HISTORY

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE

Downgraded to NATO UNCLASSIFIED
IAW SHAPE, 3050/SHGS/91, 7 NOV 91
By Gregory Biddle Date 28 FEB 92
Historical Office, OCOFS, SHAPE

1958

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SHAPE HISTORY

1958
FOREWORD

The History of SHAPE is being prepared in a series of volumes of which the first three cover the periods of command of Generals Eisenhower, Ridgway, and Gruenther. Volume I, for the Eisenhower Command, and Volume II, for the Ridgway Command, have been issued. Volume III, which covers the Gruenther Command, is in draft form.

Beginning with General Norstad's Command (end-1956), the History of SHAPE has been undertaken on a calendar year basis. This volume covers SHAPE History for the year 1958, and is being published simultaneously with the SHAPE History for 1957. Both volumes, which previously existed in draft form, are being issued to make available to members of the SHAPE Staff background information that is often needed for a valid recommendation or decision.

Published volumes of the SHAPE History for 1959 and for the period 1960-1965 have been distributed within the SHAPE Staff and are available through the SHAPE Central Registry and Records Section, PANDA Division, SHAPE.

Comments and suggestions for improvement of SHAPE Histories may be brought to the attention of the Historical Section, Office of the Secretary of the Staff, SHAPE.

R. G. DUPONT
Brigadier General, US AF
Secretary of the Staff

24 August 1967.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>No. of Copies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OSACEUR</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODSACEUR</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCOFS</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAIRDEP</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>SP ASST INTAF</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>OSECY</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACOS PANDA</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>ACOS OPS</td>
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<td>ACOS LOG</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACOS CANDE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH BUDFIN</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH PID</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PANDA (Central Registry)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Section</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total 22**
SHAPE HISTORY 1958

INDEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SACEUR's Mission, Responsibilities and Powers (MC 53, MC 70)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Function of SHAPE</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Events Concerning SHAPE</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACEUR Statement on NATO</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How an Alliance Goes to War</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied Command Europe</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The SHAPE Staff</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER II: FORCES</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC 70</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Review Guidance and MC 70</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Goals Problems</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revision of MC 70</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balanced Collective Forces Concept</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands Tactical Group</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Forces in Schleswig-Holstein</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of German Demarcation Line</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction of Danish Defense Effort</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removal of Certain Forces</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACEUR's Report to SGN on Force Reductions</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Airfields for the German Air Force</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Review 1959</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Compatibility of Ground Divisions in Central Europe</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### CHAPTER III: STRATEGIC PLANNING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atomic Stockpile Program</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACEUR's Progress Reports on IRBM and SAS</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning for Action Short of General War</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Mobile Task Force</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survivability</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Light Weight Strike Fighter</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACEUR's Emergency Defense Plan</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atomic Planning</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criteria for NATO War Headquarters</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE War Headquarters (DEVASTATE)</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACEUR's Alert System</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CHAPTER IV: TRAINING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACE Training Conference - 1958</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACE Readiness Test Program</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important NATO Exercises, 1958</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercises in General</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of Training Resources</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broad Pattern of Higher Training 1960</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Release of Information on NATO Exercises</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of National Military Service</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Training Area Problem</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Naval Training Centre</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgian-Netherlands Training Agreement</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CHAPTER V: COMMAND STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command Structure, Central Europe</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reorganization of CINCENT's Headquarters</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Further Progress toward Establishment of COMNAVBALTAP III</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The German Viewpoint</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCENT's Problems</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstitution of Headquarters TWO ATAF</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement of FOUR ATAF</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacetime Establishment Headquarters CENTAG and NORTHAG</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFMED Representation in JCOC Izmir</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER VI: LOGISTICS AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Introduction .................................................................................................................. 129

SECTION I - LOGISTICS
Logistics Implications of MC 70 ............................................................................. 130
Logistics 1958 ........................................................................................................... 132
CINCENT's Studies .................................................................................................... 135
Logistic Planning Factors Regarding Stockpiles .................................................. 136
SHAPE Guidance Issued ......................................................................................... 136
Logistic Resources .................................................................................................... 137
Shortage of War Reserve POL Stocks in Turkey ................................................... 138
Maps and Charts Policy ............................................................................................ 138

SECTION II - INFRASTRUCTURE
Infrastructure Requirements for the Period 1958-1963 ....................................... 139
Eligibility for Common Funding of Certain Categories of Infrastructure ........... 141
Review of ACE Infrastructure Slices Two through Nine .................................... 141
The SHAPE Review of Infrastructure .................................................................... 142
Improvement in the Rate of Construction of Infrastructure Projects ................. 144
The SHAPE Recommended Ninth Slice (1958) Infrastructure Program ............. 145
The SHAPE Recommended Tenth Slice (1959) Infrastructure Program ............... 146

CHAPTER VII: COMMUNICATIONS
The Forward Scatter System - Progress in 1958 ..................................................... 150
The Forward Scatter System - Increased Costs ....................................................... 151
The Reasons for the Increase in Costs .................................................................... 153
The Forward Scatter System .................................................................................... 154
Electronic Countermeasures Plan for ACE ............................................................ 157
Personnel Problems .................................................................................................. 160
Personnel for LREW System ................................................................................... 161
Personnel for Forward Scatter System .................................................................... 163
Communications Equipment ..................................................................................... 164
Communications Planning for the NIKE Air Defense System ......................... 165
Signals Conferences 1958 ....................................................................................... 166
CHAPTER VIII: INTELLIGENCE

Introduction ................................................................. 167
Basic Intelligence Guidance Background ...................... 168
Briefings and Publications ........................................... 172
SHAPE Intelligence Publications ............................... 172
The Cable ................................................................. 173
The EURPIR .............................................................. 174
Other Publications ....................................................... 174
Exploitation of Early Warning Systems for Intelligence Purposes ...... 175

CHAPTER IX: AIR DEFENSE - 1958

The Integration of the Air Defense of NATO Europe .......... 180
French Objections .......................................................... 192
The 10 December 1958 NAC Meeting ............................. 194
The Belgian Proposal .................................................... 199
SACEUR's Presentation to the Council ......................... 201
Result of the Military Committee and North Atlantic Council Meetings ......................................................... 202
MC 70 and Air Defense .................................................. 203
Early Warning ............................................................. 203
Readiness and Active Air Defense .................................. 204
SACEUR's Tasks ........................................................... 204
The Deployment of Missiles for Air Defense .................. 205
The Forward Missile Belt .............................................. 206
Missile Deployment ....................................................... 208
The Funding of Missile Sites ......................................... 208
The ACE Long-Range Early Warning System - Progress in 1958 ................................................................. 209
Improvements to the Ground Environment of the ACE Air Defense System .............................................. 210
Data Handling System .................................................. 212
Rules for Engagement of Unidentified Aircraft ............... 212
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

General Lauris Norstad, USAF, continued as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, throughout 1958. His second year as SACEUR was marked by the adoption of his strategic concept of a minimum force. The North Atlantic Council approved this concept in April. SACEUR and his staff studied the implications of this approval. Many NATO nations were reluctant to commit funds for the future without a very close examination of the cost of weapons, infrastructure, radar warning systems and other essential requirements.

Although there was no major crisis within NATO - or involving NATO nations comparable to the Suez crisis in 1956, - certain political events caused SACEUR some anxiety.


MC 53, issued in July 1955, had set forth SACEUR's responsibilities. His mission was broadly to maintain peace in Western Europe and, failing that, to defend Western Europe successfully against attack. His peacetime function was to ensure that, if an emergency occurred, the NATO forces made available by nations for the defense of ACE were organized, equipped, trained, supported and ready to implement agreed war plans.

The approval of MC 70 in April 1958, while not fundamentally changing the powers and responsibilities given to SACEUR enlarged and clarified his responsibilities. In peacetime, for example, he was required specifically to prepare and keep up to date a defense plan for the employment
of his forces in war and, in coordination with nations, provide for the most effective positioning of his forces to meet all contingencies. Without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons, it was his responsibility to prevent any incident from expanding, and to maintain or restore the integrity of the NATO area. MC 70 also named SACEUR as the direct coordinating authority for his forces having a nuclear capability.

MC 53 stated that in wartime SACEUR would exercise the full powers of a Supreme Commander and that these powers might be defined in greater detail by the North Atlantic Council after consultation with the Military Committee. MC 70 specifically directed SACEUR in wartime to conduct an immediate nuclear counter-offensive within his area of responsibility. He was to defend his area as far forward as possible with no intent of major withdrawals and with particular attention to protection of the offensive striking power. The weapons, the installations, the guidance systems, the continuation of peacetime tasks and the preservation, protection and maintenance of sea communications, were other specific responsibilities. SACEUR also was directed to support the operations of adjacent NATO Major Commands. Finally, SACEUR was directed to conduct such tasks as were required for the re-organization, re-supply and the accomplishment of necessary military tasks leading to the conclusion of the war.

The Function of SHAPE.

Early in 1958, a staff study was completed at SHAPE for the purpose of clarifying the wartime function of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. The study assumed that there were two main probabilities regarding a possible emergency. The first of these was a deliberate all-out surprise attack. There would be complete strategic surprise with warning a matter of hours, if not minutes. The second envisioned that a state of tension resulting from an incident or incidents in peacetime might - if
mishandled by one side or the other-lead to global war. Given either of these conditions, warning of the need for imminent warlike measures would be generated by a gradual build-up on both sides. Advance warning of the decision by the other side to resort to nuclear warfare would be of extreme importance, but the study concluded that it might not be possible to obtain such a warning. In fact the possibilities of tactical surprise with a warning confined to minutes had to be considered as likely. The study assumed that the probable course of any future war would be:

a. Phase One: All-out nuclear exchange which would not be likely to exceed 30 days;

b. Phase Two: A longer period of indeterminate duration to allow for re-organization and re-supply and the accomplishment of any necessary tasks leading to the conclusion of the war. The stated purpose of the SHAPE study was to provide means whereby SACEUR could carry out his responsibilities and his terms of reference. Therefore the SHAPE staff had to enable SACEUR at all times to receive directives from the Standing Group, and in turn enable him to inform these authorities of the state of operations. SACEUR had to be furnished with the necessary intelligence to develop plans and order operations in accordance with his terms of reference. The SHAPE staff had to be ready at all times to translate these decisions into detailed orders for the control and direction of operations by the forces assigned at any time to SACEUR's command. SHAPE had to be in a position to transmit these orders to the appropriate headquarters and to receive information, and to provide means of liaison with the national agencies of the countries providing forces to SACEUR's command.

The SHAPE study laid down the necessary function of this headquarters in dealing with the most likely cause of an all-out war, i.e., an incident. It was essential that SACEUR be assisted in applying and controlling varying degrees of forces in a situation where public opinion would be in an excitable, delicate state, and where political interference and control
would be very strong.

Assuming that the NATO military concept was based on a deterrent policy which precluded all possibility of a limited war with the Soviet Union, the study concluded that SHAPE had to be capable of immediate application of the maximum nuclear potential. On the other hand, it was unlikely that the end of nuclear exchanges would be the end of the war; therefore, SHAPE had to be capable of gaining an advantage over the enemy by the earliest possible re-organization and re-supply of the remaining strength in NATO forces. In conclusion, the study pointed out that to limit the wartime function of the headquarters simply to having an ability to conduct an all-out nuclear exchange of short duration was an unnecessary risk since SACEUR's terms of reference clearly required other capabilities, including the handling of incidents and the conduct of Phase Two in an all-out war. (1)

Events Concerning SHAPE.

Algiers. During the crisis which caused the downfall of the French Government in mid-1958, SHAPE officers were advised by the Chief of Staff, General Schuyler, to exercise discretion in any discussion of the events taking place. General Norstad was in Malta during the early days of the crisis. He was kept informed of events in Paris, Algiers and elsewhere by a series of messages sent from SHAPE. He was advised not to return early to his headquarters as this action might lead to an increase in the general nervousness then prevalent in France.

The movement of certain elements of the French Mediterranean fleet aroused much speculation. In answer to questions on this activity, SHAPE stated that it had no information, and pointed out that the units in question

(1) PANDP 6120 dtd 23 Jun 58, Staff Study - SACEUR's Wartime Responsibilities.
were earmarked and not assigned naval forces.\(^{(2)}\)

SACEUR was received by General de Gaulle on 24 June at the Hotel Matignon.

**Cyprus.** The Cyprus situation worsened during 1958. A direct result of the widened split between the parties involved was the decision by Greece to withdraw all Greek personnel from Izmir. SACEUR was informed in a message from COMLANDSOUTHEAST on 14 June that all Greek officers and enlisted men, together with civilians and dependents, had been withdrawn from the joint SIXATAF/COMLANDSOUTHEAST headquarters. The movement instructions had been given by General Dovas, Greek Chief of National Defense, directly to Greek officers. No NATO authorities in Izmir, Naples or Paris were consulted prior to the issuance of the instructions. Certain precautionary measures were taken in Izmir by the local authorities, but no disorders occurred. General Norstad immediately informed the Standing Group, and the Secretary General NATO of the situation. He also queried Mr. Caramanlis, MOD Greece. In a letter to General Dovas, SACEUR stated his deep concern over the action of the Greek Government. In messages to CINCSOUTH and CINCAFMED, SACEUR emphasized the "particular sensitivity which might attack to any discussion of the Cyprus issue by a senior NATO officer." SACEUR was concerned since the withdrawal left SHAPE in a difficult position, particularly regarding communications. SHAPE informed all other headquarters and agencies of the need to keep messages to Izmir to a minimum. An additional concern was that in case of emergency, there was obviously a reduced capability of the Izmir headquarters to operate. The Greek military personnel had not returned by the end of the year, but the civilian personnel returned to duty on 19 June.\(^{(3)}\)

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\(^{(2)}\) See SHAPE Msgs: SH 23898, SH 23899 and SH 23901, dtd 26 May 58.  
\(^{(3)}\) See SHAPE Msgs: SH 24352, 24353, 40508, dtd 15 and 26 Jun 58; see also Minutes of COFS Mtg, SEC 2030, dtd 19 Jun 58; The LANDSOUTHEAST 1958 History also refers.
Iraq. Another crisis affecting SHAPE during the year resulted from the overthrow of the Iraq Government during July. General Norstad did not feel at the time that the heightened tensions in the Middle East required any special alert measures for ACE forces, but events were watched to see if any change might warrant such measures. UK and US forces were sent to Jordan and the Lebanon respectively. The US forces sent to the Lebanon were under the command of a non-NATO officer, who received his orders directly from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, the fact that certain forces were taken from his area was of vital concern to SACEUR, and he had to be kept abreast of the situation. (4)

The Standing Group was informed of the effect of these troop movements on the ACE Force Posture. It was pointed out that they would further deplete the already inadequate forces available for the defense of the Central Region. SACEUR expressed the hope that the nations concerned would make "every reasonable effort" to replace their withdrawn forces as rapidly as possible. The Standing Group, in turn, informed the nations that they shared this hope.

SACEUR Statement on NATO.

During a speech to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on 13 January 1958, General Norstad spoke of the mission of the NATO forces, and referred to a responsibility which was not understood everywhere. The NATO forces were deployed not only to fight, if war came, but primarily to prevent war from coming. Since the formation of the Alliance in 1949, the member nations had united their efforts to deter aggression. The NATO forces should not be measured as geographically separate and

(4) See SEC 2030, Minutes COFS Mt held on 17 Jul 58.

The forces involved were: 2 Battle Groups from US 24th Infantry Division, one company from UK 4th Infantry Division, 1 RAF Canberra Squadron and one unit of F86D aircraft from USAFE.
concerned only with Europe, important as a free Europe was, but rather as a central source of strength in the vast apparatus which was termed the deterrent.

The most effective single element in the deterrent continued to be a heavy strategic striking force. SACEUR was convinced that the capacity for decisive retaliation was the factor that weighed most heavily on the West's side. This retaliatory force was made up of forces from all member nations. Although SACEUR believed that the forces in place were capable of what was expected of them, he emphasized that a deterrent strategy depended upon the recognition by any aggressor that he risked his own destruction. NATO must therefore insure that the price of aggression for any enemy remained prohibitively high.

General Norstad then turned to the unique feature of NATO strategy, the Shield. The Shield was made up of land, sea and air forces that were charged with holding the forward line. It served three purposes. The first was to give firm evidence of NATO's will, and its ability, to defend the peoples and territories of the Alliance. Because the posture of the NATO forces was strictly defensive, and because important new weapons justified an approach quite different from what had been possible in the past, the NATO strategy did not contemplate vast and prolonged campaigns of the type that fill history books. The task of the Shield forces was to hold in case of attack until the total weight of the retaliatory power could be brought to bear. Because this interim period would be short, perhaps only weeks, the forces required would be small given the magnitude of the task.

The second function of the Shield was to integrate the several elements of the deterrent. SACEUR pointed out that there was always the possibility of a war arising from a miscalculation or a border incident or a probing operation invited by weakness. The Shield compelled a potential invader to measure the consequences of using force, no matter how limited. He
would be confronted by the Shield in immediate opposition and would know that his use of force would bring down the whole weight of the deterrent, including the heavy strategic power.

If NATO concentrated on weapons systems for general war only, an opportunity might be presented to an aggressor for a series of limited incidents and these could in their cumulative effects be disastrous. It was essential, therefore, that the West have the ability to respond to less-than-ultimate incidents with decisive, but less-than-ultimate means. Thus the third function of the Shield was to give authority to the deterrent and flexibility to the political and military strategy of NATO.

General Norstad concluded his examination of NATO's strategic policy by stating that members of the Alliance were seeking means for broadening and deepening the deterrent and for making it effective in all essential dimensions. In principle, the numerical strength of the Army and Air Forces had increased on the order of about five to one, but when the factor of modern equipment was applied, the effectiveness of these forces had to be multiplied many times.

In the Southern and Northern regions, the goals of manpower and broad organizational structure had been largely achieved. In the Central region, however, there continued to be deficiencies, particularly in the land and air forces of the Shield. The shortage of air forces derived largely from the fact that the German air program, which had started about three years earlier, was only just getting into stride and beginning to produce squadrons. SACEUR then referred to the withdrawal of the French divisions to North Africa which prevented proper deployment of the Central region's forces.

The build-up of the German ground forces would correct the remaining and most important deficiency in the Central region. Germany had planned to deploy twelve divisions. Five were already operative, and two more would, General Norstad stated, be available in April 1958. The remaining
five would be available on a schedule which provided for their fastest reasonable development.

SACEUR concluded his speech with an examination of the decisions taken at the December 1957 Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. These decisions were taken largely to overcome two outstanding weaknesses which existed within the Alliance. Since NATO's military plans had for more than three years contemplated the use of atomic weapons, an atomic capability had been created within Allied Command Europe. Equipped for both ground and air delivery, widely dispersed, manned and operated by US personnel, this capability was substantial. But it suffered from the fact that because both the delivery means and the weapons themselves were restricted to American use, SHAPE could neither distribute them as widely nor integrate them into the Allied Forces as closely as maximum effectiveness required. The second weakness referred to by General Norstad was the implication of discrimination, of seeming to divide the Alliance into first and second class forces. The NATO atomic stockpile, approved at the December meeting of the North Atlantic Council, was planned to eliminate these weaknesses.

The North Atlantic Council had further decided, at its 1957 December meeting, to accept the United States' offer to make available to forces of the Alliance whatever intermediate-range ballistic missiles as were required by defense plans. SACEUR pointed out that the nature of these missiles gave him the widest latitude in planning their distribution. It was not necessary, or even desirable, that they be located in all NATO countries. A decision on the deployment of these missiles would be made only after study of the logistic, training and financial problems involved.

How an Alliance Goes to War.

In view of the increasing concern in many quarters regarding the use of nuclear weapons and the responsibility of the NATO military authorities
regarding this use in any future war, SACEUR's views on the subject were of interest. During a conference with the SHAPE staff prior to the 1957 December North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, General Norstad had stated that the core of the problem was that the employment of nuclear weapons would be a political responsibility. SACEUR believed it unlikely that in the foreseeable future there would be any real delegation to the military of the authority to use nuclear weapons. Indeed, he believed it would be improper to consider any such delegation.

During discussions with the political authorities, SACEUR had always taken a clearly defined line. Pointing out that no nation had ever precisely codified the respective limits of political and military authority in advance of hostilities, SACEUR went to say that in modern times, with the increased destructive power of weapons and the capability of an enemy to attack with little or no warning, the problem took on new meaning. Whilst the most satisfactory answer would be to tell the political authorities that SHAPE had prepared a "book" with all the necessary procedures covering all eventualities, it was unlikely that any such "book" would ever be compiled, even if SACEUR could compile one. The point at issue was essentially a question of the political/military relationship. Each group had to keep the other informed of developments in his respective spheres. SACEUR admitted, however, that this did not meet the "pressing requirements of instantaneous reaction." Turning to more specific needs, SACEUR stated that he desired the SHAPE staff to break down the whole "spectrum of possibilities into a few clear-cut categories of hostile actions." Between the two extremes of an all-out Soviet attack demanding full use of the available power, and limited local actions, it would be necessary to envision two or three categories in between.

In conclusion, SACEUR emphasized to his staff that in any development of ideas on this subject, the real aim would be to promote understanding between the political and military authorities. (5)

Allied Command Europe.

The Commander-in-Chief Northern Europe (CINCNORTH), Lieutenant-General Sir Cecil Stanley Sugden, UK Army, continued in office until 30 June 1958. General Sugden was succeeded by Lieutenant-General Sir Horatius Murray, UK Army. CINCNORTH's overall responsibilities continued as in former years, but he was now actively concerned in problems of command in the Baltic.

General Jean Valluy, French Army, continued as Commander-in-Chief Central Europe (CINCENT). His headquarters at Fontainebleau was occupied with a considerable amount of planning, notably in the fields of air defense and logistics.

In the South, Admiral Robert P. Briscoe, US Navy, remained as Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH). Admiral Sir Charles Lambe, RN, was responsible for the Mediterranean area, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Mediterranean (CINCAFMED).

The SHAPE Staff.

Among the changes which took place within SHAPE, one at least severed a long-term connection with Allied Command Europe. This was the retirement from military service of Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, who had been Deputy Supreme Allied Commander since the activation of SHAPE in 1951. He was succeeded on 20 September by General Sir Richard Gale, UK Army. General Gale had already had some experience in the NATO organization as Commander, Northern Army Group, from 1954 to the beginning of 1957.

The post of Air Deputy to SACEUR, which had been vacant since General Norstad became Supreme Allied Commander in November 1956, was filled by the appointment of General Leon W. Johnson, USAF. General Johnson, formerly US Standing Group Representative, took up office
on 1 May 1958.\(^{(6)}\)

(6) See Chart for Organization of SHAPE Staff; See "Allied Headquarters Strength Report" for a breakdown of the SHAPE Staff by nationality and ranks.
Although ground, sea and air forces available to SACEUR at the beginning of 1958 were still inadequate, their overall strength showed a perceptible improvement as compared with the situation at the beginning of 1957. There had been addition to the M-Day land forces in the Central European area although certain withdrawals were even then taking place. The overall improvement resulted from the maturing of 1956 plans, and from progress made in implementing the recommendations of the 1956 Annual Review. Notably, there had been reinforcement in the fighting potential of NATO through the extensive re-equipment and increasing delivery capability of many of the national air forces, the entry into service of new warships, and the strengthening of ground forces with a close support nuclear capability.

SACEUR had five more divisions assigned him than in the previous year, and twelve more RCTs. He had approximately 20 more major vessels assigned to his naval units, although the aircraft total strength had somewhat decreased. This decrease however, was in the field of air defense aircraft and transport aircraft; the strike and attack aircraft had increased by nearly one hundred. (1)

For complete review of the forces situation in Allied Command Europe during 1957 to include definitions necessary to understanding of SACEUR's forces, see Forces Chapter, 1957 SHAPE History. For detailed recapitulation of Ground and Air Force units assigned, earmarked or earmarked for assignment on Mobilization to SACEUR in 1958 see SHAPE 13/1/57 as amended and SHAPE 13/2/57 as
The mere listing of numerical force goals does not adequately reflect improvements or deficiencies in SACEUR's forces or of their combined value. Preparations were in hand to increase the fighting potential of SACEUR's ground forces through the addition of nuclear weapons to their arsenals. The U.S. continually sought during 1958 to provide initial delivery of modern weapons with potential nuclear capability to other members of the Alliance. Programs for training personnel in handling these weapons had already been arranged. \(^{(2)}\)

SACEUR's air forces faced the considerable difficulties of re-equipping on a large scale as modern types of aircraft were put into service. Nevertheless, there was a distinct improvement in the readiness of aircraft and aircrews in many air forces of the Alliance. These standards were still far short of meeting those required by SACEUR, however, and it was obvious that much further progress would be needed. The dispersal of aircraft in accordance with the requirements of MC 60 was still far from complete in many national air forces, and some which had been assigned to SACEUR were still so concentrated that they presented lucrative potential targets to any enemy air attack.

Much progress had been made during 1957 in modernizing navies. Many older vessels were refitted or replaced, the former by reconstruction.

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\(^{(1)}\) contd. amended. See also SHAPE 50-1/59 and SHAPE 50-2/59. For strength totals of forces assigned, earmarked or earmarked for assignment on mobilization to SACEUR, see SH/73/58. Strength and Composition of Headquarters throughout ACE is reported in detail in Allied Headquarters Strength Report (SG AG 2) issued periodically by SHAPE.

The German 2nd and 5th Armored Division were assigned to NATO (ACE) on 1 January 1958 and the German 1st Mountain Division and an Abu Combat Group assigned on 1 April. See SGM 1-58 for Assignment of Forces to SACEUR 1958.

\(^{(2)}\) See 1958 Strategic Planning Chapter for details of this.
the latter by loans and purchases. However, obsolescence was still a problem. There was a shortage of modern maritime aircraft and D-Day availability of naval units was still far from satisfactory.

**MC 70.**

The 1957 SHAPE Minimum Force Study set forth as exactly as possible the minimum forces which would be required to carry out the strategy planned between 1958-1963. The Standing Group had received the SHAPE study and had informed SHAPE that it intended to combine SHAPE's study with similar works by the other two Major Commanders, SACLANT and CINCHAN, to produce ultimately a document which would be known as MC 70 and which would be the force "Bible" for the next few years. (3)

**Preliminary Studies and Discussions.** It had been planned that the Standing Group would complete the study before the end of 1957, but this was not possible for various reasons. Early in 1958 however, the Standing Group forwarded to SHAPE for comment and review a draft version of MC 70. The principal comment which SHAPE had on this draft document was that it had not adequately explained several functions of the Shield forces, and as a consequence the requirement for these forces was not fully supported. In particular, it failed to state adequately the point stressed in the SHAPE Minimum Force Study: that Shield forces had a very significant role in deterring or countering aggressions short of general war.

A second key point was that the recommendations contained in the paper did not include the approval of country breakdowns by the NAC. SHAPE felt that it was absolutely necessary that the Council approve country breakdowns as guidance, at least through December 1961.

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(3) For full details of SHAPE Minimum Force Study 1958/63, and for the early history of MC 70, see SHAPE History 1957, Strategic Planning Chapter.
One of the major aspects of the draft MC 70 was that a very exact capability was attributed to the Soviet missile forces between 1961 and 1963. SHAPE considered that more emphasis should be placed on the fact that the capability would be a total capability and would not be exact. SHAPE felt also that logistics had not been adequately treated and that SACEUR's tasks should be more clearly defined in MC 70. (4)

On 17 February 1958, General Leon Johnson, then US member of the Standing Group, visited SHAPE specifically to discuss SHAPE's comments on MC 70. It was apparent that the Standing Group and SHAPE did not agree on many of the points raised and only about fifty per cent of SHAPE's suggestions for re-wording were accepted. (5)

When it became apparent that MC 70 was going to be delayed, concern developed within the NATO Council. At its meeting on 13 December 1957 the Council had been told by the Standing Group Chairman that MC 70 would not be ready before the middle of February 1958, and that it had to be approved by the Military Committee before it could be presented to the Council. National authorities would have a chance to see the draft of MC 70 which would have been furnished to members of the Military Committee and they in turn could pass copies to their governments. The Council had decided that MC 70 should be considered by a special session of the Council, with only the Defense Ministers present. The timing of this special Defense Council would be dependent upon the completion of MC 70.

(4) SHAPE/21/58, Comments on MC 70, 9 Feb 58; MCM-19-58, 30 Jan 58. For more detail on negotiations between SHAPE and SGN on re-drafting of MC 70, see report on visit to SGN by SHAPE planners in January 1958, Memorandum, SEC 2030, 31 Jan 58.

(5) SHAPE/SEC/3-58, 19 Feb 58: General Johnson's visit in regard to MC 70. For exact comparison of what SHAPE recommended and what the Standing Group accepted see SHAPE/21/58 against the background of SHAPE/SEC/3-58.
During January 1958, considerable discussion on this matter took place within the Council. Even the essential purpose of the meeting of Defense Ministers came under debate - for example there was some discussion as to whether the Defense Ministers would only take note of MC 70, or whether they would actually approve the document.\(^\text{(6)}\)

In February the Standing Group forwarded to all members of the Military Committee a draft of MC 70, asking them to send their comments forward as soon as possible. A compilation of all views from National Military Authorities was prepared and circulated to the members of the Military Committee. Comments had been received from all nations except Norway. The Standing Group had taken national views and prepared a corrigendum of MC 70 which was distributed separately. Another paper set forth these comments which had not been listed in the corrigendum. These were general comments without suggestions for any specific amendments. The Standing Group believed that countries could raise this latter type of comment at the open session of the Military Committee.\(^\text{(7)}\)

MC 70, Minimum Essential Force Requirements 1958-1963, was considered by the Military Committee on 13-14 March 1958. The Supreme NATO Commanders present were invited to present their views, according to which minimum essential force requirements has been established within their respective commands.

In talking to the Military Committee about MC 70, General Norstad pointed out that on 18 September 1957 he had briefed the Chiefs ofStaff of the NATO countries on his Minimum Force Study 1958-63, and that he would therefore only summarize the highlights and certain points not

\(^{(6)}\) For Detailed information on the nature of these discussions, see Council Records: CR(57)79; CR(58)3; C-R(58)6; C-R(58)8; C-R(58)10, of January and February 1958, and CR(58)5, also,\(\text{ same period}\).

\(^{(7)}\) MCM-31-58, 5 Mar 58, should be examined by anyone interested in detailed development of MC 70.
fully developed in the study which merited attention within the context of MC 70. In his mind, MC 70 represented the third of three critical points on the curve of the development of the military forces of NATO. The first had been the decisions at the Lisbon Conference in 1952, the second had been the approval of MC 48 in 1954. He stated that MC 70 was tangible evidence of a third critical point, in that it dealt with a period for which the basic assumptions were that both sides would have adequate stocks of nuclear weapons and operationally satisfactory delivery means.

General Norstad then presented detail of figures of the D-Day forces at that date, and the goals set for 1963.

Approval by the Military Committee. Following a full discussion by all of the representatives present on the intelligence appreciation of the threat, the NATO strategic concept, the probable nature of a future war involving NATO, the implications of the development of new weapons, and the analysis of force requirements, the Military Committee approved MC 70 as amended and instructed the International Secretariat to forward it to the North Atlantic Council. (8)

Annual Review Guidance and MC 70. The last SHAPE planning guidance which had been issued prior to 1958 was that sent to the nations in April 1957 based on a study of Forces Posture ACE 1960-62. It was out-of-date not only because a full year had elapsed but because the Minimum Forces Study 1958-63 had shown many changes which needed to be made in national forces. SACEUR had counted heavily on basing his guidance on MC 70. Accordingly, as soon as the military committee approved and forwarded MC 70 to the Council, SHAPE sent a draft guidance to the Major Subordinate Commands for later

(8) MCM-39-58, 1 Apr 58.
transmittal to the nations as planning guidance for the 1958 Annual Review. It was intended that this planning guidance be used in establishing firm national force goals for 1959, provisional goals for 1960 and planning goals for 1961.

For land forces the first requisite was successful accomplishment of the recommended training standards, manning and equipment levels. SHAPE recommended that a high priority be placed on the earliest development of integrated ground nuclear capability throughout the shield forces, in line with phased requirements stated in MC 70.

The guidance on naval forces was based on the figures for numbers of ships and aircraft required by MC 70. The major problem facing ACE navies was still the task of providing D-Day ships whose hulls and armaments could be considered fully effective.

The Defense Ministers Meeting. The Defense Ministers of NATO met in Paris on 15 April. When his opportunity came to present his views on MC 70, General Norstad followed generally the same lines he had taken with the Military Committee some weeks before. He stressed the deterrent aspect of his mission, and the fact that he needed adequate shield and strike forces in order to keep this deterrent in being. He dealt also with the possibility of small incidents and attacks which would still require adequate shield forces. Dealing with each of his Major Subordinate Commands in turn, General Norstad showed how the forces required by MC 48 differed from those required by MC 70, and insofar as possible showed the reasons for these differences. (9)

Upon completion of the presentations by the Major Commanders, detailed and searching questions were asked of them by the Defense Ministers. General Norstad was called upon to explain the significance of D-Day

(9) C-VR(58)21, 15 Apr 58, Limited Distribution - Verbatim Record of Defense Ministers' Meeting, 15 Apr 58.
divisions as opposed to 2nd echelon divisions. He pointed out that the D-Day forces were the most important forces, that some of these 30 divisions scheduled for D-Day in Central Europe would not be combat-ready. Under questioning General Norstad pointed out further that the conditions of warfare envisaged in MC 14/2 envisaged a period of organized large scale fighting of comparatively small duration, not likely to exceed 30 days. The first few days would be characterized by intense nuclear exchange. In Phase 2, a longer period of indeterminate duration would allow for reorganization, resupply, and the carrying out of military tasks leading to a conclusion of the war. From a military standpoint, the treatment accorded MC 70 at the highest NATO level left something to be desired. Whereas NATO military authorities had hoped for almost unqualified endorsement of their recommendations for strategy and forces as set forth in MC 70, no firm decision was taken at the Council level by any of the national representatives to adhere completely to these recommendations.

NAC Re-consideration of MC 70. At meetings held in late April, following the meeting of Defense Ministers, the NAC Permanent Representatives considered MC 70. The Secretary General of NATO supported the document, saying that it constituted the basis for long-term military policy of the Alliance. It was understood that the particular problems raised by MC 70 for various nations would be studied and resolved in the context of the Annual Review in 1958 and subsequently. He expressed the hope that the Council would approve the document at an early date for planning purposes, and accept the country breakdowns as guidance for the 1958 Annual Review.

During the early sessions on this subject, most of the national representatives expressed willingness to accept MC 70 for planning purposes, which would not commit any nation to produce specific forces. There was a delay in the negotiations when the Turkish Representative
demanded clarification in the use of terms such as "infiltrations, " 'incursions" and "local hostile actions, " which might change the significance of the phrase "armed attack, " i.e. the heart of Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. It was obvious that the Turkish authorities felt that any attack with arms against Turkey, whether a local incursion or not, should be repelled by the combined forces of the entire Alliance.

NAC Approval of MC 70. On 1 May 1958, the NAC placed a rather nebulous seal of approval on MC 70, after agreeing to add to its decision several paragraphs designed to overcome the Turkish objections. It approved for planning purposes, the total force requirements defined by MC 70 for the period up to the end of 1963; recognized that the currently envisaged force requirements for 1962 and 1963 would require further review in the light of new capabilities of both sides, and that appropriate reviews of subsequent requirements should be taken periodically thereafter; and accepted country breakdowns set out in MC 70 as guidance for the 1958 Annual Review. (10)

Analysis of the Council approval reveals that no single nation had stated definitely that it would raise any particular size or type of force by any particular date. This was still a statement which would be reserved for the Annual Review Process.

At a meeting on 25 June 1959, attended by SACEUR and all of his key planning officers, a discussion took place as to the degree to which future changes should be made to SHAPE's minimum force study, and ultimately to MC 70. It was pointed out that while the force tabs in the SHAPE minimum force study had been brought into line with those of MC 70, the justification for the forces in the minimum force study text had not been changed. SACEUR pointed out that while MC 70 had been accepted in principle by all nations, he had always made it quite clear that the breakdown of force requirements was subject to further and continuing examination, that the force tabs were not sacrosanct, and that SHAPE had to be flexible in its approach to this matter. The task facing SHAPE was to measure what the

(10) C-R(58)28, 28 Apr 58; C-R(58)29, 30 Apr 58; C-R(58)30, 12 May 58; MC 70(Final Decision), 6 May 58.
nations stated they would furnish against standards set in the minimum force study in the light of the latest estimates of the threat, to ensure that requirements established in the force tables were valid. SACEUR did not see any revision of MC 70 at that time. While the internal review of the minimum force study might result in some variation from the present study of requirements, there would certainly be no published change to the minimum force study prior to the December meeting of the North Atlantic Council. General Norstad directed that this review be completed in time for his use at the December 1958 Council meetings. Should it appear that the force contributions anticipated by the nations were falling below a certain level, he would have to decide whether or not to request a modification of his mission. SACEUR stated that he would take up with individual MODs, any serious short-fall in a nation's contribution. He would only do this, however, in those immediate areas where he was convinced of the validity of the requirement established. (11)

Force Goals Problems.

Approval of MC 70 did not put an end to SACEUR's problems on forces. It became apparent, when the results of the 1958 Annual Review were received, that many of the nations were not keeping MC 70 in mind. If the nations did not raise greater forces than those which they stated they intended to raise in replying to the Annual Review, it was obvious that there would be considerable short-falls between the requirements of MC 70 and the actual forces on the ground at specified periods.

In replying to the 1958 Annual Review most countries covered the period from 1959-1961, forecasting what their armed strength would be

(11) Memorandum, sub: Record of a Meeting held by SACEUR to discuss the Work Programme of the Strategic Studies Section, PANDP 1240, 8 Jul 58.
at various times during that period. The nations had been asked to
comeent on the 1963 goals as well, since these were germane to MC 70.
However, most nations limited their specific commitments on forces to
1961. Denmark did not reply beyond 1958; Norway and France did not
reply beyond 1959. It therefore became difficult to evaluate their effec-
tiveness in 1961. The goals for 1961 represented an important stage in
the attainment of the complete defensive posture for 1963 called for by
MC 70. It was possible, by studying the 1961 goals to which the nations
pledged themselves, to have some indication of the position of ACE in 1963.
It was obvious that short-falls would exist between MC 70 requirements
for 1961 and the actual force for 1961. While the entire area of ACE was
examined in a report to the Standing Group in October 1958, it will suffice
to give a single area examination to illustrate the manner in which SHAPE
pointed out to its higher authorities that the nations appeared to be falling
behind the necessary goals.

