive side, he said that the military effort which required months or years to build, might no longer be useful because it would be too late. It might well be that the military force, which was in readiness on or shortly after D-day, would make a "greater contribution than ever before to the decisive phase of a future war."

General Norstad then covered "Absorption." Even if the Western nations were completely armed, equipped and manned to fight a nuclear war, if this strength were employed in the conventional manner, a large portion of that strength would be destroyed by the first enemy nuclear attacks. He felt that we must find a way to deploy and protect our military assets to survive attacks, and at the same time be able to concentrate against the enemy as necessary. "The problem of how to absorb and survive atomic attack, and still retain the strength to neutralise the enemy's remaining offensive power, is critical."

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Participants in CPX-4
Admiral Lemonnier  Lt. General Schuyler  General Norstad
General Gruenther  Field Marshal Montgomery
See page 419 for other names
General Norstad felt that a nuclear war could not be contained in Europe - such a war inevitably would spread to all areas of the globe. Therefore, his fourth point was that the defence of Europe must be considered in relation to the battle that would be going on in other areas. The cumulative effect of all major efforts against the enemy must be considered. There should be a direct relationship between the effect upon the enemy of strategic air operations and SACEUR's operations. They would be complementary in crushing the enemy.

In a fifth principle, General Norstad claimed that for military economic and political reasons, the NATO nations must base their plans for defence upon strength, not weakness. "We must strike for decisive success, not plan to blunt the blows of failure." He asserted that NATO nations, could not spend the major portions of their resources in building and keeping up a gigantic military establishment continuously for an indefinite period of time. "Our best, and perhaps only, effective course of action is to build our plans around the employment of nuclear weapons in the event that war is forced upon us."

The Air Deputy believed that the military implications of these new "atomic principles upon SACEUR were most significant. First, his missions probably would have to be altered in order to provide the maximum benefit from a coordinated effort, as well as to avoid unnecessary overlap and the drain upon his resources. SACEUR's physical objectives might not change as a result of the strategic nuclear attack upon the enemy, but the time available to him for performing his mission would be altered. This change would have a major effect upon his planning, particularly as it related to combat readiness, and requirements for reserves and replacements.

Strategic considerations were also changed. General Norstad felt that ACE must neutralise the enemy's offensive capability by striking with maximum forces as soon as possible after the war started. At the same time physical areas had to be defended to keep the enemy from overrunning bases, territories and resources. (1)

Field Marshal Montgomery's Comments. Montgomery told the officials attending CPX IV that any idea that the introduction of nuclear weapons would not affect the organization and tactics of the war was sheer nonsense. It

(1) SHAPE AD/5/54, 23 Apr 54.
was obvious, he claimed, that many of the so-called conventional weapons of the present day would be needed in land warfare for many years to come, but the nuclear weapons provided an immensely powerful weapon for use either to ensure success and make it easier, or to prevent failure. The problem was to integrate the nuclear weapons into the present weapons systems, so as to get the greatest value from it. "We must therefore plan the future on the accepted use of the atomic weapon in war," he said, "and we must plan to do it now." Montgomery also saw that the nuclear weapon would enable SACEUR to plan offensively. "We must plan to win, from the start, and not merely to check an enemy onslaught."(1)

SACEUR's Closing Remarks. General Gruenther summed up the philosophy behind the New Approach. "From personal conversations during the past few days," he said, "I have gained the impression that some of you doubt that the use of the atomic bomb is going to be authorized. You may have good reasons for those reservations, but I think it is fair to you to know our thinking here. All of our New Approach planning is proceeding on the basis that atomic weapons will be used, and that they will be employed instantly. Obviously, such employment will have to be approved by higher headquarters. But our recommendation to the Standing Group on this matter will be quite positive, with a request that the concept be made clear to the North Atlantic Council."

"One of you made this remark to me yesterday: 'Would it not be well if we could have an atomic plan based on the philosophy which the Soviets appear to be trying to promote — that is, to use atomic weapons only in retaliation? We do not agree. Our planning does not envisage such a concept," General Gruenther continued.

"I think it would be a serious error for the Free World to give up, voluntarily, a major capability for waging war and at the same time allow the Soviets to exploit their superiority in the so-called conventional forces. I think we would place ourselves at a grave disadvantage to agree to use atomic weapons only in retaliation. To adopt that concept would be to give the initiative to the Soviets. Our thinking at SHAPE is that if war does take place, we must take the offensive immediately in the employment of the tremendous power of atomic weapons." (2)

(1) Memo, FM Montgomery to Chief of Staff, 17 Mar 54.
(2) SHAPE/249/54, Closing Remarks, CPV IV, SHAPE, 30 Apr 54.
The views of the Major Subordinate Commands. The Capabilities Plan was sufficiently advanced by May to allow the planners to present it to the MSCs. Illustrative charts were prepared and the most effective speakers of the planning staff were selected to present the Plan. A detailed description of the provisions of the Capabilities Plan was impracticable and only its salient features, particularly the departures from traditional concepts, and to some extent, the controversial features were covered in the briefings for the MSCs.

The prepared briefing emphasized that the backbone of the Plan was an almost total dependence on the offensive power of atomic weapons delivered by several means. The campaign on the ground was secondary and designed as a "holding" action in all sectors. In the Centre, the traditional barrier of the Rhine had been superseded by a much more forward barrier along the Weser (1) in order to add depth to the battlefield and to secure as large a portion of Germany as possible. The Rhine became a reserve position.

Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH) Views. On 15 May 1954 a SHAPE team, headed by AM Dawson, flew to Oslo where they briefed Lt. General Sir Robert Mansergh, CINCNORTH, and key officers, including military representatives from Norway and Denmark. The explanation and the new concepts were well received by these officials. Numerous questions were put to the briefing team by General Mansergh and by his air and naval commanders. However, CINCNORTH turned down AM Dawson's offer to discuss the comments made by his staff in detail, pointing out that the object was to give the NAG preliminary reactions only. General Mansergh did express approval of the general concept and satisfaction that a more definite and forward strategy was being developed. (2)

Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) Views. A week later AM Dawson and his team visited Fontainebleau where they briefed Marshal Juin (CINCENT), and certain AFCENT officers. Interest was keen, but this time objections of a substantive nature were raised.

The strongest objection to the provisions of the Plan was raised by Lt. General M.M. Carpentier, Fr A, (COMLANDCENT). In AM Dawson's words when reporting to SACEUR, "General Carpentier opened the conference with a long discussion which showed that he either had not understood, or did not agree with all the major points in our presentation." He felt our effectiveness would be less

(1) The NAG had not accepted DSACEUR's insistent suggestion for an Elbe position, as it felt that by 1957 such an advanced "barrier" would be beyond SACEUR's capabilities and, thus, unrealistic.
(2) SHAPE SEG 47/54, Report on Visit of NAG to Allied Forces Northern Europe, 15 May 54.
in 1957 than today. COMLANDCENT said that it would cost too much in peacetime to station our units near their wartime positions. The Weser was not a defensive line and he was afraid that we would have two battles on our hands, one in the forward area and one behind the Rhine. General Carpentier opposed placing Schleswig-Holstein under AFCENT. COMLANDCENT's "precise meaning was difficult to reach, but there was at least the inflection that the Rhine was a good solid defensive position, well suited to our purpose."

Air Chief Marshal Sir Basil Embry (COMAIRCENT) was more receptive. He welcomed the Plan because it emphasized the fact that SACEUR was engaged in a battle for survival. "It shows the direction in which we must go," AM Dawson reported ACM Embry as saying, "and it indicated the directions in which there is action that we can and must take." ACM Embry claimed that ACE "must get a sense of urgency into this, and if we do not take the necessary action, we do not deserve to survive."

COMAIRCENT's said strongly that SACEUR must have authority to act as soon as action is needed and could not afford to wait on complicated political procedures. He criticized the organisation of AIRCENT charging that it had "the wrong shape, it had the wrong equipment, and it was wrongly based." He had earlier submitted a staff study recommending changes in the organisation of air effort in the Central Region. ACM Embry concluded that the Plan could not be made to work unless ACE had the right organisation for the command and application of air power.

The meetings at Fontainebleau lasted for several days. On 22 May 1954, General Carpentier made his objections more specific. He was worried that the enemy would retain the initiative even if he did not achieve surprise. He referred again to the fact that SACEUR's forces were not stationed in positions suitable for the strategy proposed and charged that even if his forces were to take up their forward positions along the Weser, the enemy would take them in his stride and "we would be intermingled before we could bring our atomic power to bear." AM Dawson reported to SACEUR that General Carpentier "seemed convinced that we intended to break up our divisions into combat teams, and evidently still hankered after a main stop line on which we would plan to hold the enemy."

The views and reaction of Marshal Juin were of particular interest to SHAPE and to SACEUR. His reputation in France as well as the importance of AFCENT
gave his views great significance.

Marshal Juin had been informed generally on the trend of SACEUR's planning during the previous year. He was especially interested in the team's briefing and in the comments made by his own subordinates. Marshal Juin saw that ACE possessed an advantage in having nuclear superiority, but felt that this was offset by the fact that the enemy always would retain the initiative initially.

He recommended that SACEUR direct the NAG to take careful account of ACM Embry's study of air organisation. Marshal Juin felt that SACEUR's nuclear weapons and delivery systems were vital matters for further study, and that the whole concept should pivot on this. He stated that air power would decide the outcome and that land and naval forces could be considered only "holding" forces. The Allies could not destroy the enemy on the first day, he noted; ACE therefore must hold while the nuclear air offensive was launched against the Soviet Union. Because the enemies land forces would not be immediately affected by the attack on their homeland, the timing of the land battle was extremely important.

Marshal Juin told AM Dawson that he agreed with the overall presentation of the plan. But he felt that the screening forces were too light for their purposes. Nevertheless, he subscribed to the principle of light covering forces with heavier mobile forces behind the obstacle. He stressed the fact that SACEUR's tactics should be to dispose his forces in such a way as to offer to the enemy "corridors of temptation" into which the enemy might be led and then destroyed. He made a major point that the land forces must be prepared to do without direct air support. Land forces were the "defence forces" and the air force was the major force of maneuver. (1)

Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) Views. During the next week AFSOUTH was briefed. There Admiral William Fechteler, US N, CINCSOUTH, invited his staff to clarify any points with regard to the NAG's presentation itself, and reserved detailed discussion for special "syndicates" which he appointed. While only minor points of clarification arose, the syndicate discussions showed a very close interest in the proposals and a large measure of agreement with the New Approach. In particular, agreement was reached on AFSOUTH's proposed allocations of land and carrier-based aircraft.

(1) SHAPE SEC 47/54, NAG Presentation of Their Study to the Centre Command, 22 May 54.
In discussing land/air operations, the AFSOUTH staff was concerned with the Tarvisio position on the North Italian front. The staff felt that forces had to be located forward of Tarvisio, either in the area of Villach, or further to the East. Since Soviet forces might be able to get to that vicinity in a matter of hours rather than days, it was felt that the only way to ensure the Allied position was to have a small force in the British Zone of Austria, possibly in the Klagenfurt area.

AFSOUTH was also concerned about the Gorizia area. They recognised the reasons that had led to the NAG to "work to" the Italian frontier; but continued to feel that the only satisfactory answer would be to move forward to positions on the Isonzo River.

AM Dawson reported to SACEUR, that it was evident AFSOUTH wished to give further consideration to the effect dispersed tactics would have on the Greek front and the area around the Bosporus. They were receptive to the NAG's ideas, "but we cannot expect firm reactions until they have considered these ideas in closer relation to the actual territory. Both Greek and Turkish officers took a full part in these discussions and seemed anxious to reach a realistic solution."

AFSOUTH's principal concern was the lack of support units and the weakness of the logistic system. The Italian logistics system and mobilization procedures needed an appreciable overhaul.

With regard to logistics in Greece and Turkey, the lack of sufficient land communications and the vulnerability of sea communications produced problems to which AFSOUTH could not propose any satisfactory solutions. In fact AFSOUTH planners felt that the NAG Plan put the problems in an even worse light. Using landing craft to deliver supplies was still considered to be the solution for one of the many difficulties anticipated; however, progress in this area was limited. Inland communications were so bad that stockpiling appeared to be the only practical solution.

The NAG raised the question of nuclear interdiction operations, and pointed out that AFSOUTH had not stated any requirement for interdiction on the Danube river line. AFSOUTH indicated that this point would have to be considered further.

AM Dawson reported to SACEUR, that the NAG's impression was that its concept was well received, but would require more thought on the part of AFSOUTH planners before the latter could interpret the effect of the concept on their operations. (1)

(1) SHAPE/SEC/50/54, Report of NAG Visit to AFSOUTH, 29 May 54.
Allied Forces Mediterranean (AFMED) Views. The New Approach Group's visit to APMED was associated with the Group's visit to AFSOUTH. APMED's views were similar to those of AFSOUTH or touched on similar areas, but also involved theories ranging over wider areas.

Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma, (CINCAFMED) took the opportunity of AM Dawson's presence to raise the subject of "inter-service priorities" that had been set out in SHAPE guidance to the nations. He appreciated that this was not the business of the Group, but said that the national naval staffs in his command felt so strongly about this matter that he wanted to go on record as having stated his views officially. He considered that the outcome of these priorities affected the NAG's Plan.

CINCAFMED welcomed the NAG's concepts, particularly the "forward thinking" and the attempt to take a realistic view of the future. He spoke at length on the effect of SHAPE priorities on the navies which provided ships for his command and several of which had suffered budget cuts. Although these were small, they had caused a reduction of supplies and a cancellation of "re-fits". The net result, Admiral Mountbatten said was that the effectiveness of APMED naval forces was diminishing. While the NAG's Plan was an excellent one from the view of the soldier and airman, CINCAFMED had the impression that naval considerations had not been seriously taken into account.

AFMED was also concerned over logistics in Greece and Turkey. How could you get ships into port and unload them in the face of an enemy air attack when you had no effective air defence? Landing Ships Tank (LSTs) or some form of landing craft were again felt to be the solution.

At a final conference, CINCAFMED theorised that the Soviets were not out for a war of military conquest. "They were cleverer than Hitler", and he did not believe that they would try to drive across Europe using their atomic power to kill troops. Admiral Mountbatten thought that the Soviets would hold back in this direction and would concentrate on attacking Allied ports in order to create that chaos and misery in which communism flourished.

CINCAFMED did not think that the Soviets wanted to start a war, but said that they might attack if "they thought we intended to do so. We were on very dangerous ground if we ignored this possibility."
Admiral Mountbatten said civilian shipping requirements for the Continent of Europe were approximately 100,000,000 tons a year, from which he deduced the great urgency of stockpiling in certain areas and of maintaining a flow of imports. He stated that the naval requirements to ensure this flow of imports would increase rather than decrease in the future. The Admiral was particularly concerned that SHAPE might imagine that a war would be finished after 30 days, or after any similar period at the end of the first atomic "blitzkrieg." He did not believe this would be the case and in the long run, sea communications and naval support for them would be of great importance. He pointed out that no aircraft carriers of any kind could or would operate north of Crete in the Aegean region, and also stressed that these views were held universally by his staff.

AM Dawson answered that nowhere in the NAG's Plan had there been discussion of the time in relation to D-day at which a war might be over. The NAG was concerned primarily with the survival period and he made the point that the opening strategy adopted by the Soviets did not affect the overall concept. If NATO were involved in a war with the Soviet Union, at all, however it might start, whatever Soviet plans might be, the survival requirement on the Allied side demanded an immediate and all-out atomic war on the general lines the NAG had presented.

Admiral Mountbatten stated that AFMED would go ahead with planning on the basis of the NAG's concepts and would not ask for a large increase in their stated force requirements, (1) but would try to hold on to what they had. CINCAF MED gave his general agreement to the NAG's concept provided he could be assured that the Group did not envisage the end of a war in 30 days, and that SHAPE understood the increasing naval requirements for an extended war. (2)

Presentation of the New Approach to the Standing Group.

The New Approach Study was completed on 1 July and was hand-carried to the Standing Group in Washington on 6 July. The complete study consisted of SACEUR's Report on Supplementary Planning Projects; The Capabilities Plan, 1957, ACE; and a Report on Measures.

(2) SHAPE/SEC/49/54, Report on NAG Visit to AFMED, 28 May 54.
Essential to the Support of the Capabilities Plan. These three documents provided a detailed and systematic evaluation of the problems of defending ACE, evaluated the impact and potential value of using nuclear weapons, and made concrete proposals for preparing for and defending ACE in mid-1957. Salient portions of each document are presented below to give the reader a grasp of the thinking of SACEUR and the NAG.

Report on Supplementary Planning Project. Although this was technically a letter of transmittal for the Capabilities Plan and the Essential Measures, it was of great importance because it provided a succinct summary of the main features of both documents and it was also later to become the basis for MC-48, The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years.

In this report General Gruenther pointed out to the Standing Group that defence preparations in Europe must serve a three-fold object. They must provide a major deterrent to aggression in Europe; a forward defence in Europe against all forms of Soviet attack; and a high measure of confidence and security in the cold war.

"The second phase of these," he continued, "a forward defence on land and a high degree of protection against air and sea attack, will in the future, as in the past, contribute strongly to the other two. It constitutes for my command the mission which has guided the preparation of present plans and recommendations for the defence of the NATO nations."

In one sense, the conditions which were developing gave the West an advantage, and was a propitious development for NATO. "With atomic weapons it lies within our power to provide an effective defence of Western Europe," General Gruenther pointed out. "There weapons, employed in close conjunction with operations of our forces, make it possible to resist the Soviet attack by means other than numerical parity with Soviet forces."

The Capabilities Plan had been based on two main assumptions:

a. That an effective German contribution will be available in 1957.

b. That nuclear weapons would be available to both sides and would be used from the outset.

"Should either of these assumptions be invalidated, in whole or in major part," SACEUR said "the entire strategy and concept of operations on which this plan is based would require re-examination."
The SG was informed that General Gruenther's staff had devoted its primary attention and effort to things which must be done to avoid losing the war quickly. "Our vital tasks" SACEUR said, "are to deny key areas to the enemy, to prevent the essential war-making base and our military forces being destroyed through Soviet air attack, and to prevent the destruction at sea or in port of the shipping and naval forces essential to these tasks. To do this, we must withstand the initial enemy assault, hold the enemy attack, and gain the time needed to bring to bear the full NATO potential."

General Gruenther was forthright in telling the SG, "We must be prepared to make mass use of atomic weapons from the outset in case of all-out Soviet attack."

It was clear to SACEUR that in nuclear war both sides would strive to deliver a large portion of their accumulated stockpiles of nuclear weapons as rapidly and effectively as possible. The Capabilities Plan covered the period of this first major effort -- approximately thirty days or less. It was not tied to an assumption that the war would end in thirty days.

General Gruenther envisioned forces of all services working together from the outset in furtherance of the common mission, "exploiting to the full our atomic capability," and concentrating their effort on the following major operations:

a. An immediate all-out attack against the Soviet air and atomic threat, supplemented by passive measures and active defence against that threat.

b. Implementation throughout ACE of measures of passive protection against air attack and the effective employment of all available means of air defence.

c. A forward strategy in all areas -- well forward in West Germany, including Schleswig-Holstein and on, or where possible forward of, Italian and Greek frontiers, west of the Turkish Straits, and well to the east in Eastern Turkey; forward of Narvik in North Norway; and against Soviet attacks on the Danish Islands and Southern Norway, if attempted.

General Gruenther concluded by pointing out frankly that his plan was a plan and nothing more. But inherent in the plan were problems and lessons of tremendous significance for all of NATO. (1)

(1) See; Report on Supplementary Planning Project, 1 Jul 54, Annex 1, p. 409 for complete text.

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The Capabilities Plan, ACE. This study constituted the application of the forces which it was estimated nations would have created by mid-1957 against the operational mission of SACEUR, with due consideration for the employment of atomic weapons, taking full account of Soviet capabilities. The study was not intended to serve in itself as an operational directive since this was the function of the Annual Emergency Defence Plan. Although it was not an operational directive, it had been forwarded to the MSC's who had been directed "to undertake the development of their own plans based upon this concept." (1)

The study pointed out that it was developed as a direct result of the realization that nations considered themselves obliged to level off their force build-up programs. It was determined that the defensive objectives of the NATO strategic concept could be fulfilled with reduced force levels by exploiting Allied advantages in atomic weapons, by adjusting forces to atomic war conditions, and by close coordination of planned operations by all Commands in furtherance of the global war effort.

The two fundamental premises of this plan were that atomic weapons would be used in a major war by the Allies without delay, and, regardless of initial Soviet use thereof, that the major readjustments in forces necessary to adapt them to atomic war conditions would be implemented. These presumptions were implicit in any attempt to carry out NATO defence objectives with numerically inferior forces.

The general portion of the plan then went on to explain its assumptions on the numbers and issues of nuclear weapons, the Soviet threat, SACEUR's mission, and major areas of risk and weakness. Each of the Nine Major Campaigns was explained in a separate enclosure which gave details of concepts of conducting the campaigns. And finally, the Plan explained its "determination of 1957 Force Levels" and called for a German contribution of twelve divisions. The complete document was almost three inches thick.

Measures Essential to Support the Capabilities Plan. This report provided a comprehensive summary of measures required to make the transition from the 1954 military situation to the planned operations and assessed capabilities required for mid-1957. It informed the

(1) See Annex I, p. 409.
Standing Group of matters requiring their action and to indicate actions contemplated by ACE. These measures included:

a. Steps to overcome or minimize "major areas of risk of weakness" developed in the studies of Nine Major Campaigns. These were primarily operational in nature.

b. Other steps, relating primarily to the provision of logistic and administrative support essential to enabling the forces to carry out their planned operations.

The measures recommended covered six general areas: operations, forces and operational equipment; further plans and tactical concepts; training and organization; personnel; logistics; and communications.

It would require too much space to give a complete summary of the measures recommended. Listed below are examples of the manner in which the problems were stated and recommendations were made.

Alert System for ACE.
Problem. To provide an alert system which will ensure that maximum survival benefits are realized from any warning received, in no matter what form, how short, or equivocal.

Required Actions. Determine what measures can be practised and implemented by unilateral military action at command levels and below, evaluate the protective returns to be derived, and supplement SHAPE alert plans accordingly. (SHAPE study initially).

Warning of Attack.
Problem. To Institute measures to ensure the maximum possible warning of enemy attack.

Recommended Actions. Take steps to ensure that, by 1957, the main NATO radar net will be manned and on the air at all times. Extend and complete radar cover to ensure that the enemy cannot circumvent the warning net via the Norwegian Sea, or by penetrating across Iraq and Syria. A tie-in is required between Turkey and the Middle East, and the planned coverage completed between Norway, the Shetland Isles, the Faroes and Iceland.

Vulnerable Concentrations.
Problem. Force and logistic facilities are today too vulnerable to atomic attack, particularly in forward areas.
Recommended Action. Direct that all echelons of command search out and list all major concentrations in forward areas (100-150 nm from the Iron Curtain) and initiate action to reduce their vulnerability, where within their resources, and/or recommend actions beyond their resources to SACEUR -- SACEUR to furnish guidance as a basis for this effort.

Studies must be carried out throughout ACE and by national staffs aimed at early actions to correct the existing concentration of logistics support which now depends upon a small number of relatively small, vulnerable installations.

Authority to use weapons.
Problem. To insure there will be no delay in obtaining authority to use atomic weapons immediately on the outbreak of hostilities.

Recommended Action. That SACEUR's authority to implement planned use of atomic weapons be such as to ensure that no delay whatsoever will occur in countering a surprise attack. Any delay in use of such weapons (in terms of hours or less) is critical to a successful defence.

Immediate use of weapons.
Problem. The ability to deliver weapons at rates and times as envisaged in the Plan in light of logistical and technical problems which have not been tested in operations or in field exercises based upon the new tactical concepts.

Recommended Action. Review the storages sites and/or locations of weapons and component parts, and the availability of assembly teams and recommend adjustments as necessary.

To carry out comprehensive combined service exercises including the testing of logistical and technical capabilities to gain the maximum possible amount of experience of employing these weapons under the new tactical concepts.

Promulgation, testing and progressive strengthening of procedures for the direction of atomic strike operations.

Fighter Bombers in Italy.
Problem. To provide adequate fighter bombers for close support operations in Northern Italy at the onset of hostilities.
Recommended Action. Request US authorities to reconsider the allocation of one of the rotational FB wings now programmed for this area in favour of an equivalent D-Day force (e.g. 1 D-Day Wing and one Rotational Wing). Any reduction in rotational wings in favour of D-Day forces by the US should initially be made in this area.

Early Arrival of Carriers in the Mediterranean.

Problem. To increase carrier strength in the Mediterranean after D-Day in order to lessen the risk to the peacetime force in that area.

Recommended Action. Arrange for the reinforcement of the Strike and Support Force by approximately two additional carriers as early as possible after D-Day.

The Standing Group's Examination. To make certain that the New Approach was properly understood, SACEUR sent his COFS and the NAG Briefing Team to Washington to explain it in detail. On 7 July 1954, after two days of briefing, General Schuyler and the NAG Team started answering questions from the SG.

General Valluy, French member, asked how SACEUR intended to delegate the authority to use nuclear weapons to his subordinate commanders. General Schuyler answered that it was fully understood that nuclear operations could not be conducted if the commanders had to secure SACEUR's approval for each use of a nuclear weapon, therefore a new policy had recently been issued which decentralized control and responsibility in this area.

"In general," General Schuyler explained, "this policy prescribes that plans will be submitted by subordinate commanders to SACEUR, covering the specific operations visualised and covering the part that it is visualised that the weapons shall play in each operation." SACEUR allocates numbers of weapons to MSC's. This policy permits SACEUR to utilise his judgement in various cases as to what degree of decentralisation he plans to utilise. Planning numbers under this new arrangement could be decentralised down to army level.

General Valluy pointed out that one of the main principles of SACEUR's plan for the ground action appeared to be that the enemy either would be forced to concentrate so that he would be vulnerable to atomic attack, or that he would disperse for safety from atomic attack and thus be unable to attack on the ground in strength. "But," he asked, "will the enemy really need to concentrate in view of the disproportion or unbalance which will remain
between the enemy and Allied ground forces and of our own disperson?"

Colonel Goodpaster answered this by pointing out that one of the reasons for setting up an obstacle at the forward edge of the defensive zone had been to force the enemy to concentrate to break through that obstacle. He said that the effect of thermo-nuclear weapons over a large area "is such that even if the enemy were to use mass infiltration techniques (bringing forward large elements of his forces to the obstacle along the entire front) the thermo-nuclear weapon was of such a nature that it would destroy these forces." The NAG believed that if the enemy tried this tactic using perhaps 80 divisions to 30 of SACEUR's divisions they would sustain a much larger percentage of losses than would SACEUR.

Throughout the entire discussion it was apparent that, although the SG was favourably impressed with the New Approach, they saw the problems which would be encountered. They were particularly concerned with the training requirements for nuclear war, the requirement for an improved intelligence system, and the possible high cost of the program.

The SG shared a common concern that SHAPE might have fallen into the error of "forcing" a solution in some cases. For example, the Capability Plan provided that each corps would cover a front of about sixty-miles. The SG asked if this were a dispersion which came naturally, based on terrain and the best employment of forces, or whether SHAPE had merely taken the number of corps available and divided that number into the number of miles of front to be covered? Colonel Goodpaster answered "...we arrived at it in both ways, in actual fact, to apply the yardstick as we have developed it here. We found that we were somewhat strained for resources and were using M+3 divisions, which we would prefer not to have to rely on. But if we stretched further in order not to rely on them, we began to worry about maintaining the continuous screen on the front and keeping our units within distance of each other. We went into it with a relatively fixed force structure and tried to do the job with that. I don't think we could say or make the proposition that this is the best structure with which to defend, but I think we can say that it is reasonable to attempt to defend with this structure and the new weapons, provided we use them in the way generally shown, and are trained and equipped in this type of operation." (1)

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(1) SGWM 543-54, Memo for the Sg, Subj: SHAPE Capabilities Study, 20 Jul 54.
On 9 July the SG agreed to forward copies of SACEUR's Capabilities Plan to the Chiefs of Staff of the NATO nations for appropriate action.

On 29 July 1954, the SG notified General Gruenther that it intended to submit a report on his plans to the Chiefs of Staff of the SG countries by 15 August 1954 and by 1 December they would transmit to SACEUR the reply to his recommendations. (1)

Approval by the Military Committee.

MC-48. The Military Committee convened on 22 November 1954 in Washington D.C. During the meetings two vital studies were considered for presentation to the NAC. The first of these papers, MC 48, The Most Effective Pattern of Military Strength for the Next Few Years, had been prepared as a result of a Council Resolution on the 1954 Annual Review and related problems. (2) The Council had asked the MC to complete its reassessment of the manner in which NATO could make the best use of available resources. This move led the MC to request SACEUR to prepare the Capabilities Plan for 1957. The Standing Group staff had used SACEUR's cover letter to Capabilities Plan as a basis for preparing a draft of MC 48. (3)

In MC 48, the Military Committee closely followed the pattern of thought and reasoning which SACEUR had presented to them in forwarding his Capabilities Plan. They agreed that war could only come as a result of Communist aggression. In the fact of NATO's great and growing power in the field of nuclear weapons, the Soviets' only hope of winning such a war would rest upon their sudden destruction of NATO's ability to counter-attack immediately and decisively with nuclear weapons. The MC recognized that there was a possibility that the Soviets might attempt to take advantage of their preponderance in land and tactical air forces to overrun Europe without employing nuclear weapons in the hope that by so doing the Allies would also refrain from using these weapons. "In this contingency," if affirmed, "our studies indicate that NATO would be unable to prevent the rapid overrunning of Europe unless NATO immediately employed these weapons both strategically and tactically." (4)

(1) SGM 535-54, Tentative Program for the Processing of the Capabilities Study, 29 Jul 54.
(2) CM(53)166, Final.
(3) SGM 600/54, 1 Jul 54; SGM 601/54, 10 Sep 54.
(4) MC 48 is one of the key documents on NATO planning and strategy and should be reviewed in detail by any student of this period.
Since the Soviets knew this, there was little doubt that if they started a war with NATO -- it would begin with Russian nuclear attack and NATO forces would retaliate in kind. This, the military planners decided, would result in an intensive nuclear exchange in which each side would try to neutralise its opponent's nuclear capability.

NATO's capability to win would depend on its ability to survive and gain superiority in the initial phase. Thus, NATO's peacetime force structure would have to be established to achieve success during this initial phase.

After a lengthy discussion, the MC approved MC 48 and forwarded it to the NAC.

MC-49. The second important paper examined was MC 49, Capabilities Study Allied Command Europe 1957. This paper contained a short summary of the highlights of SACEUR's Capabilities Plan, the Military Committee assessment of it, the pattern of NATO forces best suited to implement the strategy in the plan, and appropriate conclusions and recommendations. MC 49 reflected the thinking of the Chiefs of Staff of the nations. However, comments from Denmark, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Turkey on the SACEUR's study raised certain points of national nature. These particular national problems, although important, did not properly figure in the document under consideration which was of a very broad and general nature. For this reason, the MC decided to forward to SACEUR only the comments which had come from the various national Chiefs of Staff.

During the discussion of MC 49, the Danish representative took exception to SACEUR's proposed arrangements for defence of Schleswig-Holstein. AM Dawson, representing SHAPE, explained that SACEUR, attached extreme importance to the concept of a forward strategy in Schleswig-Holstein and to obtaining the most effective means of command in that area. SACEUR had also directed Marshal Juin to pay particular attention to this problem. AM Dawson asked that no particular inflection be placed in the Military Committee report on this matter because the problem was under urgent investigation.

The Netherlands representative agreed in general with the directions being drawn up for SACEUR, but believed that the time factor regarding the building up and training of the land forces had not been considered sufficiently. This factor would require changes in national buildup programs -- changes which could not be made.
AM Dawson replied that SACEUR fully realised the need for quick advice and consultation with regard to any proposed changes in forces, but had not proposed to introduce such considerations until he had received the approval of his concepts. At the same time, SACEUR was well advanced in his preparations to recommend changes in organisation or buildup. (1)

As a result of the decision reached at this meeting, SACEUR was told on 23 November 1954 that, "The Military Committee concurs in general with your analysis of the conditions which will confront NATO in 1957 and with your proposed plans for meeting the threat to ACE. Therefore, the Military Committee approves your concept of operations and general strategy as a basis for current detailed recommendations as to implementing action as appropriate, for further planning as required, and for preparation of the further studies which you consider necessary."

For the first time the MC also pointed out that the new concept of strategy and operations, rather than being cheaper as some originally had hoped -- might be even more expensive.

SACEUR had also asked that the MC confirm the basic assumptions which he had used in his planning. The Committee told him, "Estimates of the external support which you anticipate to have available from other commands are acceptable for planning purposes. The assumption that one hour's minimum warning would be available to Allied Command Europe due to detection of NATO-wide Soviet attacks appears optimistic. The time required for evaluation and transmission of the first warning would make it most difficult for this amount of time to be provided to your Command." (2)

Thus, by the end of November, SACEUR had the approval of his military superiors for his new strategy and concept of operations.

Question of Command in Schleswig-Holstein. The Danish criticism of the command arrangements in Schleswig-Holstein was forwarded to SACEUR separately. "Your present division," the MC told SACEUR, "appears to need re-examination in view of the cost of the duplicate LOCs, supplies and administrative units which your present assignment of the corps in Schleswig-Holstein to the Centre Command requires. Also you should consider certain other related factors such as the critical importance of the battle in this area to the defence of

(1) MCCS, 10th Session, 29 Nov 54.
(2) MCM 4-54, Memo for SACEUR, Capabilities Plan ACE, 23 Nov 57.
Jutland and the Danish Straits, and, in case of a forces withdrawal, the necessity for this Corps to withdraw into Jutland, and the difficulty of changing operational control of this corps from the Central to the Northern Commander under these circumstances." (1)

Approval by the North Atlantic Council.

The NAC met in Paris in Ministerial Session on 17 December 1954. Lord Ismay, Secretary General, introduced MC 48 for approval. Although Anthony Eden, John F. Dulles, Paul H. Spaak, and Lester J. Pearson spoke in support of the document, there was almost no discussion of the basic concept.

However, discussion did arise over the final authority to use nuclear weapons. Mr. Dulles said that in democratic countries the military prepared their plans but "the authority to push the button", and put the plan into effect rested with the civilian head of government. He wanted to make it clear that while approving MC 48, it should also be made clear that such approval did not delegate the authority to put the plan into action in the event of hostilities. (2)

The other ministers accepted his proposal and on the next day, 18 December, the NAC announced:

The Council considered a report by the Military Committee on the most effective pattern of NATO military defensive strength over the next few years, taking into account modern developments in weapons and techniques. It approved this report as a basis for defence planning and preparations by the NATO military authorities, noting that this approval did not involve the delegation of the responsibility of governments to make decisions for putting plans into action in the event of hostilities. (3)

Thus General Gruenther had political approval for planning the defence of ACE based upon the use of nuclear weapons.

(1) SGM 743-43, Memo for SACEUR, Comments from the NATO nations on Capabilities Plan ACE 1957, 30 Nov 54.
(2) C-VR(54)50, 17 Dec 54.
(3) NATO Final Communiques, 1949-1970.
CHAPTER III

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

Atomic Guidance, Policy and Operations

With the advent of the NAG's studies, several related fields of study assumed new importance. Other planners at SHAPE were looking into the matter of atomic control procedures and air defence. Although they were major areas of investigation requiring separate decisions and actions, as the New Approach was implemented certain of the areas began to merge.

Atomic Guidance. In 1953, ACE's nuclear capability was primarily provided by the United States. Nuclear support was arranged for and under the control of US officers. General Norstad was responsible for the coordination of weapons, targets and delivery systems in his capacity as a US officer, and not as SACEUR's Deputy. (1)

However, once the NAG started planning for the use of nuclear weapons it became obvious that an international system of control over nuclear matters must at least

(1) SHAPE 289/53, 10 Mar 53; US laws forbade the disclosure of certain types of nuclear information to any but US citizens. Under US law, only the President of the United States could authorise US forces to use nuclear weapons. Plans and preparations within ACE were based on the assumption that such authorisation would be forthcoming not later than the announcement of a general alert. Special weapons forces of the US Air Force in Europe although not assigned to SACEUR, had the mission of supporting SACEUR. The US 6th Fleet was assigned to SACEUR and further assigned to CINCSOUTH. The US Strategic Air Command (SAC) had been assigned an additional mission of assisting SACEUR in the retardation of Soviet Forces. To discharge this responsibility, SAC, had established a command post (SAC Z) at Fontainebleau. SACLANT was also responsible for providing nuclear support to SACEUR.
be planned for, even if it might never become operational. (1) The relative scarcity of nuclear weapons and delivery systems made mandatory the establishment of an effective centralised control system in ACE.

Because of their capability to affect operations in more than one area, the employment of nuclear weapons could not be left to the judgement of local commanders as in the case of conventional weapons. Centralised control was absolutely essential.

When General Norstad came to SHAPE as Air Deputy in July 1953 he brought US Air Force nuclear weapons staff officers with him. These officers were to prepare the documents which would provide centralised control of nuclear operations. By late 1953, four documents were being prepared.

Annex O to the Emergency Defence Plan (EDP) for 1954. Set forth broad principles and policies for nuclear operations. It was to be issued to the subordinate commands. (2)

SACEUR's Atomic Strike Plan (ASP). Assigned targets and weapons and had to be prepared in a US channel by US officers.

Operations Directive 1-54. Assigned potential nuclear targets to the MSCs for reconnaissance, assigned targets and missions to the UK Bomber Command, and outlined certain other supporting operations. It was an Allied version of the ASP.

Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) #1. Contained detailed instructions on how the entire nuclear campaign and external conventional air support would be accomplished. SOP#1 was based on Annex O of the EDP. It was to be an Allied document issued to subordinate commanders.

(1) SGM 56-54, 13 Jan 54. The use here of the term "international system of control over nuclear matters" is intended to underscore the variance between the actual powers of SACEUR and those which were being projected. Insofar as use of atomic weapons was concerned, SACEUR possessed only the authority to plan for their use and then, only on a national basis. Standing Group instructions to him in January 1954 had stated, "SACEUR's plans should provide for the employment of atomic weapons by those national forces under his command which possess an atomic capability, but with the full realisation that the decision to initiate atomic operations can be made for these forces only by the appropriate national authorities."

(2) SHAPE 289/53, 10 Mar 53.
Staff Responsibility for Nuclear Planning. Within SHAPE, during the preparation of these instructions, certain procedural difficulties arose. These stemmed from the fact that, while the Assistant Chief of Staff, (ACOS) Plans, Policy and Operations (PPANDO) was charged with all planning, it was more expedient and practical to have nuclear planning done in the Air Deputy's Office. The fact that much of the data used in nuclear planning was restricted to US officers precluded the assignment of this task to the completely integrated PPANDO.

In the case of the ASP, there was no problem since it necessarily was in a US channel, and the Air Deputy prepared and issued it. Similarly, Annex 0 to the EDP and SOP#1 were prepared and published by the Office of the Air Deputy. But when the time came to publish Operations Directive 1-54, a discussion developed between the Air Deputy and ACOS PPANDO.

On 4 January 1954, Major General Lorrillot, ACOS PPANDO, reviewed a draft of the Operations Directive which had been sent to him by General Norstad's Operations Officer, Brigadier General Viccellio, US AF, and made rather extensive revisions. These were agreed to in informal coordination between these two agencies. However, General Lorrillot asked that, after the Air Deputy had formally approved the revised draft, it be returned to PPANDO for "preparation in final form for approval and publication." (1)

General Viccellio replied that the Operations Directive was closely allied with the Atomic Strike Plan and SOP#1, both of which had been published by the Air Deputy. In view of this, Viccellio felt that the Air Deputy should publish the Operations Directive. (2)

The matter was still unresolved on 13 January when General Lorrillot sent a copy of the draft Operations Directive to AM Dawson, DCPO, and informed him that, while both his Division and the Air Deputy were in agreement on the content of the Directive, the question of whether PPANDO or the Air Deputy was the staff element of primary responsibility for publication of this document had not been determined. General Lorrillot concluded by saying, "In my view, it is important that this question be resolved, and that a decision be made as to whether the Office of the Air Deputy or PPANDO will prepare documents which have general operational significance for the approval of SACEUR, the Air Deputy, or the Chief of Staff." (3)

(1) CN 1, IOCS, MG Lorrillot to BG Viccellio, 4 Jan 54.
(2) CN 2, IOCS, BG Viccellio to MG Lorrillot, 9 Jan 54
(3) CN 1, IOCS, ACOS PPANDO to DCPO, 13 Jan 54.
AM Dawson referred the matter to General Schuyler and told him that, "So long as we are an interservice, international headquarters responsible for the coordination of all operations on SACEUR's front, there must be one channel primarily responsible for the keeping together of all the threads of the skein. There is only one individual who can do this coordination effectively on the behalf of SACEUR, and that is the Chief of Staff." Dawson then explained the problem and recommended that the Operations Directive be issued by the Chief of Staff, with PPANDO as the principal coordinating division. However, "the authority of this document should be primarily the responsibility of the Air Deputy's department."

Based on AM Dawson's recommendation and guidance from SACEUR, General Schuyler, on 3 February realigned responsibility for nuclear planning. PPANDO Division was assigned responsibility for preparing Annex 0 to SACEUR's EDP and coordinating it with other staff divisions - "including the Office of the Air Deputy."

ASP targeting was assigned to the Air Deputy's Office which had "the responsibility for staff coordination on a strictly limited 'need-to-know' basis."

SOP#1 remained under control of the Air Deputy because it was concerned to a large extent with means and methods by which the Air Deputy would arrange for air support from external sources.

The Operations Directive, General Schuyler pointed out, "is a supporting document to the ASP, for use by Allied personnel. Consequently, this directive, like the ASP, must be prepared by the Office of the Air Deputy." General Schuyler anticipated that the Operations Directive in the future would be expanded and actually become the ASP, assigning potential targets and setting up certain other required support operations. Any information which was restricted to US personnel would be carried in a US annex to the plan. (1)

New Nuclear Policy. As the New Approach took shape, it became increasingly apparent that the control of nuclear weapons would be a vital part of the plan. General Gruenther, General Norstad and other senior officers conferred frequently on the establishment of a viable policy. Commanders in the field were also aware of this need and requested that firm guidance be provided.

(1) Memo, COFS to DCPO, DCLA and ACOSs, 3 Feb 54. No NATO concept for international nuclear planning had been devised at this time. Only the US, the UK, the Soviet Union and, to a limited extent, France had a notable nuclear weapons program. Progress in nuclear programs was pursued under measures of the strictest security.
Marshal Juin Views on Nuclear Controls. On 19 March 1954, CINCENT provided SACEUR with his views on the employment of nuclear weapons. Juin considered that although the importance of rigid control was obvious, last year's exercises had clearly demonstrated that much time was lost because of the use of very detailed and complicated procedures. Timely attacks on targets of opportunity could not be made. In his opinion the employment of nuclear weapons as provided for in SOP#1 - which had been acceptable when weapons were rare and thus reserved for unusually serious occasions - "was no longer acceptable now that the number of weapons available has grown and war plans are largely based on the use of them."

CINCENT felt that a greater efficiency could be achieved in the use of tactical weapons if SACEUR, after having allocated weapons among the various Sectors and issued general directives for their use, were to decentralize control.

The Marshal felt that the degree of decentralisation would obviously depend on the number of weapons available. MSC's could retain the right to decide to employ nuclear weapons at their level, according to the number on hand, or else they could delegate that right to Army Group or even Army level, for a clearly specified period of time. The chances of hitting targets of opportunity would be greatly improved. Juin felt that it was equally obvious that, whatever the level adopted for such decentralisation, nuclear weapons must always be used on the basis of close cooperation between the Army and the Air Force, and the Navy if necessary. It was imperative that a weapon employed by the Army not have disastrous repercussions on air operations, or vice-versa. (1)

General Gruenther replied telling the Marshal that he, too, fully appreciated the need for constant study of nuclear control and that SHAPE had initiated a study of the subject which would be completed, within ten days. (2)

SACEUR Atomic Policy. The study had been going for some time and was an attempt to crystallize the best thinking of SHAPE. It was prepared in Air Deputy's Office and was staffed during January 1954. Numerous revisions were made as the result of comments received from senior officers.

A draft, which had been reviewed and approved in principle by General Gruenther was forwarded to DCPO

(1) AFCE 544/OPS/54, 19 Mar 54.
(2) SHAPE 189/54, Ltr SACEUR to CINCENT, 25 Mar 54.
by the Chief of Staff. General Schuyler explained that the intent of the proposed text was, "to provide a policy which, while not contravening the US legal restrictions, will, nevertheless, meet the requirements of this command for the present and for the future." He asked that the DCPO prepare a final policy directive which would be suitable for SACEUR to issue to the MSCs. (1) The draft directive underwent still further refinement, including some last minute adjustments made by FM Montgomery and General Norstad. (2) On 2 July 1954, one day after the Capabilities Plan had been completed, SACEUR's Atomic Policy was sent to the MSCs.

For planning purposes the new directive divided atomic weapons into three groups: one for attacking targets of theatre-wide interest, a second group for a SACEUR reserve; and the third group earmarked for the support of plans submitted by subordinate commanders. Only SACEUR would retain a nuclear reserve.

Numbers of weapons placed in the third group were to be divided into minimum and maximum planning figures for use by the subordinate commanders in the development of their plans. The lower of these figures would represent the weapons which could be used for the support of approved operational plans of subordinate commanders in the event that all MSCs utilized their minimum weapon quotas. The upper figure represented the number which might be available to a given commander should weapon utilization in other regions be less than the minimum planning number assigned to these regions. In similar fashion and within the number provided to them, subordinate commanders would assign planning figures to successive lower joint command echelons down to and including Army - Tactical Air Force - Fleet or equivalent levels. These planning numbers were to be utilized in preparing specific nuclear operational plans at the lowest practicable joint level.

Planning numbers were to be given to commanders jointly and would not be assigned to individual service commanders.

All atomic plans submitted to SACEUR for approval were to be developed on a joint basis. When joint agreement could not be reached, the disputed points would be referred to higher levels for decision. The joint agreement would involve such matters as: objectives, tasks to be accomplished, priority of these tasks,

(1) Memo, General Schuyler to DCPO, w/Enc, 6 May 54.
(2) Memo, DCPO to ACOS PPANDO: SACEUR's Atomic Policy, 10 Jun 54.
assignment of weapons to tasks, general timing of weapon expenditures, and agreement as to which commander would have primary responsibility for executing the various tasks.

When SACEUR had approved the plans, weapons would be earmarked for their support. These plans would be executed only upon orders from SACEUR. When SACEUR ordered execution of these plans, he would in some cases direct that the weapons be used without further reference to him. In other cases SACEUR would require additional information before making his decision to use a particular weapon.

US personnel qualified in nuclear matters were to be assigned to all Allied staffs down to the lowest joint operating level to advise commanders on nuclear matters, perform physical vulnerability analyses, and provide for communications and security of information which could be released only to US personnel.

The COPS's letter of transmittal for the new nuclear policy said that: "In view of the complexity of this subject and the brevity of the attached policy statements, SHAPE personnel are available to give oral briefings and conduct discussions of this policy. (1)

New Approach Planning by the MSC.

As mentioned before, the NAG completed the New Approach Study and the nuclear planners issued SACEUR Atomic Policy during the first two days of July 1954. In forwarding the Capabilities Plan, General Gruenther had informed the Standing Group that his MSCs had been "directed to undertake the development of their own plans, based upon this concept." SACEUR had directed this "development" by oral and written instructions on 23-24 June.

SACEUR's Directive for New Approach. On 23 June, General Gruenther wrote to the MSCs and provided them with his thinking on the New Approach. He pointed out that they must free their minds from World War II philosophy and look to the time when many nuclear weapons would be available to both sides. Future battles would revolve around the use of nuclear weapons.

General Gruenther went on to say that one of the most important things that the senior commanders had to do was to determine how to organise and train Allied Air Forces so that they could survive the initial Soviet attack and then immediately launch their maximum counter-air effort.

He felt in a nuclear environment, the greatest changes in warfare would be found in the method of

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(1) SHAPE Ltr AD/O 6430/AG, SACEUR Atomic Policy, 2 Jul 54.
conducting the land-air battle for Europe. SACEUR asked the MSCs to devote their "earnest attention" to studying the changes in the land-air battle. After he and the MSCs had determined how the air-land battle should be fought, they had to determine the organisation, weapons, and tactical doctrines required to win this battle.

He then outlines the concept of the land-air battle developed by the NAG:

a. First. A thin but continuous screen of "Light Forces" based on an obstacle and having sufficient firepower to require the enemy to mass to cross the obstacle in strength. The massed enemy would then be attacked with atomic weapons.

b. Second. Strong mobile army forces, dispersed in rear of the obstacle, ready to attack any successful enemy penetrations.

c. Third. A second obstacle some distance in rear, with a similar screen. Behind this, reserve formations, to be fed forward into the battle or to act as "back stops" on the second obstacle.

d. Fourth. Further in rear, strategic reserves -- some of them air transportable.

e. Lastly. This would all be one battle -- a mobile battle in rear of the first obstacle line, which was fed by reserves from behind.

SACEUR said that while he was not certain that the concept was correct, it would have to indicate the direction in which their thinking should proceed. "It remains for the Commanders-in-Chief to examine this concept, to use it as a background for development of their own thinking, and to commence their detailed examinations. I shall expect these examinations to take the form both of staff studies and of field tests utilising CPXs and troop exercises during the remainder of 1954. The 1955 training effort should be directed solely to this end".

SACEUR informed the commanders that he would send them copies of the Capabilities Plan and additional "Staff Instructions" after the Plan had been completed.

SACEUR asked the MSCs to inform him by the end of August of the manner in which the New Approach could best be applied within their respective commands. By the end of 1954,
he desired a further and more detailed report, giving the considered views of the MSCs on:

a. The future land-air battle under this concept.

b. The war at sea under this concept (CINCAFMED, CINCNORTH and CINCSOUTH).

c. How their forces should be organised, equipped and trained to fight these battles successfully. (1)

SACEUR's Conference with the MSC. On the following day, the MSCs met at SHAPE to discuss the New Approach with SACEUR. First they received a briefing on the main points of the Capabilities Plan. It was explained that the Plan was not yet a plan, but a concept which covered the period of the opening nuclear exchange. The new concept was based on two essentials - a German contribution and the use of nuclear weapons from the start. The "new" aspect of the plan was that nuclear war required a readjustment of organisations and tactics to the nuclear environment.

In the conference it was emphasised that the concept called for:

a. An all out immediate counter-air attack.

b. A forward strategy in all areas.

c. Coordinated operations to protect allied shipping and naval forces.

d. A "New Look" at the balance between Active and Reserve forces.

SACEUR and the MSCs also discussed some of the comments that the MSCs had submitted based upon the briefings that they had received from the NAG in May. They also reviewed the draft of SACEUR's Report to the Standing Group on Supplementary Planning, which as we have seen, was to eventually serve as the basis for MC 48. (2)

(1) SHAPE 372-54, SACEUR to MSCs, 23 Jun 54.

(2) The explanation of SACEUR's conference with the MSCs is based upon notes prepared for SACEUR to use at the Conference and proposed topics for the conference. The author has not been able to find a record of the actual conference. See 2030, SACEUR's Conference with Subordinate Commanders, 24 Jun 54, file #73 in the Gruenther History Papers, 1953-1956; NAG 1/1 (Final) 11 Jun 54; and General Gruenther's Appointments, Year 1954.
Staff Instructions on the Land-Air Battle. On 8 July, AM Dawson, acting for the Chief of Staff, issued the "follow-up" guidance that had been announced in SACEUR's letter of 23 June. The purpose of this supplementary directive was to elaborate the broad concept of the future land-air battle and to list certain fundamental problems connected with the concept. The MSCs were told to take into account five basic factors: (1) Planning must be projected forward to a time when a liberal number of nuclear weapons would be available on both sides, and the nuclear weapons would be the principal agent around which the battle would be planned and fought; (2) At the start of the war ACE would be numerically inferior in divisions; (3) ACE would have an average of four active divisions per 50 miles in Central Europe; (4) Massing before an attack as in World War II would no longer be feasible; (5) Nuclear weapons could easily rupture a conventional static defence.

The MSCs were instructed to approach the problem aggressively from the standpoint of how much damage could be done to the enemy and how it could be exploited. The Chief of Staff pointed out that "too often, our initial approach has been based on what damage the enemy can do to us by atomic bombardment and how can it be avoided."

The MSCs were specifically directed to study carefully the higher tactical plan and organisation of the battle, including the command structure on all levels and the general role of the various component parts; the coordination of the nuclear, ground and conventional air effort and plans on all levels, including the problems of information, control, timing and launching of the nuclear weapon; the use of obstacles other than river lines to force the enemy into concentrations; the use of the "forward screen" forces and the air action in support of the screen; and the use of reserves and the problem of replacement of complete headquarters and units destroyed by nuclear attack. (1)

Additional Guidance to CINCENT. On 20 August 1954 hearing that Marshal Juin was calling his land, air and naval commanders to a conference at Fontainebleau in order to consider the Capabilities Plan, General Gruenther sent a personal letter to CINCENT. Marshal Juin was told that his planning should include the use of German forces and nuclear weapons in an offensive forward

(1) SHAPE 395/54, OT 25004, 8 Jul 54.
strategy based on a mobile attack. He was also to plan for preventing a Soviet attack through Schleswig-Holstein to Denmark. (1)

**CINCENT's Interim Report.** On 8 October 1954, an interim study was submitted by Marshal Juin. His progress report which had been coordinated with all of his commanders, contained definite ideas in certain areas. However, he reserved the right to change concepts in his final report due in December.

Marshal Juin was disturbed because he had received no reply from SHAPE on several studies which had been submitted by him on air defence and the organisation of air forces. He insisted that the importance of the role of the air forces in SACEUR's Capabilities Plan urgently required that a decision be taken without further delay on the questions of air defence and air force command structure. (2)

CINCENT felt that SACEUR did not have enough information on some aspects of his planning. He felt that the battle would be considerably influenced by the results of the strategic air and interdiction campaigns of external air forces. He also believed that the massive use of atomic weapons would pose problems on which no one in the theatre had sufficient information.

The campaign would be a deep, mobile battle east of the Rhine, he continued, "waged initially with our D-Day forces, but I wish to stress a concept that I have already had the opportunity of presenting, but which does not always appear to have been understood. The concept of strong zones, in which the forces are initially dispersed but ready to launch a concentrated counter attack, alternating laterally with corridors which are simply kept under surveillance, is in my view, the only way of economically combining the dynamism of the land forces with the implementation of carefully prepared atomic plans." It was becoming obvious that it would be extremely difficult for the commander of a large formation to detect a target warranting an immediate nuclear strike. His proposed layout was "also the only way of reacting against excessive dispersion of the land forces."

Marshal Juin also felt that the very nature of the battle and the destruction entailed called for "a

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(1) SHAPE 470/54, Ltr Gen Gruenther to Marshal Juin, 20 Aug 54.
(2) See Chapter V, Air Defence.
Command Organisation having an overall grasp of the situation and capable of giving timely guidance to its subordinate commanders without thought of holding them in leash and relying on signals communications that may fail when they are needed."

AFCENT was including Schleswig-Holstein in its plans, but the Marshal stated that he would have to evaluate the completed plans before he could decide if the responsibility for that area could be accepted with the forces envisaged.

"The forward strategy will be feasible only if the organisation of the command and of the combat forces, logistics and signal communications are carefully adapted to it," Juin continued. "This adaptation entails far-reaching modifications," and he had asked his subordinate commanders to undertake studies to determine what had to be done before the New Approach could be implemented before this strategy."

Marshal Juin concluded by requesting information on two questions of outstanding importance:

- a scientific determination of the real effects arising out of the mass liberation of nuclear energy over a short period of time and the expected consequence on the possibility of waging a land-air battle in the areas affected.

- real possibilities of bacteriological and chemical weapons in the 1957 land-air battle. (1)

CINCSOUTH's interim reports. The views of CINCSOUTH also were received in early October. While he agreed in general with the plan, certain aspects of the SHAPE study disturbed him. He believed, for instance, that another study should be made to determine the feasibility of the Capabilities Plan from a financial standpoint.

The analysis of the objectives in his area was agreed by him, but he laid particular stress on that aspect of his mission which spoke of developing a strategy "as far forward as possible." In this respect he considered that offensive land operations must not be undertaken until the air battle had been won, to prevent his land forces from being left without air support at some critical moment. He also said that a more aggressive ground strategy would be required in his area.

(1) AFCE 1808, Ltr CINCENT to SACEUR, 8 Oct 54.
CINCSOUTH felt the balance between his ground and air forces was unsatisfactory. Additional air units with a nuclear capability were needed. The success of the counter air and interdiction campaigns in the Southern area would be threatened by the lack of tactical and strategic air reconnaissance. In view of the proportionate air threat, a re-allocation of air strength from AFCENT to AFSOUTH should be made.

CINCSOUTH felt that the balance between his active and reserve land forces should be changed to make the active divisions immediately effective — even if this meant fewer active formations and weaker reserves.

Naval forces also lacked balance. Particularly needed were two more aircraft carriers and an amphibious task force with a marine air/ground component. (1)

Additional Nuclear Guidance.

Continual revision of nuclear documents was required. In October 1954, before the revision of these documents was completed for the following year, General Gruenther felt that it was necessary to give the subordinate commands as much accurate information as possible so that they could prepare valid plans.

Atomic Planning Numbers. On 22 October, SACEUR informed the MSCs that he had enough weapons to allow the issuance of atomic weapons planning numbers. In separate letters, each commander was told how many of each type of nuclear weapon he could plan to use. Not more than a total of 125 weapons were to be used for planning purposes by all the MSCs together. "Planning numbers are not allocations of weapons," he warned again. "When plans have been approved by SACEUR, however, weapons will be reserved for support of these plans."

Although SACEUR was going to plan and direct the theatre-wide nuclear operations, he asked the MSCs to nominate targets within their areas of responsibility for inclusion in his counter-air operations and large scale interdiction operations.

In the event of war, ACE, in conjunction with other commands possessing a nuclear delivery capability, planned to immediately attack those airfields from which the enemy could attack targets in or of major direct interest to ACE. If carried out promptly and forcefully, these

(1) AFSOUTH 45/54, Brief on Capabilities Plan, 11 Oct 54.
operations would achieve Allied air superiority in the shortest possible time. Particular emphasis would be laid on destruction of the Soviet capability to use tactical aircraft or other means to deliver nuclear weapons.

The nuclear interdiction plan would disrupt and retard the forward movement of Soviet forces in order to gain the maximum possible time for defence, and to allow time for the mobilization of reserve forces. "The planned SACEUR attack against selected transportation targets along the enemy theatre supply route is expected to reduce the strength of forces which the enemy can move and support, and to collapse the transportation system in selected areas of the enemy communications zone."

The MSCs were requested to submit their nuclear plans to SHAPE by 15 January 1955. The plans were to:

1. Reflect the detailed operational tasks to be carried out by the lower tactical commanders (i.e. Army, ATAF).
2. Show the number of nuclear weapons to be used in support of each of the above tasks.
3. Outline the objectives of each task and justify them in terms of the expected contribution to the overall plan of the MSC.
4. Indicate the general scheme of maneuver and exploiting actions.
5. Specify targets or areas where profitable targets might appear.
6. Indicate the delivery systems which would be required, and if these were not available from the commander's own sources, indicate a requirement for delivery support from SACEUR.
7. Recommend which command level should have control over weapons expended on each operational task (not lower than Army-ATAF).
8. Reflect internal and external coordination. (1)

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(1) SHAPE 612/54, Ltr SACEUR to MSCs, 22 Oct 54.
Request for Specific Plans from AFCENT. On 20 December 1954 SACEUR requested that specific plans for the employment of "maximum" and "minimum" numbers of nuclear weapons in the counter-air and interdiction campaigns in Central Europe be prepared for his review. (1)

Nuclear Plans of the MSC's

Although SHAPE had provided guidance in great detail on the preparation of nuclear plans, the desired plans were not submitted as requested.

APNORTH. CINCNORTH requested that he be given an extension on his suspense date to 31 March for the submission of his plans. On 4 February 1955, SHAPE approved CINCNORTH's request. (2) The plan was submitted on 30 March.

AFSOUTH. On 8 February 1955, CINCSOUTH submitted his plan but also reported difficulties in responding to SACEUR's request for specific plans for the employment of atomic weapons. (3)

AFCENT. To make matters even worse, planning in AFCENT came to a virtual standstill because of varying interpretations of SHAPE's nuclear instructions. General Schuyler, COFS, was well aware of the problems and had discussed the matter with General Bailly (COFS, AFCENT), General Carpentier (COMLANDCENT) and Major General Servais (COFS, LANDCENT). As a result of these conversations, General Schuyler requested that AFCENT report to SHAPE "in detail any points of difficulty" that they were having or "any points on which they feel that our current instructions are not clear". (4)

On 18 February 1955 Marshal Juin forwarded nuclear plans that had been jointly prepared by his three Principal Subordinate Commanders (PSCs). He felt that the plans were "somewhat imperfect" and said:

This imperfection arises because of certain divergencies, at times rather wide, in the interpretation which my subordinate commanders have given to your directives. The result has been, for example, that neither the Commanders of the Central Army Group and the 4th ATAF, nor the Commanders of the Ground Forces and Air Forces at Central Europe have been able to agree, without certain reservations, in the preparation of their plans.

(1) SHAPE 554/54-AG 6540/AD, 20 Dec 54
(2) SHAPE/264/55, SACEUR's Periodic Report to the Standing Group, #44; APNORTH/277/55, 30 Mar 55.
(3) AFSOUTH 43/55, Atomic Plan 2-55, 8 Feb 55
(4) Memo from AM Dawson to ACOS PP&O, Conduct of Atomic Warfare in the Central Europe Sector, 22 Feb 55. Although the available copy of this memo is unsigned, the SHAPE Historical Section feels that it is valid and it has been reproduced in full as Annex 2, p.417.
Bearing in mind the actual state of your atomic directives it seems preferable to me not to attempt to resolve, at this time, the serious problem that these divergencies pose. It is my intention to ask you under separate cover to give this matter the attention which it deserves; however, in the meantime, I would be very grateful if you would take such steps as you deem necessary, in order that any modifications which might be made in your directives, could reach me before the beginning of the next planning cycle, which is presently scheduled for the first of July. (1)

Essentially, COMCENTAG's and COMFOURATAF's opinions on the allocation of atomic weapons resulted in the following differing requirements for air delivered weapons:

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<td>Counter-Air</td>
<td>Maximum 15</td>
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<td>Interdiction</td>
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COMLANDCENT's opinion was based upon a strategy of fighting an aggressive battle east of the Rhine.

COMAIRCENT's requirement was based on the concept first that SACEUR's Interdiction Campaign, in the so-called "minimum" case, would slow the advance of the enemy army in the CENTAG area; and second, an opinion that, whereas SACEUR could direct supplementary interdiction from his level on target systems that did not alter or move, supplementary counter-air strikes must have weapons allocated and be directed from the ATAF level, at which up-to-date reconnaissance information was more fully available. (2)

The PSCs pointed out that, in the absence of detailed information to permit thorough coordination of "Northern area" and "Central area" (of the Central Region) forces' counter-air and interdiction plans with SACEUR's campaign, considerable confusion and differences of interpretation had resulted. Thorough coordination was needed at SHAPE level.

At LANDCENT, the efficiency of the method of planning itself was doubted. COMLANDCENT believed that a more distinct division of areas of responsibility was necessary which would include a geographical boundary east of which SACEUR would be responsible, and west of which the Regional Commanders would be responsible. It was necessary, COMLANDCENT stated, that a significant number of weapons be available for an interdiction program designed primarily to have a direct and immediate effect upon ground battle. It was felt that to allot 20 of the 30 weapons allocated (maximum) to the Counter-Air Campaign against which the magnitude of SACEUR's efforts had already been directed, represented a disproportionate division of the total

(1) AFCE 291/55-OPS, 1451, Central Europe Atomic Plans, 18 Feb 55
(2) COMNAVCENT abstained from presenting an opinion, pending further consideration of actual-targets.
atomic power available for both tasks.

With regard to the minimum planning numbers, COMLANDCENT considered it imperative that a part of the few available weapons be allocated to an interdiction role for use on the invasion corridors into the area of the Central Zone forces, particularly along the KASSEL/EISENACH/FRANKFURT corridor.

COMAIRCENT did not subscribe to this suggestion, but was carrying out a staff study to determine the advantages and disadvantages of such a course of action.

The PSCs also noted that to allow commanders to make firm plans, executive authority for the minimum allocation of weapons should be delegated, on approval of their plans, to the lowest joint controlling level, with use of the weapons subject only to announcement of R-Hour. (1)

Responsibility for Nuclear Planning

SHAPE's comments on its detailed review of AFCENT's plans for the control of Nuclear Warfare were withheld until the completion of Exercise LION ROUGE and to allow a more complete study of the plans in the light of SHAPE policy and instructions. However, SHAPE's reply was made in an unusual manner. Instead of commenting on the latest plans submitted by Marshal Juin on 18 February 1955, SHAPE generally critiqued a group of atomic plans which had been submitted by AFCENT the preceding September. (2)

On 24 March, General Schuyler wrote to the Marshal that although the plans submitted had been prepared prior to the issuance of SACEUR's Atomic Policy of July 1954:

(1) AFCE 29-/55-OPS 1451. Because of the growing complexity of problems associated with the timely review and approval of atomic plans developed by the various MSCs, on 14 March 1955, ACOS PPANDO, issued a memo to the sections in PPANDO establishing the responsibilities for processing and reviewing those plans when they arrived in SHAPE. The procedures required that following receipt and assignment of MSC's plans to the proper PPANDO Regional Section to determine consonance with the SHAPE EDP and SACEUR's Atomic Policy. Interested staff agencies such as the Air Deputy, their support, and to prepare any other necessary plans in support of the Chief of Staff to inform the Regional Commander of approval or modifications. MEMO PPO 1451, Responsibility for Review of Regional Atomic Plans, 14 Mar 55.

(2) AFCE/1720/54, 1722/54 and 1724/54 all of 24 Sep 54
SHAPE developed its present atomic policy and planning guidance in order to permit commanders to execute their approved plans when recommended by major subordinate commanders without requirement for joint decisions on individual targets. It is considered that the references above, which appear to require joint decisions on all targets, do not permit the expeditious employment of atomic weapons which is intended in the SACEUR Atomic Policy.

Targets in the Emergency A category, i.e. those not provided for in approved plans, should be jointly agreed. In effect, such targets represent new plans submitted to SACEUR for approval and should therefore be jointly agreed prior to submission.

The SACEUR Atomic Policy was designated to facilitate tactical employment of atomic weapons. The policy does not change the responsibilities of commanders. It should be noted, therefore, that while the policy requires plans to be developed jointly, i.e., in the closest coordination, each commander is solely responsible for the preparation of plans for his own forces, and there is no joint responsibility in this matter. (1)

On 14 May 1955, SACEUR invited CINCENT to comment on possible planned modifications and reallocation of atomic weapons within the Central Region. (2) CINCENT responded on 21 May 1955 that no formal proposal for a change in allocation of weapons among the various categories of missions, or changes in proposed delivery systems had been received at his Headquarters. However, the implications of such a change -- which had been referred to shortly before by COMAIRCENT (3) appeared to raise a doubt as to the advisability of even considering any reallocation and modification of assigned weapons at that time. As the situation stood, CINCENT observed, and because of the relatively small number of weapons allotted to the air-ground battle, an increase in the number of weapons to be delivered by air, would reduce the flexibility of atomic fire which would be deployable throughout the depth of the battle area.

Consolidation of Atomic Policy

SHAPE planners continued to study the preliminary regional plans and the myriad of factors affecting both policy and implementation. As these studies proceeded, it became evident that guidance and overall policy on the control of atomic weapons in ACE, as set forth in various directives, now had to be centralised and located in a more cohesive form. Accordingly, on 13 June 1955, SHAPE informed the MSCs that SACEUR intended to consolidate all atomic control, policy, and planning guidance.

(1) SHAPE 177/55 AG 1451 PPO, Conduct of Atomic Warfare in Central Europe, 24 Mar 55.
(2) SHAPE Msg. SH 40009, 14 May 55
(3) AIRCENT/EOPP 11711, 13 May 55
in an Atomic Annex to his Emergency Defence Plan (EDP) I-56. When promulgated this annex would reserve to SACEUR full responsibility for, and direction of the Counter-Air and Interdiction Campaigns; delegate to the MSCs execution of specified portions of these campaigns, and allocate the necessary forces and resources (1). SACEUR also indicated, shortly after, that, as the number of atomic weapons available to ACE increased, and as the delivery means became more diversified, it was probable that, other circumstances permitting, SHAPE policy again would be modified to take advantage of the increased flexibility within ACE.

The MSCs were given details of certain modifications to the existing directives which would be included in this consolidation, and were asked to incorporate them in their own procedures for exercises, particularly for an exercise known as FOXPAW, for which planning was then in progress. (2)

SHAPE's Comments on the Regional Atomic Plans

By July 1955, SHAPE was ready to start returning its comments on the regional plans to the MSCs. SHAPE policy had evolved to fit the needs of the MSCs and the growing number of nuclear weapons that were becoming available.

AFNORTH. On 28 July 1955, AM Dawson, DCPO, informed CINCNORTH that the latter's Atomic Strike Plan (3) had been closely examined. The targets selected for nuclear attack were found to be in accord with CINCNORTH's overall strategy for the defence of his area -- as set out in CINCNORTH's earlier "Considered Views on the 1957 Capabilities Plan", which SHAPE had approved. DCPO suggested that these targets should be re-examined from time to time to ensure their destruction continued to contribute to the maximum advantage to the conduct of the defence.

AM Dawson again reminded CINCNORTH of SHAPE's earlier notification that certain atomic policy and planning papers issued by SHAPE would be consolidated and issued as the Atomic Annex to SACEUR's EDP I-56. In this Annex SACEUR would reserve, to himself, full responsibility for and direction of, the interdiction and counter-air campaigns.

SACEUR would delegate to the MSCs execution of specific portions of the counter-air campaign. Similarly, MSCs would be assigned portions of SACEUR's theatre-wide interdiction campaign and the resources necessary to its execution. Interdiction

(1) SHAPE Msg. SH 21020, 13 Jun 55
(2) SHAPE Ltr. 307/55, AG 1105/7-PPO, CINCSOUTH's Capabilities Plan and Additional Studies thereon, 29 Jun 55
(3) AFNORTH/277/55, 30 Mar 55
targets which developed in the MSC's areas of operation and were not specifically reserved to SACEUR in his Atomic Strike Plan, would be the responsibility of the MSCs.

AM Dawson also noted that the SG had indicated in SG 161/8 that Finland would seek to remain neutral in a future conflict. No Finnish targets were being included in the SACEUR ASP on a scheduled basis. Such counter-air and interdiction targets as might be of interest to SACEUR in the event Finland was overrun would be assigned in the forthcoming SACEUR ASP as a regional responsibility for surveillance and attack. In respect to Finnish targets included in his ASP and such other targets in Finland as CINCNORTH might include in his regional plans, SACEUR retained power of initial decision in respect to their destruction. (1)

AFSOUTH. On 11 August 1955, SACEUR informed CINCSOUTH that a review of the latter's current plans had been carried out on the basis of the previous policy and planning guidance, and that those plans were approved on that basis, subject to certain comments (e.g., on communications, control for close support, etc.) that were included. SHAPE still stipulated however, that in Southeast Europe, only joint-level assessment of targets was agreeable to SHAPE (e.g., "joint" implying assessment made concurrently by COMLANDSOUTHEAST and COMSIXATAF). (2)

AFCENT. In September SHAPE informed CINCENT of the results of its review of Central Region plans that had been submitted in February by the so-called "Northern Forces" of that Region (e.g., Northern Army Group/TWOATAF/and Flag Officer Germany), and "Central Forces" (Central Army Group/FOURATAF/and Flag Officer Central Army Group). In the final analysis, SHAPE felt that the "Central Forces" organisation and format of plans were more desirable. However, SHAPE noted that the concept of the "joint control" used in the Central Region plans, was incorrect. SHAPE pointed out that once "joint agreement" on the assignment of weapons to tasks had been established, within the limitation of operational capabilities, control would rest with commanders responsible for the execution of those tasks.

SHAPE further indicated that the problems raised by divergent views of COMCENTAG and COMFOURATAF concerning weapons numbers would be alleviated by the publication of SACEUR's EDP 1-56 which would be effective on 1 January 1956.

Finally, SHAPE stated that, with a view to simplifying Regional Commanders' planning problems, a policy was under consideration that would result in the allocating of weapons "by specific number", instead of through continuing the "minimum-maximum system". (3)

(1) SHAPE/314/55 AG 1451 PPO, CINCNORTH's Atomic Strike Plan, 28 Jul 55.
(2) SHAPE/343/55 AG 1451 PPO, CINCSOUTH's Regional Atomic Plan 2-55, 11 Aug 55.
(3) SHAPE/390/55 AG 1451/1 PPO, Plans for the Employment of Atomic Weapons, 8 Sep 55.
Nuclear Education, Training and Exercises

At the same time that SHAPE was trying to incorporate nuclear weapons into the planning for the defence of the NATO Nations, other efforts were being made to provide the subordinate commands and the units in ACE with the information and training that they needed to survive and fight in a nuclear environment. Discussed below are some examples of SHAPE's efforts to dispell misconceptions about atomic weapons, make training conform to wartime realities, and train officers to employ nuclear weapons.

Atomic Delivery Aircraft Incidents.

From the earliest days of the Air Deputy's planning at SHAPE it had been recognised that US aircraft would conduct atomic operations in support of SACEUR's mission and that these operations might require either pre-arranged or emergency landings at air bases throughout ACE. In either case, aircraft might be en route to or returning from an atomic strike. The importance and nature of these missions required that the aircraft be given special and preferential support.

General Support responsibilities for special weapons aircraft were outlined in Annex 0 of SHAPE's EDP. However, the Air Deputy's Office felt that additional information and instructions had to be furnished to each NATO air base commander to assist him in making emergency decisions and in carrying out his responsibilities and support functions. Such information was not intended to replace more detailed information and requirements that atomic strike force commanders might furnish air base commanders supporting pre-arranged landings of atomic delivery aircraft, but it would enable supporting commanders to better understand such requirements and would provide guidance to commanders of all air bases where atomic delivery aircraft might make emergency landings.

On 24 September 1954, SHAPE informed the MSCs that each atomic weapon, atomic trained aircrew, and atomic delivery aircraft was extremely vital to SACEUR's mission. Aircrews were carefully selected and extensively trained for their missions, and aircraft were modified and fitted with special equipment. Neither atomic weapons nor aircrews and aircraft were easily replaced. Therefore, all three had to be protected and safeguarded so that they could successfully complete their assigned roles in SACEUR's mission.

SHAPE pointed out that there was no danger of a nuclear explosion when an aircraft carrying an atomic weapon landed. This was true even if the aircraft crashed and burned on landing. However, there was a danger of a high explosive detonation. Rescue and fire fighting activities had to be conducted with the same caution that might be exercised with any burning aircraft loaded with high explosives.
But if the atomic weapon were torn apart by a crash, or a high-explosive detonation occurred, the possibility of radiation existed. The immediate area had to be isolated and salvage operations undertaken by trained personnel. There was no danger of radiation from an unexploded weapon.

However, aircraft returning from an atomic strike could be dangerously contaminated. The United States Forces in Europe had atomic weapon salvage and disposal crews and these crews were available to deal with disposal operations. The most important safety precaution, SHAPE warned, was to prohibit unqualified personnel from tampering with aircraft or atomic weapons. (1)

Dissemination of Information on Atomic Weapons Systems.

On 6 January 1955, as more information on "atomic capable" tactical weapons became available on an international basis, SHAPE forwarded to CINCENT "briefs" on the Honest John Rocket and the Corporal Guided Missile. The Honest John, a 62mm rocket, was capable of all-weather support of ground forces and was particularly valuable during periods when tactical air could not give required support. The Corporal was primarily employed against personnel type targets. CINCENT was authorised to disseminate to his PSCs such portions of the data forwarded as he deemed necessary on a need-to-know basis. (2)

On 28 June 1955, similar data was forwarded to CINCNORTH and CINCSOUTH. (3)

Employment of Atomic Weapons in Maneuvers and Exercises

Established SACEUR atomic policy and strike plans provided the general basis for planning and conducting atomic play in maneuvers and exercises. In the conduct of combat operations, the authority to use atomic weapons was retained by SACEUR. SACEUR might exercise his authority by requiring that a request for each strike be submitted as the need arose, or he could approve plans of subordinate commanders for the use of atomic weapons and delegate control to them. Atomic play in exercises and maneuvers was used to test both practices.

On 18 March 1955, SHAPE informed the MSCs that for exercise purposes an agency representing SACEUR should be established either at SHAPE or within a suitable exercise cell to perform the role of SACEUR in acting upon nuclear requests. Location of this agency would depend upon the nature of the exercise and the recommendation of the commander concerned. If an agency was established to represent SACEUR, or an MSC, it was to operate as a distinct entity and function separately from

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AF/1451/AD, 24 Sep 54
(2) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1451 PPO, Information on the Honest John Rocket and the Corporal Missile, 6 Jan 55.
(3) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1451 PPO, Transmittal of Information on Honest John and Corporal, 28 Jun 55.
the headquarters being exercised and the maneuver forces.

In developing plans for atomic play, subordinate commanders were to develop exercise plans for the joint level to which planning numbers were assigned (Army/TAF, Army Group/ATAF, or similar level), consolidate them into an overall plan (such as a regional plan or appropriate level), and submit them to SHAPE for approval. SACEUR would base approval of atomic play on plans developed at the level to which planning numbers had been assigned. SACEUR also required that commanders include a recommendation as to the command level at which control authority for atomic weapons would be placed.

During the conduct of exercises, authority to execute various sections of the overall exercise plan (such as Army-TAF sections of a regional plan) was to be requested from SHAPE, or the agency representing SACEUR, using procedures outlined in SACEUR's SOP #1. After execution of approved plans had begun, if subsequent operations required a major alteration of those plans, and reconsideration of objectives, plans required for such contingencies also were to be submitted to SHAPE for approval.

Emergency targets were to be forwarded to SHAPE for approval in accordance with procedures contained in SACEUR's SOP #1. (1)

On 14 April 1956, SHAPE informed the MSCs that plans for readiness exercises, which involved only striking forces and their own headquarters, need not be submitted to SACEUR for approval of the concept of operations or number of weapons played. (2)

On 29 May, SHAPE also informed the MSCs that "atomic simulator devises" (ASD) could be used in exercises and maneuvers provided that approval was obtained from national authorities of the nation in which the device was to be used, and that SHAPE's special public information policy on the use of these devices was complied with. (3)

Clarification of Responsibilities for Joint Atomic Exercises.

As with other issues concerning the handling and/or planning for the use of atomic weapons, responsibilities within SHAPE for planning for the use of such weapons in exercises had resulted in some confusion.

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1780 OT, Employment of Atomic Weapons in Maneuvers and Exercises, 18 Mar 55.
(2) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1780 DACOS 0&T, Amendment No.1 to AG 1780 OT, Employment of Atomic Weapons in Maneuvers and Exercises, 18 Mar 55.
(3) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1780 OT, Amendment No.2 AG 1700 OT, 29 May 56.
On 11 September 1956, General Schuyler issued a Memorandum concisely outlining basic duties in this area. OANDT was made responsible for the preparation of the ACE Exercise Schedules. These would include the provisions for Joint Atomic Exercises (JAE).

OANDT was also made responsible for issuing the directives that set out the aim and objective of the JAE in much the same way that the aim and objective would be outlined to MSCs for regional exercises. The overall coordination with the other MNC in co-sponsored exercises would also be an OANDT responsibility. OANDT was to prepare the JAE reports to the Standing Group.

The planning, preparation and execution of all facets of SHAPE Sponsored JAE, except as noted above, would be the responsibility of the Air and Special Operations Division (AIROPS). Coordination with other staff division on such factors or plans as were appropriate would be handled in the same way as staff action on any other subject. (1)

**Nuclear Weapons Employment Courses.**

On 11 April 1956 an Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information was formally announced as being in force. When fully implemented the agreement would permit the release of certain atomic information that had not been available to ACE. This information, together with military information released by the United States outside the provisions of the agreement, contained the data required by Allied commanders and staff officers for the employment of nuclear weapons.

Up to this time, the final planning for the employment of nuclear weapons had had to be done by American officers because the laws of the United States did not permit anyone except US nationals to be trained in all aspects of nuclear weapons. With the new Agreement, it became possible to train other Allied personnel to work in atomic planning cells at all headquarters down to Corps level. This would lessen the drain on US resources and increase the capabilities of other NATO nations and the MSCs.

NATO Special Weapons Courses were already being taught at the US Intelligence and Military Police School at Oberammergau in West Germany. SHAPE determined that this would be a suitable location for establishing the new courses for training Allied personnel.

(1) COFS Memo AG 1450 OT, Clarification of Responsibilities for Joint Atomic Exercises within SHAPE, 11 Sep 56.
By mid-1956 no atomic information had, as yet, been released under the terms of the new Cooperation Agreement. However, SHAPE felt the matter urgent enough to proceed with planning for the courses on the basis that the required data would be released.

