Summit Guide

Lisbon Summit - 19-20 November 2010

NATO’s 24th summit meeting

At the Lisbon Summit, NATO will be presenting its third Strategic Concept since the end of the Cold War, defining the Alliance’s strategic priorities for the next decade.

While reaffirming the commitment of its members to fundamental principles and reviewing policies and objectives, the process of reflection on the 2010 Strategic Concept has also triggered off major reform throughout the entire Organization.

The summit agenda is ambitious. The new Strategic Concept will focus on collective defence and deterrence, crisis management and cooperative security. Other issues to be examined will be missile defence, progress on transition in Afghanistan, relations with Russia and a comprehensive approach to security challenges that will call for greater cooperation with partners. A new "critical capabilities package" will be presented, together with a new acquisition process; the reform of the military command structure and of NATO Agencies will be taken forward, while change is pursued at the civilian headquarters in Brussels.

NATO is involved in a wide spectrum of other issues, which are covered in the “A to Z”.

Previous summit meetings

The Alliance’s vision for Euro-Atlantic security and NATO reform

While setting the scene for the next decade, the Strategic Concept is stimulating change at a time of considerable resource constraint, with the aim of modernizing and reinforcing NATO’s capabilities.

The Strategic Concept

Even though the new Strategic Concept will only be made public on the day of the Lisbon Summit, it is important to understand the genesis of the 2010 document.

Strategic Concept
Collective defence
Crisis management
Consultation process
Comprehensive Approach

Internal reform

One of the tools for change is structural reform, touching on the military command structure, organizations and agencies, committees and staff at NATO Headquarters, Brussels.

NATO reform
Military organization and structures
Allied Command Operations
Allied Command Transformation
Working by committee
Agencies and Organizations
Paying for NATO
Defence transformation and arms control

Capabilities can drive change and are a key component of discussions on operations and missions. In this context, a new capabilities package will be presented at Lisbon, together with NATO’s ambitions on missile defence, nuclear forces and arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.

Additionally, the procedures needed to acquire and manage capabilities are being reformed to encourage multinationality, greater coordination and a functionally integrated approach to defence planning and procurement. Procedures, together with structures, are among NATO’s principal tools for change.

- Improving capabilities
- Missile defence
- NATO’s Nuclear forces
- Weapons of mass destruction
- NATO and the fight against terrorism
- Defending against cyber attacks
- NATO’s role in energy security
- Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation
- Conventional arms control
- Small arms and light weapons (SALW) and mine action
- The NATO Defence Planning Process

Crisis management

Crisis management is, and will remain, one of NATO’s fundamental security tasks.

Current operational priorities – Afghanistan in transition

Afghanistan and pressing issues related to the progress of the International Stabilization and Assistance Force (ISAF) will dominate discussions in Lisbon.

- NATO’s role in Afghanistan

Other NATO operations and missions

NATO leads other operations and missions: KFOR, counter-piracy off the Horn of Africa, Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean, the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I), assistance to the African Union, all of which are briefly explained in the introduction to military operations below:

- NATO operations and missions
- NATO’s role in Kosovo
- Counter-piracy operations

Cooperative security

While it is seeking to reinforce existing partnerships, encourage Euro-Atlantic integration and drive for greater cooperation with non-NATO troop-contributing countries, the Alliance is also working on developing closer institutional ties with other international organizations.

- Comprehensive Approach
- NATO’s relations with the UN
- EU-NATO: a strategic partnership

Boosting relations with Russia

Russia is a pivotal partner and NATO’s relations with this country will be discussed within the framework of the 2010 Strategic Concept. The NATO-Russia Summit is also expected to discuss the Joint Threat Assessment and missile defence, amongst other issues.

- NATO-Russia relations
**Partnerships and Euro-Atlantic integration**

NATO is reinforcing its partnerships and relations with other countries, envisaging a more inclusive, cooperative network with countries around the globe.

- Partnerships with non-NATO countries
- Euro-Atlantic partnership
- Mediterranean Dialogue
- Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
- Contact countries
- NATO enlargement
- Membership Action Plan

**Facts and figures**

- Member countries
- Partner countries
- Defence expenditures
- Troop contributions
- Commitments to operations and missions
NATO summit meetings

NATO summit meetings provide periodic opportunities for Heads of State and Government of member countries to evaluate and provide strategic direction for Alliance activities.

These are not regular meetings, but rather important junctures in the Alliance’s decision-making process. For instance, summits have been used to introduce new policy, invite new members into the Alliance, launch major new initiatives and build partnerships with non-NATO countries.

From the founding of NATO in 1949 until today there have been twenty-three NATO summits. The 24th will take place in Lisbon on 19-20 November 2010.

- Summit meeting agendas
- Timing and location
- Previous summit meetings
- Organizing and holding these events
- Participation

Summit meeting agendas

NATO summit meetings are effectively meetings of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) - the Alliance’s principal political decision-making body - at its highest level, that of Heads of State and Government.

Due to the political significance of summit meetings, agenda items typically address issues of overarching political or strategic importance. Items can relate to the internal functioning of the Alliance as well as NATO’s relations with external partners.

Major decisions

Many of NATO’s summit meetings can be considered as milestones in the evolution of the Alliance. For instance, the first post-Cold War summit was held in London, 1990, and outlined proposals for developing relations with Central and Eastern European countries. A year later, in Rome, NATO Heads of State and Government published a new Strategic Concept that reflected the new security environment. This document was issued as a public document for the first time ever. At the same summit, NATO established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council – a forum that officially brought together NATO and partner countries from Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus.

The 1997 Madrid and Paris Summits invited the first countries of the former Warsaw Pact – Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – to join NATO, and established partnerships between NATO and Russia and Ukraine, while the 2002 Prague Summit saw major commitments to improving NATO’s capabilities and transformed the military command structure.

These are just a few of the many decisions that have been taken over the decades (a full summary of all NATO summit meetings can be found under "Previous summit meetings").

Implementation of summit decisions

Typically, the decisions taken at a summit meeting are issued in declarations and communiqués. These are public documents that explain the Alliance’s decisions and reaffirm Allies’ support for
aspects of NATO policies.

The decisions are then translated into action by the relevant actors, according to the area of competency and responsibility: the NAC's subordinate committees and NATO's command structure, which cover the whole range of NATO functions and activities.

**Timing and location**

**Timing**

Summits are convened upon approval by the NAC at the level of Permanent Representatives (or Ambassadors) or foreign and defence ministers. They are usually called on an ad hoc basis, as required by the evolving political and security situation.

From the founding of NATO until the end of the Cold War – over forty years – there were ten summit meetings. Since 1990, their frequency has increased considerably in order to address the changes brought on by the new security challenges. In total, twenty-three summit meetings have taken place between 1949 and 2009.

**Location**

NATO summit meetings are held in one of the member countries, including Belgium, at NATO HQ. Members volunteer to host a summit meeting and, after evaluating all offers, the NAC makes the final decision concerning the location.

In recent years, summit locations have held some thematic significance. For example, the Washington Summit of 1999 commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in that city. Istanbul – which hosted a summit meeting in 2004 – connects Europe and Asia and is where the Alliance launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. This initiative is intended to foster linkages between NATO and the broader Middle East.

**Previous summit meetings**

The first time that Heads of State and Government from NATO countries met was at the actual signing ceremony of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949, but this was not a summit meeting. The first summit meeting was held six years later, in Paris in 1957, and subsequent summits occurred at key junctures in the history of the Alliance.

**Paris, 16-19 December 1957**

Reaffirmation of the principal purposes and unity of the Atlantic Alliance; Improvements in the coordination and organization of NATO forces and in political consultation arrangements; Recognition of the need for closer economic ties and for cooperation in the spirit of Article 2 of the Treaty, designed to eliminate conflict in international policies and encourage economic collaboration (Report of the Committee of the Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO, the so-called report of the Three Wise Men).

**Brussels, 26 June 1974**

Signature of the Declaration on Atlantic Relations adopted by NATO foreign ministers in Ottawa on 19 June, confirming the dedication of member countries of the Alliance to the aims and ideals of the Treaty in the 25th anniversary of its signature; Consultations on East-West relations in preparation for US-USSR summit talks on strategic nuclear arms limitations.

**Brussels, 29-30 May 1975**

Affirmation of the fundamental importance of the Alliance and of Allied cohesion in the face of international economic pressures following the 1974 oil crisis; Support for successful conclusion of negotiations in the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (to result in 1975, in the signing of the Helsinki Final Act).

**London, 10-11 May 1977**

Initiation of study on long-term trends in East-West relations and of a long-term defence programme (LTDP) aimed at improving the defensive capability of NATO member countries.
Washington D.C., 30-31 May 1978

Review of interim results of long-term initiatives taken at the 1977 London Summit; Confirmation of the validity of the Alliance’s complementary aims of maintaining security while pursuing East-West détente; Adoption of 3% target for growth in defence expenditures.

Bonn, 10 June 1982

Accession of Spain; Adoption of the Bonn Declaration setting out a six-point Programme for Peace in Freedom; Publication of a statement of Alliance’s goals and policies on Arms Control and Disarmament and a statement on Integrated NATO Defence.

Brussels, 21 November 1985

Special meeting of the North Atlantic Council for consultations with President Reagan on the positive outcome of the US-USSR Geneva Summit on arms control and other areas of cooperation.

Brussels, 2-3 March 1988

Reaffirmation of the purpose and principles of the Alliance (reference to the Harmel Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance published in 1967) and of its objectives for East-West relations; Adoption of a blue print for strengthening stability in the whole of Europe through conventional arms control negotiations.

Brussels, 29-30 May 1989

Declaration commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Alliance setting out Alliance policies and security objectives for the 1990s aimed at maintaining Alliance defence, introducing new arms control initiatives, strengthening political consultation, improving East-West cooperation and meeting global challenges; Adoption of a comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament.

Brussels, 4 December 1989

Against the background of fundamental changes in Central and Eastern Europe and the prospect of the end of the division of Europe, US President Bush consults with Alliance leaders following his summit meeting with President Gorbachev in Malta. While the NATO summit meeting is taking place, Warsaw Pact leaders denounce the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and repudiate the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty.

London, 5-6 July 1990

Publication of the London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, outlining proposals for developing cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe across a wide spectrum of political and military activities including the establishment of regular diplomatic liaison with NATO.

Rome, 7-8 November 1991

Publication of several key documents: the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept, of the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation and of statements on developments in the Soviet Union and the situation in Yugoslavia.

Brussels, 10-11 January 1994

Launching of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative; All North Atlantic Cooperation Council Partner countries and members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) are invited to participate; Publication of the Partnership for Peace Framework Document; Endorsement of the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) and other measures to develop the European Security and Defence Identity; Reaffirmation of Alliance readiness to carry out air strikes in support of UN objectives in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Paris, 27 May 1997

Signing of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Founding Act states that NATO and Russia are no longer adversaries and establishes the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.
Madrid, 8-9 July 1997
Invitations to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks; Reaffirmation of NATO’s Open Door Policy; Recognition of achievement and commitments represented by the NATO Russia-Founding Act; Signature of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine; First meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council at summit level that replaces the North Atlantic Cooperation Council; An enhanced Partnership for Peace; Updating of the 1991 Strategic Concept and adoption of a new defence posture; Reform of the NATO military command structure; Special Declaration on Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Washington D.C., 23-24 April 1999
Commemoration of NATO’s 50th Anniversary; Allies reiterate their determination to put an end to the repressive actions by President Milosevic against the local ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo; The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland participate in their first summit meeting; Adoption of the Membership Action Plan; Publication of a revised Strategic Concept; Enhancement of the European Security and Defence Identity within NATO; Launch of the Defence Capabilities Initiative; Strengthening of Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, as well as the Mediterranean Dialogue; Launch of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative.

Rome, 28 May 2002
NATO Allies and the Russian Federation create the NATO-Russia Council, where they meet as equal partners, bringing a new quality to NATO-Russia relations. The NATO-Russia Council replaces the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.

Prague, 21-22 November 2002
Invitation of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to begin accession talks; Reaffirmation of NATO’s Open Door Policy; Adoption of a series of measures to improve military capabilities (The Prague Capabilities Commitment, the NATO Response Force and the streamlining of the military command structure); Adoption of a Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism; Decision to support NATO member countries in Afghanistan; Endorsement of a package of initiatives to forge new relationships with partners.

Istanbul, 28-29 June 2004
Participation of seven new members to the event (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia); Expansion of NATO’s operation in Afghanistan by continuing the establishment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams throughout the country; Agreement to assist the Iraqi Interim Government with the training of its security forces; Maintaining support for stability in the Balkans; Decision to change NATO’s defence-planning and force-generation processes, while strengthening contributions to the fight against terrorism, including WMD aspects; Strengthening cooperation with partners and launch of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative with countries from the broader Middle East region.

Brussels, 22 February 2005
Leaders reaffirm their support for building stability in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq, and commit to strengthening the partnership between NATO and the European Union.

Riga, 28-29 November 2006
Review of progress in Afghanistan in light of the expansion of ISAF to the entire country and call for broader international engagement; Confirmation that the Alliance is prepared to play its part in implementing the security provisions of a settlement on the status of Kosovo; Measures adopted to further improve NATO’s military capabilities; NATO Response Force declared operational; Comprehensive Political Guidance published. Initiatives adopted to deepen and extend relations with partners; Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia invited to join Partnership for Peace.

Bucharest, 2-4 April 2008
At Bucharest, Allied leaders review the evolution of NATO’s main commitments: operations (Afghanistan and Kosovo); enlargement and the invitation of Albania and Croatia to start the accession process (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹ will also be invited as soon as ongoing negotiations over its name have led to an agreement); the continued development of
military capabilities to meet.

**Strasbourg/ Kehl, 3-4 April 2009**

Against the backdrop of NATO’s 60th anniversary, adoption of a Declaration on Alliance Security, calling for a new Strategic Concept; adherence to basic principles and shared values, as well as the need for ongoing transformation; in-depth discussion on Afghanistan, NATO’s key priority; welcoming of two new members: Albania and Croatia, and the pursuit of NATO’s open door policy (invitation extended to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹ as soon as a solution to the issue surrounding the country’s name is reached); France’s decision to fully participate in NATO structures and the impact of this decision on the Alliance’s relations with the European Union; and NATO’s relations with Russia.

**Organizing and holding these events**

NATO summit meetings are centred on the activities of the NAC. As with all meetings of the NAC, the Secretary General chairs the meetings and plays an important role in coordination and deliberations, as well as acting as the principal spokesman of the Alliance.

As with meetings at the levels of Permanent Representatives and ministers, the work of the NAC is prepared by subordinate committees with responsibility for specific areas of policy. Much of this work involves the Deputies Committee, consisting of Deputy Permanent Representatives, sometimes "reinforced" by national experts. In such cases it is known as the SPC(R). This committee has particular responsibility for issuing declarations and communiqués, including those published after a summit.

Other aspects of political work may be handled by the Political and Partnerships Committee. Depending on the topic under discussion, the respective senior committee with responsibility for the subject assumes the lead role in preparing Council meetings and following up Council decisions.

Support to the Council is provided by the Secretary of the Council, who is also Director of the ministerial and summit meeting Task Forces. The Secretary of the Council ensures that NAC mandates are executed and its decisions recorded and circulated. A small Council Secretariat ensures the bureaucratic and logistical aspects of the Council’s work, while the relevant divisions of the International Staff support the work of committees reporting to the NAC.

**Participation**

NATO summit meetings normally involve member countries only. However, on occasion, and provided Allies agree, meetings can be convened in other formats although there is no formal obligation to hold such assemblies.

They include, for instance, meetings of defence or foreign ministers, Heads of State and Government of countries belonging to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Russia Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission or the NATO-Georgia Commission. They can also include leaders from ISAF troop-contributing countries, as was the case at the Bucharest Summit. External stakeholders can also be involved. For instance President Karzai, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, EU Commission President Barroso, EU High Representative Solana, World Bank Managing Director Ms Okonjo-Iweala, and Japan’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sasae were also invited to attend the meeting in Bucharest.

1. Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
Strategic Concept

The Strategic Concept is an official document that outlines NATO’s enduring purpose and nature and its fundamental security tasks. It also identifies the central features of the new security environment, specifies the elements of the Alliance’s approach to security and provides guidelines for the further adaptation of its military forces.

In sum, it equips the Alliance for security challenges and guides its future political and military development.

At the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit, NATO leaders endorsed the "Declaration on Alliance Security" to ensure the continued adaptation of the Alliance. This declaration called for a new Strategic Concept to take into account radical changes in the security environment since 1999 when the current Strategic Concept was issued.

The Alliance’s strategy is therefore under discussion and a new Strategic Concept will be published at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010 to reflect new and emerging security threats, especially since the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Transformation in the broad sense of the term is a permanent feature of the Organization. Since its inception, NATO has regularly reviewed its tasks and objectives in view of the evolution of the strategic environment. Preparations for the very first Strategic Concept – "The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area" - started in October 1949. In the course of more than half a century, both the Alliance and the wider world have developed in ways that NATO’s founders could not have envisaged. Such changes have been in each and every strategic document that NATO has produced since then.

The current Strategic Concept

Fundamental principles

NATO provides a unique forum for discussion and cooperation on defence and security issues in the sense that it not only brings together two continents – Europe and North America - but it also launches multinational initiatives and offers coordinated action in many different areas.

While its activities have evolved over time in keeping with changes in the strategic environment, the basic tenets of cooperation within the Alliance remain true to the principles of the Washington Treaty: collective defence, the peaceful resolution of disputes and NATO’s defensive nature. These still characterize the Organization.

In addition, NATO remains an essential transatlantic forum for consultation, which aims to defend and promote common values founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and continues to take decisions by consensus – a decision-making process that is one
of the keys to the Alliance’s durability.

The 1999 Strategic Concept

The 1999 Strategic Concept set out the purpose and tasks of the Alliance; the strategic perspectives at that time; the Alliance’s approach to security in the 21st century and guidelines for the Alliance’s forces.

The purpose and tasks of the Alliance

NATO’s purpose is primarily to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means, to uphold the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law and contribute to peace and stability of the entire Euro-Atlantic region. To achieve this, NATO performs the following security tasks:

"Security: To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force.

Consultation: To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members’ security, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

Deterrence and Defence: To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty.

And in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area:

- Crisis Management: To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.

- Partnership: To promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action with the Alliance."

Strategic perspectives

The 1999 Strategic Concept described the evolving strategic environment at the turn of the century and assessed foreseeable security challenges and risks. It noted that NATO had played an essential part in strengthening Euro-Atlantic security since the end of the Cold War. In addition, it acknowledged that the Alliance had successfully adapted itself to enhance its ability to contribute to peace and stability through internal reforms and by developing cooperative relationships with other countries and international organizations.

While the dangers characteristic of the Cold War period had greatly diminished, complex new risks, which threatened Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, had emerged. These included terrorism, ethnic conflict, human rights abuses, political instability, economic fragility, and the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery.

The approach to security in the 21st century

NATO’s approach, as described in the 1999 strategy, was (and remains) based on a broad definition of security which recognizes the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the defence dimension. It included:

- The preservation of the transatlantic link;
- The maintenance of effective military capabilities for the full range of Alliance missions;
- The development of European capabilities within the Alliance;
- The continued commitment to conflict prevention and crisis management;
- The pursuit of partnership, cooperation and dialogue;
- Enlargement and NATO’s continued openness to new members;
- Support for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.
Guidelines for the Alliance’s forces

The final part of the 1999 Strategic Concept established guidelines for the Alliance’s forces, translating the purposes and tasks of the preceding sections into practical instructions for NATO force and operational planners. The strategy called for the continued development of the military capabilities needed for the full range of the Alliance’s missions, from collective defence to peace support and other crisis-response operations. It also stipulated that the Alliance would maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces.

The drafters and decision-makers behind the strategies

Over time and since 1949, the decision-making process with regard to the Strategic Concept has evolved, but ultimately it is the North Atlantic Council (NAC) that adopts the Alliance’s strategic documents. Of the six Strategic Concepts issued by NATO since 1949, all were approved by the NAC, with the exception of MC 14/3.

Issued in 1968, MC 14/3 was adopted by the then Defence Planning Committee (DPC), which had the same authority as the NAC in its area of responsibility. After the withdrawal of France from the integrated military structure in 1966, it was decided that responsibility for all defence matters in which France did not participate was given to the DPC, of which France was not a member. However, shortly after France decided to fully participate in NATO’s military structures (April 2009), the DPC was dissolved during a major overhaul of NATO committees, June 2010, which aimed to introduce more flexibility and efficiency into working procedures.

Before reaching the NAC, there are many stages of discussion, negotiating and drafting that take place. Interestingly, during the Cold War, strategic concepts were principally drawn up by the military for approval by the political authorities of the Alliance. They were classified documents with military references (MC), which are now accessible to the public. Since the end of the Cold War, the drafting has clearly been led by political authorities, who have been advised by the military. This reversal stems from the fact that since 1999, NATO has adopted a far broader definition of security, where dialogue and cooperation are an integral part of NATO’s strategic thinking. In addition, the 1991 and the 1999 Strategic Concepts were conceived and written to be issued as unclassified documents and released to the public.

The added novelty of the upcoming Strategic Concept is the importance of the process of producing the document. The process of reflection, consultations and drafting of the Strategic Concept is perceived as an opportunity to build understanding and support across numerous constituencies and stakeholders so as to re-engage and re-commit NATO Allies to the renewed core principles, roles and policies of the Alliance. In addition, the debate has been broadened to invite the interested public, as well as experts, to contribute.

Furthermore, this is the first time in the history of NATO that the Secretary General is initiating and steering the debate. He designated a group of high-level experts who were at the core of the reflection and produced a report “NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement” that guided the debate, before eventually consulting with member country representatives and drafting the document. Final negotiations will take place before the document is officially adopted by the NAC meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government at the next summit end 2010 in Portugal.

NATO’s strategic documents since 1949

Generally speaking, since the birth of NATO, there have been three distinct periods within which NATO’s strategic thinking has evolved:

- the Cold War period;
- the immediate post-Cold War period; and
- the security environment since 9/11.

One could say that from 1949 to 1991, NATO’s strategy was principally characterized by defence and deterrence, although with growing attention to dialogue and détente for the last two decades of this period. From 1991 a broader approach was adopted where the notions of cooperation and security complemented the basic concepts of deterrence and defence.

- From 1949 until the end of the Cold War, there were four Strategic Concepts, accompanied
by documents that laid out the measures for the military to implement the Strategic Concept (Strategic Guidance; The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years; Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept);

In the immediate post-Cold War period, two unclassified Strategic Concepts were issued, complemented by two classified military documents (MC Directive for Military Implementation of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept; MC Guidance for the Military Implementation of the Alliance Strategy);

Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, NATO’s military thinking, resources and energy have given greater attention to the fight against terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction; NATO has committed troops beyond the Euro-Atlantic area and reached a membership of 28; new threats have emerged such as energy security and cyber-attacks. These are among the factors that have brought Allied leaders to call for a new Strategic Concept.

**From 1949 until the end of the Cold War**

From 1949 to 1991, international relations were dominated by bipolar confrontation between East and West. The emphasis was more on mutual tension and confrontation than it was on dialogue and cooperation. This led to an often dangerous and expensive arms race.

As mentioned above, four Strategic Concepts were issued during this period. In addition, two key reports were also published during those four decades: the Report of the Committee of Three (December 1956) and the Harmel Report (December 1967). Both documents placed the Strategic Concepts in a wider framework by stressing issues that had an impact on the environment within which the Strategic Concepts were interpreted.

**NATO’s first Strategic Concept**

NATO started producing strategic documents as early as October 1949. But the first NATO strategy document to be approved by the NAC was “The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic area (DC 6/1), 6 January 1950 - the Alliance’s first strategic concept.

DC 6/1 provided an overall strategic concept for the Alliance. The document stated that the primary function of NATO was to deter aggression and that NATO forces would only be engaged if this primary function failed and an attack was launched. Complementarity between members and standardization were also key elements of this draft. Each member’s contribution to defence should be in proportion to its capacity – economic, industrial, geographical, military – and cooperative measures were to be put into place by NATO to ensure optimal use of resources. Numerical inferiority in terms of military resources vis-à-vis the USSR was emphasized, as well as the reliance on US nuclear capabilities. DC 6/1 stated that the Alliance should “insure the ability to carry out strategic bombing promptly by all means possible with all types of weapons, without exception”.
Although DC 6/1 was quite detailed, more guidance was needed for use by the five Regional Planning Groups that existed at the time. As a consequence, the Strategic Guidance paper (SG 13/16) was sent to the Regional Planning Groups on 6 January 1950. Entitled "Strategic Guidance for North Atlantic Regional Planning", SG 13/16 was formally approved by the Military Committee on 28 March 1950 as MC 14.

MC 14 enabled Regional Planning Groups to develop detailed defence plans to meet contingencies up to July 1954, a date by which the Alliance aimed to have a credible defence force in place. Its key objectives were to "convince the USSR that war does not pay, and should war occur, to ensure a successful defence" of the NATO area.

In parallel, SG 13/16 was also being used by the Regional Planning Groups as the basis for further, more comprehensive defence plans. These plans were consolidated into "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Medium Term Plan" (DC 13), which was approved by the Defence Committee on 1 April 1950, just one year after the signing of the Washington Treaty.

NATO's strategy was effectively contained in three basis documents:

- DC 6/1 which set forth the overall strategic concept;
- MC 14/1 which provided more specific strategic guidance for use in defence planning; and
- DC 13 which included both of these aspects as well as considerable detailed regional planning.

The Korean War and NATO's second Strategic Concept

The invasion of South Korea by North Korean divisions on 25 June 1950 had an immediate impact on NATO and its strategic thinking. It brought home the realization that NATO needed to urgently address two fundamental issues: the effectiveness of NATO’s military structures and the strength of NATO forces.

On 26 September 1950, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved the establishment of an integrated military force under centralized command; on 19 December 1950, the NAC requested the nomination of General Dwight D. Eisenhower as NATO’s first Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR); in January 1951, from Hotel Astoria in Paris, Allies were already working to get the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Forces, Europe (SHAPE) into place and on 2 April 1951, the new SHAPE HQ was activated. Other structural changes were implemented, including the abolition of the three European Regional Planning Groups, and the replacement in 1952 of the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group by Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT), leaving only the Canada-US Regional Planning Group in existence.

These structural changes, together with the accession of Greece and Turkey, needed to be reflected in the Strategic Concept. This led to the drafting of NATO’s second Strategic Concept: "The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area", which was approved by the NAC on 3 December 1952 (MC 3/5(Final)). The new Strategic Concept respected the core principles outlined in DC 6/1 and, in this sense, did not differ fundamentally from this document.

Consequently, the strategic guidance also needed updating. MC 14 was thoroughly revised and reviewed so as to include the information that had been previously contained in DC 13. MC 14 and DC 13 became one document: "Strategic Guidance" (MC 14/1) approved by the NAC at the 15-18 December 1952 Ministerial Meeting in Paris. It was a comprehensive document, which stated that NATO’s overall strategic aim was "to ensure the defense of the NATO area and to destroy the will and capability of the Soviet Union and her satellites to wage war…". NATO would do this by initially conducting an air offensive and, in parallel, conducting air, ground and sea operations. The Allied air attacks would use "all types of weapons".

There was another issue which the Korean invasion raised, but was only addressed years later: the need for NATO to engage in a "forward strategy", which meant that NATO wanted to place its defences as far east in Europe as possible, as close to the Iron Curtain as it could. This immediately raised the delicate issue of Germany’s role in such a commitment. This issue was not resolved until 1954 when NATO invited the Federal Republic of Germany to become a member, which it effectively did on 6 May 1955.

The “New Look”

In the meantime, while structural issues had moved forward, the strength of NATO forces remained a problem. At its meeting in Lisbon, in February 1952, the NAC set very ambitious force
goals that proved to be financially and politically unrealistic. As a consequence, the United States, under the leadership of NATO’s former SACEUR, Dwight D. Eisenhower, decided to shift the emphasis of their defence policy to greater dependency on the use of nuclear weapons. This "New Look" policy offered greater military effectiveness without having to spend more on defence (NSC 162/2, 30 October 1953).

However, although alluded to in the strategic documents, nuclear weapons had not yet been integrated into NATO’s strategy. SACEUR Matthew B. Ridgway stated in a report that this integration would imply increases instead of decreases in force levels. His successor, General Alfred Gruenther, established a "New Approach Group" at SHAPE in August 1953 to examine this question. In the meantime, the United States, together with a number of European members, called for the complete integration of nuclear policy into NATO strategy.

Massive retaliation and NATO’s third Strategic Concept

The work of the "New Approach Group", combined with other submissions gave birth to "The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Five Years" (MC 48), approved by the Military Committee on 22 November 1954 and by the NAC on 17 December 1954. It provided strategic guidance pending the review of MC 14/1 and contained concepts and assumptions that were later included in NATO’s third strategic concept.

MC 48 was the first official NATO document to explicitly discuss the use of nuclear weapons. It introduced the concept of massive retaliation, which is normally associated with MC 14/2 – NATO’s third Strategic Concept.

An additional report entitled "The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years – Report 2" was issued, 14 November 1955. It did not supersede MC 14/1 but added that NATO was still committed to its "forward strategy" even if there were delays in German contributions that would push the implementation of the “forward strategy” to 1959 at the earliest.

After considerable discussion, MC 14/2, "Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO Area" was issued in its final form on 23 May 1957 and was accompanied by MC 48/2, "Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept", on the same day.

MC 14/2 was the Alliance’s first Strategic Concept which advocated "massive retaliation" as a key element of NATO’s new strategy.

While some Allies strongly advocated massive retaliation since it had the advantage of helping to reduce force requirements and, therefore, defence expenditures, not all member countries wanted to go so far. A degree of flexibility was introduced in the sense that recourse to conventional weapons was envisaged to deal with certain, smaller forms of aggression, "without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons." This was also reflected in the accompanying strategic guidance. Despite this flexibility, it was nonetheless stated that NATO did not accept the concept of limited war with the USSR: "If the Soviets were involved in a hostile local action and sought to broaden the scope of such an incident or prolong it, the situation would call for the utilization of all weapons and forces at NATO’s disposal, since in no case is there a concept of limited war with the Soviets."

In addition to including the doctrine of "massive retaliation", MC 14/2 and MC 48/2 reflected other concerns including the effects on the Alliance of Soviet political and economic activities outside the NATO area. This was particularly relevant in the context of the Suez crisis and the crushing of the Hungarian uprising by the Soviet Union in 1956. The importance of out-of-area events was reflected in a political directive, CM(56)138, given from the NAC to NATO’s Military Authorities, 13 December 1956: "Although NATO defence planning is limited to the defence of the Treaty area, it is necessary to take account of the dangers which may arise for NATO because of developments outside that area."

The Report of the Three Wise Men

While NATO was hardening its military and strategic stance, in parallel, it decided to reinforce the political role of the Alliance. A few months before the adoption of MC 14/2, in December 1956, it published the Report of the Committee of Three or Report on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO.

This report, drafted by three NATO foreign ministers – Lester Pearson (Canada), Gaetano Martino (Italy) and Halvard Lange (Norway) - gave new impetus to political consultation between member countries on all aspects of relations between the East and West.
The Report was adopted in the midst of the Suez Crisis, when internal consultation on security matters affecting the Alliance was particularly low, jeopardizing Alliance solidarity. This was the first time since the signing of the Washington Treaty that NATO had officially recognized the need to reinforce its political role. The Report put forward several recommendations, including the peaceful settlement of inter-member disputes, economic cooperation, scientific and technical cooperation, cultural cooperation and cooperation in the information field.

Similarly to the Harmel Report, published in 1967, the Report of the Three Wise Men contributed to broadening the strategic framework within which the Alliance operated. Both reports could be perceived as NATO's first steps toward a more cooperative approach to security issues.

Massive retaliation put into question

As soon as NATO's third Strategic Concept was adopted, a series of international developments occurred that put into question the Alliance’s strategy of massive retaliation.

This strategy relied heavily on the United States’ nuclear capability and its will to defend European territory in the case of a Soviet nuclear attack. Firstly, Europeans started to doubt whether a US President would sacrifice an American city for a European city; secondly, the USSR had developed intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities and, more generally, its nuclear capability. As the USSR's nuclear potential increased, NATO's competitive advantage in nuclear deterrence diminished. Terms such as "Mutually Assured Destruction or MAD" started to be used.

The outbreak of the second Berlin crisis (1958-1962), provoked by the Soviet Union, reinforced these doubts: how should NATO react to threats that were below the level of an all-out attack? NATO’s nuclear deterrent had not stopped the Soviets from threatening the position of Western Allies in Berlin. So what should be done?

In 1961, J.F. Kennedy arrived at the White House. He was concerned by the issue of limited warfare and the notion that a nuclear exchange could be started by accident or miscalculation. In the meantime, the Berlin crisis intensified, leading to the construction of the Berlin Wall, and in October 1962, the Cold War peaked with the Cuban missile crisis.

The United States started advocating a stronger non-nuclear posture for NATO and the need for a strategy of “flexible response”. Initial discussions on a change of strategy were launched among NATO member countries, but there was no consensus.

The Athens Guidelines

NATO Secretary General Dirk Stikker presented a special report on NATO Defence Policy (CM(62) 48), 17 April 1962, on the issue of the political control of nuclear weapons. It was basically NATO’s first attempt to temper its policy of massive retaliation by submitting the use of nuclear weapons to consultation under varying circumstances.

Other attempts at introducing greater flexibility followed, but these caused resistance from several member countries. This internal resistance combined with the fact that the US Administration had been shaken by the assassination of Kennedy and was increasingly concerned by US military involvement in Vietnam, momentarily froze all discussions on a revised Strategic Concept for NATO.

NATO’s fourth Strategic Concept and the doctrine of flexible response

NATO’s fourth Strategic Concept – Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area (MC 14/3) – was adopted by the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) on 12 December 1967 and the final version issued on 16 January 1968. It was drafted after the withdrawal of France from NATO’s integrated military structure in 1966.

There were two key features to the new strategy: flexibility and escalation. "The deterrent concept of the Alliance is based on a flexibility that will prevent the potential aggressor from predicting with confidence NATO’s specific response to aggression and which will lead him to conclude that an unacceptable degree of risk would be involved regardless of the nature of his attack". It identified three types of military responses against aggression to NATO:

1. Direct defence: the aim was to defeat the aggression on the level at which the enemy chose to fight.
2. Deliberate escalation: this added a series of possible steps to defeat aggression by progressively raising the threat of using nuclear power as the crisis escalated.
3. General nuclear response, seen as the ultimate deterrent.

The companion document, “Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO Area (MC 48/3) was approved by the DPC on 4 December 1969 and issued in final form on 8 December 1969.

Both MC 14/3 and MC 48/3 were so inherently flexible, in substance and interpretation, that they remained valid until the end of the Cold War.

The Harmel Report

As NATO was setting its strategic objectives for the next 20 years, it also decided to draw up a report that provided a dual-track approach to security: political and military. In the context of the questioning, by some, of the relevancy of NATO, the “Harmel Report” or the “Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance” was drawn up.

It provided a broad analysis of the security environment since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 and advocated the need to maintain adequate defence while seeking a relaxation of tensions in East-West relations and working towards solutions to the underlying political problems dividing Europe.

It defined two specific tasks: political and military; political, with the formulation of proposals for balanced force reductions in the East and West; military, with the defence of exposed areas, especially the Mediterranean.

The Harmel Report, drafted during a moment of relative détente, introduced the notion of deterrence and dialogue. In that respect, as already stated in the context of the Report of the Three Wise Men, it set the tone for NATO’s first steps toward a more cooperative approach to security issues that would emerge in 1991.

However, between 1967 and 1991, there were still moments of great tension between the two blocs, as there were instances that gave rise to hope of a less turbulent relationship.

Tensions increased with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles to which NATO reacted by initiating its Double-Track Decision, December 1979: it offered the Warsaw Pact a mutual limitation of medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles and, failing a positive reaction from Moscow, threatened to deploy Pershing and cruise missiles, which it eventually did.

Détente increased with the signing of the US-Soviet agreements on Strategic Arms Limitations (SALT I) and anti-ballistic missile systems, and SALT II (although not ratified), as well as the signing of US-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

By the mid- to late 80s, both blocs moved to confidence-building. However, mutual distrust still characterized East-West relations and it was not until the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the break-up of the Soviet Union that relations could start on a new basis.

The immediate post-Cold War period

In 1991, a new era commenced. The formidable enemy that the Soviet Union had once been was dissolved and Russia, together with other former adversaries, became NATO partners and, in some case, NATO members. For the Alliance, the period was characterized by dialogue and cooperation, as well as other new ways of contributing to peace and stability such as multinational crisis management operations.

During the immediate post-Cold War period, NATO issued two unclassified Strategic Concepts that advocated a broader approach to security than before:

- The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, November 1991;
- The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, April 1999.

Both of these were accompanied by a classified military document: respectively MC 400 and MC 400/2.

NATO’s first unclassified Strategic Concept

The 1991 Strategic Concept differed dramatically from preceding strategic documents. Firstly, it was a non-confrontational document that was released to the public; and secondly, while
maintaining the security of its members as its fundamental purpose (i.e., collective defence), it sought to improve and expand security for Europe as a whole through partnership and cooperation with former adversaries. It also reduced the use of nuclear forces to a minimum level, sufficient to preserve peace and stability:

"This Strategic Concept reaffirms the defensive nature of the Alliance and the resolve of its members to safeguard their security, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Alliance’s security policy is based on dialogue; co-operation; and effective collective defence as mutually reinforcing instruments for preserving the peace. Making full use of the new opportunities available, the Alliance will maintain security at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the requirements of defence. In this way, the Alliance is making an essential contribution to promoting a lasting peaceful order."

The 1991’s Strategic Concept’s accompanying document was - and still is - classified. It is entitled: "MC Directive for Military Implementation of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept (MC 400), 12 December 1991.

NATO’s second unclassified Strategic Concept

In 1999, the year of NATO’s 50th anniversary, Allied leaders adopted a new Strategic Concept that committed members to common defence and peace and stability of the wider Euro-Atlantic area. This is the latest Strategic Concept the Alliance has issued up to now (see "The current Strategic Concept"). It is complemented by a strategic guidance document that remains classified: "MC Guidance for the Military Implementation of the Alliance Strategy" (MC 400/2), 12 February 2003.

The security environment since 9/11

The 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States brought the threat of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction to the fore. NATO needed to protect its populations both at home and abroad. It therefore underwent major internal reforms to adapt military structures and capabilities to equip members for new tasks, such as leading the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

NATO also proceeded to deepen and extend its partnerships and, essentially, accelerate its transformation to develop new political relationships and stronger operational capabilities to respond to an increasingly global and more challenging world.

These radical changes need to be reflected in NATO’s strategic documents.

A first step in that direction was taken in November 2006 when NATO leaders endorsed the “Comprehensive Political Guidance”. This is a major policy document that sets out the framework and priorities for all Alliance capability issues, planning disciplines and intelligence for the next 10 to 15 years. It analyses the probable future security environment and acknowledges the possibility of unpredictable events. Against that analysis, it sets out the kinds of operations the Alliance must be able to perform in light of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept and the kinds of capabilities the Alliance will need.

Later, at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit in April 2009, NATO leaders endorsed the “Declaration on Alliance Security” which, inter alia, called for a new Strategic Concept. This provoked a thorough debate and analysis of NATO issues and, together with the economic context, has presented an opportunity for rethinking, reprioritising and reforming NATO. The 2010 Strategic Concept will be issued in Lisbon and will also be accompanied by a strategic guidance document, possibly MC 400/3.
Collective defence

The principle of collective defence is at the very heart of NATO’s founding treaty. It remains a unique and enduring principle that binds its members together, committing them to protect each other and setting a spirit of solidarity within the Alliance.

This principle is enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. It provides that if a NATO Ally is the victim of an armed attack, each and every other member of the Alliance will consider this act of violence as an armed attack against all members and will take the actions it deems necessary to assist the Ally attacked.

NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time in its history following the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States.

A cornerstone of the Alliance

Article 5

In 1949, the primary aim of the North Atlantic Treaty was to create a pact of mutual assistance to counter the risk that the Soviet Union would seek to extend its control of Eastern Europe to other parts of the continent.

Every participating country agreed that this form of solidarity was at the heart of the Treaty, effectively making Article 5 on collective defence a key component of the Alliance.

Article 5 provides that if a NATO Ally is the victim of an armed attack, each and every other member of the Alliance will consider this act of violence as an armed attack against all members and will take the actions it deems necessary to assist the Ally attacked.

Article 5

“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”

The “out-of-area” debate

This article is complemented by Article 6, which stipulates:

Article 6¹

“For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian departments of France², on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the
jurisdiction of any Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties."

According to one of the drafters of the Treaty, Theodore C. Achilles, there was no doubt in anybody’s minds that NATO operations could also be conducted south of the Tropic of Cancer³. This was confirmed by foreign ministers in Reykjavik in May 2002 in the context of the fight against terrorism: “To carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives”. (Extract from the Reykjavik communiqué).

The principle of providing assistance

With the invocation of Article 5, Allies can provide any form of assistance they deem necessary to respond to a situation. This is an individual obligation on each Ally and each Ally is responsible for determining what it deems necessary in the particular circumstances.

This assistance is taken forward in concert with other Allies. It is not necessarily military and depends on the material resources of each country. It is therefore left to the judgement of each individual country to determine how it will contribute. Each country will consult with the other members, bearing in mind that the ultimate aim is to “to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”.

At the drafting of Article 5 in the late '40s, there was consensus on the principle of mutual assistance, but fundamental disagreement on the modalities of implementing this commitment. The European participants wanted to ensure that the United States would automatically come to their assistance should one of the signatories come under attack; the United States did not want to make such a pledge and obtained that this be reflected in the wording of Article 5.

 Invocation of Article 5

The 9/11 terrorist attacks

The United States was the object of brutal terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. The Alliance's 1999 Strategic Concept already identified terrorism as one of the risks affecting NATO's security. The Alliance’s response to September 11, however, saw NATO engage actively in the fight against terrorism, launch its first operations outside the Euro-Atlantic area and begin a far-reaching transformation of its capabilities.

An act of solidarity

On the evening of 12 September 2001, less than 24 hours after the attacks, and for the first time in NATO's history, the Allies invoked the principle of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, subsequently informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the Alliance's decision.

The North Atlantic Council - NATO’s principal political decision-making body - agreed that if it determined that the attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it would be regarded as an action covered by Article 5. On 2 October, once Council had been briefed on the results of investigations into the 9/11 attacks, it determined that they were regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

By invoking Article 5, NATO members showed their solidarity toward the United States and condemned, in the strongest possible way, the terrorist attacks against the United States.

Taking action

After 9/11, there were consultations among the Allies and collective action was decided by the Council. The United States could also carry out independent actions, consistent with its rights and obligations under the UN Charter.

On 4 October, once it had been determined that the attacks came from abroad, NATO agreed on a package of eight measures to support the United States. On the request of the US, it launched its first ever anti-terror operation - Eagle Assist - from mid-October 2001 to mid-May 2002. It consisted in seven NATO AWACS radar aircraft that helped patrol the skies over the United States; in total 830 crew members from 13 NATO countries flew over 360 sorties. This was the first time
that NATO military assets were deployed in support of an Article 5 operation.