AFNORTH. Specifically, in the North there was great concern for
Northern Norway, where the ground requirements were not going to be
met. The SHAPE report concluded that in 1959 the nuclear strength capa-
bility in the North would be only about 15% of the MC 70 requirements,
which meant that its strike forces would not be able to perform counter
nuclear tasks in general war. The forces could provide limited nuclear
support to surface forces and a significant degree of non-nuclear support.
Reconnaissance would be critical. The air defense capability of the North
would also be far below that which was required in MC 70. There was
also a grave lack in naval forces to defend Northern Norway. SHAPE
described in some detail the shortages which would exist for each command
unless the nations made a far greater effort than their replies to the 1958
Annual Review indicated.\(^{(12)}\)

\(^{(12)}\) Study Evaluation of MC 70 Short-falls, SHAPE 179/58 AG 2103 PANDP;
also see SH/PP/172/58.
SHAPE's judgement was that since most of the information provided for forces in Northern Command was limited to 1958 and 1959, an evaluation in terms of progress toward 1963 objectives was not very meaningful. In 1959 a beginning would have been made to provide a nuclear delivery strike capability by equipping one Danish FB squadron with F-110s; however, the neutralization of enemy airfields and missile sites continued to depend on forces outside the area. The air defense capability would improve with the introduction of surface to air missile in both Norway and Denmark. Lack of maritime air support in the North, inadequate M-Day ground forces and limited strike forces would make the prevention of an amphibious landing in Northern Norway, or its expulsion if entrenched, very difficult. With warning, the situation could improve to the extent that SACLANT forces would be in position and the ground force posture would have been enhanced by mobilization.

The mission of defending the Baltic Straits could be fulfilled in spite of short-falls and it was considered that the passage through the Straits could still be denied to the enemy. The task of interdicting sea lines of communications in the Baltic probably could not be accomplished. This would mean that the close sea and land defenses of the Baltic Straits would have to withstand a heavier enemy threat than anticipated but the impact of landings might be nullified by nuclear attacks.

AFCENT. Defense in the Center was jeopardized by two overriding deficiencies; lack of an adequate air defense, and lack of sufficient ground forces. Though the air defense capability had improved, primarily because of SAC, the rate of build-up fell critically short of that desired. In 1961 there would not yet be an effective air defense in the Center. Present indications were that the situation would still be unsatisfactory in 1963. This fact, when added to the delay in implementation of those special measures outlined in MC 60, placed in jeopardy the response of the strike forces to a surprise general attack.
Deficiencies in ground forces of M-Day and 1st echelon divisions, undermanning, and possible shortages of nuclear delivery units, could lead to considerable risks in fulfilling the type of forward defense envisioned in MC 70.

AFSOUTH. In Southern Europe the ground forces level for all three nations concerned would be met in 1959, 1961 and 1963. In fact, Turkey indicated that it would have an excess of one and two-thirds M-Day divisions over that originally planned. There would be short-falls in M-Day manning of divisions, however. All countries, in the Southern area, undertook to meet MC 70 requirements for ground nuclear delivery units.

In the Mediterranean, the counter nuclear task could be met in 1961, although shortages would entail a delay in striking lower priority targets. Shortages in escorts and maritime aircraft would lead to a heightened submarine threat at the outbreak of hostilities and a lack of protection for sea lines of communications, in particular those supplying Northern Greece. The deficiencies in 1961 would mean that those submarines based in Albania and the UAR would be able to enter vital areas of the Mediterranean. Most significant during the nuclear phase would be the danger to STRIKFOR SOUTH. The shortage in maritime reconnaissance over the Black Sea would make it more difficult to keep track of the enemy amphibious force should it put to sea. This, therefore, became a direct menace either to the Straits area or elsewhere along the north coast of Turkey. Should the threat develop, it would have to be met by nuclear forces either at base or on the landing - if forces were available.

The risks in the South were therefore primarily to forces operating in the Mediterranean, due to inadequate anti-submarine forces. No recommendations were made at this stage for any changes in plans.

General Norstad took the opportunity presented by the December 1958 meeting of the Council to protest to the national authorities that the nations...
apparently were ignoring MC 70. The recent Soviet threat to Berlin gave added weight to his words when he emphasized the importance of having these forces - particularly shield forces - in being. He told the Council that if he were compelled to judge the submissions made by the nations in the Annual Review, that he would say they were in general unsatisfactory. This was not only because in many instances the forces would be inadequate but because even the action which nations said they would take to provide these inadequate forces was in many cases, as he described it, hesitant and weak. Since each nation already had been told individually by the International Staff of its deficiencies in detail he did not speak of them.

There were other actions and activities not included in the Annual Review which also would have a direct bearing on the overall position for Allied defense in Europe. There was, for example, the introduction of new weapons. The minimum forces which SHAPE advocated were predicated on the availability of new weapons, which were, in fact, already becoming available. General Norstad pointed out that ACE was attempting to integrate these available new weapons into its system, but there had been delays. One of the basic problems was that of financing; SACEUR pointedly referred to SHAPE's recommendation for common financing of new items in order that the weapons might be more readily available. He pointed out the great delay of integration in air defense, urging that nations give it their closest attention. He noted that SHAPE was in a position to move ahead with the Forward Scatter System.

General Norstad concluded his talk to the Council by saying: ".... if we are to achieve a position of strength which is accepted as essential for the security and welfare of our people, the governments of the Alliance, individually and collectively, must clearly understand the problems, that is the military problems, before them and assume the primary responsibility of supporting the achievement of these goals for the Alliance."
"MC 70 with its approval by the Council is your statement of requirements. It is not a treaty; it is not a negotiating paper. It is a statement of what your military experts, as well as those of the Alliance, consider the minimum forces necessary to achieve our necessary aims. We will be strong if you face this responsibility and give clear and positive evidence of your determination to face up to this problem as you have in the past faced up to other major issues." (13)

Revision of MC 70.

On 24 November the Standing Group, in talking with Supreme Commanders, had proposed certain minor revisions that would have to be made to MC 70. The Standing Group believed and General Norstad concurred, that the force requirements for 1959, 1960 and 1961 would continue to be substantially as indicated, except where they might have to be modified because a change in time phasing appeared desirable or a reallocation between nations appeared advisable. New capabilities might necessitate revisions of force requirements for 1962, 1963 and 1964. The Standing Group had in mind publication of a revised MC 70 about 1 March 1959 as a basis for the 1959 Annual Review. On 30 December 1958, DCPANDP addressed the appropriate staff divisions on this matter, stating that he wanted Division Chiefs of these divisions to meet with him in order to identify those items in the current MC 70 which might have to be changed. There might, for example, be changes in the phasing of introduction of new weapons because of holdups in the introduction of countries' new programs. There might be exchange of commitments between nations. As an example, the German-Netherlands exchange of one reconnaissance squadron for one SSM squadron was cited.

(13) Verbatim Record, Meeting of the Council, 17 Dec 58, G-VR(58)63, 17 Dec 58.
The strategic study section of PANDP Division was currently undertaking an analysis of the Soviet missile capability in 1964. They were also preparing a long-range strategic appraisal of the period 1965-1970. Against the background of this 1965-1970 period, the impact of short-falls reported in countries and replies to the Annual Review 1958 would have to be studied by SHAPE. (14)

Balanced Collective Forces Concept.

In preparing the Minimum Force Study 1958-63, SHAPE had placed some emphasis on the principle of balanced collective forces and had begun certain studies to determine how this concept might be applied in Allied Command Europe. This concept was not new since in May 1950 before the creation of SHAPE the North Atlantic Council had passed a resolution urging all members of the Alliance to "concentrate on the creation of balanced collective forces rather than balanced national forces." In actuality, the overall force requirement included in MC 70 represented the best composition for a balanced collective force, while the country breakdown included in MC 70 represented a practical current solution to attain this overall force. On 3 March 1958 the Standing Group forwarded to SHAPE a memorandum which had been directed to the North Atlantic Council on the subject of balanced collective forces. SACEUR was asked to consider the question of balanced collective forces in relation to specific areas and tasks, taking national views into consideration when making his recommendation.

It was obvious that any decision on the implementation of balanced collective forces must be acceptable to the military authorities but that action leading to national implementation would be predominantly political.

(14) For detailed assessment of planning responsibilities as of 30 December 1958, see Memorandum subject "Force Requirements Planning beyond Current MC 70", signed DCPANDP, 30 Dec 58.
It was certainly feasible that progress could be made particularly in limited fields and in local areas. This would require careful study of each area and task, and consideration of such things as geographical features, national characteristics and national commitments. With the introduction of new weapons, the application of this balanced collective force principle could be easily applied in that field.\(^{(15)}\)

On 15 April 1958 SHAPE sent comments to the Standing Group on its paper. SHAPE realized that concrete recommendations which might be agreed between SACEUR and national authorities could evolve only slowly and in piecemeal fashion. Certainly the validity of MC 70 force breakdowns would not be affected by the application of the balanced collective force concept. The SHAPE definition stated: "Balanced collective forces may be defined as forces of one or more service furnished by more than one nation to fulfill the specific mission for which they are designed. The composition of the several national contributions, which need not be balanced in themselves, is determined by allocated roles and missions to member nations, in such a way as to achieve maximum economy of resources and overall military effectiveness. The concept of collective balance also includes the consolidation and integration of the national training and logistics facilities which support these forces." Certain other recommendations for revision of the Standing Group draft study were forwarded by SHAPE.\(^{(16)}\)

The Strategic Studies Section of PANDP Division was assigned the task of preparing a detailed study during 1958 of all aspects of balanced forces plans. On 4 August 1958 SACEUR and his key officers were briefed on the findings of this study, of which a portion was devoted to the

\(^{(15)}\) Memorandum for Secretary General, NATO, sub: "Concept of Balanced Collective Forces," SGM-130-58, 3 Mar 58.
\(^{(16)}\) Message SHAPE to SGN, SHAPTO 1638, 15 Apr 58.
redistribution of tasks and the balancing of force contributions. Following
the briefing, SACEUR expressed his opinion that much more could be done
in balancing ground and naval contributions. He approved a recommen-
dation by the Study Group to reconsider the distribution of the longer-range
ground nuclear delivery systems to achieve greater military effectiveness
and economy.

Force tables had been drawn up to accompany the study but it was
extremely difficult to arrive at a satisfactory set of proposals. General
Norstad pointed out that any application of the concept rested with the
nations but that the impetus must certainly come, at least in the beginning,
from NATO military authorities. Considerable discussion was carried on
concerning the feasibility of producing a proposal for collective balancing
of forces based solely on military factors and aiming at an ideal solution.
SACEUR believed that the most promising area for further study was in
the integration of training resources. He directed that the Major Subor-
dinate Commanders be given the annex to the study dealing with integration
of training resources and that this be discussed with them. General Norstad
directed that examination be made to determine whether it would be possible
to integrate the pilot training for the German Air Force with that of
another country and whether or not it might be feasible to establish NATO
schools below the level of the NATO Defense College to promote instruc-
tion on NATO tactical doctrines and staff procedures.

On 26 May 1958, the Standing Group forwarded to the Military
Committee its final paper on balanced collective forces. This document,
MC 81, was passed to the Military Committee and approved by them on
2 October 1958.\(^{(17)}\)

\(^{(17)}\) The "Study on Balanced Collective Forces" prepared by SHAPE may be
seen in the files of PANDP Div, SHAPE, or of the Adjutant General
Div, SHAPE. See also Memo, sub: "Balanced Collective Forces
Study," PANDP 1240/2, 20 Aug 58; see also MC 81(Final Decision),
3 Oct 58. Detailed information on balanced collective forces studies
may be obtained from these documents.
On 27 October 1958, the Standing Group directed SACEUR to make recommendations under the provisions of MC 81 on the extension of the principle of balanced collective forces in relation to specific regions and tasks, taking national views into consideration. These were sent on 25 November. (18)

SHAPE had already suggested areas for possible logistics consolidation, including movement and transportation, road transport operations, receipt and distribution of POL and specialist military engineering activities. Certain proposals for consolidation of effort with regard to training were discussed with the Major Subordinate Commanders and the national authorities. It was believed that the introduction of new weapons systems would provide future opportunities for further application of the principle of balanced collective forces. (19)

Netherlands Tactical Group.

To enable CINCENT to defend further to the East as intended during the transition period 1958-1959 and to develop later a complete forward strategy, General Valluy had recommended to SACEUR that certain steps should be taken immediately. The Netherlands Land Forces, he believed, in order to reach their battle positions much more quickly than was currently possible and at the same time to improve their combat readiness, should have a significant formation stationed in Germany in peace-time. General Speidel had originated this proposal. CINCENT suggested that a Netherlands Brigade be stationed in Germany at the earliest possible date and that the periods between reliefs of this brigade be fairly short in order to avoid having to provide family quarters in Germany.

(18) SGM-691-58, 27 Oct 58.
CINCENT proposed as the next step that sufficient logistic supplies be built up East of the Rhine/Ijssel line since restrictions on movements and the fact that the combat zone must be self-sufficient in logistics requirements made this necessary. He felt that there should be a total of 15-days stock of supplies disposed on the East of the Rhine. This would entail a logistic organization to bridge the existing gap between the national bases in the communication zone and the Corps rear boundary. SACEUR authorized CINCENT to undertake negotiations with the governments concerned on this matter. (20)

During 1958, negotiations were undertaken by CINCENT with the Governments of Germany and the Netherlands to arrange for the stationing of a Netherlands Tactical Group in Germany during peacetime. Both governments concerned agreed to support this deployment in principle. The obstacle remaining at the end of 1958 was a lack of suitable quarters for stationing this formation in Northern Germany. SACEUR lent his weight to CINCENT's recommendations by writing to Mr. Strauss, MOD Germany, asking his personal assistance in bringing about a solution to this problem. (21)

German Forces in Schleswig-Holstein.

In early July, Danish authorities visited SHAPE and at that time inquired as to the size and composition of German forces which it was planned would take over the defense of Schleswig-Holstein. Until early 1958, defense of this area had been the responsibility of Danish and UK forces, but these had been withdrawn and Germany had been assigned the task. (22)

(20) Msg, SCO IN 46870, CINCENT to SACEUR, 30 Dec 57.
(21) Ltr, SACEUR to MOD Germany, 28 Nov 58, AG 1140 PANDP; AFCE/207/58, 28 Oct 58.
(22) For details of the Schleswig-Holstein problems and the events leading up to assumption of responsibility by Germany, see Chapt. III, 1957 SHAPE History; the effective date of this action was 15 April 1958.
SHAPE notified the Danes that, although only elements of a German infantry division and an armored combat group were presently located in Schleswig-Holstein, it was intended within the next several years to build German ground strength in the area up to a full infantry division, an armored combat group and corps support units. These units would change designation, since it had been agreed with German authorities that they might, during this period, take elements of existing units to form new ones.

The Germans also had tentative plans for establishing and deploying certain air force units in Schleswig-Holstein. This included two squadrons of fighter bombers by the end of 1959, two IDF squadrons by the end of 1960; and two reconnaissance squadrons, possibly equipped with LWSR, by mid-1961.\(^2\)

**Control of German Demarcation Line.**

One of the problems which CINCENT faced was that of controlling and supervising the demarcation line between East and West Germany. Units of the various NATO nations authorized by existing treaties to have forces on the demarcation line, supervised this line. German forces in the area, the PGS, were under control of the Ministry of the Interior of the German Federal Republic. There was by mutual agreement a great deal of coordination between certain PGS units and the US Army Cavalry units located in the same area.

COMLANDCENT recommended on 29 September 1958 that these German units be placed under NATO operational control with the declaration of the simple alert or of the orange alert in the case of counter-surprise measures. This obviously was the first step in the direction of asking for complete authority to have these German units supervise the

\(^2\) Ltr, General Schuyler to Admiral Qvistgaard, 30 Jul 58, SH 114/54.
SHAPE forwarded this letter on surveillance arrangements along the German frontier to the German Minister of Defense, Mr. Strauss. CINCENT was told that SHAPE agreed with his conclusions and that this problem would be kept under active and close review.

Reduction of Danish Defense Effort.

The SHAPE Annual Review visiting team was told in Denmark that to implement the MC 70 forces would require an increase in the annual defense budget of forty percent. However, there was every indication in Denmark that the intention was to decrease the defense budget. Danish military authorities had been directed to submit overall re-organizations plans based upon each of several different budgetary figures. The Danish Parliamentary Defense Committee was expected to make a decision with respect to military support about 1 October.

SHAPE attempted to estimate what the impact of reduced budget support in Denmark might be vis-a-vis the MC 70 Force Tab. It appeared that Army M-Day forces would be reduced from the required three brigade troops to two, and that second echelon forces would be considerably reduced or might even be wiped out entirely. On the air forces, there was little information available but it appeared probable that instead of three ultimately-programmed NIKE battalions, Denmark would have only one, while it was likely to have no surface-to-surface missiles squadrons although one was called for by MC 70. The naval forces would suffer a reduction of 50% in its required destroyer strength and a substantial cut in patrol craft. In short, it appeared that MC 70 would require 40% more funds in Denmark than would be voted.

(24) CINCENT to SACEUR, sub: "Control and Supervision of Demarcation Line between East and West Germany," dtd 29 Sep 58, 1240/JPO/PP/427.
While the re-organization being contemplated was only in the preliminary stage, a trend was apparent which could dangerously weaken NATO's defenses. SACEUR told the Minister of Defense, Denmark, on 5 August that he knew of no change in the war situation or development in the military position of NATO, or of any lessening in the importance of defending Denmark and the Baltic exits which would justify any reduced defense effort. This position was supported by the latest political and intelligence estimates. SACEUR cited MC 70 as proof that national requirements had been determined and that national authorities without exception had agreed to these requirements. Any successful defense against enemy attack in the event of war would require that the military commanders be provided with forces of the general type and magnitude indicated in MC 70. Should Denmark reduce her effort, other nations might feel justified in doing the same thing. Re-organization of Danish defense forces was certainly a commendable measure if improvement of overall capabilities was the goal. However, the gap between the forces required of Denmark in MC 70 and the forces which would be possible under a reduced budget could hardly be spanned by re-organization. SACEUR expressed the hope that before any decision was taken to reduce the defense budget his views on the over-riding importance of meeting MC 70 requirements be placed before the Parliamentary Defense Committee.\(^{(26)}\)

Removal of Certain Forces.

Certain troops were removed from SACEUR's command and others placed on a stand-by status awaiting possible removal during the Middle East crisis of mid-1958.\(^{(27)}\)

The US and UK authorities withdrew forces from SACEUR's area.

\(^{(26)}\) Ltr to MOD Denmark from SACEUR, 5 Aug 58, AG 0720 PROG.
\(^{(27)}\) SHAPE 112/58, 28 Jul 58.
of command and control on an emergency basis during the 1958 Middle
East crisis. On 16 July 1958, US authorities told SACEUR that, in view of
the situation in the Middle East, they found it necessary to move two
airborne battle groups of the US Forces in Germany to Lebanon, using
transport aircraft based in Europe. At the same time the UK, as well
as removing certain F85D aircraft, announced that it was withdrawing an
infantry company and a squadron of Canberra aircraft, again on a tempo-
rary basis. (28)

SACEUR's Report to SGN on Force Reductions.

Under his terms of reference SACEUR was required to report to
the Standing Group an estimate of the military effects of the transfer of
any forces by the nations from his command. Accordingly, on 18 July
1958, he told the Standing Group that neither the temporary transfer of
the UK Canberra squadron nor the removal of eight US aircraft would si-
gnificantly affect his overall air capability in Central Europe. "My atomic
strike plan can in an emergency still be carried out as planned. My air
defense capability, though slightly affected, will remain essentially at
normal level."

With regard to his land forces in Central Europe, the loss of one
infantry company from the UK Forces was not significatn. Of the two US
airborne battle groups, one had already been transferred and the other
was remaining in Germany on a 24-hour alert. However, when the other
group had been transferred the 24th US Division would have been reduced
to 60% of its normal battle group strength.

"In summary," General Norstad told the Standing Group, "the trans-
fer of the forces discussed above, while not in itself of great consequence,

(28) Msg, SH 40521, 16 Jul 58;
     Msg, SH 45022, 16 Jul 58.
will further deplete the already inadequate forces available for defense of the Central Region. In the present period of heightened tensions, resulting from the Middle East situation, any significant reduction in forces in the vital Central area is a serious concern. I hope that the nations concerned will make every reasonable effort to replace forces withdrawn as early as practicable."(29)

These forces were returned to SACEUR's control following the lessening of tension in the Middle East.

**Tactical Airfields for the German Air Force.**

One of the thorniest problems facing SHAPE during 1958 was the matter of developing sufficient tactical airfields to support the expanding German Air Force. It was not a matter of not having enough airfields in Allied Command Europe, but rather of mal-distribution and a political concern in which certain nations were reluctant to move forces purely on military grounds.

There were programmed for construction in the Central Region 133 airfields of which 105 were either completed or under construction. Of the 28 airfields which had been programmed but not started, 24 were located in Germany and four in France. Based on 1958-1963 force goals, the total requirements for tactical airfields were for 106 in 1958 and 105 in 1963. During the interim there would be an additional requirement, fluctuating from year to year, which would reach a peak of 114 airfields in 1961.

With the build-up of the German air force, it became obvious that the Germans must have some place to station their tactical fighter squadrons and wings, and these fields could come only from new construction or from redeployment by moving units of other nations from airfields in

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(29) Msg to Standing Group, SH 40530, 18 Jul 58; SH 112/58, 28 Jul 58.
Germany to airfields elsewhere in the Central Region, particularly in Belgium and the Netherlands, perhaps in France. In other words, although the total number of airfields available in ACE was already in line with MC 70, these airfields were not located in the right places. It would be necessary to build additional airfields in the right places, thus exceeding the numerical total of MC 70 requirements, to move some units, or to curtail the deployment of the German Air Force.

To SACEUR the obvious solution was for the nations occupying airfields in Germany to move to other available fields. To this end, during 1958, certain negotiations were undertaken, but unsuccessfully.

NATO airfields in Germany were occupied by, or assigned to, tactical units of Canada, France, the UK and the US. Canada and France had two fields each, the UK occupied seven and the US occupied nine. Unfortunately for the progress of negotiations to move these forces, the individual nations had made major investments to provide facilities nationally at these NATO airfields. Dependents' quarters, officers' clubs, soldiers' billets, theatres and numerous other installations and improvements had been built at national expense. SHAPE realized that the countries required to redeploy from long-established airfields, fully provided with all facilities, including those nationally financed, would be extremely reluctant to move unless assured that this could be accomplished without cost to their governments, and with assurance of receiving a fully operational airfields in lieu of those relinquished. Germany, on the other hand, would certainly want to be assured that it had received full and proper value for any funds spent to duplicate in kind at other bases facilities received on airfields in Germany, and that the resultant military posture of the German Air Force would be acceptable. Another aspect bearing on the problem was the fact that approximately £31 million in NATO funds could be saved if eleven unstarted airfields in Germany and four in France were cancelled since they could not be developed to meet minimum NATO requirements. The
costs charged to Germany for replacement of national infrastructure given up by the nations whose units were being deployed as well as the cost of moving these units might in great measure be off-set by a reduced requirement for German national infrastructure and by reduction in expenditure for land acquisition and provision of airfields utilities. In early 1958, the SHAPE staff recommended that SACEUR assign action on this matter to CINCENT and that he approach the permanent representatives of the nations concerned to obtain their acceptance in general to movement of their units from German airfields. On 25 February 1958, SACEUR sent to General Valluy a detailed SHAPE study on this problem. He asked him to consider the extent to which requirements could be met by possible deployment of forces to take maximum advantage of available airfields through Central Europe. He asked also that General Valluy discuss this as appropriate with national authorities and send his recommendations to SACEUR. (30)

Representations to SACEUR by MOD Bonn. On 28 March 1958, the Minister of Defense, Germany, reminded SACEUR that the Germans were having difficulty in building up their air forces because of the infrastructure situation and asked for further help on this matter. He said that because of the limited airfields available, German airfields to be activated in 1958 could be deployed but that flying operations would only be possible to a very restricted extent and in some cases not at all. He predicted that the airfield situation would further deteriorate in 1959 since new airfields construction would not be completed in time. (31)

SACEUR's Reply. On 24 April, General Norstad told Mr. Strauss that he fully appreciated this problem, and that he was considering the

(30) Memorandum subject "Tactical Airfields for the German Air Force" to CINCENT, 25 Feb 58, with enclosure "Study on Airfields for GAF," AG 6100 PANDP.
(31) Mr. Strauss, MOD, to SACEUR, 28 Mar 58.
advisability of moving certain non-German units from airfields in Germany to available fields in Belgium, France and the Netherlands. This would permit the vacated fields to be used by German squadrons. In this connection, the nations moving units from Germany would undoubtedly expect to have certain facilities constructed at their new locations and would probably ask compensation for the costs resulting from the move. These anticipated expenses must, however, be compared to the alternative costs to the German government of procuring land and constructing new airfields in Germany. He also said that he had asked General Valluy to investigate all the aspects of this plan and report his findings by the end of April. He anticipated that specific proposals to the nations concerned could be made shortly after that date. General Norstad informed Mr. Strauss that he would be kept fully informed of SHAPE's progress on this matter and would certainly be consulted before any final action was recommended. (32)

It was not until August that SHAPE received a report on the negotiations from General Valluy's Headquarters, a report that revealed unsatisfactory progress in gaining national approval for redistribution of airfields in the Center. AIRCENT which had prepared the brief on the matter, refused to accept responsibility for arranging the handover of Allied airfields in Germany, claiming that these negotiations could be handled only by SACEUR. The AIRCENT Staff held that this was mainly a political and economic matter in which AIRCENT, in fact, was not empowered to negotiate with nations. The views of the various nations concerned and a report of their replies to AIRCENT on the question of moving their forces from Germany were forwarded to SACEUR. All of them were non-committal and certainly not encouraging. The conclusion reached by AIRCENT stated: "AIRCENT wishes to re-iterate the belief that this

(32) Ltr, SACEUR to Mr. Strauss, MOD Germany, 24 Apr 58.
highly intricate matter was approached wrongly and feels that SACEUR himself should bring it before the NATO Council. It will be noted that in not one single answer has a nation even hinted at its views on the political, economic or legal aspects of the proposals. AIRCENT is convinced that no real progress can be made before agreement in principle on all aspects has been reached in the Council. To hold a formal meeting with the nations in the near future is considered premature until the Council has given its blessing."

**MOD Bonn's Reply to SACEUR.** Mr. Strauss, the Minister of Defense, Germany, finally became impatient and on 22 October 1958 sent a strong letter to General Norstad pointing out that the German air force would be short of at least three airfields in 1959 if it was to fulfill the commitments of Germany under the Annual Review. Mr. Strauss said, "I thought this commitment could be accepted since you informed me ... that you would arrange for measures to be taken to eliminate the existing deficiency of airfields for the German air force and I could therefore assume that the requirements for 1959 could thus be covered too." Mr. Strauss continued: "...if the allocation of at least two wing main airfields for the 1959 activation program is not possible thanks to your kind assistance, the activation program of the German Air Force will have to be reduced in 1959 accordingly."(33)

SACEUR was particularly concerned over this letter because recent developments had given him the impression that the German airfield situation was looking up. For example, the German reply to the Annual Review 1958 briefly mentioned some lack of airfields but the detailed report on the air force did not mention any specific short-fall. Again, when the SHAPE visiting teams had called at MOD Bonn early in the year, information was given them which tended to disprove that there would be a lack of airfields before 1960. However, information given AIRCENT's representatives when

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(33) Ltr, MOD Bonn to SACEUR, 22 Oct 58.
they visited Bonn on 17 October did indicate that there would be delay in completion of three major airfields in Germany and that a review of estimates might be necessary. Several airfields had been released to the German Air Force during the year and it seemed that at least one additional field would be made available during 1959. Realizing that it would not be possible in the immediate future to convince nations to move their forces from airfields in Germany, SACEUR decided that an emergency measure was justified if the planned activation rate for the German Air Force was to be kept. This emergency measure involved the authorization by SHAPE for the development of three squadrons per airfield by the German Air Force until German airfield construction could catch up with the agreed plan. Most NATO and national air base facilities were inadequate for the support of three squadrons and to convert to a permanent three-squadron standard would be a risk which should not be taken. However, since the existing forecast indicated a comparatively low strength in flying personnel for German Air Force units during the next few years and there appeared to be no acceptable alternative solution, SHAPE was compelled to accept the risk inherent in a more concentrated deployment.

Annual Review 1959.

In late 1958, indications developed that both SACLANT and CINCHAN wished to cancel the Annual Review Procedure for 1959 although the Standing Group had called a meeting with Supreme Commanders on 24 November to discuss this question. While the SHAPE staff members concerned with the Annual Review felt that certain aspects of AR procedure might well be changed, they believed it essential to SHAPE planning and operations that the basic elements of the Annual Review was the only means available by which NATO secured

(34) Ltr, SACEUR to MOD Bonn, 31 Dec 58, On this same subject see also AAFCE COS 1596/9/9/58, (STSC/901/58 and AIRCENT 181/58). 

42
formal commitments from the nations on their total programs for future years, however conditional or incomplete these commitments might be. This formal procedure had the effect of forcing countries to consider their defense programs from a NATO viewpoint and had therefore, a beneficial effect on the general coordination of the NATO effort.

The Annual Review formed an essential basis for an orderly progression of SHAPE planning and programming. This was especially true since some countries had failed to project their force goals beyond 1959 in the current Annual Review, and experience had shown that many countries changed details of their previous provisional and planning force goals almost yearly. (35)

Neither SACLANT nor CINCHAN raised the issue of cancellation of the 1959 Annual Review at the 24 November meeting of the Standing Group and Major NATO Commanders. SACEUR referred to the Standing Group view that a new document should be prepared carrying force requirements for 1959, 1960 and 1961 in substantially the same form as MC 70, except that modifications would be made to indicate any accepted change in the timing as a result of the current Annual Review, and any re-allocations between countries which might become desirable as a result of this. SACEUR stated that he agreed in general with this procedure. However, the question of 1964, which went beyond the SG proposal would then arise. This entailed projecting MC 70 and revising it on an annual basis with a view to projecting one year forward in order to remain five years ahead. SHAPE believed that before requirements for 1964 were promulgated, consideration should be given to the period, 1965-1970 since this would constitute an important period in which big missiles would be introduced. SACEUR felt therefore that this period should be studied before any firm plans were made for 1964. (36)

(35) Memorandum for the Chief of Staff from ACOS PROG Div, 22 Nov 58, PROG 2100 AR-190/58; SCO IN 07647, 18 Nov 58.
(36) Record of Mtg, SG with Major Commanders, 24 Nov 58, SG 411, 1 Dec 58.
Operational Compatibility of Ground Divisions in Central Europe.

The Heads of Government of the NATO nations had, at their meeting in December 1957 expressed the opinion that "better use of the resources of the Alliance and greater efficiency for its forces will be obtained through a degree of standardization and integration as high as possible..." General Norstad sought all means within his authority to achieve this high degree. One way in which this might be done was by the re-organization and equipment of the ground divisions, particularly in Central Europe, where variations existed in divisional organization of the various nations, even of those who would operate on the same front or sector side-by-side.

Less than two months following the announcement by the Heads of Government, SACEUR addressed himself to CINCENT on this matter, referring to the study which CINCENT ordered in June 1957, which had been sent to SACEUR and the MODs concerned. General Valluy was told: "... in the light of realities of the present situation, the adoption of a fully standardized divisional structure agreed by all nations of Central Europe is probably not an achievable objective, nor does this appear entirely necessary in order to arrive at the efficiency and economy of resources desired. It is, however, highly desirable that the various national divisional organizations not differ so widely from an average "norm" that they are incapable of operating effectively together within our NATO Command and Control system."

SACEUR asked that CINCENT conduct an examination of the various divisional structures within his command to determine the minimum organizational changes which should be adopted in order to insure a high degree of operational compatibility for all of his ground forces. He sent General Valluy a SHAPE document setting forth guidelines for a proposed conference on this subject to be held at Fontainebleau, prior to discussions with national authorities. (37)

(37) Ltr, SHAPE to CINCENT, AG 2160 OT, 13 Feb 58, w/enclosure.
CHAPTER III

STRATEGIC PLANNING

General.

SHAPE, in nearly every aspect of its activities, was a planning headquarters, for the defense of Western Europe. This defense had two major objectives - first by the prevention of war through maintenance of demonstrable and convincing strength and secondly, should war come, to win that war acting upon prepared plans.

The staff agencies directly responsible for this type of planning were the Plans and Policies Division (PANDP), headed by Major General Puget, Fr AF, and in atomic matters only, the Air and Special Operations Division, under Major General Coiner, USAF. The PANDP Division in its planning operated directly under the Deputy Chief of Staff Plans and Policy, Lt. General Foertsch, German Army, while AIROPS, because of the operational aspects of its work, generally was in charge of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Air Marshal Dunlap, RCAF.

The year 1958 did not see any drastic revision of the policies and the higher strategic direction on which SACEUR was required to base his strategic planning. The approval of MC 70 only gave further authority to the policy which SHAPE had already established for itself the previous year in the Minimum Forces Study. MC 14/2, MC 48/2 and the Political Directive remained unchanged during 1958.

Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles.

With the development by the United States and Russia, and by certain other nations on a more limited scale, of medium range guided missiles,
it became apparent that the logical next step in the development of a nuclear weapons delivery system would be the introduction of such missiles as were available to the Western Powers into the arsenal of Allied Command Europe. Scientific developments by 1958 had made possible the provision of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) to SACEUR's forces within the foreseeable future. While manned aircraft would still be depended upon to a large extent, their limitations became increasingly evident as the Soviets developed their missile capabilities. The most important limitations were reaction time, vulnerability to attack, and all-weather capability.

It became necessary that the Western Powers develop and maintain a weapons system which could survive a surprise attack and deal a retaliatory blow to the Soviets. Other types of missiles, particularly surface-to-air missiles and anti-tank missiles, were already being integrated as far as possible into SACEUR's forces.

Any initial Soviet attack would undoubtedly be aimed at neutralizing the West's nuclear capability and air power. The possession of the IRBM would significantly enhance SACEUR's defensive posture as well as his offensive nuclear capability. Missile bases could be much smaller, more dispersed, and infinitely more difficult to locate than manned aircraft installations. Additionally they could be deployed away from large population centers and other facilities and were more readily "hardened." These factors would tend to reduce their vulnerability to attack, and, if attacked, would limit the dangers to non-military activities.

SACEUR would be responsible for determining from the military standpoint the general allocation within his command of IRBM units as they became available. It was known, before study at SHAPE had gone far, that military considerations would not demand a specific deployment pattern within Allied Command Europe.

SACEUR's Views on IRBMs. Shortly before the Heads of Governments met in Paris in December 1957, General Norstad had gathered his key
planning advisors and had expressed to them very frankly his views on the IRBM. He stated that he had taken the initiative with his superiors on the matter of distributing IRBM weapons systems in Europe. He hoped as a result of this that the United States would announce at the forthcoming meeting of Heads of Governments that it would make effective IRBMs available to NATO within a very short time. He felt that the target date for this availability should be the end of 1958, since this would be the earliest time at which SHAPE could solve all the problems which could arise in positioning these weapon systems. General Norstad emphasized the community aspects of any plan of this nature wherein NATO would make a collective decision of accepting or rejecting the concept of placing IRBMs in Western Europe. Should the decision be made by NATO to accept these weapons from the United States, the NATO Council acting on the advice of its military commanders would determine in which countries the weapons systems should be positioned. Thereafter the United States would work out bilaterally the necessary details with the individual nations concerned.

SACEUR's view was that any NATO nations possessing IRBMs would possess them primarily in the interests of NATO and not nationally. Consequently, SACEUR would expect to have greater peacetime control over these weapons than over the normal weapons. He felt that this weapons system should be so organized as to be under his operational control in peacetime as well as in war, either directly or through the Major Subordinate Commanders, and he directed that the SHAPE Staff study the command and control aspect of the IRBMs. As an example, he pointed out that what he wanted was something similar to his de facto control in peacetime over the US 3rd Air Force. The problem of the development was also a matter which he directed the SHAPE Staff to study.

His view was that the primary task of the IRBM would be to thicken coverage of the deep targets in his area of responsibility, targets in Poland for instance. During his talk with US national authorities and the Standing
Group, SACEUR had stated that he would reduce at least one squadron of aircraft called for in the Minimum Force Study totals for each IRBM squadron which was made available in NATO Europe. With the range advantage which the IRBM possessed over the weapons presently available to SACEUR, would undoubtedly come the secondary task of taking on strategic targets in the USSR which were outside his present targeting responsibility. This would require coordination with, and possible adjustment of, the forces structure of external strike forces. Information available to SHAPE indicated that the first IRBM squadron would have 15 missiles, each with five and possibly 15 launches. These missiles would be deployed on the basis of one main and four satellite launching sites. Although the estimated initial cost of a squadron was 35 million US dollars, SACEUR foresaw that at least 15 million dollars must be added to this estimate to cover the cost of infrastructure as well as other attendant expenses. The problem of sites and acquisition of land for these sites would certainly be difficult. It was obvious to him that their construction should be internationally funded. (1)

US Government Proposals on IRBMs. In December 1957 the United States Government placed before the other members of the Alliance a proposal that the US make available IRBM equipment to NATO. This equipment would be handed over to the forces of those nations that required IRBMs for the fulfillment of their NATO mission. The US proposal was that these weapons systems should be made available to the Alliance as distinct from bi-lateral arrangements between the US and interested countries.

SACEUR's Presentation to NAC. The Council called upon General Norstad to give his views of the military requirement for the IRBM, and to indicate what functions it could perform in support of his mission. On 11 December 1957 General Norstad appeared before the Council and defined

(1) Memorandum for Record, "SACEUR's Conference on 9 December Meeting with Standing Group," SHAPE PP278/57, 3 Dec 57.
for them the characteristics of the IRBM. The IRBM being contemplated for transfer to NATO had, at that time, a range of about 1500 miles. This could be extended within limits and the weapon could also be used for lesser ranges. In its present form it was rather a large weapon, 15-20 metres in length, and required rather extensive logistic support. It could be used from two types of base - in one form it was mobile to some extent, although not easily moved, and did not require extensive infrastructure or any great preparation of the site. The IRBM, however, was more effective when used from a hard base, i.e., with the fixed site protected against attack and taking advantage as far as possible of the natural features of the terrain.

With regard to his mission, the IRBM would offer an improved means of dealing with some of the targets whose destruction was essential in case of war. Because of its range the weapon might have some strategic uses. However, General Norstad felt that if NATO accepted the IRBM its primary use should be against those targets which were assigned to SACEUR for destruction. He stated that he considered the acceptance of the IRBM by NATO to be a military necessity for the Alliance.

He did not believe it would be desirable for every NATO country to have these weapons. As a matter of fact, from the military standpoint, it was only necessary for a very few of the NATO nations to be equipped with them. The range and operating characteristics of the IRBM gave it great flexibility and it was not, therefore, necessary for any particular country, for instance Norway, to have these weapons, nor did the weapons system need to be sited in any particular place. General Norstad was very insistent that if NATO accepted these weapons, they would be available to the Alliance as a whole. The forces of the NATO countries equipped with these weapons should be under the control of the NATO military authorities in peace as in war, and unless the deployment of the IRBMs in Europe was accepted by the Alliance as a whole, it would be very difficult to work out a control organization which would meet the countries' desires.
The French representative, referring to General Norstad's remark that weapons systems should remain under NATO control in time of peace, asked whether General Norstad was proposing a departure from the present system of command and control. General Norstad told him that no NATO commander could be very happy about the present relation between the Allied Commands and the forces which would be allocated to them in wartime. To be effective these forces should be more closely under NATO command in peacetime than was the case. In particular the critical forces should be in a position to re-act immediately in an emergency and this would only be possible if there were a larger measure of Allied control in peacetime than hitherto before. He referred to his proposals on integration of air defense, stating that it was only one small aspect of the program of complete control of all forces of NATO commands in peacetime, but for the critical forces it was certainly essential.