On 24 July 1956, SHAPE requested USEUCOM to consider presenting the new "Nuclear Weapons Employment Course" at Oberammergau. At the same time SHAPE also forwarded proposed Terms of Reference for the new course as well as a suggested syllabus. (1)

SHAPE's Review of the 1956 Regional EDPs

Background. During 1955 SHAPE published the Annual revisions of the Emergency Defence Plan and the Atomic Strike Plan. As a result of the division of staff responsibility at SHAPE for the preparation of these plans and the fact that they were issued approximately five months apart, inconsistencies arose in EDP 1-56 and ASP 1-56. The inconsistencies in turn caused difficulties in interpreting the plans on the part of the MSCs. (2)

AFNORTH EDP 1-56.

On 21 December 1955, CINCNORTH's EDP (EDPNE 1-56) was approved by SHAPE, subject to comments and recommendations which the Danish and Norwegian authorities might make. (3)

AFSOUTH EDP 1-56.

Initial Approval of EDP. On 3 January 1956 SACEUR approved CINCSOUTH's EDP 1-56, subject to certain detailed comments on the Annexes which SHAPE would forward to CINCSOUTH later.

In notifying CINCSOUTH of this approval, General Schuyler pointed out that action by the Standing Group on SACEUR's EDP 1-56 was expected shortly. Of particular interest to CINCSOUTH in the latter document was a small but significant change that would later be made indicating that where it was stated that "...The Erzurum area /in Turkey and the Straits/ will be secured against any threat from the east...", would be changed to read, "...The Erzurum area will be defended as far to the east as possible...". (4)

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1780.4 0T, Nuclear Weapons Employment Course, 24 Jul 56.
(2) Memo PPO 1240, Responsibility for Preparation of Atomic Weapons Annex to EDP, 11 Jun 56.
(3) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1220 PPO, EDPNE 1-56, 21 Dec 55.
(4) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1243/5 PPO, CINCSOUTH's EDP 1-56, 3 Jan 56.
AFSOUTH's Atomic Plan. Appendix 4 to Annex D to CINCSOUTH EDP 1-56 contained the AFSOUTH Regional Atomic Plan. As with those of other MSCs, CINCSOUTH's plan was reviewed by SHAPE in order that it might be aligned with SACEUR's Atomic Policy. On 7 September 1956, SHAPE finally forwarded its review to CINCSOUTH.

Approval of a plan in peacetime, SHAPE's review noted, indicated that the targets specified therein warranted atomic attack; that the action envisaged in the plan might reasonably be expected to develop; and that successful execution of the plan would provide a major contribution toward accomplishing the mission of ACE.

Approval of a plan in peacetime also indicated that detailed operational and logistic planning had to be accomplished to determine that the plan was feasible. SHAPE specified that SACEUR approval should not be considered final until the logistical feasibility of each plan had been established. Finally, SHAPE noted, that approval indicated that non-military factors had resulted in approval of certain CINCSOUTH plans as Code BLACK which, for military reasons, might have warranted approval as Code GREEN. (1)

Much of the reservation held by SHAPE about regional plans pertained to the need for clarity of terminology. SHAPE considered it imperative to define more accurately the terms "opening hours of war" and "opening phases of a war" as used in SACEUR's ASP 1-56. For the purpose of the review of regional plans, SHAPE stated that the following definitions were used:

a. Opening hours of a war: that period from General Alert until 72 hours thereafter.

b. Opening phases of a war: that period from D-Day through D plus 7 days. (2)

(1) As explained on p.119, Code GREEN weapons were those that could be expended without further recourse to SACEUR; Code BLACK weapons were those that could not be expended until SACEUR redesignated them as Code GREEN weapons.

(2) SACEUR's EDP 1-57 defined D-Day as the "day of commencement of hostilities; M-Day as the day on which, by NATO recommendation or agreement, an individual NATO nation, or combination or NATO nations, directed the mobilisation of forces earmarked for NATO command and of facilities affecting the operation of NATO command. H-Hour would be used in connection with a planned operation at any level of command. It would be the specific time at which an operation commenced. R-Hour would be the time of release of atomic weapons by SACEUR. SHAPE 500-1/56, AG 1240 PPO, 15 Jul 56.
SHAPE approved two of AFSOUTH's plans as Code GREEN; parts of five plans as Code GREEN - the remaining parts being approved as Code BLACK or recommended for submission as wartime plans. One plan was indicated as requiring assignment of weapons and the designation of a controlling commander in coordination with CINCAF MED.

Although CINCSOUTH's proposals and SHAPE's comments, described above, had affected the eligibility for approval of a number of CINCSOUTH's plans, SHAPE considered that the care taken in their preparation represented commendable progress in atomic planning in the Southern Region. SHAPE considered, however, that additional progress could be made through a more definitive treatment of the operations involved in each plan or sub-plan on a time basis.

SHAPE also indicated that widely separated threats should not be included in the same plan. This, SHAPE stated, would facilitate the categorisation of plans as Code GREEN or Code BLACK and permit more detailed planning by strike and support forces on a priority basis. It would also permit "finalising" the earmarking of weapons and logistic support arrangements if the weapons were committed to specific plans.

Finally, SHAPE assured CINCSOUTH that careful attention was being given to the latter's requirement for air delivery atomic strike forces for use in the "Southeastern Zone". ASP 1-57 in addition to requiring the US 12th Air Force to maintain a capability to deploy two squadron size task forces to the Southern Region, would call for the automatic deployment of eight of those aircraft on D-Day, unless previously ordered by SACEUR. (1)

AFMED EDP 1-56

On 20 January 1956, SACEUR approved CINCAF MED's EDP 1-56. In so doing, SACEUR noted that as his own Atomic Strike Plan 1-56 contained major revisions in procedures, and as A FMED had received planning numbers for atomic weapons for the first time, it was considered advisable that CINCAF MED revise the procedures established in his EDP.

(1) SHAPE Ltr. 179/56 AG 1220 AD, CINCSOUTH Regional Atomic Plan (Appendix 4 to Annex D to CINCSOUTH EDP 1-56), 7 Sep 56.
CINCAFMED was also informed that the Standing Group Intelligence Committee had conducted a reevaluation of Soviet Long-Range Air Force capabilities in September 1955 and had revised upward the long range air force estimates shown in AFMED's EDP. It was now estimated that the Soviet Long Range Air Force Order of Battle was 150 medium jet bombers, 20 jet heavy bombers and 20 turbo-prop heavy bombers. (1)

**AFCENT EDP 1-56**

On 24 April 1956, CINCENT submitted his atomic plans to SHAPE as an appendix to his EDP 1-56 (CE-JEDP 1-56). (2) SHAPE planners reviewed these plans in conjunction with the principles that had been promulgated in SACEUR's ASP 1-56, and forwarded an interim response to CINCENT on 27 June. (3)

On 1 August 1956, General Schuyler informed CINCENT that eight of the AFCENT plans had been approved with modification as Code GREEN; twenty plans had been approved with modification as Code BLACK; and one plan was disapproved. Action on six plans was withheld.

SHAPE seriously doubted that action contemplated in plans BREMEN-CHARLIE, CASTLE-BRAVO, HANOVER-GOLF, MAIN-KILO, MAIN-LIMA and ILLER-BRAVO, which involved targets West of the Rhine River, could reasonably be expected to occur in the period D to D+7. SHAPE's initial reaction was to disapprove these plans during peacetime because it was expected that the impact of operations conducted by major commands external to SACEUR, such as SAC, would have a profound effect on the enemies' reinforcement and support capability. Before making final decision on these plans General Schuyler requested CINCENT's estimate of the time period during which these plans would become active.

General Schuyler went on to point out that the review of regional plans had highlighted the need for more definitive guidance from SHAPE than was contained in ASP 1-56. This had become apparent when the threat envisaged in each plan was evaluated against the resources available to implement plans throughout ACE during 1956, and when strike force capability in 1956

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(1) SHAPE Ltr. 12/56 AG 1244 PPO, CINCAFMED's EDP 1-56, 20 Jan 56.
(2) AFCE Ltr. 97/56, CINCENT to SACEUR, 24 Apr 56.
(3) SHAPE Ltr. 138/56, 27 Jun 56.
to implement approved regional plans was evaluated in the light of other high priority tasks. During 1956 it was infeasible to designate strike forces and earmark weapons for plans prepared against targets which could not reasonably be expected to materialise until later in the war. It was considered that targets developing during this latter period could be covered more realistically by Wartime Plans.

The Chief of Staff, SHAPE, concluded by saying:

The care taken in the preparation of these plans represents commendable progress in atomic planning in the Centre Region. It is believed, however, that additional progress can be made by more carefully categorising plans and maintaining a more uniform pattern of responsibility for the execution of plans throughout the region. It is particularly noteworthy that plans involving the land battle campaign have been interspersed with interdiction campaign plans. It is also noted that responsible commanders among plans vary in the level of control as well as the service commander designated as responsible for execution of the plan. A further improvement would be the delineation in greater detail of specific target information. (1)

(1) SHAPE Ltr. 157/56 AC 1220 AD, Review of Appendix 1 to Annex D CE-JEDP 1-56, 1 Aug 56.
Requirement for a Ground Atomic Delivery Capability

The study of the development of nuclear delivery capabilities through ACE was a continuing task. During 1955 SHAPE conducted a study to determine the requirements of the Southern Region. The Study took into account:

a. The lack of ground nuclear delivery systems everywhere except in the Central Region.

b. The decision of the United States to establish a nuclear force in Northeast Italy which could fulfill a proportion of ACE's requirements.

On 3 December SACEUR informed the Standing Group of the results of the study discussed above. He said that it was essential that a ground atomic delivery capability be established throughout ACE at an early date. The delivery capability should be provided by units which would be:

a. In place on D-Day.

b. Located near adequate storage for the weapons and atomic cores.

SACEUR concluded by recommending that the Standing Group:

a. Approve the requirements that he was forwarding for atomic delivery forces.

b. Take appropriate action to have the requirements fulfilled by the nations. (1)

By end-May 1956, SHAPE was developing more specific initial estimates of requirements for ground atomic delivery forces for ACE. In order that particular regional requirements might be adequately reflected in SHAPE's study, CINCNORTH and CINCENT were asked to submit estimates for certain delivery systems. CINCAFMED also was asked to submit his views even though he would have no requirement for forces of this type in the foreseeable future.

SHAPE pointed out to these MSCs that because of the very limited means likely to be made available to SACEUR, requirements for ground atomic delivery forces should be directed towards providing necessary coverage of vital areas wherein an all-weather capability would be essential from the outset of hostilities, or which, for other reasons could best be covered by ground delivered means available to SACEUR would continue

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(1) SHAPE Ltr. 465/55 AG 1451 PPO, SACEUR to SG and Defence Committee, 3 Dec 55.
to be available to carry out missions in their respective areas as planned. (1)

CINCOUTH was to base his estimates on an assumed availability of delivery systems of the following types: an atomic demolition team; a 762mm rocket (Honest John) battalion; and a guided missile (Corporal) battalion. (2)

SACEUR noted that CINCOUTH in developing requirements of this type had to explore certain basic problems in order to develop workable proposals. These were separate from the basic politico-military decision, and the political arrangements necessary to permit implementation of proposals for the use of these weapons. The politico-military factors as they affected each nation in the area were important, as were the psychological problems, the peacetime stationing of units and the wartime deployment of units.

A myriad of other factors were to be considered such as:

a. How to achieve the maximum fire power at any desired point if the critical resources were stored in widely separated areas.

b. Logistic and administrative support arrangements.

c. Security and protective arrangements under conditions of both peace and war.

d. Training requirements.

e. Whether any adjustment of conventional forces would be needed to achieve the best balanced order of battle within the total force limit.

Thus, in addition to these problem areas, and to justify the requirements, SACEUR had to have information on anticipated targets; anticipated area coverage; command and control—including the integration with other ground and air formations; data on terrain and weather factors; and information on mobility, road nets, etc.

(1) SHAPE Ltr. 130/56 AG 1451 PPO, Requirements for Ground Atomic Delivery Forces, 25 May 56; SHAPE/131/56 AG 1451 PPO, 26 May 56; SHAPE 132/56 AG 1451 PPO, 25 May 56.

(2) SACEUR reminded CINCOUTH that general guidance on related atomic planning would be found in SACEUR's EDP 1-56, SACEUR's ASP 1-56, and SACEUR's Capabilities Plan, ACE-1957. Information on the characteristics and capabilities of the delivery systems was contained in SHAPE letters, AG 1451 PPO, 28 Jun 55; and AG 1450 OT, 6 Sep 55.
SACEUR acknowledged that CINCNORTH could be faced with major political problems incident to the establishment of a ground atomic delivery capability, particularly if the forces involved were available only from external sources. He therefore requested that CINCNORTH should develop his requirements without consideration of, or reference to, the possible source from which those means might be provided.

One of the political problems that SACEUR was referring to was the fact that in Norway at that time, constitutional factors prohibited the stationing of foreign forces in that country in peacetime. If tactical nuclear weapons were to be employed to defend Norway, then US forces would have to be used because American law required that atomic weapons be controlled by US personnel.

As for the political problems, these were closely related to a full understanding by the NATO nations, both individually and collectively, of the concept of atomic warfare, SACEUR observed. He did not consider these problems insurmountable, however, and felt that their solution could best be accomplished through a carefully planned step-by-step approach.

SACEUR's directions to CINCENT were similar although comparable political problems were not necessarily involved. Also, CINCENT's estimates, SACEUR stated, could include assumptions that delivery systems of the following types would be available in the Central Region: an atomic demolition team; a 762mm rocket (Honest John) battalion; a guided missile (Corporal) battalion; and a 280mm gun battalion.

Internal SHAPE Planning for Nuclear Matters

EDP and ASP

On 17 January 1956 General Schuyler reminded the staff that the Standing Group required that SACEUR's Annual EDP be submitted by 1 August preceding the year in which it was to become effective. Accordingly, a detailed schedule was issued to the divisions outlining the monthly actions required to complete the EDP on time.

To implement the EDP, SACEUR published an annual ASP. The COFS also desired that the ASP be developed concurrently with the EDP. Therefore a similar schedule was issued for developing the ASP.

(1) Shortly afterward, both CINCNORTH and CINCENT were provided with chapters 4, 5 and 6 of the United States Air Force Manual 1-6 concerning Employment of Atomic Weapons in Theatre Air Operations, so that the problems of USAF atomic strike forces might be better understood by those Commanders. Sufficient copies were forwarded so that distribution could be made down to and including the Army-ATAF-Fleet level. SHAPE Ltr. AG 6430 AD, Atomic Weapons Employment, 3 Jul 56.
General Schuyler further reminded the Staff that PPANDO, under the supervision of DCPO, had primary responsibility for the EDP while the Air Deputy had primary responsibility for the ASP. All divisions were directed to organise and coordinate their efforts so that each step in the development of the plans might be accomplished as scheduled. (1)

Responsibility for Atomic Planning

Staff responsibility for nuclear planning in SHAPE had remained relatively fixed since 1954, as described earlier. With the defining of staff responsibility for preparation of the EDP and ASP, changes in the responsibilities for atomic planning became possible.

On 11 June 1956, Major General Allard, ACOS PPANDO noted in a memorandum to the COFS that SACEUR's Atomic Weapon Policy was set forth in Annex D of the EDP 1-56, for which PPANDO was still responsible. SACEUR's ASP 1-56, which was prepared by the Air Operations Directorate of the Air Deputy's Office also contained a consolidation of the main points of SACEUR's Atomic Weapon Policy. ACOS PPANDO felt that the policy statements should be included in both the EDP and ASP because all addressees did not receive copies of both.

As a result of the division of responsibility for the EDP and the ASP, and the issuance of EDP 1-56 and ASP 1-56 approximately 5 months apart, inconsistencies arose, which had caused difficulty in interpretation by subordinate headquarters. To ensure complete agreement of matters relating to SACEUR's Atomic Weapon Policy, General Allard felt it was desirable to have one office responsible for all documents containing these matters. As the AIRDEP had responsibility for atomic operations, it was logical that his office assume the responsibility for policy as well. With minor modifications, and a few additions, the basic plan of the ASP could be included in the ASP as the Atomic Weapons Annex. (2)

Similarly, SHAPE received and reviewed two types of regional atomic plans. Plans prepared in conjunction with atomic exercises, and plans prepared in support of SACEUR's EDP and ASP. Under current procedure the Air Operations Directorate of the Air Deputy's Office, reviewed and approved exercise plans. PPANDO reviewed and approved the actual plans.

Coordination between PPANDO and the AIRDEP was excellent; however, the time available for review precluded complete coordination. Exercise plans had to resemble actual plans to be of value in an exercise. Hence, to ensure coordination

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(1) COFS Memo AG 1240 PPO, SACEUR's Annual Emergency Defence Plan and Atomic Strike Plan, 17 Jan 56.
(2) Memo PPO 1240, Responsibility for Preparation of Atomic Weapons Annex to EDP, 11 Jun 56.
and to facilitate communications among the staffs of the MSCs and SHAPE, ACOS PPANDO felt that one office in SHAPE should be responsible for these plans.

Also on 11 June, in a second memorandum, General Allard suggested that the Office of the Air Deputy, as the responsible office for atomic exercises, including review and approval of the Regional exercise atomic plans, should also be given responsibility for all atomic plans— including the transmission of planning numbers of atomic weapons to the MSC's. (1)

AM Constantine discussed the matter with AVM Campbell, Vice Air Deputy, who was aware of the proposals and agreed that such an arrangement not only would be "tidier" but would make for happier relationships if all such work were carried out in his office. The DCPO supported this suggestion, assuming that the Air Deputy's staff would continue to coordinate with PPANDO, and forwarded the proposals to the Chief of Staff on 13 June 1956. (2)

On 15 June 1956, DCPO announced the Chief of Staff's approval of the transfer of responsibilities from PPANDO to the Air Deputy's Office as described above, and further suggested that any revisions of Terms of Reference resulting thereby might be carried out in connection with the reorganisation of SHAPE then under consideration. (3)

New Guidance in Operational Planning and Priorities

Ongoing planning at SHAPE had reached a state at the end of January 1956 where SACEUR considered it important to inform the MODs and MSCs of the overall priority of emphasis that he now expected to see reflected in all planning matters, beginning with that year's Annual Review. As guidance to the MSCs it would reflect opinions and comments that already had been received in many forms and accepted by SACEUR. (4)

On 9 February, SHAPE forwarded a paper to each of the MSCs (with copies to MODs and SHAPE Staff Divisions) which established, in broad outline, the priority of tasks in ACE as envisioned in current planning "in order to provide a sound basis for determining the forces that should be given priority in their development to the desired state of readiness."

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(1) Memo PPO 1451 for COFS, Review of Regional Atomic Plans 11 Jun 56.
(2) Memo, DCPO to COFS, Responsibility for Atomic Planning, 13 Jun 56.
(3) Memo, DCPO to ACOS PPANDO, Responsibility for Atomic Planning, 15 Jun 56.
(4) COFS Memo to SACEUR, Guidance on Operational Priorities for ACE Forces, 30 Jan 56.
The priorities reflected an ACE point of view, although it was recognised that a survey of overall NATO strategy by higher authority could alter them.

General Schuyler's cover letter pointed out that SHAPE did not "see anything in the present situation which would justify any reduction in the all-level of military forces and resources currently planned". The paper itself stated that the priorities being established were intended to give only planning guidance to nations for the development of their defence programs, but, the guidance was not "to be construed as a blanket endorsement for any nation to devote all of its resources to the highest priority item with which its forces are concerned".

The concept of operations upon which the priorities were based included five fundamental tasks which had to be accomplished if ACE were to attain victory. The first priority among these basic tasks was the conduct of the atomic counter-offensive. This task was important not only because it provided a cold war deterrent, but also because its offensive capability was the most effective means of implementing a forward defensive strategy. The tasks are discussed below in their order of priority.

The Atomic Counter-Offensive. Basic elements of this task consisted of the development and maintaining of a delivery capability, reconnaissance forces and equipment; operational bases; weapon storage bases; communications and a logistic system. The forces and equipment priorities established for the Counter-offensive were:

(a) Bomber wings, fighter-bomber wings, carrier air groups and associated reconnaissance.

(b) Guided missile units such as Matador squadrons, Corporal battalions, submarines, and surface ships.

(c) Support units.

The Early Warning and Alert Systems. The basic elements of this task required the existence of an efficient intelligence organisation operating beyond the confine of ACE to provide advanced warning of impending attack. The Early Warning and Alert Systems were considered complementary to such an intelligence organisation.

These basic elements were surveillance and detection; display and evaluation; communications systems and a logistic system. The forces and equipment priorities were:

(a) Aircraft Control and Warning Units

(b) Air, sea and ground reconnaissance and warning units
Air Defence. The basic elements of this area consisted of surveillance and detection; display and evaluation; communications; interception; operational bases; and a logistic system.

Forces and equipment priorities (land-based and ship-borne) were:

(a) Guided missile units
(b) Aircraft control and warning units
(c) All weather fighter units
(d) Interceptor day fighter units
(e) Anti-aircraft artillery units
(f) Support units.

The "Shield" for Defence of ACE. This requirement consisted of basic elements as follows: D-Day forces (all services) within ACE, and those forces that would become available by D plus 5 along with an integrated atomic capability; communications systems; logistic systems; development of natural barriers; and development of anti-submarine measures. The forces and equipment priorities of the "Shield" would vary according to task and location.

Subsequent Operations. Priorities in this phase could be developed only on the basis of SACEUR's mission for continuing defence of NATO territory. The development of priorities for any additional tasks had to await receipt of long-term politico-military guidance as to the objectives to be achieved. (1)

CENTAG Recommends Decentralised Control of Atomic Weapons.

For three years CENTAG had opposed SHAPE's policy of centralised control of atomic weapons. In March 1956, representatives of LANDCENT, NORTAG, and CENTAG met to recommend changes in SACEUR's Atomic SOP Number 1, which they felt was not sufficiently flexible to allow the land battle to be conducted effectively. It was thought that the deficiencies inherent in centralised control would be mitigated if the ground commanders were given freedom of action in the employment of atomic weapons similar to that enjoyed by the air commanders. A draft SOP was forwarded to SHAPE to assist in revising the existing policy or in publishing a special LANDCENT SOP.

(1) SHAPE/60/56, AG 1223 PPO, Guidance on Operational Priorities for ACE Forces, 9 Feb 56.
In April 1956 COMCENTAG advocated a system of control based on allocation and suballocation of weapons down to corps level as a minimum. Deeming it essential that the ground commanders have an atomic authority commensurate with their responsibility in the conduct of ground operations, he recommended that they be given the same flexibility as air commanders in using weapons allocated to the air-land battle in a Code Green weapon category — those weapons that could be expended without further recourse to SACEUR.

In further justification of his views, COMCENTAG pointed out, that the SHAPE-sponsored joint atomic command post exercise BEAR CLAW, held 6-9 March 1956, appeared to substantiate the views that the ground commanders' authority in using weapons allocated to the air-land battle in a Green weapon category ought to be the same as that of air commanders.

BEAR CLAW was intended to test the command structure of ACE and procedures for implementing SACEUR's ASP 1-56. SACEUR had approved an exercise plan, BAVARIA-INDIA, designed to give COMCENTAG (and, by delegation, his army commanders) the authority to strike at enemy threats as they occurred across the width and depth of the CENTAG sector.

COMCENTAG felt that BAVARIA-INDIA was highly successful. Of 25 "Code Green" weapons allocated for the plan, 90 per cent were expended. However, of 14 requests from the French First Army for atomic strikes on emergency targets, 2 were approved and 2 disapproved by SHAPE, while 10 were left unanswered. Plans providing for "Code Black" weapons — weapons that could not be expended until SACEUR redesignated them as "Code Green" weapons -- proved unworkable.

In one instance during the exercise, 4 enemy divisions were concentrated in one area; the US 7th Army fired 2 of its remaining 3 weapons on the target but needed 8 to 10 more to complete its task. A CENTAG request to SHAPE to have 12 "Code Black" ground-delivered weapons changed to "Code Green" was disapproved, and the weapons were never used.

Further, because of overloaded communications, the time required for transmitting messages between CENTAG and SHAPE average 4 hours and 10 minutes. One message took 18 hours and 18 minutes in transmission.

Although BEAR CLAW revealed improvements, COMCENTAG stated the SACEUR's SOP Number 1 still failed to provide sufficient speed for atomic ground operations. (1)

(1) Adapted from CENTAG/HIS/1/56, Annual Historical Report, 1 Jul 55 - 30 Jun 56.
Emergency Defence Plan 1-57

Background. As indicated earlier in this chapter, planning at SHAPE in 1956 was aimed at developing the EDP and ASP for 1957 simultaneously. The development of annexes to the EDP was intended to parallel similar developments in the ASP. Parts of the ASP were to appear in the EDP. Except for the so-called US Annex to the ASP (which contained data that could be released only to US nations), neither Plan would be fully complete without the other.

Although precise parallel development was not achieved, both Plans were published during the summer of 1956, and were to become effective on 1 January 1957.

EDP 1-57, published on 15 July 1956, was designed to meet a situation in which war was forced upon NATO by acts of aggression of the USSR and/or her Satellites during 1957. The overall strategic aim of NATO in cooperation with such other friendly nations as might be involved, was "to ensure the defence of the NATO area and to destroy the will and capability of the USSR and her Satellites to wage war."

Assumptions. SHAPE planners had to use an extensive list of assumptions to create a basis for their plan. These included consideration of factors affecting political alignments; the use of atomic, chemical, biological and radiological weapons; possible Soviet unorthodox warfare activity; the warning period, if any; and German forces and their availability.

Many more tenuous or elusive factors, but ones that might conceivably affect the conduct of an effective defence, were considered. For example, assumptions concerning the attitude expected to be adopted by other nations in the event of war between NATO and the Soviet bloc included so many variables that a more thorough study of these, as they were set forth in a variety of official documents, was necessary and suggested by SHAPE. (1)

As for "atomic weapons" -- which term, as used in the EDP included "thermo-nuclear weapons" -- SHAPE considered that these would be employed by both sides.

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(1) Details regarding these attitudes and data on the Soviet bloc, were to be found in SG 161/9(F), Soviet Bloc Strength and Capabilities, 1956-60; SHAPE Quarterly Intelligence Reports; SHAPE Fortnightly Intelligence Reports; SHAPE Basic Intelligence, Ground Forces; SACLANT's Soviet Naval Order of Battle; the SHAPE Supplement to SACLANT's Naval Order of Battle; SHAPE's Basic Intelligence, Air; and SHAPE's Basic Intelligence, Logistics.
SHAPE planners therefore assumed in the EDP that authority for use of atomic weapons would be granted in sufficient time to execute the Plan.

They also acknowledged that the Soviets could use nuclear weapons which varied in strength from a few kilotons up to the megaton range. The Soviet stockpile of nuclear weapons was large enough to influence Soviet strategy, and would become progressively larger and of more importance throughout the period. However, the planners assumed, the Allies would possess a larger and more diversified stockpile and more flexible delivery systems.

Another assumption was that chemical, biological and radiological operations might be undertaken by the Soviets on a large scale. If this occurred, SHAPE considered that NATO would permit or direct SACEUR to retaliate.

SHAPE felt that the WP would use all possible means to upset the internal order of the Allied nations and paralyse the Allied war effort. This could be done by subversive action carried out by Communist minorities and Soviet supported dissident nationalist movements. There was little doubt that every effort would be made to confuse, divide and otherwise weaken the Allies.

Because of the ever-present possibility of surprise attack, planners further assumed that M-Day would coincide with D-Day.

Finally, SHAPE planners recognised that the West German forces would not be strong enough to influence the concept of operations in Central Europe and in the Baltic during 1957.

Based upon these assumptions and data available on Soviet Bloc forces, SHAPE considered that Soviet Bloc forces were in a position to attempt all or any part of the following:

a. A strategic air and naval offensive against the Allied in Europe, Asia Minor, and North America, and their overseas bases and lines of communications, giving highest priority to the destruction of Allied atomic capability.

b. Destruction of NATO forces in ACE, and the occupation of strategic areas thereof.

c. Denial of reinforcements and supplies to ACE.

d. An offensive to gain control of exits from the Baltic and Black Seas.
e. Defence of the Soviet bloc nations.

f. Strategic defence in other areas.

g. Intensified political, economic and psychological offensives in all areas outside the Soviet bloc.

External Air Support. While SACEUR's forces would carry out immediate destruction and interdiction of the enemy threat generally in areas outside the USSR proper, particularly in Central Europe, strategic Allied operations would attack the Soviet atomic offensive capability based in the USSR proper and, in addition, ensure that no further substantial build-up against ACE would "emanate from the zone of the interior of the USSR."

The Strategic air offensive was to be carried out by the US Strategic Air Command (SAC) and the UK Bomber Command (UKBC). SAC was to attack targets in direct support of SACEUR as agreed between CINCSAC and SACEUR. The UKBC had as one of its tasks the support of SACEUR. This support was to be provided by the UK Medium Bomber Force as determined by the UK Chiefs of Staff. Operational command would be retained by the national commands in both cases.

The UK Light Bomber Force (Canberras) was assigned to SACEUR. It would support SACEUR's atomic operations and perform other tasks that were described in the EDP and in SACEUR's ASP.

Finally, national air defence forces would assist in the air defence of ACE in accordance with MC 54(F), which required SACEUR to "coordinate" these measures.

External Naval Support. SACLANT and CINCHAN were to support SACEUR in the defence of ACE. SACLANT's main effort in this area would be directed toward the protection of SACEUR's northern flank and in the retardation of the initial enemy advance in Scandanavia. However, he might also directly support the land battle through air strikes; air interdiction; close air support; protection of seaward flanks; reinforcement of diversionary amphibious operations; and gunfire support.

CINCHAN and the maritime Air Commander in the Channel, CINCMAIRCHAN, had additional missions of keeping the Allied sea lines of communications in the English Channel and the southern North Sea open, and protecting shipping. (1)

(1) The division of responsibilities between SACEUR and the National Territorial Commanders was defined in MC 36.
SACEUR's Mission. EDP 1-57 defined the mission of ACE as:

Defend the area of ACE so as to provide essential control of areas and LOCs of vital importance; provide protection of Allied mobilisation and reinforcement preparatory to sustained defence and/or subsequent offensive operations; and conduct an air offensive and such other offensive operations, as forces available will permit, to attain Allied objectives.

Concept of Operations. If an act of aggression were committed against ACE, SACEUR, would immediately alert his command as provided in SACEUR's Alert Measures. Upon the announcement of a state of General Alert, MSCs would implement all possible defence plans using conventional weapons. Atomic weapons might be employed only upon release (R-Hour) by SACEUR. This might occur simultaneously, or subsequent to, the announcement of General Alert.

SACEUR's concept of operations considered that with the increased number of atomic weapons available to both sides, such operations might consist of an initial period characterised by an exchange of atomic weapons on both strategic and tactical targets. This would occur simultaneously with a major engagement of conventional forces in all or selected areas around the periphery of NATO. During this period both sides would use nuclear weapons in an attempt "to destroy the military forces, war making potential and will to fight on the other side".

A second period would develop when the stockpiles of atomic weapons would be smaller and conventional weapons would play an increasingly important part.

Whatever evolved, however, SACEUR's forces had to be able to survive the Soviet attack which probably would be made without warning and with mass destruction weapons. With the declaration of R-Hour, selected atomic forces of ACE, operating as directed by SACEUR, and known as the Atomic Strike Force (supported by SAC, the UKBC and SACLANT) automatically would conduct a massive atomic counteroffensive against the enemy delivery capability within SACEUR's area of responsibility. This counteroffensive constituted SACEUR's Scheduled Program.
The Atomic Strike Force Program also outlined requirements for that Force to attack "Interdiction Systems", the destruction of which was expected to have a theatre-wide impact upon large scale movements of enemy forces and supplies. These targets and plans for their attack constituted SACEUR's Interdiction Program. (1) Attack of Interdiction Targets would not automatically commence at R-Hour, however, but would be specifically ordered by SACEUR.

Land forces, using atomic weapons, would strive to preserve the integrity of Allied territories and protect Allied war potential. Naval forces, in addition to participating in the atomic counteroffensive, were to keep Allied sea LOCs open, conduct offensive operations to reduce the Soviet naval potential, destroy enemy shipping and give support to the land/air battle.

**Tasks.** The most essential requirements for the defence of the area of ACE were the need to: conduct an atomic counteroffensive; emerge from the initial period of intense atomic activity in such condition that the war might be pursued to a successful conclusion; gain air superiority in the airspace over ACE; prevent any Soviet land advance to the general area of the Rhine-Ijssel rivers, and into positions capable of severing the North Atlantic and Mediterranean LOCs; control the Baltic and Black Sea entrances; maintain control of the sea areas of ACE and deny their use to the enemy in order to ensure the adequate flow of logistical support to SACEUR's forces and to prevent the enemy from turning the land flanks; and to conduct such offensive operations as forces and the situation permitted.

The EDP specifically outlined the tasks of the Atomic Strike Force, of each of the MSCs and of the Strategic Reserve according to particular areas that had to be covered.

Task Organisation. Finally the EDP contained a task organisation which named individuals responsible for each of the forces concerned. In addition to listing each of the MSCs by name (Marshal Juin, LTG Sugden, etc.) it also named General Gruenther as responsible for the "ATOMIC STRIKE FORCE" and the "STRATEGIC RESERVE". (2)

(1) As described in Annex C to SHAPE/500-1/56 and in SACEUR's ASP.
(2) SHAPE/500-1/56 AG 124 PPO, SACEUR EDP 1-57, 15 Jul 56.
Atomic Strike Plan 1-57

General. ASP 1-57 was published on 17 August 1956, approximately one month after EDP 1-57. It provided for the use of atomic weapons in operations envisaged by the EDP 1-57. A special section, Annex E, a so-called "US Annex", contained information which according to US laws could be made known only to properly cleared US Nationals, and therefore was not included -- although it remained an integral part of the existing atomic strike plans.

The enemy forces, and the strengths and capabilities against which NATO forces might have to operate were contained in those documents specified for use in connection with EDP 1-57.

External Support. The plan listed the support that ACE was to receive from commands external to SACEUR. SACLANT would provide support to the extent determined by SACEUR and SACLANT. SAC also would support ACE to the extent agreed by CINCSAC and SACEUR, or as determined by the US JCS. CINCSAC would retain operational control of his forces supporting ACE.

One of the tasks of the UK Bomber Command was to provide support to SACEUR. This support would be provided by the UK Medium Bomber Force as determined by the UK Chiefs of Staff. Operational control would be retained by national command. (1)

Mission. ASP 1-57 stated that, "the mission of commanders involved in this plan with regard to their atomic operations, is to assist in accomplishing the mission for Allied Command Europe as expressed in the current SACEUR Emergency Defence Plan". In accomplishing this mission, nuclear weapons would be employed to destroy or reduce the Soviet atomic/air threat, slow enemy moves into ACE, support friendly forces in or near ACE, and other tasks as directed.

Assumptions. The ASP assumed that:

a. Hostilities would begin with world-wide atomic and non-atomic attacks against Allied forces and nations, directed particularly against Allied atomic delivery forces.

b. The attacks would be planned and executed in a manner designed to provide Allied forces with minimum reaction time.

(1) The UK Light Bomber Force (Canberra) was assigned to SACEUR. Its tasks were specified in the ASP 1-57.
c. The USSR would avoid major build-ups of forces which were likely to be detected and intercepted by Allied intelligences.

Atomic Operations. The ASP was based on the following: SACEUR would plan and direct the attack of targets of theatre-wide interest thru the SACEUR Scheduled and SACEUR Interdiction Programs.

SACEUR Scheduled Program. This was a centrally planned and directed counter-atomic and counter-air program. As an extension of it, SACEUR directed that certain other elements of this target system were to be observed and attacked as necessary by subordinate commanders. Additionally, SACEUR required the MSCs to submit plans for other atomic operations of immediate and direct local interest to them. SHAPE would provide the MSCs with numbers of weapons for planning, which would be reflected in the regional plans, with no planning numbers held in reserve.

Interdiction Program. The IP provided for attacking targets which would have an impact of theatre significance on the large-scale movement of enemy forces and supplies at the onset of hostilities. Specific targets were listed in an Annex.

The IP was completely pre-planned and Regional Commanders were assigned post-strike confirmation and restrike responsibilities for these targets. If reduced strike capabilities posed a conflict between the SACEUR Scheduled Program or attacks against air/atomic targets required in accordance with special SACEUR "directed tasks" and the SACEUR Interdiction Program, the IP would have a lower priority.

The Scheduled Program and IP reflected the recommendations of the MSCs. Regional commanders were responsible for preplanning support operations where required.

SACEUR Directed Tasks. To insure continuity of operations in carrying out the objectives of SACEUR's Scheduled and Interdiction Programs after the initial attacks, SACEUR assigned certain tasks to the MSCs known as SACEUR Directed Tasks. These consisted of surveillance and attack of specific targets not part of SACEUR's Scheduled Program; post-strike confirmation and advising strike force commanders of restrike requirements of target in SACEUR's Scheduled and Interdiction Programs; and attack of other airfields and missile sites which developed as profitable targets. The MSCs were to assign their tasks to the lowest practicable joint levels in order to expedite operations. Once approved
by SACEUR, plans for accomplishing them -- with the
exception of reconnaissance or attack of targets in
neutral territory -- would be implemented by subordinate
commanders after the announcement of R-Hour without
further reference to SACEUR.

The commanders to whom responsibility was delegated
were to be indicated in the plans. Weapons for
accomplishing SACEUR Directed Tasks—except for weapons
required for reattack of targets in SACEUR's Scheduled
and Interdiction Programs—would be provided from an
earmarked portion of the planning numbers of weapons
made available to the MSCs. (1) Specific details for
each phase of SACEUR Directed Tasks as well as
procedures for carrying out approved Regional Plans were
prescribed.

SACEUR's Reserve. SACEUR retained a small
reserve of nuclear weapons to meet unforeseen developments
and major threat to the entire theatre. Calls upon
this reserve, the ASP stipulated, must be held to an
absolute minimum and conventional resources must be
used whenever practicable.

Priorities. To provide general guidance in such
matters as allocation of weapons, available forces, training,
and similar considerations, first priority was assigned
to reduction of the enemy atomic capability while
concurrently reducing the air threat. Plans of forces
having either primary or secondary responsibilities for
targets of the SACEUR Scheduled Program and certain
SACEUR Directed Tasks were to reflect this priority.

Other priorities could not be specified ahead of
time, but would depend upon the situation as it developed.

Training and Exercises. MSCs and Commanders of
Atomic Strike Forces were to participate in and conduct
exercises and training to prepare atomic forces for their
assigned tasks. The MSCs were to provide joint command
and operations centres at each joint level of command
down to the Army/TAF or equivalent level) to insure
coordination of plans and the employment of atomic weapons;
and were to prepare and submit to SACEUR for approval
detailed plans for the use of atomic weapons.

In addition to participating in exercises and training,
the Commanders of the US Twelfth and Third Air Forces and the
Commander, UKBC Light Bomber Force (Canberra) were given

(1) Weapons for the reattack of targets in the Scheduled
and Interdiction Programs would be made available by
SACEUR.
specific guidance on maintaining a nuclear capability and being prepared to deploy forces automatically on D-Day.

Task Organisation. A list of individuals responsible for implementing the ASP was included. It differed slightly from the Task Organisation of the EDP because of the specialised tasks of the external strike forces. The list included the MSCs (Marshal Juin, LTG Sudgen, etc.) and the names of the Air Officer Commander-in-Chief, UKBC Light Bomber Force (AM Sir H. Broadhurst) and the Commander, US Third Air Force (MG Wilson). (1)

Planning for the Next Decade.

Background. Up until, and including much of 1956 planning had been segmented into 3/4-year time frames. That is, the original 1950 Medium Term Defence Plan foresaw the need for the existence of a particular kind of strategy and defence system for a conflict that might occur in the year 1954. The Capabilities Plan had fixed concepts and the next planning cycle through 1957.

Early in 1956, General Gruenther directed the staff to examine the next decade in terms of probable military developments and to determine the changes in the ACE defensive posture that these developments might indicate were necessary. SACEUR's intention had been to transmit the overall results of such an examination to the Standing Group late in 1957. However, in view of the great interest expressed by the North Atlantic Council in these matters, a particular study for the period 1960/62 was accelerated so that it would be forwarded to the Standing Group at the earliest possible moment. The study "Force Posture ACE 1960/62" was sent to the Standing Group on 28 September 1956.

SACEUR's Comments.

The Study was neither as complete nor as precise as would have resulted from a normal planning cycle, SACEUR informed the Standing Group, but he had confidence in its broad conclusions. Among these was the conclusion that while the 1960/62 study had added weight to the principles of MC 48, the magnitude of the nuclear capability it assumed and the extremely broad organisational base over which this capability would be distributed represented far more than the "normal growth" of previously accepted plans or principles. It was, in fact, SACEUR noted "a new concept." (2)

(1) SHAPE/172/56, SACEUR ASP 1-57, 17 Aug 56.
(2) SHAPE/231/56 AG 1223/2 PP, SACEUR to SG, 28 Sep 56.
The "new concept" was based upon General Norstad's idea, expounded during CPX IV, that the large scale use of nuclear weapons in a general war would exert a "great compressive effect on time". (1) Under such conditions SHAPE could not visualise organised military operations for more than 30 days. SACEUR stated that this premise dictated "an increased emphasis on forces-in-being capable of participating in the decisive initial phase". Similarly, there was "an additional requirement for deployment in depth, dispersion, and flexibility to keep pace with developments in weapons systems".

In his cover letter SACEUR recalled that a major reduction in estimates of forces required had been made possible by the integration of a full nuclear capability into all forces as envisioned under MC 48. The period 1960/62, however, would see no developments that provided any military basis for comparable reductions. (2)

While new force goals were now derived from studies of military considerations, SACEUR noted that SHAPE planners had worked "within the broad parameters established by the economic facts of NATO life". The force goals represented a level of forces "established on a minimum adequate basis".

Finally, SACEUR said that he was sending the study to the MODs and that he was preparing supporting studies that would serve as a basis for the detailed implementation of the required measures.

**Summary of the Force Posture ACE 1960/62.**

The Staff had considered that from 1960 onwards both NATO and Warsaw Pact nations would have adequate stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Until 1966 a family of missiles of all types, with ranges up to a maximum of 1500 miles would be integrated progressively into the forces of both sides. At the same time, SHAPE felt that "nuclear sufficiency", and the consequent threat of widespread destruction in general war would discourage the Soviets from resorting to such a war. But this would apply only so long as the Allies are fully prepared to fight a general war.

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(1) See General Norstad's remarks on page 62.
(2) However the military structure presented in the study did provide for certain significant reductions in air force units, heavy anti-aircraft artillery units, and reserve ground and naval forces.
SHAPE concluded that these trends and Soviet reluctance to embark on a general war, or to initiate overt acts which might lead to a general war, would probably result in the choice of "cold war" as a preferred Soviet tactic. The ACE response to, or assistance in cold war operations in such circumstances could be effective in an environment of military security and confidence.

In particular, "the maintenance of adequate forces-in-being, properly positioned and fully trained, would constitute convincing evidence that any local aggression on a scale less than that likely to lead to a general war" could be contained and would be unprofitable.

The Threat. SHAPE thought that a war would probably start with a massive Soviet nuclear offensive. An attempt would be made to rapidly neutralise the Allied nuclear capability. Land, sea and air campaigns would also be conducted to isolate and seize NATO Europe. The Soviet need for surprise would limit the forces that could be employed initially.

Phases of General War. In case of general war, the defence of NATO Europe with numerically inferior forces depended upon an immediate exploitation of the Allied nuclear capability, whether or not the Soviets employed atomic weapons. The Allies, in the initial and decisive phase, would need to conduct a series of overlapping, mutually dependent campaigns of maximum intensity and minimum duration. The objective of these campaigns would be to defend the populations, territories, vital sea areas and offensive striking power of NATO, while launching an immediate nuclear retaliatory campaign designed to neutralise the opponent's capability.

The second and final phase would involve reorganisation, rehabilitation and limited operations leading to a termination of hostilities. The character and duration of these operations could not be accurately predicted.

SACEUR's Mission. The essential elements of SACEUR's mission were to assist in deterring aggression; to assist in maintaining confidence in Europe by providing an environment of military security; and to defend the peoples and territories of NATO Europe if attacked. Therefore the military establishments could best accomplish its mission by providing visible evidence of the Allied capability and manifest readiness to employ all measures to resist aggression.
SHAPE felt that the deterrent must be such that the Soviets would always believe that a resort to general war would certainly lead to the destruction of the USSR. It must also convince the Soviets that they could not attain even limited objectives.

Requirements for a Successful Defence. If the deterrent failed, the task was to defend NATO Europe. When the Soviets had the initiative, SACEUR's forces had to be able to obtain maximum possible warning of attack and sustain the least possible damage from an initial blow. They had to immediately employ nuclear weapons to destroy the enemy, and, further, had to deploy and maneuver quickly the land, sea and air power needed to meet any form of enemy attack.

To defend successfully, ACE had to have the following:

a. Strategic and tactical intelligence systems capable of detecting impending attack.

b. An active and passive air defence, including early warning systems.

c. Nuclear strike forces, at a high state of readiness.

d. A strong SHIELD of land, sea and air forces.

e. Ready reserves which could be deployed quickly.

Recommended Changes in Force Posture. In developing the pattern of NATO military strength in the period under consideration SHAPE gave priority to forces-in-being, capable of fighting effectively in the initial phase. In view of the importance of the initial phase, the build-up of Reserve Forces was given a lower priority.

The principal changes required for 1960/62 were as follows:

a. Land Forces.

(1) A deployment forward and in depth of D-Day forces, particularly in Central Europe.

(2) Increased atomic integration and flexibility.

(3) The elimination of 3rd echelon forces.

b. Air Forces (Including Air Defence Forces.)

(1) An increased nuclear strike capability.

(2) A reduction of conventional strike forces.

(3) A large reduction in heavy anti-aircraft units.

(4) A substantial augmentation of the surface-to-air missile component of the air defence forces.
(5) A slight increase in the all-weather interceptor force.
(6) A considerable reduction in interceptor day fighters.
(7) A large augmentation of reconnaissance forces.

c. Naval Forces.

(1) An increase in D-Day availability of striking forces.
(2) A redeployment of D-Day forces to assure adequate control of front-line areas.
(3) A reduction in numbers of certain types of ships.
(4) Elimination of most categories of post D-Day forces.

Finally, SHAPE noted, the force posture recommended was an entity composed of many mutually supporting elements. Therefore, the adoption of the posture had to be carefully phased over the intervening years so that major weaknesses were avoided during transition.
Chapter IV

Forces

Planning - and the Annual Review

Defence Plans. Prior to General Gruenther's assumption of command, SHAPE prepared the Emergency Defence Plan in 1951. It was called EDP-52, because it was the plan which would be employed if war came in 1952. It was based on the forces which were actually available, and called for a defence along the Rhine River. The EDP was revised and replaced in December 1952 by EDP 1-53, which was based on forces available as of 31 December 1952.

The Medium Term Plan was also developed in 1951 as a defence concept for a war that could occur in mid-1954. It was based on the strategic guidance issued by the SG, and the force requirements that were necessary to implement a forward strategy. It bore no relation to the forces actually available at any given date, although, at the time it was produced, it was hoped that the necessary forces would be "in the field" by 1954. In 1953, the Plan already was out-of-date and was seen to have been an "ideal" that could not have been attained for many years after. The force requirements were the ultimate goals which nations would have attempted to attain by 1954; i.e., their 1954 Force Goals. These goals, which had included 18 German divisions, and which, for defence of the Centre area alone, Marshal Juin had estimated a need for a total of 95 divisions by D-30, were generally considered unattainable.

Force Requirements. Thus, since 1951, SACEUR had been working out the force requirement for implementing a forward strategy for 1954. The original requirements had been forwarded to the Standing Group in 1951. In November 1952, Revised 1954 Force Requirements were forwarded to the Standing Group, based on the Forward Strategy, new intelligence estimates of Soviet and Satellite capabilities, and Strategic Guidance issued by the MC. These force requirements were those necessary to defend Western Europe and SACEUR's mission, irrespective of any date, until the concept of operations, the enemy threat, and/or the effect of revised force requirements set out for 1954, in fact, were exactly the same for land forces as those formulated in 1952 except that they included Greece and Turkey.
TERMS USED IN RELATION TO FORCES

Certain terms used in this Chapter came into common usage with the development of the various defence plans and forces reviews of Allied Command Europe. Among these were:

Force Availabilities which designated the actual forces available, either assigned or earmarked for subsequent assignment, according to the nation's intentions.

Force Capabilities which referred to the assessment of the effectiveness of the available forces—such assessment being made by SHAPE.

Force Requirements which represented estimates by the military authorities of forces required to carry out the defence plans based on current strategy. Force Requirements were therefore targets which NATO nations were to try to achieve based on SGN guidance, assessment of the possible effectiveness of enemy forces, and, later, individual nations' financial capabilities.

Force Goals which were annual targets only, and which were phased in steps to be taken toward attainment of Force Requirements. Infrastructure programs and allocation of equipment were based on these goals.

In connection with those force goals first introduced as a result of the Lisbon Conference of the NAC in February 1952, the following terms also were used:

Firm Force Goals which nations agreed to provide by the end of 1952.

Provisional Force Goals which were estimated as attainable by the end of 1952.

Planned Force Goals which were planned for the end of 1954 toward meeting the SHAPE Force Requirements for the Medium Term Defence Plan of 1954.
In October 1952, the Standing Group told SACEUR that a long term procedure for planning within NATO would be adopted, and that it would be linked closely with the Annual Review. (1) The new procedure was based on a cycle of planning that would cover four years from the time a planning cycle was begun. Thus, effective 31 December 1952, the SG issued Strategic Guidance for 1956. All NATO Commanders were directed to prepare their estimates of the situation that might prevail as of December 1956. They would base these estimates on the Strategic Guidance, and would set out the forces required to meet the estimated situation. These were the NATO Commanders’ Force Requirements. Upon receipt of the statements from SHAPE and from other NATO Headquarters, the SG would develop NATO force requirements for 1956, which, in turn, would be forwarded to the North Atlantic Council. For its part, the Council was committed to work out steps that would be taken over the period of the next 3 years (that is, from 1953 through 1955) to meet the NATO force requirements. They would arrive at the following force goals:

a. Firm Force Goals to be achieved by 31 December 1953.

b. Provisional Force Goals to be achieved by 31 December 1954.

c. Planning Force Goals to be achieved by 31 December 1955.

Upon receipt of the statement of the various goals, SACEUR would attempt to work out an Emergency Defence Plan (EDP) based on the Firm Force Goals fixed for 1 January 1954. This plan would be known as EDP 1-54. While its support would be based on the distantly related requirements stated by the military commanders, in reality, it would be founded upon capabilities and availabilities, and not purely on the original requirements.

For these reasons, the Annual Review had great significance, provided that the Strategic Guidance, the Commanders’ concepts, and the nation’s policies and capacities did not diverge.

It was against this background that the Annual Review for 1953, was undertaken in April 1953.

The Annual Review. The Annual Review for 1952 had only just been completed when the Standing Group issued its guidance to the Major NATO Commanders for the next

(1) SG 20/49, October 1952.
year's Review to be completed by October 1953. (1) SACEUR lost no time in sending out his own guidance, in furtherance of the Standing Group's advice to the MSC's. (2) Thus, before the NAG had actually started work on the 1957 Capabilities Plan, the 1953 Annual Review was under-way. (3)

Colonel E.S. Hartshorn of the SHAPE Annual Review Office, in explaining the requirements for another Annual Review so soon, told SHAPE Staff Officers that, "(The 1953 Review) seems a little ridiculous on the face of it, because an Annual Review should be handled annually, and here we are having another one in six months; but that's because the technique has been so difficult to establish... Instead of having a full year to complete the 1953 Annual Review, we only have six months." (4)

The Council directed that firm goals be established for 1954; provisional goals should be established for 1955, planning goals for 1956, and "long-lead items" goals for 1957.

The Annual Review Questionnaire, which asked each nation to report detailed information on its existing and projected military forces was sent out to the nations by the NATO Council on 15 May 1953. SHAPE followed this Questionnaire by sending to the nations, through the MSCs, guidance as to how the countries should build-up their forces throughout the next three years. Included in this guidance was a general appraisal of each country's military services and a list of the deficiencies in training, personnel and other factors that had been noted. The

(1) MC 12-53, 25 Apr 53; and MC 11-53, 20 Apr 53. For detailed information on the origin and development of the Annual Review process, and the difficulties encountered in the 1952 Annual Review, the reader should see, SHAPE History, Volume I, Chapter 8; and SHAPE History, Volume II, Chapter 10. In many respects the Annual Review for 1953 was only a token review and the process temporarily had lost much of its significance.

(2) SHAPE 567/53, 23 May 53.

(3) The sequence of events in the AR process established for the 1952 AR, and followed in subsequent years was as follows: The issuance of guidance by the SG, followed by SACEUR's guidance for individual countries; the dispatch of AR Questionnaires to nations contributing forces; visits to those countries by SHAPE teams to advise and consult with national military authorities; receipt and examination by SHAPE of country replies to the questionnaires; forwarding of SHAPE comments on country replies to the NAC, where the AR report was prepared; receipt, consideration and approval of the final AR report by the NAC in Ministerial Session.

guidance actually was prepared by PPANDO, OANDT and the Logistics Divisions. Air Marshal Huddleston, DCPO, co-ordinated and directed the guidance, which was dispatched on 20 May 1953.

During May and June, SHAPE sent officer teams to each ACE nation to discuss this guidance and to answer questions about the filling out of the AR Questionnaires.

During August of 1953, SHAPE began examining and commenting on some of the nations' replies to the AR Questionnaire. By early September the Staff has been able to forward to the Standing Group Liaison Officer (SGLO) (1) comments on replies of the United Kingdom, Canada and Portugal. Because of the short period of time allowed the nations and the complexity of the problems on which the nations had to prepare detailed reports, by mid-September reports had not yet been received from Italy, Turkey, Norway and France. By October, all replies had been received and SHAPE comments completed.

As a result of the experience gained in 1953 AR, SHAPE felt that it was essential that SHAPE and the MSCs participate in each stage of the process. General Schuyler commented to the Chiefs of Staff of the Subordinate Commands on 16 September 1953, "We have a better system this year than last year, since the Subordinate Commands have been able to participate with SHAPE in the development of initial guidance to the countries, and, in general, the Subordinate Commands have been in on the development of the initial SHAPE comments." But this was not sufficient since the MSCs did not have enough time to study them properly. General Schuyler said that SHAPE still required assistance from the Commands, and would refer any major points to them for consideration before finalizing the SHAPE position.

General Bailly, AFCENT Chief of Staff, complained that his Commander had had only 24 hours to consider the paper of one of the countries. General Schuyler while completely sympathetic with the problem, pointed out that SHAPE itself, had had no alternative many times because SHAPE was required to have the paper returned to the Council in time, or be blamed if there should be a delay or cancellation in the full Council meeting scheduled for December. (2)

The work continued at the International Staff level and by October SHAPE began reviewing the draft Country Chapters being prepared by the SGLO and the International Staff. (3) In December 1953 the staff work was completed and the Report was finally submitted to the North Atlantic Council. (4)

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(1) TheStanding Group, the executive agency for the Military Committee, was co-located with the MC in Washington DC. The SGLO was stationed at NATO Headquarters in Paris.
(2) SHAPE 869/53, AG 2032 SEC, Minutes of Mtg. with Chiefs of Staff, 16 Sep 53.
(3) SHAPE/SEC/82/53; SHAPE/SEC/86/53.
(4) MC 39/3, 2 Dec 53, w. corrigendum, 8 Dec 53.
Although the Annual Review had been conducted with relative haste it was believed that the results of the Review were valid, at least in general matters. The Report stated that there had been substantial improvements in the effectiveness of forces because the recommendations of the 1952 Review had been accepted by the nations and because their forces had received substantial amounts of military equipment in the past year. In addition, maneuvers and exercises had been conducted during 1953 on a larger scale than before. "It should be noted, however," the Military Committee told the Council, "that the effectiveness of the forces remains below a satisfactory level in many instances."

The Standing Group pointed out to the Military Committee which, in turn, passed the comment on to the North Atlantic Council, that SACEUR's Report on the Combat Effectiveness of Land and Air Forces 1953 must be kept in mind when studying the Annual Review Report. This was because SACEUR had pointed out that many of his comments on the Annual Review 1953 did not contain an assessment of the combat effectiveness of his land and air forces. (1)

The Annual Review Report showed that there had been a general "levelling-off" in the rate of quantitative build-up in all three services. There were six less M-Day divisions in 1953 than those agreed on in the 1952 Review force goals. The land force goals for one country were, however, preliminary in anticipation of the results of a study which the Council had directed. This study had concluded that six M-Day divisions should be rephased to a later date in order to achieve an improved balance in army forces. No further increase in M-Day divisions was shown beyond 1953. The number of M+30 divisions was projected to increase from 83 at the end of 1953 to 93 by the end of 1956. For naval forces, the report showed that only minor increases were planned. For air forces, the rate of build-up had slowed down and the firm goal for 1954 was 6754 aircraft as compared with a provisional 1954 goal derived in 1952 of 7287 aircraft.

The Standing Group recommended that the Military Committee request the Council to declare that the Military objectives of NATO should be to attain and maintain the highest possible level of forces, both active and reserve, which could be provided with modern equipment over a prolonged period with due regard being paid to firm force requirements based on a realistic study of the effects of new weapons; to improve these forces in quality as far as resources permit; to add to these forces as soon as possible through EDC an effective German contribution; and to maintain the lead in the weapons and scientific fields.

(1) See next section for details of this report.
The main deficiencies and weaknesses noted in the build-up of forces were in the nature and length of military service, the low percentage of regular personnel and an overall shortage of electronic technicians. Additional deficiencies were noted in shortages in ammunition and equipment, and inadequate support forces.

The primary deficiency in Allied Command Europe was the slow progress in the build-up of modern air forces. The shortages of all-weather and interceptor day fighter-squadrons was most serious. The availability of effective aircraft on hand in 1953 in ACE was estimated by SACEUR to be even smaller than the countries' replies to the ARQ indicated.

The naval forces, although progressing, still were deficient in coastal and inshore mine-sweepers, escort vessels and attack carriers.

Force Requirements - December 1953. General Ridgway had told the North Atlantic Council of the number and types of forces he would need as of December 1954 and the requirement for these forces had been established and published by the Military Committee in April 1953. (1) In the meantime, the NAG began its studies to determine, among other things, the impact of nuclear weapons on force requirements. But by the time the Council met in December 1953 to consider Force Requirements for 1956, these studies had not indicated that the incorporation of nuclear forces into ACE by December 1956 greatly affected the general order of magnitude of the forces which SACEUR would need.

There had already been a great deal of confusion and misunderstanding over the Council's demand to know the Alliance's 1956 Force Requirements. While General Ridgway had forwarded a plan for 1956, including certain force requirements for that year, he had not considered that these requirements were valid because of the indeterminate factors involved, and he did not approve them. When the Chairman of the Standing Group, General Ely, visited SHAPE in August 1953 he was briefed on this 1956 plan and was told that SHAPE did not want to submit to the Council firm 1956 requirements because, in order to do that, SHAPE in the words of the Chief of Staff, would have "to start all over". (2)

(1) MC 26/2 (Final), 25 Apr 53.
(2) Memo for the Record, COFS Mtg, 5 Aug 53.
Later in August, because the Standing Group still wanted the statement of 1956 Requirements for the 1953 Annual Review, General Schuyler went to Washington where he talked with the Standing Group and the Military Committee, pointing out that SHAPE could not develop real and valid requirements in time for the 1953 Review, primarily because of the lack of basic planning data from the Standing Group. (1)

On 10 September, the Standing Group was again informed of SACEUR's position regarding the relationship between 1956 Force Requirements and the 1953 Annual Review. SACEUR restated the view that it was not possible to provide firm specific requirements for 1956 in time to apply them to the 1953 Annual Review. In lieu thereof, he recommended that MC 26/2 be adopted as military guidance for the remainder of the 1953 Annual Review. (2)

On 17 September, General Schuyler explained the problem, including the various alternative solutions, to the MSC Chiefs of Staff at their semi-annual meeting. General Schuyler said that for the past year SHAPE had been concerned over the problem of what forces to report to the NAC this fall. Last year the Council had requested firm force figures for 1954 through 1956, the staff had had great difficulty complying with this request, but a SHAPE position had been developed. There appeared to be three possible solutions:

a. Develop firm 1956 requirements, either with no new guidance (using SHAPE 1215/52 or MC 26/2), or with new guidance which would reflect the impact of new weapons.

b. Develop order of magnitude requirements, based on SHAPE 1215/52 but reflecting trends resulting from SHAPE's study of the impact of new weapons.

c. Proceed with no restatement of forces, using force goals developed from country submissions to the Annual Review.

The first alternative was the most desirable from SHAPE's point of view and also the one the Council wanted. However, if requirements were based on MC 26/2 SHAPE would be accepting a new and very fundamental assumption which could not be verified. MC 26/2 stated that in 1954 new weapons will have no effect on force requirements. Obviously, that statement might not be valid in 1956. On the other hand SHAPE could develop firm requirements with new guidance, provided that guidance were available. The staff had spent the past six months working on this problem and trying to

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(2) SHAPE/SEC/94/53 Memo: Minutes of COFS Mtg., 17 Sep 53.
develop new assumptions which would constitute the basis for new guidance. Assumptions were needed in four areas. First: What will the Soviet atomic capabilities be in 1956? Second: What will our own atomic capabilities be in 1956? Third: How much warning of attack can we count on in 1956? And Fourth: What part does ACE's company play in the overall war against the Soviets? However, having developed these areas, SACEUR himself simply does not have the competence to approve the assumptions; that approval must come from higher authority. In absence of properly authenticated assumptions covering these points, General Schuyler felt that SHAPE had to reject the first alternative.

The third alternative above would have been simple and would have been a suitable solution from SHAPE's point of view for the 1953 Annual Review. The Annual Review people at NATO had told SHAPE informally that a new statement of forces was not absolutely necessary for their work. However, General Schuyler said the Council had asked for the new requirements a year ago, so SHAPE had rejected this alternative.

The second alternative remained, and the Chief of Staff said this is the one we have adopted. This means that, for the purposes of the 1953 Annual Review, we have selected a general order of magnitude of forces approximating those in MC 26/2 but reflecting certain of the trends resulting from our study of this problem.

General Bailly (AFCENT) asked when an answer might be expected from the Standing Group on the 1956 problem so that the subordinate commands could continue with their planning. General Schuyler stated that the Standing Group could recommend to the Council a course of action but could make no decision itself on the SHAPE position. (1)

The Standing Group finally agreed to SHAPE's proposals. Accordingly, these force requirements were forwarded to the Standing Group and eventually approved and published as firm requirements by the Military Committee on 25 November 1953. The North Atlantic Council amended and noted these requirements on 9 December 1953. (2)

SACEUR Reports three Major Deficiencies to M.C. The MC also had convened in Paris in December 1953 in conjunction with the annual meeting of the NAC. General Gruenther attended several of their sessions and, at the invitation of the Chairman, addressed the assembled representatives.

(1) Minutes of Chief of Staffs Mtg with MSC COFS, 17 Sep 53.
(2) MC 26/3. 9 Dec 53.
He told the MC that, while he believed that the effectiveness of his command had improved very significantly during the past year, he had three major worries. First, the air defence deficiency was his major concern at the time. All-weather fighters were non-existent and the air control and warning system was hopelessly inadequate. Secondly, the nations' defence appropriations were beginning to level off. This meant that he would have to rely more and more on reserve forces. The effectiveness of those forces was still far below what he thought it should be.

The third concern was the poor logistic situation of his command. Supplies still were inadequate. Supply planning throughout his command, including that at SHAPE, was not up to the standard he desired.

General Gruenther pointed out that the New Approach planning apparently had built up in the minds of the Press, and thus, among NATO national populations, an illusion that the new weapons were magic, and that by incorporating them into NATO plans the financial burdens on the nations could be reduced. SACEUR told the Committee that while he could not yet give them definite information on the results of the new planning, he could point out that there was no data available to support an anticipated reduction in the cost of defence. (1)

Forces-in-Being.

Emerging from the NAG studies at this time was a concept quite different from that entertained by the original SHAPE planners under General Eisenhower, and even under General Ridgway. The NAG concluded that although ACE would probably need fewer divisions than originally had been foreseen, it would have to have divisions which were ready to fight immediately. There would be little use for reserve units which could not be brought into action in less than 30 days. The divisions would have to be much more highly trained and disciplined than ever before.

Unfortunately, developments during 1954 gave little hope that SACEUR would soon have these ideal divisions on the ground and ready to fight. Certain factors, such as withdrawal of units and reduction of service requirements in some nations, actually threatened ACE's strength. Progress in creating the German contribution was also slow.

Forces Discussed at CPX IV. On 30 April 1954, General Gruenther, in addressing CPX IV, reviewed the effects which it appeared would be exerted on his force requirements by the New Approach. After describing what his plan entailed, General Gruenther said, "We are trying to analyse also

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(1) 9th Session of the MC (1st meeting), 15 Dec 53.
whether or not the balance of forces is correct. Should the forces of one service be strengthened at the expense of another service?..." To enlarge this point SACEUR used a specific illustration. "We have some countries that have a fairly large number of active army divisions, but they have a low content of active personnel. This calls for a mobilization of reservists to bring the division up to strength. Some countries do not have the money to train these reservists. That raises the question: Would it be better to cut down the number of active divisions in such a country and to spend more of the money available for the training of reservists?" In partial answer to his own question, General Gruenther repeated what had been emphasized earlier by Field Marshal Montgomery, that the shield of active divisions should be ready to fight at once, without any mobilization being necessary.

General Gruenther pointed out that current force requirements for AFCENT called for 31 divisions on D-Day and 65 divisions by D+30. Comparing these with the goals which had been agreed to by the nations, he noted that by the end of 1954 there would be 18 and 1/3 D-Day divisions on the ground; by the end of 1955, assuming availability of the new German divisions, this number would increase to 28 and 1/3.

With regard to aircraft, SACEUR pointed out that 6690 aircraft were required in the Central Region. By the end of 1956, with the German contribution, there would only be 4753 aircraft in AFCENT. (1)

General Norstad also spoke at CPV IV and pointed out that while the balance of forces assigned to SACEUR probably would be affected, as they were redesigned with an eye to the possible effects of new weapons, atomic delivery forces alone could not attain SACEUR's objectives and there would still exist a requirement for military forces to perform conventional tasks. "The development of air forces," he said, "should not in every case automatically be assigned first priority." NATO would continue to need an effectively balanced land, sea and air team far into the future. However, he suggested that these forces would have to be restyled, rebuilt and rephased to carry out effective atomic operations. (2)

Capabilities of SACEUR's Forces.

A complete evaluation of SACEUR's existing and promised forces, and of the ability of those forces to carry out the tasks and missions which would be required of them was forwarded to SACEUR by PPANDO Division in early 1954. This analysis was based on statistical reports submitted by the

(1) Closing remarks by General Gruenther, CPX IV, 30 Apr 54.
(2) SHAPE/AD/5/54. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons upon Warfare, 30 Apr 54.
commands and on the report of SHAPE officers who had inspected the units. The analysis stated that the forces then available could not accomplish SACEUR's assigned mission in full. (1)

Capabilities in the North. In the Northern sector where SACEUR was charged with closing the exits of the Baltic Sea and defending as much of the territory of Norway and Denmark as possible the forces were extremely weak. Norwegian forces had been withdrawn from Germany in 1953 and one active army brigade (less one infantry battalion) was stationed in Norway with part of it in Northern Norway and the remainder in the Oslo area. Norway planned to mobilize two infantry divisions and three regimental combat teams (RCT) in case of war. These were stated to be ready to fight at M+15, but PPANDO felt that it would be M+30 before they could be combat-effective.

In Denmark active forces consisted of two infantry divisions, each having two reduced infantry regiments and some support units. One division was located in Schleswig-Holstein along with a British armoured car company. In case of war, Denmark was to mobilize three infantry divisions and two RCTs, two divisions would be used in Jutland. One infantry division and one RCT would be held in Zealand. One RCT would be placed on the island of Bornholm. PPANDO felt that these forces would not be ready to fight before M+30.

AFNORTH's air forces were also in short supply. There were 326 aircraft available, including 250 fighter bombers which had to double as day fighters. Their limitations in this role made the day fighter capability completely inadequate. Other major air force deficiencies included a lack of reconnaissance aircraft, all-weather fighters, troop carriers and air control and warning units. These weaknesses were further aggravated by the fact that SACLANT's carrier forces would not be immediately available and that the Danish government, in the words of the PPANDO, found "it inexpedient in the present situation to accept the presence in Denmark of other than Danish NATO units in peacetime."

Naval and air forces' capabilities, particularly in minelaying, were insufficient to guarantee the successful closing of the Baltic exits.

Capabilities in the Centre. In AFCENT there were 18 and 1/3 divisions from the Netherlands, France, Luxembourg, Canada, US and UK to defend along the Rhine-IJssel.

(1) Enclosure to SHAPE/PPO/58/54, Present Capability of the Allied Forces to Meet the Soviet Threat, 24 Feb 54.
All of these units were rated combat effective. The initial role of these forces in early 1954 was to provide a covering force to allow the mobilization of additional forces. By 30 Apr the Eisenhower Supreme Commander of the Atlantic (NATO: Atlantic Command: CINCSACLANT: CINCPACFLEET) was supposed to have 31 and 2/3 divisions. PPANDP doubted that these mobilization units would be completely effective.

In the meantime, the situation in Indo-China had required the withdrawal of a number of French troops from ACE. Although the number of French divisions available to SACEUR—fourteen—remained unchanged, the quality, equipment and date of availability of some of them (from 7 to 9) was seriously affected. (1)

The French Government had taken certain measures toward restoring the situation. Some 72,000 national service men who were due for discharge were retained in service. At the same time some 54,000 army reservists were recalled for service. Of these reservists, approximately 14,000 were men from North Africa and were recalled for service in that area; 5,000 were recalled and sent directly to units in Germany; and 45,000 remained initially in France. SACEUR stated the French moves "do ameliorate the situation in my Command to some extent," but was concerned because the extensive recall of reservists was for only four months.

Approximately 2600 aircraft were available to AFCENT, but the effectiveness of this force was reduced by the lack of trained personnel and equipment deficiencies.

Capabilities in the South. Defending the passes through the Alps and along the Italy-Yugoslav border, ACE had limited forces. Allied Land Forces in Austria consisted of one US RCT, one UK battalion and token French forces. Allied forces in Trieste consisted of one US RCT and one UK brigade, both of which lacked supporting elements. These forces would withdraw under pressure into Italy.

In Italy there were eight Italian divisions and two Alpine brigades, all of which were combat ready. Mobilization would raise this to twelve divisions and five Alpine brigades.

Of the 418 aircraft available in Italy, SHAPE estimated that only 307 were effective. Day fighters, all-weather fighters, reconnaissance aircraft and light bombers were in short supply. The overall effectiveness of the Italian Air Force was also limited by the shortage of personnel in general and trained technicians.

(1) PPO 1104, Memo: Maj. Gen. Lorillot to COFS, Changes to SACEUR's Forces since 1st January 1954, 8 Jul 54.
In the Greek sector, where SACEUR would attempt to retain positions in the northern mountains and to neutralise Albania, there were three Greek divisions and six independent regiments, all of which were combat ready. Mobilization would increase them to twelve divisions and twelve independent regiments. It appeared that Greece would be unable to continue to provide such large forces in the future. A SHAPE study was underway to determine the best pattern of forces which Greece would equip and maintain with US assistance.

The air situation in Greece was unsatisfactory. There were 150 fighter-bomber aircraft and 16 transport aircraft available. Major deficiencies were the lack of day fighters, all-weather fighters and reconnaissance aircraft.

In Turkey, plans called for retention of the Turkish Straits, if possible. If forces had to withdraw, priority would be given to holding Northwestern Anatolia. In eastern Turkey, the general line Erzurum-Lake Van was given priority. Turkey had seven infantry divisions, two cavalry divisions and ten separate infantry and armoured regiments, all of which were considered combat ready. Mobilization would bring this number to nineteen divisions and ten independent regiments. There were 200 fighter-bombers in Turkey and no day fighters.

Under the existing concepts for the defence of Western Europe, wherein existing division held the enemy off until reserves could be brought into action, SACEUR's M+30 requirements had been determined to be 145 divisions and 9979 aircraft. Broken down by command, this requirement was 13 divisions and 865 aircraft in the North; 65 divisions and 6690 aircraft in the Centre; 67 divisions and 2424 aircraft in the South. The nations had agreed to furnish 116 divisions and 6608 aircraft by the end of 1956. (1)

When it adopted the resolution on the 1953 Annual Review on 15 December 1953, the NAC had asked the nations for a brief written statement by 15 June 1954 of the progress being made in implementing the firm force goals and the recommendations made to them. The nations' reports were received in June and July 1954. An analytical summary of the reports was prepared by the NATO secretariat and submitted to the Council on 7 August.

It appeared from the progress report that the army force goals for 1954 generally would be met for the army, although in two instances units would be available later than originally planned. Insofar as the navies were concerned, a number of countries would not be able

(1) These figures were presented to the NAC by SACEUR on 23 Mar 54.
to attain the agreed force goals for escort vessels, minesweepers and maritime patrol aircraft. It was estimated that only 18% of the D+30 1954 requirements for ocean escorts would be met. It was clear from a study of the countries reports that there would be a further significant slippage in the attainment of 1954 air force goals in spite of the fact that these goals were 500 aircraft short of the 1954 target agreed by the NAC at Lisbon in 1952.

The tone of the entire report was pessimistic and critical. It seemed obvious that nations were allowing economic and political considerations to sway their military decisions, because the Soviet threat had apparently decreased.

In the 1953 Annual Review, a number of recommendations had been made to improve the quality of NATO forces. Increases in the length of national service and improvements in arrangements for training of reservists were recommended. In 1954, the subject of national military service was under detailed examination by the Annual Review Committee. Only two countries had increased their periods of national service, while others had reduced the period of service. Other countries were preparing to follow suit. There was also little improvement in the training of reservists. The Report stated that the situation "was most disturbing in view of the numerical inferiority of NATO forces which makes it imperative that their quality should be of the highest order."

The IS acknowledged that the analysis contained in its long report may have emphasised the unfavourable aspects of the situation. However, important progress was being made in solving many problems, powerful forces had been organised and would become increasingly effective throughout 1954. The IS felt that any complacency would be dangerous. "Certainly there is no reason to suppose" the report concluded, "that the threat with which NATO is faced has diminished or changed in any significant way, nor has it been suggested that the main recommendations on defence policy made last winter are now out of date." (1)

Readiness of Forces and Impact of the New Approach.


(1) CM(54)66, 7 Aug 54.
He supervised the preparation of a staff paper which examined the impact of the New Approach on build-up plans, on the balance between active and reserve forces, and the required quality and readiness of these forces.

General White examined the forces required to fight the new battle and their necessary standards of readiness. In his view, these forces should consist of light active forces to man the first obstacle or atomic screen; active forces to fight the mobile battle behind the screen; strategic reserves to be employed in any part of ACE and second echelon reserves to defend the second obstacle.

Noting that the New Approach demanded generally, higher quality units and troops and higher standards than those that existed, General White set up some rules for each of the above listed categories of forces.

**Light Active Forces** - would come from the area in which they fought, must be maintained permanently at war strength and be stationed in the area of their battle position. They would have to be mobile and highly trained and disciplined.

**Active Forces** - would be maintained at not less than 85% of war strength and capable of fighting at any moment. They would also have to be mobile, highly trained and disciplined.

**Strategic Reserves** - would be active forces, meeting the same requirements set forth above. In addition they would be air-transportable and have all required heavy equipment stockpiled in advance in Continental Europe.

**First Echelon Reserve Forces** - would mobilize by M+3 and be capable of fighting by M+7. Permanent trained cadres, including staff and command elements, must be maintained at not less than 75% strength. Reservists would train 30 days annually with their respective units, and must have 100% of their war equipment in their area.

The last category of forces, the **Second Echelon Reserve**, must be able to take up battle positions in the second obstacle area and fight without further training by M+10 or 15. These units would maintain a permanent skeleton command organization from division through battalion and have a permanent active cadre of regular officers, NCOs and key personnel. The unit would assemble in its entirety for 30 days training each year, and its unit equipment would be kept in reach at 100% war strength. (1)

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(1) SHAPE OT/31/54, OT 2202.1, Memo, ACOS OANDT to Command Echelon, Examination of Present Build-up Plan, 9 Jun 54.
SACEUR's Combat Readiness Report, 1954. General Gruenther, reporting to the Standing Group on the combat effectiveness—or lack of it—which his forces were believed to possess as of the end of 1954 stated that, insofar as his M-Day forces were concerned, there had been an overall improvement in the efficiency of certain of the units and that the standard of training in most units had been improved. This had been offset by two major factors which had decreased the number of M-Day units by 30% from the number available in 1953. The land forces of Greece and Turkey were being reorganised and this had temporarily lowered their M-Day capability. However, the prognosis for 1955 was excellent. The reduction of combat ready French units in Europe as caused by the situation in Indo-China and North Africa was a most serious problem. "It is not clear yet," General Gruenther said, "when that effectiveness will be restored as long as the North African problem remains unsettled."

SACEUR combined his "M-plus-15" and "M-plus-30" divisions under the heading of "Post-M-Day forces" and stated that the total number of such major units which had a reasonable chance of reaching battle efficiency by their prescribed availability dates had decreased by approximately 40% during 1954.

"I do not want to place too much emphasis on this figure," General Gruenther said, "but there has been a deterioration, and it has been a significant one." The main deficiencies were in organization; methods of training; weak active elements; incomplete and unpracticed command machine; and insufficient annual training of reservists with their units. During 1954, only about 12% of all Post-M-Day divisions had been brought to operational strength for training. "In my opinion," SACEUR said, "few of the 'M-plus-15' units could be fit for modern battle under 30 days of mobilization and few of the 'M-plus-30' units for some considerable time afterwards."

General Gruenther's Combat Effectiveness Report concluded that "I do not consider the outlook for securing adequate improvements to be an encouraging one. I find little disposition on the part of most governments to face up to the problem realistically—now or in the future."

The Assessment of Combat Effectiveness.

Establishing Standards. Determining combat effectiveness of ACE Forces had been one of the most controversial issues since the beginning. The nations did not take readily to what they considered the too-stringent requirements promulgated by SACEUR as the criteria for battle-ready divisions. And as it had been with General Ridgway, General Gruenther also encountered great difficulty in reconciling his standards with those the nations were prepared to accept. (1)

The Standing Group, largely at SHAPE's urging, had established the "Ultimate Standards of Readiness" for combat units and had published them in conjunction with MC 26/2 in April 1953. As an example of the manner in which combat effectiveness was assessed the following extract pertaining to ground units is quoted: "A D-Day Land Force unit must be sufficiently ready with regard to the factors listed below to be able to fight effectively at any time without further mobilization procedure." The factors which the Standing Group listed were: personnel, strength, training, equipment and unit supplies, supporting units, capability of deployment, and capability of the contributing nation for mobilizing and equipping trained reserves for the unit.

A reserve unit designated to fill a mobilization requirement would be maintained at such a state of readiness and with such established and tested mobilization procedures as to make it capable of reaching the standards of a D-Day unit within the time limit suitable to its designation; i.e. for a D-Day + 15 division the division must be capable of meeting the standards within 15 days.

These were only very general instructions and the Major NATO Commanders had great latitude in applying the factors set forth. SHAPE, and particularly DSACEUR who was charged with the readiness of ACE's land forces, felt it necessary to examine these factors very closely in evaluating units. He felt that the standard should be set high enough to have some real meaning. This led to considerable controversy and misunderstanding.

Report to Standing Group on Combat Readiness. On 17 November 1953, General Gruenther sent to the Standing Group a detailed account of what he had learned from the replies from the countries and from inspections made by his staff of land and air forces. (2)

He pointed out that his comments on the Nations' plans for the build-up of forces assigned or earmarked for his command had been forwarded to the Standing Group.

(1) SHAPE History, Vol. II Section III, pp.275-281
Liaison Officer in accordance with the Annual Review procedure. But he was anxious that the SG realise that in many instances his comments did not contain an assessment of the combat effectiveness of army and air force units because many of the criteria on which such an assessment must be based were not covered by the Annual Review Questionnaire. There criteria included questions of morale, training, overall organization of the forces and national mobilization procedures. Therefore, in consultation with his MSCs, SACEUR had reviewed the combat effectiveness of ACE army and air forces as a whole, in order that a uniform basis of such assessment could be applied equally to all nations.

General Gruenther's purpose had been to get a better picture of just what he had; such a picture could not be obtained from statistical data submitted by the countries. He wanted to know just how battle-worthy his assigned or earmarked units would be on mobilization day or later. His instructions to his staff had emphasized that the evaluation which he wanted should be based on strictly military factors.

The principal factors which had been used in measuring the combat readiness of ground units had been manning levels, equipment levels, regular content, strength of officer/NCO cadres, mobilization factors, and the amount, type and frequency of training carried out. Other factors affecting the evaluation included personnel assessments of the MSCs and such specifics of morale and leadership as could be firmly established.

The basic training criteria which a ground force unit had to meet before being considered battle-worthy required that the unit have: trained leaders at all levels; a fully trained command and staff; trained soldiers; competence in handling weapons and combined arms training.