On 26 October, the Alliance launched its second counter-terrorism operation in response to the attacks on the United States, Active Endeavour. Elements of NATO’s Standing Naval Forces were sent to patrol the eastern Mediterranean and monitor shipping to detect and deter terrorist activity, including illegal trafficking. In March 2004, the operation was expanded to include the entire Mediterranean.

1. Article 6 has been modified by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey.
2. On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council modified this Treaty in its decision C-R(63)2, point V, on the independence of the Algerian departments of France.
3. Documents on Canadian External Relations, Vol. 15, Ch. IV.
Crisis management is one of NATO’s fundamental security tasks. It can involve military and non-military measures to respond to a threat, be it in a national or an international situation.

A crisis can be political, military or humanitarian and can be caused by political or armed conflict, technological incidents or natural disasters. Crisis management consists of the different means of dealing with these different forms of crises.

Many crisis management operations are often loosely referred to as peacekeeping operations, but there are different types of crisis management operations. They all have specific objectives and mandates, which are important to know in order to understand the impact, limitations and contours of an operation.

NATO’s role in crisis management goes beyond military operations to include issues such as the protection of populations against natural, technological or humanitarian disaster operations.

A wide range of crisis management operations

The way of dealing with a crisis depends on its nature, scale and seriousness. In some cases, crises can be prevented through diplomacy or other measures while others require more robust measures such as military action. Depending on the nature of the crisis, different types of crisis management operations may be required.

Collective defence crises

Referred to as "Article 5 operations", these carry the implication that the decision has been taken collectively by NATO members to consider an attack or act of aggression against one or more members as an attack against all. NATO invoked Article 5 in September 2001 following the terrorist attacks against the United States.

Crisis response operations

They cover all military operations conducted by NATO in a non-Article 5 situation. They support the peace process in a conflict area and are also called peace support operations. Peace support operations include peacekeeping and peace enforcement, as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building and humanitarian operations. NATO’s involvement in the Balkans and Afghanistan and its support for Polish troops participating in the international stabilization force in Iraq are an illustration of this.

Peace support operations

These are multi-functional operations conducted impartially in support of a UN/OSCE mandate or at the invitation of a sovereign government involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies and are designed to achieve long-term political settlement or other conditions specified in the mandate. They include peacekeeping and peace enforcement as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building and humanitarian operations.

Peacekeeping: peacekeeping operations are generally undertaken under Chapter
VI of the UN Charter and are conducted with the consent of all Parties to a conflict to monitor and facilitate implementation of a peace agreement.

Peace enforcement: peace enforcement operations are undertaken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. They are coercive in nature and are conducted when the consent of all Parties to a conflict has not been achieved or might be uncertain. They are designed to maintain or re-establish peace or enforce the terms specified in the mandate.

Conflict prevention: Activities aimed at conflict prevention are normally conducted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. They range from diplomatic initiatives to preventive deployments of forces intended to prevent disputes from escalating to armed conflicts or from spreading. Conflict prevention can also include fact-finding missions, consultations, warnings, inspections and monitoring. NATO makes full use of partnership, co-operation and dialogue and its links to other organizations to contribute to preventing crises and, should they arise, defusing them at an early stage.

A preventive deployment within the framework of conflict prevention is the deployment of operational forces possessing sufficient deterrent capabilities to prevent an outbreak of hostilities.

Peacemaking: Peacemaking covers diplomatic activities conducted after the commencement of a conflict aimed at establishing a cease-fire or a rapid peaceful settlement. They can include the provision of good offices, mediation, conciliation and such actions as diplomatic pressure, isolation or sanction.

Peace building: Peace building covers actions which support political, economic, social and military measures and structures aiming to strengthen and solidify political settlements in order to redress the causes of a conflict. This includes mechanisms to identify and support structures which can play a role in consolidating peace, advance a sense of confidence and well-being and supporting economic reconstruction.

Humanitarian operations: Humanitarian operations are conducted to alleviate human suffering. Humanitarian operations may precede or accompany humanitarian activities provided by specialized civilian organizations.

Natural, technological or humanitarian disaster operations

These are operations to assist member and partner countries that are victims of disasters. For instance, NATO assisted Turkey in 1999 when it was hit by earthquakes and has helped Ukraine, which has been frequently devastated by floods.

Co-ordinating with other international players

NATO decides on a case-by-case basis and by consensus whether to engage in a crisis management operation and takes these decisions in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty. Increasingly, it contributes to efforts by the wider international community to preserve or restore peace, and prevent conflict. In this context, NATO has offered to support on a case-by-case basis in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the United Nations (UN) Security Council or the responsibility of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The record of NATO’s successful co-operation with the UN, the OSCE and the European Union (EU) in the Balkans stands as a precedent.

NATO’s growing strategic partnership with the EU, including through NATO support to EU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities, is also significant, as is the Alliance’s expanding co-operation with non-NATO countries which are members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue.

NATO’s evolving role in crisis management

Broadly speaking, NATO has had the capacity to deal with Article 5, collective defence, and disaster relief operations for a long time. Only at a later stage, during the 1990s, did it become involved in non-Article 5 operations, i.e., those that are mainly conducted in non-NATO member countries to prevent a conflict from spreading and destabilizing member or partner countries.

Prepared for Article 5 operations

Since its creation in 1949, NATO has always been prepared for Article 5 crises. Although mutual
guarantees under Article 5 of the Treaty are reciprocal and implicate all member countries, the primary purpose of Article 5 in the post Second World War environment was to enable the United States to come to the aid of its Allies in the event of aggression against them.

Up to 1991, the strategic environment in the North Atlantic region was dominated by two superpowers that were each supported by military structures. During this period, NATO's principal concern was the perceived threat from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Deterrence worked with the result that the East-West confrontation of the Cold War ended without NATO's Article 5 having to be invoked.

Engaging in non-Article 5 operations

As soon as the Soviet Union collapsed and satellite countries regained independence, past tensions resurfaced and violent conflicts broke out among ethnic groups, whose rights had been suppressed for half a century.

The first major ethnic conflict broke out in the former Yugoslavia in 1992. NATO gradually became involved in support of the United Nations through various air and sea-based support operations - enforcing economic sanctions, an arms embargo and a no-flight zone in Bosnia and Herzegovina - and by providing the UN with detailed military contingency planning concerning safe areas and the implementation of a peace plan.

The measures proved inadequate to bring an end to the war. In the summer of 1995, after violations of exclusion zones, the shelling of UN-designated safe areas and the taking of UN hostages, NATO member countries took several decisions resulting in military intervention in support of UN efforts to bring the war in Bosnia to an end. A two-week air campaign against Bosnian Serb forces was launched by NATO and in the following months a number of further military actions were taken at the request of the UN force commanders. These actions paved the way for the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord on 14 December 1995. The Alliance immediately proceeded to deploy peacekeeping forces to the country in accordance with the terms of a UN mandate, giving NATO responsibility for the implementation of the military aspects of the peace accord.

This was the first time NATO was involved in a non-Article 5 crisis management operation in its entire history. Other non-Article 5 crisis management operations were to follow - in Kosovo, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 1, Afghanistan and - in a support role - Iraq.

Provision for crisis management measures had already been made in the Alliance's 1991 Strategic Concept for "the management of crises affecting the security of its members". It was reiterated in the 1999 Strategic Concept, which states that NATO stands ready to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management. In addition, the 1999 document states that these crisis management operations would include non-Article 5 operations, i.e., operations affecting countries other than NATO member countries.

Invocation of Article 5

It was not until the turn of the century that Article 5 was invoked for the very first time in NATO's history. Contrary to expectations when Article 5 was drawn up, it was European Allies and Canada who came to the aid of the United States, which had been violently attacked by the Al-Qaeda terrorist group on September 11, 2001. Several measures were put into place by NATO to help prevent further attacks.

Developing disaster relief operations

Crisis management is a broad concept that goes beyond military operations to include issues such as the protection of populations. NATO began developing civil protection measures in the event of a nuclear attack as early as the 1950s. NATO member countries soon realized that these capabilities could be used effectively against the effects of disasters induced by floods, earthquakes or technological incidents, and against humanitarian disasters.

In 1953, the first disaster assistance scheme was implemented following devastating flooding in Northern Europe and in 1958 NATO established detailed procedures for the co-ordination of assistance between NATO member countries in case of disasters. These procedures remained in place and provided the basis for civil emergency planning work within NATO in subsequent years. They were comprehensively reviewed in 1995 when they became applicable to partner countries in addition to NATO member countries.
In 1998, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre was established to co-ordinate aid provided by different member and partner countries to a disaster-stricken area in a member or partner country. NATO also established a Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit, which is a non-standing, multinational mix of national civil and military elements that have been volunteered by member or partner countries for deployment to the area of concern.

Civil emergency planning has become a key facet of NATO involvement in crisis management. In recent years, NATO has provided support for many countries. It has assisted flood-devastated Albania, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Ukraine; supported the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Kosovo; sent aid to earthquake-stricken Turkey and Pakistan; helped to fight fires in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 1 and in Portugal; and supported Ukraine and Moldova after extreme weather conditions had destroyed power transmission capabilities. NATO also conducts civil emergency planning exercises on a regular basis.

**The decision-making bodies**

When a crisis occurs, no decisions on planning, deployment or employment of military forces are taken without political authorization. Decisions are taken by the governments of each NATO member country collectively and may include political or military measures, as well as measures to deal with civil emergencies, depending on the nature of the crisis.

NATO has different mechanisms in place to deal with crises: the top decision-making body - the North Atlantic Council - exchanges intelligence, information and other data, compares different perceptions and approaches, and harmonizes its views. The Council is supported by a number of specialized committees, including the the Political and Partnerships Committee, the Military Committee and the Civil Emergency Planning Committee. NATO communication systems, including a "Situation Centre", receive, exchange and disseminate political, economic and military intelligence and information around the clock, every single day of the year.

The NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS), the NATO Intelligence and Warning System (NIWS), NATO's Operational Planning System and NATO Civil Emergency Planning Crisis Management Arrangements are designed to underpin the Alliance's crisis management role and response capability in a complementary and synergistic fashion, as part of an overall NATO Crisis Management Process.

1. Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
The consultation process

All NATO decisions are made by consensus, after discussion and consultation among member countries. Consultation between member states is a key part of the decision-making process at NATO, allowing Allies to exchange views and information, and to discuss issues prior to reaching agreement and taking action.

The process is continuous and takes place both on an informal and a formal basis with a minimum of delay or inconvenience, due to the fact that all member states have permanent delegations at NATO Headquarters in Brussels.

The practice of regularly exchanging information and consulting together ensures that governments can come together at short notice whenever necessary, often with prior knowledge of their respective preoccupations, in order to agree on common policies or take action on the basis of consensus.

There are different forms of consultation, including the possibility of bringing an issue to the attention of the North Atlantic Council, as stated in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. The consultation process therefore gives NATO an active role in preventive diplomacy by providing the means to help avoid military conflict; it also reinforces the Alliance's political dimension.

Different forms of consultation

Consultation takes many forms. At its most basic level it involves simply the exchange of information and opinions. At another level it covers the communication of actions or decisions, which governments have already taken or may be about to take. Finally, it can encompass discussion with the aim of reaching a consensus on policies to be adopted or actions to be taken.

Under Article 4 of NATO’s founding treaty, member countries can bring an issue to the attention of the Council and discuss it with Allies. The article states:

“The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”

For instance, on 10 February 2003, Turkey formally invoked Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, asking for consultations in the North Atlantic Council on defensive assistance from NATO in the event of a threat to its population or territory resulting from armed conflict in neighbouring Iraq. Going back in time, the “Report of the Committee of Three Wise Men on non-military consultation” focuses heavily on political consultation and the political dimension consultation gives to NATO. The publication of the Report coincided with the Suez Crisis, where the lack of consultation severely divided NATO member countries at the time.

The fora for political consultation

The principal forum for political consultation is the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s principal political decision-making committee. The Secretary General, by virtue of his chairmanship, plays an essential part in this process. Consultation also takes place on a regular basis in other fora (committees, working groups etc.), all of which derive their authority from the Council.
Setting up a consultation system
Consultation and consensus were accepted as the basis for all NATO decisions when the Alliance was created in 1949.

However, it was only gradually that NATO set up a consultation system. This was done in three stages:

- **1949-1952**: at the signing of the Treaty, NATO introduced the consultation process as a key principle in its working mechanisms. This was reinforced at the Lisbon Conference where the contours of today’s NATO were put into place: the North Atlantic Council was made permanent and the position of Secretary General was created, together with an international staff that would support Council decisions on a permanent basis;

- **1952-1956**: between 1952 and the publishing of the Committee of Three’s report on non-military cooperation, attempts had been made to encourage political consultation beyond the geographical limitations defined in 1949. With regard to consultation, 1956 was a pivotal year: not only was the Report published, but the Suez crisis brought France and the United Kingdom at loggerheads with the United States, illustrating how a lack of consultation could effectively hinder Alliance unity and solidarity;

- **From 1956**: the principles of the Report of the Committee of Three were further developed and implemented.
A Comprehensive Approach

Military means alone cannot ensure successful crisis management. Meeting today’s security challenges requires a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments and close cooperation and coordination among a variety of actors. It requires a comprehensive approach by the international community.

Military and civilian actors need to plan together, operate in complementary ways, and support each other. Such a comprehensive approach is an essential part of NATO’s transformation in the area of crisis management – and this is likely to be reflected in the new Strategic Concept that is being prepared in time for the Lisbon Summit in November 2010.

"The comprehensive approach not only makes sense – it is necessary," says NATO Secretary General Rasmussen. "NATO needs to work more closely with our civilian partners on the ground, and at a political level – especially the European Union and the United Nations."

At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, Allied leaders endorsed an Action Plan for the development and implementation of NATO’s contribution to a Comprehensive Approach.

Since then, NATO has been improving its own crisis-management instruments and it has reached out to strengthen its ability to work with partner countries, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and local authorities. In particular, NATO is building closer partnerships with civilian actors that have experience and skills in areas such as institution building, development, governance, judiciary and police.

Key areas of work

The development and implementation of NATO’s contribution to a Comprehensive Approach will be a long-term effort. The Alliance intends to improve its ability to work and coordinate more closely with its partners and other international actors in crisis management.

NATO is working to make improvements in several key areas of work:

Planning and conduct of operations

NATO takes full account of all military and non-military aspects of a NATO engagement, and is working to improve practical cooperation at all levels with all relevant organizations and actors in the planning and conduct of operations. NATO’s ongoing work in the area of Operations Planning promotes a sense of common purpose and resolve, the clear definition of strategies and objectives before launching an operation, as well as enhanced planning to support nations’ contributions to operations. Although normally civilian tasks would be preformed by other actors, NATO is also developing its ability to plan for and manage the coordinated employment of Allies’ civilian capacities in an interim period, in case these actors cannot be effective at the outset.

Lessons learned, training, education and exercises

Applying a comprehensive approach means a change of mindset. The Alliance is therefore emphasizing joint training of civilian and military personnel. This promotes the sharing of lessons learned and also helps build trust and confidence between NATO, its partners and other
international and local actors. This, in turn, encourages better coordination.

**Enhancing cooperation with external actors**

Achieving lasting mutual understanding, trust, confidence and respect among the relevant organizations and actors will make their respective efforts more effective. Therefore, NATO is actively building closer links and liaison with relevant organizations and actors on a regular basis while respecting the autonomy of decision-making of each organization.

**Public messaging**

To be effective, a Comprehensive Approach must be complemented by sustained and coherent public messages. NATO’s information campaigns should be substantiated by systematic and updated information, documenting progress in relevant areas. It is important to ensure that the information strategies of the main actors should complement and not contradict each other, which could be facilitated by direct contacts between those responsible for public information.
NATO reform

The NATO Command Structure review is part of an ongoing NATO reform process which is focusing on the internal organization of NATO Headquarters (NATO Committee review) and NATO Agencies (NATO Agencies review).

NATO Command Structure review

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Rationale for the NATO Command Structure review

In the course of its history, the NATO command structure has been regularly adapted taking into account changes in the strategic environment.

NATO has gone from a focus on training and preparation for operations on Alliance territory to include also planning and execution of operations, all of which have been outside Alliance territory.

Since 1995, the NATO Command Structure has reduced from 27,000 personnel in 26 headquarter locations to now over 13,000 personnel in 11 locations. Today, the NATO Command Structure is executing operations on three continents with 150,000 personnel deployed.

The reform of the Command Structure will allow for savings, but savings are not the main goal of the reform. The NATO Command Structure review is about maintaining NATO’s responsiveness.

The new NATO Command Structure

The summit in Lisbon is expected to decide on a generic model for a new NATO Command Structure, that will be able to meet the same level of ambition that the Alliance has today, providing command and control for two major joint operations and six smaller military operations.

Decisions taken at the summit in Lisbon on the new Command Structure will be unconstrained of geographical footprints. The future locations of Alliance headquarters will be determined at a later stage in 2011.

The generic model for the new command structure to be approved in Lisbon follows a thorough review process, conducted under the assumptions that the NATO level of ambition will remain; that the Alliance will maintain robust command and control and rapidly deployable military capabilities and, finally, that the reformed Command Structure will be able to prevail in
operations in a dynamic and complex environment across NATO’s agreed missions and capabilities.

The model for the new structure reduces the NATO Command Structure in manpower while maintaining all existing roles and functions (from currently 13,000 to 8,950).

Military Command Structure

Allied Command Operations

Strategic:

Operational:

Component:

1. Appropriate links from Joint HQ Lisbon to CCs are detailed in sub-paragraph 10 b.
2. See sub-paragraph 11 b. for the DCAOCs Forward Operating Base at Tunis, SP.
NATO Agencies review

The NATO Agencies review is part of an ongoing NATO reform process which also focuses on the NATO Command Structure.

Agencies are an essential part of NATO and are a vital mechanism for procuring and sustaining capabilities collectively. They also offer a mechanism for the procurement of capabilities by nations, either individually or in groups, including services and support. There are 14 NATO Agencies. The NATO Agency review aims to enhance their efficiency and effectiveness, to achieve greater synergy between similar functions and to increase transparency and accountability.

At Lisbon, Allies are expected to agree on a model that will reduce the number of NATO agencies from 14 to three. Current work indicates a reorganization of NATO agencies along three major programmatic themes: procurement, support and communications and information.

Agency reform will ultimately bring savings, in particular with regard to overhead costs and sharing of support services.
Military organization and structures

NATO’s military organization and structures comprise all military actors and formations that are involved in and used to implement political decisions that have military implications.

The key elements of NATO’s military organization are the Military Committee, composed of the Chiefs of Defence of NATO member countries, its executive body, the International Military Staff, and the military Command Structure (distinct from the Force Structure), which is composed of Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation, headed respectively by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation (SACT).

The Force Structure consists of organizational arrangements that bring together the forces placed at the Alliance’s disposal by the member countries, along with their associated command and control structures. These forces are available for NATO operations in accordance with predetermined readiness criteria and with rules of deployment and transfer of authority to NATO command that can vary from country to country.

Working mechanisms

In practice, the Chairman of the Military Committee presides over the Military Committee where each member country has a military representative (or Milrep) for his/her Chief of Defence. This committee, NATO’s most senior military authority, provides the North Atlantic Council and the Nuclear Planning Group with consensus-based military advice— that is, advice agreed to by all of NATO’s Chiefs of Defence.

The Military Committee works closely with NATO’s two Strategic Commanders – SACEUR, responsible for operations and SACT, responsible for transformation. They are both responsible to the Military Committee for the overall conduct of all Alliance military matters within their areas of responsibility.

On the one side, the Military Committee provides the Strategic Commanders with guidance on military matters; and on the other side, it works closely with the Strategic Commanders to bring forward for political consideration by the North Atlantic Council, military assessments, plans, issues and recommendations, together with an analysis that puts this information into a wider context and takes into account the concerns of each member country. The Military Committee is supported in this role by the International Military Staff.

In sum, the Military Committee serves, inter alia, as a link between the political leaders of the HQ and the two Strategic Commanders.

The capacity to adapt

Over and above these working mechanisms, there are two phenomena that have a direct impact on the military structure, the way it functions and the way it evolves: first and foremost, international developments and events; and secondly, the constant interaction between the political and military bodies.

Evidently, political events with far-reaching consequences such as the end of the Cold War and military operations such as ISAF in Afghanistan do trigger extensive reforms, especially within
NATO’s military Command Structure. To keep pace with all these changes and future challenges, the Command Structure and way of doing business is constantly evolving. Additionally, the permanent exchange of information and specialized knowledge and experience between military experts and the political actors at NATO Headquarters is a constant and continual means of mutual education. This ability of the military and the civilian to work closely together makes NATO a unique organization.

Military Command Structure

Allied Command Operations

Strategic:

SHAPE
Mons, Belgium

Operational:

JFC HQ Brunssum
The Netherlands

Joint HQ Lisbon
Portugal

JFC HQ Naples
Italy

Component:

CC-Air HQ Ramstein
Germany

CC-Mar HQ Northwood
United Kingdom

CC-Land HQ Heidelberg
Germany

CC-Air HQ Izmir
Turkey

CC-Mar HQ Naples
Italy

CC-Land HQ Madrid
Spain

CAOC Uden
The Netherlands

DCAOC Uden
Germany

CAOC Larissa
Greece

CAOC Pinheim
Germany

DCAOC Pinheim
Germany

(1) Appropriate links from Joint HQ Lisbon to CCs are detailed in sub-paragraph 10 b.
(2) See sub-paragraph 11 b. for the DCAOCs Forward Operating Base at Vanyx, SP.
(1) This diagram does not depict the internal organisation of the HQ SACT.
(2) It could also provide a European-based interface for other transformation processes.
(3) Transformation implementation requires adaptation of existing relationships between the NATO HQ, several NATO agencies, many non-NATO entities and both Strategic Commanders.
Allied Command Operations (ACO) is one of NATO's two strategic commands. Located at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), near Mons, Belgium, it is responsible for all Alliance operations wherever it may be required.

The Command Structure is based on functionality rather than geography. There are three tiers of command: strategic, operational, and the tactical or component level.

**Strategic level**

At the strategic level, Allied Command Operations is headed by Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). SACEUR is dual-hatted as the commander of the US European Command, which shares many of the same geographical responsibilities. SACEUR is responsible to the Military Committee, which is the senior military authority in NATO under the overall political authority of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). The Military Committee is the primary source of military advice to the NAC and NPG, and is supported in its work by the International Military Staff.

**Operational level**

The operational level consists of two standing Joint Force Commands (JFCs): one in Brunssum, the Netherlands, and one in Naples, Italy, both of which can conduct operations from their static locations or provide a land-based Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters. There is also a
robust but more limited standing joint headquarters in Lisbon, Portugal, from which a deployable sea-based CJTF headquarters capability can be drawn.

**Component or tactical level**

The component or tactical level consists of six Joint Force Component Commands (JFCCs), which provide service-specific – land, maritime or air – expertise and support to the operational level.

**Evolution**

The Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) was established on 2 April 1951 in Rocquencourt, France, as part of an effort to establish an integrated and effective NATO military force. Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) was created a year later, in April 1952.

In 1967, after France’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military structure, SHAPE was relocated to Casteau, Mons, Belgium.

The London Declaration of July 1990 was a decisive turning point in the history of the Alliance and led to the adoption of the new Alliance Strategic Concept in November 1991, reflecting a broader approach to security. This in turn led to NATO’s Long Term Study to examine the Integrated Military Structure and put forward proposals for change to the Alliance’s force structures, command structures and common infrastructure.

In essence, the Cold War command structure was reduced from 78 headquarters to 20 with two overarching Strategic Commanders (SC), one for the Atlantic, and one for Europe; there were three Regional Commanders under the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT) and two under the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR).

During the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO’s military Command Structure was again reorganized with a focus on becoming leaner and more efficient. The former Allied Command Europe (ACE) became the Allied Command Operations (ACO). The Supreme Allied Commander Europe and his staff at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) situated in Mons, Belgium, were henceforth responsible for all Alliance operations, including those previously undertaken by SACLANT. The reform resulted in a significant reduction in headquarters and Combined Air Operations Centres – from 32 command centres down to 9 – and reflected a fundamental shift in Alliance thinking.

At present, the restructuring is being taken a step further to ensure that military command capabilities are more flexible. Work on developing this new structure has already started. The main conclusions with the generic model of the reform will be presented at the summit meeting in Lisbon, 19-20 November 2010.
Allied Command Transformation (ACT) is leading at the strategic command level the transformation of NATO’s military structure, forces, capabilities and doctrine. It is enhancing training, particularly of commanders and staffs, conducting experiments to assess new concepts, and promoting interoperability throughout the Alliance.

Headquarters, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (HQ SACT), located in Norfolk, Virginia, is the physical headquarters of NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), and houses the command structure of ACT. SACT is responsible to the Military Committee, which is the senior military authority in NATO under the overall political authority of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). The Military Committee is the primary source of military advice to the NAC and NPG, and is supported in its work by the International Military Staff.

Allied Command Transformation (ACT)
the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre in Portugal, various NATO schools and Centres of Excellence.

There are direct linkages between ACT, NATO educational facilities and various agencies, as well as an extensive collaboration with the US Joint Forces Command (US JFCOM). The partnership with JFCOM gives ACT a link into US transformation initiatives and fosters a two-way street between the United States and Europe.

**Evolution**

Allied Command Transformation was initially formed as Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) at Norfolk, Virginia, in April 1952, a year after the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) was established for Allied Command Europe (ACE).

ACLANT, together with ACE were streamlined at the end of the Cold War. In essence, the command structure was reduced from 78 headquarters to 20. There were the two overarching Strategic Commanders (SC), one for the Atlantic and one for Europe, with three Regional Commanders under the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT) and two under the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR).

During the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO’s military Command Structure was reorganized with a focus on becoming leaner and more efficient. Additionally, Alliance thinking fundamentally shifted: the command structures became based on functionality rather than geography. The former Allied Command Europe (ACE) became the Allied Command Operations (ACO), responsible for all Alliance operations, including those previously undertaken by SACLANT. As such, one Strategic Command was focused on NATO’s operations--Allied Command Operations (ACO/SHAPE) -- and the other on transforming NATO--Allied Command Transformation (ACT).

The reform also resulted in a significant reduction in headquarters and Combined Air Operations Centres – from 32 command centres down to 9.

At present, the restructuring is being taken a step further to ensure that military command capabilities are more flexible. Work on developing this new structure has already started. The main conclusions with the generic model of the reform will be presented at the summit meeting in Lisbon, 19-20 November 2010.

HQ SACT is the only NATO command in North America and the only permanent NATO headquarters outside of Europe.
Working by committee

NATO committees form an indispensable part of the Alliance’s decision-making process. They enable exchanges of information and consultation leading to decisions taken on the basis of unanimity and common accord.

Each member country is represented at every level of the committee structure in the fields of NATO activity in which they participate.

NATO currently has an extensive network of committees, covering everything from political issues, to improving capabilities, to technical issues related to the Alliance’s military interoperability.

NATO committees are currently under review so as to help NATO respond more effectively to today’s security concerns and to the need for more integrated, flexible working procedures.

The principal committees

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the principal political decision-making body within NATO and the only committee that was established by the founding Treaty. Under Article 9, the NAC is invested with the authority to set up “such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary” for the purposes of implementing the Treaty. Over the years, the Council has established a network of committees to facilitate the Alliance’s work and deal with all subjects on its agenda.

The principal NATO committees are the NAC, the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and the Military Committee. The Defence Planning Committee (DPC), which was also one of NATO’s top decision-making bodies, was dissolved under the June 2010 committee reform and its functions taken over by the NAC.

Committees reporting to the NAC

In addition to the NAC, the NPG and the Military Committee, there are a number of committees that report directly to the Council. Some of these are themselves supported by working groups, especially in areas such as defence procurement.

Committees reporting to the NAC include the following, which it must be noted are currently under review and could be subject to change:

- Deputies Committee
- Political and Partnerships Committee
- Defence Policy and Planning Committee
- Committee on Proliferation
- C3 Board
- Operations Policy Committee
- High Level Task Force on Conventional Arms Control
- Verification Coordinating Committee
- Conference of National Armaments Directors
- Committee for Standardization
- Logistics Committee
- Resource Policy and Planning Board
Air Defence Committee
Air Traffic Management Committee
Civil Emergency Planning Committee
Committee on Public Diplomacy
Council Operations and Exercises Committee
Security Committee
Civilian Intelligence Committee
Archives Committee

Evolution

With the exception of the NAC, committees were gradually established after the signing of the Washington Treaty on 4 April 1949 (for further information on how the committee structure evolved, see “NATO: The first five years, 1949-1954”, by Lord Ismay).

From time to time, the NATO committee structure is reviewed and reorganized so as to make it more efficient, responsive and relevant to NATO’s current priorities. This includes eliminating obsolete committees and creating new bodies.

Since its creation in 1949, the Alliance has undergone two major committee restructurings. The first took place in 1990 after the end of the Cold War, and the second in 2002, in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001.

A third major committee review started in June 2010 and is currently being implemented and fine-tuned.
Organizations and agencies

A number of organizations and agencies fall under the NATO umbrella that deal with specific subject areas or approaches – from research, logistics and communication to pipeline management and helicopter production. They provide a focus for specialized research and advice, the implementation of Alliance decisions, the management and operation of cooperative programmes and systems, and education and training.

The starting point of an organization or agency is an agreement by Alliance members on a Charter that lays out the tasks and responsibilities of a NATO organization. A board is normally set up to guide the work of the new organization, and an agency is often created to carry out its activities. In some cases, more than one agency works within the framework of an organization.

Although NATO organizations and agencies are autonomous, they are required to follow the terms set out in their charters and usually report to either the North Atlantic Council or the Military Committee, or to both. They benefit from NATO’s tax-exempt status and primarily serve the Alliance and its member states. Some, however, also assist with the needs of NATO partners when this benefits the Alliance.

NATO’s organizations and agencies are located within the Alliance Headquarters in Brussels and a number of Allied countries.

As part of the NATO reform process, the structure and organizations of the Alliance’s agencies are currently under review.
NATO’s organizations and agencies include 1:

- NATO Research and Technology Organisation (RTO)
- NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A)
- NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA)
- NATO Standardization Agency (NSA)
- Central Europe Pipeline Management Agency (CEPMA)
- NATO Medium Extended Air Defence System Design and Development Production and Logistics Management Agency
- NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Programme Management Agency (NAPMA)
- NATO Air Command and Control System (ACCS) Management Agency (NACMA)
- NATO Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation Systems Agency
- NATO Communication and Information Systems Services Agency (NCSA)
- NATO Helicopter Design and Development Production and Logistics Management Agency
- NATO EF2000 and Tornado Development and Logistics Management Agency
- NATO Airlift Management Agency (NAMA)
- NATO Training Group

1. Please note that NATO’s agencies are undergoing a review process and could be subject to change.
Paying for NATO

Member countries make direct and indirect contributions to the costs of running NATO and implementing its policies and activities.

The greater part of these contributions comes through participation in NATO-led operations and in efforts to ensure that national armed forces are interoperable with those of other member countries. Member countries incur the deployment costs involved whenever they volunteer forces to participate in NATO-led operations. With a few exceptions, they also cover the procurement of military forces and military assets such as ships, submarines, aircraft, tanks, artillery or weapons systems.

Direct contributions to budgets managed by NATO are made by members in accordance with an agreed cost-sharing formula based on relative Gross National Income. These contributions represent a very small percentage of each member’s overall defence budget and, generally, finance the expenditures of NATO’s integrated structures.

Direct contributions generally follow the principle of common funding, that is to say, member countries pool resources within a NATO framework. There are three budgets that come under the common funding arrangements:

- the civil budget;
- the military budget; and
- the NATO Security Investment Programme.

Common funding covers collective requirements such as the NATO command structure, NATO-wide air defence, command and control systems or Alliance-wide communications systems, which are not the responsibility of one single member.

Projects can also be jointly funded, which means that the participating countries can identify the requirements, the priorities and the funding arrangements, but NATO provides political and financial oversight.

Financial management of these different types of contributions is structured to ensure that the ultimate control of expenditure rests with the member countries supporting the cost of a defined activity, and is subject to consensus among them. The main body involved in these financial matters is the Resource Policy and Planning Board, to which the Budget Committee and the Investment Committee report.

Country contributions

As explained above, member countries make direct contributions to NATO in accordance with an agreed cost-sharing formula based on Gross National Income. The largest direct contributors to NATO in absolute terms are the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom and France.

Table of "Contributions of the 28 member countries to NATO’s civil and military budgets and to the security investment programme"

Different forms of direct funding

As mentioned in the introduction, direct contributions to NATO come principally in two different
forms: common funding and joint funding. They can also come in the form of trust funds, contributions in kind, ad hoc sharing arrangements and donations.

There are no fixed, pre-set rules on whether national, multinational, joint or common funding should be used to address a given problem. In general, however, the following factors will influence the choices made by countries: the required level of integration or interoperability, the affordability at the national level, the complexity of the system involved, and the potential for economies of scale. Often, a combination of funding sources is used.

NATO crisis response operations and missions are resourced along the same lines as capability projects.

**Principle and practices of common funding at NATO**

**The principle of common funding**

When a need for expenditure has been identified, countries in the Resource Policy and Planning Board discuss whether the principle of common funding should be applied – in other words whether the requirement serves the interests of all the contributing countries and therefore should be borne collectively.

The criteria for common funding are held under constant review and changes may be introduced as a result of new contingencies, for instance the need to support critical requirements in support of Alliance operations and missions.

Common funding arrangements principally include the NATO civil and military budgets, as well as the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP). These are the only funds where NATO authorities identify the requirements and set the priorities in line with overarching Alliance objectives and priorities.

Where military common funding is concerned - the military budget and the NATO Security Investment Programme – the guiding principle for eligibility is the "over and above" rule: "common funding will focus on the provision of requirements which are over and above those which could reasonably be expected to be made available from national resources."

**The civil budget**

The civil budget provides funds for personnel expenses, operating costs, and capital and programme expenditure of the International Staff at NATO HQ. It is financed from national foreign ministry budgets (in most countries), supervised by the Budget Committee and implemented by the International Staff.

The civil budget is formulated on an objective-based framework, which establishes clear links between NATO’s strategic objectives and the resources required to achieve them. There are four front-line objectives and three support objectives.

**The four frontline objectives**

- Support to operations: Provide effective policy, planning and resourcing in support of NATO operations and for civil emergency planning activities;
- Alliance capabilities: Conduct necessary policy and planning work to promote and support improved Alliance capabilities;
- Consultation and cooperation with partners: Support consultation and cooperative activities with partners to strengthen security and respond to new security challenges and threats to the Euro-Atlantic region;
- Public relations: Build awareness of, and support for, NATO, its operations and its role in promoting security through public diplomacy.

**The three support objectives**

- NATO and International Staff support: Provide professional and support services to the North Atlantic Council (NAC), subordinate committees and the International Staff;
- HQ operating and maintenance: Operate and maintain the NATO HQ facility and site by providing buildings and facilities, and management services to the NATO
HQ site in Brussels (facilities occupied by the International Military Staff are funded from the military budget);

HQ security: Ensure NATO-wide security policy and provide a safe and secure environment for all HQ staff and operations. This includes the physical security of HQ premises and the overall coordination of NATO security among member and partner countries.

The military budget
This budget covers the operating and maintenance costs of the international military structure. It is composed of over 50 separate budgets, which are financed from national defence budgets (in most countries). It is supervised by the Budget Committee and implemented by the individual budget holders. In all cases, the provision of military staff remains a nationally funded responsibility.

The military budget effectively provides funds for the International Military Staff, the strategic commanders and the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control (NAEW&C) Force and, more specifically for:

- The Military Committee, the International Military Staff and military agencies;
- The two strategic commands and associated command, control and information systems;
- Theatre headquarters for deployed operations and support of critical theatre-level enabling capabilities such as theatre medical capabilities or theatre engineering capabilities;
- The NATO Standardization Agency, the NATO ACCS Management Agency, the NATO Command and Control Agency and the NATO CIS Services Agency;
- The NATO static and deployable Combined Air Operations Centres, deployable ARS and radar systems, and deployable HQ communication systems;
- The Joint Warfare Centre (Norway), the Joint Force Training Centre (Poland), the Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre (Portugal), the NATO Defense College (Italy), the Communications and Information Systems School (Italy), the NATO Programming Centre (Belgium), the Multi-Service Electronic Warfare Support Group (United Kingdom);
- The Scientific Programme of Work of the NC3A, Allied Command Transformation experimentation funds, the Research and Technology Agency (France) and the Undersea Research Centre (Italy);
- Some limited partnership support activities and part of the Military Liaison Offices in Moscow and Kyiv.

The NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP)
This programme covers major construction and command and control system investments, which are beyond the national defence requirements of individual member countries. It supports the roles of the NATO strategic commands by providing installations and facilities such as air defence communication and information systems, military headquarters for the integrated structure and for deployed operations, and critical airfield, fuel systems and harbour facilities needed in support of deployed forces.

The NSIP is financed by the ministries of defence of each member country and is supervised by the Investment Committee. Projects are implemented either by individual host countries or by different NATO agencies and strategic commands, according to their area of expertise.

Joint funding
Joint funding arrangements are structured forms of multinational funding within the terms of an agreed NATO Charter. The participating countries still identify the requirements, the priorities and the funding arrangements, but NATO has visibility and provides political and financial oversight.

Joint funding arrangements typically lead to the setting-up of a management organization and an implementation agency. There are currently 14 NATO Agencies with activities ranging from the development and production of fighter aircraft or helicopters to the provision of logistic support or air defence communication and information systems. Other agencies coordinate Research and Development activities or are active in the fields of standardization and intelligence-sharing.
Jointly funded Agencies vary in the number of participating countries, cost-share arrangements and management structures. Work is underway, however, to streamline their activities around procurement, logistic support and air defence and communication capabilities. The introduction of shared service arrangements, also with the NATO Command Structure, in areas such as human resources, financial management and IT services should allow for more efficient operations at lower cost.

Other forms of funding

In addition to common funding and joint funding, some projects can take the form of trust fund arrangements, contributions in kind, ad hoc sharing arrangements and donations.

Management and control

Financial management within NATO is structured to ensure that the ultimate control of expenditure rests with the member countries supporting the cost of a defined activity, and is subject to consensus among them. No single body exercises direct managerial control over all four of the principal elements of the Organization’s financial structure:

- the International Staff, financed by the civil budget;
- the international military structure, financed by the military budget;
- the Security Investment Programme; and
- specialized Production and Logistics Organizations.

When cooperative activities do not involve all member countries, they are, for the most part, managed by NATO Production and Logistics Organizations. The Production and Logistics Organizations fall into two groups: those which are financed under arrangements applying to the international military structure and are subject to the general financial and audit regulations of NATO; and those which operate under charters granted by the NAC. These have their own Boards of Directors and finance committees and distinct sources of financing within national treasuries, which means that they operate in virtual autonomy.

Financial regulations applied at NATO provide basic unifying principles around which the overall financial structure is articulated. They are approved by the NAC and are complemented by rules and procedures adapting them to specific NATO bodies and programmes.

Financial management of the civil and military budgets

The civil and military budgets are annual, coinciding with the calendar year. Each one is prepared under the authority of the head of the respective NATO body, reviewed and recommended for approval on the basis of consensus by the Budget Committee composed of representatives of contributing member countries, and approved for execution by the NAC.

Failure to achieve consensus before the start of the financial year entails non-approval of the budget and the financing of operations, under the supervision of the Budget Committee, through provisional allocations limited to the level of the budget approved for the preceding year. This regime may last for six months, after which the Council is required to decide either to approve the budget or to authorize continuation of interim financing.

When the budget has been approved, the head of the NATO body has discretion to execute it through the commitment and expenditure of funds for the purposes authorized. This discretion is limited by different levels of constraint prescribed by the Financial Regulations regarding such matters as recourse to competitive bidding for contracts for the supply of goods and services, or transfers of credits to correct over or under-estimates of the funding required. Discretionary authority to execute a budget may be further limited by particular obligations to seek prior approval for commitments and expenditure. These may occasionally be imposed by the Budget Committee in the interests of ensuring strict application of new policies or of monitoring the implementation of complex initiatives such as organizational restructuring.

Financial management of the NATO Security Investment Programme

Implementation of the NATO Security Investment Programme starts from capability packages. These packages identify the assets available to and required by NATO military commanders to fulfill specified tasks. They assess common-funded supplements (in terms of capital investment and recurrent operating and maintenance costs) as well as the civilian and military manpower required to accomplish the task. They are reviewed by the Resource Policy and Planning Board.
then approved by the NAC.

Once they are approved, authorization for individual projects can move forward under the responsibility of the Investment Committee. The Host Nation (understood as either the country on whose territory the project is to be implemented, a NATO agency or a strategic command) prepares an authorization request. Once the Committee has agreed to the project, the Host Nation can proceed with its final design, contract award and implementation. Unless otherwise agreed by the Investment Committee, the bidding process is conducted among firms from those countries contributing to the project.

The financial management system which applies to the NSIP is based on an international financial clearing process. Host nations report on the expenditure foreseen on authorized projects within their responsibility. Following agreement of the forecasts by the Investment Committee, the International Staff calculates the amounts to be paid by each country and to be received by each host nation. Further calculations determine the payment amounts, currencies and which country or NATO agency will receive the funds.

Once a project has been completed, it is subject to a Joint Final Acceptance Inspection to ensure that the work undertaken is in accordance with the scope of work authorized. As soon as this report is accepted by the Investment Committee, it is added to the NATO inventory.

Financial control

With respect to the military and civil budgets, the head of the NATO body is ultimately responsible for the correct preparation and execution of the budget, the administrative support for this task is largely entrusted to his Financial Controller. The appointment of this official is the prerogative of the NAC, although the latter may delegate this task to the Budget Committee.

Each Financial Controller has final recourse to the Budget Committee in the case of persistent disagreement with the head of the respective NATO body regarding an intended transaction. The Financial Controller is charged with ensuring that all aspects of execution of the budget conform to expenditure authorizations, to any special controls imposed by the Budget Committee and to the Financial Regulations and their associated implementing rules and procedures. He may also, in response to internal auditing, install such additional controls and procedures as he deems necessary for maintaining accountability.

The International Board of Auditors

An independent International Board of Auditors for NATO is responsible for auditing the accounts of the different NATO bodies. Its principal task is to provide the NAC and member governments with the assurance that joint and common funds are properly used for the settlement of authorized expenditure and that expenditure is within the physical and financial authorizations granted.

The Board’s mandate includes not only financial but also performance audits, therefore extending its role beyond safeguarding accountability to the review of management practices in general. It is composed of officials normally drawn from the national audit bodies of member countries. These officials are appointed by and responsible to the NAC.

Bodies involved

The civil budget and the military budget are supervised by the Budget Committee and the NATO Security Investment Programme by the Investment Committee. Overall military resource policy issues are handled in the Resource Policy and Planning Board (RPPB).