In conclusion, General Norstad said that he would like to emphasize that he was ready to accept one or two IRBM squadrons, each having 15 weapons, as soon as they could be made available and he would be prepared to recommend, if desired, which countries should have the first squadrons. (2)

NATO Communique on Nuclear Warhead Stocks. On 19 December 1957, the North Atlantic Council issued a communique which stated that NATO had decided to establish stocks of nuclear warheads and that the nations had agreed that IRBMs would have to be put at the disposal of SACEUR.

Deployment of these stocks and of the missiles, and arrangements for their use, would be decided in conformity with NATO defense plans and in agreement with the countries directly concerned. NATO authorities were told to submit to the Council at an early date recommendations on the introduction of these weapons in the common defense, which would then be considered by the Council in permanent session. (3)

(2) C-R(57)78, 14 Dec 57.
On 4 January 1958 a presentation on the development of the concept for deployment of IRBMs in ACE was given to the Chief of Staff by officers from the SHAPE special planning staff. Among the significant points raised was that operational control of these IRBMs should be exercised by SACEUR direct to the missile squadron. A separate missile command under SACEUR might be necessary to handle the administration and logistics. No conclusion on this point was reached, but further study was directed. The Chief of Staff in his guidance to the planners directed that they take time to prepare a paper on the lines of the presentation which they had made, modifying it as necessary so that there would be no mention of country deployment. (4)

SHAPE Basic Study on IRBMs. The basic SHAPE study on IRBMs was issued on 11 February 1958 (PANDP 6440, 11 Feb 58), and a directive was sent to certain staff divisions listing the subjects which would require detailed analysis in furtherance of the IRBM planning project. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans and Policy, was directed to coordinate all aspects of the work. (5)

The details of a satisfactory control and command of IRBMs, which would be responsive to the requirements and responsibilities of SACEUR, and agreements with nations in which missiles were located had to be developed. A detailed manner of targeting had to be devised for a suitable IRBM target system. Intelligence Division was directed to develop target information covering certain areas of Soviet Russia which were out of range of SACEUR's present strike forces but which would be within range of IRBMs. Other matters involved sitting requirements, training responsibilities and programs, communications requirements, costing, funding and infrastructure, meteorological requirements, security requirements, provision of nuclear warheads for IRBMs, and an over-all cover plan.

(4) Memo for Record. IRBM Presentation to COFS, 4 Jan 58, PANDP 6440, 7 Jan 58.

(5) Memo, DCPANDP to AIROPS, INTEL, PANDP, PROG and others, "Required Staff Action on IRBM Project," 19 Feb 58.
The first staff meeting to consider and coordinate the IRBM project was held at SHAPE on 3 March under the chairmanship of General Gazin, ACOS PANDP. (6)

The first units available for deployment on the Continent would consist of Jupiter IRBMs, the first unit of which was scheduled to be deployed in December 1958. US authorities had established HQ USAFE as the Air Force point of contact for this project. Documents concerning operational training procedures, training plans and personnel skill requirements for the Jupiter were being forwarded to the USNMR at SHAPE and action was under way to release these documents or pertinent extracts to SHAPE and to appropriate national authorities. From the national standpoint, country negotiations would be established through diplomatic and MAAG channels with country representatives. (7)

SHAPE and Franco-US Negotiations. Later in the same month, French authorities were told by SHAPE that General Gazin would serve as the SHAPE coordinator, and procedures for working level discussions among representatives of the US, France and SHAPE regarding IRBMs were outlined. Interested members of the SHAPE staff would be briefed by US technical advisory teams. SHAPE and French military authorities would present to the US advisory teams lists of problems which would be examined by them to determine whether they fell within the diplomatic area as opposed to the military technical area. Those problems in the latter area would be used as a basis for more detailed discussion. At subsequent meetings a SHAPE staff officer would attend as an observer to note those problems of direct concern to SACEUR. Any conclusions and agreements reached at the discussions between representatives of France and the US would not, of course, represent firm commitments until governmental.

(6) PANDP 6440, 3 Mar 58, Memo from ACOS P&P to DCPANDP, "Report of Staff Progress on IRBM Project."
(7) Memo for ACPANDP, PANDP 6440, 5 Mar 58, sub: "IRBMs for NATO."
agreement had been given. However, SHAPE pointed out to French au-
thorities that an agreement should be concluded at the earliest practicable
date in order to further the IRBM program. (8)

US-Turkish Negotiations on IRBMs. SACEUR served as the interme-
diary in the original stages of negotiation between Turkish and US Govern-
ments on the establishment of an Honest John battalion in Turkey to strengthen
the defenses of the Turkish Straits. On 11 March he told the Chief of the
Turkish Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US proposal to place an Honest John
battalion in Turkey, with the equipment being provided under the Military
Assistance Program, and US personnel assisting in the training of a Turkish
unit. Custody and maintenance of nuclear warheads would be in accordance
with the principles of the NATO atomic stockpile program.

On 24 March 1958 SACEUR received confirmation from the Turkish
Government that it accepted both the proposal for the Honest John battalion
and the atomic stockpile in Turkey. He accordingly requested the US
government to make the necessary arrangements in conjunction with the
government of Turkey for carrying out these proposals, stating that SHAPE
and the subordinate headquarters at Naples and Izmir would provide advice
and assistance required and would coordinate the activity with CINCSOUTH's
defense plans. (9) (10)

Progress Report on IRBMs. In its 7 May progress report to the
Standing Group, SHAPE pointed out that SACEUR was still having discussions
with several nations in order to find suitable sites as quickly as possible and
to arrange for the necessary training of personnel to man the IRBM in the
national areas. No final arrangements had been concluded with any nation,
but SHAPE was very hopeful that the necessary detailed agreements and

(8) AG 6440 PANDP, 24 Mar 58, Memo, sub: "IRBMs."
(9) Msg to SEC DEF US from SACEUR, SHAPE 22435, 24 Mar 58.
(10) PANDP 6440, 17 Apr 58, sub: "Required Staff Action on IRBM Project."
arrangements could be completed in time to permit the installation of the IRBM when it became available.\(^{(11)}\)

After noting a progress report on the IRBM project which the SGN had submitted on 13 June, certain members of the Council asked when the IRBMs would be available. It was pointed out that six squadrons, the first to become available in December 1958 and the last expected in December 1960, would be placed in Continental Europe. During this Council meeting the Netherlands Representative expressed hope that SACEUR's current discussions on the IRBM deployment would be successful. He stated however that he had noted that certain governments had indicated refusal to accept the siting of IRBMs on their territory for political reasons. The build-up of political pressure incident to such statements made it difficult for other countries which had not been approached as yet to maintain a favorable public opinion of the acceptance of such weapons on their territory. The Netherlands Representative asked that the Standing Group do everything possible to accelerate current discussions while public opinion was still favorable.\(^{(12)}\)

**IRBM Infrastructure.** The Infrastructure Program for the period 1958-1963 had been considered and the "order of magnitude" cost estimate on the program submitted to the North Atlantic Council. This did not mean, however, that projects within the program would or should be financed by NATO common infrastructure funds. Eligibility for common funding had to be examined in every case by the Council. The urgency for the deployment of IRBM units and the length of time required for planning construction made it necessary, in the opinion of SHAPE officers, that an immediate decision on the method of funding these sites should be reached.

\(^{(11)}\) SHAPTO 1646, 7 May 58, SACEUR to SGN.
\(^{(12)}\) LOSTAN 2519, SGREP to SGN, 13 Jun 58. For additional information of more detailed nature on IRBM Planning in 1958 see also: SH/204/58, 20 Dec 58; MC 79; SGWM-723-58; SH/57/58.
No problem existed in the case of four units which would be located in the UK since arrangements had been made directly between the US and the UK on these four sites. However, a decision was required with respect to units to be located on the Continent scheduled for deployment at six-monthly intervals beginning in December 1958.

Description of the Fixed Facilities Required for IRBMs. The fixed facilities required for IRBM would consist of prepared dispersed sites for the launchers together with the internal communications and operational space needed for their coordination and support. In order to minimize the cost of fixed facilities and also to achieve certain operating advantages, it was proposed that each squadron of IRBMs would be sited near an existing airfield. This would permit use of the shop and administrative facilities already in being and would correspondingly reduce construction requirements. The comments which follow are based upon that concept. A rough estimate of cost for all fixed facilities for one squadron, not "hardened," was $2 million.

Each IRBM squadron would require one "parent" launcher site and four "satellite" launcher sites. The parent site would consist of emplacements and pads for three launchers, a receipt and inspection building for incoming missiles, a building for LOX equipment, an assembly and checkout building, a "ready" building, three environmental shelter buildings, and an operational building from which the firing of missiles from all five sites could be controlled. Included would be the provision of facilities for the operation and maintenance of external and internal communications and cryptographic security. In addition there would be required the appropriate connecting roads, security fencing and utilities.

The "satellite" launcher sites would consist of emplacements and pads for three launchers, an environmental shelter building for each emplacement, communications and cryptographic facilities, and "ready room" space for operating personnel. Connecting roads and communications
between parent and satellite sites would be needed. Generally speaking, it was to be expected that the parent site would be located about 25 miles from the associated air base and that the satellite sites would be 10 to 20 miles from the parent site. Each launcher site in the squadron, whether parent or satellite, would require about 60 acres of land including estimated safety zones in accordance with existing national regulations.

To accomplish the desired control by SACEUR, and to provide for essential external command, liaison, administrative and logistic functions, adequate and reliable communication facilities (radio and landline) had to be provided. Infrastructure requirements included the construction of extensions to the national PTT systems to squadron sites, and the provision of telephone, teletype, and cryptographic equipment at each terminal. (13)

Since these comprised fixed facilities and since the IRBM was in direct line of succession from conventional bombers, SHAPE considered that facilities for IRBMs should be eligible for common funding just as were bomber bases. They were certainly "essential to the implementation of NATO operational plans."

It would not be claimed that IRBMs would be "commonly used." However, since these IRBMs were being accepted by NATO to increase its deterrent and nuclear retaliatory capability for the common defense, command and control would have to be vested in the NATO military organization. The relation facilities would therefore only be used for NATO common purposes.

"Common interest" in these facilities could clearly be demonstrated. Apart from their deterrent role, the function of IRBMs would be to attack distant targets of primary importance to overall NATO objectives, notably the enemy's air and nuclear capability.

SACEUR's control was an essential principle to be safeguarded. It implied not only operational control, but also control of siting which must accord with overall NATO - rather than purely national - defense plans.

(13) SHAPE/56/58, Encl 1 to SHAPE ltr AG 6100/IP-46/58 PROC 16 May 58.
It was difficult to see how this principle could effectively be safeguarded, if sites were provided by means other than common funding.\(^{(14)}\)

By this time also, SHAPE had nearly completed assembling the criteria and standards for the Jupiter type IRBM and was almost as far along with those for the Thor type. Target data on the IRBM had been received from the Standing Group nations. This information, while by no means exhaustive, represented all that these countries were prepared to release to NATO at the time. Progress had also been made on the study of general policies and principles pertaining to communications for the IRBM project, and the atomic stockpile. SHAPE was thus by mid-year, well within its schedule and in a position to answer any questions on this from national authorities.\(^{(15)}\)

**Continuing Political Negotiations on IRBMs.** There had been considerable expectation on the part of NATO authorities and of national military officials, that France would accept the stationing of IRBMs on her soil. During the early part of 1958, negotiations were carried on to this end. However, the worsening political situation in France during mid- and late 1958, as well as the highly controversial potential involved in yielding a degree of national sovereignty by granting NATO authorities control over these weapons systems, combined to prevent an adequate solution and by the end of 1958 it was apparent that the matter was not going to be easily resolved.

However, in the case of Italy, a more favorable situation prevailed. During discussions with Italian officials in March, General Norstad had secured their agreement provisionally to consider accepting IRBMs from the United States, if offered. Discussion with Italian officials continued, and on 7 August 1958 General Norstad sent a message to the Secretary of Defense, United States, whose nation would provide IRBMs to Italy in the near future.\(^{(15)}\)

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\(^{(14)}\) AG 6100/IP-46/58 PROG, 16 May 58, " Provision of IRBM Sites;" see also AC/4-D/924 (STSC 551/58), 18 Jun 58.

\(^{(15)}\) COFS Mtg with Divisions Chiefs, 19 Jun 58.
event agreement was reached. He told the Secretary of Defense that SHAPE studies showed that high priority should be given to locating IRBM units in Italy. He had personally discussed the deployment of these weapons with the Italian Minister of Defense, who had indicated his approval in principle to the stationing of the IRBM in Italy.

"The Italian Government desires, and I concur," SACEUR stated, "that all training and delivery of equipment incident to this program should be handled insofar as is practicable in accordance with normal military assistance procedures, and that additional agreements between the US and Italy should be restricted to letters or notes to cover these points which cannot be satisfactorily treated under MAP."

"Accordingly, I now request the US Government to enter into direct negotiations with the Italian government with a view to the installation of the first of these IRBM units in Italy at an early date."

On 18 August 1958, SACEUR pointed out to the Standing Group that no provisions had been made in MC 70 for incorporating IRBMs which would be available by the end of the year, into Allied Command Europe. He stated that he would recommend that when IRBMs were accepted by a country they would be assigned such priority as to ensure their early operational capability. SHAPE was at that time preparing criteria and standards for the Jupiter and Thor weapon missiles which would be submitted through the Standing Group. "It is assumed," General Norstad said, "that nations initiating construction prior to final approval of these infrastructure standards will conform to SHAPE recommended criteria in order to simplify retroactive funding of these projects if they are determined to be eligible for common funding."^(17)

By October 1958 the Italian Government had agreed officially to the

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principle of accepting IRBMs in Italy. In a letter to MOD Italy, General Norstad indicated satisfaction at this development and set forth his thinking on the major principles of control and procedures for introduction of these radical weapons into the ACE defense system. He realized that many aspects of the IRBM problem were primarily the concern of Italy and the United States. However, in view of the spirit and intent of the decision taken by the NATO Heads of Government in this matter, he felt it necessary to present his view to the Italian Government. He told the Italian MOD: "I feel that an understanding between us on a number of principles will facilitate the early establishment of an intermediate range ballistic missile capability in Italy... The decision to launch these weapons will be taken by SACEUR only in agreement with the Governments of Italy and the United States. The agreement of the two governments would be given in the light of circumstances at the time and having regard to the undertaking they have assumed in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

"In principle, the operation control vested in SACEUR will be exercised from SHAPE and will be direct to a single intermediate missile headquarters above the squadron level. This intermediate headquarters should be an Italian national unit and should be commanded by an Italian General Officer. It should be permanently assigned to NATO in peace and in war in the same manner as the intermediate range ballistic missile tactical squadrons.

"Although the location of missile units will be primarily a question for agreement between the Governments of Italy and the United States, Allied Command Europe requirements should be considered in the selection of the sites. Consultation with SHAPE will ensure: (1) that security and dispersal criteria are met; (2) that the sites selected will permit the proper orientation for desired target coverage; and (3) that the sites can be prepared in time to meet the operational availability of the weapons."(18)

(18) See also SGWM-723-58, 24 Nov 58, for report by SGN to MC on "Progress on Implementation of IRBM Project in Italy."
Toward the end of 1958 it became apparent also that Turkish authorities were interested in having the IRBM stationed in their territory. During discussions between General Erdelhun, MOD Turkey, and SACEUR on 27 November, the Turkish official raised the question of IRBMs for his nation. He said that the Prime Minister himself was ready and anxious to move ahead on this issue and asked when SACEUR would be ready to discuss it more fully. General Norstad told him that he hoped to be in a position to raise the matter officially with the Turkish Government sometime in January 1959.

Speaking to the members of the North Atlantic Council at their meeting in December 1958, General Norstad gave the latest information on the status of the IRBM program. Dealing with the first generation IRBMs, the Thors and Jupiters, General Norstad pointed out that the year's accomplishments had been most encouraging. Italy had agreed in principle to accept the IRBM, and at the moment the Italian Government and the US Government had reached agreement on technical factors involved. (19)

Second Generation IRBM. SHAPE had foreseen the necessity for a much improved model of the IRBM by mid-1963. Certain operational requirements for performance had been sent to the Standing Group and to the Assistant Secretary General for Production and Logistics of NATO, Mr. Meili. In broad principle this statement established a need for a quick-reaction IRBM weapons system in the NATO Alliance; its operational mission would be the destruction of suitable military targets whose location could be fixed within 1500 nautical miles. This weapon should be available to operational units not later than 1963. It should be able to attack targets up to ranges of 1500 nautical miles. It was felt that around this basic missile there should be developed further in the future certain missiles which could be directed to shorter ranges than this 1500 mile range.

(19) General Norstad's testimony before the NAC, 17 Dec 58, C-VR(58)64.
As far as accuracy was concerned, SHAPE had asked that a weapon be designed to give a circular error probable (CEP) of 2500 ft., although it was hoped that this accuracy could be increased to 1500 ft. These operational characteristics had been submitted to the appropriate authorities of the Alliance and were being considered at the end of 1958. (20)

On 9 December 1958 SACEUR dispatched to the Standing Group a paper containing the general military operational characteristics which were deemed appropriate for an advanced generation IRBM for use in Allied Command Europe. Some of the more significant requirements established were the ability to strike targets within 1500 nautical miles, a reaction time of five minutes or less, and the ability to survive an enemy attack achieving both tactical and strategic surprise. The requirement called for the start of this weapon system's availability in 1963 but also suggested the possibility of developing a family of weapons for use at ranges of less than 1500 nautical miles. (21)

**Atomic Stockpile Program.**

Shortly before he met with the Standing Group on 9 December 1957, and just prior to the meeting of the Heads of Government, General Norstad discussed with his top officers his views of what must be done to increase the flexibility and the usefulness of the atomic weapons available, or to become available, in NATO Europe. He had recommended to the US authorities on a national basis that action be taken to provide a system which would assure the ability to promptly "marry up" nuclear weapons with the nuclear delivery system available in Allied Command Europe. He did not feel it was SHAPE's problem to determine whether any particular nation should have a nuclear capability. SHAPE's sole concern was that SACEUR have the

(20) C-VR(58)64, 17 Dec 58, General Norstad's testimony before the NAC.
(21) AG 2030 SEC, 22 Dec 58; AG 6800 PANDP, 9 Dec 58.
means to carry out assigned tasks but it was very clear that, if he were to have these means, a proper distribution of nuclear delivery means be put into effect. Action was already under way in a limited sense to broaden the ownership position of nuclear delivery means. It was consequently essential that there exist in Allied Command Europe a nuclear weapon supply system which could support all delivery means with equal efficiency. There already existed in Europe a system for the support of strictly US nuclear delivery forces. General Norstad believed that this system could be expanded without any change in the US laws, which required that nuclear weapons remain in US custody in peacetime. It would be entirely possible, General Norstad stated, for small custodian units of US personnel to be stationed with or very close to all nuclear delivery forces of whatever nationality. The necessary security and support which would be required could be provided by the local forces. If this system were developed to its ultimate capability, it would be possible to service any nuclear delivery force with the same degree of efficiency that had already been obtained by US Forces. From the military point of view, the question of who had actual custody of the nuclear weapons was unimportant. The essential factor was that these weapons would be allocated to NATO for use on tasks assigned them by SACEUR. No one nation whether US or otherwise owned these units from an operational standpoint. The question was raised as to whether there would have to be a similar broadening on the policy of release of data on nuclear weapons which, at the present time, was under certain restrictions by the United States. Actually considerable additional information had been released to NATO in the past year and in SACEUR's view the problem was more psychological than actual. He stated that the minor quantity of data still bearing the US label was concerned exclusively with weapons construction and allied technical details, which he found boring, incomprehensible and in no case germane to the discharge of the tactical task.
In extension of these views and as a result of his talks with higher authority, action was taken during the meeting of the Heads of Government in 1957 to establish an atomic stockpile for Allied Command Europe.

When the Heads of Government issued their decision relative to making the IRBMs available, they stated that stocks of nuclear warheads would be established so as to be readily available for the defense of the Alliance in case of need. These warheads, of course, were not to be restricted to those used by the IRBMs but would be used also in strike-aircraft and in atomic artillery, such as the Honest John.

This decision was based on a proposal by the United States that "it would deploy nuclear warheads under United States custody in accordance with NATO defensive planning and in agreement with the states directly concerned. In the event of hostilities, nuclear warheads would be released to the appropriate NATO Supreme Allied Commander for employment by nuclear capable forces." (22)

This decision by the Heads of Government automatically placed upon SACEUR a requirement to develop detailed plans for the establishment of these stockpiles throughout ACE in order to support the atomic vehicles and weapons which were in position or to be deployed in accordance with his strategic plans. The period for planning, so far as SHAPE was concerned, covered only the initial phase, for example through mid-1960, and was based on the nuclear delivery units including SAMs which were specified in the ACE Minimum Force Study. In addition the six IRBM squadrons which were being planned for mid-1960 would require support under the atomic stockpile program.

Custody and maintenance of the weapons at the sites would be the responsibility of US personnel in the storage sites. Security, i.e., protection against enemy attacks by enemy forces, saboteurs or para-military

(22) Brief, PANDP 6430: "NATO Atomic Stockpile Program" (prepared for AR Visiting Teams), 21 May 58.
forces would be the responsibility of the NATO countries whose delivery units were being supported.

In an emergency weapons would be released from custodial organizations to the delivery forces. The delivery forces would carry out SACEUR's programs and the regional plans under the direction of the NATO Commander designated in each approved plan.

The requirement for the number of custodial storage sites would be directly related to the need for assuring appropriate reaction times and for suitable dispersal of weapons. A standard storage capacity would be designed to provide for each type of delivery force. In most cases these factors would demand a storage site adjacent to the actual delivery unit. Joint and combined storage would be desirable where this could be accomplished without prejudicing operational requirements. (23)

On 5 February 1958, SHAPE sent to the US authorities a statement of US resources which would be required to support the NATO Stockpile Program through mid-1960. (24)

On 8 March 1958, SHAPE sent to all the Major Subordinate Commanders a "Basic Plan for the NATO Atomic Stockpile." The primary purpose of sending out this plan, aside from keeping the MSCs informed, was to develop the necessary information to carry out more detailed plans which would indicate specific locations of delivery forces, storage sites and weapons support units. Only the MSCs could make proper recommendations as to the specific locations of delivery units which were planned to be located in ACE by mid-1960, as well as for the location of associated storage sites based on criteria and assumptions contained in the basic plan. The MSCs were sent a list of the delivery units involved. For Air Force

(23) "NATO Atomic Stockpile Program", brief for AR Visiting team, PANDP 6430, 21 May 58. At this point, cover AG 6430 AO, CTS, 8 Mar 58, "NATO Atomic Stockpile," sent to MSCs as the Basic plan.

(24) SHAPE 19/58, 5 Feb 58.
delivery units, except the surface-to-surface missiles, they were told to make their recommendations on the basis of existing airfields. For ground delivery units, the locations would be stated generally within a radius of approximately ten miles, unless greater accuracy were possible. The MSCs were directed to submit their recommendations to SHAPE by 12 April 1958. (25)

SHAPE emphasized to the MSCs that joint and combined storage, as defined in the basic plan, was highly desirable in order to reduce the cost of the program in both manpower and money, where this could be accomplished without prejudicing operational requirements. In many cases, it was recognized, the need for assuring fast reaction times and for suitable dispersal of weapons would require a storage site adjacent to the actual delivery unit. In turn, delivery units should be located in peacetime, close to the positions they were expected to occupy during the initial deployment for general war.

A most important and vital aspect of this matter was the part to be played by national authorities, and MSCs were told that in developing their recommendations they should consult with these officials. Through the National Military Representatives present at SHAPE, the MODs concerned had been notified that the MSCs were taking this action. No commitment on the part of any nation would be involved until SACEUR had received all plans. He would, when appropriate, seek formal agreement from each MOD.

The Basic Plan. The basic plan for an atomic stockpile for ACE had been prepared by the SHAPE Staff in the few months following the December 1957 decision of the Heads of Government. In drafting this plan it was assumed that the NATO countries would have, in general, the nuclear delivery units specified in the ACE Minimum Force Study 1958-1963. In addition to the forces listed in the Minimum Force Study, there would be

(25) Ltr, NATO Atomic Stockpile, COFS SHAPE, to all MSCs, 8 Mar 58.
six IRBM squadrons by mid-60 which would require support by the NATO Atomic Stockpile. The NATO Council, it was presupposed, would approve common financing under infrastructure procedures for the fixed operational facilities and the administrative facilities necessary to establish the NATO Atomic Stockpile. In its initial phase, the atomic stockpile would not include provision for atomic warheads for surface-to-air missile units.

The "Concept of Operations" contained sections setting forth measures on control and use of weapons; security and custody of weapons; maintenance of weapons; emergency evacuation; transportation.

As a very necessary adjunct of the basic plan, a study estimating the number and general location of storage sites and US personnel who could be required for custody and maintenance of weapons had been completed and forwarded to the Secretary of Defense, United States, for his comments and/or concurrence to ensure the availability of trained personnel. (26)

The basic plan contained a discussion of many of the detailed problems which were foreseen in establishing the stockpile, but none proved eventually more significant than that section which stated that action to obtain approval in principle to location of NATO Stockpile Sites in countries would be initiated in each case by SACEUR. (27)

Addressing the Military Committee on 13 March 1958, General Norstad presented the existing status of the work being done on the NATO Atomic Stockpile. He stated: "The SHAPE Staff has reached certain conclusions as to special personnel requirements and has formulated certain recommendations. Organizationally, we have developed proposals for various types of detachments to support the nuclear delivery units, and these are shown on the chart grouped by Army, Air Force and Navy. These

(26) SHAPE 19/58, 5 Feb 58.
(27) For information on the Basic Plan, including definitions of the various Types of Stockpiles envisaged, see: SHAPE 24/58, AG 6430 AO, 9 May 58.
detachments constitute our initial proposals as to the minimum personnel needed to perform the US functions of custody and maintenance. You will note that these individual detachments are small; the estimated total for all of Allied Command Europe by mid-1960 will be about 2,700.

"Our initial calculations were based on one atomic support detachment for each nuclear delivery unit. Thus, this chart shows 63 detachments, corresponding to the 63 nuclear delivery units which we have recommended be available to and manned by the individual countries (apart from the US) by mid-1960. In fact, the total of atomic support detachments may be something less. My Subordinate Commanders have been directed to study the matter and prepare specific recommendations as to locations, as a basis for negotiations with governments concerned. We believe that, in many instances, it will be possible for one site to serve two or more nuclear delivery units, even of different nationalities. Therefore we have urged that maximum consolidation be sought, consistent with operational effectiveness." (28)

Funding of the Atomic Stockpile. It had been apparent from the first that one of the key decisions which would have to be made in establishing an atomic stockpile would be the decision on how it would be funded. The stockpiling facilities were going to be costly and it was unlikely that the individual nations would agree to pay for these. In the SHAPE view, nuclear ammunition storages should be paid for in the same manner as other projects which were of military value to the alliance as a whole.

Although the Military Committee had submitted to the North Atlantic Council a statement of the order of magnitude cost estimates for ACE infrastructure during the period covered by MC 70 (1958-1963) and these estimates had included provision for nuclear ammunition storages,

(28) MCM-39-58, 1 Apr 58; Note: General Norstad also spoke on "The IRBM and the NATO Atomic Stockpile" to the Defense Ministers when they met on 17 April 1959; see C-VR(58)25, 17 Apr 58.
the Committee had not said that these should be paid for by NATO common infrastructure funds. They had stated rather that eligibility for common funding should be examined and determined by the Council.

On 5 April, SHAPE told the Standing Group that it was necessary to have the question of eligibility for common funding of these nuclear ammunition storages determined without delay. There were two good reasons for this. First, a Council decision to authorize additional infrastructure funds would be facilitated by the determination of the eligibility for common funding of the various component elements (including nuclear ammunition storage). Second, given the urgency of establishing stocks of nuclear warheads in ACE and the length of time which would be required for the detailed planning and construction of storages, a declaration was immediately necessary on the method of provision of funds. (29)

The details of the facilities which it was believed would be required within ACE for nuclear storage were sent to the Standing Group along with a request for their support in acquiring common funding of these facilities. (30)

Since these storage facilities would be fixed in location and since they could be called "essential to the implementation of NATO operational plans" they fell broadly within the Council criteria for NATO common infrastructure. The rearward storage echelons would be of common use to forces of several NATO nations operating the advanced echelon. Common use could also be ascribed to forward storage echelons, inasmuch as the individual basic load sites must be capable of supporting the delivery forces of any NATO nations, in the event enemy action caused displacement. All echelons would be of common interest, since the ammunition stored there would be used in support of a defensive system immediately responsible to SACEUR's control.

(29) Ltr, SHAPE to SG, sub: "Provision of Nuclear Ammunition Storages," 5 Apr 58, AG 6100/IP-45/58 PROG.
(30) For full description of these facilities, to include rough estimate of cost of each, see SHAPE 55/58, encl 1, to SHAPE ltr "Provision of Nuclear Ammunition Storages," 5 Apr 58.
The essential principle was to be control of these weapons by SACEUR. Not only would he have operational control, but in consultation with host nations, he would have control of the siting of the storage facilities, which should be in consonance with the overall NATO rather than merely national defense planning. If storages were not paid for out of infrastructure funds it would be difficult for SACEUR to have this control.

Because of the overriding need to get some of these storage sites under way, construction planning had already been started on several basic load sites. Planning was done nationally, but in close consultation with SHAPE. SACEUR hoped that this would not prejudice favorable consideration of common funding, since a system completed only in part by the initiative of nations financially able to undertake construction would clearly not be acceptable. SHAPE recommended therefore to the Standing Group that it seek early Council approval for the principle of common funding for nuclear ammunition storages.

Following receipt of replies and comments on the draft "Plan for the Atomic Stockpile," which had been sent to the MSCs and the nations in March, the SHAPE Staff began incorporating these into a final version of the plan. This was sent to the Standing Group on 12 September 1958 and contained not only the outline of planning for the stockpile, but annexes filled with detailed information. (31)

In order to get construction started SHAPE and some of the nations had worked out an agreement in the matter of financing. Pending a decision by the Standing Group and the Council on the principle of common funding for the facilities to establish the NATO Atomic Stockpile, SHAPE urged that certain nations begin construction and pay for it, with the understanding that, if the principle of common funding were approved, the nation

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(31) Ltr, sub: "Allied Command Europe Plan for the NATO Atomic Stockpile," 12 Sep 58, SHAPE to Chmn, SGN, AG 6430 PANDP w/ Annexes A, C and E.
would be reimbursed. But in sending the plan forward to the Standing Group, SHAPE made its position clear by stating: "An early decision on common funding would assist greatly in clearing the air and removing a potential obstacle to rapid progress."(32)

SACEUR's Progress Reports on IRBM and SAS.

On 11 December, SACEUR explained to the Military Committee the progress which was being made, both on the IRBM project and on the Special Ammunition Storage projects, and gave the same explanation at the 17 December Ministerial NAC Meeting.(33)

In addressing the MODs and the Council on special ammunition storage, SACEUR pointed out that plans were based on meeting stockpile requirements as set forth in MC 70, generally following the priorities established by that document. In the interest of economy, SHAPE was attempting to develop a minimum number of these sites by doubling up wherever possible and by having two or more delivery units use the same storage sites and facilities. He referred to the detailed plan which had been sent to the Standing Group on 12 September pointing out that this plan related to storage site requirements, specifically to units, and fixed those units specifically to commands and geographical areas. While this plan considered only requirements up to mid-1960, SHAPE was already working on a study which would carry the plan forward to 1963, when the ultimate goals of MC 70 were scheduled to be reached.(34)

(32) SHAPE/128/A/58, with Annexes.
(33) The last prior reports on progress in these fields were contained in document MC 79 and MC 80, based on information furnished the Military Committee by SHAPE. These reports had been submitted to the NAC on 22 May 58. Record, MC CS/22, 15 Jan 59. See Verbatim Record of Ministerial Meeting, C-VR(58)64.
(34) Verbatim Record of Council Meeting, 17 Dec 58, C-VR(58)64.
pointing out that first priority had been given to the existing system of storage facilities designed to service the American forces which already were equipped with a nuclear delivery capability. At that time within the NATO area there were 40 such storage sites. Plans called for the creation of 175 delivery units by mid-1961, and a total of 147 storage sites to be made available by that time. SACEUR described the situation throughout the command pointing out that in addition to 40 sites which existed, another was being built in Turkey to support an Honest John battalion. In Germany action was under way to provide sites to support four British Canberra squadrons, and a site for a UK Corporal battalion. A fighter bomber squadron of the German Air Force which was programmed within the NATO Strike Forces was also being provided with a storage site. Other recent developments included a Belgian request that a site be provided for one of its strike squadrons, and a request by the Netherlands to have a site able to support an Honest John unit.

General Norstad pointed out that in order to support the needs of SACLANT, he would act as agent in the European area for those sites which were required to support SACLANT's operations.

Turning to the question of common funding, SACEUR pointed out that this had a very direct bearing on the atomic stockpile, and that there was included in the 10th Slice Infrastructure Program a specific requirement for £14,000,000 for the stockpile, and £12,000,000 for the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile Site. (35)

(35) For more information on Atomic Stockpile Program see also: SH/195/58; SH/24/58; SH/55/58; ALFCE 98/58; MC 80; ALFCE 99/58; AIRCENT/90/58; SH/AO/13/58; SH/AO/10/58; SGWM-724-58; AC-4-0-923 (STSC/547/58) 18 Jun 58; AC-4(FP)D/2381 (STSC/1318/58) 26 Nov 58; SH/19/58, 5 Feb 58.
Planning for Action Short of General War.

In the political directive issued in 1956, in MC 14/2, and again in MC 70, the NATO Council and the Military Committee had recognized that the Communist threat was not confined to general war but included also such lesser threats as local hostile action, incursions and infiltrations in the NATO area, as well as a possibility of such actions in contiguous areas. The possibility of such lesser enemy courses of action necessitated plans to counter such threats should they develop. In 1958, NATO plans provided only for an all-out response to an attack which had been estimated to be a general war attack.

Recognizing this, General Norstad had directed his staff to see what SHAPE and the MSCs should do to prepare for these lesser threats. It was obvious that at this stage, before the military problems had been covered within Allied Command Europe, there would be no point in preparing detailed recommendations or even a report for the Standing Group.

A number of interesting points emerged from this advanced study. Assuming that the normal defense posture would be based on defending as far forward as possible, that national plans existed for re-acting against any of the lesser types of aggression, and that Council authority would be required for use of nuclear weapons, the plan pointed out the great need for flexibility in Allied Command Europe capabilities. It discussed in detail the possible enemy courses of action short of general war. Major Subordinate Commanders' responsibilities were identified specifically as well as those of SHAPE and the higher echelons. A particularly significant recommendation contained in this study was that a mobile task force should be ready for use in any area of Allied Command Europe against local threats.

(36) Memo for COFS, subj: "Plan for Action Short of General War, 20 Aug 58, PANDP 1200. For excellent summation of SHAPE's thinking on this subject, interested persons should read this document in detail.
NATO Mobile Task Force.

The concept of a mobile task force had been mentioned briefly in the Minimum Force Study. SHAPE was thinking in terms of an air transportable force composed of units from several nations, whose impact would be primarily political and psychological, as evidence that SHAPE was capable of immediately dispatching a NATO force - even though a small one - to any threatened area. It should be reasonably effective militarily as soon as possible after reaching the area of deployment to which it might be dispatched. This meant that the heavier logistical items had to be available from the local resources. The force should have an international aspect in order to demonstrate united opposition to aggression, but for this purpose no more than four or five nations need be involved. There were obviously practical disadvantages in having too many. In 1958, SACEUR was thinking in terms of not more than one division strength overall with an appropriate air force complement to compromise this task force. While it would be impractical to earmark a full airborne or air transportable division equipped as a normal fighting division, it might be necessary to earmark a force of about division size to cover several national contributions and to give flexibility.

The units earmarked for this force would have to be selected among the NATO assigned forces in the Central area. They would be given this new mission as a planning responsibility but their main responsibility as part of the Shield Forces for Central Europe would remain unchanged.\(^{(37)}\)

In September 1958, CINCENT forwarded to SHAPE a detailed study on a multi-national air transportable division, a study that set forth his views concerning the appropriate measures, in addition to full-scale retaliation that could be taken to cope with emergency situations arising in ACE.\(^{(38)}\)

\(^{(37)}\) Ltr, SACEUR to Marshal of the RAF, sir William Dixon, Chairman, UK Chiefs of Staff Committee, 8 Apr 58.

\(^{(38)}\) AFCE/179/58, 13 Sep 58.
This study dealt with a mobile task force and also with the employment of reinforced air units. The mobile force was intended primarily for use on the flanks. It would have to be capable of being air-lifted. SHAPE proposed that the force be composed of infantry battalion groups earmarked from Central Europe forces organized and trained by CINCENT. CINCENT had proposed to organize a new division additional to MC 70 force requirements for this purpose. Discouraging replies for the 1958 Annual Review indicated that such additional resources would not be available, therefore the various contingents of such force would be drawn together only for operations or whenever it would be necessary for training purposes.

Authority for launching the force would rest with SACEUR. Both CINCNORTH and CINCSOUTH were told to consider how they could best use this mobile task force in appropriate areas of their commands. Planning criteria were furnished to Major Subordinate Commanders who were told to submit their plans to SHAPE for approval. CINCENT was requested to accept responsibility for establishing the capability outlined and for setting up the necessary liaison with CINCNORTH and CINCSOUTH as soon as possible. "It should be appreciated," the SHAPE letter concluded, "that these measures directed towards increased flexibility are not intended to generate a whole series of new requirements in, for example, the field of logistics. The resources planned for general war should be utilized to the maximum extent possible to meet any requirement which might stem from a situation where deployment of these units might be considered necessary." (39)

Survivability.

One of the prime requisites of defensive plans was to ensure that regardless of an enemy attack, SACEUR's retaliatory air forces would not

(39) Ltr; sub: "Additional Planning Requirements," SHAPE to Major Subordinate Commands, AG 1200 PANDP, 6 Oct 58.
be so crippled or destroyed that they could not carry out their mission of destroying the enemy's capability. The Military Committee had laid down the objectives and measures for the improvement of SACEUR's air posture. However, some of these measures establishing primary reliance on squadron deployment and off-base dispersal, appeared increasingly open to question as new information became available on the enemy's capabilities and new weapons systems. In late 1958, SHAPE sent a directive to the Commander of Allied Air Forces Central Europe to undertake a detailed study of this problem to ensure that the best possible planning had been carried out.

There was some concern at SHAPE that the deployment and dispersal measures laid down in MC 60 might not be the best pattern for survival of Allied Air Forces in Europe. Recent technical developments, improvements in weapons and methods of attack, increased power of weapons, as well as heavy expense involved in adequate dispersal measures were all factors which cast doubt upon MC 60 requirements, developments that were complicated by the fact that considerable infrastructure funds had been allocated to these measures and that new contracts were even then being awarded.\(^{(40)}\)

SACEUR wanted either to reaffirm the validity of the present measures or to develop recommended changes. Obviously, Allied Air Forces Central Europe was the headquarters best suited to deal with this problem. Therefore, SHAPE sent terms of reference to AIRCENT for guidance in carrying out detailed study. AIRCENT was directed to prepare an interim reply within a month, indicating areas, if any, in which orders to start construction on already allotted infrastructure funds should be issued. The initial phase of the study carrying through 1963 was asked for in no case later than 1 December 1958.\(^{(41)}\)

\(^{(40)}\) MC 60 (Final), 25 Apr 56 (NS).
\(^{(41)}\) Ltr, sub:"Survival Measures" to COMAIRCENT with "Terms of Reference", AG 1450 PANDP, 5 Sep 58; see also SH/PP/244/58; SH/PP/246/58; and AIRCENT 163/58.
The Light Weight Strike Fighter.