General Gruenther appended to his report a complete analysis of the combat readiness of each nation's ground force contributions, including readiness of reserves as well as readiness of units immediately available. "In general," he said, "I accept the "M" phasings given by each country to their major units as an indication of the national build-up plans, and the date by which the units will be available for movement from their place of mobilization or training. I consider, however, that certain units will not be fully battle-effective by their availability dates." Specific units were identified as deficient.

"I believe," SACEUR stated, "that the attention of all countries should be drawn to the training weaknesses in many of the after M-day units and the grave dangers
involved in committing troops to battle against a first class enemy, before they are fully trained and ready." (1)

Reductions in Strength.

During 1953 and 1954 several nations took actions which reduced the strength and effectiveness of forces assigned to or earmarked for SACEUR. Other actions also threatened to reduce the combat strength that ACE might rely on in the following years.

French Units sent to Indo-China and North Africa. In late 1953, the French Government had found it necessary to withdraw forces in Central Europe for use in Indo-China. The situation in Indo-China continued to be serious in early 1954, and the transfer of units from France to Vietnam continued. The French Minister of Defence, Rene Pleven, was concerned about this weakening of SACEUR's forces, but in considering all factors decided to protect French interests in Indo-China. On 5 June 1954, he called on General Gruenther and showed him a draft of a plan for reinforcing French forces in the Far East. He informed SACEUR that he personally felt that the effects of this plan would be rather bad on NATO.

The French plan called for the creation of three new divisions, using men from existing units in Europe. The first of these new divisions, the 11th, was to be formed at once and was to be ready to depart from France as early as 15 July 1954. Plans for the other two were still being developed. (2)

The Chief of Staff, US Army, had heard of the French plans and asked General Gruenther to tell him what effects this plan would have on NATO and on the French strength in the Centre. (3)

General Gruenther responded that the implications of these French plans could not be determined until more information was available. All the information had been passed to the Standing Group. SACEUR believed the French intended to take cadres and recruits from nine existing divisions. There was no question but that the state of readiness of French forces in ACE would be reduced significantly. Nevertheless, he was convinced that "in the light of the very difficult situation which faces the French Union today, this bold action on the part of the French Government fully deserves our support." (4)

(2) Memo for Record, Meeting between SACEUR & Minister Pleven, 5 Jun 54.
(3) Msg, DA-962540, Exclusive Ridgway for Gruenther, 5 Jun 54.
(4) Msg, SACEUR to DA, 5 Jun 54.
The troubles in North Africa also caused the French Government to withdraw additional units. On 30 June, SACEUR received a letter from the French MOD informing him of new transfers. "I have the honour of informing you," General Koenig stated, "that this decision involves the dispatch to Tunisia of three battalions of the 25th Infantry Division which are part of the forces assigned to you. This measure, which provides a new station for these units will in no way modify the principle of their assignment to SACEUR; and I assure you that every disposition will be taken to reduce to a minimum the possible effects of this move...."

At the same time, General Koenig told General Gruenther that the 11th Infantry Division would be moved to Indo-China if the French Parliament approved. He asked for General Gruenther's advance agreement to this move. (1)

General Gruenther thanked General Koenig for the information and offered no objection to the movement of the 11th Division to Indo-China. "In connection with the movement of the three battalions of the 25th Infantry Division to Tunisia," he said, "I am happy to receive your assurances that you will take the necessary steps to reduce to a minimum the adverse effects of this move on the mobilization of this Division."

In passing this information on to the Standing Group, General Gruenther noted that he considered the French MOD's memorandum as a notification of a decision on the part of the French Government. "I am studying the implications of this action," he said, "and will advise you of these as soon as practicable. For your information the 25th Division is earmarked for use by SACEUR at M plus 3." (2)

After SHAPE had had time to study the effects of the removal of three battalions from the 25th Division, General Gruenther reported to the Standing Group that this unit already was at 45% strength. If three battalions were sent to Tunisia the division would be left with two infantry regiments composed of two weak battalions and one airborne regiment. While the French had told General Gruenther that, in case of an emergency they would fly the three battalions from Tunisia to France, this did not appear practicable. "In my opinion," he told the Standing Group, "the 25th Infantry Division ceases to be an effective M+3 division on departure of three battalions to Tunisia. There is no plan to rebuild the division up to war strength and I doubt whether it could now reach proper battle status.

(1) Ltr, 4031 EMFA/12-G. 53 487 EMFA SS, General Koenig to Gen Gruenther, 30 Jun 54.
(2) Msg, SHAPE 35241, SACEUR to SG, 30 Jun 54.
Less than two weeks later, on 13 July 1954, SACEUR was notified that the second of the newly formed divisions, the 14th, was being sent to North Africa at once to complete its training because "certain incidents have taken place in Tunisia." This division had been formed from men and material of the 4th, 19th and 29th Infantry Divisions, all of which were either earmarked or assigned to SACEUR. SACEUR's approval was requested. By August, the effects of the French action in forming the 11th and 14th divisions from existing units and sending them to North Africa had become apparent. General Gruenther reported these as significant, as they directly affected his ability to defend in Central Europe. The 11th Light Infantry Division had been formed from the 2nd, 15th and 27th Infantry Divisions, with each of these units furnishing men and equipment. The 2nd Division was supposed to be an M-Day unit with the 15th and 27th Infantry Divisions being earmarked for M+15.

But by taking strength away from these units the three divisions had been considerably weakened. "The 2nd Division," General Gruenther reported, "would in emergency mobilize on a six battalion basis and on a divisional artillery basis only half its war establishment. Its effectiveness as an M-Day division is practically zero. It is doubtful whether it could be battle-worthy even on the reduced scale under M+15." Similarly, the 15th and 27th Divisions would become M+30 units and then only with six infantry battalions.

The other new division, the 14th, had been formed by "cannibalizing" four of the existing divisions, the 4th (M-Day), the 8th (M+3), and the 19th and 29th (M+30). In this case three of the four divisions were crippled, the 4th being reduced to a single regimental combat team which could not even be considered battle-worthy before M+30, the 8th not being affected too severely since it lost only one infantry and one artillery battalion, but with the 19th and 29th Divisions being so reduced that they could not be brought to fighting shape before M+60.

"To summarize," General Gruenther said, "the most serious effects of these moves is a serious loss at the most critical time of two divisions in Europe at M-Day. Most of the equipment for the 11th and 14th Divisions was drawn from the units which furnished the personnel or from reserve stocks. Until this equipment is replaced, the furnishing units cannot regain their original states, even if personnel losses are made good. At the moment we have no definite information as to the future status of equipment." (2)

(1) Msg, SACEUR to SG, 2 Jul 54.
(2) Msg, SACEUR to SG, 13 Aug 54.
This situation did not improve and throughout the remainder of the summer and autumn of 1954 the French Government sent units from France to Tunisia. In each case SACEUR answered French requests in the affirmative and passed on the information to the Standing Group. By November, 23 Infantry battalions, 7 artillery groups, 3 transport groups, plus additional supporting troops, had been removed from France to North Africa and ten additional battalions of infantry were under orders to go there. Although SACEUR's agreement had been requested and obtained on most of these units, in four cases units had been moved to North Africa without SACEUR's concurrence. (1)

In each case in the past SACEUR had forwarded French requests to the Standing Group asking that they authorize him to agree to these moves. (2) But by November 1954 the removal of French units from ACE had reached such proportions that the Standing Group finally expressed to the French MOD, "its increasing anxiety at the gradual weakening of the forces in Central Europe. In order to enable the Standing Group to make an estimate of the situation, it requests to be informed on the number and quality of the units already transferred or to be moved in North Africa, together with an indication of intentions to reconstitute these elements in Europe." (3)

Before communicating directly with the French MOD in this fashion, the SG had called General Schuyler to determine if SACEUR had any objection to their so doing. They felt that possibly SACEUR might not wish them to communicate directly with the MOD and that, conversely, the French MOD might not wish to be addressed by the SG directly. General Schuyler, on behalf of General Gruenther, stated that SACEUR had no objection. (4)

To get a better understanding of the effects that the French withdrawals were having on his defence in Central Europe, General Gruenther, on 18 November 1954, asked Marshal Juin to give him a report from the viewpoint of the field commander. This report was delivered to SHAPE on 20 November. (5)

CINCENT told General Gruenther that the temporary transfers of French forces seriously affected his command. "I also feel that taking into account the vital interests of France as well as the security of NATO bases, it is impossible to refuse to grant the transfer to North Africa of the forces

(1) Chart, Enc. to Ltr, MOD France, 4673 EMFA-12.G551, 18 Nov 54.  
(2) SHAPE/SEC/116/54, 10 Nov 54.  
(3) Msg, SG to MOD France, 17 Nov 54, passed by SHAPE in SHAPE/675/54, 18 Nov 54.  
(4) Memo, Gen Schuyler to Gen. Gruenther, 17 Nov 54.  
(5) Msg, SHAPE 37276, SACEUR to CINCENT, 18 Nov 54.
requested by the French Government with their assigned equipment in order to immediately cope with the present situation." He felt that the revolt was being instigated from abroad and threatened "France and her strategic strongholds on the Southern Mediterranean shores which are of vital importance to NATO."

"However," he continued, "those temporary transfers, coupled with the planned reduction of the Belgian Corps... do not appear to me as justifying an alteration to my strategic concept of the emergency defence plan." The Marshal felt that the increased use of nuclear weapons would more than offset the deferred availability of French forces and that he could carry out the NAG's concept "of the delaying combat East of the Rhine and fighting the Rhine-IJssel battle as planned...." (1)

He recommended immediate steps to restore the 2nd and 4th Divisions to their M-Day status and plans for a special mobilization to bring the other divisions back to their post-M-Day status.

The movements out of France continued, and on 22 November, SACEUR was informed of the French decision to move a number of infantry battalions immediately. At this time, the French MOD informed General Schuyler that his government now considered the uprisings in North Africa to be much more serious than at first supposed. The uprisings had been planned over a long period of time and were carefully supported with arms and leaders. Of 12 battalions on their way back from Indo-China, most would be used in Algeria and Morocco. (2)

On 16 December 1954, in answer to the Standing Group's request to be informed of the number and status of units transferred from France to North Africa, the French Minister of National Defence submitted a detailed accounting. Thirty three infantry battalions had been removed from AFCENT.

The French Minister indicated that the re-building of major NATO units in Europe would have to wait the return of units from North Africa. They could be returned if the situation improved, but it was more than likely that the problem would be solved when the units being withdrawn from Indo-China became available. However, accounts would have to be taken of the time required to recondition the units returning from Indo-China. (3)

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(1) Msg. CE 73450, CINCENT to SACEUR, 20 Nov 54.
(2) Ltr, 4690 EMFA 12-G.551, MOD France to SACEUR, 22 Nov 54, Memo Gen. Schuyler to Gen Gruenther, 23 Nov 54.
(3) Ltr, 4837 EMFA/12-B.5322, 948/EMFA/SS, MOD Paris to SACEUR, 16 Dec 54.
French Reorganisation Plans. Closely related to and concurrent with these withdrawals were actions being taken by the French government to reorganise its forces. General Guillaume, Chief of the French Armed Forces had told General Schuyler during a visit to SHAPE in early October that he was preparing plans to reconstitute the French Army along more suitable lines and to revamp the reserve system. On 17 November 1954 the details of this plan were presented to SACEUR.

The French officials stated that they had conducted a survey because of the new requirements arising from the use of atomic weapons. They also admitted that the heavy drain on French resources caused by Indo-China and North Africa had made a re-examination necessary. Although all the details of the program were not yet ready for presentation, General Guillaume pointed out that it was now possible "to discuss our intentions with your headquarters, in order that our plans be adapted as well as possible to the requirements arising from your operational responsibilities."

The military system under study involved several innovations. First, all basic training would be carried out in training centres, and each major battle unit thus would contain only men with over four months service. The M-Day divisions would be kept at 100% strength and the M-plus-5 divisions at 75% personnel and 100% equipment strength.

The reorganisation of units being considered provided for some rather radical departures. A motorized division of about 11,000 men would replace the infantry division. It would have four maneuver elements instead of the present three. The armoured division would be "lightened to make it more flexible and give it greater speed in engagement." It would have about 11,000 men and 200 armoured vehicles. A light mechanized division of unspecified size and a special combat team for security missions also were being considered.

General Guillaume pointed out that, in order to carry his plans to their fruition, full-scale experiments would have to be made. These experiments, he claimed, would permit worthwhile comparisons to be made at the Allied level and would mark the beginning of French development of a system to meet the assumptions of the Capabilities Plan. In order to do this he had decided to transform the much-weakened 4th Division in Germany into one of the new type motorized divisions; "create a light mechanized division in Germany using elements that already exist or that result from the above transformation"; and change the other affected division, the 2nd, stationed at Nancy, to the new "motorized" footing. He asked General Gruenther to agree to these major changes, stating that he attached the highest importance to it and that it would serve as the basis for determining the future French
contribution "to the defence of the theatre for which you are responsible." (1)

One of General Gruenther's first actions on receiving this news was to forward the plan to the SG for their consideration.

DSACEUR did not feel that SHAPE should raise objections, except in principle, to the proposed sweeping changes in the composition of the shield forces. He felt that the French Army was in trouble as a result of the crises in North Africa and Indo-China and that it should be allowed to reorganise on a sound and practical basis. He felt that the greatest threat to NATO in 1955 lay in the cold war in North Africa, and that it would be a fatal mistake to make the French put their major effort in to rebuilding the "shield" in 1955. But he felt also that a time limit must be imposed and the French be asked to rebuild their forces in Germany not later than late summer, 1957.

Montgomery held that the actual organisation of the French Army was a national matter and that no two NATO countries would look at the problem in quite the same way. SHAPE should not become involved in detail. Personally, the Field Marshal thought that the French proposals were a mistake because the new smaller units would not be capable of sustained action in battle. (2)

After considerable study of the implications of the French decisions, SACEUR replied on 22 December 1954. He told General Guillaume that he approved of some of his plans, namely, the training centres and the constitution of existing units at 100% strength. Again, in principle, he agreed that experimentation was necessary to any reorganisation. But that was about as far as he could go in his full agreement.

"Although I am therefore in sympathy with your proposal," General Gruenther told the French official, "I would have preferred your experiments to be carried out by divisions stationed behind, and not within, the 'Shield' as these forces are already dangerously weak. If it is impracticable, then in order to assist you in solving your reorganisational problems, I must accept your arguments for using the 2nd and 4th Infantry Divisions for this purpose."

General Gruenther pointed out that he would be failing in his duty to NATO if he did not underscore the risks inherent in the French proposals. The replacement of two M-Day divisions of a thoroughly battle-tested type by three smaller and more lightly equipped, entirely experimental

(1) Ltr, 1271/EMFA/EG/2, MOD France to SACEUR, 17 Nov 54.
(2) Memo to COFS, forwarding notes entitled, "Points Made by DSACEUR on the French Problem," 9 Dec 54.
units amounting to a personnel reduction of some 7,000 men was a dangerous move. "I realise," he noted, "that personnel strength by itself if not an adequate criterion by which to judge the combat effectiveness of a unit. Nevertheless, when the reduction in personnel translates itself into a reduction in the actual number of battalions available to hold a given sector of our shield, it must give rise to some concern on the part of the responsible commander".

SACEUR then asked the French to ensure that their Army in Europe was re-established on a sound and effective basis by the Autumn of 1956 and that, by then, the effective fighting power of the M-Day and M-plus-15 divisions should not be less than it had been at the beginning of 1954.

In conclusion, General Gruenther stated that he realised that France needed time to establish a firm base in North Africa and to reorganise her army. "I concur," he said, "in your short term plan to use the 2nd and 4th Infantry Divisions for experimental purposes in 1955, but I must warn that it involves a risk.... I agree with the urgent need for full scale experiments and I favour the pooling of ideas within NATO. I look upon 1955 as the main experimental year, the reorganisation to be carried out progressively in 1956 and completed by 1957." (1)

SACEUR's Combat Effectiveness Report 1954. As noted earlier General Gruenther had informed the Standing Group in February of his assessment of the combat effectiveness of ACE at the end of the 1954 training year. Based on reports from his Commanders in Chief and on staff studies at SHAPE, he had presented the SG with his personnel evaluation of Allied combat efficiency "on the assumption that we are required to oppose a first-class enemy". Certain that all Governments that had entrusted forces to his command would wish him to report with the utmost frankness upon their effectiveness, General Gruenther noted, that it was with this thought in mind that he had submitted his report.

Where land forces were concerned, and, particularly, M-Day forces, he saw an overall improvement in the battle efficiency of certain units. The standard of training

(1) Ltr., General Gruenther to General Guillaume, 22 Dec 54.
in most units was higher than ever before. In spite of this, the percentage of M-Day units fully combat worthy in the front line was down by 30% from the number of battle ready units which had been available at the end of 1953.

SACEUR cited two reasons for this decrease - the reorganisation in progress in the land forces of Greece and Italy, and the reduction in combat effectiveness of French units on the Continent because of the situation in Indo-China and North Africa. It was not yet clear when that effectiveness would be restored as long as the North African problem remained unsettled.

General Gruenther pointed out that it was not for him to say whether the remedy for these deficiencies was within the practical power of the various NATO nations. "It is my duty, however, to expose the dangerous weakness of our war machine as it stands at this moment," he said. "Parts of the machine are most efficient, but much of it is not. As a whole, it is not in a position at this moment to resist successfully an all-out aggression."

SACEUR stated his intention to send a copy of the statements he was making to the Standing Group to each MOD and to meet with representatives of each country in 1955, to consider ways and means of remedying the weaknesses in unit battle efficiency. He said that he would make clear that if a high degree of effectiveness were not reached, his Command would be unable to implement a Forward Strategy. (1)

Discussion with French Authorities in 1955.

It was in fulfillment of SACEUR's stated intentions that he already had notified General Guillaume, on 7 January 1955 that he was most desirous of holding a meeting at SHAPE, which would be attended by representatives of the land forces of the US, the UK, and France, as soon as possible to discuss "certain basic principles that should be agreed upon at an early date to guide our future experiments and planning." (2)

On 10 January 1955, and in conjunction with a letter proposing similar exchanges of information that CINCENT had sent SACEUR on 13 November 1954 (3), SACEUR informed CINCENT that he had obtained agreement from the land force authorities of the US, UK and France to convene a preliminary conference at SHAPE on 21 January. SACEUR hoped for a frank exchange of information on the ideas that each nation was formulating and on the experiments they were conducting or planning to conduct.

(1) SHAPE Ltr. 66/55 AG 1101 OT, Combat Effectiveness Report 1954, 23 Feb 55.
(2) Personal Ltr, Gen. Gruenther to Gen. Guillaume, 7 Jan 55.
(3) SHAPE Ltr. AG 0931 CS, Future Organisation of Land Forces, 10 Jan 55.
Divisional Organisation Conference.

Under the chairmanship of General Schuyler, SHAPE Chief of Staff, discussions by delegates of the UK, France and the US were held at SHAPE on 21-22 January 1955. An exhaustive exchange, as SACEUR had proposed, ensued. Because of the importance SHAPE attached to the discussions, they were electrically recorded. To make the record usefully available to all interested parties -- albeit, on a "need to know basis", General Schuyler arranged for transcripts of the verbatim record to be sent to all participants and to the MSCs. (1)

French Concept. Essentially, the French approach was that existing divisional organisations were unsuitable for atomic war. The best way to determine future organisational requirements was to break away completely from existing organisations and to produce smaller more mobile units of greater combat value, capable of penetrating and mixing with the enemy, thereby avoiding the enemy's atomic reaction.

The French therefore sought smaller and more powerful cross-country mobile units, which were not dependent upon a fixed logistical system. They had originally developed three different divisions.

a. A motorised infantry division containing manpower numbering 11,093.

b. A light mechanised division numbering 7,268.

c. An armoured division numbering 10,700.

Since development of such units, France had made certain changes in manpower and firepower in the units. The motorised infantry division was changed to a mechanised infantry division with 14,500 instead of 11,093 members. Fire power was increased by the addition of one battalion of 105mm howitzer and two combat command headquarters were added.

The light mechanised division was raised to a strength of 9,300. The strength of the armoured division was increased to 13,890, which was comparable to the earlier division in size.

Because of a lack of equipment, post M-Day infantry divisions were to be organised on the same pattern as mechanised infantry divisions, but with less combat vehicles. Those divisions would have 13,000 men.

(1) SHAPE 2030 Verbatim Record of Discussions by Delegates of the UK, France and US, held at SHAPE 21-22 Jan 55, Subj: Organisation of Ground Units, (corrected version, Jan 55).
SHAPE's Views. From SACEUR's point of view, the acceptability of such units depended, of course, on their suitability for atomic war and their fighting strength compared to existing divisions. No important modifications were noted in armoured divisions, and there seemed to be little need for further change.

As for the mechanised infantry division, the smallest basic combat team of that unit would be a mechanised infantry regiment, which, essentially, was a heavy battalion and some support units. SHAPE felt that this regiment would be a profitable atomic target. Its manpower, approximating 1500 -- was so great that the loss of one or two of such units would jeopardise the effectiveness of the division.

SHAPE authorities considered it desirable to diminish the manpower of these "regiments" by forming seven smaller battalion-sized units, rather than retaining the planned five larger units. Seven battalions of about 1000 men could be formed from five larger units without increasing in divisional strength.

With regard to the light mechanised division, SHAPE considered that this could not be compared to any existing division. Because of its limited size such a unit could be considered as a powerful combat support unit rather than as a division.

Finally, the planned post-M-Day infantry division were considered inadequate for atomic war because of their restricted mobility. SHAPE considered it particularly important that the First-Echelon reserve divisions be equipped as completely as M-Day forces. (1)

On 11 March 1955 a summary record of the January 21-22 meeting was dispatched to the French, UK and US representatives who had been present at the discussions. (2) By 19 April 1955, General Schuyler informed the French that agreement had been received from the principals to the conference for the publication, on a restricted basis,

(1) Briefing Paper for SACEUR, 2/48/6, Organisation of the New French Division w/Annex.
(2) SHAPE/264/55 AG 2208 SEC, SACEUR's Periodic Report to the SG, No.44, Jan-Mar 55, 23 May 55.
of a summary of the meeting which was sent to MSCs and the National Army Chiefs of Staff. In forwarding the summary, General Schuyler indicated that he would stress the exploratory nature of the document and the fact that it represented only French, UK and US thinking as of January 1955.

General Schuyler said that he understood that French authorities would not be able to reach any firm conclusions until early 1956. However, he noted that it would help SHAPE very much if the French would provide SHAPE their program of experiments for 1955 and if permission could be obtained for one or two SHAPE officers to attend the more important French exercises as observers. The Chief of Staff assured the French that the aim in sending observers would be "to keep abreast of your thinking and their reports would not be allowed out of SHAPE". (1)

Guidance for French Forces.

On 22 April 1955, General Schuyler sent the first of a series of guidance documents to the French Minister of Defence. The first of the series was based upon the Capabilities Study in 1957 and concerned Naval Forces. SACEUR's guidance for French Forces was necessarily of an interim nature because "programs readjustments" arising from the Capabilities Study were still dependent upon further studies of the war situation after D+30.

(1) Personal Ltr. AG 1101 OT, Gen. Schuyler to MG Ghislain, Dep COFS, Fr A, 19 Apr 55. The American Forces Network in Europe, shortly before in a news broadcast at 2230 hours, on 29 March 1955 had announced the misgivings the United States State Department had expressed to the French Government over the transfer during the preceding two years of two combat divisions of NATO forces in Europe to French North Africa. The transfer, the broadcast said, had left the French contribution to NATO forces in Europe at 10 divisions. Four more divisions earmarked for NATO were in North Africa. The French, the AFN noted, say they will send troops back to Europe as soon as possible, but "right now their presence in North Africa is necessary to insure stability under the NATO agreement". The US State Department was cited as saying that America had gone along with the French when they insisted on the transfer, but that the US had expressed certain misgivings on the action. AFN Statement 29 Mar 55 (2230 hrs), PID, SHAPE, 1 Apr 55.
Naval Forces. Briefly, the Chief of Staff stated that French Naval Forces within ACE should aim towards the development of plans for dispersion of ships and naval logistic installations during the initial phases of hostilities so as to enable naval forces to survive atomic attack; the provision of submarines to contribute to the Allied campaign in the Black Sea for the defence of the Turkish Straits; and the development of naval forces, including maritime/patrol aircraft to contribute to the defence of sea communications in the Mediterranean.

These were followed by the requirement for provision of a mine-watching organisation together with suitable mine clearance forces for Mediterranean ports and coastal shipping routes; and, finally, the provision of adequate stocks of naval equipment and supplies so as to meet naval standards of readiness.

SHAPE also wanted France's naval effort to be concentrated upon meeting force goals established in CM(54)100 and to correcting the weaknesses disclosed in SACEUR's Effectiveness Report.

Finally, General Schuyler suggested measures which stemmed from the Capabilities Study but which involved no expense in peacetime: e.g., arrangements so that minesweepers under national control could be re-deployed outside national waters if the threat grew elsewhere; planning for coordination for repair and maintenance of naval vessels within the Southern area; and investigation of the possibility of providing personnel and equipment for rescue and salvage tasks. (1)

Air Forces. Similar interim Air Force guidance was sent to the French on 30 April 1955. The Chief of Staff noted that during the 1954 AR France had announced a new air force programme that would increase the combat effectiveness of the French Air Force. France's planned activation of all-weather (AWX) squadrons and a tactical reconnaissance (TR) squadron were particularly welcomed in view of the limited capabilities of the air forces available to SACEUR in these roles.

Although the French Air Force had shown improvement since the 1954 AR guidance had been issued, much remained to be accomplished in order to achieve a fully combat effective air force. Therefore, General Schuyler noted that it was necessary to stress generally the same points that had previously been covered in the 1954 AR.

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 0940 OT, SHAPE Planning Guidance for Naval Forces, 22 Apr 55.
Many weaknesses could be corrected by a properly directed effort and should not require any substantial financial increase. In 1955, France should continue action to accelerate the provision of trained personnel and effective equipment in order to provide continuous manning and operation of the Control and Reporting Systems. The capability of the French air force to survive atomic attack had to be improved. As early as possible, the D-Day standard of combat effectiveness of tactical units had to be achieved by:

a. implementing the new French Air Force programme as outlined in the French reply to the 1954 AR.

b. Taking measures to remedy the shortages of parts and equipment.

c. Attaining a goal of 70% of assigned aircraft in commission and combat ready.

d. Increasing the number of flying training hours flown by aircrew to 240 hours per year. (1)

Land Forces. On 5 May 1955 the Chief of Staff informed the French that SHAPE had received and studied the comments of the MSCs on the Capabilities Study and as a result, SHAPE had "arrived at the overall composition of the French Land Forces which best fits the needs of SACEUR and which appears to be attainable by France." SHAPE hoped that "the overall composition" would be achieved by 1 January 1957.

Essentially, SHAPE had concluded that French Land Forces had to have the efficiency and strength on M-Day to meet a major attack in Central Europe. French Land forces had to have sufficient post M-Day forces to enable the fully mobilised army to fight, a sustained battle. In terms of the, then current standard type division, the French "minimum manpower contribution" on the Continent for 1957 was:

**M-Day Forces**

1 Army Headquarters
2 Corps Headquarters
3 Infantry Divisions
2 Armoured Divisions
Balanced Combat and Service Support Units

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(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 0950 OT, SHAPE Guidance for the French Air Force, 30 Apr 55.
Post M-Day Forces

1 Army Headquarters (for Strategic Reserve)  
3 Corps Headquarters  
6 Infantry Divisions  
1 Armoured Division  
Balanced Combat and Service Support Units

Post M-Day Forces in North Africa

2 Infantry Divisions

Two "circumstances", SHAPE noted, had had profound effects on the readiness of French forces in Europe. First, the withdrawal of units, personnel and equipment from forces assigned or earmarked to SACEUR for use in North Africa. Second, the requirement for investigating changes in divisional organisation to meet the problems posed by the Capabilities Study.

Regardless of the ultimate composition of the divisions there were certain minimum characteristics required of land forces. The units indicated as "M-Day Forces" were measured by the manpower strength of the current standard division. The build-up of these M-Day elements was the first priority, and such forces had to be assigned in peacetime.

First Echelon post-M-Day elements of the Shield should consist of the following measured by the manpower strength of the current standard division:

3 Infantry Divisions maintained in peace at 65% war strength.  
1 Armoured Division maintained in peace at 70% war strength.

Elements held at First Echelon Readiness in North Africa -- consisting of 2 infantry divisions -- had to be of such a standard that when mobilised they could be immediately capable of entering battle against "a first class enemy without any further training".

Second Echelon post-M-Day forces should consist of three Infantry Divisions and balanced combat and service support units. These had to have a defensive capability on mobilisation.

SACEUR concurred in the French plan to use certain M-Day units for experiments in the proper organisation of future divisions, but warned of the risk involved.
SHAPE also considered that a decision on the future status of the main units was premature at that time, and advised that no reorganisation, other than for the experiments themselves, should be undertaken until the results of the experiments were known.

SHAPE considered that the repatriation of cadre and troops from Indo-China and the new system of training centres providing trained national service men to M-Day units would permit substantial improvement of M-Day and First Echelon units.

Finally, the essential basic needs in the readjustment of French Land Forces were the reorganisation of active forces in order to have efficient major and combat support units available on M-Day, and to be able to fight without any mobilisation procedure; improvements in the standard of training of First Echelon Forces; and, finally, the restoration and maintenance of equipment levels of the M-Day and First Echelon Post M-Day Units to 100% of current Tables of Organisation and Equipment. (1)

Additional Withdrawals of French Forces, May 1955

On 23 May 1955, General Guillaume notified SACEUR that because of the development of the situation in North Africa, the French Government had "been led to contemplate sending very shortly new reinforcements for the maintenance of order in this area". The planned reinforcements affected the following units: 2 battalions of the 15th Infantry Division; 1 battalion of the 25th Airborne Division; and 1 battalion of the 29th Infantry Division. As these units belonged to divisions earmarked for assignment to SACEUR, General Guillaume requested SACEUR's agreement. (2)

General Gruenther reported these proposals to the Standing Group the next day, and added that Lt. General Vernoux, Deputy Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces Staff, who had delivered the letter, had noted that the

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(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 0931, SHAPE Planning Guidance for Land Forces, 5 May 55.
(2) MOD France Ltr. No. 3308 E.M.F.A./12-B5Y22, 23 May 55.

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situation in Algeria was deteriorating alarmingly. General Vernoux had reported that crops were being destroyed, telephone wires cut, bridges blown, houses burned, and general terror was being spread among the inhabitants. The French government had decided that additional French troops were urgently needed not only to augment the forces already in Algeria to combat the terrorists, but also "to demonstrate in the villages and cities in order to convince the population that the government is actively dealing with the situation."

General Vernoux had also informed SACEUR that the MOD's letter actually, covered only one increment of units which the French Government would probably consider it necessary to dispatch. Decision was expected shortly thereafter on the additional units to be selected to complete the transfer.

Consideration had been given to utilising troops that were being withdrawn from Indo-China. However, General Vernoux pointed out, the MOD had determined that these units would not be available soon enough to meet the critical situation in Algeria.

SACEUR noted to the Standing Group that the bulk of the 3 divisions concerned, the 15th, 25th and 29th had already been moved to North Africa. The projected redeployment of 4 additional battalions constituted a further serious weakening of AFCENT that could not be lightly regarded.

Of even greater concern was the indication that this redeployment constituted the first of a series of additional transfers, which, when and if effected, SACEUR stated, "could further seriously weaken the entire French ground force contribution to the defence of Central Europe."

Despite this, and in view of the French analysis of the situation in North Africa and the overall importance of this area, SACEUR considered that he had no alternative but to agree to the redeployment of the 4 battalions in question. (1)

On 28 May, SACEUR responded to General Guillaume and said that he was authorised by the Standing Group to take "strong objection to the weakening of French Forces in this most critical area of my command, and that I can only take note of these proposed redeployments with great concern." (2)

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(1) SHAPE Msg. SH 20717 SCO OUT 20717, SHAPTO 945, 24 May 55, SHAPE Msg. SH 20764, 26 May 55.
(2) Ltr. AG 1150 OT, Gen. Gruenther to MOD, France, Movement of French Forces to Algeria, 28 May 55.
Thus, the situation foreseen in the 1955 Annual Review guidance had now been worsened by the movement of French assigned and earmarked forces to North Africa. On 6 June 1955, SACEUR again summarised the effect of this in a message to the Standing Group. (1)

On 13 July 1955, SACEUR reported to the SG that as the Netherlands had stated its inability to form a second M-Day division; the Belgians could not provide one first echelon division; and the French probably would be unable to provide their fifth first echelon division, serious deficiencies had arisen in AFCENT where these shortcomings resulted in a weakening of the Northern Army Group.

The deficiencies were related solely to the forces estimated as available to support the Capabilities Plan, 1957, he pointed out. But studies proceeding in AFCENT indicated the need for further army divisions and units to man the frontier screen and cover the gaps between the strongly defended areas. (2)

Additional Withdrawals, July–November. On 25 July 1955 the French MOD announced another withdrawal of a battalion from the already weakened 8th Division. On 28 July SACEUR wrote to MOD France noting the cumulative serious effect of continuing withdrawals. He reaffirmed his prior appraisal of the military situation in the Central Sector and said:

As I see it, until such time as the French Government reconstitutes its ground force strength in Central Europe, or adequate replacement forces are made available from some other source, my ability to hold the line of the Rhine in the Southern portion of my Central Command in the face of an all-out surprise attack, will remain seriously jeopardised. I fear that the piecemeal disintegration of both M-Day and Post-M-Day forces may to all intents and purposes, destroy the possibility of an effective mobilisation of the French Army in the event of an emergency. (3)

(1) SHAPE Msg. 20912, 6 Jun 55
(2) SHAPE Ltr. 325/55 AG 1105/7 PPO, Reports Required in 1955 on Future Capabilities Plans, 1957, 13 Jul 55.
(3) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1104 OT, Reconstitution of French Forces in Europe, 28 Jul 55.
General Pierre Koenig, from MOD France, responded to SACEUR's "apprehensions" noting that he was very concerned, himself, "about this situation, to which the Premier, to whom I submitted your letter, is also giving his attention." General Koenig promised to keep SACEUR informed regarding any measures that might be decided upon in an effort to bring the French Forces up to strength. (1)

Again on 6, 11 and 22 August, and 15 September, the French informed SACEUR of still further movements of forces to North Africa. In each case SACEUR responded as before. However on 23 September, General Schuyler informed the French that SACEUR had been pleased to learn that the French proposed to recall a "Standby Reserve". (2)

On 7 October 1955, the French MOD informed SACEUR that further redeployment of French forces to North Africa were contemplated and that there would be minor changes in plans to strengthen French forces in Europe. (3) SACEUR acknowledged this letter the following day, adding that he also noted the modifications in the plan to reinforce units stationed in Germany and the build-up of the Fifteenth Infantry Division. (4)

On 4 November, General Guillaume notified SACEUR of the French Government's decision to redeploy the 19th Infantry Division, reactivated and strengthened, to North Africa. This division was a reserve division, strengthened by the recall of reserve classes. Additional personnel had been drawn from AFCENT units in excess of 100% War Establishment. (5)

On 9 November, the Standing Group Liaison Officer, in Paris, informed the SG and SACEUR that the French redeployment had been noted by the NAC, but that no query had been raised concerning resulting effectiveness. (6)

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(1) MOD France Ltr. No. 1173 DN/CAB/EMP/S, P. Koenig to SACEUR, 2 Aug 55.
(3) MOD France Ltr. 4799/EMFA/12-B.5322, 7 Oct 55.
(4) SHAPE Ltr. AG 0905.4 OT, Movement of French Forces to North Africa, 8 Oct 55.
(5) SHAPE Msg. SHAPTO 1063, 5 Nov 55.
(6) SG Msg. STAND 1333, 9 Nov 55; SGLO Msg. LOSTAN 1474, 9 Nov 55.
On 19 November 1955, an announcement in the press stated that the French government intended to release 57,000 men from military service. Inquiries at staff level to the French MOD produced the reply that the release of these men would not affect the French forces assigned to SACEUR. (1)

**French Forces and the Annual Review 1955**

In the meantime, at the Examining Session on French Forces by the Annual Review Committee, on 24 October 1955, the French Representative opened the meeting with a general statement assuring the AR group that France fully understood the seriousness of the withdrawals of forces and emphasised the fact that the whole situation was still fluid. He pointed out, however, that France was making an increased global defence effort. She had 160,000 more men under arms and her efforts in North Africa were in direct support of the Atlantic Alliance. It was against this background that the reduction of forces in Europe had to be considered. (2)

In giving a full statement of the status of earmarked French units, the French Representative stated that he had given a written answer to the Secretary General, which could be made available to delegations and to SACEUR. As to measures taken to restore the M-Day units, he pointed out that so far as possible, M-Day units had been left intact. Deficiencies had been made up by calling up 70,000 reservists and by retaining contingents otherwise due for release.

In response to a question regarding plans that had been made for the movement of assigned units from North Africa to the continent if war should break out, the French representative indicated that this was a very difficult question, only capable of "resolution at the highest level". But it might be preferable, the French Representative noted, when judged at the time, to leave those units in North Africa. (3)

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(1) SHAPE 64/56 AG 2208 SEC, SACEUR's Periodic Report to the SG, No. 47, 23 Feb 56.
(2) Memo for Record, Wg Cdr Trotter, Annual Review Office, SHAPE, 24 Oct 55.
(3) It was at this meeting, in reply to a question from the Netherlands Delegation, that the French Ambassador disclosed that it had been decided not to attempt to modify two aircraft carriers for jet operations, but two carriers would be built by 1959.
In the period following the Examining Session the various Country Chapters were readied for publication by NATO political authorities. The Country Chapters were narrative texts incorporating the most important recommendations of NATO military authorities — which had been promulgated at an earlier stage in the Review process — and conclusions and recommendations that had been discussed in the AR Committee.

In a "general order of magnitude", the Country Chapter for France acknowledged that firm Army and Navy force goals for 1955 were being met. However, as a result of movements of troops to North Africa, it was obvious that ground forces available to SACEUR in Europe fell considerably short of the Army goals, particularly in M-day units. Plans for the Air Force and Navy would not be met by the end of 1956.

The Country Chapters acknowledged that French authorities had taken measures toward restoring the forces assigned to SACEUR in Europe. However, NATO military authorities emphasised primarily the need to:

a. Restore French Army units in Europe assigned to SACEUR to their full level of effectiveness, with priority given to M-day units in Germany.

b. Defer the implementation of the French Army plan for the reorganisation of major units assigned or earmarked for NATO until more conclusive results had been obtained within NATO on suitable divisional structure for atomic warfare.

c. Provide sufficient trained personnel and full equipment for continuous early warning and so that the AC&W system could be immediately operational in an emergency.

d. Remedy the shortage of maritime patrol aircraft in order to attain and maintain, from 1956 onwards, the 1956 force goals.

On 10 November 1955, in completing its review of the Country Chapter on France, the IS recognised that the disturbances in North Africa, had created serious military and financial problems. However, it was of the utmost importance to NATO that the French units in Europe be restored to their full effectiveness with priority to M-Day units in Germany. (1)

At the same time, the IS noted that additional defence expenditures could arise as a result of the situation in North Africa. France might have to increase her defence expenditures beyond the level planned for 1956.

(1) CM(55)101, Part II.
Nevertheless, NATO authorities were compelled to recommend that "the French Government in making adjustments to their forces should, to the greatest extent possible, follow the guidance and implement the recommendations of the NATO military authorities".

The main overall problem that emerged from the 1955 Annual Review was how to meet defence requirements without increasing defence budgets. Problems were not just confined to France. Conclusions drawn from the Review revealed that overall force goals on which MC 48 had been based would not be reached in 1956, either quantitatively or qualitatively in almost all cases. The German contribution would not be complete before 1959. The reorganisation of ACE forces in line with the concept of MC 48 would involve large additional costs. The countries needed special advice on the serious defence problems with which they were faced. (1)

Resolution on Important Changes in National Defence Efforts, 1955

The unprecedented withdrawals of forces from AFCENT had given rise to some anxiety regarding the nature of obligations that had been accepted by governments through the AR process and to existing procedures for authorising or redeploying assigned forces. While the procedures of the AR were the normal method adopted in the Alliance for multilateral consideration of the national contributions, the NAC recognised that provision had to be made for circumstances in which a member government felt compelled to make important changes in its force contributions.

On 5 October 1955, the NAC agreed that in such circumstances the government concerned would inform the Council and the appropriate NATO military authorities of changes contemplated, whenever possible, in time for the NAC's views to be fully considered by that government before the execution of decisions. If a government felt compelled to withdraw units in order to meet an emergency, it was to inform the appropriate NATO military authorities, and the Council, at the first possible opportunity. As soon as possible after notification, the NATO military authorities were to provide the NAC with an estimate of the military effects of the proposed alterations.

Thus, for the first time since the London and Paris Agreements of 1954 had provided for the Annual Review process to be the forum within which nations might make "reservations" regarding commitments, Allied political and military authorities formally established conditions and procedures for considering, at any time during the year, important

(1) Brief for SACEUR, Report on the 1955 AR, CM(55)101, 9 Dec 55. On 31 December 1955 the 11th and 14th Light Infantry Divisions, already in North Africa were withdrawn from earmarking to SACEUR and placed under national command.
Reductions and Reorganisation of French Forces, 1956

Reductions in French land forces in AFCENT continued through and beyond the first quarter of 1956. On 1 March, General Ely, Chief of Staff of the French Joint General Staff, informed SACEUR that developments in North Africa had made it necessary "to send to that area a number of additional units".

As of 1 March 1956, General Ely stated the movements already effected or scheduled were as follows:

a. Units already dispatched to North Africa

1 Battalion of the 3rd Colonial Infantry Regiment (8th Infantry Division).
67th Infantry Battalion (6th Armoured Division).
1 Battalion of the 6th "Cuirassiers" (6th Armoured Division).

b. Units scheduled to depart for North Africa on and after 1 March 1956.

(1) Stationed in Germany

19th Light Infantry Battalion (5th Armoured Division) and one Infantry Battalion to be formed from the 21st Colonial Infantry Regiment (7th Light Mechanised Division), ready to move with effect from 1 March.

30th Infantry Battalion (1st Armoured Division), ready to move with effect from 8 March.

3Bn of the 32d Artillery Regiment (3d Infantry Division) and one Battalion to be formed from the 3d "Cuirassiers" (1st Armoured Division), ready to move with effect from 15 March.

(2) Stationed in France.

One Battalion of the 1st Field Artillery Regiment (8th Infantry Division), one Battalion of Infantry of the 1st "Hussards" (25th Infantry Division) and one Battalion of the 3d Engineers (6th Armoured Division), ready to move with effect from 1 March. (2)

(1) CM(54)85(F); CM(54)118(F); SGM 259-55, 29 Apr 55; CM(55)82, 5 Oct 55.
On 16 and 17 March, France informed SACEUR that more units were scheduled for withdrawal. SACEUR acknowledged receipt of the notification -- with no further comments, and informed the Standing Group, accordingly. (1)

On 19 May 1956, General Vernoux, came to see General Schuyler, at the direction of General Ely. General Ely wanted to be sure that SACEUR had up-to-date information on the troops strength in North Africa. As of 1 May, France had 100,000 in Morocco, 42,000 in Tunisia and 215,000 in Algeria.

General Vernoux said that by 1 July 1956, 50,000 reservists authorised for recall a month earlier and 55,000 to 60,000 additional reservists recently authorised for recall would also be in Algeria. Forces in Algeria would number approximately 320,000 to 325,000 by 1 July. France planned to maintain this force for as long as the situation required. (2)

Preparation for the Annual Review 1956

In the meantime, SHAPE was readying the various MODs for visits by the Annual Review Visiting Teams for 1956. Although special Planning Guidance, as a step in the AR procedure, normally preceded the visits of the Teams, Guidance was not issued for 1956. France, once again, was invited to discuss in detail any questions regarding actions planned or taken; force goals and operational priorities; combat effectiveness; and to comment on specific topics that SHAPE proposed for discussion. (3)

On 23 May 1955, as preliminary studies of current force priorities were just beginning, France notified SACEUR of the pending movement of the 7th Moroccan Rifle Regiment (a part of the 3rd Algerian Infantry Division) to Algeria. Accordingly, SACEUR informed the SG, and said "In my opinion it would be highly appropriate for the Standing Group to take cognizance of this continually deteriorating situation and to press for appropriate action by the French Government." (4)

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(2) COFS Memo for Gen. Gruenther, 19 May 56.

(3) SHAPE Ltr. AG 2100 AR France, Annual Review Visiting Teams 1956, 12 Apr 56.

(4) SHAPE Msg. SH 20764, 26 May 55. MOD Fr Ltr. 4027/EMFA/12/ B 5322, 8 Jun 56. SHAPE Msg. SH 28483, 13 Jun 56.
On 7 August 1956, General Ely notified SACEUR that "in an effort to bring the 3rd Infantry Division - a Division assigned to your Command - up to strength, the 22nd Algerian Rifle Regiment (stationed at Verdun and Lunéville) will be assigned, upon mobilisation, to this major unit, replacing the 5th Infantry Regiment. The latter, then in North Africa, had ceased to be a part of the 3rd Infantry Division on 15 July 1956." (1)

On 8 August 1956, General Gruenther informed the SG that General Ely had notified him of the temporary withdrawal of the 7th Light Mechanised Division, a unit already in Algeria, and a certain portion of the air force of the 1st CATAC, "with a view to their possible use outside the NATO zone." (2)

Organisation and Reorganisation of French Forces in Germany.

On 29 February 1956, General Guillaume, on behalf of the Joint General Staff of France, wrote to General Gruenther and asked for SACEUR's opinion on a proposed reorganisation of French Land Forces prior to submitting the proposal to the French Government.

Essentially, General Guillaume noted that several factors had made it necessary for France to reorganise her land forces - "reluctantly diminishing" her contribution to AFCENT. The first factor was a "shift of the centre of gravity of France's military strength", which was tending to slide from Western Europe to North Africa in order to check the increasing threat to which all of Africa was exposed as a result of recent developments of the Cold War. "Every effort made by France to meet this threat is therefore of benefit to the NATO Alliance", General Guillaume observed.

A second factor was the financial problem arising from the maintenance of the French Forces in Germany. An additional factor was the necessity to implement changes required by recently decided organisational reforms in the Army - the adoption of a two-monthly draft and induction system with a correlative buildup of training centres.

General Guillaume forwarded a revised French Order of Battle for 1957 reflecting a "revision" of French Forces in Germany and a "regrouping" of the French Fifth Armoured Division in Southern Germany. France considered that the latter solution "would give the First Army Corps a

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(1) Fr MOD Ltr. 4386 EMFA/12.B 5322, Assignment of the 22nd Algerian Rifle Regiment to the 3rd Infantry Division, 7 Aug 56.
(2) SHAPE Mag. SH 40233, Possible Withdrawal of NATO Forces, 8 Aug 56; SHAPE Mag. SH 40243, 10 Aug 56; SH 40252 SHAPTO 1284, Possible Withdrawal of NATO Forces, 23 Aug 56.
homogeneous station area and would leave the Palatinate unoccupied, which could only be a source of satisfaction to the German authorities. Coming at a time of the buildup of the German forces, the "forces revision" of French forces "will undoubtedly lead to a reorganisation of the Central Europe plan of deployment", General Guillaume noted. But a decision should be made without delay, he suggested, since if the principle of regroupment was accepted, measures had to be taken immediately to provide the required barracks or cantonment facilities for the Fifth Armoured Division in Southern Germany. He also pointed out that the regroupment offered the advantage of fitting the Forward Strategy of ACE by placing the entire Fifth Armoured Division east of the Rhine. (1)

At SHAPE, AM Dawson, DCPO, took action to notify CINCENT of France's proposed unilateral actions, and asked for the latter's opinion, "which, in the event of an effective application, would noticeably modify the disposal of the forces under your Command". (2)

Marshal Juin responded on 23 March by saying that "It is not for me to question the reasons why France is reducing its M-Day Divisions to 5 and its Divisions stationed in Germany to 4". He could accept these figures as a basis for discussion, provided that the 5th M-Day Division which was stationed in France and the 2d Corps support units stayed under his command.

Marshal Juin noted the earlier unsatisfactory situation when the French Army had 5 divisions in Germany deployed in two groups of 3 and 2 divisions, with the groups nearly 200 kilometres apart. It would still be worse, he said, with 4 divisions equally split into two groups.

However, to provide for a possible commitment of the strategic reserves north of the Frankfurt-parallel, a French line of communication must be maintained in the direction of Koblenz, which justified keeping one French Division in the Trier region. "Add to this the fact that it would seem advisable to leave in the rear of the German Forces as much free ground as possible on German territory west of the Rhine, and one arrives at the French proposal to put one Division in the region of Trier and three divisions east of the Rhine south of the US VII Army", Juin noted.

"We must not overlook the possibility of enemy violation of Austrian neutrality", he said, "and I think that the presence of 3 French Divisions in Germany within the 1st French Army is a wise precaution in this respect."

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(2) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1104 Fr PPO, Reorganisation of French Forces in Germany, 7 Mar 56.
But, he pointed out, it would be difficult to settle this problem finally before a decision had been made on the Command organisation in AFCENT, which would deploy the M-Day forces on D-Day. (1)

On 27 March 1956, General Vernoux came to see General Schuyler on the matter of the reconstitution of French forces. The main theme of their discussion was that France was strained to the utmost in Algeria, that additional troops would have to be raised and sent there, and that it just was "not going to be possible in the near future for the French to reconstitute their M-Day divisions in Germany".

Of France's 720,000 ground forces, 430,000 were now out of Continental Europe (370,000 in North Africa, 60,000 in other dependencies). Of the troops on the Continent, 60,000 were in Germany (reduced from about 85,000) with the remaining 230,000 in France.

Other shortcomings existed, but the French did feel that the bits and pieces now left in Germany should be consolidated. They were developing a plan for this purpose, and General Vernoux asked agreement in principle to having the French government discuss this plan with CINCENT. General Schuyler replied that he was sure SHAPE would agree, but would like a letter on the subject -- which General Vernoux promised to send. (2)

On 25 April, the letter arrived and announced France's proposal to maintain their forces at a level of approximately 60,000 men. The French authorities outlined their specific disposition and asked for SACEUR's agreement in principle, and approval of the general concept. (3)

General Schuyler acknowledged receipt of that letter on 7 May, and informed the MOD, France that SHAPE was in consultation with CINCENT on the matter. (4)

On 4 June, SACEUR informed MOD France of his general agreement to the proposed reorganisation. On the basis of this decision, SACEUR hoped that the French "in conjunction with the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe, will arrange for the new stationing of the French Forces in such time phasing as will ensure the prior

(1) AFCENT Ltr. 1104/OPS/60, Reorganisation of French Forces in Germany, 23 Mar 56. See discussion of AFCENT Command Organisation in Chapter VII .
(2) COFS Memo for General Gruenther, 27 Mar 56.
(3) French MOD Ltr. 3789 EMFA/12.B.5322, Reorganisation of the French Forces in Germany, 25 Apr 56.
(4) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1104 PPO, Reorganisation of the French Forces in Germany, 7 May 56.
availability of adequate trained German Forces in the areas to be evacuated by French units." (1)

Major developments in the reorganisation, regroupment, consolidation, or withdrawal of French forces continued to be affected by consideration of command organisation in the Centre; developing international difficulties in the Middle East; limited growth in German forces and the ongoing Annual Review studies. Full resolution of the reorganisation problem, did not occur before Marshal Junin was succeeded on 1 October by General Jean Valluy, Fr A.

In the meantime, riots in East Germany, and the Suez and Hungarian crises (the latter occurring as General Gruenther's tenure drew to a close) had focussed renewed attention on Allied Command Europe, and directly affected the debate on the political guidance for NATO military authorities that would emerge at the end of 1956.

At the same time, and throughout the entire period of the French withdrawals and reorganisation proposals, other changes or reductions combined to hinder Allied plans for an effective forward defence strategy.

Reduction in Belgian Armed Forces.

Reductions in Conscript Service. Among the other ways in which the strength of the Allied "Shield" was affected during this time were the various reductions made by nations in the length of conscript service. This practice was not restricted to one nation, but Belgium's action serves to illustrate the tendency in this area.

In 1953 Belgium had reduced its conscript service from 24 to 21 months. In May 1954, General Gruenther was told that Belgium was taking steps to reduce the 21 month period to 18 months. Mr. Henri Spaak, Foreign Minister, and Mr. Spinoy, Defence Minister, called on SACEUR on 5 May 1954 to discuss this move with him. Field Marshal Montgomery and General Schuyler attended this meeting.

Mr. Spaak explained that the reduction in service time, was a political necessity which could no longer be postponed. To compensate, home defence units were being broken up and their men added to the regular Belgian divisions. Units would be maintained generally at present.

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(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1104 PPO, Reorganisation of the French Forces in Germany, 4 Jun 56.
(2) Ltr. General Gruenther to General Guillaume, 22 Dec 54.
strengths by shortening basic training. Reserve officer volunteers would be kept on active duty for two or three months after completion of their normal 18 months service.

The Belgian authorities assured SACEUR that they intended to meet their NATO commitments and would carry them out in spirit as well as in letter. By the end of 1955 two of the Belgians divisions assigned to SACEUR would be at 75% strength and the third at 66%.

The Defence Minister invited SACEUR to send a team of staff officers to Brussels to examine in detail the steps being contemplated and to recommend to the Belgian Government any changes or additional actions desired. But he asked that the SHAPE Annual Review Team visit to Belgium be postponed for a few weeks in order to let Belgium implement its plans.

Both General Gruenther and Field Marshal Montgomery made it very clear that while they could not argue with the opinion of the Belgian Government on the political wisdom of the reduction in service, they could not accept any military judgement that such an act and the attendant reorganisation was not going to have a detrimental effect on the readiness of Belgium's military forces. Because of the suddenness of the move, the reduction of efficiency would be particularly serious. They stated that SHAPE would do all in its power to assist the Belgian Government in ameliorating the bad effects of this reorganisation.

In response to the invitation of the Belgian Minister of Defence, General P.N. White, ACOS OANDT, paid a visit to Brussels on 14 May 1954. The Chief of the Belgian Staff, General Piron, outlined for General White in detail the plans which were being made to soften the effects of the cut back.

Commenting on the training and battle readiness of the army in his report to General Gruenther, General White noted that the general staff arrangements for arresting the inevitable lowering of standards were not so satisfactory. The problem was threefold and involved reserve officers and NCOs, specialist, and reserve training. A large number of reserve officers would be leaving the active army, as were an even larger number of young non-commissioned officers and specialists. The necessary reserve training could not be accomplished because Belgium had legal restrictions preventing the type of active duty training needed by the reserve divisions. It was also against Belgian policy to call men to active duty for reserve training during their first year of reserve service.
General White informed SACEUR that General Piron intended to do his best to keep Belgian NATO forces at their current level at the expense of national units. He would try to keep these same levels after 1956 if humanly possible. The Belgian Chief of Staff realized the importance of increasing the intensity of reserve training to counteract the shortened period of active training, particularly of reserve officers, NCOs and specialists. To change the legal status, however, would be difficult. (1)

General Gruenther wrote to General Piron and suggested measures to compensate for the national service reductions. These measures were, essentially, an increase in the regular officer and NCO content in ACE units, and an increase in the amount of refresher training for the individual reservist and reserve units. "Without these measures," SACEUR said "...a reduction in the period of national service to eighteen months will have important impact on the efficiency of the Belgian forces committed to NATO." (2)

On 12 July 1954, DSACEUR flew to Belgium where he consulted with the Chiefs of the Military Staffs, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Defence. The DSACEUR explained to the Belgian officials the application of the New Approach to land forces and how the new concept was now "a matter for deep and careful examination." He warned that this new system might cost a little more, and pointedly observed that it might mean some alterations in Belgian laws relating to call-up and reserve obligations would be needed. "If the length of active Nations Service is reduced", he pointed out, "the length of reserve service should be increased." Mr. Spaak told the Field Marshal that small alterations in the existing law on length of reserve obligations might be possible.

When asked about the air force aspect, Montgomery stated that he felt it was uneconomical to build up a large air force if there was insufficient money for flying and proper operational training. (3)

While the Field Marshal was in Belgium, General Gruenther received unofficial information that the Belgian Government might be considering a reduction in its military commitments to NATO. He immediately reacted by sending a personal letter by officer courier to the Minister of Defence in Brussels. He asked for clarification

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(1) OT 1101.1, Memo from Gen. White to COFS, Plans for Implementing 18 Months National Service, 15 May 54.
(2) Ltr, General Gruenther to General Piron, 28 May 54.
(3) Memo, FM 90, FM Montgomery on Visit to Belgium 12-14 July 1954.
of these reports, and, if they were true, for a chance to express his views on any proposed program. He recalled the May meeting at SHAPE, and pointed out that at that time both Mr. Spinoy and Mr. Spaak had made it very clear that "...in implementing its plans for an 18-month period of national service, Belgium would continue to carry out both the letter and the spirit of its NATO commitments." He would "regard with great concern any significant reduction in these commitments," (1)

The next day, 19 July, SACEUR sent a second letter to Mr. Spinoy in which he explained in some detail the planning then being done by the New Approach Group, the new concepts which were emerging, and the fact that "there is a stronger requirement than ever before for M-Day land forces to be ready, in place and fully effective on the first day of the conflict." He emphasized that Belgium consult with SHAPE before making changes in its military organisation. (2)

In an immediate reply to SACEUR, the Belgian MOD said, "I very much regret that, reports published by poorly informed newspapers have given the impression that the Belgian Government had the intention of reducing on their own initiative the strength of the units they have committed themselves to furnish NATO." He told SACEUR that such a move would be contrary to "our will to work in complete agreement with you on the military level...." Mr. Spinoy assured SACEUR that the plans for Land Forces still called for three regular divisions. But, from 1956 on, Belgium would propose to SACEUR that their available strength be placed in two D-Day divisions, so as to conform to his directives. However, if SACEUR preferred 3 reduced strength divisions, Belgium would be quite pleased to study that possibility.

On 2 August 1954, General White, ACOS OANDT, again attended a meeting at Brussels with representatives of the Belgian Ministry of Defence. Information was exchanged at the meeting and no commitments were made. The Belgians indicated, however, that within their manpower means they were prepared to accept any recommendation made by SHAPE and only awaited a firm position from SACEUR.

The Belgians pointed out that, in attempting to compensate for the effects of the reduction in national service, they had transferred 1800 personnel from national forces (two battalions of infantry and one company of engineers) to SACEUR's forces. They had also extended the active duty requirement for a number of officers.

(1) Ltr, Gen. Gruenther to MOD Belgium, 18 Jul 54
(2) Ltr, Gen. Gruenther to MOD Belgium, 19 Jul 54.
They summarised their divisional priority plans for 1956 as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Phasing</th>
<th>% War Establishment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Infantry Division</td>
<td>M-Day</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Armoured Division</td>
<td>M-Day</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Infantry Division</td>
<td>M+15</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Infantry Division</td>
<td>M+30</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Infantry Division</td>
<td>M+30</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Infantry Division</td>
<td>M+90</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A study was under way to check the feasibility of maintaining the 4th Division at 23% to include its full war complement of long service officers and NCOs. One battalion per regiment together with a tank battalion and a strong artillery nucleus would be kept in being.

General White reported these matters to SHAPE and pointed out that AFCENT required six first echelon reserve divisions. "At present there are 3 French divisions available in this category. With the ceasefire in Indo-China, France should be able to furnish further divisions, and I believe it is more reasonable to derive the additional first echelon reserve divisions from France, and possibly the Netherlands, than to depend upon a 23% Belgian division in this role." (1)

General Schuyler asked General White if SACEUR, as a matter of principle, should agree to the reduction of the 4th Infantry Division to 23% with a M+15 phasing. General White replied that since SHAPE in commenting on the Belgian reply to the 1953 Annual Review Questionnaire (ARQ) had already agreed to this reduction and also had agreed in correspondence with MOD Belgium in June 1953, the question now was academic. The Chief of Staff also asked if SHAPE should agree to changing the phasing of the 5th Division from M+30 to M+90. General White answered that SHAPE should not agree.

General Schuyler wondered if Belgium might not make reductions in their forces retained under national command and thus temper the reduction in those forces assigned to NATO. General White gave a statistical comparison of the two types of forces and compared it

(1) Ltr, MOD Belgium to SACEUR, 20 Jul 54.
with similar situations in other nations. He concluded that Belgium did not have more forces under national command than it had under NATO and added, "LANDCENT believes that the Belgians are playing fair in this regard."

"It is understood," General White told the Chief of Staff, "that at the Lisbon Conference (of 1952) the Belgian delegation offered additional units in order to fill the gap between availabilities and requirements for the then critical year of 1954." Thus far, Belgium had met her commitments. He suggested that it would not be fair to be rigid in the case of Belgium when others were failing on lesser commitments. (1)

On 5 August 1954, Colonel Harteon, BE A, who had been present at the Brussels meetings, called on General Schuyler and gave a frank and detailed explanation of factors that had led to the Belgians' decision to reduce their forces committed to NATO.

General Gruenther, after receiving General Schuyler's report of these conversations, wrote to Mr. Spinoy saying that the proposed Belgian Army reductions would require careful evaluation before SHAPE could comment on them.

On 23 August 1954, MOD Belgium replied that within the framework of Belgian manpower capabilities, the greatest consideration would be given to General Gruenther's recommendations. For the details of Belgian plans for its ground forces, Mr. Spinoy referred SACEUR to the Belgian reply to the ARQ which was based "on the solution which we believe to be the best one." (2)

The Belgian reply to the 1954 ARQ indicated that reductions would occur in 1956. Belgium would maintain two completely up-to-strength M-Day divisions on active duty and transfer one division from M-Day to M+15 status. One of Belgium's M+30 divisions was placed in a category called "post M+30."

SHAPE's analysis of the Belgian reply revealed that Belgium would not meet its M+30 force goals of 5 and 2/3 divisions. Belgium, in SHAPE's opinion would be 2/3 divisions short by the end of 1954 and one division short the next year.

(1) OT 0905.1, Memo from Gen. White to Gen. Schuyler, Belgian Defence Forces, 4 Aug 54.
(2) STSC 156/54, Ltr MOD Belgium to SACEUR, 23 Aug 54.
SHAPE Planning Guidance for Belgian Land Forces.

On 21 December 1954, SACEUR indicated to MOD Belgium -- as he did to the other NATO nations -- (1) that he would furnish guidance early in 1955 on the broad pattern of assigned and earmarked forces required.

On 4 April 1955, General Schuyler informed MOD Belgium that SHAPE had received and studied the comments of the MSCs on the Capabilities Study and as a result, SHAPE had arrived at the overall composition of Belgian land force that best fitted the needs of SACEUR and which appeared to be attainable by Belgium. SHAPE hoped that Belgian authorities would be able to see their way clear to accept this pattern.

Essentially, the development of Belgian land forces foreseen in the guidance was conceived as follows. As part of the Northern Army Group, Belgian land forces had to have the efficiency and strength on M-Day to engage and defeat an enemy as far East as possible; to cover national mobilisation; and to hold defensively the Rhine-IJssel "back-stop" position.

The New Approach concept required a Belgian army of the following pattern:

a. M-Day Army Corps consisting of:
   1 Infantry Division
   1 Armoured Division
   Balanced combat and service support.

b. Post M-Day forces:
   1 Infantry Division for the army corps
   1 Army Corps consisting of 3 Infantry Divisions
   Balanced combat and service support.

For the future, M-Day forces of the Shield were to be maintained at a minimum of 75% war strength, and supported by adequate combat and service support units. Build-up of this M-Day element was a first priority, and these forces had to be assigned in peacetime.

One infantry division was to be the First Echelon force and was to be maintained at 65% of war strength. It was to be "immediately" available to back up the active army corps of the "Shield". Second Echelon forces, a

(1) SHAPE 737/54, Organisation of NATO Land Forces, 21 Dec 54.
army corps headquarters and 2 infantry divisions, were to have defensive capability on mobilisation.

Third Echelon forces consisted of one infantry division which would later join the original Second Echelon corps. (1)

The Future Pattern of Belgian Land Forces.

In accordance with the concept that had been developed in August 1954, and the Belgian forces that were to evolve within that concept, the pattern of the Belgian Army is shown on the next page.

Priorities for this buildup would be in the order indicated. With regard to the sixth division, the 5th Infantry Division, as it was known, SHAPE had considered that if this division could be maintained at SHAPE "Second Echelon levels", it should be added to this category. If not, it would have to be relegated to a Third Echelon status.

This pattern formed the background to a meeting in Brussels between a SHAPE team led by MG P.N. White, ACOS OANDT -- with LANDCENT representation -- and representatives of the Belgian General Staff, on 15 and 21 April 1955. The object of the SHAPE-LANDCENT-Belgian General Staff discussion was to examine the future pattern of the Belgian Army.

The "pattern" had been given orally to representatives of the Staff by MG White on 18 August 1954; however, no manning levels had been specified for the First Echelon Division, and the sixth division (the 5th Inf. Div.) had been relegated to an M+90 status. (2)

Briefly, the Belgian case as presented to ACE military planners, was as follows. In 1950, NATO's immediate problem had been to provide the largest number of divisions in the shortest possible time. To meet this demand, Belgium had offered 3 active and 3 reserve divisions (in addition to normal national, logistic and anti-aircraft forces) between 1950 and 1954. In order to manage this, Belgium "overdrew" on her yearly manpower quota from 1950 onward; advanced the call-up from 20 to 19; increased the length of national service to 24 months; and increased the regular content of her army from approximately 29,000 in 1950 to 46,700 in 1954.

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 0931 OT, SHAPE Planning Guidance for Land Forces, 4 Apr 55.

(2) As noted earlier, the new pattern had been stated in SACEUR's 1955 AR guidance with the sixth division placed in a Third Echelon category.
### The Belgian Army

#### Legend
- **M** Day Units
- **R** Reserve Units (Today)
- **1st Echelon (Future)**
- **2nd Echelon (Future)**
- **3rd Echelon (Future)**
- **% Active Strength (Peace)**

#### 1954

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1954</th>
<th>1957</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>M</strong></td>
<td><img src="image1" alt="Diagram" /></td>
<td><img src="image2" alt="Diagram" /></td>
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<td><strong>M</strong></td>
<td><img src="image3" alt="Diagram" /></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>M 30</strong></td>
<td><img src="image5" alt="Diagram" /></td>
<td><img src="image6" alt="Diagram" /></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>M 90</strong></td>
<td><img src="image7" alt="Diagram" /></td>
<td><img src="image8" alt="Diagram" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total**
- 6 Div
- 1 Corps HQ (Active)
- 1 Corps HQ (Reserve)

**Total**
- 6 Div
- 1 Corps HQ (Active)
- 1 Corps HQ (Reserve)
To Belgium this was an exceptional effort. While it was possible to make such an effort to meet an immediate and short-term threat, it was not possible to maintain that effort over an indefinite long-term period. Belgium's major problem was a manpower shortage caused by a lowered birth-rate over the WWII period. (1)

Belgium, consequently could not meet the new SHAPE Future Pattern for 1957. It was foreseen that Belgium also might have difficulty in meeting the modified pattern of 2 M-Day and 3 Second Echelon Divisions in the period 1959 to 1961 -- after which more men were expected to be available for national service.

SHAPE and LANDCENT planners considered that the Belgian General Staff presentation of the problem, and subsequent frank discussions, showed that it was impracticable for the Belgians to provide from 1956 onwards, one First Echelon Division in addition to two M-Day Divisions. The future realistic pattern of the Belgian Army was therefore viewed as: 2 M-Day Divisions at minimum 75% strength; 3 Second Echelon Divisions; Balanced combat and logistic support; and 1 Third Echelon Division. MG White and Colonel Britton (of LANDCENT) recommended that the 1955 AR guidance be amended accordingly and noted that Belgium's modified effort, based on her available manpower from 1956 onwards, still compared more than favourably with most NATO countries.

SHAPE planners had also considered another factor brought out in the discussions during the conferences. This was the fact that there were 2 valid methods of organising Belgian forces within the same strength levels. The second method would be to retain the majority of units at nearly full strength in peace. This would mean that certain units would have to be eliminated in peacetime and would have to be provided from reserves in time of war. The SHAPE/LANDCENT representatives felt that the first method was preferable because of the following reasons:

a. Continental armies were capable of very rapid reinforcement with reservists.

b. The organisational structure and nucleus of all units and sub-units would be retained in peace, thereby facilitating training and rapid expansion on mobilisation.

(1) Detailed figures in support of the Belgian cases are given in Annex "Z" to OT 0905.1, Note for Record on Mtg between SHAPE & Belgian General Staff on the Future Pattern of the Belgian Army, 15 April and 21 April, 5 May 55.
SHAPE's previously stated requirements would be fulfilled. (1)

As a result, on 15 June 1955, AM Dawson, informed the Belgian MOD that SHAPE confirmed the opinions of the SHAPE/LANDCENT representatives that the first method indicated was the preferable solution for M-Day divisions. (2) In other words, SHAPE preferred the retention of all units in the 1st Infantry and 6th Armoured Divisions in peacetime at reduced strength to the alternative of eliminating certain units in order that the remainder might be at full strength.

However, in the following month, SACEUR had to stress the progressive deficiencies that were appearing in ACE Land Forces — deficiencies of which the Belgian limitations were a part. Reporting to the Standing Group, SACEUR stated that:

In AFCENT a serious deficiency has arisen. The Netherlands have stated now their inability to form a second M-Day division; and the French will probably be unable to find their fifth first echelon division. This results in a weakening of Northern Army Group, where there is a loss of two divisions. This situation, foreseen in the 1955 AR guidance, has now been exacerbated by the movement of French assigned and earmarked forces to North Africa. (3)

Belgian Forces and the Annual Review, 1955

Examing Session. During the 1953 and 1954 ARs, Belgium had announced cuts in defence expenditures forecast for the years 1953, 1954 and 1955. This had followed action by the Belgian government, as the result of financial difficulties, to restrict the sum of annual expenditures.

The Belgian reply to the AR Questionnaire for 1955 showed another cut in defence expenditures for 1955 and 1956. (4)

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(1) SHAPE OT 0905.1, Note for the Record on Mtg. between SHAPE and Belgian General Staff on Future Pattern of the Belgian Army - 15 April & 21 April, 5 May 55.

(2) AG 0905.1 OT, Reorganisation of Belgian Assigned Divisions, 15 Jun 55.

(3) SHAPE Ltr. 325/55 AG 1105/7 PPO. Reports Required in 1955 on Future Capabilities Plans, 13 Jul 55.

(4) In addition, a further delay was forecast in the buildup of air forces, while the improvements planned for raising the level of operational reserves, particularly in the case of ammunition, still fell considerably short of requirements.
The Annual Review Committee conducted its Examining Session on Belgium on 26 October 1955. The Session was the longest experienced to date, according to one observer, and was concerned almost entirely with the question of Belgian Military expenditure.

The leader of the Belgian Delegation was asked how the Belgian authorities reconciled the facts of cuts in defence expenditures with the view expressed in Belgium's General Memorandum to the Belgian reply to ARQ(55) which stated that "The Belgian Government... believes that there should be no slackening of the current defence effort"? The Examiners wanted to know the Belgian government's reasons for again lowering the ceiling of annual defence expenditures, and its intentions in this respect for the period under review.

The Belgian delegate stated that these queries should be considered only in the light of certain background facts. There had been a considerable improvement in the level of ammunition reserves. The balance of air forces was improving. Although budgetary provisions showed a progressive decrease, the actual expenditure from 1954 to 1956 was approximately the same.

The policy of the Belgian Government was to maintain such forces as they had at a full state of efficiency. In comparison with other NATO nations, it was probably unfair to talk of a "reduction in defence expenditure" since the order of magnitude was small enough to be described as "about the same". The question of public opinion in military expenditure was very important, the Belgian Delegation's leader pointed out. Belgium had fought two wars with obsolete equipment, and there was strong public sentiment against buying anything but the most modern equipment. If this was not available, there would be inevitable shortfalls of expenditure against estimates.

Further, in spite of prosperity in Belgium, or perhaps because of it, there was a threat of inflation which demanded great foresight in determining levels of expenditure. The reasons for the difference in the approach by Belgium in 1955 from that of 1954 were so complex they would require a written answer, the Belgian delegate stated.
The Examiners noted that for the long term maintenance of planned forces, Belgium still relied on the continuance of North American Mutual Aid for the replacement of equipment that had been supplied under that plan. For operation and maintenance, however, Belgium had forecast the cessation of Mutual Aid, but expected the contribution from the Federal Republic of Germany to continue. The Examiners wanted to know what steps Belgium would take to maintain their forces at the planned level if their assumption with regard to replacement of equipment under Mutual Aid should not materialise? And what measures would they take to support operation and maintenance of planned forces if the FRG’s contribution were to be discontinued?

The Belgian representative answered that Belgium could not maintain her current forces if Mutual Aid were reduced. The question of cessation of contributions from Germany was being considered. No reply could be given at that time. (1)

International Staff Recommendations. On 10 November 1955, the IS issued its Country Chapters, including the one for Belgium, which summarised major defence problems and stated the conclusions and recommendations of the International Staff. Many of the weaknesses in the Belgian forces arose from budgetary limitations, the IS noted. Belgian Force Plans were based on two major assumptions:

a. That further US aid would replace all US Mutual Defence Assistance Pact (MDAP) equipment.

b. The German support contribution would continue.

The IS also noted that while serious deficiencies in Belgian forces were expected to continue throughout the period under review, Belgium intended to limit its defence expenditures from 1956 onwards to a level below that reached in the years preceding 1955. Although it was apparent that full implementation of Belgian defence plans was dependent on the continuation of German support contributions. The IS still felt that Belgium’s resources were sufficient to enable her to make a greater effort towards making good shortfalls and improving the effectiveness of her forces.

Accordingly, the IS recommended that Belgium consider raising the intended limit on defence expenditures and implement the recommendations of NATO military authorities to the greatest possible extent. (2)

(1) AR(55) Belgium (Study) d/2 (Rev), 22 Oct 55; Memo for Record, AR Examining Session Belgium, 26 Oct 55.
(2) CM(55)101, Part II, 10 Nov 55.
Future Organisation of Belgian Land Forces.

Belgium and ACE authorities continued to study the problem of Belgian land forces as they were affected by the limitations imposed by personnel restrictions.

A Belgian proposal to accomplish a 30,000 man reduction in five years instead of the three years (1959 through 1961) as originally planned, was looked favourably upon by SHAPE planners who considered that this would serve to maintain a stable organisation for a longer period.

In order to retain two M-Day divisions and support units in the M-Day category in the face of these reductions, on 17 May 1956, SHAPE suggested that Belgium stabilise the annual intake of personnel from 1957 through 1962 so that 34,000 men were inducted annually. If 28,000 (or 70% of that M-Day strength) were assigned to NATO, and this number were increased by approximately 30% of the 46,700 regulars in the Belgian Army, the M-Day strength of the NATO forces could be stabilised at approximately 40,000.

Based on the latter figure, the organisation of forces could be standardised for a period of 5 or 6 years (1957 through 1961 or 1962) could be as follows:

1 M-Day Infantry Division.
1 M-Day Armoured Division (at least 75%T/O&E strength for all units).
M-Day higher headquarters at operational strength.
Sufficient M-Day non organic combat support units at 75%T/O&E strength.
A minimum number of M-Day logistic non-organic support units.
Maintenance of other 2nd Echelon units with an active nucleus.

SHAPE also again indicated that maintaining two active divisions was of great importance to Allied Command Europe. (1)

SHAPE's suggestions were followed by a number of working discussions. On 17 June, the Belgian NMR forwarded to General Schuyler a statement on Belgium's "Reorganisation Project of the Belgian Land Forces for the Period 1957-1961". (2)

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 0905.1 OT, Future Organisation of Belgian Land Forces, 17 May 56.
(2) Belgian NMR 2140/56, with Belgian Document/G Plan/1/TS/754, 29 May 56.
The Belgian plans comprised three critical aspects. First, the reduction in available manpower - which would be reflected largely in NATO committed forces. Second, the loss to the NATO ground forces Order of Battle of a trained 2nd Echelon Division and one 3rd Echelon Division. Third, the proposals meant a reorganisation of major combat and support forces involving specific strength reductions. (1)

SHAPE did not agree with the changes proposed by Belgium. On 1 August SHAPE informed MOD Belgium that the two M-Day Divisions should not be reduced below 24,000 men. While SHAPE still preferred to have M-Day divisions at 100% strength in peacetime, a strength of 75% would permit the retention of a force structure which could capitalise on the possibility that some advance warning would allow time to receive filler personnel. The divisions could be built up again to 100% active strength when "year classes" increased again.

SHAPE considered that Belgian units were well organised, reasonably well balanced, and combat effective in their echelons. Rather than men at 100% the two comparatively small M-Day Divisions and the M-Day combat support units as proposed in the new Belgian Plan, SHAPE recommended that these units retain their current organisation and be manned according to SHAPE criteria.

SHAPE welcomed the opportunity Belgian authorities had given for joint consultation between SHAPE and Belgian Military authorities, but, at the same time, stressed its concern with the fact that proposed Belgian solutions implied a drastic reduction in Belgium's commitment to NATO. (2)

(1) The composition of Belgian (NATO) land forces in 1956 was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formations</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 M-Day Divisions</td>
<td>26,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-Day &amp; 1st Ech. Sup Units</td>
<td>14,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Ech. Units, Nucleus Only</td>
<td>3,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>44,200</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) SHAPE Ltr. AG 0905.1 OT, Organisation of Belgian Land Forces for the Period 1957-1961, 1 Aug 56.
Discussions continued in Brussels on 10 August and Belgian authorities again revised their plan on 11 August 1956. (1)

SHAPE considered that Belgium's revision had a number of advantages over its earlier plans. The proposed peacetime manning of the two M-Day divisions at approximately 85% was quite adequate. Planned composition of major units, especially the infantry divisions, was an improvement.

Also it was noted that for experimental reasons an armoured infantry battalion was included in the infantry division. Although SHAPE did not previously concur, no objection was interposed pending the results of this experimentation.

Among other things, SHAPE firmly approved the elimination of a proposed 3rd Echelon division, but could not accept the "suppression" of one of the 2nd Echelon divisions.

Once again while SHAPE authorities expressed pleasure at being afforded the opportunity to participate in the preparation of Belgian reorganisation plans. SHAPE understood the personnel problems that had caused Belgium to make the changes indicated, but it was hoped that the weaknesses revealed earlier would soon be remedied. (2)

Belgian authorities agreed with SHAPE's comments. (3) Further significant developments in this area awaited the approaching Annual Review and the accomplishment of proposed changes from 1957 onwards.

(2) SHAPE Ltr. AG 0905.1 OT, Organisation of Belgian Land Forces for the Period 1957-1961, 30 Aug 56.
(3) SHAPE 257/56 AG 2208 SEC, SACEUR's Periodic Report to the SG (Number 50), 27 Nov 56.
Belgian Air Force Reductions.

Reductions in Belgian Air Force Goals. When discussing reductions in ground forces on 20 July, 1954, Mr. Spinoy had also informed General Gruenther that Belgium intended to reduce its air force goals to three wings of interceptors, three wings of fighter/bombers, one reconnaissance squadron and one transport squadron. Based upon an inventory of Belgian capabilities, he continued, "it becomes evident that to pursue the former goal would very probably expose us to setting up an air force which we would be incapable of maintaining over a period of time at the degree of efficiency which you have the right to demand." To support this contention he cited the opinions expressed by Montgomery during his visit to Belgium in the second week of July. (1)

SACEUR replied on 9 August that "I must make it clear that I am very concerned about the operational implications of the reduction which is proposed in the Belgian Air Force." He went on to emphasize that the problems of air power were the most pressing which NATO faced. General Gruenther continued, "To be more specific, I would point out that in addition to the normal air defence requirements that might apply anywhere within the areas of Allied Command Europe, Belgium has the additional strategic importance of being a communications and port area." Any plan to reduce less than adequate forces in such a vital mission, in an area of such strategic significance was "a cause for concern on my part."

As a compromise, General Gruenther suggested that the 1.5 pilot-to-aircraft ratio prescribed by SHAPE could be changed—if necessary. He would accept a lesser figure, for example 1.2 or 1.3, an interim situation for the near future, provided 1.5 was kept as the ultimate objective. If this were a significant factor in the Belgian decision to reduce the number of planes in service, General Gruenther was willing to make modifications in standards not only in this factor, but in others.

"In summary," he said, "I must state that the problem of NATO air power is still SHAPE's most pressing problem and our New Approach studies provide no basis for reducing the air forces which we are counting on Belgium to contribute by 1957." (2)

(1) Ltr, MOD Belgium to SACEUR, 20 Jul 54.
(2) SHAPE 454/54, Ltr, Gen. Gruenther to MOD Belgium, 9 Aug 54.
On 23 August, Mr. Spinoy wrote to SACEUR and said that it was not politically feasible to increase the Belgian budget from 25% to 40% in order to provide the 531 aircraft previously agreed upon. In addition, for military reasons, he rejected SACEUR's offer to temporarily accept lower standards because, "our efforts have meaning only if the units activated reach the degree of operational efficiency required by the commanders responsible for their use. I cannot accept as a permanent factor a substantial departure from the standards..." (1)

General Gruenther's reply thanked Mr. Spinoy for his patient explanation of the reasons underlying the decision. However, SACEUR said that regardless of other considerations, he knew of no military basis which would justify reducing NATO forces at that time. This was particularly true with respect to air forces.