The Resource Policy and Planning Board

The Resource Policy and Planning Board (RPPB) is the senior advisory body to the NAC on the management of all NATO resources. It has responsibility for the overall management of NATO’s civil and military budgets, as well as the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP) and manpower. Both the Budget Committee and the Investment Committee report to the RPPB.

The Budget Committee

The Budget Committee is responsible to the Resource Policy and Planning Board for NATO’s civil and military budgets. The civil budget covers all costs related to NATO’s International Staff at
NATO HQ in Brussels; the military budget covers all costs related to the International Military Staff at NATO HQ, the strategic commands and the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control (NAEW&C) Force.

**The Investment Committee**

The Investment Committee is responsible to the Resource Policy and Planning Board for the implementation of the NATO Security and Investment Programme (NSIP).

The NATO Security and Investment Programme finances the provision of the installations and facilities needed to support the roles of the two strategic commands – Allied Command, Europe and Allied Command Transformation - recognized as exceeding the national defence requirements of individual member countries.
Improving NATO’s capabilities

NATO has been engaged in continuous and systematic transformation for many years to ensure that it has the policies, capabilities, and structures required, in the changing international security environment, to deal with current and future challenges, including of course the collective defence of its members. With Allied forces engaged in operations and missions across several continents, the Alliance needs to ensure that its armed forces remain modern, deployable and sustainable.

The Alliance’s 2010 Strategic Concept will set out NATO’s strategic priorities and define the Organization’s vision of Euro-Atlantic security for the next decade. It will provide an analysis of the strategic environment and a framework for all Alliance capability development planning disciplines and intelligence, identifying the kinds of operations the Alliance must be able to perform and the kind of capabilities it will need to do so.

Alliance capabilities will therefore be transformed and modernized under the inspiration of this new Strategic Concept. Subsequently, guidance will be provided on the implementation of the Strategic Concept for further development of capabilities.

Meeting immediate and long-term challenges

In order to meet immediate and long-term challenges, NATO continues to work on a broad and multifaceted set of activities: from strategic thinking to practical planning involving the fielding of new capabilities, the adjustment of military and civilian structures, personnel issues, equipment procurement and the development of new technologies.

With the adoption of a new Strategic Concept, NATO’s priorities will be reassessed and re-defined. In parallel, the capabilities needed to meet the demands of ongoing operations and to face emerging challenges will also be reviewed. In this context, the Alliance will:

- review existing processes and structures to increase efficiency, including through the reform of the military command structure;
- address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through, for instance, the development of a missile defence system that in addition to protecting deployed troops would also include the protection of NATO European populations and territory;
- take a number of measures to improve its ability to conduct demanding operations, whether on Alliance territory or in distant crisis response emergencies through, for instance, the improvement of air and sealift capabilities, information superiority, enhanced command and control systems, and more deployable and sustainable capabilities;
- protect troops on the ground, for example, through technologies and tactics to counter improvised explosive devices;
- develop capabilities to tackle emerging threats, including cyber defence and energy security;
- adjust its planning and capabilities to ensure it can contribute to a comprehensive
approach to operations, including stabilization and reconstruction activities, while improving relations with international organizations.

Reforming the command structure

The Alliance is engaged in a fundamental restructuring of its military headquarters to ensure that they are more agile, flexible, and affordable. The result will be a leaner, more effective structure, able to deploy headquarters for remote operations as well as to protect Alliance territory. A model, without geographic locations for the various facilities, will be presented at the Summit meeting in Lisbon, 19-20 November 2010. Decisions on the locations themselves will follow in the first half of next year.

In the same spirit, a major reform of NATO’s agencies is being conducted. It will result in a significantly smaller number of agencies, with improved efficiency. NATO Headquarters is also being reformed, including with regard to intelligence sharing and production, the process for acquiring multinational capabilities, and the number and responsibilities of committees...

Prioritizing capabilities

A defence transformation package will be presented at the next summit meeting, addressing the Alliance’s top capability priorities based on a realistic projection of resources. It will provide a renewed focus and mandate to ensure that the most urgent capabilities are delivered, including those listed below.

Missile defence

In the context of a broader response to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, NATO is pursuing projects aimed at protecting Alliance forces against ballistic missile threats with ranges up to 3,000 kilometres. By end 2010 the Alliance will have an interim capability to protect troops in a specific area against short-range and some medium-range ballistic missiles.

Initial focus has been on protecting deployed NATO troops (Theatre Missile Defence). At the Lisbon Summit, NATO leaders will decide whether to expand the system to include protection of NATO European populations and territories and at the same time invite Russia to cooperate with this system and to share in its benefits.

Cyber defence

NATO is developing new measures to enhance the protection of its communication and information systems against attempts at disruption through cyber attacks or illegal access. The Alliance is also prepared, on request, to assist Allies in the event of grave cyber attacks against their national systems. These efforts form practical aspects of a new NATO policy on cyber defence. The "NATO 2020" report, delivered in May 2010 by the Group of Experts on a new Strategic Concept for NATO, attaches considerable importance to cyber defence and recommended that high priority be given in the new Strategic Concept to addressing existing vulnerabilities.

Improving air- and sealift capabilities

Strategic air-and sealift capabilities are vital to ensure NATO countries can deploy their forces and equipment quickly to wherever they are needed. NATO member countries are not only fielding their own new strategic lift capabilities but have made arrangements that give them access to commercial transport aircraft and ships; these measure give the Alliance the capability to swiftly move troops, equipment and supplies across the globe. This is particularly important today as NATO takes on missions and operations in distant areas such as Afghanistan.

Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) capabilities

IEDs are the cause of many casualties in today’s operations, especially in Afghanistan. Work is ongoing at different levels to implement measures that will help protect troops against IEDs: initiatives to collate and share intelligence, improved training, new technical capabilities and cooperation with other international organizations. NATO’s Defence Against Terrorism (DAT) Programme of Work together with several multinational cooperation programmes are pursuing technological developments to help thwart these destructive devices as well as other threats posed by terrorists.

Improving information superiority
Information superiority aims to ensure that information and situational awareness are more quickly available to NATO decision-makers and commanders than to potential adversaries. By sharing information, data and intelligence reliably, securely and quickly during NATO-led operations, information superiority helps the Allies achieve their desired ends with smaller forces.

At the Riga Summit in November 2006, Allied leaders agreed to support efforts to achieve information superiority. Key to these efforts is the implementation of a NATO Network-Enabled Capability (NNEC), which aims to make all operational elements, from the strategic down to tactical levels, interoperable. The NNEC connects them through a federation of national and NATO networks for which NATO has established the frame. The Alliance is also working to improve its maritime situational awareness and establish the airborne Alliance Ground Surveillance system.

**Alliance Ground Surveillance**

The Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system is a key element of transformation and an essential enabling capability for forces across the full spectrum of NATO’s current and future operations and missions. The AGS will be an airborne, stand-off ground surveillance system that can detect and track vehicles, such as tanks, trucks or helicopters, moving on or near the ground, in all weather conditions.

**Stabilization and reconstruction**

The Alliance’s experience in its crisis response operations has shown the importance of stabilisation and reconstruction – activities undertaken in fragile states or in conflict or post-conflict situations to promote security, development, and good governance. The ultimate aim of these efforts is stable, self-sustaining peace. The primary responsibilities for them normally lies with other actors, but there may be cases in which NATO will need to be involved. The Alliance is now considering what additional preparations and capabilities it may need for this purpose.

**Other initiatives**

**The NATO Response Force**

The NATO Response Force (NRF), in its new configuration, is a joint, multinational force designed to respond rapidly to emerging crises across the full spectrum of Alliance missions, ranging from disaster relief or peacekeeping to high-intensity war-fighting. Made up of land, air, maritime and special forces components, it can commence deployment with as little as five days’ notice and sustain itself on operations for 30 days, or longer if re-supplied.

**Usability**

Concern about the usability of Alliance forces stretches back a number of years, reflecting a recognition that some Allies’ forces remained excessively configured for territorial defence and were not suitable for the kind of crisis-response operations beyond Alliance territory that NATO is now conducting. At the Istanbul Summit in 2004, NATO leaders agreed that the usability goals for ground forces would be 40 per cent deployable and eight per cent sustainability. This effectively meant that 40 per cent of ground forces could be deployed and eight per cent supported in overseas missions at any one time. These targets have since been raised to 50% and 10%, respectively. Targets have now also been set for air forces.

**Civil emergency planning**

In accordance with Alliance objectives, the aim of Alliance civil emergency planning (CEP) is to collect, analyze and share information on national planning activities and capabilities to help ensure the most effective use of civil resources in support of national and NATO military authorities (NMAs).

Within NATO, close civil-military cooperation is key to ensuring an optimum mix of capabilities is available when needed. Coordinated civil-military planning is becoming especially important in the context of support to NATO operations, including those involving stabilization and reconstruction. CEP helps facilitate this through a range of civil emergency planning mechanisms and capabilities, thereby allowing NMAs to draw on civilian expertise and assets in
areas such as critical infrastructure, transport, food, water, agriculture, communications, health and industry.

Energy security

The disruption of the flow of vital resources could affect Alliance security interests. In the Strasbourg/ Kehl Summit Declaration in April 2009, Allied leaders reiterated their support for efforts aimed at promoting energy infrastructure security. They also declared that they would continue to ensure that NATO's efforts would add value and were fully coordinated with those of the international community. A number of practical programmes both within the Alliance and with NATO’s Partner countries are ongoing, alongside workshops and research projects.

Understanding the procedures

Once the Strategic Concept is approved by NATO Heads of State and Government at the Lisbon Summit, additional guidance will be provided to translate its strategic objectives into capability needs and development. This additional guidance will replace the Comprehensive Political Guidance (December 2005) and set the political basis for the document which is normally produced by the Military Committee on the military implementation of the Strategic Concept.

Implementing NATO's new defence planning process

A key aim of NATO’s defence planning process is to help member countries generate forces that can move further and faster and take on the full range of missions. A new NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) was put into place early in 2010 and is currently being implemented. It aims to introduce greater coherence in defence planning, while making it a more comprehensive process.

Defence planning encompasses several planning domains: force, resource, armaments, logistics, nuclear, C3 (consultation, command and control), civil emergency planning, air defence, air traffic management, standardization, intelligence, medical support and research and technology.

The NDPP has introduced a new approach to defence planning and operates within the new NATO committee structure.

Reform of NATO’s acquisition process

As part of NATO’s reform agenda, an end-to-end rationalization of structures involved in capability development is envisaged, as well as reform of acquisition processes for NATO common-funded acquisition.

The bodies involved in decision-making

Efforts to improve NATO capabilities touch on a wide range of activities. As such, many different committees are involved in decision making for their specific areas of expertise. These include:

- the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD), the senior NATO committee responsible for Alliance armaments co-operation, material standardization and defence procurement;
- The Logistics Committee, which advises the North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee on consumer logistics matters;
- The Defence Policy and Planning Committee, responsible to the North Atlantic Council for broad defence policy and planning matters; it is also responsible for streamlining the Alliance’s defence planning process to assist in the transformation of NATO's military capabilities;
- the Civil Emergency Planning Committee (CEPC), the principal body in the area of civil emergency planning;
- the Military Committee, the senior military authority in NATO under the overall authority of the North Atlantic Council;
- Allied Command Transformation (ACT), responsible for the transformation of NATO’s
The development of capabilities over time

Since 1999, NATO Allies have made firm commitments and taken a range of initiatives to strengthen capabilities in key areas.

The Defence Capabilities Initiative

Launched at the Washington Summit in April 1999, DCI identified a number of areas where improvements in Alliance capabilities were required. These areas fell into five major categories:

- Deployability and mobility: getting forces to the crisis quickly;
- Effective engagement: improving forces’ cutting edge capacity;
- Consultation, command and control: giving forces maximum awareness and control;
- Survivability: protecting forces;
- Sustainability and logistics: supporting forces in the field.

The DCI contributed to improvements in Alliance capabilities in quite a number of important areas. However, countries were not required to report individually on progress achieved and therefore advancement under the DCI was uneven.

The Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative

The Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative was launched, at the same time as DCI, to address the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by intensifying consultations on disarmament and non-proliferation issues. A WMD Centre was set up in May 2000 to coordinate activities in this field.

The Prague Capabilities Commitment

At their meeting in June 2002, NATO defence ministers agreed to refocus their efforts and decided that a new initiative should be based on firm country-specific commitments. This initiative would also be economically realistic, should encourage greater multinational cooperation and must be conducted in coordination with the European Union. At the 2002 Prague Summit, this initiative was formally endorsed and launched under the name of the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC).

The PCC was part of a three-pronged approach to improving defence capabilities, the two others were the creation of the NATO Response Force and the streamlining of the military command structure. Allies also adopted a Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism and initiated a new Missile Defence Feasibility Study.

Under the PCC, member countries made firm political commitments to improve capabilities in more than 400 specific areas, covering the following eight fields:

- chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence;
- intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition;
- air-to-ground surveillance;
- deployable and secure command, control and communications;
- combat effectiveness, including precision-guided munitions and suppression of enemy air defences;
- strategic air and sea lift;
- air-to-air refueling;
- deployable combat support and combat service support units.
Progress in each of the areas identified above was reviewed on a regular basis. In certain areas such as strategic sealift, strategic airlift and air-to-air refueling, NATO countries pooled their resources and multinational consortia with lead-nations were formed. In other areas, NATO members agreed to improve their capabilities individually.

The PCC was coordinated with the European Union’s efforts to improve its capabilities. A NATO-EU Capability Group was set up for this purpose under the so-called “Berlin Plus” arrangements and simple methods of ensuring that the two processes complemented each other were used, for instance, by having the same countries take the lead on the same capabilities in both organizations.

Further development of capabilities

At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, NATO leaders endorsed further measures to improve the Alliance’s ability to take on operations whenever and wherever necessary. These included changes to the defence planning and force generation processes, and “usability” targets aimed at increasing the proportion of member countries’ forces that can be deployed and sustained in NATO-led operations.

It was agreed that the usability goals for ground forces was of 40 per cent deployability and eight per cent sustainability. This effectively meant that 40 per cent of ground forces can be deployed and eight per cent supported in overseas missions at any one time.

A set of practical measures to strengthen the Alliance’s contribution to the fight against terrorism and efforts to improve intelligence-sharing were also agreed.

The Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) was adopted in 2006 and at the Riga Summit in November of the same year, leaders inaugurated new initiatives. Among these were efforts to increase NATO’s information superiority in operational theatres and the endorsement of a Special Forces Initiative to increase the ability of special operations forces from member countries to train and operate together.

In 2009, at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit in April 2009, NATO leaders endorsed the "Declaration on Alliance Security" which, inter alia, called for a new Strategic Concept. This provoked a thorough debate and analysis of NATO issues and, together with the economic context, has presented an opportunity for rethinking, reprioritising and reforming NATO.
Missile defence

Missiles pose an increasing threat to Allied populations, territory and deployed forces. Over 30 countries have or are acquiring missiles that could be used to carry not just conventional warheads, but also weapons of mass destruction. The proliferation of these capabilities does not necessarily mean there is an immediate intent to attack NATO, but it does mean that the Alliance has a responsibility to protect its populations.

In early 2010, NATO acquired the first phase of an initial capability to protect Alliance forces against missile threats. At the upcoming NATO Summit in Lisbon, 19-20 November, NATO’s leaders will decide whether the Alliance should build a missile defence for Europe in order to protect its territory and populations.

NATO’s work on missile defence started in the early 1990s in response to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, including missiles. Initial focus was on protecting deployed NATO troops (Theatre Missile Defence), but work was expanded in 2002 to include considerations of protection of population centres and territory (Territorial Missile Defence).

Components of the policy

Mechanisms

Evolution

Components of the policy

The Alliance is conducting three missile defence related activities:

1. The Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence System (ALTBMD) capability

The aim of this capability is to protect NATO-deployed forces against short- and medium-range ballistic missile threats up to 3000-kilometer range. In order to manage the risk associated with development of such a complex capability, it will be fielded in several phases.

The completed capability will consist of a multi-layered system of systems, comprising low and high-altitude defences (also called lower- and upper-layer defences), including battle management, communications, command and control (BMC3I), early warning sensors, radars and various interceptors. NATO member countries will provide the sensors and weapon systems, while NATO will develop the BMC3I segment and facilitate the integration of all these elements into a coherent and effective architecture.

In 2005 the North Atlantic Council (NAC) established the NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence Programme Management Organization (ALTBMD PMO) to oversee the ALTBMD Programme. The NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A) and the NATO Air Command and Control System Management Agency (NACMA) are other key NATO bodies involved in the Programme.

The initial activities were focused mainly on system engineering and integration work and on the development of an Integration Test Bed hosted at the NC3A facilities in The Hague. The Integration Test Bed is essential to validate the development work.
The next step was the fielding in early 2010 of the first operational capability, called Interim Capability Step 1. which provides the military planners with a planning tool to build the most effective defence design for specific scenarios or real deployments. A more robust version of that capability, called Interim Capability Step 2, will be fielded by the end of 2010, and will provide additional planning tools and shared situational awareness. The complete lower-layer and upper-layer capability will be fielded in the 2018 timeframe.

In addition to developing the ALTBMD capability, the Project Management Organization is providing technical support to policy discussions of broader missile defence questions relating to the protection of NATO territory and population centers. At the June 2010 meeting of Ministers of Defence, it was agreed that, should Allies decide at the Lisbon Summit to develop a missile defence capability for NATO, an expanded Theatre Missile Defence programme could form the command, control and communications backbone of such a system.

2. Missile Defence for the protection of NATO territory

A Missile Defence Feasibility Study was launched after the November 2002 Prague Summit to examine options for protecting Alliance forces, territory and populations against the full range of missile threats. The study was executed by a transatlantic, multinational industry team, which concluded that missile defence is technically feasible. The results were approved by NATO’s Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) in April 2006, and have provided a technical basis for ongoing political and military discussions regarding the desirability of a NATO missile defence system.

In this context, at the April 2008 Bucharest Summit, the Alliance also considered the technical details and political and military implications of the proposed elements of the US missile defence system in Europe. Allied leaders recognized that the planned deployment of European-based US missile defence assets would help protect Allies, and agreed that this capability should be an integral part of any future NATO-wide missile defence architecture.

Options for a comprehensive missile defence architecture to extend coverage to all Allied territory and populations not otherwise covered by the US system were developed and reviewed at the Bucharest Summit, and the Allies also encouraged Russia to take advantage of US proposals for cooperation on missile defence. They also stated their readiness to explore the potential for linking US, NATO and Russian missile defence systems at an appropriate time.

At the April 2009 Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, the Allies tasked several NATO senior bodies to provide political, military, technical and financial advice to inform the missile defence discussion at the upcoming NATO Summit in Lisbon. That ongoing work takes into account the US plans to deploy the “Phased Adaptive Approach” in NATO-Europe.

3. Theatre Missile Defence cooperation with Russia

In 2003, under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), a study was launched to assess possible levels of interoperability among theatre missile defence systems of NATO Allies and Russia.

Together with the interoperability study, several computer assisted exercises have been held to provide the basis for future improvements to interoperability, and to develop mechanisms and procedures for joint operations in the area of theatre missile defence.

NATO and Russia are also examining possible areas for cooperation on territorial missile defence. At the Lisbon Summit, NATO nations will decide whether to expand the system, beyond protection of our deployed troops, to include protection of European populations and territories, and at the same time to invite Russia to cooperate with this system and to share in its benefits.

Mechanisms

The Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) is the senior NATO committee which acts as the tasking authority for the theatre missile defence programme. The ALTBMD Programme Management Organization, which comprises a Steering Committee and a Programme Office, directs the programme and reports to the CNAD.

The NRC Ad Hoc Working Group on Missile Defence is the steering body for NATO-Russia cooperation on missile defence.
Evolution

Two key policy documents provide the framework for NATO’s activities in the area of missile defence: NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept and the Comprehensive Political Guidance which was endorsed by Allied leaders at the November 2006 Riga Summit.

The Strategic Concept recognizes the need for missile defence to counter nuclear, biological and chemical threats. It states that “the Alliance’s defence posture against the risks and potential threats of the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery must continue to be improved, including through work on missile defence. The aim in doing so will be to further reduce operational vulnerabilities of NATO military forces while maintaining their flexibility and effectiveness despite the presence, threat or use of NBC weapons.”

The Comprehensive Political Guidance sets out the priorities for all Alliance capability issues, planning disciplines and intelligence for the next ten to 15 years. The CPG also provides an overview of the strategic environment within the same timeframe and identifies the spread of weapons of mass destruction as one of the principal threats to the Alliance.

Key milestones

**Theatre Missile Defence (TMD)**

**May 2001**
NATO launches two parallel feasibility studies for a future Alliance TMD system.

**June 2004**
At the Istanbul Summit, Allied leaders direct that work on theatre ballistic missile defence be taken forward expeditiously.

**March 2005**
The Alliance approves the establishment of a Programme Management Organization under the auspices of the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD).

**September 2006**
The Alliance awards the first major contract for the development of a test bed for the system.

**February 2008**
The test bed is opened and declared fully operational nine months ahead of schedule.

**Throughout 2008**
The system design for the NATO command and control component of the theatre missile defence system is verified through testing with national systems and facilities via the integrated test bed; this paves the way for the procurement of the capability.

**March 2010**
The Interim Capability (InCA) Step 1 is fielded.

**June 2010**
NATO signs contracts for the second phase of the interim theatre missile defence capability. This will include the capability to conduct a real-time theatre missile defence battle.

At the June 2010 meeting of NATO Ministers of Defence, it was agreed that, should Allies decide at the Lisbon Summit to develop a missile defence capability for NATO which would provide protection to European Allied populations and territory against the increasing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, an expanded Theatre Missile Defence programme could form the command, control and communications backbone of such a system. The United States’ Phased Adaptive Approach would provide a valuable national contribution to this capability.

**July 2010**
InCA 2 passes key tests during the Dutch Air Force Joint Project Optic Windmill 2010 exercise.

**December 2010**
At the end of 2010, all InCA 2 components – including missile defence sensors and shooters from NATO nations – will be linked and tested in an ‘ensemble’ test prior to handover to NATO’s military commanders.

**Territorial missile defence**

**November 2002**
At the Prague Summit, Allied leaders direct that a Missile Defence Feasibility Study be launched to examine options for protecting Alliance forces, territory and populations against the full range of missile threats.

The study concludes that missile defence is technically feasible within the limits and assumptions of the study. The results are approved by NATO’s Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD).

**April 2006**
An update of a 2004 Alliance assessment of missile threat developments is completed.

**April 2008**
At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, Allied leaders agreed that the planned deployment of European-based US missile defence assets should be an integral part of any future NATO-wide missile defence architecture. They called for options for a comprehensive missile defence architecture to extend coverage to all Allied territory
not otherwise covered by the US system to be prepared in time NATO’s next Summit in 2009.

Options for extending missile defence coverage to all Allied territory not otherwise covered by the US system are delivered to NATO’s Conference for National Armaments Directors, in preparation for the discussions at the next Summit.

At the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, Allies recognized that a future United States’ contribution of important architectural elements could enhance NATO elaboration of this Alliance effort, judged that missile threats should be addressed in a prioritised manner that includes consideration of the level of imminence of the threat and the level of acceptable risk and tasked the NAC to present recommendations comprising architecture alternatives, drawing from the architectural elements already studied, for consideration at the next Summit and to identify and undertake the policy, military and technical work related to a possible expanded role of the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme beyond the protection of NATO deployed forces to include territorial missile defence.

The US announced its plan for a “Phased Adaptive Approach”.

**NRC TMD project**

2003

A study is launched under the NRC to assess possible levels of interoperability among TMD systems of NATO Allies and Russia.

March 2004  An NRC TMD command post exercise is held in the United States.

March 2005  An NRC TMD command post exercise is held in the Netherlands.

October 2006  An NRC TMD command post exercise is held in Russia.

January 2008  An NRC TMD computer assisted exercise takes place in Germany.
Notwithstanding demands by non-governmental organizations and some Non-Aligned Governments that more should be done in terms of nuclear disarmament, NATO’s nuclear policy must serve a long-term perspective which guarantees the security and freedom of all Alliance nations against all potential future threats.

Whilst there remain large-scale nuclear forces in existence which are capable of threatening Alliance territory, and whilst other states actively seek nuclear weapons, the Alliance members agree that it is only sensible that NATO retains its own minimum nuclear deterrent capability. However, the Alliance has shown itself, and individual member nations have shown themselves, willing to make large reductions in nuclear systems and numbers of nuclear weapons to reflect political realities and positive changes in the security environment.

What does this mean in practice?

NATO’s reduced reliance on nuclear forces has been manifested in a dramatic but steady reduction in the number of weapons systems and storage facilities since the end of the Cold War.

NATO also ended the practice of maintaining standing peacetime nuclear contingency plans as soon as possible after the Cold War ended and, as a result, NATO’s nuclear forces do not target any country. Clear statements on both these aspects of NATO’s nuclear policy were made public in the 1991 Alliance Strategic Concept and reiterated in the 1999 Concept and in numerous subsequent public communiqués.

Mechanisms

Political oversight of policies directing NATO’s nuclear posture is shared among member countries. NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) provides a forum in which nuclear and non-nuclear Allies alike (except France, which has decided not to participate) engage in the development of the Alliance’s nuclear policy, and in decisions on NATO’s nuclear posture. The Group is composed of Ministers of Defence, and is presided over by NATO’s Secretary General. It meets at least once per year.

The NPG is the principal decision-making authority in NATO on matters relating to Alliance nuclear policy. It covers a broad range of subjects, such as the safety, security and survivability of nuclear weapons, communications and information systems, as well as deployment issues. The NPG also consults on wider questions of common concern, such as nuclear arms control and non-proliferation. The Alliance’s nuclear policy is kept under review and decisions are taken jointly to modify or adapt it in the light of new developments.

Evolution
The dramatic changes in the Euro-Atlantic strategic landscape brought about by the end of the Cold War were reflected in the Alliance’s 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts. Since their implementation, the Alliance has continued to take far-reaching steps to adapt its overall policy and defence posture to the new security environment.

However, more change is in store. As the Alliance develops a new Strategic Concept to replace that of 1999, NATO’s nuclear policy and posture will certainly be reviewed as part of the process.
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) pose serious risks and challenges to the Alliance and to international security. A primary aim of the Alliance is to prevent the proliferation of these weapons or, should proliferation occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means. The Allies have taken a comprehensive set of practical initiatives to defend their populations, territory and forces against potential WMD threats.

The Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) – which was endorsed at NATO’s Riga Summit in November 2006 and provides an analysis of the future security environment and a fundamental vision for NATO’s ongoing transformation – explicitly recognizes the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery as well as international terrorism as major security threats.

NATO’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiatives

The Alliance stepped up its activities in this area in 1999 with the launch of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative. This initiative was assigned to integrate political and military aspects of Alliance work in responding to proliferation of WMD. Since that Allies continue to intensify and expand NATO’s contribution to the global non-proliferation efforts, especially through strong support to various arms control and non-proliferation regimes and through international outreach to partners and relevant international organisations. Allies also intensify NATO’s defence response to the risk posed by WMD, continue to improve civil preparedness and consequence management capabilities in the event of WMD use or CBRN attack or accident.

The Weapons of Mass Destruction Centre

The WMD Centre was launched in May 2000 as a result of the Initiative on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) that was approved at the April 1999 Washington Summit. The Centre, which is located in the Emerging Security Challenges Division, also supports defence efforts to improve the preparedness of the Alliance to respond to the risks of WMD and their means of delivery.

The Centre works to strengthen dialogue and common understanding of WMD issues among member countries, to enhance consultations on non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament issues, to assess risks and to support defence efforts that serve to improve the Alliance’s preparedness to respond to the risks of WMD and their means of delivery. In recent years the Centre focuses additionally on the protection of forces and populations against, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons and on missile defence The Centre includes personnel drawn from NATO’s International Staff as well as national experts.

Improving CBRN defence capabilities

The Alliance effort to improve NATO’s CBRN defence capabilities stepped up in 1999 led to the introduction of the five CBRN defence initiatives, endorsed at the Prague Summit in 2002. These initiatives represent a crucial advance in improving NATO’s defences against WMD and emphasise
multinational participation and the rapid fielding of enhanced capabilities:

- a Prototype CBRN Joint Advisory Team that can assess the effects of a CBRN event, “reach back” to national experts and provide expert advice to NATO commanders, helping them to choose appropriate protection actions;
- deployable analytical CBRN laboratories that can be transported rapidly into theatre to investigate, collect and analyse samples for identification;
- a CBRN virtual pharmaceutical stockpile shared among Alliance members, which could rapidly support NATO deployed forces with pharmaceutical material to enhance post-exposure medical treatment and recovery;
- a Virtual Centre of Excellence for CBRN defence to enhanced visibility and transparency of all NATO CBRN training and education;
- a Near Real Time Disease Surveillance System to rapidly collect, identify, analyse and disseminate information related to any biological outbreak, with the goal of preventing or limiting the loss of personnel or resources.

Four of the Prague CBRN defence initiatives have been brought to a successful conclusion. The first two initiatives now form the Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force (CJ-CBRND-TF) consisting of NATO’s multinational CBRN Defence Battalion and Joint Assessment Team, which were declared “fully operational” at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004.

NATO achieved an interim Disease Surveillance capability in June 2007, and a full operational capability is expected in the near future.

**Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force**

The multinational CBRN Defence Battalion and Joint Assessment Team now form the NATO Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force, which is designed to perform a full range of CBRN Defence missions.

The Task Force is led by an individual Ally on a six-, or 12- month rotational basis. Under normal circumstances, it would operate within the NATO Response Force, which is a joint, multinational force designed to respond rapidly to emerging crises across the full spectrum of Alliance missions. However, the Task Force may operate independently of the NRF on other tasks as required, for example, helping civilian authorities in NATO member countries.

The Task Force deployed to assist the Greek authorities in providing security for the 2004 Olympic and Paralympic Games in Athens and in support of NATO’s Istanbul and Riga Summits.

**Joint Centre of Excellence on CBRN Defence**

The Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence in Vyskov, the Czech Republic, was activated in July 2007. It is an International Military Organization sponsored and manned by the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the United Kingdom.

The Centre offers recognized expertise and experience to the benefit of the Alliance, and supports NATO’s transformation process. It provides opportunities to improve interoperability and capabilities by enhancing multinational education, training and exercises; assisting in concept, doctrine, procedures and standards development; and testing and validating concepts through experimentation.

**Standardization, Training, Research & Development**

NATO continues to; create and improve necessary standardisation documents; conduct training and exercises and to develop the necessary capability improvements in the field of CBRN Defence through the work of many groups, bodies and institutions, including:

- CBRN Operations Working Group;
- CBRN Medical Working Group;
- Joint Capabilities Group on CBRN Defence;
- CBRN Training Working Group;
- NATO Research and Technology Organisation; and
- the Political and Partnerships Committee (taking over the task of developing and implementing science activities, which were formerly managed under the auspices of the Science for Peace and Security Committee).
Disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation

Disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation are essential tools in preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction and the spread of these weapons and their delivery systems. The Alliance continues to emphasize the importance of abiding by and strengthening existing multilateral non-proliferation and export control regimes, as well as international arms control and disarmament agreements.

NATO Allies have made substantial reductions in both the size and diversity of their nuclear capabilities. No NATO member country has a chemical or biological weapons programme. Additionally, Allies are committed to destroy any stockpiles of chemical agents and have supported a number of Partner countries in such activity.

Deterrence

The Alliance’s 1999 Strategic Concept sets out how NATO’s forces contribute to the preservation of peace. By deterring the use of weapons of mass destruction, NATO forces contribute to Alliance efforts aimed at preventing the proliferation of these weapons and their delivery systems.

The Allied defence posture makes it clear to any potential aggressor that NATO cannot be coerced by threats or use of weapons of mass destruction, and that the Alliance has the capability to respond effectively. This posture includes an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear forces based in Europe.

Missile defence

NATO continues to work on defending its populations, territory and forces against the threat posed by ballistic missile proliferation. The Alliance is approaching missile defence from several perspectives.

At the 2008 Bucharest summit, member states agreed that Ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to Allies’ populations, territory and forces. Missile defence forms part of a broader response to counter this threat. NATO therefore recognises the substantial contribution to the protection of Allies from ballistic missiles to be provided by the planned deployment of European–based United States missile defence assets.

NATO is exploring ways to link this capability with current NATO missile defence efforts as a way to ensure that it would be an integral part of any future NATO–wide missile defence architecture. Bearing in mind the principle of the indivisibility of Allied security as well as NATO solidarity, the Alliance is developing options for a comprehensive missile defence architecture to extend coverage to all Allied territory and populations not otherwise covered by the United States system. These options were reviewed at the 2009 Summit, to inform any future political decision.

NATO is commending the work already underway to strengthen NATO–Russia missile defence cooperation and is committed to transparency and reciprocal confidence building measures to allay any concerns. Allies are encouraging the Russian Federation to take advantage of United States missile defence cooperation proposals and are ready to explore the potential for linking United States, NATO and Russian missile defence systems at an appropriate time.

NATO continues to develop an Active Layered Ballistic Theatre Missile Defence (ALTBMD) system to protect troops deployed on missions by 2011. A second important aspect of the Allies’ work on missile defence is the decision taken at the Prague Summit in November 2002 to examine options for protecting Alliance populations, territory and forces against the full range of missile threats.

A third key element of Alliance work is cooperation with Russia on missile defence under the auspices of the NATO–Russia Council.

Improving civil preparedness

NATO is also actively working to improve civil preparedness and consequence-management capabilities in both Allied countries and Partner countries for potential attacks on the civilian population using CBRN agents. The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre, which is based at NATO Headquarters, stands ready to act as a clearing house for mutual assistance, upon request, and can also assist in coordinating civil-military cooperation in the event of such an attack.
Creating standard agreements among Allies

NATO continues to create and improve standard NATO agreements that will govern Allied operations in a nuclear, biological or chemical environment. These agreements guide all aspects of preparation, ranging from standards for disease surveillance to rules for restricting troop movements. Such standards combine with national force goals regarding protective and detection equipment, thereby ensuring interoperability of Alliance forces. In addition, the Alliance conducts many training exercises and senior-level seminars that are designed to test interoperability and prepare NATO leaders and forces for operations in a CBRN environment.

Cooperating with Partners

NATO’s partnership programmes provide effective frameworks for dialogue, consultation and the coordination of practical activities in relation to weapons of mass destruction.

Forums of cooperation include the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Russia Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission and the Mediterranean Dialogue. NATO also consults with countries in the broader Middle East region which take part in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative as well as with so-called “contact countries” (these are countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the Republic of Korea, which have less formal relationships with NATO but share NATO’s values and contribute to NATO-led operations).

The support of Partner countries has enhanced the effectiveness of Operation Active Endeavour, NATO’s maritime counter-terrorism operation in the Mediterranean, which continues to make an important contribution to the fight against terrorism.

International outreach activities

NATO is organizing an annual non-proliferation seminar involving non-member countries. The most recent event, which took place in Prague, the Czech Republic, in June 2010, attracted more than 120 senior officials from NATO and partner countries, as well as a number of international organizations and academic institutions. This event is unique among activities in the non-proliferation field organized by international organizations in that it provides a possibility for an informal discussion on all types of WMD threats as well as the political and diplomatic responses to them. Norway will host the next conference in 2011.

The Alliance also participates in relevant conferences organized by other international organizations, including the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Interpol and others.

Many of NATO’s activities under the Science for Peace and Security programme focus on the civilian side of nuclear, chemical and biological technology. Scientists from NATO and Partner countries are developing areas of research that impact on these areas. These include the decommissioning and disposal of WMD, and components of WMD, the safe handling of materials, techniques for arms control implementation, and the detection of CBRN agents.

Working with Russia

Beyond NATO-Russia cooperation on theatre missile defence, the Allies and Russia aim to strengthen joint endeavours in the field of non-proliferation activities. This goal was highlighted in the 2002 Rome Summit declaration on NATO-Russia relations, which established the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). An NRC Ad Hoc Working Group on Proliferation Issues was established in 2002. This body brings together representatives from Allied and Russian foreign ministries and other relevant agencies to discuss proliferation trends and concerns, and to explore possibilities for cooperation.

In addition to work under the auspices of the NRC, Allies are providing bilateral and multilateral assistance to Russia for weapons destruction, and for the safeguarding of nuclear and radiological materials. Such waste material has been accumulated from past activities in the production of nuclear weapons and the use of nuclear energy for civil and military purposes, and as a result of nuclear arms reduction.

Furthermore, a joint NATO-Russia Advisory Group has been established to assess the impact of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism.

The decision-making bodies
The North Atlantic Council, NATO’s principal decision-making body, has overall authority on Alliance policy and activity in countering WMD proliferation. The Council is supported by a number of NATO committees and groups, which provide strategic assessments and policy advice and recommendations.

The senior advisory board that is dealing with the Alliance’s political and defence efforts against WMD proliferation is the Committee on Proliferation. It brings together senior national officials responsible for political and security issues related to non-proliferation with experts on military capabilities needed to discourage WMD proliferation, to deter threats and the use of such weapons and to protect NATO populations, territory and forces. The Committee on Proliferation is chaired by NATO’s International Staff when discussing politico-military aspects of proliferation, and by national co-chairs when discussing defence-related issues.

In addition, various other NATO bodies assist the Alliance in achieving its non-proliferation objectives:

- The Defence Policy and Planning Committee (Reinforced) – DPPC(R) – consists of representatives from Allied capitals (mainly from the defence and foreign ministries). It is chaired by the Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning with the support of the WMD Centre. The DPPC(R) is the prime focus for defence and policy consultations on missile defence within the Alliance.

- The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) is a forum for consultation, cooperation and consensus building between NATO and Russia. Work in specific areas is developed in the framework of ad hoc working groups such as the NRC Ad Hoc Working Group on Proliferation, where joint work is being taken forward on consultations and cooperation against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

**Evolution**

The use or threatened use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) significantly influenced the security environment of the 20th century and will also impact international security in the foreseeable future. Strides in modern technology and scientific discoveries have opened the door to ever more destructive weapons.

During the Cold War, use of nuclear weapons was prevented by the prospect of massive retaliation. The nuclear arms race slowed in the early 1970s following the negotiation of the first arms control treaties.

The improved security environment of the 1990s enabled nuclear weapon states to dramatically reduce their nuclear stockpiles. However, the proliferation of knowledge and technology has enabled other nations to build their own nuclear weapons, extending the overall risks to new parts of the world.

At the Washington Summit in 1999, Allied leaders launched a Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative to address the risks posed by the proliferation of these weapons and their means of delivery. The initiative was designed to promote understanding of WMD issues, develop ways of responding to them, improve intelligence and information sharing, enhance existing Allied military readiness to operate in a WMD environment and counter threats posed by these weapons. Consequently, The WMDC has been established at NATO HQ in Brussels.

In 2002, at the Prague Summit the Allies launched a modernization process designed to ensure that the Alliance is able to effectively meet the new challenges of the 21st century. This included the creation of the NATO Response Force, the streamlining of the Alliance command structure and a series of measures to protect NATO forces, population and territory from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents.

In 2003, NATO has created the Multinational CBRN Defence Battalion and Joint Assessment Team, which since 2007 are part of Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force.

At the Riga Summit in 2006, Allied leaders endorsed a Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG). The CPG provides an analysis of the future security environment and a fundamental vision for NATO’s ongoing transformation. It explicitly mentions the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery as major security threats, which are particularly dangerous when combined with the threats of terrorism or failed states.

In July 2007, NATO activated a Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence in Vyskov, the Czech
Republic.

In April 2009, NATO heads of state and government endorsed NATO’s “Comprehensive Strategic-level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of WMD and Defending against CBRN Threats”. On 31 August 2009, the North Atlantic Council decided to make this document public.
The fight against terrorism is high on NATO’s agenda. At the Riga Summit in 2006 NATO declared that terrorism, together with the spread of weapons of mass destruction, are likely to be the principal threats to the Alliance over the next 10 to 15 years. By contributing to the international community's efforts to combat terrorism, NATO helps ensure that citizens can go about their daily lives safely, free from the threat of indiscriminate acts of terror.

Terrorism is a universal scourge that knows no border, nationality or religion. It is therefore a challenge that the international community must tackle together. NATO contributes to the international fight against terrorism in multiple areas, and through various means. The Alliance's activities in the fight against terrorism are in strict accordance with UN principles and international law, including international humanitarian and human rights law.

The multifaceted nature of terrorism is such that NATO has engaged in a number of initiatives – political, operational, conceptual, military, technological, scientific and economic,– to address this issue. As a consequence many areas of NATO's activity are nowadays involved in the fight against terrorism.

The Alliance contributes a range of assets to the international community in the fight against terrorism. First, NATO is a permanent Transatlantic consultation forum, capable of transforming discussions into collective decisions. Second, NATO is backed by military capabilities at the Alliance’s disposal. Third, NATO is part of a very large network of partnerships involving other states and international organizations.

**Anti-terrorism operations**

NATO conducts a number of operations that are either directly or indirectly related to the fight against terrorism.

**Operation Active Endeavour**

Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) is a maritime surveillance operation led by NATO’s naval forces to undertake anti-terrorist patrol, escort and compliant boarding in the Mediterranean. Initially limited to the Eastern Mediterranean, OAE was extended to the entire Mediterranean from March 2004.

The operation was one of eight measures taken by NATO to support the United States following the September 11 attacks, and is currently NATO’s only counter-terrorism operation. OAE is also open to partners wishing to support NATO’s operational activities against terrorism.

**NATO in Afghanistan**

Since August 2003, NATO has been leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), in assisting the Government of Afghanistan in expanding its authority and implementing security, thereby, helping to remove the conditions in which terrorism could thrive. While not a counter-terrorism operation, ISAF represents NATO’s determination to help the people of...
Afghanistan build a stable, secure and democratic state free from the threat of terrorism. In addition, many NATO Allies have forces involved in Operation Enduring Freedom, the ongoing US-led military counter-terrorism operation whose major activities are in Afghanistan.

**NATO in the Balkans**

NATO peacekeeping forces in the Balkans continue to help in creating the conditions necessary to restrict potential terrorist activities. Such assistance includes support for stopping the illegal movement of people, arms and drugs that offer important economic sources for the financing of terrorism. NATO forces also work with regional authorities on border security issues.

**Securing major public events**

NATO also provides assistance in protecting the security of major public events in Allied countries that might attract the interest of terrorists. It does this at the request of any member country by deploying NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft (AWACS), elements of NATO's multinational chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence battalion, or other capabilities. The Alliance has thus assisted high-visibility events such as Summits and Ministerial meetings, as well as sporting events such as the Athens Olympic Games.

NATO started to undertake this type of mission after it had provided air surveillance to the United States in 2001 as part of the package of eight measures agreed immediately after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Operation Eagle Assist involved the deployment of NATO AWACS aircraft to the United States from mid-October 2001 to mid-May 2002 to protect the US homeland and enable US assets to be deployed for its campaign in Afghanistan.

**Innovative technology and capabilities that address the threat**

NATO is developing capabilities and innovative technology that specifically address the issue of terrorism. The aim is to protect troops, civilians and critical infrastructure against attacks perpetrated by terrorists, such as suicide attacks with improvised explosive devices, rocket attacks against aircraft and helicopters, and the potential use of weapons of mass destruction.