In the last months of 1957 flight test evaluations had been carried on to determine which of the prototype models of the Light Weight Strike Fighter (LWSF) would be selected for NATO production and incorporation into ACE forces. SACEUR made it plain to his Staff that he did not want SHAPE to become involved in "picking the winner" even though a SHAPE officer was Chairman of the International Committee charged with this selection. He felt it essential that the committee reach a clear-cut decision that one of the prototypes listed by one of the various manufacturers was the best. If this was not possible, then their recommendations should at least list the prototypes singly in their order of merit. He disowned the project as a SHAPE project, stating that the light weight strike fighter, although originally proposed by his headquarters as a possible answer to an outstanding problem, was essentially a matter for NATO political authority. However, aircraft had been developed to meet certain operational criteria for which production facilities were known to exist and the requirement for this aircraft had been stated in the Minimum Force Study. In the last analysis it was up to the NATO Council to decide whether to adopt a light weight fighter as a means of meeting the requirement for close support aircraft which had been stated in the Minimum Force Study.

On 9 January the Advisory Committee of the NATO Light Weight Tactical Strike Fighter Committee agreed unanimously that the Italian G-91, with minor adjustments, should be the standard NATO aircraft for initial LWSF squadrons through 1960. At the same time it was recommended --in order to keep SHAPE squadrons abreast of advances technically-- that developments begin on a second generation LWSF. SACEUR agreed with the recommendations of the Advisory Committee and forwarded them to the Standing Group stating that this plan would meet SHAPE's operational requirements. While it had no authority to push this project further, SHAPE was very interested and hopeful that the project would develop and expand.
since it would set a pattern for other weapons systems developed under NATO's auspices. (42)

SHAPE was further encouraged by the decision of certain NATO nations to purchase these G-91 aircraft. The French Government in April 1958 ordered 48, while Germany and Italy each ordered 50. In each case the nation ordered aircraft exceeding the number required by MC 70 through 1960.

In order to test the light weight tactical strike fighter, an experimental squadron was established to begin the training phase of tactical trials in Italy. These trials began on 28 May and continued through September. It was intended through these trials to train operational and maintenance personnel for future LWSF squadrons in France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Turkey; to develop optimum tactics for the aircraft; and to produce tables or organization and equipment for the squadrons. (43)

An interesting development occurred in July when the Italian authorities received a request from the manufacturers of the LWSF to offer the aircraft for sale to a number of countries including many non-NATO nations. The Italian authorities asked for SHAPE's views on this procedure since this aircraft had been developed at SHAPE's initiative under NATO's auspices. SHAPE told the Standing Group that there was no objection from the military point of view to the G-91 being sold to nations other than the Soviet block nations and Egypt, providing certain conditions were observed. One condition was that re-equipment of NATO squadrons must not be affected and that any equipment of non-Italian origin would be included in the aircraft when sold without prior concurrence of countries of origin. (44)

A broad requirement for a successor to the LWSF was approved in principle by SACEUR in September 1958. The main operational requirement

(42) AG 2030 SEC 6, Feb 58.
(43) AG 2030, SEC, 27 May 58.
(44) AG 2030 SEC, 11 Jul 58; See also SH 24196 (SHAPTO 1666), 6 Jun 58.
for the successful aircraft would be the ability to achieve vertical or
nearly vertical take-off and landing.\(^{(45)}\)

**SACEUR's Emergency Defense Plan.**

Since the establishment of SHAPE, SACEUR had maintained an
Emergency Defense Plan based on those forces which were actually avai-
able as of any given year. In this respect it differed from other plans
which were projected into the future and which were based on forces to
become available. Each year, SACEUR's EDP was re-issued and re-
designated to indicate the proper year. It was carefully coordinated with
the Atomic Strike Plan (ASP) which was also issued anew each year.\(^{(46)}\)

SACEUR's EDP did not undergo a major revision in 1958, but was
brought up to date with some minor amendments and redesignated EDP
1958. Late in the year, however, SACEUR's planners decided that it
should undergo major revision in order to achieve maximum usefulness
as a major SACEUR planning document. It was also decided - should the
SGN approve - that this new plan would be issued as a "no-year" plan
and remain effective until major changes in the strategic concept should
require publication.

Among the major changes introduced into the 'no-year' version of
SACEUR's EDP was the introduction of SACEUR's atomic strike doctrine
as fundamental to the concept of operations and as basic guidance to
Major Subordinate Commanders. The intelligence presented in the plan
was amplified, and further emphasis was placed upon the forward stra-
tegy concept.\(^{(47)}\)

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\(^{(45)}\) AG 2030 SEC, 25 Sep 58; For additional interesting information on
the LWSF project and problems in connection therewith see the
following documents: Ltr to SG REP from COFS SHAPE, 26 Jan 58;
enclosing Ltr from Dr. Von Karman; Ltr, SHAPE to SGN, sub:
"Provision of Facilities for Lightweight Aircraft," 14 May 58, w/
enclosure; Summary MRecord of Meeting between Mr. Meili and
...
Atomic Planning.

The planning for atomic warfare which was carried out in ACE in 1958, as in the past, was done mainly on a US national basis in view of restrictions placed by US laws on diffusion of nuclear weapons information. The Air and Special Operations Division was primarily responsible for this planning to include the overall supervision and coordination of those made by Major Subordinate Commanders.

Criteria for NATO War Headquarters:

Members of the Production & Logistics Group, International Staff, and Members of the SHAPE Staff on the LWSF, 2 Jul 58, DCPP/838/58, and SHAPE 500/57, AG 1220 PANDP, 10 Sep 57, Ltr to all MSCs. See CRITERIA ON NUCLEAR OPERATIONS AND MOVEMENTS, SHAPE 203/58, and SHAPE/175/58.

In this same connection AFSOUTH 32/58, CINCSOUTH EDP-1, CINCSOUTH 35/58, EDP CINCORP and EDP CINCENT 35/58, and Members of the SHAPE Staff on the LWSF, 2 Jul 58, DCPP/838/58, and SHAPE 500/57, AG 1220 PANDP, 10 Sep 57, Ltr to all MSCs. See CRITERIA ON NUCLEAR OPERATIONS AND MOVEMENTS, SHAPE 203/58, and SHAPE/175/58.

(45) Members of the Production & Logistics Group, International Staff, and Members of the SHAPE Staff on the LWSF, 2 Jul 58, DCPP/838/58, and SHAPE 500/57, AG 1220 PANDP, 10 Sep 57, Ltr to all MSCs. See CRITERIA ON NUCLEAR OPERATIONS AND MOVEMENTS, SHAPE 203/58, and SHAPE/175/58.

(46) SHAPE 500/57, AG 1220 PANDP, 10 Sep 57, Ltr to all MSCs. See CRITERIA ON NUCLEAR OPERATIONS AND MOVEMENTS, SHAPE 203/58, and SHAPE/175/58.

(47) "Targets Requirements", SHAPE/115/58, SH/159/58, AFCE/205/58, ALFCE/199/58, SACEUR/US, CINCORP, and Members of the SHAPE Staff on the LWSF, 2 Jul 58, DCPP/838/58, and SHAPE 500/57, AG 1220 PANDP, 10 Sep 57, Ltr to all MSCs. See CRITERIA ON NUCLEAR OPERATIONS AND MOVEMENTS, SHAPE 203/58, and SHAPE/175/58.

(48) SHAPE/115/58, SH/159/58, AFCE/205/58, ALFCE/199/58, SACEUR/US, CINCORP, and Members of the SHAPE Staff on the LWSF, 2 Jul 58, DCPP/838/58, and SHAPE 500/57, AG 1220 PANDP, 10 Sep 57, Ltr to all MSCs. See CRITERIA ON NUCLEAR OPERATIONS AND MOVEMENTS, SHAPE 203/58, and SHAPE/175/58.

(49) Members of the Production & Logistics Group, International Staff, and Members of the SHAPE Staff on the LWSF, 2 Jul 58, DCPP/838/58, and SHAPE 500/57, AG 1220 PANDP, 10 Sep 57, Ltr to all MSCs. See CRITERIA ON NUCLEAR OPERATIONS AND MOVEMENTS, SHAPE 203/58, and SHAPE/175/58.
The culmination of this study was the publication of MC 32/12 in September 1958, later approved by the North Atlantic Council. During the preparation of MC 32/12, SHAPE was requested by the Standing Group to give assistance on certain points regarding peace and war headquarters throughout Allied Command Europe. (49)

On 22 September 1958, the Military Committee published MC 32/12, thus setting out the criteria to be used for all war headquarters included in NATO Common Infrastructure Programs.

The Military Committee considered that all major wartime headquarters had to be planned on the premise that a direct nuclear attack was possible and in most cases probable. It was essential that all headquarters be capable of immediate occupancy and operation upon receipt or orders. In no event should it take more than twenty-four hours to bring a wartime headquarters to its operational state.

The criteria established the degree of protection required for war headquarters. Each headquarters had to be at least 16 kilometers from a likely target, it had to have overhead cover of 200 meters in thickness, and the tunnel entrances had to have a minimum length of 700 meters.

The Military Committee paper was discussed at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council held on 26 November 1958. The Council decided to invite the NATO military authorities to "reaffirm their recommendations with regard to the major war headquarters in the light of the MC 32/12 criteria." It was specifically stated that all modifications to existing plans and any new plans had to be submitted to the Council for approval. The Standing Group Representative at the Council meeting stated that the military authorities would examine each war headquarters project on a case-by-case basis in the light of agreed policies and criteria. The Standing Group

(49) STAND 2386, 5 Apr 58; SCO OUT 22870, 14 Apr 58; SH 24044, 30 May 58; STASEC 5237, 22 Jul 58.
would examine the results of examinations carried out by the Major Commanders and make appropriate recommendations to the Council. On this basis, MC 32/12 was approved by the Council. (50)

SHAPE was requested to initiate a survey of all ACE war headquarters projects, to determine whether the standard of construction of each project was acceptable in the light of the approved criteria and, if not, what steps were necessary and feasible to bring it up to the required standards. Seeking further guidance, SHAPE asked the Standing Group if it would agree to a suggested method of carrying out the review which involved classifying all projects into those that already met the criteria, those that were militarily acceptable though they did not meet the required standards, and lastly, those which needed more work to bring them up to the criteria. In addition, SHAPE would classify those projects which were insufficiently advanced and could be stopped because they were militarily unsatisfactory. (51)

SHAPE War Headquarters (DEVASTATE).

Certain decisions were taken in early 1958 regarding the wartime headquarters from which SACEUR would operate. Following SACEUR's direction that the existing war headquarters site, known as DEVASTATE, should be improved, it was decided that the SHAPE Headquarters Operations Center (SHOC), had to be established at the site as the primary wartime command post. (52)

(50) MC 32/12 (Revised) (Final Decision), dtd 18 Mar 58, shows that the Council approved MC 32/12 (Revised) on 26 Nov 58, subject to reaffirmation by the military authorities. The relevant Council paper is CM(58)114, dtd 26 Nov 58; see also CR(58)56, same date.

(51) STAND 2732, 13 Nov 58; LOSTAN 2706, 26 Nov 58; SH 28386, 15 Dec 58.

(52) See SEC 2030 Minutes of COFS Meeting with Division Chiefs held at SHAPE on 22 Mar 58, and also same reference, 6 Jun 58.
It was planned that, as soon as DEVASTATE was ready, the existing SHAPE Operations Center (SHOC) would be replaced by a center known as SACEUR's Peacetime Operations Room. Signal circuits routed through the war headquarters would permit the initiation and execution of the Atomic Strike Plan and the Emergency Defense Plan from SACEUR's Peacetime Operations Room as well as from SHOC. (53)

A site for a permanent SHAPE War Headquarters acceptable both to SHAPE and the French Government could not be found near Paris. SHAPE had completed a reconnaissance of areas with suitable communications facilities and the appropriate cover but unfortunately all sites eligible under the new MC 32/12 criteria were relatively far away. The next step suggested was a thorough study to find a site within 250 miles of the peacetime site. If such a separation of peace and war headquarters was acceptable to SACEUR, then the peace site found would be proposed to the French Government. As it seemed likely that any SHAPE plan would have to be submitted to the SGN and also would have to have the approval of the NAC, inevitably there would be difficulties and delays. In any case, the planning process would be long and development of an interim war headquarters site became essential. (54)

SACEUR's Alert System.

On 28 July 1958, SHAPE issued a manual, "SACEUR's Alert System" (SHAPE/60/58), which replaced the document published in 1956. SHAPE intended the measures contained in the new manual to be effective from 1 October 1958.

The original 1956 Alert System was based on the principle of a Formal Alert System, using three categories of alert. These three alerts -- Simple, Reinforced and General -- were combined in a system designed

(53) SEC 2030, dtd 19 Jun 58.
(54) SEC 2030, 3 Dec 58.
to "facilitate the transition from peace to war in the event of a gradual deterioration in the international situation." The Simple Alert measures were preliminary measures intended to put the forces assigned to SACEUR in a state of combat readiness. The Reinforced Alert was the stage preceding an outbreak of war, and the measures it comprised were intended to ensure that the NATO Forces were at their maximum readiness before a probable enemy attack was launched. Finally, the General Alert would begin with the outbreak of hostilities. All operational plans were to be implemented, except for atomic operations. The latter would not be initiated until R-hour was declared by SACEUR. (55)

During 1957, SHAPE planners had worked on certain amendments and additions to the Alert System. The most important of these was the ACE Counter-Surprise Military Alert System. Developed as a direct result of deficiencies shown to have existed at the time of the Suez and Hungarian crises in 1956, the Counter-Surprise System was designed to allow the NATO Commanders to take certain measures to counter certain situations which were not covered by the existing Formal Alert System. (56)

On 22 November 1957, SHAPE sent to the Standing Group the recommended ACE Counter Surprise Military Alert System for its approval. SHAPE stated that after discussions with the Major Subordinate Commanders, it had been agreed that a state of "Military Vigilance" be included in the recommended system. (57)

The Standing Group approved SHAPE's recommendations on 11 March 1958. Following this approval, the NATO Governments were requested to give their formal approval to the entire Alert System, as revised by the addition of the Counter Surprise Alert System, with the State of Military Vigilance. (58)

(55) See SHAPE/76/56, 23 May 56.
(56) See SHAPE History 1957, Chapt. 2, for full explanation of the Counter Surprise Military Alert System.
(57) AG 1210/1 PANDP, 22 Nov 57.
(58) STAND 2355, 11 Mar 58, was SGN approval. The MODs were requested to study the SHAPE recommendations in AG 1210 PANDP, 13 Jun 58.
The Counter Surprise Military Planning. The Counter Surprise Military System sent to all NATO Governments for approval in June 1958, was the result of many months of planning and discussion between SHAPE and the Major Subordinate Commands. As finally developed, the System was divided in two stages—State Orange and State Scarlet. State Orange had the aim of ensuring maximum survival and protecting the NATO counter-attack capabilities. It combined all the military measures which would be applied by the NATO Forces when information received indicated a possible enemy attack within one or more hours with a maximum time approximating 36 hours.

Various measures were proposed in the event of a State Orange. All air, ground and naval forces were to be brought to a full state of operational alertness. Examples of the measures to be taken included placing the Control and Reporting Systems on a full operational basis, manning of all communications networks, dispersing from air bases all essential equipment and supplies and making logistic preparations to support forces dispersed or in a counter-action role.

State Scarlet had the same general aim as State Orange, but applied to those measures necessary when information received indicated an enemy attack within a few minutes. Measures envisaged under the State Scarlet included the movement of maximum personnel to war headquarters and other operational combat stations if not already manned, the dispersion of ships and naval aircraft and the deployment of atomic counter-action forces to operational positions.

SHAPE also recommended certain measures to be taken before the two Counter Surprise Military States. These measures were known as the State of Military Vigilance. This was not intended to be another alert state, but a precautionary condition applicable to all the NATO Forces in a period of delicate international relations, during which certain purely military precautionary measures, adapted to local conditions and geographical features, would be ordered by the various commands, which had previously prepared them.
The object of the State of Military Vigilance was to facilitate the transition from peace to war by putting the armed forces in such a posture as to enable them to meet an emergency situation as quickly as possible by applying one of the states of either the formal Alert System or the Counter Surprise Military System. These purely military measures were such that they could be continued for several weeks, or if necessary for several months, without major disadvantages. The State of Military Vigilance would be declared by SACEUR for assigned forces, and he would recommend its application to earmarked and national forces if the national authorities had not already taken this step of their own accord.

The national governments were requested to agree to the delegation by SACEUR to the Major Subordinate Commanders of this authority to order the State of Military Vigilance.

Among the measures proposed to be taken when a State of Military Vigilance was declared were the manning of war headquarters by a skeleton staff, the intensification of the collection of intelligence, a daily intelligence summary to be sent to SHAPE by National Staffs and the checking and completion of mobilization plans and alert procedures.

In a covering letter sent to all the MODs in June 1958, SHAPE pointed out that in the event that a State of Military Vigilance was declared, assigned and earmarked forces remained under national command. This was also true should conditions Orange or Scarlet be ordered, before the declaration of a Reinforced Alert.

In order to implement the military measures of the proposed Alert System, the national governments were requested to delegate to SACEUR and to the Major Subordinate Commanders authority to declare the State Orange or Scarlet for assigned or earmarked forces during training exercises.

The NATO nations were requested to agree to the SHAPE recommendations by 1 August 1958. On receipt of this agreement, SHAPE intended to
publish the new manual which would replace the existing alert system. (59)

The revised manual stated the aim of the Alert System and summarized the NATO policy to be adopted in the event of an armed attack as set forth by Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

A statement on the conditions applicable to the outbreak of hostilities showed that the Formal Alert System was intended to deal with a situation where warning of enemy attack was available in sufficient time. The Counter Surprise Military System was designed to deal with a situation whereby a hostile attack was launched with little or no warning. With the addition of the State of Military Vigilance, SACEUR thus had three different but complementary procedures available to him, dependent upon circumstances. He would recommend the implementation of his chosen procedures to the National Authorities and/or the NATO agencies, and/or the MSCs to carry out the implementation. SACEUR thus had six different possibilities: (60)

I. State of Military Vigilance

II. Counter Surprise Military System (State Orange

III. Formal Alert System (State Scarlet

A request for information on the status of negotiations on SACEUR's Alert System was made to SHAPE by the Standing Group on 10 October 1958. SHAPE indicated that most nations had replied favorably to the requests made when details of the Alert System were sent on 13 June. Only three nations had not given their views on any aspect of the SHAPE recommendations: Italy, the United Kingdom and Turkey. Certain problems were under discussion with the Danish authorities. Eleven nations had given their formal agreement to SACEUR's Alert System. (61)

(59) AG 1210 PANDP. 13 Jun 58.
(60) SHAPE/60/58, 28 Jul 58, SACEUR's Alert System.
(61) SCO IN 05960, 10 Oct 58, SGN to SHAPE; SH 27139, 21 Oct 58, to SGN.
Status of SACEUR's Alert System - December 1958. The annual report on the "Military Progress of NATO" prepared by the Military Committee stated that the combination into one publication (SHAPE/60/58) of the formal alert system and the ACE Counter Surprise System was "a significant improvement."

By December 1958 negotiations on the formal alert system had been completed with all nations, except Germany. Thirteen of the nations had completed negotiations on the counter-surprise system, and an early agreement with the United Kingdom was expected. (62)
CHAPTER IV

TRAINING

During 1958 the SHAPE Staff continued to perform those training missions with which SACEUR was charged by his terms of reference. This called for the organization and training by SACEUR of forces assigned to him, or earmarked for assignment to him by the nations, into an effective integrated fighting force capable of defending Western Europe. SACEUR was given direct control over the higher training of all forces assigned to his command in peacetime and had the authority to inspect the training of all forces assigned to his command. The nations were enjoined to give him full facilities to inspect cadres and other forces within the area of Allied Command Europe earmarked for his command. (1)

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Organization and Training (ACOS OANDT), carried out specific actions on behalf of SACEUR during 1958 to ensure that ACE forces received the best training possible in view of all factors --including political and economic-- involved. He coordinated training and training exercises and supervised the system of training inspections throughout ACE. Officers from the SHAPE Staff supervised and directed the training of major military formations throughout ACE and made recommendations for improving the training and the combat readiness of forces. Various exercises and maneuvers held under the supervision of SHAPE and the Major Subordinate Commands throughout 1958, formed the backbone of the ACE training program.

(1) MC (53) 9(Final), 7 Jul 55, "Revised Terms of Reference for the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. For definition of assigned forces and earmarked forces see Chapter II on Forces.

88
The pattern of higher training in 1958 had actually been formulated in early 1956 during General Gruenther's period as SACEUR, when SHAPE had issued to all Major Subordinate Commanders a training directive covering 1958. It stated that the further practice and development of SACEUR's atomic procedures and policies would still receive first priority in training since atomic operations would remain the key to the strategy and tactics for ACE. It also directed testing and developing the air defense system; continuing practice and development of tactical doctrines for the future land battle; and small-scale live naval exercises and paper naval control of shipping exercises.

The principle was established that regional training programs would be reduced in 1958 as much as possible, keeping in mind the needs of signal and other technical units for higher training so as to allow combat formations to concentrate on smaller unit training. At the higher training level it was suggested that sufficient live exercises be given to improve the standard of coordination, cooperation and control of troops of different nationalities working with each other in adjacent areas; that studies be continued to improve procedures and policies for air and ground delivery and atomic weapons; and that appropriate signal, logistic and other technical services be trained in operation.

ACE Training Conference - 1958.

On 17 January 1958, SHAPE called the Annual Allied Command Europe Training Conference, which was chaired by General Sixsmith, ACOS OANDT, Representative from all the Major Subordinate Commands attended. The exercises to be sponsored or directed by SACEUR during 1958 were discussed. Steps which had been taken to combine the Joint Atomic and Air Defense Exercises in mid-1958 were carefully reviewed; SHAPE's plans for an operational readiness test program were outlined; and the exercises which would be sponsored or directed by SACEUR in the

(2) Ltr, AG 1700 OT, 16 Mar 56, sub: "The Broad Pattern of Higher Training 1958" to all MSCs, with Amendment of 20 Apr 57.
following year, 1959, were set forth by the Chairman.

The most significant portion of the conference centered around a recommendation by CINCENT that the exercise load in ACE be reduced. CINCENT felt that by so doing improved exercise planning and execution would result. Among his recommendations were proposals that the Annual Joint Atomic and Air Defense Exercises be combined in the future as they were to be in 1958. CINCENT proposed that exercise periods directed responsible or higher level commanders be limited to two per year and that major exercises be kept to a maximum of six days duration. He felt that the months of April and September should be fixed as the two periods for conduct of major exercises in Allied Command Europe. He recommended also that SACEUR sponsor the September exercise. For those years in which SACEUR's requirements for major exercises could not be fulfilled by the Joint Atomic-Air Defense exercises, he suggested that SACEUR establish the time setting for the second major exercise period in conjunction with Major Subordinate Commands. Regional commanders would be permitted at least one time in each three years to conduct the September exercise so as to meet their own specific needs without having SHAPE impose major requirements which would alter the setting of the exercise. It was also proposed that the exercise planning cycle start with the development of the tentative setting at the Allied Command Europe Training Conference two years before the exercise year in question and that a rough time frame for the setting of exercises be announced in the broad pattern document. With the exception of the first recommendation made by the CINCENT, all of these proposals were agreed to. As to the first recommendation - that the Joint Atomic and Air Defense Exercises continue to be combined --no definite commitment could be established until it was determined how well the existing plans succeeded in mid-1958.
The representatives of CINCSOUTH and CINCAFMED firmly supported CINCENT's recommendation, but the CINCNORTH representative said that because of the reserve call-up problems in the North, one major exercise period per year was the maximum to which CINCNORTH could commit himself. Any program involving reserve call-ups twice in one year would have to be considered carefully by Danish and Norwegian authorities.

The political factors involved in military exercises were commented upon by the chairman in view of the great interest at the political level in the NATO exercises which had been held in the past year. Although SHAPE did not intend to create a political reaction to exercises held in ACE, in view of fluctuating political tensions, no exercise was free of political consideration. General Sixsmith asked to be kept informed of any political factors which might influence the conduct of an exercise, and of any steps which the exercise sponsors had taken to minimize political effects, should the situation so dictate.

Also discussed at the conference were the broad pattern of higher training for 1960, the requirements for exercise briefs and reports and the matter of examining, during exercises, the probable effects of radiological fall-out.**(3)**

**ACE Readiness Test Program.**

On 12 November 1957, SHAPE had forwarded to the Major Subordinate Commanders certain proposals for establishing a program of readiness tests to improve the readiness posture of forces. The first program which SHAPE proposed was designed only for the air forces of ACE, both land-based and sea-based, in the retaliatory role and with either conventional or atomic weapons.**(4)**

**(3) Ltr, AG 2030 OT, 22 Jan 58, containing Minutes of ACE Training Conference at SHAPE, held on 17 Jan 58.**

**(4) For further details of SHAPE's proposals see Chapt.5, 1957 SHAPE History.**
On 16 January 1958, representatives from CINCNORTH, CINCENT, and CINCOUTH gathered at SHAPE for a meeting at which the ACE Readiness Test Program was discussed. The definitive agreements reached at this meeting among the conferees constituted the basis for future action. They agreed for example, that the purpose of a test would be two-fold: to assess the readiness posture of SACEUR’s air forces and to improve this posture by identifying and eliminating deficiencies in planning, execution and materiel. It was agreed that it would be possible to test readiness by "aspects," --by isolation of key emergency type actions which could be tested separately.

The test would be based on current operational plans including EDPs and ASPs of SACEUR and the MSCs. It would apply not only to plans for combat action but also to all plans for logistic and ordnance support, pre-stocking, etc. The exercise plans would have to resemble actual plans as closely as possible and in the future, it was agreed, would be published simultaneously with the actual plan. (5)

The first of a series of ACE-wide air operational readiness tests which stemmed from the meeting held in January took place on 10 December 1958. The purpose of this test was to determine the initial reaction capability of the strike forces with respect to their assigned mission in SACEUR's ASP in a situation where little or no warning was given. Only air units were involved. They were assessed on their ability to launch combat-ready aircraft with combat-ready crews and a completely filled out combat profile on an assigned target. Actual flying beyond marshalling at the end of the runway was left to the discretion of the strike force commanders. The first test appeared highly successful and it was decided that future tests would be even more comprehensive and would be held throughout ACE once each quarter.

(5) Ltr, AG 2200, 17 Feb 58, sub:"ACE Readiness Test Program," with enclosures.
Important NATO Exercises, 1958.

CPX VIII. CPX VIII, the last of a series of SHAPE Command Post exercises under the direction of Field Marshal Montgomery, Deputy Supreme Commander, Allied Command Europe, was held at SHAPE from 28 April to 1 May 1958, inclusive.

The exercise was attended by the NATO Council and senior members of the International Staff, by members of the Standing Group, by the majority of Chiefs of Staff of all the nations of the Atlantic Alliance, by the Supreme Commander and other senior officers of Allied Command Atlantic, by the Allied Commanders-in-Chief and senior officers of Channel Command, and by regional Commanders-in-Chief and other senior officers of Allied Command Europe.

For the first time in a SHAPE CPX, the Secretary-General of NATO took an active part in the exercise.

The purpose of the exercise was to study how best Allied Command Europe could produce the necessary forces in accordance with practical realities and financial possibilities.

The support available from SACLANT and CINCHAN for SACEUR was considered and discussed, and the problems of Air Defense in Allied Command Europe were given consideration.

The need for collective balanced forces throughout the nations of Allied Command Europe was emphasized, and the urgent need for a fully integrated air defense system was stressed.

Exercise FULL PLAY. The Joint Atomic-Air Defense exercise FULL PLAY was held under SACEUR's sponsorship from 3-5 June 1958. The exercise was staged in all regions except the Mediterranean. It was divided into two major portions, a joint atomic portion, code-named FAST PLAY, and the air defense portion, GOOD PLAY. There was a fundamental difference between FAST PLAY, the atomic part, and GOOD PLAY, the air defense part, because FAST PLAY was sponsored and
controlled by SHAPE and detailed plans were prepared in this head-
quarters. However, since SACEUR was only the air defense coordinator
of Allied Command Europe, GOOD PLAY, although sponsored by SHAPE,
was directed and controlled by the three Major Subordinate Commands.
Each regional commander, within the very broad framework given him
by SHAPE, had to prepare detailed plans which best suited the situation
and geography within his own area. The aim of the joint atomic portion
of FULL PLAY was to practice the procedures involved in the execution
of SACEUR's ASP. Particular emphasis was given to the practice of
procedures which previous exercises had shown to be deficient. All land,
naval and air forces assigned to/or earmarked for SACEUR plus elements
of SAC and the UK Bomber Command participated in the atomic portion.
All air forces participated on a "live" basis, while land and naval forces
in some cases used a CPX basis if the commander felt it appropriate. The
joint atomic portion FAST PLAY was considered to have had results supe-
rior to those achieved in any prior exercise. However, it was still apparent
that the volume of signals traffic required to put the ASP into effect, even
under the best conditions, imposed a capacity load on ACE's facilities.
Certainly in wartime this volume could not be maintained without consider-
able delay. The time required to pass the general alert/R-hour message
from SHAPE to operational units was less than before but there still was
a requirement to improve on this time. The time delay between atomic
strike and the receipt of reconnaissance results showed a need for further
improvement.

GOOD PLAY, the air defense portion of the exercise, was aimed
at exercising the overall air defense organization of ACE "including
national and local plans" against raid sorties generated by the joint atomic
exercise. Friendly air defense forces participating were those forces
assigned or earmarked to SACEUR including forces assigned to COMSTRIK-
FORSOUTH, as well as the air defense forces of Belgium, the Netherlands
and France. In addition, certain other national headquarters and NATO headquarters participated. This exercise concentrated an important part of the air defense forces of ACE in the TWOATAF and FOURATAF area. It demonstrated that the cooperation between air defense units was not sufficiently close because of inadequate communications. The early warning system was only partially effective owing obviously to inadequate radar equipment and lack of trained personnel throughout the system.

The primary difficulty hampering the execution of GOOD PLAY was the lack of an approved regional air defense plan. In fact, GOOD PLAY was actually three separate exercises (TWOATAF, FOURATAF, and French DAT areas) conducted simultaneously in Central Europe. Identification was an acute problem. The exercise revealed some definite differences of opinion between army and air force personnel regarding the operational use of NIKE. During the entire exercise more than 900 air defense sorties were flown with more than 800 raids being intercepted. There were also 830 successful NIKE engagements.

**Exercise MEDFLEX FORT.** MEDFLEX FORT was a major naval exercise held from 19-24 May 1958, which took place in the entire Mediterranean area from the Dardanelles to the Straits of Gibraltar and was intended to exercise Mediterranean forces in carrying out their appointed tasks at a relatively late stage in atomic war. As a supplementary aim, the redeployment of forces required for defense of the Aegean in the event that the Turkish Straits fell was also tested. CINCAF MED directed the exercise and retained operational command of Allied Forces Mediterranean. The stress in this exercise was on anti-submarine measures.

**Exercise HOSTAGE NOIR.** The problems of warfare within the Central Region based upon three types of aggression against NATO were

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(6) MC 43/6, NATO Exercises 1958, 18 Jan 59, Appendix B.  
(7) Ibid, Appendix C.
examined by CINCENT in Exercise HOSTAGE NOIR. The first two situations used the same enemy plan for an all-out attack by the communist bloc, except that in the first case the aggressor achieved complete surprise, while in the second case NATO forces were able to implement alert measures to achieve a higher degree of readiness before being attacked. The third part of the exercise considered a situation where the aggressor aimed only at limited objectives and confined his attack to the use of conventional weapons. Particular emphasis was placed upon problems of air defense and of communications in the Central zone. \(^{(8)}\)

**Exercise HOSTAGE BLEU.** In early November 1958 at the Ecole Superieure de Guerre in Paris, the Commander of Allied Forces Central Europe staged a map exercise of major importance. All senior land force commanders of the Central Region down to and including Corps Commanders, the ATAF Commanders, many national Chiefs of Staff and senior officers from SHAPE including SACEUR and DSACEUR attended this exercise, which was known as HOSTAGE BLEU. The exercise aimed at bringing military thinking among senior land force commanders into line on strategical land force problems within the area of LANDCENT. The aim was not to test current or future operational plans but to test new ideas on the conduct of operation in atomic warfare. This was the first occasion in which senior land force commanders in Central Europe had been able to exchange their ideas in detail. The setting for HOSTAGE BLEU was based on the type of war envisaged by MC 70 and the situation began on the evening of D-plus-2 with friendly forces on the defensive against the invader's initial success. The exercise ran progressively through five different problems and situations, each changing on a phased time basis. Stress was given to the use of ground atomic weapons during the land battle. \(^{(9)}\)

\(^{(8)}\) MC 43/6, NATO Exercises 1958, Appendix D.
\(^{(9)}\) Ibid, Appendix E.
Exercise CRESCENT HINGE. A Joint Atomic Strike Exercise was conducted in Western Turkey and adjacent waters on 7 and 8 October 1958. It included anti-submarine warfare play. Friendly forces were those assigned to CINCSOUTH, while the enemy forces were contributed by CINCAFMED and the RAF Bomber Command. CRESCENT HINGE was designed to exercise headquarters and units of AIRSOUTH, LANDSOUTHEAST and STRIKFORSOUTH; the implementation of SACEUR’s atomic strike plan; and CINCSOUTH’s regional atomic plan. It originally had been planned to hold Exercise CRESCENT HINGE in two phases — the first phase to practice execution of the ASPs, the second phase to exercise headquarters and units in joint direct air support operations and amphibious landing operations. However, because of the politically difficult situation in the Eastern Mediterranean during the Autumn of 1958, it was judged prudent to cancel phase two, particularly the amphibious landing operation. The objectives of phase one were carried out and accomplished. Excellent training in strike air defense and anti-submarine operations was received by the forces participating.

Cancellation of Exercise FLAME TIDE. Unsettled political conditions in the Mediterranean area were responsible for the complete cancellation of one major exercise during 1958. Exercise FLAME TIDE had been scheduled for the period 12-19 September, to test through manoeuvres and CPX the capability of the ground forces situation in Northern Greece and Turkish Thrace. SACEUR’s alert system, the current EDP of LANDSOUTHEAST, the reconnaissance capability of SIXATAF and STIKFORSOUTH and their capability in conventional and atomic strikes in support of Greek and Turkish forces were to be tested. However, owing to the difficulties of mounting a large-scale exercise in the Eastern Mediterranean under the circumstances which then existed, SACEUR decided to cancel the exercise. In order to derive the maximum benefits possible from participation in the planning, national authorities conducted appropriate portions
of the exercise under national auspices. NATO officers and staff commanders participated only as observers.  \(^{(10)}\)

**Exercises in General.**

While no major problems were encountered in planning exercises, several important problems were met in their execution. First, inadequate communications continued to be a major problem, particularly in North Norway and Turkey and between land headquarters and headquarters afloat. The communications security during Exercise FULL PLAY revealed practices and procedures which could have compromised portions of operational plans.

Lack of adequate communications made it necessary for Subordinate Commanders, to act over considerable periods in absence of contact with their superiors. An overall air defense plan based on the principle of integration was badly needed. Before the emergency defense plan could be implemented there had to be a high degree of readiness. The highest possible state of readiness within current resources, and additional resources critical to the survival and retaliation had to be obtained.

**Integration of Training Resources.**

Training was basically a national responsibility but in those cases where training requirements were obviously beyond the capacity of the individual nation concerned, SHAPE felt that special arrangements should be made on a NATO basis to meet these requirements. Toward this end a number of special training facilities had already been created and others were under development. These were:

- Development of Air Weapons Training Installations - Solenzara and Decimomannu;
- Development of fighter weapons instructor school at Solenzara;
- Investigation of the problems of practice firing range facilities for the training of missile units in Europe;

\(^{(10)}\) Ltr, AG 1700 OANDT, 11 Mar 59, to SGN, sub: "Report on NATO Exercises 1958."
- Development of the NATO Tactical Air Navigation School at the Royal Netherlands Air Force-Radar School, Deelen, Netherlands;
- The Action Speed Tactical Trainer at Malta for the NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean;
- Use of the Royal Navy Tactical School at Woolwich, England, for NATO naval forces in the Northern region;
- Instruction of the ACE naval officers in atomic warfare both at the SACLANT facility, Norfolk, and by ACLANT touring teams;
- The Instruction provided by US Military Assistant Advisory Groups;
- Joint use of areas or ranges, particularly in the Central Region; as examples, use of the AA range at Putlos by Northern Army Group forces and the Hohne tank ranges by both Northern and Central Army Groups;
- Four NATO Courses at the School of Land/Air Warfare, Old Sarum, U.K.;
- A NATO senior officers' Study Period at the Joint Concealment Centre, Netheraven, U.K.;
- Three NATO courses at the Joint Services Amphibious Warfare Centre, Poole, Dorset, U.K.;
- Three NATO courses at the US Army Special Weapons School, Oberammergau, Germany;
- A NATO air-ground operations course at the USAFE Air-Ground School, Ramstein, Germany;
- SHAPE Orientation Course for Staff Signal Officers conducted by the Signal Division at SHAPE.

In January 1958, SHAPE had, in an effort to bring about some of the benefits of integration in training resources, asked the nations which of their training establishments could be enlarged to admit a NATO intake and what future training requirements were envisaged for which outside assistance would be required and which, therefore, would be best handled on a NATO basis. The replies received to these queries were inconclusive and led nowhere. SHAPE, therefore, decided that the problem should be re-appraised with a view to streamlining the combined military effort of NATO and thus relieving the financial burden of costs on the
NATO nations. In December 1958, SHAPE addressed all the Major Subordinate Commanders on the three related problems of integration of training resources, the advisability of establishing a NATO Staff College and the means of improving integration of Allied Command Europe pilot training programs. The Major Subordinate Commanders were asked to give their full consideration to these problems which were outlined and described for them in the SHAPE communication and to advise SHAPE by 30 January 1959 of their comments and recommendations. (11)

**Broad Pattern of Higher Training 1960.**

As had been the case in the past, SHAPE issued in April 1958 a directive extending SACEUR's training policy three years into the future, in this case through the year 1960. The factors which would affect training in 1960, the training aims for that year and the exercises which would be held in 1960, which was the third year of the NATO three-year training cycle, were set out in this directive. The directive was sent to all Major Subordinate Commanders for action, with all national MODs in Allied Command Europe being furnished information copies. (12)

**Release of Information on NATO Exercises.**

The full report on NATO exercises which had been held in 1957 was furnished to the NATO Council in mid-1958. Some of the Council members felt that this was too long a delay following the completion of the exercises and that the Council should be furnished full information on the results of an exercise as soon as possible after the exercise had been concluded. (13)

(11) Ltr, AG 1100 OANDT, 5 DEC 58, to MSCs, sub: "Integration of Training Resources."
(12) Ltr, AG 1700 OT, 5 Feb 58, to all MSCs, sub: "The Broad Pattern of Higher Training 1960."
(13) Msg, SCO IN 1283, SGREP to SGN, 2 Jul 58.
Length of National Military Service.