He then explained to Mr. Spinoy the origin and significance of the standards which SHAPE had established for its forces, but said, "We do appreciate, however, that these standards may temporarily have to be interpreted in the light of particular situations which may exist in any given country." And he again expressed the hope that inability to adhere rigidly to SHAPE's standards would not preclude the maintenance of necessary force levels.

General Gruenther concluded saying, "It is indeed a matter of regret on my part that Belgium has made this decision concerning its Air Force. I do appreciate, however, the frank and complete explanation which you have given to me." (2)

On 22 October 1954, General Gruenther had lunch with Foreign Minister Spaak, Defence Minister Spinoy, General Norstad, and General Schuyler. During the luncheon, Belgium's plans to curtail her air force were discussed. General Gruenther opened the discussion by pointing out that he realized that certain comments by himself and his staff, both directly to the MOD and on the ARQ(54) reply, may have caused some concern to the Belgian Government. He asked that these comments be considered as constructive in nature and made entirely from the

(1) STSC 156/54, Ltr, MOD Belgium to SACEUR, 23 Aug 54.
(2) SHAPE 525/54, Ltr, SACEUR to MOD Belgium, 15 Sep 54.
point of view of the military commander responsible for the defence of Western Europe. SACEUR did not feel that he was in a position to comment on political or economic factors, and his position should be regarded as a purely military one.

For his part, Mr. Spinoy said that he had inherited a very serious air force problem when he came into office. There was a very serious shortage of pilots and ground personnel, flying proficiency was low, and the accident rate was high. General standards of efficiency left much to be desired. He had felt it necessary to halt further expansion and devote all efforts to improving the quality of existing units. He admitted that he might well have committed an error in not consulting SHAPE sooner concerning his difficulties. He covered in some detail the difficulties in which the Belgian Air Force found itself and asked that General Norstad come to Belgium to see for himself the sad state of affairs. Mr. Spinoy said that his decision to reduce air force goals was taken not on financial grounds alone, but also because of the military factors which he had presented.

General Norstad said that he would be happy to come to Belgium. While he agreed that corrective measures were very necessary, the Air Deputy felt that Belgium could find some way to provide pilots and maintenance crews for its air force without any reduction of goals. (1)

Summarizing the discussions in a personal letter to the MOD Belgium the next day, General Gruenther told him that SHAPE considered that a military requirement existed for air forces in the Belgian area which was greater than the reduced Belgian Air Force program could support. For that reason he felt that the old objective of 531 aircraft should be retained. SHAPE was prepared and would probably prefer to accept certain temporary modifications in NATO standards of manning and training to avoid the reductions. If the Belgians still felt they had to reduce their forces, General Gruenther said that "we feel that these reductions must be reviewed by SHAPE in light of SHAPE's military planning and in light of the composition of the operational air command to which the national forces are assigned." (2)

On 26 October 1954 the official position of the Belgian Government vis-a-vis its NATO commitments was examined by the NATO International Staff during the Annual Review process. In this process, each nation

(1) Memo, COFS, SACEUR Discussions with Belgian Representatives, 22 Oct 54.
(2) Ltr, Gen. Gruenther to Mr. Spinoy, 23 Oct 54.
was given the opportunity to defend its reply to the ARQ before an examining panel. The Belgian delegation drew attention to several financial and physical difficulties which had compelled the new Belgian Government to reduce its defence budget. It was claimed that implementation of earlier Belgian plans would have cost 50 to 60 percent more than the levels now planned. The Belgian Government also considered that, from the military point of view, there were personnel difficulties in the Belgian Air Force which would prevent any increase above then current plans before 1958.

The examiners from the International Staff pointed out that the existence of all of the problems was recognized, but that no progress in NATO defence could be made if each difficulty was made the excuse for not trying to overcome the next. The International Staff felt that the Belgians seemed "to play off military and financial difficulties against one another." Over and above their other arguments, the Belgian Representatives came back to the fundamental point: namely, that the government had taken a political decision about the maximum level of defence expenditure, which could not be changed unless they considered that the circumstances in which it had been taken had themselves also changed.

As far as the air force cuts, the examiners concluded that they had found nothing "to show that it would be financially or economically impossible to make any improvements on the present Belgian plans. SACEUR probably knows that we are, in fact, up against a political decision which the Belgian Government have taken on their own, and for their own reasons." (1)

In accordance with the agreement between General Gruenther and MOD Belgium, General Norstad, flew to Belgium on 5 November where he held a three-hour frank and free discussion with Mr. Spinoy and his chief assistants.

The Belgian Minister commented at length and in detail on the problems facing his government in maintaining an air force. He asked for technical assistance from General Norstad and for support in acquiring material. Mr. Spinoy regretted that certain misunderstandings had occurred as a result of his government's decision, but he did not seem inclined to change that decision to any degree. He wanted it clearly understood that his government wanted to work closely and cooperatively with SHAPE, and asked for SHAPE views on the actions being taken or proposed by his government.

General Norstad, explained to Mr. Spinoy why the Belgian reduction was serious from the operational point of view. His greatest concern, however, was that the Belgian move might be copied by other nations. Large reductions by Belgium could cause other countries to take similar actions. Setting an example of this sort and causing a chain-reaction of reductions would have severe consequences.

Mr. Spinoy responded that it was quality, not quantity that counted; that SHAPE really should be thankful for the action taken by the Belgian government; and that the impression that budgetary questions alone had caused this decision was incorrect.

He asked General Norstad if SHAPE agreed to the Belgian decision to halt expansion for the present, recognising that expansion in the future remained a specific possibility. General Norstad replied that SHAPE could not agree to halt the build-up. (1)

Annual Review 1954.

In the Annual Review there was no reconciliation between goals Belgium proposed (and, indeed goals proposed by 4 other nations, as well), (2) and the goals that had been recommended by the International Staff in the 1953 Annual Review.

The Belgian proposals could not be reconciled with those recommended by the military authorities in the 1954 Review. As a result, the so-called "country" proposed goals -- those put forward by the countries, themselves -- ultimately were adopted by the North Atlantic Council.

Certain military planning disadvantages resulted. Various Country Chapters of the 1953 AR Report had revealed that some nationally proposed goals were not even supported by an "anticipated availability" of necessary equipment. Yet, political authorities apparently had accepted the country proposed goals without reservation.

SHAPE realised that to avoid a repetition of these developments it had to establish more realistic figures in those cases where there were differences between the country proposals and the military recommendations.

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(1) MFR AD 0950, Gen. Norstad's Mtg with MOD Belgium, 6 Nov 54.
(2) In the 1954 AR the goals of Canada, Greece, Italy and Portugal differed.
Belgium's final goals for the 1954 AR remained the same as those contained in its original proposals SHAPE planners had no other NATO information upon which to base estimates, consequently early in 1955, the Belgian plan had to be accepted for use in SHAPE planning. (1)

SHAPE Interim Guidance for the Belgian Air Force.

SHAPE's Capabilities Study had indicated the measures that had to be taken by 1957 to meet the requirements of the military situation anticipated at that time, and beyond. In the interim since the Study had been prepared, and except in a few cases, SHAPE planners had not been able to translate these measures into specific guidance for the build-up of NATO air forces. Guidance for air forces for 1955 therefore still had to be of an interim nature.

On 7 April 1955, General Schuyler forwarded SHAPE's interim guidance for the Belgian Air Force. He acknowledged that the Belgian Air Force had "shown progress on a sound basis, especially in the training of technicians". However, much improvement still was needed. The guidance emphasized the same deficiencies, and stressed the same points that had been recommended in 1954. General Schuyler also pointed out that SACEUR's Combat Effectiveness Report for 1954 had revealed certain additional weaknesses which could be corrected by properly directed effort - without any substantial financial costs.

(1) SHAPE/SEC/15/55 OT 6005.006, DCPO Memo to SHAPE Staff Divs., Air Force Goals for AR 1954, 28 Jan 55. The planning figures that had to be accepted for Belgium's air forces consisted of the following:

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Abbreviations are: IDF: Interceptor Defence Forces; FB: Fighter Bomber; AWX: All-weather; TR: Tactical Reconnaissance; TC: Troop Carrier.
In addition to reaffirming the military importance of resuming the buildup of the Belgian Air Force to previously established goals, SHAPE recommended, in order of priority, four principal actions. First, Belgium should continue action to accelerate the provision of trained personnel and effective equipment in order to provide continuous manning and operation of the Control and Reporting Systems to insure early warning of an enemy approach.

Second, pending completion of SHAPE's detailed examination of an Atomic Posture for Air Forces, and translation of that examination into specific guidance, Belgium military authorities were to improve the capability of the Belgian Air Force to survive atomic attack. Third, Belgium should take action to procure as early as possible modern AWX and IDF aircraft required to meet agreed force goals. And, finally, Belgium ought to take the necessary action to achieve as early as possible D-Day standard of combat effectiveness of tactical units by:

a. Increasing the manning and improving the skill levels of technicians.

b. Correcting the shortages in spare parts and equipment.

c. Increasing the number of fully trained aircrews to a ratio of 1.5 per aircraft.

d. Attaining a goal of 70% of assigned aircraft in commission and combat ready.

e. Providing gunnery ranges for the necessary weapon training for planned combat units. (1)

Other Implications of the Revised Belgian Air Force Composition.

Belgian Air Force reductions had implications for an agreement between Belgium and the United States. This agreement was based on US support for production of 192 Hawker Hunter (IDF) aircraft. This figure was related to earlier established Belgian force goals.

In April 1955, during the course of CPX-V, LTG Leboutte, Chief of Staff of the Belgian Air Force and Colonel Harteon, BE A, acting under instructions of the MOD Belgium, approached General Norstad, concerning the question of the composition of the Belgian Air Force within the reduced ceiling imposed during the last AR. Discussions on this matter also touched

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 0950 OT, SHAPE Interim Guidance for the Belgian Air Force, 7 Apr 55.
on support for procurement of an AWX-type aircraft. This, too, related to the previously established goal of 64 such aircraft. Because of these bilateral considerations, US authorities had been discussing the question of force composition with the Belgian MOD to determine precisely what the Belgian plans were. The discussions were conducted on the basis that any conclusions based on financial and other consideration of interest to the US and Belgian authorities would be subject to review of their "military suitability" by appropriate NATO authorities.

The Belgian MOD had also discussed this problem with various NATO authorities, including ACM Embry, COMAIRCENT. ACM Embry had told the Belgian MOD that, assuming reductions of the kind that the Belgian authorities had indicated in the most recent AR were necessary, COMAIRCENT would "probably prefer reductions to be effected in fighter/bomber type aircraft rather than in air defence type aircraft." ACM Embry had qualified his statement, however, with the stipulation that he strongly opposed any reductions at all.

General Leboutte had hoped to have SHAPE's concurrence prior to the end of CPX-V. However, General Norstad, indicated that this would not be possible. He wanted to have the SHAPE Staff examine this altered composition, and wished to secure the views of COMAIRCENT, as well and the SHAPE Staff prior to arriving at a decision. General Norstad agreed to consider the matter promptly and to advise the MOD Belgium at an early date.

By the end of April, Belgium submitted new air force proposals to SHAPE. The new proposals had been developed in discussions between MOD Belgium and the US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). (1)

MG White, ACOS OANDT, was directly concerned in this matter. Following discussions with AM Dawson and the Air Deputy's office, he provided ACM Embry with the following information:

(1) Memo Vice AIRDEP to DCPO, Belgian Air Force Composition, 29 Apr 55.
The plan proposed a reduction of fighter bombers and an increase of IDF and AWX aircraft (relative to ARQ(54) goals). This took into account COMAIRCENT's recommendation that if reductions had to be made, they should be in fighter/bombers, rather than IDF aircraft.

General White informed COMAIRCENT that if a reduced effort by Belgium had to be accepted, then SHAPE considered that the new proposal was acceptable. (1)

By June, COMAIRCENT and SHAPE had thoroughly considered the Belgian plans. On 18 June 1955, General Norstad wrote to the Belgian MOD saying that "SHAPE, of course, still regrets the Belgian decision to reduce its Air Force and we remain hopeful that, in keeping with our previous conversations, Belgium will find it possible to resume the expansion of its Air Force at least to previously established goals". However, within a reduced ceiling SHAPE desired that the higher goal of 64 AWX aircraft be definitely established as the goal. (2)

On 13 July 1955, SACEUR informed the Standing Group that he noted that the SHAPE Capabilities Study had been based on an estimated force availability in 1957 of 326 squadrons of 6710 aircraft. Based upon the 1954 Annual Review, the estimated force availability for 1957 now was 269 squadrons of 5535 aircraft. The shortfall was due mainly to "the reductions in national force goals" and to delay in beginning the organisation of German forces. (3)

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(1) SHAPE Ltr. 0950 OT, Belgian Air Force Composition, 23 May 55.
(2) SHAPE :tr. 0950 AD, 18 Jun 55.
(3) In fact, it already appeared to planners that the first German Air Force squadron would not be combat ready before mid-1957.
The combat effectiveness of SACEUR's air forces was still below requirements for effective D-Day operations, SACEUR informed the SGN. Overall combat ready aircraft stood at 50% and combat ready aircrews were below this level. At the same time, however, considerable improvement in combat effectiveness had been made; and SACEUR pointed out that if national effort continued, improvement could be expected. (1)

(1) SHAPE Ltr. 325/55, AG 1105/7 PPO, Report Required in 1955 on Future Capabilities Plans, 1957, 13 Jul 55.
CHAPTER V
AIR DEFENCE

Background

ACE Air Defence 1949-1953. Air Defence in NATO was essentially a national responsibility. As a result, the nations developed their national air defences on the basis of individual doctrines, concept of operations, economic potential, and equipment available. Each nation developed its own air defence system and the systems were not necessarily compatible and reinforcing. (1)

In 1951, MC 36 made SACEUR "responsible" for air defence in "land combat zones", but without specifically defining these zones. The nations remained responsible for the air defence of their territories except for those parts where this responsibility had been delegated to the Allied Commanders. General Air Defence plans and regulations were to be worked out between SACEUR and the National Authorities. (2)

In early 1952, SHAPE worked out the details for air defence coordination and on 10 January asked the MSCs to review them before submission to the nations for concurrence. The twofold coordination proposed -- technical and operational -- covered planning and operations of regional communications networks; development of forces under command; operational control of Air Defence Forces and C & R systems; detailed coordination directly with adjacent forces; and training. (3)

On 21 March SACEUR's proposals were submitted to the Nations for concurrence. (4) By August 1952, the nations concerned with the Northern and Central European Regions had agreed to the arrangements for coordination and organisation proposed by SHAPE. (5)

As a result of the above agreements, the coordination of air defence between forces under the command of CINCAIRCENT and the National Air Defence forces of Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and the United Kingdom became the responsibility of CINCAIRCENT. At the same time, CINCAIRCENT became jointly responsible with the respective CINCs for

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(1) SHAPE History, Vol.I, Section 1, 9 Dec 53.
(2) MC 36 (Final), 21 Nov 51.
(3) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1250 SEC, Coordination of Air Defence, 10 Jan 52.
(4) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1250 PPO, 21 Mar 52.
(5) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1250 PPO, 8 Aug 52.
coordination between the Allied Air Forces Central Europe and the Northern and Southern Commands. In fulfilling this function, he was to exercise operational control over the air defence forces of Belgium, Holland and the eastern sector of France. The Air Defence forces in Belgium and the Netherlands were initially to be under operational control of Second ATAF, those of North-eastern France under Fourt ATAF.

In October 1952, CINCAIRCENT announced that he was forming a nucleus staff for air defence. This small group was charged with the preparation of coordinated and common procedure, doctrine and standards between France, Belgium, the Netherlands and assigned AIRCENT forces participating in the air defence of Central Europe. This group was led by a French officer and it was from this small beginning that the "Embry" study was developed. (1)

Soviet Threat in 1953. The Soviets had maintained approximately 20,000 military aircraft since the beginning of SHAPE. However, since 1951 they had conducted an extensive modernisation program. By mid-1953 most of their fighters and two thirds of their light bombers were jets. During the period they had doubled the number of Tu-4s (similar to the American B-21) in operational units. New types of medium and heavy bombers including jet models, were coming into their inventory. (2)

The Russians and their European satellites had greatly increased a number of major airfields in Eastern Europe. The construction program was still underway in 1953 with great emphasis on the building of very long runways which could be used by jet bombers.

COMAIRCENT's Recommendations.

Examination of Air Force Concepts. ACM Sir Basil Embry, COMAIRCENT, had the responsibility for defending Central Europe against air attack without, in his opinion, having the means or the proper authority to do so. On 21 November 1953, he provided Field Marshal Montgomery, General Norstad, General Schuyler and other key officials within the command, a comprehensive list of air defence deficiencies in his command. ACM Embry said that if ACE could not destroy the Soviet Air Force within the first few days of the war, a task which he personally believed impossible, "we must face up to the

(1) COMAIRCENT History 1955-1956 AIRCENT 171/56.
(2) Ismay, First Five Years of NATO.
unpleasant realisation that defensive fighters cannot guarantee any defence to the Land Forces or their installations, to a depth of approximately 100 miles from our forward positions when attacks are carried out below 5,000 feet.

ACM Embry pointed out that because existing radar equipment would not permit ground-controlled interception in this forward area below 5,000 feet, the only known method of detecting and intercepting hostile aircraft at this low altitude was by using an observer corps. Since the observers did not exist in the forward area, there was no chance of intercepting fast, low-flying aircraft.

At higher altitudes the chances of interception were better. Nevertheless because of the high speed of modern aircraft and the relatively short range of Early Warning Radar, which for security reasons had to be sited some distance behind the front line positions, it was not possible to make a ground-controlled interception by fighters within approximately 60 miles of the front line position by day, except by keeping patrols in the air continuously, which was economically impossible. ACM Embry pointed out that under cover of darkness, or in bad weather, the point of interception would be still further West. Because of this there was a strong argument to develop a Guided Missile Defence instead of a Fighter Defence for important target areas situated in what was described as the "region of low-chance interception".

ACM Embry proposed creating a guided missile and light AA weapon zone, approximately 100 miles deep, behind front line positions where fighter aircraft would not normally have an air defence role. "Whatever the arguments may be on the grounds of mobility", he said, "the fact remains that fighters are now an ineffective weapon of air defence in the forward areas and there is no alternative but to turn to guided missiles and light AA guns if defence is required within about 60 miles of our front line positions."

ACM Embry felt strongly that a centralised control over all air defence operations in Central Europe must be established. He deplored what he referred to as "penny packed" organisation wherein units and control over units were decentralised and under a number of different agencies. Coordination over a wide area was essential to efficient control.

ACM Embry "proposed that we should study as a matter of urgency the forming of a centralised Air Defence System for Central Europe and the creation of a Guided Missile/Light AA Gun Defence Zone, to a depth of 100 miles behind
Allied Air Defence Command Proposed. On 4 December 1953, ACM Embry again wrote to SACEUR stating "the Communist bombing potential is very considerable and likely to increase. By no stretch of the imagination could either the French or Dutch-Belgian fighter defences alone and unaided, counter this potential bombing threat. Even with the assistance of the fighter capability in the 2nd and 4th ATAFs, the relative position is little improved". ACM Embry charged that at the present time the elements of fighter defence in the Centre sector were uncoordinated, and arranged solely for the protection of national territories.

Enemy bomber forces would have great numerical superiority and would be able to choose the time and place of their attacks. The only hope of countering this enemy advantage lay in unifying the "penny packets" into a coordinated whole thus increasing the flexibility of the defence forces and enabling the Commander to put the maximum air defence force into the right area at the right time.

ACM Embry also said that it was necessary for one agency to control all electronic counter measures in the Central Region. The failure to counter the effects of enemy radio and radar jamming would render Allied air defence ineffective.

To correct the deficiencies he had noted, COMAIRCENT recommended that "the necessary national and international agreements in principle be obtained as soon as possible to the following:

a. that on or about 1 January 1955, an Air Defence Commander for Central Europe be appointed,

b. that the Air Defence Commander shall have operational control of the air defences of France, Holland and Belgium,

c. that the Allied Air Defence Commander shall be responsible directly to the Commander, Allied Air Forces Central Europe.

d. that the planning and construction of an Air Defence Operations Centre shall be initiated as soon as possible." (2)

(1) AAFCE 717-53, 21 Nov 53. Air Defence was just one part of the comprehensive program proposed by ACM Embry.

(2) SG/1130 APFC 53, COMAIRCENT to SACEUR, 4 Dec 53.
Marshal Juin, CINCENT, strongly endorsed his subordinates concepts and recommended to SACEUR that "the different National Governments be approached with a view to obtaining their agreement in principle," to Embry's proposals. (1)

Discussions in North Atlantic Council.

As studies on specific aspects of the AD problem were being discussed in ACE and SHAPE, other important developments in the same field were occurring. At the meeting of the SG on 9 December 1953, the grave weaknesses in control and warning systems were pointed out and discussed. (2)

Although the NAC's "constitution and the method of operating made it impossible for" SHAPE to submit ACM Embry's proposals to them on "so short notice", (3) air defence deficiencies were brought to the attention of the council by the MC and the Major NATO Commanders on 15 December.

Admiral Sir John Edelston, CINCHAN, expressed concern to the NAC that his convoys might fight their way thru enemy submarines and mine fields only to find the European channel ports "bombed out of existence, incapable of working to full capacity, or closed by mines laid by air." He felt that this defect could only be remedied by providing "more radar cover, fighter aircraft and AA guns."

When SACEUR addressed the NAC on 15 December, he did not raise the air defence question, but he did point out to them that the Council had charged him "with the job of defending all of Europe and you have not said 'do not defend this part' or 'do not defend that part'; you have said 'defend it all'". He felt that his retaliatory forces could deter but not necessarily defend. However he declined to make specific recommendations at that time. (4)

SACEUR's Air Defence Initiatives.

Request for AIRCENT Study. On 22 December, General Gruenther wrote to Marshal Juin and pointed out that the cost of implementing Embry's proposals prohibited him from moving rapidly in this area. Requirements and plans

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(1) SG/1130 AFCE/53, Juin to Gruenther, 5 Dec 53.
(2) SG 195th Meeting, 9 Dec 53.
(3) Ltr. AM Dawson to ACM Embry, 15 Dec 53.
(4) CVR(53)55, 15 Dec 53.
for infrastructure, communications, and radar systems would have to be evaluated. He also indicated that his staff had discussed certain "technical aspects of setting up a central air defence organisation" with AIRCENT and he understood "that further studies are in progress."

SACEUR concluded by saying "I should be grateful if you would arrange for me to be provided with a further staff study on these lines." (1)

Air Defence of National Lines of Communications. On 5 January 1954, General Gruenther directed that a study be made of the problem of providing air defence for the national lines of communications (LOC) upon which his forces had to depend. The defence of these LOCs was for the most part a national responsibility, carried out by forces not assigned or earmarked for SACEUR.

However, in view of the importance of these LOCs, SACEUR felt in the future the air defence of these LOCs and other military installations, (even where this was purely and clearly a national responsibility carried out by national forces) must be considered in exercises, staff studies and reviews.

General Gruenther specifically cautioned that his directive did not give them any authority to communicate with the MODs of the nations concerned, or their subordinate air defence formations, on national air defence matters. Such information as was already available on the national air defence systems could be obtained by the staff from the Secretary, Anti-Aircraft Committee, PPANDO. (2)

Staff Discussion of Air Defence. The views and suggestions of ACM Embry were taken seriously by SHAPE. On 23 January 1954, at a meeting with the division chiefs, General Schuyler called upon key officers to review the situation frankly and to comment on the principles championed by Embry.

General Lorillot, ACOS PPANDO, outlined the air defence situation within ACE and indicated the steps which he felt would be necessary to correct existing weaknesses. There was a great shortage of interceptor aircraft and ACE did not have continuous radar coverage to provide for control and reporting. There was a shortage of equipment, a shortage of men to provide for continuous manning, as well as insufficient training.

(1) Ltr. Gruenther to Juin, 22 Dec 53.
(2) SHAPE Staff Directive No.65, 5 Jan 54.
facilities. The organisation of observer corps among the various nations were completely ineffective.

General Lorillot stated that the NATO nations should emphasise the development and production of aircraft, guided missiles, anti-aircraft identification devices.

AM Dawson said that while SHAPE certainly agreed with ACM Embry on the need, there were many political and financial questions to be considered. How to provide for the necessary material and equipment under infrastructure programs was also a question. Also, the fact that air defence was still a national responsibility made centralisation impossible at that time.

General Bailly, AFCENT COFS, a visitor at SHAPE on this occasion stated that he felt that while air defence was admittedly a national responsibility, there was no valid reason why the nations should object to an international command. Under the Western Union Defence Organisation (WUDO), such a command had been agreed to. It was intended that this organisation would operate only in case of war, but the five national staffs had received from their MODs instructions on how this should be done. A sub-committee on air defence had been created under WUDO and had been operative for three years. General Bailly stated that the air defence organisation in France, Belgium and Holland was derived from this committee. He felt that the nations would accept the increased financial burden since a comparison of the cost of the airfield construction program with the cost of an air defence organisation would show that the air defence organisation was relatively cheap. (1)

General Schuyler concluded the discussion by saying that incorporation of Air Defence within SACEUR's command would mean taking on additional responsibilities without the means to carry them out. (2)

The Embry Study.

Sir Basil Embry had apparently been waiting for SACEUR's request, for in less than six weeks the study was ready. On 30 January 1954 he submitted his staff study, The Organisation of Central European Air Defences, thru CINCENT to SACEUR. Historically, this study is

(2) SHAPE/24/25, Minutes C/S Mtg., 23 Jan 54.
important since it contains the germ of many of the ideas later appearing in more advanced and detailed studies on air defence. Marshal Juin gave this study his full concurrence and support. (1)

Elements of Air Defence. Embry's study began with a brief discussion of the elements of air defence. Air Defence, in his terms consisted of fighter planes, guns, guided missiles, a control and reporting system, and electronic countermeasures. The reporting system, radar or ground observer informed the controller of the strength, height, direction and speed of an enemy aircraft. This information would enable the controller to send fighters to intercept or to alert guns to counter the threat. The reporting system had to be fast enough to give sufficient warning so that fighters could be scrambled in time to intercept the enemy before he could attack his target. The fighters and guns had to be of such quality that they could engage enemy aircraft on favourable terms.

The time factor was of importance in air defence operations. ACM Embry pointed out the grave necessity for cutting down wasted time to the very minimum. From the results of tests and exercises conducted in the past few years, Embry was able to state that the average delay inherent in the present system of aircraft interception, from the time the first plot appeared on the radar screen to the time that the fighter took off, was approximately thirteen minutes. More time was lost before the fighter could sight the enemy and attack.

He cited the hypothetical case of an enemy IL-28 flying at 30,000 feet at a speed of 400 knots and with an Allied F-86-E as the intercepting plane. From the time the radar plot appeared until the interceptor's wheels left the ground the IL-28 would have penetrated approximately 87 nautical miles. In the eight and one-half minutes which it would take the F-86-E to climb to 30,000 feet the IL-28 would have penetrated another 56 nautical miles. Having reached the proper height, the F-86-E would require approximately five minutes to begin firing on the target, during which time the Soviet bomber would fly 33 more nautical miles into friendly territory. All in all, the enemy bomber would have penetrated about 176 nautical miles toward its target after having been detected. For every extra minute of delay the bomber would penetrate a further seven miles.

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(1) AFCE Ltr. 196 OPS 54, Juin to Gruenther, 30 Jan 54 w/enc., Staff Study by COMAIRCENT, AFCE 58/54.
The Threat in 1954. The numerical strength of the Soviet air forces since the beginning of SHAPE had been constant at about 20,000 aircraft; but very considerable modernisation had taken place. In 1951, about 20 per cent of their 10,000 fighters were jets; by January 1954, almost all of their fighters were jets. In early 1951, light jet bombers had not been introduced into operational units; by 1954, well over two-thirds of their 3,000 light bombers were jets. In the medium bomber category, the Soviets have since 1951, doubled the number of TU-4s (similar to the US B-29) in operational units.

The development of a comprehensive aviation training programme substantially enhanced the capability of Soviet air power.

Up to 1951, the combat value of the satellite air forces was insignificant, and their aircraft were obsolete. By 1954, they had 2,100 aircraft. Half of their fighters were jets. Their facilities had been improved, and training had reached a fairly satisfactory standard.

The comparative strength between the air forces available to the Russians in Europe on D-Day and those available to SACEUR in ACE showed a ratio of 17,000 for the enemy to 4,000 for the Allies.

The Soviets could mass a bombing threat of 1,000 TU-4s, 400 IL-28s and 700 IL-10s plus a large number of MIG-15s capable of attacking ACE. The TU-4 and the IL-28 were all-weather aircraft and could deliver nuclear weapons.

The Soviets were capable of launching an air attack upon Western Europe at any time they chose with almost complete surprise. The number of nuclear weapons available to the Russians was unknown, but was assumed that they had or would soon have enough to be a great threat. The Soviets had a substantial conventional guided missile capability. It was assumed that a nuclear warhead would be developed for the missiles. While the Soviets had the means to launch World War II type bombing attacks, it was believed that they would rely on nuclear weapons.

The Sector System. ACM Embry proposed a Sector System to be put into effect throughout Central Europe. The area to be defended would be divided into a certain number of sectors. Each sector commander would have within his sector fighter units, early warning radars, control radars and guns. He would be responsible for fighting the air battle within his sector and would be responsible for making the best combined use of fighters.
and guns in this area. He would have the power to control or restrict gunfire. All or part of the sector's aircraft could be employed without consulting higher headquarters.

Each sector would be connected to an Air Defence Operations Centre (ADOC) which would coordinate the activities of all the sectors, particularly with regard to immediate reinforcement. The ADOC would maintain a general situation map (GSM) on which would be displayed air information on the whole defence area, and this information would be displayed at the same time that the information appeared on the various sector GSMs. The ADOC would also possess exact and up-to-date information regarding the fighter aircraft in each sector throughout the defence area. The data would cover the number of aircraft already committed and their mission, the number on the ground re-arming and re-fueling and the number immediately available. The controller at the ADOC would have the overall picture of enemy and defensive fighter activity throughout the whole area and would be in a position to order immediate reinforcement between sectors in times of intense enemy activity. The Air Defence Controller would have the authority to employ aircraft outside their normal sectors.

The ADOC would not be concerned with the immediate tactical control of the battle. Aircraft would be controlled by the sector in which they were operating. Although normally these fighters would return to their own bases, they would have the capability of operating from other airfields.

Electronic Warfare. It was absolutely essential, ACM Embry believed, that EW be under a central control on a theatre basis. Such active measures as jamming, controlling all radar and radio transmissions which might assist enemy navigation if improperly employed; and such passive measures as the allocation of unjammed frequencies among elements of air defence on a threat basis and assessment of "spoofs", had to be controlled by a single agency if they were to be effective. (1)

Standing Group requests AD Study.

As studies on specific aspects of the AD problem were being discussed, other important developments were occurring.

As a result of discussions in the SG, the MC and the NAC in the previous December, on 19 February 1954, the SG informed SACEUR that it:

(1) AIRCENT 58/54, Study on the Organisation of Central European Air Defence.
Desires that you prepare a comprehensive study covering all aspects of the air defence of the NATO area of Europe, on which to base recommendations to NATO and national authorities. It will, of course, be necessary to consult fully with other commands and national authorities, who also are vitally involved.

While it will clearly be necessary to make a theoretical study of force requirements, the main aim should be to produce a Capabilities Plan of the most effective pattern of air defence within the resources generally envisaged in the 1953 Annual Review and in consideration of available intelligence and risk estimates. The study should evaluate the efficiency of the air defence on the NATO area of Europe and make recommendations for increasing the efficiency thereof. It should cover the period from now until 1 July 1957.

You should use the same planning factors as provided for your 1957 requirements and Capabilities Studies. In addition, it is desired that the study include consideration of, but by no means be confined to, the following aspects:

a. Control and reporting systems including ground, sea and air radar, ground observer organisation, recognition and identification systems, air traffic control systems, etc., and their supporting communication lines.

b. Aircraft, including types, deployment, etc.

c. Anti-aircraft artillery, including types, deployment fire control systems, etc.

d. Guided missiles, using the best information available within the limits of National Security Regulations.

e. Passive defence such as black-outs, balloons, smoke, deception.

f. Counter-measures, such as electronics counter-measures, consideration of offensive air action of own and supporting aircraft, control of electromagnetic transmission, etc.

g. Logistics support and infrastructure.

h. Man-power and training, specially availability of technicians.
i. Language and procedures, including standardisation.

j. Command, control and coordination structure and their supporting communications links, and any proposed changes thereto."

The Standing Group requested that SACEUR forward his study and recommendations to them at the earliest practicable date, but not later than 1 June 1954. (1)

Air Defence Committee.

General Gruenther established, specifically for the purposes of supervising and preparing the air defence study, an Air Defence Committee which was headed by General Lorillot, ACOS PPANDO. The two full-time members of this Committee were Group Captain Anderson, Deputy Chairman, and Lt. Col. Landon. Additional members were named from the SHAPE Signal Division and from the Office of the Air Deputy. The Committee was authorised to call in additional expert advisers from the staff divisions of SHAPE and from the Major Subordinate Commands. It was also authorised to establish liaison with the MODs of nations concerned and with the NATO Civilian Defence Committee.

The Air Defence Committee was directed to work in close and effective collaboration with the NAG which was at this time engaged in the Capabilities Plan and also interested in Air Defence.

The Committee was instructed to assemble such material and to prepare such guidance as was appropriate to SHAPE. Detailed work falling within the jurisdiction of the MSCs was to be delegated to them as soon as possible. The final coordination of the work of the MSCs and the preparation of the final report would be done at SHAPE by the Air Defence Committee. (2)

Negotiations with the Nations.

On 12 March SHAPE addressed letters to MODs of France, Belgium and the Netherlands. To M. Rene Pleven, MOD France, General Schuyler set forth ACM Embry's and Marshal Juin's views that to achieve an effective air defence we must create "an organisation which will bring under one single control in wartime all the means of air defence that we possess in the Central Region and its rear areas. It is impracticable to conduct modern air defence, if, within a homogeneous area such as the Centre, our resources are controlled by different authorities without proper collaboration and coordination." Operational control would only be necessary in time of war. (3)

(1) Msg. SCOIN 1894, SG to SACEUR, 19 Feb 54.
(2) DCPO 1250 Directive to ACOS PPANDO, 10 Mar 54.
(3) Ltr. SHAPE to MOD France, 12 Mar 54.
M. Pleven's reply on 15 April 1954, said that air
defence was a major concern and that the French
Government in 1953 had made it a point to stress to
the NAC "the weaknesses of air defence in SACEUR's area
of command and to make a strong request for the
Council's consideration of that problem".

M. Pleven also said "The French Government in 1952
made known its approval of the suggestions relating
to the adoption of a system providing for coordination
of the Central Europe and SHAPE echelons. It is
considered that this measure was only a first step and
that it should be followed by further efforts along
the line thus begun."

M. Pleven concluded by insisting that the Central
Region must be tied in with "its rear areas - Great
Britain, the Mediterranean and North Africa - and the
adjoining zones." (1)

By 27 April the Netherlands had concurred with
SHAPE's proposal, but no answer had been received
from Belgium. General Lorillot felt that it was time
to initiate discussion on the CINCENT-COMAIRCENT-French
Air Staff level. ACM Dawson agreed (2) and on 28 April
SHAPE formally suggested to the MOD France that CINCENT
and the French Air Staff hold meetings to consider the
question of organisation of air defence in Central
Europe. (3)

M. Pleven agreed to these meetings on 6 May 1954
expressing the view that a flexible and efficient
organisation for Air Defence could be set up under
the concept of Operational Control at Central Europe
level. (4)

SACEUR Discussion of AD with the NAC.

While the correspondence with M. Pleven was in progress,
the NAC called on SACEUR on 23 March 1954. At that time
both FM Montgomery and General Gruenther took occasion to
reiterate the seriousness of the air defence situation in
ACE. General Gruenther presented the case as ACM Embry
had in his various papers.

Concluding his remarks to the Council, General Gruenther
said: "There are certain national objectives which each
nation feels must be defended, but to have national
strings tied to national air forces makes it impossible
to develop a coordinated and effective air defence force.
I plead with you to do everything possible to diminish

(1) Ltr. MOD France to SACEUR, 15 Apr 54
(2) IOLC PPO 1250, PPANDO to DCPO, 27 Apr 54, w/note by DCPO,
28 Apr.
(3) Ltr. SHAPE to MOD France, 20 Apr 54.
(4) Ltr. MOD France to SACEUR, 6 May 54.
that type of thinking. I'm not for the massacre of women
and children in any city, but with the possibility of
the jet-atomic surprise attack, each site to be
defended must be given its proper priority in relation
to the overall strategy. Although we do not have
any specific recommendations to make at this time,
I respectfully recommend that you condition your thinking
to the fact that nationalistic thinking is anathema
to this problem. The difficulties of this problem
are such that a perfect solution is nearly impossible
to attain, even if it involved only one country." (1)

Air Defence Committee's Preliminary Study. By 16 April
the Committee had completed a preliminary study of
the problem and was ready to provide its finding to
the MSCs. General Schuyler forwarded an abbreviated
version of the Committee's study to the MSCs and said that
"This study will take into account the estimated enemy
threat for the period; it will evaluate the efficiency
of the air defence of the zone responsibility
of SACEUR in coordination with national authorities
and adjacent external NATO commanders; and it will
estimate the theoretical overall requirements for
an adequate air defence system during this period.
Emphasis will be placed upon capabilities, making
recommendations for achieving the maximum practicable
effectiveness from the resources to become available
before 1 July 1957, as reported in the 1953 Annual
Review."

The area to be defended was outlined for the MSCs
and included Norway, and Denmark (including their coastal
waters); the Skagerrak, the Kattegat; the Sound and Belts;
the Baltic (including its southern littoral); Western
Germany; France (French North Africa and Corsica, which,
although included in the Southern European area, were
French Zones of the Interior); Belgium; the Netherlands;
Luxembourg; the US, UK and French Zones of Austria (on
a covert basis); Italy (Sardinia and Sicily remained
an Italian responsibility under conditions parallel to
those of North Africa and Corsica); Trieste (the US and
UK Zones on a covert basis); Greece, Turkey and the whole
Mediterranean and the Black Seas; the approached to the
Strait of Gibraltar eastward of longitude five degrees
twenty-six minutes west.

(1) Summary Record, Informal Briefing of NAC, 23 Mar 54.
Extracts from the information provided by the MSCs were very revealing. On aircraft, for instance, the Committee's report read, "...only about 55 per cent of the aircraft required are expected to be available by 1957, and a large proportion of these can be expected to be ineffective because of the shortage of trained technicians and pilots. Reserves of operational aircraft are virtually non-existent, and this situation is not expected to improve..." Of the requirement for 2,350 medium anti-aircraft batteries, "only 675 batteries have been formed or are planned for formation in the immediate future, and of these, only some 390 batteries will, under present programs, have complete scales of modern equipment by 1 January 1975." On guided missiles, the Committee said, "...No guided missiles are expected to be available for air defence before 1957."

The situation with regard to radar to detect and track any enemy assault was succinctly summed up in the statement "The existing radar does not afford continuous coverage." There was very little radar in Norway and Denmark and very little likelihood of continuous plotting above 30,000 feet. In Holland and Belgium the little radar in existence was obsolete. In France, there was no radar southwest from St. Valéry, Orleans and Lyon to Glens. In Italy, there was only limited control because of the lack of height finders. In Greece, only early warning radar existed. In Turkey, coverage was inadequate and there was little chance of obtaining continuous coverage of enemy aircraft.

So few operators and men were available in ACE that only FOUR ATAF was capable of manning radar on a 24 hour basis. TWO ATAF's radar was operational only from dawn to dusk. Radar operated four hours a day in the North; 8 hours a day in parts of France and four hours per day on an average in the South. Only STRIKFORSOUTH had complete 24-hour coverage.

At the same time as the results of the Air Defence Committee's studies were sent to the MSC, they were dispatched to the MODs of the NATO nations. (1)

The SHAPE Study on Air Defence.

The final product of the work done by the Air Defence Committee and the staffs of the MSCs, in coordination with the various national authorities, was not completed by 1 July as requested by the Standing Group. Because of the complicated nature of its basic contents, the difficulty of acquiring further necessary information promptly, and the great press of other types of business at SHAPE, the study was not forwarded to the SG until

(1) SHAPE 216/54 and 217/54, 16 Apr 54.
Deficiencies in ACE Air Defence. General Gruenther, in his cover letter, outlined for the Standing Group the problem facing ACE. "We are weak in forces and resources", he said, "and we are operating under a system of divided responsibilities between NATO and national forces which prevents those resources that are available being used in the most effective manner. The overriding requirement therefore is to evolve a form of unified command responsibility which will correct this deficiency."

The Air Defence Study pointed out to the SG that the command organisation and general air defence structure of ACE were inadequate; the efficiency of the air defence system was greatly limited by the national partitioning of the NATO area of Europe; the control and reporting systems were incomplete and inadequate; operations would be hindered by the inability to exploit the full depth of the NATO area of Europe, especially in the Central Region; equipment and aircraft in use were inadequate; operations would be hindered by the inability to exploit the full depth of the NATO area of Europe, especially in the Central Region; equipment and aircraft in use were inadequate in quantity and quality; and air defence forces were untrained and would require too much time for mobilisation and deployment in case of war.

SACEUR recommended that approval in principle be given to:

a. **Command Structure.**

In broad terms, however, it is visualised that the command structure required to control the Air Defence System of the NATO area of Europe would consist basically of an Air Defence Commander in each of the regions described below. Each Air Defence Commander would be responsible to the appropriate Senior Commander and would have, in addition to his air and control and warning units, directly under him a Land Anti-aircraft Command Organisation, excepting those at field army and lower mobile force levels. To enable the command structure to function executive there will have to be Air Defence and Operating Rooms, with appropriate communications, in the North, in the Centre, and probably two in the South (one for Italy and one for Greece and Turkey).

(1) SACEUR did point out the problems of Air Defence in his report on 1 July 1954. See Annex Number 1.
b. Regional Organisation.

1. The whole of the area of SACEUR's command responsibility should be treated as a single Air Defence Zone to include the NATO area of Europe in close liaison with SAACLANT and CINCHAN.

2. This Air Defence Zone should be subdivided into regions or Air Defence Commands generally as follows:

   (a) North Norway and Denmark, coordinating with UK and CINCENT.

   (b) Centre The Central European area including France, Western Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg, coordinating with UK, CINCNORTH and CINCSOUTH.

   (c) South Italy, coordinating with CINCENT.

   (d) South Greece and Turkey, coordinating with the British Middle East Command.

3. Later developments in this structure might be an Iberian Air Defence Command and a Balkan Air Defence Command to include Yugoslavia.

4. The responsibility for the Air Defence of convoys and of the LOCs through the Mediterranean should be a matter for joint coordination and cooperation between CINCAPMED, CINCSOUTH, and adjacent National Authorities.

5. The United Kingdom, remaining under national control, should assist in coordination with CINCNORTH and CINCENT.

6. French North Africa, remaining under national control, should act in closest coordination with CINCSOUTH.

SHAPE Air Defence Staff. General Gruenther then requested that the SG authorise "forthwith an increase in the SHAPE personnel ceiling to cover the establishment of a small group of Air Defence experts (initially 12 officers and 8 other ranks and civilians). I plan that this Air Defence Group will be headed by an Officer of Air Commodore or Brigadier General rank." (1)

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(1) SHAPE 626/54, 23 Oct 54.
The Quest for Support. Both SACEUR and the Air Deputy continued to warn higher NATO authorities of the urgency of the situation, and to point out, particularly, the meaning and intent of SHAPE's actions in this area. During a visit of the Permanent Representatives of the NAC to SHAPE on December 1954, General Gruenther recalled the many programs that were part of the Capabilities Plan for 1957 the Plan that at that moment the Council had under consideration.

It was doubtful that these programs were going to save money, SACEUR said. A sophisticated air defence system that eliminated the shortcomings of a series of radar stations that worked only 8 hours a day was not going to be cheap. (1)

Again, on 17 December 1954, at the formal Ministerial meeting of the NAC, while announcing the United States' provision of an Air Defence Technical Centre Organisation in the Hague, SACEUR seized the opportunity to request political authorities' cooperation because of the urgent need for scientific personnel -- a need which soon would be presented formally to those authorities. (2)

In January 1955, General Norstad, Air Deputy, while briefing the UK Under Secretary of State on air defence problems pointed out the continuing limitations on SHAPE's acceptance of responsibility for the air defence of national territory -- a responsibility SHAPE could not carry out, said, because "we could not discharge it".

At the same time, SHAPE had no desire to have the authority to deploy the air defence forces provided by national authorities for national defence, the AIRDEP said. Nor did SHAPE aspire to any form of detailed demand or control over elements of national air defence systems. Under current terms of reference, SHAPE proposed to deal with air defence matters in broad terms "as an entirety". (3)

Establishment of the Air Defence Directorate

Staff Authorisation. On 10 December 1954, a little more than a month following SACEUR's submission of his Air Defence study, the Standing Group informed him that the staff increases he required for an Air Defence Directorate had been approved. Initially, the Directorate would consist of 12 officers and eight other ranks and civilians. However, the Standing Group also considered that SHAPE would be able to achieve some compensating savings in staff positions to effect these increases, and requested that this be done, where possible. (4)

1) Excerpt from General Gruenther's Address to the Permanent Representatives at the NAC at SHAPE, 3 Dec 54 -- from unedited draft, 3 Dec 54.
2) CVR(54)50, Meeting of the NAC, 17 Dec 54.
3) Ltr., ACM Dawson to Lord Carrington, 27 Jan 55.
4) SGN Msg. STAND (Paris) 4, 10 Dec 54.
Within a week, SHAPE notified the SG of two spaces that would be saved in PPANDO by the transfer to the Air Defence Directorate of two posts, both allotted to UK services. A Royal Air Force Air Commodore as a Director, and a French Air Force Colonel, as a Deputy Director, were being requested as early as possible to help in completing the new organisation. (1) The two executive spaces were requested on 20 December 1954; and, on 7 January 1955, a proposed table of personnel for the Air Defence Directorate was submitted to PANDA. (2)

On 13 January 1955 PANDA approved the proposed directorate staff, and the following day SHAPE forwarded a breakdown of the entire Air Defence Directorate's organisation to the Standing Group. Simultaneously, the SG was asked to obtain US agreement to fill two officer and two OR positions. SHAPE also asked for the agreement of other nations through the various NMRs. (3)

On 25 January, the US agreed to provide personnel for the Air Defence Directorate, but stipulated that these eventually had to be absorbed within the then approved ceilings. (4)

As for progress in air defence measures, themselves, on 28 January, the SGN requested that SHAPE provide a report on the coordination of these measures by April. (5)

On 19 February, France requested that it be given the same representation in the AD Directorate as that which had been allocated to the UK.

Air Defence Directorate Established. These matters did not prevent official establishment of the organisation, however. On 1 March 1955, SACEUR announced the formation of the Air Defence Directorate in the Air Deputies Office under Air Commodore Lott, RAF. For the first time in the history of ACE an official organisational element (concerned primarily with the threat from the air), assisted by the SHAPE Air Defence Technical Centre at The Hague, was charged with the actual planning of an Allied air defence and with coordination of research and scientific information on all matters relating to air defence within ACE. (6)

(1) SHAPE Msg. SH 37841, 17 Dec 54.
(3) SHAPE Msg. SH 38182, 14 Jan 55. This was followed shortly after by a requisition for a Chief, Control and Reporting Section -- Wing Commander, RAF.
(4) STAND 1038 SGN.to SHAPE, 25 Jan 55.
(5) STAND 981, SGN to SHAPE, 28 Jan 55.
(6) SHAPE 264/55, AG 2208, SACEUR's Periodic Report to the SG #44, 23 May 55.
Unfortunately, on 15 March, SHAPE had to inform the SG that, because the Directorate was still in its formative stage, it would be impracticable to submit the requested progress report on the coordination of air defence measures by April 1955. (1)

On 11 March 1955, General Norstad met with a representative of the French Air Force to discuss France's request for greater representation on the Directorate. It was agreed that the matter would be settled by the Director of the Air Defence Directorate. A further meeting on 14 April between General Bailly, representing French authorities, and Air Commodore Lott, the newly designated Air Defence Director, resulted in an agreement on 18 April to add one French officer to the Directorate's staff at the expense of a UK Army Colonel's post.

The following day the Air Defence Directorate notified PANDA of the revised organisation and the requirements for all unified officer spaces. On 26 April 1955, PANDA formally requested NMRs' approval of the changes in the newly formed Air Defence Directorate. (2)

Early accomplishments of the AD Directorate. By the end of April 1955, the Air Defence Directorate was a functioning element in SHAPE. In its first months it was concerned mainly with absorbing information relating to existing air defence systems in SACEUR's area of responsibility and in organising and developing procedures for further action. The philosophy of a Continental Air Defence System had been discussed with a number of authorities, including those of AIRCENT and the SHAPE Air Defence Technical Centre (SADTC).

The relationships between SADTC and SHAPE had been discussed by representatives of SADTC and the AD Directorate. "Sub-tasks" had been allocated.

The arrival of additional personnel in the Directorate made it possible to begin formal planning and allocation of specific tasks to members of the staff.

Current Air Defence problems were taken over from the other SHAPE divisions. These included subjects such as: standardisation of navigation aids, civil defence liaison, NATO anti-aircraft command structure, routing and recognition for aircraft in war, and German participation in Air Defence. (3)

(1) SHAPE Msg. SH 39282, 15 Mar 55.
(2) Annex A to AD 1250/3, (Air Deputy) A. Def., 6 May 55.
(3) Annex A to AD 1250/3, (Air Deputy) A. Def., 6 May 55.
SACEUR reports problems to NAC. Again, on 1 April 1955, at a briefing presented to the NAC at SHAPE, General Gruenther demonstrated, among other things, the myriad of problems presented by the multiplicity of command systems existing in the area of ACE. Using graphic displays, SACEUR showed how jet aircraft leaving Soviet-dominated territory would take from 45 to 55 minutes to penetrate at least two different command systems in Allied nations. While, assuredly, the nations concerned would expect their territories to be defended, SACEUR pointed out that, "...you can't defend them all; because if you parcel up air defence, you have no air defence left."

How to get a better command system dominated SHAPE planners' thinking, but with developing national sensitivities, he warned, "we could end up with no air defence, no matter what kind of scientific and technical improvements come out of the Hague study..." "We don't know exactly what the answer is," SACEUR continued, "but this doesn't really cost any money to solve. It's a question of getting a command system working."

Reporting systems, radar screens, and the "guided-missile phase" would follow, as would the need for all-weather fighters with complicated electronic devices. These would involve considerable expense -- something that would be known following the studies beginning at The Hague, SACEUR said. "But with inevitable evolutionary changes in weaponry, and the required air defence command-and-control system SACEUR observed that "it does not necessarily mean that it will be a cheaper effort in the long run.... The impact of such romantic words as "New Look" and "New Approach," and so forth, does not necessarily mean 'Cheaper Look', or 'Cheaper Approach'...." (1)

Air Defence Command and Control in NATO Europe -- First Official Proposals.

Within six months of the establishment of SACEUR's Air Defence planning staff, he was able to make specific recommendations to the Standing Group. On 26 August 1955, he described the efforts of that staff since its inception, and noted that its first task had been a review of the existent structure for command and control of Air Defence efforts and development of a basis for effective coordination or integration.

(1) Record of Briefing of the NATO Council, at SHAPE, Paris, France, on 1 April 1955, by Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, SACEUR, and Staff -- unedited draft prepared by the Secretary, SHAPE.
Basic Factors. Planners' approach to the problem highlighted three basic factors: that air defence remained a national responsibility, except in certain defined areas; that regional air commanders in ACE had forces, facilities and responsibilities that bore directly upon the air defence problem; and that, for reasons which derived from geography and the status of the forces build-up, the air defence implications of German rearmament were a special element of the larger consideration implicit in the first two.

The most pressing need, however, was for the establishment of some integrated or coordinate system for command and control of air defence capabilities and efforts. For this SACEUR proposed as a starting point the existing Allied Headquarters, and requested authorisation to "develop the system of coordination of Air Defence capabilities and efforts of NATO Europe."

SACEUR considered that the extent and scope of coordination on that proved possible would depend on the information that national authorities made available to Allied commanders; the degree of influence that national authorities permitted Allied commanders to exercise in their plans and programs; and, finally, on the staff capability that the Allied commanders were permitted to establish. Initial actions therefore required Allied commanders' direct access to all Air Defence agencies concerned and the interchange of appropriate information and plans. The states of combat readiness of aircraft, guns, personnel and radar; the states of alert, early warning; "Y" services; combat intelligence; standards of training; and other procedures and techniques were among the specific areas that needed to be included in the proposed coordination. (1)

Consideration to Implement the Air Defence Concept. To permit implementation of the concept, certain significant considerations applied. ATAF Commanders already had specified responsibilities in Air Defence. SACEUR did not propose to disturb that arrangement. Regional air headquarters (e.g. AIRNORTH, AIRCENT, AIRSOUTH) appeared to be the key organisations in development of participation in air defence matters; this might imply certain staff modifications or increases in personnel.

Also, with regard to the current organisational framework of ACE, and other national considerations, SACEUR believed that the time had come to recognise four Air Defence regions -- three of which would be entirely comparable in geographical terms with the then, North, South-Med and Centre Regions of ACE, and the fourth,

(1) SACEUR Ltr. AG 1250 AD, Air Defence Command and Control NATO Europe, 26 Aug 55.
which would consist of the United Kingdom. (1) These Regional Air Defence Commanders would deal with national Air Defence authorities in their regions.

SACEUR also made proposals for anti-aircraft defence (including missiles) which would necessarily be controlled by the Air Defence Commanders.

Further, SACEUR proposed setting up an Air Defence Committee at SHAPE. Among other things, this Committee would facilitate consultations and exchange of information between Allied Commands in ACE and national authorities; keep the air defence situation of the regions under constant review; make recommendations for putting coordination measures into effect; review the status of weapons and equipment and make suggestions on priorities; make recommendations for improvements in liaison and standardisation. Proposed Terms of Reference for the Committee were included with SACEUR's letter to the SG, and membership of countries, agencies and/or commanders was specified. (2)

Finally, with reference to the implications of German rearmament and air defence, SACEUR noted that such defence in West German territory was a responsibility of the Allied Tactical Air Forces. He considered it unwise to modify this arrangement, and noted that he had taken account of the possibility of the development of a separate German air defence system but it appeared undesirable.

Summary of SACEUR's AD Proposals. In summary, SACEUR asked first that "it be recognised that coordination of the present command and control systems for air defence in NATO Europe is a necessity, responsibility for which /is/ best discharged by an within ACE", and that he be authorised to develop an appropriate system for that coordination. Assuming acceptance of this principle SACEUR asked that national authorities "be joined to cooperate to the extent possible in the provision of information and in responding sympathetically to requests for assistance and participation.

He asked that it be recognised that an augmentation of personnel might be required; that the concept of the Air Defence Committee be accepted; that the concepts he had indicated with respect to Anti-Aircraft Defence be approved; and that the integration of German air defence forces within

(1) SACEUR did not propose, at that time, an additional Air Defence Region to include that part of France which was outside "the combat zone". The current area of responsibility in France and the status of the French Air Defence Command and its own responsibilities were factors that SACEUR felt should be transcended by the need for immediate integration of effort. The proposal for the creation of a UK Air Defence Region was a change from the original proposals contained in the SHAPE AD Study, See page 221.

(2) Appendix B to AG 1250 AD, 26 Aug 55.
the ATAF be accepted as a basis for operational planning. (1)

NATO Defence Ministers Briefed. Aware of the continued resistance to certain aspects of an international Allied air defence system, both General Gruenther and General Norstad, continued to plead their case and to warn higher national authorities of the common need. On 11 October 1955, both officers addressed a meeting of the NATO Defence Ministers at SHAPE.

SACEUR again graphically demonstrated the absence of full air defence control in time of peace; the difficulties confronting his command in preparing even a limited air defence in the areas where "35-45 minutes distances" separated certain NATO nations from great danger; and the restrictions that would prevail in time of war. "Knowing that this is a complicated problem, knowing how the publics in each country feel about it," he said, "we have approached the problem from a standpoint of a step-by-step approach. Rather than coming in and saying we feel that this must be a unified command today, and running our head against the stone wall, we have taken another approach. That approach is.../that we feel that there are basically four air defence areas...We think that we should have the task, the responsibility, of coordinating these areas."

"What are the means by which we would do it? One system could be a committee here representing each country. We finally discarded that system, and instead of that we are working on an arrangement now which has had the informal approval of the Standing Group....Basically, it is this: that we are asking for the responsibility for coordinating these four areas, and with contacts, liaison contacts, with people in each of the countries, who will be able to speak authoritatively for the country with respect to the specific measures we want to put across."

Further, SACEUR observed that "we have two things with the air defence problem now! One is an archaic command system for implementing any kind of air defence, and secondly, the question of the technical developments in providing an air defence system." He noted the slow but certain start being made on these problems by the new Air Defence Directorate and the Air Defence Technical Centre, but to illustrate the nature of the problems those agencies were studying, he stressed that "as of now, first of all, we have no early warning worthy of the name. Ninety per cent of our early-warning stations are operated on an 8-hour basis. Saturday and Sunday they do not operate at all."

"Of course", he observed wryly, "we have absolute guarantees from the Soviets they will never attack on Saturday and Sunday, so I think that is okay. But they might attack during the night sometime, and literally, most early warning services are manned only 8 hours a day.

(1) AG 1250 AD, 26 Aug 55.
we would still have grave deficiencies because most of our radar sets are not equipped to pick up planes above 35,000 feet."

General Norstad demonstrated the Allied approach being attempted. Responding, at SACEUR's request, to the Netherlands Defence Minister's observation that a warning line, an intercept line and four separate command areas in Europe seemed questionable, the Air Deputy rephrased the Minister's concern by suggesting a question that had been raised recently on the same issues: "What assurance would we have that our particular country would be defended in the event of an attack?"

"I think the basis for the answer is the same we gave then...", the Air Deputy said. "In the first instance, there is really no alternative. For example, the air defence of Holland does not depend upon the actual forces in Holland; the forces based in Holland are not adequate to defend that area, and the only defence then lies in a common defence."

General Norstad went on to point out that their assurance would come from the fact that each nation would be represented in the command echelon controlling the air defence in its particular area, so that the country would know exactly what was going on. In addition, each nation would have representatives at SHAPE who could keep their countries informed. (1)

Amendment of the Proposals. On 17 October, 1955, following discussion with the Standing Group, an almost identical set of proposals and rationale were forwarded by SACEUR to the latter, superseding the August letter. In the subsequent amendment of his initial proposals, however, SACEUR pointed out the limitations placed on his responsibilities for Air Defence by MC 36. (2)

Moreover, the proposal for an Air Defence Committee was withdrawn, as were General Gruenther's detailed air defence system and anti-aircraft outlines -- originally presented as enclosures to the August letter. In place of the Committee, SACEUR now indicated only that, "as an additional device to establish a coordinated effort and with due recognition that there are vital national interests involved, each country will be requested to designate a representative to work with SHAPE in an advisory capacity as required."

As for anti-aircraft, where SACEUR originally had stated that such a defence included a principle that as an integral part of air defence (including missiles),

(1) Transcript of Address by General Gruenther before the NATO Defence Ministers, SHAPE, Paris, October 11, 1955.
(2) MC 36 was a first attempt to set out a division of responsibilities between NATO & National Commanders.
"Operational control of AA fire must be exercised by the Air Defence Commander", expression of the latter principle was withdrawn. In its place, a more restrictive proposal was now stated; that is, "to insure proper and necessary coordination in the field of AA defences it may be necessary to establish a small AA staff at appropriate levels headed by an officer of sufficient rank to represent adequately all AA functions and forces in a particular area. Control of AA and its relationship to other elements of air defence will be in accordance with established SHAPE policy." (1)

Actions taken before Approval. With knowledge of the Standing Group's general approval of his latest proposals, General Gruenther, on 30 November 1955, charged his Major Subordinate Commanders as well as the Principal Subordinate Air Commanders with two vital tasks. He asked them for recommendations for staff reorganisations within the respective subordinate headquarters that would be appropriate to the projected new Allied responsibilities for air defence; and for a study of the air defence capabilities of the ATAFs in relation to the new commitments they would be undertaking.

Specifically, SACEUR considered necessary the establishment of self-contained air defence staffs in the MSCs -- particularly in AFCENT where TWO and FOUR ATAF were going to be responsible for the air defence of West Germany which was now a NATO nation. He also desired assurance that staff and control machinery were adequate at all levels, and that the forces were correctly balanced and deployed in the face of the changing conditions.

SACEUR hoped that reorganisation could be accomplished, as far as possible, with existing resources; however, "staff inadequacies alone", he said, "should not be allowed to jeopardise the result." (2)

MC 54 - Air Defence Command and Control in NATO Europe

Military Committee Approval. In the meantime, Standing Group recommendations on SACEUR's proposals of 17 October 1955 had reached the Military Committee. Those recommendations were incorporated into MC 54, "A Report by the MC on Air Defence Command and Control in NATO Europe", on 14 November 1955. MC 54 provided for the designation of four Air Defence Regions -- which included the United Kingdom as a Region; the right of direct access to national air defence agencies by appropriate Allied air defence agencies; the establishment of recognised air defence

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1250 AD, Air Defence Command & Control in NATO Europe, 17 Oct 55.
(2) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1250 AD, Regional Organisation for Air Defence, 30 Nov 55.
representatives in each national air defence authority with whom SHAPE would be in direct contact; and SACEUR as air defence coordinator.

As the winter Ministerial Meetings at which the MC's Report would be examined approached, the Air Deputy's Office noted that MC 54 differed from SACEUR's 17 October outline in that SHAPE would have had to negotiate with each and every nation the basic concepts out of which coordination and, subsequently, integration of air defence was to be developed.

On 28 November 1955, SHAPE asked the SG to amend the recommendations. MC 54 was corrected in Paris just prior to the political authorities' final review. (1)

The North Atlantic Council Approve MC 54. When the NAC met in Paris on 15 December 1955 to consider MC 54, General Gruenther was asked to speak to the Council about his recommendations.

He quickly reviewed the situation, pointing to the lack of an air defence system as "the most critical deficiency in ACE." He described the two indispensable elements for a satisfactory system: a suitable command arrangement, and the ways and means of implementing air defence itself, "such as guided missiles, early warning systems, communications and so forth."

SACEUR pointed out that the paper before the Council addressed only the command problem. It was a first step. "We do not think it is feasible, after months of contacts with the nations involved, to ask for command at this time, and that is why we have taken a smaller bite out of the cherry in our request for coordination only," he said.

He also explained the requirements for a coordinated early warning system, which recently had been submitted to the Standing Group, and for an improved communications system "to get the word back". In connection with the latter, he mentioned that "the United States and Canada had a very fine communication system utilising a principle that had been developed by the US Bureau of Standards, and this is a communication system called the 'Scatter' communication system", which involved a principle of bouncing a radio beamed signal off the ionosphere in such a way as to have it received, upon deflection toward the earth by a receiver located at a very great distance from the sources of the original signal.

(1) ODAIR Brief for SACEUR on Decison on MC 54, 5 Dec 55; SHAPE Msg. SH 24308, 28 Nov 55; & Msg, SGN to SHAPE STASEC 3185, 29 Nov 55. Customarily the MC met in Chiefs of Staff Session (MCCS), shortly before the Ministerial Meetings of the NAC. As the MC (& SG) then were located in Washington, DC, representatives of the SG accompanied MC officials on the latters' travel to Paris.
Following some discussion the North Atlantic Council formally approved MC 54 (Final) which designated SACEUR "coordinator of air defence for NATO Europe." The paper made it clear that SACEUR, thenceforth, was responsible for developing, in consultation with the national authorities, an appropriate system for the coordination of air defence in NATO Europe, and established four distinct air defence regions, which, in an emergency could incorporate existing national systems. (1)

In an unusual press conference following the NAC Meeting at the Palais de Chaillot in Paris, SACEUR noted the principal points of the action the NAC had taken. He also said, "You may wonder if by granting us this authority the Council has given us the power to shift national air defence units across national borders. We do not have that power, not because it was refused us, but because we did not ask for it. We feel that formulation of a sound defence system is an evolutionary process and that we must start with basic steps." Consequently, he observed, "We asked for and received specific authority to coordinate the early warning system and to integrate it into the four regional systems...."

Finally, SACEUR frankly and fully revealed Allied proposals for improved communications, and announced United States agreement to finance a pilot project in the tropospheric/ionospheric scatter system -- a system that a week previously he had proposed to the SG for use in all of NATO. (2)

The Call for National Representation and Liaison with SHAPE.

On 23 January 1956, following upon the endorsement of MC 54 by the NAC, SHAPE requested the MODs to arrange for the designation of national air defence representatives to permit direct access between SHAPE and national Air Defence agencies for consultation on air defence problems.

General Schuyler wrote that it was SHAPE's intent to develop a system of Command and Control which would combine the maximum defensive capability with true economy of effort. Therefore the representative should be one who has had air defence "as his major responsibility, and who is employed in the highest air force echelon," General Schuyler stated that the success of the liaison would depend entirely upon the degree of collaboration afforded in the fields of operational plans and studies, and development of equipments.

1) CVR(55)59 (Final)
and techniques.

Coordination in SHAPE normally would be centered upon the Director of Air Defence. The Chief of Staff noted that SHAPE proposed to have an initial meeting as soon as representation was complete. (1)

Regional Organisation for Air Defence.

Recommendation of MSCs. Response from the MSCs to SACEUR's request of 30 November 1955 for proposals on Regional organisation for Air Defence arrived at SHAPE early in 1956. The Principal Subordinate Air Commanders of each had made detailed studies of their current and projected capabilities.

AFNORTH. CINCNORTH forwarded COMAIRNORTH's letter of examination and indicated that he fully agreed with AIRNORTH's conclusions. Briefly, CINCNORTH indicated that, "my present command organisation appears adequate to meet the exacting requirements of a centralised regional and theatre-wide air defence system with the possible exception of Task Force North Norway. He felt that the basic problem in this area was the paucity of communications in Norway. Upon completion of programmed communications systems, the deficiency in the Command would be largely overcome.

CINCNORTH felt that staff requirements could be met by the simple expansion of the existing staffs. In this connection, COMAIRNORTH's proposals for an Air Defence Section of increased size within his headquarters was adequate to meet the requirements at Regional level.

With respect to redesign and re-orientation of the regional air forces for the air defence mission, "our greatest deficiency", CINCNORTH stated, "lies in the limited numbers and types of aircraft presently earmarked for assignment." While there was no easy solution to this shortcoming, he recommended that consideration be given to requirements listed in a previous study, referred to as "COMAIRNORTH's Guidance" -- a study that had been forwarded to the Air Deputy at SHAPE on 28 October 1955. (2)

AFSOUTH. CINCSOUTH recommended re-organisation of air staffs at Headquarters AIRSOUTH and at the ATAF level. He considered that the specialised staff element at ATRSOUTH should be distinct from existing divisions, even though the product of its work was integrated with Operations and Communications-Electronics. The staff element

1. SHAPE Ltr. AG 1250 AD, Designated National Representatives for Air Defence Liaison with SHAPE, 23 Jan 56.

2. AFNORTH Ltr. 1250/OPS, w/enc: Copy of COMAIRNORTH ltr. PO 1250 PO, 10 Jan 56, Regional Organisation for Air Defence. "COMAIRNORTH's Guidance", as referred to by CINCNORTH, had been sent to SHAPE by COMAIRNORTH ltr. AG/1220/52/P12, 28 Oct 55.
must also have the integrated support of all other elements of the air staff, he continued; and indicated that the same principles applied to the ATAFs and followed those already established in SHAPe.

CINCSOUTH forwarded AIRSOUTH's proposed air defence staff organisation and noted that the Deputy for Air Defence was placed at the level of the Deputy Commander, with general officer rank. He was so placed to give him increased prestige, and to "supply the correct emphasis and staff balance." However, in no case would he be considered as a Deputy Commander, nor would he assume command in COMAIRSOUTH's absence.

Air defence elements were to be placed at different staff levels in AIRSOUTH Headquarters, as well as in ATAF headquarters. The reason for this, CINCSOUTH stated, was that at AIRSOUTH's Headquarters, "the air defence element's work mainly /would/ be concerned with planning, expediting, supervising and international liaison. At the ATAF Headquarters, the air defence element will be concerned more with actual operations." The Deputy Chief of Staff for Air Defence in the ATAF Headquarters was to be placed on the same level as the other Deputy Chiefs of Staff in those headquarters. All three Deputy Chiefs of Staff (in each ATAF) had to be immediately responsible to his Chief of Staff in their respective fields of action operations.

As for the ATAFs, NATO responsibility for Air Defence in Italy was limited to the "land combat zone" by the terms of MC 36. It was apparent, however, that the combat zone alone was too small to constitute a separate area of air defence responsibility. "On an experimental basis", in 1955, the Commander of the Fifth ATAF therefore was given responsibility for the air defence of the Po Valley area during exercises. Even so, there remained a divided control of available resources, and responsibility was divided between NATO and National Commanders.

Negotiations were proceeding with the Italian Air Staff in an attempt to reach agreement on a workable arrangement would give full responsibility for the air defence of all Italian territory to a NATO Commander. The latter would then have full control of all the available resources, CINCSOUTH said.

It was clear to CINCSOUTH that with regard to the Sixth ATAF, available resources fell far short of essential requirements to counter the threat of modern air weapons. This would still be the case after currently planned and programmed facilities were installed, because long planned facilities had not proven capable of adaption
to changing tactics. However, it was imperative that
the installation of programmed facilities not be held
up in the hope of obtaining better ones, CINCSOUTH
noted. "If anything, their completion should be
accelerated in order to bring a working air defence
system into being in the Southern Region in the shortest
possible time."

CINCSOUTH forwarded COMAIRSOUTH's "Proposed Final
Integration of the New Air Defence Concept into
HQ AIRSOUTH"; a chart of a Possible Ultimate Integration
of the New Air Defence Concept into ATAFs and a complete
summary of ATAF Capabilities for Air Defence. (1)

AFCENT. Regional organisation for Air Defence in the
Central Region was affected by attempts, throughout
General Gruenther's tenure, to resolve conflict in
military and political views on the make up of the final
command structure in that area. For a fuller discussion
of the conflicting military concepts and the political
factors involved see chapter VII, Command Structure and
Organisation.

While conclusive organisation for air defence in the
Central Region had not yet been arrived at, SACEUR,
on 6 March 1956, informed the authorities of the non-
Continental NATO nations with forces in that area that
he had taken action to assure the presence of a French
coordinator of air defence on the staff of COMAIRCENT.
On 12 March he further outlined the proposed solution for
air defence organisation in the Central Region for the MOD
France.

The MOD France, M. Bourges Manoury responded on
20 March 1956, with his acceptance of the proposed
solution, and announced his intention to seek his
government's approval to place Lieutenant General
L. Chassin, Fr AF, at SACEUR's disposal as Central
Europe Air Defence Coordinator under ACM Sir George Mills,
COMAIRCENT. (2)

Meeting of National Air Defence Representatives.

As intended by SHAPE's letter to all MODs of
23 January 1956 requesting the designation of "National
Representatives for Air Defence Liaison with SHAPE", a
meeting of the latter with military authorities of ACE
was held at SHAPE on 24 May 1956. The meeting was opened

(1) Ltr. AFSOUTH 38/56 PO 1250, CINCSOUTH to SACEUR, Regional
Organisation for Air Defence, 29 Feb 56, w/3 Encs.
(2) MOD France Ltr. NO.404 EMFA/15.H.40, 20 Mar 56.
by General Norstad, attended also by AVM Campbell, Vice Air Deputy, and chaired by Air Commodore Lott, RAF, the Director of Air Defence. SHAPE planners, regional representatives of the MSCs and national representatives assembled for the first time as a group, and, although the meeting was not decisive, Air Commodore Lott noted that it had resulted in a valuable exchange of views on common problems. He anticipated further, full scale meetings of the same type. (1)

SACEUR Forwards Formal Manning Recommendations to the SG.

A full examination of the proposals of the MSCs for establishment and manning of their respective air defence elements was accomplished at SHAPE. On 11 June 1956, upon completion of this review, SACEUR forwarded his recommendations for strengthened air defence staffs to the SG.

He sought no increase in the specialist air defence staff at SHAPE -- which would continue to be responsible for evolving the broad policy for the coordination of European air defence -- but pointed out the importance of the Regional Staffs, to whom the responsibility for implementing policy would normally be delegated in the Regional Air Commands. These staffs would have to act in close collaboration with national authorities and had to include specialists in all aspects of air defence; had to be commensurate in size with the number of Allied and national agencies with which relationships had to be established and maintained; and had to be headed by officers of appropriate rank and experience, who would carry the necessary authority in their contacts with national and other Allied agencies.

The Requirements of the Subordinate Commands.

The requirements of the MSCs differed considerably. Each had its particular problems which affected the size and composition of the AD staffs. SACEUR's aim in each case, however, was to ensure that every aspect of AD was dealt with through clearly defined staff channels from SHAPE to the regional air commands, and that the regional staff had the capacity for detailed planning with the appropriate national authorities.

AFNORTH. In the North, SACEUR was willing to accept the existing organisation, with a strengthened air defence staff in AIRNORTH remaining responsible to the ACOS Operations and Training. As the capability in that area

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1250 AD, Minutes of a Meeting of Air Defence National Representatives held at SHAPE on 24 May 1956, 21 Jun 56.
grew, however, he saw that it would be necessary to establish an air defence coordinator, and to reorganise the staff if conformity with those of AIRCENT and AIRSOUTH.

AFCENT. In the Central Region, problems of coordination were more complex and delicate, he said. A satisfactory system had to be developed in Germany, where a German contribution could be made to those of the ATAFs. The air defence capabilities of France, Belgium and the Netherlands had to be combines, and, in this connection, SACEUR mentioned the French authorities' recent designation of LTG Chassin as the senior air defence staff officer to COMAIRCENT. General Chassin had since taken up his appointment, and SACEUR felt that it was essential to provide him with a deputy of Major General rank -- a post additional to a Brigadier General appointment already held by the UK. The Netherlands was asked to provide a deputy to General Chassin.

Air Warning Components. SACEUR also announced his simultaneous review of the requirement for a continuous manning of Allied centres in the early warning system. At his request national authorities and Regional staffs already had set up an interim organisation (as part of part of a Phase 1A -- see below: Early Warning and Air Defence). This had come into operation on 30 April 1956 for the Central and Southern Regions, and it was planned that the Northern Region would be included on 2 July 1956, making use of existing facilities. Toward the end of 1956, early warning information from the UK also would be included.

For the purpose of collecting air warning information in the Regions, air warning components would be established in the Regional Air Operations Centres (RAOC). Because of the great distance involved in the Southern Region, the resulting communications difficulties, the great number of Sector Air Operations Centres (SOC), and the delegation of policy for air defence in Greece and Turkey to the Commanding General, 6th ATAF, SACEUR noted that it had been found necessary to establish a link between the SOCs in Turkey and Greece, and the RAOC in Naples. This link was to be the 6th ATAF Air Defence Operations Centre (ADOC) in Izmir, Turkey.

Therefore, it was necessary to establish air warning components at the following Centres:

SHAPE Air Operations Centre.
RAOC Central Region.
RAOC Southern Region.
ADOC 6th ATAF.
RAOC Northern Region.

SACEUR emphasised that progress with the coordination of air defence in NATO Europe was dependent upon the rapid establishment of adequate air defence staffs. He invited the SG's early attention to these matters, and, while
certain provisional arrangements were being made for manning with temporary staffs, he further requested that he be authorised to activate and man the required activities in coordination with appropriate national authorities. (1)

Standing Group Action. The SG concurred that the proposed organisation might be an acceptable one in consonance with MC 54, and authorised the activation and manning of the proposed activities in coordination with appropriate national authorities, using personnel then allocated under the current ACE ceiling, or made available by national authorities. The SG also requested that SACEUR coordinate his proposals with the national authorities concerned and submit to the SG revised recommendations indicating the nations' concurrence or areas of disagreement.

In noting these actions for AFSOUTH, SACEUR asked CINCSOUTH for recommendations on organisation and personnel requirements for the Southern Command, where unique arrangements already had been concluded between COMAIRSOUTH and Turkish authorities, and between COMAIRSOUTH and Greek authorities. (2) These arrangements concerned the delegation of certain air defence responsibilities to national and Allied ATAF commanders. (3)

CINCSOUTH's recommendations, in response, concerned the AIRSOUTH Air Defence Staff Organisation; personnel requirements for the AIRSOUTH Air Defence and personnel requirements for the Early Warning Section of the AIRSOUTH RAOC; and personnel requirements for the Early Warning Section of the 6th ATAF Air Defence Operations Centre.

Following the SG's instructions, and in seeking national agreement to these recommendations, SHAPE forwarded AFSOUTH's recommendation to all of the nations concerned on 21 September 1956. (4)

As indicated earlier, planning for air defence in the Central Region remained a complex issue, one of the principal factors being the need for a clearly defined

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(1) Ltr, AG 4030 PA, SACEUR to SG, Regional Organisation for Air Defence, 11 Jun 56.
(2) SHAPE Msg, SH 28711, SACEUR to CINCSOUTH, 22 Jun 56.
(3) AIRSOUTH Ltr, AAOP/4000, Statement of Delegation of Authority, 22 Jun 55 w/incl: Statement of Delegation of Authority, General Air Staff, Division A, Branch A3, GAS/6326/4/ANAT, 7 Jun 55; and AG 1250 AD, Extract from Turkish/COMAIRSOUTH Air Defence Agreement, 1 Jul 55.
(4) SHAPE Ltr, AG 4030 PA, Regional Organisation for Air Defence, Southern European Command, 21 Sep 56.
system in West Germany. SHAPE had set out a policy to be followed in developing a system in Central Europe on 29 and 30 June 1956, and continued to indicate that air defence staffs at the two ATAFs in that area were required and would be similar in structure to the staffs created in SHAPE, AIRCENT, AIRNORTH and AIRSOUTH. (1)

Accordingly, SHAPE asked COMAIRCENT to provide his revised requirement if necessary, or, alternatively to state that the latter would meet the new policy requirements SHAPE had established. (2)

SHAPE Reorganises.

Almost simultaneously, as General Gruenther's tenure as SACEUR drew to a close, and as major new organisational changes were taking place in the Subordinate Commands of ACE, including those that would incorporate an Early Warning System with that of Regional Air Commands for air defence, a major SHAPE reorganisation took place.

On 14 September 1956, the Chief of Staff announced the discontinuance of the Office of the Air Deputy. General Norstad would continue to act as a Special Assistant to SACEUR, pending his own assumption of that position. Among other changes, Air Vice Marshal Lott, who, until then had been the Director, Air Defence, in the Office of the Air Deputy, now assumed the post of Assistant Chief of Staff for Air Defence, heading a new SHAPE Staff Division. Finally, Air Vice Marshal Campbell, RCAF, Vice Air Deputy to General Norstad, now became Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. The post and office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations was discontinued. (3)

Longer range planning, including a completely revised concept of air defence that would provide for the time when regional/national systems would be unified under a NATO system, continued at SHAPE. New proposals that anticipated significant changes during the next five years invoked the participation of the "designated National Air Defence Representatives" in Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. (4)

On 15 November 1956, the ACOS, Air Defence, forwarded copies of an initial draft of a new concept for the air defence of NATO Europe -- a study already under development at SHAPE -- to the MSCs and to the Designated National Representatives for Air Defence of the United Kingdom.

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(1) SHAPE Msg. SH 30196, SCOUT 30196, 3 Sep 56. See also: SHAPE Ltr. AG 1250/8 AD, Air Defence Policy in Germany, 30 Jun 56; and, below, Air Defence Policy in Germany.
(2) SHAPE Msg. SH 30196, 3 Sep 56.
(3) SHAPE GO 8 (AG 2203) SHAPE Reorganisation, 14 Sep 56; SHAPE GO 9 (AG 2071), Staff Assignments, 14 Sep 56.
(4) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1223 AD, Air Defence -- 1960/62, 12 Nov 56.
Although incomplete, it was planned that appropriate annexes describing the new concepts would be sent to these authorities as they were developed. (1)

SHAPE Air Defence Technical Centre (SADTC)

Origin of the SADTC (The Overhage Project). Creation of an electronic centre for SHAPE was actually first proposed in 1953 by a group known as the Electronic Panel of the Scientific Advisory Board to the Chief of Staff, USAF. Preliminary explorations in Europe were made early in 1954 by Lt Gen Craigie, Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, USAF, and by Dr. Donald A. Quarles, US Assistant Secretary of Defence for Research and Development, in conjunction with SHAPE and representatives of France and Great Britain.

At Dr. Quarles' request, the US Air Force assembled a small planning group to make a further study of the proposal and to recommend to the US Department of Defence and the US Air Force an organisation, a method of operation, a charter, and a method of funding for such an electronic centre. The group was headed by Dr. Carl F.J. Overhage.