**The Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work**

The Defence Against Terrorism (DAT) Programme of Work was developed by the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) at their meeting in May 2004. It was later approved as part of an enhanced set of measures to strengthen the Alliance’s fight against terrorism at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004.

With the more divergent needs of the Alliance in countering non-traditional and emerging security challenges, the DAT Programme of Work will be further leveraged to offer the Alliance a broader mechanism for comprehensive DAT capability development.

The DAT Programme of Work has focused on critical areas where technology can help prevent or mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks. Due to the urgent nature of the asymmetric environment, most projects launched under the programme are focused on finding solutions that can be fielded in the near-term. Individual NATO countries lead the projects with support and contributions from other member countries, CNAD armaments groups, and other NATO bodies.

The ten current areas in the programme are:

- Large aircraft survivability against man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS);
- The protection of harbours and ports;
- The protection of helicopters from Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPGs);
- Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs);
- Detection, protection and defeat of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons;
- Technology for Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Target Acquisition of
terrorists (IRSTA);
- Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Consequence Management;
- Defence against mortar attacks (DAMA);
- Critical infrastructure protection (CIP);
- Developing non-lethal capabilities (NLC).

Upon the successful delivery of precision air-drop technologies, the objectives of this initiative were achieved in 2008.

**Initiatives to counter chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN)***

NATO is continuing its efforts to counter chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats and hazards. To become more effective, NATO developed a “Comprehensive Strategic-level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of WMD and Defending against CBRN Threats”. In April 2009, NATO heads of state and government endorsed that policy at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit.

In addition, efforts are underway to identify capabilities to detect what chemical and biological agents have been used in an attack and to provide appropriate warning.

The NATO multinational Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) defence battalion and Joint Assessment Team, launched at the Prague Summit in 2002, is designed to respond to and manage the consequences of the use of CBRN agents both inside and beyond NATO’s area of responsibility. It will operate within the NATO Response Force (NRF) and may also be separately committed to other tasks. NATO-certified Centres of Excellence on CBRN defence (in the Czech Republic) and on defence against Terrorism (in Turkey) further enhance allied capabilities to counter CBRN threats.

**Cyber defence**

*See A-Z Page*

**Defending against cyber attacks**

**Improved intelligence-sharing**

Since 11 September 2001, NATO has sought to increase consultations on terrorism and terrorism-related issues among its members, as well as with non-member countries. Information-sharing is one of the key aspects of this exchange and, more specifically, intelligence-sharing.

At the 2002 Prague Summit, improved intelligence-sharing was identified as a key aspect of cooperation among Allies. A Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit (TTIU) was set up under the NATO Office of Security at the end of 2003, replacing a temporary cell established immediately after the September 11 attacks. The TTIU is now a permanent NATO body composed of officers from civilian and military intelligence and law enforcement agencies which analyses general terrorist threats and threats that are more specifically aimed at the Organization. In addition to regular liaison with Allied intelligence services and national terrorism coordination centres, the TTIU liaises with partner and contact nations and has become NATO HQ’s centre of expertise on terrorism.

Furthermore, at the 2004 Istanbul Summit, a decision was taken to review intelligence structures at NATO Headquarters. A new intelligence liaison cell for NATO Allies and partners to exchange relevant intelligence has been created at SHAPE in Mons, Belgium, and an Intelligence Liaison Unit (ILU) operates in NATO HQ to share information sent by non-NATO countries on a voluntary basis.

**The Economic and Financial Dimension of Terrorism**

Terrorism will continue to be resourced through a range of funding mechanisms, channels and sources. Therefore, measures to counter the financing of terrorism remain crucial to the counter-terrorism effort. The Economic Committee in reinforced session has organized
meetings with Allies to share and exchange economic intelligence on these issues. Workshops and meetings are also conducted with partners and have included representatives from relevant international financial institutions and international organizations. These activities are helping to strengthen the international effort in undermining and degrading terrorist funding mechanisms.

Science cooperation

Defence against terrorism is the first of two key priorities under the Science for Peace and Security Programme since its redirection to security in 2004, contributing to NATO’s Strategic Objective “Partnership”. The sub-elements of the Defence Against Terrorism priority identified by the SPS Committee are:

- Rapid detection, decontamination, and destruction of Chemical, Biological, Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) agents and weapons, rapid diagnosis of their effects on people, and physical protection against them; novel and rapid methods of detection; medical countermeasures; explosives detection; eco-terrorism countermeasures; and computer terrorism countermeasures.

In addition, the NATO-Russia Council SPS Committee identified six defence against terrorism priority topics for its Action Plan, which defines the areas for cooperation between the Russian Federation and NATO nations in security-related civil-science activities. These include:

- Explosives detection; psychological and sociological consequences of terrorism; CBRN protection; cyber security; transport security; environmental security and ecoterrorism.

The DAT activities under the SPS Programme involve a variety of mechanisms, including workshops, training courses, team collaborations, and multi-year applied Science for Peace (SfP) projects. A few examples of activities initiated under this priority area include:

- New biosensors for rapid and accurate detection of Anthrax
- New technology for detection of "dirty bombs"
- Technologies for cargo container inspection
- Advanced techniques for bioweapon defence
- Technology for stand-off detection of explosives (including the suicide bomber case)
- Treatments for nerve agent poisoning
- Human and social aspects of terrorist activity (including root causes, social and psychological aspects of terrorism, use of the Internet as a tool for recruitment, and the "intangibles of security")
- Protecting information networks from terrorist attacks

This DAT element of the SPS Programme has been successful in bringing together NATO, partner and Russian Federation experts and engineers to cooperate in a range of activities, including practical projects with concrete deliverables. The Programme contributed to better understanding of the terrorist threat, development of detection and response measures, and fostering effective networks of experts in key fields. This work will continue to be a core priority of the Science for Peace and Security Programme (www.nato.int/science).

A network of close cooperation with partners
The fight against terrorism has become an important element of NATO’s cooperation activities and, in some cases, has provided fresh impetus to create new links.

The contribution by a number of partners to NATO’s operations, as well as their efforts to introduce defence reforms supported by NATO programmes, contributes to the prevention of terrorism. In addition, NATO is co-operating with other international organizations in order to ensure that information is shared and appropriate action can be taken more effectively in the fight against terrorism.

**The Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T)**

NATO and its Partners are engaged in practical cooperation programmes conducted within the framework of the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T).

The Action Plan defines partnership roles as well as instruments to fight terrorism and manage its consequences. For instance, NATO and Partner countries work together to improve the safety of air space, including through the exchange of data and coordination procedures related to the handling of possible terrorist threats.

All partner countries can participate, including NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue partners and other interested countries on a case-by-case basis.

The PAP-T was adopted at the Prague Summit in November 2002 and has been evolving and expanding in line with the joint aims and efforts of Allies and partners.

The spirit in which it was adopted was already manifested on 12 September 2001, when the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council condemned the attacks on New York and Washington D.C. the previous day and offered the support of all 46 members to the United States.

Recently three informal working groups have been set up under PAP-T, addressing the security of energy infrastructure, border security, as well as financial aspects of terrorism and disruption of terrorist organisations’ sources of finance.

**Deepening relations to combat terrorism**

Combating terrorism was among the main drivers behind the creation of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in May 2002. The common fight against terrorism remains a key aspect of NATO’s dialogue with Russia, as well as a focus of the NRC’s practical cooperation activities. In December 2004, the NRC agreed an Action Plan on Terrorism and later, in 2006 and 2007, Russia participated in Operation Active Endeavour.

In 2003 the NRC also launched the Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI) to foster cooperation on airspace surveillance and air traffic coordination, with the underlying goal to enhance confidence building and to strengthen capabilities required for the handling of situations in which aircraft are suspected of being used as weapons to perpetrate terrorist attacks.

Relations with Mediterranean Dialogue partners have also deepened, including through contributions to Operation Active Endeavour.

**Creating new links**

The fight against terrorism has provided the impetus to create new links with non-partner countries. At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, NATO launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative to reach out to countries in the broader Middle East region, widening NATO’s network of partnerships in order to facilitate the fight against terrorism.

It has also reinforced its relations with “contact countries”/partners across the Globe. These are countries that are not NATO members and do not participate in any formal partnership with the Alliance. However, they share similar security concerns and have expressed an interest in developing relations with the Organization. They comprise countries such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea. Their level of involvement with NATO varies, as do the areas of cooperation.

In this context the Center of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) has served as both a location and catalyst for international dialogue and discussion regarding defense against
terrorism issues. COE-DAT has established links with over 50 countries and 40 organizations to provide subject matter experts on terrorism in order to conduct over 53 activities with over 3400 participants from 90 countries.

Increasing cooperation with other international organizations

NATO is also working to deepen its relations with the European Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations to strengthen efforts in fighting terrorism.

With regard to cooperation with the United Nations, NATO works with affiliated bodies such as the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee, its Executive Directorate and the Security Council Committee 1540. It has also established contacts with the UN on its Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and works closely with the UN agencies that play a leading role in responding to international disasters and in consequence management – the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons – and other organizations.

NATO also exchanges views with the OSCE’s Action against Terrorism Unit.

Working with aviation authorities

The use of civilian aircraft as a weapon on 11 September 2001 brought NATO to heighten awareness of such forms of terrorism and enhance aviation security. NATO’s anti-terrorism efforts include improving civil-military coordination of air traffic control by working with EUROCONTROL, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Air Transport Association so that information is shared and action taken more effectively.

Managing the consequences of terrorist attacks

NATO members and Partners work together to plan and prepare for, and respond to, possible terrorist attacks, including with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents.

Coordinating assistance to populations

Consequence management involves reactive measures to mitigate the destructive effects of terrorist attacks, incidents and natural disasters.

Consequence management is primarily a national responsibility; however, NATO supports countries in several ways. For instance, it serves as a forum where planning arrangements for such eventualities can be coordinated among countries, therefore improving preparedness should a crisis develop.

Providing timely information to the public is also a key component of consequence management. NATO has developed guidelines for use by countries in this field to ensure that coordinated warnings are given.

In addition to serving as a forum for coordination, NATO maintains an inventory of civilian and military assets that, on a case-by-case basis, could be made available for consequence management.

Protecting populations and infrastructure

Since 2001, Civil Emergency Planning activities have focused on measures aimed at enhancing national capabilities and civil preparedness in the event of possible attacks on populations or critical infrastructures using CBRN agents.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 events, at the Prague Summit in 2002, a Civil Emergency Planning Action Plan was adopted for the protection of populations against the effects of weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, a project was initiated the same year to develop non-binding guidelines and minimum standards for first responders regarding planning, training, procedures and equipment for CBRN incidents. The purpose of this initiative is to
provide general guidelines that member and Partner countries may draw upon on a voluntary basis to enhance their preparedness to protect populations against such risks. These guidelines also seek to improve interoperability between countries.

NATO’s Joint Medical Committee has developed treatment protocols for casualties following a CBRN attack and, more generally, the Alliance has defined coordination mechanisms for medical evacuation capabilities and a mechanism for allocating and transporting victims to facilities in other countries.

To add flexibility, NATO has developed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the facilitation of vital civil cross border transport. This mechanism can be used, inter alia, for providing assistance required to cope with the consequences of a CBRN incident. The MoU aims to accelerate and simplify existing national border crossing procedures and customs clearance for international assistance to reach the desired location as quickly as possible.

The protection of critical infrastructure against CBRN attacks is principally a national responsibility. Nonetheless, NATO is working to increase national awareness on this issue.

The role of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC)

Allies have established an inventory of national civil and military capabilities that could be made available to assist stricken countries – both member and Partner countries – following a CBRN terrorist attack. This inventory is maintained by the -Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre.

The EADRCC was originally created in 1998 to coordinate responses to natural and man-made disasters and, since 2001, has been given an additional coordinating role for responses to potential terrorist acts involving CBRN agents.

The centre has a standing mandate to respond to a national request for assistance in the event of a terrorist attack using CBRN agents. It organizes major international field exercises to practice responses to simulated disaster situations and consequence management.

NATO Crisis Management System

The NATO Crisis Management System provides a structured array of pre-identified political, military and civilian measures to be implemented by states and NATO in response to various crisis scenarios. This system provides the Alliance with a comprehensive set of options and measures to manage and respond to crises appropriately. Within this system, specific Civil Emergency Planning Crisis Management Arrangements define the roles of the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee, the Planning Boards and Committees, the EADRCC and the use of civil experts during times of crisis.

Network of civil experts

A network of 350 civil experts located across the Euro-Atlantic area are selected, based on specific areas of support frequently required, inter alia, by the military. They cover all civil aspects relevant to NATO planning and operations, including crisis management, consequence management and critical infrastructure protection. Experts are drawn from government and industry. They participate in training and exercises and respond to requests for assistance in accordance with specific procedures known as the Civil Emergency Planning Crisis Management Arrangements.

Historical background

The Alliance’s 1999 Strategic Concept already identified terrorism as one of the risks affecting NATO’s security. The Alliances response to September 11, however, saw NATO engage actively in the fight against terrorism, launch its first operations outside the Euro-Atlantic area and begin a far-reaching transformation of its capabilities.

Response to September 11
On the evening of 12 September 2001, less than 24 hours after the attacks, and for the first time in NATO's history, the Allies invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the Alliance's collective defence clause.

The North Atlantic Council - NATO's principal political decision-making body - agreed that if it determined that the attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it would be regarded as an action covered by Article 5, which states that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.

Earlier on the same day, NATO Partner countries, in a meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, condemned the attacks, offering their support to the United States and pledging to "undertake all efforts to combat the scourge of terrorism". This was followed by declarations of solidarity and support from Russia, on 13 September, and Ukraine, on 14 September.

On 2 October, Frank Taylor, the US Ambassador at Large and Co-ordinator for Counter-terrorism, briefed the North Atlantic Council on the results of investigations into the 11 September attacks.

As a result of the information he provided, the Council determined that the attacks were directed from abroad and shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

Two days later, on 4 October, NATO agreed on eight measures to support the United States:

- to enhance intelligence sharing and co-operation, both bilaterally and in appropriate NATO bodies, relating to the threats posed by terrorism and the actions to be taken against it;
- to provide, individually or collectively, as appropriate and according to their capabilities, assistance to Allies and other states which are or may be subject to increased terrorist threats as a result of their support for the campaign against terrorism;
- to take necessary measures to provide increased security for facilities of the United States and other Allies on their territory;
- to backfill selected Allied assets in NATO’s area of responsibility that are required to directly support operations against terrorism;
- to provide blanket overflight clearances for the United States and other Allies' aircraft, in accordance with the necessary air traffic arrangements and national procedures, for military flights related to operations against terrorism;
- to provide access for the United States and other Allies to ports and airfields on the territory of NATO nations for operations against terrorism, including for refuelling, in accordance with national procedures;
- that the Alliance is ready to deploy elements of its Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean in order to provide a NATO presence and demonstrate resolve; and
- that the Alliance is similarly ready to deploy elements of its NATO Airborne Early Warning Force to support operations against terrorism.

Shortly thereafter, NATO launched its first ever anti-terror operation - Eagle Assist. On request of the United States, from mid-October 2001 to mid-May 2002, seven NATO AWACS radar aircraft were sent to help patrol the skies over the United States; in total 830 crewmembers from 13 NATO countries flew over 360 sorties.

This was the first time that NATO military assets were deployed in support of an Article 5 operation.

On 26 October, the Alliance launched its second counter-terrorism operation in response to the attacks on the United States, Active Endeavour. Elements of NATO’s Standing Naval Forces were sent to patrol the eastern Mediterranean and monitor shipping to detect and deter terrorist activity, including illegal trafficking. On 10 March 2003, the operation was expanded to include escorting civilian shipping through the Strait of Gibraltar.

In addition, although it is not a NATO-led operation, most of the NATO Allies also have forces involved in Operation Enduring Freedom, the US-led military operation against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.
**Reykjavik – end of "out of area" debate**

NATO’s immediate response to September 11 was further strengthened by a decision, at the Reykjavik meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in May 2002, that the Alliance will operate when and where necessary to fight terrorism.

This landmark declaration effectively ended the debate on what is and what is not NATO’s area of operations and paved the way for the Alliance’s future engagements with ISAF in Afghanistan. It also was a catalyst for a broad transformation of the Alliance’s capabilities that was launched at the 2002 Prague Summit in November.

**Prague Summit - adapting to the threat of terrorism**

At the 21-22 November 2002 Prague Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government expressed their determination to deter, defend and protect their populations, territory and forces from any armed attack from abroad, including by terrorists.

To this end, they adopted a Prague package, aimed at adapting NATO to the challenge of terrorism. It comprised:

- **a Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism**: this underlines the Alliance’s readiness to act against terrorist attacks or the threat of such attacks; to lead or support counter-terrorism operations; provide assistance to national authorities in dealing with the consequence of terrorist attacks; support operations by other international organizations or coalitions involving Allies on a case-by-case basis; and to conduct military operations to engage terrorist groups and their capabilities, as and where required, and as decided by the North Atlantic Council;

- **a Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T)**;

- **five nuclear, biological and chemical defence initiatives**: a deployable nuclear, biological and chemical analytical laboratory, a nuclear, biological and chemical event response team, a virtual centre of excellence for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons defence, a NATO biological and chemical defence stockpile, and a disease surveillance system;

- **protection of civilian populations**, including a Civil Emergency Planning Action Plan;

- **missile defence**: Allies are examining options for addressing the increasing missile threat to Alliance populations, territory and forces in an effective and efficient way through an appropriate mix of political and defence efforts, along with deterrence;

- **cyber-defence**: efforts are underway within the Alliance to better protect against and prepare for a possible disruption of NATO and national critical infrastructure assets, including information and communications systems;

- **cooperation with other international organizations**;

- **improved intelligence sharing**;

In addition, they decided to create the NATO Response Force, streamline the military command structure and launch the Prague Capabilities Commitment, to better prepare NATO’s military to face new challenges, including terrorism. The NATO command structure was be supported by a network of Centres of Excellence (COE). Currently, there are 17 COE’s in NATO. Of these, 12 centers have been fully accredited by NATO. Several of them have a link to defence against terrorism, however one of these, the Center of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism in Ankara, is exclusively focused on DAT.

**Riga Summit – reaffirming the threat of terrorism**

In endorsing the Comprehensive Political Guidance at the Riga Summit in November 2006, NATO’s Heads of State and Government recognised that "terrorism, together with the spread of weapons of mass destruction, are likely to be the principal threats to the Alliance over the next
**Decision-making bodies**

The North Atlantic Council, the Alliance’s principal political decision-making body, decides on NATO’s overall role in the fight against terrorism. The response to terrorism is a standing agenda item at the Council’s weekly deliberations. Specific aspects of NATO’s involvement are developed through specialized bodies and committees.

For instance, depending on the participating countries or the issue, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) can be involved, as can the NATO-Russia Council or the NATO-Ukraine Commission. Under the authority of the NAC, Allied Command Operations has the overall responsibility for the conduct of NATO operations. The NATO Defence Review Committee is responsible for streamlining the Alliance’s defence planning process to assist in the transformation of NATO’s military capabilities. Allied Command Transformation (ACT) is responsible for the transformation of NATO’s military capabilities.

With regard to consequence management and disaster preparedness, the Senior Emergency Planning Committee (SPEPC), composed of national representatives is responsible for bringing together NATO policies in the field of civil emergency planning and providing the measures to implement these policies.

Under the direction of the SCEPC, eight technical planning boards and committees (PB&Cs) bring together national government and industrial experts and military representatives to coordinate planning activity in the relevant areas of civil activity. These experts form a network and provide a firm base for consequence management.

They maintain close links with national emergency preparedness agencies and relevant ministries. NATO Partner countries participate actively in nearly all NATO CEP activities through the EAPC and the Partnership for Peace programme.
Defending against cyber attacks

NATO is continuously developing and enhancing the protection of its communication and information systems against attacks or illegal access. These efforts, and capabilities to assist nations’ to protect their networks, represent the practical implementation of NATO’s policy on cyber defence.

This policy was approved by the member nations in January 2008, following the cyber attacks which targeted a member nations, Estonia, in 2007.

The policy establishes the basic principles and provides direction to NATO’s civil and military bodies for ensuring a consolidated approach to cyber defence and coordinated responses to cyber attacks. It also contains support to individual Allies regarding the protection of their national communication systems. The policy is supported by several military documents addressing the practical, operational aspects of cyber defence.

The "NATO 2020” report, delivered in May 2010 by the Group of Experts on a new Strategic Concept for NATO, attaches considerable importance to cyber defence and recommends that high priority be given in the new Strategic Concept to addressing existing vulnerabilities.

NATO’s cyber defence policy and activities

Context and evolution

Though NATO has always been protecting its communication and information systems, the 2002 Prague Summit served to include this function on the political agenda. Building on the technical achievements put in place since Prague, Allied leaders reiterated the need to protect information these systems at their Summit in Riga in November 2006.

A series of major cyber attacks on Estonian public and private institutions in April and May 2007 prompted NATO to take a harder look at its cyber defences. At their meeting in June 2007 Allied Defence Ministers agreed that urgent work was needed in this area. Pursuant to this agreement, NATO conducted a thorough assessment of its approach to cyber defence and reported back to Ministers in October 2007.

This report recommended specific roles for the Alliance as well as the implementation of a number of new measures aimed at improving protection against cyber attacks. It also called for the development of a NATO cyber defence policy.

Principal cyber defence activities

Coordinating and advising on cyber defence

The cyber defence policy is implemented by NATO’s political, military and technical authorities, as well as by individual Allies. A main aspect of the policy was the establishment of a NATO Cyber Defence Management Authority (CDMA) with the sole responsibility for coordinating cyber defence throughout the Alliance. The NATO CDMA is managed by the Cyber Defence Management Board, which comprises the leaders of the political, military, operational and
technical staffs in NATO with responsibilities for cyber defence. It constitutes the main consultation body for the North Atlantic Council on cyber defence and provides advice to member states on all main aspects of cyber defence.

Assisting individual Allies

Prior to the cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007, NATO's cyber defence efforts were primarily concentrated on protecting the communication systems owned and operated by the Alliance. As a result of the attacks, which were directed against public services and carried out throughout the internet, NATO's focus has been broadened to the cyber security of individual Allies. This implies that NATO has developed mechanisms for assisting those Allies who seek NATO support for the protection of their communication systems, including through the dispatch of Rapid Reinforcement Teams (RRTs). However, the Allies themselves continue to bear the main responsibility for the safety and security of their communication systems.

Research and training

The "Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn, which was accredited as a NATO CoE in 2008, conducts research and training on cyber warfare and includes a staff of 30, including specialists from the sponsoring countries (Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Spain). Three additional Allies, Hungary, Turkey and the United States are in the process of joining the Centre.

Three phases of practical activity

In mid-2002, the implementation of a Cyber Defence Programme was approved by the North Atlantic Council. The programme provided a comprehensive plan to improve the Alliance's ability to defend against cyber attacks by improving NATO capabilities. In parallel, at the Prague Summit the same year, heads of state and government decided to strengthen NATO's capabilities. This paved the way for the creation of the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) in 2002 as a part of the Cyber Defence Programme.

The comprehensive plan is divided in three phases:

- The first phase covered the creation of the currently functioning NCIRC and establishing its interim operating capability;
- The second phase will make most NCIRC capabilities fully operational by 2012;
- The third phase identifies requirements and resources to eliminate or mitigate other vulnerabilities. This initiative broadens the cyber defence view for inclusion of CDMA capabilities and the identification of "Enterprise-wide solutions" and demonstrates how new technologies could be exploited to reduce the risks associated with cyber attacks.

NATO is processing phase 2 and 3 in parallel.

Currently, NATO CDMA is operating under the auspices of the Emerging Security Challenges Division (i.e. chairmanship and its Cyber Defence Coordination and Support Centre) in NATO HQ.

Cooperating with partners

NATO is developing practical cooperation on cyber defence in accordance with the Council Guidelines for Cooperation on Cyber Defence with Partners and International Organisations (approved in August 2008), and the Framework for Cooperation on Cyber Defence between NATO and Partner countries (approved in April 2009).

In line with existing policy, NATO should be prepared, without reducing its ability to defend itself, to extend to Partner countries and international organizations its experience and, potentially, its capabilities to defend against cyber attacks. However, cooperation on cyber defence should be a two-way street: NATO should also profit from consultations and exchanges with other actors and should be able to receive assistance in case of need. By making use of existing cooperation and partnership tools NATO may tailor cooperation to the needs and interests of individual Partners or international organizations, and match it with available resources.

The CDMA, supported as necessary, by the Civil Communication Planning Committee, the
Centres of Excellence on Cyber Defence in Tallinn and on Defence against Terrorism in Ankara, as well as NATO's Science for Peace and Security Programme, has held experts’ staff talks, fact-finding missions, training seminars, and exchanges of information with interested partners and international organizations (i.e. the European Union and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe).

The principal decision-making and advisory bodies

The North Atlantic Council – NATO’s top political decision-making body - has overall control over NATO’s policies and activities with regard to cyber defence.

The Executive Working Group (EWG) has developed policy level proposal (i.e. preparation of NATO Policy on Cyber Defence and NATO decision on creation of NATO CDMA) for the approval of Council. (This Group was replaced by the Defence Policy and Planning Committee (DPPC) in June 2010).

The NATO Consultation, Control and Command (NC3) Board constitutes the main body for consultation on technical and implementation aspects of cyber defence. 
The NATO Military Authorities (NMA) and NATO’s Consultation, Control and Command Agency (NC3A) bear the specific responsibilities for identifying the statement of operational requirements and acquisition and implementation of NATO’s cyber defence capabilities.

NATO Communication and Information Services Agency (NCSA), through its NCIRC Technical Centre, is responsible for provision of technical and operational cyber security services throughout NATO. NCIRC has a key role in responding to any cyber aggression against the Alliance. It provides a means for handling and reporting incidents and disseminating important incident-related information to system/ security management and users. It also concentrates incident handling into one centralized and coordinated effort, thereby eliminating duplication of effort.
NATO’s role in energy security

NATO leaders recognize that the disruption of the flow of vital resources could affect Alliance security interests. At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, the Allies noted a report on “NATO’s Role in Energy Security,” which identifies guiding principles and outlines options and recommendations for further activities. These were reiterated at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit in April 2009.

The report identified the five following key areas where NATO can provide added value:

- information and intelligence fusion and sharing;
- projecting stability;
- advancing international and regional cooperation;
- supporting consequence management; and
- supporting the protection of critical infrastructure.

Consultations started after the Bucharest Summit regarding the depth and range of NATO’s involvement in this issue. Meanwhile, a number of practical programmes both within the Alliance and with NATO’s Partner countries are ongoing, alongside workshops and research projects.

Work in practice

Official discussions on this topic take place in the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s top political decision-making body. Concrete initiatives are underway. NATO members have supported a number of workshops and forums addressing this topic.

Through Operation Active Endeavour, NATO maritime forces have been maintaining security for key resource routes in the Mediterranean. Allies also cooperate with Partner countries and relevant experts through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)NATO’s Science for Peace and Security Programme and other frameworks.

Maritime operations support

Some 65 per cent of the oil and natural gas consumed in Western Europe passes through the Mediterranean each year, with major pipelines connecting Libya to Italy and Morocco to Spain.

NATO ships have been patrolling in the Eastern Mediterranean monitoring shipping to detect and deter terrorist activity as part of Operation Active Endeavour since October 2001. The operation has since been extended to cover the Straits of Gibraltar and the entire Mediterranean, providing escorts to non-military shipping and conducting compliant boarding of suspicious vessels.

NATO ships also systematically carry out preparatory route surveys in “choke” points (formed by narrow waterways and straits) as well as important passages and harbours throughout the Mediterranean.

Research projects and workshops

The Advanced Research Workshop on energy security issues in Vilnius, October 2009, was
supported by the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) programme. The workshop brought together numerous policy makers and advisors to discuss European energy security and supply, and to address Lithuanian energy security following the closure of the Ignalina nuclear plant.

Under the multi-year SPS project on "Sahara Trade Winds to Hydrogen", NATO supports cooperation between NATO and Mediterranean Dialogue countries, including Morocco and Mauritania. The aim is to develop cutting-edge hydrogen technology to store and transport renewable energy from wind turbines, in this way improving the capabilities of the energy expert community in these countries.

Another multi-year SPS project deals with “Seismic Hazard and Risk Assessment for Southern Caucasus-Eastern Turkey Energy Corridors”. It involves scientists from Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan, who aim to assess the seismic risks and their monitoring along two vital energy supply lines, the Baku-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline and the Baku-Erzurum natural gas pipeline.

Cooperation with Partner Countries

Due to overlapping security concerns, cooperative activities with partner countries often impact on energy security issues. The main cooperative frameworks are the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), although bilateral arrangements also exist. Areas such as defence reform, critical infrastructure protection, counter-terrorism cooperation, scientific developments and environmental protection may all impact on resource security.

History

The North Atlantic Council adopted NATO’s latest Strategic Concept in Washington D.C. in April 1999. The document outlines the Allies' perception of the international security environment and states that the disruption of vital resources could impact on Alliance security interests.

In the last few years, international trends and a number of international disputes have further contributed to Alliance concerns over resource security.

For the Allies during the Cold War, energy security meant ensuring the supply of fuel to Alliance forces. To this end, the NATO Pipeline System was set up. It consisted of ten separate and distinct military storage and distribution systems across Europe. However, in light of shifting global political and strategic realities, the concept is changing and discussions are ongoing to clarify NATO’s role in this area.
Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation in NATO

NATO has a long-standing commitment to an active policy in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The Alliance continues to pursue its security objectives through these policies, while at the same time ensuring that its collective defence obligations are met and the full range of its missions fulfilled.

Allies participate actively in international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements. NATO itself does not belong to any treaty as an entity but it continues to encourage its members, partners and other countries to implement their international obligations fully.

NATO’s policies in these fields cover consultation and practical cooperation in a wide range of areas. These include conventional arms control; nuclear policy issues; promoting mine action and combating the spread of small arms and light weapons (SALW), munitions and man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS); preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and developing and harmonizing capabilities to defend against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats.

Arms control and disarmament are key elements of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Over the past two decades, Allies have significantly contributed to more stable international relations at lower levels of military forces and armaments, through effective and verifiable arms control agreements.

At the Bucharest Summit in 2008, Allied leaders took note of a report on raising NATO’s profile in the fields of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. As part of a broader response to security issues, they agreed that NATO should continue to contribute to international efforts in these fields and keep these issues under active review. Subsequently these commitments were reaffirmed in the Strasbourg/Kehl Declaration in 2009.

Definitions

While often used together, the terms arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation do not mean the same thing. In fact, experts usually consider them to reflect associated, but different areas in the same discipline or subject.

Arms control

Arms control is the broadest of the three terms and generally refers to mutually agreed-upon restraints or controls (usually between states) on the research, manufacture, or the levels of and/or locales of deployment of troops and weapons systems.

Disarmament

Disarmament, often inaccurately used as a synonym for arms control, refers to the act of eliminating or abolishing weapons (particularly offensive arms) either unilaterally (in the hope that one’s example will be followed) or reciprocally.
Non-proliferation

For the Alliance, "non-proliferation refers to all efforts to prevent proliferation from occurring, or should it occur, to reverse it by any other means than the use of military force."¹ Non-proliferation usually applies to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), which the Alliance defines as a weapon that is "capable of a high order of destruction and of being used in such a manner as to destroy people, infrastructure or other resources on a large scale."

WMD Proliferation

Attempts made by state or non-state actors to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or devices and their means of delivery or related material, including precursors, without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the States Parties to the following agreements: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC) and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC).

¹ According to NATO’s Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Defending Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats.

The ways in which NATO effectively participates

NATO contributes to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation in many ways: through its policies, its activities and through its member countries.

Conventional forces

Allies have reduced their conventional forces significantly from Cold War levels. They remain committed to the regime of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, as a cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic security and are deeply concerned by Russia’s unilateral "suspension" of its obligations under the CFE regime. Discussions are ongoing with Russia, both in the framework of the NATO-Russia Council and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on how to break through the current impasse.

Nuclear forces

The nuclear weapons assigned to NATO have been reduced by over 90 percent since the end of the Cold War. NATO nuclear weapon states have also reduced their nuclear arsenals and ceased production of highly-enriched uranium or plutonium for nuclear weapons. All Allies are parties to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and view it as an essential foundation for international peace and security.

Armed forces

Through its cooperation framework with non-member countries, the Alliance supports defence and security sector reform, emphasizing civilian control of the military, accountability, and restructuring of military forces to lower, affordable and usable levels.

Small arms and light weapons (SALW), and mine action

Allies are working with non-member countries and other international organizations to support the full implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW in All its Aspects.

NATO also supports mine action activities. All NATO member countries, with the exception of the United States, are party to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, often referred to as the Ottawa Convention.

NATO’s PfP Trust Fund Policy was initiated in 2000 to assist countries in fulfilling their Ottawa Convention obligations to dispose of stockpiles of anti-personnel landmines. The policy was
later expanded to include efforts to implement the UN Programme of Action on SALW. More recently, the Trust Policy has also been expanded to include projects addressing the consequences of defence reform.

NATO/PfP Trust Funds may be initiated by a NATO member or partner country to tackle specific, practical issues linked to these areas. They are funded by voluntary contributions from individual NATO allies, partners, contact countries and organizations.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

"With due respect to the primarily military mission of the Alliance, NATO will work actively to prevent the proliferation of WMD by State and non-State actors, to protect the Alliance from WMD threats should prevention fail, and be prepared for recovery efforts should the Alliance suffer a WMD attack or CBRN event, within its competencies and whenever it bring added value, through a comprehensive political, military and civilian approach." ²

NATO stepped up its activities in this area in 1999 with the launch of the WMD Initiative and the establishment of a WMD Centre at NATO Headquarters the following year. NATO Allies have also taken a comprehensive set of practical initiatives to defend their populations, territory and forces against potential WMD threats. As part of NATO outreach to Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) partners, Mediterranean Dialogue Countries, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Countries and other partner countries, the NATO Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation is the only annual conference, sponsored by an international organization, dealing with all types and aspects of weapons of mass destruction.

Of particular importance is NATO’s outreach to and cooperation with the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), other regional organizations and multilateral initiatives that address WMD proliferation.

2. NATO’s Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Defending Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats, Para 4.

The evolution of NATO’s contribution to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation

Active policies in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation have been an inseparable part of NATO’s contribution to security and stability since the Harmel Report of 1967.

The Harmel Report

This report formed the basis for NATO’s security policy. It outlined two objectives: maintaining a sufficient military capacity to act as an effective and credible deterrent against aggression and other forms of pressure while seeking to improve the East-West relations. The Alliance’s objectives in arms control have been tied to the achievement of both aims. It is therefore important that defence and arms control policies remain in harmony and are mutually reinforcing.

The Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament

In May 1989, NATO adopted a Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament, which allowed the Alliance to move forward in the sphere of arms control. It addressed the role of arms control in East-West relations, the principles of Alliance security and a number of guiding principles and objectives governing Allied policy in the nuclear, conventional and chemical fields of arms control.

It clearly set out the interrelationships between arms control and defence policies and established the overall conceptual framework within which the Alliance sought progress in each area of its arms control agenda.

The Alliance’s Strategic Concept

NATO’s continued adherence to this policy was reaffirmed in the Alliance’s Strategic Concept in 1999:

"The Allies seek to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the Alliance’s ability to provide for collective defence and to fulfill the full range of its missions. The Alliance will continue to ensure that – as an important part of its broad
approach to security – defence and arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation objectives remain in harmony.”

**Summit declarations**

This commitment was reiterated by Allied leaders in declarations made at the summit meetings held in Washington (1999), Istanbul (2004), Riga (2006), Bucharest (2008), and in Strasbourg-Kehl (2009). At the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit NATO’s Heads of State and Government endorsed NATO’s Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Defending Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats.

The subject of arms control is also embedded in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and in the declaration made by Allied and Russian leaders at the 2002 Rome Summit, which set up the NATO-Russia Council.

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**NATO bodies dealing with these issues**

A number of NATO bodies oversee different aspects of Alliance activities in the fields of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Overall political guidance is provided by the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s highest political decision-making body. More detailed oversight of activities and policy in specific areas is provided by a number of bodies, including the High Level Task Force (HLTF) on Conventional Arms Control, the Nuclear Planning Group High Level Group (NPG/HLG), the Committee on Proliferation (CP) in politico-military as well as in defence format.

Within NATO’s cooperative frameworks, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (in particular, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Mine Action) and the NATO-Russia Council (in particular, the Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation (ADN) format) have central roles.
NATO’s role in conventional arms control

NATO attaches great importance to conventional arms control and provides an essential consultative and decision-making forum for its members on all aspects of arms control and disarmament.

The 1999 Strategic Concept of the Alliance reiterates the major role of arms control in achieving security objectives, the continued importance of harmonizing defence and arms control policies and objectives and NATO’s commitment to the development of future arms control agreements. This line is expected to continue with NATO’s new strategic concept.

One of the most significant achievements in this sphere is the landmark 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). This Treaty is referred to as a “cornerstone of European security” and imposes for the first time in European history legal and verifiable limits on the force structure of its 30 States Parties which stretch from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. Russia “suspended” its participation in the Treaty in December 2007.

NATO also supports the implementation of a variety of confidence and security-building measures. These include the Vienna Document, a politically binding agreement designed to promote mutual trust and transparency about a state’s military forces and activities, and the Open Skies Treaty, which is legally binding and allows for unarmed aerial observation flights over a country’s territory.

Although not all member states of the Alliance are a party to the Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel mines, all members of the Alliance fully support its humanitarian demining goals. Moreover, the Alliance assists partner countries in the destruction of surplus stocks of mines, arms and munitions through a NATO/Partnership for Peace (PfP) Trust Fund mechanism.

The first decade of the new millennium has also witnessed two other major developments in the field of conventional arms control: the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the UN process “Towards an Arms Trade Treaty.” These initiatives mark the continuing importance and relevance of conventional arms control today for peace and security.

Conventional arms control agreements

The CFE Treaty

Since the CFE Treaty’s entry into force in 1992, the destruction of over 60,000 pieces of treaty-limited equipment (tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery, attack helicopters and combat aircraft) has been verified and almost 6,000 on-site inspections have been conducted, thereby reaching its objective of creating balance and mitigating the possibility of surprise conventional attacks within its area of application.

At the first CFE Review Conference in 1996, negotiations began to adapt the CFE Treaty to reflect the realities of the post-Cold War era. This process was completed in conjunction with the OSCE Summit in Istanbul in 1999. States Parties also agreed to additional commitments, called the Istanbul Commitments. Although the Adapted CFE Treaty (ACFE) went far in adjusting the Treaty to a new security environment it was not ratified by Allied countries because of the failure of Russia to fully meet commitments regarding withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, on which Allies’ agreement to the adapted
Treaty was based.

At NATO summits and ministerial meetings since 1999, the Allies have reiterated their commitment to the CFE Treaty and have reaffirmed their readiness and commitment to ratify the Adapted Treaty. However, during the third CFE Review Conference, in June 2006, Russia expressed its concerns regarding ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty and claimed that even the ACFE was outdated.

After the June 2007 Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the CFE Treaty, the Russian President signed legislation on 14 July 2007 to unilaterally "suspend" its legal obligations under the CFE Treaty as of 12 December 2007. In response to these events, NATO offered a set of constructive and forward-looking actions on key issues, including steps by NATO Allies to ratify the Adapted CFE Treaty. These actions were called the parallel actions package.

In 2008 and 2009 consultations were held between the United States on behalf of the Alliance and Russia on the basis of the parallel actions package, but with limited development. During the spring of 2010 a new approach was developed, and the Alliance put forward its proposal for a 21st century framework to strengthen arms control and disarmament and transparency in Europe.

The aim is to agree on the framework in 2010 and then negotiate revisions of the ACFE treaty in 2011. The framework is currently subject to bilateral consultations and consultations at 36 between all CFE states parties and NATO member states not parties to the CFE Treaty.

The Vienna Document

Similarly, under the Vienna Document, thousands of inspections and evaluation visits have been conducted as well as visits to military bases and facilities; armament and equipment demonstrations are kept under observation; and exchanges of military information take place annually. As this document was last updated in 1999, there have been calls for its update to correspond with the contemporary security policy environment. Such a process started at the OSCE in Vienna in 2010.

The Open Skies Treaty

Under the Open Skies Treaty, more than 500 observation missions have been conducted since the treaty's entry into force in January 2002. Arial photography and other material from observation missions provide transparency and support verification activities carried out on the ground under other treaties. This treaty provides for extensive cooperation regarding the use of aircraft and their sensors, thereby adding to openness and confidence. Following long lasting negotiations and the 2010 review conference, digital sensors are now approved for use. This decision secures the future relevance of the treaty, adds to its efficiency and reduces implementation costs.

The UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in All Its Aspects

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council's (EAPC) Ad Hoc Working Group on SALW and Mine Action contributes to international efforts to address the illicit trade in SALW and encourages international efforts to fully implement the UN Programme of Action. It also encourages mine action efforts.

The UN Programme of Action (UN PoA) was adopted in July 2001 by nearly 150 countries, including all NATO member countries. It includes measures at the national, regional and global levels, in the areas of legislation, destruction of weapons that were confiscated, seized, or collected, as well as international cooperation and assistance to strengthen the ability of states in identifying and tracing illicit arms and light weapons. Every two years, the UN hold the Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action (BMS). The International Staff have participated in the BMS on behalf of the EAPC since 2003.

Mine Action

The EAPC Working Group on SALW and Mine Action has supported mine action efforts through
its guest speaker program by inviting numerous mine action experts to share their expertise with the Group. These speakers have hailed from national mine action centers, NGOs and international organizations and have included high profile experts, such as Nobel Laureate Ms. Jody Williams, Director of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. The Working Group intensified its focus on mine action, also incorporating issues related to explosive remnants of war and cluster munitions onto its agenda, during the second half of 2010, wherein all regular Working Group meetings were dedicated to this subject.

The Convention on Cluster Munitions
The Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) prohibits all use, stockpiling, production and transfer of cluster munitions. Separate articles in the Convention concern assistance to victims, clearance of contaminated areas and destruction of stockpiles. It became a legally binding international instrument when it entered into force on 1 August 2010.

The Arms Trade Treaty
From 12-23 July 2010, UN member countries gathered in New York for the first Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on an Arms Trade Treaty. This Treaty would aim to establish common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms. NATO stands ready to support the Arms Trade Treaty process as appropriate.

NATO/PfP Trust Fund projects
The NATO/Partnership for Peace Trust Fund mechanism was established in 2000 to assist partner countries with the safe destruction of stocks of anti-personnel land mines. It was later extended to include the destruction of surplus munitions, unexploded ordnance and SALW, and assisting partner countries in managing the consequences of defence reform. So far, 4.1 million landmines, 145,000 tonnes of explosive stockpile and munitions, and 1.5 million SALW have been destroyed.

Trust Fund projects are initiated by a NATO member or partner country, and funded by voluntary contributions from individual allies, partners, contact countries, and organizations.