A problem which had serious effect on the combat readiness of SACEUR's forces and which had never been resolved satisfactorily was taken under very careful study during 1958. Since the formation of SHAPE, various nations had reduced the length of the period of national service, reducing accordingly, of course, the period of training and, in the SHAPE view, the overall effectiveness of the forces. In November 1957, at SACEUR's request, Edinburgh University made available the services of Mr. Denis McMahon, Senior Lecturer of Psychology, who was asked to study the question of the length of national service from the scientific point of view. Previously the problem had been studied by SHAPE and the staff recommendation was that countries be asked not to reduce their periods of national service below 18 months. In carrying out his investigations during 1958, Mr. McMahon visited infantry, tank and artillery units of six of the NATO nations in the field and had conferences with commanding officers of these units. During this period he talked with more than 450 officers from these nations. He attempted to determine the point at which a plateau in the curve of military efficiency of troops was reached and concluded that under normal conditions of training it took an average of 12 months to train new recruits to a point where the curve of military efficiency flattened out. This did not mean that troops after 12 months ceased to improve, but merely that after 12 months their improvement was less marked. The time required to train NCOs and detachment commanders averaged about 18 months. The factors, of course, which affected the achievement of combat readiness included the strength and experience of the regular NCO cadre; the quality of the troops; the replacement system; the availability of training areas and equipment; and the amount of administration and housekeeping duties which impeded training. Mr. McMahon, in the report which he submitted to SACEUR, pointed out that, in his opinion, there was no spectacular means by which
the time needed for training could be shortened; that during the first 12 months the actual time troops spent in training was a major factor in obtaining efficiency. Additional time was needed in hardening and welding troops into combat teams before they were combat ready.

While the nation depended on national service to provide a significant proportion of its army, it was not possible to reduce national service below 18 months and still retain NATO assigned forces at a fully acceptable state of combat readiness.⁷⁴

The Training Area Problem.

One of the most serious problems in the field of training was that of procuring land training areas on which to conduct unit and individual training. This was particularly true in Germany, where the acquisition of land which had been difficult during 1957 remained acute during 1958. SHAPE had been attempting for some time to coordinate arrangements for use of a combined training area on the German-Belgian border, the Vogelsang-Elsenborn area. Efforts had been made to provide this area with the understanding that both German and Belgian forces would utilize it as well as a third nation, which both Belgium and Germany had agreed would be allowed to use the area during a six weeks training period.⁷⁵

The Belgian General Staff, working through SHAPE, proposed that a meeting be held with German representatives in order that bi-lateral arrangements be made for the division of the remainder of the training time between Belgium and Germany. On 24 June 1958, the Chief of Staff, SHAPE, wrote to the Chief of the German Armed Forces Staff proposing


(15) Ltr, General Schuyler to General Heusinger, 24 Jan 58; Ltr, General Schuyler to General Harteon, 24 Jan 58.
that such a meeting be held and that SHAPE send an observer to this meeting.

In his reply the German official pointed out that establishing a common training ground at Vogelsang-Elsenborn was still far from a reality and would require a considerable length of time. This stemmed from the necessity for securing agreement of the local government, LAND NORDRHEIN-WESTFALEN to the extension of the Vogelsang training area. He suggested that Belgian-German discussions and negotiations be postponed until agreement had been reached for the acquisition of the necessary land within Germany. The Chief of Staff, SHAPE, kept this issue open, however, by again addressing General Heusinger on 18 April, pointing out that, while he fully appreciated the difficulties in securing additional land, certain developments worthy of attention had taken place in the meantime. At SHAPE's request, the suspension formerly imposed on infrastructure funds for this training project had been lifted because agreement on participation by a third nation had been reached. It was understood from the Commander of Northern Army Group that both the UK and the Netherlands would be prepared to use the area as the "third nation." General Schuyler pointed out that regardless of the difficulty of acquiring land between Vogelsang and the German/Belgian frontier, some progress had to be made in the form of negotiations since it might be difficult to justify retention of the funds temporarily available unless this was done. He asked that Germany commence negotiations for the division of the remaining training time with Belgian authorities and, secondly, that they start at once negotiating to acquire the necessary land. At the same time, SHAPE asked Belgian authorities to acquire the necessary land on their side of the frontier. 

(16) Ltr, General Heusinger to General Schuyler, 19 Feb 58;
Ltr, General Schuyler to General Heusinger, 18 Apr 58;
Ltr, General Schuyler to General Harteon, 18 Apr 58.
About a month later, German officials replied to General Schuyler's request, pointing out that negotiations were presently being held with the government of the Land Nordrhein-Westfalen but that these negotiations were "at present rather difficult owing to the forthcoming elections for the Landtag" and that the negotiations on land procurement could be considered only after an agreement had been reached with the Land Government on the solution of the problem. He did not feel that there would be any point in trying to schedule training times with the Belgians, since it was not possible to predict whether or not they would be successful in securing the necessary land. As a result of this reply, SHAPE notified the Belgian Chief of Staff that it would be advisable to postpone negotiations awaiting results of the local German general elections. The Belgian authorities were also holding up acquisition of land awaiting results of the action in Germany. On 10 June, General Schuyler asked General Heusinger to raise the matter with local authorities as soon as practical after the elections had taken place. "As you know," he said, "SHAPE had originally planned for more land training areas in Germany but it being impossible to acquire such land, SHAPE has concurred in foregoing all projects except the Vogelsang-Elsenborn. You are well aware, of course, of the vital importance of this specific training area." SHAPE kept pressing this issue closely and on 14 August, once the elections were over in Germany and a new Landtag had been formed in Nordrhein-Westfalen, General Schuyler again asked the German authorities to consider this project. (17)

The recruiting and training of sufficient technicians and specialists continued to be a major military problem in Allied Command Europe during 1958, as the requirement for such personnel increased with the

(17) Ltr, General Heusinger to General Schuyler, 23 May 58; Ltr, General Schuyler to General Heusinger, 10 Jun 58; Ltr, General Schuyler to General Heusinger, 14 Aug 58.
progressive introduction of more sophisticated weapons and equipment. Although much progress had been made in training during 1957, this had not been matched by recruitment of sufficient men capable of being trained to the high standards required in the modern age. The competition from industry for technical manpower increased this problem.

On 12 February 1958, SACEUR told CINCENT that he was also concerned over the slow progress in solving the problem of land training areas within Central Europe. There was a danger that even though the nations contributed sufficient forces to the Shield, this lack of land training areas might make it impossible to train them adequately.

NATO Naval Training Centre.

For some time efforts had been made to activate a NATO Naval Training Centre to serve some of the navies in the Northern European area, to include Norway, Denmark and Germany. During 1957 two proposals had been made, one an interim plan to use an existing tactical school at Woolwich, England, sponsored by the Royal Navy and the other a long term plan to activate a Centre in either Norway, Denmark or Germany, run jointly by the user nations. In early 1958, however, the UK made a firm offer to SHAPE to sponsor two 3-week courses at Woolwich which would serve the purpose of NATO. Following a meeting in London between SHAPE officers and UK officials, SHAPE arranged for the nations concerned to discuss directly with the Tactical School the establishment of a NATO Naval Officers Course, involving the Northern European nations, and determined the number of studies which would be handled at each course.

Twenty-one officers from Germany, Denmark and Norway attended the first NATO Naval Tactical Course at the Royal Naval Tactical School at Woolwich from 24 March to 11 April 1958. It was decided that further courses would include instructions in Baltic Operations and the attendance from other NATO navies would be sought. (18)

(18) AG 2030 SEC, 25 Apr 58.
Belgian-Netherlands Training Agreement.

On 23 September the MODs of the Netherlands and Belgium announced that they had agreed to integrate training of their Air Forces. This culminated a great deal of effort by SHAPE in the form of discussions with authorities of both nations to bring about this first step for what might be considered collective, balanced forces. The integration agreed upon by the Dutch and Belgians was that the Belgians would take care of the initial training of Dutch and Belgian pilots and the Netherlands would take care of the second phase of the pilots' training until completion. The MODs had agreed on a joint maintenance program for guided missiles and had agreed further a continued effort for achieving coordinated European military projects. (19)

(19) AG 2030 SECY, 25 Sep 58.
CHAPTER V

COMMAND STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION

The majority of the problems encountered during 1958 in the area of command structure and organization within Allied Command Europe were problems arising from the international nature of SACEUR's command.

Command Structure, Central Europe

In late 1957 General Valluy had made a number of proposals for changes in the command structure within his region of Allied Command Europe, particularly in the land forces structure. SACEUR had replied to him on 20 December telling him not to take any definite action to change the command structure for the present time.

On 24 January 1958, in talking with General Norstad, General Valluy again brought up this matter, pointing out that he was ready to start discussion with the nations on possible changes in command structure. General Valluy followed this visit with a letter to General Norstad in which CINCENT made certain proposals with regard to logistic support of his forces, deployment of his forces and the command structure. He said that at the present time his forces were disposed to carry out what he called a "half forward strategy." He therefore felt it was necessary to position east of the Rhine a 15-day combat supply load and to organize depots to support the battle east of the Rhine. He felt also that it would be necessary to recommend to the nations a wartime deployment plan for land forces based on the minimum force study from which would develop what he called a peacetime location plan, a general depot infrastructure plan and a better general command structure. He felt it was time to go
to the nations and to begin studying seriously this matter of command structure and deployment as well as logistical arrangements. He felt that logistical integration to a greater degree was absolutely necessary and he asked to be allowed to start without delay negotiating with the nations for the movement of supplies east of the Rhine and deployment in command structure improvements.\(^1\)

SACEUR explained once again to CINCENT that he did not want to suggest any specific major alterations, even for the future, to the nations. He stated that he did not feel that all the factors which might influence the situation were sufficiently clear at present to warrant a discussion with national authorities and he said, "I propose to withhold action of changing structure as proposed by CINCENT until at least the Spring of 1959." With regard to logistical matters, however, he had another view. "I fully agree," SACEUR stated, "that it is now appropriate for you to consider with national authorities the problems of improved logistic support and I shall shortly advise these authorities of my request to you to raise this matter with them.\(^2\)

On 29 March 1958, General Valluy sent to SHAPE his conclusions and views on the advantages and disadvantages of having levels of national or international command at the major groupings such as corps and army. He had earlier discussed with General Norstad the possibility of eliminating an echelon of command. His study showed the advantages and disadvantages in more detail and discussed the problem of whether there should be for Central Europe a command structure which was national for some forces and inter-allied for others. In a personal letter to General Valluy on 3 May, General Schuyler pointed out that it would be very difficult to establish an entirely homogeneous organization throughout Central Europe.

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\(^1\) Ltr, CINCENT to SACEUR received 5 Feb 58, 1240/JLA/98/58.
\(^2\) Ltr, General Norstad to General Valluy, 12 Feb 58.
and stated that he believed that SACEUR felt the same way about this. "However," General Schuyler continued, "SACEUR is still firmly convinced that we now have too many echelons of command and that one such echelon should somehow be reduced - not necessarily in the same way for each nation or for each sector."(3)

At the meeting of the Military Committee on 14 March 1958, when MC 70 was being considered, a German representative made a very strong statement pointing out that higher command headquarters and command systems within ACE should be organized along what he termed "more rational lines." He claimed that recent Command Post exercises had pointed up weaknesses in these headquarters and Command systems. Moreover, he maintained, over-sized headquarters inherently generated activities which burdened the combat units and further were not in keeping with the requirements of nuclear warfare.

The Canadian representative strongly supported the German statement, pointing out that the NATO command structure was originally established to cater for a considerably larger force than existed, and it was certainly over-sized.

General Norstad stated that he had taken and was constantly taking action to modify the command structure but that, while this was easy from an Allied standpoint, it was somewhat more difficult to accomplish from a national standpoint. He considered, however, that simplification was necessary, and told the Military Committee that he would welcome any support to that end.

As a result, an addition to paragraph 34 of MC 70 was made, which stated: "The organization and size of the higher commands must be reviewed with a view to their rationalization in the field of personnel and materiel.

(3) Ltr, with enclosed study, CINCENT to SHAPE, 2200/CAB-C0S/168; Ltr, General Schuyler to General Valluy, 3 May 58.
The command and reporting system is in need of simplification and unification."(4)

Reorganization of CINCENT's Headquarters.

On 17 July 1958, CINCENT told SACEUR that he felt that the structure of his command in Fontainebleau with its four headquarters, CINCENT, COMAIRCENT, COMNAVCENT and COMLANDCENT, was too unwieldy and would prove in time of war. He felt that in peacetime he should have a single, fully integrated, joint, well-balanced headquarters along the lines of SHAPE, and that the various elements of his single headquarters should be installed close together, using the same administrative support and facilities. He had studied the revision of the existing structure and forwarded this to SHAPE for consideration by SACEUR. He proposed that his Staff be composed of 50% Army, 35% Air Force and 15% Naval personnel. While the reorganization chart which he forwarded did not allocate posts among nations, he realized that such allocation would give rise to political difficulties but this he felt was no reason to reject an effective solution. He felt that it would be necessary to move his headquarters further and that it would be well to abandon Fontainebleau as a location as soon as possible.\(^{(5)}\)

SACEUR did not approve General Valluy's proposals and on 6 August told him that he appreciated his efforts to improve his headquarters but that under existing conditions, the present system should be continued. General Valluy did not, however, give up his ideas on this matter and,

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(4) Summary Record, 19th Session, Mil.Comtee, sect.6, STSC/333/58,1Apr58.
(5) For details of reorganization suggested by CINCENT see letter, sub: "Organization of Central Europe Headquarters," General Valluy to SACEUR, 17 Jul 58, 2500/CAB/COS/357, with 3 encl.
For views of one of CINCENT's principal subordinate commanders on this reorganization, see also letter to General Valluy from COMAIRCENT, CC-2202/1, sub: "Command Organization Fontainebleau," 29 Jul 58.
on 16 October expounded in greater length and detail on his proposals. He sent a copy of this letter to SACEUR telling him that his study was continuing and that he was concerned lest his command be unprepared for what he called the great revolution in strategy involved in the future adoption of the Forward Strategy concept. (6)

Further Progress toward Establishment of COMNAVBALTAP.

During 1957 considerable effort had been made to find some solution to the vexing problem of establishing a satisfactory command arrangement in the Baltic. The negotiations which had taken place during that year bore a certain amount of fruit since COMNAVNORCENT had been established at Holtenau, Germany. On 15 October, COMNAVNORCENT established a North/Center Naval Planning Group.

The North/Center Planning Group was charged with preparing for the Naval Command organization in the Baltic recommendations which would be forwarded through CINCNORTH to CINCENT. This Group recommended that for the area of Danish territory, Schleswig-Holstein and West German territory down to the boundary between AFNORTH and AFCENT, the Kattegat, the Baltic Straits, and the Baltic Sea west of 16° east, an overall naval command, COMNAVBALTAP, with an integrated staff should be established. The Planning Group further proposed that directly under COMNAVBALTAP should be two Subordinate Commands, Flag Officer Denmark (FOD) and COMNAVGERBALT, each with assigned areas of primary responsibility. These two Subordinate Commands, as a general rule, would command forces of their own nationality. However, in the areas south-east of the main Danish islands, several tasks would exist which

(6) See Ltr, CINCENT to COMAIRCENT, sub: "Organization of Command at Fontainebleau," 16 Oct 58, 2500/CAB/COS/476; and Ltr to all Subordinate Commanders from CINCENT sub: "Central Europe Headquarters Organization," 22 Aug 58, 2500/CAB/COS/402; and Ltr CINCENT to SACEUR, no subject, 22 Aug 58, 2500/CAN/COS/403.
could not be assigned to the forces of one nation only and a more functional organization would have to be established. CINCNORTH discussed this problem in great detail, saying that he agreed that the Planning Group had produced a sensible and clear paper and that in general terms he accepted the conclusions. The main stumbling block which he saw in this matter was the extreme reluctance of the Danish Government to accept a joint command with the Germans, even in principle. He recommended that the principle of command and the location of headquarters be kept separate issues. As to the nationality of the Naval Commander, CINCNORTH accepted the prevailing view that the Commander should be either a German or a Dane and that the command should rotate between the two nationalities. The Germans had already said they would like a Danish Admiral as the first Commander but CINCNORTH doubted that Denmark would accept this, since, by implication, it would force them to accept a German as the next one. He believed, however, that they would accept a British Admiral.

At a meeting which recently had been held between CINCNORTH and SACEUR, SACEUR had ruled that when the new command, COMNAVBALTAP was established, COMNAVNORTH had to be abolished and replaced by the Naval Deputy at Kolsaas of a lower rank. SACEUR also ruled that all planning and discussion in the future on COMNAVBALTAP was to be based on the assumption that Denmark and the Baltic area were to remain in the Baltic Command and would not in due course be transferred to Central Europe. However, CINCENT was obviously involved since the Holtenau Planning Group was responsible to both CINCNORTH and CINCENT and the German Naval Forces in the Baltic in peacetime were assigned to CINCENT through COMNAVCENT. (7)

Within several days after receiving CINCNORTH's views, SACEUR was furnished a detailed paper on the Baltic from General Valluy, who was concerned primarily with the control of army forces in the area. He pointed out that the defense of the Baltic was primarily the concern of Germany and Denmark but that the axes of defense for the two nations were divergent, Germany's axis running east and west and that for Denmark north and south. He charged that there was no defense plan for that area, but simply a withdrawal east-west for the German forces and south-north for the Danish forces. He believed that unless a joint command with strong German representation was formed, no north-south support could be expected from the Germans. He felt that within a joint command there would be subordinate amphibious commands, or even purely naval commands, if necessary, which would be responsible for the initial defense of the advanced posts and which would command both Danish and German forces. He felt that the command could well be given to a British Admiral. (8)

On 26 April, SHAPE sent a reply to General Valluy revealing General Norstad's thinking on the situation in the Baltic. CINCENT was told that purely from the military standpoint, General Norstad would not and could not disagree with his general concept of a tri-service command for Denmark, Schleswig-Holstein and the Baltic Approaches, with the commander of this to be responsible directly to SACEUR. German authorities had also supported this position. However, General Norstad recognized that a number of other factors than purely military ones tended to draw the Scandinavian countries together. The overall strength and position of these nations as a group was considerably greater than the sum of their individual strengths and General Norstad considered it would be a mistake to form a military organization which would separate Denmark from Norway. For the next year or two, SACEUR envisaged efforts toward a better

integration of the forces within the framework of the present Northern command structure. He visualized the early establishment of three separate service commands with their three commanders operating in an emergency from a single JCOC, probably in Northern Denmark. The framework for two of these commands - Land Command (LANDDENMARK) and the Air Command (AIRDENMARK) already existed. This made it even more urgent in General Norstad's view that a third command in COMNAV-BALTAP be established. SHAPE then explained to General Valluy why General Norstad in the previous year had assigned the newly created German forces in Schleswig-Holstein to CINCNORTH. He felt that if these forces were brought to full strength as rapidly as possible, the Danes might be persuaded to integrate them into LANDDENMARK, accepting at the same time certain German officers for the Staff of LANDDENMARK, and General Valluy was warned that General Norstad felt strongly that any transfer of these units to Center Command would be a step in the wrong direction.

As to the nationality of the future COMNAVBAL TAP, General Norstad was prepared to accept a Commander of any nationality to which the nations involved would agree. He realized, however, that it might be impossible to secure agreement on either a Dane or a German for this post and he intended in this case to urge a British Admiral as the first Commander. As has been stated when COMNAVBAL TAP was formed, COMNAVNORTH would be abolished.

From the military standpoint it was indeed feasible to establish a single NATO Naval Commander in the Baltic, the questions of his nationality and to whom he would be assigned notwithstanding. In peacetime all German Naval forces assigned to NATO were under the command of CINCENT through COMNAVCENT and COMNORSEACENT. In wartime the German

(9) Ltr, General Schuyler to General Valluy, 26 Apr 58.
Naval forces in the North Sea sub-area (COMNORSEACENT) would remain under CINCENT, while those forces in the Baltic Sea area would come under the command of CINCNORTH through COMNAVNORTH. (10)

During CPX VIII when the Major Subordinate Commanders were present in Paris, SHAPE representatives exchanged views with Commanders and Staff from both CINCNORTH and CINCENT. It was obvious, however, from a letter which General Valluy had addressed to General Norstad on 9 May 1958 following the CPX, that he had not changed his view expressed earlier that there should be a tri-service single command and that the Baltic area, because of its growing German defense forces, must maintain very close ties in all areas with CINCENT. A copy of this letter was made available to CINCNORTH who recapitulated his views on this difficult and complex problem on 29 May 1958. He said that Denmark, Schleswig-Holstein and the Western Baltic should be regarded as one major tactical area with one command organization commanding the service of all three services and all nationalities operating in the area, and repeated his contention that the headquarters should be located in Central Jutland. CINCNORTH saw that once a forward strategy had been adopted that the area in question should be included in the Central European Command since the land battle in Schleswig-Holstein and the North German Plain would be one single battle and that the large proportion of air forces in the Baltic area would come from Central Europe. Because, however, a forward strategy would not be adopted for a long time and because the Danes had said they did not wish to be separated from Norway in the NATO command organization, CINCNORTH had continued his planning on the basis that the Western Baltic area would remain under him. He detailed the situation which existed with regard to the possibilities for setting up a joint command organization under CINCNORTH, pointing out that there was a

(10) Staff Study, Single NATO Commander for German Naval Forces, 30 Apr 58.
ICOC - the land force and the air force headquarters - already in existence. It would be a simple matter from a technical point of view to set up a headquarters to control German and Danish forces in the Western Baltic. A single commander with headquarters near Køge would have Flag Officer Denmark and Commander of the German Baltic Fleet as direct subordinates. He then discussed the political situation with regard to establishing his headquarters and asked that SACEUR issue planning instructions on which all concerned could concentrate. (11)

Meanwhile, General Norstad had been working on a solution to the appointment of a COMNAVBALTAP. He felt that a Canadian Admiral would be acceptable to both Danes and Germans, and on 13 June 1958, asked the Canadian Government to make available to him a Canadian officer for this assignment. He told the Canadian Government that, once he had received agreement in principle to the assignment of a Canadian Admiral, he would put the matter before the Standing Group and would establish COMNAVBALTAP. COMNAVBALTAP would be responsible to CINCNORTH for the defense of the Baltic Straits in war, for peacetime planning and for the conduct of naval exercises in that area. The assignment would entail command in war of the major portions of the German and Danish forces. The Commander would have a small integrated staff consisting mainly of German and Danish officers with possibly one or two US or UK officers. (12)

The Canadian Government, however, was unable to provide a qualified flag officer for the post of COMNAVBALTAP. This was unfortunate since SACEUR had received approval from the Danish and German authorities informally with the understanding that a Canadian admiral would be made available for the post. SACEUR then decided that the most reasonable alternative would be to propose a senior British admiral for the

(11) Ltr, General Sugden to General Norstad, AFNE, 29 May 58.
(12) Msg, SACEUR to MOD Canada, SCO OUT 24318, 13 Jun 58.
post of COMNAVBALTAP. On 21 July, he asked CINCNORTH for his views on this matter, pointing out that there probably would be objections from the German side, and that his proposal would have a better chance of acceptance if he could announce at the same time the elimination of COMNAVNORTH. He asked for the comments of General Sugden on this project.\(^{13}\)

CINCNORTH agreed that COMNAVBALTAP should be established and that initially a British officer would be a reasonable alternative as Commander. He preferred, however, to have him at the rank of rear-admiral. With regard to the inactivation of COMNAVNORTH, CINCNORTH felt that this command should continue for several months after establishment of COMNAVBALTAP.\(^{14}\)

SACEUR replied that there were two reasons for having a rear-admiral as the first commander. First, it would afford a smooth transition to assign the present Chairman of the North Group, General Townsend (COMNAVNORCENT), as the first commander and it would be more adaptable for a future command wherein the Joint Commander would have a three-star rank. He told General Murray that he would be writing to the Standing Group and would at that time request the disestablishment of COMNAVNORTH concurrent with or shortly following COMNAVBALTAP.

The German Viewpoint.

SACEUR learned in early August that the Germans contended that the only militarily acceptable solution was for the whole of the Danish peninsula, to include the Danish Commands of COMNORSEACENT and COMNAVCINCENT to come under the command of CINCENT. The reasons for this were strategic in that it would be impossible for the Northern Commander to exercise command as far south as the Elbe and again, of

\(^{13}\) Msg, SACEUR to CINCNORTH, SCO OUT 25114, 21 Jul 58. See also Memorandum for General Schuyler from Admiral Sala, sub:
course, the air support for the battle must come from Central Europe. Operations from airfields in Denmark would be out of the question during wartime and clearly no carrier could be expected from the North Sea. Any logistic support coming from overseas would have to come through France, Belgium or Holland. The Germans, of course, wanted their naval forces under one command. If the military solution which they wanted could not be accepted by the Danes, the Germans stated that they would prefer to retain status quo in the Baltic, rather than to accept an interim solution. The German authorities doubted whether the Danish Government would accept the principle of alternative naval commands, Danish and German, but they were quite fixed in their attitude that they would not accept a NATO Baltic Naval Commander over their forces unless the Danes agreed that the Commander should alternate between the two nations.

On 11 August, SACEUR sent to all interested MODs a proposed letter to the Standing Group setting forth the request for the establishment of an Allied Naval Command for the Baltic Approaches. SACEUR's proposals envisaged the establishment of COMNAV BALTAP on 1 April 1959, the disestablishment of COM NAVNORCENT and the North Center Planning Group and placing Flag Officer Norway directly under CINCNORTH. Simultaneously, he proposed to begin the disestablishment of COM NAVNORTH. HE stated that he intended to appoint the Chairman of the North Center Planning Group, Rear Admiral Townsend, a British Admiral, as initial commander of this organization but that when Townsend completed his tour of duty he would be replaced by a Flag Officer from one of the nations.

(13).../ Establishment of a Naval Command Baltic Approaches, 10 Jul 58, and Memorandum for Record, COFS's conversations with Admiral Qvistgaard, Chief of Defense, Denmark, at Copenhagen, 4 Jul 58, dtd 12 Jul 58.
(15) Memorandum for Record, sub: "Discussion on Baltic Naval Command during visit of Vice-Naval Depty to MOD Bonn," 7 Aug 58, NAVDEP 70.
contributing forces to this command. A proposed set of terms of reference for COMNAVBALTAP was also enclosed. (16)

Initial reaction to SACEUR's proposals was mixed but there was so much opposition voiced that SACEUR decided he would not place the matter before the Standing Group for a decision. French comments on SACEUR's proposals indicated that the French Government saw no reason for the immediate establishment of COMNAVBALTAP, although it would not object in principle. However, the French would not agree to placing COMNAVBALTAP under CINCNORTH and that instead it should, from its activation, be placed under CINCENT. (17)

The Norwegian Government concurred without comment in SACEUR's proposals to the Standing Group. (18)

The UK Government agreed but commented on the fact that, militarily, placing the Baltic Approaches Command under the Center was more suitable and by wondering why it would not be possible to disestablish NAVCENT at the same time COMNAVBALTAP was set up. In view of the reservations expressed, General Norstad decided that he would hold up further action on the Baltic Naval Command until a greater measure of agreement among the nations could be reached. On 19 October, he notified the MODs that COMNAVNORCENT and the North Center Planning Group would continue to function under their existing terms of reference and that in the event of war the German Naval Forces Baltic would pass to the command of CINCNORTH. On 31 October 1958, SACEUR notified the Standing Group of this action. This did not settle the matter, however, and certain nations were disturbed about certain aspects of SACEUR's stated original plan. For example, MOD Denmark became concerned over press

(16) Ltr, SHAPE to MODs, sub: "Establishment of Allied Naval Forces Command Baltic Approaches," w/encl ltr to SG, 11 Aug 58, AG1530/2 PANDP.
(18) Ltr, NMR Norway to SACEUR, 29 Aug 58.
reports that Danish territory might be transferred from the Northern region and placed under the Center. General Norstad felt impelled to reassure MOD Denmark in a personal cable that his headquarters had no plans or proposals involving any changes in the command arrangements which would place Denmark under the Center nor did he expect to propose such a change in the future.\(^{(19)}\)

CINCENT's Problems.

On 16 July 1958, CINCENT forwarded to SACEUR a fairly brief statement of four of the major outstanding problems which, from a strategic standpoint, were bothering him and his commanders and for which he hoped that a solution could be worked out. The 1958 EDP stated that the primary line of defense would be east of the Rhine. According to General Valluy this decision had been taken because of the belief that all ground units would be equipped with tactical atomic weapons which would allow them to defend even though there was no defensive barrier or obstacle such as the Rhine. While the Central Army Group was equipped with atomic weapons, no such weapons existed in Northern Army Group. A solution had been worked out which involved the formation of a Northern Atomic Task Force, drawn from CENTAG's forces, which would move into the area Northern Army Group in an emergency. However, General Valluy felt that this solution was unsatisfactory because of the time involved to move this force to position in NORTHAG's area. The only way out according to him would be to equip the various national forces with their own organic atomic weapons. The second problem was the lack of surveillance of the frontier areas between East and West Germany, which under current rules could be done only by British and American forces.

\(^{(19)}\) Ltr, AG 1530/2 PANDP, sub:"Establishment of Allied Naval Forces Command Baltic Approaches," 18 Oct 58; Ltr to SG, sub:"Allied Naval Commandin the Baltic Approaches," 31 Oct 58. See also SHAPE 118/58, Ltr, Gen Norstad to Gen Valluy, 8 Aug 58, and Ltr to CINCENT AG 1530/2 PANDP, 16 Sep 58. Additional information on COMNAVBALTAP problems in AFNORTH 165/58; Ltr DEN NMR 79/58; SH/118/58.
The commander of Northern Army Group found this a very difficult situation and felt that the forces of the German Defense and Security Force should share the work of surveillance under NATO's overall supervision. Thirdly, General Valluy was concerned over the problem of how operational command would be assumed by NATO commanders in an emergency. He insisted that assigned forces be placed under NATO command the moment the orange alert was declared.(20)

Reconstitution of Headquarters TWO ATAF.

When Headquarters TWO ATAF, located at Munchen-G adbach, was first activated in 1952, it was superimposed upon the UK National Headquarters. This arrangement was adopted for reasons of economy and to achieve effectiveness at as early a date as possible. However, in the meantime, the air forces of Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as of the UK, had been assigned to the Commander of TWO ATAF and had been subject to tactical plans requiring integrated effort. However, COMTWOATAF had never been authorized an integrated international staff to assist him in discharging his international responsibilities as a NATO Military Commander. The principle of the integration of forces at the tactical air forces level had been confirmed by the North Atlantic Council in October 1954. It was obvious that with the advent and build-up of the German Air Force, elements of which would be assigned to COMTWOATAF, there was an additional requirement that COMTWOATAF be authorized an independent integrated allied staff for exercise of his responsibilities. It was foreseen also that the development of plans and organization for the integration of air defense in Allied Command Europe would place further responsibilities upon this Commander at the Allied Tactical Air Force level.

(20) Ltr, CINCENT to SACEUR, 16 Jul 58, 1240/CAB/COS/360.
In 1958, SHAPE submitted to the nations concerned a proposed international peace establishment for headquarters TWOATAF. The proposed international personnel establishment for both staff and support troops for headquarters TWOATAF was sent to the nations for concurrence on 9 August. The nations agreed to the personnel requirements and to the international financial requirements necessary to support the international headquarters. On 27 November 1958, SHAPE sent to the Standing Group a request to allow the reconstitution of Headquarters TWOATAF as a fully independent integrated allied headquarters with effect from 1 January 1959. Officers and other ranks from Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK would be required, with 108 officers, 454 other ranks and 5 NATO civilians involved. No reply to this request had been received from the Standing Group by the end of 1958. (21)

Movement of FOURATAF.

In early 1958 COMAIRCENT recommended through CINCENT that in the interests of economy and improved communication, the Commander-in-Chief US Air Forces Europe also assume command of the FOURATAF and that his headquarters be located at Ramstein. Since the FOURATAF headquarters was located then at Trier, this would involve a physical move of officers and some equipment. General Valluy, in passing on this recommendation, said the Vice-Commander of FOURATAF should be a "Continental" officer because he saw a definite disadvantage if the Commander of FOURATAF also commanded one of his own national elements. The Chief-of-Staff of the French Defense Staff, General Ely, also agreed.

(21) Ltr to SG from SHAPE, sub:"Reconstitution of Headquarters TWOATAF," 27 Nov 58, AG 4030 G-8 pPANDA, with enclosure. See also Staff Study August 1958, "Proposed International Personnel Establishment for Headquarters TWOATAF and NORTHAG."
that this would make it difficult in wartime to integrate forces under such a command arrangement. The SHAPE Staff recommended that General Norstad approve the proposition in principle but that there be a separate command for US Forces assigned to FOURATAF, that the Vice-Commander be a European officer, and that successive steps be taken in the complete reorganization of the ATAFs including integration of the Air Defense and German units. (22)

On 25 March 1958, SACEUR notified the Chairman of the Standing Group that he was planning to reorganize and relocate the headquarters of the Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force. This was being done in the interests of economy and increased efficiency in the Central Europe Region and it involved the movement of headquarters FOURATAF from its Trier location to Ramstein, Germany. The Commander of the US Air Force Europe would become Commander of the Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force, continuing to carry out his national duties. The Deputy Commander of FOURATAF would be appointed from one of the European nations contributing forces to FOURATAF, initially France. SACEUR had decided on this change for a number of reasons. First, it would bring the Commander of USAFE into the NATO chain of command where his high rank and authority in national issues could be used to the best advantage of NATO. The bulk of the forces in FOURATAF were American. Secondly, this move would provide peacetime control facilities and an organization at Ramstein which would also be suitable and immediately available for wartime use. The excellent command facilities already available at Ramstein would greatly strengthen the operational structure of FOURATAF in peace and would facilitate a rapid change to war status without any interruption of control. Improved and simplified communications would be brought about and, geographically, Ramstein would be nearer to the Central Army Group

(22) Memo on COFS meeting w/ Div Chfs, 5 Mar 58, SEC 2030, 7 Mar 58.
Headquarters than Trier. This move would also bring the command set-up in the Central Region into line with that in the Northern region, where the Commander TWOATAF was on the same level as the Commander Northern Army Group.

It appeared that the proposed move would yield a cost saving to NATO. No increase in NATO personnel would be required and no change in status would be involved. However, some administrative and financial problems were investigated, including the funding of the move from Trier to Ramstein, the status and use of Trier after it had been vacated, the status and type of funding for the headquarters at Ramstein, and the support of non-US personnel at what was then a US headquarters at Ramstein. SACEUR desired to bring this move about in June or July 1958 if it could be done. (23)

In early April it was announced at a meeting of the Chief of Staff with Division Chiefs that General Norstad desired to appoint General Everest, then CINCUSAFE, to the additional post of COMFOURATAF. A French officer would initially serve as deputy COMFOURATAF. (24)

It was determined that a unit saving from moving the FOURATAF would accrue in the amount of almost a quarter of a million dollars. Because of the initial cost, however, of the move, which would be only about $25,000, it was necessary for SHAPE to ask the Standing Group to obtain Council authorization by 15 May for this move. In early May, General Norstad visited the United States and the Standing Group asked if he would discuss with them in Washington certain aspects of the proposed change in FOURATAF. The message from the Standing Group bore an implication that this project might be held up pending resolution of the ultimate disposition of the Trier/Thionville installations already occupied and possible

(23) Ltr, AG 2700 4ATAF PANDP, SHAPE to Chairman, SG, 25 Mar 58, sub: "Reorganization and Relocation of Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force."
changes in the wartime location of CENTAG. CINCENT already had proposed establishing a small advance headquarters for LANDCENT at Trier and SHAPE had reacted to this suggestion by asking him to study the possible move of the entire land headquarters to that location. Also, MOD Germany had shown some interest in using the facilities at Trier for national purposes. It was possible also that SHAPE might wish to retain the facilities at Thionville as the main FOURATAF war headquarters and a site for the JCOC. Protected wartime facilities at Ramstein were somewhat limited for both space and the degree of protection provided. SHAPE did not feel that either of the points implied by the Standing Group were germane to the main issue of whether or not FOURATAF should be moved and General Norstad was so advised. He was told also that the French and Canadian officials were generally satisfied with the administrative arrangements being worked out but that it was necessary to have a decision soon so that adequate notice could be given in cancelling leases and termination of administrative contracts.\(^{(25)}\)

On 4 June, the Council authorized the reorganization and relocation of FOURATAF as recommended by SACEUR. General Everest assumed command of FOURATAF on 1 July 1958.\(^{(26)}\)

Peacetime Establishment Headquarters CENTAG and NORTHAG.

On 19 May 1958, AFCENT forwarded to SHAPE a proposed peacetime establishment for headquarters Central Army Group stating that this did not constitute a final and complete solution to the requirement for establishing headquarters CENTAG as a fully international, integrated and independent NATO headquarters. SHAPE believed that headquarters CENTAG should be organized on a completely international status as soon

\(^{(25)}\) Msg to D. A. personal for Gen Norstad from Gen Schuyler, SCO 23577, 12 May 58.

\(^{(26)}\) SCO IN 19878, SGREP to SGN, 4 Jun 58; SCO OUT 24261, 10 Jun 58.
as practical and so informed CINCENT. SHAPE pointed out to him that an international TO & E could be established at once and the posts filled at the earliest feasible date which was mutually agreeable to CINCUSAREUR and to the MODs of France and Germany. (27)

The proposed international personnel establishment for the Staff of Headquarters NORTHAG was submitted to the nations concerned for their concurrence in August 1958. The proposed establishment for support troops for the same headquarters was sent to nations on 1 September. The total number of personnel involved called for 203 officers and 1925 other ranks and civilians from Belgium, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. (28)

AFMED Representation in JCOC Izmir.

SHAPE’s approval of emergency plans in the Black Sea area was predicated on the establishment of close coordination between CINCSOUTH and CINCAFMED. In order to accomplish this close coordination, CINCAFMED proposed to establish representatives in CINCSOUTH JCOC at Izmir. MOD Turkey indicated his general agreement with CINCAFMED’s plans but MOD Greece stated that he was unable to agree. During his discussions with Admiral Lamb in January 1958, General Norstad decided that the fact that the Greeks would not participate should not delay placing AFMED representation in JCOC at Izmir. SACEUR approved CINCAFMED’s plan to establish representation at Izmir JCOC by 1 March and directed CINCSOUTH and CINCAFMED to work out the details so as to meet this date. At the same time MOD Greece was informed of SACEUR’s decision but was told that this did not preclude eventual Greek participation if the Greeks so desired. (29)

(27) Ltr, SHAPE to CINCENT, AG 4030/C-9 PA, 1 Jul 58, sub: “Peace Establishment Headquarters CENTAG.”

An officer team representing CINCAF MED/COMM EDNOREAST was installed at the JCOC in Izmir in March on a trial basis. At that time Admiral Lamb proposed that for the time being alternative arrangements be made concerning enemy surface forces in the Black Sea. He stated that his representative at JCOC Izmir had the necessary authority to release weapons against the threat in the Black Sea and that the arrangements could be tested during Exercise FULL PLAY, which would take place soon.