After a week's initial briefing in Washington, the group departed for Europe on 18 June 1954. Meanwhile, at SHAPE, the Air Deputy, with the cooperation of the Mutual Weapons Development Team (MWDT) of the US Mission to NATO, had arranged for the group a series of discussions with the NATO countries concerned. In these discussions the purpose and functions of the proposed electronics centre were explained by the planning group, patterns of organisation were discussed and the national representatives were asked for comments and suggestions. In general the response to the idea was very favourable, and many of the individuals present at those informal meetings favoured the assignment of experienced technical personnel from their own countries to the proposed electronics centre.

Following discussions in Washington and Europe in mid-1954 the group published "An Electronic Centre for SHAPE, Report by a USAF Planning Group" on 1 September 1954.

General Gruenther was impressed with the Group and its report. He wrote to the SG that air defence was "a technically complex task which exceeds the capabilities of the individual nations." He referred to the recent intensive studies of this subject conducted in SHAPE which made it increasingly clear that new operational concepts and advanced technical developments would have to be introduced.

Among the many requirements which had to be made, SACEUR continued, "is the availability of expert technical assistance for SHAPE." In the light of the Overhage Group's

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1257 AD, A Concept of Air Defence for NATO Europe, 15 Nov 56.
recommendations and to meet SHAPE's needs in this field, "the United States under its Military Assistance Program for NATO, has offered to create and finance for a period of three years, the SHAPE Air Defence Technical Centre." The US proposed to do this through contractual arrangements with a European non-profit institution, such as the Central National Council for Applied Scientific Research of the Netherlands. The US would take responsibility for administering the contract but would do so in a manner such that the Centre would be completely responsive to the needs and requirements of SHAPE and would in effect be an adjunct of SHAPE. If NATO wished to take over the Centre, the US would transfer it to NATO or SHAPE. This would be entirely optional with NATO, and there would be no obligation whatsoever on the part of NATO or SHAPE.

The US proposal, General Gruenther concluded, would assist SHAPE in meeting its problems and therefore "I desire to accept it." Because acceptance would create no obligation for SHAPE or NATO, he felt that there was no requirement for approval by the SG or the NAC. However, SACEUR requested that the NAC be informed that "Unless the Standing Group feels that there is any reason why I should not accept this offer of the United States, and so advise me, I propose to do so." (1)

On 22 October, the SG expressed agreement with the proposal for the establishment of the SHAPE Air Defence Technical Centre and told SACEUR that the NAC would be informed of his desires. (2) Meanwhile, the proposals recommended in the Overhage report had been studied by Dr. Quarles, and, in a memorandum from his office said, "the establishment of a SHAPE Technical Air Defence Centre as a Mutual Weapons Development project along the general lines recommended by Dr. Overhage's study, ...", was approved. (3) A subsequent and similar statement was made by the US Representatives at the meeting of the NAC held on 10 November 1954. (4)

Establishment of the Centre. In carrying out the recommendations of the study group, and following an exchange of letters with the Netherlands Government and SACEUR, the US entered into contracts on 14 December 1954 with the "Ryksverdedigings Organisation Trefepast

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(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1250, Technical Aspects of the Air Defence of Europe, 18 Oct 54.
(2) SGM-Paris 683/54, Technical Aspects of the Air Defence of NATO Europe, 22 Oct 54.
(4) C-R(54)42.
Natuurwetenschappelijk Onderzoek" (RVO/TNO), (1) with the approval of the Netherlands' Government, represented by Professor G.J. Sizoo, President of the RVO/TNO, as a result of which the Centre was established as an adjunct of SHAPE. (2) On 18 December 1954, General Gruenther informed the NAC of the completion of the legal formalities necessary for the establishment of the SADTC. (3)

In a subsequent exchange of letters between SACEUR and the President of the SADTC Board, SACEUR also approved the appointment of Dr. J. Piket, who was previously Deputy Director of the RVO/TNO Physics Laboratory, as Technical Director of the Centre. On 4 March 1955 General Gruenther reassured Dr. Sizoo, "that so far as lies in my power as SACEUR, I shall do everything possible to facilitate the operations of the Centre and support the conduct of its work." (4)

Dr. Sizoo welcomed SACEUR's warm interest in the Centre, and proposed the next significant step in the organisation's progress, the establishment of an advisory council on which all NATO nations would be represented. It was, of course, planned that "...the Centre will receive its instructions from SHAPE... according to the contract," wrote Dr. Sizoo. However, "...it would be profitable for the countries /themselves/...to be involved in the execution of the work." (5) SHAPE approved the proposal, and an International Advisory Council to the SADTC Board was formed. (6) Advisory Council members were scientists appointed by the ministries of defence of member nations of NATO. They were to meet once or twice a year under chairmanship of the SADTC. For each Advisory Council member a liaison officer was subsequently nominated by the appropriate MOD's. Liaison officers were responsible for maintaining regular contacts between the SADTC and their respective nations and were to meet as often as required - usually three times a year - under the chairmanship of the Technical Director of the SADTC.

(1) Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research on behalf of National Defence, or, as generally referred to in its own Articles, the National Defence Research Organisation TNO. (Articles of the National Defence Research Organisation TNO and Rules of Procedure for the Board RVO/TNO, 25 Nov 47).
(3) C-M(54)121.
(4) Ltr. SACEUR to Dr. G.J. Sizoo, SADTC, 4 Mar 55.
(5) SADTC Ltr. 55 GT 70, Dr. Sizoo to Gen. Gruenther, 31 Mar 55.
(6) SHAPE Ltr. 1250/6, 30 Apr 55.
The Work of the SADTC. As early as 1955, the SADTC became deeply engaged in a large number of highly important projects. Among them were an examination of SHAPE's operational requirements for an integrated early warning system, an evaluation of various phases and types of guided missiles systems, the study of automatic methods of data transmission, and methods of identifying enemy raids. Still more complicated items were projected for study, among them that of scientific and technical means for feeding electronic countermeasures systems, methods of increasing the control capacity of all air defence sectors, the preparation of technical specifications to meet the requirements for an early warning capability against aircraft at extremely low altitudes, and finally, in conjunction with all of the above, particular studies of requirements for an extensive, dependable and completely integrated signals communications system. (1) In these and in many other problems the Centre had access to and advice from various national research and development programs.

SHAPE sought a still wider measure of national cooperation with this Agency, and early in 1956 it established a policy of approaching the MODs with requests for supplementary information at the same time that it issued instructions to the SADTC for undertaking a specific study. SHAPE also requested the MODs to authorise their representatives on the SADTC International Advisory Council to enter into particularly close discussions with the Centre and to assist in the establishment of other vital contacts with agencies not directly related to SHAPE. With this assistance the SADTC was soon able to advise SHAPE, not only on the best technical methods of meeting operational requirements, but also in the wider field of European air defence, as a whole. (2)

Also, as was originally intended, results of studies in the procurement of standardised equipment were reflected in SHAPE guidance to all nations, and, in the case of projects involving common funding, it became possible to provide detailed specifications for installations according to particular national requirements. (3)

(1) For both classification and fiscal control, SADTC study projects were published, at SHAPE's request, in semi-annual and annual SADTC Progress Reports.
(2) SHAPE Ltrs. AG 1250 AD, Release of Information, 30 Jan 56; AG 6441 AD, to MODs, Guided Missiles in Air Defence - Release of Information to SHAPE, 31 Jan 56.
(3) Since air defence was a national responsibility, such equipment originated in the various nations. Some was obsolete, some though modern, was developed by individual nations to meet their own specific national requirements. Standardisation was far away and even partial compatibility of the components could not easily be achieved.
Air Defence Policy in Germany.

With the signing of the London and Paris Agreements on 23 October 1954, the emergence of the Federal Republic of Germany as an independent nation in May 1955, and the subsequent incorporation of FRG officers on the planning staffs of Allied Headquarters, the MOD of the FRG indicated urgency in the need for German authorities to participate with Allied Air Forces Central Europe in air defence planning. On 23 April 1956, SHAPE informed the German MOD that SHAPE policy governing the future development of air defence in the FRG would be dispatched shortly. In the meantime, SACEUR would give authority to COMAIRCENT to initiate discussions on these matters on an exploratory, rather than executive basis; and, as soon as the policy was agreed, joint AIRCENT/German planning could proceed. (1)

SHAPE's Proposed AD Policy. SHAPE had presented a policy for air defence in Germany to national and Allied representatives at a meeting on 29 March 1956. Comments made at the meeting were carefully considered, and, with minor revisions, SHAPE presented the same policy on 29 June 1956 to MODs of Belgium, France, the FRG, The Netherlands and the UK for formal approval. Noting the implications of the Soviet Threat on Western Germany, it pointed out the intense air activity that might be expected over that country; the requirements for protecting German national territory and Allied bases; for inflicting maximum losses on all enemy raids flying over this forward zone; and the immediate concern to ACE of the effectiveness of an air defence in that area.

Currently the 2nd and 4th ATAFs were charged with responsibility for support of and participation in the overall air campaign and were specifically for direct support of the land/air battle and for air defence in the Central Region.

SHAPE pointed out the desirability of separating the air defence organisations and systems from those of tactical operations, on operational as well as technical grounds. Further, "the absence of any existing static air defence organisation in West Germany and the rebirth of the German Air Force presented a unique opportunity for

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1250 AD, German Participation in Air Defence Planning for the FRG, 23 Apr 56; SHAPE Ltr. AG 1250/8 AD, Relations with AIRCENT on the Air Defence of the FRG, 23 Apr 56. On 5 June 1956, SHAPE formally indicated to the FRG that "in view of the shortage of combat ready forces at SACEUR's disposal for the defence of Central Europe, it is important that provisions be made to ensure the most effective utilisation of all forces having any combat potential...therefore, it is considered highly desirable that the plans of the German Military Authorities and those of ACE be coordinated..." SHAPE Ltr. AG 1104/GER-PPO, Planning for the Emergency Utilisation of German Forces, 5 June 56.
designing and developing a really effective system calculated to meet the threat that will prevail at the time of its maturity, in approximately 1960", SHAPE noted.

Also as it was impracticable to develop and operate two separate air defence systems in the same air space, SHAPE recommended against development of a German air defence organisation in the area of responsibility of the ATAFs. A German contribution therefore had to be progressively integrated into the ATAFs.

SACEUR's proposed program for the Air Defence in Germany called for joint training with German elements; standardisation of procedures within and between the ATAFs; parallel development of the systems in 2ATAF and 4ATAF; and, subsequently, amalgamation into a single air defence command in Germany; appropriate Early Warning, and a Ground Observer Corps; and delegation to the AD Commander of control of firings of all anti-aircraft weapons in his area of responsibility. (1)

On 30 June 1956, SACEUR informed CINCENT of the same policy, and stated that, pending formal agreement by national authorities concerned, it was to be taken as the interim SHAPE policy for air defence in Germany. SACEUR further authorised CINCENT to begin detailed planning with German authorities on the basis of that policy. (2)

The Federal German Republic Agrees. SHAPE received the agreement of the FRG to SHAPE'S policy and, in turn, promised all possible guidance and advice on technical and operational matters. As authority for planning and implementing the policy had been delegated to COMAIRCENT, in consultation with the appropriate German authorities, SHAPE pointed out the need for the FRG to exploit this relationship first.

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1250/8 AD, Air Defence Policy in Germany, 29 Jun 56.
(2) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1250/8 AD, subj. as above, 30 Jun 56. About the same time, SHAPE learned that the US Army Europe had been conducting site surveys in the 4ATAF area in connection with the installation of NIKE battalions. SHAPE had no official information on this, other than that contained in the US Annual Review for 1955, and asked the CINC US EUCOM to provide information that could be passed to the appropriate subordinate commands. SHAPE also indicated that, with reference to West Germany, once the essential coordination with SHAPE had been accomplished, the appropriate US authorities should establish contact with COMAIRCENT for the purpose of integrating the air defence resources of the area. Subsequently, if appropriate contacts would be made with the Commanders of the ATAFs. SHAPE Ltr. AG 1250 AD, Coordination of Air Defence in Germany, 3 Jul 56.
In order to develop operational plans for air defence forces, SHAPE, meanwhile, began a study of the SADTC designed to produce a sound philosophical concept for a system of air defence in ACE now projected to approximately the year 1965. It was planned still further that reorganisation of air defence staffs would be part of the study, and in this planning both ATAF and German representation would be considered. (1)

France Agrees. On 3 September 1956, French authorities also agreed in principle to the proposed SHAPE policy on air defence in Germany. SHAPE wrote to the MOD France welcoming this accord as an important step towards the building up of an efficient system in NATO Europe.

SHAPE also acknowledged France's concern with ATAF organisation, and agreed to a French suggestion of the need to include the control of air traffic in war. SHAPE assured the MOD that a solution to the latter problem was being actively sought. (2)

Full Concurrence. By 17 November 1956, all the nations concerned had concurred in SACEUR's proposed policy of 29 June with minor provisions or exceptions. SHAPE suggested a meeting at AIRCENT to discuss current progress, and revealed that, in conjunction with AIRCENT's views, as well as with the progress that had been achieved, two new conceptual studies were now reaching a completion phase at SHAPE. These were: A New Philosophical Concept for Air Defence, circa 1965; and Guidance for NATO Nations on the Use of NIKE.

SHAPE indicated that it would shortly request the participation of CINCENT's staff officers in compiling a plan for the Central Region. (3)

Early Warning and Air Defence.

SACEUR briefed NATO Defence Ministers at SHAPE on 12 October 1955, he also drew their attention to the inadequacies of the radar early warning system in ACE and the need for early improvement.

In developing a concept for early warning of a threat to ACE, SHAPE planners had reasoned that the speed of modern aircraft and the devastating nature of the weapons they could deliver had greatly increased the importance of the principle of surprise. The NATO nations therefore existed

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(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1250/8 AD, Air Defence Policy in Germany, 2 Oct 56, referring to MOD Bonn ltrs: IV/A/3-992-52-03-3744 II/56 g., 6 Aug 56 and IV/A/3-992-52-03-3329 II/56 g., 23 Apr 56.
(2) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1250/8 AD, Air Defence Policy in Germany, 9 Oct 56, referring to MOD Fr Ltr, 4633/EMFA/12-6.B.44, 3 Sep 56.
(3) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1250/8 AD, Air Defence Policy in Germany, 17 Nov 56.
under the threat of a surprise Soviet attack. NATO strategy relied on its retaliatory capability as the main deterrent to Soviet aggression. The strategic air forces, the most vital components of the deterrent, would be effective only if the potential aggressor realised that sufficient surprise could not be achieved to enable him to destroy those forces on the ground before they could be used. Consequently, unless these forces were provided with sufficient warning of hostile intent to enable them to avoid surprise attacks, their effectiveness as a deterrent would be seriously reduced.

Request for Early Warning System. It was in this vein that SACEUR formally declared to the SG on 30 November 1955, that early warning was the key to the maintenance of an effective deterrent to war, and to effective defensive measures if the deterrent failed.

"Every effort must therefore be made," SACEUR said, "to ensure the right quality and extent of Early Warning and the speed and reliability wherewith information may be passed to action levels."

SACEUR analysed the military requirement and the various recommendations that had been developed by both NATO and national authorities for an early warning system in ACE in his proposal to the SG. Enemy courses of action; threats; cost; priorities; financial arrangements; manning and operations all were set forth. As a result, SACEUR suggested that a coordinated early warning and communications system in ACE would:

a. Limit the enemy's initiative, freedom of action and ability to achieve surprise.

b. Increase our time to execute passive defence

c. Improve the posture of ACE air forces and enable timely retaliation.

d. Enhance the prospects of destroying the enemy in the air.

He estimated the cost, broadly, at £40m, considered that the system could be in operation within approximately 2 years of approval of the plan, and, in view of its international purpose, proposed that it be financed from international funds.

In forwarding his analysis, SACEUR recommended that, "as a matter of urgency, special approval be given to the establishment of an internationally financed early warning system in ACE. (1)"

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 3176 AD, The Requirement for an Integrated Early Warning System covering the Approaches to ACE, 30 Nov 55.
Phase IA. SHAPE's policy in implementing the warning system called for the use of the best available equipment that could be operational by mid-1958. But the need to provide against a surprise attack on Allied retaliatory forces existed already and it was a necessity to make the best use of equipment then available.

Consequently, SHAPE planners evolved a draft outline plan for a Phase IA of the integrated early warning system for ACE. As SACEUR's official requirements were being submitted to the SG, representatives of SHAPE, MSCs, PSCs, ATAFs and SADTC met at SHAPE from 29 November to 1 December 1955 to discuss the plan for Phase IA.

Basically, the aim of the conferees was to set up an organisation based on the use of then available, usable equipment - which was diverse both in performance and characteristics. However, planners hoped to make a coordinated effort to employ or modify it so that the resultant system provided the required early warning belt.

The minimum operational target for Phase IA was a belt of continuous radar cover stretching out for a distance of 120 miles over the approaches to ACE. This cover was required to give 90% probability of detection of aircraft flying between 35,000 and 45,000 feet. A degree of discrimination was sought that could detect aircraft when they were separated by two nautical miles at initial detection. Height finding was required to an accuracy of +/0 2500 feet at initial detection.

While SHAPE established a need for manning a watch for 24 hours a day, the immediate requirement was not for a full watch, but for sufficient personnel to carry out the essential detecting and reporting functions.

As for communications, a need existed for methods that would ensure the transmission of raid information in the simplest form by the quickest means. SHAPE saw that each organisational level in the system had an operational function to perform before passing on the data it received; however, ancillary information and amplifying messages were not to prejudice "the main upward channel."

Therefore, the conferees decided a need existed for two circuits between each level: a direct voice channel between operating personnel, with alarm ringing facilities for the main upward channel; and interexchange circuits to handle ancillary and "downward" messages. Both circuits required continuous manning and separate routing, where possible.
In the execution of the plan, SHAPE outlined the functions of the various Sectors and Regional Air Operations Centres, and specified that, in the light of the reported information SHAPE received, a decision as to the action required to safeguard the retaliatory forces would be taken at SHAPE. At SHAPE level, a staff would be in touch with both assigned and other NATO retaliatory forces. (1)

Standing Operating Procedures for Use in Phase I. Based upon the discussions that had been held at SHAPE on 29 November 1955, and others that followed, on 31 January 1956, SHAPE promulgated Standing Operating Procedures for use in Phase I. These procedures were necessary to standardise certain usages, procedures in passing data, and in making reference to locations and the urgency of threats.

For example, a standard time to be used in the entire system was established as Greenwich (Z) time with a common reference -- all communications to be dated with the letter "Z" after the time group. All grid references were to be given in "GEOREF" indicators, to consist of two letters and four figures. In raid reporting to higher levels, two letters and two figures might be used.

Raid designations; language (a common one might be used where it existed; English, if not); status reports; area designations; traffic records; air situation reports and their precedence; procedures for transmitting early warning messages and formats -- all were specified. (2)

SHAPE also was engaged in attempting to work out complete standardisation for passive military-civil air defence alert measures; i.e., those that would also concern and invoke civil defence measures. None were then in existence.

In this connection, during the previous year, SHAPE had proposed to the MSCs procedures for the prevention of casualties, and for applying certain signals to military as well as to civilian installations. (3) These efforts continued -- inconclusively -- throughout 1956.

(1) SHAPE AG 3176/1 AD, Minutes of a Conference held at SHAPE from 29 November - 1 December 1955 to Consider the Initial Steps towards an Integrated Early Warning System for ACE, 30 Dec 55.
(2) SHAPE Ltr. AG 3176 AD, Integrated Early Warning System for ACE, 26 Mar 56.
(3) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1251 AD, Air Defence Alerts, 27 Oct 55.
Manning of the SHAPE Air Defence Operations Room for Early Warning. Although SACEUR's policy described in his 30 November 1955 letter to the SG still had not been formally endorsed, SHAPE understood that the SG had agreed to it in principle, in early 1956. Accordingly, as an air defence operations room at SHAPE was indicated in the policy as a prerequisite to the proper functioning of the integrated early warning system, and as such a room would be the focal point of the European air warning organisation while it maintained contact with other similar levels on a global basis, it followed that any arrangements for air warning at a lower level would be ineffectual until the SHAPE component was functioning.

SHAPE therefore proposed that as most of the European nations in the forward areas already were contributing to the manning of early warning stations on a 24-hour basis, those not yet participating directly -- namely, France, Belgium and the Netherlands -- should be asked to supply a skeleton establishment for the SHAPE operations room on a temporary basis.

SHAPE asked these nations to lend personnel for a period of 3 months starting on 3 April 1956, or until the permanent establishment had been agreed by the SG. (1)

Phase II. The second phase of the Early Warning System proposed for ACE was concerned with the technical aspects of implementation -- particularly communications and high performance radars which were required to support communications and control centres. When implemented, the system would provide a band of continuous coverage, subject to horizon limitations, on a medium type bomber or reconnaissance aircraft flying out to 225 nautical miles and at altitudes up to 75,000 feet over the approaches to ACE. In ACE this would provide the early warning required.

Essentially, the additional facilities needed (to those already existing control and evaluation centres, etc.) were 18 long range search radars; supporting communications; and a data transmission system. The cost of these facilities, including that part of the "Forward Scatter System" of communications that had been requested on 7 December 1955, was estimated at 35 million pounds sterling -- to be provided through NATO common funds. (See below, Forward Scatter Communications.)

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 3176 AD, Manning of SHAPE Air Defence Operations Room for Early Warning Purposes, 26 Mar 56. See also, below: Joint Command and Operations Centre.
On 9 May 1956, SACEUR asked the SG to approve this portion of the overall plans for planning purposes, subject to agreement by responsible nations. Details of cost estimates and other financial approvals would be requested at a later date. (1)

Final Approval. SACEUR's "Requirement for an Integrated Early Warning System Covering the Approaches to ACE", which became document MC 61 was published on 21 June 1956. Higher military authorities intended to seek the NAC's approval of the Requirement because all of the nations of ACE were directly concerned in both the construction and financing of the System.

In presenting the military rationale, the MC referred to the internationally financed trunk communications system that would employ "Forward Scatter" techniques, would be controlled by SHAPE, would provide a reliable and secure means for the timely dissemination of the early warning information, itself, and would also furnish data on alerts, command, and SACEUR's Atomic Strike Plan. (2) In connection with the overall program for confronting the threat from the air, recommendations also had been made on principles and objectives for the improvement of the posture of SACEUR's air force units, particularly his retaliatory forces, in a companion document, MC 60. These measures, too, largely depended on the provision of the best obtainable early warning. (3)

MC 61 (Final), with minor amendments, was approved by the Military Representatives Committee on 12 September 1956, and submitted to the NAC for consideration -- the MC having concluded that multilateral financing of the system was justifiable and merited NAC approval. (4)

On 9 January 1957, the NAC officially approved the establishment of "a multilaterally financed Early Warning System for NATO Europe." (5)

Joint Command and Operations Centres.

SACEUR's Atomic Strike Plan (ASP) was developed on the assumption that joint air/ground actions would be directed from joint centres. The principle of joint operations centres (JOCs) in planning, coordinating and directing air/ground operations had proved to be the most effective system for such actions in wartime.

(1) SHAPE Ltr. 3170/1 SIG/EL, A Plan for the Provision of an Early Warning System for ACE, Phase II, 9 May 56.
(2) MC 59 (Revised) (Final), 16 May 56.
(3) MC 60 (Final), 25 Apr 56. See below: Other Air Defence Planning Measures for the Improvement of the Posture of SACEUR's AF Units.
(4) MC 61 (Final), 12 Sep 56.
(5) CR(57)2, par. 15.
At the same time, prior to August 1956, SACEUR had not issued a specific directive on JOCs. It had been assumed that, within ACE at appropriate levels of command, such centres actually were functioning and that the joint planning and joint actions required during an atomic war could be accomplished in the existing centres.

The results of "atomic" exercises had demonstrated that effective JOCs were disappearing. In some cases, it had been found that lack of liaison between commanders had resulted in delays which completely destroyed the effectiveness and timeliness of the actions required in atomic warfare by the atomic control policy set forth in SACEUR's ASP.

As a result, on 6 August 1956, General Gruenther directed that Joint Command and Operations Centres be established at all joint levels of command, down to and including field army/tactical air force/Naval-task-group or equivalent level.

SACEUR further specified that this be accomplished with the least practicable delay and in time for utilisation in Exercise WHIPSAW -- a joint atomic exercise that was scheduled to take place from 26 to 28 September 1956, and that was to test, practice and evaluate procedures and tactics for the implementation of SACEUR's ASP 1-56. (1)

Some delay in establishing these Centres in a timely manner was noted in the Central Region -- particularly within US/Allied/Army-ATAF-type Headquarters. However, this matter was resolved following a special effort by the AFCENT Chief of Staff and General Schuyler. The Commander-in-Chief, US European Command reminded both CINCUSAREUR and CINCUSAFE of SACEUR's wishes in regard to Exercise WHIPSAW, and noted, particularly, that following the Exercise these JOCs would be maintained in a state of readiness and training that would permit immediate operation in the event of an emergency. (2)

SHAPE's Air Operations Centre. In the meantime, after three months of continuous operations with a skeleton staff, SACEUR found it possible to state reasonably accurately personnel requirements for manning the SHAPE AOC.

(1) SACEUR Ltr. AG 1520 AD, Joint Command and Operations Centre, 6 Aug 56; SACEUR's Periodic Report to the SG, #50, 27 Nov 56.

(2) Msg. USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR & CINCUSAFE, EC 9-4999, SCOIN 12036, 11 Sep 56; and Ltr. Gen. Schuyler, COFS, SHAPE, to LTG Gelee, COFS, AFCENT, 12 Sep 56.
On 14 September 1955, SHAPE informed the SG that due consideration had been given to the possibility of using personnel of the SHAPE Early Warning Centre (actually to become a part of the AOC) and personnel of the Air Operations and Air Defence Directorates, to meet the requirements. However, these personnel already were occupied with tasks in the fields of air defence and air operations planning.

SACEUR's actual requirements for manning the SHAPE AOC and a statement of the functions of the Centre were forwarded with his letter with a request that they be approved and that authorisation be granted to increase ACE's personnel ceiling, accordingly. (1)

Forward Scatter Communications.

In 1955 ACE communications consisted of a comprehensive network of land-line circuits and radio links, augmented to some extent by radio microwave links. The microwave links were an efficient component of this system, and gave a high reliability and freedom from jamming; however, they were limited to line-of-sight use -- of short range -- and expensive in equipment and personnel.

Radio links were vulnerable to jamming and it was known that the Soviets had developed significant jamming techniques. Land-line circuits were satisfactory in peacetime and would be invaluable during a period of tension and war. However, these were leased from civilian Post, Telephone, and Telegraph (PTT) systems of the various NATO countries and their prohibitive cost restricted the number that were available to ACE in peacetime. Also, land-line circuits were vulnerable, in varying degree, to enemy attack and sabotage, as they were routed primarily to meet civil needs, and passed through many areas that were potential atomic targets.

SHAPE's Study. In setting forth this thesis to the SG in December 1955, SACEUR noted that "At the present time, our communications are a dangerously weak link. Much effort and money had been put into improving them and much more progress has been made in that direction, but the limitations imposed by the techniques and resources that have been available have denied us the security and effectiveness that is so important. Our radio links are liable to jamming and our land lines are vulnerable to attack and sabotage to a high degree. Moreover, we depend on the connecting up and activating of

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 4030 PA, Personnel for SHAPE AOC, 14 Sep 56.
NB: SOC already was operating on a 24-hour basis with limited manning.
a very large number of circuits in war which are not available to us in peace. This is a time-consuming process, dependent on the continued availability of national civilian manpower, and many of the important links in our land chain are potential atomic targets." (1)

General Gruenther recommended the adoption of the "forward scatter" technique for the ACE communications system. Already proved reliable in the air defence systems of Canada and the United States, the forward scatter technique involved the use of the troposphere and ionosphere, respectively, to reflect radio waves for long and short range signals. The advantages of the system were the high rate of reliability, freedom from jamming and economy in manpower and finance. The system would have to be militarily owned and operated, thus making it permanently available. The engineering and installation of the system by a single contractor was recommended to insure uniformity.

It was recommended that "a special provision of NATO funds" be made for the financing of the system.

The system would be an integral part of the recommended Early Warning System. As noted above, SACEUR had recommended to the SG the construction of a chain of radar stations covering the approaches to ACE in November 1955. (2) It was the special purpose of the proposed Forward Scatter System to enable the Early Warning procedure to operate quickly and efficiently by providing critically located and specified circuits that would carry the early warning, atomic strike plan, chain-of-command and alert information.

On 15 December 1955, at the meeting of the NAC, General Gruenther emphasised the urgent need for a Forward Scatter System. He estimated that the introduction of the System into ACE would cost some £15m and suggested that it might well be financed as an international project. The US Secretary of Defence said that his government was anxious to see the project started as soon as possible and offered to finance the establishment of certain initial links recommended by SACEUR. This offer was conditional upon arrangements between SHAPE and the nations themselves to

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 3100 SIG, The Requirement for a Reliable and Secure ACE Signal Communications System, 7 Dec 55.
(2) SHAPE Ltr. 3176 AD, The Requirements for an Integrated Early Warning System Covering the Approaches to ACE, 30 Nov 55.
provide that the system to be installed would remain, permanently, the property of SHAPE and that the Allied military personnel required to operate and maintain the individual stations would be the continuing responsibility of SHAPE. The US government fully "expected that the remainder of the System would be financed by NATO on a multilateral basis after there had been an opportunity to study in full the SHAPE proposals." (1)

The Military Committee considered General Gruenther's recommendations, approved them on 16 March 1956 and submitted its own further recommendations to the NAC. On 11 May 1956, the Council approved the proposal for the establishment of a Forward Scatter System and recommended multilateral financing of the project. In order that an early start could be made, the NAC noted that special funding arrangements would be made -- SACEUR having included a proposal for £15m in the ACE Infrastructure Program. (2)

By the end of the following month, the Norwegian Parliament had approved the installation of the initial Tropospheric Forward Scatter System link in Norway. On-site surveys had been conducted in that country by representatives of SHAPE, AFNORTH, and the SADTC. The consulting and installation contractors started their surveys beginning on 7 May. During these surveys final technical site recommendations were made for terminals to be installed at Oslo, Trondheim, Moesjøen and Rodø. Contracts subsequently were signed between the SADTC and the consulting and installation agencies for delivery and installation of the equipment at the sites and with the construction agency for construction of buildings, preparation of the sites and building of access roads.

Almost simultaneously, France, Italy and Turkey all agreed in principle to the propose installation of Ionospheric Forward Scatter communications terminals within their countries. Legal documents transferring the necessary land to the control of SHAPE were received by CINCSOUTH from the MOD Italy and preliminary system designs for these installations were prepared. (3)

On 21 August 1956, SHAPE planners gave a briefing to five potential consultant engineering firms for the Forward Scatter System. On the basis of information presented during the briefing, the prospective firms

(1) CR(55)59, 15 Dec 55.
(2) MC 59 (Rev.)(F), 16 Mar 56. The rationale contained in this document, together with that in MC 54 -- which had designated SACEUR as Air Defence Coordinator for ACE -- were basic to MC 61(F), 12 Sep 56 -- the document that contained the final approved establishment of an Integrated Early Warning System. Approval of the details of Phase II of the required Early Warning System was contained in the approval of MC 61.
(3) SHAPE 192/56, SACEUR's Periodic Report to the SG, Apr-Jun 56 #49, 27 Aug 56.
were to submit proposals covering their qualifications and their programs for carrying out the engineering work for the project. (1)

**Rules of Engagement (ROE).**

The Soviet capability to make a surprise attack on NATO nations automatically implied a NATO need for established methods for Allied engagement of unidentified aircraft. SHAPE, on 13 March 1953, forwarded proposed "Rules of Engagement of Unidentified Aircraft by Allied Fighters" to the SG, noting the absence of standardised procedures and the lack of agreement among NATO nations as to when and how such rules might be applied.

In peacetime each nation was responsible for the air defence of its own territory, and each was free to intercept unidentified aircraft if it so desired. Interception was, in fact, already being undertaken within certain areas of ACE, but for purposes of identification only. It was therefore important that known and standardised Allied ROE be followed by both NATO and national forces, and that signals to be used in communicating with unidentified planes be standardised and widely disseminated.

SHAPE considered that adoption of "Signals between Aircraft in Flight" and their dissemination to all nations, including those of the Soviet Bloc, would place NATO as a whole, each individual nation, and SACEUR in a better position to effectively counter any surprise air attack. The ROE would not be binding after the outbreak of hostilities.

To avoid infringing on national prerogatives, SACEUR felt that the proposed ROE should become effective under the following conditions.

a. At any time an individual nation decided to intercept an unidentified aircraft in its area of national responsibility.

b. Automatically at the declaration of an alert.

c. At SACEUR's direction, when specifically authorised by the SG, in circumstances short of a Simple Alert during a period of recognised tension.

On these basis, SACEUR recommended that the SG approve and obtain NATO nations' approval of his proposed ROE. (2)

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(1) SHAPE 257/56, SACEUR's Periodic Report to the SG, Jul-Sep 56, #50, 27 Nov 56.
(2) SHAPE/282/53, Rules of Engagement, 13 Mar 53.
The following day, SHAPE sent copies of his proposals to the MSCs and to the CINC US Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean. The Commanders were asked to examine the ROE and to take such preparatory measures as were "practical and prudent" that would enable them to put the ROE into effect at an early date "if so directed by SACEUR". (1)

During September 1953, in discussions that took place in Berlin among representatives of the Four Occupying Powers on the subject of air safety, certain visual signals for use between aircraft in flight were promulgated. These were established as a basis for a standard set of signals. Accordingly, SHAPE notified the SG of certain changes that should be made in SHAPE's proposed ROE. (2) These were acknowledged and the changes made; however, two points regarding modifications to signals remained unresolved. (3)

AIRCENT's Concern. In the continued absence of established procedures, ACM Embry, COMAIRCENT, wrote to SACEUR on 18 February 1955, and proposed a set of ROE for the AIRCENT area. Recognising that "political implications" might militate against further progress in standardising such rules, ACM Embry expressed deep concern about the situation that would exist in the Central Region when and if an alert was experienced. During periods of tension which justified a political decision to declare an alert, it would be most difficult, he noted, for AIRCENT to carry out his responsibilities under four varying sets of ROE. COMAIRCENT recommended that his proposed ROE be approved, at least as an interim measure, before SACEUR's policy was issued. (4)

On 22 March 1955, in an interim reply to COMAIRCENT, SHAPE pointed out that a brief had been prepared for SACEUR to enable him to discuss the problem with the SG during his forthcoming visit to the US. SHAPE considered it advisable to await the result of this visit before agreeing to ACM Embry's proposals. (5)

On 4 July 1955, SACEUR requested that the SG formally reopen the entire problem of ROE. SACEUR further described COMAIRCENT's concern about the confusion that existed and that would exist if an alert were declared. SACEUR felt that once a "Reinforced Alert" had been declared, standard ROE must be in existence — indeed,

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(1) SHAPE Ltr. 314/53, 14 Mar 53.
(2) SHAPE Msg. SH 31092, 25 Sep 53.
(3) Msg. SG to SACEUR, TOSHAP 509, 19 Oct 53.
(4) AIRCENT Ltr. AO/1259, 18 Feb 55.
(5) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1250 CS, 22 Mar 55.
their existence would be integral to the decision to declare the Alert. It therefore was essential that all SHAPE forces adopt common ROE. The SG was asked to render an early decision on their standardisation -- at least for periods of tension. (1)

Later, COMAIRSOUTH also drew attention to the lack of agreed ROE. The recent agreements between his headquarters and the Greek and Turkish MODs whereby COMSIXATAF was given operational control of Greek and Turkish Air Defence Forces made it essential that NATO ROE for air defence, under peacetime “cold war” conditions, be established with the least practicable delay. (2)

SHAPE responded immediately to COMAIRSOUTH indicating that, as political considerations continued to be involved, the matter still was under active study by the SG. (3)

MC 66. Nothing further was forthcoming on the problem until the preparation of MC 66. This document contained the refined SHAPE-SG proposals aimed at obtaining standardised NATO ROE for implementation by NATO nations in peacetime. Before approval by the MC, many discussions were held among NATO military and national officials. SACEUR was involved in these discussions and, to brief him on the implications of MC 66, SHAPE planners outlined the still unresolved situation as it existed in November 1956.

In Greece and Turkey, the delegation of operational air defence responsibility to the NATO commander applied only in war. The wording of the existing agreements was ambiguous, and there were reasons for suspecting that Greece and Turkey placed differing interpretations on the agreements. Each nation retained responsibility for implementation of ROE in peacetime.

In Western Germany, the FRG had bilateral agreements with the UK, the US, and France, whereby these Powers provided air defence for Western Germany, but as national and not as NATO authorities.

In the remainder of NATO Europe, nations retained the responsibility for implementing ROE in peacetime.

Thus, in SHAPE's view, if the nations accepted the ROE proposed in MC 66 and agreed to implement them, definite air defence responsibilities and authority would be assigned

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1250/s AD, 4 Jul 55.
(2) AIRSOUTH Ltr. AACS 1253, 24 Aug 55.
(3) SHAPE Msg. SH 22290, 24 Aug 55.
to both NATO and national authorities. Also, MC 66 recommended that the nations delegate authority for implementation of ROE to NATO commanders during authorised alerts.

SHAPE thus had two alternatives: to accept MC 66 as it stood, and leave the implementation of the standard rules, once they had been agreed, to national authorities in peacetime; or, alternatively, to request authority for NATO commanders to implement the rules during alerts and in normal peacetime operations.

If SHAPE sought authority to implement ROE in peacetime, this could be done only if SACEUR had operational command of national air defence forces in peacetime. Any such change implied a fundamental revision of NATO doctrine, and amendment of MC 36 and MC 53 — those documents that defined the division of responsibilities between the NATO and National Commanders in Wartime and that contained in SACEUR's Terms of Reference.

At the same time, the weakness of the proposed ROE in MC 66 lay in the recommendation that nations merely be "urged" to take the necessary action. SHAPE would have preferred national agreements, through the NAC, to the general provisions of MC 66, so that the ROE could be published and applied throughout ACE. MC 66, as it stood, did not commit the nations. (1)

Despite continued effort by SHAPE authorities, however, MC 66 did not achieve approval by political authorities during the period of General Gruenther's tenure. Indeed, more than a year passed before the document was accepted — and, even then, provisionally.

**Electronic Warfare and Electronic Countermeasures (ECM)**

**Soviet and "Satellite" Capabilities.** By 1955, the Soviets were capable of providing their armed forces and those of the "satellite" countries with efficient electronic equipment in all spheres: ground point-to-point communications; ground/air VHF; metric and centimetric radars for naval, land and air use; and navigational aids.

The Soviets were thought to be capable of providing electronic guidance systems for ground/ground, ground/air, and air/air missiles. They were known to have developed travelling wave tubes and tunable magnetrons for airborne operations to cover the "S" and "X" bands up to 30,000 Mc/s, and moving target indicators for ground radars.

(1) SHAPE AD/7/56, 21 Nov 56; SHAPE AD/9/56, 27 Nov 56.
During peacetime, the Soviets had amply demonstrated their ability to jam transmissions in the broadcast frequency bands. SHAPE assumed that they could also use this capability against communications channels in time of war. Soviet land forces were known to be interested in the use of cover and deception. In the air, they had practiced the use of the so-called "window" and here, too, had a potential active jamming capability. This experience had been used to train ground radar operators in the effects of jamming and although there was, as yet, no direct evidence of an intention to support the Soviet air arm with jamming, this possibility had to be considered.

SHAPE therefore was forced to conclude that the Soviet Union and her "satellite" countries were capable of employing modern electronic equipment in support of all arms and of waging electronic warfare of an advanced nature.

Allied Capabilities. In contrast to Soviet capabilities, US and UK naval forces in ACE had searching and jamming equipment, but little was known at SHAPE of the equipment carried by the naval forces of other countries. No electronic warfare plan common to NATO naval forces existed, although SACLANT, with SACEUR's concurrence, was engaged in the preparation of a NATO manual for naval electronic warfare.

There was no land force electronic warfare capability within the forces assigned to ACE. Any capabilities within Europe existed only on a national basis.

US and UK air forces in Central Europe had limited jamming and search facilities -- the jamming capability existing principally for training purposes. The French Allied Tactical Air Force (CATAC) also had a search unit.

There was an agreed plan for providing jamming facilities for UK, Belgian and Dutch air forces on a unilateral basis.

The air forces of Northern and Southern Europe had no ECM capability, nor was there any ECM plan common to the air forces of NATO.

Thus, while some of the NATO nations were known to possess an electronic warfare capability, in mid-1955 there was no coordinated plan for the employment of electronic warfare in support of NATO forces, as a whole.
Electronic Warfare Capability for ACE. On 12 August 1955, SACEUR informed the SG that the principal reason for the inadequate capabilities in ACE was the almost complete absence, with a few notable exceptions, of electronic warfare doctrine, technique and equipment among NATO nations. Knowledge and experience of the few could not be collected and disseminated for the benefit of the remainder because of the inflexibility of the security restrictions imposed.

Nevertheless, SACEUR outlined a required electronic warfare organisation. He described how it should be controlled and specified the techniques, equipment and training which were indispensable to the development of an effective electronic warfare capability in ACE.

He asked the SG: to take note of this organisation; to approve the release of techniques to all NATO nations; to release to NATO details of equipment which conformed to the required characteristics he described in his letter; to ask the SG nations to provide training courses for other NATO nations; to expedite the approval of a SHAPE Trials and Evaluation Unit; and to advise all NATO nations that with the acceptance of these recommendations, they would be called upon to furnish appropriate support in the form of personnel and resources to implement the plans he proposed. (1)

The ECM Trials and Evaluation Unit. SHAPE had proposed an ECM Trials and Evaluation Unit to the SG as early as November 1954. (2) In December 1955, SHAPE prescribed the Unit's establishment and organisation, (3) and by February 1956, was able to announce the approval of the SG nations to the unit's formation.

On 16 February 1956, following discussions and agreement with AFCENT authorities, SHAPE informed COMAIRCENT that the responsibility for organising, operating and administering the ECM Trials and Evaluation Unit was delegated to COMAIRCENT. Functions of the unit, briefly, were to determine the tactics and equipment required for the ECM support of air forces; to provide ECM support in exercises; and to indoctrinate NATO personnel in ECM practices.

SHAPE requested that COMAIRCENT forward proposals for the Unit's Terms of Reference; a program of tasks for the Unit for a period of two years; and any revisions to the organisation originally outlined in late 1954. (4)

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1460/3 SIG/EL, The Development of an Electronic Warfare Capability for ACE, 12 Aug 55.
(2) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1460 SIG, 3 Nov 54.
(3) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1460 SIG/EL, 10 Dec 55.
(4) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1466/1 SIG/EL, ECM Trials & Evaluation Unit, 16 Feb 56.
ECM in Support of Air Defence of Base Area. On 11 June 1956, SHAPE agreed to proposals by COMAIRCENT for the establishment of a Central Region "panel" to advance planning of the use of ECM necessary for the air defence of "base areas".

The fact that some nations authorities with forces in the Central Region were able to make a positive contribution to ECM deficiencies had been recognised by SHAPE earlier that year. (1) Discussions continued between the two Headquarters' representatives successfully and, in approving the Panel, SHAPE reminded COMAIRCENT that it would be required to take cognizance of the study to be made by the SADTC on ECM.

A NATO Policy. On 18 October 1956, shortly before General Gruenther departed, NATO policy on electronic warfare was issued in MC 64(F).

The Standing Group was given the overall responsibility for coordinating the formulation of the policy and doctrine for the employment of electronic warfare by NATO forces. SHAPE's requirement for new equipment also would be coordinated through the SG.

SACEUR's responsibilities included: the planning and conduct of electronic warfare within ACE; establishing the necessary organisation within his own headquarters and subordinate commands for the conduct and control of electronic warfare; and the development, within ACE, of policies and plans in accordance with SG directives. After coordination with national authorities and other MNCs these policies and plans were to be submitted to the SG for approval.

Finally, SACEUR was made responsible for the collection of tactical electronic warfare information, its analysis and dissemination, and the exchange of such information with other MNCs and NATO national authorities. (2)

Air Defence Equipment.

At the end of 1952, General Ridgway (then SACEUR) had established a SHAPE Anti-Aircraft Defence Committee to review the whole question of the anti-aircraft defence of the lines of communication and of military installations of Allied combat forces located on national territory

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1466 SIG/EL, Electronic Countermeasures in Support of the Air Defence of the Base Areas, 11 Jun 56.
(2) MC 64, NATO Electronic Warfare Policy.
outside the land combat zone. (1) That Committee had concluded that, from the standpoint of a land based defence, the protection of national territories was extremely deficient. In June 1953, the SG was informed of these deficiencies by SHAPE. (2)

When more than six months later no action had been taken on SHAPE's warning, the SHAPE AA Committee approached General Gruenther and asked that the attention of the SG again be drawn to this dangerous situation. They added a request that the SG give firm guidance to Allied Commanders in Europe, as well as to national authorities in ACE on the question of the use of guided missiles in air defence. (3)

On 20 January 1954, SACEUR once again pointed out to the SG that the major overall weakness of the air defence of national territories within ACE was the critical shortage of anti-aircraft equipment and ammunition. While it really was beyond his authority to do anything substantive about these shortages, General Gruenther told the SG that it was probable that owing to these shortages, nations would be unable to equip the anti-aircraft units which they planned to activate. The number of planned units also would fall far short of the anti-aircraft defence needed for the territories concerned.

The main shortages the AA Defence Committee had noted were in modern electronic control equipment; ammunition to sustain the estimated consumption for the first 90 days of a war; and equipment to compensate for attrition of AA equipment during the same period. Because of these shortages, it appeared that the planned air defence of ACE would not be effective, and that even those few units that had equipment probably would not be able to continue in action for more than seven to fifteen days.

SACEUR reminded the SG of the letter he previously had sent on this subject and that he had requested that the whole question of AA equipment be taken up on a NATO-wide basis. It was SACEUR's understanding that the problem had been passed to the International Staff, but that no action had been taken on the matter.

(1) SHAPE 1399/52.
(2) SHAPE 132/53, 8 Jun 53
(3) IOCS, PPO (SHAPE), 6464, PPANDO to DCPO, 12 Jan 54.
SHAPE felt that in view of the very unsatisfactory Air Defence situation, the question had to be treated by NATO as one of extreme urgency. SHAPE was vitally interested because the matter affected the defence of the LOCs of combat forces.

SACEUR said that there was a feeling at SHAPE that many nations were holding back in building up their air defence forces with conventional weapons because they thought that the rapid development of the surface-to-air missile would soon render conventional AA weapons obsolete. They thought that the money spent on conventional weapons would be wasted.

SACEUR strongly urged the SG to take a firm position on this subject. He asked the higher military authority to inform the nations on the degree to which "ground-to-air" guided missiles would supplant conventional AA weapons within the foreseeable future, and on what date "ground-to-air" guided missiles would be available in sufficient quantities for the air defence of ACE.

If the nations were given reasonably firm and clear guidance on which to make a decision, they could go ahead with building up the necessary defences, he said. While in the foreseeable future, SACEUR noted, guided missiles would supplement, not supplant conventional anti-aircraft weapons. (1)

The View from the Centre. ACM Embry, COMAIRCENT, after reading a copy of SACEUR's letter, wrote to Marshal Juin, CINCENT, and pointed out that the implication of the letter was that the nations should be encouraged to spend money on medium and heavy AA guns to bring their air defence forces up to strength in the event that surface-to-air missiles (SAM) would not be available in sufficient quantity in the near future.

He concluded that, "Before asking the nations to spend money and resources on increasing their AA defences, I feel strongly that the overall European air defence requirements of the future should be assessed on a priority basis in relation to the forecast Communist threat." (2)

Marshal Juin agreed with ACM Embry, and forwarded his letter to General Gruenther stating, "I believe that the matter should be thoroughly studied by SHAPE and that every effort should be made to obtain the best available information bearing on this problem from the research and

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 6464, Anti-Aircraft Equipment, 20 Jan 54.
(2) AIRCENT Ltr. ADI/1255, Anti-Aircraft Equipment, 12 Feb 54.
The development organisation of France, the UK, and the US. The crux of this issue is the amount of money involved, as well as the estimated time that would elapse before advanced type anti-aircraft equipment would be available."

Marshal Juin was unable to make specific recommendations at the time. However, while agreeing with the part of SACEUR's letter to the SG "about clear guidance on the availability of guided weapons, I also concur in the Air Commander's view that the overall European defence requirements of the future should be assessed on a priority basis in relation to the forecast Communist threat," he said. "I hope that a study on these lines can soon be initiated." (1)

The SG's reaction to SACEUR's letter of 29 January 1954 was received in SHAPE in late April. The SG agreed that there was a lack of anti-aircraft equipment in ACE. However, it did not feel able to make strong representations to the NAC, or to the nations until SACEUR's Air Defence Study had been completed. The SG noted that no anti-aircraft guided missiles had been programmed for ACE, and that no information on their use was available at that time. The SG also agreed that anti-aircraft guided missiles that might become available in the foreseeable future would supplement rather than supplant conventional weapons.

The SG stated that upon completion of the Capabilities and Air Defence Studies, it might be in a better position to make definite recommendations to individual nations and to the IS regarding the inclusion of anti-aircraft equipment in the correlated production programme. (2)

SACEUR's Public Remarks - AA Weapons. As planning for a coordinated air defence system proceeded on a conceptual and organisational basis, as described at the beginning of this chapter, the UK decided to abolish its anti-aircraft command structure in its own territory. In view of the public knowledge of all the air defence planning then in progress, SACEUR noted the reactions to the UK decision that had arisen in various areas of ACE, and, early in 1955, decided to discuss the matter openly.

On 15 March 1955 he held a correspondents' luncheon at SHAPE. SACEUR noted that UK authorities considered that the main threat to British territory came from very fast, very high-flying bombers, the performance of which permitted them to operate out of effective range of conventional anti-aircraft guns, in attacks on area targets.

(1) APCE Ltr. 526 OPS/54/File 1255, Anti-Aircraft Equipment, 17 Mar 54.
(2) SGM-341-54, AG 6464. PPO, Anti-Aircraft Equipment, 23 Apr 54.
"In Continental Europe," he said, "a large part of the NATO territories lie within the range of the Soviet tactical air forces which, when operating against targets such as forces in the field, will in many cases find it necessary to fly well within anti-aircraft gunfire range. In other cases, they would do so if permitted in order to increase their effectiveness."

"I am convinced that, instead of abandoning anti-aircraft gun defence," SACEUR continued, "Continental NATO countries should continue present efforts to improve their effectiveness. Even when the guided weapon is available in sufficient numbers to deal with the high flying threat, there will still be the problem of dealing with low and medium altitude attacks, which for as far ahead as can be foreseen, will be the task of anti-aircraft artillery."

SACEUR noted that the UK decision had been based largely on geographical considerations which in many ways were unique to the British Isles. The approaches to the UK were either over the open sea or over friendly territory, and consequently, earlier and more precise warning of the approach of attacking aircraft than could be the case on the Continent was technically feasible. "In fact", SACEUR said, "there can be no rigid comparison between the UK and Continental Europe. The difference has been made clear by the UK decision to retain the conventional anti-aircraft gun for all British forces stationed on the Continent. Moreover, a number of potential targets in the UK, against which the most likely threat is from precision bombing, will still retain their conventional anti-aircraft gun defence." (1)

Anti-Aircraft Gun Policy. On 7 April 1955, SACEUR provided the MSCs with his policy on anti-aircraft guns in relation to guided missiles. SACEUR stressed that for some years to come the AA guns had to be retained as the sole ground-to-air weapon to cover a large number of targets. (2)

MSCs subsequently were asked to study a draft document, "APT II", which proposed to invoke the cooperation of ships in the anti-aircraft defence of ports and bases. SHAPE requested that the MSCs forward their comments to SHAPE on this objective. (3)

As a follow-up and aid to the development of anti-aircraft defences, on 20 June 1955, SHAPE provided the MODs and MSCs a list of all SHAPE messages and letters issued on this topic since October 1952. (4)

(2) SHAPE Ltr. AG 6464, 7 Apr 55.
(3) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1250 AD, to MSCs, 25 May 55.
(4) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1255 AD, 20 Jun 55.
However, by October of 1955, SHAPE could still only state that none of the NATO nations had yet been able to give any firm information as to the effectiveness of guided missiles, or firm dates for their availability to SACEUR, or for their use in the defence of national NATO territories.

As the result of several queries received from member countries, SHAPE was considering issuing further guidance to the effect that SACEUR did not consider that there was any justification for Continental countries to relax their efforts to provide conventional AA defences, on the grounds of the action taken by the UK. While it was obvious that guided missiles would be essential to air defence in forward areas, and, in Continental countries, "as far forward as Belgium", SHAPE Planners considered that there was no point in stressing this at a time when these weapons were not available and when SHAPE wished to avoid the sort of gap that would exist if Belgium and other countries were to relax their efforts in providing AA defences. (1)

Continuing Study - and Release of Information. On 31 January 1956, SHAPE informed all MODs that the SADTC had been instructed to examine the application of surface-to-air guided missiles (SAM) to European air defence, with particular reference to their use in Western Germany. SHAPE stressed that information on guided missile development was not currently available, and the assistance of the nations therefore was sought.

Priority had been given to Western Germany because it constituted the most difficult and the most important air defence problem in NATO Europe. In addition to the strictly military requirement for air defence of Allied forces and installations in the land combat zones, SHAPE said it was necessary to defend all German territory up to the Iron Curtain. This was a most exacting task, and was beyond the capability of any known manned fighters that would be available in the next 3 to 4 years.

On the other hand, Western Germany was in the front line of air defence for Continental territories to the West, and for the United Kingdom. It therefore, was an Allied requirement of the first importance to destroy the maximum number of enemy aircraft in this forward zone. Since Allied air defence as a whole seemed likely to gain most by the early application of guided missiles in the defence of Western Germany, this area had been selected for immediate study.

(1) Brief for SACEUR's Mtg with Minister Spinoy of Belgium, 6 Oct 55.

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The SADTC was directed to examine the problem on a short term and long term basis.

Finally, as a follow-on to another discussion of the problem that SHAPE had published the day before, SHAPE requested that information on SAMs that were in, or close to production, be released to SHAPE and that national representatives be authorised to assist the SADTC to the limits of the security release rules existing. (1)

Shortly afterward, in response to a request for guidance from a representative of Headquarters 6ATAF, in the southeastern part of ACE, SHAPE notified CINCSOUTH of additional SHAPE policy views. AA weapons should be deployed in accordance with agreed "key areas" lists, SHAPE said. Key areas should be provided adequate or reasonable anti-aircraft defence in order of priority to the extent that AA is available. "It is a mistake", SHAPE said, "to 'spread thin' or to attempt to provide AA defence to all key areas (key areas list will invariably exceed the available equipment)."

Again, SHAPE pointed out that "guns...are the only present means of low altitude defence by anti-aircraft; as such they fill a continuing need in air defence. Eventually, M.A.A. /manned-anti-aircraft/ will probably be phased out in favour of guided missiles. However, guided missiles, when introduced, will initially supplement AA guns and not supplant them." (2)

However, West German authorities placed different emphasis on air defence. This was revealed in SHAPE's response to an indication by the MOD, Bonn, which had noted that German policy favoured abandonment of the use of AA guns in favour of guided missiles and that planning would provide for the organisation of static anti-aircraft defence based on guided missiles. SHAPE noted this "with satisfaction", and informed MOD Bonn that the SADTC had been given a more precise directive with regard to the SAM study on which it was working. (3)

By October, 1956, national security restrictions still had not been sufficiently relaxed to enable coordination or integration in air defence to be completed. This was particularly true with regard to missiles.

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(1) Ltr. AG 6441 AD, Guided Missiles in AD - Release of Information to SHAPE, 31 Jan 56.
(2) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1255 AD, Policy Relating to the Employment of Anti-Aircraft Defences, 8 Feb 56.
(3) SHAPE Ltr. AG 6441 AD, Anti-Aircraft Weapons - Policy, 23 Apr 56. SHAPE was referring to MOD Bonn's letter, Staatssekretär IV/A/3-992-52-04-304 II/56 g., 1 Mar 56.
SHAPE had sufficient details on the NIKE I missile by this time to conduct a preliminary study -- the study referred to on 23 April 1956. This data was restricted initially to SHAPE and the SADTC. However, authority subsequently was received to include MSCs. Although action was initiated to permit release to MOD Bonn, nothing had been forthcoming, and SHAPE suggested that MOD Bonn initiate a separate request for NIKE information through the US Military Assistance Advisory Group in West Germany.

In any case, in answer to MOD Bonn's 30 July request for information on air defence radars and prerequisites for interceptor fighters SHAPE would provide information on the radars, but would require further specifications on the fighters.

"Within the restrictions indicated," SHAPE stated it would "always be willing to provide any assistance operationally or technically which you may require, and which is not forthcoming from your joint planning with AIRCENT."(1)

Radar Equipment. As indicated above, redesigned or modified radar equipment was considered an essential part of Phase IA of the Early Warning system. This was because very little "Allied"-owned radar equipment existed.

In this connection early in April 1953 the ACOS communications at AIRCENT, Brigadier General Farman wrote to Headquarters US Air Forces Europe (USAFE) noting that on a recent visit to USAF Headquarters in the US, he had learned that replacement radars then destined for the 12th (US) Air Force would be shipped in July 1953. Twelfth Air Force considered that this would permit an operational date for those radars of approximately October 1953.

While the new radars would improve the Early Warning and Control capability of 4ATAF, as a whole, radars at 2ATAF's disposal were obsolete and incapable of extended operations. Replacement in that area was not expected until approximately mid-1955. BG Farman therefore proposed the transfer or loan of current Twelfth Air Force radar equipment to Belgium, Holland and the UK (for the 2ATAF area) after replacements had been installed and made operational. This would provide Allied Air Forces in Central Europe with radar capable of providing early warning on a 24-hour basis, he said.

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 6441 AD, Information Relative to the Study of Suitable Weapons Systems for Air Defence, 29 Oct 56. SHAPE referred to MOD Bonn letters, IV-IV/A/3-992-52-04-3744 III/56, 30 Jul 56; and IV/a/3-992-52-03-3329 II/56, 23 Apr 56.
At USAFE Headquarters the radar equipment program itself was under overall review and that Headquarters informed COMAIRCENT that BG Farman's proposals, which had a direct bearing on US decisions, would be considered.

In July 1953, CINCUSAFE notified COMAIRCENT that while the US Commander-in-Chief did not have authority to negotiate with foreign governments concerning the disposition of "NATO Secret" surplus radar equipment, earlier correspondence with Headquarters USAF had indicated that part of USAFE surplus radar equipment could be released to NATO countries able to justify a requirement for the types available. The CINC therefore suggested that a NATO requirement be established through NATO MDA channels for interim equipment for 2ATAF.

On 6 August 1953, BG Farman notified SHAPE of the status of these exchanges and suggested that Holland, Belgium and the UK be notified that the equipment would be available, and that they take action to request it. AIRCENT considered that when deployed, it would give the 2ATAF a minimum radar chain capable of extended operation until such time as national replacement radars were "on site".

SHAPE asked the US authorities for confirmation of agreements required from appropriate US agencies, as a basis for action, and, in response, the USNMR informed SHAPE's Signal Division that Headquarters USAF interposed "no objection to the 12th Air Force's proposal for the transfer of this equipment to the NATO Countries concerned."

The USNMR indicated the US's "phase-out" intentions and noted that accordingly, "logistical support for the radar sets proposed for transfer to NATO will not be continued beyond FY 1954." Future maintenance support items over and above those available in USAFE stock would not be provided by the USAF.

On this basis, the Hq USAF stated, "approval is hereby granted on the basis that no costs involved for the transfer of this equipment or future logistics support will be borne by either MDAP or the USAF." (1)

By the following year the equipment had been installed in the 12th Air Force and Canadian Air Division Sectors of 4th ATAF. These were being manned on a 24-hour basis. Modified WWII and new equipment were replacing old equipment in the remainder of the 4ATAF and 2ATAF areas. It was anticipated that replacement would be completed during 1956. "However," ACM Embry, COMAIRCENT pointed out in a letter to CINCENT, "at the end of 1955, they do not, at present provide a watch during the hours of darkness. I recognize that the additional new radars in the 2nd ATAF area will begin to become operational and possibly have skeleton manning for a 24-hour watch in 1956, and that all possible effort is being given to this program. The manning of the Aircraft Control and Warning system, however, both as regards numbers required for a continuous 24-hour watch and the state of training of replacement personnel does cause me great concern. Replacements, particularly in the 12th Air Force Sector, have generally been of lower skills, and in the other areas, the numbers of personnel have never met the requirement for continuous 24-hour watch."

COMAIRCENT added that he was satisfied that the marked improvement which was needed could only be achieved by completion of the replacement of old equipment and adequate numbers of trained personnel to permit a continuous 24-hour watch. He concluded that "continuous training of personnel as part of an integrated system by rigorous day-to-day training supplemented by participation in large scale exercises must be provided." (1)

Other Air Defence Planning - Measures for the Improvement of the Posture of SACEUR's Air Force Units.

As indicated earlier in this chapter, MC 60 (Final), A Report by the MC on The Improvement of the Posture of SACEUR's Air Force Units, was derived directly from SACEUR's recommendations on this subject in July 1955.

At that time, SACEUR had informed the SG that as a major consequence of the Capabilities Study he had submitted, and of MC 48 and MC 49, documents that resulted from that Study, the SHAPE staff also had undertaken extensive examination of the situation that would face air force units in ACE in the light of the growing enemy atomic threat. The Staff also had studied the measures necessary to improve the posture of these units. (2)

(1) AIRCENT Ltr. CPR-3070-/3464, 8 Dec 55.
(2) Ltr. AG 6160 AD, SACEUR to SG, Improvement of Posture of SACEUR's Air Force Units, 28 Jul 55.
"Since one aircraft with an atomic bomb can now deliver destructive power which would require thousands of aircraft with conventional bombs, a relatively small number of aircraft can potentially be routinely deployed, prepared and launched on the initial massive attack with little or no detectable warning," SACEUR said. This pointed to the critical importance of the initial phase of an atomic war, especially the period of the initial attack, "to our air forces and in turn to the possibility of success in my mission of defending the area of ACE." Survival and retention of adequate operational capability of Allied air forces was a primary vital goal for the initial phase of war, he stressed, and one of the main objectives was to "improve to the maximum the possibility of receipt and dissemination of warning of enemy attack, especially the initial one." (1)

It was for this reason that Early Warning became so vital a part of the overall Allied air defence system. In order to meet the requirements of MC 48 and MC 49, SACEUR had concluded, among other things, that, in order of priority, the first measure of all, to reduce to the minimum the enemy's chance of success in a surprise attack, was:

Improving the military and political intelligence indicators programme, and assuring maximum alertness and a maximum scale of continuous effort on the part of all NATO and ACE intelligence organisations and agencies oriented towards providing advance warning, however, equivocal, of possible Soviet Bloc attempt at surprise attack. (2)

The second measure called for expanding and improving the early warning capability including low altitudes, radar and ground observer corps coverage of ACE and providing it with continuous manning.

MC 60 (Final) was approved by the Military Representatives Committee, acting on behalf of the MC, on 16 March 1956. It was approved by the NAC on 25 April 1956. (3)

(1) Ltr. AG 6160 AD, SACEUR to SG, Improvement of Posture of SACEUR's Air Force Units, 28 Jul 55.
(2) SHAPE Ltr. AG 6160 AD, 28 Jul 55.
(3) CR(56)17, 28 Apr 56. NB: So thorough and important were the analyses and conclusions in MC 60(F) that it was reaffirmed by the NAC as late as 6 Jul 60. (CR(60)29; and CR(60)56).
On 16 May 1956, SHAPE forwarded a copy of that document to all MSCs, PSCs and MODs, noting that SHAPE's 28 July 1955 recommendations were considered an essential reference for use with MC 60, and presented a fuller explanation of the concept of the new air force posture. (1)

Air Defence Planning in Late 1956.

As General Gruenther's tenure drew to a close in November 1956, three principal studies were underway in air defence planning. These were A Philosophical Concept for Air Defence circa 1963/1965; an air defence plan for Europe circa 1960/62; and a supporting study for the 1960/62 force posture plans.

The philosophical concept was designed to provide guidance in the development of air defence up to and including the introduction of a ballistic missile by the Soviets. This study was not to be a plan. It was a description of the sort of air defence system that SHAPE felt should be developed for the period 1963-65. It would deal with quality but not with quantity. The target date for the study was 30 November 1956; however, it was apparent in mid-November that the study would not be ready before the end of the year, and full SHAPE, Regional and national coordination would remain to be effected. Subsidiary studies dealing with quantities and distribution of equipment and weapons were to evolve from it.

The air defence plan for Europe was just beginning to be developed in conjunction with the regional air defence staffs. The object of this study was to produce the most economical and effective air defence plan for the period 1960/62, with regard to known technological developments and air defence "layouts" with the object of integrating air defence at the basic operational levels. The ACOS Air Defence did not expect this study to be completed before the end of February 1957.

The supporting study for the 1960/62 force posture paper was based (in agreement with PANDP) on terms of reference that included the following aims:

a. To plan the distribution of air defence weapons (shown in the posture paper) -- with a target date of 30 Nov 56.

b. To recommend desired passive defence measures for ACE -- with a target date of 30 Nov 56.

c. To continue the study of air defence posture 1960/62 with emphasis on the need for revision of the components in the light of improved surface to air missiles capabilities -- no target date was established.

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 6160/1 PFO, Improvement of the Posture of SACEUR's Air Force Units, 16 May 56.

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The ACOS Air Defence observed that the word "plan" was used in SHAPE to describe a variety of purposes. In his opinion a plan showed "an order of battle; deployment of aircraft and weapons; the layout of a control and reporting system with operation centres, radars and communications." "Only in our air defence plan for Europe do we expect to cover these aspects," he said.

Finally, AVM Lott noted, "we should bear in mind that by MC 36 and MC 54, air defence is still a national responsibility and that we have only authority for co-ordination. This makes planning by SHAPE tentative and dependent upon the goodwill of the individual nations. Unless we can get the planning data from the nations we cannot plan objectively in SHAPE so far as air defence is concerned." (1)

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(1) Memo AD 1257, ACOS Air Defence to DCO, Current Air Defence Studies, 22 Nov
CHAPTER VI
ALERT MEASURES

Background

Western Europe had lived since 1947 in constant and growing danger of invasion from the East. The price of cooperative defence involved more than money. It involved in many cases the yielding of certain national prerogatives and even some aspects of national sovereignty. This yielding was done normally in almost direct proportion to the intensity of the danger, or at least the appearance of the danger. In no way was this more evident than in the efforts made by SACEUR to establish definite and workable rules for preliminary actions and precautionary steps to be taken in an alert.

In July 1953, the North Atlantic Council approved MC 129/4 which provided for the establishment of a formal alert system. SACEUR was instructed to establish an alert system and to secure the agreement of the nations to the measures to be contained in the system.

In the process of implementing MC 129/4 SACEUR found that negotiations were drawn out over a period of years. Also, the New Approach Studies later determined that the political climate at any given time might preclude the active implementation of the formal alert system. Therefore an additional alert system was developed, the ACE Counter-Surprise Military Alert System.

The Formal Alert Systems.

SG 129/4. In approving the SG document on alerts, the NAC had laid down certain guiding rules within which the military authorities had to work. In the first place, it was the opinion of the Council that it was necessary that NATO should have a carefully thought-out and accepted system of alerts. Actions to be taken, who would take them, and the degree of authority necessary were factors that would have to be carefully thought out. It was clearly recognised that the governments retained full authority on the question of whether NATO went to war or whether it did not. It was also accepted that under normal conditions there would be time for commanders to receive political guidance and approval before taking military measures. Since it would not be possible to put on paper or envisage all the circumstances and all the conditions that might surround a crisis, it was essential that commanders have the authority to take the necessary action, and have authority in advance to take certain simple and essential measures on their own authority. That authority was limited to SACEUR himself and to his MSCs.
It was also recognised that in a critical period where military forces were not immediately threatened, but might well be threatened at a very short notice, the commanders concerned should exercise the greatest caution in putting into effect any authority given to them, so as not to compromise any political discussions that were going on at that time. (1)

SACEUR's Alert Measures, SHAPE 70/54. In accordance with SG 129/4, SACEUR in August of 1953 entered into negotiations with national authorities to reach agreement on alert measures. (2) Based upon these discussions, SHAPE established a formal alert system which included detailed measures related to progressive stages of alerts. It was based upon the development of a period of serious political tension leading up to general war. This formal system and these measures were designed to facilitate the orderly transition from peace to war. Although SACEUR Alert Measures were published on 12 February 1954, they still required agreement by the nations.

The Alert Measures provided for three levels of alert - Simple, Reinforced and General. A Simple Alert would be put in effect to make sure that the two Alerts which could possibly follow would be carried out promptly. The Simple Alert provided for certain personnel being recalled to active duty to ensure combat effectiveness in some units, security measures against surprise attack, the deployment of forces required for early warning, preparation of demolitions, the security of vital points, and other required actions. The Simple Alert normally would be called throughout ACE only after approval of the Governments had been obtained through the Permanent Representatives to the Council. However, if the emergency were sufficiently extreme and the delay might endanger his forces, SACEUR would declare a Simple Alert in his area of responsibility, as could the MSCs within theirs.

The next stage, the Reinforced Alert, which called for achieving the maximum possible preparations to meet and counter an attack, could not be executed secretly. Typical of the actions under a Reinforced Alert would be the evacuation of selected non-combatants, the deployment of air, ground and naval forces to their battle positions, mobilisation of many combat units, the withdrawal of stock piles from advance areas, etc. Just as the Reinforced Alert was stronger than the Simple Alert, so were the provisions for calling it. Normally, a Reinforced Alert could be called only after the Governments had approved

(1) Record of Briefing of NATO Council at SHAPE, 1 Apr 55.
(2) SHAPE Ltr. AG 2063/5 PPO, SACEUR Alert Measures, 31 May 55.
such action through their Permanent Representatives to the Council. In the event, however, that the situation appeared so urgent as to preclude obtaining prior approval through the Council, SACEUR might in consultation with the Standing Group and with the approval of the individual Governments concerned, put into effect a Reinforced Alert or specific measures of this alert either throughout his entire command or in the affected areas, as necessary.

The final type of alert was not one which was precautionary or preliminary in nature, but a General Alert which would mark the outbreak of hostilities. In this case, SACEUR's operational plans would be carried out. (1)

Negotiations with Nations. In accordance with the NAC's instructions, SACEUR entered into negotiations, through the MSCs, with National Authorities to seek their agreement to the implementation of these measures, at the appropriate time, on the declaration by an authorised NATO Commander of a Simple or Reinforced Alert. The negotiations proved to be long, drawn out and difficult. In each country various legal, constitutional and political situations made it almost impossible to secure agreement.

By the end of 1954, the general status of agreement to SACEUR Alert Measures was as follows:

a. Almost general agreement: Belgium, Canada, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United States. Official confirmation of negotiations with these nations had not been received.

b. Agreement on many measures with some disagreements and restrictions on a few measures: Greece and Italy. The official governmental position of these nations had recently been submitted.

c. Important amount of disagreement: France (except all reinforced Alert Measures to which negotiations had given complete agreement) and the United Kingdom. Staff level discussions regarding implementation of Alert Measures by France were underway between representatives of MOD France, CINCENT and SHAPE.

d. Detailed position unknown: Turkey.

e. Negotiations not completed: Norway and Denmark. (2)

Briefing of NAC on Status of the Alert Problem.

At the request of Lord Ismay, Secretary General of NATO, a briefing was conducted at SHAPE on 1 April 1955 for the purpose of providing the Permanent Representatives

(1) SHAPE 70/54, 12 Feb 54.
(2) Fact Sheet, SACEUR's Alert Measures and Military Alert Plans, Dec 54.
with the latest information on the status of alert negotiations with the nations. SACEUR, General Norstad and AM Dawson presented the briefing and answered questions from the Council.

AM Dawson started the discussion by giving a rundown of the status of the negotiations and the problems that had occurred in the 20 months since the SG had instructed SHAPE to enter negotiations with the Nations in July of 1953. He used a large chart to explain the various stages of alert - Simple, Reinforced, General - and the various measures that would or could be taken under the various stages.

In his discussion, AM Dawson explained that, "the simple alert really contains measures which will place the NATO Command forces in the best possible position to implement the reinforced alert. And the reinforced alert places us in the best possible position to go to war itself."

He continued by pointing out difficulties that were being experienced with several nations in reaching agreement on measures to be taken under a Simple Alert:

France had many areas of disagreement. It was a simple question of what the French Government and their Constitution were able to do. The French found great difficulty in giving authority in advance for a NATO commander to take these particular measures.

Denmark, until very recently there was no progress at all. Within the last week Denmark had agreed to certain of the simple alert measures in relation to her assigned forces.

Norway, again it was a question of a constitutional difficulty. SHAPE realised the validity of that difficulty. An example of the problem was the bringing up the strength of the assigned forces, "a measure in which, in the case of certain countries, involves a certain amount of mobilisation. Now that, straightaway, of course, puts the Government in a difficulty. To what extent would they be willing to give authority for a thing of that sort to a commander of another nationality? And in certain cases it's constitutionally impossible," stated AM Dawson.

Turkey showed certain deficiencies that were largely procedural. SHAPE knew that the Turkish Government was at that time actively engaged in considering the problem and AM Dawson was "anticipating day by day getting a more clear position from them."
AM Dawson summarised by saying that on the simple alert "we're not in a very strong position today; but we do appreciate the difficulties that the countries have had in giving even the agreement that they have."

General Gruenther entered the discussion by saying that in all of the alert measures "we visualise that authority of the Council is going to be obtained first. We're talking here, and in this negotiation, if a situation arises where it is not feasible to get that authority.... We say if there should be, then we want to be able to handle it. But I don't think it gains us anything to get into a laboured discussion as to whether or not we'll ever have time. We hope we will, very positively, have time, and that the Council would have time to deliberate on it. But the concept under which we're doing this negotiating, in accordance with the instructions from the Council and the Standing Group and the Military Committee, is on the basis that there's not time."

AM Dawson amplified SACEUR's remarks by saying to the representatives "if the Council decided today - if you, the Council - decided today you wanted to take some precautionary measures, you would have to negotiate every one. We would like to see a clearer understanding of what can and cannot be done."

AM Dawson then turned to the next stage. "The reinforced alert, is not an alert that the commanders can, themselves, on their own authority, call. The official wording is that "the Supreme NATO commanders should be authorised, in consultation with the Standing Group and with the approval of the individual governments concerned, to declare it. So the reinforced alert is one in which the governments themselves have a say."

Speaking of the countries, he said:

"France is prepared to say yes to the whole lot, right across the board, as long as it is done on the authority of their own Government. So there is a case where, although a country looks very unsatisfactory under the simple, it picks up an awful lot under the reinforced alert."

Denmark. The progress here has been recent, and we hope that there will be more soon.

Norway. We have made this progress by clarifying their difficulties, and within a month we hope that will improve.

Turkey. We know, is in the same stage as the simple alert. The problem was being discussed. Therefore, we'll hear from them very soon.
America. The US shows a very good straight line across here. There are certain reservations. Now that measure, RQG, (pointing to the chart) is full war deployment. The measure of disagreement is the extent a command can do that."

General Gruenther provided the Council with an example of disagreements SHAPE had had with the reinforced alert:

"The United States, in Germany they have a great many dependents. One of those measures provide that we get operational control of the US forces when a reinforces alert is declared. But the US has the problem of getting those dependents out. So the US said, No, we will give you control after we have the dependents out. We said to the US - because we could speak a little more frankly to them than we can to other nations, sometimes - we said, That is not good enough. We're sorry about these dependents. We'll try to get them out. But if you come to a question of first-thing-first, we may have to make a very tough decision - we don't want to make it, God knows. But we don't think that's good enough! So they finally, after a good deal of heart-tearing around, they agreed, and we have gotten complete agreement with them on that."

In responding to a question as to how to start the procedure - what was the criteria followed to determine the need for a simple alert or a reinforced alert - General Gruenther said, "I see this coming this way: a military commander sees a period of tension developing, and he says: Gentlemen, I think we ought to be doing something about this. That would be the normal thing, and that's what I think you're talking about by criteria. In which case the Council says, Well, we don't think so. That settles it; no argument about that. But that is the normal way it would happen if the Russians cooperate. If they don't cooperate, then, of course, you get into a tougher situation. But it would still be the judgement of that military man that you're grappling with, you see, because he says, I think it's tough, and time is not available. That's where you begin getting into that twilight zone. And, of course, if you add them all together, and they telescope them and the Russians attack some morning before breakfast, Sunday morning, then you have general alert and general hell, too." (1)

Revision of SACEUR's Alert Measures.

Review of the Measures. On 31 May 1955, General Schuyler wrote to the MSCs and requested their personal views on reviewing the alert measures with a view to:

(1) Record of Briefing of NATO Council at SHAPE, 1 Apr 55.
a. Assessing the efficiency of the alert system as a whole.

b. Identifying measures to be deleted, amended or added.

c. Considering the integration of national alert measures with SACEUR's alert measures, where appropriate.

The Chief of Staff felt that the negotiations with the nations, which had been taking place since August 1953, had been useful and the "positions of the nations have become fairly clear." The work done on the alert system had produced most useful results which included:

a. Acceptance by the NATO National Governments of the need for an alert system.

b. The recognition that the nations themselves must have alert systems in line with that of SACEUR.

c. Progress towards an effective NATO wide system.

General Schuyler also stated that the review must not be allowed to hold up the ratification by national governments of the agreements already made by their negotiators in cases where such ratification was still outstanding. It was therefore very important that National Authorities should not be consulted at that stage.

General Schuyler closed by saying that after SHAPE had evaluated the views of the MSCs, it might be desirable to have a meeting at SHAPE of representatives of the MSCs to discuss revision of the alert measures. (1)

"Pre-Alert" Military Measures Conference. On 12 September 1955, SHAPE invited the MSCs to send representatives to SHAPE to discuss Alert Measures. The conference, held on 17 and 18 October, resulted in discussions which highlighted the difficulty of avoiding political implications in any pre-alert or counter-surbise system which might be employed and the difficulty of implementing alert measures quickly while still respecting the authority of the nations. (2)

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 2063/5 PPO, SACEUR Alert Measures, 31 May 55.

(2) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1401 PPO, ACE Counter-Surbise Military Alert System, 28 Jun 56.
SACEUR's Revised Formal Alert System. On 23 May 1956, SHAPE published a revision (SHAPE 76/56) of the Alert System. The revision had been made necessary by the many amendments made to SHAPE/70/54 since its issue in 1954; the entry of the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO; certain original alert measures becoming routine; the required rewording of some measures of the Simple Alert to substitute the words "full strength", "full operational footing" and "reinforcements" for "mobilisation" and "war footing", because mobilisation at that stage was not agreed by several nations. (1)

The revised alert measures again required approval of the SG and the nations.

The position in November 1956, during the time of the Suez and Hungarian crises, was extremely indefinite. The alert measures required by SACEUR and which had been laid down in SHAPE/76/56 were still under negotiation with many of the governments concerned. In fact, SACEUR had received final acceptance of his measures only from Canada. No final response had been received from Turkey; the US had accepted with minor reservations; and the remaining nations expressed reservations of varying nature and importance. Until the expiration of the "reserve powers" in Germany the Ambassadors of France, the United Kingdom and the United States remained responsible for implementation, in conjunction with the German authorities, of SACEUR's Alert Measures in West Germany. (2)

The Counter-Surprise Military Alert System

Results of the New Approach. The Capabilities Plan revealed that the lack of a firm system for alerting NATO European nations and military commands to imminent danger was one of the greatest weaknesses in ACE. In submitting the Plan to the Standing Group, SACEUR had recommended that the matter be studied on an urgent basis. (4)

(1) SHAPE/76/56 AG 2063/5 PPO, SACEUR Alert Measures, 23 May 56.
(2) SHAPE History 1957, p.28.
(3) C-M(56)125, 15 Nov 56.
(4) SHAPE 330/54, Capabilities Plan, ACE 1957. See page this text.
The Military Committee's own paper that resulted from SHAPE's studies stated that, "Surprise will be a major factor in any future war involving NATO, and the degree of surprise attained by the enemy could greatly influence the outcome of the war." The MC emphasised that the ability of NATO to withstand and react to the first blow "will depend on the extent to which our forces are in effective alert status at the time of the enemy's surprise attack." (1)

Previously, the Standing Group, acting for the MC had directed the establishment of a "formal" alert system which would include detailed measures and specific actions to be taken at progressive stages of alerts. (2) SHAPE published such formal measures in February 1954 -- measures that would be taken upon declaration by an authorised NATO commander of a "Simple" or "Reinforced Alert". A formal system and the specific measures that would be taken were designed to facilitate the orderly transition from peace to war.

The NAC had instructed SACEUR to undertake negotiations, through the MSCs, with the nations represented in the various commands toward achieving general agreement on the implementation of the formal measures. The Council had agreed that during such negotiations the MNCs would have to act in accordance with the SG's detailed directive, in the absence of any other published instructions. (3)

Inadequacies in Formal Alert Systems. The formal system was found to be lacking. SHAPE found that it would not adequately cover the situations that had been envisaged in the New Approach Studies. For example, valid intelligence information might be received forecasting a possible surprise attack, but the prevailing political climate might preclude the implementation of the formal alert system. The "Equivocal Intelligence" received might not justify the implementation of a formal alert, but could not be disregarded by the military authorities. Information might be received of the penetration of the radar screen by numbers of aircraft, but such information might not constitute discovery of an overt act of aggression justifying establishment of a General Alert (in the formal system) until a hostile act actually was committed -- the

(1) MC 49(F), Capabilities Study, ACE 1957, 23 Nov 54.
(2) SG 129/4
(3) SHAPE Ltr. 70/54 1229 PPO, SACEUR Alert Measures, 12 Feb 54.