NATO bodies involved in conventional arms control
There are a number of NATO bodies that provide a forum to discuss and take forward arms control issues. Arms control policy is determined within the deliberations of the High-Level Task Force on Conventional Arms Control (HLTF), that was established for CFE and confidence and security building measures (CSBM).

Implementation and verification of arms control agreements fall under the purview of the Verification Coordination Committee, including overseeing a designated CFE verification database.

The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) also has a working group for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation.

Other fora include the Political Partnerships and Committee and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Ad Hoc Working Group on Small Arms and Light Weapons.

The NATO School Oberammergau (Germany) conducts 12 courses a year in the fields of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Some of them are also open to NATO’s partners across the globe.
Small arms and light weapons and mine action

The illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) has a detrimental impact on regional security, fueling and prolonging existing conflicts thereby destabilizing regions and exacerbating international security.

The illicit trafficking of these types of weapons often hamper the successful implementation of peacekeeping operations and development initiatives thus undermining the potential for lasting security at the regional and global level. Many of the security threats that we face today as organizations, states and regions can be linked to the pervasive problem of illicit SALW. Terrorists, organized criminal gangs, insurgents and even pirates, often find their crimes much easier to commit due to easy access to these weapons.

Out of some 200 million military firearms worldwide, at least 76 million are surplus. Moreover, an estimated diversion rate of one in every 1,000 civilian-owned weapons amounts to a loss of some 650,000 firearms per year. Such diversion contributes to crime and armed violence in many countries. Research also shows that widespread leakage of these weapons from state and civilian stockpiles is primarily due to negligence. Many aspects of stockpile security can be enhanced by relatively low-cost improvements in accounting, monitoring and the physical security of arms and ammunition.

Mines hamper reconstruction, delivery of developmental aide, and kill both people and livestock years after conflicts cease. In the late 1990s, landmines caused 15,000 to 20,000 casualties a year. While that number has decreased in recent years due to a treaty banning anti-personnel landmines, there is still not one region in the world that is totally unaffected by mines.

NATO has established a number of initiatives to address the problems relating to excess stockpiles of these weapons and ammunition, including anti-personnel landmines.

Concerning SALW, NATO and its Partners focus on fulfilling the politically binding obligations of the “United Nations (UN) Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW in All Its Aspects (PoA).”

Regarding anti-personnel landmines, the Alliance and its Partners assist signatories of the Ottawa Convention, or the “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and Their Destruction”. Allies who are not party to the Ottawa Convention facilitate efforts in the more general realm of what is commonly called mine action, which includes: clearance of mine fields, providing victim assistance, raising mine risk awareness through education efforts, and assistance in destroying mine stockpiles.

**Definitions**

**Small arms**

“Small arms” are, broadly speaking, weapons designed for individual use. They include, inter alia, revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns.
Light weapons

“Light weapons” are, broadly speaking, weapons designed for use by two or three persons serving as a crew, although some may be carried and used by a single person. They include, inter alia, heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable launchers of anti aircraft missile systems, and mortars of a calibre of less than 100 millimetres.

Figures

It is estimated that there are over a half-billion SALW in the world today – enough for one in every 11 people. They are implicated in over 1000 deaths a day.

Estimates put the total number of anti-personnel mines buried in the ground worldwide at 100 million. Global estimates of new landmine casualties each year vary between 15 000 and 20 000 people.

NATO Programmes

NATO has two very effective mechanisms that address both the issue of SALW, as well as mine action.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on SALW and Mine Action

In 1999, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) established the Ad Hoc Working Group on SALW. Originally, the Working Group focused only on issues concerning the impact of the proliferation of SALW on Alliance joint peacekeeping operations. In April 2004, the Working Group’s mandate was broadened to include mine action issues. It is one of the few forums in the world that meets on a regular basis to address these specific issues. The objective of the Working Group is to contribute to international efforts to decrease the impact of anti-personal land mines and combat the threats caused by the illicit trade of SALW.

An annual work programme

The Working Group organizes its work around a work programme that it adopts annually. In practice, the Working Group accomplishes its work on SALW and mine action issues in four key ways. The Working Group:

- Provides a forum for members to highlight their national efforts concerning SALW and mine action as well as exchange views on how best to tackle problems associated with surplus SALW, surplus stocks of conventional ammunition, and mine action issues;
- Invites speakers, as part of its Guest Speaker Program, from non-governmental organizations, regional and international organizations, and research institutes to share their views and recent research with delegations;
- Facilitates the management and creation of PfP Trust Fund projects (this includes updating delegations on the status of trust fund projects and highlighting where more effort or volunteer donations are needed);
- Organizes regular international workshops, seminars and conferences on topics particularly pertinent to SALW and mine action.

Regarding SALW, the most important theme has been encouraging states to implement what is often called physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) best practices. These are proven practices that states undertake to secure and safely store their SALW and associated ammunition, as well as identify and dispose of their surpluses. These best practices, in turn, are central to fulfilling the obligations as articulated in the UN Programme of Action on SALW.

As to mine action, the Working Group focuses on helping states destroy their stockpiles of mines, and contributes more generally to mine action efforts.

The Working Group’s executive agent

NATO’s International Staff (IS) functions as the Working Group’s executive agent. As such, the IS implements the annual work programmes and organises its meetings, usually held every 6-8 weeks.
Training on SALW-related issues

The Working Group has also worked extensively with the informal Multinational Small Arms and Ammunition Group (MSAG), which is a group of donor nations assisting governments throughout the world in implementing the UN Programme of Action.

Under the auspices of these two Groups, a series of SALW training courses have been held at the NATO School in Oberammergau (NSO), Germany, which are open to representatives from all the EAPC partners.

Currently, there are two courses that are relevant to those working in the field of SALW. The first, entitled the SALW Course, focuses on aspects related to implementation of the UNPoA and is open to countries participating in the MSAG, which conduct SALW staff assessments throughout the world. Consequently, a particular emphasis is placed on activities and exercises relevant to field assessments.

The second course, the SALW Policy Course, places more focus on policy issues but the key implementation modules from the MSAG course are also incorporated. Experts from select international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and Small Arms Survey, are invited to participate as instructors during the SALW Policy Course.

Further SALW courses are currently being developed in cooperation with members from the MSAG.

The UN Programme of Action and other global efforts

The UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (PoA) was adopted in July 2001 by nearly 150 countries, including all NATO member countries. It includes measures at the national, regional and global levels, in the areas of legislation, destruction of weapons that were confiscated, seized, or collected, as well as international cooperation and assistance to strengthen the ability of states in identifying and tracing illicit arms and light weapons. Every two years, the UN holds the Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the PoA, otherwise known as the BMS.

The activities of the Working Group have fully supported and will continue to support major global events such as the BMS. In preparation for the third BMS in 2008, the EAPC, co-sponsored with the OSCE, hosted the ‘Synergy Conference for Regional Organisations on the Implementation of the UN PoA’. This high-profile event aimed to facilitate further cooperation and promote best practices between regional organizations implementing the PoA in preparation for the third BMS. NATO’s International Staff (IS) have participated in every BMS since 2003.

Other significant topics at the global level include the current efforts towards an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). This process is expected to gain more momentum over the coming years in preparation for the UN Conference on an ATT, which is currently scheduled to take place in 2012. The activities of the Working Group on SALW and Mine Action can help to support the preparations for such a treaty and it provides an additional forum for discussion and information on the issue.

Furthermore, on the 1 August 2010, the Convention on Cluster Munitions became a legally binding instrument when it entered into force. The Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) prohibits all use, stockpiling, production and transfer of Cluster Munitions. Separate articles in the Convention concern assistance to victims, clearance of contaminated areas and destruction of stockpiles. The Working Group stands ready to provide an additional forum for the discussion and facilitation of implementation and other practical issues in this context.

Conferences, seminars and workshops

The Working Group, in addition to holding its regular meetings, has hosted a series of conferences, seminars and workshops which have focused on key thematic areas relating to SALW and mine action. To date, such events have included the Workshop on Stockpile Security and Management; the Destruction Technologies and Techniques Workshop; the man portable air defence systems (MANPADS) and All Its Aspects Workshop; the Synergy Conference for Regional Organisations on the Implementation of the UNPoA; and the Workshop on Combating
Illicit Brokering in SALW.

These events help raise awareness on these issues and provide a forum for information exchange and enhanced dialogue between the various actors involved at national, regional and global levels.

The most recent iteration of the EAPC’s annual event was the Workshop on Clearing Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) With a Focus on Cluster Munitions, which took place 19-20 April 2010 at NATO HQ. It focused on two key practical areas – clearance procedures and the destruction techniques and technologies required for the demilitarization of unserviceable stockpiles of cluster munitions. It provided experts involved in the clearance and destruction processes of unserviceable cluster munitions with a forum in which they could share information.

**NATO/Partnership for Peace Trust Fund mechanism**

The end of the Cold War brought improved security overall, but it also left a dangerous legacy of ageing arms, ammunition, anti-personnel mines, missiles, rocket fuel, chemicals and unexploded ordnance. In 1999, NATO established the NATO/PfP Trust Fund mechanism to assist Partners with these legacy problems. Since then, NATO/PfP Trust Fund projects have produced tangible results and, as such, represent the operational dimension of the Working Group’s efforts.

Trust Fund projects focus on the destruction of SALW, ammunition and mines, improving their physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) and also address the consequences of defence reform.

Allies, Partners and Contact Countries fund and execute these projects through Executive Agents. Each project has a lead nation(s), which oversees the development of project proposals along with the NATO IS and the executive agent. This ensures a mechanism with a competitive bidding process, transparency in how funds are expended and verifiable project oversight, particularly for projects involving destruction of munitions.

Trust Funds may be initiated by a NATO member or Partner country to tackle specific, practical issues linked to the demilitarization process of a country or to the introduction of defence reform projects. They are funded by voluntary contributions from individual NATO Allies, Partner countries, and most recently even NGOs. They are often implemented in cooperation with other international organisations and NGOs.

The first NATO/PfP Trust Fund project was launched in September 2000 in Albania. The project helped dispose of anti-personnel mines and excess stockpiles of arms and munitions.

As of the end of 2009, Allies and partners through the Trust Fund projects had destroyed:

- 205 million rounds of small arms ammunition;
- 2 million hand grenades;
- nearly 8,000 tonnes of other munitions, including 1,000 tonnes of cluster munitions;
- 4.1 million landmines;
- 550,000 piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO);
- 180,000 SALW;
- 1,000 man portable air defence systems (MANPADS);
- over 9,000 rockets and missiles and;
- over 1,800 tonnes of chemicals, including rocket fuel oxidiser (mélange)

In addition, some 5,000 former military personnel have received retraining assistance through Trust Fund defence reform projects.

The Trust Fund mechanism is open to countries participating in NATO’s PfP programme, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, as well as countries where NATO is leading a crisis management operation. For instance, in 2010, NATO successfully completed a Trust Fund project in Afghanistan, achieving its aim of providing the Afghan National Army further means to manage munitions in a safe and efficient way.
The bodies with a central role

In January 1999, NATO established the Ad Hoc Working Group on SALW, within the framework of the EAPC. Later that year, work began on creating the NATO/PfP Trust Fund Mechanism, which has become an integral part of the Working Group ever since. In 2004, the Working Group's mandate was expanded to include mine action issues, renaming it to the Ad Hoc Working Group on SALW and Mine Action. The Working Group’s authority comes directly from the EAPC itself.

The Luxembourg-based NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) has been chosen by the Lead Nation(s) of most (not all) NATO/PfP Trust Fund projects to be the executing agent, particularly for demilitarization projects. As such, it plays an essential role in the development and implementation of Trust Fund projects and offers technical advice and a range of management services.

Once the project proposal is agreed by the Lead Nation and the Partner country concerned, it is presented to the Political Partnerships Committee. This body serves as a formal forum to discuss the project and attract volunteer donor support and resources.

A holistic approach to a multi-faceted problem

The multi-faceted approach that is adopted by the Working Group in its annual Work Programme demonstrates the Working Group’s awareness of the need to approach the problem of SALW and mine action in a holistic way. The problems of SALW and mine action are problems that transcend state borders and therefore cannot be tackled on a single level. Instead, these challenges need to be approached from the national, regional and global levels in a coordinated way and this requires the type of comprehensive approach that the Working Group strives to incorporate into its Work Programme.
The NATO Defence Planning Process

Defence planning in the Alliance is a crucial tool which enables member countries to benefit from the political, military and resource advantages of working together. Within the defence planning process, Allies contribute to enhancing security and stability, and share the burden of developing and delivering the necessary forces and capabilities needed to achieve the Organization’s objectives. The defence planning process prevents the renationalisation of defence policies, while at the same time recognizing national sovereignty.

The aim of NATO defence planning is to provide a framework within which national and Alliance defence planning activities can be harmonized to meet agreed targets in the most effective way. It aims to facilitate the timely identification, development and delivery of the necessary range of forces - forces that are interoperable and adequately prepared, equipped, trained and supported - as well as the associated military and non-military capabilities to undertake the Alliance’s full spectrum of missions.

In April 2009, NATO leaders endorsed the Outline Model of the new NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) and in June 2009, defence ministers endorsed the Implementation and Transition Plan of the NDPP. The NDPP introduces the concept of a more coherent and comprehensive defence planning process. It applies a specific approach and mechanism through which NATO will bring its civilian and military side, including the Strategic Commands, closer together engaging them in a common, functionally integrated approach to the issue of defence planning.

This has two major implications. Firstly, work will have to be done in a functionally integrated manner while at the same time ensuring that products are fully coordinated, coherent, persuasive, clear, result-oriented and delivered on a timely basis. This will require a cultural shift in the way in which the HQs and staffs conduct business, particularly between the civilian and military experts and the various staffs supporting the committees responsible for the planning domains. Consequently, the demand for communication, consultation, coordination and for finding feasible and realistic solutions which are supported by all stakeholders will increase.

Secondly, Allies themselves, in the delegations at NATO HQ and in capitals, will have to exploit the full potential of the NDPP and coordinate and consolidate expert community views prior to presenting them in the various NATO fora. It is crucial that individual members speak with one voice in the various NATO committees.

Defence planning encompasses several planning domains: force, resource, armaments, logistics, nuclear, C3 (consultation, command and control), civil emergency planning, air defence, air traffic management, standardization, intelligence, medical support and research and technology. The NDPP has introduced a new approach to defence planning and operates within the new NATO committee structure. The Defence Policy and Planning Committee (Reinforced) is the central body that oversees the work of NATO bodies and committees responsible for the planning domains.

The NATO Defence Planning Process - NDPP

The NDPP consists of five steps. Although the process is sequential and cyclical in nature (four
year cycle with bi-annual elements), some elements occur at different frequencies and Step 4 is a continuous activity. The NDPP consists of five steps. Although the process is sequential and cyclical in nature (four year cycle with bi-annual elements), some elements occur at different frequencies and Step 4 is a continuous activity.

**Step 1 - Establish political guidance**

The intent is to develop a single, unified political guidance for defence planning which sets out the overall aims and objectives to be met by the Alliance. It translates guidance from higher strategic policy documents (i.e., the Strategic Concept and subsequent political guidance) in sufficient detail to direct the defence planning efforts of the various planning domains, both in member countries and in NATO, towards the determination of the required capabilities. This will obviate the requirement for other political guidance documents for defence planning.

Political guidance should reflect the political, military, economic, legal, civil and technological factors which could impact on the development of the required capabilities. It will, inter alia, aim at defining the number, scale and nature of the operations the Alliance should be able to conduct in the future (commonly referred to as NATO’s Level of Ambition). It will also define the requisite qualitative capability requirements to support this overall ambition. By doing so, it will steer the capability development efforts of Allies and within NATO. Furthermore, it will clearly define associated priorities and timelines, as appropriate, for use by the various planning domains.

Any political guidance needs to be written against the background that the majority of capabilities sought by the Alliance are and will be provided by individual member countries.

Political guidance will be reviewed at least every four years.

**Step 2 - Determine requirements**

There is one single consolidated list of Minimum Capability Requirements, including eventual shortfalls. These requirements are identified by the Defence Planning Staff Team, with the Strategic Commands, notably Allied Command Transformation in the lead. The team take into account all NDPP-related guidance and ensure that all requirements considered necessary to meet quantitative and qualitative ambitions set out in the political guidance are covered. The process is structured, comprehensive, transparent and traceable and uses analytical supporting tools coupled with relevant NATO expert analysis.

Planning domains are fully engaged throughout the analysis, assisting the Strategic Commands in providing a sound framework for further work which, ultimately, needs to be usable by each planning domain.

Strategic Commands must be transparent, while ensuring that political considerations do not prematurely qualify the process during which requirements are identified. This will be achieved by seeking expert advice and feedback from member countries, inviting the latter to observe key milestones and decision points, together with regular briefings to Allies.

**Step 3 - Apportion requirements and set targets**

Target setting initially apportions the overall set of Minimum Capability Requirements to individual countries and NATO entities in the form of target packages, respecting the principles of fair burden-sharing and reasonable challenge.

Initially led by the Strategic Commands, the Defence Planning Staff Team will develop targets for existing and planned capabilities against the Minimum Capability Requirements and cover them in the draft target packages, together with their associated priorities and timelines. Targets should be expressed in capability terms and be flexible enough to allow national, multinational as well as collective implementation.

Each individual Ally has the opportunity to seek clarification on the content of targets and present its national views on their acceptance during a meeting between the relevant national authorities and representatives from the Defence Planning Staff Team. Subsequently, the Defence Planning Staff Team will consider the member country's perspective and priorities with the aim of refining the NATO target packages and providing advice on what constitutes a reasonable challenge.

Following discussions with member countries, leadership of the Defence Planning Staff Team will transition from the Strategic Commands to the International Staff. At this point, the Defence Planning Staff Team will continue to refine and tailor individual draft target packages in line with
the principle of reasonable challenge. To ensure transparency and promote Alliance cohesion, packages will be forwarded to Allies with a recommendation of which targets should be retained or removed to respect this principle. Allies will review these packages during a series of multilateral examinations.

Agreed packages are accompanied by a summary report, which is prepared by the Defence Policy and Planning Committee (Reinforced), on the targets as a whole. This will subsequently be forwarded to permanent representatives for submission to defence ministers for adoption. The summary will include an assessment of the potential risk and possible impact caused by the removal of planning targets from packages on the delivery of the Alliance's Level of Ambition.

Step 4 - Facilitate Implementation

This step assists national efforts and facilitates multinational and collective efforts to satisfy agreed targets and priorities in a coherent and timely manner.

The aim is to focus on addressing the most important capability shortfalls. This is done by encouraging national implementation, facilitating and supporting multinational implementation and proceeding with the collective (multinational, joint or common-funded) acquisition of the capabilities required by the Alliance. This step also facilitates national implementation of standardization products (STANAGs/Allied Publications) developed to improve interoperability.

The detailed work needed to develop and implement a capability improvement or action plan is carried out by multidisciplinary task forces. These task forces are composed of representatives from all stakeholders, under the lead of a dedicated entity. Each task force is supported by a “Capability Monitor” who will keep themselves abreast of progress in the implementation phase and report to all relevant bodies and committees, providing feedback and additional guidance to the task force leader.

Unlike other steps in the process, this step – or function - is continuous in nature.

Step 5 - Review results

This step seeks to examine the degree to which NATO’s political objectives, ambitions and associated targets have been met and to offer feedback and direction for the next cycle of the defence planning process.

The Defence Planning Capability Review (DPCR) scrutinises and assesses Allies’ defence and financial plans as well as collective efforts so as to provide an overall assessment of the degree to which the combined Alliance forces and capabilities are able to meet the political guidance, including the NATO Level of Ambition. The DPCR provides a key mechanism for generating feedback and input for the next cycle. Capability reviews will be carried out every two years.

The review process begins with the development of the Defence Planning Capability Survey. It seeks data on national plans and policies, including Allies’ efforts (national, multinational and collective) to address their planning targets. It also seeks information on the national inventory of military forces and associated capabilities, any relevant non-military capabilities potentially available for Alliance operations and national financial plans.

The Defence Planning Staff Team conduct a preliminary analysis and produces draft assessments for each Ally. These assessments constitute a comprehensive analysis of national plans and capabilities, including on force structures, specific circumstances and priorities. The assessments also include a statement by the Strategic Commands regarding the impact each country’s plans have on the ability of Allied Command Operations to conduct missions. They may also include recommendations including, as appropriate, on the redirection of resources from surplus areas to the identified Alliance deficiencies areas.

Once a draft assessment has been developed, it will be circulated to the country concerned for discussion between the national authorities and the Defence Planning Staff Team to ensure information in the draft assessment is correct. The draft assessments are then revised accordingly and submitted to the Defence Policy and Planning Committee (Reinforced) for review and approval during a series of multilateral examinations. During these examinations, the working practice of consensus-minus-one will be continued.

In parallel with the examination of country assessments, the Military Committee, based on the Strategic Commands’ Suitability and Risk Assessment, will develop a risk assessment on the military suitability of the plans and the degree of military risk associated with them in relation to
political guidance for defence planning, including the Level of Ambition.

On the basis of the individual country assessments and Military Committee Suitability and Risk Assessment, the Defence Policy and Planning Committee (Reinforced) prepares a NATO Capabilities Report, highlighting individual and collective progress on capability development as it relates to NATO’s Level of Ambition.

The Report will also provide an assessment of any associated risks, including a brief summary of the Military Committee’s Suitability and Risk Assessment. It will also include an indication of whether the risks identified could be mitigated by capabilities developed by member countries outside the NATO defence planning process or by contracting civil assets. This would not relieve Allies from the obligation of trying to meet NATO’s Level of Ambition from within Alliance inventories, nor would it diminish the need to develop the capabilities sought. However, it will assist defence planners in prioritising their efforts to overcome the most critical shortfalls first.

The report will also contain further direction to steer capability development.

**Current support structures**

Although a more integrated and comprehensive process has been agreed comprising a coordinating framework with more flexible working arrangements, the committee and staff structures to support the process remain unchanged.

**The senior committee for defence planning**

The Defence Policy and Planning Committee (Reinforced) (DPPC(R)) is the senior committee for defence planning. It is responsible for the development of defence planning-related policy and the overall coordination and direction of NDPP activities. It also provides integrated advice to the North Atlantic Council and the Nuclear Planning Group. Effectively, the DPPC (R) is the central body that oversees the work of the NATO bodies and committees responsible for the planning domains. It can provide feedback and, as required, defence planning process-related direction to them.

**Defence Planning Staff Team**

The work of the DPPC (R) is supported by the NATO Defence Planning Staff Team. Conceptually, the Defence Planning Staff Team is a virtual pool of all civil and military expertise resident within the various NATO HQ staffs and Strategic Commands. This entity supports the entire defence planning process throughout the five steps. In practice, the Defence Planning Staff Team will provide the staff officers required to undertake the majority of the staff work to support the NDPP; a standing Core Element will facilitate the day-to-day coordination and an Internal Coordination Mechanism that oversees all aspects of the work.

**Core Element**

It is a standing inter-departmental group, co-located within the International Staff at NATO HQ, responsible for coordinating the implementation of the NDPP at staff level. The Core Element facilitates the day-to-day management of the associated defence planning efforts conducted by the various task forces and is therefore equipped with the necessary coordination authority. It supports the DPPC (R), the Internal Coordination Mechanism and line managers of the designated lead entities. The Core Element assumes a consultative role on request and as appropriate.

So far the integrated team consists of four staff officers representing their parent entities acting in a collaborative manner: from the International Staff (Defence Planning and Policy and Defence Investment), from the International Military Staff and Allied Command Transformation.

**Task forces**

Much of the NDPP work will be carried out by inter-disciplinary task forces, established from the Defence Planning Staff Team pool of experts, with representatives of stakeholder communities for the duration of a particular task. A number of task forces may be in existence at any one time, possibly under the leadership of different staff entities. They are functionally integrated teams, reinforced, as necessary, by experts from member countries or external bodies. Regardless of their parent organization, all task force members will
support the appointed task force leadership by contributing to the satisfactory conduct of a particular task.

**Internal Coordination Mechanism**

The Internal Coordination Mechanism was set up to align and de-conflict staff efforts related to defence capability development activities across the various planning domains and within the various NATO staffs, including established task forces. It coordinates the establishment, composition, manning and work programmes of the task forces. As a general rule, the Internal Coordination Mechanism will be composed of senior level officers from the International Staff (Defence Planning and Policy, Defence Investment and Operations), the International Military Staff and from Allied Command Transformation and Allied Command Operations, including representatives of the directors/heads of the planning domains. When required, the Internal Coordination Mechanism will meet at the level of the Assistant Secretary General / Flag Officer (three star) level.

**The planning domains and related committees**

In concrete terms, defence planning at NATO encompasses many different domains: force, resource, armaments, logistics, nuclear, C3 (consultation, command and control), civil emergency, air defence, air traffic management, standardization, intelligence, medical support and research and technology.

**Force planning**

Force planning aims to promote the availability of national forces and capabilities for the full range of Alliance missions. In practical terms, it seeks to ensure that Allies develop modern, deployable, sustainable and interoperable forces and capabilities, which can undertake demanding operations wherever required, including being able to operate abroad with limited or no support from the country of destination. However, force planning should not be understood to refer primarily to “forces”; the focus is on “capabilities” and, how best nations should organize their priorities to optimize these. Therefore force planning also addresses capability areas that are also covered by single-area specific planning domains.

The term “force planning” has often been used interchangeably with “defence planning” and “operational planning”. Defence planning is a much broader term and operational planning is conducted for specific, NATO-agreed operations.

**The Defence Policy and Planning Committee**

The Defence Policy and Planning Committee (DPPC) oversees the force planning process. It is the senior decision-making body on matters relating to the integrated military structure of the Alliance. It reports directly to the North Atlantic Council (NAC), provides guidance to NATO’s military authorities and, in its reinforced format, oversees the defence planning process, of which force planning is a constituent activity.

**Resource planning**

The large majority of NATO resources are national. NATO resource planning aims to provide the Alliance with the capabilities it needs, but focuses on the elements that are jointly or commonly funded, that is to say where members pool resources within a NATO framework. In this regard, resource planning is closely linked to operational planning, which aims to ensure that the Alliance can fulfill its present and future operational commitments and fight new threats such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

There is a distinction to be made between joint funding and common funding: joint funding covers activities managed by NATO agencies, such as the NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and NATO pipelines; common funding involves three different budgets: the civil budget, the military budget, and the NATO Security Investment Programme.

Relatively speaking, these budgets represent a small amount of money, but they are key for the cohesion of the Alliance and the integration of capabilities.

**The Resource Policy and Planning Board**

The Resource Policy and Planning Board (RPPB) is the senior advisory body to the North Atlantic Council on the management of all NATO resources. It has responsibility for the overall
management of NATO’s civil and military budgets, as well as the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP) and manpower.

**Armaments planning**

Armaments planning focuses on the development of multinational (but not common-funded) armaments programmes. It promotes cost-effective acquisition, co-operative development and the production of armaments. It also encourages interoperability, and technological and industrial co-operation among Allies and Partners.

*The Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD)*

The Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) is the senior NATO committee responsible for Alliance armaments cooperation, material standardization and defence procurement. It brings together the top officials responsible for defence procurement in NATO member and Partner countries to consider the political, economic and technical aspects of the development and procurement of equipment for NATO forces, with the aim of arriving at common solutions.

**Logistics planning**

Logistics planning in NATO aims at ensuring responsive and usable logistics support to NATO operations. This is achieved by promoting the development of military and civil logistics capabilities and multinational cooperation in logistics.

*The Logistics Committee*

The Logistics Committee is the senior advisory body on logistics at NATO. Its overall mandate is two-fold: to address consumer logistics matters with a view to enhancing the performance, efficiency, sustainability and combat effectiveness of Alliance forces; and to exercise, on behalf of the North Atlantic Council, an overarching coordinating authority across the whole spectrum of logistics functions within NATO.

**Nuclear planning**

The aim of nuclear policy and planning is to promote the maintenance of a credible nuclear deterrent and force posture, which meets the requirements of the current and foreseeable security environment.

Nuclear planning must ensure that the Alliance's nuclear posture is perceived as a credible and effective element of NATO’s strategy of war prevention. As such, its overall goal is to ensure security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces.

NATO has developed an adaptive nuclear planning capability. Accordingly, nuclear forces are not directed towards a specific threat nor do they target or hold at risk any country. In addition, the formulation of the Alliance's nuclear policy involves all NATO countries (except France), including non-nuclear Allies.

*The Nuclear Planning Group*

The Nuclear Planning Group takes decisions on the Alliance’s nuclear policy, which is kept under constant review and modified or adapted in light of new developments.

**C3 planning**

The effective performance of NATO’s political and military functions requires the widespread utilization of both NATO and national Consultation, Command and Control (C3) systems, services and facilities, supported by appropriate personnel and NATO-agreed doctrine, organizations and procedures.

C3 systems include communications, information, navigation and identification systems as well as sensor and warning installation systems, designed and operated in a networked and integrated form to meet the needs of NATO. Individual C3 systems may be provided by NATO via common funded programmes or by members via national, multi-national or joint-funded co-operative programmes.

C3 planning is responsive to requirements, as and when they appear, so there is no established C3 planning cycle. However, activities are harmonized with the cycles of the other associated planning
disciplines where they exist.

**The Consultation, Command and Control (C3) Board**

The Consultation, Command and Control Board is a senior multinational body acting on behalf of and responsible to the NAC on all matters relating to C3 issues throughout the Organization. This includes interoperability of NATO and national C3 systems, as well as advising the CNAD on C3 cooperative programmes.

**Civil emergency planning**

Civil emergency planning in NATO aims to collect, analyse and share information on national planning activity to ensure the most effective use of civil resources for use during emergency situations, in accordance with Alliance objectives. It enables Allies and Partners to assist each other in preparing for and dealing with the consequences of crisis, disaster or conflict.

**The Civil Emergency Planning Committee**

The Civil Emergency Planning Committee is the top advisory body for the protection of civilian populations and the use of civil resources in support of NATO objectives.

**Air defence planning**

Air defence planning enables members to harmonize national efforts with international planning related to air command and control and air defence weapons. NATO integrated air defence (NATINAD) is a network of interconnected systems and measures designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air action. A NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme has been initiated to enhance the existing NATINAD system, particularly against theatre ballistic missiles.

**The Air Defence Committee (ADC)**

The Air Defence Committee advises the North Atlantic Council and the relevant Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council bodies on all elements of air defence, including missile defence and relevant air power aspects. It promotes harmonization of national efforts with international planning related to air command and control and air defence weapons.

**Air Traffic management**

NATO's role in civil-military air traffic management is to ensure, in cooperation with other international organizations, safe access to airspace, effective delivery of services and civil-military interoperability for air operations conducted in support of the Alliance's security tasks and missions while minimizing disruption to civil aviation, already constrained by the limited capacity of systems and airports, and mitigating the cost implications of new civil technologies on defence budgets.

**The Air Traffic Management Committee (ATMC)**

The ATMC is the senior civil-military advisory body to the NAC for airspace use and air traffic management. The committee’s mission is to develop, represent and promote NATO’s view on matters related to safe and expeditious air operations in the airspace of NATO areas of responsibility and interest.

**Standardization**

At NATO, standardization is the process of developing shared concepts, doctrines, procedures and designs to achieve and maintain the most effective levels of "compatibility, interchangeability and commonality" in operations, procedures, materials, technology and administration. The primary products of this process are Standardization Agreements (STANAGS) between member countries.

**The Committee for Standardization**

The Committee for Standardization is the senior authority of the Alliance responsible for providing coordinated advice to the NAC on overall standardization issues.

**Intelligence**

Intelligence plays an important role in the defence planning process, in particular with the emergence of multidirectional and multidimensional security challenges such as terrorism and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Improved intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance as well as strategic warning and assessment capacity for NATO are essential to ensure maximum warning and preparation time to counter military and terrorist attacks. Intelligence sets out the requirements for the improved provision, exchange and analysis of all-source political, economic, security and military intelligence, and closer coordination of the intelligence producers within the Alliance.

The Intelligence Steering Board

The Intelligence Steering Board acts as an inter-service coordination body responsible for steering intelligence activities involving the International Staff and the International Military Staff and for providing effective support to the decision-making process at NATO Headquarters. It is tasked, among others, with developing the Strategic Intelligence Requirements from which any capability requirements are derived.

The Military Intelligence Committee

It is responsible for developing a work plan in particular in the areas of NATO Intelligence Support to Operations and oversight of policy guidance on military intelligence.

Medical support

Medical support is normally a national responsibility, however planning needs to be flexible to consider multinational approaches. The degree of multinationality varies according to the circumstances of the mission and the willingness of countries to participate.

The Committee of the Chiefs of Military Medical Services in NATO (COMEDS)

COMEDS is composed of the senior military medical authorities of member countries. It acts as the central point for the development and coordination of military medical matters and for providing medical advice to the Military Committee.

Research and Technology

NATO promotes and conducts cooperative research and information exchange to support the effective use of national defence research and technology and further the military needs of the Alliance.

The Research and Technology Board (RTB)

The RTB is an integrated NATO body responsible for defence research and technological development. It provides advice and assistance to the CNAD, as well as to the Military Committee. It coordinates research and technology policy in different NATO bodies and is supported by a specialized NATO Research and Technology Agency.

Evolution of defence planning within NATO

Article 5 operations and automaticity

In essence, defence planning existed during the Cold War but "operational planning", in the sense that we now know it, did not. This was because it was the task of force (and nuclear) planning to identify all the forces required to implement the collective defence war plans and members were expected to assign and employ the requested forces virtually without question. These war plans were, in effect, the only "operational plans" of the era.

Non-article 5 operations and force generation

When, after the Cold War, the Alliance started to get involved in non-Article 5 operations, the situation had to change. Since these missions are, by agreement, case-by-case and the provision of national forces is discretionary, the automaticity of availability associated with force planning during the Cold War period was lost. This led to the requirement for "force generation conferences" to solicit the necessary forces and "operational planning" to develop the plans.

Existing processes were adjusted so that "defence planning" disciplines no longer focused exclusively on meeting collective defence requirements and the needs of static warfare. Forces, assets, capabilities and facilities had to be capable of facing threats posed by failed states, ethnic
rivalry, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. In fact, acknowledging the ever-changing situation and recognizing the benefits of harmonization and coordination, the existing procedures were reviewed on a regular basis and adjusted as appropriate.

In practical terms, there was no standard defence planning process or defence planning cycle per se. Each one of the seven principal disciplines was managed by a different NATO body and applied special procedures. They also contributed differently to the overall aim of providing the Alliance with the forces and capabilities to undertake the full range of its missions.

**Introducing greater integration and harmonization**

With the differences between the various components of the defence planning process and interrelated disciplines, the need for harmonization and coordination was essential.

While force planning had provided, to a certain extent, a basis for this harmonization and coordination, at the Istanbul Summit NATO leaders concluded that more was required. They directed the Council in Permanent Session to produce comprehensive political guidance in support of the Strategic Concept for all Alliance capabilities issues, planning disciplines and intelligence, responsive to the Alliance’s requirements. They also directed that the interfaces between the respective Alliance planning disciplines, including operational planning, should be further analyzed.

A new process and working methodology were introduced in 2009: the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). It aims to improve the harmonization of the planning domains, including their related committee structure and staffs, and encourage member countries to harmonize and integrate their national defence planning activities so as to complement NATO efforts. In his introductory remarks to defence ministers in June 2009, the then NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, underlined: “If successfully implemented, the NDPP will mark the most profound change to defence planning in decades and has a very high potential to deliver tangible practical results”.

Work on the comprehensive political guidance and a suitable management mechanism to ensure its implementation was completed mid-2009.

Efforts to enhance and coordinate defence planning are not limited to the remit of the Alliance. NATO and the European Union discuss this topic in the EU-NATO Capability Group, which aims to develop the capability requirements common to both organizations. These initiatives build on the “EU and NATO: Coherent and Mutually Reinforcing Capability Requirements” document.
NATO’s role in Afghanistan

NATO’s main role in Afghanistan is to assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) in exercising and extending its authority and influence across the country, paving the way for reconstruction and effective governance. NATO does this predominantly through its United Nations-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Since NATO took command of ISAF in 2003, the Alliance has gradually expanded the reach of its mission, originally limited to Kabul, to cover all of Afghanistan’s territory. Accordingly, the number of ISAF troops has grown from the initial 5000 to around 130 400 troops from 48 countries, including all 28 NATO member nations.

Transition: Inteqal

In January 2010, the Conference on Afghanistan in London pledged “to develop, by the Kabul Conference, a plan for phased transition to Afghan security lead”. Within the framework of Afghan sovereignty, the objectives of the Inteqal Framework (inteqal is the Dari and Pashtu word for “transition”) are to strengthen Afghan ownership and leadership across all the functions of government and throughout the territory of Afghanistan.

After consultations with the Afghan Government, NATO and ISAF Foreign Ministers endorsed in Tallinn in April 2010 the political and military criteria necessary to enable transition to begin.

At the July Kabul Conference in July 2010, the Afghan Government and the international community endorsed a plan for transition. The Government of Afghanistan and the International Community committed to provide the support and the resources necessary for Afghans gradually to take full responsibility for security, governance and development.

Principles of Transition

The following principles will guide the transition process:

- **Transition is a conditions-based process, not a calendar driven event.** Recommendations are based on an assessment of conditions on the ground.
- **Transition does not signify ISAF’s withdrawal from Afghanistan but a gradual shift to a supporting role as Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) capabilities develop.** Gradually, as circumstances dictate, the international community’s civilian and military representatives will shift to supporting, then mentoring, then enabling, and finally sustaining roles across the three pillars of security, governance and development.
- **Operationally, local transition of security responsibilities to the ANSF can take place at the district or even sub-district level in some areas.** As ISAF forces thin out in some areas, some of this “transition dividend” is expected to be reinvested in other areas.
- **Transition will involve key Afghan institutions and functions as well as geographic areas, and it will include the evolution of ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Teams towards a mainstream developmental model.** Headquarters will remain even as ISAF units thin-out.

Criteria for Transition
Successful transition of security responsibility requires that Afghan National Security Forces, under effective Afghan civilian control, will be capable of tackling existing and new security challenges, with continued support from ISAF. Transition assessments will also consider the ability and authority of the Afghan Government to provide the rule of law and manage public administration at sub-national and local levels; and the capacity of an area to sustain socio-economic development. Transition must be irreversible.

**Decision Making Process**

Afghanistan’s provinces will show varying degrees of readiness for transition, depending on the security situation but also the effectiveness of government structures and mechanisms.

In the coming months, as more data from civilian experts, ISAF, the Afghan Government, UNAMA and other key stakeholders is incorporated, assessments will point where specific recommendations can be made and what are the main gaps preventing achievement of the required conditions.

Upon reviewing the assessments and recommendations, the Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board (JANIB) will submit its conclusions to the Afghan Cabinet for approval. The process by which the decision to commence transition is taken is set out below:

The JANIB has begun a thorough joint assessment process. This will allow NATO and ISAF Heads of State and Government to announce, at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, that the transition process is underway. It is expected that implementation of transition will commence in 2011 with the shared ambition, as expressed by President Karzai, to see the Afghan National Security Forces take the lead in conducting security operations across Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

**ISAF’s objectives**

ISAF is a key component of the international community’s engagement in Afghanistan, assisting the Afghan authorities in providing security and stability, in order to create the conditions for reconstruction and development.

**ISAF’s tasks**

Security
In accordance with relevant Security Council Resolutions, ISAF assists the Afghan government in the establishment of a secure and stable environment. To this end, ISAF personnel, together with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), conduct security and stability operations throughout the country. ISAF personnel are also directly involved in the training and development of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) via the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A).

- **Conducting security and stability operations**

  ISAF conducts security and stability operations across Afghanistan. A large and increasing proportion of these operations are conducted in partnership with the ANSF.

- **Training the Afghan National Security Forces**

  NATO-ISAF training efforts in Afghanistan focus on the need to significantly increase the capacity of Afghan security forces in order to enable the international community to gradually hand over lead responsibility for security to the Afghans.

  Through NTM-A, ISAF is helping to bring the ANA and the ANP to self-sustaining capability. This is being done in partnership with the United States.

  In concrete terms, ISAF troop contributing nations (TCNs) have deployed a number of Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and Police OMLTs (POMLTs). These teams are embedded in ANA and ANP units to support training and deploy on operations in an advisory role. OMLTs and POMLTs join ANA and ANP units after they have received initial training.

  In addition to training and mentoring the ANSF, ISAF nations provide donations to help equip the Afghan security forces. Equipment donations include individual equipment such as small arms, ammunition and uniforms, as well as larger equipment, such as tanks and helicopters.

  An ANA Trust Fund covers the transportation and installation costs of equipment donations, the purchase of equipment, the purchase of services for engineering and construction projects, and training, both inside and outside Afghanistan.

- **Disarming illegally armed groups (DIAG)**

  ISAF collects illegal weapons, ordnance and ammunition from armed groups and individuals. Collected weapons are catalogued and safely destroyed so that they no longer represent a threat to the local population, ANSF or ISAF personnel.

- **Facilitating ammunition depots managements**

  NATO administers a Trust Fund Project aimed at enhancing physical security at ANA ammunition depots, and at supporting the development of the ANA’s ammunition stockpile management capabilities. The project was agreed by the Afghan government, ISAF contributing nations (including three lead nations – Belgium, Canada and Luxembourg) and the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) in 2008.

- **Providing post-operation assistance**

  An ISAF Post-Operations Emergency Relief Fund (POERF) was established in 2006 to provide quick humanitarian assistance in the immediate aftermath of significant ISAF military operations. Assistance includes the provision of food, shelter and medicines, as well as the repair of buildings or key infrastructure. Such assistance is provided on a short-term basis, and responsibility is handed over to civilian actors as soon as circumstances permit.

  The fund, established under the auspices of the ISAF Commander (COMISAF), consists entirely of voluntary donations from ISAF troop-contributing nations. The NATO Senior
Civilian Representative (SCR) in Afghanistan regularly updates the North Atlantic Council on use of the fund.

**Reconstruction & Development**

Through its Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), ISAF supports reconstruction and development (R&D) in Afghanistan, securing areas in which reconstruction work is conducted by other national and international actors.

Where appropriate, and in close cooperation and coordination with the Afghan government and representatives of the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), ISAF also provides practical support for R&D work, as well as support for humanitarian assistance efforts conducted by Afghan government organizations, international organizations and NGOs.

*Providing security to permit reconstruction*

Provincial Reconstruction Teams are at the leading edge of the Alliance’s commitment to R&D efforts in Afghanistan.

These teams of civilian and military personnel work together to help extend the authority of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan throughout the country by providing security and supporting the R&D activities of Afghan, international, national and non-governmental actors in the provinces.

In addition to providing area security, PRTs also use their diplomatic and economic capabilities to support security sector reform, encourage good governance and enable reconstruction and development.

While PRTs’ civilian components take the lead in political, economic, humanitarian and social aspects of PRTs’ work, military components focus on increasing security and stability in the area and building security sector capacity in support of the GIRoA’s national development priorities. PRTs’ military components are also in charge of directing assistance to the civilian elements, in particular at the levels of transport, medical assistance and engineering.