SACEUR agreed that for the time being there should be no change in the atomic plans in the area, although he felt that the CINCAF MED representative in JCOC Izmir should be designated as primary releasing commander for atomic weapons, while CINCAF MED would be designated ultimate releasing commander, and he asked that CINCAF MED evaluate the effectiveness of these atomic release procedures from the JCOC at Izmir and pass on his views when possible.

Following his attendance at Exercise FULL PLAY, CINCAF MED reported to SACEUR that the existing arrangements worked well, that coordination was excellent and that the exchange of weapons between plans, although not actually exercised, could have been carried out readily. It was obvious that because of delays in communications from JCOC Izmir to the CINCAF MED's headquarters in Malta, that it would have been impossible under the circumstances for CINCAF MED to have served effectively as the releasing commander. He stated that the role played by the representative at Izmir (AFMED representative) was essential.

(28) ...organizational and command data of interest are contained in SH/PP/188/58 (Turkish Army Reorganization); AFSOUTH 148/58; AFCE 117/58; AFCE 130/58.
(29) AG 2030 SECY, 8 Feb 58; SCO IN 12316, 7 Jan 58; SCO IN 12446; SCO IN 12420; SCO IN 12419.
(30) For more details on this, see ltr Admiral Lamb to General Norstad, 25 Mar 58, and ltr General Norstad to Admiral Lamb, 19 Apr 58.
He fully agreed with SACEUR in establishing the AFMED representative at Izmir as effective primary releasing commander for atomic plans in the Black Sea. (31)

(31) See Ltr Admiral Lamb to General Norstad, 4 Jul 58, for additional background on performance of AFMED representative in Exercise FULL PLAY.
CHAPTER VI

LOGISTICS AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Introduction.

The reluctance of many NATO nations to commit themselves financially until the results of new strategic plans and policies had been closely examined was most noticeable in the fields of logistics and infrastructure, and continued through 1958. Despite exhaustive study by the highest NATO military authorities, decisions were still not made by the North Atlantic Council, which would allow the Major Supreme Commands to provide the necessary logistic support for their forces.

The planned introduction of new weapons into ACE created many problems. The nations were prepared to send personnel for training to operate and support these new weapons, but reluctant to come to grips with the financial aspects of the necessary infrastructure. Discussed by the Council, notably at the December 1957 and the April and June basis. Many meetings were held to discuss the financing of these new weapons, mainly to establish their eligibility for NATO Common Infrastructure Program funding.

A piecemeal solution favored by the Council did not satisfy the military planners.

SHAPE was intimately concerned with the NATO higher military bodies in providing detailed justification for future infrastructure requirements. At the same time, studies were undertaken at SHAPE to determine what degree of savings could be effected to offset any future financial commitments. During 1958, the conclusions of these studies were forwarded to the Council by the Military Committee.
Further progress was made during the year in the field of logistics integration, including a study made of the problem by a Franco-German logistics team.

SECTION I - LOGISTICS

Logistics Implications of MC 70.

Annex "F" of the "ACE Minimum Force Study" contained the principal logistics requirements which had to be met to support SACEUR's operational tasks. SHAPE developed a study outlining the action required to achieve this support, which was sent to the MSCs. During February and March 1958 SHAPE teams visited the MSCs to discuss this study and receive comments.

Following the approval of MC 70 by the Council on 9 May 1958, a revised SHAPE paper was prepared, whose title was changed to refer it to MC 70; it was amended to incorporate the recently revised "Military Planning Factors" (MC 55/1), and most of the comments made by the MSCs on the study's earlier version.

The first part of the SHAPE study dealt with the "Stockpiling of Theatre Operational Stocks." The factors which determined the size of the stockpiles needed to support SACEUR's operational tasks had been promulgated in MC 55/1. A SHAPE study on these determining factors had been forwarded to the Standing Group, but a new evaluation of these factors made by SHAPE had been issued as guidance for the 1958 Annual Review.

The stockpiling goals were stated to be the minimum required to

2. AG 1220.16/P&M-326/58 LOG, dtd 28 Jun 58: "Action Required on Logistic Implications of MC 70, as applicable to ACE."
3. SHAPE/222/57/ 4 Oct 57: "Impact of the 30-day Concept on the Stockpiling Situation."
support SACEUR's operational tasks, to be reached as quickly as possible and certainly not later than the beginning of 1963. It was considered essential that all nations attain equal levels in the size of their stockpiles, to achieve the required integration and mutual support.

The SHAPE study made it clear that stocks required for Phase I (the first 30 days) of war would have to be positioned in peacetime so that they could be immediately available. The stocks required to support all forces likely to be engaged in the following 60 days had to be positioned in peacetime and be readily available.

As new weapons and equipment were added, the necessary logistic support should be provided. The MSCs were to keep the build-up of stocks under constant review, with a system of priorities to assure that M-day forces basic equipment, for example, would be stocked first.

Guidance was given on the repair of infrastructure installations, and the emergency repair of such vital logistics installations as the POL pipeline system.

The SHAPE study emphasized that logistic support was to be provided for SACEUR's forces on the assumption that there would be no period of warning. Should there be a prior period of tension, the MSCs and nations had to prepare plans for making the best use of this time, including distribution of nuclear warheads.

Until further progress had been made in establishing the mission, operational role and composition of SACEUR's task forces, the SHAPE study stated that it was not possible to examine the logistic implications in any detail. Probably these forces would be drawn from ready units already assigned to SACEUR, and would be employed to counter a developing threat.

The revised evaluation of the factors affecting the size of stockpiles was AG 1220.16/P&M-258 LOG, 13 May 58. The Nations were requested to use this guidance for the Annual Review 58, and were requested to forward their comments, if any, to SHAPE by 1 Oct 58. In fact, some nations' comments did not reach SHAPE until after 31 Dec 58, and SHAPE planned to revise the planning factors once more early in 1959 for use in the 1959 Annual Review. See LOG Div Quarterly Report, 7 Jan 59 (LOG 2300/P&M-10/59).
in conflicts short of general war. It was likely that the force employed in any particular operation would be drawn from two or more national contingents operating under an integrated staff.

The delivery of nuclear warheads was expected to increase throughout ACE, complicating logistic problems. Other points dealt with in the SHAPE study on the logistic implications of MC 70 included medical support and the management of mass casualties; the stockpiling, distribution and wartime control of POL; and the specific air force logistic support in a general war.

Logistics 1958.

One aspect of the "Logistic Implications of the Minimum Force Study 1958-63" -- "Naval Mobile Logistic Support" -- was the subject of a study with guidance issued by SHAPE to MODs, accompanied by an annex for each nation dealing with its particular needs.\(^{(5)}\)

SHAPE recognized that the provision of additional or replacement logistic support ships was of second priority to replacement of obsolescent combatant ships required to meet D-day requirements.

CINCENT had recommended that nations should position 30 days' requirements in stockpiles east of the Rhine, and control of all logistics resources positioned by the nations in the combat zone in support of their assigned forces should be given to Allied Commanders from D-day onwards, to permit use of the resources wherever needed.\(^{(6)}\)

In order that CINCENT might properly exercise his delegated re-allocation powers in war and also to ensure the most efficient use in war

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\(^{(5)}\) AG 6960.01/P&M-159/58 LOG, sub: "Naval Mobile Logistic Support", dtd 5 Apr 58.
\(^{(6)}\) AFCE/6000.12 JLA LOG 525/57. In fact, three working groups were established to study not only the integration problem, but also to prepare an overall logistics plan and to examine the problems of logistic organization in the combat zone. The study submitted to SHAPE on 25 June 57 was the work of Working Group No 1.
of all available resources in the combat zone, he further recommended three peacetime measures:

a. Integration of logistic staffs to permit flexibility and economy. The level of integration was not defined.

b. Establishment of a series of Allied depot complexes composed of national sub-depots. Peacetime training of national logistic teams in the broad principles of the logistic organization and procedures of other national systems.

c. Finding means to finance the additional installations necessary to implement the proposals.

Integration of Logistic Support. - SHAPE's Proposals. On 25 February 1958 a SHAPE paper on the "Integration of Logistic Support for the Forces of Allied Command Europe" was sent to the Standing Group. SHAPE's study outlined the limitations imposed by MC 36/1, and stated that a less restrictive view would have to be taken of SACEUR's powers than that set forth in this document. In addition it had not been possible to reach NATO-wide agreement regarding the definition of resources to be made available to SACEUR and the MSCs. A third difficulty was the uncertainty as to what constituted an emergency, as propounded in MC 36/1, since different interpretation seemed possible.

SACEUR supported all the proposals made to him by CINCENT and pointed out that SHAPE was developing various other studies aimed at the improvement of the logistic support organization. It was believed that there was considerable potential for flexibility and economy in the possible consolidation and integration into the NATO organization of national units and staffs engaged in movements and transportation, road transport operation, receipt and distribution of POL, and specialized military engineering activities.

The NATO Spare Parts Agency provided a possible starting point. Under integrated management there might be effective redistribution and
stockpiling, a degree of centralized procurement and mutual assistance in the accomplishment of maintenance and overhaul programs. SHAPE considered that all these studies had developed to the point of practical trial and testing.

SHAPE pointed out that the Central Region would be most able to test the integrated organization, and therefore attention should be directed to the development of integration in that region. Should the tests be found successful, the organization might be introduced into the other regions as desirable. It was recommended that the Standing Group approve practical experiments to be conducted by SACEUR in the Central Region -- experiments that would test the integration of support units.

SHAPE considered that nations whose forces constituted the Central Command should position east of the Rhine reserve stocks consisting of 30 days' supply as part of their 90-day stockpiles, which would be regarded as part of the logistic resources "made available" to SACEUR. (7)

On 1 March 1958, General Norstad wrote to the five interested MODs (France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany) on the subject of future discussion of logistics problems with CINCENT. (8) SACEUR stated that he had given agreement in principle to CINCENT's concept (as contained in recommendation to SCN dated 25 February 1958.) He had also proposed to the Standing Group that practical experiments be carried on a limited scale, the principles of integration of logistic support.

The Standing Group's Views. In order to assist the NATO International Staff prepare for the April Ministerial Meeting, the Standing Group sent an interim paper stating that it had considered the integration of logistics problem, but was seeking national views. (9)

(7) AG 6000/P&M 89/58 LOG, 25 Feb 58.
(8) AG 6000/P&M 122/58 LOG, 1 Mar 58.
(9) SGM-146-58, 7 Mar 58.
There were basic differences amongst the nations in certain fundamental concepts as yet unsolved -- for example the extent to which national logistic resources would be made available to SACEUR for redeployment in war, and the level of stockpiling for necessary reserves. The basic problem was to make logistics responsive to command.

The Franco-German study was focussed on the degree of integration feasible between the two national logistics systems. In the event that positive results were reached, the NATO military authorities were to be informed with a view to inviting other nations to participate.

The Standing Group sent a follow-up paper to the Council staff which included comments on SACEUR's recommendations of 25 February. As his proposals were applicable primarily to land forces, the Standing Group stated that a separate examination of the air forces' logistics problems would have to be made. Other conclusions reached by the Standing Group were:

a. An efficient logistic support organization had to exist in peacetime;

b. A primary goal of SACEUR's studies would be to determine the highest degree of integration possible in a peacetime organization;

c. The 30-day east-of-the-Rhine concept was considered militarily sound.

CINCENT's Studies.

In anticipation of approval of MC 70 and of the Standing Group's agreement to his proposals, SACEUR instructed CINCENT to undertake coordinated studies with national authorities of the Central European countries, and requested him to forward the working group reports on logistics integration, to include detailed proposals for integration of certain logistic support facilities. SHAPE and AFCENT, after issuance of the Working

(10) SGM-215-58, 7 Apr 58.
Group No. 2 report, held a meeting to consider its recommendations.
SHAPE agreed to accept the main conclusions, but the extent of the stockpiles east of the Rhine was to be re-studied.\(^{(11)}\)

**Logistic Planning Factors Regarding Stockpiles.**

Approved in 1955, MC 55 was among the basic planning documents which had to be revised as a result of changes in strategic concepts adopted during 1957 and 1958. The changes were those necessary to bring the MC 55 military planning factors into line with strategic concepts contained in the MC 14 and 48 series, and the Minimum Force Study. The division of a future war into two phases was assumed and the estimated period before re-supply of combat forces engaged in war was 90 days. The factors to be used when calculating the size of operational stockpiles were stated to be:

- a. The size and phasing of forces as accepted in force goals;
- b. The rate of force attrition as established by the Major appropriate national authorities.
- c. The intensity of operations as established by the Major NATO Commanders.
- d. Wartime consumption rates for stores and equipment.
- e. Loss of stocks due to enemy action.
- f. The standardization of stocks.

A change in the system of reporting of operational stocks was also recommended.\(^{(12)}\)

**SHAPE Guidance Issued.**

Following the approval of MC 55/1 on 14 May 1958, SHAPE issued guidance to the Major Subordinate Commanders and the national authorities with a request that the above factors be used when completing the 1958

\(^{(11)}\) AG 6000/P&M-122/58 LOG, 1 Mar 58; AG 6000/P&M-278/58, 28 May 58.  
\(^{(12)}\) MC 55/1, 19 May 58.
Logistics Resources.

Part II of the Allied Command Europe Logistics System set out the suggested procedures to be followed by the NATO nations and the NATO military authorities when planning the positioning of stocks of equipment and materials. These stocks were made up from national resources "made available" to SACEUR, although there was no official definition of the term "logistic resources made available." (14)

The SHAPE recommendation stated that all the logistic resources of the combat and service units assigned to ACE were to be considered as made available to SACEUR, and subject to re-allocation in an emergency in war. Other national resources stationed within ACE were considered not specifically made available for re-allocation, except as might be agreed to by the national authorities on guidance of the Military Committee. (15)

The Standing Group considered SHAPE's proposals, and made compromise counter-proposals which it felt might be more acceptable to the nations, and which SHAPE considered ineffectual. A meeting of SHAPE and Standing Group planners brought forth a new compromise proposal.

The Military Committee considered this new SGN recommendation --MC 86-- during October, and approved it at the end of the year. (16) The final version of the paper stated: "All logistic resources in the possession of or controlled by the combat forces, including the service units under their command, which are assigned to Allied Command Europe, are considered as made available to SACEUR and his Major Subordinate Commanders.

(13) AG 1220.16/P&M-258/58 LOG, 13 May 58.
(14) For early history on this problem, see 1957 SHAPE History, Logistics chapter. The SHAPE recommendation was:
(15) AG 1220.08/P&M-338/57 LOG, 27 Jun 57: Logistic Resources to be made available in an Emergency in War.
(16) MC 86 (Final Decision), 30 Dec 58.
for the support of these assigned forces whether in the Combat or Communications Zones. As such they are subject to re-allocation in an emergency in war. Such authority for re-allocation of these resources outside national territory, however, is subject to prior negotiation, preferably in peacetime, between SACEUR and nations as may be necessary. Other national resources, within the area of Allied Command Europe, are not made available to Allied Commanders for re-allocation in an Emergency in war, except as may be agreed to be the nations in accordance with the Military Committee's approved policy and guidance. The national authorities were thus given the safeguards they required. Despite the SHAPE recommendation that all the combat forces' logistic resources made available were considered to be subject to re-allocation in an emergency in war, the Military Committee added a proviso that this authority must be subject to prior agreement, preferably in peacetime.

Shortage of War Reserve POL Stocks in Turkey.

In a letter to the SGN, General Schuyler drew attention to the fact that POL stock status returns continually indicated that Turkey had been unable to achieve the 30 war days' supply of all fuels established by the NAC as the minimum level, and were for short-term peacetime requirements only. (17)

It had long appeared improbable that Turkey could remedy the situation by her own efforts, or that logistical deficiencies in Turkey could be made up by measures within the terms of reference of the military authorities. It was therefore recommended that the SGN acquaint the Council with the full significance of Turkey's inadequate reserve stocks.

Maps and Charts Policy.

SHAPE issued guidance to the Major Subordinate Commands and to

(17) AG/POL0137/58 LOG, 18 Jun 58.
the NATO nations on the policy for NATO maps and charts which covered:

a. The allocation of primary mapping responsibility;
b. War reserve stocks of maps and charts;
c. The exchange of land maps and related material;
d. The exchange of aeronautical charts and reproduction material.

Maps and charts policy within ACE was intended to ensure that a smooth switch would be made from purely national to largely international map and chart production and distribution, on the outbreak of a war.

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SECTION II - INFRASTRUCTURE

Infrastructure Requirements for the Period 1958-1963.

The Military Committee prepared a report on infrastructure requirements for the period 1958-1963 following the December 1957 Council meeting. Many national delegates at this meeting had expressed concern at the cost of projects necessary to support MC 70, particularly those connected with missiles. Intended as a complementary report to MC 70, the infrastructure report, MC 32/11, was presented to the Council at the April 1958 meeting.

The Military Committee estimated the total cost of infrastructure requirements for the five-year period at £420 million. This overall figure was shown under two main headings, the first showing those projects which came within the existing cost estimate of £225 million and which would be programmed for the Tenth (1959) and Eleventh (1960) Slices. The Allied Command Europe portion of the first category was made up as follows:

(18) MC 32/11 was approved by the MC on 14 Mar 58.
Projects already eligible for common funding: £ million

Forward Scatter 15
Completion of airfields to MC 70 standards 20
Continued development of: War Headquarters 2
  Signal Communications 5
  POL Facilities 5
  Naval Bases

Eligibility for common funding not determined:

Facilities for lightweight aircraft 4
Nuclear ammunition storage (atomic stockpiling) 20
Surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missile sites excluding IRBM 60
IRBM Sites 15
Anti-submarine warning system 1
Modernization of control and warning system 20
Contingencies 19

Total 190

The second category listed those projects for probable programming in the Twelfth (1961) and Thirteenth (1962) Slices for which no funds had yet been authorized. The total ACE requirement in this category was estimated to be £167 million.

The Military Committee drew the attention of the Council to the fact that many of the projects included in future programs were those types on which no decision had been reached as to their eligibility for NATO common funding.

The question of funding the estimated infrastructure requirements was dealt with in MC 32/11. In 1957 the Council had approved a ceiling of £225 million for the four-year period, 1957-1960. If approval were given to the Ninth Slice Program (1958), about £40 million would be left to finance the remaining two annual Slices, creating a deficit of about £150 million for Slices Ten and Eleven as far as ACE was concerned.
The Military Committee suggested possible ways of saving money already allocated to former infrastructure slices for possible use in funding new requirements. It stated that a review by Supreme Commanders of all unstarted projects in former infrastructure slices might reveal projects for which the military requirements had lessened or disappeared; it might also be possible to make a more flexible use of funds already approved by decreasing the overall ceiling of funds for Slices Two through Seven, and increasing the ceiling of L 225 million for current Slices.

The Military Committee report was still under Infrastructure Committee consideration at the end of 1958. The Council, however, did approve the recommendation made in MC 32/11 that a more flexible use of approved funds be made. On instructions received from the Standing Group, SHAPE studies were made with the aim of obtaining the maximum savings possible in the provision of infrastructure support for SACEUR's forces.

Eligibility for Common Funding of Certain Categories of Infrastructure.

MC 32/11 included a reminder to the Council that no decision had yet been reached on the common funding of certain types of infrastructure, e.g., missile sites. It was the opinion of the Military Committee that this was a decision that only the Council could take.

The Military Committee was requested to examine each project contained in MC 32/11 for eligibility for common funding, based on information supplied by SACEUR.

Review of ACE Infrastructure Slices Two through Nine.

The Standing Group instructed Supreme Commanders to review urgently all programmed infrastructure in Slices Two through Nine for which funds had not yet been committed. The amount available for Slices Ten and

(19) Standing Group instructions are contained in STAND 2404, 28 Apr 58.
Eleven was, in the case of ACE, not more than £12 million.

Supreme Commanders were asked specifically to show in their review all items which could be considered for suspension, justification for the retention of the remainder, and the risks that would be involved if these were to be suspended.

The SHAPE review was completed by 1 July 1958, and was sent to the four Major Subordinate Commanders for study. (20) Representatives from the MSCs were requested not to consult the NATO nations. On Standing Group instruction, the SHAPE review was given the normal distribution for an annual slice program, and national comment was invited at a later meeting of all nations held to discuss the annual slice program.

The SHAPE review showed that £262 million was the total amount covered by the review. SHAPE had already suspended £33 million, and recommended £38 million for further suspension. £91 million was recommended for retention.

The SHAPE Review of Infrastructure.

On the day the SHAPE Review of Infrastructure was despatched to the MSCs, members of the North Atlantic Council visited SHAPE.

SACEUR explained that ACE was making the maximum possible cut in conventional infrastructure, e.g., the tactical airfields program was being cut from a total of 205 to 158 airfields. If these new requirements were not provided, ACE had no strategic concept. The new requirements represented to a great extent functions which had hitherto been left to national funding. (21)

SACEUR stated that he was satisfied generally with the review, but that he considered that the airfield category offered the possibility of further savings beyond the total of £19 million proposed for suspension. Discussions

(20) AG 6100/PI-120/58 PROG, 1 Jul 58.
(21) AG 6100/IP-113/PROG, 3 Jul 58.
on the possibilities of redeployment in the Central Region had a bearing on this. He did not believe that substantial new airfield construction in Germany was practicable, since this required large scale land acquisition. There should be therefore a considerable reduction in the £80 million representing airfield projects for retention. New funding that was shown to be required for Slices Ten and Eleven (£105 million), might be reduced to £75 million-£100 million, based on this possibility, and also on the possibility that estimates for new requirements were on the high side, in view of possible shortfalls in deliveries of new weapons. The £33 million already suspended was not available for new programming since it was to be used to settle overruns in Slices 2-7.

The ACE Review of Infrastructure was despatched to the Standing Group and its conclusions were tabulated as follows:\(^{(22)}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>L. million</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total value of projects for which money had not been released in Slices 2-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total suspended during past year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total recommended additional suspensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total suspensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suspensions as a percentage of total under consideration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The projects recommended for retention in the program amounted to 198 million pounds. SACEUR pointed out that it was vital that the aircraft be retained - both offensive and defensive; ACE had based airfield requirements on MC 70 force goals and acceptable, though minimum, standards for squadron dispersal. This meant a separate airfield for each of the more vital offensive units, and two squadrons per airfield for smaller and less critical units. SACEUR pointed out that some further savings might be possible depending on the ultimate solution of the German airfield problem, through

\(^{(22)}\) AG 6100/1P-125 PROG, 15 Jul 58.
redeployment, westward, of some of the non-German air forces located in the Federal Republic. With this exception, SACEUR believed that ACE had reduced airfield requirements to the minimum consistent with safety.

Following the Conference on Infrastructure held at SHAPE from 2 - 4 September between National Military Delegates and representatives of SHAPE, MSCs, NAC International Staff and ELLA, only minor adjustments to the review were necessary.

MC 32/15 was approved in final form by the Military Committee being in accordance with NATO military plans. The Military Committee reported that savings amounted to one third of authorized funds. The Committee further stated that it was not feasible to work out a system of priorities. About two-thirds of the total deletions would take place in the airfield category, though certain projects in the categories of naval bases, POL facilities, naval aids, signals and war headquarters were included.

Improvement in the Rate of Construction of Infrastructure Projects.

Attention was again focused on the slowness of infrastructure construction during 1958. Several factors had a bearing on the problem: the even larger number of projects in previously approved slices which had not been started, amounting to approximately one-third of the total approved programs; the lists of suspensions submitted in 1957-58 and the recent Review of Infrastructure, which resulted in approximately £70 million being made available for reprogramming; and the necessity to provide financially for the funding of planned new weapons systems, as indicated in MC 32/11.

The Standing Group undertook to study the problem. SHAPE submitted a detailed statement showing the main causes of delay and the action considered necessary to alleviate them. The SHAPE recommendations were incorporated in a Standing Group recommendation to the Council.

(23) MC 32/15 (Final Decision), 15 Dec 58.
(24) See SH 27068, 17 Oct 58.
Action was taken along the lines recommended prior to formal Council approval in March 1959.

The Standing Group considered that it was necessary to withdraw its support from all or parts of projects programmed in Slices Two through Five for which funds had not been released by 1 June 1959. The MNCs were requested to review all projects in this category on a case-by-case basis and if any projects were still considered militarily essential, they could be re-programmed after the necessary screening. It was stated that the outcome of the action relating to the four slices would be evaluated not later than March 1960, and the Standing Group would then decide whether to continue similar action or alternative measures for the remaining slices. (25)

SACEUR was requested to produce at the end of each year, beginning in December 1959, an annual consolidation of continuous review, to be called the "Yearly Infrastructure Report," in which each item of programmed but incompletely completed infrastructure would be examined. This report would determine the prospective useful life of each project from the time it was likely to be completed. The projects would be classified for reconsideration after a prescribed period: for suspension, and modification or deletion.

The SHAPE Recommended Ninth Slice (1958) Infrastructure Program.

The Military Committee report (MC 32/10, 15 Nov 57) on the SHAPE Recommended Ninth Slice Infrastructure Program was submitted to the Infrastructure Committee of the Council along with other detailed screening papers for final review early in February 1958.

In a message to all MSCs and MODs, SHAPE informed them that the Council had agreed to provisionally approve the 1958 (Slice Nine) Program. The Infrastructure Committee was instructed to bring the Ninth Slice Program back to the Council for further consideration with whatever modifications

(25) SG 137/55 (Final Decision), 31 Mar 59.
to the program were to be found necessary.

During the period May-November 1958, various nations requested the release of funds to implement certain Ninth Slice projects. By 28 November 1958, however, it became apparent that action to implement Slice Nine would soon come to a standstill. Only projects of exceptional urgency were approved where construction or planning could begin in 1958. SHAPE sent a message to the Standing Group pointing out that final approval of Slice Nine presumably had to wait until the NAC had considered the implications of three studies. These concerned the review of Slices Two through Nine, the eligibility for common funding of new categories of infrastructure, and a determination of how much money remained for programming out of funds already authorized by the Council.

SHAPE pointed out that it was obvious that nations would not be able to submit detailed calculations reflecting recent NAC decisions until well into 1959. One nation had already put forward the idea that the part of Slice Nine which had not yet been finally approved was of little urgency. SHAPE requested the Standing Group to repeat to the Council once again the necessity for keeping the Slice Nine program going.

The SHAPE Recommended Tenth Slice (1959) Infrastructure Program.

A message was sent to all MSCs informing them of the financial background to the Tenth Slice Program. SHAPE considered that for both conventional infrastructure and the initial implementation of MC 70 there were high priority requirements for about L75 million. Funds immediately available for Slices Ten and Eleven amounted to less than L30 million.

The submissions from the MSCs totalled originally about L37 million. This figure SHAPE had reduced to about L13 million. Additional funding was needed to complete the Eighth Slice Forward Scatter System -about L15 million.

(26) SH 28021, 28 Nov 58.
(27) SH 23679, 16 May 58.
On the assumption that NAC approval would be given for common funding of missile sites, approximately £20 million would be required for the first SAM sites, and approximately £20 million for the first nuclear storage projects. The overall total, with 10% added for contingencies, amounted to about £75 million.

Although the Military Committee had asked the NAC for additional funding by the interim use of savings derived from the withdrawal of the lowest priority projects from approved Slices, there was no reason to suppose that the immediate funding problem could be solved by savings.

The MSCs were informed of those projects which it was already apparent SHAPE would be unable to include in its Recommended Tenth Slice (1959) Program. SHAPE sent this program to SGN summarized as follows: (28)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Cost Estimate (£m.)</th>
<th>Total (£m.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airfields</td>
<td>11.029</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Base Installations</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL Installations</td>
<td>0.150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Communications</td>
<td>0.773</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Headquarters</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>12.224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atomic Stockpile Sites</td>
<td>14.430</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface-to-air missile (NIKE sites)</td>
<td>24.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface-to-surface missile (MATADOR sites)</td>
<td>2.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRBM sites</td>
<td>12.000</td>
<td>52.430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td><strong>64.654</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The eligibility of the last four items for common funding had not yet been determined, but it was essential that they were provided before the end of 1960.

(28) AG 6100/IP/10-115/58 PROG, 11 Jul 58.
The Standing Group had made minor adjustments to the original SHAPE recommendations, resulting in a reduced total cost estimate of L 61 million.

The Military Committee examined the SHAPE recommended Tenth Slice 1959 Infrastructure Program for military necessity, adequacy and common interest. This examination was combined with SACLANT's proposed 1959 infrastructure program and presented to the North Atlantic Council. (29)

The International Staff had estimated that sufficient funds were available to finance SHAPE's recommended Tenth Slice which would need approximately L 62 million. It appeared that savings from previous Slices and SACEUR's suspension lists would cover the estimated figure when added to funds accruing from overheads and taxes. The SHAPE program was broken down as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of projects</th>
<th>Cost in Lm.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airfields</td>
<td>7.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval base installations</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL installations</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal communications</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Headquarters</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atomic Stockpile Sites</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface-to-air missile sites (NIKE)</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface-to-surface missile sites (MATADOR)</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRBM</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>61.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The conventional projects, i.e., those in categories already approved for common funding, totalled L 8.7 million. They were, in general,

(29) MC 32/14, 1 Oct 58, contained full details of the SHAPE recommendations, including charts.
extensions and/or developments of categories already approved. The airfields projects included conversion of runways and facilities to bring them up to NATO standards, mobile facilities, arrestor gears and additional ammunition storage.

The naval base installations included a torpedo regulation station and POL, torpedo, and ammunition storage facilities. These two facilities were in Turkey. The signal communications projects consisted of three new radio relays in Greece and Turkey and one additional equipment on existing facilities in Germany.

SACEUR included four new categories of projects whose eligibility for NATO Common Infrastructure had not been determined by the Council. These were:

1. Provision of nuclear ammunition storage (atomic stockpiling);
2. Surface-to-air missile (NIKE) sites. These projects included facilities required for the operation and maintenance of the weapons systems.
3. Surface-to-surface missile (MATADOR) sites, including facilities.
4. IRBM sites, including facilities.

The Military Committee noted that the Council had provisionally approved the financing of the first 20 surface-to-air missile (NIKE) sites to be constructed in Allied Command Europe. The problem of financing the other missile sites which made up the 1959 Program had already been dealt with in MC 32/11 (SG 137/54). No decision was taken by the North Atlantic Council on the MC report on SACEUR's 1959 Common Infrastructure Program, until 29 April 1959.
CHAPTER VII

COMMUNICATIONS

The more important communication projects during 1958 were the ACE Long Range Early Warning System, the Forward Scatter System, and the ACE Electronic Countermeasures Plan. During the years, however, a great deal of the work involved routine matters necessary for the smooth operation of the communications network set up to provide SACEUR with the necessary communications support. Routine tasks included the non-stop operation of the SHAPE Communications Center, the maintenance of telephones and telephone lines, the relaying of messages, the issuance of guidance to subordinate headquarters on equipment procurement, and many other minor but nonetheless important matters.

The Forward Scatter System - Progress in 1958

Important though the routine tasks were, however, attention must be focussed on the progress made in the development of the Forward Scatter System.

As a result of the findings of the preliminary design studies made during 1957 by the International Standing Electric Corporation and Hycon-Eastern Incorporated, it was clear that the number of links
involved in the Forward Scatter System would have to be increased by 25 percent. In order that a revised cost estimate might be developed by SHAPE, it became necessary to extend the life of the Letter of Intent with International Standard Electric Corporation. It was felt that it was unwise to finalize the contract between the latter organization and SHAPE until such time as the Infrastructure Committee had had the opportunity to review the overall estimates for the network. Accordingly, SHAPE extended the life of the Letter of Intent from 15 December 1957 until 15 March 1958.\(^{(1)}\)

The Forward Scatter System - Increased Costs

A meeting was held on 4 February 1958 between members of the Infrastructure Committee of NATO and SHAPE representatives\(^{(2)}\) to acquaint the Infrastructure Committee with the fact that it was necessary to request more funds for the Forward Scatter System and, at the same time, to give the reasons for the request.

General Conrad, Chief Signal Officer, SHAPE, stated that as investigations and studies progressed, it became increasingly apparent that the original cost estimates for the construction of the System had been underestimated. He had been authorized to say that the operational requirement for the Forward Scatter System was no less important at that time than when first approved by the Council. In fact, the requirement for the militarily owned and operated system had been reinforced by the changes that had taken place on operational and strategic concepts.

\(^{(1)}\) AG 3120/2 SIG/FS, 28 Jan 58.

\(^{(2)}\) AG/4-R/240, 21 Feb 58; See also SHAPE History 1957, Communications Chapter, for early SHAPE documentation. The report of the Ad Hoc Committee was C-M(56)93.
Dr. Møller, Chief, Forward Scatter Branch, SHAPE, recalled that the System stemmed from planning studies done in the late summer of 1955, which took cognizance of the guidance presented in MC 48. Similar studies were carried out by the SHAPE Air Defense Technical Center, and a proposal was submitted by this organization to SHAPE. As a result of this early planning, SACEUR presented his "requirement for a reliable and secure Allied Command Europe Communications System, incorporating the use of the Forward Scatter technique" to the Standing Group on 7 December 1955. In February 1956, the Military Committee reported to the North Atlantic Council in document MC 59, strongly endorsing SACEUR's requirement and recommending implementation of the proposed system as a matter of urgency.

In March of the same year, the Council appointed an Ad Hoc Committee to report upon the procedures necessary for financing and implementing the system. The report of this Ad Hoc Committee was issued on 10 July 1956. Later, the Council approved this report. (3)

In August 1956, SHAPE issued an invitation to qualified electronic firms to submit proposals for engineering and installation services. In December 1956, SHAPE recommended the selection of a consultant engineering firm for the system. After discussions within the Infrastructure Committee and after further study, the SHAPE recommendation was revised in February 1957. The revised recommendation included an engineering and installation contractor, together with a consultant engineering firm serving as a directed sub-contractor.

(3) C-M(56)116
The following March, SHAPE was authorized to enter into negotiations with International Standard Electric Corporation and Hycon Eastern Incorporated for the provision of engineering/installation and consultant engineering services respectively. Negotiations were also undertaken by SHAPE with International Standard Electric Corporation and Hycon Eastern Incorporated on 10 April 1957 and a definite Letter of Intent was signed on 1 May. Since that date, SHAPE had been engaged in the active planning and engineering of the system. Site surveys had been carried out, detailed equipment specifications prepared, propagation path tests carried out and an engineering system had been developed which SHAPE was sure would meet the operational and performance requirements.

The Reasons for the Increase in Costs

The first cost estimate prepared in 1956 was based on a hypothetical and too simplified circuit. A later cost estimate was based on preliminary design studies carried out during 1957 by the two contracting firms. As a result of these studies, a need for eight more relay stations was indicated. In addition, a higher transmitting power, larger antennas and more auxiliary equipment were needed to bring the projected system up to SHAPE performance requirements.

An additional reason for the increased cost estimate was the fact that the original estimate presumed a far greater use of existing buildings and facilities than proved possible in the later and more recent site survey.
The Forward Scatter System

On 13 June 1958, the Standing Group's attention was drawn to the urgency for a decision on the problem of increased costs for the system. SACEUR had twice explained the reason for the increase in costs, had re-affirmed the urgency and military necessity of the project, and had indicated a method of obtaining additional funds.

The Standing Group was informed that the "logical progress of systems design, procurement actions and construction planning" had been upset "by lack of approval for the increased funds." The loss of the 1958 construction season at the inaccessible sites, primarily in Norway, Greece and Turkey, might extend the completion dates of the system to 1961. The system was reaching the critical stage whereby the continued delay would increase costs at the rate of approximately £100,000 per month and delay the ultimate completion date.

If the additional funds were not forthcoming, SHAPE believed that the entire concept of a reliable, integrated, military controlled and operated communications system would have to be abandoned. This gave rise to the question as to whether or not SACEUR could accomplish the missions assigned to him in the areas of air defense, early warning and retaliatory atomic strike action.

The Standing Group approved the necessity for the increase in costs of the system on 18 June 1958. Approval was also given, from the military point of view, for the allocation of additional funds in accordance with SHAPE's revised estimate.

(4) SH 24342, 13 Jun 58, SHAPE to SGN.
(5) STAND 2487, 20 Jun 58.
to confirm that the additional amount involved remained at L15 million, and that the revised estimate was, in fact, still valid.

SACEUR wrote to the Secretary General of NATO on 4 December 1958 on the problem of the release of funds for the Forward Scatter System. He pointed out that SHAPE had been implementing the project according to procedures laid down by the Council. Although the beginning of the project was marked by "difficulties and delays, many of which should never have arisen," work had proceeded satisfactorily during the past few months. However, a new problem had arisen which, "if not immediately solved," would cause a considerable waste of money and involve great delays in the further implementation of the project.

The Secretary General was reminded that SHAPE was given the status of a host nation for the implementation of the project, and the Council established the procedures which SHAPE had to follow in respect of the purchase and procurement of equipment. To ensure that the equipment finally selected resulted from an impartial technical evaluation, SHAPE had laid down detailed procedures. These procedures required that bids were opened in public and then subjected to an exhaustive and critical examination by representatives of the ten different nations belonging to the Forward Scatter Branch at SHAPE, and the resident team of scientists belonging to the SHAPE Air Defense Technical Center. The resulting recommendations were then submitted to a Board of Awards comprised of the Chief of Budget and Finance Division, SHAPE, a representative of the Scientific Advisor to SACEUR (in this case a French

(6) SCO OUT 28164, 4 Dec 58, SACEUR to SGN, quoting letter dated 4 Dec 58, SACEUR to SEC GEN NATO, "Release of Funds for Procurement of Equipment for the ACE Forward Scatter System"; See also, LOSTAN 2707, SGREP to SGN.
civilian, Dr. David), and the Director of SADTC. This Board then made its recommendations to the Projects Manager of the Forward Scatter Branch and, if the firm selected was the lowest bidder, the contract was signed. If it was decided that the contract should not be given to the lowest bidder, full details of the case were provided for the appropriate national authority or the Infrastructure Committee.

SACEUR also requested that the Council consider this problem as a matter of urgency and provide the necessary authorization for the procurement of equipment.

The Infrastructure Committee again discussed the problem of the procurement of the equipment for the Forward Scatter System at a meeting on 5 December 1958. The French Delegate stated that his country's earlier decision to place a reservation on the authorization of funds unless they were allowed to take part in the evaluation of bids remained unchanged. After the SHAPE representative had said that any compromise solution was unacceptable, the Chairman of the Committee read out SACEUR's letter to the Secretary General. The Chairman then stated that the matter would clearly have to go to the Council for discussion and asked whether there was any point in further discussing it in the Infrastructure Committee.

During the discussion which followed, the SHAPE representative added to the points already brought out in SACEUR's letter by stating that the prices SHAPE had obtained were unusually low, and estimated

(7) LOSTAN 2718, 5 Dec 58, SGREP to SGN; Additional documents for background on Forward Scatter Project: MC 59 (Revised), 11 May 56; C-M(56)93, 10 Jul 56 - complete procedures; C-M(58)113, 30 Jul 58; C-M(57)97 and AC/4-D/555 - these two documents laid down procedures covering disputes and arbitration for the Project.
the cost of the delay which would inevitably follow at some £800,000. This figure represented price increases, plus £100,000 per month which was required for running expenses.

After a categorical assurance by the SHAPE representative that the agreed procedures covering arbitration and disputes would be followed to the letter, the French Delegate lifted the reservation and accepted the SHAPE proposals. The Committee then authorized £1,941,577 for the procurement of equipment. £35,000 was to be withheld from this sum pending agreement on the purchase of training equipment.