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Penetration of borders by aircraft not constituting, in itself, an overt act of aggression against NATO.

On the other hand, the formal system appeared to be valid for conditions of mounting tension. A Simple Alert might be put into effect to insure that two succeeding, or higher stages of alert would be carried out promptly. A Simple Alert normally would be called throughout ACE only after approval of the NATO governments had been obtained through the NAC. However, if an emergency were sufficiently extreme, and a delay might endanger his forces, SACEUR could declare a Simple Alert in his area of responsibility. The MSCs could do the same.

A Reinforced Alert, the next stage in the formal alert system, called for achieving the maximum possible preparation to meet and to counter a Soviet attack. It was stronger than the Simple Alert, and so were the circumstances that called for it. It could be called only after NATO governments had approved its implementation through their NAC representatives. If a situation appeared urgent enough to preclude obtaining prior approval of the Council, SACEUR, in consultation with the SG, and with the approval of the individual governments concerned, might put into effect a Reinforced Alert, or certain measures of that Alert either in the affected area or throughout his command.

A General Alert was not precautionary or preliminary in nature, and would mark the outbreak of hostilities. In such a case, SACEUR's operational plans would immediately be carried out.

SHAPE felt that it would be desirable to adapt the existing formal system to meet the conditions under which the Soviets might attempt a surprise attack upon ACE. But in its final analysis, this was not considered possible. The formal system dealt with conditions in which political considerations, in some respects, were paramount. Urgent reaction might therefore be inhibited by restrictions that existed to ensure that national governments retained the right and power to authorise (or not to authorise) SACEUR to declare formal alerts. Adequate modifications of the formal system to include military measures to meet a suspected surprise attack would cause confusion between the formal measures to be taken with political agreement. For example, on receipt of "Equivocal Intelligence" only some of the measures of a Simple or Reinforced Alert would have to be taken; and it might not be practical to order such measures because of their political implications. (1)

(1) SHAPE Draft Staff Study, ACE Counter-Surprise Military Alert System, 22 Dec 55.
SHAPE Staff Actions. By the end of 1954 SHAPE agencies were making plans to handle a situation in which the Soviets might attack with very little or no warning. The divisions were working on the following problems:

Warning of Attack. The Air Deputies office was trying to determine methods to secure warning, ways of communicating the warnings and the procedures for instituting actions for survival.

Reduction of vulnerable concentrations. The Logistics Division was searching for measures and steps to reduce vulnerability of military forces and their logistic support in forward areas.

Atomic Posture for Air Forces. The ATRDEP was also determining the preparations and actions to be taken by air forces in order to absorb an initial large scale nuclear attack.

Atomic Threat in Thrace. PPANDO was working with the special threat that existed in this area because of the geographical limitations to the forces in Thrace and the steps necessary to reduce the vulnerability of these forces.

Military Alert Measures. PPANDO was working to establish suitable military actions to ensure the maximum survival by instituting "unilateral military decision at the appropriate time without further action by national authorities." The results of the initial "Pre-Alert" study, expected by 1 March 1955, could be used as a basis to establish objectives to be achieved by the military actions. (1)

"Pre-Alert" Military Measures Conference. On 12 September 1955, SHAPE invited the MSCs to send representatives to SHAPE to discuss "Pre-Alert" Military Measures. (2) The discussions, held on 17 and 18 October, highlighted "the difficulty of avoiding political implications in any Pre-Alert or Counter-Surprise measures which might be decided upon, and the difficulty of implementing them sufficiently quickly while still respecting the authority of the nations over their forces before the passing of command to SACEUR." (3)

(1) Fact Sheet, SACEUR's Alert Measures and Military Alert Plans, December 1954.
(2) SHAPE 389/55, 12 Sep 55.
(3) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1401, ACE Counter-Surprise Military Alert System, 28 Jun 56.
Based upon the results of this conference, staff studies made at SHAPE (1) and consultations with the MSC's, (2) SHAPE developed a new military alert system.

**Counter-Surprise Military Alert System Sent to the SG.**

On 22 October 1956, SHAPE presented to the SG the new military alert system. The proposed Counter-Surprise Military Alert System would affect directly only military forces, could be put into effect by military commanders, and would not depend on prior negotiation and agreement. Under this system, the NATO commanders could declare through calling an Alert that they believed a situation existed where an enemy attempt at surprise attack was imminent or that an attack had actually started, but which for valid reasons could not be met by SACEUR's formal alert system. The measures which SHAPE prescribed were only military actions which would resemble routine field exercises and maneuvers and the frequent practice of them would preclude the "possibility of heightening tension" when they were actually put into effect.

There were two stages in the proposed military alert system:

**Orange Alert - the Precautionary Stage.** In this stage all forces were to be brought to as high a stage of operational readiness as possible in the short time available. This included manning all communications networks; using off duty personnel to man additional equipment; full manning of C&R systems without calling up reserves; manning War Headquarters Command Posts; and the final preparation of and manning of all local weapons, unit weapons, and weapons on vital points.

**Scarlet Alert - Alarm Stage.** In this stage the amount that could be done would vary greatly between units and would also depend upon whether there had been an Orange Alert. The measures were designed to prepare for immediate attack and included maximum manning of C&R operating capacity; movement of maximum personnel to War Headquarters and other operational combat stations; launching combat ready aircraft to await combat orders; launching other flyable aircraft; and deploying atomic counter-action forces and bringing them to full operational readiness.

SHAPE made it clear that the proposed system was complementary to the Formal Alert System which was still the subject of negotiations between SHAPE and the nations.

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(1) SHAPE IOCS PPO 1401, Counter-Surprise Military System, 28 Dec 55.
(2) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1401, 28 Jun 56.
SHAPE asked that the SG approve the concept of the Counter-Surprise Military Alert System and authorise SACEUR to proceed in establishing the system in conjunction with the subordinate commands and "in close coordination with National Authorities" (1)

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1401, PANDP, ACE Counter-Surprise Military Alert System, 22 Oct 56.
OCTOBER 1956 - GENERAL GRUENTHER paid farewell visits to senior government officials and military leaders of the NATO Nations. Here he is received by Chancellor Adenauer.
CHAPTER VII

ALLIED ORGANISATION IN THE CENTRE

Evolution of ACE Command Structure.

Initial Organisation. In 1951 it was decided that the three Regional Planning Groups which SHAPE replaced would serve as a basis for the regional subordinate commands. The area from Northern Norway to the Mediterranean fell geographically and strategically into three sectors. Western Europe was the centre; on its northern flank Scandinavia, the North Sea and the Baltic; on its southern flank Italy and the Mediterranean.

Because of the importance of Western Europe, General Eisenhower decided that he would control operations in the Central Region. In 1951, he appointed General Juin (France) Commander-in-Chief, Allied Army Forces Central Europe; General Norstad (US), Commander-in-Chief, Allied Air Forces Central Europe; and Vice-Admiral Jaujard (France) Flag Office, Central Europe. Their Headquarters were at Fontainebleau, till then the seat of the Western Union Defence Organisation.

In the north, Admiral Brind (UK) was appointed the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Northern Europe; with his Headquarters at Oslo. Under his control he had an American General commanding the Air Forces, a Norwegian Land Forces Commander and a Danish Land Forces Commander. Both the Northern and Central Commands were established on the 2nd April 1951, the date when SHAPE and ACE came into being.

The problem of command in the southern area was more difficult to resolve, complicated as it was by the special position of the British Naval Force which had for so long wielded control of the Mediterranean. However, in June 1951 Admiral Carney (US) was designated Commander-in-Chief (CINC), Allied Forces Southern Europe. Under his command an Italian General commanded Land Forces, an American General commanded the Air Forces and an American Admiral controlled the powerful US 6th Fleet.

Greece and Turkey Join. With the accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO in February 1952, SACEUR was faced with the problem of how their forces were to be fitted into his command structure. As a temporary measure, CINCSOUTH was given the overall responsibility for these forces, but
they remained under their own national Commanders pending a final decision on this question.

Finally, it was decided in August 1952, that a separate command, Allied Land Forces South-Eastern Europe would be set up to control the Greek and Turkish forces, and that this new Command would be under CINCSOUTH. The site chosen for this new Headquarters was Izmir, Turkey, with an advance post in Salonika.

Mediterranean Command. At the end of 1952 it was decided that another MSC should be set up in the South, Allied Forces Mediterranean, with Headquarters at Malta. The first CINC was Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma (UK). In 1953, the various national forces under his control were organised into six separate areas, each commanded by an Admiral: one French, one Greek, one Turkish, one Italian and two British. Admiral Mountbatten's wartime mission was to secure Allied LOCs in the Mediterranean.

The Central Region. Shortly before General Gruenther became SACEUR, the Military Representatives Committee (MRC) approved General Ridgway's recommended changes for ACE. It was a double change, involving not only the Central Region, but, also an increase in the responsibilities of the Air Deputy.

Under General Eisenhower, SACEUR maintained direct control of the Central area. In July, 1953, the MRC agreed that the Central Command should be placed under its own CINC. On 14 August 1953 Marshal Juin was appointed CINC Allied Forces Central Europe, with three PSCs directly subordinate to him. COMLANDCENT controlled the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG); consisting of Belgian, Canadian, Netherlands and United Kingdom Forces, and the Central Army Group (CENTAG) consisting of French and United States Forces. Vice-Admiral Jaujard became Commander Allied Naval Forces Central Europe. General Norstad moved to SHAPE as Air Deputy and was himself replaced by Air Chief Marshal Sir Basil Embry (UK) as Commander Allied Air Forces Central Europe (COMAIRCENT). The latter controlled two Allied Tactical Air Forces, TWOATAF to give air support to NORTHAG, FOURATAF to CENTAG.

By 14 August 1953, General Gruenther had four MSCs who reported to him directly: General Mansergh in the North (CINCNORTH), Marshal Juin in the Centre (CINCENT), Admiral Fechteler in the South (CINCSOUTH) and Admiral Mountbatten in the Mediterranean (CINCAFMED).
The Air Deputy. General Norstad became Air Deputy on the 27th July, 1953. His responsibilities were considerably wider than those of his predecessor, and his staff was correspondingly larger. Hitherto the post of Air Deputy had carried with it no executive responsibilities. It was decided, however, that with the increase in air power available to ACE, both from assigned air forces and from external sources (the United States Strategic Air Command and the United Kingdom Bomber Command), a single central authority was necessary. Only in this way would the allied air forces get full advantage of the flexibility inherent in Allied air power.

General Norstad was concerned with the development of the air forces of ACE and with planning for the most effective utilisation of those forces. In addition, he was responsible for ensuring that the striking power of the US Strategic Air Force and UK Bomber Command was applied to the best advantage. (1)

Tactical Air Doctrine and ACE Air Organisation - COMAIRCENT’s Views.

Air Doctrine. One of Air Marshal Embry’s first acts as COMAIRCENT was to present General Norstad, now Air Deputy at SHAPE, with “some ideas on certain aspects of Tactical Air Force doctrine as applied to Central European Defence.” AM Embry drew the AIRDEP’s attention to ideas which, he admitted, while apparently “counter to the set principles in force today for the conduct of the Land/Air battle”, highlighted the need to modernise Allied thinking on air doctrine.

Essentially, the broad principles governing the use of air power in support of armies had been formulated from the practical lessons of WWII, he said. Those principles had been governed and influenced by the characteristics and performance of the equipment of that time — a period that, inevitably, had been overtaken by scientific and technical developments that now implied a complete re-evaluation of the earlier principles — not necessarily “with the object of trying to disprove them so much as to evaluate their significance in relation to their application to the conduct of a modern Land/Air Battle.”

The Air Marshal said that it was an “accepted

(1) This summary is taken almost word for word from Ismay’s NATO, The First Five Years, pp. 72-74. For a detailed account of the evolution of the command structure see Allied Organisation in the Centre 1953-1956, unpublished manuscript SHAPE Historical Section and SHAPE History 1952-53, Vol.II, Sect. I, Chap. III.
principle that 'It is necessary to win the Air Battle before embarking on the Land Battle'. The winning of the Air Battle is a task for Strategical Air Forces rather than for Tactical Air Forces if a literal interpretation is to be given to the term." It might take a long time for the effect of strategic operations to be felt in the area of Tactical Air Force operations.

In WWII after three years of war, when strategic air force operations had considerably reduced German Air Power, it was possible for the Tactical Air Forces - with the limited support of heavy bombers - to gain a high degree of local air superiority before the launching of land operations. At the start of another war, AM Embry felt that the Allies would not be so favourably situated and Soviet air power would be at full strength. "It will not be possible" he said, for the Tactical Air Forces to win the battle for superiority as understood in the 1939-'45 war.

Because of the speeds of modern aircraft and the limitations of technical equipment (such as radar) to detect low-flying aircraft - COMAIRCENT sought to define the broad operational requirements and tasks of the Air Forces of Central Europe. Generally, these were: Air Defence; support of land force operations by day and by night under all weather conditions; medium and short range reconnaissance; and a limited amount of "medium haul" air transport operations.

AM Embry therefore proposed that certain areas should be studied as a matter of urgency. Among these were: the forming of a centralised air defence system; the creation of a "guided-missile/light anti-aircraft gun defence zone; specifications and the placing of orders for a lightweight ground attack aircraft, and ground attack night aircraft; a study of electronic equipment required; and the development of combined plans for targeting."(1)

Air Organisations. Early in 1954, AM Embry also presented CINCEN with an elaboration on the kind of NATO air organisation that would be needed. His purpose, he said, was to set out "to establish an air chain of command and organisation in NATO Europe which, while still meeting so far as possible the many national and inter-service issues affecting it, will nevertheless retain the operating vitals needed for air warfare".

ACM Embry pointed out that SACEUR's planning directive for 1954 had stated that "a dominant factor in victory will be our ability to utilise effectively the full potential of our air forces. The greatest asset of Air Power is its flexibility.... It follows that our plans

and our Command Organisation must be such as to permit us to exploit this flexibility to the maximum.

It had always been a cardinal principle in the organisation of air forces — American, British, French and German — that the most powerful and economical method of using Air Power was through "a functional system", ACM Embry said. Each function — strategic bombing, tactical, air defence operations, etc. — had its Commander; and, in a particular theatre, all were coordinated by a single air authority. Command was "clear, responsibilities readily definable, and control direct." "Unhappily", COMAIRCENT noted, "the organisation for the operational use of Air Power in Europe is not suited to perform its task. Control is divided, responsibilities are tangled and some functions are as yet unassigned to a Commander. The whole NATO edifice of air organisation could collapse under the impact of war, and bring down with it the safety of Europe."

A remedy did not lie in air force hands alone; nor would any single organisational solution ideally suit the needs of all three services, he said. Differing national and international methods of control and organisation between air forces and armies, and the introduction of radically new weapons had altered the tactical use of Allied forces and presented a problem of great complexity.

"What is clear", ACM Embry stressed, "is that the combination of hydrogen bomb and surprise attack can produce such cataclysmic results, that there is absolutely no room for misdirection of priorities, waste of manpower, or the presence of international or inter-Soviet rivalries. Let us be in no doubt about what is the threat, about our objective, and how we should achieve them," he concluded.

ACM Embry therefore set out, in a rationale gained through previous experience in WWII and Korea, a restatement of Allied strategic aims and the functions of air power in Europe. He analysed the existing NATO military command structure, and the organisation — particularly, the air organisation (which he said was currently "illogical"). Finally he proposed a functional air organisation as being "the most efficient basis on which to prepare NATO air forces, but the only method by which they may fulfill their tasks, and meet the air threat." (1)

(1) AIRCENT 121/54, NATO Air Organisation, 7 Apr 54.

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In forwarding AM Embrys paper to SACEUR, Marshal Juin agreed with the general ideas of Embry's presentation, but called attention to two points. He said that "the proposed organisation should not do away with the basic concept of a Theatre of Operations within which land, air and naval forces carry out their operations jointly. Each Theatre of Operations should be under a single Commander who is entirely responsible for the preparation of plans and the general conduct of joint operations over an area".

The second of Marshal Juin's points was, in his own words, as follows: "We may well ask whether the present procedures for the employ of the Tactical Air Force in a Theatre of Operations and for their logistic support make it possible, at this time, to carry out a rapid redeployment of such a Tactical Air Force from one Theatre of Operations to another. Should these limiting factors not be taken into account in organising the Command?"

AM Embry's survey was of interest, CINCENT added, even if only because of the basic conceptions which he so rightly restates. Accordingly, Marshal Juin considered that the survey could be used as the basis for a careful and exhaustive study at the highest levels of the European Allied Command, i.e. SHAPE and its major subordinate commands. (1)

General Schuyler acknowledged CINCENT's letter on SACEUR's behalf on 17 May 1954, noting that SACEUR had read the study with interest and found it to be valuable "for future studies of the organisation of this Command". (2)

The Army/Air Dilemma: "Flexibility" or "Paralleling".

On 1 July 1954, Air Marshal Fraser, RAF, Chief of Staff, AIRCENT, issued an AIRCENT "Chief of Staff Policy Statement No.1" to internal staff elements of that command on the subject of "Air Force Organisation below AAFCE". (3) Pointing out that air forces generally were flexible, and that from given bases they could strike out at widely separated points, he noted that within themselves, however, their degree of flexibility varied greatly. At one end of the scale there was almost

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(1) AFCE Ltr. 794/SG/54, 23 Apr 54.
(2) SHAPE Ltr. LTG Schuyler to Marshal Juin, 17 May 54.
(3) Although by this time AIRCENT had been adopted as the official acronym for Allied Air Forces Central Europe, the term, AAFCE, frequently was used to represent the official title of that Command, or to represent the combination of the Allied air forces in Central Europe. For purposes of this narrative, the term, AIRCENT, will be applied, as from 14 Aug 53. However, note that this Headquarters was disestablished in 1966, when it was absorbed, with LANDCENT, by Headquarters AFCENT.
"global" flexibility of strategic bombers; at the other existed the much more limited flexibility of jet fighters. "Properly organised and with an adequate logistic infrastructure, air forces can increase their flexibility by moving quickly to different operating bases", he noted. But, although the potential flexibility of air forces had to be fully exploited, he added, this quality had to be kept in "correct perspective".

The association of air force elements with army elements had many advantages and should not inhibit the "latent flexibility" of the air forces concerned, AM Fraser stated. "Trouble arises when 'association' is taken to mean 'possession' leading to the belief that the associated air forces must never operate in support of any other army formation", he said. "This conception is dangerous to the extreme".

The "cure" was not to disassociate air and army. (This might be necessary later, he thought, but for entirely different reasons -- acquisition of new equipment, etc., for example.) But the time had come, he emphasised, when "an unequivocal warning must be sounded that, though there is still great advantage to be derived from paralleling of air/army formations, it can no longer be assumed that the air force can automatically parallel whatever organisation the army may care to set up unilaterally". There was a limit to the number of tactical air forces "or CATACS" (the French term for its Tactical Air Corps) that it was feasible to constitute on a given front.

AM Fraser indicated that there were "signs appearing that even with goodwill and a proper understanding on both sides more army formations may have to be created than the air forces could possibly parallel". If events proved this to be true, "we must get our principles agreed as to how the land/air tie-up can best be achieved in those circumstances", he added, indicating, finally, that while his staff had to be "elastic" in the application of those principles, each case should be dealt with on its merits as it arose.

The AIRCENT Chief of Staff's Statement included an examination of "principles", mainly devoted to demonstrating when "paralleling" was not practicable; e.g. when incompatibility existed between the role of tactical air squadrons "in the fight in the air or against enemy air installations on the one hand", and "direct support of ground forces on the other"; between "the air battle and close support". There was a very definite limit to which any air commander's sector of responsibility for the air battle could be reduced without wholly unacceptable loss of flexibility and efficiency. Therefore, if in trying to parallel army organisation a CATAC commander's sector of responsibility became too small, it might be
necessary to withdraw from him responsibility and authority for the air battle.

The conduct of this air battle would have to be undertaken at a higher level; and the CATAG commander would be left only with responsibility for close support -- and then, only with those of his units which the next higher formation had decreed from time to time were at his disposal for close support purposes.

This was "a most unhappy, inefficient and hopeless state of affairs", AM Fraser said. Two different people would be trying to judge the balance between the close support role and the air battle, and the air battle "is trying to be fought by a headquarters (ATAF) which is not designed to do it". To avoid this, the number of CATACs on a given front had to be limited. If, after full and careful consideration, the army authorities decided they needed more than the equivalent number of armies, "then one CATAC will have to work with more than one army", he said.

AM Fraser noted, among other things, that two broad principles therefore emerged for application when there were more army than air formations:

"First - The CATAC sector of responsibility must not shrink below that in which he has enough 'elbow room' to fight the air battle.

"Two - The CATAC commander must place a responsible representative with each army commander. It will be for discussion in the light of the particular circumstances as to whether the CATAC commander associates himself with one of the armies, leaving the other with merely a representative."

Embry's views on The Theatre Air Commander/Theatre CINC Relationship.

In August ACM Embry elaborated on his earlier analysis of NATO air organisation, and, particularly, on headquarters organisation in Central Europe. In two separate letters he recommended "an air organisation based on a partly functional, partly geographical system", which would permit the maximum flexibility in operation; and, as a basis (and in conjunction) with the former, an outline

1) AIRCENT-CS-2700, Chief of Staff (AIRCENT) Policy Statement #1, Air Force Organisation below AAFCE, 1 Jul 54. The document was made available to SHAPE on 3 Feb 56 by the Exec. Off. to the AIRCENT Chief of Staff in Ltr. AIRCENT-CS-2700/209, addressed to the Personal Assistant to AM Sir Walter L. Dawson, DCS P&O, SHAPE.
of the relationship between the "Theatre Air Commander" and the "Theatre Commander-in-Chief". If the responsibilities and needs of the "Theatre Air Commander" in discharging his duties were acknowledged as correct, he noted, "then the outlines of the Air Headquarters organisation he requires are established."

The Theatre Air Commander, in war, had two campaigns with which he was strictly concerned -- both of which demanded the participation of the majority of his forces. These were: the Strategic Air Campaign, in which his orders and plans stemmed from SACEUR (the Air Deputy), and (in Central Europe) the Land/Air battle, which he directed as an equal partner with the Land Force Commander. The CINC and the Land Force Commander were vitally interested in the conduct and outcome of the first, since it had a direct influence on the second campaign, he acknowledged. "However, the distinction between the Airman who has two battles to fight with the same forces (they can, of course, occur simultaneously or in sequency,) and the soldier who is concerned with one battle, has an important bearing on the need for a direct chain of Air Command and the type of staff and joint operations rooms needed," COMAIRCENT stated.

He added that the participation of the Theatre Air Commander in the Land/Air battle had to be "on an equal footing with the Land Forces Commander." "I am the first to acknowledge that the Land Force Commander carries the primary responsibility for the concept of territorial defence," he said; "but I suggest the co-equal status of the Airman is assured by the decisive power he can bring to bear from his own and external air resources."

In summary, COMAIRCENT said that the Air Commander's responsibilities and needs were as follows:

"a. The responsibility for participation in two campaigns, the strategic air and the land/air battles, which place him in a slightly different position to the Land Force Commander."

"b. A direct chain of Air Command is essential for the control of these battles, since it provides the means of keeping his associated Service Commanders in touch with the strategic air battle, for staff processing matters of purely Air concern, as well as ensuring the maximum flexibility of the Air Forces within the time scale allowed by air and land threats."

"c. A Command and staff organisation capable of the joint preparation of, and decision on, the plans
and conduct of the Land/Air battle". (1)

He attached a proposed "NATO Air Organisation" plan to both of his letters, and, on the same date that he presented these to Marshal Juin, he forwarded copies to General Norstad. (2)

**CINCENT’s Views on the AIRCENT Proposals.**

Marshal Juin forwarded ACM Embry’s latest proposals to SACEUR on 14 September. Regarding the proposed organisation, CINCENT told General Gruenther that it appeared "to be sound, and it seems to make for maximum efficiency in the Air Forces."

On the second point -- organisation at Theatre level -- CINCENT stressed "the importance of creating an Air Defence Commander, subordinate to the Commander of the Air Forces in the Theatre". "I quite agree," he said, "that there is no absolute obligation to have the tactical organisation of the Air Force and Army running parallel. I admit that a chain of direct command could exist for purely Air Force matters, as between the Air Force Commanders at supreme and theatre levels, but I should like to point out that the Theatre Commander must be kept regularly informed as to these matters. He should be consulted whenever there is any question of directing to some other task the air means normally assigned to the air-land battle in his Theatre."

He acknowledged that "Sir Basil is right when he says...that 'not one of us really believes that our present organisation is adapted to its role of peace time preparation, or that it would really be capable of directing operations in war time." But with an analysis of the tasks that would be assigned to the Central Region Commander-in-Chief -- in contrast to the "North and South Theatres", which were predominantly maritime, extensive, and lacking in homogeneity -- the Central Europe Theatre was "of modest size, wedged in between the Alps and the North Sea, and predominantly continental." Thus, "the Theatre Commander must consequently be able to direct his Army Group Commanders without any intermediary and wage his air-land battle in intimate liaison with the Commander of his Air Forces as happened in the second World War and in the same theatre, under the command of General Eisenhower."

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The organisation that logically followed, as far as Central Europe was concerned, depended upon the existence of a CINC, responsible to the Supreme Commander and directly commanding his Major Subordinate Land Commands, "and whose Deputy at one and the same time Commander of the Air Forces in the Theatre, representative in the Theatre of the Air Commander at Supreme level, and Second in Command in the Theatre".

As for the various Headquarters required by such a command organisation, CINCENT acknowledged that it might be questioned whether it would be better to have a single, integrated headquarters to which a minor headquarters could be attached for purely air force matters; or whether "three headquarters, some of whose agencies would be, if not entirely integrated, at least attached for joint planning" would be preferable.

"I should like to mention", Marshal Juin pointed out, "that the organisation just described is more or less the same as the one I regarded as desirable at the time Central Europe Theatre /sic/ was created. However, at the time, it was not accepted because of a certain doctrinal opposition on the part of Great Britain."

Finally, he added, the "interesting suggestions put forward by one of my Subordinate Commanders in no way represents any final stance taken by me." A matter of this nature called for further and attentive examination, with which he was ready to proceed, along such lines as SACEUR might indicate. (1)

SHAPE's Initial Reaction.

The SHAPE DCP, Air Marshal W.L. Dawson, considering that where "two of our responsible commanders at the level of Marshal Juin and Sir Basil Embry saying that the present organisation would not work in war, it becomes mandatory that we take some positive steps either to demonstrate that it will work, or else to change it." Accordingly, he instructed the ACOS PP&O to study the matter and personally coordinate with the Vice AIRDEP.

In instructing the ACOS PP&O, AM Dawson pointed out, "You will note that Marshal Juin says frankly in his concluding paragraphs that he had always favoured the solution put forward by ACM Embry, notably three

(1) AFCE Ltr. 1633/54, OPS 1250, Marshal Juin to SACEUR, 14 Sep 54.
Commanders in the Centre, one of whom was C-in-C and without a separate C-in-C with a 4th Headquarters. Opposition to this on the part of the UK was based mainly on the conviction that the land and air commanders carried joint responsibility for land/air operations and if one of the two were to fall back in any case of major disagreement on the fact that he was also C-in-C, one service or the other would be submerged and in danger of being mis-employed. The UK were prepared to accept an officer of any service as the C-in-C, provided that he had complete overall responsibility and not the detailed responsibility for one particular service. This is, of course, the principle that is accepted in the appointment of Supreme Commanders.

The DCPO did not favour putting off a reply to Marshal Juin — as he indicated the Air Deputy Office did — but, rather, felt that the matter should be looked at before it came up for general discussion in the approaching CPX for 1955. (1)

On 29 October 1954, SACEUR informed Marshal Juin that he was "vitally interested in insuring that the development of the organisational structure within Allied Command Europe continues to be responsive to the demands which we may expect will be placed upon that structure in the event of war." But he planned no decision on the matter in the near future.

Although he felt that CINCENT's Headquarters organisation was reasonably adequate for the immediate future, he agreed fully that there was room for improvement, "streamlining", and "perhaps some further alteration will be required, particularly in the light of our New Approach strategy".

He requested that CINCENT therefore undertake the detailed study the latter had suggested, with the "utmost freedom in formulating your proposals". "I would hope, however," he said, "that your recommendations concerning the structure for Central Europe would be sufficiently flexible to permit this structure to adapt itself to whatever changes, particularly on the air command side, may later prove desirable in the over-all system for Allied Command Europe." (2)

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(1) Memo, AM W.L. Dawson to ACOS PP&O, 7 Oct 54; Memo, AM W.L. Dawson to COFS, 15 Oct 54.

(2) SHAPE Ltr. 634/54, General Gruenther to Marshal Juin, 29 Oct 54.
The Special Committee on Command Structure, ACE.

Establishment of Committee.

On 28 December 1954, General Schuyler informed senior members of the Command Group that "various considerations" had arisen during the preceding 12 months that indicated the need for a resurvey of the command structure within ACE. Among these considerations were the approval of SACEUR's Capabilities Study by the MC; the expected addition of German forces to ACE; action by the NAC which assigned increased responsibility and authority to SACEUR, following the London and Paris Agreements; the greatly increased availability of new weapons and their means of delivery; and the urgent need for an overall air defence system.

In view of these considerations, the Chief of Staff constituted a Special Committee on Command Structure for ACE to review the command structure in ACE and to recommend to SACEUR such changes as it considered appropriate. (1) Its members, all senior officials of SHAPE, were:

- Air Vice Marshal Frank R. Miller, RCAF (Chairman)
- Major-General Stephen N. Shoosmith, UK Army
- Major-General Henri A. Lorillot, Fr Army
- Rear Admiral A.B. Vosseller, US Navy
- Brig. Gen. Willis S. Matthews, US Army
- Brig. Gen. H.C. Donnelly, US AF.

The Committee held its first meeting on 5 January 1955, and, following visits (2) and conference at all echelons

(1) Memo AG 2202 CS, COFS to DSACEUR, AIRDEP, NAVDEP, DCPO, DCLA, AGCF, SECY, and to each member of the Special Committee, 28 Dec 54.

(2) General Schuyler notified the MSCs of pending visits of the Committee to their areas. General Bailly, AFCENT COFS, was told that SACEUR did not want to Committee to interfere with Marshal Juin's review of AFCENT's command structure. See SHAPE Ltrs. AG 2202 CS, 30 Dec 54.

On 5 Jan 55, General Bailly informed AM Fraser, AIRCENT COFS, of some modification in CINCENT's views. Although this change did not reverse Marshal Juin's previous opinions, it pointed toward possible reconciliation of "divergencies". See AM Fraser ltr CS-2530 to AM Dawson, 28 Jan 55.

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of command, through the Army Group/ATAF level, submitted its report on 28 February 1955, in which it revealed important conclusions pertaining to command in the air, and to organisation in each region of ACE.

Views of Central Region Commands.

The Report contained the view of all four Central Region Commanders. In the Committee's words, the views of the commanders were:

CINCENT. There should be three HQ at Fontainebleau. The present LANDCENT organisation is unnecessary. CINCENT should in fact be LANDCENT as well, but should have a joint staff to solve those problems which require joint action. CINCENT's staff should be basically a planning staff in respect to Air and Naval problems. In Army problems it would be both a planning and executing staff. In Air and Navy, separate staffs under Air and Naval commanders would be operating or executing HQ. The Air commander would, however, be the Deputy CINC, and he would have full authority as a Deputy CINC over CINCENT's staff, and he would at the same time utilise his separate Air staff as an operating staff. The Naval commander would enjoy a similar status, except that he would not be a Deputy CINC, but would be an Assistant to the CINC. There would also be a Land Assistant to the CINC who would concern himself with training maneuvers and inspections. It was recognised that an arrangement such as this, wherein the Deputy CINC and one of the two assistants to the CINC are also commanders, requires that all the HQ be close together; the dangers in this arrangement are appreciated, but detailed consideration has not been given to the problem. Another aspect of the CINCENT concept provides for the establishment of what was referred to as "super quartermaster general", who would, in effect, run a joint logistics operations, and would run CINCENT's rear echelon when CINCENT himself displaces forward to conduct the battle.

The Air Commander would be Deputy CINC. He would also command a small operating HQ which would execute the plans developed in CINCENT's HQ. Marshal Juin considers that COMAIRCENT has two jobs, one of providing the air effort in the land/air battle, i.e., the air support phase of tactical air operations, and the other of supporting and participating in the offensive air effort. The Marshal considers that for the first job COMAIRCENT must be responsible to him, but for the second job COMAIRCENT should be directly responsible to the Air Deputy.
NAVCENT. COMNAVCENT considers the present command arrangements unsound and excessive. He considers that some means must be found whereby the overall commander will be given adequate means to permit him to do his job. He considers that a larger staff is required by CINCENT in order to permit him effectively to command the Centre. COMNAVCENT stated that he could, without any increase in number of personnel, provide sufficient personnel from his own small staff to permit improved manning of CINCENT HQ. He considers that CINCENT should have a joint and integrated staff which is, in effect, an overall planning staff, and the three services should each have a HQ which is an executing agent of the plans which CINCENT would prepare.

AIRCENT. COMAIRCENT agrees that the number of HQ should be reduced. He objects, however, to the establishing of any joint HQ in the Centre, and desires that instead there be three co-equal service HQ with one of the three commanders designated by SACEUR as the Chairman or the CINC to exercise his power of decision when such action is required. COMAIRCENT considers that because of the significance of the air effort, the air commander should be this CINC or Chairman, but he does not insist on this, and is quite prepared to accept that the Land Commander be this Chairman or CINC initially. COMAIRCENT states that it is not acceptable that he be asked to execute plans which are developed by a staff which is not his own. He considers that his staff must prepare the air plans and air advice for which he alone is responsible. He considers that it is not reasonable or proper that one part of the plans for what he regards as one overall air battle be made in one HQ by a joint staff answerable through a Chief of Staff to CINCENT, while the other phases be prepared in a separate HQ. He considers that a serious difficulty for CINCENT's plans would result from the fact that the HQ of the Air Commander should not be close the HQ of the Ground Commander, primarily because of vulnerability consideration. COMAIRCENT considers that the two problems of Land command and Air command should not be too closely related since the problems are quite different in that the Land commander in Centre can delegate authority while the Air command must be centralised and operate from COMAIRCENT level. COMAIRCENT considers that three co-equal HQ can operate effectively, and that joint problems can be satisfactorily solved by Committee effort. COMAIRCENT considers that because CINCENT must be absent much of the time to contact high national authorities etc., Deputy CINC, i.e. COMAIRCENT (should it be decided to designate the Land commander as CINCENT) should have responsibility to assure this joint effort, acting in the name of the Commander. COMAIRCENT objects strongly to CINCENT's solution with which he is familiar in detail, and points out the serious difficulty that might result if at some later date an airman were designated as CINCENT thus, presumably, requiring a complete shift of headquarters. COMAIRCENT suggests that the only solution is in fact a choice between one
integrated HQ along SHAPE lines which he considers manifestly unsound in the Centre, or the solution which he is advancing. COMAIRCENT insists that there must be one complete Air Staff to run the complete air battle. He cannot accept the splitting out of one part or phase of the functions pertaining to the air battle. COMAIRCENT does accept the desirability of the combined handling of certain logistics functions and, assuming some agreement on cut-off of authority, the Juin concept of a "super quartermaster general".

COMAIRCENT advocates an airman commanding all air effort, and insists on the necessity of one air chain of command on the basis of the necessity for taking advantage of the flexibility of air power. COMAIRCENT considers that his direct relationship with this overall air authority would cover the three operational areas of support of the counter air offensive, air defence and air participation in the land/air battle.

One overall air defence commander for the Centre, working with and subordinate to the Centre air commander, is required. An air defence operational HQ is required in a forward area alongside the operational HQ for the Centre air commander.

German accession would not affect COMAIRCENT proposals. German accession does not create a requirement for any additional ATAF. COMAIRCENT in fact opposes either additional ATAF's or CATAC's.

LANDCENT. The job of COMLANDCENT is a full-time job that cannot be satisfactorily combined with the job of CINCENT. COMLANDCENT considers that combining the two jobs is unsound, and perhaps less valid than combining COMAIRCENT and CINCENT, although he does not advocate this latter course of action. COMLANDCENT points out the dangers in the Juin-Bailly solution if an air officer were ever named to be CINCENT. COMLANDCENT feels that a Land Assistant to the CINC would be of limited effectiveness and he personally could not accept that status. COMLANDCENT considers that there can be and should be overall handling of certain problems at theatre level, i.e., at CINCENT's HQ. He is agreeable to reinforcing CINCENT's staff to permit handling of appropriate problems provided, however, that there is no reduction of any sort in the scope, powers and status of any of the three service commanders. COMLANDCENT questions the possibility of truly impartial action if CINCENT and one of the service commanders are one and the same, and points to the experience of LION ROUGE atomic policy questions as suggesting a need for a separate CINC. COMLANDCENT does not particularly like the committee organisation, but recognises some may always be required. COMLANDCENT does not oppose an organisation which provides for three co-equal commanders in the Centre without any overall HQ, and COMLANDCENT considers that this arrangement could work.
COMLANDCENT accepts the decisive quality of the Air battle with some reservations. However, he goes so far as to direct his land commanders to take risks as required to assure success of the air battle. He accepts that in the initial stages of a war any air support he may expect may be very greatly reduced because of the requirements of the air battle, but he hopes that the reduction would not be so great as to eliminate close support. COMAIRCENT has indicated that this is a possibility, but the Commander 2ATAF has expressed his conviction that there will be some support available for the participation in a land/air battle. COMLANDCENT accepts this latter situation.

Committee's Conclusions. The Committee considered that there was not sufficient justification to warrant the creation of a CINCAIR responsible to SACEUR with a direct authority over air forces existing under regional commanders. It did, however, accept the necessity for a degree of centralised control of air resources. The Committee considered that retention of the Air Deputy organisation within SHAPE, and strengthening and clarifying of the Deputies TOR, scope and authority could "solve the problem of assuring maximum gain from our vital air capability".

The Committee's report showed that there were essentially two possible solutions to the problem of command structure in the Centre Region:

a. Combining CINCENT's headquarters with LANDCENT, thus permitting CINCENT to exercise command over Army Groups. This one headquarters would have a joint staff but would at the same time be composed predominately of army personnel. COMNAVCENT would maintain a small headquarters while COMAIRCENT would maintain a substantial headquarters.

b. Three service commanders with appropriate headquarters operating under CINCENT who would have a joint staff balanced generally in respect to service, particularly in respect to air and army representation, and who would exercise in respect to land forces no authority or control generally different or unusual from that he would exercise in respect to air forces.

The Committee noted that either solution could work, that there were strong personal views held by the commanders most affected, and that there were certain advantages and disadvantages to each. It stated: "Under ordinary conditions, the Committee would designate one of the two solutions as, in its view, preferable. However, in this instance the Committee considers that because of extremely high level military and political implications, concerning which the Committee is in fact not fully informed, the Committee does not recommend one solution over the other but cites the two solutions as workable."
However, the Committee did recommend that "CINCENT's authority and more especially his staff, be strengthened, essentially at the expense of CINCENT's three subordinate service headquarters, to permit CINCENT to function more effectively as a regional commander without requiring that he rely upon an ad hoc or semipermanent committee system to provide him with staff advice and assistance."

Finally, the Committee did recommend that any action in respect to the authority and scope of CINCENT be accompanied by a clear definition of the scope and authority of subordinate commanders, particularly the Centre air commander. (1)

Developments at AFCENT - CINCENT and His Subordinate Commanders Correspond.

On 31 January 1955, in compliance with SACEUR's wish that CINCENT continue to study the Central European Command Structure, Marshal Juin wrote, simultaneously, to ACM Embry, COMAIRCENT, General Carpentier, COMLANDCENT, and VAdm Jaujard, COMNAVCENT, to acquaint these subordinate commanders with his views on this important question, before officially submitting definite proposals to SACEUR. These views were those he had presented to the Special Committee on Command Structure on 18 January 1955:

"Undoubtedly the success of that mission - maintaining the Territories of Central Europe intact - will depend on the success of the air counter-offensive and interdiction operations, in short, on the intelligent use of Strategic and Tactical Air Forces. A reverse in the air would quickly lead to a reverse on the ground. In the last resort, however, victory or defeat will be marked by the resistance or the rupture of the land front. This essential idea of a Land Front holding the enemy and forbidding him access to Allied Territories, clearly defines the nature of responsibilities inside the Central Region. It implies that its Commander-in-Chief belongs to the Army.

I should like to add to the principle of Unity of Command I have just described, a second principle - simplicity in the structure of the Command. An organisation such as ours, joint operational and interallied, is complex in character. If its Command structure is to be efficient, it must also be as simple as possible. It must in particular strive - always for more than is required for purposes of organisation. Central Europe's zone of action being very limited, there is no valid reason for denying me the possibility of personally waging a Battle for which I am responsible. Consequently, there is no justification in war time for placing a Commander, Land Forces, between the Commander-in-Chief of the Central Region and the Army Groups".

Marshal Juin then turned to the air situation and said that maintaining the unity of the Air Battle is absolutely essential:

(1) Report of the Special Committee on Command Structure, ACE, 28 Feb 55.
strategic and tactical air actions must form a whole, the former extending and accentuating the latter;

the organisation of the Command (direct Air Chain of Command) must make it possible for the Tactical Air Forces to go beyond the narrow limits of the Land-Air Battle, and, conversely and when absolutely necessary, for the Air Forces, outside the Central Region to intervene on behalf of the said battle. (1)

Thus, "in view of the extremely important part played by the Air Forces and of the facts just described, I consider that the Commander-in-Chief of Central Europe, belonging to the Army, should be assisted by a Deputy Commander appointed from the Air Forces. He would have the dual role of Air Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief and of Commander of the Air Forces in the Central Region."

Marshal Juin stated he wanted the structure of the Central Europe Command to be as follows:

A Commander-in-Chief, belonging to the Army, responsible to SACEUR.

A Commander, Air Forces, Deputy CINC, responsible for:

**In peace time**:

- Advising the CINC on the preparation of the Joint Operational Plans. To do so, and within the scope of the CINC's decision, he would be empowered to issue orders to the Joint Operational Headquarters.
- Drawing up strictly Air Forces Plans.
- Seeing that the Air Forces under his Command are conditioned for combat.

**In war time** waging the Central Europe Air Battle by:

- Assisting the CINC in the exercise of Command and advising him on the Air Force aspect of Land-Air operations.
- Seeing that the Tactical Air Forces take part in the Air Battle.
- Coordinating activity on behalf of Central Europe of the Air Force from outside the Region with Tactical Land-Air activity in the said region.

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(1) AFCE Ltr. 181/55 CAB 2991, Marshal Juin to AM Embry, COMAIRCENT; Gen. Carpentier, COMLANDCENT; VAdm Jaujard, COMNAVCENT, Command Structure and Organisation of the Various Headquarters of AFCENT, 31 Jan 55.
Coordinating the actions of the Air Defences of the National Territories in Central Europe as between themselves and with the activity of the neighbouring Territories and the Tactical Air Forces.

A Commander, Land Forces, in peacetime responsible for seeing that land forces were properly manned and trained for combat. However in wartime he would become Deputy "Land Forces" to the CINC, and performs all tasks that the CINC entrusted to him.

A Commander, Naval Forces with normal war and peacetime functions.

CINCENT also included two charts to show how the Command and Headquarters would operate. The most interesting feature of the charts is that the Deputy CINC (COMAIRCENT) would have the Chief of Staff and the Quartermaster General as his subordinates on the joint staff. The function of the AFCENT Chief of Staff were very similar to those of the DCPO at SHAPE while the proposed AFCENT Quartermaster General had functions very similar to SHAPE's DCLA.

To enable him to send SACEUR suggestions in greater detail, CINCENT requested that his PSCs appoint a General Officer "to study the question", and that the latter get in touch with his Chief of Staff, "so as to draw up a detailed plan for the Command Structure and organisation of Central Europe Headquarters. (1)

At Marshal Juin's request, General Bailly, AFCENT COPS, sent a copy of CINCENT's letter to General Schuyler, on 4 February 1955, to keep the latter informed. On the same day General Bailly also wrote to AM Fraser, CINCENT COPS, and provided "additional considerations", which Marshal Juin wanted ACM Embry to know. General Bailly also forwarded a copy of his "additional considerations" letter to the SHAPE COPS.

"I may state as of now", General Bailly informed General Schuyler, "that General Carpentier and Admiral Jaujard are in complete agreement with Marshal Juin concerning the reorganisation of Headquarters Central Europe."

"On the other hand, we are unable to predict Sir Basil's/Embry's/ reaction and if he will accept or not the views of the Commander-in-Chief Central Europe." (2)

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(1) AFCE Ltr. 181/55 CAB 2991, 31 Jan 55. See Gruenther Papers.
(2) AFCE Ltr. 183/55 CAB 2991, COFS AFCENT to COFS SHAPE, Reorganisation of HQ Central Europe, 4 Feb 55.
General Bailly noted that "Sir Basil's last views on the subject that we are aware of are contained in the letter of 5 January 1955 which I received from Air Marshal Fraser". (1) This letter had been read before "the Commission" presided over by AVM Miller, during the meeting held by that Commission on Command Structure, ACE/ on the 19th of January, "in order to gather the views of COMAIRCENT regarding problems of reorganisation". (2)

The "Additional Considerations". General Bailly reminded AM Fraser in his letter of 4 February 1955, that one of the reasons why ACM Embry did not agree on the organisation desired by the CINC, was that such an organisation did not take into consideration "the unity of the Air Battle".

"I can assure you that such is not the case", said General Bailly, "and that CINCENT, more than anyone, is striving to maintain that unity, the main factor in the efficiency of the Air Forces."

"Indeed, the unity of the Air Battle is guaranteed by the fact that it is the same High Authority COMAIRCENT which will:

a. as Deputy CINC of the Central Region, be responsible for the participation of the Air Forces in the Air-Ground battle;

b. as Commander of Air Forces Central Europe, be responsible to conduct all other air operations within the direct air chain of Command."

"...In fact, one can conceive that the J.O.C. responsible for the conduct of operations will be located side by side with the Air Force Operations Centre which will conduct operations".

General Bailly reminded AM Fraser that in his 31 January 1955 letter, CINCENT had stated that COMAIRCENT was empowered, as Deputy CINC Central Region, to give directives to the Regional Joint Staff, in conformance with the decisions made by the Commander-in-Chief.

"Sir Basil could object", General Bailly acknowledged, "that it will be difficult for him to do so on account of the differences of the languages, staff procedures, manners of approaching problems, etc...." But, "this objection can be easily eliminated by deciding that the

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(1) AIRCENT Ltr. CS-2202, COFS AIRCENT to COFS AFCENT, 5 Jan 55.
(2) AFCE Ltr. 183/55, 4 Feb 55.
Deputy Chief of CINCENT Joint Staff will be, for example, an Air Vice Marshal of the Royal Air Force."

In order not to make his 31 January 1955 letter too cumbersome Marshal Juin had not incorporated "the present considerations", General Bailly noted, but he asked me to make you aware of them, thinking they shall not fail to interest at the same time Air Chief Marshal Sir Basil Embry." (1)

COMAIRCENT Responds to CINCENT.

On 22 February 1955, COMAIRCENT responded to CINCENT's 31 January 1955 tasking. ACM Embry expressed his disappointment to Marshal Juin "that we have not been able to agree upon the type of organisation that is required in Central Europe," noting that there had emerged "a difference in our respective basic convictions upon the matter of Central European Headquarters organisation that is fundamental. So fundamental indeed is this difference of basic conception that I can see no chance, even with the maximum of give and take that is an inevitable necessity for smooth working in interservice or international endeavour, of our points of view being reconciled by a compromise between the two very differing organisations we respectively champion."

ACM Embry recognised that CINCENT had proposed features designed to meet COMAIRCENT's point of view, "but I would be neither honest with myself nor with you," he stated, "if I gave any indication that the organisation you propose could meet the requirements of an air Commander in the modern age as I, with deep conviction, interpret those requirements."

COMAIRCENT's exhaustive analysis followed. He regretted "the habit of talking about "Command by Committee" which he felt was a misleading catch phrase conferees had adopted. "Joint work is not Command by Committee," he felt. "It is joint consultation between the heads (and staffs) of two entirely different organisations each of which has a major part to play...."

ACM Embry did not oppose the existence of a CINC in the Centre -- and for the moment even considered that he (CINCENT) should be the COMLANDCENT. But he could not accept a staff chain of mixed Army and Air Force officers in which soldiers have to deal with air matters.

(1) AFCE Ltr. 182/55 CAB 2991, Gen. Bailly to AM Fraser, Reorganisation of HQ Central Europe, 4 Feb 55. This letter was forwarded with AFCE/183/55, which was addressed to Gen. Schuyler by Gen. Bailly.
they are not qualified to handle and airmen have to deal with army affairs they know nothing about, as must inevitably happen as the work passes up and down an integrated staff chain. Such an arrangement is far more inefficient and time-consuming than joint work between the staffs of two or three co-equal headquarters in which airmen deal with air matters, soldiers with army matters and sailors with naval matters."

"We must not be misled by the difficulties of our present unsatisfactory setup to believe that similar difficulties are inevitably inherent in a setup of three co-equal headquarters."

COMAIRCENT did not recognise "the right, nor do I see any necessity, for the CINC to come into air matters beyond what is strictly needed for him to discharge his overall responsibility to SACEUR for broad Central European defence policy. This would equally be true in reverse if an airman was CINC," he said.

"Be the CINC a soldier or an airman, I could never be party to the creation of one integrated headquarters at Central European level where actual control of air operations, at any rate, have to be undertaken. Such integration may be acceptable at SHAPE, which is in the main a policy-making body; but even there we are seeing a greater and greater tendency to form a separate air staff to conceive, plan and conduct air operations, which even at the level of SHAPE have to be undertaken.

If the intention of retaining a Land Force Commander, in addition to a soldier as CINC, was that the Land Force Commander "should in effect be only an Inspector General, I suggest a spade should be called a spade and that he should be shown as an Inspector General under the CINC in the Joint Headquarters. Any idea of a Land Force Headquarters as distinct from the headquarters of the CINC, who is the Land Force Commander also, should be unmistakably eradicated."

Also referring to CINCENT's organisational chart, COMAIRCENT could not agree to the distinction between an air aspect of the land/air battle and other air matters. "This is just not the case", he said. "If air power is to be properly employed in Central Europe, the principle must be adhered to that there is only one air battle which must, at each successive level, be conducted by one Commander through one Air staff. Support of external forces, air defence, reconnaissance, close support, interdiction, these are all parts of the same, the one, air battle." COMAIRCENT added, "I know you subscribe to this and that makes your diagram the more puzzling."

These and other specific views were COMAIRCENT's "frank and considered comments". He appreciated CINCENT's characteristic courtesy in asking for them, but repeated his disappointment "that in the end so
so wide a gulf has emerged between our respective points of view, each of which I am sure is held with equal conviction and sincerity, and each of which is based upon a deep conviction of how best to achieve an aim upon which there can be no question of dispute between us." (1)

CINCENT's Study of COMAIRCENT's Comments.

Marshal Juin wrote to ACM Embry on 17 March 1955 indicating that he had studied the latter's letter, and, "equally frank" stated his surprise and distress that on many points my intention had been misunderstood or at the very least construed in somewhat tendentious fashion."

CINCENT did not propose to take up these matters point by point; however he explained that he had always considered that "the division of Command into various Theatres of Operations, each having an appointed commander, was essential to an efficient coordination of effort. The Supreme Commander could not, as was the case for over two years in the Central-Europe Region, envisage carrying out this coordination himself in war-time. One cannot exercise direct command of both a ship and a fleet, or of a division and a corps," he stated.

Recalling that he had been CINCENT for a year and half, he considered that he had had "the time to grasp the real nature of the mission assigned to me."

"Your elucidations on how the air counter offensive can be fitted in with the Air-Land defensive actions of the different Regions, brought it home to me that the present capabilities of the Air Force, its power and its extreme flexibility of movement now make it impossible to contemplate using it merely on the much too restricted Regional basis."

This was why, Marshal Juin continued, he "was the first to agree that unconditional priority be given to the air battle and hoped like you that in the Western part of Europe at least a command structure capable of insuring the unity of this battle would be developed."

This was certainly the line SACEUR had taken, CINCENT noted.

"Your role is obviously somewhat reduced...and is perhaps no longer in keeping with the very large Headquarters you inherited and which you have reorganised.

(1) AIRCENT Ltr. CS-2530/02, 22 Feb 55.
But the same is true of my role since basically it is now limited merely to conducting, with your help, the air-land defensive battle."

"And that is why, conscious of my responsibility, I mean to conduct myself this battle which, in view of the physical characteristics of the Region and critical turn involving large changes in the front, requires prompt decisions to meet the situations thus brought about."

"These decisions, you will agree, can only come from a single responsible Commander and not from a body of juxtaposed but independent Commands whose inefficiency I have gauged over the last year and a half, even in peace-time. Battles are not felicitously conducted with an Aulic Council, History is there to prove it."

"My project for reforming the Command structure is governed by this idea. It is aimed at doing away with the Land Forces Command which is superfluous in such a small Region as is shown by the bitter experience of the French in 1940; an experience that General Eisenhower wished to avoid in the same Theatre of Operations in 44-45 when he opposed the setting up of a Land Command between himself and his Army Groups. This project is also aimed at providing me personally with the integrated Staff machinery for joint air-land planning. This machinery would also be yours, in your capacity as Deputy Commander-in-Chief. You would of course keep your own Command Headquarters as Commander of Central Region Air Forces, not only for the execution of joint decisions on the air-land battle, but also to enable you to issue orders in furtherance of instructions from SACEUR in order to take your part in the overall air battle."

CINCENT concluded that he hoped the Central-Europe region would finally be provided with a command structure and an organisation that, in his view, gave "a far better guarantee of efficiency than those imposed on us up to the present." He felt he therefore could not further delay the detailed study awaited by SACEUR, and noted that a working group composed of representatives from AFCENT, LANDCENT and NAVCENT was undertaking the study which he hoped to have completed by 15 April 1955. As COMAIRCENT had not responded to his request (in paragraph 4 of his 31 January 1955 letter) CINCENT regretted that AIRCENT was "not taking part in the work of this group."
"I must admit", Marshal Juin noted, "that I do not understand the attitude of non-collaboration which you have seen fit to adopt in this matter, for there is no question of implementing a decision which has already been taken but only to prepare a project for which I alone am responsible and which I have the duty to submit to my NATO Superiors. It is up to the latter to settle the debate after having examined your arguments which I find it my duty to forward to SHAPE." (1)

On 24 March 1955, General Max Gelee, Fr AF, now AFECENT COFS, forwarded copies of both ACM Embry's 22 February 1955 analysis and Marshal Juin's 17 March 1955 response to General Schuyler, "so that you may be well aware of the question and to enable you, if necessary, to inform the Supreme Commander." (2)

On 26 March 1955, at SHAPE and in accordance with General Schuyler's instructions, the Secretary of the Staff circulated a duplicate copy of the latter three documents to General Gruenther, General Norstad and Field Marshal Montgomery. (3)

CINCENT offers to give up his Command.

On 6 May 1955 Marshal Juin wrote directly to SACEUR. He said that when Central Europe had been activated, he had felt it his duty to submit certain recommendations concerning the structure of that organisation, and, in particular, "about the advisability of doing away with the Land Force command echelon". Marshal Juin observed that SACEUR had then remarked that those "conceptions were in opposition with the policy of other National Authorities and, in order not to delay the application of the proposed system, I agreed to carry it out in practice, on condition that the Land Force Commander were a Frenchman."

A year's experience as CINCENT had now led him to the conclusion that the command structure of this Region was working very badly in peacetime and would be quite inefficient in wartime." (4)

"For the planning and conduct of joint operations which are his essential responsibilities the CINC of this Region depends on a Committee system which always prevailed.

(1) AFCE Ltr. 472/55 CAB 2991, Marshal Juin to ACM Sir Basil Embry, Command Structure & Organisation of Central Europe Command Headquarters, 17 Mar 55.
(2) AFCE Ltr. 520/55 CAB 2991, General Gelee to General Schuyler, 24 Mar 55.
(4) Marshal Juin's underlining.
at Fontainebleau owing to the specific structure of Central Europe Command.

"This Committee system could perhaps be justified when the three juxtaposed Commands (Land, Air and Sea) were simultaneously under you and when the strategic mission assigned to the Commander of Central Region Air Forces exceeded by far the scope of Central Europe. But the creation of a CINC Central Europe, and the fact that the strategic Air Forces are now all grouped at your level and that only the Tactical Air Support Forces are pre-distributed among the Regions, no longer justified a system which, in the preparation and execution of decisions, causes delays inconsistent with the exigencies of the new form of war. We must now resort to a more rational organisation which will give the CINC of this Region the means to fully meet his responsibilities."

CINCENT then presented, essentially, the same analysis he had developed in his response to ACM Embry and at this time stated, "I therefore lay a particular stress on my present propositions."

He asked for SACEUR's decision on the principles of the reorganisation he suggested. "From your answer I will infer", he stated, "whether it is possible or not for me to assume any longer the responsibilities you entrusted to me." (1)

This was the first indication that Marshal Juin had considered relinquishment of his command.

A Replacement for ACM Embry.

Generally, little resulted from the above exchanges immediately. However, on 21 September 1955, Marshal Juin indicated his concurrence with the replacement of ACM Embry by ACM Sir George Mills, UK AF, as COMAIRCENT. Shortly after, however, CINCENT stipulated that "it remains understood that the responsibilities of ACM Sir George Mills will be those laid down in my draft reorganisation of the Central Europe Headquarters, which I submitted to you. The months that have elapsed since this letter was sent have left me even more firmly rooted in my convictions."

(1) AFCENT Ltr. 345/CAB, Marshal Juin to SACEUR, 6 May 55. At SHAPE, Marshal Juin's letter was released only to SACEUR, OCOFS and OSECY. General Schuyler and General Gruenther discussed it about 11 May. General Norstad was given a copy on 13 May 1955. DSACEUR and DCPO received copies on 17 May.
He requested SACEUR's decision noting that, while detailed planning of the contemplated reorganisation would demand some considerable time, "it is essential for me to know now whether you are in agreement with the basic principles of this reorganisation without which I should find it difficult in all conscience to continue to discharge the heavy responsibilities which you have seen fit to give me." (1)

SACEUR's Reaction to CINCENT's Reorganisation Qualification.

General Gruenther responded on 22 October 1955. SACEUR observed that Marshal Juin's own acceptance, on 21 September 1955 of the nomination of ACM Mills "did not suggest that there had been an assumption on your part that any new terms of reference for ACM Mills would have been approved prior to the turnover of command." Accordingly, SACEUR had confirmed to the British Government the acceptability of ACM Mills without suggesting that any immediate changes in TOR were intended prior to the turnover of command.

General Gruenther pointed out to CINCENT that the proposals the latter had made were far-reaching in their implications; certain ones had "considerable meaning in respect to other major issues which presently require consideration and study"; and SACEUR therefore felt that he had to "continue to hold in abeyance my action on your proposals."

Consequently, SACEUR considered it necessary that ACM Mills "prepare to assume his responsibilities under the same terms of reference as those now applying to ACM Embry." (2)

CINCENT Responds.

On 29 October CINCENT responded that he had asked SACEUR to make a decision bearing on the basic principles of reorganisation. "It has never been my idea that your approval, should there be approval, would carry with it the immediate implementation of the contemplated new system". He understood that many things had to be adjusted, particularly with respect to TOR and staffs.

But, said CINCENT, he had "to be careful in the handling of certain personal situations, and it is natural, in particular, that no present change be made in the terms of reference and titles pertaining to General Carpentier/COMLANDCENT/ and Admiral Jaujard/COMNAVCENT/ who would retire in March.

(1) AFCENT Ltr. CAB 2991/11, Marshal Juin to Gen. Gruenther 5 Oct 55.
Under these conditions CINCENT saw that as the reorganisation could not take place before 1 January 1956, ACM Mills would assume the same responsibilities assigned to ACM Embry. CINCENT felt it would be useful if ACM Mills could be informed of the fact that the basic decision which I am requesting of you is such as to modify his terms of reference to a certain extent, and that it could be that he that he might be called upon to conform to this prior to the expiration of his tour of Command Duty."

"Should things be otherwise," CINCENT stated, "it would clearly appear that nothing will every be realised, as the same problem will arise in the same terms at each change of a Major Commander."

"And, in this case, what is involved is not so much Sir George Mills' position as mine, which could not truly be satisfied by an adjournment 'sine die'."

CINCENT concluded that it appeared necessary "for the uncertainty to be lifted," and felt compelled to repeat his request of 5th October. (1)

**Progress on a Compromise.**

General Gruenther directed General Schuyler to discuss the matter directly with Marshal Juin. Accordingly on Tuesday 15 November 1955, with General Gelee present, the SHAPE COFS reviewed with CINCENT the entire matter of the "principles" on which the latter believed his organisation should rest. As General Schuyler noted, "it became clear that he was really thinking of a fully integrated headquarters of the SHAPE type and that the top airman, like the top navy and ground force officer, would have the title of Deputy and not Commander."

General Schuyler explained that while SACEUR was not yet prepared to make a decision, there apparently was no difficulty in the elimination of the land headquarters, but that any full integration of the headquarters into a single theatre set-up would present problems.

General Schuyler also explained General Norstad's thinking with reference to the need for an air commander to handle SHAPE-directed operations in the Centre.

The conferees came to no conclusions on this but agreed that the AFCENT COFS General Gelee would come to SHAPE and talk further with General Norstad and General Schuyler. "In the end", however, as General Schuyler later recorded, "Gelee was convinced of the continuing need for an air commander in the Centre and agreed to attempt to persuade Marshal Juin." This

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suggestion apparently marked a turning point in the continuing divergencies.

On 18 November 1955, General Gelee called General Schuyler "to say that Marshal Juin agrees to General Norstad's proposals as a basis for discussion between SACEUR, Marshal Juin and General Norstad." However, CINCENT was "now uncertain as to exactly what responsibilities he does have as a theatre commander in the Centre," and asked what responsibilities he does have as a theatre commander in the Centre. He asked that General Gruenther be prepared at their proposed discussion to give a clear definition of those responsibilities. (1)

On the same day, General Norstad, General Schuyler and General Gelee met to discuss "an outline statement of the general concepts for command arrangements at Fontainbleau" that had been prepared by General Norstad for General Gruenther's discussions with Marshal Juin. The full text of the statement was:

"The SHAPE Capabilities Plan of 1957, particularly the concept of broad strategy which form the basis of that Plan, impose two requirements on the Air Forces located or operating in the Central Region or the area of particular interest to the Central Region.

First, there is a requirement for conducting over-all air operations i.e., the so-called air battle. To discharge this function, a direct line of authority and responsibility, including the essential communications, is required between SACEUR (Air Deputy) and the Air Force Command in the Central Region.

Second, there is a requirement for appropriate participation in the "Land-Air Battle" in direct association with surface forces. SACEUR has charged CINCENT with the responsibility for the conduct of this battle; therefore, CINCENT requires direct authority and control of appropriate air forces in the Central Region to meet the requirements of this function.

The types of organisation best adapted to meeting the requirements of these two functions, if developed independently, would be quite dissimilar. On the assumption that it is undesirable, if not impossible, at this time to provide two independent command structures in the Central Region, the problem is to create an organisation which, though not ideal theoretically, will still meet the requirement. It must be borne in

mind that such an organisation may not appear entirely logical in all respects.

There are several ways in which this problem can be solved. There follows a very brief description of one way in which it might be done.

"a. Preserve the general structure of the Central Region as far as maintaining an adequate air headquarters is concerned. Provide organisationally for the existing relationship between AFCENT and AIRCENT to continue in principle.

"b. Provide a direct line of communications, command and control between SHAPE and AIRCENT, limiting its use to matters relating to the over-all air campaign, i.e., the so-called air battle.

"c. Establish by SHAPE directive the relationship between AFCENT and AIRCENT.

"d. Provide that orders and instructions passing directly from SHAPE to AIRCENT to be sent simultaneously to CINCENT for information.

"e. Establish the principle that COMAIRCENT and his staff constitute principal air advisors to CINCENT. Provide that COMAIRCENT should be the deputy to CINCENT.

"f. Establish under CINCENT a joint staff but include procedures whereby the AIRCENT staff shall have appropriate staff responsibilities, particularly in the field of jointly planning." (1)

SACEUR and CINCENT Confer on Command Organisation for the Centre.

On the morning of 7 December 1955, Marshal Juin and General Gelee met at SHAPE with SACEUR, General Norstad and General Schuyler to discuss the problem of organisation for the Centre.

General Gruenther made it clear that he was entirely in accord with Marshal Juin's proposal to eliminate the Land Centre Headquarters, and, in its place, to create the post of Land Deputy to CINCENT. Marshal Juin readily agreed.

General Gruenther and Marshal Juin then considered General Norstad's paper on a point-by-point basis, and, after a detailed discussion, Marshal Juin made it clear

that he was generally in accord with the principles set forth therein, but wished to make some specific points.

With reference to the subparagraph "a", CINCENT agreed with the proposal to continue the existence of "a separate air Headquarters properly organised to discharge the responsibilities set forth in the earlier paragraphs of the paper, but he considered the current AIRCENT staff as too large for this purpose.

He considered the subparagraph "d" as of particular importance. He recognised the need for passing orders and instructions direct from SHAPE to AIRCENT, but considered that he should receive, at the same time, copies of all such orders and instructions.

Subparagraph "e", he felt, should be stated more precisely. In particular, AIRCENT, in the "new relationship", would be the over-all deputy to CINCENT, and, in the absence of CINCENT, would act for him in the discharge of CINCENT's over-all mission. In this connection, General Schuyler noted at the meeting, CINCENT felt that it must be made clear that the new land Deputy would have limited functions only, those being specifically assigned by Marshal Juin and applicable only to the land forces. CINCENT considered that it might be necessary to find a new title for this land assistant.

With regard to the subparagraph "f", General Gruenther fully agreed with Marshal Juin's point that reference to the "responsibilities" of the staff of AIRCENT could more appropriately be changed to "functions" of the staff. In describing the new staff of CINCENT, a more precise definition would also be necessary, General Gruenther and Marshal Juin agreed.

Interservice planning would be conducted by a committee of air officers from the AIRCENT staff and ground officers from the CINCENT staff, the committee itself working directly for Marshal Juin. Thus, while the CINCENT staff might have in appropriate divisions certain air and naval officers, as well as ground personnel, assigned, nevertheless there would be few, if any, personnel other than ground in the operational and planning divisions of that staff. In this connection, General Norstad proposed the following restatement of his subparagraph "f":

"The staff of CINCENT will include appropriate representation from the three services. In keeping with the principle indicated in paragraph "e" above, air representation in CINCENT's staff activities will be provided, in general, from the AIRCENT staff, particularly in the field of joint planning."
Where the status of NAVCENT was concerned, General Gruenther made it clear that he would accept any solution to this aspect desired by Marshal Juin. CINCENT indicated that for the moment he preferred to retain Admiral Jaujard in his current status with a separate but small headquarters, apart from and at an echelon below CINCENT.

As a result General Gruenther pointed out that on the basis of the agreement arrived at during this meeting, two further steps remained to be taken: SHAPE would prepare for SACEUR's submission to the SG a statement of the general plan under which reorganisation was proposed for the Central Region Headquarters; upon approval of this plan by the SG, SACEUR would prepare a new directive for CINCENT which would define precisely the relationship and responsibility of AIRCENT both to SACEUR and to CINCENT including the principles under which the reorganisation was to be accomplished. (1)

By 27 December 1955, a draft paper had been prepared, forwarded to General Gelee and Marshal Juin and received their approval. At SHAPE, on this date, General Norstad reviewed the document and directed certain changes, prompting a revised French translation that required CINCENT's agreement. At the same time, General Schuyler forwarded this information and the required document to General Gruenther. (2)

On 29 December, General Schuyler was able to inform General Gruenther that General Gelee had "carefully looked over the French version, and with one minor change to make a truer translation of the English meaning (now incorporated), fully agrees to the text. He /General Gelee/ sees no need to reconfer Marshal Juin, who is out of Paris until about 1 January /1956/." (3)

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(1) Memo for Record, by Gen. Schuyler, Conference with Marshal Juin on Command Organisation for the Centre, 7 Dec 55. Gen. Schuyler was to coordinate with Gen. Gelee the preparation of both the papers indicated, the letter to the SG, and, later a directive to Marshal Juin. On the same date, Gen. Schuyler requested that DCPO proceed with the preparation of the papers, giving priority to the letter to the SG, and preserving coordination with CINCENT "only at my level for the present", while consulting freely with appropriate officers of the SHAPE Air Deputy Office. At SHAPE, on 9 Dec 55, the Secretary of the Staff routed a copy of COFS's MR to DSACEUR & NAVDEP, for their information.


(3) Memo, Gen. Schuyler to Gen. Gruenther, 29 Dec 55 (with which Gen. Schuyler forwarded the stencils of French and English versions of the proposed final letter to the SG for signature.)
Changes Proposed to the Standing Group.

On 31 December 1955, SACEUR officially informed the SG of his proposals and recommendations for future organisation and command relationships in AFCENT. He discussed his long concern and consideration of the matter, and the results of the study that had been carried out.

The experience of the past two years had indicated that, under existing circumstances, the Land Forces of that Region could be controlled effectively by a direct chain of command between CINCENT and the Commanders of the Allied Army Groups. Recognition of this fact would permit the elimination of LANDCENT headquarters as an intermediate authority and achieve faster and more direct command and control, as well as a reduction in the number of headquarters in ACE.

The present organisation in Central Europe did not meet the requirements "for obtaining the most effective utilisation of the air forces assigned to or deployed in the Central Region."

Consequently, improvement in control of land forces could be accomplished through consolidation of the functions of LANDCENT with those of AFCENT. Improvement in command and control of air forces was somewhat complicated, but a direct line of authority and responsibility including the essential communications between SACEUR (Air Deputy) and COMAIRCENT was required.

General Gruenther therefore proposed to take the following actions:

a. Eliminate LANDCENT as a separate headquarters and consolidate its staff element with HQ AFCENT and establish a Land Deputy to CINC.

b. Retain AIRCENT and NAVCENT, as separate headquarters.

c. Establish a direct line of authority and responsibility between SACEUR and COMAIRCENT for the passing of orders and instructions for participation in the "Air Battle". Copies of all such orders and instructions would be sent simultaneously to CINCENT for information.

d. Designate COMAIRCENT as the Deputy CINC, AFCENT, as a dual responsibility.

SACEUR recommended that the SG approve the consolidation of LANDCENT with AFCENT and note his intention to re-define
the mission and responsibilities of COMAIRCENT. (1)

**Progress is Delayed.**

In preparation for possible reissuance of new Instructions to CINCENT, as referred to earlier in this Chapter, SACEUR had forwarded draft Instructions to AFCENT on 12 November 1955. (2) On 15 February 1956, General Gelee responded that he had no comments to submit on the wartime powers. However, on the logistic responsibilities and the powers in peacetime, he had certain observations to make of the "fresh wording which might give the impression that CINCENT's authority has been increased," it appears on closer study that, except in the matter of inspection, the new text does not in fact confer on CINCENT any powers beyond these/sic/formerly held by him and which were confined to the making of recommendations."

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(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 2510 PPO, SACEUR to SG, Organisation & Command Relationships - AFCENT, 31 Dec 55. Despite the general agreement apparently arrived at among senior commanders, some doubt appeared to remain where LANDCENT Headquarters' future was concerned. General Carpentier (currently COMLANDCENT, and due to retire in March), in a visit to Minister Spinoy (of Belgium) had expressed a fear that the consolidation of the ground forces headquarters with AFCENT might be interpreted by the Germans as a discrimination against them. This argument, according to Gen. Gruenther (in notes for Major Germann for Interview with Marshal Juin, dated Jan. 26, 1956), impressed Minister Spinoy very much. "I went over this aspect in considerable detail with Spinoy and I think I convinced him that no-one -- and certainly not Marshal Juin -- had any thought of discriminating against the Germans. Ambassador de Staercke, who was present /at SACEUR's meeting with MOD Spinoy on 23 Jan 56 in Brussels/ was quite annoyed that the SG had not yet informed the National Military Representatives in Washington of the proposal, said Gen. Gruenther. Accordingly, on 26 Jan 56, Gen. Gruenther sent a message to the SG (SCOUT SH 25401) recommending "that the SG make distribution of this paper /SACEUR's 31 Dec 56 proposals/ soon, and that we be advised so that we can make a similar distribution to the national representatives /e.g. NMRs/ at SHAPE."

(2) Ltr. AFCE 2200/2 LOG F-157/56 CINCENT (signed Gen. Gelee, COFS, AFCENT) to SACEUR, 15 Feb 56.
If the Supreme Commander's intention in drawing up this instruction was to bring about a broad increase in CINCENT's powers, such powers should be fully and clearly defined in order that no confusion may result in the relations between the Allied Command and National Authorities. Moreover, I believe that there is no satisfactory alternative to the definitions being formulated at the very highest NATO level and to their distribution to nations direct from that high level.

General Gelee suggested that two forms of action could be taken with regard to the Nations. The first was the publication at the highest NATO level of the real powers attributed to the Commands. The second consists of beginning negotiations now with the National Authorities, so as to have them state their interpretations of the powers attributed to CINCENT. The outcome of this -- for which CINCENT was prepared to start negotiations, provided SACEUR gave authority to do so -- would to a certain extent decide the form of future planning of logistic support of Central Region forces, and therefore CINCENT considered that a "clear definition of my responsibilities to be of the utmost importance," and urged that a decision be reached on the matter. (1)

By 18 February, General Schuyler had to inform General Gruenther that the SG still had not acted on SACEUR's 31 December 1955 proposals. The UK position was not yet firm; the "Belgians and Dutch are both pressing SG for copies".

CINCENT assumes LANDCENT Responsibilities.

General Gelee also called SHAPE to say that Marshal Juin was concerned over what would happen when General Carpentier (COMLANDCENT) retired. General Gelee suggested that French Government could make available to SACEUR on 2 March 1956, the date of COMLANDCENT retirement, a senior French officer who could assume the responsibilities "provisionally" until reorganisation took place, when that officer would become a Land Deputy. Or, France could hold up appointment of a new officer, and SACEUR could ask Marshal Juin to take over provisionally the direction of the land forces. (2)

On 20 February 1956 General Schuyler spoke with members of the SG and informed General Gelee the following day that, although the French SG member had received the French position on the matter" nevertheless he (General Valluy, French SG representative) was reluctant to have the SG act until the position of one of the "smaller nations" had been clarified. (3)

(1) AFCE Ltr. 2200/2 LOG/F/157/56, 15 Feb 56. See Chapter X. Logistics and Infrastructure.
(3) Memo, Gen. Schuyler to SECY, 21 Feb 56.
However, on 23 February 1956, the International Planning Team of the SG issued its "revised draft" report to the SG for eventual presentation to the Military Representatives Committee, on SACEUR's 31 December 1955 proposals. The "revised draft" recommended approval of SACEUR's proposed changes in the Central Region. (1)

In the following week, however, General Gruenther informed Marshal Juin that it appeared improbable that action on the proposals could be completed prior to 2 March -- the date on which General Carpentier, COMLANDCENT, retired. It was furthermore unlikely that national authorities would nominate an officer as a replacement, and, as a consequence, SACEUR desired that CINCENT assume the responsibilities of COMLANDCENT as a temporary measure. (2)

Accordingly, on 2 March, Marshal Juin assumed provisional command of LANDCENT. (3)

On 12 March 1956, the SG bluntly informed SACEUR that the "SGN is unable to reach agreement on your proposed reorganisation. Request your desires as to any further action to be taken at this time." (4)

General Schuyler informed General Gelee of the SG's message. General Gelee stated that Marshal Juin agreed in principle that a formula could be worked out which stipulated that in CINCENT's absence AIRCENT could act in his place (guided by the Land Deputy), and that described in detail the responsibilities of the Land Deputy as principal land advisor to CINCENT, and as the officer to whom CINCENT would delegate appropriate staff responsibilities with respect to matters affecting land forces. (5)

General Schuyler proposed no immediate action, and SACEUR agreed -- pending receipt of a written "formula" from CINCENT. (6) This was received and forwarded to SACEUR by the COFS in a note that indicated that France was inclined to accept a Belgian for the Land Deputy post, with the understanding that it would later go to a German. The official French Government agreement had not been received but was expected shortly.

(1) IPT 20/9, Revised Draft, 23 Feb 56, w/Corrigendum #1, 24 Feb 56.
(3) LANDCENT Ltr. 2510 SG/101, Ordre General #1, Commandement des Forces Terrestres Alliees Centre Europe, 8 Mar 56.
(4) Msg DEF 998799, STAND 1457, SCOIN 4896, SGN to SACEUR, 12 Mar 56.
(6) Note, "AWG" (Gen. Gruenther), to COFS, 16 Mar 56.
At the same time, Belgian, Dutch and German concurrences still had not been received. General Schuyler noted General Norstad's opinion that, as rapid movement as possible should be made, it might be advisable if he (Norstad) went to Brussels to see the MOD. (1)

On the occasion of that visit, General Norstad found that the Belgian MOD's reaction to the "Proposed Centre Organisation" was extremely good. The latter had "no arguments against elimination of LANDCENT". The MOD Belgium had expressed the view that the Benelux contribution was too small to justify the position of Land Deputy even for one year, but felt that "the course of integration would be severed by putting in a German at this time."

General Norstad reported that they agreed in principle that the proposal for a Belgian for a year to eighteen months was for the purpose of easing the transition to a German. General Norstad had suggested that General Speidel might well be the German nominee.

The MOD Belgium had asked for a few days time in which to consult the Dutch on the question of a German now and the TOR of the Land Deputy. He would notify General Schuyler of the results within a week. Meanwhile, he wanted a Benelux general as the assistant to the Land deputy, to which General Norstad agreed. (2)

General Schuyler made General Norstad's report available to General Gruenther the same day. He also added that that afternoon General Vernoux of the French Armed Forces Staff, who had called on the COFS to bring him up to date on Algeria, also had asked about the status of the Centre Command problem. Briefed by General Schuyler on General Norstad's visit (albeit, without describing the result), General Vernoux was asked if, assuming difficulty in finding a Belgian candidate, there would be any French reactions to putting a German in sooner than contemplated? General Vernoux answered "it would be very difficult for the French government to accept a German now." (3)

CINCENT Again Warns of Possible Relinquishment of Command.

On Thursday, 3 May 1956, a year to the day from the time CINCENT had first suggested the possibility of a departure from his Command because of unresolved reorganisation aspects, Marshal Juin again wrote to General Gruenther in a similar vein.

(2) Note, "L.N." (Gen. Norstad) to "Al" (Gen. Gruenther), 27 Mar 56.
(3) Memo, Gen. Schuyler to Gen. Gruenther, 27 Mar 56, to which was appended the Note referred to.
Marshal Juin said that he had just learned that the project for reorganising the Central Europe Command had been returned to SACEUR by the Standing Group without any decision being made. CINCENT was "not particularly surprised". He "did not expect that Agency would take up a definite attitude at a time when it was having difficulties with certain Nations." But he felt that postponement of a decision of this question would cause a delay that was "incompatible with an effective and normal exercise of my Command".

Marshal Juin therefore again "appealed to your High Authority to intervene in this matter so that a decision may be expeditiously obtained." It was a matter of principle, he said. "Do the Nations concerned agree or disagree to the effect that the Commander-in-Chief Central Europe shall exercise simultaneous Command of the Land Forces assigned to him? For this solution is the only valid military solution for the preparation and conduct of Air/Ground operations in this sector."

If they did, "it would be very easy to solve the problem of the responsibilities of the 'Land Forces' Deputy to CINCENT...", Marshal Juin insisted. However, "in case of non-concurrence of my views, the position thus adopted will lead me to the only conclusion possible and, as I already stated in my letter No. 345/CAB dated 6 May 1955, I feel I will no longer be able, without the reorganisation which I deem indispensable, and in which you concurred, to continue to assume the responsibilities which you have assigned me." (1)

SACEUR and CINCENT Confer.

On Tuesday, 15 May 1956, General Gruenther and Marshal Juin conferred on the Central Region Command reorganisational problem. SACEUR had had conversations with various interested NATO Permanent Representatives.

(1) Ltr. 443/CAB, Marshal Juin to Gen. Gruenther, 3 May 56. A French messenger delivered the letter in prepared English and French versions at 1730 hrs. on Friday, 4 May 1956. Gen. Gruenther had departed the HQ at the time of delivery; the Secretary of the Staff immediately consulted Gen. Schuyler who directed that the letter be delivered the following morning to Gen. Gruenther. Upon receipt, discussion between the latter two followed, and Gen. Gruenther directed that the Air Deputy, Gen. Norstad be shown the letter. SACEUR planned "no precipitate action"; however, the letter in the meantime, was "not to be released or referred to w/o authority of SECV or his Deputy" (handwritten note appended to basic letter, 4, 5 & 7 May respectively).