Overall, various kinds of projects are underway, facilitated by the PRTs: schools are being rebuilt with the mentoring or assistance of ISAF engineers, allowing children to resume their education; irrigation ditches, pipelines, reservoirs and wells are being constructed to bring water to the local population and farmers; infrastructure is being repaired and/or built to facilitate mobility and communication; and local people are provided with greater access to medical assistance.

Currently, 27 PRTs operate throughout the country. Each is led by a single ISAF nation. Some consist of military forces and civilian personnel from a single nation; others are multinational with contributions from several different countries. However, their military components come under the ISAF command and are coordinated by the related Regional Command.

*Humanitarian Assistance*

Upon request, Provincial Reconstruction Teams assist the Afghan government and international actors with humanitarian relief. In particular, ISAF soldiers have launched several relief missions, distributing medication, food and winter supplies to help Afghan villagers cope with severe weather conditions in different parts of the country.

**Governance**

ISAF, through its Provincial Reconstruction Teams, helps the Afghan authorities strengthen the institutions required to fully establish good governance and rule of law and to promote human rights. PRTs’ principal mission in this respect consist of building capacity, supporting the growth of governance structures and promoting an environment within which governance can improve.

This effort is reinforced by ISAF headquarters and the NATO Senior Civilian Representative, who works to facilitate unity among PRTs’ civilian efforts, generating greater coherence with Afghan provincial and national priorities.
Counter-Narcotics

When requested by the Afghan government, ISAF supports counter-narcotics efforts by sharing information, conducting an efficient public information campaign, and providing in-extremis support to the Afghan National Security Forces’ counter-narcotics operations.

ISAF also assists the training of ANSF personnel in counter-narcotics related activities and provides logistic support, when requested, for the delivery of alternative livelihood programmes.

As reflected in assessments by the United Nations and NATO’s own military commanders, there is a growing nexus between the narcotics industry and the insurgency in some parts of the country. As a result, the Afghan government formally requested that NATO-ISAF provide greater support in counter-narcotics efforts. The Allies agreed to do this at the NATO Defence Ministers’ Meeting in Budapest on 10 October 2008.

This enhanced ISAF support includes the destruction of processing facilities, as well as action against narcotic producers if there is a clearly established link with the insurgency. Such action by ISAF forces can be taken only upon request of the Afghan government and with the consent of the national authorities of the forces involved.

1. The Turkish PRT in Wardak is limited to its civilian component.

ISAF Mandate

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been deployed since 2001 under the authority of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which authorised the establishment of the force to assist the Afghan government in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas – in particular to enable the Afghan authorities as well as UN personnel to operate in a secure environment.

At that time, the operation was limited to the Kabul area, and its command was assumed by ISAF nations on a rotational basis.

In August 2003, upon request of the UN and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, NATO took command of ISAF. Soon after, the UN mandated ISAF’s gradual expansion outside of Kabul.

While not technically a UN force, ISAF has a peace-enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Twelve UN Security Council Resolutions relate to ISAF, namely: 1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 1707, 1776, 1833, 1817, 1890 and 1917 (on 22 March 2010).

A detailed Military Technical Agreement agreed between the ISAF Commander and the Afghan Transitional Authority in January 2002 provides additional guidance for ISAF operations.
The evolution of ISAF

Origin of ISAF

ISAF was created in accordance with the Bonn Conference in December 2001. Afghan opposition leaders attending the conference began the process of reconstructing their country by setting up a new government structure, namely the Afghan Transitional Authority. The concept of a UN-mandated international force to assist the newly established Afghan Transitional Authority was also launched at this occasion to create a secure environment in and around Kabul and support the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

These agreements paved the way for the creation of a three-way partnership between the Afghan Transitional Authority, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and ISAF.

NATO takes on ISAF command

On 11 August 2003 NATO assumed leadership of the ISAF operation, turning the six-month national rotations to an end. The Alliance became responsible for the command, coordination and planning of the force, including the provision of a force commander and headquarters on the ground in Afghanistan.

This new leadership overcame the problem of a continual search to find new nations to lead the mission and the difficulties of setting up a new headquarters every six months in a complex environment. A continuing NATO headquarters also enables small countries, less likely to take over leadership responsibility, to play a strong role within a multinational headquarters.

Expansion of ISAF’s presence in Afghanistan

ISAF’s mandate was initially limited to providing security in and around Kabul. In October 2003, the United Nations extended ISAF’s mandate to cover the whole of Afghanistan (UNSCR 1510), paving the way for an expansion of the mission across the country.

Stage 1: to the north

In December 2003, the North Atlantic Council authorised the Supreme Allied Commander, General James Jones, to initiate the expansion of ISAF by taking over command of the German-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kunduz. The other eight PRTs operating in Afghanistan in 2003 remained under the command of Operation Enduring Freedom, the continuing US-led military operation in Afghanistan.

On 31 December 2003, the military component of the Kunduz PRT was placed under ISAF command as a pilot project and first step in the expansion of the mission.

Six months later, on 28 June 2004, at the Summit meeting of the NATO Heads of State and Government in Istanbul, NATO announced that it would establish four other provincial reconstruction teams in the north of the country: in Mazar-e-Sharif, Meymana, Feyzabad and Baghlan.

This process was completed on 1 October 2004, marking the completion of the first phase of ISAF’s expansion. ISAF’s area of operations then covered some 3,600 square kilometres in the north and the mission was able to influence security in nine Northern provinces of the country.

Stage 2: to the west

On 10 February 2005, NATO announced that ISAF would be further expanded, into the west of Afghanistan.

This process began on 31 May 2006, when ISAF took on command of two additional
PRTs, in the provinces of Herat and Farah and of a Forward Support Base (a logistic base) in Herat.

At the beginning of September, two further ISAF-led PRTs in the west became operational, one in Chaghcharan, capital of Ghor province, and one in Qala-e-Naw, capital of Baghdis province, completing ISAF’s expansion into the west.

The extended ISAF mission led a total of nine PRTs, in the north and the west, providing security assistance in 50% of Afghanistan’s territory. The Alliance continued to make preparations to further expand ISAF, to the south of the country.

In September 2005, the Alliance also temporarily deployed 2,000 additional troops to Afghanistan to support the 18 September provincial and parliamentary elections.

Stage 3: to the south

On 8 December 2005, meeting at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, the Allied Foreign Ministers endorsed a plan that paved the way for an expanded ISAF role and presence in Afghanistan.

The first element of this plan was the expansion of ISAF to the south in 2006, also known as Stage 3.

This was implemented on 31 July 2006, when ISAF assumed command of the southern region of Afghanistan from US-led Coalition forces, expanding its area of operations to cover an additional six provinces – Day Kundi, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Uruzgan and Zabul – and taking command of four additional PRTs.

The expanded ISAF led a total of 13 PRTs in the north, west and south, covering some three-quarters of Afghanistan’s territory.

The number of ISAF forces in the country also increased significantly, from about 10,000 prior to the expansion to about 20,000 after.

Stage 4: ISAF expands to the east, takes responsibility for entire country

On 5 October 2006, ISAF implemented the final stage of its expansion, by taking on command of the international military forces in eastern Afghanistan from the US-led Coalition.

In addition to expanding the Alliance’s area of operations, the revised operational plan also paved the way for a greater ISAF role in the country. This includes the deployment of ISAF OMLTs to Afghan National Army units at various levels of command.
NATO operations and missions

NATO is an active and leading contributor to peace and security on the international stage. Through its crisis management operations, the Alliance demonstrates both its willingness to act as a positive force for change and its capacity to meet the security challenges of the 21st century.

Since its first military intervention in 1995, NATO has been engaged in an increasingly diverse array of operations. Today, roughly 70,000 military personnel are engaged in NATO missions around the world, successfully managing complex ground, air and naval operations in all types of environment. These forces are currently operating in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Iraq, the Mediterranean, off the Horn of Africa and in Somalia.

Current operations and missions

Since its first intervention in the Balkans in 1995, the tempo and diversity of NATO operations have only increased. NATO has since been engaged in missions that cover the full spectrum of crisis management operations – from combat and peacekeeping, to training and logistics support, to surveillance and humanitarian relief. Today, they are operating in Afghanistan, Kosovo, the Mediterranean, off the Horn of Africa, in Iraq and in Somalia.

NATO in Afghanistan

NATO’s operation in Afghanistan currently constitutes the Alliance’s most significant operational commitment to date. Established by UN mandate in 2001, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been under NATO leadership since August 2003.

ISAF comprises just over 130,000 troops from 48 different countries deployed throughout Afghanistan. Its mission is to extend the authority of the Afghan central government in order to create an environment conducive to the functioning of democratic institutions and the establishment of the rule of law.

A major component of this mission is the establishment of professional Afghan National Security Forces that would enable Afghans to assume more and more responsibility for the security of their country. Much progress has already been made. From a non-existent force in 2003, the Afghan army currently comprises approximately 119,400 soldiers, and has begun taking the lead in most operations.

In addition to conducting security operations and building up the Afghan army and police, ISAF is also directly involved in facilitating the development and reconstruction of Afghanistan through 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) which are engaged in identifying reconstruction needs and supporting humanitarian assistance activities throughout the country.

NATO in Kosovo

While Afghanistan remains NATO’s primary operational theatre, the Alliance has not faltered on its other commitments, particularly in the Balkans. Today, approximately 10,000 Allied troops operate in the Balkans as part of NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR).

Having first entered Kosovo in June 1999 to end widespread violence and halt the humanitarian
disaster, KFOR troops continue to maintain a strong presence throughout the territory, preserving
the peace that was imposed by NATO nearly a decade earlier.

Following Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008, NATO agreed it would continue
to maintain its presence on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1244. In June 2008, the
Alliance decided to take on responsibility for supervising the dissolution of the Kosovo Protection
Corps and to help create a professional and multiethnic Kosovo Security Force.

Counter-piracy off the Horn of Africa

Building on previous counter-piracy missions conducted by NATO (Operation Allied Provider and
Operation Allied Protector - see below), Operation Ocean Shield is focusing on at-sea counter-
piracy operations off the Horn of Africa. Approved on 17 August 2009 by the North Atlantic
Council, this operation is contributing to international efforts to combat piracy in the area. It is
also offering, to regional states that request it, assistance in developing their own capacity to
combat piracy activities.

NATO and Iraq

Between the Balkans and Afghanistan lies Iraq, where NATO has been conducting a relatively
small but important support operation.

At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, the Allies rose above their differences and agreed to be part
of the international effort to help Iraq establish effective and accountable security forces. The
outcome was the creation of the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I).

The NTM-I delivers its training, advice and mentoring support in a number of different settings. All
NATO member countries are contributing to the training effort either in or outside of Iraq, through
financial contributions or donations of equipment.

To reinforce this initiative, NATO is working with the Iraqi government on a structured cooperation
framework to develop the Alliance's long-term relationship with Iraq.

Supporting the African Union

Well beyond the Euro-Atlantic region, the Alliance continues to support the African Union (AU) in
its peacekeeping missions on the African continent.

Since June 2007, NATO has assisted the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by providing airlift
support for AU peacekeepers. Following renewed AU requests, the North Atlantic Council has
agreed to extend its support by periods of six months on several occasions – the latest until 31
January 2010. NATO also continues to work with the AU in identifying further areas where NATO
could support the African Standby Force.

NATO’s support to AMISOM coincided with a similar support operation to the AU peacekeeping
mission in Sudan (AMIS). From June 2005 to December 2007, NATO provided air transport for
some 37,000 AMIS personnel, as well as trained and mentored over 250 AMIS officials. While
NATO’s support to this mission ended when AMIS was succeeded by the UN-AU Mission in Darfur
(UNAMID), the Alliance immediately expressed its readiness to consider any request for support to
the new peacekeeping mission.

Terminated operations and missions

Counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa

From October to December 2008, NATO launched Operation Allied Provider, which involved
counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia. Responding to a request from UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon, NATO naval forces provided escorts to UN World Food Programme (WFP)
vessels transiting through the dangerous waters in the Gulf of Aden, where growing piracy has
threatened to undermine international humanitarian efforts in Africa.

Concurrently, in response to an urgent request from the African Union, these same NATO naval
forces escorted a vessel chartered by the AU carrying equipment for the Burundian contingent
deployed to AMISOM.

From March to August 2009, NATO launched Operation Allied Protector, a counter-piracy
operation, to improve the safety of commercial maritime routes and international navigation off
the Horn of Africa. The force conducted surveillance tasks and provided protection to deter and suppress piracy and armed robbery, which are threatening sea lines of communication and economic interests.

Pakistan earthquake relief operation

Just before the onset of the harsh Himalayan winter, a devastating earthquake hit Pakistan on 8 October 2005, killing an estimated 80 000 people and leaving up to three million without food or shelter.

On 11 October, in response to a request from Pakistan, NATO launched an operation to assist in the urgent relief effort. The Alliance airlifted close to 3,500 tons of supplies and deployed engineers, medical units and specialist equipment to assist in relief operations. This was one of NATO’s largest humanitarian relief operations, which came to an end on 1 February 2006.

The Alliance has provided assistance to other countries hit by natural disasters over time, including Turkey, Ukraine and Portugal.

NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Between 1995 and 2004, NATO led a peace support force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, helping to maintain a secure environment and facilitating the country’s reconstruction in the wake of the 1992-1995 war.

In light of the improved security situation, NATO brought its peace support operation to a conclusion in December 2004 and the European Union deployed a new force called Operation Althea. This has taken on the main peace stabilization role previously undertaken by NATO under the Dayton Peace Agreement. NATO has maintained a military headquarters in the country to carry out a number of specific tasks related, in particular, to assisting the government in reforming its defence structures.

NATO in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹

Responding to a request from the Macedonian government, NATO implemented three successive operations there from August 2001 to March 2003.

First, Operation Essential Harvest disarmed ethnic Albanian groups operating on Macedonia’s territory.

The follow-on Operation Amber Fox provided protection for international monitors overseeing the implementation of the peace plan.

Finally, Operation Allied Harmony was launched in December 2002 to provide advisory elements to assist the government in ensuring stability throughout Macedonian territory.

These operations in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* demonstrated the strong inter-institutional cooperation between NATO, the EU and the OSCE.

From 1949 to 1995

During the Cold War

When NATO was established in 1949, one of its fundamental roles was to act as a powerful deterrent against military aggression – a raison d’être that remained unchanged for nearly 50 years.

In this role, NATO’s success was reflected in the fact that, throughout the entire period of the Cold War, NATO forces were not involved in a single military engagement. For much of the latter half of the 20th century, NATO remained vigilant and prepared.

After the Cold War

With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s came great changes to the international security environment. The Alliance witnessed the emergence of new threats and the resurgence of old but familiar ones.

With these changing conditions came new responsibilities. From being an exclusively defensive
alliance for nearly half a century, NATO began to assume an increasingly proactive role within the International Community. This role presented many challenges. The first test for NATO came in 1995, as the crisis in the Balkans reached a tipping point.

**NATO’s first military operation**

After diplomatic efforts failed to end the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the International Community called upon the Alliance to act, and NATO was prepared to respond.

In August 1995, NATO launched Operation Deliberate Force to compel an end to Serb-led violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This successful air campaign paved the way to the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995.

To support the implementation of this peace agreement, NATO immediately deployed a UN-mandated Implementation Force (IFOR) comprising some 60,000 troops. This operation was followed in December 1996 with the deployment of a 32,000-strong Stabilization Force (SFOR), which maintained a secure environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina until the mandate was handed over to a European Union (EU) force in December 2004.

These first three successful peace-support operations demonstrated NATO’s readiness to act decisively when called upon by the International Community. What followed was a period of unprecedented operational activity for the Alliance.

1. Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
NATO has been leading a peace support operation in Kosovo since June 1999 in support of wider international efforts to build peace and stability in the area.

Today, some 8,700 troops from the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), provided by 32 countries (24 NATO and 8 non-NATO), are still deployed in Kosovo to help maintain a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement for all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origin.

Following the declaration of independence on 17 February 2008, the Alliance reaffirmed that KFOR shall remain in Kosovo on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244, unless the United Nations Security Council decides otherwise. In June 2008, NATO agreed to take on new tasks in Kosovo to support the development of professional, democratic and multi-ethnic security structures. These tasks, together with KFOR’s overall mandate, have not been affected by the ruling of the International Court of Justice on 22 July 2010: the Advisory Opinion of the Court on the legality of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence is that it did not violate international law, nor the UNSCR 1244.

Throughout Kosovo, NATO and KFOR are continuing to work with the authorities and, bearing in mind its operational mandate, KFOR is cooperating with and assisting the UN, the EU and other international actors, as appropriate, to support the development of a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic and peaceful Kosovo.

Over time, as the security situation has improved, NATO has gradually adjusted KFOR’s force posture to what is called a deterrent presence: essentially a smaller force progressively relying more on flexibility and intelligence. The pace and level of successive troop reductions will be decided by the North Atlantic Council as the security situation on the ground evolves and in light of security conditions. As such, force levels are being reduced appropriately. This process is conditions- and not calendar-driven.

**KFOR’s objectives**

KFOR deployed into Kosovo on 12 June 1999, in the wake of a 78-day air campaign. This air campaign was launched by the Alliance in March 1999 to halt and reverse the humanitarian catastrophe that was then unfolding.

KFOR derives its mandate from UNSCR 1244 of 10 June 1999 and the Military-Technical Agreement (MTA) between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia. KFOR is operated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and, as such, is a peace enforcement operation, which is more generally referred to as a peace support operation.

Initially, KFOR’s mandate was to:

- deter renewed hostility and threats against Kosovo by Yugoslav and Serb forces;
- establish a secure environment and ensure public safety and order;
- demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army;
- support the international humanitarian effort; and
- coordinate with and support the international civil presence.
KFOR’s presence has been crucial in maintaining safety and security for all individuals and communities in Kosovo. Today, KFOR continues to contribute towards maintaining a safe and secure environment in Kosovo for the benefit of all citizens.

**KFOR’s tasks**

**Initial tasks**

KFOR tasks have included assistance with the return or relocation of displaced persons and refugees; reconstruction and demining; medical assistance; security and public order; security of ethnic minorities; protection of patrimonial sites; border security; interdiction of cross-border weapons smuggling; implementation of a Kosovo-wide weapons, ammunition and explosives amnesty programme; weapons destruction; and support for the establishment of civilian institutions, law and order, the judicial and penal system, the electoral process and other aspects of the political, economic and social life of the province.

Special attention continues to be paid to the protection of minorities. This includes regular patrols near minority enclaves, check points, escorts for minority groups, protection of heritage sites such as monasteries, and donations including food, clothes and school supplies.

**New tasks**

On 12 June 2008, NATO agreed to start implementing its new tasks in Kosovo, i.e. assist in the standing down of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and in the establishment of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) and a civilian structure to oversee the KSF. These tasks are implemented in close coordination and consultation with the relevant local and international authorities.

**Stand-down of the KPC**

The KPC was conceived as a transitional post-conflict arrangement, under the responsibility of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Its mandate was to provide disaster response services, perform search and rescue, provide a capacity for humanitarian assistance in isolated areas, assist de-mining and contribute to rebuilding infrastructure and communities.

The KPC ceased its operational activities on 20 January 2009 and was formally dissolved on 14 June 2009. In parallel, the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) was developed to ensure that key capabilities were available for emergency situations.

Those KPC members not recruited into the KSF have been resettled, reintegrated or retired with dignity. A resettlement programme funded by a NATO Trust Fund is being implemented by a local partner Non-Governmental Organisation (APPK) under the supervision of the UN Development Program (UNDP).

**Stand-up of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF)**

NATO is responsible for supervising and supporting the stand-up and training of a multi-ethnic, professional and civilian controlled KSF. The Kosovo-wide recruitment campaign for the KSF started on 21 January 2009 and focused on encouraging all minority communities in Kosovo to apply.

The KSF shall be a lightly armed force, with no heavy weapons such as tanks, heavy artillery or offensive air capability. It shall have primary responsibility for security tasks that are not appropriate for the police such as emergency response, explosive ordnance disposal, management of hazardous material, fire fighting and civil protection. It may also participate in crisis response operations, including peace support operations.

This professional, all-volunteer force is being trained according to NATO standards and is placed under civilian-led, democratic control. The recruitment process is reaching out across society and being carried out in two official languages: Albanian and Serbian. At present, the KSF comprises 1,962 personnel. Its total strength will not exceed 2,500 active personnel and 800 reservists. Training activities and courses started on 2 February 2009. The Initial Operational Capability was reached in mid-September 2009, with some 1,500 personnel; full operational capability is expected in 2012-2013. Recruitment and training continue, supported by KFOR.
Establish a civilian-led body to supervise the KSF

NATO continues to assist the authorities of Kosovo in establishing a ministry for the Kosovo Security Force. Primary responsibility for this task rests with NATO HQ in Brussels; KFOR is tasked to support the NATO Advisory Team that has been established in Pristina.

The ministry for the KSF is a civilian-led organization that exercises civilian control over the KSF. The minister for the KSF, through his ministry, exercises day-to-day responsibility for the KSF.

Command and structure of KFOR

KFOR was restructured in February 2010. The five Multinational Task Forces, which had been in place since June 2006, were succeeded by mission-tailored Multinational Battle Groups (MNBGs).

Today’s Multinational Battle Groups

A Battle Group is a military organization at the level of a battalion, consisting of numerous companies. These companies are highly mobile, flexible and rapidly deployable to potential trouble spots all over Kosovo. There are five MNBGs, which constitute KFOR and are ready to react to any threatening situation:

- MNBG North;
- MNBG South;
- MNNG East;
- MNBG West; and
- MNBG Centre, which also covers the KFOR Headquarters in Pristina.

These five MNBGs come under a single chain of command, under the authority of Commander KFOR (COMKFOR). COMKFOR reports to the Commander of Joint Force Command Naples (COM JFCN), Italy. The current COMKFOR is Major General Erhard Bühler, German Army. He assumed command of the Kosovo Force on 1 September 2010.

With the move to Transition Gate 2, KFOR is being restructured with the number of MNBGs being reduced to two.

Previous formations

Originally, KFOR was formed by four Multinational Brigades (MNB East, MNB Center, MNB Northeast, MNB Southwest) and from June 2006, by five Multinational Task Forces (MNTF): Multinational Task Force (MNTF) Centre based in Lipljan; MNTF North based in Novo Selo; MNTF South based in Prizren; MNTF West based in Pec; and MNTF East based in Urosevac.

KFOR’s transition from Brigades to Task Forces was aimed at improving the effectiveness of the forces and their ability to operate flexibly throughout Kosovo without restriction. In addition, it placed more emphasis on intelligence-led operations, with MNTFs working closely with both the local police and the local population to gather information.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Former KFOR commanders</th>
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<tr>
<td>Lt. Gen. Thorstein Skiaker, NO A</td>
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</table>
The evolution of NATO’s role in Kosovo

KFOR deploys

UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 was adopted on 10 June 1999 and on 12 June, the first elements of the NATO-led Kosovo Force, or KFOR, entered Kosovo. By 20 June, the withdrawal of Serbian forces was complete.

KFOR was initially composed of some 50,000 men and women from NATO member countries, Partner countries and non-NATO countries under unified command and control. By early 2002, KFOR was reduced to around 39,000 troops. The improved security environment enabled NATO to reduce KFOR troop levels to 26,000 by June 2003 and to 17,500 by the end of 2003.

Renewed violence

A setback in progress towards a stable, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo occurred in March 2004, when renewed violence broke out between Albanians and Serbs. At that time, KFOR troops were under attack. An additional 2,500 soldiers were rapidly deployed to reinforce the existing KFOR strength.

At the 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO leaders condemned the renewed ethnic violence and reaffirmed NATO’s commitment to a secure, stable and multi-ethnic Kosovo.

The Kosovo status talks

After 14 months of UN-led negotiations, the Special Envoy for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, presented his Comprehensive Proposal for a Kosovo Status Settlement to the UN Secretary-General in March 2007. Whilst Pristina endorsed the Ahtisaari Proposal, Belgrade categorically rejected it.

On 1 August 2007, in the absence of any UN Security Council decision on Kosovo’s future status, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon launched an extended period of engagement with the parties, led this time by an EU, Russia, US Troika under the auspices of the Contact Group. By the end of the Troika’s mandate on 10 December 2007, the negotiating parties failed to reach any agreement on Kosovo’s status.

Throughout the negotiations, NATO supported the efforts of Martti Ahtisaari and, subsequently, those of the Troika to settle Kosovo’s status; KFOR helped maintain safety and stability on the ground allowing the negotiations to proceed without disruption.

In December 2007 NATO foreign ministers agreed that KFOR would remain in Kosovo on the basis of UNSCR 1244, unless the Security Council decided otherwise. They also renewed their commitment to maintain KFOR’s national force contributions, including reserves, at current levels and with no new caveats.

At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, NATO leaders agreed that NATO and KFOR would continue to work with the authorities. They also agreed that, bearing in mind its operational mandate, KFOR would cooperate with and assist the United Nations, the European Union and other international actors, as appropriate, to support the development of a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic and peaceful Kosovo. They also stressed that NATO stands ready to play its part in the implementation of future security arrangements.

NATO foreign ministers, on 2-3 December 2008, reaffirmed that the UN-mandated NATO-led KFOR presence will remain in Kosovo on the basis of UNSCR 1244. They stressed that the prompt deployment of the European Union’s Rule and Law mission (EULEX) throughout all Kosovo was an urgent priority, and in this context noted the adoption by the UN Security Council of a statement of its presidency in support of the reconfiguration of UNMIK. They reaffirmed that NATO will continue to work towards the standing down of the Kosovo Protection Corps and the establishment of the Kosovo Security Force on the basis of NATO’s voluntary
An improved security situation

Since then, the security situation has continued to improve. As a result, on 11-12 June 2009, NATO defence ministers decided to gradually adjust KFOR’s force posture to what is called a deterrent presence. This means that, when appropriate and according to the evolution of events, over time NATO will reduce the number of forces on the ground, with the remaining forces in theatre progressively relying more on intelligence and flexibility.

At their informal meeting in Istanbul on 3-4 February 2010, NATO defence ministers were informed by the NATO Military Authorities that KFOR had successfully achieved the so-called Gate One in its transition to a deterrent presence, reducing the number of troops on the ground to some 10,200. The move to Gate 2, allowing for a total of approximately 5,000 troops, has been recommended by NATO Military Authorities and recently authorized by the North Atlantic Council (NAC).

Future decisions on further reducing KFOR’s footprint in Kosovo will continue to need the approval of the NAC in the light of both military and political considerations, with no automaticity in the move to a deterrent presence.
Counter-piracy operations

Growing piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa is threatening to undermine international humanitarian efforts in Africa, as well as safety of commercial maritime routes and international navigation. NATO is actively helping to increase security by conducting counter-piracy operations in the area.

On the request of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, in late 2008, NATO started to provide escorts to UN World Food Programme vessels transiting through these dangerous waters under Operation Allied Provider (October-December 2008). This operation was succeeded by Operation Allied Protector (March-August 2009) and currently Operation Ocean Shield, which additionally offers training to regional countries in developing their own capacity to combat piracy activities.

NATO is conducting counter-piracy activities in full complementarity with the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and with actions against piracy by other actors, including the European Union.

- Operation Ocean Shield - ongoing
- Past operations
  - Operation Allied Protector
  - Operation Allied Provider

Operation Ocean Shield - ongoing

The mission, its objectives and scope

Piracy and armed robbery are threatening vital sea lines of communication and economic interests in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa, as well as disrupting the delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia.

Building on previous counter-piracy missions conducted by NATO, Operation Ocean Shield is principally focusing on at-sea counter-piracy operations in the area. NATO has also agreed, at the request of the UN, to escort the UNSOA - United Nations Support Office for AMISOM - supply vessels to the harbour entrance of Mogadishu within means and capabilities available at the specific moment. A novelty is that the Alliance has broadened its approach to combating piracy by introducing a new element to its mission: it is currently exploring ways in which it could offer, to regional states that request it, assistance in developing their own capacity to combat piracy activities.

This operation was approved by the North Atlantic Council on 17 August 2009 and has been extended until the end of 2012.

Composition and command of the naval force

The current rotation

SNMG1 is currently conducting Operation Ocean Shield. The following ships have been assigned under the command of Commodore Christian Rune (Royal Danish Navy), as well as a submarine (HNLMS Zeeleeuw):

- HDMS Esbern Snare (Flagship, Denmark);
Commodore Rune is under the overall command of Admiral Sir Trevor Soar, Allied Maritime Component Command Headquarters Northwood, in the United Kingdom, which is one of the three Component Commands of Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum.

Previous rotations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>March-August 2010 SNMG2</th>
<th>12 March-30 June: Commodore Steve Chick (UK)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HMS Chatham (Flagship, Royal Navy)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HS LIMNOS (Greek Navy)-under national control from 30 May</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ITS SCIROCCO (Italian Navy)-under national control from 5 June</td>
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<td></td>
<td>TCG Gelibolu (Turkish Navy)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USS Cole (US Navy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st July-6 August:</td>
<td>Commodore Michiel Hijmans (Royal Netherlands Navy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HNLMS De Zeven Provinciën (Flagship, the Netherlands)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>TCG Gelibolu (Turkey)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>USS Cole (United States)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NRP Álvares Cabral (outgoing flagship, Portugal)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>H DMS Absalon (incoming flagship, Denmark)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>HMS Fredericton (Canada)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>USS Boone (United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HMS Chatham (United Kingdom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. – Nov. 2009 SNMG2</td>
<td>Commodore Steve Chick (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HS Navarinon (frigate F461, Greece)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ITS Libeccio (Italian frigate)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>TCG Gediz (Turkish frigate)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HMS Cornwall (United Kingdom frigate)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>USS Donald Cook (United States destroyer)</td>
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</table>

SNMG1 and SNMG 2

NATO has two Immediate Reaction Forces: the Standing NATO Maritime Group composed of the SNMG1 and the SNMG2; and the Standing NATO Maritime Mine Countermeasure Groups (SNMCMG1 and SNMCMG2).

The Standing NATO Maritime Groups are a multinational, integrated maritime force made up of vessels from various allied countries. These vessels are permanently available to NATO to perform different tasks ranging from participating in exercises to actually intervening in operational missions. These groups provide NATO with a continuous maritime capability for operations and other activities in peacetime and in periods of crisis and conflict. They also help to establish Alliance presence, demonstrate solidarity, conduct routine diplomatic visits to different countries, support transformation and provide a variety of maritime military capabilities to ongoing missions.

SNMG1 and SNMG2 alternate according to the operational needs of the Alliance, therefore helping to maintain optimal flexibility. Their composition varies as naval units are provided on a rotational four-to-six month basis. They are composed of between six and ten ships from as many NATO member countries.

SNMG1 is usually employed in the Eastern Atlantic area, but it can deploy anywhere NATO requires. It is made up of vessels from different member countries. Those that routinely contribute to SNMG1 are Canada, Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and the United States. Other countries have occasionally contributed.

SNMG2 is usually employed in the Mediterranean area, but it can deploy anywhere NATO requires. Member countries that routinely contribute to SNMG2 are Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, with other countries occasionally contributing.

Normally, SNMG2 and SNMCMG2 come under the command of Allied Maritime Component Command (CC-Mar) Naples, which is one of the three Component Commands of Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum.
Command Naples. However, for Operation Ocean Shield, SNMG2 has been put under the Operational Control of Component Command Maritime Headquarters Northwood, and under the overall responsibility of Joint Headquarters Lisbon.

**Past operations**

**Operation Allied Protector**

The mission, its objectives and scope

Operation Allied Protector helped to deter, defend against and disrupt pirate activities in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa.

From 24 March until 29 June 2009, the operation was conducted by SNMG1 vessels. As previously indicated, SNMG1 is usually employed in the Eastern Atlantic area, but it can deploy anywhere NATO requires. The first phase of Operation Allied Protector was undertaken as the force left for NATO’s first ever deployment to South East Asia. It made a short visit to Karachi (Pakistan) on 26-27 April. However, with the increase in pirate attacks, on 24 April NATO had already decided to cancel the other two port visits planned to Singapore and Australia. As such, the second phase of the operation, which was meant to take place as SNMG1 made its return journey towards European waters end June, was brought forward to 1 May.

From 29 June 2009, the Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2) took over responsibility from SNMG1. It had conducted NATO’s first counter-piracy operation – Operation Allied Provider (see below).

Composition and command of the naval force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>24 March–29 June 2009 SNMG1</th>
<th>29 June–August 2009 SNMG2</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rear Admiral Jose Pereira de Cunha (PO)</td>
<td>Commodore Steve Chick (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRP Corte Real (flagship, Portugal)</td>
<td>ITS Libeccio (frigate, Italy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMCS Winnipeg (Canada)</td>
<td>HS Navarion (frigate F461, Greece)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HNLMS de Zeven Provinciën (The Netherlands)</td>
<td>TCG Gediz (frigate F495, Turkey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPS Blas de Lezo (Spain)</td>
<td>HMS Cornwall (frigate F99, United Kingdom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS Halyburton (United States)</td>
<td>USS Laboon (destroyer DDG58, United States)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Operation Allied Provider (October–December 2008)**

The mission, its objectives and scope

Allied Operation Allied Provider was responsible for naval escorts to World Food Program (WFP) vessels and, more generally, patrolled the waters around Somalia. Alliance presence also helped to deter acts of piracy that threatened the region.

While providing close protection for WFP vessels and patrolling routes most susceptible to criminal acts against merchant vessels, NATO ships could use force pursuant to the authorized Rules of Engagement and in compliance with relevant international and national law.

Allied Provider was a temporary operation that was requested by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, on 25 September 2008. NATO provided this counter-piracy capacity in support of UNSC Resolutions 1814, 1816 and 1838, and in coordination with other international actors, including the European Union.

NATO defence ministers agreed to respond positively to the UN’s request on 9 October, during an informal meeting held in Budapest, Hungary. Following this decision, planning started to redirect assets of SNMG2 to conduct anti-piracy duties.

SNMG2 was already scheduled to conduct a series of Gulf port visits in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates within the framework of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). As
such, it started to transit the Suez Canal on 15 October to conduct both duties at the same time.

Composition and command of the naval force

At the time of the operation, SNMG2 comprised seven ships from Germany, Greece, Italy, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, of which three were assigned to Operation Allied Provider:

- ITS Durand de la Penne (flagship, destroyer D560, Italy);
- HS Temistokles (frigate F465, Greece);
- HMS Cumberland (frigate F85, United Kingdom).

The other four ships (FGS Karlsruhe-Germany; FGS Rhôn-Germany; TCG Gokova-Turkey; and USS The Sullivans-USA) continued deployment to ICI countries. This was the first time a NATO-flagged force deployed to the Gulf.

At the time of the operation, SNMG2 was commanded by Rear Admiral Giovanni Gumiero, Italian Navy, who was appointed to this post in July 2008. He reported to the Commander of Allied Component Command Maritime (CC-Mar) Naples. CC Mar Naples is one of the three Component Commands of Allied Joint Force Command Naples.
NATO’s relations with the United Nations

NATO and the United Nations (UN) share a commitment to maintaining international peace and security. The two organizations have been cooperating in this area since the early 1990s.

Over the years, cooperation has broadened to include consultations between NATO and UN specialised bodies on issues such as crisis management, civil-military cooperation, combating human trafficking, mine action, civil emergency planning, women and peace and security, arms control and non-proliferation, and the fight against terrorism.

In September 2008, the UN and NATO established a framework for expanded consultation and cooperation between the two organizations. This will help both organizations to address threats and challenges more effectively.

Close cooperation between NATO and the UN and its agencies is an important element in the development of an international “Comprehensive Approach” to crisis management and operations.

The UN is at the core of the framework of international organizations within which the Alliance operates, a principle that is enshrined in NATO’s founding treaty.

UN Security Council resolutions have provided the mandate for NATO’s operations in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, and the framework for NATO’s training mission in Iraq.

NATO has also provided support to UN-sponsored operations, including logistical assistance to the African Union’s UN-endorsed peacekeeping operations in Darfur, Sudan, and in Somalia; support for UN disaster-relief operations in Pakistan, following the massive earthquake in 2005; and escorting merchant ships carrying World Food Programme humanitarian supplies off the coast of Somalia.

Framework for cooperation

Evolution of cooperation in the field

The North Atlantic Treaty and the UN Charter

Framework for NATO-UN cooperation

NATO’s Secretary General reports regularly to the UN Secretary General on progress in NATO-led operations and on other key decisions of the North Atlantic Council in the area of crisis management and in the fight against terrorism. In recent years, staff-level meetings and high-level visits have become more frequent. The UN is frequently invited to attend NATO ministerial meetings.

In September 2008, building on the experience of over a decade of working together, the Secretaries General of the two organizations agreed to establish a framework for expanded consultation and cooperation. This will include regular exchanges and dialogue at senior and working levels on political and operational issues. Increasing cooperation will significantly contribute to addressing the threats and challenges that the international community faces.

Within this framework, cooperation will be further developed between NATO and the UN on issues of common interest, including in communication and information-sharing; capacity-building, training and exercises; lessons learned, planning and support for contingencies; and operational
coordination and support. Cooperation will continue to develop in a practical fashion, taking into account each organization’s specific mandate, expertise, procedures and capabilities.

Staff-level meetings also take place with other UN organizations, such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), and NATO experts participate in events organized by other UN bodies.

NATO also contributes actively to the work of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (UN CTC) – established in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1373 in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States – and participates in special meetings of the Committee bringing together international, regional and sub-regional organizations involved in this process. NATO and the UN conduct reciprocal briefings on progress in the area of counter-terrorism, in their respective committees. NATO is also committed to supporting the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

Since 2004, NATO has been working with a number of UN agencies in the framework of the Environmental Security (ENVSEC) Initiative, through the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme. (See NATO A-to-Z page on Environmental Security)*

**Evolution of NATO-UN cooperation in the field**

Working relations between the United Nations and the Alliance were limited during the Cold War. This changed in 1992, against the background of growing conflict in the western Balkans, where their respective roles in crisis management led to an intensification of practical cooperation between the two organizations in the field.

**Bringing peace to the former Yugoslavia**

In July 1992, NATO ships belonging to the Alliance’s Standing Naval Force Mediterranean, assisted by NATO Maritime Patrol Aircraft, began monitoring operations in the Adriatic in support of a UN arms embargo against all republics of the former Yugoslavia. A few months later, in November 1992, NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) began enforcement operations in support of UN Security Council resolutions aimed at preventing the escalation of the conflict.

The readiness of the Alliance to support peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council was formally stated by NATO foreign ministers in December 1992. A number of measures were subsequently taken, including joint maritime operations under the authority of the NATO and WEU Councils; NATO air operations; close air support for the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR); air strikes to protect UN “Safe Areas”; and contingency planning for other options which the United Nations might take.

Following the signature of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Agreement) on 14 December 1995, NATO was given a mandate by the United Nations, on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1031, to implement the military aspects of the peace agreement. NATO’s first peacekeeping operation, the Implementation Force (IFOR), began operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina to fulfill this mandate in December 1995. One year later, it was replaced by a NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR). Throughout their mandates both multinational forces worked closely with other international organizations and humanitarian agencies on the ground, including UN agencies such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF).

From the onset of the conflict in Kosovo in 1998 and throughout the crisis, close contacts were maintained between the UN Secretary General and NATO’s Secretary General. Actions were taken by the Alliance in support of UN Security Council resolutions both during and after the conflict. The Kosovo Force (KFOR) was deployed on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 12 June 1999 to provide an international security presence as the prerequisite for peace and reconstruction of Kosovo. Throughout its deployment, KFOR has worked closely with the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

In 2000 and 2001, NATO and the United Nations also cooperated successfully in containing major ethnic discord in southern Serbia and preventing a full-blown civil war in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

**Afghanistan**

Cooperation between NATO and the UN is playing a key role in Afghanistan. The Alliance formally
took over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a UN-mandated force, in August 2003. Originally tasked with helping provide security in and around Kabul, ISAF has subsequently been authorized by a series of UN Security Council resolutions to expand its presence into other regions of the country to extend the authority of the central government and to facilitate development and reconstruction.

NATO and ISAF work closely with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and other international actors that are supporting governance, reconstruction and development. The close cooperation takes place in various settings, in Afghanistan as well as in UN and NATO capitals. It includes co-membership of the Joint Co-ordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) overseeing the implementation of the internationally endorsed Afghanistan Compact, co-chairmanship together with the Afghan Government of the Executive Steering Committee for Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and other joint Afghan-International Community bodies.

The practical close work also covers cooperation between UNAMA, ISAF and the NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Kabul on civil-military issues such as operational planning. Beyond Kabul city, close civil-military cooperation between UNAMA and ISAF is also being pursued in those provinces where both ISAF and UNAMA are present. This practical work is now being developed comprehensively in the context of UNAMA’s Integrated Approach to selected prioritized Afghan districts.

**Iraq**

Under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1546 and at the request of the Iraqi Interim Government, NATO is providing assistance in training and equipping Iraqi security forces.

**Supporting African Union missions**

In June 2005, following a request from the African Union and in close coordination with the United Nations and the European Union, NATO agreed to support the African Union’s Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which is trying to end the continuing violence in the Darfur region. NATO assisted by airlifting peacekeepers from African troop-contributing countries to the region and also helped train AU troops in how to run a multinational military headquarters and how to manage intelligence.

Following a request from the African Union in 2007, NATO accepted to assist the African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by providing airlift support to AU member states willing to deploy on this mission. NATO is also providing expertise in the area of air movement coordination and military manpower management.

**Deterring piracy**

In October 2008, NATO agreed to a request from the UN Secretary General to deploy ships off the coast of Somalia to deter piracy and escort merchant ships carrying World Food Programme cargo.

**The North Atlantic Treaty and the UN Charter**

The Charter of the United Nations, signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945 by fifty nations, provides the legal basis for the creation of NATO and acknowledges the overall responsibility of the UN Security Council for international peace and security.

The preamble to NATO’s North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington on 4 April 1949 makes it clear that the UN Charter is the framework within which the Alliance operates. In its opening phrases, the signatories of the Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter.

In Article 1 they also undertake to settle international disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN Charter.

Article 5 of the Treaty makes explicit reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter in asserting the right of the Allies to take, individually or collectively, such action as they deem necessary for their self-defence. Moreover, it commits the member countries to terminating any armed attack and all measures taken as a result, when the UN Security Council has itself taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Further reference to the UN Charter can be found in Article 7 of the North Atlantic Treaty. It states
that the Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of Allies under the Charter, and reaffirms the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

And finally, in Article 12, a clause was included in the Treaty providing for it to be reviewed after ten years, if any of the Parties to it so requested. It stipulated that the review would take place in the light of new developments affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal and regional arrangements under the UN Charter.

1. Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
NATO-EU: a strategic partnership

NATO and the European Union are working together to prevent and resolve crises and armed conflicts in Europe and beyond. The two organizations share common strategic interests and cooperate in a spirit of complementarity and partnership.

Beyond cooperation in the field, other key priorities for cooperation are to ensure that our capability development efforts are mutually reinforcing, as well as to combat terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

NATO attributes great importance to its relationship with the European Union. A strong European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) can only benefit NATO and foster a more equitable transatlantic security partnership.