Electronic Countermeasures Plan for ACE

The NATO policy on Electronic Warfare was approved by the Military Committee and issued as MC 64 (Final) on 18 October 1956. The Standing Group was given the overall responsibility for coordinating the formulation of the policy and doctrine for the employment of electronic warfare by NATO forces. The Supreme Commander's requirements for new equipment would also be coordinated through the SGN.

SACEUR's responsibilities included:

a. The planning and conduct of electronic warfare within ACE.

b. Establishing the necessary organization within his own headquarters and subordinate commands for the conduct and control of electronic warfare.

(8) MC 64 (Final), 18 Oct 56.
c. The development, within ACE, of policies and plans which were in accord with SGN directives. After coordination with national authorities and other Major Commanders, these policies and plans were to be submitted to the SGN for approval.

d. The collection of tactical electronic warfare information, its analysis and dissemination, and the exchange of such information with other Major Commanders and national authorities.

Policy and guidance on electronic countermeasures in ACE was issued to MSCs and nations on 10 September 1957. (9)

An overall Electronic Countermeasures Plan for ACE was developed at SHAPE and, in accordance with MC 64, was despatched for approval to the Standing Group on 29 December 1958. (10) The Plan was also sent to the MSCs and national authorities for preliminary planning purposes.

The SHAPE ECM Plan supported the SACEUR EDP and provided for the establishment and optimum use of an effective ECM capability. It stated the ECM capabilities needed within the land, sea and air forces of ACE to provide the minimum support required for the effective prosecution of SACEUR's mission.

Definitions were given of the various sub-divisions of ECM warfare, including Active ECM, Passive ECM, and Electronic Counter-Countermeasures.

An analysis of the Soviet Threat from an ECM viewpoint showed that there was technical evidence of the competence of the Soviets to jam radars, navigational aids and communications-electronics systems of all types. It was assumed by SHAPE that the Soviets possessed a capability

(9) AG 1460 SIG/EL, 10 Sep 57.
(10) AG 1460 SIG/EL, 29 Dec 58.
of seriously disrupting NATO military transmissions, and that this
capability would be used during an initial attack and subsequent
operations. On the other hand, the Soviets themselves were vulnerable
to ECM attack, especially in radars, ground/air communications
facilities and certain bombing and navigation systems. SHAPE assumed
that extensive efforts were under way to improve this situation and that
the Soviet technical capability in this regard was equal to that of NATO.

The MSCs were required to submit ECM plans to SHAPE for
approval. Upon approval by SHAPE of their plans, the MSCs were
authorized to request the necessary support from national sources, and
were responsible for ensuring that the implementation of the approved
plans were pre-planned down to operating level to the maximum extent
practicable.

The required capabilities of the ECM were assessed for all forces
of NATO. The overall priority to be followed when there was any doubt
as to the relative importance of ECM capabilities was given:

a. Atomic Counter-Offensive
b. Early Warning and Alert
c. Air Defense
d. Immediate Post D-Day Operations of the Shield Forces
e. Subsequent Operations

The list given did not, however, imply that all measures in support
of the atomic counter-offensive would be implemented before a start was
made on any of the other capabilities.

The attainment of the minimum capabilities of the ECM Plan
required the existence of properly trained personnel and units within
the assigned or earmarked forces of the nations of ACE. The plan
therefore contained an estimate, by nation and by services, of the
appropriate numbers of national personnel involved. Approval of the plan by the Standing Group, and agreement by the nations to provide at least the capabilities planned, meant a requirement for a total of 2705 for the land forces, 932 for the air forces and 413 for naval forces.

SHAPE proposed that the nations achieved the planned electronic counter-measures capabilities over the four-year period 1959-1962. A proposed schedule of attainment was included in the plan.

Personnel Problems

The Standing Group submitted a report (SGM-475-58) to the North Atlantic Council on 25 July 1958, summarizing the existing and future requirements of Communications and Electronics personnel for the Allied Commands of NATO during the five-year period 1958-1962. These requirements covered not only the classic military communications networks, but also the manning of various major NATO projects planned to operate under the direct control of the NATO military headquarters. The projects included the ACE Long Range Early Warning System, the ACE Forward Scatter System and the ACE ECM Plan.

The SGN report was indicative of an order of magnitude only, since certain requirements had not yet been worked out in detail. It was nevertheless clear that the scale of the overall requirements was such as to pose a major problem of recruitment and training for many of the NATO nations. The modernization of armed forces and the establishment of missile units required for MC 70 had already created a formidable national requirement for technically qualified personnel of

(11) SGM-475-58, 25 Jul 58. See also, Note C-M(58)132 by the Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance, 1 Oct 58.
the same type. There was also the civil factor to be considered - strong competition was to be expected from industry, where parallel needs were developing.

The recent Annual Reviews had shown that certain nations were already facing difficulty in finding sufficient technical personnel for their national forces.

Another equally important aspect to the problem was the provision of the complicated and costly equipment involved and the completion of the necessary infrastructure works that had to be related to the availability of personnel to man and operate them. Firm plans were still awaited for the introduction of much of the equipment, and therefore it was very difficult to plan the recruitment and training of personnel.

The North Atlantic Council considered the SGN report on Present and Foreseeable Requirements for Communications-Electronics Personnel (SGM-475-58) at a meeting on 1 October 1958. The Council requested the SGN to complete the figures so that a more up-to-date and realistic statement of the requirements could be made. In particular, the Council wanted a firm estimate for the requirements for the Electronic Countermeasures Plan for the Central Region. The Council suggested that further necessary discussion should take place between the major NATO commanders and the appropriate national authorities. The Council also agreed to discuss at an early date the setting up of a Working Party under the Annual Review Committee to keep the problem under constant review.

**Personnel for LREW System**

SHAPE furnished guidance to the nations on the personnel requirements, training programs and time-phasing for the personnel to provide for the

operation of the Long Range Early Warning System.\(^{(13)}\) As a result of the SHAPE guidance, it was expected that the host nations would be able to make their determination of the actual number of military and civilian personnel they required to operate each radar station in their country. This determination would also include the schedule of the necessary training for their personnel and also an agreement that they would furnish the personnel at the time required. Such action by the nations would ensure that their personnel would be available to operate and maintain the stations as soon as they became operational.

In order that an evaluation of the national comments could be made by SHAPE, the nations were requested to submit the actual number of military and civilian personnel required to operate each radar station; to notify SHAPE of any further assistance needed for the training of personnel; and agreement to furnish when required on a national basis the personnel required.

The Personnel Requirements Program 1959-1963 contained a summary of the personnel requirements for the ACE Long Range Early Warning System.\(^{(14)}\). The requirement for the System was divided into national and international. All the 18 new LREW stations were to be operated by national forces furnished by host nations. These personnel were not to be held within the authorized international personnel ceiling for ACE. SHAPE undertook, during 1958, a detailed up-to-date personnel manning requirement for each radar station and this was issued as a guide to nations in September 1958.

\(^{(13)}\) AG 1250 PANDA, 17 Sep 58.

\(^{(14)}\) AG 1250 PANDA, 17 Sep 58.
The total number of national personnel required was 2,504, a figure SHAPE considered the number of individuals to operate and maintain the whole LREW system on a 24-hour basis in accordance with SHAPE standards. (15) The figure also included the personnel needed to perform the normal functions of administration, supply, security and operation of utilities.

The international requirement was confined to the technical maintenance of the Data Handling System. This was for the rearward link of the EWS between certain NATO Headquarters. A total of 35 military electronic technicians was required.

**Personnel for Forward Scatter System**

The Personnel Requirements Program 1958-1962, submitted by SHAPE on 17 October 1957, included a statement of requirements for personnel to operate the ACE Forward Scatter System. (16) The Standing Group approved an increase to the ACE International personnel ceiling to cover 104 of the posts requested by SHAPE. (17) These 104 posts included those for the Operating Units and Sections throughout ACE except for six posts.

A slight adjustment was requested to the original 1957 request made in the 1958 PRP. (18) Following constant review by SHAPE of the Forward Scatter System, it was found necessary to delete certain stations

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(15) AG 4030-G2 PA, 18 Oct 58. This PRP for 1959-1963 contains a useful summary of the personnel requirements for the LREW system.

(16) AG 4030/4 PA, 17 Oct 57.

(17) STAND 2506, 11 Jul 58.

and substitute others. Adjustments were therefore necessary to the manning tables for Operating personnel. The effect of these changes was that SHAPE requested an increase of 22 military other ranks and a decrease of 13 civilian contract technicians.

Communications Equipment

An important change took place in March 1958 in one of the responsibilities of the Chief Signal Officer at SHAPE. Until this date, he was charged with the responsibility of monitoring the procurement of communications equipment and the procurement of selected items of equipment when directed by the appropriate authority or requested by a Subordinate Command.

Since March 1958, however, Signal Division was charged with the responsibility for the procurement of all the communications electronics equipment contained in the C-E Program. The decision to centrally procure this equipment was made for four reasons. Firstly, and the primary reason, was to accomplish some degree of standardization. There were six or seven different makes of a single means of communications. This required the stockage of a large number of spares and complicated the interchange of equipment.

Through the medium of central procurement, SHAPE hoped to accomplish some degree of standardization on a regional basis. To accomplish this, SHAPE had called for a one-time report on the status of all equipment used in ACE. (19) It was hoped that the ideal state of standardization would eventually be achieved - i.e., to have a set of

(19) AG 5130 SIG/MA, 14 Feb 58; and also the Signal Officers Orientation Course Handbook, AG 1880.5 SIG/PT, 1 Sep 58.
NATO specifications for all C-E equipment.

Central procurement would also eliminate the competition between commands for similar types of equipment and thus bidding against each other. Funds would also be saved as larger, bulk purchases could be made. Finally, much needed technical information and assistance would be readily available to the subordinate commands that in the past had experienced much difficulty in preparing project descriptions.

Communications Planning for the NIKE Air Defense System

SHAPE sent to all MSCs guidance on the communications planning for a NIKE Air Defense Complex on 18 September 1958. This guidance included communications requirements for a NIKE battery, a NIKE battalion and an Anti-Air Operation Center (AAOC).

The provision of adequate communications in peacetime was stated to be a prerequisite for the combat effectiveness of NIKE Air Defense. These communications provided for the following functions:

Alert of NATO/National forces and US custodians
Air Defense Command and Control
Data Transmission
Air Defense Intelligence
National Control and Administration, including logistics and support of US custodial units

The procurement of technical equipment would be provided by the user nations.

(20) AG 6440 SIG/CEPG, 18 Sep 58. (The air defense plan which required this communications system was AG 6440/E-111/58 LOG, 15 Apr 58).
Signals Conferences 1958

The annual Staff Signal Officers Course was held at SHAPE from 16 to 24 June 1958. The aim of this Course was to acquaint signal officers with the signal network connecting the NATO military headquarters in Europe. Not only officers working within the NATO framework were orientated, but also those national officers whose work brought them into contact with the NATO communications system. The Course covered all aspects of communications work, including the Atomic Strike Plan communications system, radar operations, the forward scatter system and electronic countermeasures.

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(21) *See Course Book, AG 1880.5 SIG/PT, 1 Sep 58. This book contains all the presentations made at the Course and includes useful summaries of plan, problems and progress.*
CHAPTER VIII

INTELLIGENCE

Introduction

The problems facing SHAPE in carrying out the intelligence mission which was inherent in SACEUR's overall responsibilities were most difficult, as they had been since the establishment of SHAPE. During 1957 the weaknesses in the Allied Command Europe intelligence system caused grave concern on the part of SACEUR, as well as of his superiors. These weaknesses stemmed primarily from the fact that SACEUR lacked facilities for intelligence gathering and that he depended entirely upon national sources and upon the information from the Standing Group for his intelligence. Certain measures had been taken during 1957 to stimulate a greater cooperation on the part of the nations and to strengthen the mechanism for handling intelligence affairs within Allied Command Europe. (1)

The 1958 period was devoted to the search for measures which would produce a greater efficiency in intelligence operations and to the correction of obvious defects in the system. The officer directly responsible for intelligence matters was the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence whose Division during 1958 was reorganized and whose

(1) See Chapter IX, SHAPE History 1957, for details of intelligence activities and problems during that period.
responsibilities and duties were more clearly defined in a change to the proper Staff Directive. Closer cooperation between intelligence officers of the nations and of the commands was achieved, several important intelligence conferences were held at SHAPE and firm policy within difficult intelligence areas was established. The intelligence system of Allied Command Europe was, at the end of 1958, more cohesive and effective and stronger than it had been at the beginning of the period.

Basic Intelligence Guidance Background

Standing Group Directives to SACEUR limited his activities in the intelligence field to a certain extent. The Standing Group was charged with furnishing the Major NATO Commanders with intelligence estimates affecting their plans and preparations for war. All requests by the Major Commanders for estimates of a general nature of enemy capabilities were required to be made to the Standing Group. The Standing Group was also responsible for furnishing Major Commanders with policy directives in the field of intelligence and with coordinating their intelligence activities.

However, SACEUR was authorized to call upon national staffs for estimates of the threat pertaining to his theater and mission and to ask for factual, military and topographical intelligence from these sources. He was authorized to deal directly with national staffs but was required to forward to the Standing Group all summaries of intelligence produced by SHAPE. While his Subordinate Commanders would normally receive their intelligence directly from SACEUR, they could, in special cases, receive intelligence directly from national staffs.

(2) Basic Peacetime Intelligence Organization of NATO, SG 128/1(Final), 31 Mar 53, as amended.
The basic NATO intelligence document upon which SHAPE depended for guidance and estimates was the SG 161 series. Until 1954 this document had been revised and republished periodically, but on no particular time schedule. In 1954, however, the Council decided that, in order to conform with the NATO planning cycles and to furnish the Major Commanders an up-to-date intelligence estimate early in each calendar year, this document should be issued on an orderly cycle as an annual intelligence estimate. This resulted in the SG 161 estimate being drawn up in March and April of each year and being issued under a new series number on 1 May to Major NATO Commanders. It was revised on a semi-annual basis, including National comments as of 1 November each year.\(^{(3)}\)

In practice the Annual Estimate was developed at the Standing Group by an Ad Hoc Intelligence Committee which based its work on intelligence estimates and information produced and evaluated by the three Standing Group nations, supplemented insofar as possible by data from other sources in NATO. Participation in this estimate from other member nations of NATO was provided for in the form of national observers who gathered in Washington during the approximate three-week period in March and April when the Ad Hoc Group met to prepare the new estimate. In some cases, should a member nation not care to send its own officers, the representatives sent by SHAPE were asked to represent that nation's views as well as its own at this conference. SHAPE's views were made known at the same time. Thus the views of the nations and of SHAPE were combined in improving the value and usefulness of the document.

\(^{(3)}\) The Method of Production of Peacetime NATO Intelligence Estimates of the Soviet Bloc Strength and Capabilities, SG 128/2, 24 Sep 54.
In March of 1958, during the preparation of the Annual Intelligence Estimate, SHAPE special requests were a requirement for reappraisal of the political alignment of "neutral" countries and military implications; the political situation in the USSR and satellite nations as these influenced the military situation; and intelligence on political and economic weaknesses of the Soviet Bloc. (4)

The NATO Intelligence Estimate for 1958, SG 161/11, was issued in May 1958. During the course of the year certain revisions were incorporated into the document. In addition to this basic document, SHAPE also was able to use certain intelligence sections from MC 70. (5)

In certain respects SHAPE was not satisfied with the information furnished by SG 161/11. These deficiencies centred around the projection of estimates. At a meeting held at SHAPE on 22 and 23 October 1958, intelligence authorities of ACE discussed this problem. Regional threat estimates were defined as a strength of the enemy that might be employed against any particular front. It was agreed that some machinery should be set up within ACE to project these estimates further than they were then carried, and that MSCs would approach their national staffs in their own areas for information and advice. Any changes to the estimates which

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(4) Memorandum ACOS Intel to SHAPE representatives at SGN Meeting, ID 3500/1, 20 Feb 58.

(5) SHAPE 188/58, 12 Dec 58; SG 161/11; In addition to SG 161 series, the Standing Group also issued Intelligence Guidance in specific areas. Examples of this were SG 252; Logistical Intelligence Guide to Soviet Armed Forces; SG 252, The Threat to NATO's Southern Flank Arising from Soviet Military Targets in ACE; 258, Methodology for Assessing Road Supply of Enemy Forces; SG 166/1, Indication of Attack; SG 243, NATO Policy on P. O. W; SG 247, Wartime Intelligence of Counter Intelligence Branch; SG 233, Captured Enemy Documents.
developed, however, would have to be sent to the Standing Group.

Looking to the future, the officers at the conference decided that in preparing for the next annual estimates, which would be SG 161/12, a clearer definition of the threat should be made. In the document issued the year before, SG 161/10, a fair estimate was given of the number of divisions which might be deployed against Allied Command Europe. In SG 161/11, the issue had been avoided by saying that the capability of lines of communication were such that they could support a specified number of divisions. However, SHAPE agreed that it was necessary to get both logistic and tactical threat problems straightened out by having the MSCs get a more realistic picture through discussions with the national staffs in their areas. Following this, coordination could be carried out at SHAPE to iron out any major discrepancies. These estimates would be used as a basis for exercises in the future. It was obvious also that a more realistic amphibious threat would have to be developed and that a clearer definition of the missile threat by areas, particularly surface-to-surface missiles was needed. More information on neutral countries was also required.

It was decided finally that the MSCs, using advice which they could get from the MODs, would prepare regional estimates of the threat. Copies of these threat estimates would be sent to SHAPE, if possible by August 1959, and would be coordinated at a conference at SHAPE. Standing Group approval would be sought in order that MSCs and SHAPE could use these estimates both for planning and for exercise purposes.\(^\text{(6)}\)

\(^{\text{(6)}}\) Memorandum Minutes of Intelligence Conference, 13 Nov 58; Letter, AG 2030/12 INTEL.
Briefings and Publications

During the flare-up of tension in the Middle East in mid-1958, intelligence agencies of ACE and SHAPE increased their activities to cope with the urgent situation. Particularly, SACEUR and his Major Commanders required more detailed and timely information, in view of the grave possibility of NATO involvement. Too, certain of the member nations of NATO were involved on a bi-lateral or unilateral basis. The possibility of war beginning through miscalculation in this period was believed to have increased and the key to ultimate readiness lay in adequate warning and prior preparation. The warning necessary to allow the preparation was the responsibility of NATO intelligence agencies.

Arrangements for special intelligence briefings throughout each day were made so that SACEUR, his Deputies and the Chief of Staff could be kept abreast of latest developments. These briefings were handled by key officers of the Intelligence Division and were based on every item which could be secured through NATO channels. In addition, daily intelligence cables, incorporating all known and pertinent facts were sent to the Major Subordinate Commanders by SHAPE. From this daily cable evolved a daily summary, sent at first only to MSCs, but later expanded to include national Ministers of Defense.

SHAPE Intelligence Publications

The normal channel for disseminating intelligence information by SHAPE was in the form of a periodic cable, the SHAPE periodic intelligence report, EURPIR, and in the form of special studies on selected topics.
The Cable

On 2 July 1958, during the height of the Middle East crisis, General Tarver, ACOS, Intelligence, directed that two cables be sent to MSCs each Monday. The first cable would be Cosmic Top Secret in classification and would state whether or not hostilities appeared imminent between the Soviet Bloc and NATO nations or nations contiguous to NATO nations. The second cable would include a short resume of intelligence highlights having a bearing on the imminence of hostilities, pointing out potential danger areas and presenting a brief evaluation of pertinent intelligence. All national agencies agreed to this proposal and on 7 August the cables were initiated. On 13 August the Standing Group asked SHAPE if it intended increasing distribution beyond the MSCs and SHAPE replied that for the moment no such procedure was contemplated. However, on 4 September it was decided in agreement with the Standing Group to further disseminate the information contained in these cables from SHAPE not only to MSCs but to all MODs and to commanders down to the Army Group/ATAF level. To enable this to be accomplished more readily, the national staffs were urged to submit fullest possible information to SHAPE by Thursday of each week. During the year the distribution of this cable was expanded to include CINCHAN, COMAIRCHAN and SA CLANT.

Later in the year the UK authorities, who, along with other national authorities, were reporting on a weekly basis to SHAPE on their national judgement of the imminence of hostilities, stated that they wished to

(7) US does not send able cables in connection with imminence of hostilities; Intelligence Division File Imminence of Hostilities Reports, 3500/9, 1958; Letter, Periodic Intelligence Reports and Warning of Soviet Military Aggression, AG 3500/9 ID, 4 Jul 58; Message, DEF 946542, 13 Aug 58; Message, SHAPTO 1707, 19 Aug 58; Message, SHAPE 26029, 4 Sep 58; Message, SHAPE 26406, 24 Sep 58; Message, SHAPE 27706, 14 Nov 58.
discontinue this cable and to report only if hostilities appeared imminent. SHAPE, however, objected to this procedure, stating that it needed a positive statement otherwise it would never know whether a cable had actually been sent and had failed to be received or whether the UK had deliberately not sent a cable. More important, an action of this nature on the part of one national authority would certainly lead to a general reaction whereby other national intelligence staffs would also want not to submit negative reports. (8)

The EURPIR

In addition to the weekly cable, SHAPE issued to all MSCs and other Subordinate Commanders, with copies going to the SGN and to interested national agencies, a periodic review of intelligence, the EURPIR. This differed considerably from the weekly cable in that the information presented was, while less timely, more detailed and ranged over a greater field of subject matter. This review contained information which was thoroughly collated and evaluated and was not restricted to purely military intelligence matters.

Other Publications

In addition to the two periodic publications mentioned above, SHAPE produced, and maintained in a current status, two major handbooks, one on Soviet and satellite ground forces, the other on Soviet and satellite air forces. No SHAPE handbook on naval forces was maintained since this was felt to be more within the province of SACLANT. In addition to these, detailed studies on selected subjects were published from time to time during 1958 and distributed to Major Subordinate Commanders, as well as other commanders in Allied Command Europe.

(8) JIC 801.
Exploitation of Early Warning Systems for Intelligence Purposes

Searching for every possible means of determining information on enemy capabilities and, if possible, intentions, SHAPE had suggested to the national authorities, as well as to the MSCs, that the integrated early warning system using long range radars, which was expected to become operational in 1959, should be used to gather such information. SHAPE had asked that the nations begin using such early warning equipment as they had on a national basis even before the NATO system was put into effect in 1959. (9)

Then in August 1958, CINCSOUTH sent to SHAPE a detailed proposal for the establishment of a NATO early warning intelligence system in the Southern region. CINCSOUTH proposed that until the NATO early warning system was effective, the nations use their early warning sets in his region as basic collection devices. He set forth in detail why he felt raw information could be collected by surveying enemy areas within range of radar sets for enemy flying activity. This information, in order to develop basic intelligence, would be evaluated and correlated at various levels within his command. A qualified intelligence officer would be stationed at each sector operations center on a national basis. All tracks obtained during the radar operating hours would be studied within the SOC and correlated on a periodic basis with close cooperation with the air defense personnel. He felt that from his standpoint the intelligence produced by the evaluation of the SOC should be sent to NATO staffs on a periodic basis going through COMAIRSOUTH and CINCSOUTH. He asked that SHAPE approve this policy and that SHAPE ask the MODs in the Southern

(9) For details of this see 1957 SHAPE History, Chapter IX, and AG 3170 ID, 18 Jul 1957, Exploitation of Early Warning Systems for Intelligence Purposes.
SHAPE 58/67

region to begin the program in coordination with AFSOUTH and AIRSOUTH so that a higher degree of readiness could be brought about in all intelligence echelons in the Southern region. SHAPE approved CINCSOUTH's proposals and on 21 May forwarded them to all Ministers of Defense and to CINCNORTH and CINCENT for comment and possible adoption on a general basis. (10)

Comments from the nations and from the MSCs were generally in agreement with the proposals made by AFSOUTH for establishment of this system. Several dissenting voices came from the North. MOD Norway in a letter stated that he felt that Norway could not adopt the type of system adopted by AFSOUTH because the method of report was not as good as that which he earlier had recommended to SHAPE. The Command in the North, CINCNORTH, stated that he felt that such a system would be of little value since the Russians already knew the range of radar sets already situated in Northern Europe and they could arrange their flying between to reflect whatever picture they desired. (11)

This problem was discussed at SHAPE between representatives of Intelligence Division, Air Defense and Air Operations Divisions on 20 August. Their main concern was how to get information from the MSCs and how this information could be tied in with other intelligence information and with SACEUR's alert system. Not much progress was made during the remaining summer months until, on the 5th September 1958, AFSOUTH wrote a strong letter to SACEUR stating that the matter

(10) Letter, CINCSOUTH to SHAPE, AD 1220 ID/9, 5 May 58; Letter, SHAPE to MODs, AG 3170/1 ID, 21 May 58;

(11) Letter, MOD Norway to SACEUR, 23 Jul 58; Letter, AFNORTH to SACEUR, July 1958, both contained in ID Files 3170/1 58. For deployment detailed compilation of this system, see same file.
of establishing an early warning integrated intelligence system was, in his opinion, extremely urgent. It had been brought out in the recent Mediterranean crisis when Russian aircraft had been known to move into satellite and forward Russian airfields within range of Allied Command radars that the lack of this integrated system prevented a timely and complete acquisition of intelligence by NATO on Soviet air deployment. CINCSOUTH asked that on an urgent basis SHAPE either query the MODs in the South once more asking their cooperation in establishing a system, or that SHAPE authorize AFSOUTH to call a meeting of the MODs for the same purpose. On 16 September, SHAPE radioed to AFSOUTH stating that they were authorized to call a meeting of the representatives of the MODs. Such a meeting was called on 15 October at Naples and was attended by representatives of Turkey, Greece and Italy, of the ATAF and Army Commanders and of the CINCSOUTH Intelligence Division. All present agreed in principle that it would be possible to establish an integrated early warning intelligence system by 1 January 1959 and that this should be done on an urgent basis. (12)

Since 1955 SHAPE had been developing a plan which would set forth as closely as possible SACEUR’s Wartime Intelligence Requirements. This had been coordinated closely with another important document, "SACEUR’s Peacetime Intelligence Requirements." Shortly before the beginning of the period, SACEUR’s Peacetime Intelligence Requirements had been developed and distributed to all the MSCs and MODs. (13)

(12) Letter, CINCSOUTH to SACEUR, AG 1220 ID/9, 5 Sep 58; Message SHAPE 26239 to CINCSOUTH, 16 Sep 58; AG 1220 ID/9, letter AFSOUTH to SHAPE, 14 Nov 58, enclosing Study developed at meeting.

(13) SHAPE 242/57, 19 Dec 57.
During 1958, the SHAPE officers, in coordination with their counterparts in the Major Commands, attempted to develop and define as closely as possible SACEUR's Wartime Intelligence Requirements. This was a statement of the requirements which would be implemented at the outbreak of hostilities or prior thereto if directed by SACEUR, upon which MSCs would base their wartime collection plans. On 1 May 1958, the final draft of SACEUR's proposed Wartime Intelligence Requirements was sent to the MSCs asking that they give their comments and suggestions. (14)

(14) AG 3500/19 ID, SACEUR's Wartime Intelligence Requirements, 1 May 58, with draft enclosure.
Among the most important air defense issues facing SHAPE during 1958 was that of the provision of an integrated air defense for NATO Europe. General Norstad had submitted his concept of an integrated air defense to the North Atlantic Council at the Ministerial Meeting held in December 1957. Throughout the following twelve months a great deal of discussion took place on this particular aspect of air defense planning. Little progress was made, however, and it will be seen that General Norstad was forced to make a strong personal appeal to the Council, pointing out that it was vital to the interests of the Alliance that there was in existence in peacetime an adequate air defense for the NATO territory.

A closely related subject was that of Rules for Engagement. No uniform method of identifying aircraft was in existence within NATO. Some progress was achieved during 1958 in this field.

The ACE Long Range Early Warning System was a vital part of SACEUR's air defenses. Progress on the construction of the system was delayed considerably during the year owing to technical difficulties. Differences of opinion arose regarding the requirements. Much time was lost in discussion, however, and by the end of 1958 work was still in progress on the preparation of specification requirements.
The Integration of the Air Defense of NATO Europe

General Norstad submitted his concept of an integrated air defense of NATO Europe to the Standing Group on 6 December 1957. At the 18th Session of the Military Committee, held in Paris on 18 December, the Committee "declared itself in agreement in principle with SACEUR's study." The Standing Group was requested to study the SHAPE study and report back later to the Military Committee. SACEUR was authorized to study the matter with the appropriate national authorities and then develop an organizational concept that was to include a command and control system. After submission to the Standing Group, the SHAPE concept would then be studied by the Military Committee.

In view of the decisions taken by the Military Committee, SHAPE notified all the appropriate MODs that a Conference would be held on 7 January 1958 to obtain national views on integration. These views would help SHAPE to propose an outline organizational concept, and also help in the preparation of a phased plan giving some indication of the timing necessary to implement such a plan.

The conference was held at SHAPE and was attended by representatives from fourteen nations, together with representatives from the MSCs, SACLANT, SGN and SHAPE. SHAPE defined its concept of the principle of integration as "The welding of the existing National Air Defense Systems into one unified system with an Allied as opposed to

(1) AG 1250 AD, dtd 6 Dec 57: See 1957 History for details of SACEUR's original concept.
(2) SH 20414, dtd 19 Dec 57.
(3) AG 2030 AD, dtd 23 Jan 58. These minutes of the Conference contain a useful chart showing SHAPE's proposals for a command and control organization.
National Command and Control organization effective in peace and war. Definitions were also given of the terms Full Command, Operational Command, and Operational Control. SHAPE's proposal was for the integration of the command and control system and not the integration of the national fighting units which were operated by the Allied System. National air defense units, whether they were squadrons of manned aircraft or of missiles, would still be 100% national even though commanded and controlled through an allied organization. SHAPE would propose force levels and it would still be for the nations to decide whether to accept these levels or not. Nations would still have the right to control policy on air defense.

The national representatives raised various problems, dealing with such issues as national sovereignty, international funding, command and control and the composition of the command staff.

In response to the resolution made at the 18th Session of the Military Committee, SACEUR submitted his recommendations on the organization and command structure for the integration of air defense in NATO Europe. In a letter to the Standing Group he stated that these proposals had been evolved "largely as the result of discussions with military representatives of Nations and my subordinate commands. While the views I put forward are in general accord with the consensus expressed at the meetings, it should be remembered that the representatives were not able to present formal national viewpoints, and that individual views on specific points were not always unanimous. I believe, however, that these proposals are now in a form which merits formal consideration by the Military Committee."(4)

(4) AG 1250 AD, dtd 27 Feb 58. Integration of air defense.
SACEUR's proposal traced the historical background to the integration problem, defined the terms used and explained the concept of the system. The essence of integration as proposed was the assignment by nations to SACEUR in peace and war of the responsibility, the necessary forces, and the authority to defend the nations of NATO Europe against air attack. "Under this concept the responsibility assigned to SACEUR must be clear. There should be no division of control of air defense operations between national and allied authorities."

SACEUR pointed out that if the proposal was agreed, "the forces and facilities, now national, will have to be assigned to SACEUR in peace and war. The forces so assigned will include all air defense fighter units, surface-to-air missile units and anti-aircraft artillery units used for the defense of Allied Command Europe. In addition, it should include the units used for command and control. These must be designated as assigned units and it must be clearly stated that they are placed under SACEUR's operational command and control, subject to such specific reservations and direction as are necessary on their utilization in peace and war. The operation and employment of these assigned forces by SACEUR should be governed primarily by the rules of engagement now before the council for action which will be amplified by more comprehensive and explicit rules to be proposed by SACEUR and submitted for approval at a later date. These rules should indicate clearly the defensive actions which should be taken to counter any penetration of our Allied Command Europe air space by hostile or potentially hostile aircraft or missiles."

The responsibilities and safeguards that were necessary to protect national interests and to clarify Allied tasks were then analyzed. Certain principles were established:
a. National air defense units would be assigned to SACEUR and placed under his operational control and command in peace and war, but subject to such guidance and restriction as might be imposed in respect of employment and deployment of forces.

b. Assigned air defense forces would not be used for tasks other than air defense without national approval.

c. Assigned air defense units would, in general, be deployed in national territory unless exceptions to meet overall requirements receive national approval.

d. The composition of Allied air defense staffs at each level would be broadly in proportion to the nationality and service of the forces and facilities contributed to each allied command.

e. Control and reporting centers and stations would be manned primarily by the nation in whose territory they were located unless unusual circumstances demanded otherwise.

f. The logistical support of assigned units would remain a national responsibility.

g. Administration and discipline of personnel assigned to allied organizations would remain a responsibility of the nation concerned.

h. The allied air defense organization would continue to provide the information normally supplied by national air defense authorities for all matters which remained National in character. This would include information which was necessary from military authorities for the National control of civil aviation and civil defense.

It was considered that because of the extent of the area to be covered (as laid down in MC 54), it was desirable that the system should be organized into regions. The existing regional boundaries were to apply
until such time as adjustments to these boundaries became desirable. The regional command organizations should be based on existing allied and national facilities, headquarters and staffs, as far as possible and should conform to the following requirements:

a. There should continue to be one regional headquarters in each region. The commander was to be responsible for the operational command of all assigned air defense forces and facilities in the region. Below regional level, the existing organizations were to be used, but to be allied in nature.

b. The commanders at ATAF, DAT or equivalent level below the regional headquarters were to be responsible for the operational control of all assigned units in their areas.

c. At sector level, the air defense commander (sector commander) was to be responsible for the tactical control of units in his area.

It was pointed out that it was highly desirable that the data handling system, necessary for command control, should also be under allied control. It was the SHAPE view that the Control and Reporting System should be assigned to SACEUR. Thus it was desirable that national radars and other equipments which were to be integrated, should become allied on an agreed basis. Subsequent improvements and modifications would then be an allied responsibility.

Finally, a phased time sequence to integrate the system was suggested. The SHAPE view was that the pattern of integration should be established in one area first - the Land Combat Area of Central Europe. The area could then be extended as rapidly as conditions permitted. The phased basis was suggested as follows:

Phase IA - Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Holland and No. 2 Sector of French DAT.
Phase IB - Remainder of Metropolitan France.

Phase IC - UK, the Southern Region, the Northern Region.

The SGN was asked to approve SACEUR's recommendations for the integration of air defense under his command in peace and war. SACEUR also asked that he be directed to initiate action to effect the integration of air defense on the agreed basis. Nations should be requested to assign their air defense forces to SACEUR's operational command in peace and war, subject to their restrictions on the deployment and employment. Finally, SACEUR asked that agreement in principle be given to the common funding of changes and improvements in equipment and facilities in the control and reporting system of ACE.

Following approval by the Military Committee in April 1958 of SACEUR's proposals for the Integration of Air Defenses of NATO Europe, MC 54/1 was issued in draft by the Standing Group. On 30 April 1958, SHAPE requested the major subordinate commanders to proceed with detailed planning with the objective of reducing to a minimum the time between Council approval, if and when this was given, and actual implementation. Subsequently, SHAPE held several conferences with the regional staffs, and the regions prepared preliminary drafts of their short term operational plans for the integrated system. SHAPE then directed the MSCs to finalize these plans after informal consultation with national commands and to submit them to SHAPE by 31 December 1958.

Regions were also requested to prepare plans for the phased improvements of the NATO Air Defense System, which were foreseen to be necessary up to 1963.

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(5) AG 1250 AD, dtd 30 Apr 58. SHAPE to CINCNORTH, CINCENT, CINCSOUTH and C-in-C Fighter Command, enclosing draft MC 54/1.
(6) SCO OUT 27421, dtd 31 Oct 58, to all Regions.
On 6 November 1958, the Standing Group was informed of the progress in planning for integration in order that it would be in a position to inform the Military Committee of the status and future steps envisaged leading to the completion of SHAPE's plan. SHAPE stated that an operational ACE Outline Plan was being prepared in broad terms. This would be finalized after receipt of the regional short term plans.

Among the problems which SHAPE had agreed to study was the air defense of Portugal. SACLANT had recommended that SACEUR should assume responsibility for this, and SHAPE was particularly concerned with the early warning aspect as pertained to the Portuguese system. Other problems included possible changes in SACEUR's area of responsibility, regional boundary adjustments, modification of early warning communications, etc.

Concurrently with the immediate actions required, SHAPE was also planning for phased improvements of the NATO air defense system up to 1963. Two aspects of this long-range planning were being considered. The first dealt with the changing nature of the threat, the consequent changes in operational concepts and organizational changes that were likely to be required. The second aspect concerned equipment changes, including requirements for new radars, data handling equipment computers, etc. As an initial step in the long-range planning, SHAPE would propose that Infrastructure funding (common funding) be applied to the Control and Reporting System, down to and including sector operations centers. However, SHAPE considered that because of the nature of this longer range plan, it would not necessarily be completed prior to actual integration. The plan would be submitted at a later date.

(7) AG 1250/15 ADEF, dtd 6 Nov 58. Progress in Planning for Integration of Air Defenses for NATO Europe. SHAPE to SGN.
The Standing Group was informed that SACEUR considered the most important single problem requiring solution prior to the implementation of any approved plan for integration was that of a comprehensive and agreed set of Rules of Engagement. The recent approval of MC 66 was a step in the right direction. The rules set out in MC 66 were in essence an interrogation procedure, applicable solely to manned interceptors dealing with incursions by one or two aircraft under visual flight conditions. MC 66 did not establish a pattern for operational reaction in other circumstances. These rules had to be expanded in sufficient detail to provide a basis of authority under which SACEUR could issue his guidance and instructions to subordinate elements of his command on the specific actions he required in response to a wide range of types of violation of NATO air space. SHAPE stated that the Rules of Engagement had to state exactly what reaction was required in response to different scales of enemy or unidentified activity in the NATO air space, under all conditions of weather and light, and had to cover all available weapons systems including surface-to-air missiles.

SHAPE stated that there were doubts as to whether it would be possible to obtain agreement between national, regional and SHAPE views by the time that the ACE Outline Plan was submitted to the SGN. Action was being taken to determine the scope and nature of both SACEUR's Rules and the necessary amplification of MC 66, but it was probable that a solution would not be reached before Spring 1959.

Finally, SHAPE indicated that the following sequence of actions was necessary before integration could take place:

a. On approval of MC 54/1 by the Council, issuance of the directive by the Military Committee to SACEUR.
b. Completion by Regions and submission to SHAPE by 31 December 1958 of the regional short term operational plans for integration.

c. Completion by SHAPE and submission of the ACE Outline Plan to SGN.

d. The transfer from national to allied establishments those posts which under integration would be manned by allied personnel.

e. Completion by SHAPE and submission to the Standing Group of proposals for the basic Rules of Engagement.

f. Approval of the basic Rules of Engagement.

g. Approval of the ACE Outline Plan.

h. Issuance of SACEUR's instructions to MSCs.

i. Assignment of forces and facilities by the NATO nations, the assignments to be effective on the designated integration date.

SHAPE also indicated to the SGN those actions which could be taken as soon as possible but which did not need completion before the implementation of integration. These included those problems dealing with boundary changes, common funding, etc.