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in the interim between receipt of Marshal Juin's 3 May letter and this meeting and was compelled to indicate to CINCENT that the latter's expressions, at the beginning of the month, demonstrated that "he apparently wanted a quick solution to this problem." SACEUR felt this was not possible. General Gruenther had found a general acceptance among the higher political authorities of the concept that the theatre commander should also be the land commander, but before the nations accepted this principle, he was "certain they would want to know the position of the Germans in the new command set-up. "Specifically", said General Gruenther, "I found a trend favouring the rotation of the theatre command whereby the Germans would take their turn as CINC CENTRE."

In a memorandum for Record the same day, General Gruenther noted:

"I asked Marshal Juin whether he considered that the French Government was not in a position to have this question put to it. He replied that he did not think that the French Government could stand such a question now. There would have to be considerable public opinion preparation before the Government could make a decision that the overall command would rotate. I told Marshal Juin that this seemed to me to indicate that delay in pressing the matter would be advisable. I said that I, too, was certain that it was premature to press the French Government on this matter, and that at the same time I felt we would not get agreement from the German Government until they knew what their status would be."

"Marshal Juin said he agreed with this point of view, and, furthermore, that he felt that the Germans had considerable on their side in supporting their position."

SACEUR, consequently, "told Marshal Juin that I felt it would be best for me to let this matter rest until about September 1, 1956. I used that as an arbitrary date, because I thought that conditions in Algeria might have changed by that time, and also because by that date we should have a much more clear picture as to the prospects for development of German forces."

Marshal Juin informed SACEUR that agreeing to such a date presented "certain embarrassments for him personally. He stated that he has had in mind leaving the Central Command soon; in fact, if the principle of the Central Command set-up is not acknowledged he would like to leave immediately. However, he has no desire
to be arbitrary in this matter and would prefer to have a successor of his own choice designated before he goes. He said that his strong preference would be for General Guillaume, but there were "complications in that selection because Guillaume is due to retire in June," General Gruenther recorded.

SACEUR then told Marshal Juin that he "thought it would be a disservice to the Alliance if he should resign at this time, and that I felt he ought to remain on here until approximately the end of the year -- and in no case should he leave prior to the 1st of October". "He then said," SACEUR noted, "that his current thinking was that he might leave in October."

SACEUR recalled that "the final result of our conference was that Marshal Juin said he saw the logic of my position that no action be taken for the next three or four months; that he would now discuss the matter with the Minister of Defence and other members of the French Government; and that he would come to see me again about this problem in about a month."

Accordingly, CINCENT and SACEUR "agreed that I would not send a reply to his /CINCENT's/ letter of 3 May dealing with this matter", General Gruenther noted. (1)

CINCENT Reflects.

Within two weeks, however, General Schuyler reported to General Gruenther that Marshal Juin had reflected further on the matter, and, while recognising SACEUR's desire to hold in abeyance for a few months any further action, was not altogether satisfied. "The more he thinks about it, the more concerned he /Marshal Juin/ becomes," General Shuyler noted, following a discussion with General Gelee, Marshal Juin's Chief of Staff.

General Schuyler further reported that General Gelee, at Marshal Juin's direction, had now developed a staff reorganisation for the Centre commands, which, in his view, was applicable to either of the two solutions to the Command problem (that is, the organisation might remain as it existed, or that the command exercised by CINCENT and COMLANDCENT might be combined). The solution enlarged the CINCENT staff by adding 10-15 officers from AIRCENT and 20-25 from LANDCENT. It would establish both the "joint" and "combined" aspects of the reorganised staff that

(1) MR, Gen. Gruenther, SACEUR, 15 May 56. Again, SACEUR directed that the COFS, SHAPE, and the Air Deputy be made aware of these related proceedings.
General Gelee had suggested in the diagram that General Schuyler had shown to SACEUR earlier. The change had been worked out by a committee of representatives from the three Central Region Headquarters, and General Gelee had assured the SHAPE COFS that there were no objections to it from either the AIRCENT or LANDCENT headquarters.

General Schuyler also forewarned SACEUR that Marshal Juin intended to address another letter to him indicating that the CINCENT was prepared to accept SACEUR's desire "to hold off on the Command organisation", but only on the condition that SACEUR authorise him at once to proceed on his proposed staff reorganisation. The French commander would assure SACEUR, General Schuyler noted, that this step would "in no way compromise a later decision on command, no matter which way that decision may go." (1)

CINCENT's Personal Follow-Up.

As General Schuyler had stated, following his discussions with General Gelee at the end of May, 1956, Marshal Juin forwarded another personal letter to General Gruenther.

He recalled that since he had assumed command as CINCENT, nearly three years earlier, he had become convinced of the necessity for "internal reorganisation of the Fontainebleau Staffs". The belief had become even stronger since CINCENT's temporary assumption of direct command of the land forces (following General Carpentier's retirement from the post of COMLANDCENT, and the continuing vacancy in that post). The staff did not have sufficient resources to accomplish its tasks, and was obliged to create "Inter-Staff Working Committees to fulfill CINCENT's/requirements or to deal with combined problems within /his/authority, whereas the Staffs of the Subordinate Commands may appear over-inflated for their own specific missions."

After a great deal of joint work, a plan for the reorganisation of the "four Staffs" had been established, CINCENT stated. It called for drawing on the "Subordinate Staffs" for the personnel necessary to reinforce AFSCENT, in order to render this latter capable of dealing more efficiently with certain combined problems, and to place my immediate disposal intelligence and signal resources which are lacking." Furthermore, CINCENT specified, "it

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does not appear in any way prejudge the eventual reorganisation of the Command of Central Europe, and does not require any additional personnel."

A quick implementation would be of the greatest benefit, Marshal Juin felt; and requested General Gruenther's agreement in principle to its implementation. Upon SACEUR's agreement CINCENT proposed to forward the studies that had been carried out at AFCENT, in order that SACEUR might authorise CINCENT to "undertake at least a trial implementation, at the earliest possible moment." (1)

By 1 June, the DCPO had prepared for General Schuyler a summary of Marshal Juin's recommendations -- recommendations that had been passed through General Gelee three days earlier.

The DCPO noted that the proposed establishment called for an increase of 18 officers on the combined staff, but no overall increase because these would "come from NAVCENT, AIRCENT and include six German officers." The new staff organisation was "not closely integrated and should a new Commander LANDCENT be appointed at some future date, the LANDCENT portion of the staff can be moved back without upsetting the organisation." (2)

SACEUR Approves in Principle.

On 6 June 1956, General Gruenther responded to CINCENT's 31 May "follow-up". "I am quite willing," SACEUR said, "to give you my agreement in principle to such a reorganisation, for the purpose of strengthening your own headquarters to permit it to perform to your satisfaction the functions which you have in mind. In this connection, I have noted particularly your assurance that this reorganisation will not require additional personnel over and beyond those now assigned at Fontainebleau, and, further, that it will in no way prejudice a later decision in the matter of reorganisation of the Central European Command, which question is now before the Standing Group".

SACEUR indicated he would be happy to see CINCENT's detailed studies in order that he might "transmit...formal authority to implement /CINCENT's/ proposals." (3)

(1) AFCENT Ltr. 2991/SG/10, Marshal Juin to Gen. Gruenther, 31 May 56.
(2) Memo, DCPO to COFS, Reorganisation of HQ AFCENT, 1 Jun 56.
On 20 June 1956, Marshal Juin forwarded details of his proposed reorganisation directly to SACEUR. He stated that he wished, first, to put these into effect on a trial basis before firm decisions were taken. (1)

On 22 June 1956, General Schuyler asked the DCLA at SHAPE to take the necessary action to accomplish a final coordination of these proposals, while noting that he had also agreed with General Gelee, to approach the appropriate National Military Representatives (NMRs) at SHAPE on the matter, in order to give them suitable detailed information and to afford them an opportunity, if they wished, to register any objections.

At the same time, General Gelee was to explain the organisation fully to all nationals at Fontainebleau. Thus NMRs would feel free to consult their own nationals at Fontainebleau as to any specific details that affected them. (2)

On 28 June 1956, the plans were forwarded through the Executive, NMRs (SHAPE) to the NMRs of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the UK and the US, by RAdm. A. Rossi, ACOS PANDA, at SHAPE. Adm. Rossi noted that the proposed reorganisation was intended to be on a trial basis "for some months" and that it was not intended to amend existing personnel authorisation tables for any of the four headquarters involved for at least six months from the date of reorganisation. It was SACEUR's intention to notify Marshal Juin of his definite agreement to the reorganisation as a whole, or otherwise, Adm Rossi said, not later than 20 July 1956. (3)

The ACOS PANDA also informed the SHAPE Staff on these matters the following day. (4)

**Marshal Juin Decides to Relinquish His Command.**

On 26 June 1956, as CINCENT's proposals were being studied, Marshal Juin wrote to General Gruenther and referred to the "recent meeting" at which "I told you my intention of relinquishing command of the Allied Forces of Central Europe on the 1st of next October." Having informed Mr. Bourges-Maunoury, MOD France, of this, Marshal Juin now confirmed his departure on that date.

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(1) AFCENT Ltr. 2991/SG/12, Proposed Reorganisation of AFCENT Headquarters, 20 Jun 56.
(2) Memo, Gen. Schuyler to DCLA, 22 Jun 56.
(3) SHAPE Ltr. AG 4030 PA, ACOS PANDA, to NMRs, BE, CA, FR, NE, LU, UK, US, 28 Jun 56.
(4) IOCS, PA 4030, ACOS PANDA, to ACOSs and Deputies, 29 Jun 56.
CINCENT said he had made this decision "for reasons of personal convenience, which have no connection with the reorganisation problems I was called upon to raise within the framework of the Command I exercised under your orders."

"Nor", he said, "did they have any connection with your forthcoming departures from SHAPE /referring to the announcement of General Gruenther's approaching retirement and replacement by General Norstadt/ for I am well aware of the great care which surrounded the choice of your successor, General Norstadt/sic/, whose qualities of leadership I greatly appreciate, and whose sense of organisation and competency are unanimously recognised."

Marshal Juin stated, "I would willingly have served under his orders, in the same manner that I have served under yours, had circumstances permitted it."

CINCENT praised the "interallied command" and the opportunity to have served in turn under Generals Eisenhower, Ridgway and Gruenther. He noted that he had asked the French Government to propose General Guillaume as his successor, and described the latter's qualifications and personal qualities. (1)

SACEUR acknowledged Marshal Juin's proposed reorganisation details of 20 June on 2 July 1956, informed CINCENT that they were being submitted to the NMRs, and were being examined by the SHAPE staff, and, "hopeful that no major difficulties will be discovered" suggested that CINCENT proceed with any interim measures the latter "deemed desirable to put your changes into effect by the date you have in mind."

General Gruenther hoped to be able to send formal implementation authority not later than 20 July 1956. (2)

The following day, 3 July 1956, General Gruenther responded to CINCENT's departure notification. SACEUR was saddened to receive Marshal Juin's letter. He noted the French Commander in Chief's 5 years in ACE, and his major contribution to the defence of the Free World. SACEUR recalled CINCENT's broad grasp of defence problems, dedication, and wholehearted cooperation, and stated that with great reluctance, he accepted Marshal Juin's decision to leave, "for it is as if a phase in the history of this alliance were passing". SACEUR assured Marshal Juin that he would continue to follow his activities with great interest and hoped their paths would cross often again." (3)

(2) SHAPE Ltr. AG 4030 PA, Gen. Gruenther to Marshal Juin, 2 Jul 56.
German Interest in AFCENT Reorganisation.

On 12 July 1956, LTG Dr. Hans Speidel wrote directly from the Federal Ministry of Defence in Bonn to General Gruenther indicating that he had been given unofficial access to the 28 June 1956 letter, regarding the proposed reorganisation of AFCENT. "The Federal Minister of Defence was astonished" he said, "that he had not been officially notified of such an important document through the German NMR. The Minister has asked me to inform him as to the date from which the Federal Government is to participate in these studies, the outcome of which involves such an important political and military decision on the part of the German Government." (1)

General Schuyler discussed the matter with the German NMR and found that General Speidel's "unhappiness" primarily stemmed from the fact that the German MOD was not included on the distribution of a document in which he considered they have a direct interest. Secondly, although noting that the reorganisation was on a 6-month trial basis, the MOD nevertheless was concerned to see a decision taken to move personnel and functions from LANDCENT to AFCENT at a time when German officers were not yet in a position to participate significantly in the study leading to this decision.

General Schuyler informed General Gruenther that the German NMR stressed that the MOD "fully appreciates that decision on this reorganisation is entirely up to you. They do want to be able to give you their comments before the decision is taken." (2)

On 20 July 1956, General Gruenther acknowledged General Speidel's letter of 12 July 1956 and the concern of the MOD. He regretted the staff error that excluded the German NMR from being advised of the contemplated reorganisation and enclosed a copy of the plan proposed by Marshal Juin. Finally, he stated, "I shall be pleased to receive and consider any comments which the MOD may desire to make in arriving at my final decision in this matter."

Formal Approval.

By 1 August, the SHAPE Staff had had time to study Marshal Juin's proposals, and, subject to "two major provisos", General Gruenther wrote to CINCENT, "I am now glad to send you my formal approval of your changes requested on a trial basis." The first proviso was that the revised organisation "in no way lessen AIRCENT's capability to implement SHAPE directives rapidly nor alter the direct lines of authority, responsibility, and communication between SACEUR and COMAIRCENT as agreed between us and as incorporated in SHAPE letter AG 2510 PPO of 31 December 1955."

The second proviso was that no additional personnel, or appreciable expenditure above current levels on accommodation or communications, for example, could be involved in the reorganisation as a whole. Indeed, SACEUR, hoped that CINCENT's plan would result in some personnel economies "in due course."

SACEUR further considered it desirable that the appropriate national allocation of posts should, as far as possible, be clearly established first. As CINCENT had requested, no changes were to be made to the personnel authorisation tables for the Central Headquarters before the end of the trial period.

General Gruenther included a number of other comments and proposals which he hoped CINCENT might consider for implementation before the change-over was effected, or to be studied during the trial period, and asked for CINCENT's views and/or actions, where appropriate.

As Marshal Juin proposed to leave his command, shortly, SACEUR noted he was also informing General Jean Valluy, Fr A, who would be replacing Marshal Juin as CINCENT on 1 October 1956. SACEUR assured Marshal Juin that he would not fail to inform the latter of any comments General Valluy might make. (1)

Marshal Juin responded on 6 August 1956, and accepted SACEUR's two provisos. He observed that "these items have in no way been overlooked during the initial planning stage of the reorganisation", and, in turn, attached additional comments on the annex to SACEUR's 1 August 1956 letter. (2)

(2) Pers. Ltr. 2991/SG/162, Marshal Juin to SACEUR, 6 Aug 56.
On 1 October 1956, Marshal Juin relinquished his command to General Jean Valluy, Fr A, at Fontainebleau. The "trial" of earlier reorganisation proposals continued beyond the time when, approximately six weeks later, General Gruenther relinquished his command to General Norstad.

Postscript.

On 5 January 1957, General Norstad informed the Standing Group that he considered it desirable to withdraw General Gruenther's (and Marshal Juin's) proposals, and to retain LANDCENT. Certain personnel reductions and transfers of spaces among the headquarters nevertheless would be accomplished, as might be recommended later by CINCENT. (1)

In the meantime, several other peripheral changes had directly affected command arrangements during the period beginning in the last quarter of 1954, and continuing throughout General Gruenther's period of tenure. One stemmed from the London and Paris Agreements that had been signed on 24 October 1954. These Agreements, among other things, provided for the accession of Italy to the Brussels Treaty (of 1948); for the adherence of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty; and for the European nations of the Brussels Treaty to act as a Western European Union (WEU).

Additionally, certain terms of the related Agreement on Forces of Western European Union, which were accepted by the NAC, were reaffirmed by that body in a Resolution to Implement Section IV of the Final Act of the London Conference. (2) These confirmed SACEUR's command authority; the command area of ACE; and the specific, but more restricted command area for which SACEUR would be responsible in the matter of an integrated air defence for NATO Europe.

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(1) SHAPE Msg. SH 32972, 5 Jan 57. See SHAPE 3350/11-3, "Command Structure and Organisation, Command in the Centre 1951-1966" (Parts I & II), w/encs. -- a narrative study prepared by Mr. M. Honick, Historical Section, Office of the Secretary of the Staff. This narrative study is on file in the Historical Section, OSECY.

(2) CM(54)85.
Revised Terms of Reference consequently were issued for SACEUR, and, for the first time, replaced those that had been promulgated and slightly amended in the 1950-1952 period. These (1955) Revised Terms of Reference, (1) would affect all MSCs' TOR, (2), and, particularly, the "Command Debate" in the Centre.

(1) MC 53(F), Revised TOR for the SACEUR, 7 Jul 55.
(2) SHAPE Ltr. AG 2101 PPO, TOR for CINCENT, 12 Nov 55.

One of the complex of apartments that housed many of the families of officers, enlisted, and civilian personnel assigned to SHAPE.
CHAPTER VIII

THE INTEGRATION OF GERMAN FORCES INTO ACE

Background.

On 4 March 1947, France and the United Kingdom entered into a 50-year Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance at Dunkirk. The so-called Dunkirk Treaty provided that each of the signatories was bound to give all the military and other support and assistance in its power, should either again become involved in hostilities with Germany.

In 1948, wider arrangements were made among the UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg to coordinate their future economic, social, and cultural, as well as their defence policies. These arrangements were confirmed by all five states in the 50-year Brussels Treaty, on March 17 of that year. It, too, provided for collective defence against a possible resurgent Germany, and, within the Treaty Organisation, a Western Union Defence Organisation (WUDO) was created.

In 1949, perceiving the growing expansionist policy pursued by the Soviet Union, and supported in their efforts by the United States and Canada, the governments of all seven nations invited Norway, Denmark, Italy, Portugal and Iceland to associate with them in a North Atlantic Alliance. As a result, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington on 4 April 1949.

The provisions of the Brussels Treaty of 1948 remained in effect, however.

Meeting for the first time in Washington in September 1949, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), which had been provided for in the North Atlantic Treaty, began to build a civilian and military framework. In the following year, at a meeting held in September 1950 the NAC, alarmed at events in Korea and Southeast Asia, arrived at several far-reaching conclusions. Among these, was the recognition that, in Europe, a so-called "forward strategy" — that is, a defence of NATO Europe as far to the east as possible — was necessary; that such a defence required forces far exceeding the capabilities of those then available to NATO, that such a strategy implied the defence of West Germany.
As a result, and impelled by US political and military authorities' analyses, the NAC decided, shortly after, to study, on an Allied basis, the association of West Germany with the NATO nations.

On 18 December 1950, the Council, meeting in Brussels invited the three Western Occupying Powers in Germany -- the US, UK and France (who were also NATO members) -- to explore, with democratic leaders in Germany, ways of achieving this participation.

In the meantime, the Council also had requested its newly formed, subordinate Defence Committee (DC) to plan for the creation of an "integrated force" in Europe under the centralised command of a supreme military commander. At the Brussels meeting in December 1950, the NAC approved resultant DC recommendations, which included: creation of a European Defence Force; establishment of a Supreme Headquarters in Europe; and the reorganisation of the NATO military structure.

As a result of the NAC's approval of the DC's recommendations, the functions and responsibilities of WUDO and three Regional Planning Groups (RPG) were absorbed in a new, more centralised, but wider ranging military command, Allied Command Europe (ACE), which, with its Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), were consequently established on 2 April 1951, in Paris. As new Major Subordinate Commands within ACE began to function the RPGs were dissolved.

Later that year, the NAC was informed by the representatives of the three Occupying Powers in West Germany of the progress that had been made in developing a formula for the participation of West Germany in European defence measures. The formula, supported by all three Powers, consisted of the proposed establishment of a "European Defence Community" (EDC), which would be made up of the Brussels Treaty nations, West Germany, and Italy.

A Temporary Council Committee (TCC) was appointed at the same time to reconcile all the requirements of collective security with the political and economic capabilities of NATO member countries.

Meeting in Rome, from 24 to 28 November 1951, the NAC received progress reports on the Ottawa "taskings", and the work of the TCC, and called for an immediate study on what the relationship should be between NATO and the proposed EDC.

From 20 to 25 February 1952, in Lisbon, where the NAC Ministers for the first time, adopted firm NATO force goals, the Council also endorsed further plans (then still under negotiation in Paris) for the establishment of the EDC.
In the meantime, discussions had been taking place among representatives of the three Occupying Powers in Germany and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, with a view to developing means for vesting responsibilities for more complete self-government in a Federal German Republic, and for bringing to an end the Occupation of West Germany. These discussions resulted in the so-called Contractual Conventions, which were signed on 26 May 1952 by the FRG, France, the UK and US, in Bonn. On the following day, the European Defence Community Treaty was signed in Paris.

By early 1954, the problem of German participation in Western European defence had not been solved, however. Most of the governments concerned were in agreement with an EDC. But on 29 August, the EDC Treaty failed ratification in the French National Assembly.

Immediate efforts by the UK government to salvage the planning that had been accomplished for an EDC resulted in new consultations approximately one month later, and, from 28 September to 3 October 1954, a London Conference held by the Foreign Ministers of the five Brussels Treaty Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany resulted in a series of decisions more far-reaching than any earlier arrangements.

Followed by a Four-Power Conference (the UK, US, France and the FRG) in Paris from 20-22 October 1954, the so-called London and Paris Agreements modified the Brussels Treaty, and provided for:

a. Termination of the occupation regime in the FRG.

b. Recognition of the FRG as a sovereign state.

c. Continued presence on German territory of foreign forces at least at the strength prevailing on the date the Agreements became effective.

d. Accession of the FRG to the North Atlantic Treaty and contribution by West Germany of forces to NATO.

e. Creation of a Council of Western European Union (WEU) to cooperate closely with NATO and to administer other agreements — especially those on the limitation of armaments. (1)

f. The limitation of forces on the Continent of Europe to those that had been set forth in the Special Agreement Annexed to the EDC Treaty (the only

(1) The limitations on armaments were to be monitored by an Agency for the Control of Armaments, which could be responsible to the Council of the WEU. This Agency is not to be confused with the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the WEU Assembly, the larger body to which the Council reported, periodically.
portion of that Treaty preserved for later use): (1)

West Germany also would be affected by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's Resolution to Implement Section IV of the Final Act of the London Conference. That Conference had determined, among other things, that all forces of NATO countries stationed on the Continent of Europe should be placed under the authority of SACEUR; that forces placed under SACEUR should be deployed only with SACEUR's consent; that their location would be determined by SACEUR (after consultation with national authorities); that they would be deployed in accordance with NATO strategy; and that those forces would not be used operationally without his consent -- subject to guidance by the NAC.

On 22 October 1954 (the day prior to the signing of the London and Paris Agreements) the NAC adopted the Resolution. Essentially, except where West Germany was concerned, Section IV of the Final Act of the London Conference did not represent new proposals, but, rather, a tightening of existing NATO machinery. (2) For the Federal Republic, however, it marked an official turning point and, within other related stipulations, made possible the integration of German forces within Allied Command Europe.

Establishment of the Requirement.

As indicated earlier, the proposals for incorporation of German military units into NATO had been formally discussed in 1950. (3) SHAPE had officially referred to the necessity for a German contribution in its publication of force requirements in August 1951. (4) The Capabilities Studies of 1954 had specified that a German contribution to those "forces-in-being" would be needed from the very outset of hostilities. The Military Committee had adopted these principles as prerequisites to a realistic forward defence in ACE; and, in December 1954, following the London and Paris Agreements, and with the adoption of a new NATO Strategic Concept (MC 48), the Committee reconfirmed that an effective defence policy for NATO required an appropriate contribution to NATO forces from the FRG and that this was of major importance for the successful implementation of NATO strategy. (5)

(1) While the London and Paris Agreements modified the Brussels Treaty, they did not supersede it. The "modified" Brussels Treaty, therefore remains in effect.
(2) See: CM(54)85, the NAC's "Resolution"... and other measures, therein. See also: 2180/11-3, The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Western European Union, A Brief History of their Origins and Special Relationship, by Mr. M. Honick, Historical Section, OSECY, SHAPE, 16 Mar 73.
(3) D/MC-D/1, Joint Mtg. of the Council Deputies & MC, 9 Dec 50; and, The Defence of Western Europe, 13 Dec 50.
(4) SHAPE 333/51, 14 Aug 51.
(5) CM(54)118, 17 Dec 54.
General Speidel's Visit.

Preliminary association of German military representatives already had begun when the London and Paris Conferences were being prepared or were underway. On the morning of 8 October 1954 West German General Hans Speidel (retired) representing West German military authorities, visited the Chief of Staff, SHAPE "in order to bring him up to date on German reactions to the progress of negotiations thus far." (1)

He stated that Herr Blank, the Defence Minister in the newly formed Federal Republic, and other members of the government were "well-satisfied" with the way things appeared to be going in Paris. They already were developing their thoughts on the general nature and types of units they wished to see in the new German Army; and intended to adhere closely to the overall strength agreed under the EDC. They felt, however, that they "should give much thought to modernising the types of units to be created." German authorities hoped to discuss this with SHAPE, eventually.

General Speidel also conveyed the FRG government's views that, within overall EDC limitations, and because West Germany was "so close to the front lines", Air Force units might be primarily fighter units. German thinking did not consider plans for any other types of units at the moment -- not even light bombers.

Naval units would follow in general the type and character of those specified in the EDC provisions, but with somewhat more attention on defensive craft for the Baltic and Skagerrak areas. For this purpose, General Speidel pointed out, German forces would need 12 small submarines and 12 small destroyers -- each of which would be within the tonnage limits that had been "accepted" at London on 3 October 1954.

The West German Finance Minister was prepared to authorise an "early expenditure of funds" to get certain preparations under way Speidel said, but no forces would be created until the "final instrument" was signed.

General Speidel indicated that it was still too early to spell out the actual levels at which integration of German forces should take place, but he personally thought that this should normally be at Corps level. He recognised the many military reasons for specific exceptions to this, however, and therefore wished "the integration problem stated in very general terms in the protocols."

(1) Memorandum for Record, Visit to SHAPE by Gen. Speidel, 8 Oct 54.
General Speidel hoped that force levels, which apparently were to be included in a secret agreement, would not be so listed. He felt "it would be extremely difficult for Parliaments (including the Bundestag) to deal with any secret annexes" at the time. Finally, the German representative noted that after conferences with Herr Blank he would "remain in Paris with a small staff over the next several months, acting in a liaison capacity for military matters as appropriate." (1)

CINCENT's Early Proposals.

With the signing of the London and Paris agreements on 23 October 1954, Marshal Juin, CINCENT, wrote to SACEUR, a few days later (on 27 October) proposing certain actions regarding German representation at AFCENT, and the early establishment of some form of inspection and guidance for the German Army.

The Agreements still awaited full ratification by the governments concerned, however; and because of this, SACEUR in response noted that he fully agreed with CINCENT on the desirability of the early establishment of a small but representative group of German officers, to be assigned to the staffs at SHAPE and at Fontainebleau, as CINCENT had suggested. But General Gruenther thought it "most inadvisable for the military to suggest the attachment of individuals of German nationality to any NATO body" prior to ratification. He felt it important to avoid any military action that would embarrass NATO political authorities at that particular stage of negotiations, but did fully support the initiation of whatever prior planning might be usefully accomplished as preliminary to the assignment of German officers to the respective staffs.

SACEUR noted that he already had "received specific authority from the SG to furnish to German authorities appropriate information in reply to specific questions on a 'need to know' basis." He was to "arrange for any such contacts in this respect as discreetly as possible", and, pending ratification of the Agreements, was prepared to delegate corresponding authority to CINCENT.

As to inspection of assigned and earmarked forces within AFCENT, SACEUR considered that action had to await further delineation of his own Terms of Reference -- which were to be revised to incorporate changes resulting from the Agreements. He agreed, in the meantime, that assignment of a German officer to CINCENT's so called, Interallied Tactical Study Group would be of great assistance, and proposed to arrange for this as soon as possible after "final ratification of the Paris Accords." (2)

(1) MR, Visit to SHAPE by Gen. Speidel, 8 Oct 54.
West Germany's First Post-War Military Plans (1954).

On the morning of 2 December 1954, General Speidel again visited General Schuyler. On this occasion he presented, for the first time, as the latter described it, "the broad picture of German plans for their military establishment." Generally, these were:

a. Six armoured divisions of about 13,000 men each; six infantry divisions at about 12,500 men each.

b. Training to be done in two slices, each of 3 armoured and 3 infantry divisions.

c. A few special brigades and regiments also to be organised, including airborne units, mountain troops, reconnaissance elements, artillery groups, etc.

d. An Air Force to consist of fighters, fighter bombers and interceptors, but no light bombers.

e. A Naval Force with a strength of about 20,000. (1)

Coordination and Cooperation with German Personnel.

CINCENT had earlier inquired further regarding the security situation in Germany and on the matter of how far NATO personnel could go in disclosing NATO classified information to German authorities before their entry into NATO. He had also sought further guidance on the question of SHAPE/AFCENT relationships with authorities in West Germany. (2)

On 7 December 1954, General Schuyler assured Marshal Juin that the first of these topics was under current study. Procedures would be promulgated shortly. On the second, while normal relations had to be established with the Federal Government as rapidly as possible after the FRG's entry into NATO, Allied dealings with West Germany had to continue, officially, through the Allied High Commissioner's offices and agencies. Liaison officers were now exercising their functions and their activities had to remain limited.

On the same day, General Schuyler also issued tentative staff level guidance on the German Army, Navy and Air Force. These were to be used as interim guidance in developing studies in connection with the German armed forces for which the respective Divisions were responsible.

(1) Memo, Visit of Gen. Speidel, 2 Dec 54.

Historian's Note: Events that followed in all areas of German Armed Forces Integration -- in policy, planning, and consultation, and with respect to Army, Navy and Air Forces -- were so closely related and interlocking in their consideration and evolution, that no attempt is made here to consolidate their development, topically. The description that follows, therefore, sets forth these events and plans, as they evolved, and, generally, in chronological sequence.

(2) AFCENT Ltr. 2002/54, Machinery for Consultation with German Authorities, 5 Nov 54.
General Schuyler described the proposed mission of the German army forces as "to participate in the defence of the area of the Centre Command of ACE and in the defence of Schleswig-Holstein, which may be included in the Centre Command Sector."

He described the general outline of the composition of the German forces as this had been presented to him by General Speidel, and "if the size and composition of the 12 divisions vary substantially from divisions anticipated in the EDC, the total number of divisions may be adjusted so that the final German contribution is generally equivalent to the 12 divisions envisioned in the EDC formula", he noted. "In determining this pattern, considerations should be given to the concept contained in SACEUR's Capabilities Plan, ACE, 1957", the COFS said. The Plan envisioned substantial changes in organisation and tactical doctrine, and recommended a more forward strategy in all NATO areas. The objective now was to establish "a new pattern of forces to fit the needs of our future strategy which will incorporate nuclear weapons with the actions of land/air and naval forces."

German army units were to be developed under the principles laid down for NATO "M-Day" forces -- which were required to be ready for battle at all times. "These are the troops which will have to take the first shock of an enemy onslaught in an atomic age; they must therefore be highly trained and highly disciplined," General Schuyler advised.

Deployments were to be "in accordance with NATO strategy". While, as noted this planning was not firm, it was envisaged that there would be four German army corps --1 to be deployed in the Schleswig-Holstein area; and three in the existing Centre Command Sector.

Formulas for the composition of German Army, Navy and Air Forces, as limited by the "Special Agreement" annexed to the EDC Treaty also were outlined, and the Chief of Staff invited Division comments early in 1955. (1)

COMAIRCENT's Initiative on German Air Forces.

COMAIRCENT felt strongly about limitations placed (or that might be placed) on German air forces to be integrated into ACE. He wrote to CINCENT that German troop carrier forces should be additional to the 20 operational wing German contribution. German civil air transport in wartime also should be capable of contributing to the military air transport role.

(1) Memo, PPO 1170/1, German Armed Forces, 7 Dec 54.
He supported SACEUR's views on manpower limitations—that none should be placed on the German Air Force "because manpower must be related not only to operational aircraft, but also to the essential supporting equipments and systems such as anti-aircraft against low flying aircraft, guided missiles, C&R and observer corps which the Germans must contribute in full measure."

"The contribution of these vital supporting organisations has, in my judgement, not been adequately stressed", AM Embry protested, "and I now wish to put on record how essential it is to realise that aircraft alone do not constitute an air force." (1)

CINCENT forwarded COMAIRCENT's letter to SACEUR, stating that he was "in agreement with the opinion expressed...by the Commander AIRCENT". Marshal Juin said, that Germany should make an effective contribution to the Central Region's Air Defence in addition to the scheduled 20 operational wings. (2)

General Speidel's Army and Air Force Proposals.

On 16 December 1954, General Speidel submitted for SACEUR's review a new list of proposed Army field forces and proposed tactical air forces. These were to accompany a "mobilisation plan" he had left with General Gruenther on 15 December. (3) On 11 January 1955, General Speidel forwarded two further lists "relating to The Tactical Air Force and The Build-up rate for the Army Units." (4)

In the first set, General Speidel outlined specific numbers of personnel for the basic formations (major units) of Armoured and Infantry Divisions -- e.g., 12,600 for the first and 13,000 for the second. GHQ Organic Combat Troops were to total 165,000; Supply and Service Troops 46,000; the Total Army Field Forces amounting to approximately a total of 368,000 men.

Tactical Air Forces, including operational staff components: 8 fighter squadrons, 6 fighter-bomber squadrons, 2 all-weather fighter squadrons, 2 reconnaissance squadrons, and 2 transport squadrons totalling 26,000 men would be set up. To these would be added support units, as well as 5 light AAA battalions and 2 engineer repair and construction battalions for a cumulative total of TAF personnel of 48,000.

(1) AIRCENT Ltr. PLD-2990/1, German Forces Integration into NATO, 13 Dec 54.
(2) AFCE Ltr. 2274/54 OPS/1221/5, Marshal Juin to SACEUR, 14 Dec 54.
(3) See: SHAPE/SEC/122/54, IOCS, Information Concerning German Forces, 15 Dec 54, which enclosed, documents STSC/213/54, STSC/214/54, and STSC/216/54, reproductions of the "mobilisation plan".
(4) Ltr. from LTG Hans Speidel, 11 Jan 55.
General Speidel's Tactical Air Force list of 11 January 1955, totalling 48,000, amounted to the same strength; however, 2 Troop Carrier Wings had now been added to the various components.

Buildup of divisions and brigades, and the organic headquarters components would be carried out "until about the end of the 27th month and, with approximately 300,000 men, will compromise about 80% of the total strength of the Field Army."

After that, the remaining Army organic units (about 75,000 men -- 20% of the total strength) and units for the components of other arms, would be set up. (1)

Cumulative Problems Connected with Approaching German Integration.

A myriad of policy, planning and even protocol problems rapidly developed in the early part of 1955, in connection with approaching German integration. For the policies that SHAPE would have to adopt, and the actual steps that would have to be taken, General Schuyler directed SHAPE Staff Divisions both to prepare a list of actions, and to "make and coordinate" plans, in order that implementation might be accomplished when directed. (2)

The Vice Air Deputy, AVM Miller, indicated that steps should be taken to "encourage and promote establishment of a German Air Ministry if this has not already been planned, in order that the German air contribution to NATO may be as effective as possible". He added the need to establish COMAIRCENT's responsibilities to establish channels of liaison between COMAIRCENT and German authorities; and the need to give guidance on an effective air warning system in Germany. (3)

On 18 February 1955, General Schuyler informed the DCPO that SACEUR agreed to informal "air force discussions" with German personnel regarding the differing plans for the composition of the German air force. (4)

(1) Pers. Ltr. LTG Hans Speidel, 11 Jan 55. AM Dawson, SHAPE DCPO, informed AM Fraser, COFS, AIRCENT, of these figures and Gen. Speidel's rationale for slight realignments compared with those that had been specified in the EDC's Special Annex - although total wings (20), squadrons (60), and aircraft numbers (1326) remained the same.

(2) Memo AG 1281 PPO, Immediate Actions Required when Germany Joins NATO, 21 Jan 55.

(3) Memo, AD 1281, Immediate Actions Required, 28 Feb 55.

(4) Handwritten note, Gen. Schuyler, COFS, SHAPE, to DCPO, enclosing "Pattern of German Air Force", a 6 page paper "to establish a SHAPE position on the pattern of the GAF so that NATO guidance can be given to the German planners." (undated).
Meanwhile, on 4 February 1955, the Secretary of the Staff announced the formation of a "committee of naval officers" to meet on an ad hoc basis, to develop views and advise on the formation of policy and give guidance on points of detail. The Naval Deputy was to exercise direction, and the committee would be able to deal directly with the naval commanders in the Centre and North, as necessary. It was the "general intention," the Secretary stated, "that it/the Committee/ should cover the whole field of SHAPE naval responsibilities in relation to German naval forces." (1)

These, and a host of other major and minor details occupied the SHAPE Staff in the early part of 1955, while on the periphery of military planning the West German Bundestag ratified the London and Paris Agreements on 16 February 1955; the French Senate following suit on 27 March 1955.

Further Guidance on German Armed Forces.

On 2 March 1955, General Schuyler issued further Guidance on German Armed Forces. This concerned the general deployment and location of the German Army within the limits established by the Paris Accords; the missions, tasks and composition of the German naval force contribution, within the same limits; and similar thoughts on German Air Forces -- the greater part of the Guidance being directed to mid-1957, and therefore based on the concept of defence outlined in the Capabilities Plan, which was planned for use in 1957 Emergency Defence Plan for ACE.

As provided in the EDC's "Special Agreement", the German Army contribution was to have been 12 "groupment" slices -- essentially the same as a type Field Army. Composed of 8 Infantry Divisions (of which 2 might be of the mechanised type, with necessary combat and logistic support), and 4 Armoured divisions (these were CINCENT recommendations), the total peacetime strength of these divisions was set at 154,000 (not including "covering units"); its wartime strength, 183,400. The total German Army contribution was specified as, 333,750 in peacetime; 460,400 in wartime.

German Naval and Air Force missions and patterns of forces also were outlined for what the COFS indicated were for development of more detailed plans and for discussions with German representatives when such discussions were authorised. (2)

(1) Memo, AG 0940 SBC, SHAPE Naval Committee, 4 Feb 55.  
(2) Memo, AG 1281 PPO, Guidance on German Armed Forces, 2 Mar 55.
Air Force Talks with General Speidel.

As for the talks that SACEUR had agreed to on 18 February on the composition of German air forces, AM Dawson, DCPO, noted for General Norstad, AIRDEP, on 2 March that that agreement had been based on the following:

a. Talks were to be in general terms between General Norstad and General Speidel.

b. Informal staff discussion with German Air Force planners would include the composition of the GAF and the German plans for manning and supporting the proposed air force.

c. Discussions on deployment and integration were to be avoided except in general terms.

d. If the Germans asked specifically on the point of integration and the kindred point of command, SHAPE would say that the primary objective was to integrate at wing level, but as they gain experience and operating ability SHAPE would accept the principle that they would have a reasonable share of command responsibility at a higher level. (1)

On 10 March 1955, General Speidel, accompanied by two GAF Colonels, met with General Norstad and Air Vice Marshal Miller. SHAPE-AIRCENT views on the composition of the GAF were discussed. The Germans pointed out that adjustments in their program had been based on guidance with respect to Mutual Defence Assistance Pact (MDAP) equipment. The AIRDEP indicated that planning for composition had to be based on forces best suited to the 1958-60 period.

Distribution of GAF units between the ATAFs -- by which the Germans had originally programmed 10 of the 20 wings for the North and 10 for the South -- was now based on AIRCENT's proposals: 8 wings in the South and 12 in the North. German representatives agreed that they would "have another look at the implications" of this distribution, which seemed reasonable.

"Integration" of German forces, by which the German representatives envisioned their entry into the ATAFs at wing level, also was discussed. The Germans considered eventually obtaining an equitable share in the staff and command, first at group level, and subsequently possibly at ATAF level, proceeding toward their ultimate organisation, after considering what that should be, in a gradual manner.

(1) Memo, Brief on German Air Force for Talks with Dr. Speidel, 2 Mar 55.
In place of "wing bases" the GAF representatives offered a deployment plan that provided for squadron dispersal for all units. This would probably be even more practicable than additional wing bases, since it would permit the use of many WWII airfields that remained "in Federal hands", and would not require "recovering sizeable land to establish large bases". General Norstad agreed. If squadron bases could be provided, this was desirable; however, such a degree of dispersion might not be feasible throughout the Command, the Air Deputy pointed out.

Technical guidance was sought by the German representatives on airfield runway sizes, and arrangements were made to provide SHAPE logistics and infrastructure experts to discuss these matters, at the German representatives' request. Personnel strengths (the GAF plans were now for 80,000, plus civilians and certain inter-service logistic support); numbers of officers for Allied staffs; ranges; contact between GAF members and the Air Defence Technical Centre; basic flying training standards; signal communications; munitions levels; and similar detailed matters were among the topics also discussed. (1)

Problems Affecting the Raising of German Naval Forces.

SACEUR had established preliminary missions and force requirements for German Naval Forces in his 2 March 1955 Guidance on German Armed Forces. The buildup of forces to meet the missions would be a purely national responsibility, as was the case with all other NATO nations.

But the ACOS O&T, following the discussions that had taken place with German authorities, and further study at SHAPE, noted that it was probable that the Germans might require certain advice from SACEUR in order to help them in their planning. To do this, SHAPE considered that SACEUR should have a prepared ACE position upon which Staff discussions with the Germans could be based -- and that this should be within his Terms of Reference (MCM 14/54) (then under consideration for revision).

Thus, on 23 March 1955, MG White, ACOS O&T, prepared a draft paper containing a broad outline of the problems affecting the raising of German naval forces with the intention that it be used as an aid in initial staff level discussions with the Germans -- until full German views were known. General White forwarded a copy of the paper to both CINCNORTH and CINCENT, notifying these commanders that their representatives would be invited to attend any such discussions.

(1) Memo, AD 1281, Meeting between General Norstad and General Speidel, 10 Mar 55.
The problems, as seen by SHAPE at that moment included:
phasing of D-Day and post D-Day forces; priorities for
raising of German Naval units; training; characteristics
of type units; and the procurement of ships, aircraft
and naval equipment.

The paper provided a numerical composition, which was
taken from the Guidance that had been issued on 2 March.
Added to this, was a table of Naval forces taken from the
papers produced by General Speidel. (The latter composition
was produced without SHAPE guidance on the naval mission,
however; but the numbers of ships did not appear to differ
greatly from those SHAPE had set forth.)

SHAPE requested the Commanders' comments on these
initial outlines of the naval problems. (1)

Liaison and Consultation with German Authorities.

On 8 April, General Schuyler had indicated to AM Dawson,
a desire to confer with General Speidel during the following
week on the matter of German personnel at ACE Headquarters.
General Schuyler intended to announce that initially
at SHAPE, and, probably at AFCENT also, there should be
a small group (4 to 8 in number), and headed by a general
officer, to acquaint themselves with Allied organisation,
policies and procedures, and to give staff advise on
all problems relating to Germany.

"This group would be directly responsible to the
Chief of Staff and, of course, as part of this staff would
owe allegiance solely to SACEUR", General Schuyler said.
"After a period of adjustment, perhaps six months, the
group would be dissolved and the members would take
appropriate positions throughout the staff. By that time
we should be getting additional Germans on the staff,
primarily graduates of the NATO Defence College."

The Chief of Staff at SHAPE was still looking for a
"psychological moment to ask the SG for an increase in our
ceilings", and hoped to accomplish this after some
informal discussions during CPX Five, which would take
place shortly. (2)

General Gelee, for his part, felt the time "opportune
and pressing to reopen the question of the liaison to be
established with the German Military Authorities". He
was convinced of the need to be ready with firm proposals
before Germany's entry into NATO, and was in full agreement
with the proposals by SACEUR to set up at Fontainebleau
(AFCENT) a small German liaison staff as an extension of
the German NMR at SHAPE. But he also considered "that this
liaison should be reciprocal", at least, temporarily.

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 0905.23 OT, Problems Affecting the Raising
of the Naval Forces, 23 Mar 55.
(2) Memo, Gen. Schuyler to AM Dawson, 9 Apr 55.
General Gelee felt that if there was no interim period, or if it was of very short duration, no organisation would be set up in Bonn to take over the responsibilities of the existing, so-called (NATO) Special Security Committee -- liaison with which several officers in Bonn already were conducting -- or through the temporary German liaison staffs at SHAPE or AFCENT. General Gelee stressed this again as a temporary expediency until German authorities had been "fully indoctrinated into all the requirements of our operational plans", because "one can foresee that they will, in the early stages, have serious difficulties unless they are provided with considerable assistance to which they can turn at any moment." The AFCENT COFS thus felt that "this system of dual liaison -- the one from the Germans established at our Headquarters until they are fully integrated into our Staffs, the other from us set up temporarily at Bonn -- would, by working closely together, ensure speed and efficiency in the exchange of contacts and information which will be so essential in the early stages. We must avoid all risk of misunderstandings at the start," General Gelee concluded, and suggested that SACEUR apprise General Speidel of the matter, and discuss it with him in detail. (1)

SHAPE Queries the SG on Procedures.

SHAPE notified the SG on 16 April 1955 of developing plans for the integration of German personnel into the SHAPE staff organisation, but asked for guidance on the question of security.

Shortly after ratification a small number of German officers ("probably not exceeding 5 or 6") would be placed on the SHAPE Staff, and a similar number on the Staff of AFCENT. From the beginning, SHAPE noted, "these German officers will...be acting fully in an international capacity, owing allegiance solely to their NATO commander, and therefore we assume that once they have been COSMIC cleared there will be no special security problem involved."

However, the Germans would also wish to establish a "national military representative" at SHAPE paralleling the NMRS that represented all other NATO nations. In this case, as the NMR would represent his MOD, "the question of special security precautions may arise", SHAPE suggested, as a number of requests were anticipated through this channel for classified information. SHAPE wished to know whether the German NMR, when established, should be given the same treatment in security matters as was accorded other "national NMR's" or whether special security precautions had to be taken. (2)

(1) AFCENT Ltr. OPS/136/AFCE/55, File OPS - 1221/5, Machinery for Military Planning and Consultation with the German Authorities, 12 Apr 55.
(2) SHAPE Msg. SH 39936, SCOUT 39936, 16 Apr 55.
On 20 April 1955, General Schuyler outlined this planning to General Speidel. SHAPE also viewed the establishment of a similar representation on the CINCENT Staff as desirable. The German representative indicated that the proposed arrangements appeared generally in accord with German thinking. However, General Speidel could visit Bonn on 25 April and would present the suggestions to the "Blank office" at that time. He saw no particular difficulty in furnishing SHAPE the small number of officers required, and thought they might be available within six to eight weeks. (1)

On 23 April, as a follow-up to SHAPE's 16 April message on integration at SHAPE, General Schuyler wired a full plan for initial representation to the SG. Immediately after ratification of the London and Paris Agreements, SHAPE proposed to request the German MOD to make available for assignment to SHAPE a group of six German officers, including one General officer, with appropriate other rank assistants. The officers "will be full-fledged NATO officers, owing their loyalty to SACEUR. They will be on exactly the same status as all other officers on the SHAPE Staff", General Schuyler noted.

For an initial period of approximately 6 months, they would be held together as a single group, with possibly one or two officers of other nationalities included. The Group would be responsible directly to the Chief of Staff. During the initial period the task of the Group would be to acquaint themselves thoroughly with SHAPE Staff procedures and become familiar with planning; and to act as a group of experts in advising SACEUR, through the Chief of Staff, on all matters specifically affecting German Military Forces. All services would be represented.

After the initial six month period the Group would be broken up and individual officers assigned to various staff divisions. "Later, but before the expiration of one year, I will be prepared to resurvey the entire SHAPE Staff and to propose further integration of German Personnel", the COFS stated.

General Schuyler also proposed to suggest to the German MOD the establishment at SHAPE of a German NMR, and, finally, proposed to suggest the establishment at AFCENT of a group of 4 to 6 German officers that would operate generally along the lines visualised for the group at SHAPE. He asked for approval of these plans, in principle. (2)

1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 4117 CS, 22 Apr 55.
2) SHAPE Msg. SH 20109, SHAPTO 925, 23 Apr 55.
The SG agreed in principle on 6 May 1955. However, aware of the COFS's plan to maintain the German officers in a separate Group, the SG requested clarification, stating, "We are anxious that the German officers are allowed to make direct and personal contacts with the SHAPE Staff in order to facilitate their future integration. Your suggested inclusion of officers of other nationalities, unless carefully supervised, might tend to have the opposite effect." The SG asked, "Are we right in assuming that the mission of these officers is solely to act as guides to the Group?" (1)

General Schuyler reassured the SG on 11 May 1955. "It was never intended that the initial group of German officers should not make direct and personal contact with the SHAPE Staff, and they will be encouraged to do so and all facilities will be afforded," he said. "The object of keeping them as a group during this initial period is to provide them with a central office where they may examine and discuss the many papers and problems with which they will have to acquaint themselves."

The officers of other nationalities attached to the group would not act solely as guides, but would be available as necessary to assist and brief the German officers. They would be mainly drawn from Staff Divisions into which the initial German group would later be integrated, and might be changed from time to time according to the subject matters being studied. (2)

The Federal Republic of Germany - Western European Union - and NATO.

Formal Accession, Association and Sovereignty.

Recapitulation. On 8 April 1949, four days after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, the three principal wartime Western Allies had acknowledged the existence of a German Federal Republic. On 19 September, the Council of Allied Foreign Ministers declared that an attack against the FRG, or West Berlin, would be considered an attack against the NATO Nations. Allied military strength in West German was increased.

On 24 October 1950, the French National Assembly had considered a proposal by M. Rene Pleven for a European Army, including German contingents (commanded by German officers, at battalion level) and, on 18-19 December 1950, the NAC approved further NATO consideration of a European Defence Community.

(1) SG Msg. SCOIN 14351, DEF 981050, Informal Staff Planners Msg. 495, 9 May 55.
(2) SHAPE Msg. SH 20489, 11 May 55.
A German-Allied Military Commission was established at Bonn on 1 January 1951 to discuss the creation of the new German forces.

On 16 March 1951, organisation of a Federal German Frontier Police Force began, with the approval of the three Principal Western wartime Allies. (1)

In the following year, on 11 January 1952, the Federal German Chambers ratified West German participation in the so-called Schumann Plan (creating a European Coal and Steel Community); and on 25 May 1952, the Contractual Conventions, or, so-called Bonn Conventions, were signed among representatives of the three Western Occupying Powers in Germany and by West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. The signing of the European Defence Community (EDC) Treaty followed the next day.

On 6 September 1953, Chancellor Adenauer gained a large majority in West German elections, and in the following year, on 2 July 1954, he formally requested the three Occupying Powers in West Germany to grant the FRG "complete sovereignty".

Failure of the EDC Treaty to achieve complete ratification in August 1954, however, led to the substitution of the London and Paris Agreements on 23 October 1954. Among the provisions of the Agreements was approval by the Allied nations of the admission of West Germany to NATO.

The French National Assembly ratified the Agreements on 30 December 1954; (3) the West German Bundestag followed suit on 16 February 1955.

On 1 April 1955, the US Senate ratified the Paris Agreements; the President signed the Agreements on 7 April, at the same time signing an Executive Order authorising the US to maintain armed forces on the territory of the Federal Republic. (4)

On 20 April 1955 Dr. Conant, the US High Commissioner in Germany, deposited his Government's instruments of ratification of two of the Paris Agreements at the Federal Chancery in Bonn -- one ending the Occupation regime, the other dealing with the stationing of Allied forces in an FRG. Chancellor Adenauer carried out the same formality on behalf of the West German Government.

1) By 1956 the Border Police would be the source of personnel for the first post WWII West German Army Units. Fifty-eight percent (approximately 9,572 officers and men, out of a total of 20,000 in the Border Police) elected to transfer to the new Army. See "The Buildup of German Forces, 1951".

2) In the French National Assembly.


4) The so-called "Convention on Foreign Forces in the FRG", which did not require Senate approval.
On the same day, Italy completed its adherence to the Paris Agreements on WEU in Brussels. In Washington, the Italian Ambassador notified acceptance of the protocol by which the FRG would become a party to the North Atlantic Treaty; and, simultaneously, the Italian Government deposited the instruments of ratification with the International Court of Justice at The Hague. (1)

On 5 May 1955, West Germany became a sovereign nation.

The sequence of events that had great importance for NATO was as follows:

At 0900 hours GMT the three Allied High Commissioners met for the last time at the house of the US Commissioner, Mr. Conant. At 1050 hours, the Federal German ratification of the London and Paris Agreements was deposited at Brussels, thereby formally beginning the Western European Union (WEU).

At approximately 1100 hours, M. Francois Poncet (of France) and Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar (of the UK) deposited at the Chancellery their countries' instruments of ratification of the Agreements ending the occupation of West Germany; and at 1215 hours the West German Cabinet met to complete the declaration marking the "Day of Sovereignty".

Almost simultaneously, representatives of NATO nations that had not yet done so deposited their countries' instruments of ratification of the Agreements in Washington, thereby officially marking the creation of a Western European Union and the Federal German Republic as a sovereign state.

In the course of the afternoon, M. Francois Poncet and President Heuss of the FRG exchanged official notes sanctioning the Agreement on the Saar, and, at the Bundestag, Chancellor Adenauer read the official proclamation of sovereignty.

At 1800 hours, the three High Commissioners relinquished their appointments and conveyed to President Heuss their credentials as Ambassadors. (2)

(1) On the same day, 20 April 1955, at a private meeting of the NAC, members agreed that the flag of the FRG should be raised for the first time on 9 May 1955 outside the Palais de Chaillot, and at all NATO civil and military headquarters where flags were normally flown. They also indicated that there should be no ceremony at any headquarters when this was done. The Council felt that the ceremony of officially welcoming West Germany to NATO at the Ministerial meeting on 9 May would be sufficient.

(2) Extract from Le Monde, 6 May 55.
On the following day, 6 May 1955, West Germany's ambassador in Washington deposited the Federal Governments instrument of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty at the State Department, thereby formally bringing about West German membership in NATO. Thus WEU became effective on 5 May 1955; West German accession to the NA Treaty, on 6 May.

WEU is Inaugurated. The WEU was formally inaugurated at an after-dinner meeting at the British Embassy in Paris on the evening of 7 May 1955. M. Goffin (Belgium) was appointed Secretary General, with two assistants, Dr. von Etzdorf (FRG) and Mr. Peter Fraser (UK). Vice Admiral Ferreri (Italy) was appointed Director of the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

The WEU Council decided to set up a Standing Armaments Committee to work in close cooperation with NATO. Its headquarters was to be in Paris, and M. Christofini (France) was to be its Secretary. It was also decided that the first meeting of the WEU would be held in Strasbourg (France) at the end of the month -- at the same time as the next scheduled session of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. It was also proposed that the WEU Assembly be composed of the same individuals as those who represented their countries in the Assembly of the Council of Europe. (1)

First NATO Representation. On 8 May 1955 the Foreign Ministers of France, the UK, and the US met for discussions preliminary to the NATO Ministerial meeting at which West Germany would be represented for the first time.

The NATO Ministerial Meeting took place in Paris on May 1955, in public session in the morning, and in private session in the afternoon. At SHAPE, a West German delegation, headed by LTG Hans Speidel, attended a brief flag-raising ceremony.

On 10 May 1955, the three governments of the UK, US and France issued an invitation to the Soviet Government -- and the NAC approved -- for a Big-Four conference of Heads of Government to discuss European problems and, possibly, disarmament.

At the end of the closed session of the NAC on 10 May 1955, Chancellor Adenauer stated in a press conference that he hoped to have the first military laws enabling his government to enlist volunteers through the Parliament by the end of July. He also stated that he would reject any Soviet proposal at a Big Power conference to neutralise West Germany.

1) This would later pose problems for NATO and made mandatory certain specified security arrangements. See: 2180/11-3, The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Western European Union, A Brief History of their Origins and Special Relationship, 16 Mar 73.
The Buildup of German Forces

The Integration of West German Officers at SHAPE and AFCENT.

On 9 May, 1955, General Speidel assured General Schuyler of the German acting MOD's agreement to the arrangements at SHAPE and Fontainebleau (AFCENT) for the initial integration of a small group of German officers within those Headquarters. General Speidel asked that an official request now be addressed to him for the assignment of those officers. (1) General Speidel also attended a brief ceremony of the raising of the FRG flag at SHAPE on the same date.

On 11 May 1955, General Schuyler responding to queries on the integration of the first German officers, and on security aspects, as well as on AFCENT requirements, outlined to CINCENT the entire status of these matters as they stood at SHAPE. General Schuyler included a favourable opinion on a proposal for an extension of SHAPE's German NMR office at AFCENT for a trial period, but he added that SHAPE did not favour a suggested permanent establishment of a SHAPE-AFCENT liaison office at Bonn. (2)

General Schuyler discussed the German integration matter with General Speidel further and, on 12 May 1955, forwarded to him an official SHAPE request (to be transmitted to the FRG) for the assignment of German officers to SHAPE and AFCENT as follows:

SHAPE

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HQS AFCENT

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<td>One Lieutenant Colonel or Major</td>
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*Requested these officers be Army.

Four other ranks were proposed for clerical and secretarial duties. (3)

(1) Memo, Arrangements for Participation of German Officers at SHAPE and Fontainebleau, 9 May 55.
(2) SHAPE Ltr. AG 2209 PPO, Consultation with German authorities, 11 May 55; Memo, Channels of Communication to the FRG, 11 May 55.
(3) SHAPE Ltr. AG 4117 CS, 12 May 55.
On the same day, General Schuyler informed General Gelee at AFCENT of SHAPE's receipt of SG agreement in principle to SHAPE's proposals, and forwarded a copy of his letter to General Speidel of that date. (1)

In the meantime, the SG indicated that disclosures of NATO classified information must continue on an individual need-to-know basis, until further notification that the FRG had met NATO security requirements. (2)

On 1 July 1955, the Standing Group Liaison Officer at NATO Headquarters in Paris, was able to notify the SG that, in response to a request of the West German government, the Head of the Security Bureau had authorised the opening of a Central COSMIC registry at the office of the Ministry of Defence in Bonn. (3)

SHAPE Special Staff Group of German Officers.

On 12 July, General Schuyler announced the appointment of Colonel Morel, Fr A, of PPANDO as the temporary Liaison and Contact Officer for the Special Staff Group of five to six German officers to be assigned to SHAPE.

Colonel Morel was to be responsible directly to the Chief of Staff. His task would be to assist the German officers in obtaining background on the function and operation of the headquarters, to arrange briefings, and to obtain appropriate background papers for their use.

Division Chiefs were requested to furnish Colonel Morel briefing programs and lists of basic documents for studying. The German officers would have a COSMIC TOP SECRET clearance and would have to be informed on all classified documents on a need-to-know basis. (4)

Arrival of the First Members of the German Special Staff Group (GSSG).

General Gruenther announced on 25 July 1955, at 1000 Paris time, that the first group of six German officers would join the international staff at SHAPE on 27 July. The group consisted of: Colonel R. Heuser, AF, Captain H.E. Busch, Navy, Colonel J. Bayer, Army, Colonel A. Detlev von Plato, Army, LTC H. Hukelheim, Army, and LTC M. Schwerdtfeger, Army. (5)

1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 4117 CS, 12 May 55.
2) SG Msg. SGOI 14535, DEF 984109, 13 May 55.
3) SGLO Msg. SGOIN 16152, 011445Z, LOSTAN 1287, 1 Jul 55. SHAPE however, still had to query the SG for advice on whether restrictions on the transmittal of classified material to German authorities were now removed. SHAPE Msg. SH 21485, SHASEC 229, 8 Jul 55.
4) Memo, AG 1281 GSSG, SHAPE Special Staff Group of German Officers, 12 Jul 55.
On 27 July, the GSSG attended its first briefing. The group was accompanied by Colonel Adolph Graf von Kielmansegg, German NMR designate, and was presented to General Schuyler in the latter's office, by General Speidel.

General Schuyler welcomed the GSSG and introduced Colonel Morel and explained the latter's terms of reference. Following a statement by Colonel Morel, General Speidel responded. The SHAPE Chief of Staff and General Speidel made addresses before NATO reporters and photographers, and formal luncheons followed.

From 27 July through 30 August the GSSG then attended more than 21 briefings, including familiarisation with documents for information and action then under current study at SHAPE.

On 31 August 1955, Colonel Morel made a final address to the GSSG. By 1600 hours that date, all German officers had been "invited to the Executive officers of their new assigned Divisions." (1)

Meanwhile, on 25 August, General Schuyler directed that, as of 1 September 1955, when "members of the German Control Group will have completed their initial orientation" the group was to be dissolved and the six officers would be assigned as follows:

Colonel Richard Heuser, AF OAIRDEP
Captain Hans-Eberhard Busch, Navy PPANDO
Colonel Johannes Bayer, Army Signal Division
Colonel Anton Detlev von Plato, Army PPANDO
Lt. Colonel Heinz Heukelheim, Army Logistics Division
Lt. Colonel M. Schwerdtfeger, Army OANDT (2)

On 3 October 1955, LTG Gelee forwarded to SHAPE, AFCENT's own proposals for integrating German Officers into Central Europe and subordinate headquarters, and requested that, if approved, they be forwarded to the FRG MOD.

These proposals, General Gelee said, "constitute for this National Authority /the FRG/ the essential guidance for working out budget estimates and for receiving and conditioning the personnel eventually to be interested into these Headquarters." (3)

(1) Memo, Data for the SHAPE Historical Report, 31 Aug 55; Memo 1281/2 GSSG, Weekly Briefing Program for the GSSG, 25 Jul 55.
(2) Memo, Assignment of German Officers to Staff Divisions, 25 Aug 55. Meanwhile, on 28 Jul 55, the EXNMR, Col. E.L. Robbins, USAF, notified the COFS, that Col. Count von Kielmansegg, German NMR designate, had indicated at lunch on 27 Jul 55 that he planned to assemble a staff and return to SHAPE ready for business on or about 22 Aug 55. (See Memo, The German NMR 28 Jul 55.) The German NMR's office was set up on 1 Sep 55 (according to Col. Robbins, in an interview on 1 Feb 56.)
(3) AFCENT Ltr. 2510/EAS/112, COFS, Proposals on the progressive assignment of German Officers to Central Europe and Subordinate Headquarters, 3 Oct 55.
The Further Development of German Forces.

As the integration of German officers into the Headquarters staffs of SHAPE and AFCENT proceeded, the substance of the guidance on German Army, Naval and Air Forces that General Schuyler had issued to the SHAPE Staff on 2 March 1955 (and slightly amended on 12 April 1955) remained basic to early planning for the organisation and further integration of German forces.

The German army forces were to be designed to participate in the defence of the Central Region of ACE, including Schleswig-Holstein. German Naval forces were to assist in preventing enemy naval forces from penetrating into the North Sea through the Baltic Exits and the Kiel Canal; to interdict to the maximum extent Soviet sea LOCs in the Baltic; to participate in the Allied defences of the North German Baltic coast and the Danish islands; and to assist in maintaining Allied sea LOCs in the German coastal waters and adjacent waters.

German air forces' missions could not be restrictively defined. Rather, the German air force contribution was to be complimentary to that of existing AFCENT air forces. "The German air force shall therefore be designed to participate in the over-all defence of the Central area of ACE, and will be organised, trained and equipped to perform its war mission", General Schuyler stated. (1)

Integrated Headquarters.

On 20 April 1955, General Speidel posed questions to General Schuyler regarding integrated army and air force headquarters, their funding and location.

The COFS noted that Marshal Juin, CINCENT already had proposed the establishment, in peacetime, of an integrated (British-German-Netherlands) Army Headquarters in the Northern Army Group, and the acceptance of this project for financing under the NATO Common Infrastructure Program. SHAPE, in principle, approved the establishment of this headquarters, in peacetime. But NATO policy did not yet provide for international financing of peacetime headquarters at the field army level.

However, in view of the principles of integration (down to Army and ATAF level) that the Paris Agreements had "encouraged", General Schuyler considered it logical that NATO might shortly permit at least partial international financing for such headquarters. CINCENT had been instructed to explore the possibility of tri-partite financing, in the meantime.

(1) Memo, AG 1281 PPO, Guidance on German Armed Forces, 2 Mar 55; as amended, 12 Apr 55.
As for Air Force Headquarters, SHAPE was not aware of any proposal to build a "subterranean accommodations for integrated Air Force Headquarters in the Black Forest in the vicinity of Lahr", or of any proposal to establish such a Headquarters, as had been queried by General Speidel, based ostensibly, upon French reports. If such a proposal were being formulated, it related specifically, to an integrated headquarters that was being prepared, for certain 4ATAF units, the COFS noted.

Such a proposal, if formally suggested, could be studied further; however, in general, it was contrary to current SHAPE views, which stressed the need for more, not less, mobility in headquarters at that level. (1)

**SACEUR's Functions with Respect to German Rearmament.**

As the integration of officers and the integration of headquarters were being studied the SHAPE Staff was considering what actions had to be taken to revise SACEUR's own functions with respect to German rearmament. That is, within the provisions of the Paris Agreements, and SACEUR's Terms of Reference, the initial actions that were mandatory, and the actions that had to be undertaken or continued at SHAPE, were problems now confronting SHAPE planners.

Basic to these areas and to related problems, SHAPE had to explore further German views regarding the forces the FRG planned for national command, for internal defence, and for the common defence of Europe. The German naval contribution had to be considered, and a request made for its assignment to SACEUR. Schleswig-Holstein defence responsibility, naval command in the Baltic, and the exchange of responsibility for Schleswig-Holstein defence (from North to South), as well as the Baltic Command organisation had to be studied. Studies of equipment and training problems were necessary, as were organisation of inspection machinery, and action to secure for SACEUR the necessary authority to inspect German forces, and to request reports concerning those forces, prior to their assignment to NATO.

Finally, "a high-ranking officer" had to be appointed to transmit information from SACEUR to the WEU Council in accordance with the provisions of NATO's Resolution to implement Section IV of the Final Act of the London Conference. (2)

**Training Developments.**

Schools. Proposals also were now under consideration for sending German students to NATO military schools and to schools of other NATO countries.

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(1) SHAPE Ltr. 240/55, AG 2510 PPO, Integrated Army and AF Headquarters, 25 Apr 55.
(2) Memo, PPO 1281, Study on the German Rearmament, 5 May 55.
On 11 May 1955, following suggestions by the German Staff, and agreed to by General Schuyler, Colonel Knauer, Chief of Joint Services Training of the FRG MOD, visited SHAPE to meet officers of OANDT and SIG Division, to discuss procedures for sending German personnel to various schools and training programs.

The OANDT representatives outlined the available courses at the NATO Defence College, etc., and methods of obtaining vacancies, and asked the German Staff to determine at an early date their readiness to accept such vacancies. The SIGDIV representative gave a similar presentation.

The German official indicated a delay of approximately 6 months to arrange legal matters before training could start. The German Staff intended to begin courses of its own, the first, an inter-service, 8-week course with an attendance of approximately 400 high-ranking officers. Courses for Regimental and Battalion Commanders would follow. Company commanders' courses would follow these. Schools and training centres would be opened immediately following these early courses. (1)

Exercises. On 9 May 1955, after a conversation between the AIRCENT COFS and General Schuyler, COMAIRCENT invited the participation "on a VIP basis" of 3 German Representatives to Exercise CARTE BLANCHE. This was a major Air Force exercise in which the whole of CINCENT's Air Force and Air Forces from the various NATO nations would participate. (2)

On 13 May 1955, General Schuyler conveyed this invitation to General Speidel, noting that the purpose of the exercise was to test existing operational procedures and to train air forces for offensive and defensive operations in a widespread war. The exercise took place over the territory of the FRG and northeastern France. (3)

Finally, in bringing about German participation at the highest operational military level in NATO, General Schuyler, on 1 July 1955, asked General Speidel to convey to the FRG MOD an invitation for the attendance of German national observers on the third day of the Allied Exercise and Manoeuvre Conference to be held at the Palais de Chaillot in Paris. That Conference was attended by representatives of the SG, SACLANT, CHANC0M, SACEUR, and the NATO nations. Its aim was to discuss and confirm the exercise and manoeuvre schedules proposed by the MNCs and to indicate and coordinate the national efforts to be allocated to all NATO exercises for 1956-57. (4)

(1) IIOCS, Meeting between O&T Rep. & German Officer from Bonn, 5 May 55.
(2) COMAIRCENT Msg. SCOIN 14299, ECS 11609, Visitors for Ex. CARTE BLANCHE, 9 May 55.
(3) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1730.1 OT, 13 May 55.
(4) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1700.2 OT, The Coordination of NATO Exercise and Manoeuvre Schedules 1956-1957, 1 Jul 55.
Thus, planning for the integration, participation, training, and schooling of German personnel was well underway by mid-1955.

Buildup and Peacetime Location of German Land Forces.

Concentrated discussions and meetings on the buildup and location of German land forces also began in earnest in the spring of 1955.

On 22 April MG White, ACOS O&T, outlined for General Schuyler, "the main areas of importance where German plans seemed to be at variance with SHAPE and CINCENT thinking." These were in the:

a. Frequency of call-up of national service personnel after the initial army had been built up to strength.

b. Ratio of armoured divisions to infantry divisions.

c. Ratio of tank units to infantry and artillery units.

The COFS had called the first matter to General Speidel's attention, and as a result, following further consideration, German authorities decided to continue a "tri-monthly call-up after the army was built to strength". This was acceptable to SHAPE and CINCENT.

As for the ratio of forces, CINCENT had suggested that German forces should consist of 8 infantry divisions and four armoured divisions. There would be "no objections" if two of the infantry divisions were mechanised. SHAPE supported this CINCENT operational position, which also happened to be in accord with the EDC Special Annex on the limitation of forces.

However, MG White noted that the tank composition overbalanced the infantry and artillery strength in divisions and support units. "The extended frontages which must be covered by the NATO forces necessitate a relatively high infantry force backed up by adequate conventional artillery", he said. He suggested that German authorities study these proportions further with CINCENT. (1)

MG White visited LANDCENT on 3 June 1955 and discussed these matters with MG Cochrane, DCOS, LANDCENT. The discussion resulted in another visit by MG White and a LANDCENT representative to NORTHAG on 6 June, and to CENTAG on 7 June, to obtain the latest thinking of the two Army Group Commanders on these problems. (2)

(1) Memo OT 0905.25, Buildup of German Land Forces, 22 Apr 55. An annex to this Memo describes the German Proposals, CINCENT Recommendations, and SHAPE views.

(2) OT 0905.5.25, Notes on Meetings between SHAPE, LANDCENT, NORTHAG and CENTAG, on the Problem of the Future Organisation of the German Land Forces, 3-7 Jun 55.
COMLANDCENT presented his own views "on the centres of gravity" of the German divisions and the locations of certain headquarters in a letter to CINCENT, which the latter's COFS, General Gelee forwarded in turn, to SACEUR on 6 June 1955. In forwarding COMLANDCENT's views, General Gelee expressed his agreement with the suggestions, which had been very similar to those of General Speidel. He noted that COMLANDCENT had "asked for authority to begin discussions with Army Groups" and the "Dienstelle Blank" (the German MOD's office) in order to obtain from the latter their latest proposals for the detailed positioning of German divisional and non-divisional units. General Gelee recommended approval of COMLANDCENT's request. (1)

On 29 August 1955, General Schuyler gave this authorisation through CINCENT, "to initiate exploratory discussions with the appropriate German Military Authorities concerning matters of locations of German Military Forces", subject to approval of results by SACEUR. (2)

Deputy SACEUR and "The German National Military Machine".

Field Marshal Montgomery also played a direct part in counselling West German authorities.

On 8 September 1955, FM Montgomery met in Bonn with Herr Blank, the FPR Minister of Defence, General Heusigner, General Speidel, General Laegeler (Chief of Staff to General Heusigner) and Air Marshal Dawson, SHAPE DCPO. The Field Marshal explained that, as a servant of all NATO governments, equally, it was his duty to advise on military matters. It was for each government to accept or neglect his advice. Minister Blank "agreed that the Field Marshal should outline his views on the best organisation to control the German national military machine".

FM Montgomery stressed that Germany was starting "with a clean slate", without the complications of long standing custom and established, though outdated, constitutional responsibility. West Germany was well placed to avoid the pitfalls that other countries suffered from; such as, too great a dependence on control by committees, or allowing senior officers to be summoned directly to report to Parliament. Montgomery felt that an MOD should be solely responsible for all defence policy and should be the only channel for presenting defence matters to the government or a Parliament.

The Field Marshal felt that each of the three services should have a Chief of Staff. The three Chiefs would form a Chiefs of Staff committee, with a senior officer -- who would have no direct responsibility for any one service -- as a

(1) AFCENT Ltr. 2990/OPS/256, Peacetime Location of German Land Forces, 28 Jun 55.
(2) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1281 PPO, 29 Aug 55; SHAPE Ltr. 324/55, 17 Aug 55.
permanent chairman. The latter would be the personal Chief of Staff and professional advisor to the MOD on all defence matters, as well as the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff committee.

Following a discussion on this proposal, and a review of examples of how business might be conducted on this basis, the conferees reached general agreement on its soundness.

The MOD indicated that he was having some difficulty because of the wish of the German Parliament to exercise a close degree of control -- notably over service appointments -- but he was "optimistic as to the outcome." (1)

Meeting with German Service Chiefs.

At a subsequent meeting the same day with the German Service Chiefs, FM Montgomery again explained his international responsibilities for giving advice, and the freedom of the individual countries to accept or neglect it.

Philosophy of War. With General Heusinger's agreement, he outlined the philosophy of modern war and developed in more detail its application to German forces. He stressed "the changing tempo in comparison with past wars", demonstrated how "the air had become the dominant factor in war", but also stressed the importance of the part played by all three services, and the need for a correct balance among them.

In particular, the Field Marshal said, "the first task of the air was to gain air superiority without which each of the three services would be ineffective." The naval task was to keep open sea communications, which were essential to the maintenance of both military and civilian effort. In general, it was the task of the large navies to control the large open spaces of the world, and the smaller navies to receive and handle arriving convoys, to protect the coastal waters and to hold "such focal areas as the exits from the Baltic and Black Seas."

The "army task" was to protect the land area of Western Europe against invasion, with particular emphasis on the critical opening phase, while the air forces were still fighting for air superiority.

The Concept of the Land/Air Battle. In discussing the concept of the land/air battle in some detail, DSACEUR spoke of the composition and responsibilities of the "forward screen" and of the corps organisation behind it. He described a corps of 3 infantry divisions, each with a small armoured component integral to it. The bulk of that armour would be held for quick concentration, organised separately from the divisions, but still under the corps commander. Such independent armour

(1) "NOTE" on DSACEUR's Visit to Bonn on 8 Sep 55 (recd. in Historical Section, 2 Dec 55).
might consist of 2 brigades, but its strength would be on the order of 400 tanks per corps.

However, divisional organisation and armoured formations still comprised a subject under discussion and no firm position had yet been established.

The concept was readily accepted by the German authorities. They supported a "fluid strategy based on mobile forces as against a conception of static or field defenses". General Heusinger foresaw certain economies that might be made in supporting units to help in forming the screen; however, German authorities had not yet had an opportunity to consider this adequately.

In considering the width of a corps front, German planners noted that different types of terrain in different parts of the front would require special consideration. The corps front would vary in accordance with this and other considerations, but FM Montgomery believed that ten corps of the type described would be adequate for the defence of the central front.

Interdiction. A reference by General Heusinger to the weakness of Russian LOCs in and to Eastern Germany -- with particular reference to the crossings of the Vistula -- brought quick assurance that Allied interdiction plans did exist and could be put into effect quickly. But German anxiety and an expressed need for a number of small coastal type submarines also existed regarding the importance to the Russians of the alternative Baltic Sea LOC. Apart from this, German authorities understood that the role of their navy was primarily the defence of the islands and the exits of the Baltic.

National Service. FM Montgomery stated that the national service period to be implemented by the FRG should be long enough to ensure full and complete training of personnel for their wartime tasks. He referred to the high standards that would be demanded of personnel in the "forward screen", and, as a result, evoked general agreement.

Mobilisation. German officials expressed doubt about the mobilisation systems of the majority of the Allies, however. These they said were totally inadequate. They referred to their own scheme in 1939 which had been based on a 6-hour mobilisation period. They planned a similar scheme, again, and agreed with a statement by DSACEUR that slow and cumbersome mobilisation was useless for the critical opening phase of hostilities.

Air Defence. As for Air Defence, German officials accepted without question the need for a large measure of centralised control in the battle for air superiority. General Heusinger, referring to air defence, indicated that the Germans "fully"
understood the necessity for taking a broad international view of this subject and not attempting to have separate air defence systems on a national basis. German thinking was further advanced on this subject than that of any other Continental nations with the possible exception of Greece."

The Notes recorded of the FM's conference in Bonn indicated the cordial atmosphere throughout the visit; the special greeting by "crowds" of the FM "at many points"; and the frank and welcome manner in which all German officers and officials entered into the discussions. (1)

Composition of German Land Forces.

PM Montgomery also had explained his philosophy earlier in the year at CPX FIFE. Again, he discussed the matter with Marshal Juin, CINCENT on 26 August; and, on 12 October lectured in a similar vein to the Royal United Service Institution in London. Finally, he recommended, on 2 November 1955, that the SHAPE Staff should be instructed to work out what might be called the "SHAPE Grand Design for the defence of Central Europe", and what was needed to implement it, within the known capabilities. The Germans should be informed and "told that it is the SHAPE doctrine", he said. They should be invited to conform -- and it was unlikely that they would refuse, he indicated.

In any case, the FM emphasised the need to establish a SHAPE position as a matter of urgency. The divergent opinions of SHAPE and CINCENT on one hand, and German authorities on the other, (AFCENT preferred 8 infantry and 4 armoured divisions, while the Germans wanted 6 of each.) suggested that SACEUR might discuss the matter directly with the FRG MOD and General Heusinger. If this occurred, the Personal Staff Officer (PSO) to DSACEUR noted the Field Marshal as having indicated, he (SACEUR) "would be able to explain to the Germans the international aspect of the problem, wherein it is his task to produce a balanced Order of Battle in ACE, organised in a way that he can accomplish his primary mission." (2)

German Naval Forces.

The raising of naval forces in the FRG had not been neglected. Following SHAPE's issuance of "Guidance on German Armed Forces" on 2 March 1955, the ACOS CANDT, MG White, wrote to CINCNORTH and CINCENT announcing that the requirements established on 2 March impelled further investigation of the

(1) Notes on a Meeting with FRG Service Chiefs, in Bonn, 8 Sep 55.
(2) SHAPE/SEC/67/55, Memo, DSAC 0900/9, 2 Nov 55; SHAPE/SEC/66/55, Memo, DSAC 0900/9, 2 Nov 55.

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problems that would arise in raising Naval forces. This affected, particularly, "matters of organisation and training, including guidance on the characteristics of the type of vessels needed to meet the requirements."

Accordingly, General White outlined some of these problems -- including an examination of questions on D-Day forces, priorities, characteristics of units, procurement, and training.

Shown in appendices were the projected "EDC German Naval Contribution", the SHAPE "Proposed Force Composition for Naval Tasks", and General Speidel's proposed "Composition of the German Naval Forces to be placed at the Disposal of NATO."

MG White also proposed that his outline of the problems be used as an aid to initial staff level discussions with the Germans, whose views were needed to enable further progress to be made. (1)

First Meetings on German Naval Problems.

On 20 April 1955, the Naval Deputy, Admiral Lemonnier, Fr N, met informally in his office with Captain Zenker, who had been designated by General Speidel to meet with SHAPE representatives to discuss German naval matters.

Once again, the SHAPE representatives stressed the importance of operations in the Baltic; the German representative agreeing that German ideas on this area were very much the same. These considered that enemy amphibious operations, particularly against Zealand, would be a very likely threat to NATO forces. The Germans believed the Russians had a large submarine force in the Baltic, and, as this force could be put to little use within the Baltic, it must be one of their primary aims to get the submarines out into the North Sea through the Baltic Exits. (2)

Second Conference.

A second "Naval Conference" was held at SHAPE on 1 June 1955, and, at this time, the German Representative indicated a wish to receive a letter from SHAPE giving SACEUR's views and recommendations on the shape and size of German naval forces.

General Schuyler wrote to General Speidel on the matter on 6 July 1955. He pointed out that it was a "well established principle that SHAPE does not prepare recommendations

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(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 0905.23 OT, Problems Affecting the Raising of the Naval Forces of the German Federal Republic, 23 Mar 55.

(2) SHAPE DNAV 103, AG 2030 NAVDEP, Minutes of Meeting on German Naval Problems, 22 Apr 55.
regarding the magnitude of national contributions to NATO prior to the receipt of nationally endorsed defence programs." "To do so", the COFS said, "would result in SHAPE specifying the level of the military effort to be contributed by the nations," and SHAPE was not competent to assess the many important non-military factors which must be taken into account by the country concerned.

General Schuyler pointed out that within NATO, national contributions were made to the NAC, which was "the appropriate authority with which member-countries should finalise their proposed force contributions or discuss any changes in those contributions that become necessary from time to time."