Close cooperation between NATO and the European Union is an important element in the development of an international "Comprehensive Approach" to crisis management and operations, which requires the effective application of both military and civilian means.

NATO seeks a strong NATO-EU partnership not only on the ground, where both organizations have deployed assets such as in Kosovo and Afghanistan, but also in their strategic dialogue at the political headquarters level in Brussels. It is important to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, to ensure transparency and to respect the autonomy of the two organizations.

Institutionalized relations between NATO and the European Union were launched in 2001, building on steps taken during the 1990s to promote greater European responsibility in defence matters. The political principles underlying the relationship were set out in the December 2002 NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP.

With the enlargement of both organizations in 2004 followed by the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union in 2007, NATO and the European Union now have 21 member countries in common.

- Framework for cooperation
- Cooperation in the field
- Other areas of cooperation
- Participation
- Evolution of NATO-EU relations

Framework for cooperation

NATO and EU officials meet on a regular basis to discuss issues of common interest. Meetings take place at different levels including at the level of foreign ministers, ambassadors, military representatives and defence advisors. There are regular staff contacts between NATO’s International Staff and International Military Staff, and the European Union’s Council Secretariat and Military Staff as well as the European Defence Agency.

Permanent military liaison arrangements have been established to facilitate cooperation at the operational level. A NATO Permanent Liaison Team has been operating at the EU Military Staff since November 2005 and an EU Cell was set up at SHAPE (NATO’s strategic command for
operations in Mons, Belgium) in March 2006.

An exchange of letters between the NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency in January 2001 defined the scope of cooperation and modalities of consultation on security issues between the two organizations. Cooperation accelerated with the signing of the NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP in December 2002 and the agreement, in March 2003, of the framework for cooperation.

**NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP**

The NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP, agreed on 16 December 2002, reaffirmed the EU assured access to NATO’s planning capabilities for its own military operations and reiterated the political principles of the strategic partnership: effective mutual consultation; equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy of the European Union and NATO; respect for the interests of EU and NATO members states; respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; and coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the military capability requirements common to the two organizations.

**The “Berlin-Plus” arrangements**

As part of the framework for cooperation adopted on 17 March 2003, the so-called “Berlin-Plus” arrangements provide the basis for NATO-EU cooperation in crisis management by allowing the European Union to have access to NATO’s collective assets and capabilities for EU-led operations, including command arrangements and assistance in operational planning. In effect, they allow the Alliance to support EU-led operations in which NATO as a whole is not engaged.

**Cooperation in the field**

**The Balkans**

In July 2003, the European Union and NATO published a “Concerted Approach for the Western Balkans”. Jointly drafted, it outlines core areas of cooperation and emphasises the common vision and determination both organizations share to bring stability to the region.

- **The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia**
  On 31 March 2003, the EU-led Operation Concordia took over the responsibilities of the NATO-led mission, Operation Allied Harmony, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*. This mission, which ended in December 2003, was the first "Berlin Plus" operation in which NATO assets were made available to the European Union.

- **Bosnia and Herzegovina**
  Building on the results of Concordia and following the conclusion of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Union deployed a new mission called Operation Althea on 2 December 2004. The EU force (EUFOR) operates under the “Berlin-Plus” arrangements, drawing on NATO planning expertise and on other Alliance’s assets and capabilities. The NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe is the Commander of Operation Althea. There is also an EU Operation Headquarters (OHQ) located at SHAPE.

- **Kosovo**
  NATO has been leading a peacekeeping force in Kosovo (KFOR) since 1999. The European Union has contributed civil assets to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) for years and agreed to take over the component of the UN Mission. The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), which deployed in December 2008, is the largest civilian mission ever launched under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The central aim is to assist and support the Kosovo authorities in the rule of law area, specifically in the police, judiciary and customs areas. EULEX works closely with KFOR in the field. NATO and EU experts worked in the same team to support the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Martti Ahtisaari, in negotiations on the future status of the province of Kosovo.

**Cooperation in other regions**

- **Afghanistan**
  NATO and the European Union are playing key roles in bringing peace and stability to Afghanistan, within the international community’s broader efforts to implement a comprehensive approach in their efforts to assist the country. The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force helps create a stable and secure environment in which the
Afghan government as well as other international actors can build democratic institutions, extend the rule of law and reconstruct the country. NATO welcomed the EU’s launch of an ESDP Rule of Law mission (EUPOL) in June 2007. The European Union has also initiated a programme for justice reform and is helping to fund civilian projects in NATO- run Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that are led by an EU member country.

Darfur
Both NATO and the EU supported the African Union’s mission in Darfur, Sudan, in particular with regard to airlift rotations.

Piracy
Since September 2008, NATO and EU naval forces are deployed side by side, with other actors, off the coast of Somalia for anti-piracy missions.

Other areas of cooperation

Capabilities
Together with operations, capability development is an area where cooperation is essential and where there is potential for further growth. The NATO-EU Capability Group was established in May 2003 to ensure the coherence and mutual reinforcement of NATO and EU capability development efforts. This applies to initiatives such as the EU Battle Groups, developed within the “Headline Goal” for 2010, and the NATO Response Force, and efforts in both organizations to improve the availability of helicopters for operations.

Following the creation, in July 2004, of the European Defence Agency (EDA) to coordinate work within the European Union on the development of defence capabilities, armaments cooperation, acquisition and research, EDA experts contribute to the work of the Capability Group.

Terrorism and WMD proliferation
Both NATO and the European Union are committed to combat terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They have exchanged information on their activities in the field of protection of civilian populations against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) attacks. The two organizations also cooperate in the field of civil emergency planning by exchanging inventories of measures taken in this area.

Participation
Since the enlargement of NATO and the European Union in 2004 and the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union in 2007, the organizations have 21 member countries in common.

Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, and the United States, which are members of NATO but not of the EU, participate in all NATO-EU meetings. So do Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and since 2008, Malta, which are members of the EU and of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme.

However, Cyprus which is not a PfP member and does not have a security agreement with NATO on the exchange of classified documents, cannot participate in official NATO-EU meetings. This is a consequence of decisions taken by NATO and the EU in December 2002 – before the 2004 rounds of enlargement – when NATO had 19 members and the EU 15. Informal meetings including Cyprus take place occasionally at different levels (foreign ministers, ambassadors and military delegates).

Evolution of NATO-EU relations
In the 1990s, there was a growing realization of the need for European countries to assume greater responsibility for their common security. In parallel, NATO recognized the need to develop a “European Security and Defence Identity” within the organization that would be both an integral part of the adaptation of NATO’s political and military structures and an important contributing factor to the development of European defence capabilities.

This led to the development of arrangements between NATO and Western European Union (WEU), which, at that time, was acting for the European Union in the area of security and defence (1992 Maastricht Treaty). These arrangements laid the groundwork for the subsequent development of the NATO-EU strategic partnership, after the the WEU’s crisis-management role was transferred to
the European Union in 1999.

In January 2001, an exchange of letters between the NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency formalized the start of direct relations between NATO and the EU. Since then, considerable progress has been made in developing the NATO-EU strategic partnership, though its full potential is yet to be realized.

Key milestones:

Feb 1992

The EU adopts the Maastricht Treaty, which envisages an intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the eventual framing of a common defence policy (ESDP), with the WEU as the EU's defence component.

Close cooperation established between NATO and the WEU.

In Oslo, NATO foreign ministers support the objective of developing the WEU as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance and as the defence component of the EU, that would also cover the "Petersberg tasks" (humanitarian search and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, crisis management tasks including peacemaintenance, and environmental protection).

June 1992

Allied leaders agree to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy. NATO endorses the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces, which provides for "separable but not separate" deployable headquarters that could be used for European-led operations and is the conceptual basis for future operations involving NATO and other non-NATO countries.

Jan 1994

At a summit in St Malo, France and the United Kingdom make a joint statement affirming the EU's determination to establish a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

April 1999

At the Washington Summit, Heads of State and Government decide to develop the "Berlin-Plus" arrangements.

June 1999

European Council meeting in Cologne decides "to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence".

At the Helsinki Council meeting, EU members establish military "headline goals" to allow the EU, by 2003, to deploy up to 60 000 troops for 'Petersberg tasks'. EU members also create political and military structures including a Political and Security Committee, a Military Committee and a Military Staff. The crisis management role of the WEU is transferred to the EU. The WEU retains residual tasks.

Sep 2000

Signature of the EU's Treaty of Nice containing amendments reflecting the operative developments of the ESDP as an independent EU policy (entry into force February 2003).

Dec 2000

Beginning of institutionalised relations between NATO and the EU with the establishment of joint meetings, including at the level of foreign ministers and ambassadors. Exchange of letters between the NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency on the scope of cooperation and modalities for consultation.

Dec 2002

EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP.
1. 28 NATO member countries: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

2. Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

Mar 2003
Agreement on the framework for cooperation. Entry into force of a NATO-EU security of information agreement. Transition from the NATO-led operation 'Allied Harmony' to the EU-led Operation 'Concordia' in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

May 2003
First meeting of the NATO-EU capability group.

July 2003
Development of a common strategy for the Western Balkans.

Nov 2003
First joint NATO-EU crisis-management exercise.

Feb 2004
France, Germany and the United Kingdom launch the idea of EU rapid reaction units composed of joint battle groups.

Dec 2004
Beginning of the EU-led Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Sep 2005
Transatlantic (NATO-EU) informal ministerial dinner (New York).

Oct 2005
Agreement on Military Permanent Arrangements establishing a NATO Liaison Team at EUMS and an EU cell at SHAPE.

Dec 2009
Transatlantic (NATO-EU) informal ministerial dinner (Brussels)

Nov 2005
NATO Permanent Liaison Team set up at the EU Military Staff.

Mar 2006
EU Cell set up at SHAPE.

Apr 2006
Transatlantic (NATO-EU) informal ministerial dinner (Sofia)

Sep 2006
Transatlantic (NATO-EU) informal ministerial dinner (New York)

Jan 2007
Transatlantic (NATO-EU) informal ministerial dinner (Brussels)

Apr 2007
Transatlantic (NATO-EU) informal ministerial dinner (Oslo)

Sep 2007
Transatlantic (NATO-EU) informal ministerial dinner (New York)

Dec 2007
Transatlantic (NATO-EU) informal ministerial dinner (Brussels)

Sep 2008
Transatlantic (NATO-EU) informal ministerial dinner (New York)

Dec 2008
Transatlantic (NATO-EU) informal ministerial dinner (Brussels)

Jan 2009
NAC agreement to schedule a joint NATO-EU crisis management exercise (CMX/CME) in 2010

Mar 2009
Transatlantic (NATO-EU) informal ministerial dinner (Brussels)
NATO’s relations with Russia

The 28 Allies and Russia work together as equal partners in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), which was established in 2002. The NRC provides a framework for consultation on current security issues and practical cooperation in a wide range of areas of common interest. Its agenda builds on the basis for bilateral cooperation that was set out in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act.

Following a temporary suspension of formal meetings and cooperation in some areas in the wake of the crisis in Georgia in August 2008, relations with Russia are now dynamic and moving forward on the basis of shared mutual interests.

NATO’s new Strategic Concept, approved at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, stresses the importance to the Allies of developing “a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia” and their determination to “enhance political consultation and practical cooperation with Russia in areas of shared interests” and to “use the full potential of the NRC for dialogue and joint action”.

Lisbon also hosted the third summit in the history of the NRC. The 29 NRC leaders pledged to “work towards achieving a true strategic and modernized partnership based on the principles of reciprocal confidence, transparency, and predictability, with the aim of contributing to the creation of a common space of peace, security and stability.”

At Lisbon, NRC leaders endorsed a Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges, which include Afghanistan (including counter-narcotics), terrorism (including the vulnerability of critical infrastructure), piracy, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, as well as natural and man-made disasters. Practical cooperation is being developed in each area. NRC leaders agreed to resume cooperation in the area of theatre missile defence as well as to develop a comprehensive joint analysis of the future framework for broader missile defence cooperation in time for the June 2011 meeting of NRC defence ministers. They also agreed on a number of initiatives to assist in the stabilization of Afghanistan and the wider region.

NRC nations agree that the NRC is a valuable instrument for building practical cooperation and for political dialogue on all issues – where they agree and disagree.

Issues of particular concern to the Allies, include Russia's suspended implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and issues related to Georgia. On the latter, the Allies continue to call for Russia to reverse its recognition of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia as “independent states”, and urge Russia to meet its commitments with respect to Georgia as mediated by the European Union in August/September 2008.

While political differences remain on some high-level issues, the driving force behind the NRC’s pragmatic spirit of cooperation is the realization that NATO and Russia share strategic priorities and face common challenges.

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has expressed his desire to see progress in cooperation on three tracks, which he deems essential to build trust between the Allies and Russia: missile defence, conventional arms control, and reducing the number of short-range nuclear weapons in Europe.
Framework for cooperation

Cooperation between Russia and NATO member states is directed by the NRC and developed through various subordinate working groups and committees. Every year, NRC member countries agree on an annual work programme.

Key areas of cooperation include the fight against terrorism, defence reform, military-to-military cooperation, counter-narcotics training of Afghan and Central Asian personnel, theatre missile defence, crisis management, non-proliferation, airspace management, civil emergency planning, scientific cooperation and environmental security.

The Allies and Russia also regularly exchange views on current security issues in the Euro-Atlantic area, creating thereby a standing mechanism for consultation on larger political issues.

To facilitate cooperation, Russia has established a diplomatic mission to NATO and Russian Military Branch Offices have been set up at NATO’s two top military command headquarters. In Moscow, a NATO Information Office seeks to explain NATO and promote the benefits of the NATO-Russia partnership, and a Military Liaison Mission is helping improve transparency and coordination on the military side.

Key areas of cooperation

Current security issues

The NRC has provided a forum for the development of a continuous political dialogue on current security issues, which has expanded steadily to include frank and constructive exchanges on topical and sometimes controversial issues. Discussions have been held on subjects such as the situation in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus, Central Asia, the Middle East and Iraq, as well as exchanges on issues such as NATO’s transformation, energy security, missile defence and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

Dialogue has also generated some ideas for practical cooperation, such as the decision to launch in December 2005 of an NRC pilot project for counter-narcotics training of Afghan and Central Asian personnel (see below).

Combating terrorism

Cooperation in the struggle against terrorism has taken the form of regular exchanges of information, in-depth consultation, joint threat assessments, civil emergency planning for terrorist attacks, high-level dialogue on the role of the military in combating terrorism and on the lessons learned from recent terrorist attacks, and scientific and technical cooperation. NATO Allies and Russia also cooperate in areas related to terrorism such as border control, non-proliferation, airspace management, and nuclear safety.

In December 2004, NRC foreign ministers approved a comprehensive NRC Action Plan on Terrorism, aimed at improving overall coordination and strategic direction of NRC cooperation in this area.

Moreover, since December 2004, joint pre-deployment training has been underway to prepare Russian ships to support Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), NATO’s maritime counter-terrorist operation in the Mediterranean. Russian ships have been deployed in support of OAE in 2006, 2007 and 2008, and at the Lisbon Summit, Russia confirmed its interest in resuming operational support for the operation.

Work is ongoing on a project which aims to develop technology that will enable the stand-off detection of explosive devices (the STANDEX project) in mass transport and possibly other public gathering places.

Counter-narcotics training of Afghan and Central Asian personnel

The NRC pilot project for counter-narcotics training of Afghan and Central Asian personnel was launched by NRC foreign ministers in December 2005 to help address the threats posed by the trafficking in Afghan narcotics. It seeks to build local capacity and to promote regional networking and cooperation by sharing the combined expertise of NRC member states with mid
-level officers from Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The project is being implemented in cooperation with the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC). In 2010, the project was extended to include the training of officers from Pakistan.

Russia and Turkey have hosted training courses for Afghan and Central Asian personnel at specialized centres of excellence, and mobile courses are being conducted in each of the six participating countries. In summer 2007, the NRC welcomed Finland’s willingness to contribute to the initiative. By end 2010, close to 1250 officers had been trained under the NRC project. At the Lisbon Summit, NRC leaders agreed to expand the scope of the project to provide further direct assistance to institutional capacity building in the future.

Support for ISAF and the Afghan Armed Forces

In spring 2008, the Russian Federation offered to facilitate the land transit of non-military equipment for ISAF contributors across Russian territory in support of the NATO-led, UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Similar arrangements have been concluded with the other transit states, opening up this important supply route for ISAF in 2010. At the Lisbon Summit, NRC leaders agreed amendments to the arrangements agreed in 2008 with a view to allowing transit both to and from Afghanistan of non-lethal cargo.

NRC leaders also agreed at Lisbon to establish an NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund to help the Afghan Armed Forces to operate their helicopter fleet.

Missile defence

Cooperation in the area of theatre missile defence (TMD) has been underway for a number of years to address the unprecedented danger posed to deployed forces by the increasing availability of ever more accurate ballistic missiles. A study was launched in 2003 to assess the possible levels of interoperability among the theatre missile defence systems of NATO Allies and Russia.

Three command post exercises have been held – the first in the United States in March 2004, the second in the Netherlands in March 2005, and the third in Russia in October 2006. A computer assisted exercise took place in Germany in January 2008. Together with the interoperability study, these exercises are intended to provide the basis for future improvements to interoperability and to develop mechanisms and procedures for joint operations in the area of theatre missile defence.

In December 2009, and NRC Missile Defence Working Group was established. It was tasked to build on the lessons learned from the previous TMD cooperation and to exchange views on possible mutually beneficial cooperation on missile defence, based on a joint assessment of missile threats.

At the Lisbon Summit, NRC leaders approved the joint ballistic missile threat assessment and agreed to discuss pursuing missile defence cooperation. They decided to resume TMD cooperation and to develop a joint analysis of the future framework for missile defence cooperation.

Non-proliferation and arms control

Dialogue on a growing range of issues related to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has developed under the NRC. Concrete recommendations have been made to strengthen existing non-proliferation arrangements. A number of in-depth discussions and expert seminars have been held to explore opportunities for practical cooperation in the protection against nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Since under the NRC, work has been underway to assess global trends in WMD proliferation and their means of delivery, and to review areas in which NRC nations could work together politically to promote effective multilateral arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

The NRC has also provided a forum for frank discussions on issues related to conventional arms control, such as the CFE Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty and confidence-and-security-building measures. A key priority for all NRC nations is to work towards the ratification of the Adapted Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. The Allies have expressed concern over Russia’s unilateral “suspension” of its participation in the treaty in December 2007. While differences remain on this issue, it is important to note that the Allies remain committed to
ratifying the Adapted Treaty. Discussions are ongoing with Russia, both in the framework of the NRC and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe on how to make this possible.

At the Lisbon Summit, NRC leaders emphasized their strong support for the revitalisation and modernisation of the conventional arms control regime in Europe and their readiness to continue dialogue on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation issues of interest to the NRC.

**Nuclear weapons issues**

In the nuclear field, experts have developed a glossary of terms and definitions and organized exchanges on nuclear doctrines and strategy.

Experts and representatives from Russia and NATO member countries have also observed four nuclear-weapon-accident-response field exercises in Russia in 2004, the United Kingdom in 2005, the United States in 2006, and France in 2007. Inviting experts to attend such exercises increases transparency, develops common understanding of nuclear-weapon-accident-response procedures, and builds full confidence that the nuclear weapon states of NATO (France, the United Kingdom and United States) and Russia are fully capable to respond effectively to any emergency involving nuclear weapons. Expert seminars have also been held to discuss lessons learned from nuclear weapons incidents and accidents (2007), nuclear doctrine and strategy (2009); and potential responses to the detection of improvised nuclear or radiological devices (2010).

**Cooperative Airspace Initiative**

Significant progress has been made on the Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI). The CAI information exchange function is focusing primarily on the aspects of the fight against terrorism. The system is also providing air traffic transparency and early notification of suspicious air activities. This facilitates transparency, predictability and interoperability in airspace management.

Based on a feasibility study completed in 2005, detailed system requirements and a project plan were agreed for the system that will enable the reciprocal exchange of air traffic data between centres in NATO countries and in Russia. Implementation started in 2006. The system is expected to be fully operational in 2011 and is open for participation by other nations.

A total of around 10 millions euros have been invested in the CAI project. Nations that have contributed financially include Canada, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Russia, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The CAI system consists of two coordination centres, in Moscow and in Warsaw, and local coordination sites in Russia (Kaliningrad, Rostov-on-Don) and in NATO member countries (Bodo, Norway; Warsaw, Poland; and Ankara, Turkey). Training and exercises are ongoing in these countries.
Military-to-military cooperation

Since the NRC was established, military liaison arrangements have been enhanced, at the Allied Commands for Operations and for Transformation, as well as in Moscow. A key objective of military-to-military cooperation is to build trust, confidence and transparency, and to improve the ability of NATO and Russian forces to work together in preparation for possible future joint military operations.

Military-to-military cooperation has resumed, following a temporary suspension in the wake of the August 2008 Georgia crisis. The military work plan for 2010 focused on four agreed areas of cooperation: logistics, combating terrorism, search and rescue at sea, and counter piracy. At the Lisbon Summit, NRC leaders agreed to expand existing tactical-level cooperation to address the threat of piracy, including through joint training and exercises.

A "Political-Military Guidance Towards Enhanced Interoperability Between Forces of Russia and NATO Nations" was approved by NRC defence ministers in June 2005.

Another key document is the Partnership for Peace Status of Forces Agreement, which Russia signed in 2004 and the Russian parliament ratified in May 2007, which will facilitate further military-to-military and other practical cooperation, in particular the deployment of forces participating in joint operations and exercises.

Submarine-crew search and rescue

Work in the area of submarine-crew search and rescue at sea has intensified, since the signing of a framework agreement on cooperation in this area in February 2003, and has contributed to a real-life rescue.

In June 2005, Russia took part in NATO’s largest-ever search-and-rescue exercise, Sorbet Royal. The experience and networks developed during the exercise contributed to the success of an actual rescue operation in August 2005 off the coast of Russian Kamchatka peninsula. In 2008, Russia participated in an even more ambitious exercise, Bold Monarch.

Crisis management

NATO and Russia have a long history of cooperation in crisis management. In fact, between 1996 and 2003, Russia was the largest non-NATO troop contributor to NATO-led peacekeeping operations. Close cooperation in the Balkans has been critical in improving relations and building trust between the Russian and Allied militaries.

Since 2002, the NRC has taken steps to prepare for possible future cooperation in this area, notably through the approval in September 2002 of “Political Aspects for a Generic Concept for Joint NATO-Russia Peacekeeping Operations”. This paper explores common approaches, establishes a framework for consultation, planning and decision-making during an emerging
crisis, and defines issues related to joint training and exercises. These were tested in a procedural exercise, conducted in three phases between May 2003 and September 2004.

**Defence transparency, strategy and reform**

With a view to building mutual confidence and transparency, dialogue is ongoing on doctrinal issues, strategy and policy, including their relation to defence reform, nuclear weapons issues, force development and posture.

Past initiatives launched in the area of defence reform have focused on the evolution of the military, management of human and financial resources, reform of defence industries, managing the consequences of defence reform, and defence-related aspects of combating terrorism.

From 2002 to 2008, a NATO-Russia Resettlement Centre helped facilitate the integration of former Russian military personnel into civilian life. Set up in Moscow in July 2002, its operations were gradually expanded into the regions. Its activities included not only the provision of information regarding job-search and resettlement, but also professional courses for trainees, job-placement services, and English-language and management courses for small and medium-sized enterprises. By the end of 2008, around 2820 former military personnel from the Russian armed forces had been retrained. Over 80 per cent of them had found civilian employment as a result of the retraining or the help of the Centre’s job placement unit, which directly placed a total of about 1400 former servicemen over the period December 2004 to December 2008.

**Defence industrial cooperation**

A broad-based "Study on NATO-Russia Defence Industrial and Research and Technological Cooperation", launched in January 2005 and completed in 2007, concluded that there is potential in combining scientific and technological capabilities to address global threats.

**Logistics**

Logistics form the backbone of any military operation and in today's security environment, the need for more mobile forces and multinational operations calls for improved coordination and the pooling of resources, wherever possible. Various initiatives are pursuing logistic cooperation on both the civilian and the military side.

Meetings and seminars have focused on establishing a sound foundation of mutual understanding in the field of logistics by promoting information sharing in areas such as logistic policies, doctrine, structures and lessons learned. Opportunities for practical cooperation are being explored in areas such as air transport, air-to-air refuelling, medical services, and water purification. Cooperation is being extended to explore potential capabilities and enhance interoperability to support future operations, particularly in Afghanistan.

**Civil emergencies**

NATO and Russia have been cooperating since 1996 to develop a capacity for joint action in response to civil emergencies, such as earthquakes and floods, and to coordinate detection and prevention of disasters before they occur. Moreover, it was a Russian proposal that led to the establishment in 1998 of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre, which coordinates responses to disasters among all countries of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (the 28 NATO members and 22 Partner countries).

Under the NRC, a key focus of cooperation in this area has been to develop capabilities to manage the consequences of terrorist attacks. Two disaster-response exercises held in Russia (Bogorodsk, 2002, and Kaliningrad,2004) and another in Italy, in 2006, have resulted in concrete recommendations for consequence management. Another table-top consequence-management exercise was hosted by Norway in 2010. Future work is also expected to focus on risk reduction, capacity building and cooperation in the area of civil preparedness and consequence management related to high visibility events.

**New threats and challenges**

Scientific and technological cooperation between NATO and Russia dates back to 1998. Over the years, NATO’s science programmes, which foster collaboration and research between
scientists in NATO and Partner countries, have awarded more grants to scientists from Russia than any other country.

Under the NRC Science for Peace and Security Committee, promising work is taking place on confronting new threats and challenges through scientific and environmental cooperation. Key areas include explosives detection, protection from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents, cyber security, psychosocial consequences of terrorism, transport security, defence-related environmental issues, environmental security and eco-terrorism, and the forecast and prevention of catastrophes.

**Raising public awareness of the NRC**

An NRC web site ([http://www.nato-russia-council.info/](http://www.nato-russia-council.info/)) was launched in June 2007 to increase public awareness of NRC activities. All NRC nations have stated their commitment to explaining the merits of NATO-Russia cooperation to the public.

**Evolution of relations**

NATO-Russia relations formally began in 1991, when Russia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997), a forum created to foster transparency and dialogue with the countries after the end of the Cold War. Russia joined the Partnership for Peace in 1994, paving the way for more practical cooperation and, in 1996, Russia deployed a major contingent to the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security provided the formal basis for NATO-Russia relations and led to the development of a bilateral programme of consultation and cooperation under the Permanent Joint Council (PJC). However, lingering Cold War prejudices prevented the PJC from achieving its potential. Differences over the Kosovo air campaign also impacted on relations. However, Russia played a notable diplomatic role in resolving the Kosovo crisis and deployed peacekeepers to support the Kosovo Force in June 1999. From 1999, NATO-Russia relations began to improve significantly.

In 2002, the relationship was given new impetus and substance with the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council. The decision to establish the NRC was taken in the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, which reinforced the need for coordinated action to respond to common threats. It demonstrated the shared resolve of NATO member states and Russia to work more closely together towards the common goal of building a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic Area – a goal which was first expressed in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act.

Following Russia’s disproportionate military action in Georgia in early August 2008, the Alliance suspended formal meetings of the NRC and cooperation in some areas, while it considered the implications of Russia’s actions for the NATO-Russia relationship.

A decision to resume formal meetings and practical cooperation was taken in 2009 and the first formal ministerial-level meeting of the NRC since the Georgia crisis took place in December 2009. Ministers agreed to improve the working methods of the NRC itself, to make it more result-oriented and politically relevant, and to launch a Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges.

The Joint Review was endorsed by NRC leaders at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, where they also agreed on practical cooperation to address some of the security challenges identified. Moreover, they agreed to discuss pursuing broader missile defence cooperation.

**Key milestones**

- **1991**: Formal relations between NATO and Russia begin when Russia joins the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (later renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council), which was created as a forum for consultation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe following the end of the Cold War; the Soviet Union actually dissolved during the inaugural meeting of this body.
- **1994**: Russia joins the Partnership for Peace (PfP).
1996
Russian soldiers deploy as part of the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Memorandum of understanding on civil emergency cooperation is signed.

At a summit in Paris, Russian and Allied leaders sign the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security and establish the Permanent Joint Council (PJC)

1998
Russia establishes a diplomatic mission to NATO. Memorandum of understanding on scientific and technological cooperation is signed.

1999
Russia suspends participation in the PJC for a few months because of NATO’s Kosovo air campaign.
Russian peacekeepers deploy as part of the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo.

2000
Vladimir Putin becomes President of Russia and says he will work to rebuild relations with NATO in a "spirit of pragmatism". Broader cooperation in the PJC resumes, following a meeting of NATO and Russian foreign ministers in Florence.
The nuclear submarine *Kursk* sinks, highlighting the need for cooperation between NATO and Russia.

2001
The NATO Information Office opens in Moscow. President Putin is the first world leader to call the US President after the September 11 terrorist attacks. The attacks underscore the need for concerted international action to address terrorism and other new security threats. Russia opens its airspace to the international coalition’s campaign in Afghanistan and shares relevant intelligence.

2002
First high-level conference on the role of the military in combating terrorism is held in Rome.
NATO opens a Military Liaison Mission in Moscow.
At a summit in Rome, Russian and Allied leaders sign a declaration on "NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality" and establish the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) to replace the PJC.

A joint NATO-Russia Resettlement Centre opens to help discharged Russian military personnel return to civilian life.
Russia hosts a multinational disaster-response exercise in Noginsk.
Second high-level conference on the role of the military in combating terrorism is held in Moscow.

2003
NATO and Russia sign an agreement on submarine-crew rescue.
An NRC meeting is held in Moscow for the first time.

2004
Russian troops withdraw from the NATO-led peacekeeping forces in the Balkans.
The NATO Secretary General tries out a new hotline to the Russian defence minister.
The first NRC theatre missile defence command post exercise takes place in Colorado Springs, United States.
Agreements establish Russian military liaison offices to NATO’s strategic command headquarters.
Russia hosts a multinational disaster-response exercise in Kaliningrad.

At an NRC meeting of foreign ministers in Istanbul, Russia offers to contribute a ship to NATO’s maritime counter-terrorist operation in the Mediterranean.

Observers from NRC countries are invited to observe a Russian nuclear-weapons-accident-response field exercise near Murmansk.
The first NATO interoperability courses are held in Moscow military academies.

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In the wake of several terrorist attacks in Russia, NRC foreign ministers approve a comprehensive NRC Action Plan on Terrorism.

NATO and Russia exchange letters, agreeing procedures to prepare the way for Russia’s support for Operation Active Endeavour, NATO’s maritime counter-terrorist operation in the Mediterranean.

NRC foreign ministers issue a common statement concerning the conduct of the Ukrainian presidential elections.

The second NRC theatre missile defence command post exercise takes place in the Netherlands.
Russia signs the PfP Status of Forces Agreement.
NRC defence ministers endorse a "Political-Military Guidance" aimed at developing, over time, interoperability between Russian and Allied forces at the strategic, operational and tactical command levels.
Russia takes part in a major NATO search-and-rescue-at sea exercise, Sorbet Royal.
A UK team helps rescue Russian sailors trapped in a submarine off the Kamchatka shore.
Observers from NRC countries are invited to observe a UK nuclear-weapons-response field exercise in Edinburgh.
Russian teachers and instructors from the General Staff Academy give the first interoperability courses at the NATO School in Oberammergau.
The NRC launches a pilot project on counter-narcotics training for Afghan and Central Asian personnel.

2006
NRC foreign ministers meeting in Sofia agree a set of priorities and recommendations to guide the NRC's future work.
Observers from NRC countries are invited to observe a US nuclear-weapons-response field exercise in Wyoming.
The third NRC theatre missile defence command post exercise takes place in Moscow.
An NRC civil emergency exercise takes place in Montelibretti, Italy.
The first Russian frigate deploys to the Mediterranean to support Operation Active Endeavour.

2007
Observers from NRC countries are invited to observe a French nuclear-weapons-response field exercise.
Russian parliament ratifies the PfP Status of Forces Agreement
10th anniversary of the Founding Act and 5th anniversary of the NRC
A second Russian frigate deploys in active support of Operation Active Endeavour.

2008
A computer-assisted exercise takes place in Germany under the NRC theatre missile defence project.
Russia offers transit to ISAF contributors in support of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan.
Russia takes part in a major NATO search-and-rescue-at sea exercise, Bold Monarch.
Following Russia's disproportionate military action in Georgia in early August 2008, formal meetings of the NRC and cooperation in some areas are suspended.
Cooperation continues in key areas of common interest, such as counter-narcotics and the fight against terrorism.
NATO foreign ministers, meeting in December, agree to pursue a phased and measured approach to re-engagement with Russia.

2009
NATO foreign ministers, meeting in March, decide to resume formal meetings and practical cooperation under the NRC.
In December, at the first formal NRC ministerial since the Georgia crisis, foreign ministers take steps to reinvigorate NRC cooperation and agree to launch a Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges.
In June, the NRC meets for the first time in a political advisory format in Rome for a two-day informal, off-the-record exchange of views on how to make the NRC a more substance-based forum.

2010
In July, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola visits Moscow to discuss the implementation of NRC military-to-military cooperation with the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, Army General Nikolay Makarov and his staff.
In September, the NATO-Russia Council foreign ministers meets in New York to chart the way forward in relations and cooperation.
In early November, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen visits Russia for meetings with President Dmitry Medvedev and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to prepare for the upcoming NRC summit meeting in Lisbon.
At the Lisbon Summit, NRC leaders pledge to "work towards achieving a true strategic and modernized partnership". They endorse a Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges and agreed to resume cooperation in the area of theatre missile defence as well as to develop a comprehensive joint analysis of the future framework for broader missile defence cooperation. They also agree on a number of initiatives to assist in the stabilization of Afghanistan and the wider region.
Partnerships with non-NATO countries

NATO has developed partnerships with non-NATO countries, promoting security dialogue and cooperation, since the early 1990s. Partner countries contribute to NATO’s operations and play an active role in the Alliance’s actions against terrorism.

A key focus of cooperation with many partners, often newly independent states, is to help build a solid democratic environment and modernize armed forces.

NATO meets partner countries from Europe, Central Asia, the Caucasus and the wider Mediterranean area, as well as other partners across the globe, on a regular basis to discuss a multitude of political and security-related issues.

These partnerships help to extend security across the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. Many participating countries are able to address their own security requirements by drawing on the expertise of NATO countries. Others contribute their own expertise and capabilities to NATO activities in pursuit of shared objectives.

Beyond operations and the fight against terrorism, the Alliance also engages in practical cooperation with many partner countries in many other areas. These range from defence policy and planning, civil-military relations, education and training, to air defence, communications and information systems, crisis management, and civil emergency planning.

NATO has been building dialogue and cooperation with partner countries since 1991. The Alliance's new Strategic Concept, issued at Washington in 1999, recognises partnerships as one of NATO’s fundamental security tasks.

A network of partnerships

The Alliance engages in relations with non-NATO countries in the Euro-Atlantic area through the 50-nation Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace – a major programme of bilateral cooperation with individual Partner countries. Among these Partners, NATO has also developed specific structures for its relationships with Russia, Ukraine and, more recently, Georgia.

NATO is developing relations with Mediterranean-rim countries through the Mediterranean Dialogue, as well as with countries from the broader Middle East region through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

In addition to these more structured partnerships, NATO cooperates with a range of countries which are not part of these structures. Often referred to as “other partners across the globe” or “Contact Countries”, they share similar strategic concerns and key Alliance values. Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand are all examples in case.
The Euro-Atlantic Partnership

The Alliance seeks to foster security, stability and democratic transformation across the Euro-Atlantic area by engaging in partnership through dialogue and cooperation with non-member countries in Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership is underpinned by two key mechanisms: the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme.

The 50-nation EAPC brings together the 28 Allies and 22 Partner countries in a multilateral forum for dialogue and consultation, and provides the overall political framework for NATO’s cooperation with Partner countries.

The PfP programme facilitates practical bilateral cooperation between individual Partner countries and NATO, tailored according to the specific ambitions, needs and abilities of each Partner.

Three priorities underpin cooperation with Partners:

- Dialogue and consultations;
- Building capabilities and strengthening interoperability; and
- Supporting reform.

Activities under the EAPC and PfP are set out in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Work Plan. This is a catalogue of around 1600 activities covering over 30 areas of cooperation, ranging from arms control, through language training, foreign and security policy, and military geography.

The EAPC and the PfP programme have steadily developed their own dynamic, as successive steps have been taken by NATO and its Partner countries to extend security cooperation, building on the partnership arrangements they have created.

As NATO has transformed over the years to meet the new challenges of the evolving security environment, partnership has developed along with it. Today, Partner countries are engaged with NATO in tackling 21st century security challenges, including terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The ways and means of cooperation developed under NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership have proven to be of mutual benefit to Allies and Partners, and have helped promote stability. The mechanisms and programmes for cooperation developed under EAPC/PfP are also being used as the basis to extend cooperation to other non-member countries beyond the Euro-Atlantic area.

Partners are expected to fund their own participation in cooperation programmes. However, NATO supports the cost of individual participation of some nations in specific events, and may also support the hosting of events in some Partner countries.

Values and commitments

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership is about more than practical cooperation – it is also about values. Each Partner country signs the PfP Framework Document. In doing so, Partners commit to:

- respect international law, the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act, and international disarmament and arms control agreements;
- build a security environment based on respect for international law, the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and disarmament agreements; and
- promote stability and security in Europe and the Euro-Atlantic region, in accordance with NATO’s Strategic Concept.
refrain from the threat or use of force against other states;
settle disputes peacefully.
The Framework Document also enshrines a commitment by the Allies to consult with any
Partner country that perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence
or security – a mechanism which, for example, Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia 1 made use of during the Kosovo crisis.

The diversity of Partners
Over the years, 34 countries joined the Euro-Atlantic Partnership. A number of these, have
since become NATO member states, through three rounds of NATO enlargement. This has
changed the balance between Allies and Partners in the EAPC/PfP (since March 2004, there
have been more Allies than Partners).

The remaining Partners are a very diverse group. They include Balkan countries, the countries
of the Caucasus and Central Asia, and Western European states.

Some Partners are in the process of reforming their defence structures and capabilities. Others
are able to contribute significant forces to NATO-led operations and wish to further strengthen
interoperability, and can also offer fellow Partner countries advice, training and assistance in
various areas.

Facilitating dialogue and consultation
The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council meets at various levels and many Partner countries have
established diplomatic representation and liaison arrangements at NATO Headquarters and
NATO Commands. Dialogue and consultation is also facilitated by various other means.

Representatives of Partner countries may take up assignments as PfP Interns in the NATO’s
International Staff and various agencies. Military staff from Partner countries may also take up
posts in military commands, as so-called PfP Staff Elements.

NATO has also established Contact Point Embassies in Partner countries to facilitate liaison and
support public diplomacy efforts. The Secretary General has appointed a Special
Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia and a Senior Civilian Representative has
been appointed for Afghanistan. NATO has also opened liaison and information offices in
Georgia, Russia and Ukraine.

Evolution of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership
November 1989 saw the fall of the Berlin Wall, signalling the end of the Cold War. Within a
short period, the remarkable pace of change in Central and Eastern Europe left NATO faced
with a new and very different set of security challenges.

Allied leaders responded at their summit meeting in London, in July 1990, by extending a
“hand of friendship” across the old East-West divide and proposing a new cooperative
relationship with all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

This sea-change in attitudes was enshrined in a new strategic concept for the Alliance, issued
in November 1991, which adopted a broader approach to security. Dialogue and cooperation
would be essential parts of the approach required to manage the diversity of challenges facing
the Alliance. The key goals were now to reduce the risk of conflict arising out of
misunderstanding or design and to better manage crises affecting the security of the Allies; to
increase mutual understanding and confidence among all European states; and to expand the
opportunities for genuine partnership in dealing with common security problems.

The scene was set for the establishment in December 1991 of the North Atlantic Cooperation
Council (NACC), a forum to bring together NATO and its new Partner countries to discuss
issues of common concern.

NACC consultations focused on residual Cold War security concerns such as the withdrawal of
Russian troops from the Baltic States. Political cooperation was also launched on a number of
security and defence-related issues.
The NACC broke new ground in many ways. However, it focused on multilateral, political dialogue and lacked the possibility of each Partner country developing individual cooperative relations with NATO.

Deepening partnership

This changed in 1994 with the launch of the Partnership for Peace (PfP), a major programme of practical bilateral cooperation between NATO and individual Partner countries, which represented a significant leap forward in the cooperative process.

And, in 1997, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) was created to replace the NACC and to build on its achievements, paving the way for the development of an enhanced and more operational partnership.

Further initiatives have been taken to deepen cooperation between Allies and Partners at successive summit meetings in Madrid (1997), Washington (1999), Prague (2002) and Istanbul (2004), Riga (2006) and Bucharest (2008).

Key milestones

1990
(July) Allies extend a “hand of friendship” across the old East-West divide and propose a new cooperative relationship with all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

1991
(November) The Alliance issues a new strategic concept for NATO, which adopts a broader approach to security, emphasizing partnership, dialogue and cooperation.
(December) The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) is established as a forum for security dialogue between NATO and its new Partners.

1994
The Partnership for Peace (PfP), a major programme of practical bilateral cooperation between NATO and individual Partner countries, is launched. Partner missions to NATO are established. A Partnership Coordination Cell is set up at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) to help coordinate PfP training and exercises. An International Coordination Cell is established at SHAPE to provide briefing and planning facilities for all non-NATO countries contributing troops to NATO-led peacekeeping operations.

1995
A number of Partner countries deploy to Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of a NATO-led peacekeeping force.

1996
The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) is created to replace the NACC.

1997
The operational role of the PfP is enhanced at the Madrid Summit.

1998
Creation of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre and Disaster Response Unit.

1999
Three Partners – the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – join NATO. Dialogue and cooperation are included as fundamental security tasks in the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept.

2001
(April, Washington Summit) PfP is further enhanced and its operational role strengthened, including introduction of:
- the Operational Capabilities Concept to improve the ability of Alliance and Partner forces to operate together in NATO-led operations;
- the Political-Military Framework for partner involvement in political consultations and decision-making, in operational planning and in command arrangements;
- a Training and Education Enhancement Programme to help reinforce the operational capabilities of Partner countries.
Several Partner countries deploy peacekeepers as part of the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo.

2002
(September) The EAPC meets the day after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States and pledges to combat the scourge of terrorism.
The Partnership Trust Fund policy is launched to assist Partner countries in the safe destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines and other munitions.

2004
(November, Prague Summit) Further enhancement of partnership including:
- a Comprehensive Review to strengthen political dialogue with Partners and enhance their involvement in the planning, conduct and oversight of activities in
NATO Mediterranean Dialogue

NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue was initiated in 1994 by the North Atlantic Council (2004 thus marked the Dialogue’s 10th anniversary). It currently involves seven non-NATO countries of the Mediterranean region: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.

Origins and Objectives

The Dialogue reflects the Alliance’s view that security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. It is an integral part of NATO’s adaptation to the post-Cold War security environment, as well as an important component of the Alliance’s policy of outreach and cooperation.