General Schuyler, speaking at a Meeting with Division Chiefs on 22 October 1958, noted that General Norstad was concerned over reservations developing within certain nations on the matter of integrating air defense. (8) Norway and Denmark appeared to have certain constitutional problems which would not permit them to assign their air defense forces to SACEUR in peacetime. SACEUR's view was that if he was to assume responsibility for the air defense of NATO's territory, he would have to have the forces available to him in peacetime, and he would have to have the authority to give them instructions to react as and when the

(8) SEC 2030, dtd 22 Oct 58.
actual threat developed. He could not compromise on that issue.
If the nations were not willing to take the necessary steps to give him this authority, SACEUR would not press for this authority so long as the nations clearly understood what was at stake and that the effectiveness of the air defense of their region would be practically zero without some coordinated approach.

Air Defense Division at SHAPE prepared a brief for SACEUR in order that he could take up a position with regard to MC 54/1. The brief was prepared just prior to the Military Committee meeting held on 26 November 1958. (9)

MC 54/1 was acceptable to SHAPE, subject to one minor amendment. Acceptance by the Military Committee, however, hinged on two points. Denmark and Norway were unwilling to assign forces. As integration in the Northern Region, as elsewhere, would become effective only at a time when SACEUR and nations concerned concurred, it was the SHAPE view that the two nations should be encouraged to approve MC 54/1. Since the date for integration in the Northern Region was in the indefinite future, there appeared to be no reason why Norway and Denmark could not approve the document.

It was possible that France would not accept the full degree of integration proposed. It was believed advisable to emphasize to the Standing Group and the Military Committee that units operating under the Allied system would remain national and that there was no intent to make such forces international in character.

(9) ADEF 1250/15, dtd 24 Nov 58.
At its 21st Session on 26 November 1958, the Military Committee amended and approved MC 54/1. Three nations - Denmark, the UK and France - reserved their positions.

Denmark accepted MC 54/1 as it stood subject to a later agreement between SACEUR and the Danish authorities. The Danish constitution made this agreement necessary. The UK also accepted the general concept of an integrated air defense of NATO Europe under the direction of SACEUR. The reservation arose because the UK authorities wanted precise definitions of "operational command" and "operational control".

The French reservation was more complex. The French Representative made the following statement: "France considers that the document MC 54/1, The Integration of Air Defence in NATO Europe, constitutes an excellent presentation of most of the problems that have to be solved in order to achieve, in common, an effective Air Defence of Europe. However, there remain too many major problems, not approached here, an acceptable solution of which is essential to give practical value to the concept of the Air Defence of NATO Europe.

"In these circumstances, it appears that approval of MC 54/1 at this stage and its forwarding to the Council would entail more difficulties and misunderstandings than contributions to the objective.

"The French comments refer, inter alia, to the problems of the right to open fire, the inclusion of sea areas, the delineation of inter-regional boundaries as well as to the methods for providing the equipment and financing.

(10) MC 54/1 (Decision), dtd 26 Nov 58. See also SEC 2030, CofS Meeting with Division Chiefs, 3 Dec 58 - Statement by AM Dunlap, DCO SHAPE.
"The French authorities hoped that the Military Committee would take note of this document and instruct the Supreme Allied Commander Europe to continue his studies, his plans and his discussions with the nations concerned and that the Standing Group make a progress report available to the Military Committee within a reasonable period of time, thus enabling the Military Committee to have a more comprehensive view of the possible solutions to the remaining practical difficulties to be overcome.

"In view of the opinion expressed by the other members of the Committee, France will not oppose the forwarding of this document to the Council. However, France must express a very definite reservation for the present concerning the whole document. France further requests that the nations and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, within the framework of documents now in effect and guided by the agreement in principle given last year, continue to make progress in the field of Air Defense."

The Military Committee agreed that a statement made at the request of the Chairman of the Committee by SACEUR should be contained in the decision sheet. The statement was:

"It is scarcely necessary for me to tell this group, particularly the European members, about the importance of air defense. And after the discussions that have taken place in this very room over a period of the last three or four years, I need not point out again that there is no air defense in any one of your countries, except as the forces and the equipment and the means of your countries contribute to the overall defense. I repeat that: There is no air defense whatsoever in any one of your countries except as a part of the whole."(11)

(11) MC 54/1 (Decision), dtd 26 Nov 58.
The Military Committee requested the Council to give its consideration to the recommendations contained in MC 54/1 (Decision), which in itself contained the document already approved on 9 April 1958.

**French Objections**

At a meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 5 December 1958, the French Representative explained the reasons for his authorities' reservations with regard to the report by the Military Committee (MC 54/1 (Decision)). He emphasized that they had never opposed the concept of integration. On the contrary, they were anxious that the latter should be studied in all its aspects. Throughout discussions in the SGN and Military Committee, his authorities had constantly upheld certain views. Since they had received satisfaction in neither of these bodies, they were finally obliged to enter a reservation of a more general character and although they had not opposed transmission of the report to the Council, it was for this reason that they now advocated a further study of the matter by the Military authorities. The French Representative stressed that until certain vital elements, notably the Early Warning System and SAM units, had been installed, the organization of a common air defense was more theoretical than real. This aspect of the problem was considerably more urgent than the creation, for example, of a common command organization on the basis of present resources. Such installations were indispensible to any modern system of Air Defense and there could be little urgency in organizing a classic air defense with resources which did not meet the latest criteria. The very crux of the matter, however, was the doctrine of usage concerning the inter-related rules of aircraft and

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(12) C-R(58)58, dated 10 Dec 58.
missiles. This had never been fully elaborated and, until agreement was reached, the concept of air defense was impossible to develop. Among the other reasons for his government's reservations was that they were unable to agree to the precise inter-regional defense boundaries as proposed in the course of SGN discussions, nor to the inclusion of certain sea areas which raised political considerations. Their reservations also extended to the methods of equipment and financing of the Air Defense System.

In conclusion, the French Representative said that he fully recognized the desire of other countries for integration and the difficulties with which they were faced. The matter, however, was not sufficiently advanced since many points of disagreement remained to be overcome and there was no need for haste. The real problem lay in the fact that countries were asked to endorse a system of Air Defense based on missiles which were not yet in place, early warning which was not yet installed, and a doctrine for the use of aircraft and missiles which had not yet been elaborated. The Council should accordingly note the paper and remit it to the Military Committee for further study.

Summary of French Objections

1. As long as the Early Warning System did not exist, the necessity for speedy action toward approval of MC 54/1 was more theoretical than real.

2. Certain urgent problems need to be solved, e.g. the operation of missiles and aircraft in the same air space had not been thoroughly studied, therefore integration should not take place until these problems have been solved.

3. France did not accept the regional organization proposed or certain maritime zones proposed.
4. The method of financing integrated air defense was not covered in MC 54/1.

5. France had stated that there was no need for haste in integration of air defense in NATO Europe.

The 10 December 1958 NAC Meeting

At the 10 December 1958 NAC Meeting, the United Kingdom Representative stated that the problem under discussion between SACEUR and his authorities had been resolved. He then reminded the Council of his earlier suggestion that any decision by the Council on the Military Committee report (MC 54/1) should take the form of a clear and succinct resolution which would specifically underline the commitments into which governments had entered and which would, at the same time, facilitate the tasks of governments in making public statements on the matter. The UK Representative then circulated a draft resolution, emphasizing that the UK could withdraw its reservations on MC 54/1 only if the resolution could be accepted by the Council. He added that the document was based entirely on the MC 54/1 paper, and in no way conflicted with the views of SACEUR, who had, in fact, already indicated his approval of it.

Most of the representatives thought that there would be no difficulty in obtaining their government's approval of the UK resolution, which they hoped to do in the very near future. The French representative stated that he was obliged to place a reservation on the UK resolution. He asked that consideration of the document be deferred until January 1959.

(13) C-R(58)59, dated 15 Dec 58.
The Council took no decision on the UK resolution, but agreed to resume discussion on the integration at its meeting on 7 January 1959.

An analysis of the objections raised during discussions of MC 54/1 at the Military Committee and North Atlantic Council meetings was made by Air Defense staff at SHAPE. (14) This analysis examined each of the objections made by the French delegates to the two bodies during meetings held in the period 26 November to 10 December 1958.

The first objection concerned the statement that "as long as an early warning system did not exist, the necessity for speedy action towards approval of MC 54/1 was more theoretical than real." SHAPE's view was that the less effective the ACE early warning system, the greater was the need for an air defense system which was ready to react effectively without prior warning. In the event of no warning, the strike forces would be longer on the ground and under attack, and their survival would depend more and not less on the effectiveness of air defense. There was a greater need at that time for an effective air defense than there would be later when NATO had some offensive weapons systems with a better inherent survival capability. An early warning system did, in fact exist both within ACE and across to the Pacific. Improvement in this admittedly limited performance system was essential, but proper and timely action would require common interest and common action by the member nations of NATO. Without approval of MC 54/1, which would be an indication of the cooperativeness of the nations, ACE would continue to be delayed in building necessary

(14) From an Analysis of Certain Objections to Approval of MC 54/1. This Analysis was prepared by Air Vice Marshal McGregor, ACOS, Air Defense Division, SHAPE. The original of this undated paper was included in a Briefing Folder prepared for the December 1958 Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council for the use of SACEUR and the Chief of Staff. The Briefing Folder was held in the Secretariat Records and Administration Branch Files in October 1958.
improvements to the Early Warning System. Another consideration concerning the need for haste was the problem of Germany. The air defense of Germany was at that time the responsibility of the former occupying powers. If there was no integration of the NATO European Air Defense, Germany would establish her own system as planned during 1960-1961. Logically, the weapons of other nations deployed under the forward concept in Germany would either have to be withdrawn or would come under German operational control, a solution which was unlikely to be acceptable politically.

Another objection raised by the French delegate was that certain urgent problems had not yet been solved. An example was that of the operation of missiles and aircraft in the same airspace. This had not been thoroughly studied. Integration should not take place until these problems had been solved. SHAPE's view was that this objection implied a lack of study which might have been true of nations, but was not true of the Allied staffs. Allied recommendations had been made in the SHAPE Minimum Force Study and MC 70 and these were considered to be the best solution to problems which were technically and militarily possible at that time. The alternative to the formulation of proposals and solutions on an Allied basis was a series of widely divergent solutions by the nations. Even an imperfect single Allied solution was far more effective than a series of different national solutions applied individually in national territories. In fact, most of the problems which faced air defense planners were impossible of solution on a single nation basis as incompatibility of the solutions adopted by the different nations, inconsistencies in procedure, and lack of overall control would have prevented the collection and dissemination of tactical information which was essential for any modern weapons system.
over an international area. Detailed methods of operation, publication of operational directives, rules of engagement, and so forth would have to be accomplished prior to the date when new facilities and weapons became operational. Unless this was done under agreed procedures and clearly established responsibilities it was unlikely that the required agreement would be obtained in time, if it could be obtained at all. The specific problem of airspace mentioned required detailed planning which was lacking even at that time. Both the operation of surface-to-air missiles and air defense aircraft in the same airspace, as well as the operation of the strike forces through the air defense system would have to ignore completely national boundaries. The only appropriate agency for the detailed timely planning and implementation of operations of this type was the Allied Command. Without national approval and national confidence in the Allied planning, which would be evident by the approval of MC 54/1, it was again difficult to see how SHAPE could expect any timely improvement in critical air operations.

France had never accepted the proposed regional organization or certain maritime zones. A statement to this effect was made at the 5 December 1958 meeting of the Council, by the French Permanent Representative. The SHAPE analysis pointed out that France had approved the boundaries and the organization proposed in MC 54 and other papers. This was the first intimation known to SHAPE that France objected to the boundaries then agreed upon. It was, to say the least, unfortunate that these objections were voiced for the first time after discussions over a long period had led to SHAPE planning on the accepted basis. Unless France proposed a radical change that was designed to meet desires at the expense of the Alliance as a whole, changes in the boundaries
outlined in MC 54/1 were possible if they were proposed in the normal way. SHAPE recognized that changes might have been desired by nations and for this reason MC 54/1 proposed that planning should be based on the only boundaries which had any official status, i.e., those that were in force at that time, but that they might be changed in the light of Allied or national representations which were subsequently endorsed by the NATO authorities at the required level.

Turning to the question of finance, SHAPE pointed out that MC 54/1 clearly stated that the method of financing integration would be the subject of a separate study by the Council. France had stated that it was not mentioned in the document. SACEUR previously had recommended that improvements in the Control and Reporting System be commonly funded. MC 54/1 further stated that "pending such an agreement on Allied responsibilities, provision of radars, operation centres, military communications, and similar control facilities, and the manning of these, should remain a national responsibility to the same extent as they are at present, but the units of the control and reporting centers should be assigned to SACEUR." SHAPE considered that there was considerable merit in integration even if no change was contemplated in the method of financing and national responsibilities remained as they were. It was considered that possible improvements in methods of financing were no justification for deferring these benefits which the present proposal would give.

The final objection was the statement that there was no need for haste in integration of the air defense of NATO Europe. The SHAPE view was that NATO defense plans were based on the assumption that procedures and equipment which had been satisfactory in the past were no longer usable.
This was brought about by the nature of nuclear warfare, the introduction by both the enemy and NATO of aircraft operating at supersonic speeds, the introduction of missiles, and improved radar and other techniques.

In conclusion, the SHAPE analysis stated: "A change of command and control would inevitably result in chaos, confusion and great inefficiency if it were made at the outbreak of war - the time when the need for air defense is at its absolute maximum. It is inconceivable that nations would desire to make a change at that time but it is also clear that national control in such circumstances would be ineffective. It is obvious that the change from National to Allied control must be made in peace before an attack occurs. As the time when this might happen cannot be accurately foreseen and as an effective system must be well practised in peace to be efficient, the only time safely to make such a change is now and not in the indefinite future."

The Belgian Proposal

During the North Atlantic Council meeting on 5 December 1958, the Belgian representative spoke on the subject of the reservations made by certain nations regarding the integration of air defense. The Standing Group and SACEUR were asked to express their views on the merits of the Belgian proposal.

SACEUR considered that integration was practicable in a limited area or areas, and would result in a more effective defense system than was possible under the existing system. The proposals in MC 54/1

(15) See LOSTAN 2722, dated 6 Dec 58: Message SGREP to SGN, and ADEF 1250/15 - Brief prepared by Air Defense Division, SHAPE, for NAC Meetings, December 1958, undated. Copy held in Secretariat Record Room at Oct 59.
and the outline of the actions which were required to be taken, already indicated by SACEUR, would remain as they were and did not require alteration because one or more nations might indefinitely defer their agreement to participate. Some details of plans for non-integration areas would have to be eliminated but, other than this, the action for the development of plans, rules of engagement and all other actions leading to implementation would remain as outlined.

It was made clear, however, that the partial integration proposed by Belgium would have certain disadvantages if some national areas were excluded. The higher aircraft speeds and the growing surface-to-surface missile threat would make necessary a deployment of manned aircraft further to the rear than had been necessary. Integration on a limited basis might not have the defensive depth to obtain maximum effectiveness, and this lack of depth would become more significant as time went by.

Limited integration might also result in a withdrawal of the non-participating nations from the integrated area and result in a militarily unsound pattern of deployment, a consequent weakening of defences and an unnecessary reduction in the forces that might survive an initial attack.

Other points made by SHAPE dealt with the necessary adoption of two standards for Rules of Engagement, Data Handling equipment and similar equipments. The acceptance of two different standards in two different areas, while clearly most undesirable, was inevitable if nations not participating in integration were not to be in a position to dictate the pattern in the integrated area by withholding or deferring their agreement to such proposals as were made for that area. In addition, additional cost would inevitably result, should the non-participating nations eventually decide to be included in the integrated area.
SACEUR's Presentation to the Council

The North Atlantic Council met in ministerial session from 16-18 December 1958 at the Palais de Chaillot. The second day was devoted to an examination of the existing status of the NATO defense effort. General Norstad explained the impact of MC 70 on strategic plans and policies in ACE. (16)

During his presentation, however, SACEUR referred to air defense. He recalled that the Council agreed in 1954 that there must be a coordinated air defense in Allied Command Europe, and that this coordination would be accomplished only by the close integration of forces and facilities.

The two major projects set up to facilitate air defense, the early warning system and the basic communications system, had both been subjected to delays and difficulties.

Turning to the integration problem, SACEUR said: "It is an almost impossible task for individual countries in NATO Europe to meet the requirements and the most that I can say for allied integration of air defense is that by that means we can get the maximum effectiveness out of the facilities, out of the forces, out of equipment, out of the talent that your countries can make available, but I think it is clearly accepted by all military people, of all countries, that the only real contribution that can be made to air defense will be made through an integrated air defense. Here again we are making progress and I can only, at this time, to this group, express the hope that on your level you will give consideration to this matter with a view to moving it forward promptly so that we can make this additional contribution to our allied strength."

(16) C-VR(58)63, dated 17 Dec 58.
Result of the Military Committee and North Atlantic Council Meetings

MC 54/1 was not approved by the North Atlantic Council at the December meetings. The French and Danish reservations still stood, and the Council had not yet discussed the United Kingdom resolution, which if approved, would have removed the UK reservation. As a result, however, of the discussions that had taken place on integration both during Military Committee and Council meetings, and also as a result of the interest shown by most of the interested nations, SACEUR wrote to these nations on 31 December 1958. (17)

In his letter to nine of the ten interested European nations, France being the exception, SACEUR stated: "Reference is made to the recent discussions on air defense and the interest expressed by your Government in moving forward with this integration as rapidly as possible. I am only too willing to work with you in order to achieve all possible progress pending final approval of MC 54/1, which I hope, will not be delayed unduly. It would appear that we could move forward gradually by taking a number of preparatory steps in the military field which must be completed in any event prior to my assumption of full responsibility for the integrated air defense. That last step must, of course, await final Council determination. "There, despite the lack of formal Council action at this time, I am sure it would be the desire of that body to proceed with the development of the detailed actions which can be accomplished under existing conditions, and I am prepared to work with you to this end. Accordingly, I am directing my Major Subordinate Commanders to proceed, in consultation

(17) AG 1250 ADEF, dated 31 Dec 58: Integration of Air Defense. SACEUR to MODs of Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey and the UK.
with the appropriate National Authorities, with the preparation of regional air defense plans and such other actions as will serve to foreshorten the time between final approval and implementation of integration."

MC 70 and Air Defense

Early Warning

MC 70 drew attention to the problem of providing Allied Command Europe with an efficient early warning system. After stating that the problem was particularly acute in the area due to the proximity of Soviet weapons bases, the basic requirement was set out. It was essential that there should be a detection system effective against attack at all altitudes. A complementary communications system had to be provided to afford the fullest exploitation of the detection system. The existing early warning system would, when completed, provide effective early warning against only high altitude manned aircraft. In terms of low altitude attacks and the missile threat, early warning as it was conceived at that time was not sufficient.

The logical extension of early warning in the missile period lay in the acquisition of accurate and timely intelligence from other sources for warning purposes. The possibility of long-term concealment of aggressive intentions and the danger that an attack might develop from "incidents," the nature and scope of which would initially be unknown, required continuous efforts for the intensification of the exchange of intelligence reports and situation assessments as well as for the improvement of early warning possibilities through the intelligence services.

(18) MC 70, dated 9 May 58. See Section VI, paragraphs 14 and 16, and Section VII.
Readiness and Active Air Defense

Measures to be taken against the manned bomber and missiles were discussed in MC 70. A high degree of readiness was vital in order to permit launching the retaliation before arrival of the enemy attack. The improvement of all alert systems was considered to be a matter of urgency. The existing systems would have to be reviewed and coordinated with a view to simplification and unifications. By means of such a simplified and unified system, the Allied Commanders would have to take measures to ensure the readiness and the survival of their forces, themselves based on military decisions adapted to the situation.

SACEUR's Tasks

In peacetime, SACEUR, in accordance with the approved concept of an integrated air defense, had to be prepared to assume responsibility for such an integrated system as soon as plans were approved. Thus MC 70 underlined the necessity for an integrated air defense system. SACEUR's wartime task was "to defend his area as far forward as possible, with no intention of major withdrawals and with particular attention to the protection of the offensive striking power in his area, the weapons, the installations, and the guidance systems."

In order to achieve his tasks, SACEUR had a requirement for air defense to cover the Strike and Shield forces and safeguard their ability to accomplish their assigned tasks. In addition, there was the obligation to protect NATO countries.

The air defense forces shown in the force tables in MC 70 were based on the assumption that, irrespective of the rate of Soviet missile development, a threat against Europe from enemy manned aircraft would continue to exist throughout the period covered by the study. The tables
showing force requirements provided for the earliest possible introduction of anti-aircraft missiles. Although the need for active anti-missile defenses was recognized, no provision was made for such defenses in MC 70, since at that time it was not expected that anti-missile weapons would have become operationally available by 1963.

The Deployment of Missiles for Air Defense

In the 1958-1963 Minimum Force Study, SHAPE proposed a forward surface-to-air missile concept for air defense. At the end of 1957, General Norstad reviewed this concept in order that he could make detailed recommendations on the deployment of these missiles. To assist him in reaching a firm decision, SACEUR requested certain national authorities to make available to him the most suitable top level scientists and air defense experts. He suggested that these experts should come to SHAPE for a meeting "to review the proposed concept for the deployment of surface-to-air missiles in Central Europe in the 1958-1963 period and to make recommendations as they see fit on the use of these weapons systems and their deployment." The Air Defense Division staff at SHAPE was directed to work closely with the group.

The group of experts met at SHAPE from 21 to 23 January 1958. After considering various solutions for the deployment of the SAM units, a recommendation was made that the units be deployed in a thin forward belt combined with the close defense of selected targets in the rear. The limited forward belt would give warning of positive attack and so facilitate the timely launching of strike forces. It would also provide a

(19) SH 20242, dated 10 Dec 57: SACEUR to MODs of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, United Kingdom and United States.
kill capacity in the forward areas where the fighters could not react in time. The forward lines of this zone would have to be as close to the Iron Curtain as operational limitations permitted. In this zone, the problems of identification and control were less formidable in the vital opening phase of war, and the weapons would therefore be operated with minimum limitations.

The aim of the rearward deployment of missiles was to provide the maximum security to strike force bases and to other important targets. The group also recommended changes in balance between the forward and rear missile zones as compared with the concept put forward by SHAPE. It was suggested that the division of effort between forward and rearward zones would depend on the size of the forces eventually available, but an approximate indication distribution would be:

a. 25% in the forward belt;
b. 75% in the rear zone in defense of strike forces and important targets.

The meeting also showed that the experts favoured the continued use of the manned fighter.

The Forward Missile Belt

Following the briefing held at Fontainebleau on 25 November 1957 at which SHAPE presented its views on the deployment of the surface-to-air missiles in the Central Region, CINCENT wrote to SHAPE concurring with the SHAPE viewpoint. General Valluy, however, added a comment to the effect that he considered that deployment near the Iron Curtain would be possible only when the forward strategy made it possible to protect the sites. He considered that an interim period would be necessary during which the launching sites would be installed west of the river Weser.

(21) AFCE/238/57 dated 28 Nov 57.
On 13 February 1958, SHAPE replied to this letter from CINCENT.\(^{(22)}\)

It was stated that information in SHAPE's possession at that time indicated that the first surface-to-air missile units would not be available until some time in 1959. By then, it was expected that the setting up of the German forces should make possible, if not the full implementation of the forward strategy, at any rate adequate protection of the installations east of the Weser.

There were other considerations which SHAPE considered did not favor the temporary deployment west of the Weser. These were:

a. The desirability of installing each missile battery at its final position, owing to the extensiveness and relatively high cost of the necessary infrastructure works.

b. The imperative need to be able to make simultaneous use, immediately on the beginning of hostilities, of all the available air defense facilities. The deployment of missiles in a rear area a long way from the Iron Curtain would involve the overlapping of their operational areas and those of the piloted aircraft, and consequently the non-simultaneous use of these two facilities.

c. It was important that any hostile air threat should meet a dense and continuous defense, as far east as possible. The defense of the Central European area could be effective only if it formed a coordinated unbroken whole together with the defenses in Eastern Denmark and Southern Norway.

d. Targets in the Central European area had to be protected against air-to-surface missiles launched by enemy stand-off bombers by defenses which were as near the Iron Curtain as possible. These bombers could operate far to the east of the Iron Curtain.

\(^{(22)}\) SHAPE/1/58 dated 13 Feb 58.
SHAPE pointed out that at the SHAPE Air Defense Conference held on 21-23 January 1958 all participants had agreed that air defense should necessarily include an advanced deployment zone situated as far east as possible. Depth in defense would be ensured by successive deployment zones towards the west.

Missile Deployment

As a result of the recommendations made by the working group of scientists and air defense experts, and of the briefing made by the Air Defense Division staff to SACEUR, General Norstad decided that the SHAPE Air Defense concept contained in the Minimum Force Study need not be changed. The concept would hold good even if some readjustment in the number of missiles in the forward zone and around critical areas became desirable in the future. SACEUR directed the SHAPE staff, with assistance from CINCENT representatives, to develop recommendations on the manning and deployment of the NIKE Battalions planned for the Netherlands, Belgium, France and Germany.

The Funding of Missile Sites

The case for the NATO common funding of missile sites was presented to the Standing Group by SHAPE in 1957. Despite the increasing urgency for a decision on the funding problem, no decision was reached by the end of that year. Personnel to man and operate the missiles were expected to finish their training in the United States during 1958, and it was considered vital that the necessary infrastructure construction be started as soon as possible. Following the 1957 Heads of Government meeting, the North Atlantic Council instructed the Infrastructure Committee to study the common funding problem.

(23) See Chief of Staff's remarks at the Division Chiefs meeting held on 6 Feb 58, SEC 2030.
In February 1958, however, the Standing Group requested that the study being undertaken by the Infrastructure Committee be postponed to a future date.\(^{(25)}\) The reason for this request was, according to the SGN, that divergent views existed between SACEUR and certain nations on the question of an integrated air defense system for Allied Command Europe. The SGN thought that the latter problem should be resolved before any decision could be taken on the common funding of missile sites.

The increasing urgency of the problem forced SHAPE to raise the matter with the SGN one month later.\(^{(26)}\) The SHAPE view was that any approval by higher authority on the common funding need not wait until agreement on integration.

It was pointed out that SACEUR had recently approved CINCENT's plan for the deployment of the expected missiles, and had subsequently directed CINCENT to proceed with coordinated planning with the nations concerned in the plan in order that site surveys and land acquisition could proceed without delay. SHAPE considered that this fact taken in conjunction with Annex D of the Minimum Force Study was enough justification to obtain approval for common funding as soon as possible.

On 28 April 1958 the Standing Group removed the reservation on the problem and decided that a decision could be reached before the wider question of integration was resolved.\(^{(27)}\)

The ACE Long-Range Early Warning System - Progress in 1958

Following the agreement on the SHAPE operational requirement for the long range early warning system in September 1957, proposals were

\(^{(25)}\) SCO IN 14715, dated 27 Feb 58.
\(^{(26)}\) SH 22522, dated 27 Mar 58.
\(^{(27)}\) SCO IN 17911 (DEF 94086) dated 28 Apr 58.
made regarding selection of radar equipments. As a result of these proposals SHAPE was made responsible for the selection of radar equipments following submissions made by host nations. It was agreed that the nations would call for bids on equipment from various manufacturers and submit them for assessment to SHAPE. Twenty proposals for the supply of radar equipment were received at SHAPE. After a comprehensive and detailed study by SHAPE, with the assistance of SADTC, three were selected as being superior in all respects of the others. Apart from satisfying operational requirements, the manufacturers of the selected equipments were able to supply them within the time schedule. The manufacturers concerned were experienced in the conduct and research of production programs on a multi-national basis and had large production capacities. Details of the three selected proposals were sent to the NATO Infrastructure Committee during March 1958. The Committee approved the SHAPE proposals two months later.

Improvements to the Ground Environment of the ACE Air Defense System

Two additional reasons for an early decision by the Council on the eligibility of new types of infrastructure for common funding were outlined in a letter from SHAPE to the SGN on 14 May 1958. The first reason concerned the modernisation of the control and reporting systems of the ACE Air Defense System. The plan for an integrated air defense system for ACE, submitted by SACEUR to the SGN on 27 February 1958, included

(28) See Communications Chapter, SHAPE History 1957. See also SHAPE 171/57 dated 15 Oct 57.
(29) AG 3170 AD dated 25 Mar 58.
(30) AG 3170.9 SIG/EL dated 11 Jul 58. See Signal Division report SIG/PT 3300 dated 3 Jun 59.
(31) AG 6100/IP-50/58 PROG, dated 14 May 58.
a recommendation that the control and reporting facilities be commonly financed. In anticipation of the approval of integration, SHAPE had recommended that £20 million be spent on the modernization of the existing control and reporting systems. The Military Committee had included this SHAPE recommendation in MC 32/11 which outlined infrastructure requirements for the period 1958-1963.

SHAPE believed it was necessary to reach a decision on the principle of common funding for this modernization before final approval of SACEUR's plan for an integrated air defense system. It was necessary because approval would immediately produce a priority requirement for the modernization of the control and reporting systems.

The second reason for an early decision by the Council on common funding was the need for an anti-ballistic missile warning system. Although no detailed recommendation had been made by SHAPE on such a system, MC 32/11 included an estimate for £30 million for such a system. It was believed that the existing ballistic missile threat warranted the establishment as soon as possible of an anti-missile system.

SHAPE further considered that these two requirements were, in fact, two aspects of the same overall requirement. The modernization of the control and reporting systems would have to take into account the need for an anti-ballistic missile warning system and the necessary development and refinements needed would have to be planned for and specialized features incorporated, such as digital interception computers and communications.

It was considered that both these requirements fell under the Council criteria for NATO common infrastructure.
Data Handling System

The 9th Slice Infrastructure program included £5 million to be expended upon part of the radar data handling system for the early warning system. Owing to the delay in approval of the 9th Slice program by the Council, little progress was made on provision of the data handling system. (32)

Further delay was encountered during 1958, mainly due to the inability of the various interested agencies to agree on the technical specifications for the system.

Rules for Engagement of Unidentified Aircraft.

Since 1953 a need had existed within NATO for standardized rules to govern the engagement of unidentified aircraft over Allied airspace. In order to meet this need SACEUR, in 1953, had proposed to the Standing Group a set of rules which would place NATO, as a whole, and individual nations, in a better position to counter effectively any surprise attack. (33)

Because of political implications, however, a set of rules was not adopted until 23 January 1957, when the North Atlantic Council approved MC 66, Final. (34)

The new rules still did not become immediately operative. At their meeting on 30 January 1957, the Council agreed that the effective dates be altered for the dissemination of the Rules of Engagement. (35)
The date of issue was changed from 15 February to 1 March and the date of implementation from 1 March to 1 April.

The Council held a further meeting on 6 February 1957. (36) The United States representative drew attention to the fact that a set of

(32) AG 2030 SIG/FS, dated 19 Jun 58; See also AG 3170/3171.1, dated 4 Aug 58, 16 Dec 58 and 23 Dec 58.
(33) See SHAPE History 1953-56 for background and development of these Rules.
(34) SCO IN 17612, 26 Jan 57, and RDC/33/57, 25 Jan 57.
(35) LOSTAN 1924, dated 30 Jan 57.
(36) SCO IN 18086, dated 6 Feb 57 (LOSTAN 1933)
different rules was in operation in Germany and particularly in the Berlin corridor. In the latter case, the USSR was a party to a special quadripartite agreement. He also stated that the rules proposed were different to those in use in the United States and Canada. It was considered, therefore, by the US representative, that the promulgation and dissemination of the MC 66 rules should be on a government to government basis.

As a result of this meeting, the Council suspended approval of MC 66. The SGN was invited to clarify the points raised by the US representative.

The objections raised by the United States representative were examined at SHAPE, and the results of the examination were sent to the SGN.\(^{(37)}\) Investigations of the points at SHAPE suggested that no formal agreement existed between the four former occupying powers concerning visual identification signals in force in the vicinity of the Berlin corridors, or elsewhere in Germany. The MC 66 signals were based on accepted procedures in use by the four powers in Germany, but MC 66 included the added visual signal "circle for identification." It was thought at SHAPE that the United States' objection to the publication of the MC 66 visual signals stemmed from a concern that the Soviets might have reacted unfavorably because of the unilateral addition of this one signal, and that the MC 66 signals differed from those in use in Canada and the United States.

SHAPE stated that there was, doubtless, some possibility that the Soviets would object to the adoption of this signal, and they could have, of course, seriously disrupted traffic in the Berlin corridor, if they so desired. However, these signals applied only to the unidentified traffic and they would obtain only west of the Iron Curtain. They would have no effect on the procedures in the Berlin corridor unless the Soviets wished to adopt them in the Eastern Zone and even then there would be no

\(^{(37)}\) SH 34584, dated 14 Mar 57.
rational justification for interference with scheduled traffic. SHAPE considered that this "circle for identification" signal was a non-aggressive procedure and well within the legal and ethical rights of the Western Allies to impose within their own territory.

The MC 66 signals were designed for air defense purposes and the order "circle for identification" was included to meet a specific military requirement. SHAPE considered that the omission of this additional signal would significantly weaken the MC 66 procedures.

Concerning the second US objection, SHAPE questioned the need for complete uniformity between Europe and North America. The close contact with the Soviet Bloc and the concentration of sensitive areas in ACE required special measures to deal with violations of airspace. On the one hand, accidental violations were likely to be more frequent in Europe, and on the other hand, if the intent was hostile, the time and distance factors were more critical than in North America. The MC 66 rules were designed to meet this operational requirement.

On 1 May 1957, the SGN stated that it was of the opinion that certain rules should be substituted.\(^{(38)}\) The proposed MC 66 rules should be withdrawn and the rules taken from the Supplementary Flight Information document dated 1 January 1957 (USAF - USN) be substituted. These new Rules were to apply to NATO Europe, including Turkey.

Air Vice Marshal McGregor, ACOS, Air Defense, SHAPE, in a brief prepared to SACEUR, stated that the only point of difference (apart from certain emergency procedures) between MC 66 and SGN's proposals was that the latter omitted the initial challenge "circle for identification."\(^{(39)}\)

\(^{(38)}\) STAND 1931, dated 1 May 57. The proposed new rules were included in this message.

\(^{(39)}\) AD 1250/2, dated 13 May 57.
Whilst this omission weakened the procedures, AVM McGregor believed that the important thing was to get an agreed set of Rules introduced, even if they were not as strong as SHAPE would like. Accordingly, the SGN was informed that SHAPE agreed to the revised set of Rules. (40)

The Standing Group explained, in a reply to SHAPE on 6 June 1958, that the modifications they had proposed, which had been accepted by SHAPE, brought the proposed visual identification procedures into line with those established by France, the United Kingdom, the United States and USSR for Berlin, and the previously occupied zones of Germany. (41)

At its meeting of 2 July 1958, the Council approved MC 66 (Final) and agreed that all European NATO Governments and Turkey should on 1 August 1958 promulgate a NOTAM (Notice to Airmen) to the effect that, as from 15th September 1958, the visual identification signals set out in MC 66 would be used over their territory and territorial waters in areas to be defined in the NOTAM. (42) (Copies of MC 66 were despatched to all MSCs and interested agencies on 28 August 1958.)

An unforeseen difficulty arose following the promulgation of the new procedures by the Italian and United Kingdom authorities. The Executive Secretary of NATO, Lord Coleridge, received a letter from the Chairman of CEAC (Committee for European Air-Space Coordination) and also a telegram from IATA (International Air Transport Association) regarding the new NOTAMs promulgated by the two national authorities. It was pointed out that "very grave consequences to civil aircraft" could arise out of the application of the new air interception rules. IATA requested an official assurance that these proposed procedures would not

(40) SHAPTO 1470, dated 21 May 57.
(41) STAND 2466, dated 6 Jun 58.
(42) C-R(58)41, dated 2 Jul 58, which approved MC 66 (Final).
be applied to international scheduled aircraft belonging to member airlines of the association. The association drew attention to the fact that the procedures had not been coordinated nor were they internationally agreed since neither ICAO (International Civil Aircraft Organization) nor IATA had been consulted. The new procedures were also in conflict with the previously agreed procedures for NATO exercises.

The Standing Group, informed of the problem, considered that the problem of coordination of the Rules of Engagement as reflected in MC 66 with the appropriate international organizations such as ICAO and IATA was a responsibility of NATO agencies such as CEAC and the NATO nations concerned.\(^{(43)}\)

In addition, the Standing Group considered that the MC 66 Rules superseded the existing rules of procedures for civilian aircraft as promulgated by CEAC. SHAPE, however, considered that the two sets of Rules were complementary.\(^{(44)}\) The CEAC rules defined procedures accepted by the civil airlines as reasonably safe. When under these rules a civilian aircraft had been approached and identified, the interception was broken off before the MC 66 Rules became applicable. Only in the case of an aircraft not being properly marked or otherwise suspect - and this should not have occurred in the case of a civil airliner - would MC 66 become applicable. It followed that the civil airlines' safety was ensured by the CEAC Rules of Interception.

The Chairman of CEAC stated that the Standing Group's decision meant that the appropriate international agencies should be informed that MC 66 superseded the original CEAC procedures. However, the SGN had no objection to CEAC considering possible amendments to MC 66 (Final), provided that these amendments were submitted by the civil-military

\(^{(43)}\) LOSTAN 2595, dated 5 Sep 58, and STAND 2608, dated 17 Sep 58.
\(^{(44)}\) SHAPTO 1752, dated 20 Oct 58.
authorities of member nations, and that any such amendments, as agreed by CEAC, were submitted to SGN.\(^{(45)}\)

A meeting was held of CEAC on 1 and 4 December 1958 on the subject of Rules for Engagement of Unidentified Aircraft by NATO fighters in Peacetime.\(^{(46)}\) It was unanimously decided that MC 66 should not be amended. It was decided that all NATO nations would issue on 15 January 1959 a Standard Notice to Airmen (NOTAM), which had been prepared by the Committee, in supersession of individual NOTAMs issued by nations on MC 66 signals. In this standard NOTAM the signals themselves would be preceded by a preamble designed to reassure civilian operators. The Chairman of IATA was satisfied that the safety of civilian airline operators was safeguarded provided strict discipline was observed.

Meanwhile, SHAPE had informed the Major Subordinate Commanders in June 1958 that although MC 66 was a valuable step forward in that it established a set of Rules of Engagement for distribution and use by the NATO European nations, further development was necessary.\(^{(47)}\) It was the SHAPE view that the Rules required considerable amplification if they were to provide the necessary guidance to NATO Commanders and those responsible for ordering the appropriate active defense reaction to any enemy penetration or attack. Furthermore, if the integration of the air defense of ACE was approved, such Rules of Engagement would form the basis for the initial operation of the air defense forces in the case of attack.

SHAPE was particularly concerned with the problem of a raid of critical size, which if permitted to penetrate, could destroy a significant proportion of the retaliatory forces and/or the NATO defensive capability.

\(^{(45)}\) AC/92-D/90, dated 9 Oct 58.
\(^{(46)}\) LOSTAN 2715, dated 5 Dec 58.
\(^{(47)}\) AG 1250/2 ADEF, dated 16 Jun 58.
The new Rules of Engagement for defensive action, whilst taking into account the possibility of a missile attack, were to be designed to define the appropriate actions which should be taken against the manned or winged missile threat. It was considered that the revised Rules should be based on the use of conventional warheads, though it was appreciated that additional Rules would have to be framed at a later date to prescribe the conditions under which nuclear warheads could and would be used for defensive purposes in an initial attack.