The views that had been expressed in the various meetings were opinions based on considerations of the tasks to be performed and related to the earlier EDC proposals, the Paris Accords and SHAPE contacts with the German staff. Those expressed by SHAPE were designed to assist the FRG in preparing answers to the Annual Review Questionnaire, "but they should not be considered, at this stage, as a statement of SACEUR's recommendations", General Schuyler said.

SHAPE's firm recommendations could be prepared only after SHAPE had had an opportunity to review the overall German force program when it was presented to SHAPE during the course of the AR.

General Schuyler then noted that SHAPE envisioned the main missions of the German naval forces as:

a. To assist in preventing enemy naval forces from getting to the North Sea through the Baltic Exits and the Kiel Canal.

b. To interdict Soviet sea LOCs in the Baltic.

c. To participate in the Allied defences of the German Baltic coast and the Danish islands.

d. To assist in maintaining Allied sea LOCs in the Baltic.

In conformity with these missions, the tentative shape and size of German naval forces, as discussed among the German and SHAPE staffs was set out for General Speidel's "convenience" as follows:
18 small fast destroyers
10 harbour defence craft
6 ocean minesweepers
24 coastal minesweepers
24 inshore minesweepers
12 coastal submarines
40 fast patrol boats
2 coastal minelayers
58 maritime aircraft and helicopters
36 landing craft
1 coast artillery regiment
10 escorts

These were tentative and informal, General Schuyler again reminded General Speidel. He hoped they would be reflected in the German replies to the ARQ, which, when received would be examined and commented upon by the NAC during the normal AR procedure. (1)

The Last Naval Meeting.

Meanwhile, on 5 July 1955, a third and final meeting of SHAPE and German Naval Representatives was held at SHAPE. Admiral Lemmonier, SHAPE Naval Deputy noted that this would be the last meeting because of the early assignment of German officers to the Staff. He emphasised that SHAPE was anxious that all problems should be dealt with through the normal staff machinery, and that future correspondence should be channeled through the German NMR.

On this occasion conference discussed the future size and shape of the German Navy, "unloading" exercises, and standardisation.

A principal topic was naval aviation, including the composition and characteristics of naval aircraft. German representatives had gone into the matter in some detail in the United States, and it was most important, the German representative said, to plan upon an aircraft which was now in production, so as to avoid any teething troubles with aircraft of new design, and so that the detailed plans for air crews and training could be made against the requirements of an aircraft then in service.

However, aviators contacted in the US Navy during the German visit to the US had indicated that no single aircraft could perform the tasks under consideration, and they held out no promise of any such aircraft being available in the immediate future. The Americans had therefore advised the Germans to adopt a policy of dividing the numbers of needed aircraft into three types to meet the various tasks. (2)

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 0940 CS, 6 Jul 55.
(2) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1281/DNAV.128, 11 Jul 55.
The German Presentation to the Annual Review Committee.

On 5 November 1955, the German Delegation made its official presentation to the AR Committee in Paris. The Germans intended to provide 32 billion DM over 3 years for the buildup of forces. This would leave a gap, the SHAPE members of the AR Office noted, of 13 1/2 billion, of which 3 1/2 billion had been committed by the US under so-called "Nash Commitments". The remaining 10 billion was the subject of negotiations with the US, as the bulk of this represented equipment that was available only from the US.

The US Ambassador, Mr. Perkins, indicated that the US had no intention of increasing its aid for Germany unless the Germans increased their defence effort.

Sir Christopher Steele, the UK Ambassador, pointed out that the British did not believe they could spend the amount of money appropriated for the first year and therefore wanted the Germans to consider extending support for occupation troops.

The German representatives felt they could meet the time schedule of 3 to 4 years for raising effective German forces, if the provision of equipment was not a limitation.

With regard to the question of 8-and-4, or 6-and-6 divisions, the Germans indicated that they already had replied to SHAPE on this subject, and had nothing further to add. The Secretary General stated that he hoped the Germans did not consider this matter closed, but would continue discussions with SHAPE on the subject. The Germans indicated their willingness to do so.

A final product of the meeting’s considerations was the SGLO’s (General de Chassey) emphasis that it was not a military determination (e.g., SHAPE’s) as to whether the forces were or were not within the limitations of the EDC figures and Paris Accords. It was a political determination.

The German Delegation supported this statement, adding that in their interpretation of the EDC Treaty’ annex they were 10% below the ceilings.

The Secretary General invited each Delegation to make up its mind on the matter and inform its own Ministry, so that actions could be taken in the NAC. (1)

(1) SHAPE Memo, Country Examination - Germany, 5 Nov 55. Gen. de Chassey asked Col. Murdoch to inform the DCPO that he (Gen. de Chassey) had made it clear, and would continue to make it clear in his discussions with Delegations, that SACEUR would not make determinations as to whether the proposed forces were within the "limitations", but would leave that to political authorities.
The British Admiralty's Views. On 25 November 1955, the Naval Deputy in O&T, SHAPE, informed SACEUR that he had received a telephone call from the British Admiralty on the proposed size of the German Navy. The British MOD's opinion, while not yet available, was not anticipated as being much different.

The Admiralty considered that a naval force of the size proposed in the AR was an essential requirement to implement the naval plans in the Baltic and North Sea. But the Naval Force proposed in the AR was recognised as more powerful than that listed in the EDC Annex.

Because of the totally different missions of the two, it was not possible to make any direct comparison of their relative strengths. The Admiralty was therefore unable to suggest any reductions in the AR figures which would effect a balance, since no balance was possible when forces of totally different character were compared.

Captain Walwyn had spoken to Admiral Jaquard (COMNAVCENT), but the latter had had no information from the "French Admiralty". However, COMNAVCENT was in full agreement with the British Admiralty's views.

The SHAPE OANDT naval deputy suggested that "the question of the reserve forces might well be used to provide a solution 'out of court'. These, under EDC, were .85 minesweepers and 40 harbour defence craft, which add up to the large total of approximately 36,000 tons", he said. "There is no mention of these in the AR figures and it could well be argued that, as we have not so far made any use of these numbers, the total force now proposed is still below the total active and reserve force under EDC." (1)

The Land Forces Solution. SHAPE had generally agreed with the FRG's AR proposals. However, SHAPE had also recommended the ratio of 8 infantry and 4 armoured divisions, instead of the proposed ratio of 6 infantry and 6 armoured divisions. Discussions on this had continued at the staff level. (2)

On 29 November 1955, General Gruenther wrote to General Heusinger at Bonn suggesting that, in view of the tests then being conducted in several NATO countries to determine the most suitable types of divisions for use in modern warfare, "it might be wise to defer a final determination on two of the proposed armoured divisions. This would give an opportunity thoroughly to evaluate the results of these important tests before becoming firmly committed to a set type for these two later divisions". (1)

(1) Memo OT 0905.5.23, German Naval Forces, 25 Nov 55.
(2) SHAPE Ltr. 404/55, SHAPE Comments on the German Reply to ARQ(55), 26 Sep 55.
To this end, SACEUR suggested that if the German Reply to ARQ(55) were amended to show 6 infantry, 4 armoured and "2 undetermined divisions" it would facilitate the AR process for the year 1955. A final resolution of the problem could then be made at a later date when all the necessary data was at hand, "possibly during the 1956 AR procedure". (1)

The German Délegation indicated its intention to amend the German submission to ARQ(55), as SACEUR requested. (2)

Indications of Difficulties.

On 27 January 1956, CINCENT, Marshal Juin, as authorised by SACEUR, visited the FRG MOD. CINCENT reported to SACEUR that he had been well received and had heard a presentation of problems facing the MOD from Minister Blank in the presence of General Heusinger and General Speidel. Among these were the need for "a fresh military law" that had to be enacted before 31 March 1956 legislation which would permit the incorporation of Frontier Police personnel into the armed forces, and was the "only way of ensuring that the necessary cadre personnel enlisted within the time laid down for the buildup of the German units".

Among other things, the MOD also indicated that "a knowledge of the overall geographical locations of the German Forces, and, hence, of their broad command organisation, /was/ essential for him to be able to develop an appropriate policy for camp construction, involving enormous outlay, in the time required."

"The arrangements that have just been made to set up the training centres and the cadre units provide acceptable, but provisional, locations for two years to come", CINCENT reported the MOD had said. The locations had been determined solely on the basis of the camps available and could in no way be regarded as operational locations. But if delay in the activation of the German forces and their integration into a valid operational layout was to be avoided, it was during the two coming years that the installations required for the ultimate location of these forces must be built. (3)

SACEUR responded with appreciation for the information CINCENT had forwarded and indicated that SHAPE was conducting intensive studies on the subject. He hoped to be able to ask CINCENT's opinion on these studies before taking a final decision, which would "permit the German

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 2100 AR Germany, German Reply to ARQ(55), 29 Nov 55.
(2) SGLO AR Memo No. 180/55, 30 Nov 55:SHAPE Memo for SGLO, German Country Chapter, 2 Dec 55.
(3) AFCENT Ltr. 2990/EAS/16, Visit to Bonn, 8 Feb 56.
authorities to conduct their work on a sound basis". (1)

Marshal Juin's Report on German Rearmament.

Marshal Juin again discussed the buildup of German forces with representatives of the FRG on 6 July 1956 at Bonn. The information he received at this time seemed "extremely important and reassuring", he later informed SACEUR, and that "the Germans gave me a strong impression of their willingness and ability to achieve their objectives on time". These objectives, briefly, were presented by the three Service Chiefs as follows.

Land Force Buildup.

On 31 December 1958, the German land forces were to comprise:

a. Operational Forces: 6 Infantry Divisions, 6 Armoured Divisions, 2 Mountain Brigades, 2 Airborne Brigades and the necessary tactical and logistic support units.

b. A Regional organisation, based on 6 Military Regions.

The Regional organisation was being set up. It included training units which, as of 1 July, consisted of 9 operating schools -- 6 of which worked in conjunction with "Experiment Battalions", and 3 to train cadres and service and logistic support units.

In 1956 the buildup schedule, was as follows:

1 July Setting-up of the first three Infantry Divisions, composed of Frontier Police personnel, supplemented, after 1 August, by volunteers trained at the schools. Each of these three divisions will be at 2/3 strength, i.e., 10 battalions or equivalent units out of the planned 15.

1 September Setting-up of one Armoured Division (cadres from the training schools and the balance consisting of volunteers).

1 November Setting-up of a second Armoured Division.

By the end of 1956, the strength of these forces was to reach 64,000 men and, with 2/3 of their "T/O" units, 3 infantry divisions, 2 armoured divisions, 1 mountain brigade and 1 airborne brigade would be set up. In 1957 (the second year), 3 more infantry divisions and 3 more Armoured divisions would be set up in the same way. Strength would amount to 200,000 men by the end of 1957.

(1) Pers. Ltr. AG 2050 PPO, SACEUR to CINCENT, 28 Feb 56.
In 1958, the 6th Armoured Division, 1 mountain brigade and 1 airborne brigade would be set up, together with the tactical and logistic support units required for the overall land forces.

By the end of 1958, the overall program would be completed.

As of 6 July 1956 -- the day the discussions took place -- the actual strength of FRG forces, the West German Service Cheifs stated, amounted to very nearly 30,000 men.

The foregoing, presented by General Laegeler, called for no comment, Marshal Juin recalled. AFCENT needed both infantry and armoured divisions. "The reasons which caused CINCENT to prefer 8 Infantry Divisions and 4 Armoured Divisions to 6 Infantry Divisions and 6 Armoured Divisions have lost value and on this point it is impossible to state categorically that the maximum effort should be made to set up Infantry Divisions or Armoured Divisions", Marshal Juin now noted.

Air Forces Buildup.

General Kammhuber, in presenting German Air Force data, emphasised that there were more difficulties in building up the Air Force than the Land Forces.

There was "a gap of 11 years, which means that the seasoned pilots are now too old, and training young ones will take a long time", CINCENT cited the German Chief as stating. The years 1956 and 1957 would be primarily devoted to training. Four schools were now operating in Germany at Fürstenfeldbruck, Kafbeuren, Landsberg and Mumminger. Training was more or less along US lines and instructors were being trained for 2 years in the US.

Equipment had to come, initially, in the form of aid from the NATO countries. It was scheduled to reach Training Centres at the beginning of 1957, and, from there, would go to the units.

The buildup schedule was as follows:

1956
No combat units anticipated.

1957 (May)
The first wings set up ready for operational training.

(October) First operational units.

1958 (Spring) The German Air Force able to fulfill tactical and air defence missions.

The peacetime infrastructure needed would be built up in step with the forces' buildup. Wartime would present much more difficult problems because of the need for dispersal, etc. "However", CINCENT reported, "there is reason to hope that it will be solved in the next few years."
The Air Force planned to include personnel composed of 78% volunteers, "under contract", and only 22% draftees. This buildup would be affected greatly by the terms of military service laid down by legislation then before Parliament.

General Kammhuber anticipated that German units would be given the latest equipment, e.g., F100 Fighters, F84 Fighter-Bombers, and F102 Tactical Reconnaissance Aircraft. He emphasised that technical progress was rapid and that the equipment for the German forces "would keep up with it".

Marshal Juin stressed the need for speeding up airfield construction and commented also on the matter of air defence. The position of West German, entirely within the Combat Zone, raised the problem of the integration of that area within the NATO air defence system. Marshal Juin noted that a coordinating agency had recently been established at AIRCENT with the mission of solving this extremely difficult problem. CINCENT stressed the need for close coordination in this field, too.

Naval Forces.

Admiral Ruge of the German Naval Staff noted that the West German Navy would be a small one, adapted to special conditions in the North Sea and Baltic. Its tasks would be, among others, convoy protection, keeping supply lines open from the North Sea; covering the entrances to the Baltic; supporting the flanks of Allied land forces; and harassing the enemy's naval units and supplies. Among the "missions", Admiral Ruge said, were: mining and minesweeping; convoy protection; landings, as required; and reconnaissance. All this would be accomplished with a small fleet of ships varying from 300 tons (submarines), to 3,000 tons (surface vessels).

In addition to a detailed list of the various types and numbers of ships planned, the Admiral also stated that the Naval Air Force of 58 aircraft could carry out combat, reconnaissance and submarine-chasing missions.

The Navy would have a total of 30,000 men, 17,000 of them afloat.

The Naval Buildup program was as follows:

1 July A few ships from Allied sources were already in service.

1 September 1956 Forty seven vessels in service. Crews would come from the Auxiliary Police units set up by the Allied Forces in Germany.
31 December 1956

The training system would be in full operation.

1957

Efforts in the fields of logistics, naval bases, etc. would go forward.

1958

Navy fully activated.

While accomplishment of this program could be achieved without difficulty as far as personnel was concerned, equipment would present some difficulties, as West German shipyards were full.

The FRG intended to ask the US to loan some ships and planned to order several vessels in France.

As to command organisation, Admiral Ruge responded to Marshal Juin's queries by indicating that in the North Sea, a solution was in sight. In the Baltic no solution had been found; however, the Admiral "emphasised that this question must not be left in the air"; the Command in this key area must be organised. Marshal Juin agreed.

As for German non-operational forces "in the event of the implementation of the 1956 Emergency Plan", Marshal Juin noted the relationship of this matter with Schleswig-Holstein. German representatives, in reply, considered that, in that part of the area which would not be defended by CINCNORTH, naval forces were mobile enough to avoid any danger. The armoured division in the Hamburg area could be withdrawn and made secure in the Central Europe Sector, they said.

On 13 July 1956, Marshal Juin informed General Gruenther of the content and outcome of these discussions. (1)

Further Developments in German Air Force Integration.

One of the most important and complex problems raised by integration of German forces into NATO was the determination of an organisational structure that would assure the most effective utilisation of the German contribution. Such a structure would have to meet the needs of NATO operational requirements as well as various national requirements.

SHAPE, as noted elsewhere in this volume, was deeply engaged in studying the air defence of NATO Europe. The results of these air defence studies would have major effects on the ATAF organisation as it then existed in Europe; while any reorganisation of the ATAF's that might result from the air defence studies had to provide an organisational structure capable of carrying out effectively the tactical air functions, other than air defence, that were

(1) AFCENT Ltr. 1221/5/OPS/151, 13 Jul 56.
assigned to the ATAFs. At the same time it would have to be compatible with any proposed organisation required for the air defence task.

Because of the time required to develop definitive solutions from the air defence studies, SHAPE planners saw that it would be necessary to plan the initial integration of the German Air Forces into the 2nd and 4th ATAFs as then organised, or, with relatively minor changes in these organisations. Accordingly, General Schuyler requested that CINCENT study and prepare recommendations for the most effective organisation structure, below AIRCENT level, into which German Air Force integration might begin. For these purposes, CINCENT was informed that 2ATAF and 4ATAF would be retained as international headquarters with both tactical air and air defence responsibilities. German air wings would be integrated as homogeneous units. Aircraft control and reporting units might be integrated in a different manner from that recommended for tactical wings, the COPS noted.

At the same time, "international operational chains of command" had to be provided down to the homogeneous national units insofar as possible. Requirements for national chains of command for administration, logistics and technical direction would be met.

As far as was possible, identical principles and levels of integration would apply to both 2ATAF and 4ATAF. The number of additional international headquarters required would be kept to a minimum.

General Schuyler urged Marshal Juin to consult the national authorities of the nations concerned in conducting this study and in formulating his recommendations, and to consult with SHAPE authorities, as well. (1)

The FRG MOD's own proposals for such organisation were forwarded to SHAPE on 8 September 1956. General Schuyler assured the Minister that a thorough examination of these would take place at SHAPE simultaneously with a review of the comments still anticipated from CINCENT, and that SHAPE planners' comments would be forwarded upon completion of the review. (2)

Pilot-Training Progress. In the meantime, MOD Bonn had indicated that German training plans called for using German facilities as well as US MDAP assistance, and that these facilities would be taxed to the maximum to attain sufficient pilots to provide one pilot for each combat cockpit requirement. This was not an acceptable ratio of pilots to combat aircraft; nor would the current program provide personnel for schools, bases, etc., as well. The

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(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 0905.5.24 OT, German Air Force Integration into NATO, 9 May 56.
(2) SHAPE Ltr. AG 0905.5.24 OT, Organisation of the German AF and its Integration into NATO, 11 Oct 56.
saturation of training facilities precluded the training of the 1150 additional pilots required to permit a minimum acceptable aircrew/aircraft ratio necessary for the GAF units to become operationally effective in the time period specified in MC 48, the document that had resulted from SACEUR's capabilities planning.

Consequently, the FRG MOD was heavily reliant on the combined facilities of both the US and Canada. General Schuyler reminded Canadian authorities of this on 11 August 1956 and indicated the importance of the Canadian Pilot Training Programme. (1)

To a plea from COMAIRCENT that action was needed to relieve the situation as soon as possible, SHAPE responded with information about the reminder General Schuyler had sent to Canadian authorities. The requirement that had been set forth, for 750 pilot training spaces requested by West Germany was agreed.

At the same time, observing that SHAPE did not have knowledge of British-German negotiations on the subject, SHAPE stated that if it became possible "that these negotiations can be influenced in favour of granting the training, SHAPE will exert its influence in this direction." (2)

Status of German Armed Forces - End 1956.

As General Gruenther's tenure of command as SACEUR drew to a close, it was possible to estimate the anticipated strength of German Armed Forces on 1 January 1957; that is, a little more than 8 years from the time the principle of the rearmament of West Germany was first officially supported in the North Atlantic Council, and a little more than 2 years from the time the FRG acceded to WEU, and adhered to the North Atlantic Treaty. The projected status of German Forces was:

Land Forces. Out of a total strength of 20,000 in the Border Police, 16,614 were eligible for transfer to the army. Of these, 9,572 officers and men, or about 58%, elected to transfer. The remaining 7,000 who chose to stay in the Border Police did so for the following reasons: Border Police pay was higher than that of the Army; Army pension legislation was not yet finalised; the availability of homes, family locations, etc. and "natural loyalty to a well organised and well-led unit".

German army buildup plans had been based on an expected 80% enrollment from the Border Police; i.e. about 15,300. The German reply to the ARQ received in SHAPE on 3 July 1956 had shown an estimated strength on 1 January

(1) SHAPE Msg. SH 29727, For Foulkes from Schuyler, 11 Aug 56. (2) SHAPE Ltr. AG 0905.5.24 OT, German Air Force Buildup, 29 Aug 56.
1957 of 77,252. SHAPE planners now saw this reduced by some 3,700, as the result of lower numbers of transfers—although it was anticipated that the deficit might be made up from volunteers.

The probable effect of the reduced transfers from the Border Police was the possible slightly lower initial manning levels of cadres; although the overall buildup plan of the German Army might not be affected. The Border Police would continue to exist and would be brought back to a strength of 20,000.

Air Force: The total strength of the Air Force planned for 1 January 1957 and given in the German Reply to the ARQ was 17,818. No obstacles could be foreseen to the attainment of this total. 16,000 would be Regular volunteers.

Navy: The total strength of the Navy would be 9,965. This number consisted entirely of Regular volunteers and was considered achievable by SHAPE planners. (1)

Residual Problems on German Integration.

Accommodation for Forces. As indicated above, camp construction, training centres and accommodation, progressively became prime problems for German authorities. On 22 September 1956, General Speidel wrote to General Gruenther and referred to this matter and the scheduled buildup, particularly as the subject of the drafting of conscripts related to it. That buildup "will to a great extent depend on the availability -- only temporary if necessary -- of other accommodation facilities" by the spring of 1957, General Speidel said. "In order to achieve this, all barracks installations within the FRG shall have to be utilised to their maximum capacity until the accommodation projects now under construction for the Federal Armed Forces will have been completed".

General Speidel asked SACEUR to support a request that the MOD, Herr Blank, would be making to the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces stationed in the FRG for the full utilisation of the installations in use by Allied Forces, "In order to render possible a release of accommodation for use by the Federal Armed Forces". Wherever such action was necessary, the MOD also would contact political authorities. (2)

General Schuyler responded for General Gruenther and assured General Speidel that "the Allied Commander-in-Chief will be able to comply in varying degrees with your request", subject to operational requirements.

(1) IOCS OT 09055, Estimated Strength of German Armed Forces, 6 Jul 56.
(2) Pers. Ltr. LTG Dr. H. Speidel to Gen. Gruenther, 22 Sep 56.
In this connection, the SHAPE COPS had asked CINCENT, to examine the effect of these releases of barrack accommodation on his operational plans and to inform General Speidel of his decision. (1)

Extracts of General Speidel's appeal were forwarded by General Schuyler to Belgian, French, UK and US authorities, who were also informed of General Schuyler's request to CINCENT, and of SHAPE's consideration of the "important and beneficial effect on the rate of buildup of the German Army" that cooperation with the German request would have. (2)

Conscription. Reports also had reached SACEUR to the effect that the FRG had decided to limit its period of military conscription to 12 months instead of 18 months as had previously been contemplated.

General Gruenther wrote to the Standing Group Liaison Officer on 27 October 1956, recalling that it had long been SHAPE's position that a minimum of 24 months' national service should be the objective for all NATO nations. He recognised that in the case of a number of countries, certain national considerations made it impracticable for them to establish a term longer than 18 months. But the German decision to adopt a conscription period of even shorter duration, he believed, was "a matter of serious concern."

The minimum requirement for defence, and for maintaining NATO's M-Day units at the highest standard of military effectiveness, remained, and SACEUR hoped that the SGLO would be able to express his concern to the national delegates on the AR Committee at an early date. (3)

Conscription and the Paris Accords. A final matter that remained to signal some concern on the part of planners was the development and integration of Federal German forces within the limits established by the Paris Accords.

Some German military spokesman had indicated that the German forces would now be constituted on a basis of three regulars to two conscripts, instead of two regulars to three conscripts, to help offset some of the disadvantages of a 12-month conscription period.

At the same time it was contended by some experts that this increase in regular personnel could be construed as a violation of the Paris Accords, unless it was agreed to by all WEU nations, as provided for by the Treaty. The latter argument was based on Protocol No. II - Article 1 of the London and Paris Agreements which stated that:

(1) Pers. Ltr. AG 0905.5.25 OT, Gen. Schuyler to LTG Speidel, 9 Oct 56.
(2) SHAPE Ltr. AG 0905.5.25 OT, Provision of Barrack Accommodation for the German Army from Allied Forces in Germany, 9 Oct 56.
1. The land and air forces which each of the High Contracting Parties to the present Protocol shall place under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe in peacetime on the mainland of Europe shall not exceed in total strength and number of formations:

   a. for Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, the maxima laid down for peacetime in the Special Agreement annexed to the Treaty on the Establishment of a European Defence Community signed at Paris, on 27th May 1952; and...

2. The number of formations mentioned in paragraph 1 may be brought up to date and adapted as necessary to make them suitable for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, provided that the equivalent fighting capacity and total strengths are not exceeded....

The Special Agreement annexed to the Treaty, referred to above, stated the following percentages for regular contents:

(1) Army (% of total force)
   - Officers 5%
   - NCO's 15%
   - EM 10%
   - Total regulars 30%

(2) Air Force
   - Officers 9%
   - NCO's 31%
   - EM 20%
   - Total regulars 60%

(3) Naval Forces
   - To be fixed at a later date.

The point the experts attempted to make was that so large a change in the percentage of regulars changed the composition of the peacetime strength to the extent that the fighting capacity of the agreed force had been exceeded. (1)

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(1) SHAPE Memo, AG 2100 AR Germany, German Rearmament, 26 Oct 56.
CHAPTER IX

DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING SACEUR's RESPONSIBILITIES AND CAPABILITIES

Training

General. In 1953 SACEUR's Terms of Reference (TOR) stated that his main function in peacetime was "to ensure that, if an emergency occurs, the NATO forces made available by nations for the defence of Western Europe will be organised, equipped, trained and ready to implement agreed war plans...."

The TOR also stated that SACEUR's "peacetime responsibilities shall include: the organisation and training of national units assigned to his command into an effective integrated force...and/ the exercising of these forces in maneuvers after consultation, as appropriate, with the national authorities concerned." SACEUR, also had "direct control over the higher training of all national forces assigned to his command". (1)

The direction of and participation in the training programs of the forces in ACE took various forms. SACEUR's directives set forth the broad principles to be followed and the concepts to be followed to keep up with the strategic plans of ACE. National authorities were urged to give greater impetus to the training of their own forces and the widest possible participation in combined and unified major exercises was encouraged. Exercises and maneuvers were to stress troop direction and actions at all levels. Special exercises with emphasis on staff operations at theatre and command level were to be conducted.

In order to keep SHAPE informed on the progress of training throughout ACE, observers frequently were sent to the MSCs to observe national exercises and routine training. At major combined exercises, senior SHAPE officers (sometimes, SACEUR himself) viewed and critiqued the training activities.

Observer Program. Shortly after assuming command as SACEUR, General Gruenther issued a policy statement on the use of SHAPE observers at exercises and maneuvers. "The purpose of sending SHAPE observers to exercises and maneuvers", he said, "is to evaluate the combat effectiveness of headquarters and forces concerned and to gain specific information concerning certain items connected with the exercises."

(1) MC 22/12(F), Revision of the TOR of SACEUR, 19 Feb 52.

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By the terms of this new directive, OANDT was made responsible for keeping the rest of the staff informed on projected maneuvers and exercises. General Grunenthal directed the attendance of an observer group composed of representatives of LOG, PPANDO, the Chief Signal Officer, and OANDT at "major" exercises. Other observers nominated by interested Deputies, UCOFs or ACOS would be considered for attendance at these exercises. The representative from OANDT was designated as the monitor of such groups. He would also be responsible for preparing a consolidated report from the individual reports prepared by members of the visiting groups.

Normally, SHAPE would not send an observer group to minor exercises or to those exercises which were devoted to a single field such as logistics or signal communications. ACOS's sent a single observer to view some particular aspect of this type of exercise.

In order to achieve the maximum benefit from attendance of SHAPE observers at all types of exercises and maneuvers, reports were necessary. These reports would be submitted to OANDT through appropriate division chiefs. The ACOS OANDT would inform the Chief of Staff of any items considered appropriate and would inform other division chiefs of items in their field of interest which required action on the part of SHAPE.

As a matter of principle, SHAPE Observer Reports on training activities would not be forwarded to national authorities. However, these reports could be used as a basis for bringing to the attention of these officials any situation that required some remedial action by them. (1)

Changes in SACEUR's TOR. In July 1955, as the result of the London and Paris Agreements and the approaching integration of German forces into ACE, SACEUR's TOR were revised. SACEUR still was charged with the organisation and training of his forces into an effective integrated force, to include the exercising of these forces in maneuvers, after consultation, as appropriate, with the national authorities concerned. He also was assigned "direct control over the higher training of all forces assigned to his command"; and his revised TOR reconfirmed that he was to be given "facilities by the nations to inspect the training of those cadre and other forces within the area of ACE earmarked for his command". (2)

(1) AG 2072, SHAPE Staff Directive No. 9, 7 Sep 53.
(2) MC 53(F), Revised TOR for the SACEUR, 7 Jul 55.
To carry out this important training function for SACEUR, OANFD continued to coordinate training and to supervise training inspections throughout ACE. SHAPE supervised and directed the training of major military formations by providing training guidance, observing training, and passing on to appropriate authorities recommendations for improving the state of readiness of the forces. The various exercises and maneuvers conducted under supervision of SACEUR and the MSCs provided an important contribution to training in ACE.

Guidance for Higher Training. Firm plans for training were established by General Gruenther in 1954 in conjunction with the New Approach Planning. SACEUR told the MSCs that, while it was not possible to make precise plans for the future, he would give them the main features of the 1957 training period. There would be the usual SHAPE Command Post Exercise in late April. Full-scale land, sea and air maneuvers would be held in the Northern Command, if possible in conjunction with some of SAzLANT's forces and the Northern elements of Allied Forces Central Europe. AFSOUTH would stage a combined maneuver with AFMED. In the Central Command, priority would be given to testing of the air defence systems of Central Europe including, General Gruenther hoped, that of the United Kingdom. General Gruenther concluded that in 1957 there also would be "a continuing need for theatre-wide air maneuvers to test all aspects of atomic operations." (1)

Exercise Objectives. SHAPE's purpose in all exercises was to achieve the maximum training value for the arm or arms of the service for which an exercise was designed. In some exercises, the objectives would stress the training of air forces, and army and navy roles were tailored to support the attainment of air force objectives. This position was reversed when exercises were designed primarily to train either land or sea forces.

SHAPE's Training Directive No. 18 explained the exercise objectives to the Subordinate Commands in May 1956. Along with other objectives, the general objectives of the SHAPE sponsored Joint Atomic Exercises (JAE) were noted as testing the ASP and the implementation of its SOPs. The JAE normally started with a surprise attack on ACE on D-Day, followed by an Allied air counter-offensive which received the greatest emphasis. SHAPE sponsored JAE had priority and precedence over all other exercises held in ACE. The MSCs were responsible for determining objectives and training appropriate to their requirements in regional exercises, whether they were linked to or totally separate from the JAE. (2)

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1702 OT, The Broad Pattern of Higher Training, 1955 to 1957, 18 Nov 54.
(2) AG 2333 OT, Training Directive No. 18, 7 May 56.
Land Training Areas - in the Central Region. From 1954 onward, the problem of providing land training areas for the forces of ACE was a continuing one. The NAC agreed in 1951 that additional training areas were necessary and provisions had been made in Slice III and IV of the Infrastructure Program for common funding of training areas. But because of the difficulty of obtaining additional land, it had not been possible to provide NATO training areas.

In July 1956, CINCENT noted that the position regarding training areas and facilities was becoming more and more critical. The areas that were available were inadequate even for current needs. In view of future requirements, it was felt that discussions with MOD Germany should be started, and that SHAPE should be responsible for the conduct of these discussions. CINCENT asked SHAPE for guidance on the problem. In January 1957, SHAPE responded, agreeing that responsibility for NATO contact with the West German MOD should be its own, and informed CINCENT that the whole question of training areas was under study.

Intelligence

SACEUR's mission included a requirement that he be completely informed of enemy capabilities and of any developments that might lead to an attack on his command. This requirement, which constituted an intelligence responsibility, could not be adequately fulfilled.

SACEUR had no intelligence-gathering agencies at his disposal and he was entirely dependent on national agencies and the SG for intelligence.

But even SG directives to SACEUR limited his activities. The SG was charged with furnishing the MNCs with intelligence estimates affecting their plans and preparations for war. All requests by the MNCs for estimates of a general nature of enemy capabilities were required to be made to the SG. The SG was responsible for furnishing the MNCs with policy directives in the field of intelligence and with coordinating their intelligence activities.

SACEUR was authorised to call upon national staffs for estimates of the threat to his command and mission, and to ask for factual military and topographical information from these sources. He was authorised to deal directly with national staffs but was required to forward to the SG all summaries of intelligence produced by SHAPE. While the MSCs normally would receive their intelligence directly from SACEUR, in special cases they could receive information directly from national staffs.

(1) AFCENT Ltr. 6102/OPS/154, 23 Jul 56.
(2) SHAPE Ltr. AG 6102/OT, 29 Jan 57.
(3) SG 128/1(F), 31 Mar 53.
Basic NATO Intelligence — The SG 161 series. Until 1954, SG 161 had been revised and republished from time to time without a definite schedule. In 1954, the Council decided that, in order to conform with NATO planning cycles, and to furnish the MNCs with an up-to-date intelligence estimate early in each calendar year, SG 161 would be issued on an orderly cyclic basis as an annual intelligence estimate. This resulted in the SG 161 estimate being drawn up in March and April of each year, and its being issued under a new series number on 1 May to the MNCs. It was revised on a semi-annual basis and included national comments as of 1 November each year. (1)

In actual practice, the annual estimate was developed at the SG by an Ad Hoc Intelligence Committee that based its work on intelligence estimates and information produced and evaluated by the three Standing Group nations, supplemented by data from other sources in NATO. Participation in this estimate by member nations of NATO was provided for in the form of national observers who gathered in Washington during the three-week period in March and April when the Ad Hoc Group met to prepare the new estimate. In some cases, if a member nation did not care to send its own officers, the representatives sent by SHAPE were asked to present that nation's views as well as SHAPE's own at the conference. Thus, the views of the nations and of SHAPE were combined in improving the value and usefulness of the estimates.

SACEUR's requirements still were not met, however. Although the procedures for Annual Estimates continued, generally, as planned, whether or not NATO nations would comply with his requests for data was another matter. It became evident that intelligence information responses varied from nation to nation.

SHAPE's Peacetime Intelligence Requirement. On 8 August 1956, SACEUR again notified the NATO nations (except Iceland) of his requirements. He pointed out that at SHAPE all planning was geared to the concept of warfare now envisaged in MC 48, which assumed that the Soviets would be the aggressor; would direct a significant part of their effort against ACE; would attempt to attain complete surprise; and that nuclear weapons would be employed.

SACEUR made it clear that he was most interested in intelligence information on forces that would be brought to bear against his command, but he did not feel that nations should withhold from him information concerning other areas of planning e.g., pertinent political and economic data also was important.

(1) SG 128/2, 24 Sep 54.
SACEUR described the requirements to be met for drafting and implementing defence plans, and amplified these by presenting a list of "indicators". He also emphasised that, the "Intelligence Division, SHAPE, not only lacks ready access to sources, but has limited research capability, and is therefore completely dependent on finished and evaluated intelligence supplied by the national staffs, the Standing Group and certain national commands in Europe".

Further, SACEUR requested that any indications of the imminence of hostilities be sent to SHAPE by the highest appropriate priority. Cabled reports were requested, if possible, on any significant intelligence that would lose value if delayed. A weekly cabled report was called for on a joint collated estimate of the imminence of hostilities, as were, a weekly written report with joint collated summaries of intelligence value. (1)

SACEUR's Support for Intelligence Requirements. SACEUR was directly interested in the events that took place in USSR, in the Soviet Satellite Nations, and in the Middle East during the period from 19 October 1956 to 20 November 1956. His interest was not matched, however, by a steady flow of intelligence information from the nations on the threatening developments then taking place. Intelligence officers at SHAPE continued to be almost entirely dependent on press and radio reports. SACEUR had no way of judging the validity of these reports.

During developments in Poland and in Hungary in October, for example, newspaper and radio reports told of the massing of Soviet troops on the Polish border. (2) If true, this might have had a decided effect on SACEUR's plans and actions. But SACEUR had no way of verifying the reports, and several days passed before intelligence reports reached SHAPE on this situation from some nations. In this period of intense political and military activity, SHAPE received a total of 118 intelligence messages from NATO nations. Such support varied greatly from nation to nation. Some nations sent one report; others sent 25 or 30.

SHAPE considered that part of this reaction may have developed from a feeling among some NATO nations that the Middle East was outside SACEUR's area of responsibility. At the same time, SHAPE recognised that events in the Middle East, and, especially, Soviet reaction to these events, could have serious implications for, and greatly influence SACEUR's plans and decisions. (3)

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 3505/1 ID, SHAPE Intelligence Peacetime Requirements, 8 Aug 56.
(2) The Author, Mr. Honick, was in the Air Deputies Office at this time and observed the reliance on "press and radio reports".
(3) SHAPE Staff Study, "The Improvement of Intelligence Systems within NATO", Tab B, 13 Dec 56.
Reductions in International Staffs.

In mid-1956, the SG expressed concern that Allied headquarters staffs throughout NATO were growing too large. The SG stated that some NATO nations were finding it difficult to meet the growing costs of maintaining the numerical strength of their assigned forces, and that everything possible had to be done to alleviate this situation. "One way in which concrete evidence of this could be demonstrated", the SG informed SACEUR, "would be to make a significant reduction in the international ceiling of the Staffs under your command". The SG noted that many of the planning tasks that originally required large staffs had been accomplished, and pointed out that while a certain degree of duplication was inevitable in an international staff, the experience the national representatives had gained through working on these staffs should permit some streamlining. SACEUR was given an overall reduction target of 10% of the international ceiling, ans was asked to review the international staff organisation within ACE, accordingly. (1)

SACEUR sent the SG an interim reply to its proposals in November 1956. He noted that the proposal had been coordinated with each of the MSCs and pointed out that the workload in the majority of headquarters had increased considerably during previous years. At SHAPE, for example, the workload had increased one-third since 1953, although the number of personnel still were below the authorised figure for that time.

General Gruenther's response, in fact, was a "reclama" against a 10% reduction, and an effort to demonstrate SHAPE personnel productivity was presented in the form of a graph, which accompanied his reply.

SHAPE concluded that ACE, as a whole, could not absorb, or cope with an overall 10% reduction of its authorised personnel ceiling of 12,153 spaces; and that no personnel reduction could be applied to support troops, for whom the requirement was constantly increasing. A final decision on the degree of a possible personnel reduction had to await further study, particularly because of the matter of the integration of German forces into ACE. (2)

(1) Memo, SG to SACEUR, CS GM4-56, 20 Jun 56.
(2) SHAPE Ltr. AG 4030 PA, International Personnel Ceiling, 5 Nov 56.
CHANGE OF COMMAND CEREMONY

Field Marshal Montgomery  General Gruenther  General Norstad  Admiral Sala

20 November 1956
CHAPTER X

LOGISTICS AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Logistic Responsibilities

A major problem in all attempts to develop an efficient logistic support system for ACE had been the question of defining SACEUR's responsibilities exactly. In December 1950, the NAC agreed to accept two basic principles. The Nations were to be responsible for the logistic support of their own forces, while SACEUR would be responsible for the coordination of the logistic support for the forces under his command. This decision was made to safeguard the sovereignty of the nations by leaving the direction of national logistic systems to the respective national authorities. SACEUR thus was placed in a curious position. He had no powers of direction over the national logistic systems, but at the same time, he was responsible for the overall effectiveness of the logistic support for his forces. He could recommend to the nations that they adopt his logistic plans and he was given certain powers to insure that his recommendations were understood by the nations. (1)

For example, in peacetime, SACEUR had the authority to establish priorities for the buildup of supplies and, after consultation with the nations, could direct the geographic location of stocks. He could supervise the construction of facilities provided by common funding and had the authority to make inspections to ascertain construction progress. Also among his powers was the authority to control, directly, the training of logistical units. To carry out these responsibilities, SACEUR was given direct access to national authorities in charge of logistical systems.

SACEUR could also communicate directly with national chiefs of staff, defence ministers, and heads of governments; and he could delegate authority to the MSCs, who, in turn, had the right to communicate directly with the appropriate national authorities at lower levels. SACEUR's wartime powers and responsibilities represented an extension of his peacetime role —

(1) DC 24/3, 18 Dec 50. See SHAPE History, Vol.I, Sect. III, Chapt. 9. SACEUR's responsibilities were contained in MC 53 (F), his newly revised TOR; and MC 36/1, Division of Responsibilities between NATO and National Commanders.
with certain exceptions. In the case of absolute necessity, for example, he could request national authorities to place at his disposal any part of their logistical resources, including resources not previously made available. (1)

In order that SACEUR could fulfill his logistical responsibilities, an efficient logistical system had to be established and maintained in peacetime - a system capable of rapid expansion in wartime.

The rules and principles within which SACEUR could develop a logistic system created difficulties from the start, and many other problems developed involving sovereignty, financing and flexibility. Although planning had started in 1952, (2) four years of discussion and negotiations were required before the NAC would approve a logistical system for ACE.

The SHAPE Logistics Plan - 1952

On 30 October 1952, SHAPE submitted its Logistics Plan to the SG. The plan dealt with each of the main logistical deficiencies and suggested that it would be necessary to amend SACEUR's Term of Reference in the field of logistics to allow the establishment of an integrated logistics system.

Specific Proposals. The resupply proposals were:

a. To establish specific stock levels in the combat zone and in intermediate depots. Intermediate depot commanders in wartime were to maintain their supply levels by demand upon base sections of interior installations as specified by national authorities.

b. To establish specified reserve stocks in peacetime in base depots in the United Kingdom, France and North Africa for the resupply of common-user type items and permit SACEUR to direct the flow of these items in wartime.

(1) MC 36/1 contained a description of SACEUR's wartime powers and responsibilities. His logistic responsibilities were set out for both the forward (combat) zone and the rear (communication) zone. Just where these zones would be divided in a nuclear war could not be visualised, however. Consequently, SACEUR and the MSCs were given additional powers "in an emergency" -- the definition of an emergency being "an unforeseen combination of circumstances which calls for immediate action". Within ACE, Allied Commanders had the responsibility for deciding what constituted an "emergency". See SGM 225-54, 5 Mar 54.

(2) SHAPE History, Vol. II, Ch. 9.
c. To start this system as recommended without delay and to exercise it in peacetime by passing material through it.

The problems of SACEUR's authority and the relations of allied commanders with national authorities were to be solved by the adoption of three proposals:

a. Nations should designate logistics staff officers and commanders with authority over installations used in the support of those of their national forces assigned to ACE. These officers were to provide the channel for direct coordination and recommendation by allied logistic staff officers and commanders at appropriate levels.

b. Allied commanders should be given authority to order intermediate depot commanders to support operational units of other nations when such units were away from their own LOCs.

c. Change SACEUR's TOR to define precisely the authority of Allied Commanders in logistic matters.

The establishment of centralised reserves would permit the use of short supply items according to projected operational requirements. To simplify the problems that would arise regarding costs, it was suggested that the centralised reserves should either be set up under the control of the producer nations, the US and UK, or stocks owned by individual nations should be turned over to the "host" nation as custodian. In either case, "host" nations should provide depot facilities. (1)

Limited Approval by the Standing Group. The SG gave approval to SHAPE's Plan on 6 May 1953. However, there were reservations which limited the scope of the plan. The SG drew attention to the fact that SHAPE's proposals would have far-reaching financial implications for nations producing common-user items of equipment. It was not possible to take final action on the plan until such time as SHAPE had had the opportunity to discuss in detail the proposed changes with the nations and with ACE subordinate commanders.

(1) SHAPE 1130/52, 30 Oct 52.
The SG considered that SHAPE's proposals might tend to release the nations from the agreed principle that each nation was responsible for the logistical support of its own forces. Until such time as conditions proved the desirability of altering the principle, the SG felt that it must continue to support the concept that the nations controlled the expenditure of their defence budgets and resources, particularly in peacetime. The SHAPE plan indicated that there would be some modifications to this policy and any such modification should be guarded against.

SHAPE had proposed establishing central reserves of common-user items and had also suggested that the producer nations should accept responsibility for these central reserves. In addition to the cost of the initial provision of stocks, there was a risk that the stocks might become obsolete; and the problem of stock control and accounting and security arrangements would add to the producer nations' manpower and financial requirements. The UK had stated that it could not accept this additional financial burden.

Finally, the SG pointed out that logistic resources were being developed in ACE to support forces which were not specifically assigned to NATO. (1) These resources were intermingled with those resources required for the support by forces of the same nations which were committed to NATO. It was necessary, to ensure that the logistical support of a purely national force was neither prejudiced nor compromised by any changes in SACEUR's logistical authority.

Within these limitations, the SG supported any proposed modifications to SACEUR's logistic system. In carrying out the SHAPE proposals, the nations would be requested to take effective steps to provide service support units and reserve stocks and to develop plans for the resupply of forces on a NATO-wide basis.

The Standing Group agreed with SHAPE's statement of the basic need for increased military production and financing of production by the European NATO nations. These measures were necessary because no system, regardless of its merits and theoretical efficiency, could meet the demands placed upon it unless adequate stocks were available.

(1) e.g., The United States Strategic Air Command and the Military Air Transport Service.
Standing Group approval of the proposal that SACEUR's TOR be amended was withheld until discussions had progressed sufficiently to establish very clearly the area and extent of the changes required. Any action on the proposed changes was to be so limited as to deny, except in the case of critical emergency, the power to reallocate or divert national resources without the consent of the appropriate national authorities.

Finally, subject to the comments contained in its memorandum, the SG recommended that the MC approve SHAPE's plan as a basis for further discussion. (1)

Logistics Instructions to MSCs. In August 1953, SHAPE issued revised Logistics Instructions to the MSCs. The purpose of the new Instructions was to outline the basic principles for the development in peace and operation in war of logistic support for the forces of ACE and to delineate the responsibilities of SACEUR and his MSCs in these matters. (2)

Logistics System ACE, 1954.

After receipt of the SG's very limited approval of its 1952 Logistics System, SHAPE started to prepare a system that would overcome the reservations of the SG and the nations and at the same time be "the most effective plan...within the framework" provided by the SG. As the new plan was developed, extended staff conversations with the MODs were held with the view of removing the reservations made to the previous plan.

On 16 February 1954, General Gruenther submitted the revised plan to the SG. He provided them with the views of the "national ministeries of defence as developed in the SHAPE staff conversations" and a staff study on logistical problems developed by SHAPE. SACEUR said that improving ACE's logistical system within existing NATO policy fell "into two distinct parts: first the problem of flexibility keyed to the intermediate support system; second the problem of effective direction and use of available resources, keyed to the base depot systems on which the forces rely for stock replenishment and base maintenance."

This natural division required planning in two parts:

(1) SGM-698-53, 6 May 53.
(2) SHAPE AG 2353.02/P865/53 LOG, Logistics Instructions ACE, 23 Aug 53.
Part I - the provision of flexible procedures between the intermediate support elements of national logistic systems including:

a. The designation of senior logistic officers from each MOD and from each military service, at appropriate levels, to provide authoritative logistic channels for allied commanders.

b. The establishment and training of advance parties within the intermediate support establishments of national logistic systems.

c. The designation of specific base depots and repair and overhaul facilities upon which national intermediate support systems could rely for replenishment, maintenance support and material evacuation.

Part II - the establishment of centrally controlled operational reserve stocks, including the following two points:

a. The establishment in peacetime of centrally controlled operational reserve stocks in the United Kingdom, France and the Mediterranean Area. The planned establishment of these stocks was "designed to permit the integration...of German force components within the structure of the European Defence Community as and when this came into being."

b. The exercise of these stocks by passing through them training ammunition, maintenance spares and other items in time of peace.

SACEUR said that the implementation of Part I fell "within my existing authority and responsibilities as SACEUR under the terms of MC 36 and DC 24/3 (Final)". The MOD's had agreed to the implementation of these measures and they were now being carried out "in detailed arrangements between my major subordinate allied commands and the nations." On Part II of the plan, General Gruenther recommended "that the nations be requested to enter into regional financing agreements for the establishment of centrally controlled operational reserve stocks." (1)

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1228.08/P92/54 LOG, Logistics System ACE, 16 Feb 54.
Approval by Military Representative Committee. The Standing Group considered SACEUR’s plan and approved the proposals subject to certain modifications. The plan, as amended, was forwarded to the Military Representatives Committee for review and approval.

In their report on 9 February 1955, the MRC asked the NAC to note that for the 1st Part of the plan, SACEUR had the necessary powers to proceed with the implementation, and that Part I was approved by the MRC. Regarding the 2nd Part, the establishment, stocking and maintaining in time of peace of the operational reserve depots under centralised control, the MRC stated that the military requirements had not yet been established. In addition, there were many political, financial, economical, and legal implications. Nevertheless, from a military point of view, the MRC stated that the establishment of such a plan was, in principle, desirable. The possibility of establishment depended principally on the satisfactory resolution of the non-military implications and the ability of the nations to make bi- or multi-lateral agreements, on a regional basis and in liaison with other interested NATO nations, to provide stocks.

The MRC asked the Council to:

a. Note that the MRC in principle, approved as militarily desirable Part II of the Plan, as amended by the SG.

b. Invite the interested nations to participate in the operation of Part II of the plan, bearing in mind that any such participation would be determined by the resolution of the non-military problems and would also depend on the satisfactory conclusion of bi and multi-lateral agreements. (I)

Withdrawal of the Logistics Plan. On 22 April 1955, SACEUR informed the SG that "taking into consideration important developments over the past year and in light of the specific views of a number of nations as recently reported to me, I consider that the plan now requires certain modification." He was preparing a revision but felt that the SG should know the following points that the revision would cover:

Part I of the plan required no significant alteration. To a substantial degree it has, in fact, already been implemented.

Part II, however, does require important modifications by reason of the elimination of EDC, of the new concept developed in the Capabilities Plan 1957, and of the current status and planned future developments of national logistic systems.

(1) MRM-15-55.
With respect to AFNORTH, in view of our forward strategy and of the vulnerability in an atomic age of UK ports and sea convoys, I now consider it desirable to plan for stocking reserve supplies in Norway and Denmark, rather than in "base UK".

In AFSOUTH recent studies of the shipping problem in the Mediterranean and of the probable development of a campaign in that area, lead me to conclude that reserve stocks in Italy, Greece and Turkey, should be maintained within the national supply systems of those countries rather than in any central Mediterranean base.

In AFCENT, the abandonment of the EDC concept has eliminated one of the strongest justifications for centrally controlled operational reserves. This factor, plus reservations about increased costs of centrally controlled reserve stocks, have led certain nations to start negotiating bilateral agreements for stocking reserves in national depots.

"In all areas, I feel emphasis should be placed on developing full understanding and agreement as to procedures under which SACEUR may implement his authority to control supply allocations in an emergency. SACEUR's coordination responsibility over national logistic systems available to support his forces will then be based on an accurate reporting system (1) rather than on the establishment of specific base depot complexes under centralised control. "(2)

Revised Plan. On 3 September 1955, SACEUR again submitted a plan for an ACE Logistics System. Part One had not been substantially changed although many of its details "had been deleted as superfluous".

Part Two had been completely revised and now provided for "The establishment of procedures to permit SACEUR to direct the utilisation (including reallocation in an emergency in wartime) of those portions of the logistic support systems made available to him by the appropriate national authorities including the following three points:

- a. The establishment in peacetime of adequate operational reserve stocks in the three major areas of operations and the turnover to the degree practicable of these stocks by effecting resupply to intermediate support elements in time of peace.

- b. The establishment in peacetime of an accurate reporting procedure to provide Allied commanders in peace or wartime with the minimum information essential to the execution of their responsibilities.

(1) Underlinings by authors.
(2) SHAPE Msg. SH 20086, SHAPE Logistic System, 22 Apr 55.
c. The establishment in peacetime of agreed procedures for:

1. Designating logistic resources made available to support SACEUR's forces.

2. Exercising priority control of the expenditure of items in critically short supply.

3. Executing as may be necessary SACEUR's wartime authority (as defined in his terms of reference) for reallocation of logistic resources made available to support assigned forces.

SACEUR emphasised the changed concept in Part II by saying, "I feel that the vital portion of the entire plan will be the development of full understanding and agreement as to the procedures under which I may implement my authority to control reallocations in an emergency in war, based on information gained from an effective reporting system." (1)

Approval by NAC and Implementation. SHAPE's proposals, after many months of discussion, were approved by the North Atlantic Council on 2 July 1956. (2) The MSCs were immediately directed by SACEUR to start using the system. (3)

As promulgated, the System was divided into two parts. Part I dealt with the relationship between the national logistical systems administration and SACEUR; Part II was concerned with SACEUR's direction of the logistical resources made available to him by the nations. (4)

Part I. Each of the two major sections of the "Logistic System" was sub-divided into three "Points", dealing with the procedures to be adopted by SACEUR and the nations. The first Point of Part I was an elaboration of SACEUR's right to communicate directly with persons responsible for the direction of national logistic systems. A senior logistic officer at ministry of defense levels would be designated by each nation for consultation with SACEUR and his major subordinate commanders. Other logistic officers would be appointed at lower levels and it was the special function of these officers to initiate prompt action in response to requests from SACEUR or his representatives.

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 1228/P-521/55 LOG, 3 Sep 55.
(2) CR(56)35, 2 Jul 56.
(3) SHAPE History 1957, p. 175.
(4) When recommending the adoption of the System to the SG, Gen. Gruenther had stated that no attempt had been made to define the words, "made available". He noted that further study was necessary on this subject, and the SG would receive SHAPE's recommendations at a later date. This study was still underway at the end of General Gruenther's tenure as SACEUR.
The situation might arise in wartime in which a large national force would be deployed away from its own territory, and thus away from its own logistic system. Obviously, should this occur, the deployed force would be dependent upon the logistic system of another country. Point two established procedures aimed at avoiding confusion and delay should this situation arise. Specially trained personnel from each of the nations would form "Advance Parties." These "Advance Parties" would move before any planned deployment of the larger force and work with the "host" logistic system. Requests for supplies from the "host" logistic system would be made, and the supplies would be sent direct from the "host" depots to the deployed force depots. After resupply had been established to the deployed force from its own logistic system, a method of reimbursement or replacement-in-kind would operate.

In order to arrive at sound command decisions, commanders would have to know, in peacetime, the capabilities of the various national logistic systems. The third Point in Part I concerned the exchange of information between the nations and ACE commanders on such items as stockpiling, repair facilities and depot capabilities.

Nations were directed to designate depots and indicate the level of stocks held upon which SACEUR's forces could rely in time of war.

Part II. The nature of the mission of Allied Command Europe was such that in any war certain of the nations would have to support expeditionary forces which could not be supplied from their own logistical systems. The second part of the ACE System suggested the procedures which nations should adopt with respect to stocks. It was necessary to resolve the problems raised by the positioning of stocks of one nation in another nation's territory. While the responsibility for making bi-lateral or multi-lateral agreements on positioning rested with the nations involved, it was SACEUR's responsibility to determine the geographic distribution of these stocks. Point one of Part II directed the nations to effect the necessary coordination with SACEUR, and furnish reports to provide him with essential information as to stocks held. Two peacetime reports were established to be submitted through the major subordinate commanders, and the requirement for a third report to be issued in wartime was formulated. SACEUR was given the overall responsibility for deciding what information was needed in these reports.
SACEUR's power over those logistic resources made available to him by the nations included the right to re-allocate supplies from one nation to another. The appropriate allied commanders were empowered to exercise this right during any wartime emergency and the appropriate procedures were established in Point three of Part II. However, a situation might arise when further supplies over and above those made available would be needed. Procedures were established in order that commanders could request nations to furnish these extra supplies. (1)

NATO Common Infrastructure.

In April 1953, the NAC had approved a ceiling of £250m for three years to cover Slices V, VI and VII of the NATO Common Infrastructure. This was to provide support for ACE and ACLANT forces expected to be available by the end of 1957, the planning period that had been foreseen in the Capabilities Studies. (2)

By the time Slice VII had been approved, the £250m allotted was entirely committed, with the exception of a contingency fund to insure completion of Slices II to VII.

On 27 April 1956, the MC requested the NAC to make additional funds available for the financing of future infrastructure projects during the period from 1957 to 1959. The MC recommended the sum of £325m. (3) Because of the relatively peaceful attitude of the Soviet Union and the desire of many nations to reduce their defence appropriations, the MC request was the subject of long and difficult discussion by the Council. (4)

On 14 August 1956, the NAC authorised further infrastructure development for a four-year period, setting a ceiling of £225m. This amount included a 10% contingency fund, and the sum of £19m to finance a portion of the 1956 Program's installations in West Germany. This left a sum of £183.5m which was allocated as follows: SACEUR, £147m; SACLANT, £36.5m. (5)

(1) SHAPE History 1957, pp. 176-177.
(2) A graphic presentation of Infrastructure Programs is given in the annual Infrastructure Data Book (see issue of 29 May 57).
(3) MC 32/6 (F), 27 Apr 56.
(4) MC 32/9 (F), 18 Dec 56.
(5) Msg. SG to SACEUR, STAND 1603, 3 Aug 56.
Slice VIII was developed at a meeting between national delegations and SHAPE (Logistics Division) planners at SHAPE in September 1956. At this meeting SHAPE noted that it had developed a £211m program for a three-year period. However, Slice VIII now had to be planned on a much reduced overall figure of £147m, and SHAPE had had to develop a program with approximately £80m, allowing £67m for the remaining three years. (1)

On 10 October 1956, a revised Slice VIII was submitted to the SG, which made a preliminary report to the MC on 15 November. (2)

SHAPE's Recommended Slice VIII

The total estimate of SACEUR's Slice VIII Program, as submitted to the MC, was £78.635m. That proposal together with SACLANT's program, accounted for approximately 51% of the funds authorised by the Council for the new four-year program.

In accordance with the SG's instructions, SHAPE had included in its proposals only those projects where military necessity could be fully justified. These projects were capable of rapid implementation in the light of the current political situation and the construction and economic capacity of host nations, as well as the availability of land, so that the backlog of approved projects would not be increased. (3)

The projects were: The Forward Scatter System, already approved by the Council; an Integrated Early Warning System; the conversion of a number of tactical airfields already approved under previous Slices, as well as the construction of some new airfields; and the provision of a number of airfields together with adequate support facilities for that part of the West German Air Force.

Financing the Forward Scatter System. The NAC had approved the multi-lateral financing of the Forward Scatter System under the "most expeditious method of provision of NATO funds as will permit the accomplishment of the system." (4)

The Council decided that the System should be included in Slice VIII of Infrastructure. At an NAC meeting on 18 July 1956, approval was given to the allotment of approximately £12.14m. The Infrastructure Committee was instructed to consider a request from SACEUR for £600,000 to be made available to enable studies for detailed planning to start at once. (5)

(1) SHAPE Ltr. AG 6100/8/IP-2/56 PROG, Summary of a Mtg of SHAPE & National Delegates on the VIII Slice Infrastructure Program, 28 Sep 56.
(2) SG 137/52, as summarised in AG 6100/8/IP-12/PROG, 17 Nov 56.
(3) SG Msg. STAND 1603, 3 Aug 56.
(4) MC 59 (Rev) (F), 16 Mar 56.
(5) There were certain reservations to this. See CR(56)40, 21 Jul 56.
Advance Approval for the Early Warning System. The Infrastructure Committee recommended advance approval for the provision of technical equipment needed for the 18 radar stations programmed under Slice VIII. The Committee had screened the relevant part of the Program, the total cost of which was estimated to be £11.85m.

The Committee further stated that advance approval to this portion would enable SHAPE to go ahead with the detailed planning and arrangements for the installation of the system, and asked the NAC for formal approval of it as set forth in MC 61 (F). The Council also was asked to agree that the costs of maintenance and operations of Slice VIII projects would be commonly financed, and that, as other stations were incorporated into the scheme, common financing would be approved in proportion to the degree of NATO use. (1)

Tactical Airfields. SACEUR recommended that £30.615m of Slice VIII be spent for:

a. The construction of four new tactical airfields in Germany.

b. Conversion of six national airfields in Belgium, France and the Netherlands to meet new squadron airfield criteria.

c. Conversion of 54 tactical airfields approved under previous programs to meet new NATO standards.

d. Extension of runways at 32 airfields programmed in previous slices.

e. Provision of wing facilities at three airfields in Germany.

f. Addition of an auxiliary strip at five airfields in Denmark and Norway.

g. Strengthening of pavements at six airfields in Denmark and Turkey.

This program was based on three main needs. First, the support required for air force units expected to be available to ACE at the end of 1958, or, in the case of German units, during the first half of 1959. Second, implementation of previously approved dispersal policies by conversion of previously programmed airfields to new standards and by a limited expansion of the airfield complex in AFCENT. The third was for the extension of runways to exploit the full operational capabilities of new types of aircraft.

(1) CM(56)140.
SHAPE pointed out that with the airfields approved in Slice VIII, the Northern and Southern Regions would have more than attained the minimum airfield complex while the Central Region, even with the additional airfields recommended in the present program, would still be short of the minimum goals.

Because of the difficulties anticipated by the Germans in acquiring the land and of the delays inherent in implementing a construction program of the size of the German program, SHAPE felt that all airfields required for use by the German Air Force through 30 June 1959 should be retained in Slice VIII in order to ensure that the airfields would be completed in time. (1)

MC Approval of Slice VIII. The MC considered that SACEUR's program was sound and that there was a sufficient degree of common usage or NATO interest for all projects to be recommended. The MC therefore recommended approval by the NAC, subject to the following considerations: that continuous screening would be carried out by the International Staff and by the MNC with the aim of establishing the most effective methods of implementing the proposals; that, during this process, the agreed concepts determining the strategy and posture of NATO forces should be borne in mind; and that, should there be any significant changes to the presently estimated force build-up, such changes would be reflected by relevant amendments to these programs. (2)

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(1) MC 60 (F), 9 Jul 56; SHAPE Study 230/56 AG 1223/2PP, 28 Sep 56.
(2) MC 32/9(F), 20 Dec 56.
CHAPTER XI

EPILOGUE

General Gruenther Departs.

On 20 November 1956, following visits to NATO capitals -- visits that had become traditional on the arrival and departure of a Supreme Allied Commander Europe -- and on the day following the award to him of the "Medaille Militaire" at Les Invalides in Paris, by the French Premier, M. Guy Mollet, General Gruenther relinquished his command to General Norstad -- the first non-Army officer designated to occupy that post.

In a colourful ceremony at SHAPE attended by senior diplomatic and military authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the host country, by senior members of his staff, members of SHAPE and their families, and by representatives of the world's press, and, to the accompaniment of the band of the French Garde Republicaine, General Gruenther took the salute, and reviewed an international, interservice military honour guard, representing the forces of the NATO nations.

On the following day, after a formal departure ceremony at Orly Field, SHAPE's first Chief of Staff, and its third Supreme Allied Commander, boarded his aircraft, and departed for his home in the United States and retirement from active military service.

A Summing Up.

From the beginning, the objective of NATO strategy and policy had been the prevention of war through a credible deterrent; the maintenance of confidence by the nations in the ability of the Alliance to provide a valid defence; and the provision of such a defence in the event the deterrent failed.

Both NATO and Soviet military capabilities brought evolutionary changes in NATO's military policies. When a Soviet invasion of Western Europe seemed imminent, Allied forces were at their most inadequate level of strength and organisation. It was this situation that brought about a concerted Allied effort to establish SHAPE and ACE.

During this early period, force goals commensurate with the task at hand were proposed, but remained beyond the means of the nations to achieve. A "forward strategy" was an early goal, but until the latter part of the 1950's
the Rhine-Ijssel was the forward defensive position in the Central Region. Prior to 1954 planning efforts were directed toward developing an Allied capability to prevent an enemy from overrunning Western Europe, with a view toward mounting a counter offensive later. NATO defence planning was in terms of conventional forces and the utmost reliance was placed upon massive American nuclear strikes into Eurasia.

Planning between 1954 and 1957, however, introduced a defence based on certain nuclear-capable forces and, with German participation in NATO, the forward strategy was extended eastward. While during 1957 and 1958, greater emphasis would be placed on development of a NATO deterrent and on reliance on nuclear weapons which, with the approval of the NATO Heads of Government, would be used by forces in NATO Europe.

The concept of "sword and shield" would be further developed and foreseen was the possibility of non-US, NATO nuclear-capable forces, and a NATO IRBM force. Force goals -- which had never been completely met -- were, for the first time, to be more realistically aligned with nations' capabilities.

Consequences of many later developments in Allied Command Europe, all of which followed in one way or another on the intensive studies that had originated with the "New Approach" taken by SHAPE planners during General Gruenther's tenure of command, will be found in succeeding volumes of the SHAPE History.
SUBJECT: Report on Supplementary Planning Project

TO: The Standing Group
    Washington, D.C.

1. The study requested by the Standing Group in SGM-53-54 has now been completed. It consists of two documents:

   a. A Capabilities Plan, with attached staff studies and analyses of campaigns, forces, organisation and doctrine. This study presents the concept of operations for a defence of Western Europe if war should come in mid-1957. The annexes contain supporting material useful for detailed staff study and for general guidance to my Commanders who have been directed to undertake the development of their own plans, based on this concept.

   b. A Report on Program Recommendations, which examines the areas of risk disclosed by the Capabilities Plan and presents recommendations to reduce these risks, without requiring additional major units.

These documents will be hand-carried to Washington by my Chief of Staff and delivered to the Standing Group on 6 July, at the time of the oral presentation.

2. I have discussed this problem with my Commander-in-Chief and have been given their ideas and suggestions. I endorse the general conception of the Plan and the broad conclusions reached. I also support the recommendations of the Program Report as a basis for early action to improve the status of our forces.

Underlying Factors

3. Defence preparation in Europe to be successful must serve a three-fold object. They must provide:

   a. A major deterrent to aggression in Europe.

   b. A forward defence in Europe against all forms of Soviet attack. As a corollary to this aspect it must be emphasised that we could not reasonably expect to win a world war unless we are able to operate freely our air power and our sea power.

   c. A high measure of confidence and security in the cold war.
4. The second of these -- a forward defence on land and a high degree of protection against air and sea attack -- will contribute strongly to the other two. It constitutes, for my command, the mission which is the basis of the present plans and recommendations.

5. The accomplishment of this mission in Europe, in proper coordination with military operations in other areas, must remain an essential element and objective in any total pattern of world-wide military strategy for a war against the Soviet Bloc.

6. With atomic weapons, it lies within our power to provide such an effective defence in Western Europe. These weapons, employed in close conjunction with operations of our forces, make it possible to resist a Soviet attack by means of other than numerical parity with Soviet forces. But this is true only if we have clear ideas on how the major battles can be most effectively fought by land, sea and air, and if we act promptly to put our forces into proper condition to fight.

Major Assumptions

7. The Capabilities Plan has been based on two main assumptions:

   a. That an effective German contribution will be available in 1957.

   b. That atomic and thermonuclear weapons in quantities as indicated will be available to both sides and will be used from the outset.

Should either of these assumptions be invalidated, in whole or in major part, then the entire strategy and concept of operations on which this plan is based would require re-examination.

Over-all Strategy

8. In planning operations in case of war in 1957, primary attention and effort have been focused upon vital objectives -- the things we must do to avoid losing the war quickly, and to put ourselves in a good position to continue it successfully.

9. Within this Command area, our vital tasks are to deny areas to the enemy, to prevent the essential war-making base and our military forces being destroyed through Soviet air attack, and to prevent the destruction at sea or in port of the shipping and naval forces essential to these tasks. To do this, we must withstand the initial enemy assault, hold the enemy attack, and gain the time needed to bring to bear the full NATO potential.
10. It is clear that in atomic war both sides will strive to deliver a large portion of their accumulated stockpiles of nuclear weapons as rapidly and effectively as possible. The plan concentrates on the period of this first major effort — approximately thirty days or less. It is not, however, tied to an assumption that war ends by that time. We must, in fact, be prepared for combat operations of much longer duration, the nature of which will depend upon our assessment of the outcome of the initial atomic exchange. I am initiating studies for the subsequent period.

11. The military operations entailed by our tasks will be joint operations. Forces of all services must work together from the outset in furtherance of the common mission, exploiting to the full our atomic capability, and concentrating their effort on the following major operations.

   a. An immediate all-out attack against the Soviet air and atomic threat, supplemented by passive measures and active defence against that threat. The attack on the enemy air complex is the crucial action.

   b. Implementation throughout SACEUR's area of responsibility of measures of passive protection against air attack and the effective employment of all available means of active air defence.

   c. Progressively tightened interdiction, along main river lines and on sea LOC's, of the Soviet build-up and of their support operations.

   d. Coordinated operations to protect essential Allied shipping and naval forces against losses critical to forward strategy to the civilian war-making base, or to the successful continuation of operations on a sustained basis. The task will be to keep at least minimum essential tonnage moving, and to keep in being the naval forces for this and the other essential operations I have indicated.

   e. A forward strategy in all areas — well forward in West Germany, including Schleswig-Holstein and on, or where possible forward of, Italian and Greek frontiers; west of the Turkish Straits, and well to the east in Eastern Turkey; forward of Narvik in North Norway; and against Soviet attacks on the Danish Islands and Southern Norway, if attempted.
Special Considerations

12. The following major points should be carefully noted in connection with the assessments, plans and recommendations submitted herewith:

a. The Intelligence estimate is based upon the promise that present trends in the Soviet build-up will continue, and that the Soviets have no pre-determined D-day in sight. In basing military preparations on this premise, we must accept the necessity to be alert for any change therein.

b. The need for maximum warning of Soviet attack increases with the growing Soviet atomic capability. Should the Soviets be able to move major reinforcements into forward areas, without the Allies detecting this action and taking appropriate readiness measures, the margin of safety available to the Allies for successfully carrying out the planned operations would be greatly jeopardised. The necessity to place Allied forces in a condition of tactical readiness against atomic attack is clearly shown by these studies.

c. A sustained defence in this area is dependent upon the timely arrival of reinforcements and supplies from overseas. This is primarily the responsibility of SACLANT and CHANCOM and is not covered in the Plan except insofar as the sea communications fall within my area of responsibility.

d. The assessment of nuclear effects, for planning purposes, on both sides, could not include such factors as the impact of radio-active fall-out from high or low bursts, or area saturation from multiple explosions in the restricted area of Eastern Europe in a short period. The direction of prevailing winds is generally in our favour, but this and other weather and technical factors must receive further careful study.

e. The psychological impact of the use of mass destruction weapons on the scale contemplated in this plan has not been evaluated and will require further study. In particular, the problem of refugees and civilian morale in an atomic war must be examined.

f. Effects of the operations of other command, particularly the Strategic Air Command, have been taken into account in this study. The conclusions as to these effects were arrived at by my staff on the basis of advice received through liaison with the commands concerned and should be reviewed and validated.
The estimate of the Soviet nuclear capability against Allied Command Europe intentionally exceeds guidance given by the Standing Group in SGM-56-54, in an effort to err, if at all, on the conservative side, and to insure that conclusions reached will be valid for a considerable time.

h. It has not as yet been practicable to assess the costs of the steps indicated as necessary to adapt our forces and their supporting facilities to conditions of atomic warfare. Costing studies of the various programs resulting from this project should be developed during the course of NATO Annual Review and other program examinations.

The Problem of Air Defence

13. a. For this plan to succeed, an effective air defence must be coupled with it. The vastly increased atomic and thermonuclear destructive power which will be in Soviet hands by 1957 gives new urgency to defence against Soviet attack -- or threat of attack -- directly against the centres of national life and the sources of military power of the NATO nations. In the NATO area of Europe, the ability to defend against such a threat does not exist today -- it must be created by the time this Soviet threat reached great size. The limited capabilities for air defence in this area have been convincingly brought out in the course of this and concurrent studies.

b. Active defence against Soviet atomic attack by air can only be effective if it employs all weapons available -- missiles in addition to interceptors and AA artillery -- and is conducted in close coordination with Allied counter-air operations, and with passive defence preparations. The solution of this problem falls in large part outside the scope of the present project. A study on air defence will be submitted to the Standing Group shortly.

c. Although not within my responsibility, it is also necessary to see that Civil Defence receives proper attention. It is my observation that at present there is no sound Civil Defence organisation in any national territory.

Improvements and Adjustments Required

14. These operations will place new demands on our forces, their support, and their higher command organisations. If we are to have the capability to conduct operations successfully in 1957, many things must be done between now and then. The present project has made an initial
attack on these problems, identifying in broad terms actions to be taken, corrective measures to be applied, risks and weaknesses to be overcome, and attempting to define solutions. It is my intention to initiate additional studies and actions covering these problems.

15. It is testimony to the flexibility of existing types of forces and equipment, that they will permit us to adopt much of the new tactical warfare. Progressively, however, we must develop forces, facilities and equipment adapted to these new doctrines.

16. A tactical conception for the battle, involving in some cases a "yardstick" of operations, has been developed as the basis for the plan and for the assessment of our capability. It also serves to indicate the direction of the desirable changes. Many of the measures required are clearly defined and it remains only to put them into effect. For others, much further study is needed; for these the present study has aimed at providing in concret form a basis for further development.

17. I invite special attention to the following principal groups of measures required:

a. Measures to survive Soviet atomic attack -- especially initial attack -- and continue to operate effectively, are first in importance. These apply to all forces, air, land and sea alike. The enemy's mounting atomic and thermonuclear capabilities force us to disperse on a much wider scale than in past wars. We must readjust our tactical dispositions, improve and augment passive protection and active defence and attain increased unit dispersion and high mobility of our forces and their essential support.

b. There must be no failure in our ability to employ atomic weapons without delay from the outset should hostilities occur. We must improve and protect the ability of our NATO command structure to employ these weapons with utmost effect, even while the enemy attack is in progress. The atomic weapon must, for the Allies, be the principal agent around which the battle is planned and fought.

c. The forces upon which we depend for success in our defence operations must be brought to a high state of training and combat readiness. Operations are dependent upon the maintenance by the nations of effective forces in the magnitude envisaged. The German contribution must be included.
d. The phasing and the organisation of our land forces, in particular, must be brought into accord with our strategical plans, and with the tactical operations to be carried out. D-day forces must be maintained in peacetime ready, with no mobilisation procedure, to conduct the mobile forward battle, seizing and holding the initiative through their capability for rapid action. The immediate follow-up forces must be maintained at peacetime strengths and standards of training enabling them to accomplish their assigned role. Our structure for the replacement of casualties must be reviewed and strengthened. I have already issued instructions to my major subordinate commanders to examine in detail the problems of the organisation, weapons and tactical doctrine we will require for our land forces and to submit to me their views on these matters within the next few months.

e. The conditions of warfare foreseen will require considerable improvement in all types of equipment and major adjustments in signal communications. The main areas of logistic weakness which need improvement are service support forces, transport facilities, P.O.L. distribution facilities and supply and equipment reserves. Stocking in forward areas, the development of new, more mobile logistic techniques, will be essential.

18. For further details of the plans and recommended adjustments, reference should be made to the "Capabilities Plan, 1957, Allied Command Europe" and "Program Recommendations Report".

Conclusions

19. On the basis of planned operations as indicated, and provided necessary steps to adapt our forces to the conditions of atomic warfare are taken, it is my conviction that an effective defence is possible in the European area. Such an assessment is contingent upon the successful completion of measures along the lines I have indicated in paragraphs 17 and 18.

20. Even after such measures are taken, there will remain certain risks and weaknesses in our defence posture. Those of principal importance are indicated in the plan. It is my opinion, however, that those risks and weaknesses do not invalidate my assessment of our general capability to conduct a successful defence in 1957.

22. Certain actions can be taken within the responsibility and authority of this command. These are being initiated.
Recommendations

23. I recommend that the Standing Group:

a. Approve the concept of operations and the general strategy set out in the Capabilities Plan.

b. Note my intention thereafter to utilise the Report on Program Recommendations as a basis for appropriate further action.

ALFRED M. GRUENTHER
General, United States Army

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(French translation will follow as early as possible).
MEMORANDUM FOR: ACOS PP&O

SUBJECT: Conduct of atomic warfare in the Central Europe sector.

1. I have discussed these papers on atomic warfare with the Chief of Staff. He has introduced a new fact of which none of us was aware, that is, he has already discussed this subject in considerable detail with Gen. Carpentier, Gen. Servais and Gen. Bailly.

2. The C/S is well aware of the situation and of the fact that planning has largely come to a standstill because of differences in the interpretation of the instructions that have been given. He has, therefore, already asked the Centre to report to us in detail any points of difficulty that they are having, or any points on which they feel that our current instructions are not clear.

3. For these reasons, the C/S prefers to await the receipt of this letter from the Centre and to take up no further action in this Hq until we have their specific points to reply to.

4. I should be grateful therefore if you would hold the draft letter to the Centre. We may still have to send this letter, or something approximating to it, or we may be able to use the carefully thought out wording of this letter in our reply to points raised by the Centre.

W. L. DAWSON
Air Marshal RAF
Deputy Chief of Staff
Plans & Operations
Sources used in the development of this history were of four types:

- official documents made available by the International Staff, NATO, and by the International Military Staff of the North Atlantic Military Committee, both of which are located at NATO Headquarters, in Brussels;

- documents held in both original and microfilm form in the files of the Central Records Section at SHAPE;

- annual histories of the Major and Principal Subordinate Commands of Allied Command Europe; and,

- original letters, memorandums, messages, briefing papers and other correspondence among the principals concerned dating from the period covered by the volume, and collected by the Historical Section over a twenty-year period.

Of the latter, the more important have been assembled and retained in the Historical Section in a collection entitled, The Gruenther Papers. The remainder, and the original draft text of this volume have been recorded on microfilm, and retained in SHAPE Central Records as an integral part of the ACE Historical Program -- designated Project 12 in the series of SHAPE Microfilm Projects.
**LIST OF GENERAL OFFICERS PARTICIPATING IN CPX-4 GROUP PHOTO**

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<td>11 - SAACLANT</td>
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<td>General FRATTINI, E. G.</td>
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AFSE

30 - COMLAND SOUTHEAST  Lt. Gen.  KENDALL, P. W.  US
31 - COMAIRSOUTH  Lt. Gen.  CRAIGIE, L. C.  US
32 - COMD U.S. 6th FLEET  Vice Adm.  COMBS, T. S.  US
33 - COMD 6 ATAF  Maj. Gen.  EATON, R. E. L.  US

AFMED

34 - CINC AFMED  Admiral  The Earl MOUNTBATTEN of BURMA  UK
35 - COMEDOC  Vice Adm.  SALA, A. P.  FR
36 - COMEDCENT  Admiral  GIROSI, M.  IT
37 - REP COMEDEAST  Rear Adm.  XEPOS  GR
38 - COS COMEDNOREAST  Rear Adm.  ARNOM, R.  TK
39 - REP COMEDSOUEAST  Captain  MASTERMAN, T. N.  UK

NATIONAL CHIEFS OF STAFF OR REPRESENTATIVES:

BELGIUM

40 - CHIEF OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF AND CHAIRMAN OF STAFF COMMITTEE  Lt. Gen.  PIRON, J. B.
41 - CHIEF OF THE AIR GENERAL STAFF  Lt. Gen.  LEBOUTTE, L. J.
42 - CHIEF OF THE NAVAL GENERAL STAFF  Cdre  ROBINS, L. J.

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GREECE
57 - CHIEF OF THE GENERAL AIR STAFF: Air Marshal KELAIDIS, E. P.

ITALY
58 - CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF: General MANCINELLI, G.
59 - CHIEF OF THE ARMY STAFF: General PIZZORNO, G.
60 - CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF: Admiral FERRERI, E.
61 - CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF: General URBANI, A. U.

LUXEMBOURG

THE NETHERLANDS
64 - CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF: Vice Adm. de BOOIJ, A.
65 - REP. OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF: Commodore REIJNIERSE, W. J.

NORWAY
66 - CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STAFF: Lt. Gen. BERG, O.
67 - CINC NORWEGIAN ARMY: Lt. Gen. HANSTEEN, W.
68 - CINC ROYAL NORWEGIAN NAVY: Vice Adm. STORHEILL, S. V.

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Norway

69 - CINC Royal Norwegian Air Force  Lt. Gen. LAMBERTS, F.

Portugal

70 - Chief of the General Staff  Admiral de BETTENCOURT, M. O.

71 - Chief of the Army Staff  General RODRIGUES, J. F. B.

72 - Chief of the Naval Staff  Rear Adm. BRITO, J. G.

73 - Chief of the Air Staff  General MACEDO, C. C.

Turkey

74 - Rep. of the Chief of the General Staff  Lt. Gen. GURKAYNAK, Y.

75 - Ass't Secretary National Defense  Lt. Gen. SELISIK, S.

76 - Chief of Staff Naval Forces  Vice Adm. OZAK, Z.

77 - Commander Air Defense  Maj. Gen. GOKNART, S.

United States

78 - Vice Chief of Staff Army  General BOLTE, C. L.

79 - Chief of Staff Air Force  General TWINING, N. F.

80 - CINCNELM (Representing Chief of Naval Operations)  Admiral CASSADY, J. H.
UNITED STATES

81 - COMD US MARINE CORPS  General  SHEPHERD, L. C.

UNITED KINGDOM

82 - FIRST SEA LORD AND  Admiral of the Fleet  McGRIGOR, Sir Rhoderick R.

83 - CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF  F. M.  HARDING, Sir John

84 - CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF  Air Chief Marshal  DICKSON, Sir William F/