The Mediterranean Dialogue’s overall aim is to:

- contribute to regional security and stability
- achieve better mutual understanding
- dispel any misconceptions about NATO among Dialogue countries

Key Principles

The successful launch of the Mediterranean Dialogue and its subsequent development has been based upon five principles:

The Dialogue is progressive in terms of participation and substance. Such flexibility has allowed the number of Dialogue partners to grow - witness the inclusion of Jordan in November 1995 and Algeria in March 2000 - and the content of the Dialogue to evolve over time.

The Dialogue is primarily bilateral in structure (NATO+1). Despite the predominantly bilateral character, the Dialogue nevertheless allows for multilateral meetings on a regular basis (NATO+7).

All Mediterranean partners are offered the same basis for cooperation activities and discussion with NATO. This non-discrimination is an essential feature of the Dialogue and has been key to its successful establishment and subsequent development. Within this non-discriminatory framework, Dialogue countries are free to choose the extent and intensity of their participation (self-differentiation), including through the establishment of Individual Cooperation Programmes (ICP).

The Dialogue is meant to mutually reinforce and complement other international efforts such as, for example, the EU’s Barcelona Process (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership), the Partnership for the Mediterranean and the OSCE’s Mediterranean Initiative.

In principle, activities within the Dialogue take place on a self-funding basis. However, Allies agreed to consider requests for financial assistance in support of Mediterranean partners’ participation in the Dialogue. A number of measures have recently been taken to facilitate cooperation, notably the revision of the Dialogue’s funding policy thus allowing to fund up to 100% of the participation costs in Dialogue’s activities and the extension of the NATO/PfP Trust Fund mechanisms to Mediterranean Dialogue countries.
The political dimension

The Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG), established at the Madrid Summit in July 1997 under the supervision of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), has the overall responsibility for the Mediterranean Dialogue. It meets at the level of Political Counsellors on a regular basis to discuss all matters related to the Dialogue including its further development.

Political consultations in the NATO+1 format are held on a regular basis both at Ambassadorial and working level. These discussions provide an opportunity for sharing views on a range of issues relevant to the security situation in the Mediterranean, as well as on the further development of the political and practical cooperation dimensions of the Dialogue.

Meetings in the NATO+7 format, including NAC+7 meetings, are also held on a regular basis, in particular following the NATO Ministerial meetings, Summits of Heads of State and Government, and other major NATO events. These meetings represent an opportunity for NATO’s Secretary General to brief Mediterranean Dialogue Ambassadors on the Alliance’s current agenda.

At the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO’s Heads of State and Government elevated the MD to a genuine partnership through the establishment of a more ambitious and expanded framework, which considerably enhanced both the MD’s political and practical cooperation dimensions.

Since then, the constant increase in the number and quality of the NATO-MD political dialogue has recently reached a sustainable level. Consultations of the 28 Allies and seven MD countries take place on a regular basis on a bilateral and multilateral level, at Ministerial, Ambassadorial and working level formats. That has also included three meetings of the NATO and MD Foreign Ministers in December 2004, 2007 and 2008 in Brussels. Two meetings of NATO and MD Defense Ministers in 2006 and 2007 in Taormina and Seville. Ten meetings of the Chief of Defense of NATO and MD countries have also take place so far.

MD partners have reiterated their support for enhanced political consultations to better tailor the MD to their specific interests and to maintain the distinctive cooperation framework of the MD.

The political dimension also includes visits by NATO Senior Officials, including the Secretary General and the Deputy Secretary General, to Mediterranean Dialogue countries. The main purpose of these visits is to meet with the relevant host authorities and exchange views on NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, as well as to get a better appreciation of each partner’s specific objectives and priorities.

The practical dimension

Measures of practical cooperation between NATO and Mediterranean Dialogue countries are laid down in an annual Work Programme which aims at building confidence through cooperation in security-related issues.

The annual Work Programme includes seminars, workshops and other practical activities in the fields of public diplomacy, civil emergency planning, crisis management, border security, small arms & light weapons, defence reform and defence economics, scientific and environmental cooperation, as well as consultations on terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

There is also a military dimension to the annual Work Programme which includes invitations to Dialogue countries to observe - and in some cases participate - in NATO/PfP military exercises, attend courses and other academic activities at the NATO School (SHAPE) in Oberammergau (Germany) and the NATO Defense College in Rome (Italy), and visit NATO military bodies.

The military programme also includes port visits by NATO’s Standing Naval Forces, on-site train-the-trainers sessions by Mobile Training Teams, and visits by NATO experts to assess the possibilities for further cooperation in the military field.

Furthermore, NATO+7 consultation meetings on the military programme involving military representatives from NATO and the seven Mediterranean Dialogue countries are held twice a year.
State of play

Following 11 September 2001, Allies repeatedly stressed the importance of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the new level of attention that NATO as a whole was giving to it. At their Summit meeting in Prague in November 2002, NATO’s HOSG decided to substantially upgrade the political and practical dimensions of the Mediterranean Dialogue.

At their Summit meeting in Istanbul in June 2004, NATO’s HOSG invited Mediterranean partners to establish a more ambitious and expanded framework for the Mediterranean Dialogue, guided by the principle of joint ownership and taking into consideration their particular interests and needs.

The aim is to contribute towards regional security and stability through stronger practical cooperation, including by enhancing the existing political dialogue, achieving interoperability, developing defence reform and contributing to the fight against terrorism.

Since the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, an annual Mediterranean Dialogue Work Programme (MDWP) focusing on agreed priority areas, has been expanded progressively in more than 30 areas of cooperation, going from about 100 activities in 2004, to about 700 activities and events in 2010.

While the MDWP is essentially military (85% of the activities), it comprises activities in a wide range of areas of cooperation including Military Education, Training and Doctrine, Defence Policy and Strategy, Defence Investment, Civil Emergency Planning, Public Diplomacy, Crisis Management, Armaments and Intelligence related activities.

A number of cooperation tools were also successively opened to MD countries, such as:

- The e-Prime database which provides electronic access to the MDWP allowing close monitoring of cooperation activities;
- The full package of Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) to improve partners’ capacity to contribute effectively to NATO-led Crisis Response Operations through achieving interoperability;
- The Trust Fund mechanism that currently includes ongoing substantial projects with MD countries such as Jordan and Mauritania;
- The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC) aims at improving partners’ capacity in supporting NATO’s response to crises;
- The Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism (PAP-T) aims at strengthening NATO’s ability to work effectively with MD partners in the fight against terrorism;
- The Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) action plan aims at improving the civil preparedness against CBRN attacks on populations and critical infrastructures.

The NATO Training Cooperation Initiative (NTCI), launched at the 2007 Riga Summit. The NTCI aims at complementing existing cooperation activities developed in the MD framework through: the establishment of a “NATO Regional Cooperation Course” at the NATO Defence College (NDC) in Rome, which consists in a ten-week strategic level course also focusing on current security challenges in the Middle East.

Individual Cooperation Programmes (ICPs) which are a major instrument to strengthen the MD cooperation. They aim at enhancing the political dialogue and at tailoring the cooperation with NATO according to key strategic national needs. Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia have all agreed tailored Individual Cooperation Programmes with NATO.
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)

Reaching out to the broader Middle East

NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, launched at the Alliance’s Summit in the Turkish city in June 2004, aims to contribute to long-term global and regional security by offering countries of the broader Middle East region practical bilateral security cooperation with NATO.

ICI focuses on practical cooperation in areas where NATO can add value, notably in the security field. Six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council were initially invited to participate. To date, four of these -- Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates -- have joined. Saudia Arabia and Oman have also shown an interest in the Initiative.

Based on the principle of inclusiveness, the Initiative is, however, open to all interested countries of the broader Middle East region who subscribe to its aims and content, including the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

It is understood that the words “country” and “countries” in the document do not exclude participation, subject to the North Atlantic Council’s approval, of the Palestinian Authority in cooperation under this initiative.

Each interested country will be considered by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis and on its own merit. Participation of countries in the region in the Initiative as well as the pace and extent of their cooperation with NATO will depend in large measure on their individual response and level of interest.

To date, four of the six countries - Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates - have joined the Initiative, while all six countries have shown a great interest in it.

What key principles is the Initiative based on?

The ICI is based on a number of important principles, including:

- it is a cooperative initiative, based on joint ownership and the mutual interests of NATO and the countries of the region, taking into account their diversity and specific needs;
- the process is distinct yet takes into account and complements other international initiatives including by the G8 and international organisations such as the EU and the OSCE.

What does this mean in practice?

The Initiative offers a ‘menu’ of bilateral activities that countries can choose from in six areas:

1. tailored advice on defence reform, defence budgeting, defence planning and civil-military relations;
2. military-to-military cooperation to contribute to interoperability through participation in selected military exercises and related education and training activities that could improve the ability of participating countries’ forces to operate with those of the Alliance; and through participation in selected NATO and PfP exercises and in NATO-led operation on a case-by-case basis;
3. cooperation in the fight against terrorism, including through intelligence-sharing;
4. cooperation in the Alliance's work on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery,
5. cooperation regarding border security in connection with terrorism, small arms and light weapons and the fight against illegal trafficking;
6. civil emergency planning, including participating in training courses and exercises on disaster assistance.

How did the Initiative evolve?

NATO recognizes that dealing with today's complex new threats requires wide international cooperation and collective effort. That is why NATO has developed, and continues to develop, a network of partnerships in the security field.

The Initiative was preceded by a series of high level consultations conducted by the Deputy Secretary General of NATO, Ambassador Minuto Rizzo, with six countries of the region in May, September and December 2004. These were: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. During these consultations all of the countries expressed their interest in the Initiative.

ICI was launched at the Summit meeting of NATO Heads of State and Government in Istanbul, 28 June 2004.

Following the Summit, from September to December 2004, the Deputy Secretary General of NATO paid a second round of visits to the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, to discuss the way ahead.

In the first three months of 2005, three countries: Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar formally joined the ICI.

In March 2005, NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division and the NATO Defense College organized in Rome a conference on “NATO and the broader Middle East region”. It brought together over 100 high-ranking officials, parliamentarians, academics and security experts from NATO and the countries of the Gulf to exchange perceptions and discuss further ideas concerning the implementation of the Initiative.

In June 2005, the United Arab Emirates joined the Initiative.

Which NATO bodies have a central role?

Following the launch of the ICI, NATO countries decided to establish the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Group, composed of political counsellors from the 28 delegations of member countries to NATO.

The Group is in charge of defining the procedures for the development of a menu of practical activities with interested countries and ensuring its successful implementation. It will also report to the Council or to NATO's Senior Political Committee and will prepare the ground for the decisions to be adopted by the North Atlantic Council on ICI.

In addition, the Group will engage countries participating in the Initiative on a '28+1' basis for the development of individual workplans and follow up on their implementation.
NATO’s relations with Contact Countries

In addition to its formal partnerships, NATO cooperates with a range of countries which are not part of these structures. Often referred to as “other partners across the globe” or “Contact Countries”, they share similar strategic concerns and key Alliance values. Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand are all examples in case.

These countries have expressed an interest in deepening relations with NATO, or simply wish to be informed of NATO’s agenda. Some are troop contributors to NATO-led operations or contribute to these operations in other ways. Others simply seek to cooperate with NATO in areas of common interest. Over recent years, NATO has developed bilateral relations with each of these countries.

Significant steps were taken at the 2006 Riga Summit to increase the operational relevance of NATO's cooperation with both its formal Partners and other partners across the globe. These steps were reinforced by decisions at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, which defined a set of objectives for these relationships and created avenues for enhanced political dialogue.

Annual work programmes have been developed with interested partner countries. Activities range from joint exercises and joint operations, through to language training and advice, and information exchange.

Individual Contact Countries choose in which areas they wish to be engaged with NATO, and the extent of this cooperation. Any inclusion of Contact Countries in Alliance activities requires approval of the North Atlantic Council, NATO's principal decision-making body, except in certain cases. Cooperation with Contact Countries should be mutually beneficial and reciprocal.

**Support for NATO-led operations**

Contributions from partners across the globe to NATO-led operations have been significant and advantageous to international peace and security.

In the Balkans, Argentinean and Chilean forces have worked alongside NATO Allies in ensuring security in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Kosovo, Argentina has helped NATO personnel in providing medical and social assistance to the local population and cooperated on peace agreement implementation since 1999.

In Afghanistan, a number of other Contact Countries such as Australia and New Zealand work alongside the Allies as part of the International Security Assistance Force. Other countries, like Japan, support ISAF efforts of stabilization in Afghanistan without being involved militarily by funding various development projects and dispatching liaison officers.

The participation of partners in NATO-led peace support operations is guided by the Political-Military Framework, which has been developed for NATO-led Partnership for Peace operations. This states that the involvement of contributing states in planning and force generation processes takes place through the International Coordination Centre at Supreme Allied Headquarters Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, and, where appropriate, through temporary liaison arrangements with the strategic commands.

Typically, forces from these countries are incorporated into operations on the same basis as forces
from NATO members and Partners. This implies that they are involved in the decision-making process through their association to the work of committees, the posting of liaison officers in the operational headquarters or to SHAPE. They often operate under the direct command of the Operational Commander through multinational divisional headquarters.

**Evolution of relations**

NATO has been cooperating with countries which are not formal partner countries since the 1990s. For example, a political dialogue with Japan began in 1990, and Argentina and Chile contributed forces to NATO’s missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, these cooperation were taking place on an ad hoc basis.

NATO’s involvement in areas outside of its traditional region – including Afghanistan and Darfur – has increased the need and the opportunities for enhanced interaction with these other partners across the globe. Similarly, the convergence of strategic priorities between Allies and certain partners, such as countering terrorism, has led these countries to seek greater cooperation with NATO.

The Allies established a set of general guidelines on relations with Contact Countries in 1998. The guidelines do not allow for a formal institutionalisation of relations, but reflect the Allies’ desire to increase cooperation. Following extensive debate, the term Contact Countries was agreed by the Allies in 2004; more recently, the term “other partners across the globe” is also being used.

At the 2006 Riga Summit, NATO pledged to increase the operational relevance of relations with interested Contact Countries. In particular, steps were taken to strengthen NATO's ability to work with current and potential contributors to NATO operations which share NATO's interests and values. This decision marked a policy shift for the Alliance, allowing Contact Countries to have access, in principle, to any of the activities offered under NATO’s structured partnerships.

Decisions taken at the 2008 Bucharest Summit defined NATO’s objectives for its relationships with partners across the globe. These include support for operations, security cooperation, and enhanced common understanding to advance shared security interests and democratic values. To this end, various avenues were created to enhance political dialogue: meetings of the North Atlantic Council with ministers of the countries concerned, high level talks, and meetings with ambassadors. In addition, annual work programmes (referred to as Individual Tailored Cooperation Packages of Activities) were further developed.

1. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.
NATO enlargement

NATO’s door remains open to any European country in a position to undertake the commitments and obligations of membership, and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Since 1949, NATO’s membership has increased from 12 to 28 countries through six rounds of enlargement. Albania and Croatia, which were invited to join NATO at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, formally became members when the accession process was completed on 1 April 2009.

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has, like Albania and Croatia, been participating in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for a number of years to prepare for possible membership. At Bucharest, Allied leaders agreed to invite the country to become a member as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the issue over the country’s name has been reached with Greece.

A number of other important decisions concerning enlargement were taken at Bucharest. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro were invited to start Intensified Dialogues on their membership aspirations and related reforms. Allied leaders also agreed that Georgia and Ukraine – which were already engaged in an Intensified Dialogue with NATO – will become members in future.

In December 2009, NATO foreign ministers invited Montenegro to join the MAP and assured Bosnia and Herzegovina that it will join once it has achieved the necessary progress in its reform efforts.

NATO’s “open door policy” is based on Article 10 of its founding treaty. Any decision to invite a country to join the Alliance is taken by the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s principal decision-making body, on the basis of consensus among all Allies. No third country has a say in such deliberations.

NATO’s ongoing enlargement process poses no threat to any country. It is aimed at promoting stability and cooperation, at building a Europe whole and free, united in peace, democracy and common values.

- Support for aspirant countries
- 1995 Study on Enlargement
- Accession process
- Evolution of NATO’s “open door policy”

Support for aspirant countries

Countries that have declared an interest in joining the Alliance are initially invited to engage in an Intensified Dialogue with NATO about their membership aspirations and related reforms.

Aspirant countries may then be invited to participate in the Membership Action Plan to prepare for potential membership and demonstrate their ability to meet the obligations and commitments of possible future membership. In principle, participation in the MAP does not guarantee future membership, but it constitutes the key preparation mechanism.

Countries aspiring to join NATO have to demonstrate that they are in a position to further the principles of the 1949 Washington Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. They are also expected to meet certain political, economic and military criteria, which are laid out in the
1995 Study on NATO Enlargement

1995 Study on Enlargement

In 1995, the Alliance published the results of a Study on NATO Enlargement that considered the merits of admitting new members and how they should be brought in.

It concluded that the end of the Cold War provided a unique opportunity to build improved security in the entire Euro-Atlantic area and that NATO enlargement would contribute to enhanced stability and security for all.

The Study further concluded that enlargement would contribute to enhanced stability and security for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area by encouraging and supporting democratic reforms, including the establishment of civilian and democratic control over military forces; fostering patterns and habits of cooperation, consultation and consensus-building characteristic of relations among members of the Alliance; and promoting good-neighborly relations.

It would increase transparency in defence planning and military budgets, thereby reinforcing confidence among states, and would reinforce the overall tendency toward closer integration and cooperation in Europe. The Study also concluded that enlargement would strengthen the Alliance’s ability to contribute to European and international security and strengthen and broaden the transatlantic partnership.

According to the Study, countries seeking NATO membership would have to be able to demonstrate that they have fulfilled certain requirements. These include:

- a functioning democratic political system based on a market economy;
- the fair treatment of minority populations;
- a commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflicts;
- the ability and willingness to make a military contribution NATO operations; and
- a commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutional structures.

Once admitted, new members would enjoy all the rights and assume all the obligations of membership. This would include acceptance at the time that they join of all the principles, policies and procedures previously adopted by Alliance members.

Accession process

Once the Allies have decided to invite a country to become a member of NATO, they officially invite the country to begin accession talks with the Alliance. This is the first step in the accession process on the way to formal membership.

The major steps in the process are:

1. Accession talks with a NATO team

These talks take place at NATO headquarters in Brussels and bring together teams of NATO experts and representatives of the individual invitees. Their aim is to obtain formal confirmation from the invitees of their willingness and ability to meet the political, legal and military obligations and commitments of NATO membership, as laid out in the Washington Treaty and in the Study on NATO Enlargement.

The talks take place in two sessions with each invitee. In the first session, political and defence or military issues are discussed, essentially providing the opportunity to establish that the preconditions for membership have been met. The second session is more technical and includes discussion of resources, security, and legal issues as well as the contribution of each new member country to NATO’s common budget. This is determined on a proportional basis, according to the size of their economies in relation to those of other Alliance member countries.

Invittees are also required to implement measures to ensure the protection of NATO classified information, and prepare their security and intelligence services to work with the NATO Office of Security.

The end product of these discussions is a timetable to be submitted by each invitee for the completion of necessary reforms, which may continue even after these countries have become
NATO members.

2. Invitees send letters of intent to NATO, along with timetables for completion of reforms

In the second step of the accession process, each invitee country provides confirmation of its acceptance of the obligations and commitments of membership in the form of a letter of intent from each foreign minister addressed to the NATO Secretary General. Together with this letter they also formally submit their individual reform timetables.

3. Accession protocols are signed by NATO countries

NATO then prepares Accession Protocols to the Washington Treaty for each invitee. These protocols are in effect amendments or additions to the Treaty, which once signed and ratified by Allies, become an integral part of the Treaty itself and permit the invited countries to become parties to the Treaty.

4. Accession protocols are ratified by NATO countries

The governments of NATO member states ratify the protocols, according to their national requirements and procedures. The ratification procedure varies from country to country. For example, the United States requires a two-thirds majority to pass the required legislation in the Senate. Elsewhere, for example in the United Kingdom, no formal parliamentary vote is required.

5. The Secretary General invites the potential new members to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty

Once all NATO member countries notify the Government of the United States of America, the depository of the Washington Treaty, of their acceptance of the protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of the potential new members, the Secretary General invites the new countries to accede to the Treaty.

6. Invitees accede to the North Atlantic Treaty in accordance with their national procedures

7. Upon depositing their instruments of accession with the US State Department, invitees formally become NATO members

**Evolution of NATO’s “open door policy”**

NATO’s “open door policy” is based upon Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, which states that membership is open to any "European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area”.

The enlargement of the Alliance is an ongoing and dynamic process. Since the Alliance was created in 1949, its membership has grown from the 12 founding members to today’s 28 members through six rounds of enlargement in 1952, 1955, 1982, 1999, 2004 and 2009.

The first three rounds of enlargement – which brought in Greece and Turkey (1952), West Germany (1955) and Spain (1982) – took place during the Cold War, when strategic considerations were at the forefront of decision-making.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, signalled the end of the Cold War and was followed by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the break up of the Soviet Union, ending the division of Europe. The reunification of Germany in October 1990 brought the territory of the former East Germany into the Alliance. The new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe were eager to guarantee their freedom by becoming integrated into Euro-Atlantic institutions.

NATO enlargement was the subject of lively debate in the early 1990s. Many political analysts were unsure of the benefits that enlargement would bring. Some were concerned about the possible impact on Alliance cohesion and solidarity, as well as on relations with other states, notably Russia. It is in this context that the Alliance carried out a Study on NATO Enlargement in 1995 (see above).

**Post-Cold War enlargement**
Based on the findings of the Study on Enlargement, the Alliance invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks at the Alliance’s Madrid Summit in 1997. These three countries became the first former members of the Warsaw Pact to join NATO in 1999.

At the 1999 Washington Summit, the Membership Action Plan was launched to help other aspirant countries prepare for possible membership.

Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia and Slovenia were invited to begin accession talks at the Alliance’s Prague Summit in 2002 and joined NATO in 2004. All seven countries had participated in the MAP.

**Bucharest Summit decisions**

At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, Allied leaders took a number of steps related to the future enlargement of the Alliance.

Several decisions concerned countries in the Western Balkans. The Allies see the closer integration of Western Balkan countries into Euro-Atlantic institutions as essential to ensuring long-term self-sustaining stability in this region, where NATO has been heavily engaged in peace-support operations since the mid 1990s.

- Albania and Croatia were invited to start accession talks to join the Alliance and joined NATO in April 2009.
- The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* was assured that it will also be invited to join the Alliance as soon as a solution to the issue of the country’s name has been reached with Greece.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro were invited to start Intensified Dialogues on their membership aspirations and related reforms.

Allied leaders also agreed at Bucharest that Georgia and Ukraine, which were already engaged in Intensified Dialogues with NATO, will one day become members. In December 2008, Allied foreign ministers decided to enhance opportunities for assisting the two countries in efforts to meet membership requirements by making use of the framework of the existing NATO-Ukraine Commission and NATO-Georgia Commission – without prejudice to further decisions which may be taken about their applications to join the MAP.

**Timeline of key milestones**

- **4 April 1949**
  Signature of the North Atlantic Treaty by 12 founding members: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. Article 10 of the treaty provides basis NATO’s “open door policy”.

- **18 February 1952**
  Accession of Greece and Turkey.

- **6 May 1955**
  Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany.

- **30 May 1982**
  Spain joins the Alliance (and the integrated military structure in 1998).

- **October 1990**
  With the reunification of Germany, the new German Länder in the East become part of NATO.

- **January 1994**
  At the Brussels Summit, Allied leaders reaffirm that NATO remains open to the membership of other European countries.

- **28 September 1995**
  Publication of NATO Study on Enlargement.

- **8-9 July 1997**
  At the Madrid Summit, three Partner countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – are invited to start accession talks.

- **12 March 1999**
  Accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, bringing the Alliance to 19 members.

- **23-25 April 1999**
  Launch of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the Washington Summit. (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia join the MAP.)

- **14 May 2002**
  NATO foreign ministers officially announce the participation of Croatia in the Map at their meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland.

- **May 2002**
  President Leonid Kuchma announces Ukraine’s goal of eventual NATO membership.

- **At the Prague Summit, seven Partner countries – Bulgaria, Estonia,
1. Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

21-22 November 2002
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia – are invited to start accession talks.

26 March 2003
Signing ceremony of the Accession Protocols of the seven invitees.

29 March 2004
Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

21 April 2005
Launch of the Intensified Dialogue on Ukraine’s aspirations to NATO membership and related reforms, at an informal meeting of foreign ministers in Vilnius, Lithuania.

21 September 2006
NATO foreign ministers in New York announce the decision to offer an Intensified Dialogue to Georgia.

28-29 November 2006
At the Riga Summit, Allied leaders state that invitations will be extended to MAP countries that fulfil certain conditions.

2-4 April 2008
At the Bucharest Summit, Allied leaders invite Albania and Croatia to start accession talks; assure the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* that it will be invited once a solution to the issue of the country’s name has been reached with Greece; invite Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro to start Intensified Dialogues; and agree that Georgia and Ukraine will become members in future.

9 July 2008
Accession protocols for Albania and Croatia are signed.

1 April 2009
Accession of Albania and Croatia.

4 December 2009
NATO foreign ministers invite Montenegro to join the Membership Action Plan.
Membership Action Plan (MAP)

The Membership Action Plan (MAP) is a NATO programme of advice, assistance and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance. Participation in the MAP does not prejudge any decision by the Alliance on future membership.

Current participants in the MAP are the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹, which has been participating in the MAP since 1999, and Montenegro, which was invited to join in December 2009. Welcoming progress made in its reform efforts, in April 2010, the Allies formally invited Bosnia and Herzegovina to join the MAP with one important condition: the first Annual National Programme under the MAP will only be accepted by NATO once a key remaining issue concerning immovable defence property has been resolved.

Countries participating in the MAP submit individual annual national programmes on their preparations for possible future membership. These cover political, economic, defence, resource, security and legal aspects.

The MAP process provides a focused and candid feedback mechanism on aspirant countries’ progress on their programmes. This includes both political and technical advice, as well as annual meetings between all NATO members and individual aspirants at the level of the North Atlantic Council to assess progress. A key element is the defence planning approach for aspirants, which includes elaboration and review of agreed planning targets.

Throughout the year, meetings and workshops with NATO civilian and military experts in various fields allow for discussion of the entire spectrum of issues relevant to membership. An annual consolidated progress report on activities under the MAP is presented to NATO foreign and defence ministers at their regular spring meetings each year.

The MAP was launched in April 1999 at the Alliance’s Washington Summit to help countries aspiring to NATO membership in their preparations. The process drew heavily on the experience gained during the accession process of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, which had joined NATO in the Alliance’s first post-Cold War round of enlargement in 1999.

Participation in the MAP

Participation in the MAP has helped prepare the seven countries that joined NATO in the second post-Cold War round of enlargement in 2004 (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) as well as Albania and Croatia, which joined in April 2009.

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹ continues to participate in the MAP – Allied leaders have agreed to invite the country to become a member as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the issue over the country’s name has been reached with Greece.

When NATO foreign ministers invited Montenegro to join the MAP in December 2009, they also assured Bosnia and Herzegovina that it will be able to join once it has achieved the necessary progress in its reform efforts.

1. Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
Member countries

At present, NATO has 28 members. Albania and Croatia are the countries that joined the Alliance most recently, in April 2009.

In 1949, there were 12 founding members of the Alliance. Provision for enlargement is given by Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that membership is open to any “European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area”.

Alphabetical list of NATO member countries
About member countries and their accession

About member countries and their accession

The founding members

On 4 April 1949, the foreign ministers from 12 countries signed the North Atlantic Treaty at the Departmental Auditorium in Washington D.C.: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Within the following five months of the signing ceremony, the Treaty was ratified by the parliaments of the interested countries, sealing their membership.

The 12 signatories

Some of the foreign ministers who signed the Treaty were heavily involved in NATO’s work at a later stage in their careers:

Belgium: M. Paul-Henri Spaak (NATO Secretary General, 1957-1961);
Canada: Mr. Lester B. Pearson (negotiated the Treaty and was one of the “Three Wise Men” who drafted the report on non-military cooperation in NATO, published in 1956 in the wake of the Suez crisis);
Denmark: Mr. Gustav Rasmussen;
France: M. Robert Schuman (architect of the European institutions, who also initiated the idea of a European Defence Community);
Iceland: Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson;
Italy: Count Carlo Sforza;
Luxembourg: M. Joseph Bech;
the Netherlands: Dr. D.U. Stikker (NATO Secretary General, 1961-1964);
Norway: Mr. Halvard M. Lange (one of the “Three Wise Men” who drafted the report on non-military cooperation in NATO);
Portugal: Dr. Jose Caerio da Matta;
the United Kingdom: Mr. Ernest Bevin (main drive behind the creation of NATO and as Foreign Secretary from 1945 to 1951, he attended the first formative meetings of the North Atlantic Council);
the United States: Mr. Dean Acheson (as US Secretary of State from 1949 to 1953, he attended and chaired meetings of the North Atlantic Council).

Flexibility of NATO membership

On signing the Treaty, countries voluntarily commit themselves to participating in the political consultations and military activities of the Organization. Although each and every signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty is subject to the obligations of the Treaty, there remains a certain degree of
flexibility which allows members to choose how they participate. The memberships of Iceland and France, for instance, illustrate this point.

**Iceland**

When Iceland signed the Treaty in 1949, it did not have – and still does not have – armed forces. There is no legal impediment to forming them, but Iceland has chosen not to have any. However, Iceland has a Coast Guard, national police forces, an air defence system and a voluntary expeditionary peacekeeping force. Since 1951, Iceland also benefits from a long-standing bilateral defence agreement with the United States. In 2006, US forces were withdrawn but the defence agreement remains valid. Since 2008, air policing has been conducted on a periodic basis by NATO Allies.

Today, Iceland with its population of 320 000 is represented on all of NATO’s principal committees; it pays toward NATO’s military budget, civilian budget and the NATO Security and Investment Programme. Since 2006, it has also assumed the responsibility of a host and user nation to NATO infrastructure based in Iceland. Iceland also contributes civilian peacekeepers to NATO-led operations. It regularly hosts NATO exercises and events, and is taking a more active role in NATO deliberations and planning.

**France**

In 1966, President Charles De Gaulle decided to withdraw France from NATO’s integrated military structure. This reflected the desire for greater military independence, particularly vis-à-vis the United States, and the refusal to integrate France’s nuclear deterrent or accept any form of control over its armed forces.

In practical terms, while France still fully participated in the political instances of the Organization, it was no longer represented on certain committees, for instance, the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group. This decision also led to the removal of French forces from NATO commands and foreign forces from French territory. The stationing of foreign weapons, including nuclear weapons, was also banned. NATO’s political headquarters (based in Paris since 1952), as well as the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe or SHAPE (in Rocquencourt since 1951) moved to Belgium.

Despite France’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military structure, two technical agreements were signed with the Alliance, setting out procedures in the event of soviet aggression. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, France has regularly contributed troops to NATO’s military operations, making it one of the largest troop-contributing states. It is also NATO’s fourth biggest contributor to the military budget.

Since the early 1990s, France has been distancing itself from the 1966 decision with, for instance, its participation at the meetings of defence ministers since 1994 (Seville) and the presence of French officers in ACO and ACT structures since 2003. At NATO’s Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, April 2009, France officially announced its decision to fully participate in NATO structures.

**The accession of Greece and Turkey**

Three years after the signing of the Washington Treaty, on 18 February 1952, Greece and Turkey joined NATO. This enabled NATO to reinforce its “southern flank”.

At a time when there was a fear of communist expansion throughout Europe and other parts of the world (soviet support of the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950), extending security to south-eastern Europe was strategically important. Not only did NATO membership curb communist influence in Greece – a country recovering from civil war - but it also relieved Turkey from soviet pressure for access to key strategic maritime routes.

**The accession of Germany**

Germany became a NATO member on 6 May 1955. This was the result of several years of deliberations among western leaders and Germany, whose population opposed any form of rearmament.

Following the end of the Second World War, ways of integrating Germany into West European defence structures was a priority. When the European Defence Community failed, Germany joined the Western Union, which became the Western European Union as soon as it had adhered to the organization. This, together with the termination of its status as an occupied country, was a stepping stone to becoming a member of NATO.
The Federal Republic of Germany officially joined the Western Union on 23 October 1954 and its status as an occupied country came to an end when the Bonn-Paris conventions came into effect on 5 May 1955. The next day, it became NATO’s 15th member country.

With the reunification of Germany on 3 October 1990, the länder of the former German Democratic Republic joined the Federal Republic of Germany in its membership of NATO.

The accession of Spain

Despite considerable public opposition, Spain joined the Alliance on 30 May 1982, but refrained from participating in the integrated military structure. This position was reaffirmed in a referendum held in 1986.

Spain fully participated in the political instances of the Organization. With regard to the military aspects, it was present as an observer on the Nuclear Planning Group; reserved its position on participation in the integrated communication system; maintained Spanish forces under Spanish command and did not accept to have troops deployed outside of Spain for long periods of time. Nevertheless, Spanish forces would still be able to operate with other NATO forces in an emergency.

Spain’s reservations gradually diminished and at the nomination of Dr Javier Solana as NATO’s first Spanish Secretary General (1995-1999), the Spanish Parliament endorsed the country’s participation in the integrated military command structure (1996).

The first wave of post-Cold War enlargement

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact after the end of the Cold War opened up the possibility of further NATO enlargement. Some of the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe were eager to become integrated into Euro-Atlantic institutions.

In 1995, the Alliance carried out and published the results of a Study on NATO Enlargement that considered the merits of admitting new members and how they should be brought in. It concluded that the end of the Cold War provided a unique opportunity to build improved security in the entire Euro-Atlantic area and that NATO enlargement would contribute to enhanced stability and security for all.

The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were invited to begin accession talks at the Alliance’s Madrid Summit in 1997 and on 12 March 1999 they became the first former members of the Warsaw Pact to join NATO.

Drawing heavily on the experience gained during this accession process, NATO launched the Membership Action Plan - or MAP - at the Washington Summit in April 1999. The MAP was established to help countries aspiring to NATO membership in their preparations, even if it did not pre-judge any decisions.

The second wave of post-Cold War enlargement

Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia and Slovenia were invited to begin accession talks at the Alliance’s Prague Summit in 2002. On 29 March 2004, they officially became members of the Alliance, making this the largest wave of enlargement in NATO history.

All seven countries had participated in the MAP before acceding to NATO.

The accession of Albania and Croatia

The most recent accessions are those of Albania and Croatia. Albania had participated in MAP since its inception in 1999 and Croatia joined in 2002. They worked with NATO in a wide range of areas, with particular emphasis on defence and security sector reform, as well as support for wider democratic and institutional reform.

In July 2008, they both signed Accession Protocols and became official members of the Alliance on 1 April 2009.
Information on Defence Expenditures

NATO publishes an annual compendium of financial, personnel and economic data for all member countries. Since 1963, this report has formed a consistent basis of comparison of the defence effort of Alliance members based on a common definition of defence expenditure. Through the links below, you can find data covering the years from 1949 to the present.

Working mechanism

The figures represent payments actually made or to be made during the course of the fiscal year. They are based on the NATO definition of defence expenditure. In view of the differences between this and national definitions, the figures shown may diverge considerably from those which are quoted by national authorities or given in national budgets.

Evolution

Each year, updated tables with nations’ defence expenditures are published on the NATO website in PDF and Excel format. The latest version of the compendium provides tables covering key indicators on the financial and economic aspects of NATO defence, including:

- Total defence expenditures
- Defence expenditure and GDP growth rates
- Defence expenditures as a percentage of GDP
- Defence expenditures and GDP per capita
- Defence expenditures by category
- Armed forces personnel strength

Archive of tables

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Troop contributions

When a NATO operation or mission is deemed necessary, NATO member countries and partner countries volunteer personnel, equipment, and resources for the mission. These national contributions operate under the aegis of the Alliance.

An Alliance of 28 sovereign countries, NATO itself does not possess military forces per se. While personnel serving in a NATO operation are often referred to collectively as “NATO forces”, they are actually multinational forces composed of individuals, formations and equipment drawn from NATO member countries and, in some cases, partner countries or other troop contributing nations.

The procedure for staffing an operation or mission is often referred to as "force generation". This procedure ensures that Alliance operations or missions have the manpower and materials required to achieve set objectives.

Work in practice

The final decision on whether to contribute troops and equipment to a NATO-led operation or mission is taken by national capitals, who communicate continuously with NATO through their permanent diplomatic missions, national military representation, or partnership liaison teams.

Force generation

When a NATO operation or mission is deemed necessary, NATO’s military authorities draft a concept of operations – referred to as a CONOPS – which outlines the troop and equipment requirements necessary to meet the operations’ or mission’s objectives. Upon approval of the concept of operations and the release of a "Force Activation Directive" by the North Atlantic Council, Allied Command Operations, led by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, initiates the force generation and activation process.

In general, the force generation process follows a standard procedure. For a given operation or mission, a list of personnel and equipment requirements (the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements), is produced by Allied Command Operations and sent to NATO member countries and, in some cases, partner countries.

National offers to provide personnel are addressed during conferences attended by representatives from NATO and partner countries. These conferences take place on an ad hoc basis as required. For example, a force generation conference will take place prior to the start of a new operation or mission, or if there are significant changes in an ongoing operation. In addition to these conferences, an annual conference is held for all operations and missions, the Global Force Generation Conference.

Contributions by individual countries, both NATO members and partners, are subject to their overall national capacity, taking into account prior commitments, force size, structure, and activity level. Every contribution, whether big or small, is valuable and contributes to the success of the operation or mission.

In many cases, NATO or partner countries will commit complete or formed units to operations or missions. A country may volunteer to send a complete battle group, which – in the case of ground
forces – could include infantry personnel, an armoured reconnaissance element, an artillery battery to provide fire support, and service support personnel.

Countries that provide leadership for an entire operation or mission, or take responsibility for central elements, are identified as “lead.” For example, the lead country for a given operation or mission might provide the command element and a significant part of the forces, and will also be responsible for filling the remainder of the force required.

Although NATO as an Alliance does own and maintain some specialized equipment, such as the AWACS aircraft and strategic communications equipment, troop-contributing countries generally commit the equipment necessary to support their personnel in pursuit of operational objectives.

Caveats

It is during the force generation process that caveats are stated. While national contributions to NATO operations are expected to operate under the Alliance’s chain of command, the provision of forces by NATO and partner countries is sometimes conditional on factors such as geography, logistics, time, rules of engagement, or command status. Known as “caveats,” these conditions can restrict NATO commanders by limiting their flexibility to respond to situations on the ground. For this reason, the Alliance seeks national contributions with as few caveats as possible.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), such as those established in Afghanistan under the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, constitute an exception to the normal force generation process. In contrast to traditional military operations, PRTs are interdisciplinary. That is, they are comprised of development workers, military forces, diplomats and civilian police, who work to extend the authority of the central Afghan government in remote areas, and to facilitate development and reconstruction.

Because of the unique combination of personnel, NATO is involved in generating forces for the military component of a PRT, while it is the responsibility of the contributing country to staff the civilian components. As a result, PRTs are a hybrid of personnel who fall under either NATO or national chains of command.

Coordinating troop contributions for non-NATO operations

Over the years, the Alliance has developed significant expertise in coordinating troop contributions for multinational operations. In the past, it has offered this expertise in support of non-NATO operations.

Under the Berlin Plus agreement, the Alliance cooperates closely with the European Union (EU) in the resourcing of selected operations. When requested by the EU, NATO’s Deputy SACEUR and his staff provide support in coordinating member countries’ troop contributions. For example, the Deputy SACEUR was identified as operational commander for Operation Althea, the EU-led operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and was responsible for force generation.

NATO also provided force generation support to Germany and the Netherlands, during their leadership of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force in 2003 in Afghanistan, prior to its conversion into a NATO-led operation.

Central NATO bodies

Allied Command Operations, commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), is responsible for executing all Alliance operations and missions. The Deputy SACEUR and his staff coordinate troop contributions.

In determining troop contributions, Allied Command Operations engages with the Military Committee, the North Atlantic Council, and individual countries, all of which have critical roles to play in bringing Alliance operations and missions to reality.

History

For much of NATO’s history, the Alliance’s primary operational commitment was focused on the former border between the East and West Germany.
For over 40 years, NATO strategists spoke of medium and long-term “force plans” rather than “force generation” for specific operations. This was because during that time, the Alliance maintained static, “conventional” forces in former West Germany, poised for an attack from the former Soviet Union.

Beginning in 1986, conventional forces were reduced and, following the end of the Cold War, bases of individual NATO countries in Germany were largely dismantled or converted to other use, although some remain functional to this day.

NATO’s first major land expeditionary operation took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a result of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. The NATO force generation process, which is still in use today, was developed during the NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and later in Kosovo.

Transforming to meet operational needs

While the core procedures for contributing troops and equipment remain valid, the process has been refined in tandem with NATO’s transformation. At their May 2002 meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, NATO foreign ministers decided that: "To carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives."

NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan in 2003 posed a number of new problems for force generation. It soon became apparent that the nature of the mission was different from previous tasks – greater flexibility was needed in types and numbers of forces from rotation to rotation and from area to area. In addition, with many countries moving to smaller, more highly trained and highly equipped forces, it became unrealistic to expect large standing commitments from individual countries.

The procedure for staffing an operation or mission was made more responsive to operational requirements. Communication between NATO commanders and member/partner countries has been improved, allowing potential troop-contributing countries to be better informed about evolving operational requirements.

The first Global Force Generation Conference was held in November 2003 – prior to this, force generation meetings had been called on an ad hoc basis as required. During this annual conference, troop and resource requirements for all NATO-led operations and missions are addressed at the same time. While ad hoc meetings are still necessary to address immediate needs, rolling numerous meetings into one facilitates improved coordination between and within troop contributing countries and NATO military authorities.

Lastly, NATO military planners are taking a longer view of force generation. While developments in operations, as well as political developments within troop contributing countries, prohibit definitive troop and material commitments far into the future, NATO military planners are looking beyond immediate needs, which allows both the Alliance and troop-contributing countries to better plan their resources.
which they participate;
- a Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T);
- Individual Partnership Action Plans, allowing the Alliance to tailor its assistance
to interested Partners seeking more structured support for domestic reforms,
particularly in the defence and security sector.

2003

Some Partner countries contribute troops to the NATO-led International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

Seven Partners – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia – join NATO.

2004

(June, Istanbul Summit) Further steps are taken to strengthen Partnership
including:
- a Partnership Action Plan for Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB) to encourage
and support Partners in building effective and democratically responsible defence
institutions;
- an enhanced Operational Capabilities Concept and Partners are offered
representation at Allied Command Transformation to help promote greater military
interoperability between NATO and Partner country forces;
- a special focus on the Caucasus and Central Asia.

2006

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia become Partners.

(April, Bucharest Summit)
- Malta returns to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and joins the EAPC (Malta first
joined the PfP programme in April 1995 but suspended its participation in October
1996).

2008

- Priority is given to building integrity in defence institutions and the important
role of women in conflict resolution (as outlined in UN Security Council Resolution
1325).

2009

Two Partners – Albania and Croatia – become members of NATO.